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Does Firing a CEO Pay Off?

Alexandridis, G, Doukas, J and Mavis, Christos (2019) Does Firing a CEO Pay Off? Financial Management, 48 (1). pp. 3-43.

2018-05-05 CEO Forced Turnovers Editor changes.pdf - Accepted version Manuscript

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We examine whether involuntary CEO replacements pay off by improving firm prospects. We find CEO successors’ acquisition investments to be associated with significantly higher shareholder gains relative to their predecessors and the average CEO. This improvement in post-turnover acquisition performance appears to be a function of board independence, hedge fund ownership, and the new CEO’s relative experience. CEO successors also create sizeable shareholder value by reversing prior investments through asset disposals and discontinuing operations and by employing more efficient investment strategies. Our evidence suggests that firing a CEO pays off.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Surrey Business School
Authors :
Alexandridis, G
Doukas, J
Date : 3 March 2019
DOI : 10.1111/fima.12228
Copyright Disclaimer : This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Alexandridis, G, Doukas, J.A, and Mavis, C.P, Does Firing a CEO Pay Off? DOI: 10.1111/fima.12228 which has been published in final form at This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.
Uncontrolled Keywords : CEO turnovers; Acquisition performance; Divestitures; Corporate governance; CEO experience; Hedge funds
Depositing User : Users 8 not found.
Date Deposited : 09 May 2018 12:58
Last Modified : 06 Jul 2019 05:25

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