Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey

Avoine, G, Bingol, MA, Boureanu, Ioana, Capkun, S, Hancke, G, Kardas, S, Kim, CH, Lauradoux, C, Martin, B, Munilla, J et al, Peinado-Dominguez, A, Bonne Rasmussen, K, Singelee, D, Tchamkerten, A, Trujillo-Rasua, R and Vaudenay, S (2017) Security of Distance-Bounding: A Survey ACM Computing Surveys, 4.

Preview	Text articleDB.pdf - Accepted version Manuscript Download (1MB) | Preview
	Text article.pdf - Proof Restricted to Repository staff only Download (719kB)

Abstract

Distance bounding protocols allow a verifier to both authenticate a prover and evaluate whether the latter is located in his vicinity. These protocols are of particular interest in contactless systems, e.g., electronic payment or access control systems, which are vulnerable to distance-based frauds. This survey analyzes and compares in a unified manner many existing distance bounding protocols with respect to several key security and complexity features.

Item Type:	Article
Divisions :	Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Computing Science
Authors :	Name Email ORCID Avoine, G Bingol, MA Boureanu, Ioana i.boureanu@surrey.ac.uk Capkun, S Hancke, G Kardas, S Kim, CH Lauradoux, C Martin, B Munilla, J Peinado-Dominguez, A Bonne Rasmussen, K Singelee, D Tchamkerten, A Trujillo-Rasua, R Vaudenay, S
Date :	21 September 2017
Copyright Disclaimer :	© ACM, 2017. This is the author's version of the work. It is posted here by permission of ACM for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive version will be published in ACM Computing Survey at http://csur.acm.org/
Uncontrolled Keywords :	Information Security, Cryptography, Contactless, Relay attacks, Distance fraud, Mafia fraud, Terrorist fraud, Distance bounding, Proximity check
Depositing User :	Melanie Hughes
Date Deposited :	21 Jun 2017 13:46
Last Modified :	16 Jan 2019 18:53
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/841451

Actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads