Banks, Maturity Mismatches and Liquidity Crises: A Simple Model
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Rajan, RS and Bird, G (2003) Banks, Maturity Mismatches and Liquidity Crises: A Simple Model Economia Internazionale / International Economics, 56 (2). pp. 185-192.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In determining the maturity structure of bank loans in the presence of pre-determined short-term international liabilities, we show that maturity mismatches in banks’ balance sheets are fully consistent with the assumption of banks acting as self-interested, optimising agents. Although often attributed to the moral hazard associated with safety nets, the analysis shows that financial crises can occur in their absence.
Item Type: | Article | |||||||||
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Divisions : | Surrey research (other units) | |||||||||
Authors : |
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Date : | 2003 | |||||||||
Uncontrolled Keywords : | F34 F39 G21, Banks, currency crisis, East Asia, maturity mismatches, moral hazard | |||||||||
Depositing User : | Symplectic Elements | |||||||||
Date Deposited : | 16 May 2017 15:13 | |||||||||
Last Modified : | 24 Jan 2020 14:09 | |||||||||
URI: | http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/818157 |
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