Optimal auctions and information disclosure

Gershkov, A (2009) Optimal auctions and information disclosure Review of Economic Design, 13 (4). pp. 335-344.

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Abstract

We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the quality of the object for sale. We show that the seller maximizes his expected revenue by revelation of all information to all bidders and implementing a second price auction with appropriate reservation price. © Springer-Verlag 2009.

Item Type:	Article
Divisions :	Surrey research (other units)
Authors :	Name Email ORCID Gershkov, A a.gershkov@surrey.ac.uk
Date :	1 November 2009
DOI :	10.1007/s10058-009-0084-9
Depositing User :	Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited :	16 May 2017 15:13
Last Modified :	24 Jan 2020 14:08
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/818133

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