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If You Cannot Help Being Committed to It, then It Exists:A Defense of Robust Normative Realism

Rodriguez-Blanco, V (2012) If You Cannot Help Being Committed to It, then It Exists:A Defense of Robust Normative Realism Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 32 (4). pp. 823-841.

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This review article examines David Enoch’s recent book Taking Morality Seriously and focuses on ‘the deliberative indispensability of irreducibly normative truths’ which is a central argument of the book. I will show that this important and original argument as it stands fails. I will also argue that if Enoch had embraced all the consequences of his argument, then he would have opened up a more promising line of argument via which to defend the robust realism of normative truths. I will, therefore, attempt to defend a modified version of robust realism of normative truths and, in so doing, I will show how all the implications of Enoch’s insight can fully be embraced. I will finally demonstrate how this modified version illuminates some Dworkinian insights on the nature of law, but also undermines Dworkin’s theory of constructive interpretation.

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Law
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Law
Authors :
Rodriguez-Blanco, V
Date : 2012
DOI : 10.1093/ojls/gqs020
Copyright Disclaimer : Copyright 2012 Oxford University Press
Uncontrolled Keywords : Meta-ethics Legal Philosophy Dworkin the deliberative point of view practical reasoning moral realism
Additional Information : Full text not available from this repository.
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 09 Sep 2016 13:20
Last Modified : 31 Oct 2017 18:40

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