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R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly

Zikos, V (2010) R&D Collaboration Networks in Mixed Oligopoly Southern Economic Journal, 77 (1). pp. 189-212.

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We develop a model of endogenous network formation in order to examine the incentives for R&D collaboration in a mixed oligopoly. Our analysis reveals that the complete network, where each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable. When R&D subsidies are not available, in addition to the complete network, the private partial and the private-hub star networks are Pareto efficient. However, the complete network becomes the unique Pareto efficient network when R&D is subsidized. This result is in contrast with earlier contributions in private oligopoly where under strong market rivalry a conflict between stable and efficient networks is likely to occur. It also highlights the role of a public firm as policy instrument in aligning individual incentives for collaboration with the objective of efficiency, independently of whether R&D subsidies are provided by the regulator.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
Zikos, V
Date : 1 July 2010
DOI : 10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.189
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 09 Jul 2012 12:46
Last Modified : 31 Oct 2017 14:32

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