Auction driven dynamic spectrum allocation: optimal bidding, pricing and service priorities for multi-rate, multi-class CDMA

Rodriguez, V, Moessner, K and Tafazolli, R (2005) Auction driven dynamic spectrum allocation: optimal bidding, pricing and service priorities for multi-rate, multi-class CDMA Proc. IEEE 16th Int. Symp. Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Communications PIMRC 2005, 3. pp. 1850-1854.

Preview

Text SRF002221.pdf - Version of Record Download (1MB)

Abstract

Dynamic spectrum allocation (DSA) seeks to exploit the variations in the loads of various radio-access networks to allocate the spectrum efficiently. Here, a spectrum manager implements DSA by periodically auctioning short-term spectrum licenses. We solve analytically the problem of the operator of a CDMA cell populated by delaytolerant terminals operating at various data rates, on the downlink, and representing users with dissimilar "willingness to pay" (WtP). WtP is the most a user would pay for a correctly transferred information bit. The operator finds a revenue-maximising internal pricing and a service priority policy, along with a bid for spectrum. Our clear and specific analytical results apply to a wide variety of physical layer configurations. The optimal operating point can be easily obtained from the frame-success rate function. At the optimum, (with a convenient time scale) a terminal's contribution to revenues is the product of its WtP by its data rate; and the product of its WtP by its channel gain determines its service priority ("revenue per Hertz"). Assuming a second-price auction, the operator's optimal bid for a certain spectrum band equals the sum of the individual revenue contributions of the additional terminals that could be served, if the band is won.

Item Type:	Article
Divisions :	Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Electronic Engineering > Centre for Communication Systems Research
Authors :	Name Email ORCID Rodriguez, V Moessner, K Tafazolli, R
Date :	2005
DOI :	10.1109/PIMRC.2005.1651761
Depositing User :	Melanie Hughes
Date Deposited :	17 Sep 2010 12:59
Last Modified :	31 Oct 2017 14:04
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/2287

Actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads