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Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games

Carmona, Guilherme and Podczeck, Konrad (2020) Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games Theoretical Economics.

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Abstract

In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players) we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Carmona, Guilhermeg.carmona@surrey.ac.uk
Podczeck, Konrad
Date : 16 September 2020
Copyright Disclaimer : Copyright 2020 © The Econometric Society
Uncontrolled Keywords : Large games; Pure strategy; Nash equilibrium; Generic property
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Diane Maxfield
Date Deposited : 06 Oct 2020 16:40
Last Modified : 06 Oct 2020 16:40
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/858682

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