Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games
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Carmona, Guilherme and Podczeck, Konrad (2020) Strict pure strategy Nash equilibria in large finite-player games Theoretical Economics.
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Abstract
In the context of anonymous games (i.e., games where the payoff of a player is, apart from his/her own action, determined by the distribution of the actions made by the other players) we present a model in which, generically (in a precise sense), finite-player games have strict pure strategy Nash equilibria if the number of agents is large. A key feature of our model is that payoff functions have differentiability properties. A consequence of our existence result is that, in our model, equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable by pure strategy Nash equilibria of large finite-player games.
| Item Type: | Article | |||||||||
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| Divisions : | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics | |||||||||
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| Date : | 16 September 2020 | |||||||||
| Copyright Disclaimer : | Copyright 2020 © The Econometric Society | |||||||||
| Uncontrolled Keywords : | Large games; Pure strategy; Nash equilibrium; Generic property | |||||||||
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| Depositing User : | Diane Maxfield | |||||||||
| Date Deposited : | 06 Oct 2020 16:40 | |||||||||
| Last Modified : | 06 Oct 2020 16:40 | |||||||||
| URI: | http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/858682 |
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