A game-theoretic model of coalition formation among primates

Stamatopoulos, Giorgos, Sengupta, Abhijit, Vogel, Erin and Janson, Charles (2009) A game-theoretic model of coalition formation among primates Journal of Bioeconomics, 11 (2). pp. 165-183.

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Abstract

This paper models the coalition formation process among primates as a sequential game. The population consists of individuals having distinct social ranks which is determined by the individual’s resource holding potential. Each member of the population is interested in gaining access to a food resource, either individually or via a coalition. At any given stage of the game, a player can either propose a specific coalition or he can be proposed to in order to join one. Hence, the strategy of a player consists of a sequence of decisions regarding who to propose to for the formation of a coalition and which proposals to accept or reject. We derive the preferences of the players over the various coalition structures under the assumption that the probability of a coalition to obtain the resource is given by a logistic distribution as a function of relative strengths of the players. We show that, given the primates’ strategic behavior, a variety of different coalition structures can emerge in equilibrium.

Item Type:	Article
Divisions :	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Surrey Business School
Authors :	Name Email ORCID Stamatopoulos, Giorgos Sengupta, Abhijit abhijit.sengupta@surrey.ac.uk Vogel, Erin Janson, Charles
Date :	9 July 2009
DOI :	10.1007/s10818-009-9060-2
Copyright Disclaimer :	Copyright © 2009, Springer Nature
Additional Information :	Embargo OK Metadata OK No Further Action
Depositing User :	James Marshall
Date Deposited :	19 Aug 2020 14:43
Last Modified :	19 Aug 2020 14:43
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/858443

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