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Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of Large Finite-Player Games and their Relationship to Non-Atomic Games

Carmona, Guilherme and Podczeck, Konrad (2020) Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of Large Finite-Player Games and their Relationship to Non-Atomic Games Journal of Economic Literature.

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Abstract

We consider Nash equilibria of large anonymous games (i.e., each player’s payoff depends on his choice and the distribution of the choices made by others). We show that pure strategy Nash equilibria exist in all sufficiently large finiteplayer games with finite action spaces and for generic distributions of players’ payoff functions. We also show that equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable in terms of Nash equilibria of large finite-player games. Extensions of these results to games with general compact metric action spaces are provided.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Carmona, Guilhermeg.carmona@surrey.ac.uk
Podczeck, Konrad
Date : 9 February 2020
Uncontrolled Keywords : Large games, pure strategy, Nash equilibrium, asymptotic implementation, generic property.
Depositing User : James Marshall
Date Deposited : 11 Feb 2020 09:45
Last Modified : 11 Feb 2020 09:45
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/853712

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