University of Surrey

Test tubes in the lab Research in the ATI Dance Research

Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues

Bozbay, Irem (2019) Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues Social Choice and Welfare, 53 (2). pp. 337-370.

[img] Text
bozbay SCWe (1).pdf - Accepted version Manuscript
Restricted to Repository staff only until 6 April 2020.

Download (447kB)


This paper analyzes the problem of aggregating individual judgments over two interconnected issues. Voters share a common preference which is state-dependent, but they hold private information about what the state might be. I assume strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting and I want to determine voting rules which induce an efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies, hence lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. Interconnectedness may lead to private information that is inconsistent with the state, which leads to the impossibility of efficient information aggregation. Once I introduce the possibility of abstention, the negative conclusion no longer prevails and there is always a voting rule which aggregates information efficiently. I obtain a similar positive result when I rule out the possibility of inconsistent private information. I analyze the situations in which such rules exist whenever necessary, as well as the nature of these rules.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
Date : August 2019
DOI : 10.1007/s00355-019-01186-6
Copyright Disclaimer : © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019
Uncontrolled Keywords : judgment aggregation, efficient information aggregation, strategic voting, private information
Depositing User : Charlene King
Date Deposited : 25 Apr 2019 10:54
Last Modified : 16 Aug 2019 13:43

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item


Downloads per month over past year

Information about this web site

© The University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom.
+44 (0)1483 300800