Nationalism and schooling in Piedmont-Irty, 1700-1900

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Department of Sociology
University of Surrey
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The art of forming men in every country is so tightly connected to the form of government, that it is not possible to make considerable changes to public education without doing them at the same time to the essential constitution of a state.

Anonymous (1764: 85).
Abstract

In the wake of the resurgence of ethnic tensions, the last twenty years saw the development of a burgeoning interest in the origin of nationalism. The argument that the growth of the modern state was a decisive factor in precipitating nationalism commands wide consensus across the ethnosymbolist/modernist divide. The exact nature of the relationship between nationalism and state formation, on the other hand, is yet to be adequately understood. The centrality of state schooling systems in defining the modern state as an institution and nationalism as a practice renders it a privileged standpoint to address the relationship between nationalism and state formation.

The thesis examines the relationship between the rise of Italian nationalism to dominant ideology and the growth of the state schooling system in Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The thesis shows that in the central part of the nineteenth century Piedmont witnessed an exceptional development of the state schooling system. Multi-causal analysis is employed to show that nationalism played a key role in explaining Piedmont's particular trajectory of schooling development. The argument is supported through an analysis of the nationalist purposes behind schooling reform, including an examination of policy and practice of language as a medium of teaching and the teaching of history.

In accounting for the positive impact of Italian nationalism on Piedmont's schooling developments, the thesis seeks to move beyond the limitations of arguments relying on the constructed nature of modern nations, and shows that the development of nationalist ideology and associated conceptions of citizenship was instrumental to legitimise the development of the state schooling system amid difficulties experienced by Piedmont with legitimising the practice with the language of the social contract. These difficulties are traced to
tensions between the logic of state formation entailed by post-
mercantilist thought, underlying the growth of the state schooling
system, and the definitions of society and subjective rights associated
to the tradition of the social contract.
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Preface

My interest in nationalism dates back to 1997, when, as part of my degree in economics and econometrics, I participated to a research on the relationship between economic diversity and nationalist movements, under the supervision of S. Goyal. The research was later developed in my final project at the University of Essex, under the supervision of R. Bailey. Beside my experience as a school-child, a spell as statistician at the Department for Education and Employment represented my only background on schooling before starting this research. While studying the history of Italian nationalism, I became interested in the role played by the schooling system in the construction of the Italian nation. The thesis gradually developed in a comparative study of nationalism and schooling in modern England and Italy. The political divisions characterising Italy's past offer a rich working ground for the comparativist. For the same reason it represents a nightmare for the historian. For most of the period under analysis Italy was divided in about ten states, each with its own schooling system, and it has been necessary to narrow down the focus. The role of leadership played by Piedmont in the period leading and in the aftermath of the unification made it the obvious choice. As the research went on, I became more and more aware of my ignorance of the past, and how the contested and conflicting nature of historical accounts prevents one from taking secondary sources at face value. To address these concerns, I felt the need to further narrow down the scope of the research to one case. I was raised in Italy, and to this day national history constitutes the great bulk of the history taught in school. My lack of background in history at the academic level meant that the advantages of having greater familiarity with the context outweighed the drawback of possessing a preconceived idea about it.

The thesis is meant to be read as an integrated whole, but different chapters engage with different aspects of the question. In particular,
those who are interested in how historical sociology can approach the question of schooling and nationalism can focus on chapters 3 and 4. Those interested in the particular development of schooling and nationalism in Piedmont can concentrate on chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 1 outlines the research question and the research method. Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the setting of the research, Piedmont. Chapter 3 provides a critical summary of the main theories informing the research, by comparing different approaches taken by the historical sociology of nationalism and that of schooling. Chapter 4 discusses historical sociology and the research method. The empirical analysis is carried out in chapter 5 and 6. The former focuses on the growth of schooling in modern Piedmont. The latter discusses the process whereby the Piedmontese schooling system became aimed at constructing a nation. In conclusion, chapter 7 summarises the main argument and findings of the thesis.

I would like to thank the Sirovich family for their kind hospitality while doing library and archive research in Turin, my supervisors, Martin Bulmer and Victoria Alexander, for their support throughout the writing of the thesis, Chris Smaje for introducing me to historical sociology, and my family, the ESRC and the department of sociology of the University of Surrey for funding the research.

David Chilosi
Abbreviations

A.S.T.: State Archive, Turin
B.C.T.: Civic Library, Turin
B.L.L.: British Library, London
B.N.T.: National Library, Turin
B.R.T.: Royal Library, Turin.
B.U.P.T.: Library of the department of pedagogy, university of Turin
B.U.S.T: Library of the department of history, university of Turin
1 Introduction

Introduction

Once upon a time...
A king! – Will shout my little readers.
No, kids, you are wrong. Once upon a time there was a piece of wood.

Collodi ([1883]1924: 5).

The beginning of Collodi’s *The adventures of Pinocchio* can be read as summary of the prevailing positions on the question of nationalism in sociological theory. The question of nationalism has been dominated by the relationship between nationalism and the origin of nations. The major debate produced by nationalist studies has sprung from the claim that, against the grain of nationalist narratives, the state constructed the symbols of the nation in modern times. Similarly to Collodi’s Pinocchio, at the origins of nationalism, the modernist argument goes (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1994; Breuilly, 1995; Anderson, 2000), did not lie a conscious subject, but an amorphous network of overlapping and contextual loyalties. Contrary to received wisdom, the symbols of the nation are not rooted in the distant past, but the result of deliberate forgery on the part of the state. Ethnosymbolism (Smith, 1991; Llobera, 1996; Hastings, 1997), the major source of opposition to this argument, admits a certain degree of forgery and that the emergence of mass nations was a modern phenomenon. On the other hand, as if inverting Pinocchio’s incipit, ethnosymbolists assert that proto-national forms of identification among an elite was a pre-condition for nationalism to develop. Once upon a time, ethnosymbolists maintain, there was a king waiting to be crowned.
Without taking away anything from the fundamental contribution of the ethnosymbolism/modernist debate to furthering our understanding of nationalism, I would argue that it has come to a standstill. We cannot but share the ethnosymbolist claim that nationalism did not come out of the blue, and nationalists drew upon a symbolic repertoire which evolved over the long period. The change in political language brought by nationalism was more subtle than implied by the modernist position. And yet the explanatory advantages of moving the origin of nations back to the middle-ages, or sometime between then and the nineteenth century, are dubious. The accusation moved against modernists that there are antecedents to the symbols of the nation does not challenge the fundamentals of their argument. There is no denying that starting from the nineteenth century the symbols of the nation acquired unprecedented centrality, and this cannot be explained either primarily or solely in terms of the force of pre-existing ethnic feelings. Many proto-nations did not turn into nations, and the eventual success of proto-nations is only weakly related to how wide and deep-rooted was their appeal in early modern times. The modernist arguments that pre-existing ethnic feelings, on the whole, were a poor predictor of nationalism and the state was a more important actor than proto-nations in precipitating nationalism, hold firm against the ethnosymbolists' objections.

There is therefore a case for shifting the focus from the relationship between nation and nationalism to that between state and nationalism. The aim of this thesis is to develop the argument that nationalism was a political ideology which emergence was related to the growth of the modern state through an analysis of relationship between growth of a state schooling system and rise of nationalism in Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Method

The empirical analysis is based upon the development of nationalism and that of a state schooling system in Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Piedmont, a present day region lying at the north-west of Italy, was the core area of the Kingdom of Sardinia, the leader of the process of Italian unification. In particular, we shall attend at the interplay between rhythm of growth of state schooling, institutionalisation of a nationalist pedagogy, and rise of nationalist ideology. The conceptual tools employed in the analysis, the periodisation and the overall methodological approach are mainly drawn from two bodies of literature, the historical sociology of nationalism and the historical sociology of schooling, with a slight change of emphasis with respect to both.

With respect to the historical sociology of schooling (Archer, 1979; De Swaan, 1987; Smelser, 1991; Green, 1992), I shift the focus from institutional developments to quantitative growth. The institutional perspective is not abandoned but it is, as it were, placed in the background. In doing so, I seek to give greater relevance to the fact that institutional developments, while related to patterns of growth, do not mirror them in an univocal way. In particular, the Piedmontese case highlights how two assumptions implicitly made by the literature are inadequate. First, legal and actual schooling provision can differ markedly. To make an example, compulsory education was introduced in Lombardy as early as 1786. However, not until almost a century later was the great majority of the children in schooling age enrolled. By contrast, in Piedmont, at the time schooling attendance began to be compulsory, 1859, almost all the children in schooling age were enrolled in elementary education. Second, intensity of institutional intervention and processes of expansion do not necessarily follow
parallel paths. Eighteenth-century Piedmont experienced the assertion of a strong secular leadership in education earlier and with more intensity than in most of Europe. Yet state intervention did not deliver growth and the provision remained amongst the lowest in Italy throughout the century. As stressed also by Meyer et al. (1979), there is something to be gained from keeping processes of bureaucratisation and expansion separately, while mapping the growth of state schooling.

I follow the approach indicated by Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1990) and Breuilly (1995) of treating nationalism as a political ideology, whereby the legitimacy of the state is conditional upon it embodying the nation, but I push its logic further. In contrast with this approach, instead of addressing nationalism in a retrospective fashion, by mapping the development of modern nations, I take the perspective of the state, through an analysis of the transformations of the meaning of political legitimacy and associated institutional developments occurring in connection with the transition from absolutism to nation-state. In other words, the emphasis is on explaining changes in the rules of the game, rather than the identity of the players. By concentrating on the ways in which nineteenth-century nationalism is particular, rather than the extent to which Italian identity was constructed, I seek to move beyond the strictures of the debate between modernism and ethnosymbolism. In addition, the discussion is based on how nationalist ideology manifested itself in schooling, rather than nationalism in general. In focusing on a particular crystallisation of nationalism, I attempt to gain in precision what I lose in generality.

The empirical analysis is based upon a single case. This is by no means exceptional in works of historical sociology (e.g. Barbagli, 1976; Collins, 1979; Elias, 1983), however it is particular. The analysis has been restricted to one case in order to allow exploring the particular case with greater depth than it is usually the case in historical sociology. By doing that, I seek to address critiques moved against
historical sociology of illegitimately treating interpretations produced by historians as facts (e.g. Goldthorpe, 1994). A comparative dimension is maintained directly through comparison of Piedmontese data with Italian and European data, and indirectly, by discussing theoretical arguments emerged from other contexts in relation to Piedmontese and Italian evidence.

The particular development of the nation-state in Piedmont, a case little explored by the comparative literature, renders it particularly apt to comparing the different ideological premises of absolutism and nation-state and relate them to schooling developments. Piedmont provides substantial advantages compared to other better known cases, like England and France, where the development of a nation-state was more gradual, since it allows drawing sharper contrasts, and thus lends itself to a fuller characterisation of the ways in which the nation-state introduced an historical rupture. Piedmont, more unambiguously than the Italian core, followed the absolutist route to modernity. This aspect enhances its comparative value since makes it more representative of wider European trends than other Italian regional states. Finally, the role of leadership of Piedmont during and in the aftermath of the unification of Italy ensures greater continuity across the unification divide.

Outline

The thesis is organised as follows. After introducing the reader to the case study, Piedmont, in chapter 2, chapter 3 provides a critical summary of the main theories informing the research. Chapter 4 discusses historical sociology and the research method. The two following chapters, 5 and 6, analyse the emergence of universal schooling and the development of a nationalist school in Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In conclusion, chapter 7 summarises the main argument and results of the enquiry.
2. Piedmont

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the setting of the research, Piedmont, particularly in relation to the development of the nation-state between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries. The focus is on the comparative position of Piedmont within Europe and Italy in particular. The periodisation and scope of the presentation reflect those of the analytical chapters, where, while the analysis is focused upon Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, early modern developments and data from other parts of Italy and Europe are discussed as background and comparative material. The next section presents geopolitical developments (six maps have been added to the text). The following section addresses the growth of the modern state. Finally, I look at nationalism. The conclusion summarises the main lines of development of the nation-state in Piedmont.

Geopolitics

Literally, Piedmont means ‘at the feet of the mountain’. Piedmont’s geopolitical history would be better described as ‘at the feet at the volcano’. Living dangerously is the dominant trait of modern Piedmont. Between 1560 and 1861, the Principality of Piedmont was the core territory of the Savoyard State, Kingdom of Sardinia since 1720. The present-day flag of Piedmont is modelled after the symbol of the Savoy House. Within the volatile climate of modern Italy, Piedmont exhibited exceptional political stability. The same dynasty, the Savoy House, ruled over Piedmont more or less uninterruptedly between the eleventh century and 1945, when a referendum gave birth to the Republic of Italy. However, this should not to be taken as meaning that Piedmont lived a quiet existence. Surrounded as it was by greater
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
powers threatening to spill over the little Savoyard state (and occasionally doing so), it is only at the price of carefully planned betrayals and shady agreements externally, and a marked authoritarianism and militarism domestically, that Piedmont managed to maintain its autonomy for so long. In the nineteenth century, Piedmont led the military operation leading to the Italian unification.

After a brief discussion of the role of geography in Piedmontese political history, I shall present the main territorial changes and international relations of the Savoyard State between the fourteenth and nineteenth centuries, starting with the early modern period. In concluding the section, I briefly touch upon the role of regionalism in post-unification Italy, relevant to understanding the context within which Italian nation-builders were operating.

The territory of Piedmont owes its compactness to being surrounded by mountains. The North-Western Alps mark its boarders with France, Switzerland and Aosta. The beginning of the Alpine chain divides Piedmont from the Ligurian coastline southwards. The only exception to this rule is the Eastern side, where a river, the Ticino, marks the separation with Lombardy. Traditionally, the latter was also the most volatile frontier of the state.

Being surrounded by mountains helped to imagine the Piedmontese lands as a natural administrative unit at an early stage. The territorial integration of Piedmont was given a major spur between the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries, when Amedeus VIII started the process of unification of the Piedmontese dominion of the Savoy House into a principality. After 1560, when the capital was transferred from Chambéry to Turin, Piedmont became increasingly identified as the homeland of the ruling dynasty.
The Alps acted as a hindering factor towards the formation of a unified state. The division imposed by the Alps were the main rationale behind the administrative organisation of the Savoyard State. The Alps separated the Duchy of Savoy, the Duchy of Aosta and the County of Nice from the Piedmontese mainland, leading to the construction of separate administrative, linguistic and legal communities (other territories under Savoyard dominion included Oneglia, a small enclave on the Ligurian coast purchased in 1576). Within Piedmont itself, the beautiful Alpine valleys around Torre Pellice provided refuge to the Valdese Heresy, unique example of a successful Protestant movement in the whole of Italy.

Before the unification, the most significant territorial gains for the Savoyard State were made at the beginning of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (the most considerable loss was the territory around Geneva in 1536). In 1713, Vittorio Amedeo II was rewarded by the Emperor for his help in the war of Spanish succession (which Piedmont started with France, against the emperor) with the title of King, access to the international system of states almost at an equal level with the great powers, and dominion over Sicily and the province of Monferrato. The peace of Utrecht gave also the former Spanish territories of Lombardy and Naples to the Austrians. Before seven years had passed, the presence of the new power was felt by Vittorio Amedeo II, who was forced to exchange with Charles VI Sicily for Sardinia, to become King of Sardinia (see map 1).

In 1815, after the Congress of Wien, notwithstanding the fact that the Savoyard monarchy played a very limited role in ousting Napoleon from power (if any), the territory of the kingdom came out significantly enlarged from the post-war settlements (see map 2). In the wake of the royalist climate of post-Wien Europe, the Republic of Genoa ceased to be a sovereign state to be put under the authority of the Savoyard monarchy. Other reasons behind the enlargement of the Kingdom of
Sardinia included the attempt to simplify the administrative map of Italy, after the Napoleonic model, and the construction of a power which could counter the Austrian hegemony over the Italian peninsula (direct in Lombardy and Venice, indirect elsewhere).

Between the fourteenth and the nineteenth centuries, the Savoy House surrendered its sovereignty over Piedmont between the 1530s and 1559, and between 1796 and 1814. Piedmont was invaded between the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. All these events came at the hand of France. For the Savoyard State, France was at once an enemy to fear and a model to follow. French culture was traditionally very strong in the 'territories beyond the mountains', but also in the Piedmontese mainland. Until the sixteenth century, the dominant culture owed more to French than to Italian traditions. French influence remained strong throughout the seventeenth century, when, handicapped by the loss of Pinerolo, the Savoyard State acted as little more than a French satellite (Symcox, 1983). The French hold was weakened in the following century, when, in Piedmont, a more markedly Italian identity started emerging (Ricuperati, 1989a). However, the apex of the French influence was yet to come. At the beginning of the nineteenth century (1802), together with Liguria and part of Emilia, Piedmont was annexed to the French empire, as its 29th division (eastern, central and southern Italy was divided in eight separate administrations). Being under the influence of France distinguished modern Piedmont from the Italian core, where Spain and, from the eighteenth century, Austria were the hegemonic powers.

Between the high middle ages and the Renaissance, Piedmont enjoyed less autonomy from imperial rule than the Renaissance core. Albeit with less intensity than in southern Italy, the Savoyard State was Catholic throughout the early modern period, with this aspect becoming particularly marked in the counter-reformation period between the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Differently from the Italian core, the French influence meant that Gallican traditions were strong, particularly in the French speaking areas. Valdese and Jews were legally and institutionally discriminated and persecuted (until 1848). In the later seventeenth century, in the wake of the French religious wars, the Valdese were victim of massacre and enforced conversion at the hands of the Savoyard army (Symcox, 1983: ch. 6). The period between the seventeenth and, particularly, the eighteenth centuries witnessed the intensification of jurisdictional controversies between church and state, in the wake of the growth of absolutism. In the eighteenth century, the Kingdom of Sardinia experienced intense jurisdictional controversies about half a century earlier than the rest of absolutist Italy (Quazza, 1957; Venturi, 1976). In the immediate aftermath of the Congress of Wien, the Kingdom of Sardinia distinguished itself for being particularly reactionary with respect to the innovative church/state relationship introduced by post-revolutionary France (Woolf, 1979: 244-5).

In July 1859, the centuries long dynastic aspirations of extending the territory of the Savoyard State westwards over the Lombard plains finally materialised itself. On the other hand, the acquisition came at a price, for the Savoyard State surrendered the provinces of Nice and Savoy to France in exchange for its military aid against Austria. The conquest of Lombardy marked the beginning of the Italian unification, started in 1848 with the failed Savoyard attack on Austria. In the months following Lombardy’s conquest, Tuscany and Emilia were annexed by referendum. According to one interpretation, the government intended to stop the operation then. The south was ‘freed’ by Giuseppe Garibaldi, a freedom fighter leader of a voluntary army of untrained troops, the ‘one thousand’, as they were called. It was only after Garibaldi’s mission (initially opposed, but de facto tolerated by the Savoyard government; Garibaldi sailed from Genova, a Savoyard port) proved to be unexpectedly successful that the Savoyard monarchy
seized the opportunity to further expand its dominion over the whole of the peninsula. The unification was more or less completed over the following decade. Before the end of 1860, Garibaldi surrendered its dominions in Southern Italy to the king, Vittorio Emanuele II. The regions of Venice and Rome were obtained in 1866 and 1870 (see maps 3 and 4). With the exceptions of Trentino Alto Adige, Istria and Friuli, added after the First World War (Istria was lost after the second), the domestic territory of Italy remains unchanged since 1870.

France was the only state, beside the Savoyard State, directly (with troops) contributing to the Italian unification (albeit at times it opposed it as well, in 1848 and to defend the papal states in the 1860s). Other foreign powers key to the success of the operation included Britain, through ‘diplomatic’ support to Garibaldi’s expedition (Britain sent the fleet to prevent France from intervening against Garibaldi), and Prussia, which, by waging war against Austria and France, rendered possible the annexation of Venice and Rome (Venice was an Austrian territory, and a French garrison was defending what was left of the papal territories). The main opponents of the unification were Austria and the Papal State, which both lost territories as a result (Seton-Watson, 1967; Woolf, 1979; Hearder, 1983; Duggan, 1994).

Amid a marked centralism, under the sign of a strong Piedmontese leadership, and ethnic diversity, the newly born Italian state struggled to assert itself domestically, particularly in the south. These problems, for instance, found expression in the 1860-70 ‘war against brigandage’, which claimed more victims than the whole of the Risorgimento. According to Gramsci’s (1994: 154-8) account, the resistance to the process of state formation in post-unification Italy was elaborated and objectified with ethnic signifiers. He cites three such instances. First, southern autonomism, culminating in the 1920 ultimatum to the union of the Sicilian landowners. The latter were claiming that, since Italy was a contract between peoples and the terms of the contract had been
broken, the Sicilian people had the right to recover self-determination. Second, the Lombard's elite threatened to re-constitute the Duchy of Milan. Third, positivist sociologists blamed slow development in the south on the racial inferiority of its population. Gramsci's observations invite to a reappraisal of Lyttleton's (1996: 33) assessment that: 'The real problem with Italian regionalism is why there was so little of it. In both political and cultural terms, down to 1922, it was a weak and declining force'.

The modern state

Going to Piedmont's capital, Turin, one looks in vain for the narrow and tortuous alleys and pompous cathedrals and municipal buildings characteristic of the centre of other Italian cities such as Naples, Pisa, Rome and Florence. By contrast, Turin is filled with huge squares organised in a rigidly geometric fashion, and its symbol is an exhibition centre. This is not to say that the city is without its pomposity. Walking around the centre of Turin one is struck by the number of statues of members of the royal family and heroes of the Risorgimento standing, or sometimes riding horses, in a typically haughty posture. Turin's most well known products are the FIAT, the car's factory, and the football team associated to the company, Juventus. Unlike the Italian core, it is to nationalism and industrial capitalism, as opposed to the Renaissance, that Piedmont traces its golden age. The peripheral role played during the Renaissance had a long lasting legacy on the development of the modern state in Piedmont, and we shall start this section by briefly discussing the main features of the Renaissance state. I shall than proceed to map the development of the modern state in Piedmont, highlighting its particular features in comparison with Europe and Italy.

It is not a coincidence that Machiavelli's famous study of the Renaissance state, *The Prince* (1995), is usually seen as the first
example of modern political science. In many respects, the Renaissance city can be seen as a precursor in miniature of the modern nation-state. The Renaissance city is most famous for being the birthplace of modern individualism. However, an increased emphasis on the ethical value of man was not the only way in which the Renaissance anticipated the nineteenth century. The Renaissance city shared with the industrial society an economy based on long-distance trade, banking, and the development of rapidly changing proto-industrial production techniques (Kindelberger, 1996: ch. 4). In common with the bourgeois society, merchants and bankers were exercising significant influence in an increasingly dense and meritocratic institutional structure. As in nineteenth-century Italy, Renaissance cities were led by officials elected by a small minority of the male population (albeit by the fifteenth century despotism had become the norm). Like nineteenth-century nation-states, the Renaissance city celebrated the virtues of the patriot and the martyr (Llobera, 2000: 67).

On the other hand, one ought to resist the temptation of assimilating the Renaissance state to the modern state. On this, Kirshner (1995: 5) says:

The rulers of the Italian regional states tended to consolidate power in their own hands, especially in regard to judicial, fiscal and military matters. But this historical pattern ... should not be taken to mean that autonomous self-sustaining centralized administrative structures came into existence. Indeed, the notion of a centralizing state was literally inconceivable, and its use as a category of analysis for understanding the Italian regional states in this period is best avoided. Nor should these Italian regional states be represented by the figure of the sovereign, a juridical persona endowed with total control of all the available resources in the territory he administered. Nor should they be equated to with the monopolistic powers associated with sovereign states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which possessed the self-
defining capacity to determine the legitimate scope of their own authority—what German jurists call Kompetenz-Kompetenz.

Moreover, if somewhat paradoxically, as Gramsci (1994: 267) was noticing sixty years ago or so, and, more recently stressed by Spruyt (1994), the Renaissance city acted as an obstacle to the development of the modern state, rather than a favouring factor (see also Anzilotti, 1981). The failure to win over the countryside and the submitted cities prevented the regional states from achieving early territorial integration. The result that was that between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at the same time as in northern and western Europe territorial states were being increasingly successful at asserting sovereignty domestically, refeudalisation ensued throughout Italy (even though, the actual extent of the process of refeudalisation has recently been recently at the centre of historical revisionism). In addition, Stumpo (1984) argues, republican traditions hindered the development of the administrative state, in that they relied on patrimonialist conceptions of rule, thus preventing the assertion of an identification between public and state underpinning the process.

In Piedmont alone, where the Renaissance tradition was weak, did the development of the modern state follow the typical pattern observed in the European core. As predicted by Poggi’s (1978) typical model of state development, in Piedmont between the high middle-ages and the beginning of the early modern period, a feudal structure was gradually replaced by a system of estates regulating taxation and military policy together with the sovereign. The early modern period saw the development of a centralised administrative structure under the aegis of an absolute ruler, which gave way to a representative system in the post-revolutionary period.

A stronger feudal structure meant that, differently from the Renaissance core, in Piedmont there developed an influential system of estates.
These were called for the last time in 1560, thereby marking the beginning of absolutism, anticipating the rest of the peninsula by two centuries. As Anderson (1974: 170) puts it: 'there alone a rigorous, rigid and indigenous absolutism emerged'. In 1642, the dominion of the central authority over the feudal lords was sanctioned by the institution of the intendant, after the French model. The intendant, similarly to a present-day prefect, was entrusted with representing the authority of the monarchy in every province of the Savoyard State. A single revenue system was developed starting from the second half of the seventeenth century. A *camera dei conti* for Piedmont, alongside one for Savoy, was instituted in 1577 (a unified one for the whole of the kingdom was in place from the beginning of the eighteenth century). However, Symcox (1983: 60) remarks, 'It is probably fair to say that until the reforms of 1717 Victor Amedeus had no exact idea of what his revenue totalled, nor of how much money was in the state treasury at any given moment'.

The extent to which absolutism progressed in the seventeenth century is at the centre of controversy. Stumpo (1979) has influentially challenged the traditional view that the seventeenth century was a period of refeudalisation. On the contrary, Stumpo argues, the central part of the century was a key period for the modernisation of Piedmont, marked by an intensification of processes of bourgeoisisation of the offices and growth of the state's administrative intervention in society. In any case, there is a wide consensus about the fact that, to use Quazza's (1957: 91-5) words, 'the problem of the construction of a modern centralised state, in its fundamental aspects of personal government of the monarchy and bureaucratic regime with prevalence of the administrative over the judiciary ... in Piedmont reaches its solution with the eighteenth-century reforms' (see also Symcox, 1983; Ricuperati, 1994). In this respect, Piedmont anticipated the rest of absolutist Italy (Lombardy, Tuscany, Naples, Modena and Parma) by about half a century, placing itself in line with Spain, Prussia, and
Austria. Another aspect of Vittorio Amedeo’s reign that we need mentioning is the development of an incipient militarism, with which Piedmontese culture came to be associated. In 1738 one every 75 inhabitants was a soldier, the same as in Prussia and more than twice than in France in the same year (Barberis, 1988: 141). In addition, from the eighteenth century the state began to make regular use of statistics. The first full census was carried out in 1734 (Symcox, 1983: 198). More generally, in this period, the Savoyard elite started relying on the developing human sciences of economics and demography in guiding its policies. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the monarchy started developing a centralised medical and educational structure, substituting church and municipalities, traditionally in charge of these fields (Roggero, 1981; Ricuperati, 1994; Cosmancini, 1997: 297). Woolf (1979: 66) argues that the main impetus behind Vittorio Amedeo II’s administrative reforms was the war of Spanish succession. Amongst the Italian states, in fact, only the Savoyard State had an important role during the conflict. Barberis (1988) also stresses how the expansion and reform of the army had repercussions on the whole of the Piedmontese administrative structure. Other factors accounting for Piedmont’s particular trajectory of state development within absolutist Italy in the eighteenth century include the early transition to absolutism (Stumpo, 1984; see also, Symcox, 1983).

Quazza (1957) identifies the beginning of the eighteenth century also the turning point towards a bourgeoisisation of the offices of the state. Ricuperati (1994) charges that Quazza fails to provide a satisfactory definition of bourgeoisie, and that, in the light of new data, the process is better viewed as one of amalgam between elements of the third estate and traditional nobility, leading to a construction of a more or less homogeneous nobility of office, under the sign of a strong subordination to the ruler and the state (within Italy, in Piedmont alone there developed a strong tradition of nobility of office). Similar remarks are made by Roggero (2002: 257-65), who stresses that there
lacked a sense of distinction in opposition to the aristocracy amongst bourgeois functionaries and magistrates in eighteenth-century Piedmont. According to Barberis (1988), this started to be the case from the later eighteenth century.

A sense of bourgeois identity was developed throughout Italy with some force under the French administration, and, especially, under Napoleon. 'In many respects', Galasso (1981: 207) writes, 'the Napoleonic period simply developed the premises of the Jacobin's years. The strengthening and enlargement of the bourgeoisie remain the basic theme of class relationships'. On the other hand, a weak economy, after the crises of the second half of the eighteenth century and the failure to embark on the industrial and agrarian revolution between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries (see Malanima, 2002), meant that in Piedmont and, even more, in the rest of Italy (particularly in the south), the bourgeoisie remained comparatively weak.

With Napoleon, for the first time, the bureaucracy starts to fully acquire the modern characteristics of impersonality, specialisation, nation-wide standardisation and meritocracy. After an initial retreat, the same principles were endorsed by the restoration governments, which sought to maintain the efficiency of Napoleon's 'administrative monarchy', within the framework of the old order.

As recently shown by Nada and Notario (1993), notwithstanding an initial rejection, the maintenance and development of Napoleon's administrative structure became the dominant trait of restoration Piedmont from the beginning of the 1820s, and, especially the 1830s (that was the general trend in the Italian states of the period; Riall, 1994). Linguistic and legislative standardisation across the provinces of the kingdom, educational expansion, growth of sanitary and poor relief measures, including vaccinations and spreading of hygienic norms, and
the institution of a standing police force incessantly surveilling the population were all pursued by the restoration government.

As in the eighteenth century, when the growth of administrative absolutism taxed the political and financial resources of the state to its limits, in the long run, the attempt to pursue a modernising policy remaining within the framework of the old regime proved too much to bear. On the one hand, it led to straining the relationship with church and aristocracy, attacked in their traditional areas of autonomy. On the other, it left unsatisfied the most ambitious reformers. Notwithstanding the economic success enjoyed by Piedmont in those years, the legitimacy of the absolute state was at an all time low. In 1820-1, like the rest of Italy, the Savoyard kingdom saw the explosion of insurrectional activities demanding the end of absolute rule. Even if the turmoil was defeated, it soon became clear that the French revolution had left an indelible mark. The insurrection exploded again in 1833, and, by 1848, in connection with yet more turmoil, the king, if somewhat reluctantly, gave in.

In 1848, Carlo Alberto issued the *Statuto Albertino*. The latter was the only Italian constitution surviving after 1849, and, with the unification, it became the Italian constitution (it remained so until 1948). The Subalpine parliament was divided in two chambers, the senate, appointed by the king, and the chamber of deputies elected by Italy. The intention, codified in the *Statuto*, of rigidly subordinating the Subalpine parliament to the executive and the monarchy was not enforced. ‘Particularly after 1852, when ... Cavour became prime minister’, Riall (1994: 14) writes, ‘parliament began successfully to assert its authority’ (see also Caracciolo, 1960: ch. 3).

The franchise was grounded in property and educational qualification. Initially it was very limited, about 2 percent of the male population at the time of the unification (1861). The share was expanded to about 7
percent, to include the lower middle-class and the skilled workers, in 1882. Universal male suffrage was introduced as late as 1913, to be revoked by fascism. Women had to wait until the end of the Second World War to start voting.

Although the constitution prescribed Catholic religion as the state religion, the formula soon became *lettera morta*, under the attacks of Cavour, the Savoyard’s prime minister in the Risorgimento’s years, in the name of ‘free church in a free state’ (Caracciolo, 1960). Secularism and anti-clericalism were dominant in Piedmont in the Risorgimento’s years and in Italy in the aftermath of the unification. The Church maintained an ambivalent position towards Italian nationalism in the early phases of the Risorgimento, when an influential sector of the nationalist intelligentsia saw the pope as the possible leader of an Italian confederation. However, starting from 1848 the official position of the pope was one of opposition. Political measures taken by the Catholic Church against Italy included failing to recognise Italy and the prohibition to participate to Italian political life for Catholics.

Sustained industrial development in Piedmont started from the 1830s (Italy as a whole, started catching up with the most industrially advanced countries from the end of the nineteenth century). By 1848, Bulferetti and Luraghi (1966: 117) claim, ‘the working class was born in Piedmont, the industrial proletariat in the modern sense’. The latter movement was spurred by the intervention of Carlo Alberto, who, from the 1830s started pursuing a policy of economic liberalism, marked by the liberalisation of the export of silk, and infrastructural development. The trend intensified in the aftermath of 1848, when Piedmont unambiguously embraced a liberal economic policy, and became the most dynamic Italian economy. By the time of the unification half of the Italian railway was in Piedmont.
Mann (1993: ch. 11) has shown that the distinctive characteristic of the nineteenth-century state compared to the eighteenth-century state is the predominance of the civilian scope over the military, rather than merely an expansion of size of the state (according to Mann’s measurement, actually the state’s size decreased in the course of the nineteenth century). At the time of the unification, Italy’s government compared to civil society, in monetary terms (budget/GNP), was about the same size as in Austria and Great Britain, and slightly lower than in France (Mann, 1993: 366-7; De Fort, 1996: 113). Even more markedly than in the European core, the Italian state was predominantly civilian. In 1883 military and navy accounted for a mere 7.7 percent of the total wage expenditures. The number of their employees was just over a fourth of those employed by the treasury (greatest department) and about one half of the ministries of public works and education (Caracciolo, 1960: 121).

The history of the Italian state has been traditionally described as the failure to achieve early state formation, amid the universalism of the Church and the territorial disintegration brought about by the Renaissance city. The development of the modern state in Piedmont confirms a hindering role for the Renaissance city in the development of the modern state. On the other hand, the Piedmontese case invites a reappraisal of the idea that the Church prevented Italy from achieving early state formation, and of the retrospective vision that the unification was a pre-condition to jump on the train of European development. Notwithstanding the limitations imposed by the small size, the development of the Savoyard State was remarkably similar to that of absolutist Europe (France, Prussia).

Nationalism

Gramsci (1994) commented that a particularity of the Italian democratic revolution was that of being carried out by a state,
Piedmont, rather than a class, as in France. There is little doubt about the fact that Piedmont played the outstanding role in the process of Italian unification. Indeed, it would not be too far from the truth to state that Italy was an extension of the Savoyard dominion. The holy trinity of the Italian Risorgimento, Cavour, the stateman, Garibaldi, the freedom fighter, and Mazzini, the ideologue, were all born in Savoyard territories (even though most of Garibaldi’s ‘one thousand’ came from Brescia, in Lombardy). Piedmont was the only Italian state directly involved in the military operation leading to the unification of Italy and provided the model for the administrative structure of the newly born Italian state, as well as the constitution. Understanding what factors made Piedmont the candidate for leading the construction of Italy is the first topic for discussion in this section. I will then address the role of Italian identity in explaining the unification of Italy.

Davies (1997: 638) calls Piedmont, ‘the unlikely leader of the movement for Italian unification’. Little about Piedmont’s history anticipates its role as ‘liberator’ of the Italian nation. Notwithstanding its long lasting autonomy, the strong influence of France meant that Piedmont was no less ‘polluted’ by foreign culture than other areas that experienced foreign rule directly. On the contrary, there is a case for arguing that Piedmontese culture was more foreign oriented than that of the Italian core.

Piedmont’s leadership is at odds with the nationalist idea of the Italian nation-state as heir of the Renaissance civilisation. As we have been discussing in the previous section, the Renaissance played a limited role in Piedmont’s history. When Machiavelli (1995: ch. 26) wrote the famous last chapter of The Prince, no doubt, he was not thinking of the Savoy Duke as he would free Italy from the ‘barbarians’.

Early state formation and sovereignty meant that a particularly strong affiliation to the ‘little patria’ was present in Piedmont. As one
commentator, the abbot Compagnoni (cited in Ricuperati, 1994: 213), put it towards the end of the eighteenth century: ‘I have called the Piedmontese a nation and not an Italian tribe, and I believe this judgement to be well grounded. They have had for centuries their own dynasty and government. The culture, which they have acquired maybe later than the other Italians, is all their work’. And, more recently, as remarked by Broers (1997: 29): ‘there was, indeed, a deep feeling of political nationalism throughout subalpine society under the ancien régime, but it was specifically Piedmontese, not Italian in any sense’.

Much has been made of the impact of the French dominion over Italy in strengthening a sense of Italian identity, through the institution of the Kingdom of Italy and the associated army. Piedmont, however, was never part of this administrative unit. The national identity institutionalised under the French educational system was Piedmontese in the Jacobin years, and French in the Napoleonic ones, never Italian. If the French administration contributed to foster a sense of Italian identity in Piedmont, this came as a reaction to the imposition of French culture (the actual significance of this type of feeling is an object of controversy).

One aspect often invoked to explain the Piedmontese leadership was the fact that it was the only regional state ruled by a domestic dynasty. However, the Italianness of the Savoy House is an invented tradition. Their preferred language was French. It is only from the 1830s that the Savoy House sought to insert its history within a wider Italian context (Nada and Notario, 1993: 250). In the eighteenth century the monarchy saw itself as being of Saxon origins (Ricuperati, 1989b). The ethnic affiliations of the monarchy were considerably elastic, and the Savoy House’s comparative advantage with respect to other potential leaders, such as the Bourbons and the Habsburg Lorena, did not lie in a particularly deep-rooted Italian identity.
The only ethnographic variable predicting a stronger nationalist movement in Piedmont than elsewhere in the peninsula was comparatively high literacy rates (Vigo, 1993: 42). But high literacy is a political variable as much as it is an ethnographic one, in that it signals advanced capitalism and state formation. The reason why in Piedmont Italian nationalism became dominant earlier than elsewhere were primarily geopolitical, social, and ideological, not ethnic. Piedmont, more than any other Italian state could claim independence from Austria, and thus was the obvious candidate to lead a war against it. As a corollary to this assertion, Piedmont was the only north-western state not under Austrian rule. In the course of the nineteenth century, the north-west became the stronghold of the Italian bourgeoisie, not least through early industrialisation and nationalism. Italian nationalism drew greater support from the middle-class (Gabaccia, 2000: 39) and was used as a vehicle to further its interests, not least the enfranchisement. Other factors include a good administrative record. Thanks to the early transition to liberalism, the Savoyard State managed to pursue a policy of modernisation more energetically than anywhere else, and this factor was key in legitimising the imposition of a Piedmontese model in the aftermath of the unification, as well as attracting support from the local elite for a union with Piedmont in the period leading to it. The early transition to liberalism also accounts for why Piedmont attracted the favour of the patriots, in that moderate and democratic nationalists alike were united under the banner of liberalism. Another crucial aspect was Piedmont's particular relationship with France, the main model of the Italian patriots. This factor eased the early assertion of a constitutional monarchy which accompanied the rise to dominance of Italian nationalism in Piedmont. Summing up, geopolitical (vicinity to France, autonomy from Austria), ideological (the early transition to liberalism), and social factors (a strong bourgeoisie), not a particularly strong sense of Italianness, explain the leadership of Piedmont in the process of Italian unification. In short, the modernist argument that nineteenth-century nationalism
was a political movement, which developed in the wake of the French revolution and the assertion of doctrines of popular sovereignty, rather than being the product of pre-existing ethnic affiliations, fits the Piedmontese case very well.

On the other hand, I am wary of taking the modernist argument too far. Gellner's (1983) theory that nationalism tends to develop around units of similar industrial development and in tandem with industrialisation suits Italy well enough. Nationalism drew greater support in the north-west, where industrialisation was comparatively more advanced, and the Italian regions shared a peripheral role in the early phases of the industrial revolution. In addition, the construction of a unified market was one of the main drives behind the unification. As Mittermaier (p. 39) observed in 1845: 'The complaints of the class of citizens refer principally to the impediments to industry and obstacles to commerce, and especially the grave excise duties, which, with the fragmentation of Italy in single states, affect negatively the traveller not less than the merchant'. And yet Llobera (1996: ch. 5) is correct in stressing that economic reductionism fails to account for the shape of national identity. Industrialisation was remarkably unevenly spread across regions, and patterns of industrialisation, by themselves, were more conducive to keeping territorial separations than abolishing them. Italy was not a customs league like Germany, and, as shown by Banti (2000: 20-1), before the unification Italy hardly constituted a market. If it came to be seen as one, this has more to do with pre-existing linguistic and cultural ties, rather than with the 'objective' trajectories of industrial capitalism.

There is little doubt that in Italy, even more markedly than in France, the emergence of popular nationalism, was the result, rather than the cause of nationalism. The strength of the national bond amongst the masses at the time of the unification is best represented by the fact that the national language, traditionally the most important signifier of
Italian identity, was intelligible only for a tiny minority of the population, with estimates ranging from 0.8% to about 10%, in the most conservative cases (Berruto, 1982: 905). These data compare with 80% in France at the same time (Weber, 1976: 310).

Equally, there is no denying that sectors of the Risorgimento’s leadership used nationalism in an instrumental and opportunistic way. ‘Few people’, Mack Smith (cited in Riall, 2000: 145) remarks, ‘were as surprised by Italian unification as Cavour’. Italian identity, as we have observed earlier, was hardly stronger in the ruling dynasty. Similar remarks can be made about the local elite, which, as we mentioned earlier in the chapter, did not hesitate to question Italian identity as a basis for state legitimacy, when their interests were at stake.

However, it would be reductive to view Italian identity as an invention of the nationalist leadership (see also Llobera, 1996: 63-70; Gabaccia, 2000). Metternich’s famous assertion that Italy was merely a geographical expression was most certainly off the mark. First, Italy as cultural and, at least in some sense, political community had a long history. Italy had a name since the classical times, and at various points of the low middle ages, it was used to designate kingdoms covering parts of its territory. Albeit divisive in the Risorgimento’s years, being home to the papacy was a key factor in giving Italy a sense of cultural distinction. It was in this spirit that, in 1347, Cola di Rienzo could appeal to all the communes of Italy to unite to obtain security and peace for Universa sacra italia. Italian was a codified language at least since the fourteenth century, when Dante wrote De vulgari eloquentia, to defend its usage, and The Divine Comedy to show how this could be done to some effect. At the same time, notwithstanding the political fragmentation that characterised it, Italy was seen by Petrarca as a ‘patria’. Henceforth, Italy continued to compete with regional states and cities as a locus of primary allegiance. The success enjoyed by Renaissance culture contributed to further intensify a sense of cultural
distinction, marked by Machiavelli’s final chapter of *The Prince* (1513), cited earlier, and Guicciardini’s *History of Italy* (1536-40).

Second, as stressed by Mann (1996) and Anderson (2000), before the emergence of nationalism, the development of print capitalism and the growth of administrative states contributed to the crystallisation of modern national identities around notions of the public. Austrian administrators called Lombardy with names such as ‘Austrian states of Italy’, and Lombard children were taught to speak, write and read in Italian in school. In Piedmont, processes of linguistic standardisation of the administration gathered momentum starting with the eighteenth century and had an important role in precipitating the dominance of Italian over French cultural affiliations. Other agents included literary societies, *accademi*, such as the Filopatria and Sampaolina (Ricuperati, 1989a). In the eighteenth century there was a widespread feeling of Italianness amongst the ‘public’, across the regional states. Judging from the titles of eighteenth-century journals, at the time, the public felt the affiliation to Italy more strongly than to the regional states. Ricuperati (1976: 366-72) lists 119 journals published in Italy in the eighteenth century; 14 of them have Italy in the title, against only 9 mentioning the region. Often eighteenth-century political treatises saw Italy as their audience (e.g. Pilati’s (1770) *On the reform of Italy* and Carli’s ([1787] 1975) *New method for the public schools of Italy*). The idea that Italy was a public found an influential codification at the beginning of the eighteenth century in Muratori’s ([1704], reproduced in Carpanetto, 1990: 38-43) *First designs of the literary republic of Italy exposed to the public by Limindo Pritanio*, where the Modenese abbot imagines the association of all Italian literate public, irrespective of their status, in one republic dedicated to the promotion of arts and sciences in the peninsula. By the end of the century, one of the most influential anti-absolutist treatises, Alfieri’s *On tyranny* ([1777] 1985), saw Italy as the prospective land of freedom, the patria, and did not feel
the need to explain why his choice fell on Italy rather than Piedmont, where he was born.

The growth of the eighteenth-century administrative state and the development of print capitalism and associated institutions, such as universities, publishing houses, literary societies and so on led to imagine also communities other than Italy. The same literary societies promoting the cultivation of Italian language were writing the history of Piedmont (Ricuperati, 1989a; 1989b). To Bogino (1966: 360), Piedmontese prime minister in the central part of the eighteenth century, Sardinia was a 'nation full honour'. Italian identity represented one amongst many possible choices to direct the nationalist struggle. As Galasso (cited in Llobera, 1996: 69) puts it, 'there is nothing in Italian history that predestined the different republics to become a state'. Nevertheless, state formation and print capitalism, as well as a tradition of Italian patriotism, were key in providing the backdrop against which nineteenth-century nationalist ideologues, such as Mazzini, developed their theories about who was eligible for 'peoplehood' and state builders, like Cavour, constructed their strategies of action.

To conclude this section, we can share Breuilly's (1995: ch. 4) assessment that pre-existing ethnic feelings were not particularly important in explaining the unification of Italy only with some qualifications. A marked leadership of Piedmont was the result of ideological, social and geopolitical factors more than being the expression of stronger ethnic feelings than elsewhere in the peninsula. Equally, there is no denying that before the unification Italian identity was the domain of a few and that the emergence of popular nationalism was the result, not the cause of nationalism. On the other hand, Italian nationalists were successful at mobilising the public and the state against the old order also because they could rely on pre-existing ties of language and loyalty, and the 'people' and 'the market' came to be
identified with Italy also because nationalist ideologues, state-builders and capitalists built upon a tradition of Italian patriotism, dating back at least to the high middle-ages, not simply out of sheer imagination and power.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have been presenting the development of the nation-state in Piedmont. Modern Piedmont, homeland of the Savoy House between 1560 and 1861, exhibited remarkable political stability over the modern period, notwithstanding the small size and high dependence from its more powerful neighbours, particularly France. A peripheral role in the Renaissance meant that the development of the modern state in Piedmont departed from that of the Italian core and followed a path more similar to that of absolutist Europe (France, Prussia). In the nineteenth century, the Kingdom of Sardinia was the first Italian state to become a constitutional monarchy. A marked leadership of the Kingdom of Sardinia in the process of Italian unification is more directly associated to geopolitical, ideological and social factors than to ethnographic variables. In Italy, popular nationalism, more evidently than in France, was the result, not the cause of nationalism. Nevertheless, the presence of pre-existing ties of loyalty and language, dating back at least to the high middle ages, was a key factor in shaping the process of unification of Italy.
3. Theories of nationalism and schooling

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to summarise the main theoretical positions informing the empirical analysis. I mainly draw from the historical sociologies of nationalism and schooling. The question of nationalism often appears in works on the rise of state schooling systems, and the growth of schooling is routinely discussed in studies of nationalism, even though its importance tends to be restricted to its role in processes of nation-building. On the other hand, the level of interchange between these two bodies of literature remains limited. What follows compares the two perspectives.

The most well-known argument linking nationalism and nineteenth-century educational developments is that state schooling was instrumental to the construction of the nation. Accordingly, I start by discussing theories explaining the growth of state systems of education with reference to processes of nation-building. Alongside this perspective, the historical sociologies of nationalism and schooling have produced the position that state and schooling became nationalist as a result of ideological tensions brought about by the growth of the (educating) state. The third section covers theories associating the rise of nationalist ideology and the nationalist school to the emergence of state schooling systems organised along class lines. The following section discusses works relating the growth of the modern state, the emergence of modern conceptions of society and nationalist ideology. The final section discusses how Foucault’s work on bio-power can help us moving beyond some of the limitations of the historical sociology of schooling, and refine our understanding of the relationship between the growth of the modern state and nationalist ideology. In conclusion, I
summarise the main issues emerging from the discussion, and locate the present research within the debate.

Schooling and nation-building

From the 1970s, various studies (e.g. Mosse 1975; Weber 1976; Gellner, 1983; Breuilly, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1994, 2000) have stressed that the concept of the nation as a community sharing common symbols, rituals, language and body cannot be meaningfully be applied to early nineteenth-century European societies, where national identity was the domain of a few. As it is routinely stressed in both historical and sociological literature on nationalism (e.g. Weber, 1976: ch. 5; Soldani and Turi, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1994: 91-2; Calhoun, 1997: 79-81; Green, 2001: ch.: 5), schooling was one of the basic sites where the masses of peasants made their encounter with the national language and culture with which they eventually learned to identify.

It is a short step from here to viewing the spread of schooling as being motivated by the need to ‘create’ homogeneous nations. This idea has been developed within traditions as diverse as American neo-institutionalism, and British and French post-Marxism.

The position that schooling expansion and state intervention in education are a direct consequence of the need to forge nations is advanced in its most explicit form by Balibar (1991b). According to him, the legitimacy of modern nation-states implicitly relies upon the idea that there is an extra-political ethnic community of which the state represents an extension (no matter how civic nation-states claim to be). In addition, Balibar argues, ethnic identities are based upon arbitrary markers and are essentially fictive. As a consequence, they need to be ‘created’ and maintained artificially.

Following Althusser (1972), Balibar identifies schools and families as the principal institutional sites assisting the process of maintenance and
diffusion of the dominant ideology in capitalist societies. Differently from his mentor, however, for Balibar the main purpose of ‘the ideological state apparatus’ is not to reproduce the class structure, but to construct the national community. The ‘contemporary importance of schooling and the family unit’, Balibar (1991b: 102) writes, derives ‘from the fact that they subordinate [the] reproduction [of labour power] to the constitution of a fictive ethnicity’.

Ever since Nairn (1977) said that understanding nationalism constitutes the greatest failure of Marxism, few fail to notice Marxism’s problems with explaining the phenomenon (e.g. Halsey et al., 1997; Llobera, 1996: ch. 3; Anderson, 2000: 3-4). Balibar (1991b: 89-90) addresses the difficulties Marxist theory has had with deriving nationalism from capitalism by endorsing the world system perspective (after Braudel and Wallerstein), and assumes that whereas the nation constitutes a form of bourgeois hegemony, it is not the only possible one. In addition, Balibar (1991b: 90) avoids the pitfalls of vulgar Marxism of granting the hegemonic subject unconditioned creative power of agency1 by framing himself in the tradition of structural Marxism (e.g. Poulantzas, 1978) and postulating that nation-states and bourgeoisie shaped one another in a process without a subject.

Balibar’s idea of viewing nationalism as a discursive formation has been influential in shaping the research agenda of nationalism studies in recent years (e.g. Duara, 1995: 15; Calhoun, 1997: 22-3; Özkirimli, 2003: 341). On the other hand, it is less clear whether Balibar is able to counter the charge, advanced, amongst others, by Breuilly (1993: ch. 1) and Llobera (1996: ch. 5), that nationalism was used to further the interests of diverse classes2, and thus it makes little sense to view nationalism as a bourgeois ideology. More directly relevant to our present concerns, Balibar’s definition of fictive ethnicity remains problematic.
As also stressed by himself (1991b: 93), any kind of social identity is imagined, and, therefore, in some sense ‘fictive’. The opposition between the ‘fiction’ of homogeneous trans-historical national communities and the ‘reality’ of class divided societies with no essential link to their ancestors is unsatisfactory. As stressed by Smaje (2000: 72-3), nations are not the arbitrary creation of the elite. While nationalism might rely on ‘invented traditions’ and the like, the context giving rise to these creations is real, and there is a need to attend at the particular features of the context, when accounting for the emergence of determinate ideological patterns (see also Calhoun 1997: 22-3; Anderson, 2000: 6).

In addition, the reliance of the state on mythical narratives to legitimise itself is an enduring feature of Western political trajectories, rather than being a peculiar feature of the age of nationalism. Retrospectively, the model of political legitimacy that nationalism replaced, divine right and law of descent, is grounded upon postulates which reality is at least as questionable as that of modern nations. Nations need to be ‘created’ as much as any other legitimising subject, and there is a need for specifying otherwise what is about the nation form which informs the emergence of state systems of education.

Finally, Balibar’s argument that state schooling is a consequence of national sovereignty is somewhat at odds with eighteenth-century educational developments, when reforms anticipating the nineteenth century were passed in absolutist states (cf. Raeff, 1975: 1232-3; Green, 1992), such as Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Naples, and not in constitutional monarchies like England and Holland (cf. De Swaan, 1988: 99-103), where, arguably, ideas of national sovereignty were more influential (Greenfeld, 1994: 14; Llobera, 1996: 220). An alternative explanation linking schooling to processes of nation-building without relying on the manufactured nature of nations is that advanced by neo-institutionalists.
Neo-institutionalists (Meyer et al., 1979; Boli and Ramirez, 1987a, 1987b, Meyer et al., 1991) draw from Bendix’s work on nation-building and world system theory to question the ideas that the growth of state systems of education correspond to changes in underlying technologies of production and distribution of resources. By looking at twentieth-century patterns of global educational expansion and modern developments in Western countries, they show that the emergence of national systems of education, when looked at from a comparative perspective, appears to be correlated with ideological changes much more closely than with either technological innovations or particular structures of interests.

In the course of the twentieth century, Boli and Ramirez (1987a) and Meyer et al. (1991) claim, state schooling has spread with remarkably low degrees of variation, with respect to both organisational structure and curricular practice, across countries with the most diverse socio-economic conditions. In nineteenth-century America, Meyer et al. (1979) show, schooling expanded across both industrial and rural areas, suggesting that nation-building was a more important factor than the requirements of production in explaining the phenomenon. Finally, in early modern Europe, Boli and Ramirez (1987b: 192) stress, state schooling developed earlier in comparatively backward countries, such as Denmark, Sweden and Prussia, casting doubts on theories reducing state intervention in education to the demands of the industrial society (either disciplinary (e.g. Thompson, 1967) or functional (e.g. Schultz, 1977)).

According to Boli and Ramirez (1987a, 1987b), patterns of educational institutionalisation between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries are chiefly explained by modern conceptions of the individual and the state, which, with the global expansion of the nation-state form, came to involve virtually every human society. Processes of educational
institutionalisation and governmentalisation, they claim, result from the combined effects of individualism and statism, where the former refers to the idea that the individual constitutes the essential unit of ethical, religious and legal value, and the latter is defined as the ideology whereby 'the constitution and the relative standing of the state is of great concern to all the elements of the nation' (1987b: 195).

Individualism, Boli and Ramirez (1987a; 1987a: 192-7) argue, altered the material and social conception of the individual and demands that individuals are provided with the means to cultivate their self-development. Statism implies that the formation of individuals ought to be directed towards the empowerment and integration of the association. For Boli and Ramirez (1987b: 193-5), these two ideological forces started informing European ontology with the Reformation and 'reached a high degree of maturity by the end of the eighteenth century', to find their full expression around nationalist ideology and modern conceptions of citizenship from the nineteenth century onwards. As a particular important factor in explaining the assertion of a statist model, Boli and Ramirez (1987b: 195-6) single out the presence of a crises of national integrity, whereby military events or economic decline lead societies to believe that 'a fall to a lower status is imminent ... or that ascendancy to a higher status is about to be thwarted'.

Neo-institutionalists offer an original and interesting perspective to the question of explaining the growth of state schooling, and it is to their credit to have stressed the importance of nationalist ideology in shaping dominant forms of education at a time when the constructed nature of nations was yet to be adequately explored. However, some of their positions are not without problems. By their own admission, Boli and Ramirez (1987a: 192-3) attempt to construct a tentative explanation, rather than a fully-fledged theory, and it would be unfair to be
excessively critical. Nevertheless, in the interest of future research, it is worth pointing out areas for improvement.

Smelser (1991: 360) contests the claim that nation-building and citizenship were important in explaining the expansion of popular schooling in the early nineteenth century on the grounds that the British elite was aiming at forging loyal subject, rather than conscious citizens. Personally, I would resist the temptation to draw such sharp contrasts between conceptions of subject-hood and citizenship at the time, and think that the main weaknesses of the argument lie elsewhere.

At the conceptual level, granting primacy to the ideological structure is an arbitrary operation and a multi-causal explanation would be apt. As Balibar’s (1991b: 89) shows, the conflictualist and world system perspective are not as incompatible as neo-institutionalists maintain. Similarly, Gellner (1983) indicates that industrialisation and nationalism do not necessarily need to be treated as separated phenomena.

At the empirical level, there are reasons to doubt that some of the links between individualism and state schooling adduced by Boli and Ramirez are, in fact, accurate. Green (1992: ch. 6, 1997: 57-61) and Morefield (2002) emphasise the extent to which the force of individualist traditions in England acted as an obstacle to the development of state education, rather than a favouring factor. At the very least, Boli and Ramirez argument on the effects of individualism upon educational developments need some qualifications.

Furthermore, Boli and Ramirez’s discussion of what leads societies to embark on a individualist and statist model is less than convincing, and ultimately they rely on teleology (the ‘coming to maturity of the ideas’). As an explanation for the assertion of statist ideology and subsequent
state intervention in education, the concept of crisis of national integrity is weak in a number of respects.

A crisis of national integrity presupposes that the destinies of the nation are felt to be intrinsically linked to those of each individual member, to the effect that the definition of statist ideology is coterminous with its conditions of emergence. Their interpretation belies a presentist reading, in that societies are assumed to be capable of foreseeing their imminent decline or progress, and to be aware that greater governmentalisation of education will lead to greater national welfare. Neither assumption is tenable, especially in view of the fact that the nineteenth century was when the principle found its first wide applications. If authoritarianism is a common trait of societies in crises, directing it towards schooling is a peculiarly modern phenomenon, and their characterisation of national crises is too vague to be useful.

Significant developments towards educational governmentalisation also occurred in the absence of such conditions, as for instance it is the case with eighteenth century educational reforms, which, on the contrary, can be seen as being favoured from a period of prolonged peace. In the last instance, defeat and famine have a history long predating that of either nationalism or state education. In all likeness they will outlive them.

More generally, neo-institutionalists tend to concentrate excessively on similarities across societies to the effect of failing to account for important differences. As highlighted by Archer and Vaughan (1971), Archer (1979), Smelser (1990, 1991) and Green (1992, 1997), nineteenth-century educational developments were remarkably unevenly spread. And, as stressed by Green (1992, 1997: chs. 3, 5), so were nation-building and individualist ideology.
Green (1992, 1997: ch. 2) claims that the main variable accounting for the uneven educational development in Western countries between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is the process of state formation. For Green, the emergence of state systems of education is to be understood as part of the wider process of institutionalisation of civilian life and the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus which accompanied the rise of the bourgeoisie to hegemony. The fact that different countries experienced state formation differently implied that national systems of education grew unevenly.

In addition, Green (1992: 36-48, 1997) argues, variations cannot be derived in any easy way from the underlying socio-economic conditions, and consideration of military and political discipline were more important than the needs of the economy in explaining early educational developments. In England, for instance, the idea that the state is responsible for providing schooling struggled to assert itself significantly more than in continental Europe, notwithstanding the fact that it was the first country to industrialise. Green (1992: 74-5) also rejects Archer's (1979) idea that the English particular development of state education is accounted for by the late enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie on the grounds that even after the middle-class was enfranchised the level of political intervention remained comparatively low.

To overcome this impasse without departing from a Marxist framework, Green (1992: 90-9) follows Gramsci's theory of hegemony, and argues that pre-existing political traditions shape the process of change independently of socio-economic variables. There are here some similarities with Archer's (1979) assumption that cross-cutting ideological ties might lead actors to act in a non-rational way. However, whereas for Archer (1979) this factor contributed to the delayed development of state education in England because the issue of secular education divided the English middle and working classes,
Green (1992: 211) down-plays the importance of religious sectionalism. Neither denominational competition was peculiarly English, Green argues, nor changing inter-denominational and state-church relationships can account for the English particular development in the intervening period. Instead, Green (1992: ch. 6; 1997: chs. 3, 5) claims that political intervention in education in nineteenth-century England remained at comparatively low levels because of two reasons:

First, early national formation. Following the perspective that in England national identity developed earlier than in continental Europe (e.g. Colley, 1992; Greenfeld, 1994: ch. 1; Hastings, 1997: ch. 2), Green (1992: 241-2; 1997: 95) argues that this factor implied that the English state lacked one of the main reasons leading to educational developments elsewhere.

Second, liberal traditions were particularly entrenched in English society. The legacy of the seventeenth century anti-absolutist struggle, Green (1992: ch. 6, 1997: 57-61) maintains, implied that Lockean individualism and *laissez faire* liberalism were particularly strong in eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries England, and this factor prevented the early assertion of a statist model of development.

Green is somewhat imprecise when he associates Lockean individualism to *laissez faire* capitalism. As argued by chapter five, these two doctrines informed a different type of critique to state schooling systems, and had different effects upon schooling developments. But he is quite right in emphasising that state education is a difficult question for liberalism. In addition, the tradition of comparing England to France, where in the eighteenth century legislative intervention in education was considerably more timid than in Prussia, Austria-Hungary or absolutist Italy, has tended to obscure the fact that post-revolutionary England is quite distinctive in its lack of state schooling, and it is to Green’s credit to stress this fact. Equally,
while I do not necessarily agree with Green’s assessment that economic factors were less important in the early phases of schooling expansion, I share Green’s view that the particular trajectories of state formation were an important factor in accounting for the uneven development of state schooling in nineteenth-century Europe, as chapter five shows in relation to Piedmont.

On the other hand, for all his comparative insight, Green essentialises state formation, thereby falling short of accounting for the transition from a type of state formation relying on the limitation of the access of the populace to schooling, to one whereby state formation is achieved through schooling expansion. As stressed also by himself the early phases of schooling expansion were centred in the Germanic states, rather than France and England, where, arguably, the middle-class was more influential. Hence, explaining the emergence of universal schooling in terms of the rise of the bourgeois state falls short of providing a satisfactory answer.

In addition, given the emphasis Green puts on liberal ideology in explaining the slow development of the state schooling system in nineteenth-century England, Green’s analysis would benefit from a fuller treatment of the reasons why liberalism acted as an obstacle towards the development of state schooling systems there, but it had an opposite effect in continental Europe, where the pace of governmental penetration in education greatly accelerated as the transition from absolutist to liberal forms of constitutional structure took place (Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 117-30; Green, 1992: 130-2). Finally, Green exaggerates the peculiarity of English schooling developments, by neglecting that liberal opposition to state schooling systems was found also in continental Europe, and taking a somewhat one-sided view on the comparatively low levels of schooling diffusion in nineteenth-century England. Other sources depict a different scenario (see West, 1964; Laquer, 1976; Smelser, 1991).
Nationalism, state schooling and the class society

As well as witnessing the rise of state systems of education and nationalism, the nineteenth century saw Europe turning its back on the traditions of the ancien régime. This movement involved the transformation from a society of estates, particularistic, organised hierarchically around markers of blood, to a society of classes, lateral and formally egalitarian and meritocratic. The ways in which this transition is linked to the growth of state schooling and nationalism is discussed by Archer and Vaughan (1971) and Gellner (1983).

These two works start from opposite theoretical standpoints on what factors are responsible for the growth of state systems of education. Gellner (1983) considers state schooling as being a functional requirement of industrial societies. Archer and Vaughan (1971) emphasise the conflictual dimension, by stressing the impact of industrialisation and extension of the franchise on underlying structures of power.

On the other hand, there are substantial similarities in the way they link nationalism to the need to legitimise the transition from ancien régime to modern forms of educational provision. Discussing these parallels in the light of on-going debates on nationalism is the objective of this section.

Archer and Vaughan (1971) claim that nationalism was an important ideological weapon employed by French bourgeoisie to legitimise their bid to assert their dominion over schooling between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries against church and religious orders. According to their account, the blueprint of the nationalist school was originally conceived in the 1760s as part of the mounting struggle of the French parliamentarians against the Jesuit monopoly on secondary education.
The parliamentarians did not rely on national sovereignty and framed themselves in the Gallican tradition of divine right. On the other hand, they anticipated nationalist ways of conceiving of education in terms of curriculum, institutional boundaries and ideology.

Parliamentarians demanded revisions of the curriculum involving the teaching of the mother tongue in place of Latin and the history of French kings instead of that of antiquity, and the introduction of subjects like national literature and regional geography (Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 156). They emphasised the importance of citizenship in defining the boundaries of the educational community and directing the ends of schooling (Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 151-5). In defending the right of the state in the field, La Chatolois identifies in the nation the sole legitimate educating subject.

The plan of the parliamentarians, Archer and Vaughan (1971: 135-6) say, were not implemented after the Jesuits were expelled and schooling remained under the direction of religious orders, albeit different ones, until the end of the century. Nationalism did not loom large in the educational imagination of revolutionary France either, for the emphasis was on individual rights and secularism was the predominant theme (Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 188-9). It is only with Napoleon’s seizure of power that nationalist narratives became important in shaping the process of secularisation of post-primary education (Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 180-1).

For Archer and Vaughan (1971: 151-9) the blueprint of the parliamentarians proved an attractive strategy for the French middle-class because of four main reasons. First, it stressed state leadership. This principle was used both against the church and individual freedom. Second, it informed a modernisation of the curriculum and pedagogical methods by identifying the end of education with maximising the power of the state in accordance with reason and
secular ethics, as opposed to out-worldly salvation. Third, it promoted particularistic identities against the universalistic pretensions of the church. Fourth, it advocated the replacement of an education organised in orders with one defined along class lines.

All but the last involve processes of secularisation of the apparatus. On the other hand, their discussion of the transition from revolutionary to Napoleonic France indicates that they believe that secularism did not necessarily need to rely on nationalism (it was only at the moment étatism became important that nationalism started being influential). Neither, they argue that nationalism is always anti-clerical, as their discussion of England shows\(^1\) (1971: 92, 107-116).

According to Archer and Vaughan, in early nineteenth-century England, nationalism was a conservative ideology, employed by the Anglican Church to further its dominion in education and promote identity between religious morality and secular philosophy. In other words, in England, in sharp contrast to France, nationalism was opposed to processes of secularisation. There are, on the other hand, points of contact, in that English nationalism was anti-aristocratic and egalitarian and stressed the importance of inculcating a common morality through education for citizenship. Moreover, English nationalists like Arnold, in common with their French counterparts, advocated a proactive role for the government (as opposed to private associations and individuals) in the organisation and provision of schooling, in order to implement a standardised system. This requirement did not clash with the Anglican Church prerogatives in the field, for Arnold envisaged an identity between state and church.

It would be most certainly inappropriate to treat Archer and Vaughan’s account as a theory of nationalism. Archer and Vaughan’s interest lies primarily on explaining patterns of educational institutionalisation, rather than the emergence of particular ideological forces. And in a
later rejoinder, where Archer (1979) expands the temporal and geographical scope of the analysis, the study of ideology is granted much less attention.

On the other hand, Archer and Vaughan’s reflections on the relationship between nationalism and education in England and France anticipate later developments in the historical sociology of nationalism in a number of ways. For instance, the presence of substantial analogies between English Anglicanism and nationalist ideology is one of the few points which meets general agreement in an otherwise very divided field (e.g. see Greenfeld, 1994: ch. 1; Llobera, 1996: 135-7; Gellner, 1997: ch. 12; Calhoun, 1997: 72-3). Similarities between nationalist ideology and Gallicanism in eighteenth-century France have been detected by Greenfeld (1994: 109-13) and Llobera (1996: 138-9). The most striking parallels, however, are with Gellner (1983).

Gellner’s theory of nationalism is well-known and a short summary will suffice here. The organisation of culture in industrial societies, Gellner (1983: esp. ch. 2, 3) argues, differs sharply from that of agrarian societies, where the dominant model predicted a universal high culture centred upon the clergy and Latin, and a patch-work of more or less isolated context-based linguistic communities at the bottom. In addition, Gellner argues, agrarian societies rely on a rigidly stratified social order. By contrast, a functional requirement of industrial societies is to foster occupational mobility and endow individuals with the capacity for long-distance, impersonal communication. The consequence being that state systems of education promoting universal literacy and a common, egalitarian culture must be put in place. A corollary of this transformation is the assertion of the principle of identity between state and culture, underlying the rise of nationalist ideology.
Gellner, like Archer and Vaughan, argues that nationalism is organically related to an educational system aimed at the production of a society of classes (albeit Archer and Vaughan, more than Gellner, stress the inegalitarian implications of such a principle), a role of leadership for the state in educational organisation and provision, and the promotion of particularistic and categorical identities around notions of citizenship.

On the other hand, one important difference between Archer and Vaughan and Gellner is that the former emphasise, in a way that Gellner does not, how nationalism in both nineteenth-century France and England was used to further the prerogatives of the state in education against private individuals, even more directly than against the church.

Gellner’s theory of nationalism has been widely criticised for being reductionist and functionalist (e.g. Calhoun, 1997: 80; Tambini, 2000: 140-1). Archer and Vaughan (1971), Archer (1979), Neo-institutionalists (Meyer et al., 1979; Boli and Ramirez, 1987a, 1987b, Meyer et al., 1991), and Green (1992, 1997) highlight how Gellner’s argument that state systems of education are a by-product of industrialisation involves similar problems. On their part, it less than clear whether Archer and Vaughan’s Weberian approach manage to avoid reification of the bourgeoisie\textsuperscript{11} and other actors\textsuperscript{12}, and, ultimately, they rely on instrumentalism in explaining the emergence of determinate institutional and ideological patterns.

On the other hand, Archer and Vaughan and Gellner’s argument that nationalism is fed by the rise of the egalitarian state continue to command wide influence. The fact that nationalism is grounded upon particularistic identities around the state emerging in opposition to the universalism of the church is emphasised also by Anderson (2000: 14-9) (see also Chabod, 1962: 3-4; Smith, 1991: 17-8; Llobera, 1996:
221). And this is one of the most important reasons why, Rokkan (1999: 144) adds, processes of nation-building were delayed where the lack of Protestant movements and geographical proximity to Rome prevented an early crystallisation of particularistic identities.

However, the extent to which particularistic identities are a peculiarly modern phenomenon and Catholicism and universalism constitute an obstacle to the assertion of national identity is a matter for contention. For instance, Spruyt (1994: 55) agrees that the universalistic project of church and empire belongs to a different type of political imagination from the sovereign state. On the other hand, Spruyt (1994: ch. 7, 172-8) and Llobera (1996: 67) invite to a reappraisal of the force of Rokkan’s argument, by highlighting how in Italy particularistic identities developed in the high middle-ages around the free-cities. More generally, the recent trend in nationalism studies is to down-play the Catholic/Protestant distinction, and emphasise how in early modern period Catholic states started organising themselves along national lines too (Greenfeld, 1994: 51-4, Armstrong, cited in Llobera, 1996: 134; Llobera, 1996: ch. 6). At a more radical level, the very opposition between universalism and particularism has recently being questioned by scholars such as Chatterjee (1993: ch. 11), Duara (1995: 8-9), Calhoun (1997: 19-20, ch. 6) and Balibar (1991a: 54-64), stressing discursive affinities between the universalistic project of modernity and nationalist ideology, which takes us to egalitarianism.

The fact that nationalism is based upon egalitarian and categorical identities around (or against) the state is stressed by Balibar (1991a: 54-64, 1991b: 100-1), Calhoun (1997: 42-8) and Anderson (2000: 15, 19). Smith (1991: 166) also emphasises the importance of the assertion of lateral identities in explaining nationalism. According to Greenfeld (1994), the single most important factor behind the rise of nationalist ideology is the identity crises brought about by the break-up of the society of orders and the rise of egalitarianism. The extent to which
egalitarianism and categorical identities are modern, and nationalism is a by-product of egalitarian ideology, however, remains unsettled.

With respect to the latter question, at one side of the spectrum we have those like Viroli (2000) and Greenfeld (1994), who stress differences between ethnic and civic ways of imagining the nation, thereby questioning the fact that egalitarianism is responsible for ethno-nationalism. From the opposite perspective Kapferer (1988) and Smaje (2000: 159) argue that ethno-nationalism is associated to tensions embedded into egalitarian ideology, particularly with respect to the relationship between individual and state sovereignty (see also Balibar, 1991a; Chatterjee, 1993: 227-34).

As for the putative modernity of categorical identities around the state, the opposition between traditional geimenschaft and modern gesellschaft upon which the concept rests has recently underwent severe criticisms. Smaje (2000: ch. 3), for instance, argues that the idea that sovereignty is essentially singular has been characterising Western political thought since the low middle-ages, and stresses how the eclipse of more particularistic status-based identities was already under-way from the high middle ages (after Habermas). More generally, the recent tendency in the historical sociology of the state (e.g. Spruyt, 1994; Rokkan, 1999), has been that of viewing the process of standardisation of legal and behavioural norms around the state as the precipitate of centuries long processes, rather than being strongly associated with the industrial order of things, thus vitiating too sharp distinctions between traditional and modern identities. This perspective would suggest that egalitarianism by itself falls short for accounting for the specificity of nineteenth-century nationalism.

The idea that nationalism is to be explained with reference to the impact the growth of the modern state on changing conceptions of political legitimacy, on the other hand, is shared by virtually all major
works on nationalism published in recent years. It is to this perspective that we now turn.

Nationalism, state and society

This section focuses on Breuilly (1995) and Calhoun (1997). Education is not particularly important in either Breuilly’s (1995) or Calhoun’s (1997) discussions of nationalism. Breuilly does not touch the topic. Calhoun (1997: 68, 79-81) limits himself to stressing how the growth of schooling contributed to the formation of national identities both before (by favouring linguistic standardisation) and during the age of nationalism (when education was used to further processes of national integration). On the other hand, both these works attend at the interplay between the growth of the administrative capacity of the modern state and changing ideas of political legitimacy, and link the process to the rise of nationalism.

The expansion of the bureaucracy and the concomitant intensification of political intervention in the daily lives of subjects under absolutism, Breuilly (1993: 55, chs. 3, 18) argues, led to a revision of the dominant coordinates of political legitimacy. Somewhat paradoxically, at the same time as the crown was becoming a closer presence, societies started to imagine themselves as essentially different from the ruler. This transformation introduced substantial innovations with respect to the traditional government and subjects distinction, in that it conceived of society as possessing an extra-political identity, to the implication that the legitimacy of state policies started to be measured against this subject.

For Breuilly, much of the success of nationalism in the intervening period is to be explained by the problem of giving content to this conceptual scheme, the promise of nationalism being that of
transcending the separation between state and society. The nationalist idea took a while before taking over, though.

For instance, in France, Breuilly (1993: 88-91) argues, absolute kings were neither judged nor did they rely on nationalist arguments in legitimising the process of state formation. Until well into the eighteenth century, rulers continued to justify their actions with the traditional principles of divine and monarchical right, and insofar as the nation was mentioned, it was represented as a set of political arrangements. However, in the course of the eighteenth century, the attempt and the subsequent failure to upset the traditional institutional structure on the part of the crown opened the way for the nationalist idea to assert itself.

On the one hand, the difficulties led the monarchy to rely ever more heavily on its image of distance from the sectional interests of society, as codified in the literature on enlightened despotism. On the other, the resistance organised itself around the discourse of the historical liberties of the nation. This double movement, Breuilly maintains, created the intellectual context for imagining a split between nation and state.

The latter concept was first explicitly proposed by the Third Estate in the meeting of the Estates-General in 1789, when ‘legal’ France, based upon historical privilege, was distinguished from ‘real’ France, grounded in natural rights. In the same year, the National Assembly declared the nation to be the source of all sovereignty.

Calhoun (1997: 69-79) takes a less elitist perspective in explaining the rise of modern ideas of society, by emphasising the new opportunities for greater popular participation to political discourse and activity introduced by improved information technology and processes of integration of the institutional structure, rather than increased control.
On the other hand, he shares with Breuilly the view that the rise of nationalism is closely associated to the break-up of traditional ideas of political legitimacy. In addition, in common with Breuilly, Calhoun stresses the importance of the emergence of ideas of non-political organisation.

According to Calhoun (1997: 73-4), an early anticipation of nationalist ideology is to be found in the thought of Hobbes. Hobbes, Calhoun stresses, introduced the principle that the legitimacy of power was grounded in the interests of the whole people of the kingdom, as opposed to divine right or law of descent. In addition, Hobbes made an important step towards nationalism by imagining that political identities were categorical (as opposed to being mediated). However, differently from nationalist ideology, Calhoun maintains, Hobbes did not conceive of the existence of a society, as opposed to an aggregation of isolated individuals, outside the state. Introducing the latter concept was the job of his critics, particularly Locke.

Modern conceptions of civil society, Calhoun (1997: 71-2) argues, found a first codification in the writings of the Scottish enlightenment (e.g. Ferguson and Smith; on this see also Keane, 1988; Perez-Diaz, 1995). However, as stressed also by Taylor (1990: 104-5), Chatterjee (1993: 227-30) and Bobbio (1988: 74, 79), something similar was already present in Locke’s theory of the dual contract16.

For Calhoun (1997: 72-3), Locke anticipates nationalism insofar as he presupposes the existence of a community of interdependent individuals (a people) upon which the legitimacy of the state rests. Even though Locke himself was not aware of the importance of the change he introduced, Calhoun (1997: 74-5) claims, the idea that governments were to embody national aspirations to survive started becoming increasingly influential in tandem with the gradual assertion of democratic doctrines of political legitimacy. The principle found a
first application amongst the English aristocracy, and was brought to its apotheosis by the French revolution.

Breuilly (1995) and Calhoun (1997: ch. 4) can account for why nationalism became influential from the later eighteenth century, when the process of state formation experienced a somewhat of an intensification (not least through educational reforms). Their idea that the crystallisation of national identities is closely associated to the emergence of notions of civil society is endorsed also by Taylor (1990: 111-3), Chatterjee (1993) and Llobera (1996: ch. 5).

In addition, Calhoun’s and Breuilly’s insight that nationalism is about conceptualising the relationship between state and society goes some way in explaining why nationalism became important in legitimising state education in nineteenth-century liberal democracies at the same time as the social status of schooling was under particularly intense scrutiny. This line of interpretation is consistent with Archer and Vaughan (1971: 180-1, 188-9), Hobsbawm (1990: ch. 3, 2000: 263-9), Balibar (1991b: 101-2), Chatterjee (1993: 227-9) and Morefields (2002), who also link the emergence of organic ways of imagining the state to the difficulties of liberal thought with accommodating the interventionist state within the state/society framework17.

On the other hand, there is a sense in which Breuilly and Calhoun are too much and too little modernist at the same time. The extent to which eighteenth-century notions of civil society introduced a paradigmatic break is less clear than Breuilly and Calhoun maintain. For instance, Foucault (1998: 78-99) and Sahilins (cited in Smaje, 2000: 158) argue that Hobbes’s ‘warre of every man against every man’ is metaphorical, and Hobbes does conceive of a society in the state of nature. Similar indications emerge from Meinecke (1998), who stresses how the idea that the state possessed properties irreducible to the sum of its component part was central to Western political thought since the times
of Machiavelli. From the opposite perspective, Breuilly and Calhoun are too quick to assimilate contractualistic thinking with nationalist ideology. This point is made apparent if we now turn to Foucault’s (1991a; 1991b; 1998; 2001a) writings on bio-power.

**Bio-power, schooling and nationalism**

Foucault is not a theorist of nationalism. As far as I know, the word nationalism never appears in any of his writings. Neither does Foucault manifest a specific interest for schooling (even though schooling is without doubts of central importance in characterising the disciplinary society Foucault (1991a) describes in *Discipline and punish*). Moreover, Foucault writings do not present an organic theory. Indeed, being against theory is what he is most famous for. Hence, Foucault’s presence in a survey of theories on nationalism and schooling might seem odd, and an explanation is apt. The reason I included Foucault in the selection is that in the empirical analysis I am going to apply ideas drawn from his writings on bio-power in order to refine our understanding of the relationship between growth of the state and rise of nationalism, and his thought is tricky enough to deserve a separate treatment.

But, first of all, let us introduce bio-power. Foucault (2001a: 121) describes bio-power as ‘a power which is exercised positively on life, which ... manages it, empower it, multiplies it, and exercise upon it precise controls and aggregate regulations’. Bio-power is at once set of prescriptions and a set of practices, a discourse. Bio-power involves the detailed knowledge and systematic intervention on the functioning of the individual body and the aggregate dynamics of the population. The aim of bio-power is to render bodies and populations governable, or, to use Foucault’s more famous expression, disciplined. Unlike the slave, who obeys amid the threat of force, the disciplined body conforms to
the demands put before him/her through spontaneous bodily reactions. In addition, a disciplined body is empowered, as opposed to being simply subjugated, through the development of a detailed knowledge about the type of resistance and, by implication, opportunity exhibited by it. The body is conceived of as an organic substance exhibiting regular patterns of reaction to a determinate set of incentives. The latter are aimed at rendering bodies docile, healthy, strong and useful, and are applied unwittingly, in such away that the disciplined body, like Pinocchio, the puppet without strings, is not aware of being governed.

The other pole of application of bio-power, together with the body, is the population, conceived as a network of life chances which dynamics are irreducible to that of the sum of its component parts. Similarly to the body, the population is governed through detailed knowledge of its organic properties, such as rate of births, deaths and diseases, economic cycles and systematic interventions upon them.

According to Foucault (1991b), the development of bio-power in modern Europe followed two main phases. A first phase, beginning around the sixteenth century, witnessing a first development of the theory, as it were, of bio-power in a body of literature written around the problematic of how to govern the state (e.g. Peruta, Botero), in the wake of the early stages of formation of the modern administrative state. However, Foucault argues, its actual application remained limited. The second phase, starting from the second half of the eighteenth and particularly the nineteenth centuries witnessed the spread of this type of technique with unprecedented levels of intensity. Foucault traces this transition to two main factors.

First, the emergence of notions of population. The development of statistics, Foucault (1991b) argues, led to fundamental shift in perspective, whereby aggregate dynamics of health, wealth and reproduction appear to be irreducible to those of its component parts, and particularly the family. This movement coincided with a
transformation in economic thought with the model of the family giving way to that of the population (until the eighteenth century, economy was synonymous with management of the household). For Foucault (1991b), this passage for crucial for explaining the rise to dominance of a model of political rule which ceases to be centred upon the welfare of the sovereign, like in mercantilism, to one principally concerned with that of the population, as with political economy. The model of the population, in fact, allowed the assumption of an essential continuity between the welfare of the ruler and that of the state as a whole to rely on a more solid model than that of the family.

Second, the growth of bio-power was hindered by the theory of sovereignty. The latter, Foucault (2001a: 80) argues, was based upon premises which renders it incompatible with the exercise of bio-power:

If it is true that the juridical discourse [of sovereignty] has been able to serve and represents a type of power, although, probably not in an exhaustive way, based upon extraction and death, it is absolutely heterogeneous to the new procedures of power which are based on technique and not right, on normalisation and not law, on control and not punishment and which are exercised at levels and forms which go beyond the State and its apparatus

And it is to tensions between bio-power and the theory of sovereignty that Foucault (1991a) traces delays in the deployment of bio-power and cahnes in the theory of sovereignty accompanying the development of bio-power. Hobbes' social contract and Rousseau's transformation upon it, for Foucault, represent two instances of the latter process.

However, as it is made apparent in his 1976 course, Foucault does not see Rousseau's social contract as the end point of the process. Foucault (1998: 181) emphasises how Roussevian thought lacked an essential element of nineteenth-century conceptions of sovereignty, in that it was
fundamentally a-historical. In France, the idea that subjective rights are grounded in the particular history of 'a nation', Foucault (1998: 147-85) claims, was initiated at the beginning of the eighteenth century by aristocratic historians like Boulainvilliers, as a weapon against the centralising efforts of the monarchy and in opposition, not as a product, of the social contract. In particular, Foucault focuses on two sources of differentiation with the latter. First, the founding subject instead of the savage is the barbarian. The barbarian, differently from the savage, lies at the edge, as opposed to outside, civilisation. In addition, whereas the savage is chiefly concerned with dynamics of exchange, the barbarian exercises domination. Second, related to the latter point, to the idea that the political order was based upon a contract, Boulainviellers opposed a conception of political right defined by the outcome of real wars between collective subjects cross-cutting the social body (nations).

According to Foucault, the French bourgeoisie continued to be framed into the idea that political legitimacy was grounded in the social contract and remained, on the whole, a-historical until the end of the eighteenth century. It is only with the revolution that the idea that the legitimacy of the political order was grounded upon the history of nations and their wars became adopted by the bourgeoisie. This movement, Foucault (1998: 186-205) adds, coincided with the birth of dialectical history.

Foucault reflections bear upon both the question of what factors led to the growth of state schooling and that of why this movement coincided with the rise of nationalism. With respect to the former, Foucault complements Green's (1992, 1997: ch. 2) idea that state systems of education are part of wider processes of state formation, by providing a more satisfactory explanation of its rhythm of growth. Foucault's idea that the emergence of conception of population precipitated processes of state formation has substantial parallels with De Swaan's (1988) argument that the rise of the welfare state resulted from the intensification of networks of dependency amongst social groups and
Boli and Ramirez's (1987a) conception of statism. However, Foucault's account has the advantage of moving beyond the broadly functionalist approach employed by these works in explaining the movement, as well as providing a fuller characterisation of the dynamics underlying the process. The argument that the transition from mercantilism to political economy associated to the emergence of ideas of population was an important factor behind the growth of bio-power shall be used in chapter five in order to account for the sudden growth of state schooling experienced by the Italian states from the later eighteenth century. Furthermore, the idea that the progress of bio-power was hindered by traditional conceptions of sovereignty allows us to explain why growth of state schooling was eased by the transition from absolutism to nation-state, moving beyond the limitations of teleological arguments such as Boli and Ramirez's (1987b) and of those which explain the correlation in terms of the manufactured nature of nations.

Foucault's discussion of the relationship between development of bio-power, the social contract and organic ways of imagining the state has substantial parallels with Breuilly's (1995) and Calhoun's (1997: 69-79) argument that the rise of nationalism was related to problems of political legitimacy brought about by the growth of the modern state. On the other hand, rather more satisfactorily than them, Foucault highlights how it was not merely the growth of the state, but the assertion of a particular technique of state formation, bio-power, which was conducive to the social contract and nationalism. In doing so, Foucault can account for why nationalist forms of democratic rule differed from traditional models, such as republicanism, in a way that Calhoun and Breuilly cannot (as well as other accounts linking nationalism to egalitarianism). Particularly useful in this respect is Foucault's emphasis on population in defining the conditions of exercise of bio-power. The perspective of population allows to move beyond the limitations of Calhoun's and Breuilly's reliance on modern
conceptions of civil society in explaining nationalism, in that it captures with greater accuracy the movement whereby 'the people' becomes conceived as possessing a particular organic identity, and does not rest on the dubious claim that civil society was responsible for introducing the idea that society acts as a guardian against abuses on the part of political power. The latter idea, for instance, as we shall see in chapter six, was already embedded in traditional conceptions of 'patria'. Furthermore, Foucault's account exhibits greater accuracy than Calhoun and Breuilly, by spelling in greater details what factors governed the transition from social contract to nationalism. Chapter six shows that nationalism was conceived of as an alternative to the social contract, hinting at inadequacies in Calhoun's argument that nationalism was a direct consequence of the application of the social contract (Breuilly concedes that historicism constituted a departure from the state/society framework, but falls short of accounting for why the transition took place). The perspective of bio-power helps explaining the movement leading to the eventual rise of dominance of the idea that subjective rights are grounded on national history, as opposed to the social contract, by stressing the conceptual problematic brought by a 'biological' subject of right. The idea that a type of power exercised as an instance of biological production of the body and the population was conducive to a vision of political right grounded in the history of the population is persuasive. This passage allowed conceiving of a subject of right, a citizen, which identity changes in accordance with the type of conditioning to which he/she is subjected to, as well as a type of power which optimal deployment is grounded upon the particular historical conditions of the population. In addition, this type of argument does not lack the support of more mainstream literature. There are, for instance, clear parallels with Smith's (1991: 96-7) claim that the rise of nationalism and historicism are associated to the ethical dilemmas introduced by the spread of science (albeit Smith emphasises tensions with religious, rather than within secular, thought). The importance of political economy in precipitating
nationalist conceptions of society is stressed also by Breuilly (1995) and Calhoun (1997). Finally, an association between processes of normalisation of the biological functioning of the body, anxiety about change and nationalism is emphasised by Mosse (1985).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented how the nature of the relationship between nationalism and state systems of education has been addressed by sociological literature, with reference to eight theorists in particular: Balibar, Boli and Ramirez, Green, Archer and Vaughan, Gellner, Breuilly, Calhoun and Foucault. The discussion has revolved around two basic questions: (a) what factors were responsible for the growth of state systems of education; (b) why the growth of state systems of education was conducive to nationalism. With respect to the first question, scholars focus on one or more of the following factors: the rise of the bourgeoisie, nationalism, industrialisation, and state formation. In the course of the presentation I have commented on merits and limitations of these explanations. Chapter five provides a more detailed discussion of the role of industrialisation, the bourgeoisie and state formation in explaining the origin of state systems of education in relation to Piedmontese and Italian evidence. The impact of nationalism is addressed in chapter six. As for the impact of state schooling on nationalism, the literature provides us with two main types of explanation. First, nationalism and state systems of education both obey to the logic of the egalitarian state, whereby the promotion of categorical identities around the state is perceived of paramount importance for its overall welfare. According to this perspective, nationalism is chiefly defined by the fact that it postulates cultural homogeneity within the boundaries of the state as being at once a precondition for state legitimacy and an end of the state. These principles were instrumental to the legitimisation of state systems of education aimed at breaking down sources of particularism within state.
boundaries. Second, the growth of the state provided the context for the emergence of modern doctrines of popular sovereignty. In turn, nationalism corresponded to the translation of democracy in practice. In concluding the final section, I have argued that this perspective neglects important discontinuities between contractualist thought, upon which democratic doctrines were grounded, and nationalism, particularly with reference to the relationship between history and citizenship. This issue will be developed in chapter six.
4. Research method

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to expound and justify the choice of method. The presentation is organised around four topics. After introducing the reader to historical sociology in the next section, the third section discusses why social structures of past societies are of concern for sociologists. The fourth section focuses on the relationship between structure and ideology. I shall then proceed to address issues of reliability in historical sociology and outline the data-gathering strategy. The conclusion summarises the main points made.

Historical sociology

Historical sociology, its proponents maintain, accounts for the set of relationships making possible the emergence of distinctive patterns of action in any given social context. In other words, historical sociology attends to the ways in which social change is structured (Burke, 1980: 13; Elias, 1983: ch. 1; Bendix, 1984: 6; Skocpol, 1984: 1-2). As it is often the case with definitions, such statements raise more questions than they answer. In particular, this section discusses to what extent the analysis of historical structures is peculiar to historical sociology.

The identity of historical sociology has been at the centre of much debate. The dominant position predicts that history and sociology are distinguished by different objectives and a different method, particularly in relation to what counts as valid evidence (e.g. see Smith, 1991; Goldthorpe, 1994; Mouzelis, 1994). According to this view, history is primarily concerned with the particular, whereas sociology strives for generalisation (nomothetic/ideographic distinction). Sociologists, this perspective maintains, treat each case as
representative of wider social trends. By contrast, historians seek to understand the particular case. In addition, historical sociologists tend to rely on secondary sources to a greater extent than historians. Within sociology, historical sociology claims a particular status for it relies on historical material in constructing theoretical arguments. This attribute differentiates historical sociology from the main body of the discipline, where survey data, field-work and documentary analysis of contemporary societies constitute the main sources of evidence.

Both historians and sociologists have questioned the validity of the distinction between history and sociology. Mann (1994) views sociology as defining a scientific approach to society. History may or may not be guided by such principles. Hence, history and sociology overlap, rather than defining separate forms of enquiry. Similarly, Skocpol (1984) qualifies as historical sociology also works interested in particular outcomes, as well others where a more explicit attempt to construct general arguments is made, provided they do it in a systematic way. From the other side of the disciplinary boundary, Carr (1990) rejects the whole idea that history is not concerned with the general. ‘The historian’, Carr (1990: 63-6) writes, ‘is not really interested in the unique but in what it is general in the unique … It is nonsense to say that generalisation is foreign to history; history thrives on generalisation’. In addition, Carr argues, sociology, if it wants to avoid the danger of being an unconscious apologist of a static society, ‘must become dynamic - a study not of society at rest (for no such society exists), but of social change and development’. Hence, ‘the more sociological history becomes, and the more historical sociology becomes, the better for both’. Abrams (1983) invites to an even more radical redrawing of the disciplinary boundaries. According to Abrams (1983: x; emphasis in original):

In my understanding of history and sociology there can be no relationship between them because, in terms of their fundamental
preoccupations, history and sociology are and always have been
the same thing. Both seek to understand the puzzle of human
agency and both seek to do so in terms of the process of social
structuring.

Unravelling the interplay between structure, what actors have to do,
and agency, what actors choose to do, Abrams maintains, defines both
the objectives of history and sociology, properly conceived. Moreover,
Abrams (1983: 3) adds, sociology is compelled to be historical in scope
by the fact that social structures are not 'things', but they change over
time. Within this context, time is that which allows to distinguish
between the contingent and the necessary, 'the social world is
essentially historical. Process is the link between action and structure'.

Abrams (1983) and Carr (1990) are correct in stressing that history is
not mere accumulation of knowledge about particular events of the
past. As argued at length by Carr (1990), the past is composed by a
potentially infinite number of facts, and yet only a few of them
constitute historical facts. Historical facts are distinctive in that they are
deemed by the historian to cast light on the nature of historical
processes. In turn, what historical processes are considered to be of
interest and the ways historians approach them are intrinsically linked
to the particular preoccupations of the day. The historian, in selecting
the type of questions and the material to tackle them, is guided by
motives which go beyond understanding the particular case. By
directing his/her gaze towards the past, the historian seeks to illuminate
aspects of the present, not simply enlarge our stock of knowledge of the
past. If, starting from the nineteenth century, the historical development
of societies has been at the centre of unprecedented attention, it is
because, in the wake of the development of human sciences, historical
knowledge came to be perceived as central to understanding the
possibilities for political intervention upon societies, not simply out of
a sudden curiosity for the past. 'History', Hegel (reproduced in Aiken,
1956: 89) wrote, 'is the exhibition of the Spirit in the process of working out the knowledge of that which is potentially'. If Hegelian notions of 'Spirit' now appear overlaid with problems of teleology and historical determinism, the aspect of studying the past in order to act consciously upon the present continues to characterise present-day historical enquiry. So, for instance, it is in the wake of the resurgence of ethnic conflicts and nationalist movements that historians have in recent years addressed the rise of nationalism in past societies, not merely thanks to the brilliance of scholars of nationalism or out of a fascination with the bizarreness of nationalist thought. There is no difference here between history and historical sociology, in either method or objectives.

Furthermore, few historians, I suspect, would subscribe to the idea that there work does not rest on a systematic approach, and Skocpol's (1984) and Mann's (1994) argument that history is less systematic than sociology is somewhat misleading. And yet, I believe there is something to be gained from granting historical sociology a separate status from history. It is difficult to deny that historical sociology exhibits a greater emphasis on the comparative value of each given historical case, as opposed to the presentation of original evidence. The work of historians on primary sources constitutes an essential tool for the historical sociologist, as well as other historians, and I see no good reason why the situation ought to be changed. Having said this, I feel sympathetic to the idea that historians and sociologists are compelled to exchange methods and interpretations by the fact that their aims and methodological orientations overlap to a significant degree.

**History and social change**

This section discusses in what ways social change renders an historical perspective useful and enriching. In particular, I single out four factors why the study of the past is of concern for sociologists: (a) social
patterns are sufficiently stable to allow meaningful comparisons with the past; (b) social change maybe so slow to need an historical perspective to be detected; (c) social structures are processes with a long memory; (d) the order of change is key to understanding the relationship between social processes and structures. In concluding the section, I touch upon the role of origins in sociological explanation.

Abrams' (1983) and Carr's (1990) argument that sociology needs to be historical in scope to do justice to the dynamic nature of society and social structures need some qualifications. To begin with, the fact that societies are dynamic does not necessarily imply that they cannot be meaningfully analysed as if they were static, and it is hard to share Abrams' imperialism. This point is made apparent if we compare sociology with geography, the study of territory. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Croce (reproduced in White, 1955: 48-9), the Italian philosopher, wrote:

Whatever that is being judged, is always an historical fact, a becoming, a process under way, for there are no immobile facts nor can such things be envisaged in the world of reality ... for example ... The stone is really a process under way, struggling against the forces of disintegration and yielding only bit by bit ... historical judgement is not a variety of knowledge, but it is knowledge itself; it is the form which completely fills and exhausts the field of knowing, leaving no room for anything else

There is no denying that even an object as static as a stone possesses dynamic properties. Few, on the other hand, would subscribe to Croce's uncompromising historicism and argue that geographers ought to abandon the study of contemporary territory because of this reason. The nature of stones is sufficiently stable to allow us to assume that it is as if they were 'immobile facts', for the purposes of gaining insights into their nature. Similarly, stating that the dynamic nature of societies
disqualifies synchronic analysis from being meaningful is falling back on the positivist utopia of reproducing society as it is. Even if there is no such thing as a 'society at rest', this factor by itself does not imply that some types of question cannot be addressed in terms of present developments. The historical and present oriented approaches are better viewed as complementing each other, rather than posing an alternative.

With respect to the question of why the historical perspective is useful, the assumption that societies change is a pre-condition for historical sociology to be meaningful. If societies were static objects, there would be no good reason to adventure into the uncertainties of the past. As stressed by Goldthorpe (1994), historical evidence is more costly to gather than data from contemporary society, and if we are to endorse an historical approach we need to have a good reason to do so. One such reason is that societies change, and hence certain aspects of them can be identified only by attending at their development over time. Were it not the case that societies change, the study of the past would not introduce any substantial advantage with respect to the analysis of present societies, and reliance on historical material would represent an unnecessary complication. The dynamic nature of society, on the other hand, does not automatically render historical sociology necessary. If societies were 'white noise', exhibiting no relationship to their past development, the study of the past would be of little help to the understanding of the present. A bit like trainspotting, studying the past would be a well worth activity for its entertainment value, but of little interest to the social scientist concerned with illuminating the nature of the societies we are living in. Historical sociology grounds its legitimacy on the assumption that past and present societies differ and yet they are related. It is the way that societies change, rather than merely that they change, that renders an historical perspective enriching. In particular, one can identify at least four such features.
First, social change is patterned, and patterns of change are sufficiently stable to provide meaningful analogies in the past. The study of social phenomena benefits from knowledge of the past because there is an essential similarity between past and present manifestations of a given phenomenon. When we study how a social phenomenon developed in the past, we assume that the past and present manifestations of the phenomenon are comparable, and thus its past unfolding constitutes a good predictor of its present nature and likely development. For instance, nineteenth-century nationalism is relevant to understanding contemporary nationalism because we assume that the two phenomena are, at least to some extent, analogous. In this respect, it is the relative stability of social structures, rather their continuously changing nature that renders history of interest to the sociologist. It is the fact that nationalism remained, on the whole, significantly similar to its prior self, not that it developed in another entity, that makes nineteenth-century nationalism a worthwhile field of enquiry for sociologists. In addition, the study of the past manifestations of the phenomenon exhibits substantial advantages over that of the present because the historian, unlike the observer of present societies, is a in a position to know how things turned out to be. This should not be taken as meaning that history will necessarily repeat itself or that the observed development of a given phenomenon was unavoidable. Italian nationalism eventually turned into fascism. This does not mean that nationalists inevitably become fascist. Nevertheless, the past experience is useful in gaining insights into the possibilities of change and, in this case, dangers associated with any given social process.

Second, sometimes (but by no means not always) the cycle of change is of the order of centuries, rather than decades, and thus its nature is revealed only by attending its development over the long period (on these issues see also Braudel, 1980). To use again the similitude with geography, the shape of continents is a case in point. The rhythm of change is so slow that to be detected, and therefore acquire meaning,
necessitates an historical (in this case pre-historical, even) perspective. The need to question the past arises out of the fact that change is very slow, not the dynamic nature of the elements of which the continent is composed. By analogy, social structures, while never completely stable, are nevertheless subject to enduring regularities. And it is the latter aspect, not the former that compels sociologists to widen the scope of their horizon to the centuries before us. For example, the institutional structure of schooling is subject to almost daily variations, through decrees, issuing of governmental instruction and other types of intervention. Nevertheless, in other respects, the institutional structure of contemporary schooling is remarkably similar to that of its nineteenth century-counterpart. In Piedmont, ever since 1848, schooling has been organised into elementary, secondary and further education, and all the children have been expected to be enrolled for a number of years. These aspects differentiate sharply modern and contemporary structures of schooling provision from those of the past, and it is customary to say that the nineteenth century brought about an ‘educational revolution’. In order to appreciate the extent to which such an assessment is accurate it is necessary to study the development of institutionalised education over the long period. Revolution conveys the idea of a sudden and radical change. Not unless one widens the angle beyond the nineteenth century does the extent to which the change brought about by nineteenth-century schooling promoters was sudden, as opposed to gradual, and radical, rather than conservative, becomes apparent. And this is because of the slowness of change, not the historically contingent nature of structures of schooling provision. It is because the organisation of schooling exhibits a significant degree of stability over time that an historical perspective adds to its understanding, not simply the dynamic nature of structures of schooling provision. Similar remarks can be made the study of nationalism. Perhaps the most debated issue in nationalist studies has concerned the question of when was the nation. One of the reason why this question has attracted so much attention is that the shape of ideologies and
associated forms of collective identification change slowly and subtly (another is sociologists' obsession with origins, which shall be discussed later). The methodological implication being that it is only through a patient work of reconstruction of their development over the long period that the ways in which they are particular emerge.

Third, social structures are processes with a very long memory. The past lives in the present a subterranean existence, which can be rendered explicit only by looking at the ways current formation came into being (Archer, 1979: 11-20; Smith, 1991; Bryant, 1994). So, for instance, as stressed by Abrams (1983: 1-2) himself, contemporary Italy’s political instability is not merely the result of the incompetence of the Italian political class, but is directly related to a history of political divisions. Knowledge of events occurring hundreds of years ago thus becomes an essential element towards the understanding of contemporary Italy. Similarly, to take an example from this research, the development of schooling in modern Piedmont was fundamentally shaped by the fact that it played a peripheral role in the Renaissance. The latter factor meant that absolutism developed earlier than elsewhere in the peninsula. In turn, early transition to absolutism had an impact on eighteenth-century developments, since the Savoyard State reformed the schooling system earlier than the other regional states and failed to pursue a policy of schooling growth. If at the beginning of the nineteenth century Piedmont’s schooling provision was amongst the lowest in Italy, it is not simply because its nineteenth-century political elite was more reactionary than elsewhere in the peninsula, but because of the way the Savoyard State developed over the whole of the early modern period. Not unless one expands the scope of analysis to cover the centuries preceding 1800 do these factors become apparent. That is not simply because societies change. On the contrary, knowledge of Renaissance Italy helps understanding contemporary Italy or nineteenth-century Piedmont because they share fundamental features.
It is the resilience of the past, not merely the dynamic nature of societies which renders the historical perspective useful and enriching.

Fourth, the temporal sequence of events is key to understanding the relationship between processes and structures (Skocpol, 1984). Mapping the historical development of social phenomena helps understanding what factors are more important in explaining their emergence. For example, if we are to assess the impact of ethnic heterogeneity on the development of a nationalist pedagogy, we might compare the type of pedagogy in place in Piedmontese school before and after the unification. If schooling became aimed at constructing a nation only after the unification, we can conclude that the ethnic heterogeneity brought about by the unification was an important factor in turning schools into a site of nationalist propaganda. As it turns out that was not the case, and hence we argue that ethnic heterogeneity is less important than some scholars would have us to believe in precipitating processes of nation-building. In a similar way, if we want to understand whether changes in techniques of state formation between the first half and the second half of the eighteenth century were important in precipitating growth schooling, we may compare educational reforms carried out in these two periods. A marked change in orientation with respect to diffusion of schooling supports the argument that something important happened between the first half and the second half of the eighteenth century.

In the paragraph above, I have been qualifying the idea that sociology needs to take an historical approach in order to do justice to the dynamic nature of social structures. My argument has been that the need for historical sociology arises out of the fact that the way societies change renders the past key to understanding contemporary social structures. Yet, more often than not, works in historical sociology only touch upon present societies. There are, of course, notable exceptions. For instance, Brubaker (1992) maps the development of citizenship
policies in France and Germany from the eighteenth century up to the present day. Similarly, Archer (1979) looks at how the structure of state systems of education in four different countries changed between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, that is hardly the norm. The historical sociology of schooling, for instance, almost always stops the analysis sometime between the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. Archer and Vaughan (1971) focus on the early phases of educational expansion, between the French revolution and 1848. Green (1992) begins the analysis in the sixteenth century to stop at around 1870, when Foster’s Education Act put the bases for an integrated system of education in England. A similar periodisation is adopted by Boli and Ramirez (1987b). De Swaan (1988) and Smelser (1991) cover the nineteenth century. Meyer et al. (1979) study developments of schooling occurring between 1870 and 1930.

The fact that historical sociologists of schooling focus on nineteenth-century developments, instead of carrying out the analysis up to the present day, is not simply the result of a division of labour, whereby historical sociologists study the past in order to prepare the ground for a more historically conscious analysis of the present. It is the consequence of the fact that the period between the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is when state systems of education similar to contemporary ones came into being, and that the intellectual trajectory of historical sociology (similarly to nationalism) is intrinsically linked to the quest for origins. Why are origins so important? Mann (1994: 39; emphasis in original) writes: ‘An historical causal analysis of origins considers the conditions which gave rise to modern institutions relevant to understanding their present nature and likely persistence’.

There are at least two problems associated with this approach. First, to a great extent, social phenomena acquire an identity, and therefore an origin, in relation to conventional parameters set by the researcher, and it is important not to confuse ideal types with reality. For instance,
Archer (1979) is able to date state systems of education with a yearly precision by defining state systems of education in relation to *de jure* governmental leadership, nation-wide diffusion and integration of the component parts. However, none of these attributes came out of the blue. The elements listed by Archer did not happen all at the same time giving rise to a coherent whole. They were the result of long, overlapping and uneven processes, manifesting themselves neither in complete isolation nor in a necessary relation to each other. If one were to slightly change the emphasis of Archer's definition (e.g. change *de jure* to *de facto*) one could come up with a very different dating than hers. As an illustration of this argument, take the Piedmontese case. In Piedmont, an integrated state educational system has been in place since 1729. However, processes of centralisation were under way at least since the counterreformation, in the sixteenth century. In addition, popular schooling started growing only from the later eighteenth century, when the Piedmont was invaded by the French army, and not until the second half of the nineteenth century was the great majority of the children in schooling age enrolled. We have here four possible dates for the origin of state systems of education in Piedmont, spread over a period spanning four centuries. Establishing when a phenomenon begins involves a good deal of arbitrariness, and social phenomena ought to be approached with due sensitivity to the ways in which they are dispersed through time. Origins are a working tool, not an historical datum. This point is worth stressing because, as proved also by the amount of controversy that has surrounded the question of ‘when was the nation’ within nationalist studies, scholars often tend to forget this fact.

Second, there is no good reason to believe that the origins of a phenomenon are of particular importance in defining its historical function. On this, Foucault (1991c: 79), citing Nietzsche, says: "The lofty origin is no more than "a metaphysical extension which arises from the belief that things are most precious and essential at the
moment of birth". Foucault touches here an important point. Mann’s (1994) argument implicitly assumes is that by attending at the ways a phenomenon came into being we can access to what historical conditions are responsible for its deployment and therefore the phenomenon’s present nature. This approach is grounded on the teleological assumption that the development of an institution corresponds to the coming to maturity of a process. As argued by Nietzsche (1991: 60; emphasis in original), the idea that the end of an institution, an idea or a thing is defined by the reason why it came into being is profoundly misleading:

the genetic cause of a thing and its final utility, as well as its effective usage and insertion within a system of ends, are facts toto coelo differentiated one from the other; something existing, which in some way came into being, is always interpreted in a novel way ... with new ends, taken away, manipulated and adapted to new objectives ... If one understands the utility of a physiological organ (or even a juridical institution, a social custom, a political habit, a given form in the arts or in the religious cult), this should not be taken as meaning that something has been understood about its origin ... ‘Evolution’ of a ‘thing’, of a custom, of an organ, hence, is an altogether different thing than its progressus towards a destination

Institutions, ideas and things can be employed to different ends depending on the will which governs it. Explaining the origin and the present function of institutions such as the nation-state or state systems of education poses different problems. While explaining their present nature and past developments are undoubtedly related tasks (for the reasons expounded above), they ought to be treated as different questions (it is less than clear that Foucault’s own historical works do not fall prey to this type of problem, which partly explains why he was particularly concerned with the question of the relationship between
origin and knowledge). For instance, in this research, I argue that the rise of nationalist ideology to dominance in nineteenth-century Piedmont was associated to the problem of legitimising the state’s leadership in schooling. However, it would be absurd to claim that contemporary manifestations of nationalism, such as the Northern League, are explained in terms of the attempt to further processes of centralisation of the schooling apparatus. On the contrary, to remain with the example of the Northern League, the opposite holds, and the promotion of a schooling curriculum tailored to the local conditions is a central aspect of the policy pursued by the party. Similarly, schooling emerged in medieval Europe as an institution to train the clergy. However, that gradually ceased to be either the primary or sole objective of the institution, and its conditions of emergence are a very poor predictor of its future developments. Notwithstanding the fact that the origins of schooling are intimately linked to the expansion of the Church, processes of secularisation coincided with a marked increase, not decrease, of its importance. Origins and subsequent developments correspond to different processes, and the historical conditions responsible for the initial deployment of a social phenomenon ought not to be seen as necessarily representative of its present functions.

On the other hand, the analysis of origins is methodologically justified (and, indeed, the present study relies heavily on this type of approach) by the fact that it allows to draw sharp contrasts. So, for instance, the ways in which nationalist ideology is particular are more easily identified by comparing nineteenth-century nation-states with absolutist states, rather than twentieth-century states, with which they exhibit greater ideological continuity. The possibility to draw sharp contrasts renders the study of the emergence of social phenomena particularly apt to identify the ways in which social phenomena are particular and, by implication, carry out causal analysis on what factors were responsible for their deployment. In short, I am not opposed to the study of origins. However, I am wary of charging it with metaphysical attributes.
Structure and ideology

Gone are the days when structure was seen as a unifying principle explaining in a relationship of subordination every aspect of social life, being this the class struggle, as in the Marxist tradition, or the functioning of complex societies, like in Durkheim and Parson. Two recurrent strategies in recent works in historical sociology are to either abandon the concept of structure altogether, as with post-modernism and anti-foundational thought, or, following Weber, to view structure in multiple terms.

With respect to the former strategy, I agree with Smaje's (2000: 33, 75) argument that the critique of a singular historical determination should not lead us to assume no historical determination at all. The theoretical advantage of embracing ambivalence in place of structure is dubious. At least since Weber, sociologists know that the claim to a transcendent epistemological status on the part of scientific enquiry can never be fully sustained. And yet this fact, by itself, does not prevent us to systematically attend to the ways in which the social world is patterned, and, in doing so, to gain insights into its functioning. Even if it is not possible to provide a complete account of the details and accidents giving shape to social life, it is nevertheless within the reach of the researcher to model enduring and recurrent manifestations of it.

Archer (1979) and Mann (1986; 1996) are examples of the latter approach. In opposition to the idea that the Marxist idea of labour as the single determinant of social life, they propose a multiple model of social structure, whereby other sources of power, such as ideological and political structures play an equally important role. In particular, here we shall concentrate on their discussion of ideology.
Archer (1979; see also Archer and Vaughan, 1971) assumes that there is a rough congruence between interests and values, and there are two basic reasons why that is the case. The first has to do with the nature of social structures, whereby structural conditioning implies that unless actors shape their values in accordance with their interests they incur punishment, to the result that, in the long-run, actors end up endorsing values corresponding to their interests. The second derives from the purposes of ideology. For Archer, the purposes of ideology are to justify dynamics of dominance or assertion on the part of a social group by making appear the desired outcome as universally progressive and providing a blueprint to direct action. In addition, Archer argues, the elaboration of an ideology is a pre-condition for assertive action to take place, as well as for dominion to be maintained. Nationalism in nineteenth-century France, for instance, is viewed by Archer as a middle-class ideology, instrumental to its challenge to the traditional dominion of the clergy over schooling. As she (1979: 115) puts it:

the bourgeois assertive group appealed to French Enlightenment thought and especially Diderot. His stress on utilitarianism, nationalism, and meritocracy captured their aims perfectly, specified precisely the type of education desired and negated the Catholic definition of instruction so successfully that even the Monarchy supported the expulsion of the Jesuit order

Archer admits two exceptions to the rule that actors’ values can be derived by their interests. Cross-cutting ties deriving from other struggles might imply that actors endorse belief contrary to their interests and more than one ideology can serve the same interests.

A similar conception of ideology is adopted by Mann (1986; 1996). Mann (1996: 227) writes:
To struggle successfully as a class or nation requires a meaning system embodying ultimate values, norms, and ritual and aesthetic practices. It requires ideology in the dual sense of immanent collective morale and a transcendent message to confer morality on one's own collective identity, to deny it to the opponent, to totalize the struggle, and to conceive of an alternative society worth the struggle.

As with Archer, for Mann ideology is a pre-condition for mobilising actors towards a given end. In addition, Mann shares with Archer the assumption that ideology is inherently universalistic in aspiration and particularistic in practice. However, Mann, more explicitly than Archer, rejects interest-driven theories of society on the grounds that in the name of ideology actors act against their stated interests. Hence, according to Mann, networks of emotional attachments, irreducible to the actors' interests, must be incorporated into an explanatory model. It is in this spirit that Mann argues that a pre-condition for nationalism to develop was the rise of institutional networks of literacy under the aegis of state builders and capitalist entrepreneurs.

Mann, more satisfactorily than Archer, allows understanding the mobilising force of nationalist ideology. Some of the acts committed in the name of the nation can be accounted for by Archer's scheme only as a momentary lapse of reason, and it is our duty towards nationalism's victims, as well as the perpetrators, to do better than that. However, Mann's approach evinces ultimately unsatisfactory materialist groundings, in that the emergence of a particular ideological pattern is explained solely in relation to the interests it represents and the institutional basis upon which the ideology rests. There are at least three problems associated with Mann's method.

First, it neglects the extent to which interests and group affiliations are defined by ideology. As argued by Foucault (1991a) discourse does not
masks the true identity of the subject, but produces it. Ideologues are at once expressions and producers of power relations. Take, for instance, nationalism. The idea that a nation constitutes an interest group is intrinsically linked to the rise of nationalist ideology. As stressed by Gellner (1983), to a large extent, it was nationalist ideologues that gave shape and content to the nation, rather than the other way round (see also Breuilly, 1995; Brubaker, 1997). Failing to recognise this fact corresponds to assuming that nations possess an interest and an identity independently of whether its members are aware of it. In other words, it entails assuming that the nation exists beyond itself, to the effect that the explanation of the ideology becomes coterminous with it. Furthermore, the type of the interests guiding the action of nations is fundamentally shaped by nationalism. As we mentioned earlier, Mann finds it difficult to accommodate actions such as rape, martyrdom and genocide within an instrumentalist framework of analysis. Mann’s suggestion of including institutional variables into the explanatory scheme goes some way in accounting for the emotional force of nationalism. It falls short, on the other hand, of explaining why determinate set of actions become identified as being in the nation’s interest in the first place. There is therefore a case for approaching ideology with greater sensitivity to the ways in which dynamics of group formation and interest definition are shaped by ideology, rather than providing the a priori ground for its development.

Second, not only, as conceded by Archer different ideologies can serve the same interests, but the same ideology can serve different, even opposite interests. As various scholars have pointed out (e.g. Smith, 1991; Breuilly, 1995), nationalism was used as a vehicle to further the interests of diverse groups, and it makes little sense to view nationalism as the ideology of any one class, being that the bourgeoisie or others. In Archer’s own earlier work (Archer and Vaughan, 1972), she herself associates nationalism to secular projects in France and to religious dominion in England. This should not be taken as implying that, as De
Swaan argues (1988: 8), since ideas lend themselves to contradictory policies and action, the analysis of ideology is of little explanatory help. Ideologies lend themselves to legitimise contradictory actions. Nevertheless, ideologies are not equally compatible with an infinite pattern of actions. Ideology has a constraining, albeit not deterministic, role in guiding action. Equally, the above argument does not imply that interests are irrelevant to account for the emergence of particular ideological crystallisations. Dynamics of interest have an impact upon what aspects a particular ideology become more prominent at any given time. So, for instance, the rise of Italian nationalism, I argue, is linked to the attempt to legitimise state schooling, and some of its features, such as an emphasis on the constructed nature of the citizen and the transformative power of the nation-state, can be directly related to this end. And yet by themselves, explaining ideology solely in terms of the interests it serves fails to capture how ideology can be bent towards manifold directions. Ideologies are better viewed as defining arenas of struggle between competing elite, providing a set of symbolic resources which can be mobilised towards different ends.

Third, the development of ideological configurations finds its ground upon pre-existing ideological traditions, rather than simply reflecting the creativity of the actors and their interests. To use Zimmer’s (2003: 174) words, ‘While ideological innovation is by no means impossible, such innovation tends to take the form of novel combinations rather than pure invention’ (see also Wagner, 1986; Smaje, 2000). Again I take as an example nationalism. Nationalist ideologues introduced substantial innovations with respect to traditional doctrines of political legitimacy. Nevertheless they drew upon a pre-existing symbolic repertoire, and it is hard to explain nationalism outside the biblical tradition of the ‘chosen people’, medieval patriotism and the social contract. Therefore, when accounting for the emergence of a particular ideology it is necessary to attend at the ideological context within which agents operate. In addition, logical tensions embedded within a
particular ideological structure are important in accounting for its developments, in that logical contradictions lend themselves to be challenged by asserting and descending groups looking for arguments to challenge the grounds of dominance and assertion. For instance, as we are going to see in the empirical chapters, tensions between the logic of development of the post-mercantilist state and the social contract opened the way for the Catholic Church’s strategy of defence of its prerogatives in education as well as the nationalist’s challenge to them.

**Historical sociology and evidence**

History has always being rewritten ... Each period takes it over and stamps it with its dominant slant of thought. Praise and blame are apportioned accordingly. All this drags on until the matter itself becomes unrecognisable. Then nothing can help except a return to the original evidence. But would we study it at all without the impulse of the present? ... Is a completely true history possible? (Ranke, cited in Elias, 1983: 4)

With these words, the nineteenth-century German historian Ranke summarises with admirable economy some of the most serious problems one faces when addressing historical material. The position of the historian as a member of society, as well as the position society accords to history, prevents one from making any ultimate claim to objectivity. The answer to Ranke’s question is, without doubts, no, ‘completely true history’ is not possible. What we look for in history is bound to shape what we see, and history, almost inevitably, will be bent towards one’s own objective. If we identify patterns and these conform to an overall logic development, this is not simply because we observe the manifestation of underlying social forces, but because, as researchers, that is what we look for in the data. What type of patterns emerge is intrinsically linked to what variables we focus upon. Our
particular social identity is of fundamental importance in determining what types of explanation we feel more sympathetic to and, by implication, which ones appear to be more persuasive.

These problems are particularly serious in historical sociology, where the fact that the scope of the enquiry tends to cover a number of societies over long periods of time forces the researcher to greater reliance on secondary sources, with the result that the danger of selecting material solely on the bases of the logic of the argument becomes particularly severe. Even if the position of the researcher cannot be completely transcended, there are nevertheless ways of minimising the dangers of employing evidence in a purely instrumental way. These issues have recently been at the centre of a symposium on the *British Journal of Sociology*. In what follows, I summarise the main lines of the debate. I then proceed to outline the data-gathering strategy I employ in the empirical chapters.

For Goldthorpe (1994: 64-7), the use of secondary sources is problematic because ‘historical facts may be understood as simply ‘inferences from relics’, which are made with very varying degrees of security and which, moreover, typically represent highly interdependent elements within complex, and inevitably contestable, interpretative schemes’. Thus, the tendency among historical sociologists of treating secondary sources ‘as if they were an assemblage of relatively discrete and stable identities’ is wanting. The results of this lack of self-reflexivity, Goldthorpe continues, are ‘serious weaknesses in their work in the linkage between evidence and argument: this was often tenuous and arbitrary to quite unacceptable degree’.

To this charge, historical sociologists reply with three types of argument. First, the charges Goldthorpe advances against the evidence used by historical sociologists can be applied also to fieldwork and survey data. For instance, Bryant (1994: 5) argues: ‘finitude and
incompleteness, after all, seem to be characteristic of most forms of scientific enquiry'. On the contrary, the fact that historians often have a more limited degree of control over the sample than sociologists do results in less biased accounts. Second, historical sociologists are not passive receivers. This is valid both for the academic community as a whole, where scrutinising the accuracy of the evidence constitutes one of the favourite pastime, and the single researcher. As stressed by Hart (1994: 28) and Mann (1994: 40-1), historical sociologists have the ability to critically engage with their sources. By attending at the way arguments are constructed and comparing various accounts, historical sociologists are able to analyse data from fresh angles without necessarily falling pray to the tricks of the historian. Third, Bryant (1994: 13-4) notices how Goldthorpe overlooks how historians are concerned with reportage as well as interpretation, where reportage means information regarding basic questions such as who, where, when, how many etc. Whereas they tend to be interwoven, he argues, it is possible for the attentive reader to distinguish between the two and treat basic information as safe.

I agree that Goldthorpe (1994) overstates the peculiarity of historical knowledge. Being contested is a feature of scientific knowledge in general, rather than being specific to history. Confrontation between different positions and questioning received truths are essential elements of any type of scientific enquiry. This factor does not prevent scientists to treat findings of others as if they were facts, for else any type of scientific knowledge would be impossible. The contested nature of evidence does not by itself renders science meaningless. If the failures of science makes us aware of the dangers associated to the scientific method, its successes renders the opportunities exhibited by it undeniable.

Bryant (1994) neglects the extent to which establishing simple historical facts, such as the author of a treatise or the number of schools
in a given historical context, can give rise to conflicting interpretations. On the other hand, he strikes a good point by emphasising how history is characterised by areas of agreement as well as dispute. No historian in his right state of mind would hope to base his work entirely on primary sources, and feels confident to do so because many aspects of our histories have been covered very well indeed. Neglecting these information would be arrogant. There is no a priori reason to believe that the research on primary sources on the part of sociologists would deliver more accurate accounts. On the contrary, the fact that historians are more accustomed to dealing with primary sources means that the opposite holds.

On the other hand, we can agree with Goldthorpe that historical material should be approached with special care. Mann (1994) and Hart (1994) are correct in stressing that sociologists can critically engage with the sources. However, they overstate the extent to which sociological training, by itself, enables to evaluate historical evidence. Comparing sources and assessing the quality of historical interpretations demands familiarity with the type of evidence employed by historians as well as the historical context. This fact has two main consequences. First, relying exclusively on secondary sources as advocated, for instance, by De Swaan (1988), is less safe than he claims. Second, historical sociologists ought to concentrate less on ‘big structures, large processes, huge comparisons’, to use Tilly’s (1984) expression, and spend more time becoming familiar with the particular case(s).

To enter into the specifics of this research, the evidence is based on both primary and secondary literature. The empirical analysis is based upon the development of state schooling, on the one hand, and the institutionalisation of a nationalist (i.e. aimed at constructing a nation) pedagogy, on the other. In particular, to map these processes I rely on three types of evidence: quantitative data on schooling diffusion,
institutional history of schooling and writings of intellectuals on state and schooling.

The relative abundance of published quantitative data on schooling diffusion in modern Italy has meant that it has been possible to base the quantitative analysis almost exclusively on published sources. The presentation of quantitative data cover the period between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries. The periodisation reflects two basic concerns. First, to evaluate the scale of the change occurring between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries it is necessary to compare it with the size of the provision in place in the previous centuries. Second, the Renaissance was an important period in terms of state and schooling developments in Italy. Therefore, some knowledge of the Renaissance is needed to interpret later developments. Data from areas other than Piedmont, particularly other Italian regions, have been presented in order to characterise the particular development of schooling in Piedmont. In addition, I present published data on schooling diffusion across and within regions and industrialisation rates in post-unification Italy in order assess the impact of industrialisation and other factors on schooling diffusion. Merits and problems associated with the measuring techniques employed by quantitative historians of schooling are discussed in chapter five. Here, I shall limit myself to comment that while quantitative analysis provides a useful complement to institutional analysis while mapping state schooling, since it renders explicit divergences between patterns of intervention and patterns of growth and renders clear the scale of the change occurring between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it cannot serve as a substitute for it. The means of intervention are as important as the results in order to interpret schooling developments.

By institutional developments, I mean history of changes in the organisational structure of the schooling provision, curriculum and pedagogy. Following the approach indicated by 'new sociology of
education' (e.g. Young, 1971), curriculum and pedagogy have a central part in the analysis, particularly in relation to characterising the intentions of schooling promoters. The evidence is drawn from secondary sources, published and unpublished legislative and administrative interventions, and theoretical writings on state schooling. In Italy, secondary literature on the institutional history of schooling concentrates on juridical and administrative developments at the elite level, to the result that little is known of the extent to which instruction were followed and shaped by the action of intermediate agents, such as families, teachers, inspectors and councils, as well as the recipients of schooling, the children. In selecting the evidence, I followed the same strategy. Not because I think that the behaviour of intermediate agents and children are unimportant, but because elite data are rich enough to provide enough material for a meaningful analysis to be carried out, and, since the actions of those in authority is better documented, in the economy of the work it has been preferred to concentrate on this type of evidence.

Finally, in keeping with the type of approach outlined in the previous section, I take ideology seriously. In other words, I pay attention to the overall logic of dominant structures of thought to explain any given outcome. Following a similar approach to Archer and Vaughan (1972) and Green (1992), educational ideologies are studied through writings of key intellectual figures and senior officials setting the agenda of educational policies. These include writings of Muratori, Leprotti, Genovesi, Carli, Gorani, Filangieri and Casati. Even if some of these authors came from context other than Piedmont, the fact that their writings were read across Italy renders their thought relevant to interpret Piedmontese developments. In addition the study of ideology is aimed at characterising nationalist conceptions of citizenship and attend at the intellectual context that led to their development. In line with the approach taken by sociological works on nationalism, such as Chatterjee (1993: ch. 11), Breuilly (1995: ch. 2), Llobera (1996: ch. 7)
and Calhoun (1997: ch. 5), nationalist conceptions of citizenship are analysed through writings of major Italian political thinkers, particularly Doria, Muratori, Amidei, Mazzini and B. Spaventa.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have been discussing what a sociological approach to the study of history promises to yield and outlined the approach I intend to pursue. To summarise the main points, firstly, even if history and historical sociology do not differ a great deal in terms of objective and overall methodological orientation, I have been arguing in favour of a particular status for historical sociology, grounded in a greater emphasis on the comparative value of each given case, as opposed to the presentation of original evidence. Secondly, I have qualified the assertion that historical sociology grounds its legitimacy in the dynamic nature of social structures, by arguing that it is the way they change that it renders an historical approach enriching, singling out four such features: (a) social pattern are sufficiently stable to allow meaningful comparisons with the past; (b) social change maybe so slow to need an historical perspective to be detected; (c) social structures are processes with a long memory; (d) the order of change is key to understanding the relationship between social processes and structures. In addition, I touched upon the role of origins in sociological explanation, stressing that while the analysis of origins is methodologically justified, since it allows to draw sharp contrasts, it is important not to charge origins with metaphysical attributes. Thirdly, I have been advocating an explanatory role for ideological structures autonomously of structures of interests on the grounds that to a large extent interests and group affiliations are defined by ideology, the same ideology can serve different interests, and ideological developments find their ground upon pre-existing traditions. Finally, we have been discussing problems of reliability in works of historical sociology, emphasising how evaluating historical evidence demands some familiarity with the historical
context and the historiographical evidence, and presented the data-gathering strategy adopted in the present research. The next two chapters illustrate an empirical application of the type of historical sociology advocated in the discussion, starting with an analysis of the growth of state schooling in Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
5. Universal schooling in Piedmont

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to account for the origin of universal schooling in Piedmont. By origin of universal schooling, I mean the transition from a situation where a minority of the children attend schools to one where almost all of them do it for a number of years. The discussion draws mainly from the historical sociology of schooling (Archer and Vaughan, 1972; Archer, 1979; Boli and Ramirez, 1987b; De Swaan, 1988: ch. 3; Smelser, 1991; Green, 1992). Differently from the approach taken by these works, however, the focus of the analysis is on quantitative growth. In shifting the focus from state systems of education to universal schooling, I seek to give greater relevance to the facts that institutional developments, while related to processes of growth, do not mirror them in a transparent or univocal way.

The discussion focuses on the impact of industrialisation, rise of the bourgeoisie and state formation on the development of universal schooling in Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To anticipate the main conclusions, whereas both industrialisation and the rise of the bourgeoisie had a positive effect on growth of schooling, the origin of universal schooling cannot be explained solely in relation to these processes. Following the approach of Green (1992) (see also Boli and Ramirez, 1987b; De Swaan, 1988), I argue that that the growth of state schooling was part of wider processes of state formation, and the particular trajectory of state formation of Piedmont was decisive in shaping patterns of growth across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, I operate two basic transformations upon Green's explanatory framework. First, I emphasise discontinuities with respect to popular schooling in early modern and modern techniques of state formation. In particular, I show that in Italy state
formation became strongly associated with schooling expansion only starting from the second half of the eighteenth century. To explain the transition, I draw from Foucault's (1991b; 2001a) writings on bio-power and stress the importance of changes in dominant perspectives in economic thought, away from mercantilism. Second, I explore the different effect of liberalism on the development of the state schooling system across England and Piedmont. In doing so, I distinguish between liberal critiques to state-led schooling systems on grounds of efficiency and those grounded in right, and argue that the framework of legitimacy associated to classical liberal philosophy, more unambiguously than *laissez faire* liberalism, acted as an obstacle towards the development of state-led schooling systems.

The chapter is organised as follows. After expounding the method of measurement, I map the rhythm of growth of schooling in modern Piedmont. The following three sections discuss the impact of industrialisation, rise of the bourgeoisie and state formation on patterns of growth of schooling in Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In conclusion, I summarise the main results of the enquiry.

**Measuring schooling**

Since the 1970s, the growth of schooling in Italy has been at the centre of growing attention on the part of social historians, and even if we are still far from having a complete picture at our disposal, long-term trends have been studied in enough details to allow meaningful comparisons to be drawn relying on published sources alone. On the other hand, the limitations of indicators of growth of schooling must be kept in mind before they can be put into use. The objective of this section is to discuss strengths and weaknesses of the various indicators I employ to measure growth of schooling.
Growth of schooling manifests itself in two ways. Either a growing share of the population attends schools, or children stay in schools for longer. The focus of this analysis is on the former. To measure it, I employ the following indicators.

In Piedmont, the state started to gather statistics on the provision of elementary education in the nineteenth century. Hence, for the early modern period I have been forced to rely heavily on the estimates of historians. Estimates are based on incomplete information and involve a good deal of guess-work, reflecting more or less justified expectations on the part of the historian on variables such as demographic trends, distribution of schooling across areas, number of unofficial schools, and quality of the data reproduced in the documents. Whenever I encountered conflicting accounts, I regarded the assessment supported by better data as more reliable.

Estimates of growth of schooling take three basic forms: number of schools, enrolment and literacy rates. Traditionally, the latter constitutes the main tool employed to measure overall levels of instruction in pre-industrial societies, the main reason being that they are relatively easy to gather through documents, particularly marriage registries, were the signature is required. Typically, the only attempt to measure long-term trends in schooling provision in Piedmont, Cipolla (1969), is based almost exclusively on literacy rates. However, as a measure of schooling diffusion literacy rates exhibit serious limitations (and, as we shall see, Cipolla’s account is, in fact, flawed). Melton (1988: 8-9) and Brizzi (cited in Toscani, 1993: 182-3) argue that, in the early modern period, not all types of school put equal emphasis on literacy, and thus low literacy levels can be found in connection with high schooling diffusion. I consider the opposite kind of relationship more likely. Whereas, certainly from the second half of the eighteenth century, one can expect all those who have been in school to be able to sign their name, schooling is by no means the only site where literacy,
and basic literacy in particular, is acquired. In addition, distribution of literacy are affected by growth of schooling only with a certain time-lag. Thus, firstly, literacy rates tend to be greater than schooling attendance. Secondly, the distribution of literacy does not necessarily mirror that of schooling at any given moment. Thirdly, while schooling expansion leads to greater literacy, rising literacy does not necessarily imply a greater schooling provision. For these reasons, I have been using literacy rates as a proxy of schooling availability only in the absence of better measurements, complementing them with qualitative evidence, or to confirm the accuracy of other indicators.

Numbers of schools and enrolment rates are related to diffusion of schooling in a more direct way than literacy rates, and whenever conflicting results appear, I consider them more reliable. On the other hand, they are not without their problems. Estimates of number of schools and enrolment rates are mostly based on data reproduced on administrative documents of the local secular and religious authorities. These are bound to be incomplete, in that the intensity of control upon diffusion of schooling, particularly before the eighteenth century, was weak. In addition, numbers of schools identifies with a certain precision the trend, but can be misleading unless the information include their size and do not tell much about overall levels of diffusion. In these respect enrolment rates offer a more complete picture, and they will be our main indicator. However, enrolment rates measure changes in the length of schooling attendance as well as growth in the number of students, and do not give accurate information on how regular the attendance is. In addition, typically these data are costly to acquire, for the lack of regular statistics implies that the relevant information tends to be scattered across a variety of documents. The result being that we have at our disposal only a few snapshots, often limited to a certain area. If the coverage is detailed enough starting from the eighteenth century, this is not the case for the preceding period (in any case this problem is not too serious, as the analysis concentrates upon the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and data from the centuries before are presented chiefly to set the context and provide a contrast).

With the nineteenth century the data becomes significantly better. First, the presence of government statistics implies that less guess-work is involved and measurements are more frequent. Second, the fact that schooling becomes more standardised implies that it is safer to assume a typical path of attendance, with the result that enrolment rates become more representative of overall levels of diffusion. Third, increasing attention on the part of the authorities on popular education implies that statistics become more accurate as the century progresses (even though this factor might have also an opposite effect. For instance, the growth of schooling in Piedmont in the period leading to the unification is almost too fast to be believed, and it may well be that the statistics had been swelled in order to support the Piedmontese bid for leadership in post-unification Italy). Fourth, after the unification statistics become gathered according to a uniform method, and the results can be compared across regions more directly (Vigo, 1971: 132-4).

Yet government statistics leave some periods uncovered and are bound to contain serious errors. Both because of technical reasons and the type of incentives faced by the agencies (families, pupils, teachers, inspectors, councils, state) involved in the data collection, which, in the Italian case, by and large, remain to be ascertained. To minimise the possibility of making wrong assessments and fill the gaps, whenever available, I checked the accuracy of the results emerging from enrolment rates against other indicators. These include literacy rates, number of teachers, and boroughs and towns with at least one elementary school.
Quantitative growth, 1200-1900

In what follows, I measure the rhythm of growth of schooling between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries in Piedmont and post-unification Italy. The aim of the operation is twofold. First, introduce the reader to the origin of universal schooling in Italy and the comparative position of Piedmont in the process. Second, provide an empirical base for the theoretical discussion. The presentation is chronological. After quickly looking at the Renaissance school, I cover developments between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The final part is dedicated to the nineteenth century.

In Italy, the period between the thirteenth and the first half of the sixteenth centuries witnessed a marked increase of the provision of schooling on the part of the local authorities for the urban elite, merchants and their employees, and to a lesser extent, the populace. Similarly to contemporary schooling, the curriculum of the Renaissance school was centred around literacy and numeracy. Administrative documents testify that by the later thirteenth century in the Italian city-states schooling had reached a respectable diffusion. In 1288, Milan employed about 70 teachers of grammar for pre-university education, and there is evidence that similar movements were occurring in other cities, such as Genoa, Verona, Bassano, San Gimignano and Bologna. Piedmont, while arguably not at the centre of this movement, was not untouched, and municipalities were providing free education for the poor in Turin, Ivrea and Pinerolo from the fifteenth century. By the closure of the sixteenth century, schooling was attended by a sizeable portion of the male, and to a lesser extent female, urban population of the Renaissance core. In Florence in 1480 about 28 percent of the boys aged between 11 and 13 were attending regular schools. Given the high standing of Florence at the time, the figure is likely to be exceptionally high, and about one century later, in 1587, boys’ attendance to regular
schools in Venice was at 26 percent (against about 11 percent of females in convents and popular schools). In Venice, schools for the poor, both males and females, were much less diffused, but their impact was not negligible, about 6.5 percent of the children (Grendler, 1991: 7-8, 53, 87, 116, 118).

According to Cipolla (1969: 53, 63), the progress of elementary education in early modern Piedmont did not follow a linear pattern. In the seventeenth century, in Italy the growth of popular educations was hindered by economic crises and the decline of cities, with the church concentrating on the education of the children of the elite. By contrast, in eighteenth-century Piedmont, in the wake of a social, economic and artistic revival, basic literacy advanced rapidly.

Cipolla (1969: 53) does not produce any data for the seventeenth century, and his assessment on the poor state of elementary education in seventeenth-century Italy is suspiciously in line with Cipolla’s general argument that economic development is the main factor behind schooling expansion. There is little controversy about the fact that the seventeenth century was not a felicitous period for the university of Turin (Balani and Roggero, 1976: 55; Ricuperati and Roggero, 1977: 225-6). However, the university is not the school, and historians of early modern schooling in Italy are less prone than Cipolla to dismiss the effort of the church towards popular education (see Balani and Roggero, 1976: 16-7; Brizzi, 1982: 906; Grendler, 1991: 360).

The availability of quantitative data for the seventeenth century is too limited to settle the question. Estimates of literacy rates show that by the beginning of the eighteenth century the diffusion of literacy in Turin was not comparable to that of the best endowed European areas (Stone, 1966; Duglio, 1971). The idea that the seventeenth century was a period of slow development for schooling is supported also by data on the foundation of popular schools in Piedmont. According to
Berardi's (1982: 36) account, Duboin (1818-69), in his collection of official interventions (laws, edicts, patents and posters) of the Savoyard Kingdom registers only two foundations in the seventeenth century (1610 and 1699), and none in the central part of the century. This figure compares with five registered foundations in the course of the eighteenth century (1717, 1719, 1743, 1769, 1772 and 1789). However, the difference between the two figures is small, and it might simply due to greater availability of data, or signal an intensification of control upon diffusion of popular schools.

A similar estimate for Lombardy, based on primary sources, while confirming a slowing down of the pace of growth of schooling in the central part of the seventeenth century, invites to a reassessment of the actual impact of the decline:

Table 5.1

Registered foundations of popular schools in Lombardy, 1570-1760

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Foundations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1570-1630</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1631-1680</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1681-1735</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1736-1760</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition, in sharp contrast to Cipolla’s (1969: 53, 63) prediction on educational trends in early modern Piedmont, the secondary sector expanded in the course of the seventeenth century, but not in the eighteenth. In the Savoy dominions, between 1561 and 1679 the Jesuits established schools in nine cities (Roggero, 1981: 17). By 1729 there were 45 secondary schools managed by the Jesuits and other religious orders spread homogeneously around the territories of Piedmont and Savoy. Although we do not know much about the state of the provision before, the Jesuit intervention is normally accounted for by historians in terms of foundation, rather than replacement, and the fact that the size of the system did not increase in the course of the eighteenth
century testifies that the secondary sector had reached a respectable magnitude. The eighteenth century did not witness a significant growth of either size or number of secondary schools. In the aftermath of 1729 reforms, the number of colleges in Piedmont and Savoy decreased from 45 to 31, to rise to 41 by 1772 (Roggero, 1981: Appendix). The size of schools remained stable in the course of the century with the number of the registered employees rising from 313 in 1739-40 to 405 in 1771-2\textsuperscript{21} (hence, about 10 employees for each school).

In short, even if the data broadly confirms Cipolla's assessment on the poor state of elementary education in seventeenth century Piedmont, there are reasons to believe that the seventeenth-century crises was less marked than Cipolla maintains. What is more clear is that, as we are now going to see, Piedmont failed to experience a boom in the eighteenth century.

Cipolla (1969: 63) supports his claim on the rapid growth of elementary education in eighteenth-century Piedmont by saying that in 1740 about 76 percent of the bakers working in Turin could sign their name, for the figure to rise to 96 percent by 1796, and his assessment on rapidly rising literacy levels in eighteenth-century Piedmont is confirmed by other sources. According to Duglio's (1971: 495-7) estimates, literacy rates rose steadily between 1710 and 1790 in Turin and the province. Particularly in the latter, Duglio registers a marked increase, from 21 percent to 65 percent for the males and from 6 percent to 30 percent for the females. By the closure of the century, in an isolated village of the country-side, Candiolo, half the men could sign their name in a petition (similar estimates in France in the same period rates rural male literacy at between 20 percent and 60 percent depending on the area) (Roggero, 1992: 140). On the other hand, rising literacy levels do not necessarily imply that the schooling provision was growing at similar rates. As it turns out, that was not the case.
According to Ricuperati (1982: 996), Lombardy and Piedmont constructed a state system of education more systematically than anywhere else in Italy, with the result that by the end of the eighteenth century basic education was quite diffuse. However, Ricuperati does not support this claim with any data, and while there is evidence that by the beginning of the nineteenth century schooling had reached mass proportions in Lombardy (see table 5.2), in Piedmont the effect of the educational reforms was ambivalent at best, if not outright conservative.

As we have seen earlier, the eighteenth century did not witness an increase in the size of the secondary sector, upon which the attention of the monarchy concentrated. The only data available on diffusion of primary and elementary schools in the eighteenth century is for the capital, where the supply did not progress in any significant way, either as a result or after the educational reforms. In Turin, in 1738 the king opened six primary classes (i.e. aimed at preparing for the secondary school), which occasionally were admitting poor children free of charge. However, other data shows that expansion of popular access to schooling is not what the absolutist state was after. First, in connection with the operation all the schools for the poor (four at the beginning of the century) were closed down, to be opened again, two, towards the end of the eighteenth century by a religious order (Berardi, 1982: 36; Roggero, 1992: 145). Second, in contrast to the religious system (which was free), substantial fees were introduced to register in the primary class. Third, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the number of official primary schools had not increased, and in 1807 there were still only six state elementary schools (Roggero, 1992: 177). Even if educational institutions had been closed down in the wake of the political and financial crises of the later eighteenth century, this should be more than offset by the French and Austrian administrations, which in the intervening period both sought to implement compulsory education (1799 and 1812 respectively), and a greater diffusion in the
course of the eighteenth century is unlikely. Fifth, the overall level of attendance remained limited. According to Roggero’s (1992: 178) estimate, in 1807 about one fourth of the boys aged between seven and fourteen were attending some school for a period of time. This figure is about the same, if a little smaller, as enrolment rates in Florence more than four centuries before (Grendler, 1991: 53).

Turin is not the whole of Piedmont, and it may well be that schooling expanded more quickly elsewhere, in the wake of processes of integration between centre and periphery. As we have mentioned earlier, literacy rates rose in the province more rapidly than in the capital. In the territories of neighbouring areas, Lombardy and the Republic of Venice, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, schooling was considerably spread also in territories distant from the capital (Vigo, 1971: 89). Similarly, the first data at our disposal for Piedmont (1850) shows that Turin lagged behind the province of Ivrea and the provision in the capital was only marginally greater than in Vercelli (Vigo, 1971: 100-1, 119). On the other hand, the rest of the region was significantly worse endowed. In addition, firstly, in contrast to Lombardy and the Republic of Venice, the Savoyard monarchy started pursuing a policy of educational expansion only in the nineteenth century (Genovesi, 1999; Roggero, 2002). Secondly, the data on Turin indicate that in the eighteenth century the development of primary education closely followed that of the secondary sector, which, as we mentioned earlier, did not expand in the course of the eighteenth century. Thirdly, the number of registered foundations of popular schools in the course of the eighteenth century in the Kingdom’s mainland was low (five) (Berardi, 1982: 36). Fourthly, nineteenth-century data show that at the beginning of the 1840s elementary schools were still absent from the great part of the Kingdom’s mainland (see table 5.5). Hence, too different a scenario is unlikely.

What is more, by the beginning of the nineteenth century schooling in
Turin was significantly less diffuse than in other Italian regions:

Table 5.2

Ratio of schoolboys over male population aged 6-12 in Italy at the beginning of the nineteenth century (1810 ca) by region (percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>62</th>
<th>41</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>16</th>
<th>32</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turin</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombard departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Venetian departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emilian departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marchigian departments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kingdom of Naples</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 The figure for Turin refers to 1807 and the age range is 7-14.
2 The figure for the Kingdom of Naples refers to 1814.

Sources: Vigo (1971: 89); Roggero (1992: 178).

These data are based upon statistics gathered by the French administration. Conceivably, fourteen years of discontinuous and uncertain rule were too short a time for the French to significantly alter the distribution of schooling across regions, and these figures can be regarded as representative of the legacy of the ancien régime (with the possible exception of the data on Naples, since the period between 1809 and 1814 witnessed a marked acceleration in the pace of expansion; Brambilla, 1972: 522). Due to the different age range these figures exaggerate the poorness of the provision in Turin. Nevertheless, according to Roggero (1992: 177), the capital was considerably better endowed than the rest of Piedmont and the statistics of Turin, differently from the others, include non-official schools (which accounted for almost half of the total estimated attendance). Hence, the indication that schooling diffusion at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Piedmont was significantly lower than in Lombardy, Venice and the Kingdom of Naples.

Brambilla (1972: 522) warns us that statistics from the French period contain serious errors, and there is a risk of getting the wrong message, even at a broad level of comparison. Yet, other sources confirm the
scenario emerging from table 5.2. Comparatively high diffusion in Venice and, to a lesser extent, in Naples is supported by data on number of schools. By 1792 there were forty primary schools in Naples (Sani, cited in Genovesi, 1999: 25). Venice in 1786 counted nineteen public schools and about three-hundred private teachers (Scarabello, 1992: 638-9). These data, I remind you, compare with six elementary schools in Turin in 1807, where the population was about one fourth of Naples and two-thirds of Venice (Woolf, 1979: 283-4; Roggero, 1992: 177). The Lombard’s leadership is confirmed by nineteenth-century data (see table 5.4), as well as the high rate of growth registered by Toscani (1993: 174) in the later part of the eighteenth century.

The comparatively weak position of Turin can be traced to a lack of expansion in the later part of the eighteenth century, more directly than to the legacy of the Renaissance. In 1770, Venice counted as many state primary schools as Turin. Even if a thriving private sector meant that the provision of schooling in Venice was probably higher than in Turin (in 1786 the size of the private sector, in terms of number of school-children, was more than three times greater than the public sector), it is only in the intervening period that marked difference started emerging. Between 1770 and 1786, in fact, while schooling was stagnating in Turin, the number of public schools more than tripled in Venice (from 6 to 19) (Scarabello, 1992: 638-9). In Lombardy, while up to the 1760s the trend of expansion did not depart from that of the two previous centuries (see table 5.1), from the 1770s schooling started growing at a pace which would have been unconceivable in the preceding centuries. Between 1775 and 1796 there were founded 206 schools. This figure compares with 34 registered foundations between 1750 and 1775, and 72 between 1570 and 1750 (Toscani, 1993: 112, 115-6, 119, 174).

The table and chart in the two following pages show trends in schooling diffusion in the nineteenth century in seven Italian regions, two from the north-west, Piedmont and Lombardy, one from the north-
east, Veneto, two from central Italy, Tuscany and Lazio, and two from the south, Campania and Sardinia (Sardinia and Lazio have not been included in the graph due to too limited availability of data).

The data is mostly based upon government statistics gathered by Vigo (1971). The chart has been drawn assuming that enrolment rates are correct, and is based on informed guesses for the period not covered by the statistics.

The first thing one notices by looking at the graph 5.1 and table 5.3 is that Piedmont and Lombardy the size of the provision reached quasi-universal proportions considerably earlier than any other region. This is due neither to the sample nor to the measurement. Data from the 1861 census on number of boroughs with at least one school and literacy rates provide the same indication (Vigo, 1993: 50; De Fort, 1996: 79).

Enrolment rates show that, in contrast to the previous century, by the mid-nineteenth century Piedmont was second only to Lombardy, thus indicating a comparatively high growth in the course of the first half of the century. They do not tell us, on the other hand, when Piedmont made the ‘jump’. Other sources can help us filling the gap.

Enrolment rates declined between 1814 and 1818 in Campania and increased only by a relatively small amount between 1810 and 1830 in Lombardy, suggesting that, in general, the period immediately after the restoration was not one of expansion. This interpretation is supported by the fact that at the same time schools were viewed with suspicion by the Piedmontese authorities, who feared them to be a site of revolutionary propaganda following the French rule (Roggero, 1992: 156-7).
Table 5.3
Ratio of school-children over population aged 6-12 in nineteenth-century Italy by region (in percentage).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Year</th>
<th>1814</th>
<th>1818</th>
<th>1830</th>
<th>1835</th>
<th>1841</th>
<th>1845</th>
<th>1848</th>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1851</th>
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<td>Lombardy</td>
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<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
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<td>83</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>86</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20?</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 These figures refer to the average number of school-children and have been computed with reference to the rate Piedmont/Kingdom and number of children of 1850.
2 These figures refer to success of compulsion.
3 These figures include children attending schools for children aged 3 to 6.
4 These figures refer to the province of Rome.
5 These figures refer to the kingdom of Naples (mainland).

From 1822 it became compulsory for councils to open free elementary schools, and this factor, no doubt, had an impact on dynamics of growth. Quite substantial, in the account of Serristori ([1833: 61-2] reproduced in Bearardi, 1982: 182-3), who wrote in the *Statistical essay of Italy* that by the beginning of the 1830s male (but not female) elementary schools were present in virtually all towns of the kingdom’s mainland. On the other hand, other sources indicate that Serristori’s estimate overstates the case.

Mittermaier (1845: 201-2) argues that the 1822 regulation were largely ineffectual, and Mittermaier and Rodolico (1936: 397) write that the provision started expanding at some pace only from the 1840s. Their assessments needs to be scrutinised, since Mittermaier is advocating an
intensification of governmental intervention in education and Rodolico is celebrating the reign of Carlo Alberto, ruler of Sardinia from 1831. Hence, both of them have an incentive to exaggerate the achievements of the 1840s interventions. Yet a glance at the quantitative data gathered by Griseri (1973: 22, 38, 73, 74) broadly confirms the accuracy of their assessment. Statistics of the deputy intendant of Salluzzo show in the period between 1825 and 1832, in the province the schooling population registered a very limited growth, from 3118 to 3336. In 1839 the magistrato della riforma, the officer responsible for directing the schooling apparatus, ordered a general inspection of all colleges and schools. The results showed that by 1842 elementary schools were still absent from the great part of the Piedmontese mainland. The 1853 statistics depict a very different scenario. In the whole of kingdom (including Sardinia, where the provision of schooling was amongst the lowest in Italy), only a minority of the towns were still without any male elementary school (see table 5.4). If these figures confirm both the limited impact of the 1822 regulation, and an acceleration from the 1840s, the 1842 statistics also showed that only about 19 percent (328) of the towns had no school at all, indicating that in the course of the 1840s some of these schools probably changed status, and the real pattern of growth was somewhat more gradual than Mittermaier and Rodolico claim.

In any case, in Piedmont, and not anywhere else to a comparable extent, schooling grew at great pace between 1853 and 1864. The difference between the figures (from 46 percent to 93 percent) cannot be explained by the fact that the liberal regime allowed private schools to 'come out', since both in 1850 and 1864 the private sector accounted only for a minority of the enrolments, and the share decreased from 10 percent to 4 percent in the course of the same years (Vigo, 1971: 100-1; 132-3). The fact that from the 1840s the path of attendance to elementary schools became increasingly regulated and prolonged (from 'two or more years' to four years; Berardi, 1982: ch. 2), implies that
some of the difference is due to a longer stay. In addition, much of the difference is accounted for by the fact that girls started going to school in great numbers. However, this was the case also in other regions (see table 5.3), and the rate of growth remains too great to be believed. If enrolment rates are correct, Piedmont managed to achieve in just over a decade what Lombardy did not manage in a century of compulsory education. And all this without schooling being compulsory (it became so only from 1859, only for two years, and without specifying any sanction). It may well be that the 1863 statistics had been swelled in order to support the (successful) Piedmontese bid for leadership in education in post-unification Italy. Some inconsistencies in the data would suggest that to be the case. On the other hand, there is a limit to the possibilities of manipulation, and, even if the change was probably more gradual than the figures suggest, other sources confirm that during the 1850s in Piedmont schooling grew at a particularly high pace, for the girls in particular. The following table is based upon statistics of the magistrato della riforma and the ministry of public instruction:

Table 5.4
Towns with at least one elementary school in the Kingdom of Sardinia, 1840-1860 ca. (percentage).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1842</td>
<td>10*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This figure refer to the provinces of Turin, Cuneo, Nice, Alessandria, Novara and Aosta only.
Source: Griseri (1973: 38, 73-4).

These data cast some light on how Piedmont managed to become the best endowed region by the time of the unification starting from a subaltern position at the beginning of the century. Between the 1840s
and the 1850s, at the same time as the Kingdom of Sardinia was becoming a constitutional monarchy, schooling grew at a greater pace than anywhere else.

By contrast, in central and southern Italy schooling growth was on the whole slow up to the unification, for an acceleration to ensue in its aftermath. This is as valid for the above sample as for the peninsula as a whole:

Table 5.5
Ratio of school-children over population aged 6-12 in Italy by area after the unification (in percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Region</th>
<th>North-West</th>
<th>North-East</th>
<th>Centre</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Isles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863-4</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>37*</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-2</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-2</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This figure is for Emilia only.

North-West: Lombardy, Liguria and Lombardy.
North-East: Veneto and Emilia.
Centre: Tuscany, Marches, Umbria, Lazio and Abruzzi.
South: Molise, Campania, Apulia, Basilicata and Calabria.
Isles: Sicily and Sardinia.

In addition, these data show that while in the immediate aftermath of the unification, beside the north-west, where the margin for improvement was small, schooling grew at sustained pace everywhere (albeit not to the same extent as in post-1848 Piedmont), the latter part of the century witnessed a marked slowing down in the south and the isles.

In this section I have measured the rhythm of growth of schooling in Piedmont and post-unification Italy between the thirteenth and nineteenth centuries. To summarise the main lines of development,
between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries schooling experienced a first phase of expansion centred in the cities of the Renaissance core. Throughout Italy, up until the second half of the eighteenth century, schooling remained the domain of a minority. Over the long period, the emergence of universal schooling was sudden, rather than gradual. From the 1770s the schooling provision, particularly for the boys, began growing with at unprecedented pace in some areas, notably Austrian Lombardy and the Republic of Venice, but not in Piedmont. At the beginning of nineteenth century, the schooling provision in Piedmont was amongst the lowest in Italy. Starting from the 1840s, in Piedmont schooling grew faster than anywhere else in Italy. By the time of the unification, statistics show that Piedmont was the first Italian region for schooling diffusion and almost all the children in schooling age were enrolled. In central and southern Italy, and, to a lesser extent, in the north-east, the provision remained limited until the unification. The immediate aftermath of the unification saw an acceleration everywhere, albeit not of the same proportion experienced by Piedmont in the central part of the nineteenth century. In the last twenty years of the century, schooling continued to grow at a good pace in central and north-eastern Italy, but significantly less so in the south and the isles. By the turn of the century the majority of Italian children in schooling age was enrolled. We shall now proceed to discuss the theoretical implications of these findings.

Schooling and industrialisation

The major debate emerging from the historical sociology of schooling has been the extent to which the state systems of education are explained by the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. The argument that mass education emerged to train the work-force to the technical requirements of industrial production nowadays commands much less influence than it used to be the case, and Gellner (1983: ch. 3) is possibly the sole historical sociologist arguing for the
unmediated primacy of industrialisation in explaining the rise of universal schooling in recent times. The industrialisation hypothesis has been challenged on three grounds. Firstly, systematic interventions aimed at promoting schooling expansion often predated the industrial revolution, and patterns of growth, across and within nation-states were only weakly correlated to industrialisation. Hence, factors other than industrialisation, such as philanthropy, state formation and nation-building were decisive in explaining dynamics of growth (Laquer, 1969; Meyer et al., 1979; Boli and Ramirez, 1987b; De Swaan, 1988: ch. 3; Green, 1992). Secondly, the functional link between education and industrial production, particularly in the early phase of industrialisation (1780-1870), is much weaker than it is usually assumed. The first factories, the argument goes, did not demand particularly complex tasks from the workers, and literacy was not a prerequisite to enter into the labour market. On the contrary, the first industrialists relied with unprecedented intensity on child labour, to the effect that, on the whole, the first phase of industrialisation had a negative effect on schooling diffusion (Cipolla, 1969: 68; Smelser, 1991: 356; Green, 1992). Thirdly, the effects of industrialisation upon growth of schooling were mediated through conflicts between interested groups, such as classes, churches, and local and central elite, and patterns of growth were significantly affected by the distribution of economic, ideological and political power across nation-states (Archer and Vaughan, 1972; Archer, 1979; De Swaan, 1988: ch. 3; Barbagli, 1976; Smelser, 1991; Green, 1992).

On the other hand, the industrial revolution continues to recover central importance in most accounts of educational expansion. In particular, one can identify four types recurrent arguments. First, in the second half of the nineteenth century industrial technology became increasingly complex, and industrialisation became important in accounting for growth of schooling from around 1870 (Cipolla, 1969: 68-71; Green, 1992). Second, in contrast to agrarian production, the
factory demanded a disciplined (punctual, cleaned, healthy, orderly) work-force (Thompson, 1967; see also Bowles and Gintis, 1976; De Swaan, 1988). Third, schooling expansion followed the attempt to manage the social tensions brought about by the development of an industrial urban economy (Wardle, 1970: 22-6; Laquer, 1976; De Swaan, 1988: ch. 3; Smelser, 1991: 357). Fourth, industrialisation upset the traditional structure of power relations and identity, by endowing the middle-class with unprecedented access to wealth, and political and ideological influence. In turn, the rise of the bourgeoisie translated in an increasing emphasis on qualification in defining the social hierarchy and schooling diffusion to train the work-force (Archer and Vaughan, 1972; Archer, 1979; Berardi, 1982; Green, 1992).

What follows discusses the above arguments in relation to the particular development of schooling in Piedmont within Italy and patterns of growth of schooling within and across regions in post-unification Italy. In particular, the section focuses on the impact of industrialisation. The rise of the bourgeoisie and state formation are addressed in the two next sections.

The Italian evidence confirms Cipolla's (1969: 68) argument that the association between industrialisation and growth of schooling became stronger in the later part of the nineteenth century. First, the city started being dominant in terms of diffusion of schooling only towards the later nineteenth century. At the time of unification enrolment rates were not significantly greater in the urban centres. And particularly so in a relatively industrialised region like Piedmont, where, on the contrary, the diffusion of elementary schools was higher in the countryside (even if attendance in the country-side was more intermittent (Vigo, 1971; Berardi, 1982), with the implication that the actual levels of attendance remained higher in the cities, this factor does not challenge the result in its essentials). It is only in the intervening period, and particularly in
the last twenty years of the century, that a marked difference of schooling diffusion across urban and rural areas started emerging:

**Table 5.6**

*Ratio of school-children over population aged 6-12 in urban and rural areas in Piedmont and Italy after the unification (in percentage)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Rest</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Rest</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863-4</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881-2</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901-2</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Second, a strengthening of the association between schooling diffusion and industrial development in the later nineteenth century is confirmed if we look at correlation rates between regional distribution of schooling and industrialisation. Regional industrialisation is measured as the percentage of industrial added value over percentage of male population aged fifteen or more. The following table shows correlation rates between regional schooling diffusion and industrialisation:

**Table 5.7**

*Correlation between regional industrialisation and diffusion of schooling in post-unification Italy (in percentage).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years* (sample size)</th>
<th>Corr (schooling, industrialisation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1864/1871 (n=14)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882/1881 (n=16)</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902/1902 (n=16)</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the first year refers to the enrolment rates statistics and the second to industrialisation rate statistics.

The last figure is significantly higher than the other two, thus confirming a strengthening of the association between industrialisation and schooling diffusion in the later part of the nineteenth century (the fact that the second figure is lower than the first one is due an increase in the size of the sample and ought not be given much importance). To control for the effect of wealth, I have compared correlation rates between enrolment rates and GDP per capita and enrolment rates and industrialisation by area (north-west, centre and north-east (not included in the first row), and south):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years* (sample size)</th>
<th>Corr (schooling, industrialisation)</th>
<th>Corr (schooling, GDP per capita)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1863/1871 (n=2)</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882/1891 (n=3)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902/1911 (n=3)</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*the first year refers to the enrolment rates statistics and the second to industrialisation rate and GDP per capita statistics.


The correlation between schooling diffusion and industrialisation is consistently and significantly higher than that between schooling diffusion and GDP per capita (again, an increase in the correlation rates with respect to the previous table is due to a smaller sample size). Hence, we may conclude that industrialisation had a positive effect on schooling diffusion independently of its correlation with wealth, particularly in the later nineteenth century.

On the other hand, Italian schooling developments cast doubts on the argument that that early phases of industrialisation hindered the growth of schooling. The actual impact of child labour in the early phases of
industrialisation on dynamics of growth of schooling should not be overstated. In Italy, industrialisation had a positive effect on schooling diffusion also in the first half of the nineteenth century. The correlation rate between regional industrialisation and schooling diffusion was high already at the time of the unification (see table 5.7). Within nineteenth-century Italy, the two regional leaders in terms schooling development, Piedmont and Lombardy, were also early industrialisers, not in spite, but partly because of that. As noticed by Berardi (1982), educational growth in Piedmont followed the industrial take off of the 1830s. A marked leadership in the early phases of industrialisation did not affect negatively the trend of growth in Lombardy (see table 5.3 and graph 5.1).

Moreover, in the first half of the nineteenth century, industrialisation was not centred in the urban areas. The greatest share of industrial workers were employed in the textile sector, which was not concentrated in the cities. For instance, in 1819 Portula, a village in the province of Biella, counted almost twice as many looms as Turin (Bulferetti and Luraghi, 1966: 101, 117). Hence, the lack of correlation between industrialisation and urbanisation in the first half of the nineteenth century (see table 5.6) does not necessarily disqualify industrialisation from being an important factor also in the early phases of schooling expansion.

It does, on the other hand, indicate that, in Italy, the emergence of universal schooling cannot be explained in terms of the attempt to manage social tensions brought about by processes of urbanisation unleashed by the industrial revolution. In this respect, the Piedmontese data are particularly significant. Since the councils were responsible for financing and running elementary schools, we would expect the geographical distribution of schooling to be particularly sensitive to the local conditions.
Furthermore, these data should not seen as meaning that the later nineteenth century witnessed a shift in the objectives of popular schooling from state formation to economic development. The two objectives, both in the early and in the later part of the nineteenth century were combined. If in Italy the early stages of expansion (1770-1860), popular schooling spread more or less homogeneously across rural and urban areas, this is not because schooling promoters were not concerned with economic progress, as some commentators have argued in relation to other contexts (Laquer, 1976; Meyer et al., 1979). Quite independently of whether the production process demanded particularly refined skills from the workers, enhancing the productive capacities of the population was a central preoccupation of schooling promoters in the second half of the eighteenth century. As the Milanese economist Gorani ([1773]1975: 156) wrote in *Essay on public education*:

> When a sovereign plans to perfect the arts, the trades, the manufacture, he needs necessarily to spread more lights amongst those who cultivate them. Ignorance produces superstition ... superstition expands its evil empire ... over the mechanical arts, trades and agriculture ... Hence, politicians, stop talking about the ways to perfect the mechanical arts, the trades, the manufacture. There is only one way ... Dissolve the dark ignorance; direct the children of the artisans to able teachers ... Never again will the artisans be useless machines unable to reflect, but men who can reason with solid foundations on the principles of their occupation.

Rather, as in the physiocratic and cameralist traditions, early schooling promoters viewed agricultural productivity to be crucial for economic development. Rural economy ("introduction to the probity and economy suitable for the country people") was taught as a subject of the curriculum of the first Lombard’s state elementary schools (Ichino Rossi, 1977: 159). Maria Theresa (cited in Ichino Rossi, 1977: 144-5),

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empress of Austria, clearly inspired by the economists, in the 1774 regulation, instructed the Lombard’s elementary teachers thus: ‘The infamous class of the people has been for the greatest part of the past forsaken in the native ignorance, without training and culture. Hence the prejudices, and the mistakes, which spurred by ignorance, have been maintained to these days; hence, in many places the slow progress of agriculture’.

If starting from the later nineteenth century, schooling started being more diffuse in urban and industrial areas, this occurred as part of general redressing of economic policy, rather than as a result of the fact that technological progress led to the emergence of an association between schooling and economic development, as Cipolla (1969) would have it. The relevant association was between industrialisation and economic development, not between schooling and economic development. Favouring industrial development over agriculture was a dominant trait of economic policy in general in the same period. In Gramsci’s (1997: 154) words: ‘Crispi [‘s] ... general policy tends to strengthen industrialism in the north ... he does not hesitate to throw the Mezzogiorno and the isles in a terrible commercial crises, in order to strengthen industry ... it is the policy of producing the producer’. At the same time the problem of constructing the citizen was becoming, if something, more, not less central, in shaping schooling policies, in the wake of the intensification of policies of nation-building that followed the unification of Italy.

By contrast, the fact that industrialisation had a positive effect on schooling diffusion throughout the nineteenth century should not be taken as meaning that schooling expansion was either primarily or solely driven by industrialisation. The aims of educational expansion, both before and after 1870, went beyond training the work-force to the technical requirements of industrial production. The industrial revolution was not a pre-condition to experience mass schooling. In
Tuscany, Lombardy, Parma, Modena and Naples the process of expansion of popular education started gathering momentum from the 1770s (Peroni, 1928; Balani and Roggero, 1976; Ricuperati and Roggero, 1977; Genovesi, 1999: ch. 2). There is evidence that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, before the industrial revolution invested the Italian peninsula, the diffusion of schooling reached mass proportions in Lombardy and Veneto (see table 5.2). In some areas, universal schooling predated the technological innovations of the later nineteenth century and its emergence cannot be reduced to them. As shown by table 5.5, in the north-west, by 1863, almost all the children in schooling age were enrolled. Even after 1870, the provision of schooling was greatly in excess of the demand for industrial workers. Whereas by the beginning of the twentieth century, the majority of the Italian children in schooling age was enrolled (64 percent, Vigo, 1971: 183), Italy was still a predominantly agrarian society. As late as 1921, the national census classified three fifths of the active population as agricultural workers.

Viewing schooling expansion as a creation of the industrial bourgeoisie to accustom the work-force to the disciplinary demands of the factory is reductive. Firstly, a similar pedagogical model was meant to be applied also upon rural workers and citizens, (here I limit myself to mention these two categories, but the list could be easily expanded). The association between schooling and production of disciplined rural workers is well represented by Pagnini’s (1775, reproduced in Balani and Roggero, 1976: 131-4) Project of some school of agriculture and coherently a system of education for the country boys, winner of a prize at the Accademia dei Georgofili in Florence, from which the following extract is taken:

they [the rural workers] must learn ... those rules and maxims, physical as well as moral, ... which must produce in the farmers a robustness and bodily health such as to become fully active, and
accustomed to fatigue, which is indispensable to their art... 
secondly, cancel their ... prejudices, to render them shrewd and considerate, and able to change their coarseness and pride into docility, through which they become bent and apt to listen to the reasons and truths, which they will hear from their masters, supervisors and leaders.

The idea that schooling was instrumental to the production of disciplined citizens is well conveyed by Carli ([1787] 1975: 161), functionary of the Austrian government in Lombardy, for whom the end of public education was the creation of:

the necessary uniformity of maxims and feelings; without which it is broken that chain of opinion and custom, which, supplementing force and fear, ... induces men spontaneously and gently towards discipline, and accustoms them to uniform their ideas, and direct them towards the legitimate point of union, that is society, and the sovereign.

Secondly, the association between schooling and production of disciplined bodies long predated the nineteenth century and the industrial revolution. Schools were used as a means to discipline children of elite and poor at least since the sixteenth century (Balani and Roggero, 1976: 16-7; Grendler, 1991: 365; Brizzi, 1982: 906-7). An emphasis on continuous surveillance and minute regulation on the usage of time, imagination and body are to be found already in Renaissance pedagogical thought, and were characterising the functioning of Italian schools at least since the heyday of the counter-reformation (Anselmi, 1981; Scaglione, 1986: 94-5; Châtellier, 1988: 44-54). For instance, these ideals found a particularly extreme manifestation in the system of the internato, theorised by Renaissance pedagogues and realised by the Jesuits for the children of the aristocracy. The system is described by Balani and Roggero (1976: 51)
The aims of the internato ... was to separate the child from the outside world ... isolating him within a closed space to shape him through an uninterrupted surveillance ... [and] minute rules [which] were guiding in every instant the life of the pupils'. And Roggero (1981: 81), with reference to the noble’s college of Turin: ‘The superiors were taking the most diligent care that the boarders were never left to themselves and were led at each instant of their laborious day ... Also the division of the spaces within the college ... was articulated in such a way as to favour the surveillance of the pupils’.

Thirdly, related to the last point, disciplinary techniques were by no means limited to the education of the subaltern classes. On the contrary, traditionally, discipline was applied with greater intensity upon the children of the elite, in a monotonic fashion (for the aristocracy more than the rest). As an example of these dynamics, consider the following extract from a request for funding addressed to the king of Sardinia, dated fourteenth of June 1776. The abbot in charge of the Turin’s boarding school had been forced to take on a new employee, after the suppression of the fellowship of Jesus had left him with a personnel shortage. These were the tasks:

Close and universal vigilance on the conduct of both the noble boarders, as regards piety, customs, studying, civility, cleanness, health, and observance of each rule, down to the tiniest, and on that of tutors, teachers, assistants, waiters, and other personnel employed by the college to keep everyone to their duty; and obviate to any relaxing of the discipline.

The industrial bourgeoisie was not responsible for turning schooling into a disciplinary institution, discipline was not peculiar to factory work, and factory workers were not the sole object of disciplinary intervention. While, arguably, the industrial revolution did contribute to precipitate the spread of disciplinary techniques and associated
institutions, the argument that popular schooling emerged in order to train the work-force to the discipline of the factory is reductive. Starting from the nineteenth century, the aims of state schooling included, but by no means were limited to, training a modern industrial work-force.

**Schooling and the middle-class**

As stressed by Archer (1979), the positive effect of industrialisation on schooling diffusion is better seen as mediated by the agency of the middle-class. Early industrialisation falls short of explaining Piedmont's exceptional growth of schooling in the central part of the nineteenth century, and there is a strong case for granting the early enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie an independent role in the process. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, in Piedmont, the rate of industrialisation was only marginally superior to the national average (0.07 points against a range of 0.75 in 1871, and 0.18 against a range of 1.03 in 1901), and remained well below that of Lombardy. Notably, Piedmont's relative industrialisation in 1871 was lower than in Sicily, where landed interests traditionally were strong and enrolment rates were amongst the lowest of the peninsula (14 percent in 1863, 29 percent in 1882, 44 percent compared to a national average of 43 percent, 57 percent and 64 percent respectively) (Vigo, 1971: 137, 159, 183; Fenoaltea, 1999: 16).

A marked intensification of processes of secularisation of state schooling is a definitive trait of post-1848 educational policies (Bertoni Jovine, 1954; Berardi, 1982; Genovesi, 1999). The dominant position in the Subalpin parliament was one of educational expansion (De Fort, 1996). As the president of the chamber Bixio put it in 1848 in the address to the crown:
The government takes the vote for the universal re-organisation of public education which must inform the growing generation of both sexes to virtue, charity of the patria, and liberty; the Chamber trusts that free instruction extended to every type of studying will prepare the citizens to the noble office of holding and illustrate the State. The deputies will not neglect any proposition directed to the highest end, to the development of the material and moral interests of society, and for the benefit of the less wealthy and more numerous classes.

The enfranchisement of the middle-class proved to be positive factors on schooling expansion also in the other Italian regions, where, as we saw earlier in the chapter, in the aftermath of the unification the rate of growth accelerated significantly. The correlation rate between regional distribution of enrolment rates and industrialisation falls significantly if we neglect the effect of industrialisation upon distribution of wealth. In 1902 the correlation rate between regional enrolment rates and number of industrial workers every one thousand inhabitants was 5.9 percent (Vigo, 1971: 107). This figure compares with 7.7 percent, when we take into account industrial wealth when measuring regional industrialisation (see table 5.7). Albeit isolated, the result is significant since at the time, according to Cipolla (1969: 69-72), there was close link between literacy and industrial production, and thus we expect a close correlation between schooling diffusion and demand for industrial manpower.

On the other hand, the emergence of universal schooling cannot be reduced to the transition from a society of orders, where the educational system is dominated by the clergy to the benefit of the aristocracy, to a society of classes, where schooling is dominated by the bourgeoisie. Archer (1979) argues that in France, England, Denmark and Russia, before the establishment of state systems of education, schooling was dominated by the clergy in an absolutist fashion. The religious system
of education obstructed the bourgeoisie because it granted insufficient attention to financial disciplines, legitimised a rigidly stratified social order and prevented the middle-class to access positions commensurate to their qualifications. The legitimization of a conservative social structure rendered the religious system beneficial to the aristocracy. Similarly, Brizzi (1976) claims that, in early modern Italy, the Jesuit system acted as a means to reinforce the aristocratic hold on political power against the challenge of the third estate through the college of the aristocracy. Brizzi supports this claim by showing that the public of the college of the aristocracy was drawn disproportionately from the aristocracy of blood.

The Piedmontese case shows that this perspective tells only a part of the story. On the whole, particularism was eroded, not re-enforced by the religious system. The type of dominion legitimised by the religious system was lateral, rather than particularistic, and formally grounded on merit, as opposed to blood. The Jesuits intensified processes of individualisation to previously unseen extents through the continuous and meticulous recording of details about each student’s ‘virtues and vices’, an unprecedented reliance on examination, and, crucially, the employment of comparable evaluation standards across aristocracy, clergy and third estate (Brizzi, 1981; Anselmi, 1981; Scaglione, 1986). Free and officially open to everyone willing and capable, but in practice serving a selected public, the Jesuit system contributed to the crystallisation of lateral identities across clerical elite, aristocracy and liberal professions, not least through the usage of Latin as the exclusive medium of teaching and a uniform pedagogy across the system. Like state schooling in the class society (see Young, 1971; Bourdieu, 1972; Bernstein, 1997), by and large, the religious system of education, assisted processes of reproduction of the social structure through hidden, as opposed to overt, means, such as a status oriented pedagogy, curriculum and evaluation (Anselmi, 1981: 39-40; Brizzi, 1976: 235-56; Roggero, 1981: 84-90; Scaglione, 1986: 91-2).
The Jesuit system granted the aristocracy a separate educational space, through the college of the aristocracy. However, a distinct educational space for the aristocracy hardly constituted a novelty, and the relative weight of the college of the aristocracy within the religious system should not be overstated. In Piedmont and Savoy, there was only one college for the aristocracy, and its establishment (1679) post-dated the spread of religious colleges for third estate and clergy, forty-four by 1729. The argument that the religious system was instrumental to aristocratic dominion neglects that schooling served also as a means to legitimise the liberal professions' dominion over the populace. The assumption that education in the old order was absolutely dominated by the Church is ill-suited to describe early modern Piedmont, where religious schools were predominantly financed by municipalities (Balani and Roggero, 1976; Roggero, 1981).

The beginning of state's leadership in education, carried out between the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, and fiercely opposed by the Catholic Church, led to a strengthening of the association between the schooling system and production of an educated elite, overlapping, but by no means coterminous, with the aristocracy (Roggero, 1981; 2002). By the later seventeenth century, the spread of mercantilism meant that the regulation of dynamics of access to the liberal professions was the objective of deliberate educational policies on the part of the state. As the intendant of Savigliano (cited in Roggero, 1981: 24) put it in 1699, in a letter to Her Majesty: 'Reflect her Your Eminent Signoria ... on the political usefulness of [a Jesuit school] since we find ourselves without lawyers, doctors, solicitors and scientists ... the only means to make up for such a shortage, will be the opening of schools of the above mentioned Fathers'. At the same time Jesuit schools were departing from the religious and humanities centred curriculum prescribed by the Ratio studiorum in favour of more scientific and mundane oriented
subjects. In the noble’s college of Turin, for instance, the curriculum included: ‘geometry, geography, cosmography, fortification, chronology, history, ... coat of arms, ... civil and canonic law, foreign languages, French and others’ (cited in Roggero, 1981: 83). The link between educational reforms and promotion of scientific knowledge is stressed in the Royal Constitutions for the University of Turin (1729), which motivate the re-organisation of the university thus: ‘so that the Youth cultivated in the sciences and the good arts can ... usefully serve the Prince and the Patria, and benefit itself and the others through the usage of the knowledge acquired’ (reproduced in Duboin, 1818-1869: 249). The curriculum of the university included experimental physics, mathematics and geometry in the faculty of arts (reproduced in Balani and Roggero, 1976: 94).

State intervention in schooling coincided with a process of closure of popular access to schooling, and it would not be incorrect to associate the 1729 educational reforms to the attempt to clamp down on what was seen as an excessive demand on schooling on the part of the third estate. However, the means of intervention, the introduction of fees to access to the primary classes together with greater integration between primary and secondary sectors, corresponded to a class, not aristocratic, type of closure. An emphasis on meritocratic, as opposed to aristocratic, closure emerge from the fact that the absolutist educational system fostered intergenerational social mobility through the introduction of a system of bursaries, the Collegio delle province, being the most famous manifestation.

The growth of popular schooling cannot be explained solely with reference to the fact that in the nineteenth century the bourgeoisie took control of the schooling system. Both because the assumption that schooling under the old order was unambiguously obstructive of the ‘bourgeoisie’ is inaccurate, and because the fact that the schooling system was serving the interests of the middle-class was not a sufficient
condition to experience sustained schooling expansion. Sectors of the 'bourgeoisie', liberal professions, state functionaries, local elite, thrived on the religious and absolutist schooling systems. The absolutist state, if somewhat more bulkily, exhibited a propensity to erode areas of clerical and aristocratic autonomy through schooling in the same way as the nineteenth-century bourgeois state did. And yet, as we have seen in the previous section, between the sixteenth and the second half of the eighteenth centuries growth of popular schooling was very slow indeed. By and large, as far as schooling was used as a means of social reproduction, the mechanism relied on dynamics of limitation, not expansion, of the access of the populace to schooling.

Neither the industrial revolution nor the enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie were responsible for changing the attitude of state builders towards popular education. In Piedmont educational expansion did follow the industrial take off and benefited from the enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie. However, this is due to the particular trajectory of state formation of Piedmont. A strong intellectual movement demanding state-led schooling expansion started developing earlier, from the 1760s (Peroni, 1928; Balani and Roggero, 1976: 112-42). From the 1770s Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Naples and, especially, Lombardy, put in place measures aimed at expanding the provision of popular education (Balani and Roggero, 1976; Ricuperati and Roggero, 1977; Genovesi, 1999: ch. 2).

As argued by Green (1992), particular trajectories of state formation were decisive in shaping the process of growth of state schooling, in a way that can only partly be accounted for by class relationships. It was neither a weak tradition of capitalism nor a weak 'bourgeoisie' that prevented eighteenth-century Piedmont, unlike Lombardy, Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Venice and Naples, to pursue a policy of expansion of popular schooling. According to Malanima’s (1999: 203-4) account, Piedmont was hit with less intensity than the rest of the peninsula by
the eighteenth-century economic crises, with the result that Piedmontese industry and commerce were in a comparatively good state. As shown by Stumpo (1979, 1984), between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in Piedmont the state started organising itself along capitalist lines earlier than the other Italian states. Even if the peripheral role played by Piedmont during the Renaissance hindered the rise of an urban patriciate to the result that aristocratic traditions were stronger than in the Italian core, early state formation meant that, in institutional terms, the Piedmontese ‘bourgeoisie’ was in a comparatively good position to bring about change. It was Piedmont’s particular trajectory of state formation, not its class structure, that explains the lack of popular schooling expansion in eighteenth-century Piedmont.

Finally, the fact that the rise of the bourgeoisie to hegemony led to the development of state schooling systems ought not to be seen as the result of the fact that the bourgeoisie acquired the means to enforce its desires, as implied by Archer’s (1979) explanatory model. Processes of centralisation and intensification of governmental control upon popular education underpinning nineteenth-century Piedmont’s exceptional schooling development only partly reflected the will of the bourgeoisie. The educational reforms leading to Piedmonts’ exceptional growth of schooling in the aftermath of 1848 were top-down measure, passed in authoritarian fashion. The two major educational reforms of those years, Boncompagni Law (1848) and Casati Law (1859) were passed by decree, and attempts of changing the legislation through parliament collapsed, or were severely delayed as in the case of the Lanza Law (1857), around the issue of the ‘liberty of teaching’ (Gentile, 1920; Talamanca, 1977; De Fort, 1996: 37-75). The Piedmontese bourgeoisie, similarly to its English and French counterparts, was deeply divided by the issue of whether it was legitimate for a liberal state to retain a role of leadership in education. Hence, either one takes a structuralist perspective and sees the development of state schooling
systems as a crystallisation of the increased strength of the bourgeoise within Piedmontese society, as opposed to a manifestation of its will, or accords the political elite an independent role of agency in the process. Either way, we are compelled to look at the role of the state in the development of the Piedmontese state schooling system in greater details. To this task we now turn.

**Schooling and state formation**

The development of the state schooling system in Piedmont suits Green’s (1992; see also Boli and Ramirez, 1987a; De Swaan, 1988: ch. 3) argument that the growth of state schooling systems was part of wider processes of state formation very well. Between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, all the major educational reforms were carried out in connection with wider processes of reform of the administrative structure of the state. Complementarily, failure to reform the state coincided with failure to reform the schooling apparatus.

The development of the state schooling system started between the end of the seventeenth century, marked by the establishment of the college of the aristocracy in Turin (1688), entirely funded with royal finances, and at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when the 1729 educational reforms asserted the monarch’s leadership over secondary schools, first case in Italy. At the same time the Amedean reforms were altering radically the institutional outlook of the Savoyard State, anticipating other absolutist states in Italy by about half a century (Quazza, 1954; Symcox, 1983; Ricuperati, 1994). In the second half of the eighteenth century, Piedmont, differently from Tuscany, Lombardy, Parma, Naples and Modena, failed to embark on major reformist activities (Woolf, 1977: ch. 5). Whereas Tuscany, Lombardy, Parma, Naples and Modena started pursuing policies of expansion of popular education between the 1760s and 1770s, in Piedmont the 1772 educational regulation did not introduce substantial innovations with
respect to 1729 (Balani and Roggero, 1976; Ricuperati and Roggero, 1977; Roggero, 1981; Genovesi, 1999: ch. 2). The basis of universal schooling in Piedmont were put by the Jacobins and Napoleon (Roggero, 1992; Genovesi, 1999: ch. 3). Its development fell upon the restoration regime, starting with the 1822 regulation, which rendered compulsory for councils to establish free elementary schools (Griseri, 1973; Berardi, 1982; Genovesi, 1999: ch. 4). Educational interventions in the restoration period were part of a wider movement of development of the administrative capacity of the state, after the Napoleonic model of 'administrative monarchy' (Raponi, 1981; Nada and Notario, 1993; Riall, 1994). However, at this stage, schooling developments remained framed within the educational structure inherited from the eighteenth century. Between 1848 and 1859, the system radically departed from the absolutist model, to become similar to the one of post-revolutionary France, with a common, compulsory elementary course for all (Bertoni Jovine, 1954; Berardi, 1982; Genovesi, 1999; Morandini, 2003). At the same time Piedmont, earlier than the rest of Italy, was departing from the absolutist model of state development to become a nation-state (Caracciolo; 1960; Riall, 1994).

On the other hand, the Italian evidence challenges two arguments produced by the literature on education and state formation. First, the importance of militarism in precipitating popular schooling ought not to be overstated. An influential strand of literature (e.g. Mann, 1993; on Britain see Colley, 1992) sees the development of the administrative capacity of the state, and schooling in particular (e.g. Boli and Ramirez, 1987b), as a sort of 'homeostatic' reaction to militarism, and the pressure of modern warfare on the financial and political resources of the modern state. As we observed in chapter two, eighteenth-century Piedmont witnessed militarism comparable to that of Prussia and more marked than elsewhere in Italy. And this factor was reflected by the fact that in Piedmont a state schooling system was introduced earlier than anywhere else in Italy and more systematically than in most places. On
the other hand, militarism failed to deliver growth of schooling. On the contrary, eighteenth-century Piedmont was particular within Italy by failing to pursue a policy of expansion of popular schooling between the 1770s and the 1780s.

Second, accelerated state formation was not a sufficient condition to experience growth of the schooling provision (see Boli and Ramirez, 1987b; Green, 1992). In Piedmont, accelerated state formation in the first half of the eighteenth century failed to deliver schooling expansion. Across Italy, accelerated state formation became unambiguously associated to schooling expansion only starting from the second half of the eighteenth century. Even if early modern educational developments anticipated those of the nineteenth century there are important differences, and the two phenomena must be distinguished. Arguments associating the growth of state schooling systems to the growth of the modern state fall prey to similar problems to those relying on the rise of the bourgeoisie, since, while both the making of the bourgeoisie and that of the modern state developed over the long period, that was not the case with popular schooling, which development was sudden.

There is therefore the need to specify why state builders in eighteenth-century Piedmont, unlike Lombardy, the Republic of Venice, Tuscany, Modena, Parma, and Naples in the second half of the eighteenth century, failed to pursue a policy of schooling expansion. This question can be answered by following Foucault (1991b; 2001a), and view schooling expansion as a manifestation of bio-power.

According to Foucault, in the course of the eighteenth century the development of bio-power saw a marked acceleration in the wake of the emergence of post-mercantilist techniques of state formation and associated notions of population. In particular, mercantilism, Foucault argues, acted as an obstacle towards the development of bio-power
because it remained framed within a top-down vision of power, rather than diffuse one, and the idea that aggregate dynamics of population behaviour, such as rates of death and reproduction and economic cycles, exhibit regularities amenable to systemic controls was key in precipitating the transition. In addition, for Foucault, the progress of bio-power was hindered by the rigidity of the theory of sovereignty.

Foucault’s emphasis on the departure from mercantilism in precipitating bio-power is consistent with the uneven development of schooling systems across eighteenth-century Italy. In particular, this perspective accounts for why Piedmont, which reformed in the early part of the eighteenth century following a mercantilist logic (Ricuperati and Roggero, 1977; Roggero, 1992), failed to pursue schooling expansion. And why Lombardy, the Republic of Venice, Tuscany, Naples, Modena and Parma, which reformed the educational system in the second half of the eighteenth century, at the same time as mercantilism was giving way to political economy and physiocratic thought as dominant perspectives in economic thought (Woolf, 1979), pursued a policy of schooling expansion. In addition, Foucault’s perspective accounts for why in Austrian Lombardy, where the movement away from mercantilism was anticipated by cameralism, experienced educational reforms with the greatest levels of intensity.

Compulsory schooling was introduced in Lombardy as early as 1786, only case in eighteenth-century Italy. In Lombardy, the educational reforms of the 1770s and 1780s led to the construction of the most integrated schooling system in Italy, together with the Piedmontese one (Peroni, 1928; Balani and Roggero, 1976; Ricuperati, 1982; Genovesi, 1999). Systematic intervention in popular schooling delivered rapid expansion, and, as we have seen in the section on quantitative growth, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, Lombardy exhibited a marked leadership with respect to schooling diffusion within Italy.
On the fact that physiocratic thought and political economy represented a departure from mercantilism, and from a top-down to a diffuse vision of political power in particular, there is little controversy (Haney, 1949; Bell, 1953; Roll, 1953). In addition, economists, such as Carli, Beccaria and Genovesi were pivotal figures in precipitating the expansion of popular schooling in second half of the eighteenth century in Italy (Peroni, 1928; Balani and Roggero, 1976), and, as predicted by Foucault (1991b; 2001a), associated popular schooling to the construction of disciplined bodies and populations. In the words of the abbot Genovesi ([1768] 1824: 83-7):

The State is a great family. From this it follows that like in the well governed family we do not think only about having numerous children but also about educating it ... Before anything else we must take care of both the domestic and civil education, through which we become to trained and regulated in what we think and intend to do ... A good education is that which makes good heads and strong bodies ... In a plan of wise education we would like I The Laws of puberty not in line with the natural body should be corrected. Puberty in the women must not be before 17, and those of the males not before 20 ... II Re-establish feasts and gymn

The relationship between cameralism and mercantilism is more complicated, since cameralist thought is sometimes viewed as a form of mercantilism (e.g. Haney, 1949: ch. 8; Bell, 1953: ch. 7). However, there are important differences between these two bodies of thought. In particular, here we shall focus on their different attitude towards the question of population. According to Bell (1953: 120), both mercantilists and cameralists praised dense populations, and viewed a productive population as an important agent in wealth getting. Rima (1967: 26-7) also claims that mercantilists emphasised the importance of fighting idleness in the population, citing as an example William Petty.
On the other hand, other sources depict a different picture. If there is wide agreement that both mercantilists and cameralists emphasised the desirability of a numerous population, other scholars are less prone than Bell and Rima to associate mercantilism with an emphasis on the productivity of the population. Roll (1953: 104), for instance, argues that the thought of Petty represented a departure from mercantilism exactly because Petty emphasised the importance of labour as a source of wealth, whereas mercantilists were chiefly concerned with dynamics of exchange. More generally, Roll views a shift from a focus on trade to one on production as one of defining features of post-mercantilist economic thought.

As we mentioned earlier, Haney (1949: ch. 8) sees cameralism as a form of mercantilism. However, he stresses that cameralist thinkers were less concerned than mercantilists with foreign relations, commerce and the balance of trade, and concentrated more on production. In particular, the stimulation of industry was addressed by cameralists under the heading of 'police', which objective was that of dealing with conduct and sustenance of the population. Raeff (1975: 1224) also argues that cameralism differed from mercantilism because whereas mercantilist thought was chiefly concerned with the regulation of tariffs, taxation and trade, cameralism entailed the construction of a comprehensive system of national economy, the 'police'. The latter was aimed at promoting and protecting the productive potentials of the population. A similar perspective emerges from Pribram's (1983) history of economic thought. Pribram (1983: 91-6) stresses how cameralists thought that one of the main tasks of public administration was the maintenance of a numerous and well-employed population, and that it entailed a shift from trade to industry as the main means of economic progress (Pribram emphasises the latter aspect in the thought of Sonnenfels in particular). Hence, the indication is that cameralism did lead to an increased emphasis on stimulating the productivity of the
population, as opposed to merely increasing its size, than it was the case with mercantilism.

The emphasis found in cameralist thought on the contribution of a well-behaved and industrious population towards the good administration of the state had direct consequences on their attitude towards popular schooling. For cameralist thinkers education was part of the 'police', and the construction of a disciplined work-force was the main objective of popular schooling (Haney, 1949: 157; Melton, 1988). And, as shown by Raeff (1975) and Melton (1988), cameralist thought was central in shaping the educational policies of eighteenth-century Austria and Prussia.

The fact that cameralism and notions of population associated to it were important in precipitating popular schooling in the course of the eighteenth century is further supported by the fact that there is evidence that at the same time cameralist thought started influencing the Piedmontese administration, its attitude towards popular schooling started changing. In an influential monograph on the state in eighteenth-century Piedmont published recently, Ricuperati (1994) argues that the Piedmontese reforms were informed by Muratori's (1749) model of 'public happiness'. Muratori, librarian and abbot in Modena, was one of the major Italian intellectual figure of the early part of the eighteenth century.

Muratori's thought on schooling reflects closely the Piedmontese educational reforms. Muratori (1749: 77-8) advocates the establishment of state schooling systems similar to the Piedmontese one:

> it is of the greatest importance for each country to found and maintain public schools. And it must be called privileged that city where with the name of university are taught by professors paid by the prince, or the public all the sciences ... [Hence] In our
days singular glory has been acquired by Luigi XIV the great King of France, and Peter the Great Emperor of Russia, and we need to add Vittorio Amedeo King of Sardinia, whose sublime mind and beautiful genius, knowing all that can influence the Good and Glory of a country, promoted amply the Study of Letters, the Cultivation of Arts and Commerce, and the exercise of the Militia in his Piedmont. In addition to the university, which he founded in Turin, he built a college of Theology, Law, Medicine and Surgery.

However, Muratori does not advocate popular schooling. Although Muratori (1749: 77) believes that it is ‘of the greatest importance ... the goodness and wise regulation of a people’s custom’, he chiefly associates the good administration of the state to a virtuous and able ruling class, and grants the problem of how to regulate the conduct of the populace only cursory attention in his treatise. Accordingly, for Muratori, the main objective of schooling is to train the ruling class. As he (1749: 74) puts it: ‘The study of letters can serve to form excellent captains, and the kings, to succeed in the civil and military government ... have to learn that which is needed to keep a king prudent on the throne and courageous in war’. For Muratori (1749: 76) a more ‘ignorant people’ is more obedient, and only a few, liberal professions, clergy and elite, need to be educated in schools. ‘Law and medicine’, Muratori writes, ‘are not needed by he who is not arguing and is healthy’. And the best means to educate the populace is through mass: ‘the ministries of the sacred religion of Christ ... to whose preaching are invited all the people ... are the most comfortable and quick means to educate the populace and teach it the goodness and righteousness of customs’.

We now turn the attention to another text, written just over ten years later than Muratori’s treatise under the influence of cameralism. For Carlo Felice Leprotti (1966), Piedmontese Secretary of State and War
in Sardinia, the objectives of popular schooling and its relationship to social order are diametrically opposed from Muratori. In what follows, I present a detailed summary of the last section of the report, where Leprotti addresses the issue of education. Beside the fact that Leprotti, differently from Muratori, views the state educational system as a means to educate the population, which behaviour Leprotti considers of paramount importance, this section is of particular interest to us because of two reasons. First, Leprotti’s plan of intervention corresponds closely to the logic of bio-power, as described in chapter three. As we are now going to see Leprotti, similarly to the cameralist thinker von Justi (see Foucault, 2001b: 142), grounds policy-making upon the nature of the Sardinian population, conceived of as an organic substance amenable to gradual empowerment through a set of detailed regulation and incentives tailored to it. Second, Leprotti’s project of ‘cleansing Sardinia’ closely resembles policies of nation-building that developed in nineteenth-century Piedmont. Analogies between the two processes include the institutional means, schooling, theatre, and public celebrations, the objectives, the emancipation from barbarism and the construction of an integrated society, and the logic of intervention, which for Leprotti is grounded upon the particularistic nature of the Sardinian population.

The title of the report is First book on the reasons behind the population implosion in Sardinia. The stated aim of the report is to discuss how to transform Sardinia from an ‘accessory’ to a ‘real’ power, exploiting its underused natural resources. The final section, On the remedies to moral evils, starts by addressing how to reform the customs of Sardinians, ‘cleansing the Nation’ as Leprotti calls the operation. ‘[T]here are still in Sardinia some traces, or relics of that coarseness, and ancient barbarism, perennial source of one-thousand disorders’, Leprotti comments (1966: 107-12). ‘[H]ence we start with this objective, with the intent of cleansing, as much as it is possible, that Nation, and refine it so that it will catch up with the most civilised
of Europe'. Leprotti rejects Aristotle's argument that 'some kind of men' do not need to be trained for they are born slaves, on the grounds that: 'it is much easier to lead enlightened people, whom by reason, willingly, and precisely obey ... than coarse and wild people, who unavoidably execute appallingly that which poorly comprehended'. For this reason, the establishment of a university in Sardinia's capital city, Cagliari, would be of great advantage, 'especially as regards the reformation of customs'. To support the argument Leprotti cites the beneficial effects of the educational reforms in Piedmont, where the university led to 'the increase of commerce ... , the cleansing of customs, the advancement of mechanics, the dissolution of the first darkness, and the ancient ignorance, and the good taste in each thing'. However, according to Leprotti, it would be unwise to apply directly the Piedmontese system in Sardinia. For instance, 'being Sardinians by nature ready, and ferocious ... it is apt to forbid to each student to carry swords, imitating the custom introduced in all the Prussian universities'.

Leprotti then goes on to suggest other measures to 'cleanse Sardinia'. 'Having started the work, and prepared the spirits through sciences and arts', Leprotti (1966: 112-7), writes, 'it would be convenient to study how to instil in the souls a certain sweetness, or docility, which partly tempers, and corrects that innate ferocity. This idea must not be communicated through violence and Laws, but through very sweet means, which operating slowly conduct the Peoples to the given end, without them realising it'. Such measures include the establishment of theatres, which like 'a sleeping drug' calms the 'animal spirit of the sick', the implementation of restrictive laws on the supply of alcohol (very important for Leprotti given that the hot climate of Sardinia, and the effects of wine and liqueur on the blood motion), and the institution of public celebrations. On the latter, Leprotti says, 'These are directed towards tightening the knots of society amongst natives, and give motion, as it were, ... to the totality of its inhabitants, which contribute
... to undress them, without them realising it, of the wild genius leading them to solitude and violent life'.

'Having cleansed the Nation', Leprotti continues, 'it seems to me that there is nothing left but to take out those barriers in between marriages, unique means to repair humankind'. As with education, Leprotti advises his king against applying in Sardinia the same type of intervention as in Piedmont, without taking into account the particular body of the local population. 'Beware of the climate, and of the fecundity of the women to that corresponding', Leprotti warns his ruler, 'It would be in vain to apply the incentives only for those women with more than twelve children. Such a law is beneficial in the more temperate climates, and where the population is more advanced, like in Piedmont, but in Sardinia it seems to me, that the number of six, or at most eight should be enough, to enjoy these privileges'.

The fact that in the second half of the eighteenth century the Piedmontese elite started changing attitude towards popular schooling raises the question of why Piedmont failed to follow Lombardy, the Republic of Venice, Tuscany, Parma, Modena and Naples in their effort towards schooling expansion. A full treatment of this problematic would demand a more detailed analysis of the differences between eighteenth-century Piedmont and the other Italian regional states than we are able to offer here. On the other hand, Foucault's (1991b) perspective of bio-power can help us in two respects. First, the early transition to absolutism meant that a particularly strong form of authoritarianism developed in Piedmont, thereby hindering the assertion of models of state formation grounded on the assumption that power is diffuse, as opposed to being concentrated in the elite. Second, the rigidity of the scheme of sovereignty meant that state formation under absolutism occurred in a discrete, rather than continuous fashion. Piedmont experienced difficulties while furthering processes of state formation remaining within absolutist frameworks of political
legitimacy in the first half of the eighteenth century, when the institutional reforms, and the educational reforms in particular, led to prolonged litigations with the Church (Quazza, 1954). Absolutist states reforming the schooling system in the second half of the eighteenth century faced similar difficulties (Venturi, 1976). In Piedmont, the educational arrangement reached with the Church predicted that the Church retained the jurisdiction on popular schooling, and the reluctance of facing the consequences of redrawing jurisdictional boundaries goes some way in accounting for the failure to reform popular education.

The argument that the origin of universal schooling is associated to the emergence of diffuse conceptions of power in economic thought apparently conflicts with Green’s (1992) claim that laissez faire liberalism hindered the development of the state schooling system in the first half of the nineteenth century in England (see also Cipolla, 1969; Wardle, 1970), since, notoriously, laissez faire liberalism celebrated the importance of the resistance in devising effective policy making to an unprecedented extent. The remain of this section addresses the relationship between liberalism and state schooling systems.

A full discussion of whether the growth of schooling in the first half of the nineteenth century in England was comparatively slow is beyond the scope of the present discussion. Here we shall limit ourselves to stress two things. First, as emphasised by Green (1992: 248-54) himself, laissez faire liberals were enthusiast supporters of schooling expansion, and they saw popular schooling as a means to construct an orderly and quiescent population (see also West, 1965: ch. 8). Hence, notwithstanding the apparent contradiction, in this respect, the English evidence does support the claim that schooling expansion was a manifestation of bio-power, and that the emergence of diffuse conceptions of power was an important factor in changing the
dominant attitude towards popular schooling.

Second, the evidence on the state of schooling in the first half of the nineteenth century in England is mixed. Green (1992) and, especially, Cipolla (1969) claim that England was characterised by comparatively low rates of growth of schooling in this period. On the other hand, Laquer (1976) sees the early part of the nineteenth century as a period of intense development of popular schooling, emphasising the role of agency of the working class in furthering processes. West (1965: chs. 9-10) argues that enrolment rates started rising rapidly well before the 1870 Education Act, which effect on growth of schooling was ambivalent. Italian statistics rate England as better endowed than France and inferior only to Prussia with respect to schooling diffusion by the mid-nineteenth century (De Fort, 1996: 78).

Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the evidence does suggest that England failed to play the unambiguously dominant role with respect to schooling expansion we would expect from the what at the time was the unchallenged leader of industrial capitalism. And there is case for subscribing to Green’s (1992) view, and grant England’s particular trajectory of state formation an important role in explaining this fact. On the other hand, we can accept Green’s argument that laissez faire liberalism was responsible for retarding the construction of an integrated schooling system in the first half of the nineteenth century in England only with two qualifications.

First, there is little doubt that in nineteenth-century England the schooling system was considerably less integrated than in continental Europe, and the influence of society-led models of schooling development advocated by laissez faire liberals goes some way in accounting for this fact. On the other hand, a similar movement developed also in Piedmont. If in Piedmont state builders relied much less on the private sector than they did in England is not primarily
because *laissez faire* liberalism was not as strong as it was in England. It is because Piedmontese state builders thought that the particular resistance exhibited by Piedmont was less suitable to a society-led model of development than in England, where the population was more used to liberty. As Gabriele Casati (1859, reproduced in Talamo, 1960: 73), Piedmontese ministry of public instruction, wrote in the report to the king where he expounds the principles informing the Casati Law: ‘An unlimited liberty ... is convenient and apt in England, where the private citizens have been for a long time accustomed to do that which elsewhere is left to the government, could not be experimented without dangers here’. Hence, we must stress that the logic of *laissez faire* liberalism, when applied to political practice (if not necessarily in theory), was not against the development of a state-led schooling system as such, but entailed that the degree of political intervention ought to be limited by the particular type of resistance exhibited by each given society.

Second, it is important to distinguish between the ‘limited state’ advocated by *laissez faire* liberals and the ‘nightwatchman state’ entailed by classical liberal philosophy. Green (1992) is somewhat imprecise on this issue. In particular, Green fails to distinguish *laissez faire* critiques to state schooling system on grounds of efficiency, with those invoking the illegitimacy of the operation on the grounds that by claiming control of schooling the state would infringe subjective rights, and he is too quick in associating the dominance of *laissez faire* liberalism in early nineteenth-century England to the legacy of the eighteenth-century liberal state and its emphasis on individual freedom. The opposition to state-led schooling systems informed by classical liberal philosophy and that associated to *laissez faire* liberalism must be distinguished. Not only for the sake of precision, but also because they had different effects on the development of state schooling systems. For the reason expounded above, the effects of *laissez faire* liberalism on the development of a state-led schooling system was only
weakly negative. As we are now going to see, a stronger opposition was informed by the second type of critique.

Italian schooling developments confirm that eighteenth-century England was particular in lacking a state-led schooling system, and that this fact can be explained in terms of its particular constitutional structure. In eighteenth-century Italy, similarly to England, the presence of constitutional systems of government was a hindering factor towards the assertion of the state's leadership in education. The state intervened first in Piedmont, where absolutism developed earlier and republican traditions were weaker. By contrast, the intensity of political intervention remained comparatively weak in the Republic of Venice, where, similarly to England and differently from Lombardy, Tuscany, Parma, Modena and Naples, the private sector, as opposed to the state, was leading the process of growth of schooling (Ricuperati and Roggero, 1977; Scarabello, 1992).

Within classical republicanism, a critique to the legitimacy of state schooling systems similar to the one later elaborated by English liberal thinkers such as J. S. Mill (see Green, 1992: 254) is to be found in the thought of the later Doria ([1741] 1978: 928):

> the peoples are like the princes want them. It is for every-one to see that the peoples become like brute animals when they are left without a true education and discipline, and even more they become like brute animals when tyrants expressly educate them with a vicious and false discipline

By explaining the growth of state schooling systems in terms of the rise of individualist ideology, Boli and Ramirez (1987b) neglect important tensions between the language of individualism and the logic informing the construction of nineteenth-century schooling systems. State schooling systems were not only aimed at empowering the individual,
but also at unwittingly bend the body towards social ends. As we observed earlier, the technique of implementation of state schooling system did not reflect universalistic conceptions of human nature, but the particularistic nature of populations which were gradually transformed by them.

This logic of development was difficult to accommodate within classical liberal conceptions of subjective rights. If at the beginning of the 1830s, the Lombard jurist Romagnosi (1833: 232) was writing:

> Public instruction is necessary for the conservation and progress of the single associates. Hence, since it a necessary natural right of every-one towards the community; in the same way it is a necessary natural duty of the community towards every-one.

It is not to demand his state to honour its commitment to individualist values by intervening systematically in the education of the individual. But because the principle of individual sovereignty was perceived as being in tension with compulsory schooling by French liberals. ‘The Chamber of the Deputies’ Romagnosi (1833: 239) writes ‘was convinced that the introduction of this principle [compulsory schooling] in the law was above the power of the legislator’. And the controversy was gradually expanding across liberal circles in Italy.

At the beginning of the 1840s, Mazzini ([1842] 1972: 104-5) informs us, the idea that subjective rights are grounded in the individual was employed to question the legitimacy of state-led schooling systems. The issue of the ‘liberty of teaching’, what was the right of the liberal state to educate the individual, invested the Piedmontese public sphere in the course of the 1840s, marked by Lambruschini’s (1841) article *Instruction: On the liberty of teaching*, and, after 1848, the Subalpin parliament. The controversy acquired a particularly high degree of intensity the 1850s, when the inability to find a solution to the
problematic led to the resignations of the ministry of public instruction, Gioia (Gentile, 1920; Talamanca, 1975; Berardi, 1982).

Key in precipitating the controversy was the agency of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church exploited tensions between classical liberalism and state schooling systems to defend its prerogatives in the field to some effect. As the Catholic philologist, Amedeo Peyron (1851: 118), wrote in the aftermath of the 1848 educational reforms in On secondary education in Piedmont, 'what party is left [to the Church]? Pronounce liberty of teaching'. And in 1870, the Catholic Member of Parliament, D' Ondes Reggio, in a speech defending a proposal of legislative reform aimed at relieving the government of its responsibilities in schooling:

Human society ... is composed of various families living together ... men in human societies have to practice their duties and rights, develop their capacities, pursue the good; and all this without this society being a State, i.e. a Government ... From this follows that teaching, like family, patriarchal authority, property, arts and trades, religion with its priests, charitable associations, does not belong to the state, it precedes it. ... States ... are borne for internal security and defense from external enemies ... Governments do not have rights, but only functions; even less can they concede rights or impose duties, for men receive rights and duties from nature.

Hence, in both discursive and institutional terms the Italian evidence shows that classical liberal philosophy and cognate doctrines, like traditional republicanism acted as an obstacle towards the assertion of a state leadership in schooling. This fact raises questions about why in nineteenth-century Piedmont, differently from eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries England, liberalism eased the progress of the state schooling system. In this respect, we must stress that Italian liberalism,
more unambiguously than English liberalism, was of a nationalist type. Nationalism was key in overcoming the difficulties of legitimising state schooling with the language of liberalism. As exemplified by the following extract from senator Linati's (reproduced in Talamo, 1960: 91-2) speech in parliament in 1859:

A government ... must not only govern but found the nation: to make it in such a way that each member feels the association ... Those that advocate the liberty of teaching think of the individual not the nation ... Does it not compete to [society] the right, better still the duty to provide and demand a bodily spirit from the nation? That which is necessary everywhere is indispensable in Italy, because Italy is not a made nation, like France, Spain and England, but a nation to be made, and it is apt to make it immediately.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I have been discussing the origin of universal schooling in relation to patterns of schooling expansion in Piedmont between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. In particular, we considered the impact of industrialisation, rise of the bourgeoisie and state formation. To summarise the main conclusions, both industrialisation and the rise of the bourgeoisie had a positive effect upon growth of schooling. Early industrialisation and enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie were found in connection with an exceptional rate of schooling development in the central part of the nineteenth century in Piedmont. Across post-unification Italy, regional industrialisation was strongly correlated with schooling diffusion, particularly in the later part of the nineteenth century.

However, the emergence of universal schooling cannot be explained solely in relation to these processes. Patterns of schooling expansion in
Piedmont between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries obeyed only imperfectly to the logics of bourgeois hegemony and industrialization, and they were significantly affected by dynamics of state formation. This not because the modern state has an inherent tendency to gradually expand its scope of intervention. Universal schooling corresponded to the assertion of particular technique of state formation, not simply the development of a process under way. In particular, I stressed the importance of the movement away from mercantilism as the dominant perspective in economic thought in precipitating the process.

Finally, I addressed the relationship between liberalism and state schooling systems, emphasising how the definition of subjective rights entailed by classical liberal philosophy, more unambiguously than laissez faire liberalism, acted as an obstacle towards the assertion of a state leadership in schooling. The ways in which tensions between the logic of development of state schooling systems and the definition of subjective rights associated to classic liberal philosophy provided a context for the emergence of the nationalist solution to state/society relations, thereby precipitating the development of the state schooling system in Risorgimento’s Piedmont, will be addressed in the next chapter.
6. The nationalist school in Piedmont

Introduction

This chapter discusses the process by which the Piedmontese schooling system became aimed at constructing a nation. The objective of the operation is twofold. First, to show that the schooling system in Risorgimento’s Piedmont was aimed at constructing a nation, thereby supporting the claim that nationalism was an important factor in explaining Piedmont's exceptional schooling development in the central part of the nineteenth century. Second, to show that nationalism was instrumental to overcome difficulties associated with legitimising the development of the state schooling system with the language of the social contract, and discuss the implication of these findings with respect to on-going debates on the relationship between nationalism and state formation.

The chapter is organised as follows. The next section maps the institutionalisation of a nationalist pedagogy in the Piedmontese schooling system, by attending to the development of national language as a medium of teaching and national history as schooling subject between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In doing so, I challenge the positions that Italian nation-building was precipitated by the unification of Italy and the enfranchisement of the working-class, and that the enfranchisement of the working-class was responsible for precipitating political nationalism. Risorgimento’s nationalism exhibited typical features of political nationalism both with respect to the attitude of state builders towards the nationalist objectives of popular education, and with respect to the grounds of national identity, which included descent.
The chapter then moves on to address the relationship between political nationalism and the state schooling system. Through a comparison between absolutist and nationalist conceptions of citizenship, I show that while nationalist ideology was anticipated by the social contract, it entailed a different conception of subjective rights, and was developed in opposition to the social contract as a doctrine of political legitimacy. In particular, I show that the movement away from the social contract towards nationalist ideology was instrumental to overcome difficulties experienced by liberal thinkers with legitimising the maintenance and development of a centralised schooling system with the language of the social contract. In turn, I argue that these difficulties are to be traced to tensions between post-mercantilist techniques of state formation and the definition of subjective rights associated to the tradition of the social contract. The conclusion summarises the main argument and findings.

**Language, history and nation-building**

This section maps the institutionalisation of a nationalist pedagogy in the Piedmontese schooling system between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by attending to the development of national language as a medium of teaching and national history as a schooling subject. The first part is dedicated to language. The second part focuses on history. In concluding the section, I discuss the implications of the findings.

**Language**

Ever since the nineteenth century, language as a basis for collective identification and objective of the political struggle has been playing a prominent part in most, if not all, nationalist movements. This is particularly so in the Italian case, where the basis for nationhood, Hobsbawm (1994: 37) writes, was the presence of an elite sharing a
national literary and administrative language, Italian. The promotion of Italian language was also one of the basic means through which nation-builder in Risorgimento's Piedmont and post-unification Italy sought to foster a categorical identification with the nation-state amongst society, with schooling playing a central part in the process (Marazzini, 1984: ch. 5; Catarsi, 1990; Soldani and Turi, 1993; Morandini, 2003).

Things had not always been so. Across the Italian peninsula, Italian was a literary and administrative language at least since the fourteenth century, when Renaissance humanism celebrated the virtues of vernacular, taught, written, read and spoken, with unprecedented intensity. However, in Piedmont even more than in other regional states, before the nineteenth century, the importance of Italian was incredibly limited, when compared to contemporary standards. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Piedmont presented a diversified patchwork of linguistic communities. Italian was the official language of government since the sixteenth century. But it was not the only one. Laws were written in both French and Italian. Across the Kingdom of Sardinia, linguistic diversity between the different administrative units was the norm. French in Savoy, Val d'Aosta and parts of Piedmont, Nissard in Nice, and Italian in the Piedmontese mainland (Symcox, 1983: 16). Italian was not the only language read or spoken by the elite. The Piedmontese ruling class preferred French in their social relationships and private milieus, limiting themselves to use Italian as a lingua franca in the offices of government. It is only in the course of the eighteenth century, particularly from the 1730s, under the reign of Carlo Emanuele III, that marked dominance of Italian over French as the language of ruling class and institutions of the state started to emerge (Ricuperati, 1989a). The Piedmontese publishing industry produced periodicals in both French and Italian. Throughout the eighteenth century, both French and Italian were unintelligible to the greatest part of the populace. The latter communicated through local dialects and lacked even basic literacy skills (albeit literacy rates
increased significantly in the course of the eighteenth century) (Duglio, 1971; Roggero, 1992).

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Italian was neither a schooling subject nor a teaching language. Following the Jesuit tradition, with the exception of ‘French and other foreign languages’, Latin was the only language in use in the religious schools. Italian penetrated schools and university starting from the 1730s, after the monarchy had gained control of the educational apparatus. On the other hand, in eighteenth-century Piedmont, the importance of Italian within the educational system remained very limited. As late as 1772 ‘Italian eloquence’ and surgery were the only academic subjects taught in Italian. Starting from the 1730s, Italian was taught in secondary schools, but only on Saturdays in the last three years of the course. Italian grammar became a full subject of the royal schools only towards the later part of the eighteenth century, in connection with the issuing of the 1772 regulations. Until 1780, when textbooks in Italian were imported from the Lombard elementary schools, students were learning even the first notions of literacy in Latin. Until well into the nineteenth century, Latin remained the principal medium of teaching in Piedmontese schools (Migliorini and Griffith, 1966; Roggero, 1981; Ricuperati, 1989a; Marazzini, 1984; Roggero, 2002).

The lack of diffusion of Italian amongst the populace was source of neither concern nor surprise to eighteenth-century Piedmontese state builders. As reflected by the limited diffusion of popular schooling, what little effort was made by the monarchy to spread Italian through schooling was confined to the elite. The question of teaching vernacular to the masses started attracting the attention of Piedmontese intellectuals and literary societies, such as the Sampaolina and the Filopatria, in the later eighteenth century (Marazzini, 1984: 117; Ricuperati, 1989a: 167-9; Roggero, 2002: 243, 245). Similarly to nineteenth-century nation-building, the project of diffusion of Italian
was associated to that of fostering a particularistic and categorical identity with the patria/nation. In the words of the conservative Piedmontese aristocrat, Galeani Napione (1791; cited in De Mauro, 1970: 5), author of the influential *On the usage and advantages of Italian language*:

Language is one of the strongest links to the patria ... To have one’s own language, to cultivate it, love it, appreciate it, to use it both in official and domestic situations ... is not the last reason which unite men and attach them to the province where they live; which helps instil in their heart an original character, particular to the nation

Processes of normalisation of linguistic practices amongst the populace were began by the Jacobins, after Piedmont was invaded in 1796. As stressed by Hobsbawm (1996: 21), the Jacobins considered mastery of the state language as a pre-condition to qualify for full citizenship and associated language to political loyalty. These same ideals were reflected in the educational reforms of the Jacobin and Napoleonic years (1796-1799, 1799-1815), when the pre-eminence of vernacular over Latin as a teaching and taught language was strongly asserted. The 1801 elementary curriculum included reading and writing in Italian. The teaching of Latin was advised from the second year. In 1802, in connection with the annexation of Piedmont to France, French became the dominant teaching language. Albeit limited in the actual results, the Jacobin and Napoleonic administrations gave also the first major spur towards the development of popular schooling, culminating with the introduction of compulsory elementary schools in 1812 (Brambilla, 1979; Roggero, 1992; Genovesi, 1999: 37-9).

After an initial retreat, the lead of the French of employing schooling to further processes of linguistic standardisation was gradually endorsed by the absolutist state in the restoration period (1815-1848). The choice
of language fell on Italian. This was due to three main factors: the trend set in the previous century, as a way of establishing distance with revolutionary France, and as a consequence of the fact that an anti-French, pro-Italian movement crystallised amongst the Piedmontese intelligentsia in the wake of policies of linguistic standardisation carried out by Napoleon. In 1822, Carlo Felice issued schooling regulations making compulsory for councils to establish free elementary schools teaching reading and writing in Italian. Albeit officially prohibited, Latin continued to be used to teach literacy in schools, and in 1827 the official position of the authority was one of tolerance for the practice. Not so in 1840, when the teaching of Latin in elementary schools was strictly prohibited by Troya's regulations for elementary teachers. Ever since, Latin has never made his way back into elementary schools.

Beside Italian, another language spread amongst the populace through schooling in the restoration years was Piedmontese. By norm dialect was used as a teaching tool and teachers were encouraged to translate Italian words in dialect so as to ensure their proper comprehension on the part of the children. There were also issued school text-books on how to translate from Piedmontese dialect into Italian, such as Ponza's (1843) *Piedmontese anthology to exercise in translation from Piedmontese to Italian*, as well as a number of Piedmontese/Italian dictionaries (Marazzini, 1984: ch. 5).

Between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, dialect was attacked by enlightenment thinkers as an obstacle to progress. The period between the 1830s and the 1840s witnessed a widening of the public appeal of the anti-dialect movement, marked by publications such as Dal Pozzo's (1835) *Plan of an association for all Italy having as an objective the diffusion of the pure Italian language and the suppression of the various dialects spoken in the peninsula*. At the same time the spreading of Italian language was seen as a means to
prepare the political unification of Italy (Marazzini, 1984: ch. 5; Barberis, 1988: ch. 4). For Dal Pozzo linguistic unification was a substitute for political unification, which he considered an unrealisable dream. As if inverting Dal Pozzo’s judgement, the American novelist J. F. Cooper (1838: 317-8) observed in his travelling diaries, published three years later: ‘Sooner or later, Italy will inevitably become a single State: this is a result that I hold to be inevitable, though the means by which it is to be effected are still hidden ... In the absence of great political events, to weaken the authority of the present governments, education is the surest process, though a slow one’. In the late 1840s, the struggle against dialect was consciously associated to processes of de-Piedmontisation meant to pave the way for the unification of Italy by pedagogical writers like Pansoja in Short account on the suppression of dialects (1848), Gissey in On the study of language as a means of national education (1848) and Cargnino, author of On the usage of national language in Piedmont (1848). The latter (cited in Morandini, 2003: 183-4), for instance, in an article published on the Istitutore, a Piedmontese pedagogical journal specialised in popular education, remarked:

It is in vain to hope that the feeling of Italian Nationality spread and become rooted amongst administrators, military, traders, and all the classes, it is in vain to hope that our men considered themselves other than Piedmontese, Ligurian, Lombard until will prevail the spoken municipal dialects. Language is the most evident and eloquent sign of nationality, actually it constitutes its central element, ... because a common language implies exactly a commonality of manners of conceiving and act which joins the souls of a society distinct from the others.

We ought not to overstate the force of anti-dialect practices in the Risorgimento’s schools. In 1849, in contrast to the post-unification period (Catarsi, 1990: 20), the government’s instructions for
elementary teachers were still encouraging the usage of dialect as a device to teach Italian: 'In the teaching of reading and writing ... the teachers must ensure that [the pupils] understand the content of what they write and read, by making them express in dialect the words most different from it. In this way they will obtain a double training at once' (reproduced in Marchi, 1985: 132). As late as 1863 Manzoni in Report on the unity of the language, written by the nationalist novelist for the ministry of public instruction, defended the spreading of Piedmontese-Italian dictionaries as a way of favouring the linguistic unification of the newly born Italian state (Marazzini, 1984: 208).

In any case, from around 1848 the idea that the process of linguistic standardisation of society was associated with the construction of Italy was institutionalised in the Piedmontese schooling system. In 1849, the year after the 'first war of independence', the governmental instructions for 'teachers and other officers involved in public education' stated that public education was the foundation of the feelings of 'national independence [and] freedom ... which constitute the citizen worthy of living in a free country' (reproduced in Berardi, 1982: 153). The spreading of Italian language was one of the basic means through which the schooling system was meant to construct national feelings in the children according to Risorgimento's statemen and schooling promoters. Already in 1847, Vincenzo Troya (cited by Morandini, 2003: 165), author of the 1840 governmental instructions for elementary teachers and an anthology of Italian fiction and poetry in use in the Piedmontese schools in the Risorgimento's years, wrote an article on the Piedmontese pedagogical journal The Educator, 'Advantages of making speak the Italian language at an early stage'. The following is an extract from the article:

We must align the love of the newly born to the laws of the patria, the customs of the patria, the walls of the patria, and such a love is associated with that of the language which makes us
brothers ... He who complains of the ignorance of the people, ...
of the weak feeling of Italian nationality and does not do anything
about the spreading of Italian language ... is either a liar or a
madman

Two years later, Antonino Parato ([1849] 1885: 461-7), author of the
text-book of Italian grammar in use in the Sardinian states’ elementary
schools in the Risorgimento’s years, in a speech given for the opening
of the national college of Mortara was saying:

The destinies of Italy are associated with the destinies of
instruction and education ... If we want to fulfil the national
destinies, we must radically and absolutely modify our education
... the Italian language, by being a particular offspring of our
character, of our climate, of our political institutions, is the most
powerful vehicle of national ideas, the base of Italian civility, the
strongest link of souls and hearts ... The diffusion of Italian
language is the means to spread the national idea ... Let us print
in our minds that ... until the use of Italian language does not
become more popular, the multitudes will never feel to be
Italians, ... The unity of language is that which must prepare the
union of the souls.

In similar spirit in 1855, the ministry of public instruction, Lanza (cited
in De Fort, 1996: 58), in a project of educational reform presented to
the chamber of the Subalpin Parliament:

This aspect of the question assumes in our particular conditions a
great importance, since much more than in the schools of other
nations, our has the task of concentrating almost exclusively on
the question of the teaching language. The language, in the other
nations, is learned by the people with the milk ... For our people,
on the contrary, the language which they learn from their
mother’s lips ... is not the light which can awaken in them the feeling of the nation to which they belong. Such a language can only be learnt in the school ... language is the only character in which nationalities recognise themselves, it is the deposit of patriotic traditions.

Similar objectives were expressed in the government instructions for elementary teachers Lanza issued in 1857 where, the Piedmontese ministry invited the teachers to ask the children to write essay’s with titles such as ‘facts of patriotic history’ or ‘facts honourable to the Italian name’ (cited in Morandini, 2003: 262).

In short, in Piedmont, the transition from absolutism to nation-state led to a radical change in the relationship between schooling and language, and more generally between language and society. Vernacular recovered a very limited importance within the eighteenth-century schooling system. Linguistic diversity, within and across classes was the norm in eighteenth-century Piedmont. Post-revolutionary France was responsible for beginning processes of linguistic standardisation of society around vernacular. Even if the policy was endorsed by the absolutist state in the restoration years, it became intense only from the 1840s, at the same time as Italian nationalism was becoming dominant. The nationalist aspect of the pedagogy became more marked in the post-unification years, as with the implementation of restrictive anti-dialect practices. However, the idea that the spreading of Italian language was instrumental to the construction of Italy was institutionalised in the schooling system in the aftermath of 1848, before the unification.

**History**

The construction of a shared past uniting elite and people towards a common destiny constitutes another essential element of nation-
building, together with the promotion of a common language (Calhoun, 1997: ch. 3; Hobsbawm, 2000). The change entailed by this technique of state formation is even more spectacular that represented by the rise of vernacular. In the space of a few decades, the status of history changed from virtual secrecy to being of universal domain.

More markedly than vernacular, the teaching of history was not favoured by the eighteenth-century absolutist state. Italy did not lack a tradition of history as a taught subject in schools. Ancient and contemporary history was of central importance to Renaissance humanists, and the study of ancient historians, Cesare, Sallustio, Valerio Massimo, was included in the curriculum of the Renaissance school, as part of the course of humanities destined to educate state and clerical functionaries (Grendler, 1991: 277-85). However, the importance of history declined in the religious schooling system, where history was taught only sporadically and late, lacking a specific disciplinary status (Scaglione, 1986: 89-90). ‘Chronology, history and coat of arms’ were included in the 1679 curriculum of the Nobles’ College of Turin (cited in Roggero, 1981: 83). A celebratory history of the ruling dynasty was staged in plays in the student theatre attached to the institution. History was not a subject in the eighteenth-century royal schools. History was not an academic discipline either. In 1715, the introduction of universal history as an academic subject was recommended by both Maffei and D’Aguirre, but even if D’Aguirre’s plan was adopted, history was left out (Balani and Roggero, 1976; Roggero, 1981).

The absence of history from the schooling curriculum in eighteenth-century Piedmont reflected the dominant view that history was better kept for the very few. According to Ricuperati’s (1989a; 1989b) account, in the first half of the eighteenth-century in Piedmont circulated three main types of history. Firstly, dynastic history, represented by Lama’s Histoire de la Maison de Savoye (1722-1729),
centred on defending the historical role of the Savoy House and the thesis that the Savoy House was of Saxon origins. The latter was instrumental to legitimise Vittorio Amedeo II's claim to the title of Vicar of the Sacred Roman Empire in Italy, which elevated the standing of the Savoy House above that of other Italian princes, thereby contributing to legitimise the monarchy's ambitions over Lombardy. Secondly, there was neo-ghibellin history, exemplified by Muratori's collection of medieval writings, the *Rerum Italicarum scriptores*. According to Muratori, the Savoy's claim of being of Saxon origins had no historical grounds, and this was the main reason why he ran into difficulties with the monarchy while compiling his history of medieval Italy. The objective of Muratori was 'to establish whether we derive from the ancient Italians, or from the Goths, the Lombards, the Franks, and the Germans' (cited in Noether, 1951: 77). Muratori did not think that sharing a common origin ought to alter the political organisation of Italy, which he judged an equilibrated combination of monarchies and republics. Thirdly, Jean Baptiste De Tellier's *Recueil contenant dissertation historique et geographique sur la vallée et Duchée d’Aoste*, 'the first civil, religious and to some extent political and social history of the Duchy, where he defended, against the uniformity imposed by Amadean policy, the historicity of the privileges and autonomies' (Ricuperati, 1989a: 154). None of these works was published.

Piedmont started to be seen as a potential subject of 'national' history by Piedmontese intellectuals in the second half of the eighteenth century, where national meant economic, political, civil and literary. The idea was developed by the same literary societies, Filopatria, Sampaolina, and intellectuals, Denina, Galeani Napione, advocating the spread the standardisation of linguistic norms amongst the populace, and was associated to similar objectives. For instance, Galeani Napione, author of *Essay on the art of history* (1773), stressed the importance of writing 'a history of Piedmont that is “national” and
“popular”, explaining what importance and usefulness had history not only for politicians and magistrates, but also to create a ... moral and political identity’ (Ricuperati, 1989a: 168). The monarchy was less than sympathetic to the idea of publishing a history of Piedmont, and a first attempt made by Denina was blocked by the censor.

In 1796, Piedmont was invaded by the French army. The attitude of the French administration towards the writing of a history of Piedmont and the diffusion of history in general contrasted sharply with that of the eighteenth-century absolutist state. Similarly to Renaissance thinkers, the Jacobins associated knowledge of history to republican virtue. Denina’s work was published in 1809, under the title of History of Western Italy. In 1798, the Jacobin administration also tried to establish a state institution to supervise an official history of Piedmont, the Deputation of History of the Patria, but the operation did not materialise itself (Ricuperati, 1989b: 8). The project was explicitly linked to the reform of schooling. The stated aim of the institution was to: ‘Gather in the archives and the National libraries all the documents, which are believed to be more interesting for a sincere and exact history of Piedmont [for the] progress of public instruction, not less than for the honour of the Piedmontese nation’ (cited in Romagnani, 1983: 82). During the Napoleonic period, the history of particularistic republics/peoples was a subject in secondary, but not elementary schools. The 1802 curriculum for secondary schools included ‘elements of geography and history, particularly of ancient and modern republics’ (cited in Nada and Notario, 1993: 39). The 1811 curriculum of secondary schools of the Kingdom of Italy included ‘general history of the peoples and their customs’ (cited in Di Pietro, 1979: 730).

The idea of spreading history amongst a wider public, if not particularly the populace, became dominant in the absolutist state starting from the 1820s, marked by the foundation of the Egyptian Museum of Turin (1824). That of sponsoring the writing and diffusion
of the history of the patria, the peoples of the Kingdom of Sardinia, was institutionalised between in the 1830s, when Carlo Alberto, following the lead of the Jacobins, founded the Deputation of History of the Patria, first case of an historical society in Italy. Even if, until 1848, the term patria officially referred to the dominions of Carlo Alberto, from the early stages the attention of deputation was directed to the ethnic identity of Italy and the ruling dynasty, and the civic identity of Piedmont, more than to the Sardinian States. In the restoration years, the historians of the deputation were concerned with three main histories. First, the history of the monarchy, instrumental to defend the monarchy’s claim that the Savoy House was of Italian origins, and pave the way for its leadership in the nationalist struggle. Second, the history of democracy in Piedmont, aimed at establishing if there were and what was the role of the estates system in medieval Piedmont, instrumental to further democratic projects and obstructed by the monarchy. Third, the blood of Italy: the ‘Longobard question’, initiated by Manzoni, taking Machiavelli as a model, concerned with establishing whether and to what extent Longobards and Romans were two separate peoples, as opposed to a fusion, and thereby define the blood of the Italian nation. The debate gave rise to three main thesis, Roman blood, Longobard and Roman blood, or a mixture between Roman and various barbarian peoples’ blood (Romagnani, 1983).

Mittermaier (1845: 202) writes that the 1840 regulations were granting more time to the teaching of geography and history in secondary schools. However, the institutionalisation of history in the Piedmontese educational system remained weak. A chair of ‘military history of Italy’ at the University of Turin was established as late as 1846. These institutions served a selected public. In restoration Piedmont, history still carried an elitist mark. As Balbo (1833; cited in Romagnani, 1983: 27-8; emphasis mine) put it in the inaugural speech for the opening of the Deputation of History of the Patria: history is ‘the science truly teacher of the princes as much as the people, the doctrine necessary for
all the governing and *many* of the governed*. It may be, on the other hand, that some education in patriotic history was given in elementary schools as part of religious education. That, in fact, was the case, in the 1850s (Morandini, 2003: 259).

The restoration state in Lombardy exhibited a greater propensity than Piedmont towards diffusing history through schooling. As early as 1818, ‘universal history’ was included in the programme of elementary technical schools and ‘history of the Austrian states of Germany and Italy’ in that of the *liceo*. However, in Lombardy, the diffusion of history as a taught subject remained limited and the attitude of the authorities towards it ambivalent. The elementary technical schools were never established. In 1824, universal history became optional, and that of the Austrian states of Germany and Italy an academic subject. In 1850, ‘most important events of universal history and particularly Austrian history’ was subject of the *liceo* (Di Pietro, 1979: 733).

Ironically, the idea of teaching history to foster identification with Italy was anticipated by the Austrian administration in Lombardy, who, in 1818, instructed secondary schools teachers of history to tell students about ‘the many and great men which in the sciences and the arts and in any kind of knowledge illustrated [Italy]’ (cited in Di Pietro, 1979: 733). In Piedmont, the idea of teaching national history to the populace became dominant in the aftermath of 1848, when Italy’s history and geography became subjects of the elementary curriculum. The curriculum of elementary schools in 1834 read thus ‘reading, writing, Christian doctrine, and elements of Italian language and arithmetic’. In 1848, ‘tales taken from the history of Italy’ and a description of ‘Italy and [its] divisions’ were introduced as subjects in the primary schools attached to the national colleges (former Jesuit colleges) (Morandini, 2003: 71). In 1849, the regulation for evening and Sunday schools prescribed the teaching of ‘the first and easiest notions of national history and geography’ (reproduced in Marchi, 1985: 133), in
the last two years of elementary schools. The 1853 regulations for elementary schools included the teaching of ‘tales taken from the history of the patria’ (reproduced in Berardi, 1982: 171) in the fourth year. The instruction was confirmed and extended by the Casati Law (1859), which prescribed curriculum included geography and ‘exposition of the most notable facts of national history’ from the third year.

It is important to stress that in the Risorgimento’s schools the terms patria and nation referred to Italy and not Piedmont, and that schooling promoters consciously associated the teaching of patriotic/national history to fostering a categorical identification with Italy amongst the children. As exemplified by the following extract from government’s instructions on how to teach history in special schools, dated 24 December 1856 (cited in Di Pietro, 1979: 744): ‘It is believed that more than from universal history ... the youth ... could benefit from that of our nation ... the pupils will learn how our patria is not limited by the borders of a State, but is truly and completely where we speak the same speech’.

The type of Italian identity promoted through the teaching of history in the Risorgimento’s schools combined ethnic elements, like a particularistic origin, language and territory, and civic elements, such as laws and interests. In 1856, the ministry Lanza, in the instruction to the teachers described Italy as ‘that civil society to which we are bound by a common language, origin, laws, interests, memories and hopes’ (cited in Morandini, 2003: 259). Similarly to the histories studied by the Deputation of History of the Patria in the Restoration years, the history of Italy represented in history text-books in the post-1848 schooling system centred on the invasion of the Barbarians, the origin of Italy, and the communal experience, the history of democracy in Italy. This was the case with Scarabelli’s (1850) *Summary of the civil history of the Italian people*. The barbarian invasions were also the
starting point of Ricotti's (1851-2) *Short history of Europe and particularly of Italy from the year 476 to 1849*, written by the chair of history at the University of Turin for the Piedmontese schools (Morandini, 2003: 160, 168). It is not a coincidence that history as a taught subject developed in tandem with geography. For nineteenth-century schooling promoters the identity of peoples, including the Italian people, was intrinsically linked to the particularistic conditions of the territory. For La Farina, author of a history text-book for elementary school published in Turin in 1853, Italy’s ‘borders are marked by its geographical position, the conformity of language, character, customs, misfortunes and hopes’ (cited in Morandini, 2003: 163). The history taught in nineteenth-century secondary schools, certainly in the second half of the nineteenth century, under both absolutist and nation-states, told students that political boundaries are the outcome of the interplay between the ethnic identity of peoples, their homeland and particularistic features to it associated, and political conventions. In 1850, the Lombard teachers of the *ginnasium* and *liceo* were instructed to teach history thus:

> take as a guidance through history some important events, preceded by local geography ... make well understand the pragmatic connection between the internal life of States and peoples and the development of political constitutions ... the objective exposition of the States, their constitution and culture.

The following extract is taken from government’s instructions on how to teach history in Italian technical colleges in 1871:

> [the teaching of history had] to be constantly united to that of geography ... keeping in mind the mutations of boarders, and if these have reason in the conditions of the soil, that is to say ethnography, or simply in political conventions, clarifying ... the

Summing up, with respect to history, even more markedly than language, the institutionalisation of a nationalist pedagogy is strongly associated to the nation-state form, as anticipated by post-revolutionary France and developed by liberal Piedmont. In eighteenth-century Piedmont history was neither a schooling nor an academic subject. The French invasion at the end of the eighteenth century marked an inversion of tendency, albeit the diffusion of history as a schooling subject remained limited to the secondary sector, and was yet to acquire overt particularistic connotations. The diffusion of the history of the patria was favoured, but only timidly by the restoration state. From the early stages the operation was associated with the construction of Italy. National history became a subject of elementary schools in the aftermath of 1848.

**Nation-building, the unification and the enfranchisement of the working-class**

In other words, both with respect to history and language, in Piedmont, the assertion of the nation-state form entailed the development of radically new means of state formation. These data supports the modernist argument that nationalism is a modern phenomenon, strongly associated to the post-revolutionary order, rather than the precipitate of long term developments (see Gellner, 1983; Breuilly, 1993; Hobsbawm, 1994). On the other hand, these data also show that there are dangers in importing too hastily the modernist approach in historical analysis. In particular, the fact that most historical accounts of Italian nation-building followed the modernist wave of nationalist studies has led scholars to assume that since Italy was a late moderniser, nineteenth-century Italy experienced nationalism with less intensity than in European, and Italian nationalism is usually associated
with the later nineteenth and, especially, the twentieth centuries. This reading, our analysis indicates, is inaccurate.

Hobsbawm (1994: 44-5) argues that until around 1880, it did not matter to Italian nationalists what was the ethnic identity of the populace. It is only in the wake of processes of democratisation and rise of mass politics that the problem of how ordinary men and women felt about nationality became important. On these grounds, as well as liberal and instrumentalist, as opposed to ethnic connotations, Hobsbawm differentiates the Risorgimento from the phenomenon of political nationalism. The ideas that in Risorgimento’s Piedmont nation-building was weak, and that nation-building was precipitated by the extension of the franchise dominate recent accounts of schooling and nation-building in both Italian and British historical literature (Tobia, 1991: v; Porciani, 1993: 390; Soldani and Turi, 1993: 17; Gentile, 1996: 11-2; Ventura, 2000: 53; Doumanis, 2001: 106; Lyttleton 2001: 28).

Another influence on this position is that of Gramsci (1994), who harshly criticised the Risorgimento’s leadership for failing to pursue a policy of mobilisation of the masses. Bertoni Jovine (1954: 323) also associates the emergence of a nationalist pedagogy to the later nineteenth century, in her history of popular schooling in Italy.

Our analysis of the development of educational policies in Risorgimento’s Piedmont shows that the assessment that nation-building became intense only towards the later nineteenth century is inaccurate. In both quantitative and qualitative terms Risorgimento’s Piedmont experienced intense nation-building. As discussed in chapter five, the central part of the nineteenth century witnessed an exceptional development of popular schooling. The discussion above shows that, as stressed also by Morandini (2003), both with respect to language and to history, a nationalist pedagogy was institutionalised in the Piedmontese
schooling system in the aftermath of 1848, before the later nineteenth century.

The other dominant perspective in historical accounts of nation-building in nineteenth-century Italy, alongside the extension of the franchise, is that the main purpose of nation-building was to construct Italy amid the ethnic diversity brought by the unification (Barbagli, 1974: 86; Catarsi, 1990: 10; Soldani and Turi, 1993: 17; Vigo, 1993).

The development of a nationalist pedagogy in the Piedmontese schooling system shows that the nationalist aspect of it did intensify in the aftermath of the unification, as with the introduction of restrictive anti-dialect practices. Furthermore, it shows that the institutionalisation of a nationalist pedagogy addressed concerns about the limited diffusion of Italian identity within society, and nineteenth-century state builders saw it as a means to prepare and further the political and cultural unification of Italy. However, the fact that the process was started by Risorgimento’s Piedmont, rather than post-unification Italy, shows that it was not the political event and the ethnic diversity that it brought that were primarily responsible for precipitating Italian nation-building, but the process of unification and the ideology of nationalism.

Another implication of our findings on nation-building in Risorgimento’s Piedmont is that the enfranchisement of the working-class was not responsible for unleashing political nationalism. Hobsbawm (1994) overstates the centrality of language to Risorgimento’s conceptions of nationhood. Italian language was central to Italian identity. However, to Risorgimento’s state builders, Italian identity encompassed also symbols other than language. As stressed earlier, Italian identity, as promoted in the Risorgimento’s schools, was also grounded on unambiguously ethnic signifiers, such as descent. The question of the ‘blood of Italy’ was addressed by educational
Institutions already in the 1830s (on Risorgimento’s Italy and ethnicity see also Banti, 2000).

In Piedmont, political nationalism was more directly associated to liberalism and the bourgeois state than it was to democracy and mass politics. In particular, the development of political nationalism, the next section argues, was intimately linked to the difficulties of liberal thinkers with legitimising the development of the state schooling system with the language of the social contract.

Citizenship and nation-building

What follows compares nationalist and absolutist conceptions of citizenship. The analysis is based upon writings of two early eighteenth-century absolutist ideologues, the early Doria and Muratori, one late eighteenth-century absolutist ideologue, Amidei, and two nationalist ideologues, Mazzini and B. Spaventa. In doing so, I show that nationalist conceptions of citizenship were deployed against the definition of subjective rights associated to the tradition of the social contract, and that the movement was instrumental to overcoming difficulties associated with legitimising state schooling systems with the language of the social contract. The presentation is followed by a discussion of the implication of the finding for the relationship between nationalism and state formation.

On patria and nation

As we mentioned earlier, the citizen of the absolutist state owed allegiance to the patria. Hence, in order to define absolutist conceptions of citizenship we must start by looking at what absolutist thinkers meant by patria. Banti (2000: 3-4) distinguishes two fundamental meanings for patria in eighteenth-century Italian thought. A first meaning, cited in the Dictionary of the academia of the bran in both
the 1612 and 1806 editions, whereby patria means 'place of birth, or from which we derive our origin'. In turn, this could refer to a village, a city, a region, a state, or a cultural area. Secondly, patria was the political-institutional system claiming the loyalty of the subjects or the citizens. As examples of the latter usage, Banti cites Doria's *The civil life* (1710), and articles in the *Coffe* (influential periodical published in Milan in the second half of the eighteenth century). In addition, Banti specifies, for the *Coffe*’s writers, patria could refer both to a political-institutional system and the community living under the laws of that system. Let us pursue Banti’s exploration a bit further, beginning with Doria.

In the passage Banti refers to, Doria ([1710] 1978: 878) tells the prince how to educate the people. Doria writes: ‘in the peoples instil maxims of virtue and moderation ... in such a way ... that the love of patria is not of the type that feels like liberty, but rather that it is love towards the prince, that is to say love of patria relative to that of the prince’. For Doria patria is not simply the political system to which the citizen owes loyalty. Patria is sharply separated from the prince. In this respect, Doria’s patria is akin to Machiavelli’s state (see Chabod, 1962: 46).

In the following sentence, Doria provides a further confirmation and clarifies the nature of the relationship between prince and patria: ‘the armies will be courageous, but of a courage directed only towards the sole love of the prince and of the patria at the condition this is led and sustained by the virtuous prince’. Patria is that which the prince governs. In stressing the subordination of the love of patria to that of the prince in the hierarchy of loyalties, Doria is distancing himself from the republican tradition, whereby citizens could revolt against the prince when acting on behalf of the people, as it is made clear by the following quote:
The virtuous captains well instructed in the art of war, but to the prince completely subordinated and not busy to be loved by the peoples and the soldiers like the captains of the republics. And even if this renders the armies not as much virtuous, not being like those of the republics led by free and virtuous maxims, but only by maxims virtuous and obliging, it is necessary that in the kingdoms that the captains are ... always submitted to their prince.

Doria’s thought, in essence, does not depart from the republican scheme. Simply, he inverts the hierarchy of loyalties by placing the prince above the people/patria.

The relationship between patria as a locus of political loyalty and patria as the place of origin becomes clearer if now turn the attention to Muratori’s ([1735] 1978) pedagogical treatise, *Moral philosophy exposed to the youth*. Muratori (1978: 835-6) describes the patria thus:

> From it we had life, from it we had support, and because of this in addition to the natural mother the patria should be named mother ... so there can be occasions when the citizen is obliged to love and prefer the patria to his parents and children. ... life and goods sometimes must be sacrificed to save the patria ... notwithstanding the fact that sometimes its government does not seem right, ... the generous and good citizen must do it good, if he can. For [the patria], I say it again, is his mother.

This passage shows that: first, as with Doria, for Muratori patria refers to that which is governed by the prince. Second, the prince has a moral right to claim a portion of the individual’s natural rights (life, property, honour) when acting on behalf of the patria, and the claim of the patria upon the citizen’s natural rights is grounded upon the idea that the
patria constitutes a natural, family-like form of affiliation, as indicated by the metaphor of the mother.

In addition, the quote shows that Muratori’s citizen stands in a categorical relationship with the patria, in Calhoun’s (1997) sense of being direct, unmediated by other webs of loyalties. Consistently with these premises, Muratori’s citizen grounds allegiance to the prince on a contract between individuals, acting out of interest, and the sovereign:

> It is from here that originate most of the kings of these lands, men, independent but unhappy, agreed to elect a chief and prince an only man or various magistrates, subjecting themselves to his or their will, for the persuasion and the desire of a lesser evil or a greater good.

Similarly to Doria’s citizen and differently from the republican tradition, Muratori’s citizen of the patria is not a legal subject of right. Muratori (1978: 853) reserves the legal right to disobedience and revolt to the religious subject: ‘it is a great virtue to obey and submit also to the leadership of an evil prince, as long as it is not contrary to the law of Whom is superior to good and evil’. Muratori’ scheme was consistent with the then dominant doctrine of divine right (Jemolo, 1974: 49), and Muratori did not perceive as contradictory combining the social contract and divine right: ‘[T]he prince’, Muratori (1978: 843) writes, ‘is put by God on the throne’.

A first transformation of Muratori’s model is operated by Amidei, who in a treatise published anonymously in 1764 in Florence adapted Rousseau’s social contract to the local requirements of a monarchy entangled in bitter jurisdictional controversies with the Church (Venturi, 1976). As it is clear since the title of the piece, The church and the republic within their limits, Amidei’s genius lies in rendering explicit the opportunities for radically altering state, public and church
relationships opened by Rousseavian thought. 'Every enlightened citizen', Amidei (1980: 169) writes, 'fervently desires the increase of his [the monarch's] authority for the public happiness'. The crucial point is that Rousseau's contract allows the monarch to do away at once with natural and divine laws as limitation to the exercise of sovereignty (in this, Amidei contrasted with the other great jurisdictional treatise of the period, Pilati's Of a reform of Italy ([1767] 1770); on natural and divine laws in early modern Italy see also Meinecke, 1998: 125-7).

But let us look at Amidei's contract in greater detail. For Amidei (1980: 158-159), similarly to nationalism for contemporary scholars, divine right is an invented tradition, created by opportunistic princes to justify their rule to naïve subjects, but ill-suited to the contemporary man. In truth, the political and spiritual realms are essentially different, in that they are grounded on different moral systems. For example:

the conjunction of the sexes without the previous formality of religious ceremonies, [Amidei (1980: 167) argues], is a sin, but it is not a crime against the political body ... And this only example will serve to illustrate how much importance has keeping separated the religious virtues from the political virtues and the religious vices, which are sins, from the political vices, which I call crimes.

Amidei's position on the grounds of separation of religious and secular realms, in essence, does not depart from Muratori's (1749: ch. 8) thought on the topic, whereby crime and sins (public happiness and salvation) define two different types of jurisdiction (prince and church). More radically than Muratori, however, Amidei takes this argument to bear upon the origins of sovereignty, and, by implication, on the nature of political right. Henceforth, the church ceases to have any legal claim to political authority, and the legal right to disobedience and revolt is
reserved to the governed subject, the political body. This passage lends Amidei’s monarch to a greater vulnerability towards the moral subject of right than Muratori’s prince. Let us now look at how Amidei addresses this problem.

Not content with rejecting divine right, Amidei pronounces himself against natural law, which he finds empirically wanting. ‘The philosophers which have written on the theory of natural right’, Amidei (1980: 167) writes, ‘have formed some hypothesis, which I find unsatisfactory, because they are founded more on their imagination than proved by nature’. For Amidei (1980: 167-8), originally, men were not linked in any association. On the other hand, Amidei argues, neither it can be that isolated individuals united themselves spontaneously for ‘In nature instantaneous motions are absurd, and the association of men in the form of a people presupposes the existence of an aggregation in the state of nature’. Hence, Amidei (1980: 168-82) writes ‘The family was the first model of political societies ... A people, a nation is nothing but a general society composed of as many particular societies as are the families united in one body’. However, for Amidei, the model of the family is too contingent to be the base of right: familial links are dissolved when children become adults, and from then on the union becomes voluntary. To make the political association a permanent and enduring act another step is needed. And it is at this point ‘The will of everybody united ... , this association formed the social contract, ..., and the body politic came to life’. Henceforth, even if sometimes the body of society transfer sovereign authority to a senate or a person, the latter ‘belongs essentially to the body of society to which each member has ceded his rights, which he received from nature’.

Notwithstanding the initial success met by Amidei’s treatise, in the intervening period his ideas were to fall into disrepute, and Amidei himself turned to enlightened despotism (some sort of secularised
divine right) in his later years. Amidei’s ideas came back into vogue with the new century, when his model was taken on, amongst others, by the son of a Genovese doctor, by the name of Giuseppe Mazzini.

The following discussion is based upon writings of the 1830s and 1840s, while Mazzini was living in London, after being exiled from Piedmont, and expelled from Switzerland and France. Mazzini was the ideological leader of the democratic faction in Risorgimento’s Italy.

Mazzini’s nation/patria, like Amidei’s body politic is the result of a conscious act of will on the part of a collective subject, a social contract. For Mazzini (1831; cited by Banti: 59-60; emphasis in original) the Italian nation is ‘the universality of Italians, bond by a common pact and living by under a common law’. The concept is reiterated three years later: ‘you are peoples but you are not a nation … you do not have a national pact, produced by the national will’. And again, in the On the duties of man (1841-2), Mazzini’s theoretical testament: ‘The patria is not an aggregate it is an association’.

In addition, as with Amidei, the collective subject stipulating the association is defined by spontaneous, natural aggregations leading to the formation of . We cite again from the On the duties of man (1841-2): (cited by Banti, 2000: 64; emphasis in original): ‘The natural divisions, the innate spontaneous trends of the peoples will substitute the arbitrary divisions sanctioned by the sad governments’.

On the other hand there are important differences between Amidei’s and Mazzini’s social contract. First, a change in the identity of the contracting subject, which, from egalitarian and universalistic, becomes exploitative and particularistic. For Amidei the community of extended kinship, the nation, defined communities of natural law, universalistic and egalitarian. Mazzini’s definition of the same category is diametrically opposed. For Mazzini spontaneous aggregations define

The true country is a community of free men and equals, bound together in fraternal concord to labour towards a common aim. You are bound to make it and to maintain it such. The country is not an aggregation, but an association. There is, therefore, no true country without a uniform right. There is no true country where the uniformity of that right is violated by the existence of caste privilege and inequality. Where ... there is not a common Principle, recognized, accepted, and developed by all, there is no true Nation, no People; but only a multitude, a fortuitous agglomeration of men whom circumstances have called together and whom circumstances may again divide. In the name of the love you bear your country, you must peacefully but untiringly combat the existence of privilege and inequality in the land that gave you life.

One of the implications of Mazzini’s definition of multitude is that the multitude must be ‘nationalised’ before it can exercise liberty, and the position of those who deny the state the right to lead the schooling system is illegitimate. On this Mazzini (1971: 108-10) writes:

[The] cry liberty of teaching disinhers the Patria of any moral direction ... Without National Education the Nation does not exist morally ... ask, demand the establishment of a system of national education free, compulsory for all

Second, the social contract, with Mazzini, is put to a different use than in Amidei. Mazzini’s contract is the founding act of the nation, but, differently from Amidei’s social contract, does not define subjective rights. On the contrary, nationalist ideology was deployed by Mazzini
against the definition of subjective rights entailed by Amidei’s social contract, as well as that of natural law.

The movement was deployed by Mazzini to overcome difficulties associated with legitimising a state schooling system with the definition of subjective rights associated to the social contract. Mazzini ([1841-2] 1972: 104-5; emphasis in original) summarises the main positions of the debate between those advocating the leadership of the state in the schooling provision and those that advocate the leadership of society thus:

Two doctrines, two schools, divide the field of those who fight for liberty against despotism. The first declares that sovereignty resides in the individual: the second claims that it lives only in society, and it becomes a norm the consensus manifested by the majority. The first believes it has accomplished its mission when it has proclaimed the rights believed inherent in all human nature and attended liberty; the second looks exclusively to the association, and deduce from its constitutive pact the duties of each individual.

Mazzini finds both the alternative that subjective rights are grounded in the individual, as predicted by natural law, and the alternative that they are grounded in the collective will, as in the Rousseavian social contract, unsatisfactory. According to Mazzini (1972: 105), ultimately sovereignty lies neither in the individual, nor in the social contract:

Sovereignty is in God, in the moral Law, in the providential design that governs the world and that is revealed by the inspirations of the virtuous Genius and the tendency of Humanity in the various epochs of its life ... Sovereignty does not lie with the individual, it does not lie with society unless they both conform to ... that Law ... Either an individual is the best
interpreter of the moral Law and governs in its name or he is an usurper ... The simple vote of the majority does not constitute sovereignty if it is evidently opposed to the supreme moral norms, or closes deliberately the way to future Progress.

Which, for Mazzini implies:

You must be concerned that your children learn the principles and beliefs leading the life of their brothers in the times when they live and in the land to them assigned: -what is the moral, social, and political programme of their Nation: - what is the spirit of the legislation judging their actions

In other words, Mazzini’s subjective rights become mutable around the nation and history. Subjective rights not only change as the result of the transition from a natural to a civilised state, as entailed by Amidei’s contract, but continue to change as the history of humanity, and that of the nation in particular, moves towards progress. And Mazzini deploys this discursive device to legitimise the development of state schooling systems.

At the beginning of the 1850s, about ten years after Mazzini was writing, the controversy on the ‘liberty of teaching’ exploded in the Subalpin parliament, academia and printed press, in the wake of the construction of the post-1848 schooling system (Gentile, 1920; Talamanca, 1975). Amongst others, the question was tackled by another political refugee, Bertando Spaventa, Neapolitan philosopher, while in exile in Piedmont. Between the 1850s and the 1860s, his writings on the topic and the theory of the state to it associated were taken as models by the Piedmontese liberal elite against the liberal opposition to the development of a centralised schooling system (Gentile, 1920; Borghi, 1951).
For Spaventa there is no way to conciliate a centralised schooling system with liberty in absolute terms. The problem is to establish how much despotism is legitimate given the particular social and political conditions of a State. Spaventa ([1851] 1962: 5-6) describes the issue thus:

talking in absolute terms, all those who love liberty, and want it in full, cannot deny that teaching must be free. But if the question is placed in the field of reality and practice, if we look at the particular social and political conditions of a State, opinions start diverging ... Some want absolute liberty without restrictions, without limits; others want it limited ... Those who want it absolute ... claim that, when we want to prescribe a limit, we do not know where to find it, how to justify it, and we fall back on arbitrary judgements ... Those who want it limited ... cannot agree on assessing the borders

Over the following years, Spaventa developed his idea that subjective rights are defined by the particular political and social conditions of the state in a systematic theory of the state, very similar to that of Mazzini. For Spaventa, like Mazzini, the particularity of a state is defined by the nation. As he (1969: 285) puts it: 'The nature and hence the particularity of the State is its nationality'. In addition, as with Mazzini, Spaventa’s (1969: 278; emphasis in original) state creates the free individual: ‘the State not only protects, but creates the particular interests’. And the state does so in accordance with the particular essence of the nation. ‘The State’, Spaventa (1969: 285; emphasis in original) writes ‘is the national substance, truly and really conscious of itself; the spirit of a people ... in its true and perfect existence’.

Spaventa, on the other hand, takes to more extreme consequences Mazzini’s ideas that the social contract has nothing to say about subjective rights by doing away with the social contract altogether. As
an alternative theory on the origins of sovereignty, Spaventa draws from Hegelian dialectical history. For Spaventa ([1860] 1969: 194-205), the history of mankind up to the French revolution is a long attempt to conciliate the principles of universality and particularity of subjective rights. Within this context, the social contract is nothing but one phase of this opposition, superior to the medieval world in that it grants a special status to science as a means to unravel the continuity between the absolute and the contingent, but nevertheless entangled in the tension between necessity (represented by natural law) and freedom (represented by the arbitrary contract, similar to that of Amidei). The phase of the social contract is followed by that of the nation-state, harbinger of a new synthesis between the two principles: ‘the idea of a universal law of humankind in the proper and particular existence of the nations’, Spaventa (1969: 204) writes, ‘overcomes every previous discovery’.

**Nationalism, the social contract and state formation**

The analysis of the development of nationalist ideology carried out above has emphasised how, while nationalist ideology was anticipated by the eighteenth-century contractualistic thought, nationalist ideology was deployed in opposition to the conception of citizenship entailed by the social contract, not as an application of it. Furthermore, we saw that difficulties experienced by liberal thinkers and state builders in Risorgimento’s Piedmont with the question of the legitimacy of the development of a centralised state schooling system provided a context for the movement away from the social contract in favour of nationalist ideology as the dominant narrative of political legitimacy. The following section discusses the implications of the findings in relation to on-going debates on nationalism and state formation.

As argued in the previous section, Hobsbawm (1996) is incorrect when stating that political nationalism was precipitated by the
enfranchisement of the working class. And yet Italian nationalism supports Hobsbawm’s characterisation of political nationalism as an ideology that developed in opposition to liberalism in the wake of the development of the apparatus of popular control of the modern state.

On the other hand, Hobsbawm overstates the discontinuity between liberalism and nationalism. Italian nationalism was a branch of liberal philosophy and was fundamentally shaped by its contradictions. This is not because liberal thinkers struggled to adapt social reality to the assumptions about human nature of the social contract. Calhoun (1997) argues that nationalism developed because contractualistic thinkers like Locke and Rousseau failed to notice that the ethnic identity of the people is contextual, and amenable to be changed by statecraft. The failure to recognise this fact implied that when the model of the social contract was applied to real contexts, it led to the development of conflicting claims to peoplehood. Similarly, Balibar (1991b) claims that nation-building is an entailment of tensions between the nationalist idea that the state embodies an egalitarian and bounded ethnic group, and a reality of hierarchical and contextual identities.

Balibar and Calhoun characterisation of nationalist ideology and its relationship to nation-building is inaccurate. Nationalist conceptions of civil society were the opposite of egalitarian, stable and bounded. As we have seen, rather more like post-mercantilist notions of population, Mazzini conceived of the multitude as particularistic networks of unstable, exploitative and hierarchical relationships amenable to gradual improvement. One consequence of this fact is that nationalist ideology did not entail the erosion of ethnic particularism through the development of state schooling systems because nationalist ideology assumes that ethnic groups are egalitarian and stable, and therefore the state needs to construct an egalitarian ethnic identity within society to render the act credible, as implied by Balibar’s and Calhoun’s arguments.
The similarity between nationalist conceptions of society and post-mercantilist notions of population, and their difference with the definition of society associated with the social contract, together with the fact that nationalist conceptions of subjective rights were deployed against the conception of subjective rights of the social contract, support Breuilly's (1995) theory of nationalism. Breuilly (1995) argues in the wake of development of post-mercantilist economic thought, the eighteenth century witnessed the development of an increasing emphasis on the idea that society possess self-regulatory properties, beyond the control of statecraft. This movement led to the development of a novel set of questions on how to regulate state/society relationships in the light of this fact, and nationalism emerged to provide a solution to these dilemmas (even though Breuilly misplace the origin of the idea that each society is unique by imputing that to nationalist thought, as opposed to post-mercantilism). The finding support also Foucault's (1991b; 2001a) argument that tensions between the logic of growth of bio-power and the theory of sovereignty were responsible for explaining changes in dominant conceptions of political legitimacy that occurred in Western Europe between the later eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the process by which the Piedmontese schooling system became aimed at constructing a nation. In particular, the chapter has challenged the view that Italian nation-building was precipitated by the enfranchisement of the working class and the unification of Italy, by showing that, with respect to schooling, nation-building became intense already in the Risorgimento's years. In accounting for why Italian nationalism led to the development of policies of nation-building, I argued that nationalist ideology and associated conceptions of citizenship were instrumental to overcoming
difficulties experienced by liberal Piedmont with legitimising the maintenance and development of a state schooling system with the language of the social contract. The next chapter summarises the main argument and findings of the thesis.
7. Conclusion

In conclusion, I summarise the main argument and findings of the thesis. The stated aim of the thesis was to cast some light on the phenomenon of nationalism, and its relationship with the modern state in particular. The issue has been addressed through an analysis of the relationship between growth of a state schooling system and the rise of nationalist ideology to dominance in Piedmont between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. The main argument put forward has been that nationalist ideology was instrumental to legitimise the growth of a state schooling system, in the wake of difficulties experienced by liberal Piedmont with legitimising the practice with the language of the social contract. What follows summarises how I developed this argument, and discusses its implications for the historical sociology of schooling and that of nationalism.

The thesis considered the impact of industrialisation, rise of the middle-class and state formation on patterns of growth of state schooling systems across eighteenth and nineteenth-century Italy, leading to the following findings.

The cases of Piedmont and Italy supports the claim that industrialisation was an important factor in precipitating the growth of a state schooling system. In Piedmont, the industrial take-off of the 1830s was followed by a sudden acceleration of the pace of growth of popular schooling. Between the 1840s and 1850s, in the space of about twenty years, schooling changed from being the domain of a minority of boys to being attended by virtually all the children in schooling age. Statistics show that at the beginning of the 1840s elementary schooling was absent from the great part of the Piedmontese mainland, and there were virtually no schools for the girls. By the time of the unification (1861), 93 percent of the children in schooling age was enrolled. At the same time political and ideological intervention in popular schooling
greatly intensified. The first periodicals dedicated to popular schooling were issued in the 1830s. The 1840 saw the issuing of the first instructions issued by the Savoyard government for elementary teachers, and the establishment of the first government schools to train elementary teachers. A standardised and integrated schooling system divided in elementary, secondary and further education was developed between 1848 and 1859, by which time schooling became compulsory.

In post-unification Italy regional patterns of schooling expansion exhibited a strong correlation with industrialisation. Schooling reached quasi-universal proportions in the industrial triangle in the north-west considerably earlier than in the rest of the peninsula. The association between industrial and schooling developments became stronger in the later part of the nineteenth century, when schooling became a markedly urban phenomenon, and the gap between the rural south and the rest of Italy widened, in the wake of the intensification of policies of industrial development.

On the other hand, the Italian evidence show that the emergence of state schooling systems cannot be explained solely in relation to the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society, as Gellner (1983) would have it. The growth of state schooling systems obeyed logics that cannot be derived in any easy way from the assertion of an industrial technology of production, and changes in ideological and power relationships accompanying the growth of state schooling systems cannot be dismissed as a smoke-screen for industrial interest.

First, industrialisation was not a pre-condition to experience intense expansion. In Naples, Modena, Tuscany, Lombardy, Venice and Parma, the movement towards schooling expansion became intense in the second half of the eighteenth century, before industrialisation. This aspect was particularly marked in Lombardy, where compulsory schooling was introduced as early as 1786. In real terms the new
educational order took a while to take off, but the impact of the eighteenth-century schooling reforms was all but negligible. In the last twenty years of the eighteenth century, Lombardy registered twice as many foundations of schools as in the previous two centuries. By the beginning of the twentieth century, French statisticians registered that about 60 percent of the boys in schooling age were enrolled.

Second, the process of schooling expansion corresponded to the development of a particular technique of economic development, which was related but not reducible to industrialisation, either as an economic or a social phenomenon. Up until the later nineteenth century, the movement towards schooling expansion involved the countryside as much as the city, indicating that state schooling systems did not emerge primarily to address concerns about the social tensions brought by the process of urbanisation unleashed by the industrial revolution, as De Swaan (1988) and Smelser (1991) suggest. At the time of the unification patterns of diffusion of schooling within Italian regions were not centred in the cities. This is not because early schooling promoters were not concerned with economic and technological progress, as argued by Laquer (1976) and Meyer et al. in relation to the development of popular schooling in England and the U.S.. Regardless of whether the technology of production demanded particularly refined skills from the workers, schooling expansion was associated by enlightenment thinkers and absolutist and republican state builders to exploiting the opportunities opened by technology for economic progress. However, these objectives became strongly associated with industrialisation only in the course of the nineteenth century. In the preceding period, following the physiocratic tradition, the schooling system was meant to train rural, as well as city workers. Finally, the emergence of state schooling system was not precipitated by the fact that the factory, unlike the field, demanded disciplined workers, as claimed by Thompson (1967). Schooling promoters meant to apply
disciplinary techniques to construct rural workers as well as factory workers.

Third, early industrialisation falls short of accounting for the exceptional growth of schooling experienced by Piedmont in the central part of the nineteenth century. Within Italy, in comparative terms, in the central part of the nineteenth century, Piedmont witnessed exceptional rates of growth of schooling. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, French statistics show that enrolment rates in Turin were lower than in the Kingdom of Naples. By the time of the unification, statistics rated Piedmont as the first Italian region for schooling diffusion. This pattern of development cannot be explained solely in terms of early industrialisation. Economic historians register a level of industrial development only marginally superior to the national average in the same period.

The exceptional development of state schooling in the central part of the nineteenth century in Piedmont can be accounted for by the early enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie. The dominant position of the Subalpin parliament was one of schooling expansion. The schooling system emerging in the aftermath of the enfranchisement of the bourgeoisie was shaped so as to further the construction of a middle-class and a working class to it subordinated, as anticipated by the Napoleonic schooling system.

On the other hand, the argument that the development of state schooling systems corresponded to the rise of the bourgeoisie to economic and political power, as implied by Archer's (1979) explanatory framework, leaves questions unresolved. First, the making of the middle-class developed over the long period, but the process of schooling expansion started gathering momentum only in the second half of the eighteenth century. In Piedmont, the schooling system was aimed at constructing the 'bourgeoisie', a lateral class with governing
responsibilities of doctors, lawyers, state functionaries, at least since the sixteenth century. This aspect became particularly marked in the wake of the eighteenth-century educational reforms, when the absolutist state claimed direct control of the schooling system. And yet, in eighteenth-century Piedmont popular schooling grew hardly, if at all.

Second, the process of schooling expansion became intense before either the enfranchisement of the middle-class or the making of the industrial bourgeoisie. The presence of a marked intensification of processes of schooling expansion in the later part of the eighteenth century in Naples, Modena, Tuscany, Venice, Lombardy and Parma, indicates that the process predated the rise to economic and political power of the industrial bourgeoisie.

Third, class analysis falls short of explaining why eighteenth-century Piedmont, where in institutional and economic terms the bourgeoisie was comparatively strong, failed to embark on a policy of schooling expansion.

Fourth, the Piedmontese bourgeoisie was remarkably divided on the question of the legitimacy of the state schooling system, and the post-1848 schooling reforms did not simply reflect its will.

As indicated by Green’s (1992) approach, these patterns can be explained by viewing the growth of state schooling systems as part of wider processes of state formation. In Piedmont, across the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, all the major educational reforms were found together with wider movements of reform of the administrative structure of the state.

This is not because the growth of state schooling systems was the result of the gradual development of the modern state. When looked from the long period, the growth of state schooling systems was sudden, rather
than gradual. The size of popular schooling expanded very slowly between the sixteenth and the later eighteenth century. Historians estimate that enrolment rates in Turin at the beginning of the nineteenth century were about the same, if a bit lower, than in Florence four centuries earlier. Henceforth, popular schooling started growing at great pace. By 1863, statistics indicate that in northwestern Italy almost all the children in schooling age were enrolled.

Following Foucault's (1991b; 2001a) perspective of bio-power, the uneven development of schooling across eighteenth-century Italy has been accounted for by associating the emergence of universal schooling to the assertion of post-mercantilist techniques of state formation. The Italian case suggests that the emergence of universal schooling was directly related to the assertion of post-mercantilist techniques of state formation. Piedmont, which reformed the schooling system in the first half of the eighteenth century, at a time mercantilist was dominant, failed to pursue a policy of schooling expansion. By contrast, Naples, Modena, Tuscany, Lombardy and Parma that reformed the schooling system in the second half of the eighteenth century, at the same time as mercantilism was giving way to physiocracy and political economy as the dominant perspective in economic thought, all pursued policies of schooling expansion. In addition, in the eighteenth century the process of schooling expansion was comparatively more intense in Austrian Lombardy, where the post-mercantilist model of state development was anticipated by cameralism.

Cameralist thinkers and post-mercantilist economists were pivotal figures in changing the dominant attitude towards popular schooling in Italy, and associated popular schooling to the construction of disciplined bodies and a disciplined population. In particular, in explaining why post-mercantilist thought led the development of popular schooling, we stressed the importance accorded by post-
mercantilist economists to the contribution a well-behaved and industrious population in defining effective statecraft.

Key in explaining the exceptional development of the state schooling system in Risorgimento’s Piedmont was the fact that Italian nationalism became dominant earlier than elsewhere in the peninsula. Contrary to what is held by British and Italian historians, in Piedmont Italian nation-building became intense in the Risorgimento’s years, before the unification and the enfranchisement of the working-class. First, as we mentioned earlier, in the central part of the nineteenth century the schooling system was developing at great pace.

Second, at the same time the schooling system became aimed at constructing Italy. The institutionalisation of Italian nationalism in the Piedmontese educational system started in the 1830s, marked by the foundation of Deputation of History of the Patria, officially concerned with the history of the Sardinian States, but de facto engaged with the history of Italy. It was developed by the post-1848 schooling system, when Italian history and geography became subjects of the curriculum of elementary schools, and the schooling system gradually became aimed at furthering processes of de-Piedmontisation meant to pave the way for the unification of Italy, not least through the use of Italian as the medium of teaching.

Third, from these early stages Italian nationalism combined ethnic and civic elements. Italy was defined by Risorgimento’s state builders as a particularistic population sharing ethnic attributes, like descent, as well as community of interests and laws.

The main reason why nationalism led to the development of state schooling systems is not that nationalism rests upon the existence of ‘fictive’ ethnic communities, which therefore need to be constructed by the state (see Balibar, 1991b; Hobsbawm, 1994; 2000). This
perspective oversimplifies the relationship between nationalism and nation-building.

In many respects Italy was an arbitrary construction. Before the unification Italian identity was the domain of a few. Historians estimate that at the time of the unification Italian was intelligible for less than 10 percent of the population. Italian identity had to be constructed in Piedmont even more than elsewhere in the peninsula. The peripheral role played by Piedmont during the Renaissance together with strong French influences meant that in Piedmont Italian traditions were even weaker than in the Italian core. Equally, there is no denying that the development of the schooling system in Risorgimento’s Piedmont and post-unification Italy addressed concerns about the limited diffusion of Italian identity.

However, in other respects Italy was the opposite of an arbitrary construction, it was a scientific construction. As shown by the analysis of the thought of Mazzini and Spaventa carried out in chapter six, nationalist ideologues did not assume that ethnic groups are bounded and egalitarian communities, as implied by Balibar’s definition of nationalism. Nationalist ideologues conceived of ethnic groups as particularistic and unstable networks of hierarchical and exploitative relationships amenable to gradual empowerment. This vision of society corresponded closely to that of post-mercantilist thought, and differed sharply from that of the tradition of the social contract.

Italian nationalism was instrumental to overcome tensions between the logic of state formation associated to this vision of society and the definition of subjective rights entailed by the tradition of the social contract. Liberal Piedmont ran into difficulties when attempting to legitimise the construction of a centralised schooling system with the language of the social contract. These debates provided a context for the development of the nationalist solution to state/society relations,
and nationalist conceptions of citizenship and subjective rights were deployed against those of the social contract. Italian nation-building did not originate because nationalism was modelled after the social contract and the latter’s conception of society was at odds with a reality of exploitation and mutable and fluid identities (see Balibar, 1991b; Calhoun, 1997). Rather, as suggested by Breuilly’s (1995) theory of nationalism and Foucault’s (1991b; 2001a) perspective of bio-power, nationalist ideologues sought to adapt the state/society framework inherited from the theory of sovereignty to the logic of state formation informed by post-mercantilist thought.
Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm (2000) are often accused of this sin (e.g. Calhoun, 1997: 22-3; Anderson, 2000: 6; Smaje, 2000: 72-3). Within the sociology of education the position that the nationalist school is instrumental to the bourgeois hegemony has been advanced by Apple (1990: ch. 4), with reference to nineteenth-century America.

Smith (1991: 166-7), for instance, considers bourgeoisie, working-class, professionals, monarchy, aristocracy, gentry, church, merchant and intellectual stratum as all being key actors in contributing to the spread of nationalist ideology in various periods of European history. More recently the trend has been that of emphasising the contribution also of subaltern groups, such as women and peasants (e.g. Chatterjee, 1993; Yuval-Davis, 2001).

Laquer (1976: 215-6) also stress a lack of correlation between patterns of Sunday school expansion and industrialisation between the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries in England. Consistently with these data, Cipolla (1969: 68) argues that industrialisation on the whole was unimportant in explaining schooling expansion until the end of the nineteenth century, since the technology employed in the first phase of industrialisation was not particularly complex.

Boli and Ramirez emphasis on war in accounting for the timing of state intervention in education can, on the other hand, be saved by endorsing the perspective that the growth in size of warfare made the loyalty of the masses a particularly pressing problem, as suggested by Colley (1992) and Mann (1993: ch. 11). The hypothesis of a connection between war and educational reform is confirmed by Piedmont, where the two major reforms of the nineteenth century (Boncompagni law, 1848 and Casati law, 1859) were passed during the conflict with Austria-Hungary. However, a more obvious explanation for the overlapping between warfare and educational reforms, certainly in Piedmont, is that the matter was controversial, and the wars provided the government the opportunity to pass the legislation by decree (without parliamentary approval and discussion).

Mann (1993: ch. 11) also views state education as being an element of state formation.

The same two reasons are advanced by Mandler (2003) to explain the comparatively low size of the English state in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, Mandler emphasises more than Green the impact of early state formation.

It is in fact in reaction to economic functionalism that the conflictualist approach thrived in the sociology of education from the 1960s (cf. Halsey and Karabel, 1977). Empirical studies informed by the conflictualist tradition include Barbagli (1974), Bourdieu (1972), Bowles and Gintis (1976), Collins (1979) and Halsey et al. (1980). For theoretical discussions of these issues see Althusser (1972), Poulantzas (1978), Shapiro (1980) and Dale (1990).

Archer and Vaughan mainly rely on writings by Rolland d’Erceville, Caradeuc de la Chatalois and, to a lesser extent, Diderot.

I claim for the Nation an education which depends upon nothing but the State, because it belongs to it in essence; because the Nation has an inalienable and imprescrible right to educate its members; because in the end the children of the State must be brought up by the State’ (Le Chatolois, 1763, cited in Archer and Vaughan, 1971: 153). According to Archer and Vaughan (1971: 153), Le Chatolois was also the first to use the word ‘national’ in connection with education in France.

Archer and Vaughan mainly rely on writings by Arnold.

For instance there is evidence that in the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie was remarkably divided on the question of the legitimacy or desirability of state schooling in a way that, as stressed also by Green (1992: 74-5), cannot be accounted for by Archer and Vaughan’s conceptual scheme.

The opposition between ethnic and civic nationalism goes back to the nineteenth century, when Germany and France were contesting sovereignty over Alsace (cf. Zimmer, 2003: 174-5). More recently, the distinction has been influentially endorsed by Brubaker (1992) to describe the differences between French and German nationalism. A slightly different version of the argument is advanced by Hobsbawm (2000: 268-9), who identifies a transition between liberal and irrational ways of conceiving the polity between the first and the second half of the nineteenth century. For an application of the ethnic/civic dichotomy to education see Wiborg (2000). For a critique of the opposition between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalism embedded in such a scheme see Chatterjee (1993) and Calhoun (1997: 3, 83-5). Zimmer (2003: 177) also stresses the inadequacies of the opposition to describe nationalism as a public discourse, for the two elements tend to combine. Similar remarks are made by Balibar (1991b: 96-100). Benner (2003) calls for a radical revision of the distinction by stressing how Herder, traditionally
considered as the quintessential ethnonationalist ideologue, combines political and ethnic ways of imagining the nation.

The clergy, the nobility, the sovereign courts, the lower tribunals, the officers attached to these tribunals, the universities, the academies, the financial companies, all present and, in all parts of the State, bodies in being which one can regard as the links of a great chain of being of which the first is in the hands of your Majesty, as head and sovereign of all that constitutes the body of the nation’ (Seguirier, 1776, cited in Breuilly, 1993: 89).

The Nation is essentially the source of all sovereignty; nor can any individual, or any body of man, be entitled to any authority which is not expressly derived from it’ (cited in Breuilly, 1993: 90).

Locke introduces an intermediate moment between the individuals and the state in the form of a pre-political society. In this model, the state is a trust created by the pre-political society. Differently from Hobbes, for Locke the constitution of the state does not negate the preceding moment, rather it perfects it so that the political and pre-political societies co-exist (Bobbio, 1988: 74). The pre-political society becomes the locus of much that is valuable and creative in social life (Chatterjee, 1993: 228-9). This last element is one of the key defining feature of civil society, as it is understood in the liberal tradition: a sphere of social life where individuals can freely (outside state tutelage) engage in productive and cultural activities.

More specifically, Hobbsbawm (1990: ch. 3, 2000: 263-9) explains the explosion of state nationalism in Western Europe at the end of the nineteenth century with reference to the problem of conceptualising state and society relationship after the growth of the administrative apparatus of the state upset the traditional frame-work. Morefields (2002) claims that in the second half of the nineteenth century English liberals started relying on organic conceptions of the nation-state as a result of the difficulties liberal thought has with imagining community and elaborating the grounds of legitimacy of the interventionist state. Chatterjee (1993: 227-34) claims that liberal conceptions of civil society (particularly with reference to Locke, Montesquieu and Hegel) suppress tensions between the idea that subjective rights are grounded in the individual and that they are based upon community. One historical trajectory informed by this tension is that of identifying the nation as the sole legitimate community and the administrative apparatus of the nation-state as its executor. In turn, Chatterjee (1993: 234-9) argues, the problematic was triggered by the progressive erasure of community-based identities under the normalising sway of capitalism and disciplinary power. On Archer and Vaughan (1971: 180-1, 188-9) see discussion in section above. Balibar (1991b: 97-8) links the emergence of familial metaphors to represent the nation to the growth of state intervention in the family and concomitant changing conceptions of public and private.

Indeed, according to Hoskin (1990) Foucault is a crypto-educationalist.

Starting from around 1979 Foucault increasingly use the term ‘government’ in place of ‘power’ (cf. Foucault, 1999). According to Pasquino (1993: 79) the two terms are roughly equivalent.

According to Pasquino (1993) Foucault is wrong in considering the idea that the social body is divided into conflicting fields as a peculiar feature of the discourse of war. For him the important difference introduced by this discourse lies in the fact that traditionally political thought did not identify a possible source of disorder abuses on the part of the public authority.

Estado degli impiegati nell’anno scolastico 1739-40 and Nota de’ Sign.ri Riformatori Professori ed altri impiegati nelle Regie Scuole di Provincia per l’anno scolastico 1771-2 in A.S.T., Economia, Pubblica istruzione, Magistrato della riforma: Scuole Provinciali, m.2.

First, in the 1863-4 statistics, and not the following one, the number of enrolled boys exceeded the total number of boys in schooling age (6-12). Second, Liguria, under Savoyard rule since 1815, results to be the third region for schooling diffusion according to the 1863-4 statistics, but only the seventh according to the 1861 census, which asked how many boroughs had at least one school and for the rest reproduced a scenario fundamentally consistent with that emerging from the enrolment rates.

Other examples include Beccaria, the famous criminologist (1764, reproduced in Balani and Roggero, 1976: 128): ‘Do you want to prevent crimes? Make sure that light accompanies freedom ... Whoever has a sensitive soul ... will be forced to bless the throne and him who occupies it’. For the Neapolitan economist Genovesi (1768, cited in Peroni, 1928: 291), popular schooling was necessary because it ‘civilises the human souls, discipline them and render them more obedient’. According to the Neapolitn jurist Filangieri ([1780-5]1922: 13): ‘the most effective of the means ... to keep the constitutions of governments still and stable is to educate the youth to loath the constitution’. The Regulation of Lombard’s schools in 1818 instructed the teachers of the Imperial schools thus: ‘the teachers must take special care to instil in the school-children gratitude towards the parents, love of art,
love of the Sovereign, and the patria, obedience to the law, respect for the magistrates' (cited in Genovesi, 1999: 40-1). See also summary of Leprotti below.

24 Consider also the following quotation from the instructions for a head-teacher issued by the Piedmontese government in 1738, the duty 'of the Assistants will be to watch incessantly over the conduct of the pupils both within and without the college' (A.S.T., Pubblica Istruzione, Collegio dei Nobili e delle Province: m. 1, Istruzione Al Sig Preside del Collegio delle Province. La quale comprende altresi Le obbligazioni di ciascuno de' suoi Subalterni nel medesimo). The following extract is from a plan of legislative interventions in the Piedmontese schools (1737), 'it is necessary that in every city there is someone to watch over professors and pupils, ..., never allowing the introduction of any abuse, no matter how tiny' (A.S.T., Pubblica Istruzione, Regia Università: m. 5, Progetto di provvedimenti per l' Università di Torino, formato dal Gran Cancelliere Zoppi). Consider also the description of the tasks of the censor in Parma (1768): 'They will explore the conduct of the Pupils, and discovering some vicious custom, or perverse character, or scandals .... will tell the Deputy, so that [the pupil] will be warned severely, and punished; and, in case he did not repent, he will ... be expelled from the Royal Schools' (A.S.T., Economia, Pubblica Istruzione, Regia Università: m. 6, Costituzione per i nuovi Regi Studi di Parma: 44).

25 A.S.T., Pubblica Istruzione, Collegio delle Province: m. 2 non inventariato, L' uffizio di Ministro del Reale Collegio de' Nobili ha li seguenti pesi


27 The curriculum prescribed by the Ratio studiorum limited itself to teaching mathematics and general physics under the course of philosophy (on the Jesuit curriculum see Scaglione, 1986: 82-94).

28 B.N.T., Parliamentary papers, Camera, 10/5/1870.

29 Ghibellin was the name of the imperial faction, opposed to the papacy, in medieval Italy.


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