Culture change: an attempt to teach ethics to police leaders and managers within a traditional institution and changing social milieu

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**Culture change: an attempt to teach ethics to police leaders and managers within a traditional institution and changing social milieu**

**Abstract**

This inquiry describes an attempt to teach ethics to police leaders and managers within the unique institutional context of 'Bramshill' - the site of the Police Staff College within the National Police Training organisation. It shows how the subject 'ethics' was re-introduced to the curriculum of the middle-manager programmes of study and sets this re-introduction in the context of the wider strategic priorities and culture change aspirations of the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The study identifies a sequence of 'action research' stages each reflecting a search to secure a positive evaluation for the emerging educational designs. This part of the account will illustrate how difficult it was to secure, consistently, a positive evaluation of and response to the learning designs from the client group. Finally, though, after a number of set-backs and disappointments it became possible to claim some degree of success for the educational project.

The thesis presented here is a post-modern text in three senses; first, its construction is an example of a ‘transitext’ built up over time; second, it is post-modern in its content including materials from eclectic and diverse sources; third, it is ‘local’, contextually specific and highly personal. In this latter respect it recognises that a different author would create a different style of account and a different theoretical structure in the course of making sense of the inquiry and the facts of the inquiry.

The first part of the thesis establishes the background to the project and foundations for the study. The second part charts the unfolding stages of the inquiry from the re-introduction of 'ethics' until its removal from the middle-management programme. The third part of the thesis develops a number of theoretical interpretations and concludes with the presentation of information concerning the 'moral world' of police leaders and managers. The concluding chapter re-affirms the significance of 'ethics' in police strategic discourse, summarises the main findings of the study and concludes optimistically by noting how 'ethics' has, at last, come to be positively valued by a consistent majority of the client group at the dawn of the new millennium.
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Introduction

The inquiry I shall describe here drew inspiration from both simple and complex writings and other forms of action concerned with the struggle to achieve social justice, the promotion of human rights and the protection of civil liberties.

In the course of his dialogues, Socrates had set out stringent criteria for human conduct to meet if it were to be considered 'ethical'. Compared with the urbane sophistication of late modern socially constructed persons, his conception of the nature of the 'good' life and 'right' action was stunning in its moral absolutism. Kant's moral philosophy was similarly striking and confronting; How, I wondered, would the world be organised if we were to follow one version of his categorical imperative and 'act only on that maxim which we could at the same time will to be a universal law'? Mill, too, had shaped a part of my thinking. He had observed, for example, that the history of the development of socio-political systems conspicuously featured the struggle between liberty and authority. He sought to curb the exercise of tyranny over the individual subject by asserting that a large measure of liberty was necessary if individuals were to enjoy the 'good' life. Without 'liberty' there would be no guarantee of the freedom to plan a life to suit individual character; nor would there be a guarantee that the individual could associate with the company of his or her choice. Mill's ideas support and defend 'difference', 'otherness', variety, the unusual and the unexpected.

Yet whilst Socrates, Kant and Mill stand as major figures in the intellectual traditions of western moral philosophy it was, perhaps, more humble, commonplace or evocative writing which served to provide equally important foundations for my study.

So, for example, Arendt's (1964) economical and iconoclastic phrase 'the banality of evil' had suggested to me how readily and casually individual human goodness and moral sensitivity can be over-ridden by ordinary, everyday social influence processes. The title of Fanon's (1965) work, 'The wretched of the earth', somehow, in itself, had cast a critical shadow, like a film of varnish, over my picture of the world. Freire (1976) in the course of his 'education-as-the-practice-of freedom' had included a reference to the response of a street sweeper in Brasilia, who on rediscovering the value of his own person, had said: 'Tomorrow, I'm going to work with my head held high'. Freire's simple note had continued to remind me of the
need to respect, always, the basic dignity of each and every person. And, maybe because I worked in a place of the 'haves', it was the remarkable bold lettering I had seen on the playground wall of a school in the deprived, disadvantaged part of Pittsburgh that 'moved' me most. It read: 'Our mission, every child, every day, in every way, achieving academic success'. Often, I would find myself saying: 'If they can set this as their goal then, surely, we can do the equivalent at the Police Staff College'.

Greene (1993) makes reference to a range of literary and philosophical works that she uses as educational resources in the exploration of multiculturalism and pluralism. She takes Whitman's (1931) 'Song of myself' as an emblem of the ethos of democracy and uses his work as an entrée to the study of 'the many long dumb voices' and of 'the rights of them the others are down upon'. I, too, had found in Whitman's work a profound and reassuring moral message commending the rich possibilities in human life. Greene also mentions Morrison (1972), Anzaldua (1987) and Kincaid (1990) who help to tell the stories of 'the many long dumb voices' - the voices of the excluded and marginalised. These writings had influenced and educated and inspired me. They told of 'local knowledge' (Geertz, 1983), of the 'tyranny' to which Mill had reacted, and, of the subtle charms of diversity.

In his poem, 'The great lover', Brooke (1946) identified several of his many loves - such things as 'wet roofs beneath the lamp light', 'the blue bitter smoke of wood' and 'the keen unpassioned beauty of a great machine'; he also includes the phrase: 'And voices that do sing'. What other voices had 'sung' to me throughout the progress of this study?

They included Achebe's (1986) excoriating critique of colonialism tersely captured at the conclusion of his 'Things fall apart'. There, Achebe deftly portrays something of the resolute 'District Commissioner' who, as he makes plans to write a book on his efforts 'to bring civilisation to different parts of Africa', reduces the life of Okonkwo, 'one of the greatest men in Umuofia' to a morcel of 'interesting reading'. The District Commissioner reflects upon his future oeuvre and the dead Okonkwo as follows:

"One could almost write a whole chapter on him. Perhaps not a whole chapter but a reasonable paragraph, at any rate. There was so much else to include, and one must be firm in cutting out details. He [the District Commissioner] had already chosen the title of the book, after much thought: The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes of the Lower Niger". (Achebe 1986: 149,150)
I imagined that a study of ethics might have some part to play in helping to avert callousness and insensitivity. I imagined, too, that a study of ethics could help in appreciating the fullness of life itself. Skvorecky (1980) in his 'Red music' identifies the essence of jazz as:

"... an elan vital, a forceful vitality, an explosive creative energy as breathtaking as that of any true art, that may be felt even in the saddest of blues. Its effect is cathartic." (Skvorecky 1980: 7)

The creative energy of the 'elan vital' finds itself pitted against the intolerance of ideologues. So, he continues:

"Totalitarian ideologists don't like real life (other people's), because it cannot be totally controlled; they loathe art, the product of a yearning for life, because that, too, evades control – if controlled and legislated, it perishes. But before it perishes – or when it finds refuge in some kind of samizdat underground – art ...becomes protest. Popular mass art, like jazz, becomes mass protest. That's why the ideological guns and sometimes even the police guns of all dictatorships are aimed at the man with the horns." (Skvorecky, 1980: 8)

I found a link between Skvorecky's irrepressible creative energy and the remarkable 'manual of escape, of liberation' presented by Gide (1949) in his 'Les Nourritures terrestres'. In this work, Gide was able to capture the potential for joy in the most basic experiences of life where 'mere being became an immense delight'. Oftentimes, it had occurred to me that compared with Skvorecky's 'elan vital' and Gide's joie de vivre, something was missing from the general outlook of many police. Their defensiveness and scepticism - their readiness to find fault, to complain and to criticise - their lack of trust, and, their fixation with human weakness and fallibility signified the loss of their ability to wonder at the fruits of the earth and to marvel at the facts of human achievement. Surely 'ethics' could help restore an enchantment with human life and experience, with human projects and products. And, as I constructed something called 'ethics' as a subject for study, I was reminded of an approach to education voiced by Montaigne in an observation he had made concerning the appropriation of knowledge:

"We are not under a king: each man should look after himself. Let him know what he knows at least; he must imbibe their ways of thought, not learn their precepts; and he may boldly forget, if he will, where he has learnt his opinions, so long as he may make them his own. Truth and reason are common to all men, and no more
belong to the man who first uttered them than to him that repeateth them after him. It is no more a matter of Plato's opinion than of mine, when he and I understand and see things alike. The bees steal from this flower and that, but afterwards turn their pilferings into honey, which is their own. It is thyme and marjoram no longer." (Montaigne 1958: 56)

How might I design an educational experience where my students could turn their 'pilferings' into a honey that was their own? My commitment to this ethos would remain a basic value throughout the inquiry.

Thus, from the outset, I should declare that my work was fired by hope and ideals.

It was also cast against the backdrop of ethical relativism. This specific backdrop inevitably raises questions about the morality of law, the morality of the wider society and the moral foundations of educational decision making. Warnock (1978) in her postscript to her survey of the contemporary study of ethics remarks:

"... it seems to me there is one outstanding problem in ethics at the present time and that is the problem of relativism." (Warnock 1976: 143)

It follows, she suggests, that the central problem of ethics is to find a justification for asserting that anything is 'positively and absolutely right or wrong', or 'to be pursued or to be avoided'. She continues:

"... if we agree with Mill that questions of ultimate ends, questions about what is fundamentally desirable, are not susceptible of proof, then somehow, the question has got to be settled as to who is entitled to impose a moral code on his (sic) neighbours. Ethics thus spills over into law (if the law enforces morality, what morality should it enforce? The confident view that each society has just one moral code which it wants enforced does not look very plausible any more). It spills over into politics (whose right is it to impose on other people what everyone has to do?). It spills over into sociology (who, when we come to analyse it, actually controls what people are told?) and into education (who ought to decide what children should be taught?)." (Warnock 1978: 143)

Warnock's observations struck right to the heart of my practice. Rightly or wrongly, I found myself in the position of being able to decide - to some degree - what police leaders and managers could study on development programmes at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. I thought that, for good reason, 'ethics' should be a topic they examined during their visit to the national centre for higher police training.
My study, though, was formally stimulated by the publication of a draft statement of ethical principles for the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The statement was published at the National Police Staff College, Bramshill, Hampshire on 8 December 1992. The ethics of police had become an explicit concern for those police strategists who were focusing upon the quality of policing services that were being provided for the people of the nation. A rigorous 'service' philosophy for police had been (and was being) articulated by police leaders. This was reflected in the Association of Chief Police Officers' (ACPO) strategic policy document, 'Setting the standards for policing: meeting community expectations' which had been published in 1990. This document advocated that all police and civilian members of staff within the police organisation adopt and abide by the professional principles set out in ACPO's (1990) Statement of Common Purpose and Values and it noted that:

"The success of the traditional system of policing in England and Wales is dependent on public confidence in the police and in the style of policing.... Good relations with the community, the prerequisite of public confidence, require the highest standard of courtesy, integrity, and fairness by the Police service. In addition, they require an acknowledgement by the Police that they recognise and respect the policing needs of the community." (ACPO 1990: 2)

The authors of the strategic policy document made reference to the value priorities they wanted to see expressed in police 'training' as follows:

"Everyone, chief officer, patrolling constable and civilian employee can improve their relationship with the public and give a better service by adopting the statement of common purpose and values and by taking full responsibility for their own behaviour. Training will need to emphasise the need for this commitment at all levels." (ACPO 1990: 13)

At the same time, and despite this stress upon the importance of police professionalism, the subject 'ethics' and the study of the ethics of police scarcely featured on the middle management programme of study at Bramshill. Moreover, I think it reasonable to argue that the study of ethics by police should not have to wait for legitimation from emerging strategic emphases. As Ker Muir (1977) has pointed out, policing deals with the 'big insistent problems' of existence. He indicates that beneath the 'small phrases' police officers might use as they discuss their work - such as 'role' and the sorts of things that make them 'feel good' - are the 'big' questions concerning how, in the face of choice and circumstance, to live out
"The policeman was beset by the same profound questions of moral philosophy as any other member of mankind." (Ker Muir 1977: 190)

Those questions, for Ker Muir, include; 'What is the meaning of life?', 'Do the risks I take and the privations I suffer matter to society or mankind?', and, 'Are the sacrifices I make and the hurts I inflict justified in God's eyes, or mine?'

Ker Muir goes on to suggest that these questions - which are more or less moral in character - emerge as a result of our existential condition. He writes:

"Out of hope that life has some meaning, we create milestones to measure the moral distance we have thus far traversed. Such milestones may be public in nature: How many people have I "helped"? How many potential victims have I saved from harm? How much better have I made a community? On the other hand, our measures may be more private ones: How much have I improved myself? How far have I moved my children toward knowledge, security, or happiness? How closely have I adhered to God's law?" (Ker Muir 1977: 189)

'How many people could I have helped?' and 'How much better have I made a community?' are questions connected to the basic purposes and functions of police. They are also questions concerned with justice and benevolence, liberty and order, security, fellowship, hope, and, the ordinary everyday ways we transact with our fellows. We do, I believe, measure a life in terms of the 'moral distance' a person has 'traversed'.

I thought that those 'big' questions Ker Muir identifies were too important to be set aside, passed over and ignored - especially in an institution supposedly constituted to provide 'higher training' for the police. I decided to take the opportunity provided by the renewed interest in 'police ethics' and make it possible for police leaders and managers to examine the subject during their course(s) of study at Bramshill.

My account will show how, as a member of the tutorial staff at the Police Staff College, I designed a form of 'ethics education' (for police leaders and managers attending middle-management programmes of study at Bramshill) and how I reintroduced the subject to the middle-management curriculum. After the initial reintroduction I was able to include an 'ethics unit' on the 'Managing People' module of the Police Management Programme. Successful completion of this programme led to the award of the Institute of Management's 'Diploma in Police Management'.

a life. He notes that:
A paramount concern for me, from the outset of the project, was that I should find a way to provide an educational experience that would be given a positive valuation by my client groups.

As I embarked upon the inquiry I had no idea that this objective would prove to be quite so elusive.

So, five years after I had taken the first tentative steps to teach 'ethics' to large groups of middle-managers at Bramshill, I was still engaged in re-thinking and re-formulating the learning design in order to try and attract a genuine and consistent positive response from the client group(s). Then, and quite suddenly, as I shall relate in the forthcoming pages, a decision was taken not to include my work on 'ethics' within the content of the 'Managing People' module constituting part of the middle-management programme run by the college. Moreover, despite the temporary 'stay of execution' the subject enjoyed (as it was renamed 'principled leadership' and included on a different module, 'Managing Operations') it ultimately failed to win a reprieve and was soon discontinued on that module.

However, a subsequent change of staff resulted in a re-appraisal of the earlier decision. So, in October 1999, the subject was included as one of the six core topics addressed on that component of the programme dealing with leadership and 'people' skills. Moreover, the course critiques indicate that the 'ethics unit' has come to be positively valued by a large majority of the client group.

The account as a 'perseverance, struggle and adventure' narrative

The dissertation presented in the following pages might have been read as a 'defeat' narrative if the project and inquiry had been abandoned in the spring of 1998 – following the decision not to include 'ethics' as a topic on the Police Management Programme. However, because action research is intrinsically a continuing process of strategic action and reflection I persevered in advocating the need to include the subject on the management development curriculum. Ultimately this proved fruitful and the struggle – as well as the adventure – of the preceding years was rewarded.

During my study an institutional change occurred within Bramshill which gives added impetus to the inclusion of 'ethics' as a topic of study for police leaders and managers. Thus, in the late summer of 1999, a 'Human Rights' unit was established within National Police Training's newly formed 'Leadership and Management' faculty. The 'Human Rights' unit takes as a part of its work not only the study of rights-based ethics but also the contexting of human rights within traditions of
ethical discourse and moral philosophy. To the extent that the specific study of human rights will feature on all the leadership and management development programmes offered by the Leadership and Management faculty at Bramshill and that this study will draw from an appreciation both of 'ethics' and the 'rule of law' then ethics, directly or indirectly, is set to take on a relatively high profile across the police leadership development curriculum.

However, the relationship between the inquiry reported here and this recent development is tenuous. Without the enactment of the Human Rights Act in 1998 it is doubtful whether the study of ethics and human rights would have been included as topics on the middle-management programmes. This illustrates, in part, how decisions concerning the nature and content of higher police training are made within National Police Training and, therefore, Bramshill. The Human Rights Act requires police to conform to its provisions; in consequence, the programmes of study at Bramshill adjust themselves in order to forewarn police of the newly emerging rules and procedures they must observe. (I should add, of course, that the programmes of study might also attempt to suggest or illustrate how the police organisation may approach the implementation of new directives and strategic emphases.) Decision-making within National Police Training reflects a hierarchy of values - at the apex of which is the need to ensure that police practices reflect Government legislation and Home Office directives. The development of police professional knowledge is a secondary consideration. A wider 'critical' analysis of police occupies an even lower position in the values hierarchy.

Notwithstanding the impetus given to the study of human rights and ethics by the Human Rights Act, it might have been the case that the report into 'Police Integrity' published in 1999 by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary could, itself, have provided backing and support for the ongoing 'ethics education' at Bramshill. However, even though the Inspection team, in the course of their study, did visit the institution, their report makes no reference to the actual ethics teaching that had taken place there. Thus, the content of the Inspectorate's report failed to include any discussion of the learnings that had emerged in relation to teaching ethics to police leaders and managers as a result of my inquiry. Some of these learnings had even been published in academic journals. Nor was any mention made of the work of two other Bramshill tutors, one of whom serves as an advisor to the Council of Europe on police ethics, whilst the other directs the executive seminar programme - included upon which are examinations of the moral aspects of policing in the United Kingdom. So, any encouragement that might have been given to the study of human rights and ethics through the publication of the HMI report is unrelated to practitioner development and the specialist knowledge wrought from years of
study by the tutorial staff at Bramshill.

Nonetheless, the fact that the inquiry I shall describe here existed and had, in different ways, involved several members of the teaching staff, meant that I was perceived as having some knowledge in relation to the ethics of 'police' and the teaching of ethics to police. It was, therefore, possible to include me as a core member of staff in the newly established 'Human Rights Unit'. The unit itself has been constituted to help support the work of the recently constituted ACPO 'Human Rights Working Group' through, for example, the provision of training and development materials concerned with 'human rights' and the implementation of the Human Rights Act. This remit necessarily entails strengthening and developing training resources embracing, for example, the concept of equal opportunities, the valuing of diversity, the need to exercise the duty of care, the continuing struggle against racism, sexism, homophobia and xenophobia, and, the protection of individual human rights and civil liberties.

This account constitutes a ‘struggle’ and ‘adventure’ narrative in the sense that I tried to find a way of presenting ‘ethics’ to police leaders and managers that would do justice to the complexity of a subject area which itself remains relatively underdeveloped in the field of policing and criminal justice. In fact, Kleinig and Leland Smith’s (1997) survey of materials available to the criminal justice ethics educator (in the specific field of teaching police ethics) identifies only fifteen papers devoted to issues connected with the teaching of police ethics. Furthermore, their bibliography contains no reference whatsoever to teaching ethics to police leaders and managers. To the extent that I had to construct materials for this particular client group my inquiry approximated an adventure into the unknown. I will tell a story which often resulted in enormous personal disappointment on my part. I hope, though, that my recent ‘successful’ design, allied to the existence of the Human Rights Unit and the continuing concerns about police integrity will ensure that ethics and the moral dimensions of policing will become a natural feature of police professional development.

The account as individual educational action research

The dissertation might also be read as individual educational action research. I shall indicate why I think that this inquiry qualifies as this form of action research when I turn to examine the methodology of the inquiry. There are grounds, however, for conceptualising my work as a 'case study' which investigates strategies for teaching 'ethics' to police leaders and managers. In fact, in one major phase of the research I adopted a 'case study' approach to my inquiry as I attempted to become as
receptive as possible to the presenting characteristics of the client group(s). Stake's (1995) analysis of the art of case study research includes an insistence that the case researcher should make the case 'come alive'. This has served as an important principle to me - especially in the middle and latter periods of my inquiry. In this introduction I shall 'open my account' with an illustrative vignette (involving educational practice at Bramshill) which is designed to begin the process of making the case 'come alive'.

In the third section of this dissertation I shall, following Stake, try to 'make the case understandable.' I have, though, been alert to his observation that:

"The researcher is the agent of new interpretation, new knowledge, but also new illusion. Sometimes the researcher points to what to believe, sometimes facilitating reader understandings that exceed the comprehension of the researcher." (Stake 1995: 99)

This observation by Stake helps to raise a fundamental question about the presentation and re-presentation of 'reality' in research accounts and the research story. Recently, for example, in the field of action research Lomax (1997) has defined and described a 'crisis of representation'. She recognises, for example, that action research - especially collaborative action research - takes place in social settings involving a number of persons. Therefore, if it is to be communicated authentically it should try to include the voices and perspectives of those persons involved in the situations of practice. How, though, might disparate voices and expressive styles be brought together? How might the complexities of individual experience including, for example, Dadds (1993) 'feeling of thinking' be written into the narrative?

I have tried to resolve some of these problems by writing both a relatively personal account – which includes some 'close to the grain' experiential disclosures – and by including, where appropriate, the ‘voices’ of several programme participants. The issue of ‘writing style’ in the field of action research and its representation has been discussed by Christensen and Atweh (1998) who themselves build on the earlier work of Cloake and Noud (1991). Christensen and Atweh point out that different researchers have a preference for, and expertise in, certain styles of writing. Their analysis of how best to communicate the ethos of action research includes the reflections of Kemmis (1998) who contends that action researchers should 'tell the story of their projects'. He moves on to say:
"The idea is that we [action researchers] try to convey that our projects are grounded in the lives and experiences of particular participants (not the universal subject, the impersonal 'academic' style)... At the same time, we want to show that we are critical practitioners, able to stand back from our work and think about it as a basis for re-orienting ourselves and our action (not people whose perspective is immutably fixed by our location as if we could never see beyond the boundaries of our prejudices or points of view). Different authors will want to tell the story of their projects in different ways." (Kemmis, in Christensen and Atweh 1998: 338)

The very fact of participating directly in real-life social action projects necessarily engages the 'whole-person' of the action researcher. Something of the actual reality is left out of the account if no reference is made to affective responses — and the account is rendered misleading if it is presented in an exclusively impersonal style. This constitutes a part of the justification for my choice of presentational style.

Hanrahan (1998) provides a recent and concise example of this 'personal' way of presenting an action research report. She discusses how, over a period of thirty months she experienced a number of transitions (or 'revolutions') in her thinking about the nature of research, how best to conduct research and who should actually 'do' research. Her account illustrates how she came to jettison a positivist approach to generating knowledge but she also shows how the research journey is fraught with uncertainties, doubts and simple human frailties. In short, she demonstrates the importance and salience of 'personality' in action research. This suggests that a part of the representation of action research should include an investigation of the role the researcher's personal history may play in the planning, conduct and theorising which constitute the unfolding inquiry process.

But this constitutes only a part of the problem: the account presented here has been written against the backdrop of post-structuralism and postmodernism - which has, inter alia, heralded the 'death of the author'. Thus, as Barthes (1966) began to suggest, all literature - i.e. anything which is scriptable - is 'intertextual' - in the sense that every word, phrasing or segment of writing is a reworking of other writings which precede or surround the individual work. Eagleton (1996) summarises his appreciation of post-structuralist insight in relation to 'text' as follows:

"A specific piece of writing .. has no clearly defined boundaries: it spills over constantly into the works clustered around it, generating a hundred different perspectives which dwindle to vanishing point. The work cannot be sprung shut, rendered determinate, by an appeal to the author, for the 'death of the author' is
a slogan that modern criticism is now confidently able to proclaim. The biography of the author is, after all, merely another text, which need not be ascribed any special privilege: this text too can be deconstructed. It is language which speaks in literature, in all its swarming polysemic plurality, not the author himself (sic)."

(Eagleton 1996: 119, 120)

Eagleton's remarks highlight the difficulty of ascribing authorship to any piece of writing. Momentarily at least, it is the reader who produces the text's meaning - and who remains free to find irreducible plurality in the work.

This observation continues to raise a number of questions for me concerning the text presented here. What will the reader 'do' to this text? How will the reader 'produce' the story? Should I (could I) have worked harder to provide a defence of the work as individual educational action research? How important is it for an inquiry to be located within a genre of research? Have I properly emphasised the strangeness of Bramshill? Is Bramshill any more strange than anywhere else? Why did I want to subtitle this text, 'The feeling of practice' and then choose not to do so? What has had to be suppressed and/or left out of my account? How do I explain the seeming paradox of writing in the first person when I remark upon the 'death of the author' and the de-centring of authorship?

These problems have been addressed, obliquely, by MacLure (1996) as she reflected upon the biographies of ten individuals who had become action researchers. In the course of her discussion she includes an observation about the identity of action research itself. She thinks action research illustrates a kind of 'in-between-ness' or 'hybridity'. In other words, action research reflects a restless movement in the space between boundaries. MacLure notes that action research 'rehearses' a number of oppositional dilemmas - such as those between 'theory' and 'practice', between the 'personal' and the professional' and between the 'sacred languages of science, scholarship or research' and the 'mundane dialects of practice and everyday experience'. MacLure, therefore, categorises action research as follows:

"Action research is itself a boundary dweller. It has always drawn its power (and also, of course, its problems of legitimation within the institutional discourses of theory and research) from its challenge to the customary dispositions of 'privilege' in the unequal relations of dualism - between theory and practice, subjectivity and objectivity, academic and practitioner. It has developed a powerful critique of the academic discourses of positivist science and scholarship and the tyrannies that theory and expertise have exerted upon the teacher as the other." (MacLure 1996: 
The identification of action research (and the action researcher) as 'boundary dweller' means that action research can be viewed as an embodiment of the transgressive figure such as the 'trickster' or 'cyborg' discussed by Haraway (1982). In consequence, action researchers are able, in principle, to break free from conventional genres of method and of representation. Nonetheless, MacLure finds that the action researcher 'seems still to be concerned with transcending those opposites from which it draws its power'. Thus, action researchers either try to reverse the poles of those opposites so that one is 'privileged' over the other or they try to seek some form of reconciliation in which differences might be 'resolved or dissolved'. This allows her to contend that a part of the action research 'project' is built upon the idea of triumphal progress. Therefore, as Lather (1994) points out, action research is presented as a victory narrative. MacLure moves on to question whether the stories of action research should be constructed as 'victory' narratives or whether they might gain something by resisting this temptation:

"The point might be to resist resolution, to live 'at the hyphen' as Fine (1994) puts it, between those boundaries that are inevitably implicated in narratives of becoming an action researcher. Might we be cyborgs, hybrids or tricksters, whose business is to prevent solutions to the problem of getting safely across the boundaries of teacher/academic, personal/professional...?" (MacLure 1996: 283)

MacLure, albeit indirectly, hints at the power that might, therefore, lie within 'struggle' narratives which remain cautious about claiming victory. I failed to create a 'design' for ethics education that resolved the tensions between police and civilian, the 'practical' man or woman and the 'intellectual' or between contrasting value frameworks. Moreover, my account might show how I failed in 'getting safely across the boundaries of teacher/academic' as well as the 'personal' and the 'professional'. To that extent, it may be that this account constitutes an example of the 'hybridity' and 'in-between-ness' to which MacLure refers.

Whatever else I might have intended to do in the course of presenting my work I have wanted to follow Elliott's (1990) suggestion - (which was based on his concern about the quality of research that was being generated within universities) - that research should culminate in the researcher saying something 'new and interesting'. I hope, for the reader, this proves to be so. The inquiry absorbed my attention for the best part of a decade and, just when I thought I had reached a plateau of 'success', I found, instead, that my work was not wanted. For this reason, I wondered whether it would be more accurate to describe this as a 'crash' or 'exile'
narrative. However, in spite of the sadness I felt, these 'facts' of 'failure' remain educational, illuminating and provocative. Moreover, the data I shall present does not suggest that my work was ineffective. Thus, for example, my inquiry seems to reveal, more clearly, the nature of decision-making at Bramshill and the way in which Bramshill is itself nested within a wider consumer culture which insists that 'service providers' should 'please the customer'.

Several of the findings emerging form my inquiry help to make a contribution to the educational knowledge concerning teaching ethics to police and to the gathering anthropological knowledge of police themselves. Thus, for example, quite independently of the work conducted by American teachers of criminal justice ethics, I found that most police leaders and managers positively valued their opportunity to create and enact 'ethics plays'. The plays constituted a type of creative case study. I was to discover that the American criminal justice ethics educators reported in Kleinig and Leland Smith's (1997) collection of papers examining strategic issues in 'ethics' teaching showed particular support for the use of case studies (and their variants).

Other important knowledge emerging from my inquiry lay in the data patterns revealed by various versions of an instrument I called the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'. The successive versions of this instrument generated a wealth of new information about the 'moral world' of police officers. This data was used to support my educational practice and the very fact that I was able to cite the pattern of responses to the various questions in the questionnaires helped me to feel confident and to present myself as an informed practitioner.

Before presenting an opening glimpse concerning educational practice at Bramshill I should add that a small number of publications generated from within the 'community' of action researchers have provided an extensive array of criteria concerned with judging and assessing action research reports. I shall refer to these criteria in some detail as the narrative unfolds. The opening glimpse I am about to present is designed as a description which should, as Clarke, Dudley, Edwards, Rowland, Ryan and Winter (1993) remark lead to 'appreciation' as a prelude to 'analysis'. This illustrative vignette hints at the dramaturgical nuances that make the practice of higher police training at Bramshill a somewhat peculiar and distinct phenomenon.

Opening the account: 'I'd have liked to know what ethics is.'

It was early October 1992. I was 'co-facilitating a 'syndicate' of fourteen Chief
Inspectors who were attending a 'Junior Command Course'. This was a seven-week long leadership development programme for middle-managers in the police service of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The course, officially, attempted to review how effective participants were in relation to a competency model of police management. It also claimed, through the provision of a number of learning opportunities and structured experiences, to help develop the course participants in relation both to the 'core competencies' of that model and the more intangible attitudes and values commensurate with police leadership and management in a 'learning' society.

In practice the curriculum emerged as a result of the interaction between the staff facilitators and the student group.

My partner was an experienced and senior police officer who brought a particularly idiosyncratic approach to educational practice. He wanted his syndicate to have a 'good time'. For him, this would be achieved, in large part, through the team spirit engendered as the student group set about raising money for charities. At our first meeting, a few days before the course began, he had told me, proudly, of the achievements of his previous syndicate. It was the 'best syndicate' and it was the 'best syndicate' because 'it had donated more money to charity than any of the other seven syndicate groups'. Some of that money had been raised as a result of securing sponsorship relating to the distance syndicate members could travel in twenty four hours (starting with just £5). This had led to the complete dispersal of the group - with two ingenious (and persuasive) members managing to cross the Atlantic before arriving in the United States of America.

This latter activity took place during that phase of the course when students had the responsibility for 'managing their own learning'. Self-managed learning had taken on a very particular character at Bramshill. Thus, towards the latter phase of the programme, the syndicate directors withdrew from having contact with the student group. For a while, at least, the syndicate was left leaderless. In consequence, students were free to do whatever they wanted to do. To fill the hiatus, the 'best syndicate' busied itself raising money for charity.

My co-facilitator was rather scathing about concepts such as 'self-development' and even more scathing about some of his colleagues (police and civilian tutors) who believed that self-awareness and the study of one's self were important. He was not schooled in the theory and practice of facilitation but 'led from the front' and kept his syndicates occupied by 'dishing out tasks' and telling them to 'get on with it.' He was a large and imposing man who loved - and had played - rugby union. He
thought I was acceptable because he knew I played various sports and he had read
a piece I had written describing a model for facilitating adult learning. This had
helped him with a Masters degree he was pursuing. He said that because of the help
my writing had given him, he 'owed' me something.

I had rejoined the staff at Bramshill in August 1992 after spending three years
practising organisational development within a multi-national information
technology company. During those three years I had witnessed, first hand, how
Handy's (1989) concept of the 'triple I' organisation ('information', 'intelligence' and
'ideas' for 'added value') was becoming a reality and, in the course of so becoming,
was turning people into disposable information carriers permanently liable to
obsolescence (and hence, redundancy). Brownhill (1999) has remarked how
organisations in themselves do not have agency - and therefore are non-moral.
However, the business ideology producing people and produced by people in 'the
age of the smart machine' (Zuboff, 1988) had disturbed me. It appeared that
persons had come to have only 'instrumental' value. They were, despite all the
rhetoric to the contrary, reduced to 'means' in the service of corporate 'ends'. People
were not valued in their own right. It had become clear to me that the public service
sector needed to be extremely vigilant as it sought to embrace facets of business
ideology if it were to preserve its integrity and its professional standards. I had
come to understand more clearly the forms of society that the public service sector
helps to make possible and I thought it important to support the best possible
provision of those services.

Simultaneously my work within a 'high-tech' global corporation had involved
examining the way such corporations and their technologies underpinned and
shaped some of the major features of postmodernity. They participate, massively,
for example in creating hyper-reality and the simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981, 1990,
1992) the consequences of which remain unclear. As Best and Kellner (1991)
argue, the present moment contains both utopian and dystopian aspects that point
to an uncertain future. They argue that the 'information explosion', 'computerisation
processes', and, 'new media technologies' could work to 'multiply and pluralise
information' or 'anaesthetise meaning in a self-neutralising noise', could 'facilitate
new learning skills' or 'perpetuate class inequalities' and, could stimulate diversity
or crush difference under the press of homogenisation. I was beginning to ask how
one was to make sense of police in postmodern times. Were they condemned to
support and embody a relentlessly increasing programme of surveillance? Were
they types of sign in a mere play of signs? Did they simply 'learn their lines well'
and play out games in the larger game of social control? Were they postmodern
types - cyborgs - or, even, virtu(al)cops? And, behind all this I wanted to know if
'ethics' - in the sense of thinking seriously about moral values - mattered to police any more.

After three days of the seven-week residential course my co-facilitator was taken ill and was unable to take any further part in the course delivery. I was left with the group.

It was composed of men aged between 33 and 49. Amongst the group was an individual who wanted to be paid overtime for having to come to Bramshill, a number officers who were planning for their retirement, one individual who wanted to take the opportunity the college offered to prepare himself for taking a Master's degree, two officers who had earnestly tried to introduce some 'management ideas' to their part of the organisation and one individual who wanted the police service to adopt the idea of 'meeting the needs of the customer'. Within the group there was also an egregious character (I shall call him F. P.) who, whenever he interjected told memorable (if apocryphal) tales and anecdotes about himself, his colleagues, policing and the nature of his police force. He had, for example, so hated a superintendent within that force, that he, along with some colleagues, had surreptitiously put the drug 'LSD' into the unfortunate man's mug of coffee. The syndicate remained impassive as F. P. finished his story by saying that it had 'served the bastard right' when he (the superintendent) had to 'go o ff sick from work' because the effects of the drug had 'made him feel so weird'.

As the weeks unfolded, the group talked about itself as 'gelling'. F. P., though, revealed another aspect of himself. He seemed to fall asleep at quite unpredictable and often inappropriate times during classroom activities. Thus, even when turn-taking events were occurring (where everyone shared their learnings or observations - or were giving feedback to others in the group) F. P. might find himself taking a nap. In general, his colleagues did not disturb him. He also absented himself from the group from time to time and missed a number of course activities. I sensed he was, in some way, 'adrift'.

However, he did decide to attend an hour-long 'elective' session on 'ethics' that was presented by a member of staff who had become interested in the ethics of policing. A part of my role as a syndicate director was to explore issues raised for the officers in the group as a result of their attending such 'elective' sessions. It transpired that those members of the syndicate who had gone along to the focus on ethics reported that they had not benefited from the endeavours of my colleague. At the conclusion of the 'exploring the learning' session F. P. declared that, notwithstanding the fact he had wasted his time, he had liked the person who was
presenting the topic 'ethics'. He then said:

"It was disappointing though. I'd have liked to know what ethics is."

His fellow officers agreed. They, too, would have liked to know what ethics was really about.

As a result of this exchange, I began to wonder if police leaders and managers had been adequately familiarised with the study of ethics and policing. I also wondered if F. P. was 'adrift', in part, because he had no perspective on police practice that drew from the ethics of public service.

As the course entered its final phase I had grown exasperated with some of the conduct shown by syndicate members. Put most simply, there was, as I saw it, insufficient rigour. Rarely, for example, would the group spend time reviewing 'learning activities' against even the most rudimentary models of the experiential learning cycle. I was not convinced that the course was effecting much learning. I confronted the group and identified some of the specific actions that were causing me concern. Amongst these I mentioned some patterns of behaviour displayed by F. P. and I talked about the impact, on me, of his conduct. The group turned against me. I was told that F. P. had his problems and it was none of my business to interfere. In fact I was 'well out of order'. I was accused of 'trying to break up the group'. I countered this by saying that I thought it important to consider how we should use the resources entrusted to us in the public sector to serve best the public interest and that I did not think that we were using these resources properly. At this point one member acknowledged that he agreed with me - and that he had not realised, initially, where I was 'coming from'. F. P. relished the hostility. He said that it was the 'most memorable moment of the course'.

The course moved on towards its conclusion. At its end, I was thanked warmly by the syndicate and presented with a farewell gift. F. P. was unable to come to the last farewell session. He was 'indisposed'. I was told that, on the final night of his stay at Bramshill, he had remained alone, drinking whisky, in one of the college drawing rooms, after everyone else had decided to retire to bed. F. P., I was reminded by one officer, had 'his problems'.

F. P. was a generous man. When I thought of him I would find myself smiling. I liked him.

Six years later, F. P. was sentenced to a lengthy term in prison. He had been found
guilty of corruption and conspiring to pervert the course of justice whilst he was still a serving police officer.

Throughout those six years I had conducted an inquiry concerned with teaching ethics to police leaders and managers. As I learned of the sad fate that had befallen F. P. I was reminded of his remark, 'I'd have liked to know what ethics is' and I wished that, in the course of his professional development, he could have spent more time exploring the subject. Donahue and Felts (1993) might well be correct in contending that the study of ethics cannot make people more ethical. But the study of ethics can help to make salient the ethos and core values characterising organisations and it can promote forms of discourse which enable more consideration to be paid to the moral content of policing. A cultural context within which ethical concepts were made explicit and confidently deployed in the process of practical decision-making might have provided, for F. P., a more helpful and appropriate occupational milieu.
Part One

The foundations of the inquiry

Chapter One describes the institutional context in which the inquiry took place. The first Appendix to this dissertation contains a number of photographs of 'Bramshill'; these serve to illustrate, pictorially, some features of the institution - and help to underline the 'local' and particular nature of the study.

Chapter Two examines the specific factors that generated the research project; it refers to the wider strategic emphases calling for culture change in the police service - as well as the first attempt, in 1982, to introduce 'ethics' to 'command' programmes at Bramshill.

Chapter Three states the research question and identifies the philosophical ideas underpinning the inquiry.

Chapter Four reviews the nature of 'action research' and locates the methodology of the inquiry within an 'individual educational action research' approach.

Chapter Five is divided into two parts; Part one discusses the developing scholarly literature on police and police ethics as a basis for constructing the content of an 'ethics education' for the police themselves; Part two discusses the educational emphasis that was chosen for the project.

Together, these chapters refer to the foundations that were created for the subsequent research inquiry.
Chapter One

Context: The background to the study

"The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher judge, the doctor judge, the educator judge, the 'social-worker' judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements. The carceral network, in its compact or disseminated forms, with its systems of insertion, distribution, surveillance, observation, has been the greatest support, in modern society, of the normalising power." (Foucault: 1991: 304)

The study reported here took place in a particular and distinct location, the Police Staff College, Bramshill. This constitutes a unique institutional context and the symbolism of 'Bramshill' played a significant role in the educational process I shall come to describe.

In this chapter I shall 'set the scene' for my inquiry by identifying the official role of the Police Staff College. I shall also describe, briefly, the character and nature of 'Bramshill'. Finally, I shall provide an outline of the 'ethics' package that was introduced by Richards (1982) to programmes of study at the College.

The role of the Police Staff College

The first National Police College (later to move to Bramshill, and, later still to be renamed the Police Staff College) was set up at Ryton-on-Dunsmore, a village near Coventry, on 1 April 1948. The College was established following the recommendations of the Police Post-War Committee published in 1946. In the first report of that committee (HMSO, 1946) the case for a Police College was made. It also included some details concerning the recommended syllabus for developing police leaders. The committee asserted that the police service should be commanded by persons who joined as constables and not by 'outsiders' promoted into the higher ranks. However, the committee was concerned that, without some form of college experience, there would be nothing to counteract the influence of long service in a subordinate capacity. Whilst such service could provide invaluable experience- especially in relation to building the 'craft knowledge' of policing - it could not be assumed that it would always help in generating the qualities necessary for effectiveness in senior management and/or administration. It would not guarantee the 'growth of the broad outlook, the quality of leadership and the
independent habits of mind' - which the committee took to be essential if a senior police officer was to command the respect of his or her subordinates and the confidence of all the community policed.

Thus, from its inception, the Police College was established to train and develop the present and future leaders of the police service. The Police Committee recommended that the Police College should run five courses, of which the two main ones were to be a 'junior' course for Inspectors and a 'senior' course for Superintendents. The suggested syllabus for the 'junior' course included the following groups of subjects:

A) Police principles: historical - political - ethical - legal

B) Police organisation and administration

C) Legal (including, legal history and constitutional law; the principles of law etc., and, criminal law and procedure)

D) Science and police work

E) Semi - or non-professional lectures (In this latter category, the committee suggested subjects such as penal systems, government services, commerce and industry)

It is plain, therefore, that the committee recognised, inter alia, the study of ethics and the ethical dimension of policing was a necessary and an important element in police leadership development.

Whilst the 1946 committee set some broad parameters concerning the appropriate content for the development of police leaders, the 1948 White Paper on police training went further and stated that police leaders would need the virtues of a liberal education. The committee took the view that police leaders needed to have some appreciation of the value frameworks lying at the core of a liberal democracy. In his study of the history of the Police Staff College, Villiers (1998) asks:

"Does that imply a need to turn our leading police officers into political theorists or moral philosophers?" (Villiers 1998: 45)

He immediately answers:
"By no means. The role of the police is to police. They are the executive and not the legislature or judiciary; and it is their primary responsibility to enforce the law. However, the law has to be enforced and order maintained by thinking men and women; and the Police College makes a valuable contribution to the way those processes are carried out." (Villiers 1998: 45)

Villiers' contention draws sustenance from the Home Affairs Committee Report (1989) into 'Higher Police Training and the Police Staff College'. This committee noted that in the 1960s the College moved to Bramshill House in Hampshire and in 1979 the name of the institution was changed to 'reflect more accurately its function in providing higher training for the present and future leaders of the police service'. The committee added:

"Nevertheless, the role and aims of the Police Staff College remain broadly the same today as in 1947." (Home Affairs Committee, Third Report, 1989: vi para. 6)

The committee reported that:

"We share the view of the Home Office and the Commandant of the Police Staff College that the central role of the college should remain the provision of higher training for the present and future leaders of the police service." (Home Affairs Committee, Third report, 1989: xi para. 28)

The Home Office submitted a memorandum to the committee - which was 'taken before' them in January 1989 - within which it (the Home Office), defined the role of the Police College at Bramshill. The role was made up of nine different components. The first three are described as follows:

- To provide a higher training for the present and future leaders of the police service. To this end, to provide a coherent and comprehensive pattern of courses for officers at key levels of command which develop the potential of those who attend, increase their professional and managerial knowledge and skills and broaden their outlook and equip them with a comprehensive understanding of the context in which they operate, especially in relation to the community which they serve and protect.

- In addition, to present a wide variety of short courses, complementary to the Command courses, which reflect the police service's priorities and the career needs of individual officers. These short courses principally focus on matters of current
importance, management and the development of specialist skills and knowledge.

- To foster the teaching and dissemination of good practice, by encouraging the study of the central issues of policing, and the cultivation of professional police ethics

The Home Affairs Committee (1989) also reported that the Commandant of the college had stated that the college aimed to teach 'key management principles' and sought to encourage officers in the use of effective management techniques. They added however:

"Training can help to disseminate the findings of operational experience and research. It can reinforce earlier training in the ethics of policing and thus help to preserve the integrity and reputation of the police service" (Home Affairs Committee, Third Report, 1989: vii, para. 14)

Thus, and again through the explicit mention of the term 'ethics', attention is drawn to the fact that a part of the College function is to provide some form of education dealing with the study of ethics on the police leadership development curriculum.

The police service itself made plain the moral foundations of police leadership through the Association of Chief Police Officers (1990) Statement of Common Purpose and Values. The actual wording of that statement is as follows:

"The purpose of the police service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen's Peace; to protect, help, and reassure the community; and to be seen to do all this with integrity, common sense, and sound judgement.

We must be compassionate, courteous and patient, acting without fear or favour or prejudice to the rights of others. We need to be professional, calm and restrained in the face of violence and apply only that force which is necessary to accomplish our lawful duty. We must strive to reduce the fears of the public and, so far as we can, reflect their priorities in the action we take. We must respond to well-founded criticism with a willingness to change." (ACPO 1990)

This statement clarified the valued ends and the socially acceptable means of policing and describes much of the moral content (and moral requirement) of policing and its leadership. The enduring demands of policing in a liberal democracy mean that, wherever possible, police officers need to be 'cool, calm and
collected' under pressure, quick to assist and help the citizenry and slow to condemn their fellow citizens. Clearly, if the Police Staff College was charged with the responsibility of developing the present and future leaders of the service then at least a part of its curriculum should be devoted to some form of ethics education as well as the development of what Kleinig (1990) has referred to as 'moral expertise'.

However, Bramshill as an institution reflects not only cultural diversity but cultures that stand in uneasy relationship to each other. In consequence, the official function of the College is refracted by and filtered through complex cultural patterns and processes.

**Bramshill as 'context' for the study**

The Bramshill site of National Police Training (NPT) most usually and typically strikes the visitor as impressive. Villiers (1998) argues that Bramshill exists as a symbol of the past within the present. It is a traditional institution. He attempts to capture some of the sensations connected with coming to Bramshill in the following way:

"You come to the old porter's lodge, red-brick and impressively mottoed. You drive through its archway, and pause at the barrier whilst the friendly and efficient security guard who has emerged from his unhistorical but dry porta cabin checks your pass and exchanges the time of day. And you look up the mile-long, oak-lined, deer-bordered, bridge-crossing avenue to the massive house on the ridge in wonder and amazement." (Villiers, 1998 : 39)

The 'massive house on the ridge', to which he refers, is the mansion or 'Bramshill house'. This, as he observes, is now known around the world and is synonymous with higher police training in the United Kingdom. Although the actual history of the mansion house is complex it was built in the tradition of the Elizabethan prodigy houses with, in part, the intention of entertaining the monarch. It is now a 'Grade One' listed building. Nothing about it can be altered without the agreement of English Heritage. The mansion itself, its contents and the various cultural artifacts adorning the other buildings within the Bramshill estate suggest tradition, continuity, order, hierarchy, conservatism, as well as patriarchy and colonialism. These terms have emerged as descriptions of Bramshill following culture audit processes conducted by students at the College.

Throughout the history of the Police College, different people have given it objects
of historical interest or curiosity. In addition to these offerings both students and
visitors have, for various reasons, presented hundreds of gifts and tokens of
appreciation. In consequence, the Police College has become not only a centre for
the development of police leadership but also the representation of - and, in some
ways, the emblem of - police culture. Villiers notes:

"The extent of our acquisitions has to be seen to be fully appreciated. The list
maintained by the procurement department gives some idea of its range. It includes
badges, batons, big-game busts, candelabra, colours and flags, cups and sports
trophies, dummies, furniture, glassware, handcuffs, maps, medals, paintings,
plaques, rattles, rose bowls, shields ..... statues, tableware, tankards, timepieces,
tipstaves, truncheons, uniforms, vases and weapons." (Villiers 1998 : 59)

Bramshill, then, carries complex and powerful symbolism. In consequence, it
evokes for its clientele, mixed and varied emotions; often it provokes an ambivalent
response. It is seen as simultaneously reassuring and oppressive. It is perceived as
reflecting the 'official' line - the 'centre' in which both Government policies and the
policies of senior police officers are disseminated throughout England, Wales and
Northern Ireland, and, as 'slow moving', somewhat antiquated and elitist. These
features of the context appear both to support and subvert the educational
enterprise. They support the teaching design because it is assumed to be legitimated
by appropriate authorities. They subvert it because 'Bramshill' is perceived to be
located in the 'old' world, insulated from the contemporary, and set apart from
'reality'. The photographs included at the end of this dissertation in the Appendix
entitled, 'A picture of Bramshill' illustrate, pictorially, some of the main features
of the institution.

No research study has been conducted which investigates the extent to which
Bramshill is a total institution (Goffman, 1961). However, two studies help to
clarify the cultural milieu of professional practice at Bramshill. Thus, Plumridge
(1988), following two decades of work as a management tutor within the college,
provides an account of the way curricular emphases evolved in the 1970s and
1980s. His account gives an insight into some of the factors that make the practice
of education problematic for the tutorial staff. Howell (1997), working as an insider
researcher whilst resident at Bramshill, illustrates some of the typical ways
Bramshill is construed from across the police service as a whole.

Plumridge (1988), in a discussion concerning the role of Bramshill in relation to
management and organisational development in the police service, helps in the
process of constructing a picture of the institution. In the course of his narrative, he
shows how the concept 'manager' was gradually accepted by the more senior ranking police officers and how programmes of study were influenced by the theory and practice of organisational development. Plumridge explores the changing context of policing and a range of factors and pressures enjoining the police organisation to change. His contends that only through becoming 'learning systems' could police organisations respond effectively to these pressures. He goes on to record how, by the late 1980s, an ethos of learning and development gradually came to be positioned at the core of the learning structures, learning opportunities and programmes of study that were provided by the college.

However he concludes his extensive discussion by surfacing a number of Bramshill's 'unresolved issues'. He believes that amongst the most important of those unresolved issues is the lack of clarity concerning the mission of the institution. Plumridge is able to show that despite the official role (i.e. to produce from within the service its own leaders) a whole series of developments (especially in the 1980s) - including the short course programme and consultancy support to police organisations - had meant a 'moving away' from a narrow interpretation and obvious enactment of that official role. In its place, the new developments were concerned to address a different agenda which Plumridge thought was the central issue for 'most chief officers':

"... namely, 'where and how can I obtain help to enable me to develop a more effective and efficient organisation?'" (Plumridge 1988: 129)

The fact that he was able to highlight the unclear mission of the institution simply draws attention to the elusive and apparently unstable character of the Police Staff College. In virtue of the competing claims upon Bramshill, Plumridge himself asks:

"... what is Bramshill to be - a staff college, the policeman's (sic) university, the centre of higher police training, a management and organisation development centre, or a resource centre?" (Plumridge 1988: 129)

Plumridge had mounted an impressive rationale for sustaining and enhancing a 'developmental' approach and yet ten years later Villiers (1998) was able to announce that Bramshill had seen the rise and fall of 'facilitation' - i.e. an abandonment of the paramountcy of a developmental educational philosophy. In the place of learner-centred courses were 'faculty-based' programmes delivered under the quality assurance and quality control frameworks of National Police Training. How can such a change be explained?
A part of the explanation lies in a phenomenon made explicit in Plumridge's text. That phenomenon concerns an ongoing feature of police organisations which emerges from research data - in part supplied by Plumridge himself. He reports how the police organisation was characterised by police managers as an admixture of power and role cultures. Based on his own work (Plumridge 1983) and Males' (1983) he summarises the defining characteristics of the police organisation as follows:

- a rigid structure; hierarchical valuing deference and conformity; effort and energy spent on preserving roles, departments, rules, procedures, committees and tradition

- an atmosphere of formality and suspicion that was impersonal and action-centred. Communication was restricted in its flow, was downward - and feelings were hidden and repressed

- decision-making and policy-making stemmed from the top with little participation from below

- management values and attitudes concerned with controlling personnel through the sanctions of coercive power etc.

The disciplined 'control' culture of police described by Plumridge means that decision-making is very susceptible to the ideological preferences and the personal preferences of its leadership. The Police Staff College - dominated as it is by police officers - is not exempt from this broadly patterned cultural feature. It is significant that Plumridge names three successive Commandants at Bramshill and hints at the major influence that was brought to bear on the organisation through their particular personalities and agendas.

Whilst Bramshill is also responsive to far wider developments leading to major changes in its emphases - such as the creation of National Police Training in 1993 - the idiosyncratic value preferences of its most senior leadership exerts a substantial effect on what takes place in the name of higher police training. The very fact that the most senior personnel at Bramshill change regularly means that the educational 'paradigms' are, themselves, likely to be discontinuous.

Plumridge also obliquely hints at some of the discomforts that face the tutorial staff at the College. The features he identifies go some way towards accounting for the relatively defensive and insecure situation in which the staff find themselves.
Thus, on the subject of the recruitment of police officers to serve on the staff, he writes:

"... conditions of service at Bramshill tend not to attract many applicants of the right potential calibre, and a period on the staff is often, very unfairly, seen as a setback to their careers." (Plumridge 1988: 129)

Of the civilian tutorial staff, he observes:

"The role of the academic (civilian) staff can all too easily be underrated, sneered at, or even dismissed by the more 'macho' and pragmatic among police officers." (Plumridge 1988: 129)

In relation to the clients who have the opportunity to make use of the college he notes:

"The expectations of its clients are very varied, ambiguous, ambivalent and often conflicting." (Plumridge 1988: 128)

A corollary of this latter observation is the difficulty in finding ways of securing a positive evaluation for College learning designs that depart from the craft professional topics of crime investigation and managing (or learning more about) the varieties of police operation.

Villiers (1998) compares the situation at Bramshill before and after 1993 and finds that its status has 'changed considerably'. Prior to 1993 the Commandant's sole responsibility was to 'command' the Police Staff College; the role was 'finite and clearly understood' and the task was to provide 'higher police training'. Since 1993 no longer have there been Commandants; instead, a National Director steers the newly formed organisation, National Police Training. The creation of three faculties - a process known as 'facultisation' - along with the official promotional materials of National Police Training - signals an increasing adoption of the rhetoric and rationales of professionalisation and the new 'managerialism'.

Howell's (1997) study of decision making and policy formation in hierarchical organisations includes a number of personal observations about the nature of Bramshill as well as an indication of the way it is perceived by officers at different levels in the hierarchical structure of the police service. Howell kept a record of his residential experience at Bramshill whilst conducting his research project in the newly-formed 'Strategy and Policy faculty'. His study can be read as a rare example
of 'insider' research within the institutional framework of the centre for higher police training.

He reports that despite the fact he was employed by the faculty to discover more about policy formation and that he 'sat in' on courses in order to make contact with students at the college he had considerable difficulty in finding people to interview for his research. This contrasted with the willingness to be interviewed by him that police officers expressed in their own force contexts. Howell 'wondered' if this was connected with the way course attendance at Bramshill was conceptualised by police officers. He writes:

"After about three weeks it occurred to me that interviewing police officers in their own police stations [compared with Bramshill] was proving far easier to arrange. I felt that they may view Bramshill as a form of holiday from their routine jobs and be unwilling to go through the process of being interviewed whilst there." (Howell 1997: 23,24)

Howell formed the impression that police officers on Bramshill are inclined to treat their experience as a complete break from the real world of everyday problem solving and, as a result, they had no wish to participate in a research process interested in their beliefs about 'policy'. I should note here that Bramshill has been likened by an external organisational development consultant (Johnson 1986, personal communication) to a 'medieval university'; it functions like an 'oasis in the desert'. A part of the meaning of Bramshill lies in its separation from the everyday and the familiar.

Howell developed his particular research to consider why a 'code of ethics' failed to be established within the police service. He sought the opinions of various respondents in relation to their beliefs concerning the impact of different bodies (e.g. Central Government, HMIC, the Police Federation etc.) on police policy and he devoted, in the course of his narrative, a short section on the possible contribution of Bramshill to policy formation. He writes:

"Whilst Bramshill and National Police Training claim not to teach policy or influence decision-making regarding policy-matters it does provide an excellent means of exposing police officers to ideas and best practices occurring in other forces. It provides an integrating focus for information exchange in an informal atmosphere of recreation and learning." (Howell 1997: 47)

This is a subtle observation; first, Howell manages to indicate the ongoing
distinction between 'Bramshill' and the National Police Training organisation; second, he notes the diplomatic need for the training organisation(s) not to encroach upon the strategic leadership of police organisations; third, he conjoins the terms 'recreation' and 'learning' in his description of the atmosphere at Bramshill.

He subsequently includes, in his narrative, some of the ways in which the police officers he interviewed referred to Bramshill:

"... many police officers used to call Bramshill, 'Never Never land' or 'The dream factory'... some officers I spoke to commented that it was so relaxing for them at Bramshill that 'it takes nine days to get used to - and then, unfortunately, the next day they go home.'" (Howell 1997: 18)

It appears that a reciprocal process is established involving mutually reinforcing moments of 'separation from the everyday', 'remoteness', 'other worldliness', 'dream land', 'fantasies' - leading to an increasing 'separation from the everyday' and so on.

Finally, here I should note the fact that Howell presents evidence concerning pre-judgements about Bramshill. As an institution it is associated with the privileges of status and power and therefore attracts resentments from the lower ranks. By way of example, Howell includes the following observation from one of his interviewees:

"... it [Bramshill] is ridiculed by the junior ranks as they don't come here and don't know what it does ... it is likely that people who come here [Bramshill] and then try to implement change are likely going to be perceived as doing it because they have been to Bramshill." (Howell 1997: 68)

Howell's insider research provides a rough guide illustrating some of the interpretive frameworks deployed by police officers attending programmes of study at Bramshill. These frameworks place the civilian tutor at an initial disadvantage in the practice of education or 'higher training'. Nonetheless the inquiry presented here took place in the full knowledge of this disadvantage. It was concerned with 'foregrounding' the study of ethics as a part of police leadership and management development.

**Ethics and police: a preliminary note**

Following a foundational discussion in Plato's 'Republic' - where it becomes
possible to identify a first depiction of the police function in a complex society -
and Locke's (1720) analysis of the appropriate separation of powers in a society
committed to persons as the bearers of rights, police are constituted, in liberal
democracies, to help sustain and secure the rule of law. That law is, in some
fundamental sense, subordinate to the demands of morality. Moreover, in liberal
democracies, the citizenry (the public) enjoy a certain form of relationship with the
arrangements and organisations of the state. It is one of consent. In essence, the
public consents to the presence and powers of police and tolerate their police.
Police cease to be tolerated if the public is no longer able to place trust and
confidence in them.

Prefiguring the concerns of strategic police leadership emerging in the 1990s
Richards (1985) examines the quality of trust and confidence that is extended
towards the police. He found it in decline. A host of reasons can be found for such
diminishing trust and confidence. His concern however is that this situation
presents a potential danger to the liberal democratic state:

"... policing a liberal democratic state is a demanding and delicate activity which
must reflect the emerging value preferences of the citizenry." (Richards 1985: 17)

and that therefore

"... there is a continuous need for police at the supervisory levels to possess high
qualities of leadership and management .." (Richards 1985: 17)

In liberal democracies, the people, through democratic political arrangements,
bring into existence rules which are enacted by the Queen in Parliament and upheld
by the courts. Under these same political arrangements the police service, as a
public body, is entrusted, in the interests of the citizens, with upholding the rule of
law, preventing crime, protecting life and property and preserving public
tranquillity. For this purpose, individual police officers are invested with the rights
and duties that prescribe and circumscribe their role, give them authority and
provide them with the necessary powers to carry out their duties. In a liberal
democratic state the institution of police is understood in these terms and the trust,
confidence and respect the public extend to police is generally summed up by the
notion of 'consent'. If trust in, confidence in, and respect for police are lost - or
decline to low levels - then the notion that police are there by 'consent' becomes
increasingly untenable.

Richards (1985) indicates that we doubly have reason to be concerned. First, at the
macro-level, one of the essential elements of liberal democracy - policing by and with the consent of the people - is threatened. Second, because of the predominantly social scientific emphasis in police leadership development - concerned as it is with explanation and prediction, efficiency and effectiveness - the moral or ethical basis of policing and police leadership was becoming overlooked. To this extent Richards shares a concern voiced by Habermas (1970). Habermas argues that technology and the technical interest so dominate developed societies that the conditions for securing ethical development are obliterated.

Richards identifies certain key moral dilemmas in policing ranging from the use of discretion, the practice of deception and the use of power and authority. He builds a strong case indicating that without the language and concepts of ethics and some ethical theory the requirement of hard critical thinking which is necessary for the proper practice of police management and leadership will be diminished.

He concludes his work with the observation:

"... if, as I have argued, the police, in order to enjoy the trust and confidence of the public, need to police towards worthwhile ends in a morally acceptable manner, then applied ethics, as well as such instruments as police codes, are a necessary requirement for officers." (Richards 1985: 31)

Richards highlights the need for the police in general to recognise the importance of ethical considerations. He was also responsible for designing the first 'ethics' education to be incorporated into the command courses at Bramshill.

**Introducing the subject 'ethics' onto the police leadership development curriculum**

In 1978 the Police Staff College recruited onto its staff a political and moral philosopher. A part of his initial brief (Richards, 1992, personal communication) was to create and introduce an 'ethics package' that would be included as part of the course content on the 'Command courses'. This package was presented to students attending the Junior Command Course in 1982. The Junior Command Course was an obligatory part of the training and development for all officers holding Chief Inspector rank in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Each of those Junior Command Courses lasted for several months and more than one hundred officers attended each course. The student body was constituted into syndicates. Typically, each course numbered eight syndicates with fourteen officers in each syndicate. Two members of staff, one a police officer (of Superintendent rank) and one a
civilian member of the tutorial staff were cast in the role of 'syndicate directors' for each of the eight syndicates.

The educational background of the staff directing the syndicates varied considerably. Whilst the majority of police staff held a first degree or a masters degree in a variety of subjects, some did not. The civilian tutorial staff had, in the main, a background in politics and/or the social sciences. Some had studied sociology, others politics, others psychology and others, again, economics. However, a major and extensive focus upon ethics and moral philosophy in their first degree or post-graduate studies had not been a feature of their formal education. Notwithstanding any lack of expertise or familiarity with the sorts of subject germane to police leadership and management development, syndicate directors at the college had to manage the process of helping their students learn from whatever content was presented at central level on the courses.

The programme for the Junior Command Course for the 'Police Ethics Exercise' in December 1982 lasted for two and one-half days. Its objectives were written down and distributed to each student. They were as follows:

- To make explicit values and principles the general pursuit and application of which constitute the British way of life

- To present a concept of professionalism and to explore its major implications for the Police Service

- To highlight the significance of the ethical requirements of professionalism by introducing a theory of normative ethics

- To provide students with the opportunity to engage in critical moral thinking

The programme itself consisted of a small number of central lectures to the whole student body following a 'general introduction to the programme' by the Deputy Commandant of the College.

Those lectures were:

- 'The character of the United Kingdom'

- 'The idea of professionalism'
The lectures were delivered by an historian, a sociologist and an ethicist respectively. Following each of the first two lectures, a seminar was organised against a predetermined discussion agenda. The introduction to ethics was followed by a set of 'exemplary moral tales' designed to explore moral conflicts. These were then followed by a series of police-related case studies. To illustrate the nature of these discussion agendas I have included extracts from the original documents. (Appendix A contains a selection of materials from the original ethics teaching in order to convey, as accurate a sense as possible the nature of the educational design) Thus, in relation to 'the character of the United Kingdom, syndicate members examined questions such as:

'Is the idea or theory of the Social Contract realistic?' 'Is it useful?'

'Does the character of the U.K. constitution depend ultimately on a basic consensus of the political parties?'

'Examine the distinction between power and authority.'

In relation to 'the idea of professionalism', some of the questions explored were:

'In what respects is the police service currently deficient in professionalism in each of the following areas: (i) autonomy, (ii) social esteem (iii) technical proficiency?'

'What are the main obstacles to the fuller attainment of professional standards of autonomy, social esteem and technical proficiency?'

'What can be done, realistically speaking, to enhance police professionalism?'

I think it is fair to argue that these kinds of questions, and, the concepts they involve, are intellectually demanding and relatively sophisticated. If, to these agendas, is added the content of the material presented on ethics itself, then I want to argue that course participants were confronted with something genuinely difficult. So, for example, under the heading, 'Towards a police professional ethic,' students read about the purpose of morality in the context of an analysis of the nature of human nature. Morality was conceptualised as a 'socially recognised device more pervasive and ubiquitous than the law designed to counter-act persistent limitations built into the human condition'. They moved on to explore a 'normative ethic' and after learning that moral principles have three noteworthy
features - i.e. they are 'prescriptive', 'universalisable' and 'over-ride other prescriptions' - finished their enquiry with the draft of a 'suggested police ethical code'.

I should add though that this first draft of an ethical code itself influenced the draft statement of ethical principles which came to be published a decade later by the Association of Chief Police Officers' Quality of Service Committee.

Snell (1993) has developed a useful typology of the different curriculum emphases within management development that trainers and educators have created for the subject 'ethics'. This design for police ethics education most clearly approximates a 'high culture - academic transmission' model identified and described by Snell.

In 1982, I was a member of the directing staff at the Police Staff College and, with the help of a Superintendent, I co-directed syndicates of Chief Inspectors. I had a background in philosophical psychology - which proved to be invaluable to me - but I had only a modest familiarity with moral philosophy. My police co-director had no familiarity with the study of ethics whatsoever. Occasionally, amongst our syndicate group were officers who had studied political ideas, history or sociology - and sometimes this knowledge enabled them to enjoy a somewhat extended discussion of the seminar questions and the issues surfaced in the lectures. Mostly, however, the group struggled to sustain a reasoned and informed debate. Moreover, a number of students were openly hostile to the subject matter and, despite reassurances to the contrary, reasoned that because 'ethics' was being examined their own integrity was doubted by the 'college' - and therefore, its staff. Massey (1993) comments that this is not an unusual response shown towards the topic 'ethics' when it is presented on the syllabus of police courses.

For my part, I was especially interested in the subject matter and very concerned that it should be a success. I struggled to master the content and, similarly, tried to intervene helpfully and from an informed base, in the different types of discussion. I was grateful to have the opportunity to develop my own appreciation of ethics and to be part of a process examining ethics and policing. Moreover, I thought that the quality of police exchanges with their public suffered because it was not sufficiently informed and guided by moral values such as justice, benevolence and tolerance. I agreed with Richards (1985) that the curriculum for police leadership development was dominated by police specialist discourse and by the language and concepts of the social sciences. Additionally, I sensed that Habermas was correct in his observation that ethics had become suppressed in contemporary consciousness. I was, therefore, committed to the success of our new educational
However, despite the efforts of most of the staff, the student feedback was not sufficiently positive for the subject, 'ethics' to continue to be a part of the police leadership and management development curriculum. Several students were scathing about the particular educational experience that they had endured. To use their term, they 'rubbished' ethics. Although the staff involved with the design of the 'package' made various adjustments to try and secure a positive valorisation from the majority of the students, the student feedback continued to be negative.

Finally, the senior management team at the college decided to terminate 'ethics' teaching and the subject only featured as a peripheral option on any of the command courses at Bramshill.

In the next chapter I shall examine the more specific developments which led to me to develop an action research inquiry into the design and delivery of an 'ethics education' for police leaders and managers. However, I should add that I remained profoundly disquieted that the formal and/or named study of ethics had been removed from the curriculum. The grounds for its removal appeared to be based on the fact that it had failed to please the client group, despite the importance of the subject. The executive leadership of the college had not been willing or able to find a way to support and defend the inclusion of 'ethics' on the command courses at Bramshill. *Prima facie* this constituted a failure to adhere to a part of the very constitution of the college.
Chapter Two

An examination of the specific factors which generated the research project

"The most intractable struggles, political liberalism assumes, are confessedly for the sake of the highest things: for religion, for philosophical views of the world, and for different moral conceptions of the good. We should find it remarkable that, so deeply opposed in these ways, just co-operation among free and equal citizens is possible at all. In fact, historical experience suggests that it rarely is." (Rawls, 1996: 4)

In this chapter I shall provide an account exploring the question: 'Why and how the research originated'. I shall begin by outlining some of the strategic emphases voiced by police leaders at the beginning of the 1990s. These emphases indicate that concerns with police ethics and culture change were at the core of police strategic thinking. I shall then provide a brief characterisation of the pattern of curriculum evolution at Bramshill and describe how 'ethics' made its first appearance as a named subject of study on Command courses at the College. Then, after indicating how the earliest design for an ethics education met with opposition from the client group and also from the emerging educational methodologies employed by the college, I shall move on to stress the long-standing ethical concerns involving the policing of a free and humane society and use this as an entrée to introduce the rationale I developed for presenting an 'ethics education' to police.

My research project grew out of three mutually reinforcing streams of influence. First, in my role as course manager of the 'Leadership Development Programme' and subsequent 'Police Management Programme' at the National Police Staff College, Bramshill, I was aware of the need to understand, interpret and disseminate the strategic initiatives in policing. These initiatives took a particular focus in the last decade of the twentieth century under the umbrella concept of 'quality of service'. It was these strategic emphases which catalysed the first stages of the research process.

Second, simply as an educator, I found the absence of the provision of an 'ethics education' for police management and leadership development unacceptable. By the last decade of the twentieth century its very survival on the police leadership development curriculum was in doubt. I faced a simple question: 'What form might ethics education take for it to be both valued by course participants and 'effective' in outcome?' I was, though, more concerned with creating a design for 'ethics
education' that would secure a positive valorisation from the student group because of my knowledge of the decision-making processes at Bramshill. Typically the different forms of educational event would use 'end-of-course' rating scales and, if courses or elements of those courses were judged negatively then they would come under pressure to be altered or removed altogether from the programme(s) of study.

Third, informed and critical awareness of police in liberal democracies inevitably raises important questions concerning the 'moral health' of the police organisation and police management. In consequence, it is difficult to be 'involved' with police without taking questions of 'ethics' seriously. The research sought, albeit modestly, to make a contribution to the 'moral health' of police in contemporary British society. Since, as I have indicated above, it is difficult to take the study of police seriously without reference to the moral basis of policing and the significance of ethics for police I conclude this chapter by outlining a set of reasons (a rationale) for the study of police ethics.

The immediate origins of the research inquiry

An immediate impetus to developing an effective ethics education for police officers was provided by a related set of strategic initiatives adopted by senior police officers at the beginning of the 1990s. Foremost among these were Woodcock (1991), (1992), Imbert (1992), the authors of the Quality of Service committee publication, 'Getting Things Right' (1993), Hirst (1992), Dear (1993) and Bunyard (1993).

Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary, Sir John Woodcock, in an address entitled, 'Trust in the police - the search for truth', given to the International Police Exhibition and Conference on 13 October 1992, focused the police service in general - and police leadership in particular - upon the central importance of appropriate professional ethics in contemporary police organisations serving liberal democracies. His first message was concerned with the nature of the occupational culture of the police. For him, features of that culture worked, in essence, against securing trust and confidence in the integrity of police. He noted:

"... the working culture of the police service is shot-through with corner cutting and expediency." (Woodcock, 1992: 3)

His second message addressed the causal nature of such 'corner-cutting and expediency'. This happened, according to Woodcock, because police themselves mistrusted the workings of the criminal justice system. Woodcock's analysis was
articulated as follows:

"Among police officers, there is a widespread mistrust of the current system, the mechanisms of which are seen broadly and unnecessarily to favour the accused at the expense of the rights of victims. As a result, some parts of the working culture of the police service have become distorted by a concern to get round the effects of such mechanisms, which are, of course, in place precisely because there are doubts about the probity of the police." (Woodcock, 1992: 4)

In the same address, Woodcock moved on to propose ways of dealing with the two concerns he had identified - i.e. the integrity of police and the trust felt by police in the mechanisms and procedures of the criminal justice system - arguing that the police service needed to change its culture 'dramatically'. He wrote:

"The work place values of the modern police service have not yet fully cut free of the past and the police service faces a massive task, if it is to hold, as the community now demands, integrity and respect for human rights above all other considerations." (Woodcock 1992: 7)

In the pursuit of such a culture change, Woodcock made five recommendations. It was his emphasis upon the importance of a developing code of ethics for the police service in the United Kingdom - as well as his broader call for culture change and different emphases in police management and leadership practices - that, together, provided an immediate strategic rationale for this research. The specific content of Woodcock's recommendations can be summarised as follows:

First, every effort must be made to make 'come alive' the strategic position articulated by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and published in 1990 as the 'Statement of Common Purpose and Values'. That statement (which I have reproduced in Chapter One) reflected a mission shared by the strategic leadership of the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Second, the 'full weight' of the Inspectorate would be put behind the code of ethics for the police service. At the time of his address the 'code of ethics' was still in a developmental stage. It was published as a 'draft statement of ethical principles' on 8 December 1992. Whereas the statement of common purpose and values makes clear the mission of the police service, the code of ethics is designed to provide individual officers with guidance as to their proper professional behaviour. In a brief discussion concerning the raison d'etre of such a code of ethics, as well as its specific purpose, Woodcock provides the following account:
"It may well be asked as to why, 150 years after the service was established, it has suddenly found itself needing a Code of Ethics. The answer is that 20th. century Britain is a multi-cultural society; while basic values alter little, different societies have different ways of approaching those values. For the last several decades, the police may have been complacent in assuming a shared set of values among those whom it recruits; the purpose of the new Code is to make manifest the values that the organisation demands from those in its ranks.

That said, it is vital that the issue of the Code is not seen as expressing widespread dissatisfaction with the behaviour of officers currently serving. Its main purposes are, first, to confirm shared values among individuals and, secondly, to provide a method of decision making for individuals facing difficult moral choices." (Woodcock, 1992: 14)

Third, Woodcock thought that making such a code of ethics (or statement of ethical principles) work in the everyday life of operational policing required an alteration in the nature of supervisory practices. Rather than supervise in a 'post facto' manner - through checking upon the notes taken and prepared by police officers in the course of their duties - supervision needed to be focused on 'deeds' rather than words. Woodcock characterises the way he wanted to see supervision conducted as follows:

"Supervisors must find out how their officers operate, must listen to their tape recordings, view their video recordings, manage by walking about, be available. The culture of the detective in sole charge of his or her case must end." (Woodcock 1992: 18)

Fourth, the police must cease to believe that they are solely the agents of the prosecution and become gatherers of evidence. In this respect, Woodcock is emphasising the need for police to act as dispassionate (or disinterested) researchers of social phenomena.

Finally, he notes that in criminal investigations there are generally only four types of evidence - that of chance witnesses, surveillance evidence, forensic evidence and, confession evidence - and that the latter, confession evidence, is a vital tool of justice. Plainly, any actions on the part of police which compromise the trust and confidence that might be placed upon confession evidence would have very problematic consequences for the criminal justice system itself. In short, it would be disastrous if police did not manifest the highest standards of integrity.
The substance of Woodcock's address might be taken as setting a particular agenda for the development of police in the United Kingdom where an emphasis is placed both on meeting the demands of human rights considerations and sustaining high ethical standards. If the education, training and development of police officers were to be constituted to support such an agenda then some sort of explicit 'ethics' or 'moral values' education should feature as an element in its programme designs. It is perhaps, significant, that Woodcock himself embraced concerns about the quality of ethics education for police when he noted in his address:

"... I look to the code of ethics to be ... uncompromising. It must contain a straightforward statement that, however worthy the end desired, no officer should believe that he or she has the moral authority to go outside the due process of law. I hope that the teaching and explanatory materials which accompanies the code will explain how things have come to pass, how the police finally realised that they did not have responsibility to shore up the criminal justice system, how good intentions led to ill consequences, how discretion and innovation are essential but not in relation to the moral dilemmas of investigation." (Woodcock 1992: 16,17)

Woodcock's second contribution to the 'reinvention' of police that was being advocated in the first part of the decade lay in his paper, 'Overturning police culture' (Woodcock 1991). He discerned a major change that was about to affect all aspects of police culture and identified three inter-dependent elements in that change. Again, central among these was his appreciation of human rights issues: he wrote:

"It will be a change of culture and that change will be threefold, each interdependent with the other. First, the rights of the customer of police services will be raised to the pinnacle of all police activity. Secondly, human rights issues rather than the control of crime will come to the forefront of police thinking, albeit that the human rights of the majority can be deeply threatened by growth in crime. Thirdly, there will be a recognition that fair and equal treatment of all police and civil staff is not an end in itself but additionally a mirror image by which the public discerns the nature of police treatment of minorities" (Woodcock 1991: 172,173)

For Woodcock, such a culture change was necessary to maintain the very nature of a police service based upon consent.

At the same International Police Exhibition and Conference, Sir Peter Imbert addressed conference delegates and included in his address a content
complementary to that presented by Woodcock. Whilst Woodcock focused particularly upon the subculture of police, Imbert considered wider societal changes as well as concerns about the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system. He returned though to discuss the developments connected with police organisations (and the Metropolitan police in particular). Imbert emphasised changes within and without the police organisation as follows:

"We have been changing in response to the changing expectations of our public. In respect of our ideas for an improved criminal justice system, we have made a lengthy and extremely detailed submission to the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice ... In respect of maintaining the public's trust, we have put substantial efforts into keeping and enhancing what is still in the last analysis a high level of public approval." (Imbert 1992: 22)

He then proceeded to outline the 'macro' level changes involving partnerships with other agencies and organisations in an attempt to deal with crime as well as the culture change programme (the 'Plus' programme) developed in the Metropolitan police. He wrote:

"... it would be meaningless to ask the community to enter into such a partnership unless it is founded upon a climate of mutual trust and understanding. The 'Plus' programme is the means of creating that climate, a process of cultural change within the organisation to ensure that all 44,000 employees, police and civilian, are pushing in the same direction - serving the people of London. This is what is at the heart of 'Plus', a contract between the police and the public based on the Statement of Our Common Purpose and Values. I have already referred to a change in our policing style. We have also seen changes to our planning process, our command and decision-making structures, our corporate identity, our paperwork, human resource management, and the way we communicate both internally and externally.

As well as the whole 'Plus' programme, other important attitudinal work has been going on for some time within the Metropolitan Police ... We have also introduced an ethical dimension into the training programmes which strongly underlines the concept of the investigative process comprising a search for truth rather than a search for a prosecution." (Imbert 1992: 23,24)

The obvious overlap between Woodcock's recommendations and the issues Imbert chose to make salient indicated the consensus that was beginning to develop amongst police strategists concerning the need to secure an appropriate moral ethos within policing. This was to be underlined when, later that year, at the 'Quality of
Service' seminar held on 8 December 1992 at the Police Staff College, Bramshill, both the draft statement of ethical principles and a document 'Getting Things Right' - outlining a comprehensive formulation concerning the appropriate ways in which police managers and leaders should design their organisations and conduct their managerial practice - were published. The former document took the form of a set of eleven ethical principles, that were aspirational in nature. The latter also pointed to the perceived importance of 'ethics' in achieving the goals of the police service. Earlier that year, the Quality of Service committee produced a document, "Strategic Priorities for 1992", identifying six major tasks which they thought the service 'must undertake' if it is to guarantee quality policing in the 1990s. Those tasks were:

- Setting standards and measuring performance
- Training
- Promotion of good practice and research throughout the service
- Meeting the needs and expectations of external customers
- Meeting the needs and expectations of internal customers
- Police ethics

'Getting things right' included text detailing the kind of occupational culture considered appropriate for a police service concerned with value for money, quality management, achieving performance targets - whilst at the same time remaining informed and guided by police professional ethics. Its authors wrote:

"So what sort of culture should we aim for over the next ten years to help make "quality" possible? The first thing to be said is that we must firmly maintain high standards of business ethics and honesty. These will not be compromised. We do, however, need a culture which acknowledges that our major strength is our people: they must be openly valued not only for the skills they bring to the job, but as individuals, too. Our culture needs to be more comfortable with taking some risks, and needs to have more faith in the ability of the staff who are closest to the customer to make decisions about the service they provide - after all, they are usually the best informed." (Quality of Service Committee, 1993: 4)

Thus, if the Quality of Service committee's publication were to be read as a management manifesto for police leaders and managers, then concerns about
maintaining 'high standards of business ethics and honesty' are placed at the top of a hierarchy of values. Again, it follows logically that some aspect of police education generally - and police management education specifically - must be concerned with addressing 'police ethics' if these strategic positions are to be more than merely high-minded (but ultimately empty) pronouncements.

Another initiator of the concerted attempt to effect culture change in the police service was Hirst. From his perspective of chief constable, Hirst was one of the prime movers of the 'quality management' philosophy in the police of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. He was keen to begin to establish some definition of 'quality' which might be used to gauge measures of public satisfaction with police services. Again, Hirst emphasises the need for a radical culture shift if the police organisation was to bring itself into line with professional service cultures. He writes:

"The pursuit of the quality of service issue and the identification of the changes which will have to take place, both internally and externally in order to realise the goal we have set begins to suggest a movement towards a different model of policing. It may be that the coercive system of policing and police management valid in the immediate post-war era have had their day. We should perhaps, be pursuing a compliance model of policing and be seeking a more participative model of management. To try to change the ethos of the service and at the same time retain the former standards and values of police management is unlikely to be successful" (Hirst 1991: 192)

Dear (1993) in the course of his work as one of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary extended the strategic analysis concerning culture change in the police service by surfacing a number of 'philosophical issues' confronting the service. He was concerned that the accountancy model - which stressed 'value for money' - was compromising a 'high quality of service to the public'. He wrote:

"Quality, the human face, care, attention and putting the customer first are all requirements that are demanded as much from the police as from many other organisations in both the public and private sectors." (Dear 1993: 2)

His concerns about the value priorities in policing continued to underline the fact that police leaders were participating in a fundamental debate about the proper style and manner of the police.

Lastly, I should mention Sir Robert Bunyard's (1993) paper, 'The future of
policing'. Although setting out to consider the place of police in the wider criminal justice system, Bunyard stressed a choice facing police practitioners: either they could continue to be perceived as 'difficult artisans' by other groups of professionals and practitioners in the criminal justice system, or they could develop a differently perceived identity - that of 'educated' professionals.

Whilst Woodcock, Imbert, Hirst, Dear and Bunyard all emphasised the need for culture change and development within which, *inter alia*, they advocated new value priorities for the police service, and the 'Quality of Service' committee outlined a 'blueprint' for ways in which police managers should operate, it was the actual publication of the statement of ethical principles and a supporting commentary which served as the powerful immediate stimulus for me to try and develop an effective ethics education for police leaders and managers.

The draft statement of ethical principles was made public by Commander Dickinson, who - in the course of presenting the statement - emphasised that the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland already had a statement of common purpose and values which was to be complemented by the statement of ethical principles. The entire text of the police service statement of ethical principles - which was given wide coverage in the national press - reads as follows:

"*I aspire to:*

*Act with fairness, carrying out my responsibilities with integrity and impartiality*

*Perform my duties with diligence and the proper use of discretion*

*In dealings with all individuals, both outside and inside the police service, display self control, tolerance, understanding and courtesy appropriate to the circumstances*

*Uphold fundamental human rights, treating every person as an individual and display respect and compassion towards them*

*Support all colleagues in the performance of their lawful duties and, in doing so, actively oppose and draw attention to any malpractice by any person*

*Respect the fact that much of the information I receive is confidential and may only be divulged when my duty requires me to do so*
Exercise force only when justified and use only the minimum amount of force to effect my lawful purpose and restore the peace

Use resources entrusted to me to the maximum benefit of the public

Act only within the law, in the understanding that I have no authority to depart from due legal process and that no one may place a requirement on me to do so

Continually accept responsibility for self development, continually seeking to improve the way in which I serve the community

Accept personal accountability for my own acts and omissions"

This statement of ethical principles makes reference to a very wide range of considerations which fall within the traditional province and subject matter of ethics (e.g. the virtues, notions of 'rights', concepts of duty etc.). In order to develop a context in which to study and debate the principles, a commentary on the statements was also developed by the Ethics sub-committee of the Quality of Service committee. A central aspect of the commentary was its reference to international rights-based instruments such as the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. It also attempted to help clarify and interpret the meaning of the different statements contained within the overall draft statement of principles. Thus, the commentary highlighted the fact that there was a need to provide an opportunity for police to debate and discuss the statement of ethical principles in an appropriate and disciplined educational context.

Ethics education for police managers and leaders: the background and educational context

Whilst the strategic leadership of the police service provided a platform from which to develop an ethics education for police managers I have noted in Chapter One how an earlier initiative had taken place which had attempted to introduce 'ethics' to courses of study at the National Police Staff College, Bramshill. This earlier work provided me with some preliminary foundations for constructing a police ethics education for police leaders and managers. Here, though, I shall describe the background and context for the beginnings of a named examination of 'ethics' (on the police leadership development curriculum) and then develop the discussion begun in Chapter One concerning the educational character of Richards (1982) design.
It remains difficult to pinpoint the exact circumstances that led to the introduction of ethics education into the command (senior officer) programmes at the Police Staff College. The history of police leadership education, training and development has not yet been written. However, I think it possible to discern four distinct phases of emphasis characterising curriculum delivery at Bramshill. They are: 'liberal humanism', 'subject disciplines', 'self development and management development', and, finally, 'police professionalism and the new managerialism'.

Throughout the sixties, the educational model and its content was firmly based upon the enlightenment assumptions concerned with humanising individuals and with humanising the workplace. An admixture of police professional topics and liberal studies was offered to the senior and middle ranks of the police service. In the seventies, the formal curriculum focused upon key subject areas and topics which, together, were considered relevant to police: politics, sociology, economics and management dominated - along with strategic and operational policing matters such as 'police accountability' and 'major incident handling'. The eighties came to see a radical departure from conventional content and methodologies; the rise of self-development - and an emphasis upon the 'manner' rather than the 'matter' or 'cognitive content' of education (Peters 1966) - and the negotiated curriculum, were salient features of the educational landscape shaping itself at the college.

Plumridge (1988) charts these developments and shows how the tutorial staff came to adopt the role of facilitators of learning and how they took as their goal the genesis of self-managed learners and the creation of police organisations as 'learning systems. Heron's (1977) models of education and development provided a framework for training both new and established staff within the institutional context. The college attempted to implement the 'learner-centred' paradigm outlined by, for example, Claxton (1997).

Paralleling such an emphasis was the recognition of a dominant occupational figure in western societies: the 'manager'. The 1980s also saw the rise of the new managerialism and a gradual move towards creating the performance culture in organisations. Senior and middle ranking police officers were conceptualised and identified as 'strategic' or 'middle' managers respectively.

The 1990s has emerged as an era concerned with the professionalisation of the police and the struggle to embrace the new managerial litany of 'business process re-engineering', 'culture by design', 'networks', 'partnerships' 'consultants and mentors', 'outsourcing', 'downsizing' and the 'business-ification' of the public sector.
A part of that search for increased professionalisation has resulted in a series of partnerships between Bramshill and 'award granting' bodies (namely, the Universities of Cambridge, and Manchester, the Open University and the Institute of Management) such that programmes of study at Bramshill (and within the National Police Training estate) lead to nationally recognised qualifications. This era has brought an apparent new discipline and rigour to the educational opportunities and programmes of study, whilst, at the same time, providing the conditions within which distinct models of theory and practice for police management can emerge.

Ethics education, as a distinct field of learning was established on the overt curriculum in the early 1980s. As such, it vied for attention and acceptance with social science subjects, specialist police subjects, and the emerging discourses (and methods) of management education. It found itself amidst the gathering tide of self development and the view that the Staff College did not actually have a teaching function (Plumridge 1988) but offered 'learning opportunities' for 'self-directed' learners.

Certain events foreshadowed the appearance of ethics as a named subject of 'study'. To some extent these events were essentially similar to those which had led to calls for ethics education for police in the United States of America. For Kleinig (1990), in his seminal exploration of police ethics teaching and learning, the increasingly articulate debate concerning the need for police ethics training drew its impetus from a number of sources. These included not only public concern over police corruption and misconduct, but also, wider social currents including a greater awareness of ethical diversity, increased media penetration, a decline of public trust in the police, a trend towards occupational 'professionalisation', technological changes and so on. More specifically, on both sides of the Atlantic, there has been a lifting of the 'corporate veil' of police organisations through the activities of researchers from different disciplines. As a result the ethical shortcomings of the police were made visible. Thus, in a North American context, the authors of the Police Foundation report, 'The quality of police education' (1978) highlighted *inter alia*, the need for police ethics education, writing:

"*Every police education programme should include in its required curriculum, a thorough consideration of the value choices and ethical dilemmas of police work ... *" (Sherman et al. 1978 : 4)

Richards (1985), in his 'plea for applied ethics', provides an account similar to that presented by Kleinig. He concluded that whilst the service had managed to
combine a high order of public acceptance with the discharge of its duties, a combination of socio-cultural changes - such as an increased reluctance to defer to authority - combined with the increased critical scrutiny of the police - had led not quite to a 'crisis of confidence' but to a 'dislocation' in the police/public relationship. Richards noted:

"From the mid 1960's onwards, incidents, investigations and inquiries cumulatively began to erode public confidence in the integrity and competence of the police service in general ..." (Richards, 1985: 15)

He took the prime purpose of applied ethics to be the mending of such a dislocation. Against such a background 'ethics education' appeared on the formal curriculum at Bramshill.

**The birth of an ethics education at the Police Staff College**

The first attempt to launch an ethics education and to establish it on the police leadership and management development curriculum was marked by a commitment to a genuine investigation of the subject 'ethics'. In addition to academically grounded and expository accounts, students examined 'exemplary moral tales' (where they would confront and address moral dilemmas) as well as police-related case studies. These took the form of staff-led seminar discussions.

The manner of providing ethics education was an admixture of something approaching a university model featuring expert tutor delivery and small-group tutor-led discussion. There were, in addition, some student-led sessions. As one of the staff tutors assisting in this venture I found that it was necessary to have some formal philosophical training in order to cope with the material.

Although several tutors made valiant attempts to help participants move beyond just 'knowing about' the concerns with which the subject 'ethics' deals towards more sophisticated critical thinking, only a small minority of these participants seemed willing to embark on a personal and professional journey of inquiry. Yet, in retrospect, it is not difficult to account for this; Snell (1993) has provided a useful way of classifying the different curricular emphases in management ethics education: he identifies the formal purposes of management ethics education/training as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic formal purposes</th>
<th>Curricular emphases</th>
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| Company/professional socialisation | * Rules, procedures'  
* Codes of ethics  
* Stakeholder responsibility  
* Trustworthiness in role  
* Best practice |
| Cultural transmission; Academic grounding | *Timeless debates  
* Philosophical paradoxes  
* Rigour of argumentation |
| Organisation citizenship; Personal development | * Neighbourly responsibility  
* Defending and promoting rights  
* Values clarification  
* Respecting others as oneself |
| Critical pragmatism; Social transformation | * Improving ethics in practice  
* Detecting false consciousness  
* Moral leadership  
* Transforming moral ethos |

(Source: Snell, R. 1993: 172)

The very fact that the first manifestation of an 'ethics education' included a relatively systematic examination of some of the basic concepts with which moral philosophers deal - as well as a consideration of the nature of normative ethical theories - constitutes a part of the reason why it can be placed in the 'cultural transmission/academic grounding' category of curriculum emphasis.

**Critique - and the fate of ethics education:**

Such a model and design for ethics education met with an occupational cultural outlook (Banton, 1964, Holdaway, 1981, Reiner, 1985, Brown, 1992) that has been described as 'anti-academic'. The obscure, arcane (and often technical) language of moral philosophy and the dense conceptual analyses that were presented elicited an antipathetic response from the client group. The educational background of the majority of police middle (and even senior) ranking officers had not prepared them...
for exercises in 'armchair anthropology' which were conducted during certain lectures. Nor had the student group familiarity with the academic practice of disinterestedness, conjecture and refutation.

More problematically, the tide of experiential learning was beginning to flood through the Police Staff College. The demanding intellectual, logical and cognitive requirements of a disciplined ethics education were set against a new ethos: the primacy of 'felt experience'. The challenging and self-confronting ingredients of 'ethics' were less palatable than the blandishments of 'self-acceptance', 'unconditional positive regard' and 'personal becoming'. After a brief attempt to create an 'experiential ethics' the subject gradually lost its place on the curriculum.

Richards (1985) foretold the fate of ethics in his analysis of ethics education and the rise of the social sciences: 'Ethics', he wrote, 'is set aside'.

By the beginning of the 1990s apart from a specialist study course and the occasional study option on the senior management courses at Bramshill, ethics education scarcely figured on the formal curriculum at all. In the light of the emerging strategic emphases for police this was, in itself, a scarcely defensible situation.

As an educator, I imagined that there were alternative ways of developing the content and methods of 'ethics' such that it might be secured on the curriculum. A rationale for 'Police ethics education' might be constructed that was founded, in part, upon some of the long-standing analyses concerning ethics and the police.

**Ethics and police: long standing concerns**

From the earliest documented writing in political and social philosophy an interest and concern has been expressed by thinkers, in both the occidental and oriental worlds, with respect to the ways humanity - the generality of persons - might design and develop social arrangements within which the 'good' life might be pursued. Plato's 'Republic' offered one such vision. An alternative is reflected in the writing of Lao Tzu. The problems constellating around issues of power, authority, order, control and justice, have engaged the attention of philosophers, political theorists, sociologists and the historians of ideas throughout recorded history. Any reading of history indicates that power may be used in ways that cause enormous human hurt, suffering and injustice. Midgley (1988) has commented upon 'the reality of human wickedness', whilst Arendt (1969), as I have already noted, has described the 'banality of human evil'.
The academic study of police has consistently reflected an emphasis upon ways in which police powers are used and abused.

At some level, it is probably true to say that ethicists and students of police are always concerned with the phenomena emerging in Nazi Germany during the 1930s and 1940s, and, in particular, the rise of the Gestapo. Even if this is not a shared concern, it would be difficult to imagine developing a modern police service without acknowledging some of the 'lessons' from history. One hope for an ethics education is that it might play a preventive role in averting the horrors and atrocities visited by humans on humans.

The lessons of history served as the most general reason for sustaining my wish to re-introduce ethics to the police leadership and management development curriculum. However, the specific rationale for the present study derives from the three sources that I have described.

First, strategic police leadership has trenchantly called for a culture change within the police service. Raising the profile of 'ethics' is a central element in this culture change. Part of the role of the Police Staff College, Bramshill, is concerned with disseminating strategic messages to its client groups. In consequence, discussion and debate concerning 'police ethics' is necessary.

Second, the actual place and position of ethics education on the police management and leadership development curriculum in the early 1990s was at best precarious and, at worst, in danger of extinction. That ethics should occupy such a marginal position was a reflection of a complex set of interacting forces but, in the light of both the responsibilities of educators and the purposes for which Bramshill, as an institution, had been established, I thought that this constituted an indefensible state of affairs.

Third, the study of police necessarily embraces the 'big' questions of law, morality, power, control, order, authority, justice etc. In consequence ethical debate, and the study of ethical issues and concerns, are central to those processes which take seriously the development of police officers. In consequence I set out to construct a specific rationale in order to help reintroduce ethics to the curriculum at the Police Staff College.
Defining the rationale concerning ethics education for police in general and police managers in particular

In answer to the question, 'Why the study of ethics for police?' I developed the following set of arguments:

1. The facts of policing

There are certain facts about policing which conspire to make it a morally vulnerable activity. These include: the use of force, the need to practice deception in order to attain valued ends, the pressures generated by emergencies and responses to threats. The experimental social psychological research by Milgram (1974) concerning 'obedience to authority' also highlights the readiness with which people working in hierarchical systems can acquiesce to malevolent authority and the banality of evil.

The social psychological features of the police occupational culture - with, for example, an emphasis upon loyalty and the separation of the police from the public policed - contain features that can counteract adherence to the highest standards of professional ethics.

2. The moral basis of policing

Police are a social creation. They are consented to by a public who grant them powers, including coercive powers, in return for a service concerned to achieve worthwhile ends (e.g. social peace) through the use of socially acceptable means. At the heart of the police/public relationship are the notions of trust, confidence, reciprocity and mutuality. Policing rests upon a moral foundation.

3. The legal basis of policing

Law, although separable from morality in certain respects, is nonetheless based upon a framework of moral values. Law stems from notions and ideas concerning the social order that supports the 'good life' (even though notions of the 'good life' vary enormously in time and place). In the United Kingdom, those moral values that directly influence law making and law enforcement include, justice, freedom, equality and respect for persons. Law must be applied impartially, and police, as law enforcers must act impartially. Moreover, police in virtue of their entrusted powers, must also act within the law. To do otherwise threatens all the achievements of the legal system.
4. Constitutional obligations

The United Kingdom is a signatory to International and specific European instruments endorsing and enshrining fundamental human rights that have universal applicability. In addition, certain documents frame codes of conduct and define expectations of and for police.

5. Contemporary times - the argument from post modernity

Contemporary times bears witness to the delegitimation of authority, to moral and ethical pluralism, to the demise of certainty, to the age of mistrust, to a sense of 'life as game'. Post-modern people have been likened to tourists living by the slogan, 'Your value for my money'. It is an age of the 'end' of everything - the end of history, the end of the western world - even, the end of morality. Lipovetsky (1992) has conceived our times in terms of the 'twilight of duty'. In the face of such considerable uncertainties concerning the criteria that guide our decisions and our valuations, ethics emerges as a way of 're-enchanting' our personal and social being.

6. The argument from professionalism

The police might aspire to the status of a profession or wish to see their work characterised as 'professional'. Professions are characterised by explicit codes of ethics. These exist for good reason. They provide a firm contractual undertaking on the part of their membership to sustain standards and to provide services commensurate with those standards. Professional work is subjected by the clients of its services (or outputs) to evaluative judgments. These include the proper economic use of resources, concerns with the veracity and currency of advice and professional pronouncements, integrity, honesty, benevolence and justice.

7. The argument from history

Liberal democracy is both a creation and an achievement. Broadly speaking, liberal democracies have managed to meet the wants, needs and interests of their citizens. Police, in part, protect the perimeters of societies within which the institutions of liberal democracy survive. These achievements reflect a moral tradition stemming from Greco-Roman cultures, a tradition concerned with articulating ethical frameworks and with the promotion of human flourishing as well as the curbing of human limitations. History indicates that potentially disastrous consequences
emerge unless moral values are used as the criteria against which to test initiatives and socio-political practices.

8. The argument from within the police organisation

The original instructions determined by Sir Robert Peel to the police of the metropolis enjoin its officers to adhere to high moral standards. Even in contemporary times, police studies include discussions and portraits of the 'exemplary' police officer - the ideal standard or type to which police might aspire. But, even more recently, the representative bodies within the service such as ACPO, the superintendents association etc. have argued for and insisted upon the importance of conduct in line with ethical codes and have exhorted the service to follow the highest standards of ethical practice.

9. The argument from police/public relations

There is not a crisis of confidence between police and public but there is something of a dislocation in the relationship. The various recent explorations of this relationship - such as the Operational Policing Review (1990) – acknowledges such a dislocation. If the public begins to doubt the integrity of their police and if that same public begins to doubt the 'value for money' which it perceives it is receiving from its police then the whole basis of policing by consent and the notion of a police of and for the people is untenable.

A police committed to and expressing, consistently, the range of moral values, and virtues, which ethics - especially applied ethics - is concerned to achieve, is one means to address such a dislocation.

10 The argument from human authenticity

Prior to the social programme within which we are specifically socialised it is possible to perceive an essential ethical ground to the human self. We might conceive the ethical ground to human being as a component of our birthright. This feature of our birthright is denied through distorting social experiences. The nature of these distortions has been analysed by Heron (1977a) in his discussion of the 'non-cathartic' society. Ethics re-emphasises the conditions that help individuals and collectivities create worthwhile forms of life and organisations 'fit to house the human spirit'.

11. The purposes of education

Education is, at bottom, a process of transmitting certain values. An educated person (following Peters 1966) 'comes to see the world differently' as a result of the educational process and experience. It always remains a possibility for educators to design educational events (whatever their specific nature) which have a larger or smaller moral or ethical content. The responsibilities and choices of the educator provide opportunities for an ethics education across time, place and curriculum.

12. The argument from a theory of justice

The first virtue of any social institution is justice (Rawls 1971). If we discover an unjust institution we are enjoined to reform it. Unjust institutions cause human hurt. Police, as a social institution must demonstrate that they are a just institution. If not, they must be reformed.

Conclusion

I used this set of arguments as the basis for advocating that ethics should feature as a subject of study on the Police Leadership Development Programme, the content of which I was asked to develop in early 1993. I also recognised that I was setting out to change a concrete situation of practice. Ethics, as a named subject of study and inquiry was not properly secured on the Police Leadership Development curriculum at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. I wanted this to change. These constituted the first and initial grounds for me to conceptualise my project as an action research inquiry.
Chapter Three

The foundations of the educational inquiry

"There is no overarching totality, rationality or fixed centre to human life ... just a plurality of cultures and narratives which cannot be hierarchically ordered as 'privileged' and which must consequently respect the inviolable 'otherness' of ways of doing things which are not their own. Knowledge is relative to cultural contexts, so that to claim to know the world 'as it is' is simply a chimera" (Eagleton 1996: 201)

In this chapter I shall begin by stating the research question, discuss briefly what that statement implies and then turn to examine the philosophical foundations of the inquiry. I shall then illustrate how I thought it possible to locate 'action research' within a broader 'qualitative-interpretive' model of social research.

A statement of the research question

The situation presenting itself to me at the Police Staff College in the winter of 1992 was paradoxical. On the one hand, certain major strategic emphases had called for ethics to be re-positioned so that a consciousness of ethics lay at the heart of police practice. On the other, the subject 'ethics' had become marginalised on the management and leadership development curriculum. I wanted to change this situation. I wanted to construct an 'ethics education' that would, as a result of a positive valuation from those who experienced both its form and content, become a more secure feature on the curriculum. In consequence, the research question I came to formulate was: 'Could I create an 'ethics education' for police leaders and managers that would be positively valued by sufficient of the 'client' group such that the subject 'ethics' would be secured on the curriculum?'

By stating the research question in this way, it is important to examine what is implied in its particular wording:

First, it fails to be inclusive. I judged that it was not possible to ask, 'Could we create an 'ethics education' for police leaders and managers ....?' This was because of the institutional context. Bramshill did not have a research culture - as was highlighted by Reiner and Waddington in their evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee's (1989) inquiry into higher police training - and there was a great deal of evidence (e.g. from the sociological study of police) pointing to the antipathy police managers might feel towards certain types of research endeavour. I would
begin, instead, with a personal inquiry and aim to incorporate co-researchers as the project developed.

Second, I chose the term an 'ethics education' rather than, for example, 'ethics training', 'ethics package', or some other wording, because I wanted to avoid providing apparently easy solutions to complex problems. Donahue and Felts (1993) had mounted a powerful critique of the implications of the 'technocratisation' of society (and its organisations) and believed that the typical ways of trying to promote 'ethics' (e.g. codes of ethics) failed to provide those conditions of symbolic interaction necessary to develop ethics in practice. In consequence, I wanted to create an educational learning design which made some form of symbolic interaction possible - on the assumption that such a design might help participants develop their ethical sensitivities and, perhaps, their ability to make that part of the world around them an 'ethical place'.

Third, I include a reference both to police leaders and police managers. This was because a small number of the participants in my client groups were graduates from the Accelerated Promotion Course and, therefore, were likely to fill, in the future, the senior strategic leadership ranks of the police service. I also recognised that leadership can be manifested at all levels of an organisation (Egan 1988) in the sense that innovation and change can, in principle, be driven by any organisational member. In this latter sense it is not incorrect to assume that all persons attending programmes of study at Bramshill have the possibility to be leaders.

Fourth, by acknowledging the need to secure a 'positive evaluation' I was not attempting to bring about institutional change in relation to how educational and training events were evaluated at Bramshill. There were two reasons for this: I did not think that the curriculum management processes at Bramshill could ever remain stable for very long because of the turnover of the police staff and because of the regular 'paradigm shifts' which overtook the college programmes. In consequence, I judged that even if I were to be successful this would only be a short term gain. I also thought it was, in principle, possible to obtain the necessary positive evaluation that I was seeking. I imagined that with sufficient hard work, design skill and competence - coupled with including the careful justification for taking ethics seriously (which had been developed by police leaders and ethicists) I would achieve my goal.

The philosophical foundations of the inquiry

Harre (1981) has worked out a philosophical basis for social inquiry that illustrates
how a model of science may continue to serve in the process of generating social
and/or educational knowledge. He alerted social researchers to the analytic schema
used by physicists - which, for example, conceive of sub-atomic phenomena in
terms of centres of energy - and thereby helped social researchers to unshackle
themselves from the reductionist 'experimental science' approaches of positivism.

Harre contrasts the limitations of the 'positivist-empiricist' approach to scientific
exploration with its alternative, 'realism'. For the realist, scientific theories contain
descriptions of mechanisms that might account for the observable patterns and the
apparent properties of things. Harre notes that most realists take 'facts' and
'theories' to be linked. He writes:

"Facts are revealed to a human observer who uses a theory to identify significant
items from the complex flux of experience." (Harre 1981: 3)

In this way, Harre begins to emphasise the role played by the conceptual 'apparatus'
of the inquirer in the process of generating any description and explanations of
'reality'.

He goes on to show how a theory functions for a realist in two distinct ways. On
the one hand it is involved in the creation and experiencing of facts. This is so
because concepts or 'analytics' are brought to bear on the 'experiential matrix of
observable particulars of various kinds'. On the other hand, theory functions to
anticipate reality 'by carrying our conceptions beyond the empirically given'. So,
for example, a 'family tiff' - which, from a purely 'empirical' reading might appear
to be an aggressive conflict - can be shown, if it reproduces a regular pattern to be
more an expression of solidarity.

Harre moves on to illustrate what psychology might look like if constructed
according to the realist tradition. (It might be objected that education reflects a
different domain of study in comparison with psychology and therefore, Harre's
discussion is irrelevant. However, I think it is possible to redescribe Harre's focus
such that it takes account of social phenomena in general - and to include amongst
social phenomena the practice of education.) In Harre's subsequent discussion he
first examines the role of theory in generating fact via the use of 'analytic schemata'
and then he examines the role of theory in the 'transcending of experience'. By way
of clarification he writes:

"Any science deploys two interrelated conceptual systems. There is an analytic
scheme required to reveal, identify, partition, and classify the items which make up
a field of interest. ... Then there is an explanatory scheme required to formulate theories descriptive of the mechanisms productive of the items under analysis." (Harre 1981: 5)

Harre illustrates how analytic schema function by discussing episodes in social life. If we observe social life the ordinary common sense concepts that we deploy - such as 'woman', 'man', 'waiting', and 'shopping' - help us to find order, pattern and meaning in the on-going flow of human activities and encounters. However, he points out that 'much activity remains mysterious and some goes unnoticed'. New analytic concepts are needed in order to perceive better the nature of reality. So, for example, students of social interaction have introduced concepts such as 'barrier signals', 'relic gestures', 'tie signs' and 'status displays' and, as a result more of the 'texture' of social life becomes available for empirical study.

Whilst analytic schema help to reveal non-random structures - ordered patterns of action which are interpreted as the performance of social acts or the enactment of a social drama - Harre thinks that we are then moved to ask: 'How is such orderliness produced?' At this point in Harre's discussion he points out that natural sciences always proceed in the same way as they seek to find an answer to this kind of question. They try to discover the mechanism that produces the pattern. However, because the generative mechanisms are believed to be hidden from view 'natural scientists try to find a simulacrum of the real but unknown pattern generator'.

He recognises that the creative scientific imagination is constrained because the imagined generative mechanisms must conform to 'some general description of how scientists of the period believe the world really is' - or, as Harre calls it, a 'source model'. He writes:

"Any explanatory method must be based on a source model, since we must be able to have some confidence in the mechanisms that we imagine to be in nature might be real." (Harre 1981: 6)

This observation prompts the question, 'What is (are) the source model(s) currently in use in the fields of social and educational studies?' It appears that there are, in fact, two main categories of source model. The first category employs a machine metaphor of persons and the universe whilst the second category employs a power metaphor of persons and the universe. New paradigm researchers such as Reason and Rowan (1981) have agreed on the need to stress the active capacities of human inquirers and the co-existence of multiple points of view.
Harre summarises his analysis of the scientific method by saying:

"The account of the scientific method I have just laid out involves structural concepts for revealing and describing the patterns discerned by an 'educated' observer. It also involves a presumption that we can think beyond given experience to the imagined and hidden processes that could produce observed patterns, the presumption that we can think in depth." (Harre 1981: 7)

He contends that psychology (and therefore, I think, social inquiry generally) could benefit from a borrowing of the methodologies actually used by physicists and chemists - which are based upon the need to get 'active agents to reveal their capabilities and to identify the invariants upon which the integrity of natural structures depends'. Harre's exposition suggests that a twofold onus is placed upon social inquirers. First, they need to be alerted to the nature of the analytic schemata they use to apprehend the unfolding of social reality. They also need to record the order or structure of the reality so apprehended. Second, they must acknowledge the creative and inventive nature of producing explanatory models - the generative mechanism(s) that they believe are responsible for the patterns observed, and of the wider and constraining source model(s).

Reason and Rowan (1981) attempt to outline many of the characteristics of the source model(s) informing the nature of explanations in new paradigm research by cataloguing the following sources of influence: humanistic and clinical psychology, phenomenological and ethnomethodological approaches to sociology and anthropology, the applied behavioral sciences including action research, Marxism, existentialism and Hegelian dialectics. However, they build upon Heron's (1981) elaboration of the philosophical basis of a new research paradigm to stress its fundamental feature: it is based upon the recognition of a 'subject-subject' rather than a 'subject-object' relation between persons - including 'researching persons'.

If it is the case that social research necessarily entails encounters between human subjects then it seems important to consider some broad features of the human subject which might have significance for the inquiry process.

In recent times, the nature of the human subject has been conceptualised as a bearer of powers: thus, for example, Nietzsche (1973) has asserted that humans are simultaneously united as creature and creator. He writes:

"In man (sic) there is matter, fragment, excess, clay, mud, madness, chaos; but in
man there is also creator, sculptor, the hardness of the hammer, the divine spectator and the seventh day...." (Nietzsche, 1973: 136)

Another major theme - intimately connected with the recognition of powers - lies in a capacity for choice-making.

So, Heidegger (1962) in his analysis of our 'being in the world' finds that amongst the everyday characteristics of that being lies the ever-present possibility of death. This fact of our existence can be responded to in a number of ways; we can, for example, suppress this awareness and find ways to distract ourselves or we might face up to it and ask, 'What meaning does my life have?' Heidegger therefore points to the choices we are able to make when we confront the facts of our existence and to the related capacity to give meaning to life. He also emphasises 'Geworfenheit' or 'thrown-ness'. We find ourselves thrown into a world that we did not choose to enter. We did not choose our genetic structure, our temperament, our parents or the environing culture. However, from these we have to fashion a life. Heidegger therefore points to both the 'press' of circumstance and the choices we make in relation to those circumstances.

The 'active powers', 'choice potential' and 'meaning-making' attributes of persons were conceptions embraced by theorists and practitioners of humanistic psychology (after e.g. Shaffer 1978). Humanistic psychologists consistently resisted the 'persons-as-machine' metaphor of positivism, and, particularly through the work of Heron (1981) His model of the person includes the following observation:

"[We have] intellectual capacities for understanding our world and ourselves, affective capacities for caring and delighting in other persons and ourselves, conative capacities for making real choices about how we want to live, relate to others and shape the world." (Heron 1981: 7)

In virtue of the fact that we possess intellectual capacities for understanding the world we are, to some extent, researchers and inquirers. Our search for meaning and understanding differs in terms of degree and in terms of rigour. I assume that whenever we 'research', we embark on a process - using various procedures or methods - of finding out something. We want to develop our knowledge - and that knowledge as Torbert (1981) remarked - is 'gained through action and for action'.

Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, deals with the questions concerning whether we are justified in claiming to know anything, and if so, what. Currently, and especially within the human and social 'sciences' there is no single dominant
position from which to arbitrate over researching methodologies and strategies. This is because, at the most fundamental level of belief or assumption, i.e. the level of worldview or 'paradigm' there are competing positions vying for 'dominance'. Guba and Lincoln (1994) understand paradigms as:

"Basic belief systems based on ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions" (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 107)

They go on to describe a paradigm as follows:

"A paradigm may be viewed as a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimates or first principles. It represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the nature of the "world", the individual's place in it, and the range of possible relationships to that world and its parts, as, for example, cosmologies and theologies do." (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 107)

Guba and Lincoln examine the content of paradigms so defined in terms of the answers given to (or the positions taken in relation to) three fundamental questions, the 'ontological' question, the 'epistemological' question, and, the 'methodological' question. The inquirer is understood, therefore, to conduct his or her inquiry from the basis of a paradigm (or a set of basic beliefs) concerned with the way that particular inquirer has (more or less awarely, and, more or less genuinely) answered questions to do with the nature of reality, the nature of the relationship between the knower and the known, and, the way(s) in which the knower can go about finding out whatever can be 'known'. Thus, as Guba and Lincoln write, inquiry paradigms define for inquirers:

"... what it is they are about, and what falls within and outside the limits of legitimate inquiry" (Guba and Lincoln 1994: 108)

The ontological question deals with the form and nature of reality itself. Assumptions about the nature of reality define what can be known about it. There may, for example, be some 'real' reality or the very term 'reality' may be recognised to stand for no tangible 'something' at all. In Western philosophy it is probably true to say that the single most important contrast in relation to assumptions about the nature of reality is that between the idea that there is a real world - and that what can be known about it is 'how things really are' - with an alternative idea that reality is a subjective construction always reflecting the nature of inquirers themselves in specific times and places.
The epistemological question is concerned with the nature of the relationship between the knower and what can be known. If a 'real' reality is assumed - i.e. that there are facts to be discovered which just 'are' then the posture of the knower must be one of objectivity unadulterated by interests, biases, preferences etc. Metaphorically speaking answering epistemological questions in this way suggests that inquirers could, as it were, point a pair of neutral binoculars at the world and view the objective facts. If, by contrast, the very conceptual apparatus of the inquirer is understood to shape the possible forms of knowledge, and that there is always a possible contrast between the world as it might be (or worlds as they might be) and the world as it is apprehended and known, then 'objectivity' is not considered a possibility.

The methodological question asks, 'How can the inquirer go about finding out whatever he or she believes can be known?' If a 'real' reality can be 'got at' by an objective inquirer then control must be exerted over possible confounding factors, whether the methods are qualitative (e.g. observational) or quantitative (e.g. the experimental method). But if there is not assumed to be a 'real' reality and that which is known is always a function to some degree of the knower or inquirer then the research methodology has to be understood not as a controlling and purifying process but one where versions of reality or descriptions of realities are uncovered, negotiated, conjectured and made more explicit, understood as they must be, as temporary pictures in time.

The inquiry methodology, will, whatever the methods, be cast in a mood of 'openness to revision' and acceptance of a multiperspectival state of affairs. Moreover, if the methodology acknowledges that the inquirer necessarily is a prominent (if not the prominent) feature in the story that comes to be told, then the inquirer's own interests, intentions, social and personal constructions and values will need to be made explicit.

A personal position

How have I come to answer these three questions? Before providing a brief answer, I should note that I accept Guba and Lincoln's contention that my answers will remain articles of faith. Thus, they observe:

"The beliefs are basic in the sense that they must be accepted simple on faith (however well argued); there is no way to establish there ultimate truthfulness"

(Guba and Lincoln 1994: 107)
In relation to the ontological question i.e. 'what is the form and nature of reality?' my answer reflects a fundamental uncertainty. If there is not a 'real' reality as the positivists had assumed (and which, presumably remains an assumption held by many scientists exploring the physical and inorganic world), what would a world of endless multiple realities look like? Logically, it seems we could never know because there would, as it were, be no certainty concerning any 'final' conclusion.

Rogers (1980) represents the stance I have come to adopt. He asks the question, 'What is this 'real' world?' and then proceeds to demonstrate that there can no longer be certainties concerning the real or true nature of an objective reality. He does this by showing that reality is not to be naively understood as that which is given to us by our senses, nor are we to take our own self conceptions as 'realities' (we may be self deceiving), nor can we find certainties in our interpersonal judgments nor in the any socially organised forms of organisation or culture. Rogers asks again:

"Where have my thoughts led me in relation to an objective world of reality? It clearly does not exist in the objects we can see and feel and hold. It does not exist in the technology we admire so greatly. It is not found in the solid earth or the twinkling stars. It does not lie in the solid knowledge of those around us. It is not found in the organisations or customs or rituals of any one culture. It is not even in our own known personal worlds. It must take into account mysterious and currently unfathomable 'separate realities', incredibly different from the objective world" (Rogers 1980: 103)

Logically, my 'resolution' of the ontological question was determined by my answer to the epistemological question, 'What is the nature of the relationship between the knower and what can be known?' Here, I have been directly influenced by the Kantian approach to epistemology. Prior to Kant's major philosophy, a revival of scepticism in our ability to access external reality had led to two broad sorts of answer to the question, 'How can we know what things are truly like?' On the one hand, we knew through 'sensation' and the data given through our sense, or, on the other, we knew through pure reason, or 'purified' reason, a reason acting independently of our senses.

The first view had been given renewed vitality through the writings of Hume whilst the latter had been explored with relentless precision by Descartes. Kant took against both these views and argued for a synthesis. For Kant, the world and the world as it is experienced were two sides of the same coin. They were distinct but not separate, just as a face and its expressions are both distinct and separate. How did Kant effect such a synthesis?
He argued that we knew things through the action of sensation and judgment. Kant understood the nature of our knowledge in terms of the metaphor of a 'compound'. The compound of sensation and judgment was the way the very world itself was apprehended. In Kant's view all our perceptions and experiences come to us through our sensory and mental apparatus in forms which are sense dependent and mind dependent.

His resolution to the epistemological question has been captured in the two expressions:

'Intuitions without concepts are meaningless'

and

'Concepts without content are empty'

Kant argued that for anything to be experienced at all, it would need to be substantial, existing in space and time. Scruton (1982) clarifies Kant's epistemology as follows:

"He [Kant] came to think as follows. Neither experience nor reason are alone able to provide knowledge. The first provides content without form - intuitions without concepts are meaningless, the second, form without content - concepts without content are empty. Only in their synthesis is knowledge possible; hence there is no knowledge that does not bear the marks of reason and of experience together." (Scruton 1982: 17)

Lest knowledge be seen as 'merely subjective' or 'purely personal' and therefore, arbitrary, Scruton continues:

"Such knowledge is, however, genuine and objective. It transcends the point of view of man (sic) who possesses it, and makes legitimate claims about an independent world. Nevertheless, it is impossible to know the world as it is in itself, independent of all perspective. Such an absolute conception of the object of knowledge is senseless, Kant argues since it can be given only by employing concepts from which every element of meaning has been refined away. While I can know the world independently of my view of it, what I know (the world of appearance) bears the indelible marks of that point of view. Objects do not depend for their existence on my perceiving them: but their nature is determined by the fact that they can be
perceived ... Experience contains within itself the features of space, time and causality. Hence, in describing my experience I am referring to an ordered perspective on an independent world." (Scruton 1982: 17)

In this way, the ontological question concerning the form and nature of the world is, in part, answered through a conception of the relationship between the knower and that which can be known. There is a world 'out there' but it cannot be apprehended independently of the sensory and conceptual operations of the knower. Kant opened up the distinction between the world in itself which we can never know and the world that we experience through sensation and judgment. Thus, he provides a model to account for both physical and social realities; sensation and experience combine with concepts and judgment. In this way he paves the way for an examination of the nature of the judgments that the sensing subject can bring to bear on the content of perceptions. Thereby, we are led to explore, examine, understand and be acutely aware of the concepts we live by. This itself opens the way to three sorts of analysis:

First, we can take inventory of the way in which shared concepts structure our realities. We can attend to and examine the social construction of reality.

Second, we can examine unique personal realities and achieve greater understanding of the way in each individual brings personal conceptualisations to their particular way of apprehending the world. That is, we can examine personal constructions of reality.

Third, we can explore who 'gets' and who 'sets' the nature and type of concepts that are, in potentia, available to all. In other words we can examine the way power and persuasion functions to produce stories and accounts which are produced and sustained in communities of discourse. In this way, we enter into a more clearly defined socio-political arena.

A Kantian point of view implies, for the researcher, a particular need to uncover the concepts that he or she brings to bear on the 'raw thought feels' of experience.

In relation to the methodological question, since I assume that the world cannot be apprehended independently of the knower and that the knower interacts with the that-which-is-to-be-known in ways immediately impacting on those very same phenomena to be known such that they are always and necessarily a product of that interaction, then, an objective positivistic or even post-positivistic stance is untenable. Methodologically I assume that the metaphor most accurately describing
myself and persons with whom I interact is in that of 'person as inquirer'. I should add that the idea of 'person-as-inquirer' refers to a potential in human being that is not always activated. I prefer this to the metaphor 'person as scientist' because 'inquirer' suggests that persons are less wedded to a standardised and rigidly disciplined methodology. Guba and Lincoln (1994) describe methodologies commensurate with four different paradigms - the 'positivist', the 'post-positivist', the 'critical theorist' and the 'constructivist'. It would be an oversimplification to say that I have adopted either that methodology which they associate with the critical theory paradigm or that which is associated with the constructivist paradigm.

My methodology reflects my position with regard to ontological and epistemological questions but adopts its specific form - which will be developed below - because of the context of practice in which the research was situated. To the extent that I recognise our social constructions of reality are influenced by the temporariness of prevailing power/authority relations and definitions of the 'way things are' then, I embrace a perspective sympathetic to the framework of critical theory. To the extent that I am disinclined to assume any ultimate social reality or personal reality upon which one might converge, I reflect the constructivist position of ontological relativism.

For me, it seems possible to argue for a 'critical constructivist' position to be taken seriously. On this account, I acknowledge the realities of existing power relations, themselves reflecting historical processes of persuasion, conflict management and control which subsequently determine and limit the range of possible identities and valuations provided in any one society and culture. However, I also acknowledge that there always remains the freedom to see things differently and the freedom to dissent. Although sets of social programmes exist, they are not complete. They cannot prevent individuals imagining that the world and their place in it could be otherwise. There is, as it were, always room for dissent, divergence and difference. So, there is always simultaneously, a general way of 'seeing' and a personal way of seeing. If a critical theorist stance requires that the inquirer accept that somewhere there is 'the reality' then I cannot endorse such a position. If the constructivist does not acknowledge that the processes of social construction reflect the constructions of those who have enjoyed dominance in time and place then I could not endorse their position.

In the next section, I shall return to more general considerations concerning paradigms or 'models' of inquiry in order to justify the emphases I have taken in my inquiry methods.
Contrasting models of inquiry - an elaboration of detail

Following Denicolo and Lathlean (1995) - who accept that it is currently possible to speak of an old (positivist and post-positivist) paradigm and a 'new' paradigm (as well as a 'third position' - which might be a critical theorist paradigm or an alternative 'post-modern' paradigm or even a paradigm drawing together the themes of 'old' and 'new' paradigms), it is useful to draw out the contrasts between inquirers who proceed in their explorations of social and personal phenomena with the central inquiry metaphor, 'Person as object' with those who pursue their inquiries under a different conceptual umbrella with the central inquiry metaphor: 'Person as scientist'. Denicolo and Lathlean refer to these two methodologies and their attendant methods as the 'Quantitative model' and the 'Qualitative-interpretive model' respectively.

Their analysis corresponds to Guba and Lincoln's (1994) separation between paradigms that answer the ontological question in favour of some 'real' reality with those that understand 'reality' as a human construction.

At the heart of the two different research models lie the two different metaphors concerning the nature of persons. It is from those metaphors that conceptions of truth, questions of methodology, the purposes served by the research, and details of procedures are all derived.

The 'Quantitative' model, with its central metaphor, 'persons as objects', understands knowledge to be the accumulation of facts. Since humans are viewed as if they have objective properties, the task of the researcher is to develop ever more detail concerning the nature of those properties. The 'Qualitative' model, with its central metaphor, 'persons as scientists', understands knowledge as constructions of reality.

Criteria of truth: Correspondence and coherence

Within the quantitative model, the criterion used for calling a statement true, where true statements are those which assert the existence of some actual state-of-affairs (or any fact about the world) reflects a correspondence theory of truth. Correspondence, here, is understood in the sense: 'A statement is true if it corresponds with the facts' or 'A statement is true if it corresponds with some actual state of affairs in the world'. Thus, a criterion of truth is correspondence with reality.
Plainly, a major difficulty with such an approach is connected with an increasing realisation by even those scientists working in the physical sciences that the 'facts' of the world e.g. sub atomic 'particles' actually reflect conceptual metaphors deriving from the particular world of human experience at particular moments in cultural space and time. Thus, for example, the facts, 'particle' or 'wave' are actually reflecting conceptualisation derived from a broader experiential world i.e. the waves of the sea or, the particles of substance in the deserts. Analysis of our ways of making identification of 'facts' indicates that they are bounded by linguistic categorisations which are human constructions.

In the qualitative model, the criterion for calling a statement true is 'coherence'. A body of beliefs is said to be true when, first, none of them is inconsistent with any others, and, second, when they mutually support one another. Hospers (1990) exemplifies the coherentist criterion of truth in the following way:

"We constantly use [the] coherence test in daily life, even though we may not know that it goes by this name. Suppose we wonder whether Smith is the murderer; if we believe she was, our belief may be true ("correspond to the fact"), but we have no way of knowing this since there were no witnesses. However, detectives place the time of the murder at 11 p.m.; a neighbour saw Smith leaving the murdered man's house at 11.05 p.m.; blood of Smith's blood type was found on the murdered person's clothing; the fingerprints on the furniture exactly resemble Smith's fingerprints; Smith was absent from her house between 10 and 12 as her husband noticed; and so on. We have a pretty good case against Smith, and it consists largely of a number of observations that cohere, or fit in with each other; we can explain them all on the hypothesis that Smith was the murderer. Juries often convict on evidence such as this. The evidence consists largely of mutually cohering bits and pieces." (Hospers 1990: 184)

The coherence theory (or criterion for determining a statement to be true) is applicable to situations in which no direct evidence is possible. Whenever we talk about, on the one hand, unobservables in the material world, e.g. neutrons or intangibles in the social world e.g. the experience of ethics education, or personal ethical systems, we are not discussing phenomena such as books on the table that we can see for ourselves. In the case of the former, we watch for various chemical combinations in the laboratory, see what combines with what, what happens when we add some of this to some of that etc. Then we devise a theory of different kinds of atoms with different structures, and we devise it to be consistent with everything we know or believe we know to be 'true'. In other words, we adopt a coherentist
approach to truth. In the latter case, we might discover that it is both the case that police officers conceive of themselves as adhering to 'high' ethical standards, and also conceive of themselves as consistently following ethical principles. Simultaneously, one might observe that police officers are 'judgmental' and interpersonally 'punitive' i.e. they are not especially tolerant, nor compassionate nor benevolent.

Moreover, they may make these observations concerning themselves i.e. they may be fully aware of these apparent contradictions. A psychodynamic theory might be developed around which all the statements and observations concerning police cohere. In the absence of any concrete, tangible and straightforward access to 'reality' as Hospers succinctly remarks 'it is coherence that does the trick, for in the realm of unobservables the correspondence test is useless'.

**Questions of methodology**

The quantitative model embraces a traditional conception of science and researchers aspire to an objectivity that is defined as free from subjectivity and researcher bias. Error elimination, i.e. the control of confounding variables is a central requirement in the research methodology. The researcher, from their detached and disinterested position takes the neutral facts and builds an explanatory theory. In terms of their relationship with the phenomena researched, the researcher occupies a position of unilateral control. They design the research and they collect the data. In the human and social world, those upon whom the research is done are the research 'subjects'. Such research is essentially 'reductionist'. Phenomena are taken apart in order to uncover their constituent parts and to understand how things work.

By contrast, the qualitative model embraces a different conception of science. Science is what we are. Researchers aspire not to any objectivity but to securing social agreement for ways of seeing and conceptualising and accounting for the phenomena under review. Researchers are reflexive in their approach, reflecting back their learnings to others who were more or less centrally involved in the data gathering and data analysis processes. 'How does this seem to you?' might be one of the questions an inquirer asks of interested parties, or 'Does this seem to square with your experience?' as s/he tests out a description.

Researchers under this model do not consider that there are neutral facts to be gathered. 'Facts' and 'theory construction' are co-operatively developed and negotiated. Participants play at least some part in designing the research itself. Such
research is essentially holistic in nature where an attempt is made to 'get at it in all its complexity'.

**Purposes served by the research**

The quantitative model aims to produce generalisations that will apply to all populations or populations of phenomena as a whole. It is nomothetic in nature. The research is in the service of explanation, prediction and control.

By contrast, the qualitative model aims to produce descriptions of individual and particular cases. It is ideographic in nature. The essence of the work is to aim towards a practical outcome where, especially, more information can guide decision-making processes, enlighten, provoke appreciation and understanding, and so on.

**Details of procedures - preliminary considerations affecting choice of research methods**

The quantitative model aspires towards using those procedures e.g. the experimental method which conform to a methodology which presupposes that there is a 'real' reality which can be known independently of the conceptual apparatus of the knower. Questions of validity and reliability are very important.

The qualitative model uses those methods congruent with the notion of verstehen i.e. the 'in-depth' understanding of a 'situation'. Questions of reliability and validity are less significant than questions of authenticity and utility.

The central metaphor, 'person as scientist' from which all the details and characteristics of the qualitative model can be deduced is, in its main details, equivalent to the metaphor, 'person as inquirer' which remains one of the central assumptions about the nature of persons guiding the research reported here. That central metaphor aligned with the inquiry paradigm reflecting a synthesis between critical theory and constructivist positions took on concrete shape as action research.

However, on each of the four facets of the contrasting inquiry models discussed above, action research has no difficulty embracing the logical requirements of the qualitative-interpretive model. In that model, the criterion for calling a statement true is 'coherence'. Since action research is not, in itself, a method but, rather, an approach consisting of intentional action (interventions) designed to achieve an
approximation to a more valued state of affairs, knowledge claims may be generated as a result of their cohering with the views of others. A part of action research can (or should) include an 'audit trail' where the inquirer(s) make(s) public the emerging understandings and subject those understandings to critique and revision from interested parties.

In the qualitative-interpretive model, researchers aspire to securing social agreement for ways of seeing, conceptualising and accounting for the phenomena under review. The basic action research cycle allows researchers to make public their reflections and to subject any conclusions they might wish to draw to some form of consensual validation. Action research makes public its 'findings' and accepts the potentially illusory nature of any conclusions.

The purposes served by action research are not exclusively concerned with explanation, prediction and control. Action research-as-an-approach acknowledges the uniqueness of the social situations in which interventions designed to secure particular valued outcomes take place. Action research can itself lead to designs to study and change the very forms of institutional power, control and legitimation that control the definitions of knowledge and status in the social contexts.

The qualitative-interpretive model uses those methods congruent with the notion of 'verstehen' - the 'in-depth' understanding of a 'situation'. Action research, in virtue of the fact that it allows a choice of methods and techniques judged appropriate to the concrete situation of practice, emancipates the inquirer(s) from having to adopt any method or technique in particular. Action researchers are, in a certain sense, emancipated. Harre and Gillett (1994) suggest that we have to 'get inside' the forms of life and the norms, conventions, rules and so on in which any individual's activities take shape. They write:

"This requires the kind of understanding Weber calls verstehen. It is based on an empathic identification with the other that helps the observer make sense of what the other is doing. Such an approach to the understanding of behaviour can be sensitive to the subtleties of the situation of the other in a way that an attempt to identify and isolate a surveyable number of objective independent variables cannot be." (Harre and Gillett, 1994: 20)

They continue:

"We would say that we need to know what a situation means to a person and not just what the situation is (say, according to a description in terms of physical
characteristics as these are seen by an observer) if we are to understand what that person is doing. Imagine, for example, the markings on a bush trail that a European tourist might ignore but that instantly would be read by an Aboriginal tracker and would guide him immediately to his quarry. Here the marks are, in a certain sense, the same for each observer - a bent twig, a crushed flower - but their meaning differs according to their place in the current perspective of each traveller" (Harre and Gillett, 1994: 20,21)

Harre and Gillett's conclusion is double edged for the action researcher. On the one hand, action researchers have to uncover the meanings that are given to 'concrete' situations by those who participate in their enquiries. At the same time, the action researcher (her or himself) is positioned in a complex structure of rules and practices within which they, themselves, move and from which they give the neutral facts of the world meaning.

In the next chapter, I shall illustrate how the philosophical foundations I developed for my inquiry were given concrete form as I began to develop an action research framework to guide the project.
Chapter Four

The methodological approach: action research as a framework for the inquiry

"We needed our clowns, and we used 'em to help us all learn the best ways to get along with each other. Bein' an individual is real good, but sometimes we're so busy bein' individuals we forget we gotta live with a lot of other people who all got the right to be individuals too, and the clowns could show us if we were gettin' a bit pushy, or startin' to take ourselves too serious. Wasn't nothin' sacred to a clown. Sometimes a clown would find another clown taggin' along behind, imitatin', and then the first one knew that maybe somethin' was gettin' out of hand, and maybe the clown was bein' mean or usin' her position as a clown to push people around and sharpen her own axe for her own reasons." (Cameron, 1984: 90)

My research into the teaching and learning of police ethics drew from an 'action research' framework. A research methodology derives from the most fundamental assumptions embraced by a researcher and in particular those concerning their views of the nature of knowledge itself (epistemology) and their understandings of the nature of reality (ontology).

In this chapter I shall present a brief and selective account of the nature of action research as it has been depicted in the academic literature. I shall use an argument borrowed from Wittgenstein to suggest that different forms of action research bear a family resemblance - one to another. From this it follows that action researchers need not be chained to any formulaic prescriptions or creedal dogma. I shall then follow Carr and Kemmis (1994) and contend that emancipatory action research constitutes the enactment of a 'critical educational science'. A critical educational science would be consistent with the philosophical position I adopted and which I outlined in the previous chapter.

Research for practical action: the presentation of action research in the academic literature

Adelman (1993) examines the origins of action research by focusing upon Lewin's (1946) reflection on how to effect social change. He also draws from the writings of Marrow (1969) - who was Lewin's biographer. Adelman points out that action research:

".. gives credence to the development of powers of reflective thought, discussion, decision and action by ordinary (sic) people participating in collective research on
"private troubles". " (Adelman 1993: 8)

This characterisation of action research picks out a number of its typical features. So, it includes the cognitive processes occurring during periods of reflection and forms of conduct informed by those deliberations. Moreover, Adelman highlights the collective, participatory and inclusive nature of action research.

Adelman moves on to note the relatively positivistic assumptions undergirding Lewin's work; it is clear that Lewin's epistemology reflected a faith in the authority of science and objectivity.

Yet, even as the work and writing of Lewin is standardly taken as the 'origin' of action research, others such as Gunz (1995) detect 'many' sources that have led to the practice of this inquiry approach. Gunz specifically identifies Moreno - the founder of psychodrama - as a figure of major significance because of his (Moreno's) emphasis upon group methods and active performance in coming to understand and effect personal and social change. So, whilst Lewin is credited as the 'founder' of action research, the applied practices of the human sciences can all claim to have an action research character or essence.

Lewin's (1946) paper has especial significance for action researchers because it constitutes an early clarification of certain issues fundamental both to social research and to practitioners working in complex social settings. He begins by citing the predicament of persons who were working to improve inter-group relations but who remained unclear as to whether or not any real progress was being made and which, if any, intervention techniques were effective. In the light of this, Lewin reports that there is a demand for 'action research, for research which will help the practitioner'. So, at the outset, the idea of action research is immediately linked with helping the endeavours of the practitioner.

Lewin recognised that if the practices of social management and social engineering were to be effective they needed to acknowledge the fact that the situation confronting practitioners were multi-variable and multi-layered. Moreover, only an interdisciplinary knowledge base could adequately reflect the complex dynamics at play in the 'actual side and end streets' of specific large and small towns where attempts to effect social change were being conducted. This knowledge would also need to be organised into three forms; general laws (concerning the nature of persons and the explanation of their conduct) expressed in 'if so' propositions, knowledge about the characteristics of specific situations, and, knowledge about the effectiveness of 'change techniques'.
When Lewin turned from considering the contribution that social research in general could make in helping to achieve positive social change to a more specific examination of research for social planning and action he articulated what was to become the classic rendition of the sequence of activities in action research. He arrived at this outline (which was not labelled 'action research') by examining the process of planning in the more general practice of social management. However, he embraced an extended concept of planning that included executing the plan and evaluating the success of that action. Lewin's basic action research model consists of a) a planning stage b) an action stage and c) a fact finding or 'reconnaissance' stage - designed to determine how effective the action had been. In his discussion of the planning stage he includes the following points:

"Planning starts usually with something like a general idea. For one reason or another it seems desirable to reach a certain objective. Exactly how to circumscribe this objective, and how to reach it is frequently not too clear. The first step then is to examine the idea carefully in the light of the means available. Frequently more fact-finding about the situation is required. If this first period of planning is successful, two items emerge: namely an "overall plan" of how to reach the objective and secondly, a decision in regard to the first step of action." (Lewin 1946: 37)

This is an important passage because Lewin points to the fact that values are at play in the determining of an objective. He underlines the need to investigate further the contours of the situation in order, better, to circumscribe the objective and he recognises that this stage does not necessarily lead to a comprehensive and complete set of action steps. Lewin does not provide any more detail on this stage and continues:

"The next period is devoted to executing the first step of the overall plan." (Lewin 1946: 37)

The third stage involves fact-finding or 'reconnaissance' designed to determine as accurately and objectively as possible the new situation. This reconnaissance stage, has, for Lewin, four functions:

- it should evaluate the action and examine whether what has been achieved is above or below expectation

- it gives planners a chance to learn. Thus, for example, insights can emerge
concerning the strengths or weaknesses of different types of action

- it provides a basis for planning the next step

- it serves as a basis, if necessary, for modifying the overall plan

This third stage in the process therefore includes uncovering the facts of the situation after the action as well as sense-making or meaning-making. It allows the basic action research model to involve four moments: planning, acting, observing and reflecting. Lewin immediately moves on to say that the next step involves another circle of planning, executing the plan (acting) and fact finding - which leads to a third cycle and so on.

His paper emphasises the need for research both to help practice and to generate research findings from practice. It includes an outline of the circle (or cycle) of action research and it indicates the categories of knowledge relevant to 'social management' and social change.

Adelman traces the chequered history of action research since it was initially conceptualised by Lewin and observes that by the end of the 1960s it had 'lost its coherence in the USA.' He writes:

"Instead of empowering ordinary people in their own communities, action research had become incorporated as part of the armoury of managerial development for "corporate excellence"." (Adelman 1993: 16)

Adelman moves on to cite Sanford (1970) who ruefully observed that action research 'was never accepted as bona fide research in the USA' and therefore 'never really got off the ground'. Later, Sanford (1981), found himself anxious to address a trend in social research which had overlooked the value of action research.

_The basic action research model: an elaboration_

Sanford believed that his own work had improved upon Lewin's model but he recognised that this would not have been possible without the earlier foundations that had been established by Lewin. In answer to the question, 'What was Lewin's model?', Sanford finds that it was well-expressed in Lewin's (1947) paper on 'Group decision and social change.' The model consisted of a repeating cycle of activities; those activities were summarised by Sanford in the following way:
"Action research consisted in analysis, fact-finding, conceptualisation, planning, execution, more fact-finding or evaluation - and then a repetition of the whole circle of activities; indeed a spiral of such circles." (Sanford 1981: 174)

Here, Sanford sustains the sequence of activities, 'planning, execution and fact-finding (reconnaissance) but includes certain steps additional to the actual 'planning' stage. He also links the Lewinian concepts to a common-sense model of solving problems and learning new skills. Sanford finds there to be a need for social science to re-consider the importance that should be given to the investigation of practical problems and commends alternative ways to those which had come to dominate social science (i.e. the detached, artificial and unrealistic conditions established by the use of the experimental method in the laboratory). To assist in this process Sanford provided a 'sketch' of a contemporary model for action research - although he preferred to call it 'research-action'. The model that Sanford suggests is founded upon his idea concerning the major questions with which social science should deal. This form of question is less concerned with the accumulation of more and more detailed knowledge about specific features of human beings but with how to create social arrangements that help to promote the development of all individuals concerned. His model has three main features. First, 'analysis' - to determine what kinds of question are to be asked. Second, a 'comprehensive approach to individual development' which goes far beyond Lewin's formulation. Third, a 'more contemporary approach to planning' that involves the very people who will be affected by any proposed changes to their circumstances.

It is possible to find in Sanford's work a refining of Lewin's original action research model and an acknowledgement that it approximates a generic problem-solving process. I should add the important caveat that the involvement with and study of practical problems was a continuing source of theoretical ideas. It is also possible to find an emphasis upon the sorts of questions important for the researcher. These are 'how' questions - such as 'how to improve teaching?' or 'how to promote the development of individuals in specific special contexts?'. This form of question - as a fundamental focus for educational action research inquiries - has also been emphasised by Whitehead (1989) and the several researchers who have, subsequently, adopted his inquiry emphasis.

Sanford also thinks that if action research takes as its aim the promotion of individual development then it has to extend Lewin's original model. It must 'fill in' his scheme with 'particular kinds of needs, dispositions, values, conflicts and so forth'. He writes:
"An approach that is concerned with individual development must be comprehensive. An interest in changing one aspect of behaviour ... must take into account the implications of such change for the total person. To understand the person we must see him (sic) in his total setting. Research action is properly multi-disciplinary ..." (Sanford 1981: 178)

This observation, by implication, attaches to the practice of action research, where relevant, the knowledges that have accumulated in the human sciences. It also intimates the significance of cultural knowledge in determining how best to intervene in situations of practice. He also suggests the holistic nature of action research.

Effectively Sanford calls for action research to stand as an alternative to established and institutionalised social science. In a damning passage he likens the output of social science to the polluting outputs of industry:

"Like other industries, social science has been polluting its environment, not only by treating its research subjects as means rather than ends and disseminating a rather monstrous image of researchable man, but also by creating an enormous amount of waste in the form of useless information." (Sanford 1981: 179)

In this way, another aspect of action research is foregrounded: the knowledge it generates should be useful.

Action research has also been included amongst the technologies of 'mainstream' organisational development.

**The basic model of action research: an approach to organisational development - and the inclusion of 'systems level' thinking**

Beginning in 1972, Pfeiffer and Jones published a series of annuals designed to be used as resources for professionals working in human relations contexts. These annuals contained both learning designs (in the form of structured experiences) and a variety of theoretical resources including a range of conceptual models and frameworks. At the beginning of the 1990s many of the models that had appeared in the annuals were organised into four volumes - the last of which featured models for organisational development. Included in this volume was a short section entitled 'Action research'. The discussion in that section is devoted to considering action research as an organisation-development' intervention. It also includes reference
to French and Bell's (1984) classic text on organisation development. The action research inclusion in Pfeiffer (1991) begins by saying:

"Action research is a time-honoured procedure for systematically improving organisations." (Pfeiffer (ed.) 1991: 5)

Its author (or authors) continues:

"To this day, action research is an essential tool for behavioural scientists who are conducting organisational improvement interventions." (Pfeiffer (ed.) 1991: 5)

Subsequently, action research is represented as more than actions to solve problems and more than abstract research. It is a 'hybrid' of both. French and Bell (1984) from a process perspective define action research as follows:

"Action research may be described as a process, that is, as an ongoing series of events and actions. Used in this way, we define action research as follows: action research is the process of systematically collecting research data about an ongoing system relative to some object, goal, or need of that system; feeding these data back into the system; taking actions by altering selected variables within the system based both on the data and on hypotheses; and evaluating the results of actions by collecting more data." (French and Bell 1984: 84,85)

Their depiction of action research is nuanced towards a systems approach. It also suggests an emphasis upon a rigorous and disciplined problem-solving method. Immediately following their definition they provide a lucid account of the activities constituting the process. It is in this account that one finds resonances with Egan's (1988) models for change management. They write:

"This definition characterises action research in terms of the activities comprising the process: first a static picture is taken of an organisation; on the basis of "what exists", hunches and hypotheses suggest actions: these actions typically entail manipulating some variable in the system that is under the control of the action researcher (this often means doing something differently from the way it has always been done); later, a second static picture is taken of the system to examine the effects of the actions taken." (French and Bell 1984: 85)

The first 'static picture' co-incides with Egan's 'where are we now?' Implicit in French and Bell's text is the desire to 'improve' or change a situation. This is
equivalent to Egan's 'where do we want to be?' The actions (and manipulation of variables) are concerned to 'move from here to there' - from the actual to the ideal.

French and Bell highlight the potential for action research to be an effective approach for system-wide or 'whole' organisation change and development. This harmonises with the collectivist ideals of action research. However, in educational settings more individualised practices of action research have emerged - and it is here that the 'personhood' of the inquirer(s) has been included as a central and unavoidable part of the research endeavour.

Adelman (1993) records how, in the United Kingdom, the 'Humanities Curriculum Project' (Stenhouse, 1975, 1980) - which benefited from the innovative approach to education embraced by Stenhouse - 'engaged participating teachers in the discussion of issues they identified from classroom practice'. A member of the Humanities Curriculum Project team was Elliott - who subsequently was to author a text devoted to action research for educational change (Elliott, 1991). Adelman shows how action research has established itself within a number of university locations - and he also distinguishes between those 'who concentrated on individual reflective practice' such as Schon (1983) and those 'who try to carry on Lewin's group discussion' methods and commitments. Adelman thus introduces his readership to a bifurcation in the development of the practice of action research.

**Action research in educational settings: contrasting orientations**

Elliott (1990) in the course of advocating the need to sustain the creative ethos of 'conversational research communities' begins by stating his concern that the Government (of the 1980s) was forcing a model of resource management on the British higher education system that endangered the pursuit of worthwhile research. For him, such 'conversational communities' were capable of being repositories of excellence in research because they fostered various qualities in their membership such as:

- intellectual creativity
- the courage to say new and interesting things to audiences
- a tolerance of intellectual deviance
- methodological pluralism
If these qualities mean anything at all they must mean the expression of 'difference' - in the sense that the conversational community enjoys a plurality of voices and a diversity of inquiry methods.

In order to illustrate the character of a 'conversational educational research community' Elliott draws heavily from his own experience as a researcher and, in particular, the view of educational research shared by staff at the Centre for Applied Research in Education located in the University of East Anglia. He summarises that view by making five points and, in so doing, he invites his readership to ask themselves if their inquiry meets the criteria so advanced. Elliott orders his points as follows:

- the over-riding purpose of educational research is to bring about worthwhile educational change

- research is only educational when it is directed towards realising educational values in practice. It cannot be dissociated from conceptions of worthwhile educational practices

- teachers and students have an important and significant role as participants in the educational research process

- since attempts to realise educational values in practice shape up differently in particular situations, educational research is grounded in the qualitative study of cases

- since educational values are infinitely contestable, educational researchers should adopt a reflexive attitude towards their biases by entertaining alternative views of the situation

The principles articulated by Elliott permit considerable discretion on the part of the individual researcher - underlined by the fact that 'educational research' finds itself dealing with the 'qualitative study of cases'.

He moves on to argue that one of the biggest constraints on the development of the researcher is the presumption that there is a right method or set of techniques for doing educational research. He notes that this presumption 'dominates the training of educational researchers in higher education institutions' and that it:

"... results in a situation where the development of educational researchers is
viewed as an initial 'tooling-up' phase, after which they are deemed competent to undertake research." (Elliott 1990: 5)

However, for Elliott, this is a recipe for mediocrity because:

"Excellence in educational research depends upon the continuous participation of researchers in a reflective conversation about their practices against a background of fundamental research principles." (Elliott 1990: 5)

He immediately adds:

"Within such a conversation there is no closure or constraint on the methodological possibilities entertained." (Elliott 1990: 5)

Elliott is more concerned that research be educational than it should slavishly follow methodological routines and he moves on to provide a criterion for an inquiry process to be called 'action research'. First though he defines educational research (rather than research-on-education) in terms of its primary aim. That primary aim is the promotion of worthwhile change by influencing the practical judgements of teachers and/or policy makers. The definition is elaborated in order to clarify what is entailed in the making of improved practical judgements. Improved practical judgements rest upon the development of practical wisdom. Practical wisdom is itself defined in terms of the ability to discern what can be changed in a situation to improve it. For Elliott, the ability so to discern, is based upon a very complete and integrated grasp of the factors at play in the situation of practice. Having thus defined (and elaborated upon) the nature of educational research, Elliott finds it to be identical with that activity categorised as action research. In short, educational (or action) research is that which promotes or takes as its quest the achievement of, practical wisdom.

If the criterion for something to be called 'action research' is a research activity (or activities) which takes as its goal the genesis of 'practical wisdom' (or some contribution to the expression of practical wisdom) then researchers who claim that they are conducting action research must indicate how their endeavours are related to the achievement of such a goal.

This conceptualisation of action research allows it to be understood as a relatively inclusive rather than exclusive activity. Elliott not only acknowledges that 'highly specialised forms of inquiry from within particular academic disciplines' can constitute intrinsic elements within the action research process but he also
emphasises the fact that the researcher who is conducting educational research must be free to 'choose the methods to fit' the complex practical problem. Elliott also refers to Midgley's (1989) observation which itself reflects something we already know from common-sense experience - that the quality of teaching and other practical activities 'is heavily dependent upon the personalities of the individuals involved'. Since research is, itself, a complex practical activity then it too will be heavily influenced by the dispositions of, and, the decisions taken by, the researcher. Here, it seems that Elliott recognises the centrality of the person of the researcher to the action research process.

Implicit in Elliott's stance is a permission for action researchers to develop methods of research appropriate to their context.

However, Kemmis and McTaggart (1988) and, more recently, Aspland, Macpherson, Proudford and Whitmore (1996) and, Kemmis and Wilkinson (1998), stipulate a number of features that a research approach must meet if it is to be 'full' action research. These writers are concerned to sustain the genuinely collaborative, participatory or collectivist aspects of action research - which make it possible to understand action research as the essential method for developing a critical educational science. Kemmis and McTaggart (1988) contend that action research is 'participatory, collaborative research' which typically arises from the 'clarification of some concerns generally shared by a group'. They provide a schematisation of the process - which is reproduced in Kemmis and Wilkinson (1998). Whilst Stringer (1996) developed a method for conducting action research that is appealingly (and deceptively) simple - he shows how community based action research can involve three broad steps which he describes as 'look', 'think' and 'act' - Kemmis and Wilkinson's (1998) outline of the practice of participatory action research is more clearly located within the tradition of critical theory. They begin their paper by mentioning that, for them, action research is 'inadequately described in terms of a mechanical sequence of steps'. From their position of considerable experience in the theory and practice of action research they note that it is generally thought to involve a spiral of the activities: planning a change; acting and observing the process and consequences of the change; reflecting on these processes and consequences; and, re-planning.

Whilst this description approximates that which is standardly advanced they qualify this description by attempting to convey a more accurate picture of what actually happens in actual practice:

"In reality the process may not be as neat as this spiral of self-contained cycles of
planning, acting and observing, and reflecting suggests. The stages overlap and initial plans quickly become obsolete in the light of learning from experience. In reality the process is likely to be more fluid, open and responsive." (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998: 21)

In this way Kemmis and Wilkinson recognise the openness of the researcher (or researchers) to the data and information revealed in the field of practice. Clearly, at least a part of this data will be grasped and made sense of in terms of the conceptual frameworks embraced by the researcher - and this latter point links in to their subsequent argument concerning how to define 'success' in action research. They write:

"The criteria of success is not whether participants have followed the steps faithfully, but whether they have a strong and authentic sense of development and evolution in their practices, their understanding of those practices, and the situations in which they practice." (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998: 21)

Whilst Kemmis and Wilkinson remain faithful to the value framework that was developed by Carr and Kemmis (1986) this 'success' criterion provides action researchers with a potential set of questions (or issues) against which they can test their practice.

So they can ask:

- Am I confident that I have learned, developed and/or changed both in relation to myself and to my identity as a practitioner?

- Can I point to an enhanced understanding of my practice?

- Have I a more sophisticated grasp of the nature of my situation of practice?

Kemmis and Wilkinson themselves present, at the conclusion of their chapter a set of questions to help participatory action researchers reflect on their projects processes and outcomes - which themselves could be used as a set of guidelines for managing an action research inquiry. A number of those questions relate to their contention that participatory action research has 'six other key features' which are as important as the basic action research cycle. They note each feature and accompany each with a short explanation. Participatory action research is: a social process; participatory; practical and collaborative; emancipatory; critical; and, recursive (reflexive, dialectical). The short explanations make explicit the link
between participatory action research and Carr and Kemmis' (1986) earlier ambitions to develop a critical educational science. Thus, for example the 'emancipatory' character of participatory action research includes the following description:

".. it [participatory action research] aims to help people recover, and unshackle themselves from the constraints of irrational, unproductive, unjust and unsatisfying social structures which limit their self-development and self determination. It is a process in which people explore the ways in which their practices are shaped and constrained by wider social (cultural, economic and political) structures, and consider whether they can intervene to release themselves from these constraints ...." (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998: 24)

This form of expression has unmistakable links with the radical forms of education and development reflected in, for example, the writings of Freire (1976), Ernst and Goodison (1981), Randall and Southgate (1986) and Lyons (1976). It also resonates with the more radical aspects of Heron's educational models. Thus, for example, Heron (1989) identifies inter alia the following targets for 'confronting interventions':

"... rigid norms and values, rigid social structuring and allocation of roles in the wider society .....restrictive attitudes and behaviour such as: patriarchy and rigid gender roles; authoritarianism and widespread subtle oppression in the workplace; rigid stereotyping of children, the elderly, the physically ill, the mentally distressed, ethnic minorities, socio-economic classes; unaware political impotence and passivity in the street, in the neighbourhood, in the nation ... " (Heron 1989: 49)

In addition, Kemmis and Wilkinson underline the fact that action research deals with actual practice. Their language illustrates how fundamental the study of practice is to action research:

"It [action research] involves learning about the real, material, concrete, particular practices of particular people in particular places." (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998: 24)

In their view, action researchers need feel no shame about the fact that their work is 'mundane and mired in history'. This is entirely consistent with their more general socio-political theory concerning the genesis of the social world and the making of its inhabitants. Whilst their participatory approach to action research
necessarily is inclusive in the sense that it involves numbers of persons, most of the points they make about the collective endeavour can be appropriated by the individual educational action researcher. Thus, for example, when they turn to suggest the positive outcomes of participatory action research they write:

"Action research is a learning process whose fruits are the real and material changes in: what people do, how they interact with the world and with others; what they mean and what they value; the discourses in which they understand and interpret their world. " (Kemmis and Wilkinson 1998: 25)

This statement can serve as a way of extending the previous 'success' criterion. Thus, action researchers can examine their 'achievements' by asking:

- What, if any, real and material changes can I point to in my practice?

- How might I be different in relation to the way I interact with the world and with others in the world?

- How have I come to define myself and what, now, is important to and for me?

- How has my language (my conceptual frameworks) developed in relation to the way I engage with my world, my practice and my relationships?

I should note here that at a later stage of my inquiry I focused more intensely on the details of the criteria that had appeared or were to appear in the research and academic literature concerning how to present and 'quality assure' action research projects. I shall draw from those ideas in subsequent chapters.

**Recurring themes adhering to discourses on action research**

I think it helpful to conclude this discussion of the nature of action research by summarising some recurring themes that appear in the academic literature. They include:

- a focus on a basic action research model involving a number of stages

- an emphasis upon the study and improvement of a practice

- a concern to generate practical knowledge and/or practical wisdom
- an explicit articulation of values - at both an individual and collective level

- a flexibility in relation to methods for effecting change in situations of practice

- a recognition of the complex 'holism' of situations of practice

It is also clear that each writer who begins to present an account of 'action research' leaves it with their own distinct imprint. Wittgenstein (1997) helps, I think, to consider the nature of action research in a particular kind of way if we build upon his way of examining the nature of 'games'. In his analysis of their nature (i.e. the nature of games), he writes:

"Consider, for example, the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say: 'There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' " - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat, don't think, but look!" (Wittgenstein 1997: 31)

So, as we look at clusters of games we find that one board game resembles another board game but then if we compare board games with card games we find new kinds of similarity whilst other features drop away. Thus, Wittgenstein introduces us to the idea that the concept 'game' is a concept with 'blurred edges' - where no precise definition of the nature of a game can be given. *Mutatis mutandis*, action research also has blurred edges. There is no single best way to conduct action research.

Nonetheless, at the beginning of my project, two sorts of writing helped to provide me with guidelines informing and guiding the development of the inquiry. These consisted of a) published case studies in the action research literature and b) methods for conducting action research. The latter are detailed in Kemmis and McTaggart (1988), Elliott (1991), McKernan (1991) and Hopkins (1992). The former provide a variety of models for conducting action research. Appendix B includes details of two contrasting case studies reported in the literature on action research; one case study (Reid, 1994) approaches the idea of a 'critical educational science' whilst the other (Armstrong, 1981) represents an excellent example of careful observation and description in a classroom setting.
The idea of a critical educational science

A critical educational science has been mapped by Carr and Kemmis (1994) and its research methodology (the enactment of a critical educational science) has been developed on the basis of Lewin's (1946) early action research formulation. Carr and Kemmis conceive of educational research generated by a critical social science paradigm (or tradition) in the following way:

"...it [critical educational science] envisages a form of educational research which is conducted by those involved in education themselves. It takes a view of educational research as critical analysis directed at the transformation of educational practices, the educational understandings and educational values of those involved in the process and the social and institutional structures which provide frameworks for their action." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 156)

Throughout the subsequent development of their account, Carr and Kemmis return to emphasise a) the centrality of the practitioner in his or her own situation working collaboratively and democratically with others and b) the focus of the practitioner/enquirer in terms of:

- the improvement of a social practice
- the improvement of the understanding of the practice
- the improvement of the situation in which the practice is conducted

Thus, for example, Carr and Kemmis write:

"A critical educational science must then be a participatory science, its participants or 'subjects' being the teachers, students and others who create, maintain, enjoy and endure educational arrangements." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 158)

and

"The full task of a critical educational science requires participants to collaborate in the organisation of their own enlightenment, the decision-making by which they will transform their situations, and continuing critical analysis in the light of the consequences of those transformations which can sustain the engagement of scientific discourse, processes of enlightenment and practical action." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 159)
This last sentence echoes Habermas' three functions in the critical social scientific process - the creation of critical theorems, the organisation of enlightenment and the organisation for action. Again, in relation to the threefold interest of a critical educational science, Carr and Kemmis, for example, write:

"Put simply, the contribution of educational research to educational practice must be evident in actual improvements of concrete educational practices, of the actual understandings of those practices by their practitioners, and in the improvement of the concrete situations in which these practices occur." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 160)

To show how educational practitioners can develop forms of work which constitute a reformed practice of educational research, Carr and Kemmis turn to the idea of action research. They define action research as follows:

"Action research is simply a form of self reflective enquiry undertaken by participants in social situations in order to improve the rationality and justice of their own practices, their understanding of these practices, and the situations in which the practices are carried out." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 162)

One way of reading this definition would be to note that an individual participant in some social process could become a lone and singular explorer engaged with trying to understand a very social and participative situation peopled with co-practitioners - who simply happen not to adopt a way of conceiving their activities as action research. However, Carr and Kemmis move on to delineate the minimal requirements that an activity has to meet if it is to be described as action research. Here, the 'collective' rather than the individual nature of the practice is defined. Thus they include the definition of action research generated by participants at a seminar on action research held at Deakin University in 1981. For these participants, educational action research is:

"A term used to describe a family of activities in curriculum development, professional development, school [college] improvement programmes, and systems planning and policy development. These activities have in common the identification of strategies of planned action which are implemented and then systematically submitted to observation, reflection, and change. Participants in the action being considered are integrally involved in all of these activities." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 164)
Moreover, two essential aims of action research are identified; to improve and to involve. The minimal requirements for action research, according to Carr and Kemmis, need three conditions to be fulfilled. Failure to meet these, for them, means that claims to action research cannot be taken seriously. Those conditions are:

"...firstly a project takes as its subject matter a social practice, regarding it as a form of strategic action susceptible of improvement; secondly, the project proceeds through a spiral of cycles of planning, acting, observing and reflecting, with each of these activities being systematically and self-critically implemented and interrelated; thirdly the project involves those responsible for the practice in each of the moments of the activity, widening participation in the project gradually to include those affected by the practice, and maintaining collaborative control of the process." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 165)

My intention was to develop an inquiry that would meet these criteria. My project took 'as its subject matter a social practice' - i.e. the design and delivery of an 'ethics education' - something I could conceive as a 'form of strategic action susceptible of improvement'. I imagined that I would develop the project 'through a spiral of cycles of planning, acting, observing and reflecting' and, lastly, I wanted the 'clients' attending courses of study at the Police Staff College, to collaborate in as many aspects of the educational process as possible. In this way, I hoped to create a form of action research that constituted a manifestation of critical educational science.

However, as I have noted I was not working in an institutional context that embraced a research culture. Nor was I working with client groups drawn from an occupational culture that was familiar with forms of collaborative or co-operative inquiry. Nonetheless, I thought (and hoped) that I would be able to develop my research such that I would, eventually, meet the criteria for action research stipulated by Carr and Kemmis. At its inception, my inquiry was a relatively lone venture.

**Placing the person of the researcher at the heart of the inquiry and the alignment of action research with 'new paradigm' inquiry**

A 'foundational' principle has continued to inform and guide my research (or 'searching') process. There is (at least for me) a rhythm in living and work - a contention between opposites - cyclical processes of action and reflection, of intellect and feeling, confrontation and support, creativity and receptivity and, of
encounter and silence. These processes, in relation to the practice of effective leadership, have been beautifully described by Heider (1987). By way of example, he writes:

"The leader can act as warrior or healer. As a warrior, the leader acts with power and decision. That is the Yang or masculine aspect of leadership. Most of the time, however, the leader acts as a healer and is in an open, receptive, and nourishing state, That is the feminine or Yin aspect of leadership. This mixture of doing and being, of warrior and healer, is both reproductive and potent. There is a third aspect of leadership: Tao. Periodically, the leader withdraws from the group and returns to silence ..... being, doing, being .... then Tao. I withdraw in order to empty myself of what has happened, to replenish my spirit." (Heider, 1987: 55)

Gibran (1980) also captures the expression of 'opposites' in his discussion on 'reason' (intellect) and 'passion' (feeling):

"Your soul is oftentimes a battlefield, upon which your reason and your judgment wage war against your passion and your appetite. Would that I could be peacemaker in your soul, that I might turn the discord and the rivalry of your elements into oneness and melody. But how shall I, unless you yourselves be also the peacemakers, nay, the lovers of all your elements? .... I would have you consider your judgement and your appetite even as you would two loved guests in your house. Surely you would not honour one guest above the other; for he who is mindful of one loses the love and faith of both." (Gibran 1980: 59,60)

Rowan's (1981) 'dialectical paradigm' describes these 'moments' in the inquiry (or learning) process in somewhat different terms - but his basic idea seems isomorphic with the idea of moving between poles of energy. Rowan argues that it is possible to consider a research cycle that characterises all research; it has four phases: 'Being', 'Project', 'Encounter' and, 'Communication'.

Understood experientially, 'Being' refers to that phase of the process where a social inquirer 'rests in his or her own experience' and recognises at some point, that existing practice seems to be inadequate. There is some gap between the actual and the ideal. Movement from this phase entails a process of thinking and conjecturing from which, a 'project' emerges. Such a project embodies a plan of action. Of this phase, Rowan writes:

"This is where I take a risk, and form an intention. It will involve some form of bridging distances - to another person, to a new field, to a different theory or
At some point in the cycle, plans have to be translated into action. 'Action', as Rowan states, is 'the thing to get into'. However, Rowan sees this form of action as involving participation with others. Hence, this phase is one of 'Encounter'. This goes on until the researcher gets to the point of saturation. Some sort of withdrawal is necessary in order to find out the meaning of what has occurred.

This inner process of making sense builds towards another outward moment, 'Communication'. Here, the researcher wants to share, discuss, debate and clarify his or her conclusions. Rowan conceptualises four stages and, two distinct processes of mentation: the first, I call 'Thinking and conjecturing'; the second, 'Making sense and conceptualising'.

That tradition of inquiry, to which I refer to above, is expressed in the plastic arts and particularly in the work of painting (Gombrich, 1995). We see, in the work of the artist, something of genuine research; we see each work as an experiment - as a position, or, a point in time which the artist has reached (Rewald 1976), (Camp 1981). Research is a process of coming to new awarenesses, discovering new forms, understanding one's limited points of view, and, moving on.

Traditional action research can be re-described in Rowan's terms. First, the researcher arrives at a personal point of puzzlement or ignorance. This is the point prior to the 'Planning' stage of action research. Then, the researcher determines some form of intervention designed to secure a valued outcome. The planning stage of action research constitutes the 'Project'. Plans are translated into action. The 'acting' stage of action research takes place in an interpersonal context. It is therefore, an 'Encounter'. The 'Encounter' generates data (which is transformed into information) as the inquirer both 'Observes' and 'Reflects' upon the outcomes of their interventions. Re-described in these terms it becomes clear that action research is not amenable to a technical problem solving process. The action researcher - he or she - is located at the heart of the process.

Laidlaw (1997) provides a highly personal account of her educational practice and, in the course of exploring the 'paradigm' of action research contrasts 'technical' action research with 'emancipatory' action research. She claims that technical action research emphasises the method of modifying processes and, whilst adhering to the method of systematic and cyclical enquiry, nonetheless is 'without a grounding in a particular set of values'. By contrast, emancipatory action research requires that every stage of the systematic and cyclical enquiry adhere closely towards the
realisation of 'democratic and emancipatory values in action'. Emancipatory action research, in virtue of the values it expresses is necessarily collaborative and participatory. The emerging 'collaborative' or 'participatory' action research is heavily focused upon the processes of working together on issues which are negotiated and explored by all concerned with the processes. So construed, such action research approximates 'co-operative inquiry' (Heron 1989).

Laidlaw identifies some of the reasons why collaborative action research can be viewed as 'superior' to other forms of action research. She points out that by 'sharing our knowledge we devolve the power implicit in the creation of knowledge' and that:

"By working collaboratively ... we share the responsibility and power of .. knowledge creation." (Laidlaw 1997: 43)

Moreover, Laidlaw points out that:

"A prime motive of working together in an educational action research context is the potential to negotiate meanings that may lead to educational improvements." (Laidlaw 1997: 43)

Laidlaw also suggests that an 'individual orientation' to action research is 'not a universally held principle within the action research communities'. She cites Elliott (1991) who is concerned that individual action inquiries can lead to 'mere technical rationality'.

However, whilst Elliott is properly concerned to encourage collaborative action research - as a matter of principle - the earlier writing of Habermas recognises that action researchers are also embedded in political contexts and have to 'organise' for the 'political struggle'. In certain contexts - especially those where levels of trust are low - it is not always possible to initiate collaborative action research. Moreover, other writers recognise that action research, in virtue of the fact that one or more human beings set out to learn more about a human social situation, is intimately related to the development of 'personal knowledge'. Laidlaw's own remarkably personal account was itself influenced by Whitehead's (1985) support for the individual's right to determine the nature and course of his/her inquiry. This same emphasis is made explicit (and legitimated) in the work of McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead (1996), who in response to 'numerous requests from practitioners over the years' provide 'a basic guide to educational action research'. Each of these authors has been involved in the actual practice of action research projects and a
particular feature of their work lies in their emphasis upon the 'person' of the action researcher him or herself. They write:

"... in our opinion, one should not tell others how to do action research. The term embodies a whole set of principles, processes and procedures that one has to experience personally for the whole process to make sense. We felt that any book that legislated would in fact deny the essence of action research." (McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead 1996: 1)

From the outset, McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead are careful to compare and contrast action research with other research approaches. They contend that action research shares with other approaches the following four characteristics:

- it leads to knowledge

- it provides evidence to support this knowledge

- it makes explicit the process of enquiry through which knowledge emerges

- it links new knowledge with existing knowledge

However, they distinguish action research from other research in the following three important ways:

- it requires action as an integral part of the research process itself

- it is focused by the researcher's professional values rather than methodological considerations

- it is necessarily insider research, in the sense of practitioners researching their own professional actions

In this way, McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead locate the practitioner at the centre of the action research process. In consequence, concepts such as agency and processes such as decision-making are central to action research (and, thereby immediately distinguish action research from positivist assumptions and methodologies). Atwood (1996) has her narrator make the following observation concerning her (the narrator's) imaginings about the future reconstruction of her lived experience:

"It is impossible to say exactly how a thing was, because what you say can never
be exact, you always leave something out, there are too many parts, sides, crosscurrents, nuances ..." (Atwood 1996 : 144)

Undeniably Atwood is correct. The task of the constructivist researcher is to try to minimise the significant elements - the 'parts, sides ......' - which are left out and to be aware of the way their own psychology exerts a massive influence throughout the whole of the research process. My account acknowledges that my own values, preferences, energies and limitations (of intellect, knowledge, will and rationality) determined, to a very significant degree the design, delivery and development of an ethics education for police leaders and managers.

**Embarking upon the action research inquiry: the initial emphasis**

As I began preparing to re-introduce 'ethics' as a named topic of study to the police leadership development curriculum I faced a first primary and priority task. I had to organise the design and delivery of some form of ethics education experience for large groups of police middle managers who were attending leadership development programmes at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. As the project began, I drew the following small number of points from the research literature:

- action research inquiries are based upon a research model involving a series of steps, stages or activities including planning, acting and then reflecting upon the results of those actions, as well as the way the process has been managed

- action research inquiries appreciate the uniqueness of the situation of practice

- action research inquiries have the potential to serve as methodologies for a critical educational science

- action research inquiries approximate to the artist's search for understanding and communication

As Rowan (1981) observed, action is the 'place to get into'. It is to this I now turn.
Chapter five

Constructing an 'ethics education' for police leaders and managers: preparing to reintroduce 'ethics' to the police leadership and management development curriculum

"... the police literature says nothing about the professional policeman's sense of place, time, and purpose, or how he cultivates an awareness of the trends of past and future, or of his development of a standard of success for his individual actions in keeping with both the limits of his individual capacities and his impulse for public service. The literature points to the necessity that a policeman have such a social, historical and ethical perspective and how it would be useful in compensating for the unique distortions of information which befall the policeman - distortions resulting from a steady diet of life's pathologies, from the organisational necessities of maintaining intensely high morale (to overcome fear, hardship and frustration), and from the authority of office. The literature simply has not described the means of acquiring such a perspective." (Ker Muir, 1977: 296)

Action research (after Lewin 1946) begins with a 'general idea' where 'for one reason or another it seems desirable to reach a certain objective'. The long term goal (or objective) of the inquiry was to secure ethics education on the police leadership and management development curriculum. My more immediate goal was to re-introduce ethics to the curriculum of the middle-management programmes. Already, I had participated in the presentation of Richards (1982) first and original 'ethics package' for the development of the inspecting and superintending ranks of the police service. In Lewinian terms, I had witnessed at first hand the 'action' stage of an educational intervention and the subsequent 'reconnaissance' - the latter revealing the gulf between the hoped for outcome and the actual outcome. I had made sense of the short-lived nature of that original venture by contending that the 'academic transmission' curriculum emphasis conflicted with the pragmatic interests and values that were shared by the majority of the student group. This first experience constituted a starting point for the preliminary stage of my inquiry.

The preparatory process began in the winter of 1992. Yet, even in 1996 when Kleinig introduced his readership to the study of police ethics, he was still able to recognise that there was a lack of any reasonably comprehensive and scholarly discussion on the subject. He also thought it accurate to note that readers of part three of his text would find that it offered the 'beginnings' of what he saw as a
crucial area of police ethics - 'problems that are largely managerial or organisational in character'. In part, this was the very area upon which I was choosing to focus my attention.

Kleinig imagined that students of police ethics would, in the course of studying the subject, progress from a focus on the ethical issues at street-level to those topics dealt with at managerial level; he added that those latter topics would be 'well-suited to an advanced course in police ethics'. Kleinig's observations serve to highlight the fact that in this preliminary stage of the action research inquiry there remained considerable scope for determining the content and methods of the learning design.

In this chapter I shall come to describe the nature of the educational design that I developed in the first half of 1993 and subsequently presented to the leadership development programme (after a brief trial in June 1993 - see Appendix C) in the autumn of that year. In 'Part One' I shall discuss how I approached the task of determining the content for a police ethics education. Specifically, I drew my ideas (concerning content) from the relatively extensive literature on the police and the emerging writings on police ethics - including those sources concerned with 'teaching ethics to police'. I also reviewed, selectively, literature on management and organisational ethics. Inevitably I also drew from certain works concerned with 'ethics and the professions' as well as sources commenting on the teaching of ethics. I conclude the first part of the chapter with a brief summary of those topics that appear to have justifiable claim for inclusion on an 'ethics education' for police leaders and managers.

I shall then move on in 'Part Two' to focus on the challenge of designing for the actual educational process. This latter task involved 'filling out' the details of the concrete educational design and involved making decisions concerning each of the major elements comprising any learning design. Here I drew from my professional training in the theory and practice of humanistic education and the facilitation of adult learning. I was also concerned to clarify the type of educational emphasis I would adopt - especially if I were trying to create a 'critical' ethics education experience. I shall suggest that educational designs embracing the principles of critical pragmatism, inquiry models based on emancipatory action research and the radical possibilities of humanistic psychology are markedly similar in terms of the way they guide and inform conduct. I shall also indicate why the institutional context in which I was working did not permit me to adopt, straightforwardly, the principles of an emancipatory education. In the beginning, my action research inquiry could best be described as a complex 'problem solving' process.
Part One

Police ethics: issues and themes in the developing academic literature

Kleinig (1990) contends that morality is concerned, essentially, with humans in their relations with each other. He adds that:

"Morality is concerned with being and doing at the most basic level, with people's common standing as human beings. For that reason there can be no distinctive police ethic but only a human ethic applied to police situations." (Kleinig 1990: 2)

This view of ethics places it at the heart of human being and doing. Ethics is not some desirable 'add-on' but exists in propria persona. It follows that the content of the study of police ethics must be both specific and general. Specifically, there must be included some analysis of the morally challenging aspects of police work. More generally, a wider study of police contributes to understanding the making and shaping of police 'being and doing'. Kant (1956) in his critique of practical reason carefully drew our attention to the necessary connection between obligation and freedom. Thus, 'ought' implies 'can'. It follows that the development of the subject 'police ethics' cannot proceed independently of the knowledges revealed by a social psychology and social anthropology of police. Here I shall begin by exploring the relatively scant literature on police ethics before noting the more general works on police that help provide some of that social psychological and social anthropological knowledge.

My own grounding in the study of police ethics began with Ker Muir's (1977) inquiry into the nature of the 'good' police officer. His work had helped me to make some informed contribution to the early presentation of police ethics education at Bramshill. In consequence, I shall begin the review of those published works helping to organise the content of an ethics education for police managers by referring to his pathbreaking work.

At the outset he asks: 'What is a good policeman (sic), and what does he think and do differently from a bad one?' 'Does police work corrupt, or does it expand a policeman's horizons and magnify his soul?' 'Can anything be done to avert the potential for his moral breakdown?' Ker Muir was influenced by Weber's conviction that people who let themselves in for 'politics' (and police are 'street-corner politicians') contracted with 'diabolical' powers liable to be morally
In the early part of the 1970s, Ker Muir studied the psychological development of twenty eight young men who were serving police officers in a West Coast North American city. As a result he concluded that a good police officer becomes so to the extent that he (or she) develops two virtues. On the one hand, to become a good police officer one has to grasp the nature of human suffering. He elaborates this in terms of the 'tragic perspective' - as contrasted with its opposite, the 'cynic perspective'. He conceptualises the development of either tragic or cynic perspectives as the development of 'understanding' - an understanding of the nature of humanity.

On the other hand, Ker Muir reasons that the good police officer has to develop morally in a specific way: he (or she) has to resolve the contradiction of achieving just ends with coercive means. He writes:

"A patrolman who develops this tragic sense and moral equanimity tends to grow in the job, increasing in confidence, skills, sensitivity and awareness." (Ker Muir 1977: 4)

Subsequently, Ker Muir provides a relatively detailed analysis of the constituent elements of cynicism. He traces the cynic point of view from its historical roots in Greek philosophy instancing Diogenes as 'its major figure'. Diogenes' cynicism was characterised by three themes. The first entails a view of humankind as 'dualistic' rather than 'unitary' - the cynics and the fools:

"... mankind was not unitary, but dualistic. Mankind was divided into two kinds of people - friends and enemies, cynics and fools, the strong and the susceptible, those with and without "virtue". Virtue was the awareness of the advantages of amounting to nothing and having nothing. Cynicism denied the brotherhood of man and insisted on dividing the world into two classes: the susceptible, made so by their ambitions and possessions, and those who were smart enough to know how to become invulnerable by dwarfing themselves. That was the cynic's starting point." (Ker Muir 1977: 175)

The second aspect was 'fault-finding'. A necessary part of human experience is that of pain and suffering - for countless reasons - but for the cynic, 'suffering was always a matter of personal choice'. Cynics took the view that if anyone suffered it was because of their failure to detach themselves from any emotional connections with 'civilisation'. Referring to Dudley's (1937) scholarly work on the nature of
cynicism, Ker Muir quotes him pithily, as follows:

"The fault is always in ourselves" (Dudley, 1937: 67)

Ker Muir goes on to say that, for the cynic, if an individual experienced suffering that was a matter of personal choice. It resulted from striving to 'be' someone or 'have' something:

"If an individual chose to forego the cynic's virtue he had only himself to blame. Anyone who suffered simply lacked the self-discipline to train himself in self-denial, indifference and renunciation of the false currency of civilisation - its common materialistic sense and its dainty civilised values." (Ker Muir 1977: 175)

The third theme was that of individualism where the cynic sheered (or sheers) off attachments to other individuals. Socrates has observed in Plato's 'Republic' that 'mutual need' was one of the basic principles at the foundations of human society. However, the cynic denies this and does not recognise any need for mutuality and interdependence. As Ker Muir puts it:

"In other words, the praiseworthy cynic was the one who refused all human ties .... It was the ultimate in self-defense." (Ker Muir 1977: 176)

In summary, Ker Muir captures the distinctive outlook of the cynic as follows:

"... the dualistic conception of mankind as two warring camps, a simple causal theory presupposing the individual's absolute control over his (sic) fate, and the defensive virtue of complete indifference" (Ker Muir 1977: 176)

He contends that three factors can arrest the development of cynicism: leadership, learning and language. The role of the 'chief' and of superordinates in the organisation was to cultivate an appreciation of the nature of humanity. In addition the role of police leaders was to develop an organisational ethos marked by a rich conceptual language designed to capture and order the experiential facts of policing. He also stressed the importance of an organisational ethos which valued learning more about the nature of the human condition.

The three points made by Ker Muir provide a potential starting point for an ethics education experience oriented towards actual practitioners. It suggests the need for police managers to clarify their role priorities and it recommends that they explore and articulate ethical concepts. In short, it underlines the need for police to be
skilled at giving their work an 'ethical reading'. It also, through its emphasis on learning, suggests the importance of both a personal inquiry (i.e. asking questions such as 'What have I become?) and the genesis of an environing 'learning culture'.

Ker Muir (1977) concludes his study saying that there remained a lack of scholarship concerning the development of professional police officers:

"The police literature does not contain descriptions of how policemen (sic) come to reconcile the sometimes necessary extortionate practices of authority with their previously felt obligations to be reasonable, kind empathetic and creative. It provides no explanation of how the professional policeman maintains a complex sense of right and wrong without a loss of self-esteem or a belief in civility. The literature does not tell us how a policeman can develop a morality enabling him to be mean opportunistically without becoming mean compulsively." (Ker Muir 1977: 296)

The police literature had, though, begun to grow and, at the same time as the publication of Ker Muir's work, had begun to include the first discussions on police ethics. Police training courses could, in principle, draw from Kookén (1957), Hansen (1973) and Bristow (1975) all of whom had produced commentaries on police ethics. However, the work of Elliston and Feldberg (1985) and Heffernan and Stroup (1985) heralded a more detailed, sophisticated and extensive discussion of ethical dilemmas and challenges specific to police work.

Elliston and Feldberg (1985) provide a relatively early introduction to the subject 'police ethics'. They trace a brief history of its development and underline the fact that 'police ethics is still in its infancy'. It was only in 1981, through their own endeavours, that the first conference was organised to address, comprehensively, the full array of ethical issues in police work. The essays published in their volume constitute the output from that early conference. They group the collection of fifteen papers concerned with moral issues in police work under four headings:

- Authority, discretion and the police function
- Deception
- Force and deadly force
- Corruption
These groupings indicate some of the main conceptual categories used to structure and order the study of police ethics. Elliston and Feldberg in common with most students of police in America begin their work with an emphasis upon police powers and claim that the police are among the most powerful agents of the state. Police, they point out, are empowered to disrupt the daily routines of citizens if they so wish (and have reason or cause so to do). They also, like other writers, point to the comparative recency of the scholarly studies on police. Their work takes as its audience the police themselves, police trainers and educators, researchers and philosophers. They contend that ethics is 'another tool' in the hands of police academy instructors 'to build the character a good cop needs' and, with allusions to MacIntyre and Plato, they add:

"The virtues, which have recently become philosophically fashionable, are seldom more important to society than in the guardians of the state. Police ethics re-emphasises the significance of honesty, loyalty, integrity, and obedience. Indeed, such virtues are more than useful; in many situations, they are a matter of life and death." (Elliston and Feldberg 1985: 1)

They note the importance of ethics to effective police administration and assert that moral reasoning enables police leaders to achieve a better quality of decision-making and problem-solving. They also pick out a feature of police work that highlights the significance of moral values in policing. They note that those who study police 'quickly realise their largely unsupervised and unstructured discretion' and precisely because police enjoy considerable latitude in their decision-making the values - both moral and non-moral - become determinative.

Elliston and Feldberg also remind their readers that the more developed area of professional ethics has shown how simplistic and misleading the application of the principles derived from abstract ethical theory can be. Thus, in fields such as bioethics it has not been possible to take a standard ethical principle (such as the rule utilitarian 'always act such as to bring a greater balance of good over evil into the world') apply it to a specific case and allow it to determine action. This approach has 'failed to capture the complexities and nuances of the values at stake'. Their text provides a link with the more specific discussion concerning the teaching of police ethics when they move on to suggest what the teaching of police ethics may achieve. Their discussion helps to form the basis of Kleinig's (1990) later more detailed examination. For them police ethics teaching might have four objectives. First, police officers, police managers and leaders may be sensitised to the moral dimension of their work. Second, police ethics can help develop a richer articulation of ethical issues. It can provide, through language, an extensive and
clear set of ethical concepts such as 'conscientiousness', 'rights' and 'obligations'. Third, a study of police ethics presents the opportunity to test ethical arguments. Fourth, the study can help in the search for optimal solutions to some of the complex problems faced in policing the human condition.

Elliston and Feldberg's work is linked to that of their work to Heffernan and Stroup (1985). They note that, in 1982, another conference concerned with the study of police ethics led to the publication of a second set of scholarly works. Heffernan and Stroup's (1985) collection of papers can, itself, be taken as a complementary way of conceptualising the main concerns of police ethics. They organise the eleven essays comprising their volume under five headings:

- Fidelity to law

- Discretion

- Undercover operations

- The use of deadly force

- The future of policing (In this latter category they include works on police and electoral politics, affirmative action and the police and sexual integration in American law enforcement)

These topic areas begin to illustrate the ethical demands arising from the role and function of police in a democratic society and lay the foundations for a subsequent maturing of professional and personal ethics for police.

The reference by Elliston and Feldberg to 'virtue' is made central in Delattre's (1990) study of 'character' and police. Delattre himself has played a very major role in shaping the content of police ethics presented at the FBI academy in Virginia. Delattre examines the idea of an 'excellent' character in an analysis which emphasises the need to acquire habits and qualities that 'become integral' to a person's life. How does he conceive the 'excellent' police officer? He writes:

"They respect and even love honesty, which has become second nature. Such persons behave in the same way as the self-controlled or self-disciplined person in that they do their duty but they enjoy peace of mind in knowing who they are and what they stand for. Such persons can be said to be truly incorruptible, with no temptation to steal because money is "only green paper" (sic). Persons of such
character are fit to bear the trust of public office in law enforcement." (Delattre 1993: 63)

This idealised portrait of the moral exemplar is subsequently developed by Delattre. In an account which reprises Aristotle's analysis of the moral virtues he includes 'temperance' and 'self-control' as well as 'courage'. He also argues that 'two kinds of 'wholeness' are related to excellence of character. The first consists of the ability to 'make best use of circumstances' whilst the second consists of 'integrity' - which he defines as 'wholeness, being one thing through and through'. Delattre also adds to his sketch the importance of 'service' and 'trustworthiness'. Since ethics is not just concerned with questions concerning how we ought to act but with questions concerning what we might be, Delattre's emphasis on moral virtues underlines the significance of theories of moral value in the study of police ethics.

As Elliston and Feldberg (1985) and Heffernan and Stroup (1985) were pioneering the study of police ethics (and distinguishing the categories of study upon which a police ethics might focus) in America, Richards (1985) was beginning to develop the study of police ethics in the United Kingdom. Simultaneously, Laugharne and Newman (1985) were advancing an analysis of the duties of police officers in a work explicitly designed to enhance the integrity of police practitioners. (I shall discuss the major contribution to the teaching of police ethics that was made by Richards when I turn to examine the very first publications devoted to its teaching).

Laugharne and Newman's work might be taken as a forerunner of the many strategic emphases concerned with the moral values in policing that were to be articulated from within the police service of England, Wales and Northern Ireland in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Their work influenced the culture change programmes that were advocated and attempted by police; it also influenced the subsequent statement of common purpose and values for the police service and, the tone of the draft statement of ethical principles.

The foreword to Laugharne and Newman's work underlines the purpose of the handbook. It (the handbook) was designed to provide an extended description of the principles that should govern policing and to explore how the police service could become more responsive to the needs of the citizenry rather than remain somewhat detached and insular. Laugharne and Newman base their analysis both on an examination of the role requirements of the constable and the intimately related concept of the Rule of Law. They derive nine duties that they break down into two main categories. The first five are 'duties of function' - which indicate 'what' police should do - whilst the remaining four are 'duties of method' - which
outline 'how' police should comport themselves as they seek to attain their ends. The code itself restates the primary function of the police, emphasises human rights considerations and the Rule of Law, urges police to respect the dignity of the individual and to 'treat every person of whatever social position, race or creed, with courtesy and understanding', restates the doctrine of minimum force and underlines the duty to 'befriend and assist citizens'. It stipulates that police should be brave and selfless, should always act for the public good and should exercise their powers without undue peremptoriness.

Underlining their concern that police should be irreproachable public servants Laugharne and Newman conclude with a final duty of method:

"To guard the good reputation of the Force, to work constantly to maintain its high ideals, to encourage others to do so by good example and leadership, and to contribute to its excellence by showing resolution and honesty if faced with police malpractice." (Laugharne and Newman 1985: 61)

Laugharne and Newman's work was echoed in Imbert's (1989) cultural design for the Metropolitan Police Service in the 1990s. This included a statement of the common purpose and values of the Metropolitan police which, significantly was no longer referred to as a 'force' but as a 'service'. Imbert acknowledged the financial cost of policing services in London and added:

"They [the people of London] have every right to expect, and we have a duty to provide a cost-effective, non-discriminatory service that works well at every level" (Imbert 1989: 2)

Imbert outlined his ideal for the Metropolitan Police organisation. This included:

- a force experienced by its membership as united and acting upon a common purpose

- a commitment to providing a quality of service to the public

- fairness, equity and justice throughout the organisation

- accountability through performance measurement

Imbert's prescriptions (and culture change initiative, the 'Plus Programme') extend the discussion of police ethics into management and organisational ethics. I shall
examine this area after first considering the nature of the police themselves.

Police ethicists had gradually begun to articulate the 'oughts' of policing. What features of police psychology, police socialisation and police culture might be relevant in the determination of police conduct?

**Police 'personality' and the social construction of police officers**

Ker Muir (1977) at the culmination of his study of the psychological development of police officers turns to consider the sources a teacher mounting a course on 'police' might include on their study programme. For a study of philosophy and police, Ker Muir suggests Packer (1968); for history, Lane (1967); for description, Rubinstein; for social science, Westley (1970) and for policy, Berkeley (1969). Each has the status of a classic work on police and each has a claim to inclusion on a thorough course in police ethics. Ker Muir also believes that courses on police would benefit if they were to include Chevigny's (1969) study of police from the perspective of the victims of abusive police power and Sykes' (1966) study of police in unconventional settings.

He makes specific mention of the importance of Wambaugh's novels including 'The New Centurions', (1970) 'The Blue Knight' (1972) and 'The Onion Field' (1973). Significantly, another student of police, Klockars (1983) - who, like Ker Muir, has shown a particular interest in the moral aspects of policing - also refers to the educational value of reading Wambaugh when he, Klockars, turns to examine how to develop an understanding of police and police work. Wambaugh's novels all explore 'the big expansive truth' (as Klockars puts it) that policing is a morally dangerous occupation - ultimately so because of the police officer's right to use coercive force. The moral issues raised by the fact of police power occupy a dominant, if not central, place in scholarly discussions on police ethics.

Ker Muir also considers that the works of Banton (1964), Skolnick (1966), Neiderhoffer (1967) and Wilson (1968) all contribute towards an 'understanding of the modern police officer'. Banton's work illustrates some of the psychological difficulties experienced by police officers as initial motives and their subsequent work come into conflict. Skolnick presents a cartography of the 'policeman's (sic) working personality' finding that 'certain outstanding elements in the police milieu' namely danger, authority and efficiency combine 'to generate distinctive cognitive and behavioural responses in police'. Skolnick goes on to say:

"The process by which this "personality" is developed may be summarised: the
policeman's role contains two principal variables, danger and authority, which should be interpreted in the light of a "constant" pressure to appear efficient. The element of danger seems to make the policeman especially attentive to signs indicating a potential for violence and lawbreaking. As a result, the policeman is generally a "suspicious" person." (Skolnick 1966: 44)

Neiderhoffer (1967) explores a somewhat different aspect of the psychological development of police officers. He examines some of the pressures intrinsic to policing which incline police towards cynicism. Wilson (1968) discovered that whilst police organisations were sensitive to their political environment they remained relatively immune to governance from the 'outside'. He found that police view most issues as a struggle for control of their department by 'outside' forces. In addition, Wilson notes that whilst all organisations resist change, factors such as the perceived low esteem of the police role, render the police especially resistant to change.

The issue of a 'police personality' has received some attention in social scientific writings on police. The earliest of these writings were American although the pioneering sociological study by Banton (1964) in the United Kingdom also refers to the complex psychological development of police officers. Balch (1972), in an extensive review article, focused upon the hypothesis that police could be distinguished by their 'authoritarian' personality (after the original work on authoritarianism by Adorno, Levinson, Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford) but found the data to support this view, at best, inconclusive. He indicated that the research findings - many of which suffered from methodological weaknesses - revealed that there appeared to be little to distinguish the American police officer from the average middle- or working-class white citizen. However, whilst Balch emphasised the apparent similarity of the police officer to groupings in the wider population, Lefkovitz (1975) contended that the weight of research and opinion did point towards a non-pathological 'modal police personality' comprising two trait syndromes. He called 'Trait syndrome 1': 'Isolation and secrecy; Defensiveness and suspiciousness; Cynicism' and introduced his discussion of this trait as follows:

"The relevant literature makes it difficult to resist forming an image of a close group of men (sic), sharing a life style and general outlook on the world which includes intense feelings of being misunderstood and misrepresented by outsiders, hence requiring absolute secrecy as well as suspicion towards all such outsiders." (Lefkovitz, 1975: 9)

Certainly it is difficult to find police officers who would disagree with the fact that
they are 'suspicious' and police are also likely to characterise themselves as 'cynical'. Lefkovitz described 'Trait syndrome 2' as 'Authoritarianism, Status concerns, and Violence'. However, immediately having identified this 'trait syndrome' he emphasises the equivocal nature of any supporting data:

"Possibly the most tendentious issue, and one about which there is considerable inconsistency among the empirical findings is whether policemen (sic) may be validly described as "authoritarian personalities."' (Lefkovitz, 1975: 11)

He goes on to underline the uncertainties concerning whether or not police do 'possess' an authoritarian personality but he does provide evidence that police have status concerns and a proneness to use violence in order to assert their authority.

In addition to these 'trait syndromes', Lefkovitz highlights the tendency for police to presume that they are viewed more negatively by the 'public' than, in fact, they are so viewed. Moreover, police tend to be a 'conservative, conventional group' concerned with maintaining the status quo. Lastly, he suggests that whilst the empirical evidence is 'disorganised':

"... it is probably accurate to conclude that a considerable residue of ill-will, fear, distrust, and lack of respect permeates both the police community and nonwhite ethnic communities vis a vis each other " (Lefkovitz, 1975: 16)

He concludes his review of over eighty studies with the assertion that the preponderance of available evidence does suggest a modal police personality although there is virtually no data to support the idea that those modalities are pathological.

Ker Muir (1977) notes that the studies he cites agree of one aspect of police work:

"... police work in the field is frightening. Danger lurks unpredictably in every encounter" (Ker Muir 1977: 292)

Caution and suspicion, inevitably, as a result of the milieu of policing, become a part of the police officer's disposition. A corollary of this disposition is a lack of trust. The study of the psychological attributes of police officers became more extensive including, for example, the study of 'psychological types' based on the Jungian framework of the Myers Briggs Type Indicator (Hanевич, 1978) as well as Eysenck's Personality Questionnaire (Gudjonsson and Adlam, 1983).
In my own experience, (and in relation to my study) I found that police leaders and managers brought scepticism, suspicion and defensiveness to the classroom context. There was, for example, plenty of non-verbal evidence to justify this observation. They also brought the habitual patterns of conduct that have been identified by the more anthropological studies. They were more likely to be interested in the person they were encountering rather than the rational processes of appreciating and evaluating their discourse. This would need to be taken into account during the actual presentation of an 'ethics education' experience because the audience would be silently asking itself the question: 'How ethical is this person, here, in front of me?'

The scholarly study of the British police beginning with Banton (1964) tells a story that differs from the American accounts in terms of degree - although there remains a broad similarity in relation to the way particular social psychological factors are identified and taken to generate a distinct occupational culture and mode of apprehending reality.

Reiner (1985) basing his views on an extensive period of studying police summarised police culture as 'very pragmatic, concrete, down to earth, and anti-theoretical'. Bradley, Walker and Wilkie (1986) in a work designed to help with the actual practice of managing police, examine the set of determinants or causes by which police come to share views about their work and their organisation. In common with many writers on the police they recognise the power of the 'occupational subculture' within which probationary constables are 'soaked' from the moment of entry and that therefore:

"... such things as courses in anthropology, 'human awareness' or group dynamics may simply exist as isolated currents and eddies whose impact will be negligible against the force of a very strong tide." (Bradley, Wilkie and Walker, 1986: 195)

Bradley, Wilkie and Walker identify three features common to police work that influence the 'subjectivity' - the practical reasoning and behaviour - of officers. The three features are:

- the moral dilemmas and dangers of policework

- the informational constraints inherent in policework

- the contrasts in police work between the routine and the predictable
They emphasise the significance of the moral dimension of policework and the development of strong group cohesiveness in their analysis of the social construction of police officers. In relation to the former, they, in common with many other students of police, explore the consequences for police, of power wielding. For them:

"The basis of the police officer's authority consists of a legal licence to compel others to refrain from using illegitimate force or engaging in other legally prohibited acts. He (sic) is blessed - or cursed - with the attribute of coercive power, the legitimate capacity to control the conduct of others by threatening them with harm ... this capacity to apprehend, to arrest, to armlock, to handcuff, to take into custody, is always present." (Bradley, Wilkie and Walker 1986: 166)

To examine the dilemmas this creates for police they turn to discuss Ker Muir's (1977) work concerning the paradoxes of power thus re-affirming the moral dangers to which police are exposed.

Their analysis of police socialisation - which draws heavily from Van Maanen's (1973) study of the making of police officers - recognises that police have to learn their jobs within a pre-existing system and therefore, however, individual, idiosyncratic or 'different' they may be, the simple necessity of taking part in organised collective activity ensures participation in a common form of life and the appropriation of the norms and values of fellow officers. In fact, Bradley, Wilkie and Walker link the initial police training designs with the genesis of a 'total police personality' and find that it encourages 'widespread conformity to the ongoing organisation and its values'. They also recognise the corollary of group cohesion: group exclusivity. They write:

"... there is a definite 'all in the same boat' philosophy, which does not discriminate by department, rank or any other criteria. The police are insiders, the public are outsiders, and this notion has consequences in terms of style and substance. Stylistically certain postures require to be struck, whose aims and effects are to unify the service and distance it from the public ... it is an attitude of clannishness, of strength through unity, of group loyalty, one which is most obviously manifested in the closing of ranks in public." (Bradley, Wilkie and Walker 1986: 196)

The features which make policing unique were analysed by the 'Quality of Service committee' (1992) and discussed under nine headings:

- the wide menu of responsibilities
- the large degree of discretion
- the uncertainty about the role of the police
- the need for instant decisions
- the reliance upon individual skills, judgement and initiative
- the emotional demands of policing
- the physical dangers of policing
- the influence of the police officer's image
- the exacting demands of the criminal justice system

The authors provide a convincing case that these features of policing have certain broadly predictable outcomes which culminate both in creating and sustaining a powerful occupational culture. In the course of their analysis, for example, the authors of the report make the observation:

"The emotional stress of policing cannot be underestimated. Constant exposures to suicides (sic) assaults, disputes and conflicts - and in extreme cases ... to the distress of physically and sexually abused children - is bound to have serious psychological effects. Most police officers gradually develop an automatic defence barrier so that they can cope with the frustration of not being in a position to solve the problems they deal with. In the absence of an effective support system ... the "canteen culture" is given room to thrive, and the idea that "they", their leaders and society in general "do not understand" takes firm root." (Quality of Service Committee, 'Getting Things Right' 1992: 25)

A number of patterns emerge from the academic literature which point to the distinct psychological development of police officers, to an occupational culture marked by solidarity and loyalty, and, to structural features of police work - including its historical traditions - which, together, provide an appreciation of the way the 'oughts' of police might be attenuated by the 'can'. Richards (1993) acknowledges this when, in criticism of his earlier writing (which assumed autonomous rational agents), he notes that the social psychological circumstances of police are such that the exercise of clear, independent judgement is difficult and
'the freedom to exercise moral choice is circumscribed in ways that are complex'.

From this discussion it follows that the content of an ethics education, for it to be appropriately sensitive to the police condition, should include an appreciation of the major dynamics at play in shaping the conduct of police officers. Ethics education for police leaders and managers also needed to include an appreciation of the specific issues facing those same leaders and managers. As the new millennium approached the area of management and organisational ethics had received renewed and serious attention. My design for an ethics education needed to reflect developments in this field.

Management and organisational ethics

The more recent literature on management and organisational development has shown an increasing concern with the ethics of organisations - and some well-established concepts such as 'organisational culture' necessarily invite considerations of the value structure of organisations.

Maclagan (1991) remarks that there has been a marked rise in interest in business ethics in the United Kingdom. He suggests that this emergence of concern could be the result of a more general disquiet about values in society and in professional practice. He thinks that considerable emphasis has been placed on the function of codes of ethics. He finds this consistent with the idea of the professionalisation of management (for, as many writers on 'the professions', point out one of their distinguishing features is an explicit code of ethics). Maclagan thinks that there is a significant difference however, between 'code ethics' that are laid out in professional codes and personal moral judgement - which, he believes, is enhanced through management development programmes. Maclagan's views are important because they reflect a recurring theme in writings on ethics. Thus, he is concerned with the question of how moral ideals become integrated into the day-to-day practices, conduct, style and manner of individual persons (and/or organisational members).

He precedes his discussion concerning the practice of management education and development by debating how, if management can be seen as a moral practice, this feature of management is incorporated within competence frameworks. He dismisses as 'too narrow' some current definitions of management competence unless they are broadened to include moral behaviour. He adds that whilst some writers (notably Boyatsis, 1982) have included the notion of 'moral maturity' in their analyses, many more technically orientated competence models have
overlooked the moral dimension. Maclagan continues by discussing the nature of moral maturity - and, adhering closely to Kohlberg's (1969) work on moral development, he notes that it entails not only a commitment to ideals but also the capacity to act accordingly. Building upon Kohlberg's recognition that there is a difference between the capacity for moral reasoning and actual commitments to the values and expression of ethical conduct, Maclagan asks what this might mean for management and organisational development specialists. He thinks it highlights the need for those specialists to identify the 'blockages' that prevent people living up to their ideals. Thus, a part of the design for helping managers with the expression of ethical conduct entails, in the first instance, the careful identification of those barriers and blockages.

When Maclagan turns to consider the actual design of an ethics education for managers he argues that if consistent moral conduct is only made possible when a person becomes personally committed to the expression of moral values then some form of 'experiential' learning design is needed. He thinks that the process of management education and development should comprise two phases. The first should help learners acquire the capacity for moral reasoning. The second should help develop qualities such as 'empathy' and 'the strength of character' to act, if need be, against the majority opinion.

He then moves on to provide a more detailed specification of the aims or outcomes of programmes aimed at facilitating moral behaviour in organisations. Here, he includes cognitive understanding, affective qualities, interpersonal skills and self-knowledge. He also includes a reference to the need to address the nature of the prevailing occupational culture. Thus, Maclagan begins to frame some of the major dimensions that needed to be addressed on any management development programme which appreciates the moral dimension of management. His relatively holistic model is extended by Snell (1993).

Snell presents an analysis of that range of skills and qualities which he believes would equip managers to build and sustain organisations characterised by a commendable moral ethos. It follows that a management ethics curriculum would have to provide coverage of those areas he details. His specification has similarities with some of the ideal practitioner accounts presented by Heron (1989, 1993) - illustrating the overlap between radical humanistic education and critical theory.

Snell divides his model into the cognitive, performative and affective. He then finds four further categories:
"Strategic skills are a blend of the cognitive and performative domains. Self-insight entails using conceptual skills (cognitive) to make sense of emotional experience (affective), so is a blend of these two domains. Emotional management is a blend of the performative and the affective, entailing the control or expression of emotions for practical purposes. Core ethical qualities draw on and integrate all three domains, necessary when managers face ethical dilemmas and conflicts." (Snell, 1993: 182)

He then fills out the details of his scheme and includes more than sixty 'elements' under the separate headings. To illustrate its breadth and depth, here, I shall include some of its content below:

Cognitive
- developing stage-five or stage-six ethical reasoning capacity (after Kohlberg 1969)
- distinguishing the ethical from the aesthetic or prudential
- appreciation of wider institutional barriers to ethical conduct

Performative
- assertiveness in taking a moral stand
- capacity to handle conflicts
- presenting oneself as a moral actor

Affective
- emotional integrity
- ethical will and commitment
- spiritual awareness; transcending materialistic 'having' (after Fromm)

Strategic
- knowing how to read the moral ethos of organisations
- approaches to improving systems and cultures for better moral conduct
- reading the micropolitical forces in play

Emotional management
- maintaining critical receptivity to reasoned ethical; arguments
- handling anger and conflict constructively
- remaining resolute in the face of adversity, failure and duality

Self-insight

- understanding one's own values
- appreciating the extent of one's own ethical will/emotional integrity
- identifying and setting aside ulterior motives

Core ethical

- knowing personal stakeholdings (what can be sacrificed and what cannot)
- integrity and authenticity
- ability to detect, understand, act on and learn form ethical dilemmas
- capacity for clear-headed-reasoning under pressure

The comprehensiveness of Snell's framework is related to his concern to develop an approach to management ethics that is both pragmatic - in the sense that it addresses, sympathetically, the real-life ethical dilemmas of managers - but also critical in 'cutting through the comfort zones of conventional business ideology with sharp questioning'. Snell's model presents itself as a ready made diagnostic structure helping managers and professionals in any organisation ask the question: 'How well do I 'shape up' in relation to all this?'

His work also includes the detailed elaboration of different types/levels of moral ethos as they apply to organisations. In arriving at the concept of a moral ethos he asks:

"Is there a 'something' permeating an organisation which constrains or otherwise affects the ethical reasoning and actions of the individuals within it? If this 'something' exists, what might it be called? What are the salient dimensions of this 'something'?" (Snell, 1993: 67)

Whilst Snell, inter alia, draws from the work of Jackall (1988), Jackson and Carter (1983), Srivasta and Cooperrider (1986) and Kahn (1990), as he tracks down the nature of this 'something', he chooses to set the tone for his analysis by referring to Jackall (1988). Jackall observes:

"The moral ethos of managerial circles .. is .. most notable for its lack of fixedness."
In the welter of practical affairs in the corporate world, morality does not emerge from some set of internally held convictions or principles, but rather from ongoing, albeit changing, relationships with some person, some coterie, some social network, some clique that matters to a person. Since these relationships are always situational contingent, and in flux, managerial moralities are always situational, always relative." (Jackall, 1988: 101)

Snell, then, answers his first question by conceptualising that 'something' which permeates an organisation as its 'moral ethos'. He defines it as "a force residing outside individuals yet something that individuals may bend to and become part of." (Snell, 1993: 71)

Basing his approach upon a critique of Kohlberg's stage model of ethical reasoning as well as Lavoie and Culbert (1978), Bird and Walters (1989), and Petrich and Wegley's (1992) analyses of the moral climate of organisations, and informed by the reasoning of Maclagan (1991), Snell proposes an 'original' model not only composed of six types of moral ethos but also featuring sixteen dimensions which he describes as the 'salient properties of a moral ethos within organisations'. He believes that these sixteen dimensions may be regarded as variables which are not, however entirely separate and discrete. The six types of organisational moral ethos - all based upon the Kohlbergian stages of ethical reasoning - are:

- Fear ridden (stage one)
- Advantage seeking (stage two)
- Members only (stage three)
- Regulated (stage four)
- Quality seeking (stage five)
- Soul searching (stage six)

Importantly, the strategic emphases voiced by senior police officers at the beginning of the 1990s coincide particularly with the characteristics of stage 5 (and, to some extent, stage 6) organisations. Thus, at least a part of my design for an ethics education could explore the level of organisational development achieved by police.
How though has the ideal police organisation been represented?

Delattre (1993) outlines the characteristics of an 'ethically ideal' police institution. He recognises that because of the inevitability of human imperfections it remains an impossibility to create such organisations. The ideal remains an aspiration. What, for Delattre, would the ideal organisation look like? He answers:

"An ethical organisation would be one with integrity; that is, one where policies and practices were forged by consideration of morally relevant reasons - such as the dignity of human beings - rather than from impulse, whim, desire for personal gratification, and the like. There would be no 'us against them' attitudes against the public and no disrespect for the limits of the law ... In such an organisation, policies and conduct would be informed by considerations of justice, not only in dealing with the public but also in all reward and accountability structures ..." (Delattre 1993: 54)

Delattre's model for the ideal police organisation appears to be an extension of his notion of the exemplary police character. Both Snell - in an extended sense and Delattre - in a more circumscribed way - offer images of the ideal organisation. In educational terms, this specification of the ideal could be used to catalyse reflections on the 'moral health' of the police organisation. Through this work I was able to develop a 'Moral ethos' questionnaire designed to 'audit' the moral health of the police organisation.

**Teaching and learning police ethics: The work of Sherman, Pollock-Byrne, Richards and Kleinig**

Whilst the academic study of 'police' provided a fairly extensive coverage of ethical issues, few sources examined the more specific area of the teaching and learning of police ethics. In this section I shall concentrate on some of those few published and unpublished sources which comment in a direct way upon the teaching and/or learning of police ethics. Richards' (1985) paper, 'A plea for applied ethics' provides the starting point for the development of 'ethics' teaching to police in the United Kingdom. However, before examining the work of Richards and that of Kleinig - who has certain claims to be credited with authoring the first comprehensive and integrated text on police ethics (Kleinig, 1996) - I shall refer, briefly, to Sherman's (1982) monograph, 'Ethics in criminal justice education', and, Pollock-Byrne's (1993) paper, 'Teaching criminal justice ethics'. Sherman's work can be taken as a beginning of the scholarly examination of key issues in teaching ethics to criminal justice professionals whilst Pollock-Byrne provides an
indication of the state of the art (of teaching ethics to those same professionals) shortly after my study had begun. Pollock-Byrne’s paper is, in part, based on his reflections following five years worth of teaching criminal justice ethics – and therefore constitutes a very rare account of this form of specialised practice.

Sherman’s text benefited from comments and advice provided by the staff of the Hastings Centre, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York. This centre was established in 1969 to address the ethical problems stemming from rapid developments in medicine, biology and the behavioural sciences. It subsequently became concerned with professional ethics and with the teaching of ethics to undergraduates and to actual (or would be) professionals. Sherman organises his text into a number of short chapters each of which addresses a key area in the curriculum design process. He first makes the case for teaching ethics to criminal justice professionals, then considers the aims of ethics education and, after discussing course content, he concludes with an examination of some of the major ‘teaching issues’ such as ‘who should teach ethics?’

He underlines the need for ‘ethics’ in the professional training and development of the criminal justice professional by making the following observation:

“Few vocations offer as much moral complexity as criminal justice. Few occupations are as ethically demanding or as full of moral conflicts. No other occupation requires its members to make moral judgements about how other people have behaved, and then to make and implement moral judgements about how society should respond to them.” (Sherman 1982: 1)

He continues:

“Measured solely by the volume of moral confrontations and judgements, it would seem that the moral boundaries of our society are set not by organised religion, not by the schools, but by the agents of criminal justice.” (Sherman 1982: 1)

Then he observes:

“Yet it is hard to find an occupation so poorly prepared for its moral tasks.” (Sherman 1982: 1)

So, Sherman builds his case for teaching ‘ethics’ to police and other role-fillers in the criminal justice system. The overall argument he subsequently develops in his text can be summarised as follows:
- There is a serious need for teaching and research on the applied ethics of criminal justice because of the powerful and significant effect criminal justice personnel can have on the lives and livelihoods of others.

- The goals of such courses should include the five general goals identified by the Hastings Centre for all teaching (of ethics) in higher education – as well as three that are specific to criminal justice ethics courses. The five general goals are: stimulating the moral imagination; developing skills in the recognition of ethical issues; developing skills of analysis; eliciting a sense of moral obligation; and, fostering an ability to tolerate - and resist – disagreement and ambiguity. The three goals specific to police and other professionals in the criminal justice system are: understanding the morality of coercion (especially in the light of Ker Muir’s (1977) work; integrating technical and moral competence; and, becoming familiar with the full range of moral issues in criminology and criminal justice – such as justice versus law, the use of discretion, rights and freedoms.

- The scope of ethical issues is broad; and yet courses should teach students how to deal with issues generally rather than what is right for each issue.

- Some formal ethical framework is necessary for a rigorous analysis of any difficult ethical problem. (Sherman specifically mentions four such frameworks: Utilitarianism, Kant’s ethics, Sartre’s existentialism and a Rawlsian deontology)

- Professional codes of ethics provide little guidance, creating an even greater need for teaching formal ethical frameworks.

- Any course or attempt to teach ethics needs to give careful consideration to the ‘unique’ teaching issues for ethics.

Sherman identifies six such ‘unique’ teaching issues. First, he intimates that effective teachers of ‘ethics’ are rare. Good teaching requires an integration of ethical analysis with the concrete conditions and specific problems faced by a practice (such as policing). Second, students will have diverse backgrounds as well as differential abilities and capacities. Third, there remained a dearth of useful reading materials to support the learning designs. In fact, at the time of publication - which occurred in the same year that Richards introduced his ‘ethics package’ to the command course at Bramshill, Sherman remarks that there is a ‘general absence of the right kind of materials’.) Fourth, it remains unclear how best to sequence the
course materials and content. He contended that the teacher of ‘ethics’ faced a
dilemma; was it best to start with specific ethical dilemmas and build towards an
awareness of normative ethical theories or was it better to provide the frameworks
first and then apply them to specific cases? Fifth, Sherman noted that ethics
teachers or educators needed to consider deploying a wide range of teaching
methods and tactics; finally, he simply observed that student evaluation (and the
evaluation of the course by students) posed a distinct problem. (Here, I should note,
that Kleinig and Leland Smith’s (1997) admit that the area of ethics teaching which
has received least attention is that of its evaluation.)

Sherman’s early work provided a basic template helping me consider some of the
critical issues in teaching ethics. Despite the comparative thoroughness of his
monograph - and the powerful case he made for the importance of ‘ethics’ in the
development of criminal justice professionals - a decade later Pollock-Byrne (1993)
reported that there remained real difficulties in assembling appropriate content
resources for students attending such ‘ethics’ courses. Pollock Byrne acknowledges
that whilst the pioneering works of Heffernan (1982), Elliston and Bowie (1982)
as well as Schmalleger and Gustafson (1981) formed the core of a body of
literature ‘there is a difficulty in adapting the material available to a classroom’.
Nonetheless Pollock Byrne began teaching criminal justice ethics in 1987 and he
remarks that:

“...it is probably crucial to introduce such concepts as justice versus law, moral
relativism versus absolutism, teleological versus deontological philosophical,
approaches and so on.” (Pollock Byrne 1993: 288)

He goes on to advocate using as wide a variety of teaching methods as possible –
and concludes by claiming that ‘the most problematic theme of an ethics course
moral relativism versus moral absolutism’. Pollock-Byrne suggests that the lapse
into moral relativism - whilst commendable to the extent that it reflects increased
tolerance - should be countered by pointing out some of its (relativism’s)
fundamental problems. Here, and especially in the light of Singer’s (1993a)
repudiation of moral relativism, I should declare my support for Pollock Byrne’s
argument.

Whilst the foundations for teaching ethics to police were being laid in the USA,
Richards had simultaneously constructed an approach to teaching command
personnel in the police organisation in the United Kingdom

In his paper, ‘A plea for applied ethics’ Richards' main objective was to
recommend that it (applied ethics) be given 'more attention' in the police service. He contrasts the fact that whilst the social sciences have an established place within police training, the questions with which ethics deals, i.e. those related to how officers should act, are not the subject of any substantial training or educational focus. Richards argues that applied ethics holds out certain 'promises' for the police. These he identifies as follows:

- the possibility that moral problems will be more fully understood, analysed more carefully and made more tractable
- the fact that questions about the values served by an occupation will be addressed and the ways in which those ends or values will be legitimately achieved
- the encouraging of reflection on one's personal obligations, the rights and obligations of colleagues and the appropriate virtues that should be cultivated
- securing the trust and confidence of the people policed

Whilst Richards' paper discusses each area his initial focus examines the quality of trust and confidence that is extended towards the police. He writes:

"The British police service, which was diffidently introduced into a libertarian political and social climate, has, throughout the one hundred and fifty years or so of its existence, managed to combine a high order of public acceptance with the discharge of its duties. Indeed, from its beginnings, its relationship with the public, that vast and amorphous body, has been governed by the principle that only by gaining its co-operation and trust could it hope to secure the objective of helping to uphold social order. That it has generally managed, in pursuit of this objective, to police in a mild and unaggressive (sic) way says much for both police and public. However, during the past twenty years there have been considerable social changes in British society which have affected all sections of it and hence both parties to the police-public relationship. Many of them undoubtedly made the task of the police in seeking the support of the public more difficult." (Richards 1985: 14)

He moves on to examine not only a range of social trends and changes in the wider society which have altered, in part, the attitude of the public to police but also 'incidents, investigations and inquiries' that, cumulatively, began to erode public confidence in the integrity and competence of the police service in general. He notes:
"The Soho pornography scandal, Operation Countryman, the riots of Summer 1981, the Yorkshire Ripper investigation, Michael Fagan, Grunwick, Lewisham, Southall and Blair Peach and similar happenings lent credibility to the growing accusations about abuse of suspects while in custody, racism, corruption, the excessive use of force in effecting public order, and scepticism about police effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with crime." (Richards, 1985: 15)

Richards contends that the study of applied ethics might assist in mending the dislocation in the police/public relationship.

He continues by identifying certain key moral dilemmas in policing - including the use of discretion, the practice of deception and, the use (and abuse) of power and authority.

He concludes his work with the observation:

"... if, as I have argued, the police, in order to enjoy the trust and confidence of the public, need to police towards worthwhile ends in a morally acceptable manner, then applied ethics, as well as such instruments as police codes, are a necessary requirement for officers." (Richards 1985: 31)

Richards contends that a study of ethics undertaken by police - and especially police managers and leaders - can lead to a range of outcomes including improved police/public relationships and the heightened expression of moral values in action.

His earlier design (Richards 1982) for an ethics education included a range of background materials that attempted to secure certain of these outcomes. Thus, his 'police ethics exercise - towards a police professional ethic' concluded with a suggested police ethical code, itself intended to supply the governing principles and values sustaining and shaping the relationship between the police professional and his or her clients. The fact that Richards both articulated and then presented a 'suggested ethical code' to officers attending the Junior Command Course at the Police Staff College indicates his ultimate aspiration for a study of police ethics i.e. to guide (or prescribe) conduct. His 'suggested ethical code' was articulated as follows:

"As a British police officer and citizen I will, on behalf of my fellow citizens:

- detect and prevent crime, apprehend offenders, protect persons and property, and
by preserving public tranquillity, maintain the queen's peace

- do my duty and, when situations demand it, be a credit to the Police Service by doing it to the limits of my capacity

- be fair and impartial to all people, no matter what their social position, race or creed, and actively seek the support and goodwill of my fellow-citizens

- have a compassionate respect for the dignity of the individual and behave to all with courtesy, self-control, human understanding and tolerance

- never use more force than is necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose nor subject anybody to any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

- strive continually to increase my professional skills so that I can exercise my discretion with ever greater skill and judgement

- uphold the law, observe due legal process and obey orders which conform to such law and process

- keep matters of a confidential nature degree unless the performance of police duty requires otherwise

- act with honesty and integrity towards colleagues and fellow-citizens and be mindful of the reputation of the Police Service

The code is deliberately presented in this form to resemble an oath. It is also intended to be reasonably memorable and to foster professional pride and self-respect in any officer who endeavours to apply it. All the principles in it have the quality of overridingness; they override non-moral principles .... Thoughtful consideration of the principles should reveal that they meet the requirements of critical moral thinking, provide moral guidelines for the police code and qualify as a professional ethic." (Richards, 1992: 8,9)

The resemblance of this 'suggested ethical code' which remained unpublished and the subsequent 'draft statement of ethical principles' published in December 1992 is striking. However, whilst Richards generated and clarified his aims for 'police ethics' he did not elaborate upon the major questions that could be asked of any attempt to create a specific ethics education. He provided a sophisticated analysis of the 'ethics of policing' and then relied upon the intelligence of staff and students
alike to 'progress' his work both into the classroom and then into practice.

By way of contrast, Kleinig (1990) deals authoritatively and comprehensively with the problem of 'teaching and learning police ethics'. In consequence, I shall devote some extended attention to his work. The abstract, at the beginning of his paper, points to the issues which he sought to address:

"There is still much confusion over the teaching of police ethics, a confusion rooted not only in uncertainty about the specific character of police ethics but also to the varied audiences and contexts for which the teaching is intended" (Kleinig, 1990: 1)

Kleinig's paper attempts to separate out the main questions that the teaching of police ethics needs to confront and then proceeds to evaluate, critically, the options to which these questions give rise. His paper constitutes a detailed and finely argued account identifying and dealing with the main issues facing ethics educators in the context of police education. Specifically, Kleinig asks, and then answers seven questions:

- In what way is it appropriate to speak of "police ethics"?
- Why ought police ethics be taught?
- To whom ought police ethics be taught?
- Where ought police ethics be taught?
- What should police ethics training seek to achieve?
- How should police ethics training be integrated into a curriculum?
- What should be the focus of a police ethics syllabus?

Because the research to be reported here, started from such a fragile and under-resourced position, the discussion which Kleinig advances in relation to each question is particularly important. In a sense, these questions represent a logical starting point for building a police ethics education.

In what way is it appropriate to speak of "police ethics"?
Kleinig argues that although there are good grounds to conceive of police as distinct in social and cultural ways, to speak of something distinctive and particular, i.e. 'police ethics' is to fail to grasp the nature of ethics itself. Just as Mackie (1977) understood ethics to be connected with examining the nature of 'good life' so, Kleinig endorses the view that ethics is to do with what we are as human beings.

More recently, Kleinig (1996) has defined ethics in the following terms:

".. ethics is the most fundamental currency of human interaction. The language of ethics is the universal coinage that enables us to relate to each other as human beings. It's what distinguishes us from robots, animals, and mere functionaries. If I can try a compact but general definition: Ethics is concerned with what we are, in our relations with each other, whether we conceive of those relations individually, collectively, or institutionally. Note where the emphasis lies: not just on what we do, but with what we are in what we do. Ethics is concerned with character, with attitudes, with reasons and with intentions as they find expression in our dealings with others." (Kleinig 1996: 3-4)

So, Kleinig is keen to argue that morality is concerned with 'being' and 'doing' at the most fundamental level. It is concerned with people's shared humanity. Therefore, discussions on ethics need to begin with understanding the nature of ethics - and humanity - itself.

Nonetheless, there is something distinctive about police work which places police in positions that most ordinary humans are spared. Kleinig puts it as follows:

"Police, by virtue of their function either on the borderlands of sociality or in 'in extremis' circumstances, are frequently faced with decisions that most of us are spared, decisions rarely confronted in the regular rhythms of life. A police ethic must be concerned with decision making under those circumstances, with a human response to situations that are often structured by the subhuman and misanthropic and that tend to invite the same from those who investigate them."(Kleinig 1990: 3)

Kleinig accepts that there is a case to understand police ethics in terms of role occupancy but he prefers to understand role occupancy as a morally significant fact about a person's circumstances rather than to see it as generating a particular ethic. In consequence, since police ethics is simply a domain characterised by a particular focus rather than a distinct set of values it, police ethics, cannot be divorced from social and political ethics.
Why ought police ethics be taught?

Whilst it is not too difficult to argue for and justify the teaching of ethics in general precisely because the interpersonal and institutional world is 'shot through' with ethical concerns - meeting and greeting, making reparation for wrongs, concerns to achieve impartiality and fairness etc., - what further need is there that something called 'police ethics' be developed and 'taught'? The answer is to be found in the distinct, specific and particular nature of police work. Kleinig describes six features of such work which suggest that an ethical awareness might be helpful to police personnel in the quest for worthwhile objectives achieved through morally acceptable means. Those six features are:

- The authority and discretion which police are given and possess

- Operating in contexts of abnormality where the ordinary constraints of morality have little meaning i.e. dealing with the psychopathic, the sociopathic, the irrational, the insane, the hopeless, the sad and the dispossessed

- Responding to crisis and emergency situations

- The legal and organisational imperatives to intervene in situations that others may have only a moral, and not a 'mandatory' responsibility in which to become involved

- The fact that police officers are subject to much greater temptations than others. Kleinig gives this latter point an interesting twist indicating that whilst some social currency can be earned by most of us if we adopt a 'nice/O.K.' persona this might well constitute a dereliction of duty on the part of a police officer

- The high degree of peer pressure to conform to group norms.

On this latter point, Kleinig writes:

"If this is not to be destructive of moral autonomy, a very high degree of moral courage may be required." (Kleinig 1990: 4)

In the light of this distinct set of social psychological features, Kleinig's view is that it cannot be presumed that those who enter police work will be prepared for its moral challenges. He seems to suggest that because the nature of police work is...
sufficiently distinct and atypical it requires an engagement with a distinct subject, ‘police ethics’. Thus he writes:

"Even though police ethics is continuous with ethics and police are called to respond in an appropriately human way to the situations that are their responsibility, those situations are sufficiently atypical to demand responses for which the ordinary affairs of life provide no adequate preparation."(Kleinig 1990: 4)

To whom ought police ethics be taught?

A first response to this question is simple; police themselves must be the primary recipients and beneficiaries of an ethics education. But all sorts of questions concerning the timing, level, content and depth of such an ethics education are more difficult to answer. Moreover, at certain loci of the police organisation - e.g. supervisory and managerial ranks, it is difficult to establish when and what ethics education to impart.

Where should police ethics be taught?

This is difficult to answer. Whilst it is in the 'academy' that conditions are likely to be most facilitative for considered and undisturbed ethical investigation and reflection, it is in the workplace itself that the main influences creating the ethical dilemmas issues and problems reside. In this sense, those educational programmes committed to action research and action learning might well be stronger candidates for an effective ethics education than programmes more detached from the problems of 'practice'.

What should police ethics training seek to achieve?

This stands as one of the more basic and fundamental questions influencing this research inquiry. Plainly, since part of the research process has been concerned to develop an ethics education for police managers and leaders, a detailed analysis of the aims of an ethics education has constituted a significant part of the inquiry process. Here, only the initial statements and discussion by Kleinig will be reported. Kleinig argues that a police ethics course might have three general aims. These he describes as:

- The reinforcement of moral resolve
- Moral sensitisation

- The imparting of moral expertise

Kleinig subjects each area (or aim) to a moderately extended discussion. Implicit in his analysis is a recognition of the importance of concepts and the language of ethics in providing the frameworks through which to view and understand the moral world as well as providing, through the use of language, the speech acts serving to make moral encounters more manageable and tractable.

Before examining each of the three aims Kleinig posits for a police ethics training, he notes that, whilst a variety a purposes may be served by such training, the educational process and its outcomes should not be concerned to 'deliver' a general moral education. He writes:

"What I think needs to be assumed about all contexts in which police ethics is taught is that its teaching is not intended to provide a general moral education. Not only is it inappropriate to expect any course to do that, but it must be presumed that those who undertake a course in police ethics will come to it with reasonably well-developed moral personalities and dispositional goodwill." (Kleinig 1990: 8)

What does Kleinig mean by 'the reinforcement of moral resolve'? It means that, because police work subjects officers to pressures that are unusual in nature and especially morally demanding, an engagement with police ethics may, as it were, 'inoculate' officers against some - or all - of those stresses and pressures; in short, it may reinforce their moral resolve. Kleinig writes:

"The purpose of a course in police ethics may be seen to promote the closer correspondence between belief and action, between commitment and conduct, between intention and behaviour. Its goal will be to counter akrasia - weakness of will, the failure of moral nerve, susceptibility to temptation, loss of self control." (Kleinig 1990: 8)

In this sense, the idea of reinforcing moral resolve is to help officers sustain and maintain their standards of decency and their endorsement of moral principles such as compassion, benevolence, tolerance and justice. Moral sensitisation is more concerned with the development of moral capacities. It cannot be assumed that people entering the police occupation have achieved full moral development. Indeed, it could be argued that such persons will have something of a context-specific moral outlook reflecting the particular values of a social class and cultural
tradition. This might not be the best preparation for a career where moral diversity is inevitable. So, one of the major goals of police ethics may be seen as the development of moral sensitisation where moral depth and breadth is nurtured.

"It will be acknowledged that although police recruits have been morally trained, individually they will reflect the influence of diverse and partisan moral traditions, traditions from which, in certain respects, they need to be freed. A police ethics course may have as its purpose fostering the acceptance of certain "culturally universal" moral understandings, suited to the work recruits will be undertaking. The various police codes of ethics might be seen as providing that universal moral core in which respect for the persons of others will be articulated in a manner relevant to police work." (Kleinig 1990: 9)

However, whilst Kleinig advocates moral sensitisation as one of the most important aims of police ethics training, he does not regard it as the most important aim. It is here that he intimates his concern to help officers develop, through language, the ability to articulate existing moral sensibilities and appreciations:

"... moral sensitisation ought not to be seen as the primary focus of a programme in police ethics. For the most part, a lack of moral sensitivity is not the problem first experienced by police officers. It is, rather, an inability to articulate and express sensitivities already acquired. It is a lack of expertise in reflecting creatively on the complex circumstances of police decision making that is most lacking, a lack that subsequently expresses itself in a form of moral desensitisation and cynicism." (Kleinig 1990: 10)

Thus, Kleinig ushers in that aspect of police ethics training and education to which he wishes to give most weight, the 'imperting' of moral expertise. Moral expertise refers, in part, to the ability to understand and reflect imaginatively and systematically about policing and its situational demands. A primary claim advanced by Kleinig is that through the imparting of moral expertise - via programmes in police ethics training and education - those two other goals of increasing moral resolve and developing moral sensitisation will 'be effectively pursued'. The notion of moral expertise might be taken to lie at the heart of Kleinig's conceptualisation of the aims for police ethics training and education. Unpacking the meaning of moral expertise is no easy manner; and, sadly, Kleinig does not immediately examine how such moral expertise may be acquired through constructing an ethics education in general (or a police ethics education in particular). However, he does set out to answer the question, 'what is meant by the development of moral expertise?' His answer raises questions concerning the very
nature of human nature, as well as issues concerned with the fundamentals of human psychology. He writes:

".. what is meant by the development of moral expertise[?]. Morally significant conduct is probably the peculiar preserve of human beings. It is assignable to them because of their capacity for reflective self-evaluation, whereby their behaviour is rendered subject to choice and is not characterizable as the merely instinctive - or even learned - reflexive response to some stimulus. The ability to make such choices and to make them well is learned. Though it includes much more than the development of rational skills - even in a broad sense - the development of those skills does encourage and provide for an ever expanding and deepening appreciation of (at least) the world of human transactions. Moral expertise deepens and shapes respect for persons that is at the heart of moral sensitivity." (Kleinig 1990: 11)

In relation to the task of developing an ethics education for police this passage might stand as one of the most significant foundational statements identifying as it does, certain critical issues which police themselves (and especially police leaders, managers and administrators) need to engage with, examine, and explore. Although he does not commit himself to the specific means and methods which might impart moral expertise, Kleinig points, implicitly, to some clear 'candidates' in his final section entitled, 'What should be the focus of police ethics syllabus?'

More recently, Kleinig (1996) in a personal communication, has illustrated his methodology by presenting a clear articulation of certain key concepts - professionalism, accountability, loyalty and cynicism - the consideration of which and, the understanding of which, provide (in this case) police leaders with a scaffolding to support their choices, reflections and decisions, as well as the positions they might take, in relation to individual, collective and institutional actions.

How should police ethics be integrated into the curriculum?

Kleinig asks: Should it be compulsory or optional? Should it be taught as a separate course or included as an ingredient in many courses? How does the overt curriculum in police ethics relate to the covert curriculum of police training?

Since policing is, at bottom, concerned with establishing conditions within which humanity may enjoy meeting its wants, needs and interests it is difficult to argue against the compulsory nature of ethics teaching. It remains difficult to decide
whether ethics should be separated from the remainder of police courses content and given a separate focus or whether it should be threaded throughout the curriculum. In reality, it seems that it is more problematic to sustain an integrated focus and that a separate course enables detailed and sustained attention to be given to the recurring ethical problems confronting police.

What should be the focus of a police ethics syllabus?

Kleinig decides that there should be four elements or aspects:

- A general introduction to moral philosophy
- Examining codes of police ethics
- Case studies
- Middle level inquiries

Taking each of the above in turn, the purpose of a general course in moral philosophy is to identify the basic content of ethics such that, provided the course is well presented, order, comprehension and connectedness are brought to bear on the otherwise confused and inarticulate experiences and capacities of inexperienced police officers which are demonstrated when confronted with the unexpected, unusual, or, quite simply, the more complex of moral issues. Because moral 'education' largely takes place in a context of habitualised social practices and conventions - i.e. we do not hold up to a critical or conceptual eye either our own social and psychological development or the moral principles and the content of our ethical systems - the generality of people (and police officers) simply have not decisional control over ethical deliberation and action.

The purpose of examining codes of ethics is, in part, to avoid the problem of remoteness that courses in moral philosophy can engender. Codes of ethics for police represent general statements of police ethical responsibility tailored to the contexts of policing. They also provide some articulation of the issues which police are to take especially seriously and can act as a guide for practical decision making. Nonetheless they have a set of particular weaknesses both if they were to constitute the sole focus for an ethics education and because they tend to be treated as if they were legal devices; in consequence they tend not to invoke and excite the motivational factors which are at the heart of genuine ethical decision taking.
Case studies root the examination of police ethics education in 'real life'. Case studies enable learners to appreciate the complexities of real life and the host of factors and considerations which must be taken into account to achieve a morally sophisticated and wise decision. Kleinig is relatively emphatic on this point:

"I am convinced that if a course in police ethics is to be of real assistance and value to law-enforcement personnel, it will need to make a judicious use of case studies. Only so will the skills of decision making in complex and morally ambiguous situations be realistically developed. Only via the concrete circumstances of police work will students be able to trace the forms of inquiry that lead ultimately to the most general questions of moral theory. If those ties to the lived world can be established, then students will be initiated into an ongoing enterprise of reflective deliberation, focused enough for the practical purposes of their lives, yet open to the continual reevaluation that characterises the mature and autonomous moral personality." (Kleinig 1990: 15)

Finally, 'Middle-level inquiries' refers to the investigation of those issues such as authority, discretion, deception, coercion, resource allocation etc. which should be focused in terms of the way they present themselves in police work. They are referred to as 'middle-level inquiries' because, pressed in one direction they give rise to the more general questions in ethics to do with justice, freedom etc. and to the abstract debates of ethical theory, pressed in another, they manifest themselves in particular and concrete situations. As such, middle-level inquiries present themselves as sensible candidates to include in programmes of police ethics.

Thus, Kleinig provided both a comprehensive framework and a tightly argued rationale for determining, inter alia, the content of an ethics education for police in general.

All these authors had discussed the aims for ethics education. They had drawn attention to the possibility that ethics education might lead to more principled conduct and to securing a proper relationship between the police and those policed. As this inquiry progressed I learned (Kleinig and Leland Smith 1997) that some subtly different ambitions were to be articulated for ethics education. However, my first task was to determine the aims of an ethics education experience that I was constructing for the Police Leadership Development Programme. Since it was unrealistic to expect that a short experience would lead to changes in conduct I thought it sensible to try and achieve an awareness of the nature of the subject ethics and to 'bring it alive' for police officers.
In addition to Richards' (1985) and Kleinig's (1990) discussions concerning the 'promise' of applied ethics and the aims that a study of ethics might attain, other materials relevant to constructing an ethics educational experience had also been produced in the United Kingdom. These included a range of historical writings on police beginning with Colquhoun's 'A treatise on the Police of the Metropolis' and continuing through the work of a number of police historians such as Reith (1938), Critchley (1967) and Palmer (1988). I thought it sensible (because many police officers are interested in 'history') to include a reference to Colquhoun's work in my first presentation of 'ethics' to police as it represents a major starting point for discussion concerning the priorities of the police function. Writing in an evocative and persuasive style, Colquhoun (1806) articulates a moral basis for police stemming in part from a traditional concern with law and order but also from a 'scientific' concern with the prevention of crime and those conditions facilitative of crime and delinquency. It is also possible to discern, in his writing, an appeal to the moral status and dignity of the policing function.

He wanted to see proper rewards and emoluments for constables, appropriate numbers constituted to carry out their functions, and, proper management and training. The latter recommendation included the following counsel:

".. it should be the business of the parochial Chief Constable ... to impress upon their minds the necessity of purity, vigilance, and attention to orders - and of being humane, prudent and vigorous, in the execution of such duties as belong to their functions." (Colquhoun, 1806: 407, 408)

Thus, Colquhoun's text illustrates less a reliance upon a contractarian rationale for police but a recognition that the office of constable is central to the wellbeing of the citizenry, an office which must be animated through the expression of a set of characterological virtues. (The excerpts from Colquhoun's work that I provided as a resource for police are included at Appendix D.)

This emphasis upon 'character' was made explicit in Sir Richard Mayne's instructions to the Metropolitan Police in 1829 wherein, for example he stated that there was nothing more important for a police officer than a 'perfect command of temper'. It finds itself re-vivified in the writings of Laugharne and Newman and is reflected in the content of the draft statement of ethical principles.

A concluding comment

The scholarly literature relevant to constructing an ethics education for police
suggests that many subjects have a rightful claim to be included amongst its content. The social psychological and sociological writings highlight the significance of personality and character development, as well as the implications stemming from identifications with an 'in group' and group cohesiveness. Problems of loyalty and impartiality are an inevitable consequence. This, and more general literature on police, also points to the importance of questions concerning their role and its attendant duties, and, the demands of 'professionalism'. The emerging study of police ethics highlights questions concerning the uses and abuses of power and authority, the nature of discretion, the use of deception, problems emerging from specific police practices such as undercover work and the use of informants, tensions between due process and crime control, and, a number of ethical issues connected with the police organisation - such as equal opportunities.

When some writings in the field of management and organisations are applied to police a number of questions emerge concerning the ability of police leaders and managers to deploy ethical skills. In addition, that literature indicates possible ways of auditing the 'ethical health' of the police organisation.

In consequence I had a considerable resource base from which to draw as I developed the actual content of an ethics education.

**Part Two**

*Clarifying the educational emphasis*

A new course of study, 'The Leadership Development Programme' was being planned to replace the existing 'Junior Command Course' in the Autumn of 1993 and I was asked by the Dean of Studies at the College, in the spring of 1993, to develop the curriculum for the new course. The first three weeks of the seven-week programme were to be devoted to 'self-development' whilst the latter four weeks would be given over to 'focused modules' of study such as 'Human Resource Development', 'Financial Management' and 'European integration'. I decided to use the authority invested in my role to include a one and one-half day 'Ethics' module on the Leadership Development Programme. In consequence, in addition to providing materials for the new course as a whole, I had the specific task of creating an 'ethics' educational design for the middle managers of the police service. Prior to this development I would have the opportunity to develop two lectures on ethics and present them to the Junior Command Course.

Richards (1985, 1993) and Kleinig (1990) had begun the task of providing a clear
indication of the subjects that could be included in a police ethics education as well as pointers to the way such an education might be conducted. Snell (1993) had developed an analysis and critique of the form and content of different curricula emphases in management ethics education. After clarifying Snell's 'critically pragmatic' approach to a management ethics education I shall suggest that this model shares many of the features of emancipatory action research. In consequence, Snell's design co-incided with my long term aspiration to conduct emancipatory action research.

He begins his discussion of the different types of curriculum by highlighting the way learning designs convey powerful and significant messages:

"Much socialisation is implicit and unconscious, taking place day-to-day through conversations and incidental observation and feedback. There may also be a formal training or educational element [the management development programme etc.], involving instruction, demonstration and possibly testing. Within this formal element there will be implicit socialisation currents as well as explicit ones, since the moral ethos is expressed in the nature of staff-learner, staff-staff and learner-learner interactions and transactions ..." (Snell 1993: 172)

Snell's appreciation of the significance of interactions taking place throughout management development courses resonates with Peters (1966) earlier analysis of 'education'. Peters argued that if something were to count as education then it needed to meet criteria concerning its matter, its manner and its cognitive content. Its matter had to be considered worthwhile by those committed to it. Its manner needed to be contrasted with conditioning or indoctrination. Finally, its cognitive content needed to be directed at helping a person transform their outlook. Thus, both Peters and Snell are alert to the value-paradigm that lies embedded in the overall enactment of the curriculum.

Before he outlines the practice of several principles of a critically pragmatic education he discusses the shortcomings of other curricular emphases. Snell suggests that the presentation of management ethics which takes as its basic formal purpose socialisation into the company (or occupation) emphasises rules and procedures, codes of ethics, stakeholder responsibility, trustworthiness in role and best practice. He recognises that the major concern with this approach is to mould the company member to the prevailing norms, attitudes and perspectives within a particular group. He believes that this type of learning design reflects 'stage four' principles (i.e. rules and procedures) although the actual course content can suggest concerns with pluralism, utilitarianism, justice and the Rawlsian 'maximin'
principle. He moves on, however, to capture a major problem likely to be encountered in this kind of programme and writes:

"Some company socialisation programmes, where what the company wants is clearly spelt out may, however, turn out to be counter productive in ethical terms. This is because the moral ethos of the programme may have a much greater impact on participants' ethical conduct than any formal message or learning agenda. An emphasis on conformity may simply tap into stage-three ('be nice') urges among participants to be seen to fit in with what is wanted, or even stage-two ('get the most for yourself') mentality: it is to their advantage to appear to care about ethics. Medium and message need to be aligned ..." (Snell 1993: 174)

Snell finds that the fundamental problem with the socialisation approach is that it can merely hope that the moral ethos (including the course itself) will support the ideals espoused on the programme. There appears to be little evidence that this is the case.

The 'cultural transmission/academic grounding approach relies on disseminating that body (or those bodies) of knowledge grown from within the academic communities. Snell thinks that:

"Management ethics education moulded and delivered in this tradition presents students with a selection of theories about ethics in a management context which have earned respect in academic circles. The preoccupations, issues and dilemmas (among academics) that have given rise to the theories also figure in the curriculum... " (Snell 1993: 175)

Perhaps a little unfairly, Snell contends that the 'academic grounding' approach remains 'deliberately inward looking' and is unconcerned with practical problems such as 'how to run a company on a sound ethical basis'. Nonetheless, the esoterically technical and obfuscatory language of 'high culture' does mean that this approach simply remains too inaccessible for most practitioners. It is probably unhelpful in relation to making a difference to practice.

Snell has kinder things to say about a curriculum emphasis that stresses 'citizen education and personal development'. He believes that 'citizen education' sets out:

"... to encourage other-centredness, sensitivity to social and communal phenomena and a general ability to enact stage five [Kohlbergian] principles." (Snell 1993: 176)
To be a good citizen entails personal development - and so citizen education is linked to a focus upon the personhood of the individual. Here, according to Snell, there is a major emphasis on a respect for one's rights rather than on the wider questions about collective responsibilities, communal obligations and civil liberties. Snell distances himself from the person-centred approach he perceives in Maclagan's work, writing:

"While the curriculum supported by Maclagan (1992) is extensive ... at least one key element is missing. Education for citizenship and personal development focuses exclusively on the problems of individuals. The shortcomings of a typical moral ethos - a collective problem if ever there was one - tend not to be addressed. 'Snell 1993: 177"

Here, as Snell leads his readership to consider the appeal of 'critical pragmatism' he raises the question ignored by the 'citizen education/personal development' approach: 'Why are things as bad for us as they are?'

In contrast to all these different emphases, education based upon a critically pragmatic perspective takes as its ultimate aim the removal of the barriers to the creation of better collective arrangements.

Snell takes the starting point for critical reflection the 'creative examination' of one's own day to day experience. Freire's (1972) pedagogy of the oppressed provides an example of a form of critical education. Here, using drawings of everyday encounters Freire was able to generate open discussions of 'power dynamics within an oppressed community'. Snell also cites Postman and Weingartner's (1969) work as illustrative of a critical approach to education. They enunciate one of its major principles in relation to the purpose of schools as follows:

"Our intellectual history is a chronicle of the anguish and suffering of men(sic) who tried to help their contemporaries see that some part of their fondest beliefs were misconceptions, faulty assumptions, superstitions and even downright lies." (Postman and Weingartner 1969: 16)

He also cites Walker and Boud (1992) who advocate the importance of critical reflection in the process of unveiling unconscious restraints and determined patterns of behaviour.
Critical reflection as part of a critically pragmatic education moves from a focus on the limitations to which a self has been subject to a focus on the collectivity - and hence the possibility of social transformation. Snell writes:

"Educating for the purpose of social transformation entails helping participants to draw connections between what appear, without critical reflection, to be a set of individual problems. This paves the way for the creative design of collective innovations and for the development of political skills. The underlying aim is to equip social activists with the ability to envisage direction for their community and openly negotiate ways forward with other members." (Snell 1993: 179)

The fact that critical pragmatism promises to help initiate processes of social transformation links managers to forms of moral leadership. If the educational process is concerned to examine limiting perspectives and the limiting social milieu generating these perspectives and then moves on to examine how to remove these limitations it is engaged in a process of exposing injustices. If persons who experience this mode of education and development subsequently act to reduce injustices then they are engaged in the practice of moral leadership.

He finds, however, that a critically pragmatic education is atypical in management development programmes. Citing the work of Anthony (1986) it appears that, at best, a critical approach to management might appear on MBA electives. The situation in 'staff colleges' is even worse. Indeed, of these contexts Anthony remarks:

"What cannot be permitted is the sort of rigorous analysis that would expose the company's policies as platitudinous and its objectives confused. It is often not corporate good that is pursued through management education, it is a particular view of the corporation and of its 'goals', generated by its chief executive and protected from critical attention by its management trainers." (Anthony 1986: 137)

Snell moves on to explain the practice of several principles in a critically pragmatic education. These principles include:

- advocating and defending the philosophy of critical pragmatism

- staff as guides, supportive stewards, and critical, reflexive co-learners

- recognising peer expertise
- grounding discovery in personal experience, subjecting it to critical reflection and reflexivity

- collective choice, responsibility, management and support

- maintaining a stage-five or stage-six moral ethos/learning climate

These principles illustrate the similarities between Snell's critical pragmatism and emancipatory action research. They can both be re-described as a form of inquiry emphasising a way of learning and developing which seeks both to release persons from restrictive psycho and social dynamics and to create social arrangements governed by robust ethical principles such as justice, benevolence, autonomy and pluralism.

**Design constraints**

Immediately having articulated the principles of a critically pragmatic education, Snell adds that these principles do not apply to short, 'one-off' workshops, seminars or conferences for managers because, at best these could only be 'tasters' for the more extensive educational processes attempting to make the principles come alive. I shall return to consider the implications of this observation when I note the 'design constraints' below.

Significantly, for the design of my inquiry, at the very conclusion of his text Snell recognises the 'institutional challenge' facing any design which embraces the principles of critical pragmatism and a stage-five moral ethos. Why does he make this assumption? He answers this by referring to five pre-suppositions. They are:

- The moral ethos in which management educators and developers work is typically at stage four or lower

- The moral ethos of a course is typically at stage four or lower

- The prevailing educational philosophy is typically very different from one of critical pragmatism

- Those aspiring to stage-five conduct will be under pressure to 'level down', i.e. to act in accordance with the prevailing moral ethos which is at a lower stage

- Critical pragmatists will be under pressure to conform to 'normal' educational
In response to his challenge, 'If these assumptions do not ring true in your situation, ask yourself: Am I seeing the world through rose-coloured spectacles?' I considered the extent to which his pre-suppositions accurately reflected the realities of the Police Staff College.

Was the moral ethos in which the management educators and developers worked a stage four (or lower) ethos? To the extent that the dominant culture within the Police Staff College was a police culture and that this culture was perhaps best characterised by a stage four moral ethos then this first pre-supposition is supported.

Was the moral ethos of the management development course itself at stage four or lower? No straightforward answer can be given to this question. The emphasis on 'facilitation and student centred learning' was on the wane. The competence framework of the Management Charter Initiative was serving as a backdrop to the middle management programme(s) and the 'new managerialism' with its emphasis upon performance indicators and performance management was creating a new atmosphere of discipline and rigour, as well as control and conformity. Together these factors made it difficult to see how the course milieu genuinely rose above stage four.

Was the prevailing educational philosophy very different from one of critical pragmatism? The course philosophies were admixtures of occupational socialisation, rites de passage, and holistic personal development. There was, in fact, almost a complete absence of any critical perspective voiced by Snell with his question; 'Why are things as bad for us as they are? or by action researchers in the emancipatory tradition of Carr and Kemmis with their concerns to help unshackle people from the rigid bonds of restrictive social and political structures.

Did those aspiring to stage-five conduct find themselves under pressure to 'level down', i.e. to act in accordance with the prevailing lower-stage moral ethos? To the extent that staff were gradually losing their autonomy and were being required to deliver an increasingly standardised 'quality controlled' curriculum then they were, I think, under pressure to 'level down'. This was exacerbated by pressures from course participants who were unfamiliar with taking a proactive stance in relation to managing their own learning and helping others achieve their learning goals.

Were 'would be' critical pragmatists under pressure to conform to 'normal'
educational principles and practices? Three facts suggest that the tutorial staff were not encouraged to be critical pragmatists. First, the tutorial staff were expected to deliver a standardised curriculum and were subject to bureaucratic assessment processes. Second a training rather than educational emphasis had come to dominate at Bramshill. Third, the curriculum privileged the techniques of management and leadership and suppressed any sustained analysis concerning the interests served by these technologies.

In design terms I recognised that launching a full 'critically pragmatic' design was unrealistic. I was, after Habermas, about to 'conduct a political struggle' and I thought it naïve to jeopardise the new venture by introducing an approach that was alien to the institution. In addition, I could not afford to overlook the findings reported by Plumridge (1988) concerning the organisational milieu of police - a power and role culture - and his observations concerning the difficulties of introducing changes to the college curriculum. In an institutional context dominated by police officers I would need to conduct the political struggle by finding a content and methods that were sympathetic to the needs and interests of the client group.

I also recognised that the work of ethicists such as Richards and Kleinig inclined towards the 'cultural transmission/academic grounding' curriculum emphasis. In the light of the earlier experiences concerning ethics education - some ten years previously - I thought it more sensible and educationally defensible to position the design of ethics education on the boundaries of the 'organisation citizenship/personal development' and 'critical pragmatism/social transformation' models. I wanted to appeal to that aspect of the police service and its officers concerned with the pursuit of social justice and the joint solving of social problems.

I was situated in a particular context with limited resources and limited opportunities. Precisely because of this it was unrealistic for me to offer a full-blown 'course of study' in ethics. I would have the opportunity of operating partly in the 'workshop' mode exemplified by Jackson (1993). Jackson had asked; 'How can ethics be taught?' and had suggested a 'workshop' design 'the chief goal' of which was 'to accustom participants to thinking in terms of ethics by making them comfortable with the term, linking it to other people and words with which they are more comfortable'. This goal contrasts with the goals stated for a course in a typical degree programme which Jackson, building upon the work of Steinfels (1977), Fleishman and Payne (1980), Worthley (1981) and Rohr (1989) summarises as follows:
- The recognition of ethical issues
- A deepened comprehension of ethics
- Sustained ethical analysis
- Contact with exemplary instances of ethical analysis

My task was problematic because I did not have the opportunity to develop relationships with students over time and thereby enjoy any special rapport that might come emerge. Perhaps, at best, I could create an extended workshop form of design and hope that those more profound goals that Jackson identifies would be attained as a result of commitments by individuals to their own professional development. I could, however, call upon the support of a range of colleagues who, in different ways had expressed a willingness to support me in the new venture.

**The nature of my educational emphasis**

I had clarified the links between critical pragmatism (and social transformation) and emancipatory action research. I had also recognised the contextual factors which militated against the immediate full adoption of these approaches. However, the educational culture at the Police Staff College did have familiarity with Heron's (1977b, 1989) models of holistic education - which had come to stress the values of authentic hierarchy, co-operation and autonomy in the design of educational interventions.

I decided, therefore, to suggest to staff that the first three weeks of the leadership development programme should focus on reproducing the learning community designs pioneered by Heron during his association with the University of Surrey and then allow this emphasis on self-and-peer managed learning to be carried through into the second phase of the course when the series of focused modules would, in turn, be offered to the course.

At the level of my own personal practice I was influenced by the inspirational accounts of practice that I had encountered in the scholarly literature on teachers and teaching. Quite specifically Kohl's (1967) work served to guide my own practice. In 'Thirty six children', Kohl investigates how he approached teaching thirty six black children (aged ten and fourteen) in Harlem, New York City. Kohl had received a single 'orientation' session at the school the day before he provides this account:
"I remembered my barren classroom, no books, a battered piano, broken windows and desks, falling plaster, and an oppressive darkness.

I was handed a roll book with thirty six names and thirty six cumulative record cards, years of judgements already passed upon the children, their official personalities .... Then I locked away the record cards in a closet. The children would tell me who they were. Each child, each new school year, is potentially many things, only one of which the cumulative record card documents. It is amazing how 'emotional' problems can disappear, how the dullest child can be transformed into the keenest, and the brightest into the most ordinary when the prefabricated judgements of other teachers are forgotten.

The children entered at nine and filled up the seats. They were silent and stared at me. It was a shock to see thirty-six black faces before me. No preparation helped. It is one thing to be liberal and talk, another to face something and learn that you're afraid." (Kohl, 1967: 10)

After personal and professional struggles, learning and inspiration, Kohl was able to develop the children, and, to achieve, in comparison with the expectations of the educational system, exceptional results. He was concerned to appreciate the experience, interests and energies of those children. Kohl used Greek mythology, history, newspapers, dance music and lyrics, and the concerns facing the children in Harlem, rather than the inappropriate texts, curricula and learning structures of the mainstream system. Subjects, in short, were made to 'come alive'.

This is what I hoped for with ethics education. I wanted it to 'come alive'.

I wanted to include in the design, a range of learning opportunities marked by variety and contrast and in which texts, presentations and learning structures made 'ethics' come alive. In this way, I began to lay down the preliminary framework which served as a precursor to the subsequent action research inquiry. I had also been influenced by Rogers (1961) declaration on teaching and learning as well as his subsequent development of the practice of humanistic education and I adopted these principles as a backdrop to my work.

I prepared an outline of these principles (which is included at Appendix E) and which I made available to any interested student attending courses of study at Bramshill.
The radical possibilities in humanistic education

The radical possibilities in humanistic education are not apparent in some of the major anthologies of writings on an humanistic approach to education. Thus, for example, Roberts (1975) and, Eiben and Milliren (1976) include many discussions which explore the practice of humanistic education but these promote the pursuit of individualism and focus on the person and self-centred development. However, Shaffer (1978) and Graham (1986) had recognised that humanistic psychology addressed the nature of human being and human becoming and, in virtue of this, acknowledged the reciprocal dialectical nature of social arrangements and persons.

The political, critical and emancipatory aspect of humanistic psychology is made salient in Heron's (1977a) critique of the 'non-cathartic' society. In that work Heron focuses upon the nature of human distress. He states his main 'theoretical suggestion' concerning personal distress by contending that there is, in human beings, not only the anger, fear and grief - whose equivalents are found in animals - but also anger fear and grief that is the result of interference with personal needs - both in the infant and the adult.

Heron asserts that, *sui generis*, human beings have needs for love, understanding and choice. He finds though, evidence to suggest that these needs are systematically unmet in the 'rigid society' and that the consequences of this are widely apparent in our culture. He contrasts the types of behaviour which emerge when personal needs are fulfilled with 'distorted human behaviour' and of the latter he writes:

"When personal needs are interfered with or suspended in some way and their proper fulfilment occluded and suppressed, then behaviour is distorted into half-conscious, quasi-mechanical, repetitive, maladaptive forms. Humans become the confused victims of disrupted psychological processes that play themselves out in behaviour in a relatively unaware and uncontrolled way. The point about distorted behaviour is that it is ... blind, repetitive, unproductive, dissatisfying to the person who is not in charge of it ..." (Heron 1977a: 7)

He then adds:

"Distorted behaviour is above all compulsive. It appears to be very widespread throughout the culture" (Heron 1977a: 7,8)

From his analysis, it follows that compulsive and conventional people make up a substantial part of the rigid society and perpetuate, unawarely, its dysfunctional
character. He writes:

"The personal needs of a great number of people can be systematically interfered with in rigid organisations and societies in which there is political oppression, economic exploitation, denial of human rights. Personal needs here may be almost totally negated, or their fulfilment may only be tolerated up to a point and in certain restricted social areas ..." (Heron, 1977a: 14)

Heron exemplifies the nature of the repressive society by describing the 'external oppressor's voice'. It expresses itself with injunctions such as:

"Don't do this, don't do that; don't be this, don't be that. You should/ought/must do/be other than you are doing/being" (Heron 1977a: 30)

He notes that the correlate of this is 'the conformist's voice' which says:

"I'm no good. I should be other than I am. I should and shall behave in ways that they demand and expect. This is the correlate of [the external oppressor] so that the person becomes her own internal moralistic oppressor, putting herself down and thereby sustaining the suppression both of her deeper human needs and the resultant distress." (Heron 1977a: 31)

This analysis points to the fundamental and dialectical link between collective social forms and the making of persons. Here Heron makes a connection between the social and the personal.

Following Heron (1977b) I was attempting to move away from 'prescriptive education and training' towards a process which was more holistic and 'catalytic'. A prescriptive education and training is characterised by the tutor making all the decisions concerning the purposes, content, methods and evaluation of the learning process. This is the 'traditional' expert-driven model of education. As Heron points out, it may also be called the 'authoritarian' model since it excludes any genuine educational democracy. By this he means that on all significant matters of educational substance the student is not consulted nor given a voice in the design and 'delivery' of the educational events.

Heron sums up prescriptive education and training by highlighting the 'unilateral' nature of its educational decision-making about all the main components of an educational design i.e. student learning goals, the teaching and learning methods to be used, the way the topics, teaching and learning methods etc, are assembled,
Since one of my overall objectives for the ethics education experience was that participants become involved and reflect the characteristics of educated persons (i.e. are self-determining, self-monitoring and self-adjusting) as they develop towards autonomous professionals, prescriptive education and training seemed to be an inappropriate way of securing these outcomes.

An alternative is characterised in Heron's scheme as 'catalytic education and training'. Heron conceives of catalytic education as reflecting education in its original sense:

"Catalytic education is education in the original sense of drawing the student out: facilitating information-giving, independent thinking, self-directed problem solving, self-discovery, self-insight." (Heron, 1977b:10)

In catalytic education and training the tutor consults students about programme design, learning methods and facilitates some measure of self and peer assessment and collaborative assessment with staff.

Heron briefly and concisely outlines the features of catalytic education and training as follows:

"The following list sketches out some of the many possibilities for catalytic education and training.

1. The tutor and student conjointly make decisions about, or the tutor invites the student individually or with his (sic) peers to make decisions about:

   a) Student learning objectives in terms of knowledge, attitudes, skills - in relation to data, things, persons

   b) Teaching and learning methods to be used

   c) Course design: topics and their sequencing, interrelated with teaching and learning methods, time available and pacing of learning, human resources, material resources such as books etc.

   d) Assessment of student work: criteria to be applied, method of applying them,
applying them

e) Evaluation of teaching and of the course as a whole: criteria, methods, application

*If the students are involved in decision-making in all these areas then we have the full-blown peer learning community, the tutor merely being a special facilitative resource among peers.*" (Heron 1977b: 18)

The complex of a critically pragmatic educational designs, emancipatory action research and a radical humanistic psychology constituted the foundational ideas upon which I wanted to base an ethics education for police leaders and managers.

I wanted the first trials of 'ethics education' to begin the long process of building support for the subject. To do this, I needed sufficient of the student group to express a positive response to their experience with the educational processes and events. I also needed the staff to support the venture. It was possible to sustain the delivery of a topic on the curriculum if staff thought it valuable and necessary - but there were never guarantees that such support could be relied upon.

This review of the areas of the content areas and educational designs enabled me to conclude my preparations for re-introducing the subject ethics. The action research inquiry would begin by emphasising the 'problem-solving' cycles of action research and take as its ambition emancipatory action research.

*Concluding the preparatory stage*

Emerging from the foundational stage of the inquiry were the following achievements:

- a developing rationale for police ethics education (see chapter two)

- an appreciation of the major issues and problems with which police ethics deals

- the establishment of an explicitly stated purpose and aims for ethics education

- first sketches concerning an appropriate 'ethics education' content for police leaders and managers

- the beginnings of an integration with ethics and other areas in management
development (e.g. quality management, counselling, the duty of care, the moral basis of leadership etc.).

- the first experiences connected with the actual re-introduction of ethics onto the police leadership and management development curriculum

It is to this first experience that I shall now turn.
Part Two

Cycles or phases of action research

The second part of the dissertation traces the unfolding stages of the action research inquiry from the initial re-introduction of 'ethics' to the police middle-management programme in the Summer and Autumn of 1993 until its termination in the Spring of 1998.

Chapter Six describes the nature of the educational design constituting the re-introduction of the subject 'ethics' to the Leadership Development Programme. This phase of the project was considered a 'preliminary' stage.

Chapter Seven outlines the first full action research cycle entitled: 'In search of the perfect design'.

Chapter Eight describes the second full action research cycle characterised as 'Eclecticism and pragmatics'.

Chapter Nine examines the 'Case study' emphasis adopted in the third full cycle of action research.

Chapter Ten elaborates on the event provoking a final attempt to secure a positive valuation for the 'ethics education experience', adumbrates the nature of the final design, and notes how, despite the foregoing stages of research and learning, 'ethics' was removed from the content of the police middle-management programme.

Part Two of this dissertation concludes with an indication that the 'story' was not yet over and that 'ethics' came to feature again, at a later date, as a named area of study on the middle-management programme.
Chapter six

Action research and a developing ethics education for police leaders and managers: the preliminary stage

"In the not so distant days when Auvergne farms were virtually self-sufficient, the kitchen garden lived up to its name, providing a wide variety of vegetables for the stewpot. Things have not changed much today: most gardens, both in the countryside and, more surprisingly, in towns, are given over almost entirely to the growing of vegetables and fruit.... As the climate is often harsh because of the altitude, pride of place is given to hardy vegetables such as cabbage and Swiss chard, both of which occupy an important place in Auvergnat cuisine. Potatoes are also a staple. They are often imaginatively combined with cheese ... This was not always so: potatoes were viewed with suspicion when first introduced towards the end of the eighteenth century. Garlic, shallots and onions are all widely grown ... Courgettes, which appeared in Auvergnat shops only some twenty years ago, have since caught on as garden vegetables .... Usually Auvergnat culinary conservatism repels all intruders. Basil, for example, despite promotion on countless radio and television programmes and in magazine and newspaper recipes, has totally failed to gain a foothold in the Auvergnat kitchen garden, where the only herbs generally to be found are parsley, chives and, sometimes, tarragon." (Graham, 1999: 142,143)

The foundations for my inquiry had been established. I had constructed a rationale for including the teaching of ethics to police leaders and managers, identified themes and issues concerning 'police ethics' in the literature and, reviewed educational approaches commensurate with my epistemological framework. In this chapter I will describe the actual re-introduction of 'ethics' to the police leadership development curriculum, comment on the development of an 'ethics module' and conclude with a summary of the main learnings I had begun to derive from the experience.

Re-introducing ethics to the police leadership development curriculum - the first trials

I realised that it was unwise to risk employing a full-blown application of Heron's catalytic education model because I needed to avoid an outright rejection of 'ethics'. Because of the decision-making realities at Bramshill, I had to try and secure a positive reaction to any first attempt to re-introduce the subject at 'whole course' level. I also realised that I did not have sufficient time, experiential or intellectual
resources to facilitate an authentic student-centred inquiry - beginning with individual participants establishing their learning goals. I had sufficient evidence that the police occupational cultural experience did not sit comfortably with the complexities of an emergent curriculum necessarily entailed by such an approach. I would try to establish an accurate introduction to ethics and then include a sufficient variety of learning activities in order to provide a content that would, hopefully, engage the interest of the majority of the participants.

I actively solicited support from all those members of staff who had some expertise in or sympathies for the subject of ethics and by November 1993 I was able to produce an 'ethics' module for the Leadership Development Programme. Here, I shall reproduce the outline details of that module. Full details were distributed on 1 November 1993 to the seventy four officers attending the course. In addition, they were instructed to review a preliminary package containing an overview of police strategic emphases for the 1990s.

This included a précis of Woodcock's (1992) paper, 'Trust in the police - the search for truth' as well as a summary of the four themes constituting the new 'quality of service' philosophy:

- quality management
- professional ethics
- value for money
- performance indicators

The questionnaire referred to in the briefing notes was the first version of an instrument later to be entitled the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'. The idea behind the inclusion of such an instrument was for it both to catalyse debate amongst participants and to discover the data patterns emerging from the responses to the questions. These patterns could then be reflected back into succeeding modules and thereby strengthen the content of 'ethics education'.

The members of staff included Neil Richards who had first introduced ethics as a named area of study to the command courses at Bramshill and Peter Villiers, who, later came to write the book 'Better Police Ethics'. In addition James Dickinson who delivered the presentation to the 'Quality of Service' seminar in December 1992 outlining the draft statement of ethical principles for the Police Service had
agreed to participate. A number of police officers seconded to the tutorial staff of the college were also willing to help with the content of 'ethics' on the Leadership Development Programme.

Was this a design for a 'critical education'? Habermas had mentioned both the development of the organisation for enlightenment and the subsequent conducting of the political struggle. The design for an ethics education attempted to be 'critical' in the sense that it presented an answer to the question, 'How ought one to act?' (and thereby sought to provide a critique of the contemporary ways persons are constrained and organised) and I understood my work with both staff and students to reflect an attempt to create basic forms of an 'organisation for enlightenment'. I was also conducting a political struggle which involved securing the support and participation of my colleagues and I was consciously exploiting my role and status within the college. However, tested against the principles advanced by Snell, the criteria for emancipatory action research in Kemmis and McTaggart, and, Heron's catalytic education model, the design was staff-led - and only provided a freedom to learn within the staff-determined structures.

Did the design include a content aligned with Kleinig's (1990) recommendations for a police ethics syllabus (i.e. a general introduction to moral philosophy; examining codes of police ethics; case studies; and, middle-level inquiries)? The programme was designed to include some reference to the nature of moral philosophy, a consideration of the police service statement of ethical principles, a case study - through the examination of crime investigation, and, middle level inquiries - which were raised in the course of the lectures and the workshops. Thus, at least to a minimal degree, all Kleinig’s recommended content areas were to be addressed.

An outline of the 'ethics module' that constituted a reintroduction of 'ethics' to the Police Middle Management Development Programme

The details of the ethics module, entitled 'practical ethics' (the original full document is included at Appendix F), were presented at a briefing to the staff of the Leadership Development Programme on 1 November 1993. The information included the following:

The Ethics programme

Here is the ethics programme together with an example of the ethics questionnaire which all course members will be given on Thursday morning. We suggest that you
use part of the time between 1100 hrs and 1250 hrs on Thursday 4 November to push your syndicate well forward on this questionnaire, which must be completed and handed in by the following morning at 0830 hrs. One way of achieving this is to make one member of the syndicate responsible for leading a discussion on each of the five sections of the questionnaire, i.e. Moral development; Moral dilemmas; Self-perception of personal ethical standards; the moral character of the police organisation; and, Your response to the statement of ethical principles.

**Practical ethics**

**Aim:** To bring ethics to life

**Objectives:**

- To explore and understand the nature of ethics and the relationship between ethics and morality
- To explore and grasp the need for a code of ethics in the police service
- To explore and resolve ethical dilemmas arising as practical difficulties

**Part One (the morning of Thursday 4 November)**

**Lecture: 'Ethics introduced' - Robert Adlam**

- The subject of ethics introduced and defined
- The nature of obligation; How ought we to act?
- The nature of moral value; What is an exemplary person?
- Barriers to ethical behaviour
- Reference to research questionnaire

**Lecture: 'Professional ethics' - Peter Villiers**

- Authority and obedience explored
- What does it mean to say 'no'?
- Ethics, values and loyalty
- Professional ethics
- Importance of the questionnaire

**Syndicate rooms - Initial analysis and completion of questionnaire**
Part Two (All day, Monday 8 November)

Talk: 'Ethics and the pursuit of the good life' - Robert Adlam

Questions and reference to the research questionnaire - Robert Adlam

Talk: 'Ethics and crime investigation' - Brendan Gibb-Gray

Syndicate rooms - A choice of workshops 1400 hrs - 1730 hrs

These included:
- The Police service statement of ethical principles - what do we think of it - are we happy with it? - Paul Forrester
- Ethics, integrity and choice - Neil Richards
- Ethics in Public life - Bernard Sleigh

Part Three: Lecture Room D - Whole course

Summary of research findings - Robert Adlam

The code: developments - James Dickinson

As a staff we were all anxious about the outcome. I was especially worried because I had instigated this re-introduction and had risked exposing my colleagues to the critical scrutiny of the student body.

In the following illustrative vignette, I have attempted to communicate the atmosphere and 'essence' of the educational event.

An illustrative vignette: 'I suppose we're going to be ethically cleansed'

To an extent we had all become a little more sensitised to 'ethics': news broadcasts and programmes had told us that British peacekeeping troops had been sent to Bosnia in October 1992. The United Nations Protection Force was operating in the former Yugoslavia and the shocking horrors of 'ethnic cleansing' had entered the national consciousness.

The atmosphere, in the amphitheatre, (Lecture Room D) where I was about to give the first lecture of the 'ethics module' was simultaneously expectant and sceptical.
There was an animated buzz in the air. The seventy four chief inspectors on the programme had spent three weeks devoted to 'self-development and personal awareness', 'interpersonal skills', 'group and team effectiveness' and the study of a range of management skills - from 'assertiveness' to 'conflict-management' in syndicates. Those six syndicates had developed different operating norms (and localised cultures); they had also developed different valuations of the content and educational methods. For some groups it was a relief to end the 'navel-gazing airy-fairy world of Bramshill speak'. Anything different promised to be a relief from the 'whale music and bean bags'. For other groups the shift to a structured 'input' - where tasks were predetermined and students were expected to adhere to a patterned educational design was an unwelcome imposition.

Ethics was also something 'new'. 'What's this going to be about, Rob?' I was asked by an officer seated close to me - as I was about to begin my first presentation.

'You'll see', I replied: 'I hope it will be interesting for you'.

A passion overtook me as I began. Momentarily I remembered the images of the Nazi death camps and the mutilated bodies of the Rwandans and Bosnians. And I remembered the scathing critique of 'totalitarian man' that Skvorecky, had written in his novelette, 'Emoke':

"Naturally there is no such thing as a superman, but it always seemed to me that there is such a thing as a subhuman. He exists, he is among us for all the days of the world, like Jesus' poor, except that the submen aren't poor ... who with no qualms assert the absolute priority of their bellies, their imagined (but to them indisputable) rights and broadcast their own inanity in speeches about their infallibility, always ready to judge others, to condemn others, not for an instant doubting their own perfection, not for a moment contemplating the meaning of their own existence, deriding morality as outdated ... they never realise that they are simply a terrible emptiness bounded by skin and bones, leaving in their wake traces of lesser or greater pain, ruined lives, wrecked existences jobs spoiled, tasks undone ... and dull and sordid cynicism." (Skvorecky, 1980: 68)

Wisely or not, I dedicated my opening lecture to 'the people of Sarajevo and Srebrenica, of Vitaz and Mostar'.

'I suppose we're going to be ethically cleansed', observed a confident wag - from the far end of the amphitheatre.
I had become accustomed to police humour and, silently, I reminded myself: 'These people haven't asked to come here'.

As I developed my presentation and paused occasionally to include pieces of video in an attempt to underline or illustrate my points, the audience listened - some patiently, others thoughtfully and some again, earnestly. I imagined the contrast between my delivery and the careful, analytic and deliberate development of empirically based or rational/conceptual argument in the university lecture theatre or seminar group. Mine was an educational process close to 'theatre' and close to a form of gladiatorial combat. The verdict could be equally clear-cut and damning. I tried to use my passion to get me through to the end.

My colleagues' presentations also evoked metaphors of combat and cabaret: Peter Villiers drew from the dramas of his experiences as an intelligence officer in Northern Ireland; Brendan Gibb-Gray discussed the police role in the criminal justice system and, using as a backdrop slides of the blood-spattered body of a murdered prostitute, (taken during the investigation of a murder inquiry in which he was a senior detective) urged the audience to jettison their 'cultural baggage' and become disinterested impartial seekers of truth. James Dickinson presented a vivid case study involving misplaced loyalty and the propensity for police to 'cover up' for their colleagues. The atmosphere became chilly.

Once the demands of 'performance' were over, the workshops revealed different and important phenomena. I had decided to work with the energy in the group. They had heard a great deal from me. But, what had they to say about 'ethics'? I suggested that we 'pick up on' any issue they wanted to discuss. For the first half an hour we considered the problem of ethical relativism, the sources of moral corruption, the problem of the police culture and then one officer remarked:

'Look - Rob, I know you're a believer but I think we can counter each of the eleven statements of ethical principle with a more realistic statement of unethical principles'.

'That's interesting - what might the top eleven statements of ethical principle be?' I replied.

The fifteen officers in the group set about organising themselves to identify the list.

After tea they presented me the following printed notes, entitled: 'The Police Service top ten - plus one - unethical statements':
I enjoyed the laughter that accompanied their work. They seemed to have had fun. Here, again, though, was drawn the contrast between organisations 'fit to house the human spirit' and the experienced realities. As the workshop ended, one officer quietly mentioned to me:

'You're ahead of your time. Keep it going. Take the flak. Keep at it. It's important'

**A simple evaluation:**

However, were we as a team of tutors and presenters 'successful'? At the end of the module each member of each syndicate completed an evaluation of the 'ethics module'. Despite a number of reservations concerning this method of judging the work of the tutorial staff at Bramshill it constituted the major basis for decision-making concerning any substantive course content.

Overall, we had managed to survive. We were trying to obtain a rating that was below 3 (the 'mid-point') - on each of the criteria, where a rating of 1 was positive and a rating of 5 was negative. On six of the nine criteria the ratings leaned slightly towards the positive pole. On three of the nine criteria the ratings were leaning slightly towards the negative pole. The most positive rating was given to criterion three - 'I found that the module was sufficiently intellectually demanding' versus 'I did not find the course sufficiently intellectually demanding' whilst the most negative rating was given to criterion five - 'The module struck the right balance between practical and theoretical work' versus 'I thought the course was too academic and theoretical/practical'.
Table 1: Means and Standard deviations of ratings on nine evaluation criteria: (N = 74 students)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Mean score</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 'The module contained a great deal of new information versus 'the module included little that was new to me'</td>
<td>2.813</td>
<td>1.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 'The module fully met its stated objectives' versus 'The module did not fully meet its stated objectives'</td>
<td>2.932</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I found the module was sufficiently intellectually demanding' versus 'I did not find the course sufficiently intellectually demanding'</td>
<td>2.419</td>
<td>0.811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 'The module had the right focus for me' versus 'The module did not have the right focus for me'</td>
<td>3.067</td>
<td>1.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 'The module struck the right balance between practical and theoretical work' versus 'I thought the module was too academic and theoretical (or too practical)'</td>
<td>3.365</td>
<td>1.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 'The course was highly relevant to the work I will have to do' versus 'The course had little relevance to the work I will have to do'</td>
<td>3.122</td>
<td>0.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: 'I thought the amount of work I had to do was about right' versus 'I found that there was too little/too much to do'</td>
<td>2.986</td>
<td>0.914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: 'I liked the structure of the module' versus 'I did not like the structure of the module'</td>
<td>2.985</td>
<td>1.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: 'I thought that the tutor(s) was/were fully competent' versus 'I did not think the tutor(s) was/were fully competent'</td>
<td>2.905</td>
<td>0.796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whilst I had hoped for a more positive outcome I was pleased that the re-
introduction of ethics to a major programme of study at Bramshill had managed, at least, to avoid an outright rejection from the client group as a whole. I felt that a platform had been established and that the next stage would be to consolidate and to try and incorporate some of the findings emerging from the responses to the questionnaire(s). I also wanted to feel a greater sense of mastery over the actual material I was presenting and developing, and, I wanted to find ways of working with the issues and concerns of the client group itself. In this way, after determining the content for an ethics education and organising for its re-introduction I had completed the preliminary process of beginning an action research inquiry.

**Reflection and stock taking**

The preparatory process and subsequent re-introduction of ethics to the middle-management programme, in the latter part of 1993, corresponded to Lewin's (1946) ideas of 'planning', 'executing the plan' and 'reconnaissance'. I had wanted to create an ethics education that was marked by a variety of learning methods and structures - as well as a range of topic areas - in the hope that it might interest and engage a majority of the client group. In the preliminary stage of the inquiry process, I - with a small number of interested colleagues - wanted, initially, to develop a picture of how our clients would react to the essential contours of the subject, 'ethics', as well as our attempts to examine issues of contemporary relevance to police managers.

The re-introduction enabled me to learn how to use the language of ethics (in the sense that I could, fluently, describe different theoretical perspectives without recourse to notes) and to develop the specific content of a number of different learning structures. The lectures I developed were based on a number of introductions to the subject 'ethics'. These included Frankena's (1973) clarification of the nature of ethics - including a discussion of the dilemma facing Socrates described by Plato in the Crito - and his outline of the major theories of normative ethics, Mackie's (1977) sketch of a practical morality, Warnock's (1967) examination of the purpose of morality, Williams (1993) delineation of the major concepts deployed in ethical discourse, and, Singer's (1993b) extensive collection of papers outlining the major theories of ethics and the major issues which attract ethical debate.

I also made reference to the facts of the holocaust, and the ways in which ethicists have discussed this terrible and dreadful tragedy. I included, for example, the remark made by Bauman (1993) which invites us to be endlessly alert to our potential for complicity in the perpetuation of evil. He writes:
"One needs to be defeated first to be accused of immorality, and for the charge to stick. Leaders of Nazi Germany who ordered extermination have been judged, sentenced, and hanged - and their deeds, which would have gone down in history textbooks as the story of human ascent had Germany been victorious, have been classified as crimes against humanity. The verdict is safe ... It will stand until cards are reshuffled and so historical memory is reshuffled to suit new hands.' (Bauman 1993: 226,227)

Whenever I referred to this observation during the course of my lectures, I would recommend that if anything were to be taken from the study of 'ethics' this, of all things, might be the most important.

I tried, through the presentation of this latter material, to convey a sense of the perils liable to emerge if persons (or groups of persons) were denied a fully human status. However, to avoid conveying any sense that ethics was only concerned with extremes I also emphasised the 'everydayness' of ethics. Following Wittgenstein (1953), I noted that our particular actions are embedded in larger projects which, typically, are concerned with achieving a worthwhile state of affairs - and if we examine the nature of that state of affairs we would find that it had a moral character.

The first informal version of the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire' had begun to reveal some data patterns that I was able to include in my presentations to course members. The purpose of this was to help stimulate and sustain processes of 'self-exploration' and to stimulate reflection on the ethics of the police organisation. Amongst the first set of findings were the following:

- one in five of the client group felt that they had been corrupted by the police experience. A similar proportion indicated that they had been 'tested' by the policing experience and after an initial decline in their ethical standards had re-established a strong moral foundation to their professional lives

- of the ethical dilemmas they chose to identify, the largest proportion (more than half) concerned the conduct and/or actions of their fellow officers

- in the main, the officers attending the middle-management programme expressed a positive response to the draft statement of ethical principles

- a majority of officers pointed to the police culture as a barrier to ethical conduct
- almost all officers indicated that they were 'very highly' or 'very' ethical

- a majority of officers inclined towards a 'tragic' perspective on humankind compared with those who held a 'cynic' perspective (Ker Muir, 1977)

These (and other) data suggested that although some overall trends were present the moral landscape of police was marked as much by heterogeneity as homogeneity.

**New developments**

Whilst these developments were occurring, the design of the Leadership Development Programme (LDP) as a whole allowed the staff at Bramshill to continue examining how to present and integrate both a 'student-centred' phase and a subsequent non-negotiable core subject/topic curriculum.

However, in the summer of 1994 we were to learn that the Leadership Development Programme was to be the last of its type in the history of the Police Staff College. According to the rhetoric of the most senior police and civilian staff at Bramshill, pressures towards the 'professionalisation' of policing had led the police service to wish for (and call for) programmes of study leading to nationally recognised qualifications. The syndicate-based seven-week long course structure of the Leadership Development Programme was to give way to a new modular design, the 'Police Management Programme'. I shall outline the nature of this latter programme and the nature and evaluation of 'ethics education' on that programme in a later section of this chapter. Before I do so, I shall provide a summary of the final delivery of 'ethics' on the Leadership Development Programme. This latter design, in comparison with that presented fourteen months earlier, illustrates our attempt to make changes in order to 'reach' as many of the client group as possible.

In February 1995 - four programme deliveries after the initial re-introduction of 'ethics' in November 1993 - the programme was entitled: 'Leadership, values and cultural change'. It was accompanied with short biographical details of the various contributors as well as selected readings on leadership. It also included an outline of Beabout and Wannemann's hierarchy of ethical principles - which, following the teaching methods used by Childress (1991) including his design for helping to resolve ethical dilemmas - constituted my attempt to provide course participants with a framework to consider employing when dealing with moral dilemmas. Here, I should add that, whilst I agreed with the scepticism expressed by Donahue and Felts (1993) concerning the use of any technical formulae for the development of ethics, the intention behind such an inclusion was to demonstrate that some
'practical guidelines' for making 'progress' in ethics did exist (Moreover, I had, I think, a duty to make them available.)

With the assistance of my colleague, Peter Villiers we designed a programme, the outline details of which are described below.

The programme itself ran from 7 - 10 February 1995. Course participants were given the following information:

'Introduction:

*Over the next ten years the police service needs to:*

- raise the quality of leadership
- demonstrate ethically acceptable professional standards; and
- make (selective) changes to police culture

*You are the key ingredient for putting ideals into practice.*

This programme gives you the opportunity to investigate and debate what is wrong and what is right, and to decide what to do about it.

At 1400 hrs in the afternoon of Tuesday 7 February, the programme was launched by Assistant Chief Constable Ian Blair (then of the Thames Valley Police and subsequently to become the Chief Constable of Surrey Police) who examined the following three areas:

- *Applied police ethics*
- *Police work and corruption*
- *The need for an ethical code*

This was followed by a process of 'ethical stock-taking' in the six syndicates (each composed of twelve officers) using what was now publicly described as the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire' - and some preparation for syndicate presentations to the whole course. The purpose of the 'ethical-stock taking' session was to allow course participants to note down their responses to a range of questions on the questionnaire and to continue to use the data patterns emerging to strengthen the content of subsequent 'ethics' deliveries.
The programme design for Wednesday 8 February was as follows:

0900 - 1040

'Ethics, values and morality: a general introduction to ethics as a practical basis for decision making'. Robert Adlam

- The subject of ethics introduced and defined
- The nature of obligation. How ought we to act?
- The nature of moral value. What is an exemplary person?
- Barriers to ethical behaviour
- Research on police ethics

1100 - 1245

Robert Adlam and Peter Villiers

- The reinvention of police
- The ethical profile of the police middle-manager revisited
- Law, morality and liberal democracy
- The fundamental role of the police

1400 - 1700

'The police culture' - Paul Dennison (Co-director, the Strategic Command Course)

1900 - 2000

'On Leadership' - Geoffrey Dear, Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary (HMI)

On Thursday 9 February the focus moved initially towards a study of leadership before returning in the afternoon to a series of seminars within which practical ethical dilemmas were explored. This culminated in a debate on ethics conducted by course participants. The motion for debate was: 'This house believes that police culture is a force for good'.

Finally each of the six syndicate groups reconvened for a discussion, review and critique of the programme.
This design expressed a particular rationale and a distinct way of working that we had come to develop whilst we had the responsibility for managing the programme delivery to large groups of middle managers. First, in order to give the programme 'gravitas' we included two very senior police officers. One took an uncompromising view about the need to take seriously the subject 'ethics' and to confront directly, corruption or moral sloth in the workplace. The other stressed the need for police leaders to demonstrate 'morally-principled' leadership and advocated taking the 'moral highground' in the 'fight' against the criminal. Second, the central presentations given by Peter Villiers and myself were quasi-dramatic performances. We both used evocative storytelling and some theatricality to animate those aspects of the subject we were dealing with. We knew that if, for example, we referred too closely to notes we ran the risk of being perceived as 'not knowing' our subject. Third, a majority of the learning structures within the design involved the active participation of the client group. They were assigned a number of tasks - including the managing of the final 'whole-course' debate. In this way we attempted to provide moments of action and reflection, encounter and silence, intellectual stimulation and the sharing of experiences.

How was this design received?

The syndicate directors issued the course evaluation forms from which it was possible to gauge, crudely, how the experience had been valued. They also provided me with their observations concerning patterns of response amongst the syndicate groups.

On the rating scales we achieved the following results: (I have included, in brackets, the means and standard deviations of the first delivery in 1993)

The seventy one course participants rated our works as follows:
Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviations of ratings on nine evaluation criteria (Data from initial re-introduction of ‘ethics’ included in brackets)
N = 71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Mean score</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>2.014</td>
<td>0.786</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(1.048)</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I found the module was sufficiently intellectually demanding' versus 'I did not find the course sufficiently intellectually demanding'</td>
<td>1.875</td>
<td>0.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.419)</td>
<td>(0.811)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 'The module had the right focus for me' versus 'The module did not have the right focus for me'</td>
<td>2.357</td>
<td>1.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.067)</td>
<td>(1.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 'The module struck the right balance between practical and theoretical work' versus 'I thought the module was too academic and theoretical (or too practical)'</td>
<td>2.538</td>
<td>1.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.365)</td>
<td>(1.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 'The course was highly relevant to the work I will have to do' versus 'The course had little relevance to the work I will have to do'</td>
<td>2.654</td>
<td>0.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.122)</td>
<td>(0.757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: 'I thought the amount of work I had to do was about right' versus 'I found that there was too little/too much to do'</td>
<td>2.004</td>
<td>0.896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.986)</td>
<td>(0.914)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: 'I liked the structure of the module' versus 'I did not like the structure of the module'</td>
<td>2.315</td>
<td>0.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.985)</td>
<td>(1.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: 'I thought that the tutor(s) was/were fully competent' versus 'I did not think the tutor(s) was/were fully competent'</td>
<td>1.874</td>
<td>0.863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.905)</td>
<td>(0.796)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Compared with the re-introduction of 'ethics' in November 1993 the ratings on each of the nine criteria had improved and were sufficiently positive for the staff of the Leadership Development Programme to conclude that the experience had been, in the main, a success. Nonetheless it is noticeable how the two lowest ratings were in relation to criterion 5 and criterion 6. These criteria refer to the extent to which participants perceived that we had struck the right balance between the practical and theoretical, and, to the perception of the relevance of the module to participants' future work projects.

The staff also made reference to the following:

- *Some of the content was perceived as too academic and theoretical*

- *The police leaders were viewed, sceptically, 'as poachers turned gamekeepers'*

- *The student group as a whole would have preferred to spend more time addressing practical issues*

- *The data patterns on police themselves (i.e. the material emerging from the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire) interested most of the students*

- *The quality of the presentations was good*

- *Sometimes the staff seemed to be moralising*

- *A great deal of scepticism is attributed to the motives of those connected with the police service statement of ethical principles and the new emphases on ethics*

**The completion of the preliminary stage of the inquiry: a summary**

The re-introduction of ethics to the police leadership development curriculum and the first series of deliveries had enabled me to complete the preliminary cycle of an action research process. The completion of this stage led me to draft the following reflections concerning why it was that my design for the 'ethics education' experience was *not* something that was, uniformly, valued positively:

1. Ethics - as a subject - was not a topic with which a majority of the client group was familiar - in the sense of having received instruction and/or training during the course of their professional development. In consequence its very newness meant
that it was liable to attract the following types of observation from course participants:

It could be seen as the 'latest piece of Bramshill gimmickry', as the 'flavour of the month' or as 'something new with which to beat the police'.

2. Ethics - as a subject - is intrinsically difficult. Concepts such as 'justice' or 'integrity' are relatively abstract and much less straightforward to grasp than empirical description or practitioner anecdote. Ethics as a subject is demanding intellectually. Thus, it can be dismissed by varying proportions of the client group as 'academic', 'removed from reality', 'theoretical gobbledygook' etc.

3. Teaching ethics is difficult because it cannot offer clear-cut, straightforward and unproblematic solutions to problem situations. (This was to be expressed elegantly and succinctly by a senior police officer at the very end of the inquiry reported in this dissertation when, in the context of discussing the policing of situations of environmental protest, she said: 'You are never going to please everybody when you deal with a 'real life' ethical dilemma. ')

4. Teaching ethics is difficult - in the sense that it may not lead to a positive evaluation from the client group - because of the level of moral development of some persons in the group. After Kohlberg (1969), the group itself might be characterised by a 'conventional' rather than post-conventional level of moral development - and find itself disturbed by an educational encounter seeking to examine the nature of an individual's 'moral world'.

5. The teaching of ethics is difficult because it can elicit within the client group feelings of shame and guilt. Perhaps moral exemplariness is beyond the reach of all but the tiniest fraction of mortals and so, as soon as the 'good' life is made salient through the presentation of 'ethics', an inevitable response is to feel 'imperfect'. At the end of the film, 'Schindler's List', Oscar Schindler, in a moment of temporary emotional collapse whispers: 'I could have done more!, and, in so doing, illustrates the psychological demands of 'ethics'.

6. Related to the above, it seems that the simple fact of making the subject 'ethics' salient necessarily implies the need for change. The very surfacing of concepts such as 'justice' and 'integrity', the introduction of a statement of ethical principles for police, and the examination of a range of duties that have come to be attached to the role of police officer in the United Kingdom, all serve as tests against which current practices and human dispositions can be judged and found wanting. In
consequence, the study of ethics, implicitly or explicitly introduces a critique of conventional practice and advocates a better state of affairs. To stay as one is - in an unjust world - is hard to defend. Thus, 'ethics' calls for change.

7. Ethics teaching is difficult because the teachers/tutors can be perceived in negative terms - e.g. they may be seen to be 'moralising', 'lacking experience of the police world', 'hypocritical' or 'unattractive'. This latter view may stem from the police antipathy towards civilians as a whole, or civilians with certain characteristics, or to 'trainers', or to senior officers - who, by definition, must be 'unethical'. This latter point was later to be expressed by Villiers (1998) as follows:

"A police audience may be .. doubtful about the credibility of an experienced practitioner, because they doubt his (sic) personal integrity. Why has he come to lecture on ethics at a Police College? What is gnawing at his conscience? And if he is so keen on morality now, why didn't he put his morals into practice when he was a working detective?"

He continues by outlining the argument underlying this scepticism:

"In effect, the senior officer faces the subtle, possibly part-conscious and probably unfalsifiable train of thought which runs something as follows:

a) The lecturer is a police officer who was once a working detective or uniformed officer.

b) As such, he must have faced many moral dilemmas, including such issues as bending the rules to achieve a result.

c) He was promoted. Therefore, he must have been successful in his work. Therefore he must have acquired convictions in court. Therefore, he must have bent the rules on occasion, or ignored others doing so, and taken credit for their work. (The implication is that police work requires one to bend the rules. The questions are when and how, not why.)

d) Now, as a successful police officer, he is telling us not to bend the rules, and to stop others doing so. There is a contradiction here. " (Villiers, 1998: 2)

If I were to secure the subject 'ethics' on the police leadership and management development curriculum then I was going to have to create a design that would surmount these difficulties. The Leadership Development Programme had enabled
me to trial a first design for an ethics education - and had been able to benefit from a relatively extensive set of resources. Moreover, the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire' had begun to provide a data-base in relation to the professional ethics of police managers.

The emerging data patterns meant that I was able to present concrete information about police themselves. This could be used as another tactic for achieving my goal.

In addition, subsequent versions of the questionnaire had enabled me to collect data concerning how my client groups identified the fundamental purposes of police, the appropriate values emphases in the developing police organisation and the proper moral foundations of police leadership. In this latter respect, the virtues of 'honesty' and 'integrity' had been chosen as the most important personal qualities for a police leader. Finally, I had developed a picture, through the use of the questionnaire, of the perspectives on human nature held by police middle managers. (The general pattern of responses to the different versions of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire will be reported in chapter fourteen of this dissertation.)

I was ready to begin the next stage of the inquiry. In the preliminary stage I had concentrated on the content and style of an ethics education for police leaders and managers. In needed to strengthen the rigour of the action research process. However, the circumstances for the delivery of 'ethics education' would be significantly different: a fundamentally new type of programme design had been created for the middle-managers of the police service. I shall begin the next chapter by outlining the nature of this change.
Chapter seven

Action research and a developing ethics education for police leaders and managers: the first action research cycle

"And he [Cezanne] repeated again and again: "All things, particularly in art, are theory developed and applied in contact with nature."" (Rewald, 1973: 578)

This chapter will chart the development of an 'ethics education' on the middle-management programme at Bramshill. I shall begin by describing the transition from the Leadership Development Programme to the new 'Police Management Programme', and illustrate how I attempted to create and deliver an 'ethics unit' in the 'Managing People' module of the new programme. I shall then indicate the features of the 'audit trail' I followed as part of a 'quality assurance' process designed to confer rigour and discipline on my inquiry. The chapter will include a synopsis of my design, delivery and subsequent reflections on the emerging 'ethics educational experience' that, together, constituted mini-cycles of action research within a more extended phase. I will conclude by acknowledging the fact that I was, unwittingly, conducting a form of practice underpinned by positivist assumptions. The 'shock' of this discovery was the major catalyst for a subsequent change in the tenor of my work.

'In search of the perfect design' - individual educational action research and 'ethics education' on the Police Management Programme

As part of a wider strategy for police training concerned with the professionalisation of policing and police management, the perception of stakeholder expectations and demands, and the need for 'quality-assured' education, training and development, the most senior decision-making educational group at the Police Staff College, Bramshill, the 'Programme Board' asked me, in August 1994 to lead a project (which would include and involve certain of the tutorial staff) that would come to offer a management programme to the inspecting ranks of the police service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Our brief was 'to teach the knowledge and understanding component of the Management Charter Initiative's Middle Management (M2) standards. Our partner, in this venture, was the Institute of Management. However, in that partnership, it was not the role of the Institute to provide the curriculum or syllabus for the programme. So, our task was not only to develop an appropriate curriculum but to satisfy the Institute of Management that we would be offering a 'quality-assured' programme within an institutional setting that was itself structured to support the programme.
The qualification, to which successful completion of the programme would lead, was the 'Diploma in Police Management'. Attainment of the diploma would be contingent upon candidates completing workplace-based assignments within which they would demonstrate the 'practice' (or practical) equivalent of a 'first degree' standard. In other words, certain 'higher order skills, abilities and capacities' would be manifested by candidates - and these would find expression in the way they described and analysed their actual management practice.

This brief and requirement constituted a radical departure in the nature of police management education, training and development offered by the Police Staff College. To be successful, it required a culture change of the deepest order. It presaged something of a revolution in the college's organisational order and it meant that some very new sorts of questions and problems would be faced by all those connected with the new programme. In Schwab's (1969) analysis of the components of any educational setting, i.e. staff, students/learners, content and milieu, the staff were to experience significant change, students attending the programme would uncover a new 'psychological contract' with the programme deliverers, the content would be concerned with charting a new terrain in management education and the milieu - i.e. the College environment - would reflect uncertainties, contradictions and ambiguities, in the sense that the institutional setting itself embraced a range of competing values frameworks and educational paradigms.

The development of the proposal document was affected by a wider societal climate of 'self-help', (Fukuyama 1992) career uncertainties, (Schein 1994), postmodernist ethos and ethics, (Connor 1989), (Harvey 1990), (Best and Kellner 1991), (Bauman 1993), and increasing competitiveness (Peters 1992) as well as the emergence of the knowledge economy (Toffler 1990), and, (Drucker 1992); these all created dynamics which made the construction of the curriculum a particularly demanding and tense experience for those concerned with its creation.

The Management Charter Initiative's model of managerial competence is an 'outcome' model. The competent manager - at the M2 middle management standards - is that person who is able to effect certain specific outcomes in an extensive range of managerial situations. To achieve these outcomes, according to the model, the competent manager will fill, separately or simultaneously, four roles. These are: 'Managing Operations' (Activities), 'Managing Finance', 'Managing People' and, 'Managing Information'. The hierarchical structure of the standards specifies those outcomes in terms of performance indicators and the contexts in
which such achievements need to occur. Our programme was to teach (or provide) the knowledge and understanding underpinning the achievement of a very wide range of types of managerial outcome. Among the questions that we had to confront were:

'What is the nature of that knowledge and understanding?' and, 'How does that knowledge and understanding relate to the achievement of those outcomes?'

In addition to these fundamental questions, we also had to examine what sort of educational experience needed to be offered to a particular client group that would actually catalyse effective management practice, which would be demonstrated and enacted in the workplace. Moreover, we understood the need to conceive of the programme in developmental terms both in order to serve the practical needs of the client within a particular occupational and organisational culture, as well as to reflect current managerial orthodoxies concerning changing skill sets (Handy 1989) and the genesis of 'reflective practitioners' (Schon 1983).

How did we resolve these issues? I have reported (Adlam, 1997) that the staff constituted themselves, temporarily, as a group of action researchers who met regularly both before the delivery of the new programme and during its first months, in order to try and resolve these (and other) questions. In that paper - which is included in Appendix P - I note that we were unable to find any clear-cut resolutions to our problems. We acknowledged, amongst ourselves, the tensions between 'education' and training', between 'meeting the wants and needs of our customers' and 'providing expert and authoritative knowledges' etc.

We did, however, succeed in convincing the Institute of Management that we had sufficient professional capability to be in a position to launch the programme. Thus, in the late spring of 1995, the Police Staff College, Bramshill was accredited by a panel of assessors from the Institute of Management to offer a management development programme leading to a Diploma in Police Management at the M2 level of the Management Charter Initiative's standards. The panel of assessors agreed that the 'Managing People' module should include a specific unit devoted to teaching an 'ethics' for police management practice.

_I came to understand this first full stage (i.e. the phase after the preliminary phase of re-introducing ethics to the middle management programmes) of the research process in 'problem-solving' terms. I thought that I would be able to learn a_
sufficient array of knowledges that would enable me, in practice, to secure the positive valuation that I was seeking. In my own mind, I was working towards the 'perfect design'.

At the beginning of this phase of the inquiry I wanted to ensure that the process itself would meet - where possible - the 'quality assurance' criteria that had been suggested in the academic literature on action research. Throughout my action research enquiry I tried to ensure the validity of my claims to knowledge. I established an 'audit trail' for the design which was similar to that subsequently reported by Hughes, Denley and Whitehead (1999) in that section of their paper devoted to Hughes' reflections upon the process of legitimising her action research and reported in her doctoral thesis.

Hughes notes that she subjected the research process, her findings and her personal accounts to critical reflection and review through a number of methods. They included:

- Requesting colleagues to evaluate her effectiveness as a practitioner and researcher
- Requesting her colleagues to comment on the veracity of her accounts
- Ensuring rigour in her use of interviews and questionnaires
- Utilising a personal journal to assist the process of systematic ongoing reflection, planning and action
- Working with her tutor as a 'critical friend'
- Presenting her research for public debate and criticism

Hughes summarises the discipline she brought to bear upon her research process by asserting that it was these measures and procedures that would authenticate her accounts and would support the accuracy of her claims to knowledge.

I proceeded in an almost identical way. In the first stage of the action research process I sought to include the tutorial staff as 'observers' within the deliveries of the 'ethics unit'. I began to keep a personal journal in June 1985 - in which I noted the emerging designs for the ethics unit as well as a range of personal observations and reflections upon those designs and their 'deliveries'. I also involved six of my
colleagues directly in the role of interviewers. Their task was to uncover the nature of the participants' experience of ethics education. This was subsequently supplemented by 'experiential records' that course participants were asked to keep as the ethics unit was being delivered. Finally, I began to present accounts of the project to the wider educational action research community and to submit papers for publication. In this latter respect I wanted the process of criticism to help me become more aware of the limitations of my understanding and the deficiencies in my practice.

The conduct of my inquiry process was given added rigour as a result of contemplating the proposals and arguments advanced by Clarke, Dudley, Edwards, Rowland, Ryan and Winter (1993), Lomax (1994) and Tickle (1995) who were all concerned with critiquing the quality of action research reports. Clarke et al. refer to a distinct feature of action research:

"Action Research is distinctive in that it produces 'personal' (rather than objective) knowledge" (Clarke et al. 1993: 491)

In order to avoid the trap of an extreme epistemological subjectivism, action researchers, standardly, employ a range of methods to secure the authenticity and credibility of their accounts and explanations - such as those employed by Hughes and noted in Hughes, Denley and Whitehead (1999). However, it is probably true to say that personal experiential knowledge enjoys pre-eminence within the genesis, progress and presentation of action research projects.

The project undertaken here was permanently informed by Popper's (1972) cautionary warning concerning the inherent limitations of our 'sources of knowledge' and his observation that 'the best we can hope for' is to arrive at a more mature appreciation of our problems.

Lomax (1994), at the outset of her account makes clear her belief that the evaluative criteria and assessment procedures of 'academia' should not take precedence over the insights of teachers themselves provided that those insights were 'grounded in a rigorous examination of their own practice'. She defines the most important feature of teacher action research as 'professional' i.e. concerned with making change for the better in concrete situations of practice rather than the 'educational' i.e. the genesis of more knowledge - especially on the part of the researcher. Lomax believes that teacher action research should be seen as a process of disciplined intervention. She summarises the nature of teacher action research as follows:
"Teacher action research is a systematic and intentional inquiry by teachers in order to make sense of their practices and improve them." (Lomax 1994: 115)

In highlighting the practical focus of striving to effect a change for the better Lomax differentiates her main unit of appraisal from that proposed in Whitehead and Foster's (1984) earlier discussion. They focus upon the individual's claim to know his or her own educational development. For Lomax it is the emphasis on the 'practical' as opposed to the more circumscribed 'educational' aim of teacher action research. Moreover, she argues that 'a focus upon the 'professional' rather than the educational is essential' if practitioner rather than academic criteria are to be identified for judging an action research dissertation.

The remainder of her paper can be read as a sequential set of tests or requirements for disciplined action research conducted by practitioners in the situations of their own professional practice. I shall begin to discuss the extent to which my work met these criteria when I come to present a review of my action research inquiry in the next chapter.

The criteriological frameworks articulated by Clarke, Dudley, Edwards, Rowland, Ryan and Winter, and by Lomax were complemented by Tickle's listing of criteria constituting a test for 'quality' in educational action research. Tickle asked his audience at the second international conference on teacher research (at the University of Georgia, Athens, USA in April 1993) to define the criteria against which they would seek to have their own research judged. The conferencees adopted fifteen criteria which, according to Tickle, they 'appropriated' as an 'approved list'. Tickle's list includes criteria that can be aggregated together because, like those of Lomax (1994) they point to the unfolding sequence of the research. Tickle's criteria are also concerned with the quality or validity of the knowledge generated by the research. He argues that meeting the full range of criteria would constitute as 'tough a task as any practitioner could wish for.' He then suggests that, for him, the standards set by the teacher-researchers amounted to 'complete assurance', 'total quality', were 'fully inclusive' and would constitute a 'masterly demonstration'.

I wanted to design a form of ethics education that might meet Tickle's 'total quality' criteria. It was because of this ambition that I chose to subtitle this phase of the project: 'In search of the perfect design'.
The emerging 'ethics education' unit for the Police Management Programme

The Design

The 'ethics unit' was positioned within a three-week long 'Managing People' module - which was itself designed to provide coverage of the knowledge and understanding underpinning the four units of competence comprising the module. Although 'ethics' as a topic was not mentioned within the competence framework I indicated to the Institute of Management's panel of assessors that the practices of 'managing people' needed a moral foundation - and that the content of the Police Management Programme would not only provide specific learning structures concerned with ethics but that a theme of 'principled policing' would run throughout the programme material.

The design of the initial one-day module offered on the 'Managing People' module in June 1995 was organised in a tutor manual (which still exists) and included the following aims and objectives:

The aims of the unit were:

- To achieve a positive valuing of ethics and the study of police ethics
- To enable the practice of ethical management and leadership through the use of ethical perspectives and ethically based interventions

The objectives of the unit:

- To introduce the subject 'ethics' - including a definition of ethics, the history of the subject and an outline of its current territory
- To describe 'normative ethics'
- To present the 'ethical profile' of police leaders and managers
- To describe the nature of applied ethics
- To locate ethics in the institution and function of police
- To profile the moral ethos of the police organisation
To examine the practice of ethical leadership

To provide frameworks for ethical decision-making

To test knowledge and understanding through an 'open-book' assignment at the end of the teaching day

The Delivery

On 8 June 1995, I recorded in my 'action research' diary the 'actual content' of the learning structures delivered on this, the first occasion that an 'ethics education' was presented on the Police Management Programme.

After an initial warm-up activity - when students were asked to convene in small groups and consider their 'first thoughts' about the nature of ethics - and a subsequent brief look at the 'ethical profile' emerging from the successive versions of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire - I gave the first presentation. The aims of this presentation were stated on the relevant computer slide as follows:

- To introduce the subject ethics and to underline its contemporary significance

- To describe the nature of obligation and value

- To comment upon police ethics

This presentation was followed by 'questions and answers' where some of the enduring concerns of some of those in the client group were mentioned. These included the following:

'Why do we have to study ethics - when the ethics of others in the criminal justice system are questionable?'

'This is all very well but how is it going to help policing Coventry on a Saturday night?'

'Isn't ethics just the latest flavour of the month?'

'Are you saying that we aren't ethical?'

Massey (1993), has indicated that in the course of presenting the subject 'ethics' to
police officers (undergoing their foundation training) these kinds of question are typically raised by his students. In the course of trying to respond to questions such as these I sensed that a substantial proportion of the client group were reflecting what Scheingold (1984) claimed was a characteristic of police cultures: the view that police are victims of public misunderstandings and varying levels of scorn. The literature of transactional analysis demonstrates how 'victims' become 'persecutors' as they try to 'hit back' against the real or perceived injustices visited upon and against them. I had, therefore, in the course of my presentations and in my responses to these questions to avoid communicating from a perceived 'critical parent' position. In relation to this latter point, I wrote, in my research diary, a note to myself:

'Remember - if they begin to get hostile with you because they think you are reproaching them or being sanctimonious - remind yourself of the time you had 'Equal Opportunities' training - and how resentful you felt at the lack of recognition concerning the attempt you had made to combat racism and sexism. That's how many of them might be feeling.'

The presentation was followed by small group discussions using the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire' as a basis for personal reflection before the second presentation. I had expected to give a lecture examining 'applied ethics' where I would surface some key moral dilemmas and challenges in policing - such as the problem of loyalty and conflicting claims to rights. However, because of timing difficulties, I selected a presentation concerned with the 'reinvention of police'. This enabled me to introduce the police strategic emphases of the early 1990s beginning with a précis of Woodcock's (1992) paper 'Trust in the police: the search for truth' and culminating in an overview of the 'Quality of Service' philosophy launched at the end of 1992.

Again, although a small number of the client group showed what appeared to be genuine interest, as the group left for lunch, one officer remarked:

'Poachers turned gatekeepers - I'd like to know how many people they have trodden on or destroyed getting to where they are.'

The afternoon session began with Assistant Chief Constable, Ian McDonald running an analysis of the ethical principles which might underpin the practice of leadership - in which he described the pattern of responses emerging from workshops he had conducted in other countries. He noted that there was considerable cross-cultural consistency in the specification for 'morally principled
police leadership' and referred to the importance of 'honesty', 'justice', 'integrity', and, 'courage'.

This led into my final presentation to the module participants entitled: 'Frameworks for ethical decision-making' - where I discussed the police service draft statement of ethical principles and the decision hierarchy suggested by Beabout and Wannemann (1994). This was followed by a half-hour test of knowledge and understanding - which included three basic questions: participants were asked to define 'ethics', to identify at least one normative ethical theory and to discuss how ethics might assist in police professional practice.

Finally, I asked each person in the client group to complete, anonymously, a 'unit evaluation'.

The Evaluation

The unit evaluation asked for participants to respond to the following five questions:

1. What were the high points of the unit?

2. What were the low points of the unit?

3. How (if at all) would you improve the unit?

4. What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as a result of your experience with the unit?

5. What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the ethics unit (Please tick the appropriate box) The categories were:

- A very high level
- A high level
- A moderate level
- Little
- Very little

The written responses to these questions revealed the following patterns:

The high points of the unit included:
'The rigour', 'The commitment of the tutor', 'The professionalism of the presentations', 'The refreshing look at something new', 'The opportunity to have a brain stretch'

The low points of the unit were dominated by the response to the test of knowledge and understanding. This was cited by a large majority of the participants who made statements such as:

'The day was spoiled by the test', 'The test/exam totally spoiled the day', 'What was the point of the exam? It detracted from the value of the day', 'It was like going back to school again, taking the test, it was a bit of an insult'

Additionally small numbers of participants mentioned that there was:

'Too much history', 'Too much theory', 'Not enough time for addressing personal issues'.

In answer to the question, 'How (if at all) would you improve the unit? The majority of participants focused mainly on the need to abolish (or re-schedule) the exam.

In addition, a third of the participants thought that the content of the module would be improved if it were to be less 'academic' and/or 'less theoretical'. More time should be given over to 'practical' or 'real-world/real life' concerns.

A quarter of the participants saw no value added by the contribution of the senior police officer and suggested that it should be 'dropped'.

A third of the participants suggested that 'more time' be allocated to 'ethics'.

The responses to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as a result of your experience on the unit?' revealed the following pattern:

10 out of 25 mentioned that they now had a 'clearer idea', a 'better grasp' or a 'better understanding' of ethics

14 out of 25 stated that they were surprised at the pattern of responses emerging from the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire and that they were as a result more 'optimistic' or 'cheered' by the standards of their colleagues.
6 out of 25 noted that 'no' learning or 'nothing particular' had resulted from the day.

Finally, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:

- A very high level: N = 1
- A high level: N = 7
- A moderate level: N = 10
- Little: N = 6
- Very little: N = 0

In addition to this simple and basic form of evaluation, the lead tutor of the module invited me to attend a 'stock-taking' session at the beginning of the next week (when the module entered its second week). Although the bulk of the 'stock-taking' was concerned with the nature of the Police Management Programme it became clear that the 'ethics' unit had resulted in a high degree of reflection on the part of many of the participants.

Different individuals made remarks such as:

'I found myself thinking a great deal about my own ethics and the ethics in the organisation - I needed more time'

'Ethics is a profound subject - we need to spend more time looking at the issues'

'It caused me to re-think many things - about myself and my work'

'Ethics is so important that you need to give it more time'

I also discovered the fact that my own personality and character was the subject of a particular focus:

'I spent most of the time wondering if you were a poofsta'

'You seem like a nice guy - but you come across as effeminate - this is a problem for you'

'You're a believer - have you ever been out on the ground with police officers?'
'You'd be more successful if we knew more about you'

'You come across as committed but you are living on a different plane'

The module leader emphatically believed that more time should be given over to the focus on ethics within the 'Managing People' module. I was invited to 'take' two days of the programme. In consequence, and in the light of the pattern of responses to the first unit delivery on the module, I set about creating a more extensive design.

**The Design**

My reflections prior to the unit delivery in July 1995 were documented in my diary notes. Immediately prior to the next 'design' of the ethics unit they included (1 July 1995) the following:

'After initial presentations plus the 'Moral Ethos' questionnaire, the programme should be more 'student-centred' - there should be a 'co-operative inquiry' design.'

Ideally, I wanted course participants to have the 'space' and freedom to surface their own concerns and issues - and, with the help of their colleagues and the resources that might be assembled 'on site' (at the college) - find ways of addressing them. In this respect I was not seeking the design elegance suggested by Heron in his discussion of co-operative inquiry; here the intention was to provide something resembling a 'do-it-yourself' type of inquiry, or a 'do-it-yourself' approach to discovery and learning. In design terms, I thought it appropriate to lead and structure the first day - and then to grant the client group far more autonomy in the second day. This, I thought, would meet the needs for structure and for safety - and would then respect the participants needs for autonomy and self-definition.

I also realised that it was overly ambitious to create a design that might reflect Snell's 'critical pragmatism' and/or 'social transformation' curriculum model. So, my (clumsily worded) diary entry (1 July 1995) reads:

'My purposes for an ethics education for police, tested against Snell's (1993) outline are primarily to do with critical pragmatism and/or social transformation. But, having said this, I would be very cautious about the realities of achieving this. In fact, my actual practice may be more accurately mapped on to Maclagan's (1993) five purposes of an ethics education:
- Raising awareness and stimulating the moral imagination

- Helping managers create organisations which support ethical conduct

- Enhancing personal and interpersonal skills of a non-cognitive nature

- Providing concepts, theories and analytical skills for ethical reasoning and ethical decision-making

- The development of a 'capacity for judgement'

**The Delivery**

On 12 July 1995 I began at 1100 hrs. with a reference to the previous module content and I highlighted the moral character of 'the duty of care' as well as Egan's model of the 'skilled helper'. I outlined the overall structure of the next two days noting that I would 'lead' the majority of the first day and then we would move over to a 'form of co-operative inquiry' where the course members would aggregate into 'interest' groups and focus upon a topic for which, hopefully, they would have some energy to explore. I asked participants to complete the 'starting point' sheet - concerned with communicating the aims and objectives of the unit and identifying their previous experience with 'ethics'.

By way of introduction I uncovered a poster sized photograph of my Grandmother (a person I had never met) and mentioned that she had been unable to return to her home in the Czech Republic because of the Nazi invasion of the Sudetenland in 1939. She never did return to her home and died, in England, before I was born. I added that at least a part of the role of 'ethics' is to try to minimise the likelihood of these sorts of tragedy. I wanted my client group to know that for me 'ethics' was not merely an academic subject separated from the 'real world'. The 'moral point' of view was something very central in my life and work.

The first presentation dealt with the 'history' of ethical ideas and moved on to provide an outline of 'normative ethics'.

The second presentation (after lunch) was entitled 'a first look at police ethics'. Here I mentioned some of the major moral dilemmas in policing - basing my account upon Richards (1985) summary. I also reported some of the data patterns emerging from the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. These included, for example, the fact that most police middle managers saw themselves as 'highly ethical' and
that a slight majority of the respondents had a positive reaction to the draft statement of ethical principles.

This was followed by discussions in small groups where I invited participants to 'explore any aspects' of the material that I had covered or issues that had been surfaced for individuals. I also stated that because these issues could be sensitive and personal I would not expect any 'sharing' in the larger group.

The final session of the day was 'fronted' by a trained counsellor who had designed a session to examine the moral basis of management - through emphasising the outcomes to which counselling and 'helping' might aim. This (in my judgement) was a considered and reflective session and it culminated in the practice of a 'helping skills' model.

On 13 July 1995 I began with a reflection on the previous day - which included a clarification of certain points - before suggesting the areas that separate student groups might wish to explore. I had selected three formats for examining ethical issues and concerns: an 'argument', a 'creative' piece and a 'personal development' exercise. I suggested that the group form itself into three subgroups each of which would produce a 'powerful, riveting and relevant' learning structure on 'ethics' that would 'move us all on'.

Three groups rapidly formed and worked on their area for the next two hours.

At midday the groups were ready to 'deliver' their designs.

The first group (the 'argument') produced a highly structured debate on the need for the police service to adopt a formal code of ethics. (The motion was defeated with 8 votes for and 16 against)

The second group (the creative piece) produced (after lunch) a complex play exploring the fabrication of evidence and the pressures to subvert the due process of law. This was followed by a lengthy discussion and analysis.

The third group offered their structure after tea. It took the form of a guided phantasy culminating in a self-confrontation exercise. This exercise raised issues such as 'giving up power and control' and 'trust'.

A part of my diary entry for that day I commented:
'I would say that this was a highly effective day. It was an excellent example of a focused group of learners - however, in the sense of a) a learning community and b) a co-operative inquiry, neither forms were fully realised. It may be more accurate to say that I am structuring relatively open-ended learning opportunities for individuals within boundaries.....'

**The Evaluation**

Again, I used the same simple structure that had been constructed for the evaluation of the previous unit. Thus, the unit evaluation asked for participants to respond to the five questions noted in an earlier part of this chapter.

The high points of the unit were similar to those of the previous unit. They included: 'The high level of intellectual content', 'The inclusion of new research on police', 'The sincerity of the tutor', 'The opportunity to get stuck in to a meaty task', 'The chance to discuss deep things with colleagues'.

The low points of the unit included: 'Wasting too much time on academic aspects', 'Not enough time to deal with our issues', 'Counselling session didn't add anything', 'Inadequate preparation for the topic', 'Not enough practical analysis', 'Rob Adlam's ideas too difficult to understand'.

The unit could be improved by addressing all those topics mentioned above. In addition, some respondents suggested that I 'include the study of police ethical dilemmas examined by senior and/or experienced police officers' - as well as 'guidelines for resolving ethical dilemmas'.

The response to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as a result of your experience with the unit?' was similar to the previous group:

11 out of 24 mentioned that they now had a 'more understanding', 'clearer idea', 'an insight into', a 'grasp of' or a 'better understanding' of ethics

10 out of 24 stated that they were surprised at the pattern of responses emerging from the Bramshill ethics questionnaire and that they were 'encouraged' or 'reassured' or 'felt positive about' the data

5 out of 24 noted that 'not much' learning or 'nothing really' or 'zero' had resulted from the day.
Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:

- A very high level: N = 3
- A high level: N = 4
- A moderate level: N = 11
- Little: N = 5
- Very little: N = 1

Whilst the data, overall, were satisfactory, I wondered why it was that I could not manage to create a design that would achieve, for the majority of the participants, a 'high level' of learning. Moreover, a quarter of the participants were not - in terms of their own judgements - achieving much learning from the ethics unit. This left me determined to create a design that might 'win over' the large majority of the participants. I decided, for the next unit delivery, to increase the amount of time spent on 'practical activities' and to curtail the amount of time I spent giving presentations.

**The Design**

The new design attempted to provide the client group with as much freedom as possible - within the constraints of a structure I would provide - to develop, for themselves and their colleagues, learning structures that would 'engage' everyone. I resolved to 'earn my corn' by providing 'committed' introductory overviews to 'ethics' and then 'applied ethics' at the beginning of each day. I would then continue, on the first day with the 'co-operative inquiry' model I had introduced on the previous unit delivery and develop a new activity that I would come to call, *The play's the thing*. This design attempted to incorporate the subtleties of 'drama' and the theatre in order to reveal and deal with 'truths' that are difficult to address in 'real' life.

**The Delivery**

On 6 September 1995 at 1100 hrs. I began an introduction to the ethics unit - and discussed, briefly an assignment I had created entitled 'Ethical leadership'. I then moved on to give an overview of the subject 'ethics' (based upon Frankena's (1973) introduction to the subject). I examined the original 'Socratic dilemma' discussed in the Crito - which constitutes a remarkable example of the implications of abiding, unswervingly to ethical principles. During this I was asked by one participant:
'Was Socrates mad? - he sounds a right prat to me'

This was immediately followed by a loud burst of laughter from the group before someone else quipped:

'He should stick to football' (a reference to the Brazilian footballer, named Socrates)

I then introduced the client group to 'normative ethics'. As a result of the questions that began to issue from the group, this activity lasted for two hours.

After the lunch break, I announced that, 'following the positive response from a previous group', the members of the group could choose to create 'learning designs' for their colleagues. Again, the three structures for exploring ethical issues were: a 'creative piece', an 'argument' and a 'personal development' exercise.

Following the tea break each group presented their pieces. In turn they were concerned to examine the 'ethics police', the notion that the statement of ethical principles was an effort to manipulate public opinion and, an examination of the role of moral values in professional life.

On the second day, 7 September 1999, I delivered a presentation entitled 'Applied ethics' and quickly moved on to present the new exercise I had written for the unit, entitled: 'The play's the thing'. Each participant was given a single sheet of A4 paper upon which was written:

'Ethics, leadership and professionalism - An exercise: 'Dealing with moral dilemmas in policing'

Introduction:

It is something of a truism to remark that policing is a morally demanding and morally vulnerable activity. Policing, as William Ker Muir wrote, deals with the 'big questions' such as how to use coercive power without becoming corrupted, how to prevent loyalty from becoming misplaced, and, how to present one's best self in the face of threat and abuse. The context of policing provides the stage upon which some of the most testing moral dramas are enacted.

The purpose of this exercise is to examine areas in which moral dilemmas,
difficulties or conflicts are likely to be experienced by police officers - and to explore ways in which the application of ethical principles might enhance the practice of police leadership and management. The areas have been chosen because they reflect those commonly noted in the research literature on 'police ethics'.

Then, under the heading, 'The play's the thing', the participants on the module were asked to choose from one of four topic areas, concerning, 'loyalty', 'discretion', 'deception' and 'the use or power and authority', and then to produce a short play or playlet (lasting no more than twenty minutes) in which a moral dilemma connected with the subject area was to be presented.

In addition, the group was asked either to present an analysis as to how to resolve the dilemma by making reference to the application of moral principles or to invite the audience of fellow students to resolve the dilemma(s) by 'finishing the script'.

Each group was also asked to invite 'discussion' and a 'critical appreciation' from the audience. Finally, in order to finish the activity, each group was requested to make a summary of the process 'by providing a short record of the most significant learning points to the 'learning community' '.

This, I felt was a considerable risk on my part. I had no idea how the group would come to respond to this structure. However, after a moment's pause, individuals organised themselves into the four separate groups and spent, independently of me, the next two hours working on their designs.

Immediately after lunch, Assistant Chief Constable, Ian McDonald ran a session examining the practice of 'ethical leadership' after which the student group began their 'plays'.

The first group, taking the subject, 'loyalty', examined the devastating difficulties surrounding the problem of encountering a drunk police officer - who happened to be a personal friend - involved (and at fault) in a car accident.

The second play explored the moral aspects of power - taking as its focus three forms of power; the power of patronage, sexual power, and, the power of knowledge.

The remaining plays were presented and discussed on the morning of the third day.
The play on 'discretion' showed how social class factors influence police decision-making including arrest and detention. It featured the discovery of homosexual encounters involving *inter alia* the director of a social services department (who was vividly caricatured) and a local magistrate (who was also vividly caricatured). The final play attempted to capture the prevalence of deception within the police organisation by focusing on the way performance figures are 'massaged' - and published in order to give the impression that police are 'effective'.

In my diary I noted:

>'The plays seem to 'work'. They like to be set a task which they have to master. There was plenty of creative work - and I think Donahue and Felts (1993) are correct to contrast the 'code ethics' approach with the attempt to create communicative conditions where discussions on ethics can place. Is this structure getting towards Habermas' ideal communication conditions?'

**The Evaluation**

In addition to the basic and simple framework I had introduced for the first two deliveries of the 'ethics unit' on the module, I wanted to examine the pattern of data emerging from one other source. A 'Quality of Service' form had been re-instituted at the College - the second part of which allowed course participants to reflect on each week as a whole.

The high points of the unit, because of the inclusion of the 'play's' showed some differences in comparison with the previous unit(s). They included: 'The chance to work with other police officers studying ethical dilemmas,' 'Addressing practical concerns', 'The practical exercises,' 'Doing something profound', and 'Coming to terms with the dark side of policing'

The low points of the unit included: 'Too much time on the theory', 'Theory - difficult to understand', 'We don't need Greek history', 'The tutor was not easy to understand - make it more simple', and, 'The tutor needs to come down a level to be understood'.

As with the previous unit deliveries, the suggested improvements were related to the 'low' points mentioned above and again recommended reducing the amount of time spent on the academic aspects of 'ethics'.

The response to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as
a result of your experience with the unit?' was similar to the previous group:

14 out of 28 mentioned that they now had an 'insight, 'a knowledge of ethics', 'clarification about ethics' 'a clearer idea', a 'good grasp', or a 'better understanding' of ethics

12 out of 28 stated that they were 'interested in' or 'surprised by' the pattern of responses emerging from the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire and that they were "pleased with' or 'enthusiastic about' or 'reassured by' or 'felt positive about' the data.

9 out of 28 noted that 'very little', 'not much' 'learning or 'nothing really' or 'naff all' had resulted from the day. This was disappointing for me. I had imagined that the ethics plays might, in themselves, have produced some valuable learning. They had, for example, demonstrated how ethical problems become amplified after an initial carelessness or ethically unskilled judgment. The vividness of this simple fact - through the medium of the plays - appeared to me to hold important lessons. This did not, however, impress itself on almost one third of the participants.

Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:

- A very high level: N = 1
- A high level: N = 5
- A moderate level: N = 13
- Little: N = 7
- Very little: N = 2

The new 'Quality of Service' evaluation which focused upon the week as a whole produced the following information:

The first question asked: 'What were the high points of the course?'

On the positive side, of the eighteen respondents, nine wrote the following:

'The presentations by Rob Adlam were technically amazing', 'Entirely due to the laughter generated - the plays on moral dilemmas - They provided, however, a good vehicle for discussions', 'Practical exercises - the plays - which allowed theoretical knowledge to be applied', 'The plays', 'The rigour', 'Presentation on ethics was catalytic for further knowledge', 'The playlets on the subjects of
discretion, deception, loyalty and power. All very informative and enjoyable. 

'Playlets', 'The four plays produced by the syndicates for Rob Adlam's input on Thursday'

Conversely, in response to the question, 'What were the low points of the course' it was clear that almost one third of the participants identified aspects of or all of the 'ethics unit'. Thus, they wrote the following:

'Ethics', 'First morning on ethics - taught session Plato, Aristotle et al. Probably necessary but not the stuff to seize the imagination,'The first session by Mr. Adlam went right over my head', 'Difficulty in understanding theory of ethics,' Difficulty in understanding Rob Adlam's ideas', 'Two hours on the esoteric theory of ethics - practical applications dealt with in fifteen minutes'

Reflection

After the first three designs I recorded the following observation in my diary - which was to lead, a few months later, to a re-appraisal of my practice:

'Inadvertently, I realise that I have adopted something of a positivist perspective - i.e. if I could come up with enough tricks and distractions then 'ethics' education would receive a positive evaluation'

I was beginning to realise that I was attempting to get a grip upon as many variables affecting the evaluation of the ethics unit as was possible and then, by so manipulating those variables, I was hoping to succeed in obtaining the level of positive response to my work that would secure ethics on the curriculum. However, although I recorded this reflection I continued to try to make improvements to the design. The plays had proved to be a 'success' in the sense of securing a positive response from a slight majority of the group (although the amount and level of analysis following the presentations was minimal and any analysis that did take place was relatively superficial).

I resolved to spend less time presenting an introduction to the subject of ethics to the group - and to use extracts from video-tape material in order to stimulate discussion and enquiry into police related issues. Over the next two deliveries my diary entries record my continuing attempts to find ways of presenting valued learning structures and opportunities to the client group. The pattern of feedback remained similar. I noted in my diary on 31 October 1995:
"Activity" - any activity - such as the 'plays' is preferred to 'analysis'."

By the end of the fifth unit delivery my diary note on 23 November 1995 was headed: 'Action research as techno-fix'. I went on to write:

'One conclusion I have gradually come to settle upon is that the 'action research' which I have been conducting is, to a large degree built upon a 'techno-fix' assumption - of which I was, initially, largely unaware. In this sense, I suspect that I have embodied the world-view that Bauman (1993) describes in his 'postmodern ethics' - especially chapter five. This techno-fix assumption suggests that if the practitioner can identify all the key variables which then might be manipulated or controlled in a certain way e.g. in my case through the initial 'cognitive structuring' of the situation, the 'performance art' I achieve, etc. then a positive valuation (in this case of 'ethics') will occur. This casts the action researcher into something of a techno-magician role'

Beginning the transition to a new phase: 'Pragmatics and experimentation'.

I realised that my final design for 1995 would constitute the beginning of a transition to a new phase of action research. In this next phase I wanted to build upon the learnings from the earlier preliminary stage and from the first major phase of the inquiry 'in search for the perfect design' - and find ways to stimulate appropriate learning amongst the client group as well as a deeper understanding of the experience of the client group. My diary note of 29 November 1995 reads:

'In order for me to change I will have to give something up. This is the last time I shall be using the 'techno-fix' style - infotainment as a means of conducting ethics education'.

I continued:

'Today the 'ethics' unit began. I felt in a strange mood. Right up to the last minute I was working on the purposes and justification for an ethics education. But, my mood was strange. The action research experiences had probably taken their toll. I was 'fed-up' with feeling under pressure from the 'audience' and constantly being placed under a kind of relentless scrutiny. That's why it will be 'easier' to move away from this way of working. It requires too much discipline, too much self-monitoring.'

In addition, a new exercise I had piloted with a group, of overseas police officers,
entitled, 'Ultima Ethica' served as an illustration of a response tendency within the client group. This exercise was designed to raise questions about the way any complex society might best be organised and policed. However, although the exercise was constructed to identify the moral foundations of policing it was not possible for me to elicit from a majority of the group a sustained and serious level of analysis. By way of example, a part of the exercise asked for responses to the question: What principles should be at the foundation of an ideal society? The responses included:

*Everyone to stand on their own two feet (all of them)*
*Self-reliance*
*No such thing as a free lunch, dinner or tea*
*No god higher than man*
*The end always justifies the means*
*Strength is power*
*All men are equal - some more equal than others*
*The power team - big swinging 'dicks'*
*The pond life - frogs and tadpoles*

The 'response tendency', I have referred to above, consisted of a predilection, by more than a minority of the client group to sabotage any sustained rational and thoughtful inquiry into the fundamentals of policing. It was, therefore, time to rethink my designs for an ethics unit on the Police Management Programme.

*Preparing for a transition*

To help with the transition I had decided to enlist the help of colleagues on the staff at Bramshill to conduct interviews with randomly selected course participants. I wanted the interviews to help me get a clearer idea as to what impact the ethics education design was having upon them. I was determined to take account of the information that would be surfaced in these interviews in my search for the construction of an ethics education that would be positively valued by the client group.

The first six interviews took place in December 1995, a few days after the ethics unit on the Police Management Programme. Each of the three interviewers used the same interview schedule and, at the end of the interview, provided the interviewee with a brief summary of the content of the interview to check that the summary was, itself, 'accurate'.

The first interview schedule consisted of the following six questions.

1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the 'ethics' unit of the Managing People' module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?

3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?

4. How might your experience on the 'ethics' unit influence your practice as a manager?

5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?

6. Anything else?

I classified the responses to each interview into one of three categories:

A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim (goal) of the action research process

B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first action research aim

C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the action research process has been achieved

I have reproduced the details of the first six interviews at Appendix G.

**Summary of the first interviews:**

1. Overall the interviews left me with some grounds for optimism concerning the first goal of the action research process - i.e. to achieve, from a majority of the client group, a positive valuation of their experience with 'ethics education'.

2. The initial presentation(s) on 'ethics' were perceived as intellectual - and although it was possible to value the overall process there appears to be the risk of a negative valuation of the experience if it is perceived as too or overly theoretical.
3. There are suggestions of a reluctance or resistance by members of the client group to participate (exercises are resisted or people 'do not put their toe in')

4. There is evidence of some 'significant learning' e.g. one participant came to 'understand myself' - and there was evidence of increased awareness as well as an enhanced ethical; sensitivity/perception

Summary and Review:

At the conclusion of the first action research cycle I made the following note in my diary dated 28 December 1995:

There is evidence from the project that ethics education can be developed for police middle-managers and leaders so that it is 'fun', enjoyable, personally significant, valued and experienced as worthwhile, illuminating and rewarding. Some of the comments that course participants made over the three weeks of the last module delivery in 1995 were:

- "I was, for want of a better word, enlightened."

- "I was a cynic but I'm not now."

- "This has been the best three weeks on a police course I have ever spent - I have been 'touched', and I didn't think I would."

The new design will try to build upon those methods which seemed to work most for the group as a whole - i.e. vivid video, plays, activities in small groups - but I shall try to worry less about the relentless attempt to identify and stay in control of all the variables that might conceivably have a bearing on the final evaluation. I shall develop an approach which is more eclectic and pragmatic.

I looked forward optimistically to a shift of emphasis in the new design.
Chapter eight

Action research and a developing ethics education for police leaders and managers: the second cycle

""Frankly, this is my position," Signac had written to Monet. "I have been painting for two years and my only models have been your own works; I have been following the wonderful path that you broke for us ... I beg you to let me see you, if only for a short visit. I should be happy to show you five or six studies; perhaps you would tell me what you think of them and give me the counsel I need so badly, for the fact is that I have the most horrible doubts, having always worked by myself, without teacher, encouragement, or criticism."

It is not known whether Monet received Signac, for he was little prone to giving advice and usually told those who came to consult him: "I advise you to paint the best way you can, as much as you can, without being afraid to paint bad pictures ... If your painting does not improve of itself ... then there is nothing to be done ... I can't do anything about it." "(Rewald 1973: 503)

In this chapter I shall describe how I attempted to improve the design and delivery of the ethics unit on the Police Management Programme. The second cycle of action research was initially concerned to build upon the positively valued learning structures developed in the first full cycle. Simultaneously, I wanted to break free from a positivist (or neo-positivist) approach. However, this cycle culminated in the failure to introduce a genuinely collaborative or participatory action research approach to conducting 'ethics education'. It was this failure that led me to introduce a third cycle at the beginning of 1997.

At the outset of the second cycle I had come to conceptualise the particular approach I was taking as 'eclecticism and pragmatics'. Thus as I began this cycle, I was less concerned with having to meet essentially academic criteria - such as ensuring that my client group had insights into some of the major ideas and theoretical frameworks standardly encountered in introductions to ethics (e.g. Frankena, 1973, Foot, 1979, and Singer, 1993b) - but more keen to provide a set of 'triggers' - or catalytic learning structures - that might 'connect' with the interests of police middle-managers. However, this did not mean that I would entirely eschew a discussion of the basic concepts which have emerged as answers to the question, 'How should one live?'

I wanted to enhance the rigour of the design by ensuring that 'learning log' activities
would offer the possibility for my clients to ground the learning in their own reflections on their practice. These learning log activities were based upon the material that would be presented during the teaching day.

I had come to realise that primarily the course participants welcomed the opportunity to converse with each other about their policing practices and experiences. In consequence, I began to develop learning structures to help them 'share the stories' of their own personal and professional development. These structures included the examination of their personal and professional values frameworks.

In addition, throughout this research cycle, I continued to gather data from the module participants using a modification of the interview schedule that had been used in December 1995. By the end of this cycle a total of fifty four interviews had been conducted. The interview data revealed a slightly more positive response to 'ethics' than the data emerging from the simple evaluation form. A careful study of the interview data powerfully illustrates the variety of 'voices' at play in police middle management. A record exists of all those interviews. However, in this chapter I have picked out those few respondents who typify categories of reaction to the ethics education.

I shall begin, however, with a return to the question of 'quality assurance' in order to show how the frameworks articulated by Clarke et al (1993), Lomax (1994) and Tickle (1995) helped me to monitor and 'take stock' of the progress of my inquiry.

*A return to the question of 'quality assurance'*

In the last chapter, I introduced brief details concerning contemporary discussions investigating the criteria that have been thought to be appropriate for governing the quality standards of action research inquiries. Lomax (1994) takes an explicitly radical stance and argues that the 'academy' should recognise the competence of an 'insider' to make the appropriate 'judgement' about the development of their professional practice. She is reluctant to accord primacy of judgement to external authorities and/or experts, noting also that standardisation (in the form of fixed criteria) is 'at odds' with many of the basic premises of action research. Lomax, instead, stresses the paramountcy of the researcher - him or herself - in relation to the process of authenticating knowledges emerging from his or her (or the shared) action research inquiry. She writes:

"Action research celebrates difference between researchers and allows for unique
solutions to unique problems. It is adaptable and does not prescribe a common course of action. It is sensitive to context and supports the exploration of previously implicit understandings. These features of action research certainly do not sit easily with formal assessment arrangements." (Lomax 1994: 124)

Whilst this statement is consistent with the values of autonomy, respect for individual differences, empowerment and emancipation, Lomax, nonetheless, presents a comprehensive set of guidelines which help the action researcher to test the quality of their research activities. I should note that Lomax discusses how she has attempted to support the process of making appropriate judgements about action research projects by pointing out that 'the research has to be validated within the practitioner context before it can be submitted for assessment in report form'. I chose to provide my tutorial colleagues with descriptions of my practice and I asked them to judge whether the content of those descriptions was 'accurate, fair and authentic'.

Here, using the criteria developed by Clark et al. (1993), Lomax (1994) and Tickle (1995) I shall present a brief interim analysis of my inquiry in order to demonstrate how I was monitoring the unfolding processes. The reflection on my work helped stimulate my later attempt to conduct a form of collaborative inquiry.

**Reflection and stock-taking**

Lomax presents a relatively straightforward sequential identification of successive moments in the action research inquiry process. (Appendix H summarises the criteria she describes for each of a five stage action research process) For this reason, I asked myself questions connected with this sequence of activities. Where Clarke et al. and Tickle refine or extend the issues addressed by Lomax I included these additional points in the critical appraisal of my project.

In stage one, Lomax asks the researcher to explain the research context, make explicit the educational intention and provide a rationale for the inquiry. This I had done - although I had not made public the nature of my educational values or my educational intentions. This latter task needed to be completed.

In stage two, Lomax focuses on the role of the researcher and writes:

"You should start with a clear plan of action which includes imagined solutions but you should be ready to modify this as the research proceeds. This process should be recorded and made explicit. You will need to be ready to take 'risks' and possibly expose others to risk. You will need to consider the part others play and..."
be clear about the ethical principles that will govern your research." (Lomax 1994: 120)

This aspect of my project was problematic. Whilst my plan of action was to create and present an 'ethics education' - and I had developed learning structures designed to be appropriate for and relevant to the distinctive client group I had acted unilaterally in determining the form and content of the educational experience. This was because of my reluctance to risk facilitating a genuinely learner-centred approach to the educational design. This, I thought, was a particular weakness of the inquiry. I resolved to change a part of the character of the inquiry - when I had sufficient confidence to risk doing so. I was also concerned that, ironically, my development of an 'ethics education' - which was also the subject of an action research inquiry was, itself, unethical. Was I 'exploiting' the client group in the pursuit of my own interests and agenda? I tried to make clear to the successive groups of police middle managers that my project had been stimulated by the publicly stated need to develop educational materials in the field of police ethics - to help implement the strategy set by the Quality of Service committee - but I was aware of the disjunction between the values of my clients (on courses of study at Bramshill) and research values. I have already mentioned how a proportion of police middle-managers resent or devalue research endeavours. This remained an uncomfortable tension for me throughout the whole of the inquiry process.

Stage three, for Lomax, concerns monitoring the nature of the action taken and the reconnaissance phase of the research cycle(s). She advises the inquirer to collect comprehensive data and then to subject that data to thorough critical scrutiny. She adds:

"In order to 'appreciate' the action, you (sic) will need to interrogate the data and identify patterns and themes. These patterns and themes are the 'green shoots' of theory that is grounded in the events that you describe." (Lomax 1994: 121)

Whilst I had tried to provide a detailed description of the way I had progressed the basic action research cycle into and within my situation of practice I had not exposed any of my analyses to critique by others. Here, too, was another weakness in my approach. (I was, much later in my research, to convene meetings with the staff and with officers returning to Bramshill for various programmes of study in which I, after first describing the nature of the data that I had gathered, asked for their help in making sense of that data. This constituted an attempt to improve the situation.)
I had spent many hours intensely contemplating the emerging data and I had begun to create theory grounded in the phenomena emerging in the situation of practice. A very real puzzle for me concerned the fact that it remained difficult to find obviously uniform responses to the ethics education experience. This seemed to be corroborated by the variability within the responses to the different questionnaires.

Stage four asks for an evaluation of the project. This stage explores whether or not the outcomes are significant, whether there has been any practical change and whether the research(s) has (have) developed professionally. At the very least I was confident that I had begun to present a worthwhile area of study to police leaders and managers. Beyond this, I was beginning to build a useful data profile concerning the patterning of responses to the questionnaires. I was, however, much less certain that I had 'exposed the assumptions and contradictions' in my 'claims to know'. At this stage of the research inquiry I hoped that I might I achieve this.

Stage five addresses the actual nature of the research report. Clarke et al. and Tickle emphasise the importance of providing almost palpable descriptions of the research situation and of communicating with a credible and authentic voice. I wanted my research to portray the story of my inquiry and the writings on case study research suggested ways in which to achieve this. So, for example, Stake (1995) describes what readers of a case study should expect. He emphasises both the uniqueness of the single case, its inherent complexity, and, its relationship to wider circumstances.

The second major phase of my inquiry was marked, initially, by insouciance and sanguininity. I worried less about the critical gaze of moral philosophers as I moved into the new phase.

*Action research and a developing ethics education for police leaders and managers: the second cycle - 'Eclecticism and pragmatics'*

*The Design*

My design was scheduled to be presented to the course on 11 January 1996. In order to communicate an outline of the nature of the subject 'ethics' and to provide initial 'structure' I resolved to give an opening and relatively informal presentation on 'ethics' which included a 'first look at police ethics'. This opening presentation was positioned in the afternoon of the third day of the module. I began the next day with a brief comment on the nature of human nature - where I made reference to the idea of human limitation, before outlining the major police ethical dilemmas.
These included: 'The problem of loyalty', 'Impartiality', 'The proper use of force', 'The use of discretion', 'The problem of deception', 'Conflicts of rights', and 'The conflict between due process and crime control'. I then outlined a 'programme for managing ethically' which drew from Heron's (1989a) six category intervention analysis, Snell's (1993) analysis of skills for ethical management and ideas from the 'quality' movement.

The remainder of the day was devoted to the exercise, 'The play's the thing'. I encouraged the client group to form itself into four sub-groups each of which would select one of the four topics and present both an unfolding drama prior to their facilitating a detailed analysis of the ethical issues that were involved. Those topics were:

- The practice of discretion
- The problem of loyalty
- The problem of deception
- The use and abuse of power

The final part of the unit, scheduled for the beginning of the next day attempted to use video material to explore the problem of ethical relativism. I wished to include exercise 'Ultima Ethica' because I thought it provided the opportunity to appreciate the role of police in any complex human society. Lastly, I included a 'personal journey' design based upon Assagioli's psychosynthesis in order to emphasise the centrality of the human agent and their choices in the expression of ethical conduct.

The Delivery

I had a sense that the delivery of the unit was carefully 'stage-managed'. I was feeling considerable pressure to achieve positive results but, simultaneously, liberation from trying to uncover and control every variable that might impact on the value that might be assigned to the way I had presented the educational structure.

I introduced the unit by recognising that 'it would be quite wrong' to imply that, in virtue of the fact that we were examining 'ethics', any one person in the client group was unethical. I also indicated that there were support readings to supplement any topic areas that would be raised during the unit.

In addition, I realised that my delivery was beginning to reflect my own educational development. I had begun to consider that the study of ethics could lead to a form
of personal liberation because it not only gave permissions to lead and live a 'mixed' life but it also served to avoid the alienating effects of a technological and/or materialist consciousness.

My diary entry on 10 January 1996 includes the following:

'I began with a lecture, 'Foundations for ethics'. This went smoothly enough. Two officers came up to me at the end and said: 'That was excellent.'"

At the end of the first full day, my diary entry on 11 January 1996 states:

'I mapped three issues - the nature of human nature, police ethical dilemmas and ways of 'managing' ethically. And then it was: 'The play's the thing'. Four plays were produced - they were lengthy and intricate - a commendable set of productions - and a good level of analysis. For example, it became clear that there is a police norm (which can collude with the commission of unethical conduct) that features a readiness not to 'look' too closely at what fellow officers are doing. It also became clear that ethical discourse is not especially prevalent in police problem solving or decision making. Police officers are not particularly used to employing the language of moral principles. They are quick to judge and use expressions like, 'That's way out of order' - but they infrequently stress moral positives like benevolence or integrity.'

I had chosen to illustrate the problem associated with the widespread assumption (amongst police and non-police) that ethics was/were 'merely relative to a particular culture at a particular time' with a video contrasting the treatment afforded to cats in Manhattan with that meted out to different sorts of animal in a province in southern China. Some Manhattan dwellers lavish more care on their pets than they do on fellow humans whilst cats, dogs etc. can be subjected to unsympathetic treatments in some parts of China. Following Singer (1993a), the ethical relativist would not be able to 'take against' these local Chinese customs and practices or the choices made by a community of rich Americans.

Exercise 'Ultima Ethica' again proved to be, at best, partially successful. Only two of the three groups took the exercise seriously. However, a video segment from the film 'Schindler's list' - which I had chosen to prompt reflection on the 'moral distance' a person can 'traverse' - impacted powerfully upon the client group. The final activity, 'a personal journey', elicited from the vast majority, considerable energy - and the value of this exercise was mentioned in the subsequent interviews.
The Evaluation

I used the simple structure used in the unit deliveries of the previous cycle.

As before, every one of the twenty eight module participants was asked to give their responses to the five questions on the evaluation form.

The high points of the unit included: 'The play's - a refreshing way to learn', 'The study of police ethical dilemmas via the plays', 'The deep nature of the subject matter', 'The thoroughness and high level of the inputs', 'The professionalism of the tutor', 'The experience of enlightenment', 'Seeing hard bitten cynical coppers getting 'stuck in' - and taking things seriously', 'Schindler'slist clip - I shall go and see the whole film'.

The low points of the unit included: 'Too heavy in parts', 'Rob's too much of an academic', 'Theory boring', 'Theory over my head', 'More input needed from police', 'Too much time on academic aspects', 'Not enough practical analysis', 'Rob Adlam should spent more time out on the ground - then he'd understand us better'.

It seemed that the unit could be 'improved' by reducing even further the academic or 'theory' content and increasing the practical discussions. In addition, some respondents suggested that I 'include the study of police ethical dilemmas examined by senior and/or experienced police officers' - as well as 'clear guidelines for resolving ethical dilemmas'.

The response to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as a result of your experience with the unit ?' was similar to the previous group:

16 out of 28 mentioned that they now had a 'better awareness', 'better idea', 'clearer idea', a 'grasp' a 'better understanding' of ethics. In addition, 14 out of the 28 participants added that they now 'understood the importance of ethics in policing', or 'saw the relevance of ethics to police work', or 'realised that we are involved on a daily basis with ethics'.

12 out of 28 indicated that they had learned more about the 'ethics' of their colleagues as a result of examining the patterns of data emerging from the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire.
6 out of 28 noted that 'Very little', 'not a lot', or 'not much' learning had resulted from the two days.

Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:

- A very high level: N = 2
- A high level: N = 10
- A moderate level: N = 10
- Little: N = 5
- Very little: N = 1

Comment

This data suggested that the new approach - which was as much a reflection of my own feeling of 'liberation' from the relentless search for the 'perfect design' - was edging towards the uniformly positive evaluation I was seeking.

The interview data

The interview data provided me with grounds for optimism. Four of the six interviewees were unequivocally positive in their valuation of the experience. The other two revealed a mixture of positive and negative reactions to the 'ethics education' experience.

The set of interviews (P7 - P12) were conducted on 16 January 1996.

In response to suggestions by the interviewers the interview schedule had been altered. It now consisted of four questions:

1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

2. The second area concerns your own ethical development: How do you picture yourself in terms of your ethical development?

3. The third area concerns your views of what ethics education might achieve. What do you think ethics education might achieve and in what way would you like to see ethics education conducted?
4. Lastly, how if at all would you improve the ethics education offered on the module?

I have chosen to reproduce two interviews in their entirety; the content remains faithful to the notes of the interviews given to me by the interviewers.
Interview schedule (P7)

1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the 'ethics' unit of the Managing People' module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

A very positive experience. Torn with note taking rather than sitting back absorbing. Felt that the presentation was very well structured - flowed from the almost abstract to the practical concrete issues within the police service. Felt concerned about colleagues - almost antipathy [of his colleagues] to the abstract philosophies presented and they were unable to see the relevance of these in current present day activities

2. The second area concerns your own ethical development: How do you picture yourself in terms of your ethical development?

Input seemed to crystallise many thoughts and ideas that he had before, however, there is now an increased level of awareness about these issues with which he is able to make the appropriate links and interpret more clearly in the workplace

3. The third area concerns your views of what ethics education might achieve. What do you think ethics education might achieve and in what way would you like to see ethics education conducted?

It brought home to him as a serving officer of 19 years and it is the first time that any such structured input has been available. Believes it should be offered to new recruits which will be of great benefit to them and enable them to understand better the practical issues of policing and more amenable to change

4. Lastly, how if at all would you improve the ethics education offered on the module?

Information should be given at the start of the presentation i.e. in handouts and their contents in order to enable the participants to gauge how much note-taking is required. This would create more time for S _____ and others to relax and enjoy the presentation much better.
Classification: A - A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim (goal) of the action research process

Comment

1. This individual had a 'very positive experience' with the 'ethics education' event(s). This simple statement represents the achievement of the first goal set for the action research process in the design and delivery of ethics education to police leaders and managers.

2. Evidence is (again) presented concerning the negative response ('Felt concerned about the almost antipathy to the abstract philosophies presented..') that colleagues exhibited (even if that response was masked in the more public educational settings).

3. In response to Question 2 some data concerning the impact of the ethics education is volunteered: there is both an 'increased level of awareness' and a consolidation of 'many thoughts and ideas' (the term he uses is ‘crystallise’). In addition ‘greater clarity of perception’ can be brought to the workplace.

4. Question 3 reveals the fact that this was 'the first time that any such structured input (on ethics) has been available during 19 years as a serving police officer’

Interview schedule (P9)

1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

Personally speaking I had to listen intently - I knew nothing of the background (to ethics) - I was racing on ahead - thinking 'where is this taking me professionally?' I'll listen to anything and I wasn’t clear where it was taking me. I wanted, at the end of the session, to see where I was going to get the benefit. I would have liked more 'organisational ethics' e.g. 'What gives the right of someone who is younger etc. to say 'you're corrupt'? I think the exercises that were teed up were very good; then I was hoping that we'd see more practical application. If you were able to draw in other aspects I would like a comparison - e.g. business ethics, medical ethics - this would give another angle to it. Overall I had a positive feel about it - a positive value
2. The second area concerns your own ethical development: How do you picture yourself in terms of your ethical development?

I'm 'there' frankly. Ethically the only problem is how much subterfuge I will have to use. Ethically, I have to decide. Individually my ethical stance won't change - it'll alter a bit - but its built on some sociological things - I won't change. I think police ethics have been driven by the need to deal with dishonesty (and with 'Jack-the-Lad' who wants a conviction at all costs) - and I now see a different ethical standard. I am 'set'. The only bit I have to think about is minding my Ps and Q's - a little bit of sensitivity.

3. The third area concerns your views of what ethics education might achieve. What do you think ethics education might achieve and in what way would you like to see ethics education conducted?

What I would like to see achieved is ethics put into the practical arena - I'd like to see how an ethical stance changed an organisation or what ethical practice is in organisations - both police and non-police. To round it off, it may be beneficial for people to have an examination of their own personal ethics - if there were a way of doing it.

4. Lastly, how if at all would you improve the ethics education offered on the module?

I enjoyed 'where it came from' - I enjoyed the build up - I got a positive lift from it - it was the one subject on the programme I was frightened of....

Classification: B - A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first action research aim

Comment

1. Again, there is a reference to knowing 'nothing' of the background to ethics

2. This participant wanted to 'know where it was taking me professionally' and this was linked with a desire to 'see more practical application'

3. The issue of 'organisational ethics' is raised - again in the context of wanting more of a focus on this topic - and, again, this is linked to comparative ethics - e.g.
business and medicine

4. There is a suggestion about some of the distinct developments viz a vis 'police ethics' which may constitute part of the 'role morality' - i.e. the standards acceptable within police practice - including 'subterfuge' and its limits which are not thought to be acceptable to a more common and general morality.

5. This participant also wanted to see 'ethics put into the practical arena ... how an ethical stance changed an organisation'.

6. An additional suggestion for improving the unit was the fact that 'it may be beneficial for people to have an examination of their personal ethics'.

Reflection

Although the interview data suggested that the design of the ethics unit was beginning to achieve the reaction that might lead to achieving the goals of the action research project there was, in the overall unit evaluation, a more tepid response. To some extent this was not surprising. The interview context affords to the interviewee a relatively intense level of attention that is normally denied in the usual process of police education and development. Moreover, the interviewee is actively asked to explore their learning and valuing of the project in a social situation which tends to call for a considered reaction.

I should note, too, that one of my police colleagues mentioned the fact that police learn to respond to interviews and surveys by 'giving them what they want to hear'. In other words, the interview data may have drawn a response from the participants that was skewed in a positive direction because they knew I was concerned to design a 'successful' form of ethics education.

As I prepared for the next delivery in this research cycle I resolved to introduce the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire not as a specific means to help collect data from the group but expressly to stimulate small group discussions concerning how the individuals in that group responded to the various questions. I was to discover that technological developments at Bramshill were to cause me to create more of a redesign than I had originally planned.

The Design
The usual room in which I was able to show my computer screen presentations was not available so the module leader decided that the ethics unit should begin the second week of the course. This was significant because the design that emerged gradually became consolidated and more routinised - especially in the third long action research cycle. I wanted to provide certain foundations in 'ethics' but, from the outset, I was determined to locate the subject in the practice of policing. To that end, I had decided to use a video clip featuring an undercover operation that placed male and female police officers at risk of physical harm. The video also included references to the 'morally difficult' nature of police undercover work made by a very senior police officer. In order to support this emphasis of grounding ethics in the practice of policing I had also elaborated and finalised the design of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. This consisted of sixteen questions that could be used to prompt individual reflection on such issues as the nature of their own moral system and subsequent 'sharing' in small group discussions. I had also assembled video material designed to illustrate wider concerns about the probity of public officials. In addition, I wanted to draw from the powerful images and vignettes in the film, 'Schindler's list' as well as the demanding material concerning the treatment of animals in the film examining our (often) contradictory attitudes towards animals.

In design terms, I was still attempting to provide containment through structure within which there was considerable 'space' for individual enquiry processes. I was also trying to do justice both to the subject 'ethics' and the 'real-world' experiences of police officers. My choice of video material was influenced by the need both to 'legitimate' the subject through evoking very obvious police dilemmas which were, themselves, acknowledged as such, by senior police officers. I also wanted to continue with a conceptual analysis of police concerning their proper function and appropriate conduct in a democratic society. However, I also wanted to include in the design a set of very personal questions using the metaphor of life as a personal journey towards fulfilment and self-actualisation. The design, through the medium of the 'plays' attempted to empower the client group to take responsibility for its own identification and analysis of major ethical dilemmas in policing.

The Delivery

My diary entry on 19 February 1996 records the following:

'I kept the pace on the first day moving along briskly. After the introductory presentation - which lasted an hour - I showed the video clip featuring undercover operations. The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire was used for small group
discussions - and, although I did not 'poke my nose in' those discussions seemed to be earnest, focused and productive. Quite a lot of thoughtful self-disclosure seemed to be taking place. After lunch I used video clips (Schindler's list, and then an interview with the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis) to catalyse small group discussions. These preceded exercise Ultima Ethica'. I finished the day with the 'personal journey exercise.'

I then added:

'I feel that I am nearly at a position where I am 'there'. Most officers take the work seriously and seem to spend quite a lot of effort thinking about the 'issues' and reflecting upon their own moral systems and their moral development.'

Although I was beginning to feel that my action research project was on the threshold of achieving its goal I was also continuing to experience considerable psychological pressure. Part of this pressure was connected with the sheer demand of preparation for the unit. In addition, the actual delivery of the material itself was, for me, tense and anxiety-ridden. The presentations I gave required lucidity and energy. The experience was similar to that of being a solo actor in a very lengthy one-act play. The video material was impactive - but it was also profound and distressing. The psychosynthesis exercise concerned with the 'personal journey' was always risky and required very real discipline on my part. Moreover, it was always possible that, despite the rationale or 'cognitive structuring' I provided before any learning structure of stimulus, I could always 'lose' a person.

My diary entry on 20 February 1996 following the second day of the unit reads:

'After an opening lecture on 'Applied ethics' which was followed by some questions it was time for the plays. Four very good plays were produced and performed. Two of the plays made references to various writers on police ethics - including Kleinig, Klockars and Delattre'.

My diary notes also adumbrated the content of the four plays and concluded with the observation:

'Good news. I was told that the group was going to meet in the Mansion Bar and afterwards in the Great Drawing Room to discuss the issues raised over the two days. This is a real step forward.'

Evaluation
I continued to use the simple structure used in the previous unit deliveries.

Every one of the thirty module participants was asked to respond to the usual five questions:

The high points of the unit included: 'Rob's commitment and professionalism was excellent', 'The research that has gone into the course', 'The plays on the second day', 'The 'journey exercise' - it has changed my life', 'The study of something 'deep', 'The chance to think out of the box' 'Schindler's list video clip - made me want to see the film'.

The low points of the unit included: 'The first day was over my head in places', 'Ethics is just a flavour of the month thing', 'The tutor was living in a dream world', 'Overly academic', 'Some people shouldn't be on the course'

As before a small number of participants noted that the unit could be 'improved' by reducing even further the academic or 'theory' content and increasing the practical discussions. And, again, as before, some respondents suggested that I 'include the study of police ethical dilemmas examined by senior and/or experienced police officers' - as well as 'guidelines for resolving ethical dilemmas'.

The response to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as a result of your experience with the unit?' was similar to the previous group:

21 out of 30 mentioned that they now had a 'Clarification of what ethics is', a 'clearer idea', or a 'better understanding' of ethics. As with the previous group, 16 out of the 30 participants added that they now 'understood the importance of ethics in policing', or 'saw the relevance of ethics to police work', or 'realised that we are involved on a daily basis with ethics'.

12 out of 28 indicated that they had learned more about the 'ethics' of their colleagues as a result of examining the patterns of data emerging from the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire.

4 out of 30 noted that 'Naff all', 'Zilch', 'Very little', or 'Not a lot' of learning had resulted from the two days.

Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:
- A very high level: N = 2
- A high level: N = 10
- A moderate level: N = 10
- Little: N = 4
- Very little: N = 4

As with the previous module six officers were asked to take part in interviews in the week following their experience with an 'ethics education'. The reaction of two interviewees was positive, two reported a mix of positives and negatives whilst two had negative reactions.

Here, I have reproduced an example of each category of respondent. The responses to each question were written by each of the interviewers; the accuracy was checked and agreed by each of the interviewees.

**Interview schedule (P15)**

1. Before we look at your recent experience with 'ethics education' have you had any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?

   *Ethics did get a mention on an EO course - but it was like an exhortation. There wasn't any analysis.*

2. We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so on ...

   *It was a real high for me. I feel 'enlightened'. I had never had the chance to examine and think about these kinds of issues - and it has helped me to understand why I am policing and how I should police. We've got all sorts of dilemmas and problems with the N _______ demonstrations and protests and now I'm clearer about the important principles at stake*  

3. The third area concerns your view on what ethics education might achieve, and, how it might be conducted. Specifically, a) what do you think ethics education might achieve, and, b) in what way would you like to see ethics education
conducted?

Well - as it is, it worked for me. So it can achieve enlightenment - and confidence in the way we police. I wouldn't change any of it.

4. Lastly, how, if at all, would you improve the ethics education that was offered on the module?

The trouble is - if you alter it much - you might not achieve what you could achieve. A bit more practical in emphasis I suppose.

Classification: A - A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim (goal) of the action research process

Comment

1. This is a positive evaluation of the experience and reflects, therefore, the first aim of the action research process

2. Again, there is evidence of the 'underplayed' and underdeveloped nature of 'ethics' in police 'professional' development

3. The educational experience had led to 'enlightenment'

4. He was not keen to see many changes - except perhaps a reduction in the level of 'theory'

Interview schedule (P16)

1. Before we look at your recent experience with 'ethics education' have you had any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?

In my regional Inspectors' course reference was made to 'ethics' from time to time but there was no detailed focus

2. We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so
Initially I felt a bit negative because I wondered why we needed to do ethics and then I began to see how it would help me in Complaints and discipline where I shall be working. At the end of the first morning I was lost - there wasn't anything concrete to grab hold of - but when we did the plays and started analysing them I could see ethics more clearly - It achieved a lot of reflection

3. The third area concerns your view on what ethics education might achieve, and, how it might be conducted. Specifically, a) what do you think ethics education might achieve, and, b) in what way would you like to see ethics education conducted?

Well, I would have preferred it if it were simpler. But maybe it isn't a simple subject. There is a real value in just knowing what ethics is - and that's the first thing to achieve. I'd like to see ethics presented by a mixture of police and non-police.

4. Lastly, how, if at all, would you improve the ethics education that was offered on the module?

I would try to find a way so that everyone on the course was forced to participate. Some people just pay lip-service to what is going on - and then mumble in the bar that its f**king crap

Classification: B - A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first action research aim

Comment

1. There was only partial achievement of the primary aim of my action research

2. Again, the content of ethics was perceived to be 'too difficult'

3. Reference was made to the hypocrisy (and therefore dysfunctionality) of some (an unspecified number) of course participants

Interview schedule (P19)

1. Before we look at your recent experience with 'ethics education' have you had
any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?

*Nothing comes to mind*

2. We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so on ...

*It was all more-or-less negative for me, I'm afraid. The presenter [RobAdlam] used quite unnecessary words like 'a map of the terrain' and his definition of ethics left us all worse off. As far as I could tell we didn't get anything of benefit. The plays were just ways of filling the day - a 'waste of space'*

3. The third area concerns your view on what ethics education might achieve, and, how it might be conducted. Specifically, a) what do you think ethics education might achieve, and, b) in what way would you like to see ethics education conducted?

*Ethics is a waste of time. It won't achieve anything because either you're naturally a good character or you aren't. Some police are, perhaps, able to get a bit of benefit but I think its unlikely. If we have to have ethics then do it twenty years earlier*

4. Lastly, how, if at all, would you improve the ethics education that was offered on the module?

*I don't think It's worth having on the module*

Classification: C - A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the action research process has been achieved

**Comment**

1. The first aim of the action research process is not achieved. This participant does not give a positive valuation to the experience - in fact, the experience with ethics education is valued negatively
2. Apparently related to the negative evaluation is his theory of character which is divided into those who are 'naturally' good and those who are not.

3. Another reference is made to the perceived inappropriateness of the way I was using language (as a presenter) - 'the presenter used quite unnecessary words'.

**Review**

Although I was feeling relatively buoyant concerning the achievements of the project I was still unable to 'succeed' with all the participants. The overall pattern of data showed that a majority of the client group was valuing its experience with my educational design. Despite the discipline that I was trying to exert I was still unable to 'connect' with everyone in a way that was, for each, positively valued. I decided, therefore, further to reduce the 'academic' content and to develop a new structure which would help explore 'organisational ethics'. However, I reproduced, in broad terms, the two day design in the March and April deliveries. The pattern of feedback in the 'evaluation' remained remarkably constant. In the April delivery I noted in my diary:

'The results have been, in some ways, encouraging.

The positives are as follows:

- A small number of officers reported - in an unsolicited way - that my ethics education has 'changed their lives'.

- The majority of those interviews have valued, enjoyed, liked etc. the ethics education.

However the disappointments have been:

- Rarely a sustained analysis of the 'plays'

- Not much apparent valuing of exercise 'Ultima Ethica'

- My own discomfort with my role - more a tutor or 'teller', less a facilitator

- A general failure on my part to provoke self-managed or 'mature' learning. We all seem, as a staff, to have to 'mother' them.'
I had also established a relatively stable design. The design was reproduced over the next three module deliveries in the months of June, July and August.

In my diary entry of 15 June 1996 I summarised the developments concerning the ethics unit and the nature of its design as follows:

'As the incoming 'Managing People' module approaches, I shall note the principle developments that have taken place and the new 'ingredients' that have been 'designed' into the unit:

- my values statement in relation to action research 'on' ethics education

- the learning log and its relationship to the unit

- the content for an ethics education: this consists of a very broad introductory lecture and videos, the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire, a brief review of the main ethical issues discussed in the 'ethics of policing', the Moral Ethos Questionnaire' and the exercise, 'The play's the thing'.

I also include a choice of activities for students to examine in small groups - ethical leadership, the practice of ethical management and the development of a 'managerial manifesto'

On 17 June 1996, I welcomed thirty officers who were attending the 'Managing people' module of the Police Management Programme. I had taken on the role of module leader - and this enabled me to outline how the different components of the module would 'hang together'. It also gave me a chance to distribute my 'educational values' statement to help participants recognise the nature of the emphases I would be taking. A part of my diary entry, written on the evening of that day, recounts the reaction to my 'values statement'.

'We assembled at 0900 hrs for the 'Managing People' module. For the first time, I distributed - early on in the programme - a copy of my 'Values statement'. I asked each of the thirty participants to read it - and to do two things; first, to let me know what they thought - and how they had responded to it; and, second, to 'confront' 'challenge' or 'indicate' to me when they saw a departure on my part from these espoused values.

As a matter of fact, everyone appeared to read the statement but no one said
anything about it when I asked for feedback.

This doesn't surprise me for three reasons. First, my own anxieties about doing such a culturally abnormal thing probably led me to do it all (i.e. the distribution of the statement) in rather too cursory manner. So, it probably seemed that I wasn't really encouraging a response. Second, my action took place at a very early stage of group formation. Participants would not be unfrozen - and therefore disinclined to respond. Third, the powerful character of police culture has developed ways of dealing with 'things sensitive' and/or 'things different'. They read it but probably dealt with it as follows: O.K., latest thing, let's move on - this isn't immediately, in any way, connected with policing'. I had probably tapped into a culturally patterned response.'

The evaluation data provided by the client group replicated that of the preceding unit deliveries.

The interview data complemented this pattern. To illustrate this pattern, I have included the responses of the interviewees to the question: 'We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so on ...'

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It's good to know where you stand with your personal ethics. It gives you a god focus from here [this point in my career] onwards. I didn't like the Plato and Pluto bit and it went on too long. It was in too much detail. Rob speaks at a level way above my head - but I've only got 'O' levels. It's useful for policy making I think. I needed the work to be more related to my work environment. The 'Hard Cases' [a sample of ethical dilemmas experienced by police officers in the UK that were provided by Kleinig] were good, and so were the playlets because they provoked discussion.

P33

My view is tainted because the ACPO Quality of service launch on ethics fell so flat. It's a waste of time teaching it. The lectures are too long. We've all got discretion and we can exercise it if we wish - it's as simple as that.
I found the periodical extract interesting [Pollock-Byrne's chapter on ethics and criminal justice] and the 'Hard Cases' too. The plays were informative. Apart from that I found Socrates and Plato irrelevant because it wasn't linked to my current environment. It would be better to get straight to the issues that matter.

The subject is right, although I felt not enough time was spent on it so it seemed a bit rushed. There is value in putting our work into an ethical framework - it was a refreshing experience.

I ended up in a group of quite negative people who didn't think it was worth doing the exercise(s) - so it was a bit of a low really. The videos were interesting except we've learned to 'keep the lid on' our feelings. I thought it was all rather gloomy - but I've reflected on the experience - we all have - and we know it is important. A mixture of negative and positive for me.

It's hard to describe because I'm still thinking about it. When I drove home on Friday I didn't listen to the stereo because I was going over it all in my mind. I was asking questions like: 'Is our society just?' 'Am I ethical?' So although it was [the two days focus] complicated - especially the history of ethics - and the comments during and about the plays - I've got interested in the subject. Do we need a code of ethics? Is utilitarianism the best for police? It was successful because it made me think about these things for the first time in a focused way.

Whilst I had continued in July and August with broadly similar designs to those of the preceding month a question had taken shape in my mind. In part, this was prompted by a University lecturer who had come to take an interest in my work. She had remarked:

'Why don't you try some proper (sic) action research? Even if it fails that will be a worthwhile finding.'
Would it be possible to develop a design that would approximate the orthodoxies of a more 'adult' approach to learning and the more genuinely collaborative and co-operative models of action research? At the very outset of my project I had wanted to create an emancipatory form of action research. Could I demonstrate the courage of my convictions?

*Preparing for a collaborative action research approach to an 'ethics education experience'*

Throughout August and September I prepared to launch a more genuinely collaborative approach to conducting ethics education. I made a particularly detailed study of two recently published resources. The first was Kleinig's (1996), *The ethics of policing*. The second was Stringer's (1995), *Action research*. Kleinig's work represented the most comprehensive scholarly examination of the subject 'police ethics' now available. Stringer presented a relatively straightforward framework for conducting collaborative action research. I thought that it would be possible to follow Stringer's design and, to support the variety of concerns that might emerge from a more 'invitational' approach to 'ethics', I set out to compile a wealth of resource materials in order to support the inquiry process that I was hoping to stimulate as a result of the new design. Here though, I found myself experiencing a frustrating contradiction. From a purely rational standpoint it seemed perfectly possible to collaborate with the client group in setting an inquiry agenda. On the other hand, my experience told me that such an approach would be counter the 'rule bound' nature of the culture. Nonetheless, I hoped that, with proper skill and sufficient resources, it might be possible to conduct and facilitate the educational process in a reasoned and collaborative way.

Stringer had described a 'basic action research routine' consisting of three steps, 'look', 'think' and, 'act'. The basic routine was preceded by a preliminary stage described as 'establishing the climate'. He had noted that prior to the actual 'look', 'think' and 'act' process of collaborative action research it was necessary to 'set the scene' by basing the actual process upon four 'working principles of community based action research'. These are:

- Establish 'quality' relationships
- Manifest effective communication
- Develop authentic participation
- Include all relevant parties (stakeholders)

In my modification of Stringer's procedure I wanted to encourage participants to
'look' and 'think' about their situation of practice in relation to 'ethics'. To help them do this I would ask them to consider the draft statement of ethical principles and to use Kleinig's comprehensive cataloguing of 'police ethics' in order to help in the process of identifying the issues they would wish to 'work on'. Prior to the 'act' stage I wanted individuals in the group to consider the methods they might adopt to make progress towards their own learning goals. I would facilitate the process and provide as many appropriate resources as I could.

Initially I tried, in the September delivery of the ethics unit, to work in a more interactive way with the client group, as a prelude to the stronger form of action research that I had planned for October. My diary notes made on 4 September 1996 illustrate some of the difficulties I anticipated if I were to adopt the action researcher role as defined by Stringer (1996). He had suggested that 'titles such as facilitator, associate and consultant are appropriate' and had emphasised that, in collaborative action research, the researcher (or co-researcher) was 'there as a catalyst'. Stringer elaborated the research role by making four other points:

- The role was not to impose but to stimulate people to change. This was to be done by addressing issues that 'concern them now'

- The essence of the work is process - the way things are done - rather than the result achieved

- The key is to enable people to develop their own analysis of the issues

- The researcher starts 'where people are', and not where someone else thinks they are or ought to be

However, even though, in the September delivery I tried to handle the material in as interactive a way as possible I noted:

'The participants prefer the tutor to lead, structure, inform and to take the major educational decisions'.

Attempting a collaborative action research approach to conducting an 'ethics education' experience

My diary note (dated 23 October 1996) immediately following my attempt to conduct a more collaborative approach to ethics education reads:
'At around 0900 hrs. I launched the first explicit attempt to conduct a collaborative action research approach to ethics education. I looked down at my notes and smiled to myself as I read the instruction (or exhortation) that I had written to myself: 'Don't panic'. I did not feel particularly panicky - but I immediately realised that so much of my preparation was irrelevant. No one was or would be particularly interested in the finer points of action research nor in the fine details of my intellectual approach. Suddenly it all seemed a bit ridiculous. My task was to find, if I could, a way of involving them in 'setting the agenda'. So, rather than 'inform' them of 'action research' I simply asked them to 'glance at' my statement of intent. I then outlined the basic idea of action research - and emphasised the fact that I thought they would prefer to 'have a say' in what we looked at and how we looked at 'ethics'. I then adhered to my original scene setting design in the following way: I described, briefly, my own relationship with 'ethics' and then I showed an extract from the film 'Schindler's list' as a prelude to asking the question, 'What is ethics'? 'If it 'leapt up and hit us in the face', would we 'know' it was 'ethics'?' I organised the twenty eight participants into small groups to discuss their definition of ethics and followed this with Kleinig's (1996) characterisation of 'ethics'. I provided a short introduction to ethics making reference to 'how it all began' with Socrates' question, 'How should one live?'. I then distributed some cards and asked everyone if they might write down the topics in which they were interested and how they imagined they might 'address' the issues. The atmosphere suddenly became very strained. Some participants were frustrated and some became hostile'.

What then happened?

My subsequent diary note records the outcome:

'The 'warm-up' doesn't seem necessary. The instructions - if they are to work at all - need to be articulated very carefully. Otherwise participants just do not seem to understand what is required of them'. In fact, most of the group seemed bewildered.

Some remarked: 'What are we supposed to do?'

One commented: 'But you're the expert - we don't know what we have to write down'

Another declaimed: 'Oh just get on with it, Rob - let's not waste any time'

Across the group a mood of frustration and irritation was beginning to manifest
itself. These feelings were clearly reflected in the subsequent interviews.

In the presenting circumstances - a group waiting expectantly for me to lead an examination of ethics - I judged that it was educationally absurd to insist on conforming with a collaborative mode of inquiry. I recalled the comments of one of my colleagues:

'These people are, by and large, not mature learners'.

I should also add that prior to and during the process I experienced very considerable anxiety. I noted in my dairy:

'My level of anxiety is raised by risking a genuinely collaborative approach. I have to guard against this if it is not to lead to some panic-driven decisions'.

After the hesitation and the discomfort I decided, after all, to structure the remaining two days beginning with the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire and finishing with a personal exploration into values and leadership. I included the newly developed 'Moral Ethos' (of organisations) questionnaire as well as small group discussions examining a series of police moral dilemmas supplied by Kleinig.

Evaluation

Every one of the twenty eight module participants was asked to respond to the usual five questions:

The high points of the unit included: 'One of the 'deepest and most worthwhile experiences I have had at the college' 'Schindler's list - very moving' 'The thoroughness of the material', 'At last something 'different' and profound'.

The low points of the unit included: 'Unnecessary beginning', 'Too much removed from reality', 'The tutor didn't seem to know where he was going' 'Too abstract', 'You've either got ethics or you haven't so its a waste of time studying it', 'No police speakers'.

Yet again a small number of participants suggested that the unit could be 'improved' by reducing still further the academic or 'theory' content and increasing the practical discussions. As before, some respondents suggested that 'There should be included the study of police ethical dilemmas examined by senior and/or
experienced police officers'. Again, more specific help in dealing with practical problems was mentioned: 'Give us practical guidelines for resolving ethical dilemmas'.

The response to the fourth question, 'What (if any) learning 'happened' for you as a result of your experience with the unit?' was similar to the previous group:

17 out of 28 mentioned that they now had a 'better idea', 'clearer idea', a 'grasp' a 'better understanding' of ethics.

Again, as with the previous group, 10 out of the 28 participants added that they now 'understood the importance of ethics in policing', or 'saw the relevance of ethics to police work', or 'recognised that 'principles' are our business', 'realised that we are involved on a daily basis with ethics'.

3 out of 28 noted that 'Very little', or 'Not a lot' of learning had resulted from the two days.

Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:

- A very high level: N = 1
- A high level: N = 7
- A moderate level: N = 12
- Little: N = 5
- Very little: N = 3

The interview data revealed that four interviewees had a positive reaction to the unit whilst two reported a mixture of positive and negatives responses. All participants commented on the difficulties caused by my attempt to involve them actively in creating a collaborative form of inquiry.

To complete the detail of this cycle of action research I have selected one of each of the two categories of interview in order to exemplify the type of responses to my educational design:
Interview schedule (P50)

1. Before we look at your recent experience with 'ethics education' have you had any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?

None - apart from commenting on ACPO draft ACPO paper

2. We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so on ...

A strange beginning - a slow start - and then having been away from 'academic' arena I had some difficulty in absorbing [the material] - but, on reflection, it was a very effective activity. The learning logs help - the handouts - a bit sterile - but a useful reminder. It could be easy to 'switch-off' if you are not prepared to learn. For me it was very effective. I have looked 'inside myself' at the way I conduct myself.

3. The third area concerns your view on what ethics education might achieve, and, how it might be conducted. Specifically, a) what do you think ethics education might achieve, and, b) in what way would you like to see ethics education conducted?

From the manager's point of view it does nothing but good. It gives the individual responsibility rather than acting as the organisation is perceived as wanting. It should be given at all levels - probationers because it is more difficult to 'correct' people later - but it is also important for middle and senior managers.

There should be a place for ethics and values on all courses - at an appropriate level and quantity - get the 'thinking process' going and let people take it forward for themselves

4. Lastly, how, if at all, would you improve the ethics education that was offered on the module?

On Wednesday and Thursday [of the previous week] I would have said, 'pitch it at a lower level' but, on reflection, it has achieved the effect
Classification: A - A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first action research aim

Comment

There is sufficient evidence to conclude that the first aim of the action research process - to create an ethics education positively valued by police leaders and managers has been achieved - 'on reflection, it was a very effective activity'.

Interview schedule (P54)

1. Before we look at your recent experience with 'ethics education' have you had any previous training or development experience where you have examined 'ethics' as a subject area? If you had, what did it consist of and what did you 'make' of it?

No previous experience

2. We would like to explore, in detail, the nature of your recent experience with 'ethics' on the 'Managing People' module. Please could you describe that experience. What was it like? Were there any 'highs' or 'lows' for example? Did it prompt reflection on your part? What (if anything) has it achieved for you? And so on ...

The experience? Interesting in parts - the plays were fun to do - but watching the others [their plays] wasn't very valuable although quite enjoyable. The two days were rather separated from one another in content and emphasis. Sometimes I got 'lost' - although it is a difficult subject. Overall a 'fifty/fifty' - half-and-half 'highs' and 'lows'.

3. The third area concerns your view on what ethics education might achieve, and, how it might be conducted. Specifically, a) what do you think ethics education might achieve, and, b) in what way would you like to see ethics education conducted?

Ethics should help to make us or keep us ethical. I would like to have had a preliminary briefing - so that I didn't just 'walk into it' - and a chance to listen to some police speakers - for 'balance' - as well as an examination of how and why things go wrong (E.g. the Guildford Four)
4. Lastly, how, if at all, would you improve the ethics education that was offered on the module?

*Less theory - more practical - more analysis of police work and difficulties. As it was there were plusses - it got most people thinking and talking*

Classification: B - A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first action research aim

**Comment**

1. There is insufficient evidence to conclude that the first aim of the action research process - to create an ethics education positively valued by police leaders and managers has been achieved - 'Overall a 'fifty/fifty' - half-and-half 'highs' and 'lows''

**Review**

Although I had prepared extensively and carefully for an approximation of a collaborative action research process I had been unable to initiate an educational process where, together, the participants and myself shared in setting the 'educational agenda'. My fellow tutors on the Police Management Programme had all encountered difficulties with the client group and recognised that, in very broad terms, police middle managers are not used to exercising autonomy either in the work place or in the context of training. Moreover, the module - within which the ethics unit was placed - did not provide any induction into a learning process marked by the 'mood' of a co-operative inquiry'. Although the University tutor had stressed that I should, in the design of an ethics education, resist the 'socio-political pressures' of my situation, I found that my attempt to resist them jeopardised the positive responses to my educational designs.

My disappointment, frustration, anxiety and fear were the mainsprings for me, in December 1996 to enter a new cycle of action research. My diary note of 4 December 1996 reads:

*I am beginning the process of preparing to look at the next ethics education as a case study'*
By this I meant that I would abandon the struggle to refine and re-develop the educational design. I would simply lead and structure the first day of the unit and provide plenty of space throughout the second day for individuals to pursue their practical concerns. I would also hold to a fixed pattern of delivery and be especially receptive to the client experience in order that I might better come to understand the nature of the client group. Extraordinary as it may seem, I realised that I had never sought to collect some basic information about the client group (such as their age, length of service, and level of educational attainment). I had recognised that they were 'experienced' but if I were to be asked to provide any more specific details I would not be able to do so. Moreover, this information was not available within the administrative systems of the college. I thought that I needed to be better placed to answer the question, 'Who are these people?' So, a new cycle was about to begin.
Chapter nine

Action research and a developing ethics education for police leaders and managers: the third cycle - the 'case study' emphasis

"The assistant looked at me with an amused, vaguely ironic expression: better not to do than to do, better to meditate than to act, better his astrophysics, the threshold of the Unknowable, than my chemistry, a mess compounded of stenches, explosions, and small futile mysteries. I thought of another moral, more down to earth and concrete, and I believe that every militant chemist can confirm it: that one must distrust the almost-the-same (sodium is almost the same as potassium, but with sodium nothing [no explosion] would have happened), the practically identical, the approximate, the or-even, all surrogates, and all patchwork. The differences can be small, but they can lead to radically different consequences, like a railroad's switch points; the chemist's trade consists in good part in being aware of these differences, knowing them close up, and foreseeing their effects. And not only the chemist's trade." (Levi 1986: 60)

In this chapter I shall describe the characteristics of the third major action research cycle. I shall include a small number of illustrative vignettes designed to communicate fragments of the social reality obtaining in the 'educational situation'. A part of my intention in this chapter is to represent my situation of 'classroom' practice through the provision of a relatively rich description of that same situation. I shall also make reference to the data emerging from the 'experiential records' that were kept by randomly selected course participants during this phase of the inquiry. In this way, I shall continue to 'bring the voices' of the police students into the narrative. Whilst the design elicited, in the first half of the cycle, a generally favourable response, I encountered hostile and negative reactions in the autumn of 1997. This prompted me to attempt one last design strategy. I shall discuss the nature of this strategy in the next chapter.

Immediately prior to this phase I had become convinced that I was not capable, through the provision of new learning structures, or more radically, through creating a revised learning paradigm, of making any substantial improvements to the content and methods of the 'ethics unit'. Apart from including some 'personal awareness' exercises I thought that I had reached a 'plateau' in the creative process. It seemed that, despite my attempts to involve, actively, the client group, in setting the educational agenda, the idea of 'taking responsibility' for managing at least certain aspects of the learning event was too alien for a majority in the group. If the
group preferred to be 'led' then, for me to be effective, I would have to provide a
design that, simultaneously, would provide direction and containment as well as a
freedom for participants to focus upon issues that interested and animated them.

As I prepared for the 'Case study' emphasis I wanted to adopt as 'receptive' a way
of working with the groups as I could. I wanted to be 'open' to the presenting
characteristics of the groups themselves. If my work was to be disqualified from
achieving a full 'action research' status (following the disappointments I have
described in the previous chapter) then I might still attain my objective by
providing a rich and varied learning opportunity whilst carefully attending to the
variety of persons within the client group. I wanted to 'take' the group in such a way
that reflected the style of group leadership advocated by Heider (1986). Heider
provides a deceptively simple set of recommendations - in part derived from the
ancient Taoist philosophy of Lao Tzu - for group leaders; he is keen to emphasise
the importance of both the masculine and feminine aspects of group leadership as
well as the importance of stillness or, as he puts it, 'a return to silence'. Similarly,
Gibran's (1980) observations on teaching suggest that it is better not to try and
convince others of one's doctrines but allow them to find their own 'way'. It was
because I was no longer concerned to 'force the pace' that I thought it appropriate
to conceptualise this phase of the action research project as the 'case study'
emphasis.

**The Preparation**

Kleinig (1996) had examined the moral foundations of policing and had argued
that, in liberal democracies it is most appropriate for police to act as 'social
peacekeepers' rather than as 'crime fighters' or 'law enforcers'. Prior to his analysis
he had explored the nature of ethics and, within this exploration, had included a
discussion on the conditions that enable humans to become as they are. He points
out that we do not attain our humanity as the result of a 'simple process of
maturation' but as a result of our 'communal engagement with others through a
process of interaction and learning'. However, he also turns to identify the
conditions that allow us to achieve these secure foundations for a subsequent
socially flourishing and creative way of life. He leads his readership forward in the
following way:

"... for humans to aspire to be and to be what they aspire to be, they must interact
and be disposed to interact in certain kinds of ways. Their experience of the world
must be of a relatively firmly established kind. Not every form of interaction is
conducive to human flourishing: that we know from child and social psychology,
This observation enabled me to develop a way of thinking about the proper purpose of police that I articulated, publicly, for the first time at a senior officers seminar convened at Bramshill in November 1996. There, I argued that if, as a species, we need certain conditions to prevail in order for us to move beyond deranged, compulsive or narrowly conventional modes of existence, then we need police (or the policing function) to help secure those conditions. In addition, if we are not so much creatures of instinct and maturation, but rather creatures with learning capacities, then, police are agents in the service of securing those conditions in which we may enjoy learning and 'good' learning. In this latter respect I had in mind an idea of the good life which was, following Plato, a 'mixed' life where the moral and non-moral good were pursued (both in ample measure). In short, I came to think of the police as a public agency charged with 'helping to secure those conditions within which humans learn and learn well'.

I was pleased to discover that none of the seminar participants quarrelled with this way of thinking about the essential function of police and I thought it sensible to include this conception of the police role within the next 'ethics unit' delivery. So strengthened, I began to finalise the new design. I had developed new exercises concerned with the social construction of persons and with the values of the leader/manager. The purpose of these latter activities was to provide an opportunity to focus upon the 'self' and to ground the exploration of ethics in the nature of an individual's personhood.

I chose to consider the final delivery of the 'ethics unit' in December 1996 as a transitional experience. My diary notes of 4 December 1996 include the following observation which begins to illustrate more of the detail of my situation of practice. I include that description here in order to signal the beginnings of the new approach:

'It was a freezing morning. It took me about thirty minutes to 'set up' the Assembly Hall and get it ready to receive the twenty seven students. Four gas fires had been supplied by the engineering department. They were glowing - a reddish soft-flamed incandescence. They seemed to help create a slightly utilitarian yet romantic atmosphere. I decided to play Beethoven's violin concerto. I placed my own seat facing a wide horseshoe of chairs. I had no desk, no papers and no protection.
Gradually individuals started to come into the hall. No one said anything to me. I went to get a cup of coffee. By the time I returned it was almost 9 a.m. I was feeling extremely nervous - but I noticed that the Hall itself resembled a chapel. The lighting arrangements created many localised pools of light and the back-projection screen, filled with bluish-purple light, at one end of the hall, seemed to take the place of an altar.

The note continues:

'I had been very conscious of the need to consider carefully the structuring of the total environment over which I had some control. I could not ignore the relatively recent advances in media and communications studies and their understandings of semiology and iconography. I was attempting to manage the context in order to effect a shift from the everyday world into a realm of thoughtful and considered reflection, even, of reverence.'

On this occasion I was not able, however, to conduct an evaluation of the delivery. The Christmas preparations and a sudden change in my college role called me away from the Police Management Programme. I was, unexpectedly, appointed Director of the Accelerated Promotion Course, on 10 December 1996. My immediate duties made it impossible to collect information concerning the experience of the client group with the new emphasis. Over the Christmas recess I organised the design of the first 'case study' delivery which was subsequently offered to the participants on the first 'Managing People' module of 1997.

Prior to the actual delivery of the unit I wanted to collect more information on the client group itself. As I noted in the previous chapter I had come to realise that, in fact, I was not as informed about some of the basic characteristics of the client group (such as their ages, their length of service, the level of their educational attainment etc.) as I might be. In consequence, to collect such information, I developed a simple questionnaire, entitled, 'Preparation for ethics education' (see Appendix I).

The Design

A part of the objective of using a 'preparatory' questionnaire was to indicate to course participants that I was keen to provide educational material in order to meet the topic areas they wanted to explore. In the event, I was able to photocopy selections from the literature to meet, where possible, special interests that were identified (e.g. 'policing the internet', 'the ethics of crime investigation') but which
I could not cover in the unit itself. I also hoped to 'signal' the fact that I was approaching the unit with a high level of commitment and a real thoroughness of preparation.

The design I had created followed a basic pattern throughout the first day. It used a mixture of video material either to trigger discussion or for illustrative purposes, questionnaires, small group activities and computer screen presentations. I wanted to ensure that course participants had a great deal of material both to serve as a foundation for their reflections on ethics as well as a stimulus for the more practical inquiry scheduled for the second day. On that second day, I would form participants into small 'inquiry' groups based upon 'learning style' preferences and, later in the course of the cycle I included analyses of ethical issues in policing led by police officers who had volunteered to help with 'police-specific' issues (such as the 'Carl Bridgewater' case and cases concerned with racial attacks).

The Delivery

In Appendix J, I provide an outline chronology of the activities and structures I included in the first ‘case study’ delivery. My extended diary note of 5 and 6 February 1997 concerning the delivery of the module, under the heading: 'a case study', reads as follows:

'Immediately prior to this two-day case study I had re-focused upon Stake's (1995) recommendations for case study research. In consequence, I had spent the evening prior to the 'delivery' of the unit organising the room [the Assembly Hall] and establishing an atmosphere that might be 'conducive' to learning. I had also asked the course administrator to distribute a questionnaire on the first day of the module requesting information that would help in the subsequent design of the 'ethics' focus.

As I arrived at the college - it was 0820 in the morning - to begin my work with the course, I was, as usual, feeling very anxious. Why do I always feel so nervous before I 'take' the group for the two days? Is it because the subject just is 'difficult' and I can offer no guarantee that life will be made any easier as a result of engaging with 'ethics'? Is it because I know that I will be judged in terms of the degree to which I manifest conduct in accordance with ethical principles? Is it because most people in our society have only known the oppressive nature of 'duty' ethics and therefore have, from the outset, an antipathy to the subject?

I noticed, as I walked from my parked car to the Assembly Hall - the place where
the ethics unit was to be delivered - a faint rustling sound. The now-dry fallen leaves were swirling in the winter wind across the courtyard. Undaunted by their subtle melancholy, I had decided to begin my ethics teaching by playing the quietly moving and sometimes inspiring music from the 'Concierto de Aranjuez' by Joaquin Rodrigo.

I arranged my papers - including a page of notes concerned with introducing the ethics unit. I turned on (powered up) the various equipment and ran through my first computer screen presentation. It looked beautiful in the dim light. I checked the 'change over' from computer screen to the video channel and tested the sound levels on 'Schindler's list'. Whilst I was doing all this a few members of the group came into the Assembly Hall and placed coats and briefcases adjacent to or under their seats. Some said 'morning' or 'alright' - before returning to the Dining Hall for their breakfast or else to linger at the entrance to the Assembly Hall. Everything was neat and tidy. I had laid out the photocopies of the support material on a small stage behind my seat. There were more than dozen such documents.

Once all my preparations were complete, I left the hall for a quick cup of coffee and reminded myself of the sequence of activities and the rationale for those activities. I then observed a few 'stilling' activities - to calm my nerves and to establish a proper mental discipline before returning to the hall a few moments before 9 a.m. The hall itself contained almost its full complement of course participants. Who, though, were these people?

The data collected on the 'preparation for ethics education' questionnaire revealed the following set of characteristics concerning the client group:

Apart from presenting robust, bluff and sizeable physiques, some of the details of this group (numbering 31 persons) emerging from the responses were as follows:

- The group was in the first stage of 'middle age' with an average age of 42.25 years
- The average length of service was 19 years 7 months
- The group estimated that approximately one-twentith of its police experience had been spent on training and/or development courses with an average estimated length of time spent on police courses at just over 12 months
- The 'qualification profile' of the group showed that one third had a first and/or masters degree whilst the remainder had a variety of qualifications including
NVQs, 'A' levels, 'O' levels and 'City and Guilds'. One person had no educational qualifications.

- More than one half of the course had never encountered something named or referred to as 'ethics' on any training and/or development course within or outside police training. 17 of the group mentioned 'No experience', 11 indicated that the topic had been mentioned on a course, 2 had experienced a one-day focus in the context of a course such as 'equal opportunities, whilst 1 participant had examined ethics on a four-day course.

- In response to the question, 'What topic areas would you like to study during the two days on ethics, the client group showed considerable variation. The responses ranged from the very specific to the rather general. 10 respondents either 'didn't know' or were 'happy to be guided' or simply left the question blank. Amongst the remainder, two small clusters were apparent. One cluster grouping was interested in 'barriers to ethical behaviour or the problems of trying to be ethical in a non-ethical environment. Another cluster wanted to examine broad ethical principles such as 'integrity', 'impartiality', 'equality', and 'equal opportunities'. 3 wanted to focus upon 'change management'.

- Overall there was a fairly even spread of 'learning style' preferences. 7 were activists, 7 reflectors, 3 were theorists, 2 were pragmatists whilst the remaining 10 had strengths in more than one style. 2 persons left this question unanswered.

(I should note that this profile was repeated with remarkable regularity in successive groups apart from the July course - which had a far higher proportion of women)

My diary entry continues:

'I began with a statement of the aims for the two days. Beneath the injunction, 'Don't panic' (a message to myself reminding me not to allow my emotion to lead me into making rash decisions) I had written down, in my notes, the following text which I reproduced verbatim:

"The purpose of the following two days is to visit some of the areas with which ethics is concerned and to provide you with a language or set of concepts, in order to make the subject and its concerns more manageable. But really, the design is for you. It provides you with materials, space for reflection and the opportunity to explore, on your own terms, issues which are relevant to you and to the situations
in which you manage”.

I sat in a lone chair facing the group and, after announcing these aims, I emphasised that, whilst I would be featuring prominently in the first day, the second day would be given over to their 'agenda' and their 'designs' for learning.

The first day was largely orchestrated and structured by me. We watched a range of video clips (such as excerpts taken from 'Schindler's list') each of which catalysed discussion (in small groups) on subjects such as the nature of ethics itself, ethical dilemmas, and, frameworks for their resolution. We paid attention to three computer screen-based presentations that I had made, completed two questionnaires, one concerned to uncover - from the point of view of descriptive ethics - the character of the individual's moral system, whilst the other focused upon the 'moral ethos' of the police organisation. The day was then focused upon completing two 'learning log' activities concerned with values clarification and the nature of principled leadership.

The responses they gave to the questionnaire exploring their perception of the moral ethos of the organisation were particularly interesting. This instrument, made up of sixteen dimensions, including, for example, 'Moral tone', 'Respect for dignity' and, 'Positional abuse' provides an indication of the nature of the moral 'force fields' prevailing within the organisation. This group, in comparison with the aggregate profile of previous groups, had a noticeably more negative view of their organisation. So, for example, the modal tendency was to characterise the workplace as follows:

- 'Get the job done at all costs'
- 'Oppression and coercion'
- 'Secretive scheming'
- 'Strictly rule-bound'
- 'Combat arena'
- 'Rigid Command'
- 'Dialogue seeking' - and
- 'Symbiotic relationship'.

I pointed out, that, compared with their predecessors they painted a rather disturbing - almost negative - picture of the organisation.

Most of the group were clearly interested by this finding - and, seemingly, rather pleased with themselves for achieving what many saw as a certain notoriety.

'But wouldn't you have predicted that?', conjectured one of them. 'That's what happens when you're only evaluated on performance indicators and results'.

I responded by saying that, in the light of strategic emphases in policing, such as 'Performance with integrity' and the 'Duty of care', one might have predicted that there would be a perceived improvement in the moral ethos of the organisation. This was met by wry smiles and shakes of the head. Tactily, I was being told that I was not 'in touch with reality'. Silently, I said to myself:

"There really is a deep distrust of the motives of senior management - these people, here, in this room, seem to have virtually no faith in the integrity of command personnel".

Throughout the day, somewhere around half of the group were 'bright-eyed' and engaged. As many, if not more, were taciturn, laying back in their seats, winking at each other, immobile. My efforts were certainly not engaging everyone.

My diary record continues:

On the second day, the onus was on them. After a 'warm up' activity featuring 'biography work' (during which I was informed by another college tutor, who had encountered some of the group during a coffee break, that 'some of them were not taking the exercise seriously'), I formed the group into 'Reflectors', 'Theorists', 'Pragmatists' and 'Activists', depending upon their learning style preferences. I gave them a list of topic areas from which they might wish to draw as well as various appropriate support materials. It was up to them to set their learning goals, to discover content and methods suitable to the achievement of their goals and to concern themselves with how they might evaluate their processes and products.

Compared with the partial success (in terms of energy and amount of shared and relevant discourse) this was the most successful learning design. For the remainder
of the day the pragmatists worked towards producing a learning pack for ethical policing, the theorists took a particularly problematic policing moral dilemma involving decisions to use 'agents provocateurs' and subjected the problem to levels of analysis involving a hierarchy of moral principles, whilst the reflectors produced a play examining the dilemmas involved with adhering to principled practice, in the knowledge that the actual result would be less effective than one emerging from adopting less principled methods and procedures. The activists, who chose to present their work at the culmination of the day, produced four beautifully conceived playlets each involving decision dilemmas. The audience was asked to predict subsequent behaviours on the part of the characters portrayed in the playlets. The design was engaging, elegant and revealing. So, always, the audience was split in its predictions - and stimulated to explore the assumptions upon which their decisions and predictions had been based.

Powerfully, by way of conclusion, one of the activists said:

'We have heard over the last two days, of Socrates, of Sophocles and even Aristophanes. But I want to ask you a question, taken not from the Greeks but the Romans. It is this: 'Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?' It means: 'Who guards the guardians?' Well, we are the guardians - so, who guards us? He paused: 'The answer is, 'nobody'. We have to do it ourselves. And that is the challenge. We have to look to ourselves for setting and maintaining the highest standards .......

Quickly, I drew the day to a conclusion:

'I hope you have enjoyed a good quality of conversation', was my final remark.

A closing vignette: 'At the end of the day'

I spent a few minutes exploring with a colleague, who had acted as a helper and observer during the process, his reflections upon the events he had experienced and witnessed, during which he said:

'You must keep the first day theory input as it is. If they don't get it then, they will never get it' - and then he moved on to examine ways of improving the design of the second day. He said that he would pencil down some suggestions and send them to me. Then I spent some time with another member of staff who had come in to watch the student 'products'.

'I liked the pragmatists piece', she said. 'Obviously they put a lot of work into it. The
theorists bit was strange. I didn't like the way they slightly mocked you - but the thing as a whole was good.'

We shared our impressions of the quality of learning opportunity that was on offer. Genuinely we thought that we were edging towards Stenhouse's (1975) establishment of learning groups within which concepts could be developed to work through into the formal cultures of the wider social structure. We asked the question:

'What more can we expect - from them and from us?'

I returned to my study and worked through the E mail and voice mail messages that had accumulated throughout the day. This took me until after six in the evening. Finally, I was free to return to the teaching arena, collect my papers, videos computer disks and CDs and make for home. I walked across the courtyard, through the now still long-ago fallen leaves of autumn, touched by the evening chill with rimy frost, into the Assembly Hall. I paused, at its entrance, surprised. The lights were on, and, from the interior I heard voices - animated voices - happy voices. Three officers were sitting near to my lectern. They were concentrating upon their learning log activities. Next to them the fires still glowed.

One looked up. He said:

'We tried to make the Dire Straights' video work (I had showed an excerpt earlier in the day) but we couldn't. We wanted to see it and listen to, it again. It was so good'.

'Yes', I replied. 'It is marvellous'.

They continued with their work. I tidied up. Then, unsolicited, the same man said:

'I want to tell you, that I really enjoyed the days. I didn't always understand it - but it was really worthwhile'.

'Thank you,' I replied.

A woman inspector, sitting next to him said:

'I was not sure, at the beginning. But it was really great as it developed'.
The third among them added.

'We're going shortly. We've nearly finished. I have to say that it has been good to do it. Thanks'.

I felt a great sense of relief. I looked up at the clock hanging high at the end of the hall. It was six thirty in the evening. I thought:

'We started at nine this morning and these three people have worked through, with just short breaks for coffee, lunch and tea, until after six during which time they have listened to a lecture, written their biography, created and presented a theatre piece, participated in other people's work efforts and completed two learning log activities'.

As they left, I thanked them for their efforts and said that I particularly liked the pieces of work that the groups had produced. I had. I added that I wanted to work in a way that freed people from their subjugation to the voice of the 'expert' so that individuals might create their own language, meanings and concepts, with which to surface and address their issues and problems. They had done this.

I played the tape of Dire Straights in concert and wondered at the good comradeship of the musicians. The fires burned red-orange.

Something worthwhile, both in process terms and in terms of working towards Habermas' (1974) ideal communication conditions had come into being.

I was very tired as I arranged the seats, picked up the remainder of my papers strewn hither and thither, switched off both the projector and the astonishingly complex music system and walked towards the door. As I left, no one was around. There was a stillness everywhere. In the flowerbeds, I noticed that the first leaves of the daffodils and tulips were making their appearance.

**Evaluation**

The pattern of responses on the simple 'ethics education evaluation' form was as follows:

In terms of the 'high points' of the unit, a majority of the participants mentioned the plays including the following remarks:
'The playlets', 'The play's', 'Getting into the activist group and the dramas', 'The role plays', 'The study of ethics in the plays', 'The deep nature of the subject matter'

In addition, slightly over one-half mentioned the video clips including the following:

'The videos were very impactive', 'The videos', 'The thought-provoking videos', 'Schindler's list'

Other observations included:

'The efforts of the tutor', 'The professionalism', 'The presentations were excellent'

Almost half the participants continued to find the material too academic, too difficult, or too demanding:

Thus, the low points of the unit included:

'Rob pitched it - on the first day at too high a level', 'Too much theory', 'Some of it went over my head and a tutor shouldn't lose people', 'I had to try to get my head round some of it - it was too difficult'.

As with the previous unit deliveries, those who suggested improvements wanted a toning down of the academic and/or conceptual aspects and the inclusion of more 'real world scenarios'. In addition, some respondents wanted me to try and include 'real world' practitioners (fellow police officers) who had been engaged with solving or addressing ethical dilemmas.

The respondents indicated a generally positive response to the fourth question concerning the learning that had occurred during the module.

22 out of the 31 participants reported that they had learned more about ethics and police ethics. They included remarks such as:

'I learned about a new subject 'ethics' and how it relates to policing', 'I have a better idea what ethics is', 'I understood the relevance of ethics in policing', 'I learned something about ethics'.
10 out of 31 learned more about themselves:

'I had a lot of insights into myself', 'I clarified my morals', 'I learned more about myself', 'I realised the sort of person I was better than I had before'

9 out of 31 mentioned learning something as a result of the questionnaires.

5 out of 31 remained impervious to learning. As with previous groups they were terse in their remarks. For them, 'Null point', 'Zero', 'Not a lot' or 'Very little' learning had resulted from the two days.

Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the 'ethics' unit were distributed as follows:

- A very high level: N = 4
- A high level: N = 10
- A moderate level: N = 13
- Little: N = 2
- Very little: N = 4

Throughout the project I had been hoping to discover a design that would result in no one falling into the categories 'Little' or 'Very little' and, ideally I wanted all participants to achieve a 'High' or 'Very high' level of learning. However, the previous three years had taught me that this was still an elusive dream. Nonetheless, the pattern of data appeared sufficiently positive for me to feel a sense of 'success'. This sense of 'success' was confirmed by the interview data; in a similar way to previous groups this data revealed that four interviewees were unreservedly positive in their responses whilst two were ambivalent in their reactions to my learning design.

By way of example one interviewer recorded the following remarks made by two respondents in the 'positive' category:

- 'Two days of stimulation. M is a reflector and so he was stimulated. The playlets were a 'high' M especially liked the way the groups were formed (i.e. reflectors, activists etc.) Video clips were good. There were no 'lows'. It stimulated conversation at the weekend.'

- 'Overall positive. Made him reflect on some issues in force and also acted as a catalyst for that. 'Low' was format of the room (too big) and too many people to
allow for proper discussion. But it made him stop and think about what he stood for.'

In contrast, the following remarks were made by a respondent in the 'mix of positives and negatives' category:

- 'In general has prompted a lot of thought especially as he is a detective. If there had been no ethics input he would still think about ethics (it is genuinely discussed at work). It is couched in intellectual terms by Rob. E. feels a 'warming up' period is needed before we get into the intellectual aspects. At present Rob loses some in group. What was the relevance of ancient philosophers? Very difficult for some students. Playlets were very good - and directly relevant. It made him think about it. 90% found it too difficult.'

Reflection

Overall, I felt pleased with this achievement and, despite, my observations on the first day of the unit i.e. that as many as one half of the group were at best ready to dismiss my efforts, it seemed that the overall design, the content and the methods were achieving a genuinely positive valuation from a majority in the group. I remained, however, aware of the slight difference reflected in the interview data compared with the anonymous 'evaluation' form. I reminded myself of the broad and informal procedural rule existed within the occupational culture that advised its membership to 'tell them what they want to hear'. It seemed to me that at least one of the interviewees was an individual who entertained negative feelings towards the experience but who responded in a more detached and analytic way in the context of the interview.

I was also acutely aware of the sheer demand of 'taking' a relatively large group of 'mixed ability' police managers over a two-day period. I still thought that, in my role as a tutor at the College, the role itself require that I continue to provide some content concerned with the nature of the subject 'ethics' - even if this was considered to be 'academic' by substantial numbers in the group. This was an issue of role-integrity for me. Clearly it remained a challenge to my competence and ability as to how I would find a way to do this without it being overly abstruse and inaccessible.

In addition, I reminded myself that the design was wrought in terms of a 'whole'. The first day explicitly sought to establish foundations for a subsequent thoughtful and significant inquiry by the client group. If I were to alter the content and/or
methods then I might destroy the balance between the two educational moments.

In consequence, I decided to hold the design constant and simply include inputs from police officers who wanted to help me in the last phase of the second day. However, in place of the evaluation interviews I decided to invite participants to keep 'experiential records' during the actual delivery of the ethics unit. I was no longer able to call upon staff to act as interviewers. One was about to retire and the secondments of the others to the college had come to an end.

**The design of the 'Experiential Records'**

Randomly selected participants were invited to complete an 'experiential record' every two hours. They were asked to make eight entries over the two days (four each day) against the following headings:

1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?

2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.

3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.

4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?

5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.

6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)

7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?

8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?

I also drafted a statement of my educational objectives (see Appendix K) - which I distributed to each of the module participants. Participants completing the experiential records were asked to indicate whether the design for an 'ethics
education' was achieving these objectives.

*A brief note on the design and delivery of the unit, March 1997*

In the light of the preceding reflection, I adhered to a very similar pattern both in terms of the content and methods of the delivery. However, a police officer colleague had volunteered to 'ground' the subject in 'real' policing issues. So, once the 'plays' had been completed by the four groups I constituted on the second day (reflectors, activists, pragmatists and theorists) the group turned to examine the ethical issues involved in the tragic murders of Carl Bridgewater and Stephen Hughes. However, the group turned against the presenter and devalued the exercises. Such was the fragility of my achievement that I was especially concerned about the effect one negative experience could have on the overall value attached to the unit.

**The Evaluation**

The pattern of responses on the simple 'ethics education evaluation' form very closely approximated those of the previous unit delivery. However, the visiting tutor was the subject of a number of critical remarks by a majority of the students including:

*'Who was that prat?* 'Get rid of that police officer', *'If we were armed we'd have shot him'* and, *'The visiting speaker was supercilious and ineffective'*

Nonetheless, the data emerging from the experiential records kept by four of five randomly selected course participants) sustained my strengthening belief that the design was a 'success' and that I would achieve the goals of the research project. (Appendix L reproduces one record in its complete form.) In the next section, I shall provide a synopsis of the data emerging from the experiential records.

**The Experiential Records: emerging themes**

The following themes were apparent in the detail of the experiential records:

- The ethics unit had succeeded in stimulating a 'questioning' process

*E.g. 'Do organisations pay due regard to ethics? 'Did those involved in the Bridgewater case believe they were acting 'ethically' in 1970's, given the Policing attitudes at that time? '***
- The educational value of the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'

E.g. Fascinating. Not enough time to explore everyone's views relating to ethics questionnaire. Our group of four were very candid.

- The design and content of the ethics unit had succeeded in evoking processes of reflection

E.g. 'Reflecting on where ethics fits into policing. "Thinking, reflecting. Observing interest of other students." A variety of different thought processes and emotions were triggered during the session, stimulated by the video clips.'

- Resistances to learning were noted by some participants in relation to their colleagues

E.g. 'One of my group didn't really want to get in touch with the issues. The remaining 2 members were trying to reflect and explore the issues raised. 'People were listening. In the group discussion a couple of people did not participate - one had the shutters up - the other seemed to reject the ideas and the input.'

- The data from the experiential records show that some positively valued learning was occurring

E.g. 'Whenever I come to the college I may not always agree with what I hear but I do walk away feeling I have been given new dimensions to reflect on. So far after three days of Managing People, today has provided the most stimulation. But to get the best from stimulation I need more time to think'.

E.g. 'Overall, I return to my comments after Day One. Bramshill always presents a challenge to my thinking, it stimulates concepts. Conversely, the Bridgewater/Lawrence sessions were not that fruitful, I kept asking myself the direction and stimulation of this session on ethics, there was ample discussion on legal process but not on ethics'. 'Enjoyable. Enlightening. Revealing'

E.g. 'Thought provoking. Lively and appealing to me'

E.g. 'We, the police service, are not up to the standard we want to be. The group was benefiting from the experience'
Reflection

The experiential records had yielded valuable information confirming my belief that it was possible to create a design that could succeed in securing a positive response form most of the client group. The data also revealed that course participants themselves were aware that a number of their fellows were not receptive to me, the unit, the module or the institution. I remained disappointed that, despite a lengthy process of trying to create a design that would both do justice to the subject and 'please' the client group I had not been successful. However, because the data was sufficiently positive I kept faith with my design although I replaced my police colleagues with others from a large Metropolitan force who had created an 'anti-corruption' unit.

A brief note on the 'ethics unit' delivered in April 1997

I held the design constant (apart) from introducing a new session at the end of the second day which was led by police officers from an anti-corruption unit. Again, the responses to the simple evaluation form reproduced the pattern of the preceding two deliveries. The experiential records continued to provide evidence for a certain degree of success with the 'case study' design emphasis and approach. This data also revealed the important differences in terms of the way individual participants chose to record their experiences. So, for example, despite his response at question 8 (see below) one participant mentioned to me, in a conversation following the unit delivery:

'I spent - like I don't know how many of us did as well - trying to work you out - whether or not you were a queer'

whilst another described the unit as:

'A tour de force with a mixed ability group'

At the end of the first session the first respondent (above) described his experience in response to question 8 in the following terms: (I.e. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?)

I would say that I had never considered ethics to this degree before. By this stage I had begun to realise the importance of the issue. On my questionnaire the
previous day I had asked the question 'do we have a code of ethics?' I was surprised that we do and we managed to explore the various viewpoints which illustrated to me that my basic moral code was similar to others

whilst the other articulated his experience as follows:

*Ethics is worth studying and deals with the most important issues facing humans generally and police specifically.*

**From Success to Failure**

The next three deliveries of the ethics unit, which took place in May, June and July 1997 were, again, in general terms, favourably received. In fact, at the end of the two days and for the first time, the 'July' group spontaneously applauded my work. This was a moment of very real pleasure for me. I imagined that I had, at last, a sufficient warrant to claim that I had been 'successful'. Moreover, I decided, therefore, not to require any more participants to complete experiential records. However, in September 1997 I was disabused of the idea that I had achieved my goal.

My detailed diary note of the September delivery made on 16 September 1997 indicates how easy it is, in the course of sustaining a factual and/or rational analysis, to be 'mis-taken'. The Royal Ulster Constabulary occupy a special status in the minds of the police of the United Kingdom (as Villiers (1998) has documented) and I made the mistake of mentioning them in the context of discussing the use of torture. Despite the fact that I had covered the same material in the July delivery I was not able to elicit the same response from the client group - as the diary record illustrates:

'Towards the very end of the first day I started to conclude in my usual manner.

*Firstly, I raised the question of 'ethical progress' by stating that it is perfectly possible to defend and justify the claim that very real moral advances have been made over the course of human history - and that even in relatively recent times such an idea of 'ethical progress' could be applied to the nature and quality of police probationer training. For vivid effect I illustrated this with the opening scenes from Kubrick's film, 'Full Metal Jacket' - in large part because several experienced police officers had told me that those opening scenes were 'not too far removed' from their very first experiences (some twenty years ago) in the police organisation.*
Then, I moved on to remind the group that ethics deals not only with the most profound questions we face such as: 'How should one live?' but also the most intractable and difficult of questions, (following Kleinig 1996) such as: 'Are there circumstances or conditions when it is right, or at least, not evil, to use torture?' Again, to make the question 'come alive' I had selected a particularly harrowing section from Pontecorvo's film, 'The battle of Algiers' - which featured the responses of a French paratroop commander to journalists who were demanding a more detailed account of the French army's treatment of Algerians suspected of or connected with terrorism. As the film sequence unfolds the viewer looks at disturbing (even horrifying) scenes of torture. I simply prefaced the screening by noting that this question probably confronts any state authority faced with violent insurrection and will not have been 'a million miles away from the relatively recent situation facing the police and army in Northern Ireland'.

On the second day of the course at the beginning of the day (and following the usual pattern of activities) I briefed the group to form into three evenly-sized sub-groups, to identify ethical or moral dilemmas with which they have had to grapple or which they were currently facing, and, by way of play, playlet or extended role play, to stage a thirty minute event for their colleagues on the course that would be 'riveting', and 'would enhance our grasp and appreciation of practical ethics in such a way that the presentation would move the whole group forward'. Each group had two hours to work at this task.

The first group presented a particularly dramatic exploration of the sexual assault of a young woman probationer by a very 'successful' crime-fighting team of police officers (of which she was a member) - under the title (and justification) that it was 'only a joke'. This piece was hugely impactive and its dénouement took the form of an investigation of each person involved in the assault - an investigation which explored their justifications or explanations for and of the event.

Then the second group followed. This group had decided to explore the attitudes of police managers to police professional development opportunities. They contended that it was possible to identify three roughly equal groupings; individuals who welcomed any opportunities for professional development; individuals who presented a public face that professional development was 'rubbish and a waste of time' but who did so because this conformed with a wider occupational culture taking as one of its norms the derogation of anything done by way of 'training'. In fact, though, this group was able to accord some value to training and development but would never voice this publicly; finally, the third
group consisted of people who cynically made public statements advocating the benefits and value of training and development but who were savagely condemnatory of those experiences among their close associates.

Following this identification of these three types of responses to training and development, the group then chose to capture each type by taking my first day of 'ethics teaching' as an example. Vividly they portrayed the three sorts of character - and then invited the watching audience to examine their response to the first day of teaching. Specifically, they asked the audience to arrange itself in a group sculpture along a continuum of response to my work from the positive to the negative.

A slight majority indicted that they had responded moderately or very negatively. In addition, some of those in the 'negative' category spoke:

One said: 'It was dismal'

Another said: 'I thought it was disgraceful to link the Royal Ulster Constabulary with genocide. It made me very angry'

A third remarked: 'It didn't have anything to do with reality'

As I listened to these responses I was - once again - tempted to abandon the venture of trying to provide a valued ethics education for police managers.

It seems that the client group has a tremendous readiness to smuggle into the educational structures intentions on my part which I simply do not have. I was not linking the Royal Ulster Constabulary with genocide. I was simply raising a question (concerning the hardest of choices persons in authority may have to face) and inviting, by way of filmic example, an extended consideration of the question, 'Are their conditions or circumstances when torture may be the right (or least harmful) course of action?' Sometimes, even the majority of my client group is unwilling or unable to take a disinterested point of view and shows a propensity, instead, to 'read' into the presentation of the material a slight upon themselves or it displays a heightened readiness to condemn the presenter as 'unethical'.

Often, it seems the attribution 'unethical' is earned simply because the material is disturbing or invites some self-evaluation on the part of the individual police officer. It is this 'assault' on my character which is particularly hard to bear.
This unit delivery was then followed (in October) by another delivery that attracted a hostile or negative response from a majority in the group. I shall describe that response at the beginning of the next chapter. This, together with the response to my work in September 1997 was sufficient for me to search for a final design.

Summary

The action research inquiry reported here demonstrated that I could not achieve a consistent positive response to the learning structures I had developed over a period of five years.

I had, after the preliminary stage of the research process, adopted three design emphases. The more recent stage, reported in this chapter, had sought to hold the design constant and document the emerging phenomena. Those phenomena pointed to the basic unpredictability inhering in the educational encounter.

It seemed that as I delivered the unit I trod a hazardous path. Thus, whilst I could draw energy from my anxieties - and use this to fuel my passion and commitment for the subject 'ethics' - the energy had to be very carefully controlled. So, an aside here, the development of a train of thought there, or even just a moment of levity, could jeopardise the entire design. Sometimes I felt as if I were 'superglued' into position.
Chapter ten

Action research and a developing ethics education for police leaders and managers: the fourth cycle

"A sad fact, of course, about adult life is that you see the very things you'll never adapt to coming toward you on the horizon. You see them as the problems they are, you worry like hell about them, you make provisions, take precautions, fashion adjustments; you tell yourself you'll have to change your way of doing things." (Ford, 1996: 5)

In this chapter I will begin with a prolix description of the specific and critical episode which led me to initiate a fourth cycle in the action research process. I shall also include a short reflection upon that episode in which I make a number of observations concerning some characteristics of the client groups which the tutorial staff have to take into account as they practice their educational endeavours at Bramshill. I entitled the final design, 'Values and ethics.' This design endeavoured to emphasise the 'personal experiences', 'practical concerns' and 'individual wishes' of the client group.

I shall then outline the nature and fate of this 'final' design - which was presented as the 'ethics unit' on the 'Managing People' module. Lest the experiences I have described over the course of this narrative emerge as especially idiosyncratic I shall include, at the end of this chapter, a short note written by a fellow tutor concerning his experience of teaching short courses on ethics at Bramshill. This note is significant because it suggests that I was not alone in encountering difficulties with the presentation of the subject 'ethics' to police leaders and managers. I shall end with a brief summary noting some of the achievements that have taken place as a result of my inquiry.

The struggle continues

At the end of the last chapter I concluded with a brief note contrasting the delight I experienced in July 1997 with the subsequent disappointment I felt in September 1997 following the vituperative criticism to which I was subjected. Originally, I had intended to continue my 'case study' emphasis until the beginning of August 1997. From then on I imagined that I would allow myself to rely upon what I thought constituted a manageable and 'effective' design for ethics education - which I would continue to deliver to my client group for as long as I was able to do so. I had already learned and relearned that an enormous amount of discipline, rigour
and preparation needed to be devoted to each 'delivery' of my work if I was to be ready to 'model' and express a set of moral values commensurate with my subject matter. I had even become optimistic that I might even be able to relax and enjoy the experience of delivering the material. Indeed, as I have already mentioned, in July 1997, to my surprise and delight, the group had broken out into applause at the culmination of my work. Moreover, some persons in this particular group had asked for me to make a more extended contribution to future deliveries of the 'Managing People' module. I was confident that, at last, I had, achieved a way of working with the client group that would secure, in the main, a positive response to and valuation of 'ethics'.

I also discovered that the general strategy I was adopting co-incided with designs thought to be effective by other criminal justice ethics educators. Kleinig and Leland Smith (1997) had published a collection of papers (following a specially convened workshop in the City University, New York) which took as its theme 'strategic issues' in teaching criminal justice ethics. They point out that the various contributors to their volume share the view that the use of some kind of case study material was likely to be the most effective way of helping achieve the various aims of ethics education. My inclusion of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire and the subsequent opportunity to identify and then present - through the medium of theatre - an ethical dilemma - represented a specific variation of the 'case study' method. In fact, this approach corresponds to a particular description presented by Caroline Whitbeck in Kleinig and Leland Smith's (1997) publication.

Throughout August I focused my own thoughts on the notion of 'ethical progress'. I wanted to develop a response to the argument raised by many in my client group that 'ethics' was always relative to a particular culture. Basing my ideas upon MacIntyre's (1982) contention that 'moral concepts change as social life changes', I wanted to argue that - as a result of learning (by which I mean the knowledge we have come to have about ourselves e.g. those conditions which need to be met if we are to enjoy positive psychological functioning free from crippling distresses) - it becomes possible to adopt a certain distance from any particular culture. This distance enables us to view the varieties of cultural practice in relation to the extent to which any practice provides those conditions within which individuals learn and flourish. From this stance it seems possible to transcend ethical relativism by subjecting particular social arrangements to something approximating a universal test. That test is constituted in terms of the extent to which the moral values underpinning and guaranteeing those conditions within which people may learn (and learn well) - i.e. tolerance, benevolence, appreciation of difference - are manifested - and that the forms of human life expressed and permitted in the
culture can be 'read' as derivatives of those values.

So, apparently strengthened, I presented the 'ethics unit' in September. As I reported in the last chapter a majority in the client group made a public statement that was critical of my work. That unit delivery illustrated how my situation of practice was intrinsically unpredictable.

In the light of this experience, I decided to return to an earlier formulation for the unit where - with the use of three central 'presentations', three exercises and some evocative videos - I would base my work upon the general themes which interested managers in the police organisation. I would lead and structure the first day. In addition, I had asked a co-tutor on the 'Managing People' module if she would 'sit in' and provide me with feedback concerning her evaluation of my work.

A Stimulus for Change - the delivery in October 1997:

In the lengthy description which follows I have recorded the turn of events leading to a final revision of my learning design.

At the conclusion of the 'ethics unit' my diary note on 15 October 1997 records the following:

'From my point of view the day seemed to go rather successfully. I covered a lot of ground and finished by showing the notorious clip from the beginnings of Kubrick's 'Full Metal Jacket' - where I emphasised the idea of 'ethical progress' - and then concluded with my reminder of the fact that ethics deals with the most difficult questions we have to face - including for example: 'Are there certain conditions when the use of torture is justified in the sense that it is the least evil of options?'. Again, by way of example I used an extract from Pontecorvo's 'The Battle of Algiers' - which shows scenes and images of torture. I used this film clip to emphasise the 'hard questions' ethicists have to deal with'

However, my cautious optimism was short lived: my diary entry on 17 October 1997 reads as follows:

'As I left the College and drove home on Tuesday 15 October I was feeling pleased with the way I had performed. Forty eight hours later my feelings were sad, angry and bitter. This is what proceeded to happen:

I was sitting in my office preparing to brief two new 'consultant tutors' who had
joined the staff at Bramshill in the earlier part of the week. They were to take on the role of co-facilitators on the Accelerated Promotion Course that was scheduled to begin in a few days time. Both had relatively little experience with the kind of facilitation that they were going to be called upon to practice so it was important for me to give them as much help as possible. During a preliminary conversation with them, M. (the leader of the 'Managing People' module) suddenly appeared at the entrance to my office and asked me if I would join him and the other tutor who were leading sessions on the module. 'Something interesting has come up', he added. 'Try to join us for lunch if you can'.

Somewhat against my better judgment I agreed to join them.

Over lunch, I learned that the co-tutor who had been with me during my 'ethics unit' had run a morning event entitled 'Managing with Heart' and, in the course of that event, had not only revealed to the group her own emotional state following my work (she had felt a bit depressed) but had then elicited from some persons in the client group a range of negative or distressed emotions that had originated as a result of my work. It seemed that I was to blame for this improper state of affairs. I was asked if I would be prepared to come back into the group at the beginning of the next day and 'work through' a number of problems that seemed to be 'at large' in that same group. It seemed to me that I rather owed this to my colleagues and to the course - although I desperately wanted to spend the day preparing for a conference at which I was scheduled to deliver a paper. The lead tutor of the 'Managing People' module suggested that I bring in some video triggers in anticipation of the fact that we would invite the client group to explore, through the medium of theatre, their practical problems in the areas of ethics and the 'duty of care'.

Duly, in the evening I identified some video material that I thought might help extend and/or clarify the content of my earlier teaching. My diary entry recorded the following events:

I arrived the next morning at 0830 hrs. and just after I had set up the room - in case the video material would be needed - the other tutors arrived:

'How do you think we should play this?' asked M. the module leader.

'I don't really know', I replied. 'I wonder if we might get some feedback from them concerning the problems they are experiencing'.
'O.K.', he replied. 'Look', he said, 'The half term reports are coming up at school. It's about half way through the course so why don't we invite them to form into three groups and give us a 'half term' report on how they think we are doing and we can give a 'half term' report on how we see things going?'

'That sounds interesting', I said, even though the symbolism of the school room struck me as rather inflammatory. 'O.K.', I said, 'Let's do it.'

M., the module leader, began the session with a long recitation on 'sarcasm', formed the large group into three sub-groups and gave each half an hour to list on one sheet of flipchart paper their response to the question: 'How do you see us doing?'

We convened to another room and debated our own response. My two co-tutors wanted to present, on A1 size flipchart paper, a drawing of two tombstones with the inscription on one: 'We wanted to change the world' and on the other: 'We changed some things for the better and some for the worse'. I was a little surprised at this shared ambition of theirs and at the rather enigmatic symbol of tombstones. However, since time was pressing, I said, 'Well, I don't really want to change the world - only small bits of it'. After some discussion, the inscription on the tombstones became: 'We wanted to change bits of the world' and on the other the inscription was: 'We changed some bits for the better and some bits we made worse'. To the bottom of the page, I added: 'Sun's going down' - an oblique reference to a line from a dialogue in the film, 'Schindler's List' - and to the fact that we, as tutors, were now in the latter stages of our careers.

We re-entered the Assembly Hall. What followed became difficult for me to report because I began to experience very strong emotions that became so intense I could not, in the end, trust myself to speak. I was afraid that I would 'come out with something' for which I might later 'pay dearly'. I might 'pay dearly' for the following reason. It is not unknown for police officers to leave courses at Bramshill and then to write letters of complaint to the most senior personnel connected with police training. The senior personnel then contact the senior college staff and in the subsequent inquiries the tutorial staff are required to provide a written or verbal account giving their 'side of the story'. However, it is by no means clear that the tutorial staff are appropriately supported by senior management. One college tutor summarised his perception of the situation saying:

'There is a confusion in this place in relation to the understanding of impartiality. Impartiality and support are not, in fact, mutually exclusive - but in this place that point is missed.'
The first group had not finished writing their conclusions on a flipchart so they decided to read them from the notes that a spokesman had in front of him. I began to write down the various points on a sheet of paper. Under the heading: 'Feedback from Group One', I wrote:

*For a course that is about managing people this is not a good way of managing people:

- we feel that the group is much too big
- we did not have a proper introduction
- there is inflexibility in the programme
*M. (the module leader) starts off today with an input on 'sarcasm' - some of us felt a bit patronised
*Rob - turning to you and ethics. You finished on a long day input with something on torture. We are all used to seeing awful things; what were we supposed to do with those images?
*You, Rob, said that something like a third are 'unreachable' - thirty three percent of people who come on the courses at Bramshill - does that mean one third of us shouldn't be here?
*You (Rob) said, 'If you want to fall asleep then you can.' That implies that what you're doing doesn't matter
*Ethics - we didn't know much about the subject - and you went straight through on your set agenda
*We have a lot of sympathy for you – it's a very large group
*And we have learned from one another
*One member is very disappointed. It's not meeting their needs.
*One tutor, P. V. has credibility. He avoided jargon.

As I wrote down these points I began to feel both sad and angry and a sense of hopelessness. For example, I did not realise that it was 'up to me' to determine how individuals are to deal with images of torture. 'Surely', I thought, 'on a residential course, people have plenty of opportunity to discuss their responses and can 'think things through' for themselves.'

M., the module leader decided that he wanted to respond to certain of these points but before he did one of the group said:

'Before you go on, M., I just want to say that I'm not happy with what Rob is doing. He doesn't seem to be listening but is writing'.
This was sufficient to trigger intensely strong feelings of anger in me. I felt as if my own normal professional discipline - i.e. trying to record accurately what was being said - and my character itself - were being attacked.

The other tutor, D. leant across to me and remarked quietly but crossly: 'There really is an extraordinary level of misreading going on here'.

With barely disguised anger in my voice I said: 'I'm writing down everything that is being said. I find it very interesting'.

'Well, it doesn't seem like it,' was the reply.

Immediately I shot back:

'Do you want to see what I've written?'

'No'. He shook his head.

On this particular occasion I really did find it difficult to recover my composure. I listened as M. explained that he, too, thought the venue was 'awful', that there were not enough staff, that the group was too big and so on. Then some debate took place about the need for a training needs analysis and the poor reputation of the programme. I simply began to feel worse and worse. I had no idea as to how I was going to support M. and P. What is more I knew that if I failed to show, overtly and obviously, some support to M. and P. I would probably be seen by the group as disloyal, cowardly and, of course, unethical.

At last we were 'ready' to hear from the next group.

Although M. had pointedly opened the proceedings of the day with an analysis of the destructive power of sarcasm, the second group began with: 'Could do better'. I wrote down the following as I attempted to capture exactly what it was that their rapporteur was saying:

*Read what is going on (You should be able to read what is going on. You did not).
* Day 2: Ethics. Pitched at wrong level - Rob's lecture was on a plane - at a level - that most people didn't understand what was going on.
* If this course is a bus on a tour, the bus is in a lay-by and the wheel's come off. We're trying to fix it.
*What's the purpose of this exercise? - who's benefiting - us or you (i.e. the staff)?*

During the recounting of this M. (the module leader) was accused of playing games. Shortly after the feedback, M. emphatically stated that he 'did not play games'.

Notwithstanding the pressures M. was under, I remained feeling pretty beleaguered. It seemed that my relatively simple description of the nature of 'ethics' and the illustrations in the videos were, somehow, still too difficult and unhelpful for the group.

The third group responded as follows:

*The practical application is missing
*The input is not always set at an appropriate level
*A cross-flow of experience is required
*You should be aware of the content and the audience
*There should be an opportunity to explore issues as they arise
*There is a lack of flexibility
*The content is interesting and thought provoking
*The theory on ethics was excellent - but we didn't have the opportunity to use the experiences that are current in the service. The theory must be pitched at a level which is acceptable to all people in the audience. It was quite apparent in our group that it was over the heads of some people in the group and you have a duty not to lose any one
*This opportunity for feedback is appreciated

Again, some discussion followed this but I noted down:

'My thoughts, once again, are to do with giving the subject i.e. offering 'ethics', a miss'.

I had reached the stage where I was no longer sure that it was worth the effort continuing with the teaching of 'ethics'. I had had enough of the criticisms.

After this feedback was completed M. then showed our two tombstones to the group. At a later point on the morning one of the client group asked both for more specific feedback concerning the group itself as well as an explanation of the meaning of the design - but because of various dynamics pushing and pulling at different people this never actually took place. The morning continued mainly with
M. and P. responding and with me listening. My gloominess must have been palpable. I was not sure whether my anger was so obvious. I suspect that it was.

Curiously, one member of the group chose to address me at some length concerning his belief that I had the power to influence 'The whole of the police service'. The subtext of his intervention was that I really should be capable of doing more and responding more appropriately in my 'ethics' sessions. Another person queried whether or not I had read the 'pre-ethics' questionnaire that she had completed. Yet another wanted to address issues to do with the use of informants. I was also challenged for not showing support for the need to conduct a thorough 'training needs analysis' before offering a 'Police Management Programme' but that same person announced some forty minutes later that he actually did not know what his needs were - although he did know what he wanted. However, he failed to acknowledge that I had raised doubts about the value of training needs analyses precisely 'because they reveal a great list of elements that do not necessarily correspond with people's needs - and the reason for that is that they are not aware of those needs'.

I spent the lunchbreak doing some vigorous aerobic exercises. This was my attempt to release my feelings of stress and frustration and prepare myself for whatever was in 'store'.

M. and D. led the afternoon session - a rather shapeless discussion concerning 'levels of communication' - and, finally I was asked to provide a structure to help explore 'peak level' communications. Even this was problematic - and one person considered the exercise 'dangerous'.

Reflection

Within this 'feedback data' something is revealed which points to the complexity of providing 'management development' in general and 'ethics education' specifically for groups of police officers in the middle management ranks of the police service in the institutional context of Bramshill. Here, on the basis of factual evidence, I shall identify a number of those problems

- Within the client group as a whole there is a lack of familiarity with taking responsibility for 'making learning happen'. The group remains relatively passive. The tutors are the providers. Additionally, the tutors are supposed to do most or all of the interpreting and sense-making. The idea of autonomy and 'inner dependence' seems rather alien to the majority in the group.
- Broad conceptual ideas, theory and principles have to be 'worked through' by the tutors 'into' the workplace. However, this exposes the tutors to a constant dilemma because too much 'obviousness' means that the tutor can be regarded as patronising whilst too much 'stretching' of the learner means that the tutor is 'on another plane' or 'out of touch' - and therefore insensitive or overly (and pretentiously) intellectual.

- For some in the client group, the criteria for judging tutors are unforgiving and extreme. If a person 'gets lost' it is the tutor's fault and a reflection upon that tutor's competence. This though is unreasonable. If tutors work at the pace of the least sophisticated they come to frustrate the more sophisticated.

- Exercises that are 'normal' - or productive - on other management development programmes (such as 'biography work') - are taken to be 'dangerous' by a proportion of police officers/managers. This is so because it is imagined that they might elicit distressing memories or even some form of 'catharsis'. The catharsis may be expressed in tears or bitter anger. There is, in consequence, a fear, that these expressions might lead to some form of personality destruction.

- The prevalence of attributing negative intentions, motives or dispositions to tutors is especially marked. (In fact, tutors are simply and innocently 'doing their 'best' but are rarely credited with this).

- The rapidity with which persons in the client group take offence (or take offence on behalf of another member of the client group who may or may not have taken offence) leads the staff to feel that they are constantly 'walking on eggshells' - it is as if some police develop quite extraordinary sensibilities and become remarkably 'precious'.

To exemplify this last point, I was asked by one person in the client group (as the group was dispersing) if I would spend some time discussing the day's events. During that discussion I was told that my use of the expression 'Jesus Christ' (which, apparently, I had uttered earlier in the day during the feedback session) was 'offensive'. As I listened to this I thought, again, how incredibly difficult it is to navigate through the sensibilities of the membership of the group(s). I 'came out' with this expression because of my frustration and irritation. Nonetheless, and quite plainly, it was considered a serious breach of probity.

- The client group remains susceptible to influences over which the tutors at Bramshill have little control. The relative lack of familiarity with management
theory and concepts means that persons within the group - who claim to have that understanding and familiarity - can come to exert an unusual level of power (within the group). This was starkly revealed in the October delivery of the 'Managing People' module when one participant claimed a knowledge of Heron's (1989) model of interpersonal intervention and then went on to give a straightforwardly inaccurate characterisation of that model. However, the group appeared to 'side' with his obtuse rendition rather than that of the better informed tutor.

Despite my temporary loss of heart I enjoined myself not to 'give in'. I concluded that, notwithstanding all the strategic developments I had undertaken over the years of the inquiry, a new design was necessary.

**Moving On - A New Design:**

As I came to terms with the features of the October delivery I revisited my strategy for the delivery of the 'ethics education'. Another cycle of 'individual educational action research' was about to commence.

I decided to re-title the unit, 'Values and ethics' in an attempt to remove some of the anxieties which seem to be elicited at the prospect of having to explore something called 'ethics'. I also decided that, after establishing 'safety' - (by outlining my aims and intentions for the unit - in which I would include a very clear statement that the programme would allow one complete day for participants to explore their own issues, interests and problems) - I would begin by examining the moral development of one chief police officer. I would use an autobiographical account that included descriptions of particular life experiences which had deeply influenced the person in question. I wanted to make sure that the 'ethics unit' did not depart from 'reality'.

I wanted to 'tell the story' of that leader in a way which illustrated those few moments in his life which had shaped his practice of 'principled leadership'. I thought that this short presentation would be sufficiently interesting for participants to be stimulated to explore the development of their own personal and professional values.

Once these person-focused activities had been completed I would move on to outline - in the briefest of terms - the nature of ethics, and then, immediately, I would introduce those areas that present particular difficulties for police - such as 'loyalty' and 'impartiality'. Participants would then have the opportunity to consider these areas in small discussion groups before turning to examine both the idea of
an 'ethical reading' (through the analysis of Frank Holl's (1874) painting, 'Deserted') and the subsequent 'ethical audit' or 'ethical stocktaking' - through the medium of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire.

I would finish by asking the question: 'Just how can we create an ethical working environment?' - for which I had designed a practical set of guidelines made up of eight different steps.

The new design was scheduled to be delivered in November 1997. This would be the last delivery of the 'Managing People' module in that year.

**Action research: The final phase: 'Grounding the study of 'ethics' in persons, their personal experience, practical concerns and individual interests'**

Between the end of October 1997 and mid-November 1997 I developed the 'final' design for an ethics education for police leaders and managers in the police organisation. During that relatively short period, I created three new exercises and two new 'lecture-presentations'. The new design set out to 'ground' the educational experience in the personal experiences of police officers and, additionally, sought to provide participants with a framework for ethical practice in the workplace. The first new exercise provided descriptions of the characteristics of superior managers and leaders - (after, Bennis and Nanus, 1985, Kouzes and Posner, 1987, Kinlaw, 1989 and Egan, 1994) and was designed to help participants identify concrete evidence for any claims that they might make concerning their own management and leadership practice. The second exercise focused upon values and leadership. The third exercise contained guidelines for creating an ethical working environment. These developments were in direct response to the frustrations and difficulties that the most recent client groups appeared to have been experiencing. Throughout my previous work I had been (more or less heavily) criticised for being overly 'intellectual' and although I tried to respond to these charges with a gradual attenuation of academic references and language, I had still not succeeded, in avoiding the pejorative label of being 'academic'. In consequence, the emphasis throughout the final design was to make the subject as accessible, practical and uncomplicated as possible.

Whilst my aim was still to attain a positive valuation for the 'ethics education' experience I was no longer setting out to 'make the subject come alive' in the same way as I had originally intended. How was I revising the aims?

As I looked again at the original 'action research values statement' I produced (for
the classes taking place throughout 1995 and 1996) I was struck by the fact that, whilst such a statement might be interesting to full time educationalists, it would be relatively irrelevant to the 'practical man' (or practical woman). My statement of intent for 'ethics education' no longer reflected the emphases in the new design.

My aims were now simpler. I was hoping to achieve the following goals:

- To describe some significant moments in the development of a police leader and to illustrate the relationship between those key moments and subsequent police management practice

- To help participants examine their own value system and consider the relationship between their values and their actual practice

- To provide participants with concrete guidelines for developing 'ethical organisations'

- To give participants the opportunity to analyse personal and organisational ethics with a view to strengthening their desire to attain consistently high ethical standards

In addition I was aiming to identify - for participants - the moral demands and difficulties in policing and by so doing, to encourage an appreciation of the moral complexities of policing.

The more specifically educational objectives - such as 'stretching persons powers and capacities' now lay at an implicit level embedded in the processes and experiences of the different specific learning structures.

This new emphasis reflected three significant learnings from the action research process:

First, I was responding to a dominant occupational cultural preference - in part reflecting a personality type i.e. the predominance of a 'sensing judging' type (after Jung 1926) - for focusing upon tangible police experiences rather than more general conceptual ideas or principles.

Second, I was designing an educational experience that consciously recognised the fact that police managers and leaders focus considerable energy upon 'personality' - the motives and dispositions of their fellow interactors. In broad terms, the police
officers with whom I was working were curious about the psychological contours of others. In consequence I was setting out to provide opportunities - through small group discussions etc. - for participants to 'ground' the content of 'ethics' in their personal experiences and viewpoints.

Third, I was coming to terms with my own limitations. Although I had tried to introduce a relatively thorough examination of ethics - through, for example, outlining normative ethical theories, the history of moral philosophy, a note on 'postmodern ethics' and some philosophical analysis of concepts such as justice or loyalty, this had not been valued by a majority in the client groups. Moreover, I was no longer prepared to be thought of as 'unethical' as a result of using certain materials - even if those materials were commensurate with an evocative and focused exploration of ethics and the questions with which ethics deals. To an extent, I had admitted defeat - both at the level of practice and at a more emotional level.

A Prelude to the New Design

The 'Managing Operations' module of the Police Management Programme - a two week residential module with the same client group as the 'Managing People' module had taken as its themes, 'Customer service','Community partnerships and consultation' 'Guidelines for managing police operations', 'The management of change' and 'Quality management'. I had been asked by the module leaders to evolve my work on 'Quality management' into 'Principled leadership'. In November 1997 the session I was asked to run was entitled: 'Managing Operations and Ethical leadership'. This allowed me to begin to explore a way of working with the client group consisting of a higher proportion of small group exercises focusing simultaneously upon the individual participant and the situations of their practice.

On that module, I provided one presentation interspersed with four activities. The activities were structures focusing upon 'empowerment', the development of a personal vision (for the part of the organisation over which the individual had some control), a 'values clarification' activity and an analysis of personality preference and subsequent implications for managing operations.

In fact the outcome was highly successful in terms of client response. One officer - who had known me from a programme I had run eleven years previously - sought me out to say:

"It worked for them you know. It really worked. They liked it. They were positive
about it"

The ratings on the course feedback sheet confirmed this. My work received a very positive evaluation.

As the first occasion for my launching the new emphasis approached I found myself grappling with the fact that the 'trick' in providing a valued educational experience for my client group lay in managing a set of polarities and tensions. Among these was the need to introduce 'something new' but to limit the degree of strangeness. Another was the need to provide a sufficient stimulus for small group personal discussions but to 'keep the action moving along'.

In the new design I was also returning to some of the principles for helping adults to learn. I was particularly concerned to try and create an atmosphere in which participants would draw from their own experiences. I would be concerned to provide a set of short (but coherent) 'inputs' as a prelude to personal/experience-based small group activities.

As I prepared the 'inputs' I found myself facing, once again, the enormous disjunction between the informed and scholarly literature on ethics - instanced, for example in Kleinig's (1996) *The ethics of policing* - and the more practical discourse of my client group. I realised that - especially in the light of my teaching experiences - I would not be able to address any issue in the illuminating depth that a university course of study might realistically achieve. However, I continued to remain anxious about how I would avoid the banality of the commonplace in my 'inputs' as well as the obscurity and esotericism of significant philosophical analysis. Moreover, I had to remain constantly vigilant for the readiness with which individuals within the client group might 'take against' myself, the course, or the college. A former Accelerated Promotion Course student, attending part of the Police Management Programme, who had known me for a number of years, murmured to me on 7 November 1997:

"It really is extraordinary how negative some of the participants can be"

As I began to make my final preparations over the weekend before 11 November 1997 the design I had shaped under the title: 'Values and ethics' was as follows:

- An informal introduction to 'values and ethics'

- The values development of a police leader and an outline of the characteristics of
superior leaders and managers - a presentation

- Exercise 1: Profiling the individual participant against the characteristics of superior leaders and managers

- Exercise 2: Leadership and values

Illustrative videos: Scotland Yard: The Commissioner; Schindler's List

- Ethics and police - a presentation

- Exercise 3: The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire

- Illustrative video: Mutiny on the Bounty

- Managerial ethics - a short informal introduction

- Illustrative video: The Suffolk video factory

- Exercise 4: Profiling the moral ethos of the Police organisation

- Exercise 5: Creating and developing ethical organisations

As I prepared the Assembly Hall - in a conventional design - three rows of chairs with nine in each row - I felt very real disappointment at its symbolism. My attempt to bring something new, fresh and 'contemporary' was being abandoned. I reminded myself that it would be quite wrong to let my disappointment diminish the experience for the participants in the client group that I would meet the next morning. For them, none of my disappointment would be known. They were coming to the day - I had to assume - in good faith.

The struggle to achieve an effective ethics education experience had impacted upon others of the staff at Bramshill. Two of the tutorial staff and my administrative assistant (who was playing a significant role helping with data collection) were now deeply interested in the outcome. They were also worried. How would the new focus be received? They anticipated that a focus upon the police experience itself would produce a different kind of reaction, namely, 'defensiveness'. This was the risk I was taking.
Introducing the new design

My diary note on 11 November 1998 included the following observation:

'Today was 'Remembrance day' - The eleventh day of the eleventh month of 1997. As I drove to work through country lanes washed with the colours of a damp autumn I thought of St. Exupery's observation: 'In this war men fall like autumn leaves'. I was keen that the participants in my client group would have something worthwhile to remember as a result of the day's learning structures.'

I subsequently developed the following description of the launch of the new design for the fourth cycle in the action research process:

'I began by introducing myself - distributed the two sets of aims for 'ethics education', underlined the fact that by addressing the subject I was not implying that any participants in the group were unethical and then outlined the basic structure of the day. I then noted some of the points emerging from the questionnaire that they had all completed the day before - for example, the fact that in this particular group some two-thirds had not previously examined the subject 'ethics' - before making a short reference to the origins of the study of ethics. I then gave the first lecture/presentation which I duly illustrated with a video featuring the actions and considered reflections of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. The first activity looked at the characteristics of 'superior managers and leaders' - within which I had highlighted the moral dimension. I formed the participants into six groups of four persons. A relatively animated buzz of conversation was generated in those groups.

After coffee I turned to focus the subject more in the actual practice of policing. By way of entrée I made reference to the purpose of ethics - 'to promote human flourishing and combat human limitations' and then, to emphasise the 'positive and negative' possibilities in human conduct I showed a fifteen minute clip from the end of the film, 'Schindler's List' - which, in addition, surfaces several of the hardest questions with which ethics must grapple. I knew that the next presentation would be the most difficult to deliver because I was going to identify those areas which caused ethical problems in policing. The first part - on the moral history of police went well until I began to suggest the reasons behind Newman's (1985) development of the principles of policing: I included a reference to Amnesty International's criticism of the Royal Ulster Constabulary which, I commented was 'probably justified'. Almost certainly this was a mistake simply because it was too risky a thing to say at this point in my relationship with the group.
Nonetheless, something of the earlier buzz of animated conversation was recovered as pairs of individuals attempted a 'moral reading' of the painting, 'Deserted'. However, a very distinct 'stiffening' of mood overtook the group when I began to comment on the seven areas Kleinig (1996) describes as 'personal ethics'. Here, then, I probably made three more mistakes. First, I imagine that I overemphasised the negative aspects of policing - e.g. by describing 'cynicism', the 'inevitable practice of lying', the 'power of informants to corrupt police officers' etc. Second, I was not rehearsed or tight enough in my descriptions; I should have been able to clarify the major points better. Third, I added - again rather gratuitously - that I did not mind what police officers did in their private lives - and then foolishly mentioned that it was up to the individual concerned what sorts of 'perversions' he or she got up to in the confines of their own home. This was meant to be humorous. It was probably misplaced.

Here, I think I lost some of the necessary discipline that I have learned is essential in the course of providing ethics education if the tutor is not to excite some hostility and/or defensiveness.'

I reformed the small groups of four and distributed the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. After a slightly muted start the groups continued to discuss their responses until sometime after their allotted time for lunchbreak.

I began the afternoon session by acknowledging the fact that I might have caused offence through some of my remarks in the morning and then introduced the concept of a moral ethos. I did this by asking what 'atmosphere' characterised 'Bramshill'. The initial answers to my question were significant.

'It's a fantasy world', was the first comment. 'Its insular' was the second. 'It's like a boarding school' was the third.

I showed my concern to these responses by saying: 'Oh, dear. I suppose I'm one of the people to blame for this since I'm one of the culture setters and carriers'.

Then, however, a fourth individual commented: 'All those things that have been said are good. Bramshill shows consistency and continuity. The one thing we can all do here is have time to think precisely because of those conditions of insularity and containment. We can't do any of these things 'out there.'
At this I moved on. The group studied the organisational ethos of the Victoria and Albert museum (through the use of a video clip) before focusing on their perception of the moral ethos of the police organisation. Two members of the total group refused to complete the questionnaire. I let it pass because the other members of their groups were responding to the refusals. Finally we concluded with the analysis of the 'Suffolk video factory'.

I ended the day with a question that I addressed to the whole group: 'How sure can you be that you do not display some of the same characteristics of the managers we have just observed?'

As the group left my sense was that, for the majority, the day had been received positively. Moreover, my sense was that the same majority would have been content to continue for another two hours. Certainly I had plenty more material to use. I was disappointed that I had not been able to include two of the exercises I had designed especially because they would have reinforced the design emphasis concerned with giving individuals structures within which to examine their own 'values' and with some practical guidelines to 'create ethical working environments'.

I discussed my perception of the day with one of the course tutors and with the course administrator. They both expressed very real concern at the way the 'ethos' at Bramshill had been described and agreed that it was very likely that I had elicited a level of defensiveness that was scarcely likely to be conducive to learning.

'You are walking on eggshells all the time,' observed the course administrator: 'You have to try to anticipate every possible response to whatever you say or do. You have to possess an extraordinary degree of self-control where almost everything you do has to be pre-planned. It seems well-nigh impossible.'

How would the group evaluate their experience?

D. and M. (the module leaders) had set aside the following lunchtime to share any information they had been able to glean from the group concerning my work. D had included a specific focus on the morning of Wednesday 12 November to examine - as part of her inquiry into the nature of emotions - the affective responses to the day on 'ethics'. M. had canvassed views (informally) over breakfast and coffee. They reported a positive response. D. noted that the group had been particularly influenced by the film of the Suffolk video factory - 'You must keep it in', she said, and that individuals in the group had been able to make links not only between the sessions e.g. the 'duty of care' and 'ethics' but also with police work. M. identified
one individual from a northern force who had especially sought him out to say how powerful and impressive the examination of 'ethics' had been. Nonetheless, P. identified support for the view that the work was 'intellectual demanding'. At this I expressed surprise, even, incredulity - but overall I felt very considerable relief.

Significantly, when the written course evaluations were received at the end of the module, my work on ethics was not identified by any participant as warranting either negative or positive comment. To the extent that I had managed (almost for the first time) not to have some relatively explicit critical response I was pleased. However, the price for my less 'demanding' and more conservative approach was that I had not managed to 'excite' any explicit recognition of a more powerful and 'significant learning' episode.

**Moving on - Sustaining the design**

I resolved both to continue with the emphasis I had first 'piloted' in November 1997 and to sustain the discipline of avoiding the provocation of defensiveness or hostility on the part of my clients by maintaining a rigorous control over myself and my 'teaching' content. I also decided to simplify the instrument examining the 'moral ethos of organisations' through constructing a simpler questionnaire, 'The organisational ethics questionnaire'. I was excited about the prospect of collecting more data concerning the moral ethos of the police organisation - and, from experience I knew that my teaching performances tended to be invigorated by the frisson of the 'new' and my wonderment at the outcomes. In addition, I had developed a set of support materials based upon Kleinig (1996), Laugharne and Newman (1985) and Villiers (1997) in order to 'reassure' those officers who felt that they needed a more extensive examination of ethical issues involved in areas such as the use of force and discretion as well as the ethics of crime investigation. However, one particular element that I realised I should include in the learning materials was a method, design or 'recipe' for ethical decision-making (despite my reservations that practitioners in situ scarcely, if ever, seek out and follow any actual piece of paper upon which guidelines and procedures are stated). I saw this as one of the development tasks I should undertake for a 'strengthening' of the ethics education unit.

**The delivery of the 'ethics unit' February 1998:**

The module leaders had tried to secure some basic conditions where all of the eighteen student participants were given plenty of opportunity to settle into the 'classroom environment' and to form preliminary relationships with one another
Before any 'learning structures' were provided. Prior to my work, I had arranged the chairs in three rows - in order to provide 'safety.'

I introduced myself - and gave some simple information concerning who I was and my role in the College. I said that the fact we were examining the subject 'ethics' did not, in any way, imply that persons in the room were unethical. The subject itself was worth examining 'especially in the light of recent strategic emphases from within policing itself - such as the 'statement of common purpose and values'. I then began with a simple clarification as to the nature of 'ethics' before embarking upon the first presentation - which I duly illustrated with some video material featuring a police leader.

I then proceeded to offer the group a choice from two activities. Would they prefer to examine a case study featuring the 'moral development' of a police leader or would they prefer to compare themselves to 'superior' managers and leaders? After a few moments of hesitation the group opted for the second activity. Once this had been completed I simply provided a brief synopsis of the 'case study'.

I began the next session similarly by offering a choice between two activities: either we could review the major ethical dilemmas in policing or the group could use the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire as a form of 'ethical stocktaking'.

The group opted for the 'stock-taking' activity - and, once the subsequent lengthy discussions had been completed, I concluded the session with a summary of the data patterns emerging from the instrument.

I continued throughout the day by offering choices to the group and remaining as informal and uncontroversial as possible. I also began to collect data from the 'Organisational Ethics questionnaire'. The findings indicated that most participants worked in organisations that fell short of the type of moral ethos advocated by police strategists.

**The Evaluation**

I had re-installed the simple evaluation questionnaire that I had used throughout the majority of the action research process. The data emerging replicated the pattern of the previous unit delivery in the new cycle of the research.

In terms of the 'high points' of the unit, a majority of the participants mentioned the following:
'The opportunity for self-reflection', 'Thinking about personal ethics', 'The chance to examine something deep', 'The intellectual stimulation', 'The videos - very interesting', 'The videos were excellent', 'The thought-provoking videos', 'Schindler's List - I will go and see the whole film', 'The small group discussions'

More than half the participants either left the space blank in which to identify low points or said that there were no low points

Of the remainder only one commented on the fact that it was:

'Over my head - not enough practical application'

Whilst the others mentioned:

'The lack of time to address the issues'
'The venue', 'The acoustics'

Those who suggested improvements wanted the inclusion of more 'real world scenarios'. Two participants wanted more clarification of 'ethics'. Three wanted to spend more time examining how to make the organisation more ethical.

In relation to the fourth question concerning the learning that had occurred during the module the results were positive.

14 out of the 18 participants reported that they had learned more about the subject 'ethics' and/or 'police ethics' or 'professional' ethics. They included remarks such as:

'I learned about a new subject area I had never studied before 'ethics' and how it relates to policing', 'I now know what ethics is', 'The ethics in policing', 'Ethics and professions'

12 out of 18 stated that they had learned more about themselves:

'I found out things about my own values and ethics', 'I realised that I had lost my ethics', 'I sorted out my values'

9 out of 18 stated that they had learned something from the different sorts of activities.
Only two persons out of 18 reported a low level of learning:

One wrote: 'I merely reinforced what I know already'.

The other commented: 'Some interesting discussions but what did I learn? Nothing earth shattering'

Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the 'ethics' unit?' were distributed as follows:

- A very high level: N = 0
- A high level: N = 2
- A moderate level: N = 14
- Little: N = 2
- Very little: N = 0

Reflection

Although the new design was a distant relative of that which I had created in the first cycle of the action research process it appeared not to elicit the polarity of response and, with careful replication, I felt optimistic that I might gradually improve the level of positive valuation. I would sustain the style, method and content of the unit in the next delivery.

The Delivery - March 1998:

Just prior to what was to be the final delivery of the ethics unit on the 'Managing People' module I had written in my diary:

'There seems to be a way to do it. There needs to be some choice, lots of structure and rhythms of concept development and emotional evocation'

On this occasion I was looking forward to engaging, in a relaxed way, with the group. I had decided begin with an informal introduction to 'ethics' and examine, by way of 'warm -up' activity, Frank Holl's painting, 'Deserted'. I would then reproduce the design of the previous unit delivery. This I did. There were twenty one participants.
The Evaluation

The results of the evaluation questionnaire were as follows:

In terms of the 'high points' of the unit, the participants mentioned the following:

'It was interesting to see the influences on a senior police leader', 'The chance to reflect on my values', 'Not having the usual police training type course', 'Chatting about profound things with colleagues', 'Thinking for a change', 'The videos on organisations', 'Thinking about my ethics', 'The mental stimulation', 'The bit from 'Four weddings and a funeral - very moving', 'Schindler's List', 'The discussions with other police officers'

The low points were:

'Too idealistic - not in touch with reality', 'The prejudices of the police', 'Not enough time spent helping on the realities', 'The size of the group', 'No police speakers'

A majority said that the unit did not need to be improved.

Those who suggested improvements wanted the inclusion of "practical guidelines" and "how to combat the performance target mentality" or 'more information on ethics'

In relation to the fourth question concerning the learning that had occurred during the module the results were positive.

17 out of the 21 participants reported that they had learned more about the subject 'ethics' and/or 'police ethics' or 'professional' ethics or 'organisational' ethics including the following remarks:

'I found out things about my own values and ethics', 'I realised that I had lost my ethics', 'I sorted out my values'

14 out of 21 stated that they had learned something from the following different sorts of activities:

The 'ethical reading'
The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire
Discussions with colleagues on 'ethical dilemmas in policing'

*The tutor input*

*The study of organisations and ethics*

*The chance to reflect*

3 persons out of 21 reported that little if any learning had resulted from the unit.

Lastly, the responses to the fifth question, 'What value (if any) do you assign to your experience with the 'ethics' unit?' were distributed as follows:

- A very high level: N = 0
- A high level: N = 4
- A moderate level: N = 13
- Little: N = 3
- Very little: N = 0

*An Ending*

A former tutor at the college, who had been a participant on the module, generously, sought me out at the end of the module delivery and said:

'You ought to collect the data on the 'Organisational Ethics' and publish it - its important stuff, you know.'

I had begun to 'write up' the earlier findings on the 'Moral Ethos' Questionnaire and I said; 'Yes - I wish I had the time.'

The Police Management Programme, which had begun in the Spring of 1995 was undergoing a review. When the new design was decided upon in May of 1999 I was not asked to offer any form of 'ethics education' to the course by the new Programme managers. No one told me why this was so.

I was to learn, in 1999, from the course administrator, that my work was perceived as 'risky' because it could lead to strong positive or negative feelings - and if strong negative feelings were aroused this would make it difficult for the subsequent 'inputs' by other tutors to be appreciated. It was better, therefore, to 'drop' ethics from the module.

In the Spring of 1998 I had to come to terms with the fact that my attempt to 'secure' ethics education on the police leadership and management curriculum had,
apparently, failed.

A concluding note

Towards the latter end of 1998, after I had begun to assemble all the facts emerging from the inquiry, I had begun to develop following the publication of the draft statement of ethical principles in December 1992, I asked my colleagues in the Police Leadership faculty if they might help me in the process of developing theory from the data. Informally, I mentioned to one of my colleagues - who had helped me in the earliest days of the project - that I had, after so much effort 'failed' to secure the subject 'ethics' on the curriculum - through achieving sufficiently positive feedback from the participants in the client groups. A few days later, and, unsolicited, I received a note from that tutor.

I have chosen to include this note here because I think it helps to corroborate my account and I think it also lends authenticity to that same account.

It read as follows:

'My experience in running short courses on ethics at Bramshill has been, more often than not, they end in the crushing disappointment of negative, destructive and even vindictive feedback from a vocal minority, whilst the majority remains silent, their real thoughts undeclared. Clearly a committed and thoughtful minority wishes to make something of the subject, recognises that the tutor is not there to pander to and flatter their prejudices but, in some sense, to help their education, and accepts that there is no easy path to ethical understanding and awareness. However, this group has always proved a minority, and I am left with a deep sense of mystery as to why their colleagues come, or having come, why they remain.'

The note continued:

'Their unwillingness to apply themselves to the task in hand, actively and wholeheartedly, saddens me. What they ask for is glib and simplistic formulae; and the tutor whom they really approve is the showman who flatters them, and who writes integrity on the board, but ignores its absence in the room.'

The note then succinctly and incisively captures the difficulties of keeping faith with the courage of one's convictions. It observes:

'I challenge them in some way; their behaviour, their compromises, their
inauthenticity; and they react by being abrasive, cynical, flippant, dismissive and
crass. (As opposed to the minority, who remain interested, thoughtful, sincere and
committed. But, as always, an empty vessel makes the most noise.)'

My colleague finished his note by observing that he did not wish to signal 'a
resignation' but 'a reflection' on a recurring state of affairs and ended by saying:

'Please read it in that light.'

Although the programme managers and relevant module leaders of the Police
Management Programme could no longer support the inclusion within their
programme content of something called 'ethics' a great deal of learning and
discovery had taken place throughout the inquiry. Data patterns had emerged from
the questionnaires which illustrated some features of the moral world of police
officers - and which constituted valuable material for helping stimulate thinking
about how to develop the police organisation. For example, the organisation was
perceived by the majority of middle-managers to be marked by 'secret scheming'
and characterised as a 'rules and procedures' rather than a 'quality' organisation.

Slightly more than one-half of all the police officers who attended the 'Managing
People' module had never, throughout their entire police career experienced a
training or development event which included some study of ethics. My inquiry had
demonstrated that the ethics unit had been impactive for at least a small number of
officers. Some of these effects were unpredictable. Thus, one officer decided, as
a result of my work, to make a formal complaint against his organisation on the
grounds of racial discrimination. Another decided to choose to focus upon the
subject 'police ethics' in his dissertation for a Master's degree. One officer who had
been appointed training manager within his force decided to incorporate some
study of 'ethics' on all the training designs offered within that force. Yet again,
another officer developed a 'leadership manifesto' as a result of the stimulation
provided by the ethics unit. He told me that his manifesto was prominently
displayed in his office so that those around him knew the nature of his value
commitments. Two officers volunteered to return to Bramshill to help act as
additional resources during the delivery of the ethics unit. They assisted me in the
first months of the 'case study' emphasis - and would have continued to do so but
for the fact that one was promoted and the other was selected to take on a new role
within his force. Finally, many of the learning structures I had developed were
borrowed and adapted by officers who had some form of training function.

My work was also responded to positively by a wider audience. Two researchers
in the United Kingdom cited my work in their papers and presentations whilst visitors to Bramshill, from overseas, showed a particular interest in the work. Most of these visitors wanted to include some of my materials in their police development programmes.

After so much effort to make the exploration of the subject 'ethics' (and 'police ethics') a positively valued experience - and to see it secured on the middle-management programme - I had to face up to the sad fact that I had failed. I turned, therefore, to find a way of making sense of the experience and its attendant phenomena.

But this individual educational action research process was to culminate in a happy ending; in the course of that sense-making process I asked my colleagues to help develop explanations and theories. As a result of this - and almost eighteen months later - I was asked to make contributions to the new 'Advanced People Skills' module of the middle-manager programme. I shall return to remark upon this outcome in the concluding chapter of this narrative.
Making sense of the inquiry

Chapter Eleven begins with a question, 'What sense can I make of the inquiry?' and starts the process of constructing a 'personal and local educational theory' - at the core of which lies a framework of values.

Chapter Twelve considers 'ethics education' at Bramshill from a dramaturgical perspective and shows how the experience can be 'read' as an example of ethnopsychoology in action.

Chapter Thirteen - using some of Foucault's ideas concerning the science of discipline - speculates upon the 'governmental rationalities' at work in police leadership and management generally as well as police leadership and management training specifically - and recognises that the 'ethics education' design is contexted within a 'site of contestation' reflecting competing 'governmental rationalities'.

Chapter Fourteen describes the findings emerging from the successive versions of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire as the study unfolded. This data helps to make sense of some of the enduring response patterns noted in the inquiry reported here.

The dissertation is completed by a 'concluding chapter' which underlines the fact that 'ethics' continues to be a police strategic emphasis, comments on the work of two ethicists working at Bramshill, summarises the achievements of the inquiry and ends with a closing vignette.
Chapter eleven

Theory building: What sense can I make of the inquiry?

"The illusion is that changes in the climate of opinion are so large and slow that what we do as individuals makes no difference to them. This is to confuse making an imperceptible contribution with making no contribution. There is a great difference between many people making an imperceptible contribution and the same people each making no contribution. There is a difference between a town where everyone puts their ice cream wrapper in the bin and one where each person drops in it the street, saying, 'Mine won't make any difference.' " (Glover, 1989: 204)

Introduction

The study reported here has shown how a form of 'ethics education' was explicitly re-introduced to the curriculum of the Leadership Development Programme (and subsequent Police Management Programme) at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. My account describes how, over a period of more than five years, I strove to find a way of presenting 'ethics' so that it might be positively valued by the programme participants. I wanted the subject to become a stable feature on the middle-management development programme. However, in 1998, following a revision of the programme, 'ethics' (as a subject for a particular focus) was not selected - by the decision-makers responsible for the programme content - to be included on the curriculum. Subsequently, though, two new members of the teaching staff at Bramshill became familiar with my work and included 'ethics and leadership' on the 'Advanced People Skills' module of the Police Management Programme in the autumn of 1999.

The research question I had asked was: 'Could I create an 'ethics education' for police leaders and managers that would be positively valued by sufficient of the client group such that the subject 'ethics' would be secured on the curriculum?'

Notwithstanding the various strategies and tactics I deployed over the course of the inquiry I did not, in fact, succeed, consistently, in achieving my aim. Moreover, I had aspired to establish a form of emancipatory action research as the expression of a critical educational science. The account of the different phases or cycles in my action research process shows that I failed to establish those conditions where participatory, collaborative or emancipatory action research could even begin to take place. It follows that a number of my values - both educational and moral -
were not realised in my practice.

How can I make sense of the process? What sort of theoretical interpretation can I create from the facts of the inquiry? In principle I could draw from the full range of theories that have been advanced and developed as explanations for human conduct. Clearly, for example, it would be possible to 'read' the details of this study from the perspective of chaos theory or to understand the more specific successive educational designs as representations of post-modernist educational practices. However, whilst my interpretations have been influenced by several such sources I have organised my theory-building into three related but separate areas. Thus, in this chapter I shall highlight the role my own values and role-conceptions played in initiating, sustaining and shaping the inquiry itself. In so doing, I shall link my theoretical formulation to Whitehead's (1989) framework concerned with creating a 'living educational theory'. In the following chapter I shall discuss the inquiry from a dramaturgical perspective. Then, in chapter thirteen, I shall adopt a Foucauldian approach as I move on to consider the 'make-up' of police and the complexities of their governance.

First, though, I shall make reference to Winter's (1998) discussion concerning theory in action research. He shows how theory is rich, pervasive and multi-faceted in the conduct of action research. In the course of his text, Winter observes that action researchers, at some level, always encounter specific and particular situations which provoke commensurately local theoretical interpretations. This 'local' mode of fashioning theory has been well-illustrated by Elliott (1992). I shall cite Elliott's example and take this as my cue for personalising the sense-making process and ground my theorising in patterned aspects of my own person.

**Theory in action research**

Winter (1998) probes, specifically into the nature of theory and the conduct of action research; he describes 'theory' as 'speculative play with possible general explanations of what we experience and observe'. He rejects the notion that theory is something residing in books stored in the 'warehouse' of the university. For him, theories can be used to control or, conversely, can be personally (and collectively) empowering. Plainly, if a theory is generated by a practitioner/inquirer then it is, in a sense, 'owned' by that same inquirer and linked to their identity.

He likens the theoretical dimension to a 'voyage of self-discovery'. My experience, in part, coincides with this characterisation. As my inquiry developed I realised that it was my own personhood - the way I interpreted my role, my modes of reaction,
the nature and pattern of my experience which prompted those modes of reaction, and, the extent of my creative competence - that lay at the heart of the research.

Winter moves on to make four points about both the origins of, and the nature of, theory in action research. I shall summarise those points and indicate how my own theory-building reflected the processes to which he refers.

He asks; 'Where does 'theory' come from in action research?' and answers this by saying that it does not come from a computer search of the literature. Theoretical resources are not predefined in advance but are drawn in by the 'process of the inquiry'. So, for Winter, theory emerges:

"... from a process of improvisation as we draw on different aspects of our prior professional and general knowledge in the course of the inquiry. This theoretical dimension of action research inquiry may be thought of as a journey of self-discovery. Every time a colleague or a student or a client presents us with something and surprising (in the data) or a new possible interpretation pops into our head concerning some event or part of the data, we find new relevance in theories which we were 'aware of' beforehand, but which until this moment had not seemed significant." (Winter 1998: 250)

A clear example of this process in my inquiry concerned the reflections of a police officer who wanted me to 'succeed'. He reported that he was 'surprised' at how 'anti' so many police were towards civilians. I was reminded that I was a 'mere civvy'. This particular experience helped to make salient those social psychological theories reported in Brown (1986) - and especially Tajfel's (1978) studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations - which point towards a generic norm featuring the tendency to discriminate in favour of one's own group identification. This led me to ask the question: 'If, because I am an outsider, I am likely to be discounted in some fashion, how might this be overcome?' At least a part of my answer to this problem was to acknowledge, in the early phase of my 'ethics teaching' how difficult it is for any outsider to 'get on the inside of another form of social practice'. I also chose, in my introductions to the 'ethics unit', to accentuate the fact that I was not a police officer and that I hoped that I would not be perceived as presumptuous or patronising by persons in the client group.

His second point concerns the fact that theory in action research is inherently both reflexive and multi-disciplinary because action research is necessarily concerned as much with the process of the inquiry as with the 'problem' issue(s). He notes that
throughout action research the inquirer (the researcher) involves participants in negotiations, resolves ethical dilemmas, establishes and develops the focus of the work and constructs strategies for agreeing interpretations of events. Therefore and inevitably, the action researcher draws on a whole variety of different types of theory including those concerned with social interaction to wider macro political/economic theories helping to understand the contextual influences impacting upon the actors and their situations of practice. (I should note that, whilst I had hoped to be able to involve participants in negotiations (concerning how, collaboratively, we might address 'ethics') I only risked this approach on two occasions - both of which I had to abandon rapidly. In the final stage of the project I was able to offer choices to the participants - but this fell short of more conventional action research practice.)

Winter, I think, is entirely correct in his description of this aspect of 'theory in action research'. Thus, as I developed the inquiry I had to take account of theories concerned with individual personality and identity (including the fact that police are more interested in the person than in a rational critique of their arguments and opinions) as well as those concerned with understanding the nature of Bramshill as an institution. In this latter respect, I had to accept that, although my workplace was described as a 'college' it did not practice 'education' but something curious and distinct representing a complex and often tacit negotiation between tutor and client group. I characterised (see Adlam, 1999) the nature of the encounter as a form of 'infotainment' or 'edutainment'.

Third, action research requires theory in the sense of speculation on the hypothetical meanings of the immediately observable. Winter points out that theory, in this sense, is absolutely central to action research because it involves questioning the meaning of the data so that participants can go beyond the already 'expert' understandings which 'defined' their starting points. Throughout the course of the study I met, intermittently, with my staff colleagues in order to try and develop understandings of our practice. In the last two years of the study I was able to begin the process of presenting my findings to my colleagues and to invite them to 'speculate' upon the 'data'. These meetings led me towards an analysis of the 'make up' of police leaders and managers that I shall explore, in detail, in a later chapter. Here, though, I want to emphasise three insights that emerged for me in the course of the study.

First, I learned that despite my apparent commitment to emancipatory action research, I was, in fact, unwittingly pursuing a positivist form of practice as I searched to identify, manipulate and control as many relevant 'variables' as I could
discover which might have had some bearing on the 'evaluation of my teaching designs. Unbeknown (to myself), I had succumbed to the power of the positivist impulse and the desire to 'be in control'.

Second, my inquiry suggests the need for a 'conversational community' to form - in order to help practitioner/inquirers explore and analyse their practice. Because of the fragility of the educational ethos in my situation of practice I made some educational decisions that were born out of distress - and this led me to adopt some highly questionable tactics. So, for example, on occasion I used overly emotional and disturbing video content in an extreme effort to counter the view that 'ethics is/are only relative'. If I had been able to discuss my work and my inquiry within such a conversational community then I would (I think) have dealt more effectively with my emotional reactions.

Third, the data emerging from my inquiry enjoined me to face up to a difficult realisation concerning the dominance of the arational over the rational in relation to educational decision-making at Bramshill. Prior to my study I had not realised the extent of the limits to the rational enterprise. At the very beginning of the action research inquiry I developed - for police leaders and managers attending courses of study at Bramshill - a thorough rationale (a defense) for the study of ethics. In a world where rationality dominated, the arguments in this rationale would, themselves, contain sufficient reason to continue with the study of ethics on all police leadership and management development courses. However, as my study has shown, this did not, in fact, happen. Consequently, a major finding of this study concerns a reminder about the existence of limitations to rationality and rational decision-making – identified, for example, by Simon (1962).

Winter's fourth point about theory in action research starts from recognising the fact that engaging in action research inevitably brings the inquirer(s) 'up against' a varied set of theoretical perspectives. He emphasises, however, that action research is 'above all about determining courses of action'. The researcher, in the light of their understandings and their values, is always trying to approximate to a 'better', i.e. a more valued, state of affairs. Yet, in order to act we need to make choices. Consequently:

"... this means that we have to establish an effective relationship between these different theoretical perspectives. So action research involves the integration of theory - in and for action. The action research process itself involves deciding how best to intervene here and now, in this situation, with these individuals, in the light of these social and professional values, amidst the complex pressure of this
organisational and political context." (Winter 1998: 251)

It could be argued, therefore, that theory in action research is subordinate to the technical, ethical, social and political aspects of a practice. This, I think, is mistaken because any practice is theory-impregnated. However, it remains the case that the action researcher confronts (and works with) the massivity of goal-oriented social projects and that direct experiential knowledge assumes a certain precedence over other forms of knowledge. To be effective the action researcher does need to deploy an extensive and integrated range of theoretical knowledges. The most recent stage of my project provides a good example this; here, I have developed a form of practice which makes use of the support from my fellow tutors and which reflects a better appreciation of the existential circumstances of my clients whilst they are at Bramshill.

I hope, that in the course of describing the different stages of the action research process I have begun to indicate the variety of theoretical understandings which helped me to decide how best to intervene 'here and now, in this situation'. Winter's last point highlights the central role that the decision-making processes of the practitioner play in the course and progress of an action research inquiry. I shall take this as an appropriate moment for identifying the way the inquirer builds theory from practice and then integrates that theory into subsequent practice.

An example of practitioner-generated theory

Elliott (1992) provides a straightforward example of theory grounded in practice which demystifies the business of 'theory construction'. I shall refer to his example because it also illustrates, clearly, the most general sequence of individual action research activity that I followed throughout the inquiry. His example of theory-building grounded in practical experience (rather than imported from the 'outside' in the form of academic conceptualisations) is taken from his own work as a teacher in a secondary modern school in the early 1960s. He reports that the deputy head at the school had organised for the fourth year girls to see a film depicting, in great detail, the birth of a baby. News reached the staff room that, during the screening of the film, four girls had, simultaneously, fainted. He, Elliott, argued that if boys had been present they would have provided an 'emotional check' on this reaction. During the afternoon the boys complained that they had not been able to see the film and that the girls were using the occasion to impute 'emotional immaturity' to them. Elliott decided to test this theory of emotional maturity/immaturity and invited fourth year boys (and any girls who wanted to see the film again) to view it after school. He summarises what happened as follows:
"No immature behaviour was evidenced from the boys, no girls fainted, and the showing was followed by a thoughtful, lively, and sensitive discussion." (Elliott, 1992: 8)

He goes on to say that the data gathered during these events, from observation of practice and student feedback provided the basis for changes in the programme of sex education within the school. He outlines the theory/practice process as follows:

"Information about the fainting episode led me to hypothesise that it wouldn't have happened in the presence of boys. The feedback from the boys about their feelings on being excluded prompted me to organise the second showing in order to test the hypotheses that girls wouldn't faint in the presence of boys, and that the boys wouldn't display immature behaviour in the presence of girls. The success of the second showing then stimulated the gathering of further data from students about their needs in the area of sex education." (Elliott, 1992: 9)

Elliott's example demonstrates well the reflective-interpretive processes of the practitioner/researcher. These processes were highlighted by Orona (1997) in her grounded theory study of persons who were carers of Alzheimer's disease sufferers. Orona found that much of the time during her study she simply 'walked', or 'sat' or, most importantly, 'daydreamed' - all of which were integral and productive processes in her inquiry.

It may well be the case that any researcher's quest for understanding will include phases of intense internal dialogue and then a vaguer kind of dreaminess - a dreaminess where lines of thought are (somehow) surfaced and pursued, conclusions are rehearsed, new possibilities are conjectured and insights achieved.

Certainly, I can say that the dominant activity of the study reported here has been a deep and sustained inner mentation - occasionally sharp in focus because of the clarity of a question - but more generally marked by a sense of wondering - wondering why something had happened, wondering if 'such and such' were the case - or just revisiting past noticings. In the light of this preliminary discussion concerning theory and the centrality of the person in (individual) educational action research I can now begin to elaborate a more specific interpretation of the inquiry.

**Personalising the inquiry**

I want, at the outset, to emphasise that I have come to understand the inquiry as
analogous to a type of creative project. I mean by this that, when I view a painting, theatre piece, garden design or architectural construction, it seems to me that I am presented with the outcome of a search to express something valued by the designer - and yet something constrained by and embedded within a wider historical and socio-cultural context. If I am to make sense of the 'finished' piece that, for example, the painter presents, I can only do so by trying to grasp the values informing and guiding the painter's practice and the wider historico-socio-cultural context. Therefore, if I am, similarly, trying to make sense of the form and content of the project I have described here, then I can only do so by trying to grasp the values informing and guiding my practice and the context in which that practice took place. So, the concept of 'value' constitutes a major explanatory unit in my sense-making process. In consequence, I shall need to provide an account that illustrates how the educational events and encounters I have described were fashioned from some of my (socially-constructed) values.

However, the account of the inquiry process also shows that I failed to express certain values in my practice. Thus, an equally important part of my discussion is devoted to making sense of why this was the case. To help me provide such an account I shall draw from Weber's (1948) 'professional political' model.

I shall make the assumption that I acted as a 'practitioner-inquirer' or 'teacher-researcher' - and, my practice was intended to be 'educational' - throughout the duration of the research process. It follows some of my sense-making might sensibly draw from my understanding of the nature of an educational practice. This I attend to in the following section. The discussion will allow me to move on to explore the creation of a 'personal and local' educational theory using Whitehead's (1989) model as a generative framework. I shall take Whitehead's concept of a 'living educational theory' as a catalyst for developing theory. I shall emphasise the fact that it was the denial or suppression of certain of my values - especially as they were related to my role obligations, my personal development and my professional development - that were responsible for launching and shaping the project. They constitute a central element in the 'living educational theory' or 'personal and local educational theory' I begin to articulate here.

**The nature of education and educational inquiry**

Peters (1968) in his analysis of the concept of education points out that, for something to count as 'education', it must embody or be connected to something judged to be worthwhile. He identifies the intrinsically ethical character of education in the following way:
"'Education' has notions such as 'improvement', 'betterment' and 'the passing on of something worthwhile' built into it. That education must involve something of ethical value is, therefore, a matter of logical necessity." (Peters 1968: 91)

Following Peters, a fundamental presupposition underpinning my inquiry was that if I took it to be educational (rather than something else - such as 'propaganda', 'manipulative persuasion' or 'indoctrination') then it must conform to certain criteria amongst which must be included the direct or indirect expression of moral values. It follows that an inquiry into something purportedly 'educational' will need to examine, at least in part, the moral ends sought and the moral qualities embodied in the practice; it will also examine whether or not the practice aims to sustain and enhance the expression of moral values in future social actions. Thus, an educational inquiry will be concerned to discover which moral values are expressed in the practice and will explore how they are expressed in the practice. It will also explore which moral values are denied in practice and will attempt, in the first instance, to give an account explaining why they are not expressed in the practice.

I want to add that whilst it is possible for almost any human experience to be 'educational' (in the sense that some form of learning can, in principle, take place), institutions specifically established for educational purposes - such as the Police Staff College, Bramshill, enjoy choice, some control and some degree of power over the nature of the curriculum experience they provide. In virtue of that choice, control and power, the curriculum so constructed has, always, the potential to embody, express and commend a range of both moral and non-moral values. Not only was I acting within an institutional context as a practitioner-inquirer but I was also fully aware of the powers and privileges conferred upon persons, such as myself, within that institutional context. The role I filled - and my interpretation of my role requirements - need, therefore, to be included within my theorising of the inquiry process and its outcomes.

These preliminary observations provide me with grounds for locating my inquiry within the framework that Maxwell (1985) refers to as a 'philosophy of wisdom' rather than a 'philosophy of knowledge' perspective and approach. A 'philosophy of wisdom' (in contrast to a 'philosophy of knowledge') takes the view that the aim of practical inquiry is to realise what is of value in life (and values are both moral e. g. justice and non-moral e. g. efficiency). The aims of practical educational inquiry are to realise certain moral and non-moral values in the social practice of education. (It may be added that the aim of practical educational inquiry is also to be concerned to realise values and educational values in social practices after the
educational event itself.) Practical educational inquiry - given prior commitments to a philosophy of wisdom - begins with questions of the form, 'How can I realise certain of my values in practice? I shall develop an answer to this question shortly.

As I began to try and make sense of my project - its unfolding and its termination and its ultimate revival (on the Police Management Programme) - I recognised that I had begun the inquiry with a form of the question, 'How do I improve my practice?', and I had then endeavoured, throughout the course of the project to improve aspects of my practice. This type of question and form of conduct appears to be isomorphic with the 'theory-generating' model Whitehead (1989) presents in his paper concerning the creation of a 'living educational theory'.

**Whitehead's approach to creating a 'living educational theory'**

Whitehead (1989) introduces his readership to the idea of a living educational theory by stating an assumption he has concerning something common to the conduct of educational practitioners. From this he moves on to propose a basic approach to generating educational theory. He writes:

"I'm assuming that all readers of this journal will at some time have asked themselves questions of the kind, 'How do I improve my practice? ', and will have endeavoured to improve some aspect of their practice. I believe that a systematic reflection on such a process provides insights into the nature of the descriptions and explanations which we would accept as valid accounts of our educational development. I claim that a living educational theory will be produced from such accounts." (Whitehead 1989: 41)

The first part of his contention - which includes his reference to a concern by the practitioner to improve their practice - would certainly appear to be accurate. Moreover, it directly applies to my situation. Thus, when I reviewed the content of the middle-management programme at Bramshill I found that 'ethics' as a subject occupied, at best, a peripheral feature of the curriculum. I endeavoured to improve the practice of education at the Police Staff College, by re-introducing ethics to the main curriculum and by trying to present a valued educational experience for the participants on the programme.

In the second part of Whitehead's contention he goes on to make his central point concerning the genesis of a certain type of theory. Thus, he believes that a 'systematic reflection on the process of endeavouring to improve aspects of practice will provide 'insights' into the 'nature of descriptions and explanations' - which we
- the writers and readers - would accept as valid accounts of our educational
development. These 'valid accounts' would themselves produce or stand as a 'living
educational theory'.

Here, then, I shall attempt to provide a systematic reflection on the process of
endeavouring to improve aspects of my practice. If I am successful in this, then,
according to Whitehead, I should go some way towards creating a 'living
educational theory'.

Whitehead is also concerned to embrace an epistemology reflecting Collingwood's
(1982) emphasis on the importance of the 'questioning activity'. Collingwood
introduces his readership to the 'question and answer' nature of knowledge by
observing that the work of Bacon and Descartes represented a classical expression
of a fundamental principle in logic which he, Collingwood, expresses as follows:

".. the principle, that a body of knowledge consists not of 'propositions',
'statements', 'judgments' or whatever name logicians use in order to designate
assertive acts of thought .... but of these together with the questions they are meant
to answer, and that a logic in which the answers are attended to and the question
neglected is a false logic." (Collingwood, 1982: 30,31)

Collingwood contends that in order to understand anything anybody advances by
way of explanation we must know the exact nature of the question that the
explanation is trying to answer. Moreover, the truth of any assertion also lay in
such a 'question and answer complex':

"It seemed to me that truth, if that meant the kind of thing which I was accustomed
to pursue in my ordinary work as a philosopher or historian - truth in the sense in
which a philosophical theory or historical narrative is called true, which seemed
to me the proper sense of the word - was something that belonged not to any single
proposition, nor even, as the coherence-theorists maintained, to a complex of
propositions taken together; but to a complex consisting of questions and answers."
(Collingwood, 198: 37)

Whitehead advocates that theory building by educational practitioners should
reflect the 'complex' consisting of questions and answers rather than the
'propositional' form that is typical of the 'disciplines' approach to educational
theory. I shall follow his suggestion when I turn, shortly, to explicate the details of
Whitehead's discussion concerning a living educational theory.
Following his discussion of the contrast between 'propositional' forms of theory and 'question and answer' forms, he is able to move on to define the purpose of his influential paper as follows:

"... the purpose of my own text is to direct your attention to the living individuals and the contexts within which a living theory is being produced (Lomax, 1986). Again, I wish to stress that this is not to deny the importance of propositional forms of understanding. In a living educational theory the logic of the propositional forms, whilst existing within the explanations given by practitioners in making sense of their practice, does not characterise the explanation. Rather the explanation is characterised by the logic of question and answer used in the exploration of questions of the form, 'How do I improve my practice?'" (Whitehead, 1989: 43)

As I develop this account I hope to illustrate how the explanations I offer reflect my attempts to answer different sorts of question, all connected with the specific educational project I undertook. The project itself was located within a particular institutional context and I shall need to reflect the impact of the institutional context in my sense-making process.

**The genesis of a personal educational theory: a general model**

Whitehead presents an outline of his idea concerning the creation of a 'living educational theory' by describing the 'state of his thinking' in relation to the genesis of such a theory - which itself reflects the logic of question and answer. He focuses upon six areas. They are:

1. How do I improve my practice? - a question of methodology
2. A question of acknowledging one's existence as a living contradiction
3. How do we show our values in action?
4. How do we know that what the researcher says is true? - a question of validity
5. How can we move from the individual to the universal - a question of generalisability.
6. Which power relations influence the academic legitimacy of a living educational theory? - a question of the politics of truth.
The value priorities and the value concerns of the inquirer are central to the first three areas. I shall provide a brief outline of the way Whitehead discusses these three areas before I turn to apply his thinking to my own inquiry.

He thinks that the question which initiates an educational inquiry, i.e. 'How do I improve my practice?' is a question of methodology. However, the question itself presupposes a denial or suppression (or negation) of the values of the practitioner - or some problem the practitioner experiences in relation to the enactment of his or her values. Whitehead finds that this question initiates a form of action research. He writes:

"If we look at the locations where a living form of educational theory is being produced (Lomax 1986; McNiff, 1988) we can trace the development of a number of teacher-researchers who have used the following form of action/reflection cycle for presenting their claims to know their own educational development as they investigate questions of the form, "How do I improve this process of education here?" ' (Whitehead 1989: 43)

According to Whitehead, the 'action reflection cycle' takes the form:

- I experience problems when my educational values are negated in practice

- I imagine ways of overcoming my problems

- I act on a chosen solution

- I evaluate the outcomes of my actions

- I modify my problems, ideas and actions in the light of my evaluations .... (and the cycle continues)

So, for Whitehead the 'action/reflection' cycle is energised by the negation of the practitioner's values. He points out that this form of inquiry falls within the tradition of action research - but it is distinguished from other approaches 'through its inclusion of 'I' as a living contradiction within the presentation of a claim to educational knowledge'.

The idea of action research as taking the form of cycle or spiral of steps has a long and well-known history but Whitehead's emphasis on 'contradiction' is more
unusual and idiosyncratic. He elaborates upon this when he turns to address the second area, 'A question of acknowledging one's existence as a living contradiction'.

What does this mean? Here, it seems that Whitehead draws, in part, from the theoretical tradition established by Hegel and Marx - a tradition which holds that all phenomena incorporate latent tendencies and contradictions that generate change. Lyons (1988), informs her readership that one of the basic principles of materialist dialectics is that change comes primarily from the development of contradictions inside a person. She argues that 'everything is full of contradictions' and, by way of example, notes:

".. For instance, there is a part of me that is courageous in bringing out differences, and a part of me that wants to preserve the peace at any price. There are parts of my understanding that are firmly grounded and will remain consistent, but I also know that some things I think and write today may embarrass me three months from now." (Lyons 1988: 14)

She continues, saying:

"Because dialectics sees that change arises primarily from contradictions inside a person, it opposes the world view that people are like billiard balls, incapable of changing until hit by an outside force. In a dialectical view, changes can and should arise from an internal commitment on the part of the one who is changing." (Lyons, 1988: 15)

This argument seems valid. If persons are characterised by contradiction then an awareness of those contradictions might be sufficient to provoke change. Whitehead recognises that his own 'insights about the nature of educational theory' have been influenced by video-tape evidence which led him to see himself as a living contradiction. He writes:

"I could see that the 'I' in the question, 'How do I improve this process of education here?', existed as a living contradiction. By this I mean that 'I' contained two mutually exclusive opposites, the experience of holding educational values and the experience of their negation." (Whitehead, 1989: 44)

In a subsequent text (Whitehead, 1993) he provides a striking example of the contradictions between his educational values and their negation when he describes how his identity as a 'creative academic' was negated by the conventions of higher
education. Lyons' observation makes it possible to identify how educators might, in practice, negate their educational values. For example, there might be contradictions between the educational value of 'self-directed learning' and the level of directing, structuring and controlling exhibited by the teacher. Or, their might be a contradiction between valuing diversity and the finding of a 'personal voice' with the judgement of students' work if it is measured against conventional assessment criteria. We could easily imagine contradictions between moral values such as 'impartiality' with according preferential treatment to the more tractable or docile students, or, 'justice' with the differential allocation of time and resources to the student body. Whilst Whitehead emphasises the significance for him of the 'contradiction' experience in catalysing his educational development, Lomax, in an earlier published dialogue with Whitehead (Whitehead and Lomax 1987), has allowed for the possibility that there may be other motives which come to stimulate the search for solutions and/or the betterment of practice. It may be the case that inquiry can either start from the position where a practitioner experiences a gap between the real (actual) and the ideal or even from a more disinterested curiosity.

Thus, in my own situation, it was the absence of something I thought had value (i.e. 'ethics') from the police leadership and management development curriculum that provoked me into beginning the inquiry. It was not until the inquiry process had reached some maturity that I was able to focus my attention upon myself as a 'living contradiction'. In consequence, and in some contradistinction to Whitehead, I want to start detailing the process of creating a living educational theory by focusing upon Whitehead's third question. That third question is: 'How do we show our values in action?'

Most obviously, a person's actions, in circumstances of choice, indicate the projects they have energy for (i.e. they choose this rather than that) - and, within the parameters of the project itself, their conduct reveals a particular values set. Findlay (1970) for example, reminds us that we do, in fact, cherish, esteem and prize states of affair, objects and situations. In the practice of education, for example, one teacher may especially value 'precision' in measurement whilst another may, in comparison, place more value on inculcating a 'spirit of inquiry'. Whitehead, though, develops his question in a particular way. He writes:

"The reason that values are fundamental to educational theory is that education is a value-laden practical activity. We cannot distinguish a process as education without making a value-judgement. I am taking such values to be the human goals which we use to give our lives their particular form. These values, which are embodied in our practice, are often referred to in terms such as freedom, justice,
democracy (Peters, 1966) and love and productive work (Fromm, 1960). When offering an explanation for an individual's educational development these values can be used as reasons for action" (Whitehead 1989: 45)

Whitehead's discussion demonstrates how questions of value lie at the heart of those educational practices concerned with attempting to bring about improvements in a situation of practice.

Values and action: identifying the clusters of values determining the inquiry (or, an outline of the values I sought to realise in my practice)

Which values served as the catalyst for the whole of the inquiry reported here?

When I asked the question, 'How can I realise my values in my practice?' I drew a distinction between my role obligations in relation to participating in institutional processes concerned with police leadership practices within the United Kingdom, my more general moral values, certain, more specific educational values, and, person-centred framework of values developed by Heron (1990).

First, I understood my role as a 'civilian tutor' - employed by the Home Civil Service - to be constructed and legitimated in terms of some form of alignment with the ideals of civil and public service in a liberal democracy. If I were to enjoy the powers and privileges conferred upon me in such a role I could only do so if I were to meet the obligations - contingent upon my situation of practice - and provide police leadership and management development opportunities which included a serious and systematic focus on helping police to discharge their legitimate function in a liberal democracy. The professional ethic of the 'Home Civil Service' has been discussed by Hennessy (1989) and Phillips (1991) and this, too, constituted a basic scaffolding of values for the guidance of civil and public servants. I shall refer to their formulations of civil service ethics when I turn to examine how my work reflected these and other moral values commitments.

Second, at a more general level, however, I was also the beneficiary and inheritor of an ethical tradition stretching back in time to the earliest recorded ethical writings - and continuing through the more systematic formulations of the Greeks - then on, over the last two thousand years, to modern and postmodern moral philosophy. In consequence, I was alerted to the richness of ethical schema - including duty-based, rights-based, virtue-based, goal-based and discourse ethics - and the possibility of bringing ethical considerations to the foreground of individual lives, social practices and organisational forms.
Third, I understood education, ultimately, to be concerned with the promotion of human flourishing through the provision of those conditions which facilitated the realisation of that which persons - in manifold ways - might be. To that extent, I valued the inclusion of all those knowledges which appear to have some bearing upon that realisation. In consequence, my educational designs attempted to incorporate 'whole person' learning structures (such as 'biography work') as well as the provision of learning structures designed to help examine ethical dilemmas. I had learned a great deal from Heron's (1977) theories concerning the disabling effects of human distresses and of the impact of psychodynamic processes on communication and social encounters.

Fourth, Heron's (1974) concept of the 'educated person' i.e. someone who is self-directing, self-monitoring, and, self-correcting - within a social milieu - provided my practice with a fundamental source of inspiration. This inspiration was given a more political focus through the writings of Freire (1996), Carr and Kemmis (1986) and Kemmis and Wilkinson (1998).

After the 'preliminary' phase of my enquiry, I was able to provide brief summaries of these values emphases for those police leaders and managers who attended the 'ethics unit'. (This statement is included at Appendix L to this dissertation.)

In relation to my role obligations, I shall first consider the ethic of the 'Home Civil Service'. Second, I shall address the values at the heart of liberal democracy and those appropriate for police in a liberal democracy.

Hennessy (1989) in his exposition of Civil Service ethics describes a 'genetic code' of constituent parts which, together, generates a greater ethical whole. The constituent parts of the 'code' are:

- 'Probity'
- 'Care for evidence'
- 'A respect for reason'
- 'A willingness to speak truth unto power'
- 'A capacity not just to live with the consequences of what you believe to be a mistaken course, but to pursue it energetically'
- 'An appreciation of the public interest'
- 'An awareness, necessary at all times, of other people's life chances', and
- 'Equity and fairness'.

Hennessy also makes reference to the important requirement for civil servants always to be 'constitutional'. By this he means that the Civil Service itself be under the control of a higher authority of elected ministers accountable to Parliament. A 'constitutional' Civil Service is made possible because of 'three flying buttresses, essential to the stability of the system': They are:

"A constant and careful concern for the law. A constant and careful concern for Parliament - its needs and procedures. No lying and misleading. A concern for democracy. You may not like the kind of people it places above you but coups or any kind of destabilisation are out (sic)." (Hennessy, 1993: 413)

If I were to fill, adequately, the role of tutor at the Police Staff College, then my practice either would need to be able to meet Hennessy's criteria or, if they departed from them I would have to provide a proper justification. In fact one of Hennessy's criteria or 'constituent parts could encourage a form of obedience to bureaucracy i.e. his observation that a civil servant should pursue, energetically, a perceived mistaken course of action. When I turn to discuss Weber's model of the 'mature man' (sic) I shall describe a conceptual framework that suggests a corrective to this.

To the extent that I enjoyed considerable freedom in the construction of course curricula and specific learning structures I had certain responsibilities to ensure that the 'public interest was served'. I imagined that the project concerned with developing a positively valued ethics education experience would be one way of working towards serving the public interest.

Phillips (1993) offers a more general approach towards identifying the professional ethic of the Home Civil Service but concludes with the following remarks both applauding the recent commitments to efficiency whilst endorsing a tradition of 'service':

"The modern trend towards setting out much more clearly and publicly the targets to be achieved by each management unit is an indispensable part of improving the efficiency of the service; but it cannot be substituted for the corporate ethos of
integrity and public service which has developed over the last one hundred and fifty years." (Phillips, 1993: 57)

From Phillips I drew further support for the idea of serving the public interest and finding a moral basis for my own and police accountability.

At the beginning of 1990 I began to ask the question: 'What, for me, are the important emphases and issues that should be included in the formal processes of police leadership and management development? (Later I was to refine this question by asking: 'What should we expect from police leaders?' I answered this question (see Adlam 1998c) by suggesting the nature of a range of knowledges that a person claiming the status of police leader might reasonably be expected to express.)

My answer to the first question began with an observation about policing itself. As Kleinig (1996) suggests, human societies have always needed a policing function; social co-ordination and harmony have never flourished without some form of executive authority. However, the fundamental relation of the citizen to the police in a liberal democracy is one of consent. Police are carefully constituted in order to take account of this fundamental relation. Police activity is designed as a process of facilitating the achievement of worthwhile ends through the adoption of socially and morally acceptable means. The original instructions created for the metropolitan Police in 1829 and the successive statements from ACPO and the Home Office concerning the purpose of police illustrate well the moral ends to which policing aims. In addition, some additional remarks in the original 1829 instructions also specify the dispositions of character that should be expressed by the individual police officer:

"He will be civil and attentive to all persons, of every rank and class; insolence or incivility will not be passed over. While on Duty, he must not enter into conversation with any one, except on matters relating to his Duty. He must be particularly cautious, not to interfere idly or unnecessarily; when required to act, he will do so with decision and boldness; on all occasions he may expect to receive the fullest support in the proper exercise of his authority. He must remember, that there is no qualification more indispensable to a Police officer, than a perfect command of temper, never suffering himself to be moved in the slightest degree, by any language or threats that may be used; if he do his duty in a quiet and determined manner, such conduct will probably induce well-disposed by-standers to assist him, should he require it." (Metropolitan Police, 1829)
These remarks are important precisely because they refer, in large part, to moral qualities such as impartiality and the proper use of power. The ACPO statement of Common Purpose and Values commends a similar set of virtues.

Williams (1993) takes a virtue to be a 'disposition of character to choose or reject actions because they are of a certain ethically relevant kind'. In short, a virtue is an ethically admirable disposition of character. The actions of police officers - in the pursuit of their ends - are expected to reflect certain of these admirable dispositions of character - such as 'compassion', 'courtesy' and self-control.

Thus, a first answer to the question, 'What, for me, are the important emphases and issues which should be included in the formal processes of police leadership and management development? is simply that something is wrong if police leaders and managers do not appreciate the moral foundations of policing and the function of the police institution in liberal democracies. I understand the police function, ultimately, to be connected with helping to secure those social and psychological conditions which people need if they are to learn and 'learn well'. These conditions have been extensively documented by Heron (1977) and Kleinig (1996). They include affection and love, choice and control, stability and predictability, and, the possibility of making sense of the complex phenomena of the world. A major part of the police function is to help create stability and predictability - which themselves facilitate the expression of affection.

If I return to Whitehead's question, 'How do we show our values in action?' then I think it is legitimate for me to claim that my decision to reintroduce the subject 'ethics' onto the police leadership development programme is indicative of some (or all) of the values I have noted above.

In addition, I think it is important for me to highlight the fact that I wanted the police leadership development curriculum to make salient ideas and ideals central to liberal democracy. These have been recently analysed in a subtle way by Jones, Newburn and Smith (1994), in the context of their examination of the 'democratic nature' of policing. The overall aim of their research was to describe and analyse how the various actors involved in the policy-making process interact to produce changes in the style, organisation and operation of policing on the ground. A major part of their study involved detailed case studies of four provincial police forces and relevant organisations such as police authorities in the four force areas. However, their work is more fundamentally an exploration of democracy. They point out that most research and writing on democracy focuses on 'political' institutions such as parliaments, political parties, cabinets, electoral systems and so
on. They argue that in the 'modern service delivery state' the way public services impinge on the lives of citizens may be more important as the 'embodiment or negation' of the democratic ideal than parliament or central government. For them:

"The protection of liberty, social and economic opportunities, and the ability of individuals to shape and develop their lives are crucially affected by a range of public services." (Jones, Newburn and Smith, 1994: 1)

They suggest that, arguably, the police are the central public service in the modern state because the police are constituted to protect the essential freedoms of the citizenry whilst simultaneously enjoying a monopoly over the legitimate use of force. If the police are such a central element in the modern state then it follows that policing policy and its formulation can be taken as an indication of the extent to which the democratic ideal is achieved. In this way, Jones, Newburn and Smith are led to tease out the main ideas and ideals of democracy. Their review of the concept of 'democracy' in political thought - from the critique by Plato through the classical theorists such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill and the 'empirical' theorists such as Joseph Schumpeter - enables them to propose seven criteria of democracy that can be used as a framework of analysis to test how far a state (or any of its public services) is, in fact, democratic. Moreover, they arrange these criteria in an order of priority as follows:

- Equity
- Delivery of service
- Responsiveness
- Distribution of power
- Information
- Redress
- Participation

They provide definitions of each of the seven 'criteria' - as they might be applied to policing - in the following way:

Equity: In so far as the police are delivering services, these should be distributed
fairly between groups and individuals. In so far as the police are enforcing the law in their adversarial role, the pattern of enforcement should be fair.

Delivery of service: The police should deliver the appropriate services (as determined on other criteria) effectively and efficiently.

Responsiveness: In determining the order of priorities, the allocation of resources between different activities and objectives, and the choice of policing methods, the police should be responsive to the views of a representative body.

Distribution of power: Power to determine policing policy should not be concentrated but distributed between a number of different bodies.

Information: Information should be regularly published on funding, expenditure, activity and outputs. A representative body should be able to engage in a continuing dialogue with the professional managers of the police force so as to become better informed and to elicit relevant information through a sequence of interactions.

Redress: It should be possible for a representative body to dismiss an incompetent or corrupt chief officer, or one who exceeds his or her powers. There should be means of redress for unlawful or unreasonable treatment by individual officers.

Participation: As far as possible, citizens should participate in discussion of policing policy with police managers

Whilst Jones, Newburn and Smith's analysis provides relatively specific criteria which can test the extent to which the police service is itself 'democratic' it is also possible to locate the police within the more abstract values of liberal democracy. The liberal democratic state seeks to create and preserve certain social and cultural conditions especially those concerned with civil liberties and human rights. The public political culture of liberal democracies is marked by a possible freedom of expression, the search for justice and equity, 'voice', 'protest' and 'dissent'. It is also marked by the Rule of Law - which is brought into existence through a democratically elected Government. Police help to secure those social and cultural conditions through upholding the Rule of Law and maintaining the Queen's Peace. These are worthwhile ends and can be achieved through morally acceptable means. It is here that 'ethics' - as a subject of study - can facilitate the quality of the policing function in liberal democracies.

To the extent that ethics occupied (at best) a fringe position on the police leadership
and management development curriculum I think it is valid for me to claim that certain of my values were denied in my practice. However, I think that this interpretation reflects a certain development of Whitehead's original meaning; he seems to emphasise the development of an ongoing practice rather than the different question of redesigning or reconsidering the actual curriculum subject matter.

Whitehead thinks that in order to understand the values that move our development forward we should start with 'records of our experience of their negation'. He advocates using video-tape recordings of practice so that teachers can engage in dialogues with colleagues about their practice. (I used colleagues as direct observers of my work and the data emerging from interviews with the students as well as the data emerging from the experiential records.) He moves on to say that 'a clear understanding of these values can be shown to emerge in practice through time and struggle' and adds:

"The kind of theory I have in mind forms part of the educational practices of the individuals concerned. It is not a theory which can be constituted into a propositional form. It is a description and explanation of practice which is part of the living form of practice itself." (Whitehead 1989: 45,46)

In short, Whitehead is arguing that values - the things an educator thinks are important - form an irreducible part of their educational practice. I think that my own study clearly endorses this. I also think that Whitehead's view coincides with Heron's (1989) observation that a 'person is a signature in action'. In other words, each and every practitioner brings a unique style and energy to their practice, a part of which expresses their non-moral and moral values.

I shall now attempt to indicate, specifically, how the ethics education experience I constructed was animated by the value possibilities connected to my institutional role and my educational values - and which, also, contained evidence of their contradiction. I should also add that, in addition to my relatively abstract value commitments concerning civil liberties and human rights, as well as valuing 'education' (rather than training') I also valued my own psychological well-being in the face of group responses that were always initially sceptical and could become marked by hostility, overt criticism, negativity and personal insult.

First, I have indicated some of the basic values of a public servant, especially as they are focused by the role of 'tutor' at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. Equity and justice have been identified as core values along with 'probity', 'integrity', and,
'public service'. Thus, from the outset, in the face of discretionary choice - where I could have chosen to emphasise the purely 'managerial' aspects of police leadership - I chose, instead, to construct an ethics education experience which attempted to provide my clients with an appreciation of the moral foundations and ideals of their profession (or vocation). The design of that educational experience was accompanied by an explicit statement of my values and my clients were asked to reflect back to me the extent to which my practice met those values. This values framework was presented to each of my classes once the earliest stages of the action research process had been completed. It made reference (see Appendix M) to my hope that the progress of the ethics unit would allow us to enjoy:

- **Freedom** - including the freedom to dissent

- **Democracy**

- **Fairness**:

- **Self-determination**

I asked participants to 'tell me if I deviated from these value commitments'.

The statement continued with a reference to my educational values, my personal values and my professional values. Finally I included the following comments about the character of the ethics education unit I was hoping to deliver as follows:

'This is what I aspire to achieve in experiential terms for participants on the 'ethics' part of the syllabus:

- Understanding and valuing the history of ideas in relation to ethics

- Recognising the everyday and commonplace nature of ethical reasoning and ethical action

- Focusing ethical principles and theories on the analysis of policing and police leadership issues and practices

- Promoting and realising an active learning process on the part of participants where, ultimately, agendas are co-operatively negotiated and learning structures are developed to meet participants wants, needs and interests
Providing a learning climate within which participants have freedoms to learn and enjoy exploring ethics as a domain of enquiry

I also made explicit the particular educational aims I had for an 'ethics education' and those clients who were chosen to keep experiential records of the 'ethics unit' were asked to judge the extent to which I had achieved those ends.

I think that these statements provide sufficient evidence for my claim that it was a set of values developed over time that both energised the project and gave it much of its specific form.

In order to defend my claim, however, I shall provide some more specific evidence illustrating congruity between the values and the design:

- Freedom-in-action

My introduction to the unit included references to 'a way we might all think about how to construe the next two days devoted to 'ethics' '. I suggested that we could 'enjoy' a 'space' in which to explore ideas and reflect upon our practices - a space where I would 'try to respond to the energies and interests of the group'. I would do this by being flexible over the timings of the activities and by attempting to elicit from the group their preferences for alternative learning structures. For example, I would ask the group - after an initial 'warm-up' activity if they would prefer to compare their own professional development with a case study of the professional and ethical development of a police leader or whether they would prefer to begin by examining video material that could help them to clarify the nature of 'ethics'.

- Democracy-in-action

I sought, most obviously, to enact the democratic ideal in the two attempts to create a genuinely 'collaborative' approach to the design of the ethics education experience. I knew that this was a high risk strategy but, in October 1996, I began the unit by contrasting a 'traditional' with a more 'client centred' approach to education and then I invited participants to note down their objectives, preferences and suggestions for the subsequent learning design. However, on both occasions, despite the fact that I had distributed cards upon which individuals could write down their interests and I had divided the class into smaller groups comprising four (or five) members - each of which had a flip chart (to collect the individual responses) - there was very little energy for the process.
However, despite my failure, in subsequent learning designs I tried to encourage individuals to make it clear to me what activities they had 'energy for' and, similarly, to make it clear to me how I might proceed in ways that were meeting their needs. I would also 'stop' whatever it was I was doing if it seemed that certain problems were becoming manifest in the group. For example, one officer, described Heron's 'ideal client outcomes' as:

'a load of bollocks - nothing more than a load of bollocks',

I responded by saying how intrigued I was by his response and that I always found it easier to make progress if people would express 'how they saw things'. The officer in question was then able to enjoy a share in the governance of subsequent discourse.

- Fairness-in-action

I tried to ensure fairness at the group level by providing a wide range of learning structures and by attending to the detail of discussion and/or problem solving in the different sub-groups. I also made it clear that I was available to help when groups began working in different locations on their own designs and projects.

Most importantly, however, I tried to make sure that everyone felt that they could 'enjoy an equal voice' by using non-verbal behaviours to 'bring in' contributions from everyone. I would also ask, once certain of the group had spoken or had provided analyses whether there were other views - or whether the issues could be developed in any ways.

- Self-determination-in-action:

Concretely, my valuing of 'self-determination' was expressed in structures such as the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. I would suggest ways in which, within the context of small groups, participants might like to proceed. However, I always emphasised (gently) that different groups and different preferences for ways of working and that they were free to determine the pace and emphasis of their work. I would also provide a range of options concerning which aspects of 'ethics' different individuals might wish to explore and discuss - and these options were supplemented by a range of different 'support' materials.
Values underprivileged or suppressed in my educational practice

In the planning and preliminary stage of the project, I clarified the values I wanted to express in my practice and recognised how they approximated to the outline of a critical educational science that had been described by Carr and Kemmis (1986). Yet, my actual practice - in the face-to-face educational encounter - failed to give full expression to many of my educational values. The values underprivileged or suppressed in my practice included; choice; autonomy; collaboration; participation; authenticity; courage; integrity; and, mutuality. Such was the extent of my failure that it remains a moot point whether the project I have described can be accepted as 'action research'. Moreover, tested against the models of educational decision-making discussed by Heron (1977), (1989) I would probably be adjudged to have, unilaterally, made all the major educational decisions. Thus, I operated in the 'hierarchical' and 'authoritarian' mode.

How can I explain this? When I recount the story of my research to any listener who might have an interest in the work I acknowledge that nothing would seem more reasonable, attainable and appropriate (for an educational project) than the practising of a form of collaborative action research. Surely, the participants would have wanted to co-operate in the setting of learning goals, in identifying the content they wished to explore, and, the methods they deemed attractive for investigating that content? Instead, when I tried to initiate this mode of working I simply succeeded in exciting a response marked by confusion, irritation, anger and bewilderment.

To explain this turn of events I have had to come to terms with the fact that I compromised (or 'gave up on') some of my educational values. As I turned to analyse this phenomenon I began by recreating a basic design dilemma in my practice. Thus, I had set out to achieve a worthwhile end (i.e. a positively valued ethics education) but I had to decide, from a number of possible approaches, which means to employ. So conceptualised I was able to recast my inquiry in terms of Weber's 'professional political' model and to explore my conduct in relation to his analytic schema.

Weber's 'professional political' model

The professional political model was first enunciated by Weber in a lecture at the University of Munich in 1918. Weber warned his audience - advanced students of law and politics - that very grave moral dangers would inevitably face those
amongst them who pursued a career in politics. This was because, as Weber saw it, a profound moral dilemma lay at the core of every politician's professional life. The dilemma lay in the fact that every politician must, on some occasion, use morally reprehensible means in order to achieve morally good ends. The politician is caught in a genuine moral dilemma from which it is impossible to escape without committing a moral wrong: if politicians employ reprehensible means to achieve worthwhile ends they become morally tarnished for having done so; if, on the other hand, they fail to employ morally 'dirty' means they become guilty of failing to achieve good and worthwhile ends.

How does Weber characterise the morally reprehensible means? He included: lies and threats, actually hurting or threatening to hurt people, committing or causing to be committed acts of violence and brutality. All of these acts would sometimes be required of politicians. Plainly, politicians do decide that, in order to achieve their ends, co-ercive power may be visited upon the person of the citizen. Ker Muir (1974) reminds us of the sheer extent of personal possessions which render us (more or less) vulnerable to (and victims of) co-ercive power. He writes:

"... we can itemise a vast stock of possessions a potential victim has: his (sic) life or his physical and emotional integrity, to start with; his reputation; his good conscience; his attractiveness; his influence; his job; the tools of his trade; his store of wisdom; his self-confidence; his freedom; his initiatives; his access to positions of power; and all the valuable possessions of the persons and institutions with which he identifies - those of his family, his friends, his firm, and his country. In any such inventory of possessions, there is invariably a considerable number of quite fragile items which can be destroyed easily in the first strike." (Ker Muir 1974: 199)

Weber's original audience included students who were committed to ideals such as promoting justice, preserving freedom and achieving social peace. Those same students were, presumably, looking forward to doing these things in honest and decent ways and in finding pride in what they had done. Weber made it clear that it was not possible to have it both ways. Worthwhile means could only be achieved through the use of co-ercive (hurt-making) means or decent means could be sustained at the expense of realising worthwhile ends. Politicians, and as Ker Muir (1977) demonstrated, police, could not avoid becoming 'corrupted'. Weber, though, offered four alternatives to those who would let themselves in for 'politics'. First, people could give up a political career. Second, they could give up their passionate hopes for using their power to achieve their ideals and become obedient bureaucrats. Third, they could hold on to their ideals but abandon their respect for
sensitive and civilised mean for achieving them. They could lie or hurt without suffering guilt or sustained doubt. The fourth alternative was to become, as Weber put it, a 'mature man' (sic). Ker Muir (1977) refers to this as the 'professional political' alternative.

Weber developed an appreciation of this last alternative in the following way: the problem of the professional politician was to suffer the morally devastating pressures of exercising coercive power without crumbling, without abandoning ideals, and without becoming bitter and cynical. Weber thought that this would be possible if two virtues were cultivated.

The first was moral; it lies in the strong conviction that the achievement of certain morally worthwhile ends are so important that it allows the professional politician to accept having to use morally dangerous, coercive or violent means.

The second virtue was intellectual. Weber called it 'perspective'. It meant that politicians would see the 'big picture'. Perspective helped the professional politician see that their passions were part of a complex world - a world of chance, 'thrownness', accident, fate and choice - and this caused them to respect the 'lifeworlds', sensitivities and sufferings of others. Perspective reminded the politician that humans are 'one of a piece'. Rogers (1961) suggests this when he remarks that what is most personal is also most general. In other words, personal suffering - the sadness of loss, the fear of abandonment, the anger provoked by injustice - is the shared experience of everyone. So, perspective served to teach the professional politician tragedy and tragedy acted as a restraint upon the tendency or impulse to use morally reprehensible means too quickly. Whilst perspective would not prevent the politician from using 'dirty' means it prevented them from becoming insensitive to the pain and suffering that they would inflict on others.

What has this got to do with the practice of education and with the choices I made in my situation of practice? If Ker Muir was able to extend Weber's analysis to the practice of policing, then, in principle, it is possible to apply the analysis to the practice of educating. Educators, in fact, can employ the power to hurt. They can harm a learner's possessions - such as his or her sense of competence, or esteem. They too, on this analysis, are liable to becoming corrupted. What though, was my situation within the Police Management Programme context at Bramshill?

At the outset of my project, to use Weber's terms, I wanted to present an ethics education in 'honest and decent ways'. For me this meant practising a form of emancipatory and critical education. To do this I ought to have worked according
to a collaborative action research model. However, I wanted to achieve the worthwhile ends of a positively valued ethics education - as part of a longer term ambition to help enhance the quality of police leadership and management. A first glance, according to Weber's analysis, indicates that in my practice I chose his third option. I abandoned worthwhile means in order to secure worthwhile ends. Whilst I did not lie or use threat I failed to sustain the courage of my convictions. It is for this reason that I include amongst the values suppressed in my project those of courage and integrity. Moreover, because I kept silence about my preferred ways of working I did not share an authentic communication with programme participants.

Whilst this constitutes a logical analysis of my practice it is based on a particular conception of the nature of 'honest and decent' means. It might be possible for me to escape this damning judgement if I were to find some evidence that I used 'honest and decent' means. At best I can find partial exoneration. Thus, amongst the duties of an educator I might be able to surface concepts such as 'readiness', 'familiarity', 'expectations', or even, 'level of development' in relation to the characteristics of participants and recognise that it is neither honest nor decent to proceed without taking these factors into account. There appear to be some empirical grounds for believing that a majority of my client group had not experienced, in the course of their police training, an approach which allowed them the freedom to find their own understandings and/or the methods for applying 'official' knowledge. The procedures of and for applying the law, the technical methods for achieving specific police purposes and the technical developments in the practice of police management dominated the content of their training experience.

My analysis is also based on the idea that I was working in an educational context. This, though, is rendered problematic because competing definitions can be constructed which might better reflect the actual institutional ethos. A first alternative definition might consider Bramshill as a place where clients avail themselves of a professional service. A second can consider Bramshill as a training institution providing 'training solutions' to policing problems. In fact, the latter term is actually used in the formal and public statement concerning the aims of National Police Training within which Bramshill functions as a 'solution provider'. (An alternative way of conceptualising Bramshill as an institution responding to 'moral-panic' rationality will be noted in another chapter.)

Against the first alternative conception - i.e. Bramshill as a place where clients avail themselves of a professional service - there is little (if any) debate across the
institution as a whole exploring alternative ways of conceptualising the nature of the client-professional relationship. Schein (1988), in his revision of an earlier discussion of consultation models, discusses the radically different ways of 'being' a client. In the 'purchase of information or expertise' model he characterises the 'essence of the message' from the client to the consultant as follows:

"Here is my problem, bring me back an answer and tell me how much it will cost" (Schein 1988: 23)

However, Schein pushes his analysis further and suggests that:

"Psychologically the message is, "please take the problem off my shoulders and bring me back a solution" which permits the client to relax and concentrate on other matters, secure in the knowledge that an expert is now handling the situation - "owning the problem,". If the solution turns out to be useless, the consultant can easily be blamed." (Schein, 1988: 23)

The client at Bramshill appears to be marked by this type of assumption. Put in Schein's terms:

"You, the tutor are expert and it is up to you to dispense your expertise and information such that it sorts out my problems."

In Schein's second model, the 'doctor-patient' model the consultant is called in to find out what is wrong with the client and then recommends how to make the client better. Schein writes:

"The essence of this model is that the client delegates to the consultant not only locating a remedy, but first, diagnosing the disease. The client becomes very dependent on the consultant until the consultant is ready to offer a prescription. As in the expert model, the consultant takes the problem onto his (sic) own shoulders and permits the client to relax, secure in the knowledge that someone else is looking into it." (Schein 1988: 27)

In both these models the client is 'looked after' by the consultant and the responsibility for 'owning' the problem and finding solutions to the problem is taken away from the client.

In contrast to these two models, Schein describes the characteristics of the process consultation model. He writes:
"The major distinction of the process consultation model [with the expert and doctor-patient models] lies in how the consultant structures the relationship, not in what the client does ... Clients may be asked for information, invite the consultant to do a diagnosis, or ask for help in some other way, but the consultant is not obligated to respond literally to the client's overt request" (Schein 1988: volume II 29)

My practice did not operate within this mature form of the client-professional relationship. My situation of practice, was marked by either (or both) of the first two models described by Schein. I note this in defence of my actual practice. It is, at best, an imperfect defence.

A return to Whitehead's model

In the final section of this chapter I shall complete my discussion of Whitehead's 'model' for creating a living educational theory.

The claims made and advanced by the researcher need to be validated. It is this to which Whitehead turns when he addresses the fourth area. He asks: 'How do we know that what the researcher says is true?'

Whitehead's fourth question is concerned with validity. He notes:

"Researchers need to know what to use as the unit of appraisal and the standards of judgement in order to test a claim to educational knowledge. I suggest that the unit of appraisal is the individual's claim to know his or her own educational development. Within this unit of appraisal I use methodological, logical, ethical and aesthetic standards to judge the claim to knowledge." (Whitehead, 1989: 46)

Whitehead grounds his epistemology within the framework of 'Personal Knowledge' established by Polanyi (1958) and he continues with an indication of the questions he includes in making judgements about the validity of an individual's claim to educational knowledge. Those questions are:

- Was the inquiry carried out in a systematic way? (He adds: 'One methodological criterion I have used is the action reflection cycle....')

- Are the values used to distinguish the claim to knowledge as educational knowledge clearly shown and justified?
- Does the claim contain evidence of a critical accommodation of propositional contributions from the traditional disciplines of education?

- Are the assertions made in the claim clearly justified?

- Is there evidence of an enquiring and critical approach to an educational problem?

I shall, in my final chapter, provide an outline of the main facts emerging from this inquiry. Here, though I simply want to make a series of claims about my educational development which, in turn, stemmed from a question about improving the practice of education in this situation - here - at the Police Staff College - concerning the content of the police leadership development curriculum. Specifically, the subject 'ethics' consisted of an optional two-hour 'elective' session on the Junior Command Course attracting a relatively small proportion of the students on that course. Most simply, this constituted a failure to meet one of the basic purposes for which the institution was established; for me, it constituted a fundamental dereliction of duty. As I have noted above, I have chosen to construe this as a situation in which my values were negated in my situation of practice. This negation catalysed the inquiry process that, as a result, enables me to make the following claims about my educational development:

At a personal level:

- I have clarified and developed my moral and non-moral values

- I have clarified and developed my educational values

At an intellectual level

- I have extended my knowledge of ethics

- I have extended my knowledge of police ethics

As an 'educationalist' (or 'educational practitioner')

- I have learned more about the nature of education

As a practitioner in a particular educational context
- I have learned more about teaching ethics
- I have learned about teaching ethics to police
- I have learned about the ethical dilemmas in policing
- I have learned about police themselves

My educational development also includes five other learnings:

First, I have learned about myself in relation to my own psychological security and well-being: I have learned about how I 'survive' in a particular institutional setting. This learning has also revealed what could be described as my 'dark' or shadow side.

Second, I have learned about the nature of a 'practice'

Third, I have learned about some aspects of educational research

Fourth, I learned about the nature of an institution's culture and the impact of that culture on educational processes.

Fifth, I should add that the action reflection cycle and the enactment of action research leads, continually, to realisations about my own ignorance - and this perhaps constitutes my final claim to educational knowledge i.e. how tentative, necessarily, my claims to knowledge really are.

Whitehead's fifth area of focus is concerned with 'generalisability'. His question takes the form, 'How can we move from the individual to the universal? - a question of generalisability.'

He proposes that educational theory be viewed as a dynamic and living form 'whose content changes with the developing public conversations of those involved in its creation'. A living educational theory 'is constituted by the practitioners' public descriptions and explanations of their practice'. However, the theory is not confined to these accounts but in the relationship between the accounts and the practice.' Moreover, it is the relationship which constitutes the descriptions and explanations as a living form of theory.

The actual practice of making public one's descriptions and explanations together
with the analysis of the relationship between the account(s) and practice can illuminate and illustrate this process:

I made public (initially in conversations and discussion and then in more formally convened meetings) my descriptions and explanations of the 'fate' of different learning structures I provided within the 'ethics unit'. Amongst these was my experience with exercise 'Ultima ethica' - an exercise which attempted to help participants examine and clarify the moral foundations of policing. This exercise was 'unsuccessful' in the sense that it never attracted significant positive comment and, on occasions, led to patterns of response that appalled certain of the same client group. In consequence I stopped using the exercise. This is a brief description of the facts. How am I to explain this? I stopped using the exercise because of the tendency for negativity (once it was elicited) to generalise across the whole range of learning events. In other words, a 'failure' in one area of the ethics unit could 'provoke' a rejection of the whole unit. What was the reason for the negative response in the first place? I explained it in terms of the perceived 'irrelevance' of such an activity to the 'real world' of everyday policing.

The relationship between the account and my practice is complex and significant. My experience with exercise 'Ultima ethica' was salutary cautioning me to avoid or minimise including references to the historical development of ethics and the inclusion of material which would be perceived as too far removed from the immediate world of policing. It also left me feeling disappointed and slightly resentful. However, in making explicit these feelings I am immediately conscious that it seems somewhat unusual to do so. And this suggests to me that a whole aspect of practice is suppressed and 'left out' of the descriptions and explanations of the practice.

My description and explanation served to confirm a view held by my colleagues in the faculty - i.e. that our educational ambitions and methods would remain particularly modest. In this way, an individual account extends into a wider community where it confirms, disconfirms or stimulates other practitioners to embark upon their own conjecture-refutation process.

Finally, Whitehead turns to the 'politics of truth'. He asks: 'Which power relations influence the academic legitimacy of a living educational theory? - a question of the politics of truth.

Here, Whitehead confronts the nature of those power relations which 'legitimate' claims to knowledge and truth within the academy. He is concerned to discover
how 'to support those power relations which support the autonomy of practical rationality within education' - or, put differently, with the search for the expression by practitioners of moral and non-moral values in their educational practice. He finds that the 'academy' can include practices - such as the appointment of examiners, the formal requirements concerning the style (and content) of research publications and, the fact that the power relations in the academic community support the power of truth against the truth of power. Implicitly Whitehead calls for a reform - and a significant part of the reform process would be concerned with re-conceptualising the nature of educational theory. He writes:

"What I am advocating is that the propositional form of discourse in the disciplines of education should be incorporated within a living form of theory. This theory should not be seen in purely propositional terms. It should be seen to exist in the lives of practitioners as they reflect on the implications of asking themselves questions of the kind, 'How do I improve my practice?'" (Whitehead, 1989: 50)

Significantly, he concludes by emphasising the 'voice' of the practitioner - and thereby underlines his commitment to the value of the sharing of personal knowledge - by quoting Gilles Deleuze in conversation with Michel Foucault:

"You were the first to teach us something absolutely fundamental; the indignity of speaking for others. We ridiculed representation and said it was finished, but we failed to draw the consequences of this theoretical conversion - to appreciate the theoretical fact that only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on their own behalf." (Foucault, 1980: 114)

This last point - especially the last sentence quoted above - is fundamental to the study reported here precisely because I have been directly concerned with a particular educational enterprise about which I am attempting to speak in a practical way. At this stage I should simply emphasise that as I came to develop a 'personal and local' educational theory I realised how difficult it is to make contact with and speak one's own voice. The study reported here has been strongly influenced by emotion, by a recognition of its uniqueness and by a sense of 'difference'. However, it does appear that none of these are unequivocally valued in the traditions of the academy - and that has led me to consider suppressing some of the actual realities of the study. This, I think, adequately underlines Whitehead's concern about the truth of power and its relation to admissions of truth.
Concluding remarks:

Throughout Whitehead's approach to theory building is his emphasis on the knowledge emerging from the process of 'question and answer', the centrality of experiencing oneself as a living contradiction and the significance of dialogue in the genesis of educational knowledge. The process of question and answer is illustrated below and this will form a conclusion to this chapter.

His fundamental question is: 'How do I improve my practice?' or its more specific variants. How, then, do I improve my practice as a practitioner in the field of ethics education for police leaders and managers? Here are my answers:

I improve my practice by examining the quality of my practice in relation to the constituent elements of the educational situation. Thus:

I improve my practice by developing the content of ethics education; I improve my practice by developing the methods of ethics education; I improve my practice by understanding (learning more and more about) the characteristics (including the wants, needs and interests) of my 'clients'.

I improve my practice by 'working' on myself - both as a 'performer' and through a process of self-study (designed to help me reflect on my practice). I improve my practice as a performer by remaining open to learning about how to offer ethics education. So, for example, it was not until the Spring of 1999 that I first witnessed a senior police officer offering an account of ethical policing grounded in her own practice which perfectly illustrated how to enhance moral sensitisation, the increasing of moral resolve and the enhancing of ethical skills - thus coinciding with Kleinig's (1990) suggestions as to what ethics education might achieve.

I improve my practice by 'conducting the political struggle' in the institutional context; and; I improve my practice by examining the nature of 'education' itself.

This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the role my values played in the constructing and pursuing the inquiry. These values form a basic element in the 'living educational theory' - here conceived as a 'personal and local educational theory' - that has begun to be constructed in this chapter. The next chapter will explore the details and drama of the actual 'educational' encounter.
Chapter twelve

Ethics education as a complex cultural drama


In this chapter I shall draw from the recent developments in discourse psychology and provide an interpretation of my situation of practice (and the specific 'ethics education' encounter) in relation to a complex and dynamic process involving powerful cultural meanings. I shall suggest that Bramshill creates problems of identity for both course participants and tutorial staff alike and that ethics education can be 'read' as the staging of a complex cultural drama. The nature of that drama is made unusual because of its theme 'ethics'. To help with exploring ethics education as a complex cultural drama I shall pay close attention to the detailed description and analysis of a 'possession oracle' - which, despite the apparent cultural distance with my work as an ethics educator in the Police Staff College, Bramshill - provides illuminating points of comparison and contrast with the inquiry reported here. This analysis throws the dramatic setting of Bramshill into relief. In consequence, it becomes possible to understand better the responses of police managers to the 'Bramshill experience'.

Introduction:

The account which I shall present here was initially provoked through reading Benjamin's (1999) discussion of the 'storyteller'. Benjamin thinks that the first storyteller of the Greeks was Herodotus. Benjamin goes on to give an example of Herodotus' writing taken from the fourteenth chapter of the third book of the 'Histories' which deals with the story of the Persian king Psammenitus. It is this:

"When the Persian king Psammenitus had been beaten and captured by the Persian king Cambyses, Cambyses was bent on humbling his prisoner. He gave orders to place Psammenitus on the road along which the Persian triumphal procession was
to pass. And he further arranged that the prisoner should see his daughter pass by as a maid going to the well with her pitcher. While all the Egyptians were lamenting and bewailing this spectacle, Psammenitus stood alone, mute and motionless, his eyes fixed on the ground; and when presently he saw his son, who was being taken along in the procession to be executed, he likewise remained unmoved. But when, afterwards he recognised one of his servants, an old, impoverished man, in the ranks of the prisoners, he beat his fists against his head and gave all the signs of deepest mourning." (Benjamin 1999: 89)

Benjamin takes this as an example of the nature of 'true' storytelling. He suggests that a story 'does not expend itself'. Instead, 'it preserves and concentrates its strength' and is capable of releasing it even after a long time. This, he thinks is true of Psammenitus' story. He exemplifies this as follows:

"Thus Montaigne referred to this Egyptian king and asked himself why he mourned only when he caught sight of his servant. Montaigne answers: 'Since he was already overfull of grief, it took only the smallest increase for it to burst through its dams'. Thus Montaigne. But one could also say: 'The king is not moved by the fate of those of royal blood for it is his own fate. Or: We are moved by much on the stage that does not move us in real life; to the king, this servant is only an actor. Or: Great grief is pent up and breaks forth only with relaxation. Seeing this servant was the relaxation. Herodotus offers us no explanations. His report is the driest. That is why this story from ancient Egypt is still capable after thousands of years of arousing astonishment and thoughtfulness. It resembles the seeds of grain which have lain for centuries in the chambers of the pyramids shut up air-tight and have retained their germinative power to this day." (Benjamin 1999: 90)

In this discussion of 'true storytelling', Benjamin posts a reminder concerning the way an account may arouse 'thoughtfulness' and a number of subsequent explanatory stories. Whilst the account I have provided in the preceding pages does not aspire to the quality of storytelling Benjamin identifies, it has aroused the 'thoughtfulness' (on my part) to which Benjamin refers. It would be possible to generate a host of explanatory readings. Yet, out of a range of 'explanatory readings' which one(s) might I select?

This question resolved itself for me in the course of examining the rethinking of psychology that has been suggested by Harre and Gillett (1995), Harre and Stearns (1995), Smith, Harre and Van Langenhove (1995) and Harre (1998). Harre and Gillett (1995) outline the basis of this new psychology through their discussion of
the recent 'second cognitive' revolution that has happened within the subject. The principle of the new movement is that the main characteristics of human life - from emotion to will - are best understood as products of discourse. The specific approach to discourse analysis I shall present here lies itself within the earlier tradition of the dramaturgical perspective given renewed analytical rigour in the works of Goffman (1959) and in Harre and Secord's (1972) approach to explaining social behaviour.

This form of analysis has been lucidly presented in Harre and Stearns (1995) in their selection of cases that illustrate discursive psychology in practice. Amongst these cases Much and Mahapatra (1995) provide an analysis of a Kalasi or 'possession oracle' entitled: 'Constructing divinity'.

Kalasis are possession oracles who take their name from the Goddess Kali. The goddess selects a few of her human devotees for possession - who thus become 'possession oracles'. As I reflected upon the detail of Much and Mahapatra's descriptions and discussion of the 'possession oracle', I was struck by the parallels and similarities with my own context of practice. I began to turn the eye of discourse analysis onto my practice of 'ethics education'.

In the discussion that follows, I shall first provide a précis of Much and Mahapatra's account. I shall then take the form of their analysis and apply it the presentation of ethics education to police middle-managers in the institutional context of Bramshill.

**A study of transformation: Much and Mahapatra's exploration of a possession oracle**

To establish their credentials as discourse analysts Much and Mahapatra, at the very outset of their discussion refer to the 'prospectus' for a trans-cultural psychology outlined by Much (1995) - which takes as its focus the investigations of a) indigenous theories and b) the interconnectedness of three co-creative semiotic systems, namely: persons, social structures and cultural symbol systems. This framework for investigation is developed with and by the case study of the Kalasi.

Much and Mahapatra suggest that it is possible to consider the role of possession oracle from the point of view of personal meanings and values, social statuses or positions and of local cultural symbolic contexts. I shall illustrate how, similarly,
I can consider the interaction between myself as a tutor and police officers as I presented an ethics education in terms of personal meanings and values, social statuses and positions, and, local cultural symbolic contexts.

Much and Mahapatra begin their study of the Kalasi with a contextual reference. They write:

"Orissa, a state on the eastern coast of India, just south of West Bengal and Bihar, remains in many ways an 'enchanted' world, where a remarkable feature of the ordinary life is the extent to which all aspects of the daily environment, domestic, occupational and commercial are saturated with the symbols of the sacred world, reminding participants, at every encounter, of the here-and-now presence of a sacred order permeating even as it transcends the objects and events of the material and social world. Here also various arts of ritual are outstanding in countless cultural performances designed to draw onlookers into the realm of discourse with the gods." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 55)

Whilst the location of my practice was not directly constructed as a place of worship it is possible and plausible to apply a similar template of analysis and to ask what symbols 'saturated' all aspects of the 'daily environment' of Bramshill. I shall return shortly to provide a detailed response to this question. (My response will, in addition to my own 'reading', reflect a recent 'culture audit' conducted by 'high flier' students on the Accelerated Promotion Course.)

Much and Mahapatra note the popularity of one ritual art in Orissa - the darshan. They describe this as a vision or viewing of persons or objects who are in one way or another 'special conduits of divinity'. They describe how both animate and inanimate objects may be such conduits of divinity or 'containers' into which the God or goddess can be persuaded to dwell. However, they draw a distinction between performances involving ritual discourse with object conduits (such as a natural stone) and those involving discourse with personal conduits of divinity. Thus, they say that there is:

"... apparently intense satisfaction of not only viewing the divinity and having oneself heard by the divinity, but having the divinity respond immediately and directly to oneself, in words and gestures that can be apprehended as human discourse." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 56)

They move on to examine one particular conduit of divinity who, they think, is an
excellent example of the Kalasi tradition. They provide considerable background detail concerning the Kalasi - a married woman to whom they give the pseudonym, Basanti Devi - before moving on to describe the events involved in her transformation from a 'devout housewife and village woman' to the living Goddess. So, for example, they include the fact that Basanti Devi recalls that her earliest inclinations were consistent with the demands of divine possession and that a cobra, the mascot of the God Siva, stayed near her in childhood.

Much and Mahapatra introduce their readers to the transformation process as follows:

"The public possession trance of a Kalasi occurs in the following way: At specific times and places, and after ritual preparations, the Goddess enters and merges with [lagaiba] the Kalasi. At this time the ordinary person in the body disappears into the background and the Goddess acts and speaks through the Kalasi's body." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 57)

Kalasi possession oracles - like other possession oracles in Orissa - are held to have special powers when possessed by the Goddess:

"Their actions and speech are understood as the actions and speech of the Goddess and their special powers are understood as attributes of the Goddess and not the person in her ordinary state. During the time of possession devotees gather around the Mother hoping for advice and cures for their psychological and physical problems, court cases, school problems, family problems and illnesses." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 58)

These observations help to shape the points of comparison and contrast with the situation at Bramshill. To some extent, for example, people on courses at Bramshill hope for advice and even for 'cures' to their professional problems. Similarly, to some extent, tutors at Bramshill can be understood as experts with special powers and knowledge. However, I shall try to illustrate how the cultural background of police and the symbolism of Bramshill create conditions that lead to distinct ways of apprehending the tutorial staff. The responses of police to the staff create distinct patterns of adaptation as uncertain and insecure identities collide. The observations noted by Much and Mahapatra also helped to shape the following questions: In what ways did I prepare myself for the performance of 'ethics education'? What was I a conduit for? To what extent does a 'teaching' performance at Bramshill require a departure from the 'ordinary state' (or the ordinary state of consciousness) of the
person? I shall return to discuss these at a later stage in this chapter.

Much and Mahapatra describe the series of ritual discursive actions through which Basanti Devi transformed herself from village woman to the living Goddess. During this account they include Basanti Devi's observation that three kinds of people visited the goddess - true devotees, people who were curious, and, some who were more interested in others amongst the audience. What purposes did my 'audience' of police officers bring to the 'ethics education'? This reveals a part of the difference between the two situations. The staff folklore at Bramshill reports that a third of the audience 'want to learn something', a third 'will go one way or the other', and, a third 'should not be at the College' (either because they did not want to come or because they are not disposed to value anything 'on offer'.)

Much and Mahapatra include considerable details concerning the symbolic communication that takes place during the ritual transformation - water is sprinkled to purify the area around a fire pit, oblations are offered to satisfy the fire, pushpanjali (petals and leaves) are offered to the Goddess - and they describe the nature of the physical transformation that accompanies the manifestation of the Goddess:

"While the Mother is trembling her very long black hair falls out of its knot and hangs loose down her back. Her countenance has changed dramatically ... Her face, now, has taken on an angry appearance with the lower eyelids raised at the inner corner and darkened. The forehead is not creased but is sternly set and stony giving a different set to her eyes. The mouth is also sternly set, giving her a fierce look." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 60)

They continue:

"Her demeanour continues to change. She no longer has the held-in rounded posture with down-curving shoulders typical of traditional village women. The 'veil' of her sari is now off her head and her walk has become upright and strong-shouldered, a confident, arrogant, even swaggering posture." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 60)

So transformed Basanti Devi/Goddess - the 'Mother' - prepares to address the worshippers, supplicants and inquirers who have gathered around the Thakara ghara - the shrine. A woman sings bhajans - songs of praise of the Goddess. A male devotee sings bhajan in her praise from the background. At this point the Mother
begins her hukum or commands. Their text contains several examples of the features of hukum discourse.

At the conclusion of their description Much and Mahapatra (1995) refer to Much's (1995) contention that discourse analysis should routinely include context analysis. By this Much means the 'idea that much important symbolic communication occurs in the environmental and action contexts surrounding speech.' Their description and observation, prompted me to ask: What important symbolic communication occurs in the environmental and action context surrounding the words and symbolic acts constituting programmes of study and the specific educational and training events at Bramshill? I shall provide the answer to this question after I have noted how Much and Mahapatra make sense of the rituals of transformation.

They describe how they make sense of the ritual as follows:

"The purpose of ritual arts seems to be to produce in the practitioner, as well as those privileged to share the performance, an intense imaginative experience of communicating with (e.g. speaking with, seeing, feeling, identifying with, merging with) divinity, and the presence here and now of a sacred world, awesome, fearsome and beautiful." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 63)

In the earliest stages of the project - as my colleagues and I sought to 'bring ethics to life' - my preparations were too, marked by rituals, by an intense focus of consciousness on the performances I would be giving, and, by inner dialogues which attempted to reproduce Socrates' conversations in the Crito, the Meno, the Phaedo and the Protagoras. I shall describe my own identity transformation process in the latter part of this chapter. Before that I shall address a basic question concerning the 'divine context' of my practice. In the wider institutional context, how was my social role constituted? What was its raison d'être? What was I to be a conduit for?

A conduit for what?

Richards (1999) understands the core institutional purpose of Bramshill to be concerned with realising Home Office policy. In his reflection upon the way of life Bramshill continues to reproduce he finds an institution consistently concerned with implementing the resolutions of government. Richards finds that the symbolism at Bramshill is best understood in terms of the maintenance of the 'establishment'. He elaborates on this by drawing an analogy between the situation
at Bramshill and the governmental problems obtaining in the Roman empire. Put most simply, he asks: 'How was Rome to make sure that its provinces were 'Romanised'? For Richards, 'the centre has to find a way of fetting the unfetted'. Bramshill continues, primarily, to carry out a 'fetting' function. Richards also develops a class-based analysis in order to make sense of the sequences of adaptation at Bramshill. He puts his interpretation as follows:

"The Home and Colonials of the established middle-class had to find a way of establishing a major organ of social control (the police) - and therefore of subjects fit for the localised rule of the outlying districts. It had to turn the working class NCOs of the police into officers. It relied on the staff of the college to do this. With the rise of the meritocratic society, the Home Office has had to manage the rise of the working class - and therefore, of the police. So Bramshill makes a series of adjustments as the Home Office develops its strategies of control.' (Richards 1999 personal communication)

The topics for study on the curriculum at Bramshill illustrate how the institution responds to the concerns of central government, the emphases of individual Home Secretaries and the directives of senior and influential civil servants. For this reason, Home Office circulars are often referred to in the scholarly literature on police as the major catalysts determining the storylines and semantic content - the discourses - of police leaders. Home Office circular 114 of 1983 - with its emphases on 'efficiency and effectiveness' in the provision of police services is probably the paradigm case.

Thus, it becomes possible to provide a first answer to the question: 'What are the tutorial staff at Bramshill conduits for?' They are conduits for Home Office desires. How does the iconography - the symbols that saturate Bramshill - create a context for the pursuit of Home Office desire? The photographs I have included at the conclusion of this dissertation begin to speak to the reader and illustrate some of the inanimate objects that carry potent sacred and secular meanings. Villiers (1998), in his history of the Police Staff College, begins to elaborate a picture of the core meanings attaching to Bramshill. He notes how the opening of the Police College was featured on the radio newsreel of the Light programme on 15 October 1948. The newsreel started by describing the current agenda of the U.N. Security Council but moved on to report on 'matters closer to home':

"On the domestic front, the main item was the official opening of the Police College by the Home Secretary, the Rt. Hon. Chuter Ede, M.P., who referred to the event
as a landmark in police history." (Villiers 1998: 21)

Villiers' history includes photographs of the official opening of the college where Sir Frank Newsam (the 'creator' of the college), the Rt. Hon. Chuter Ede, M.P., and Brigadier Dunn (the first commandant) are pictured inspecting the uniformed police officers. He also includes a more recent colour photograph showing a view from the walled rose garden to the mansion entitled, 'Bramshill - through the gateway'. The institution is presented as aristocratic and noble. Villiers consolidates this picture by including, the following text under the heading, 'Distinguished visitors' to the college. With reference to the 'several royal visits' to Bramshill he writes:

"King George VI and Queen Elizabeth visited the college on 5 April 1951 .... They were so interested by a demonstration of police dogs at work that they were unable to spare the time .. to see the specially prepared museum display ..." (Villiers 1998: 22)

Villiers suggest that Bramshill exists as 'a symbol of the past within the present' and he suggests its other worldliness when he remarks that the visitor to Bramshill will, on arriving at the security controlled front gate:

"Look up the mile long oak-lined ... avenue to the massive house on the ridge in wonder and amazement" (Villiers 1998: 39)

In his description of the enormous number of gifts that have been donated to the college he intimates that Bramshill as an institution is suffused with meanings that transcend its college status - and he recognises that the donations themselves make it possible to consider Bramshill as an anthropological institute. The symbols at Bramshill that are most 'obvious' include those of royalty and patriotism, state officials, including police themselves and the police link with the military through uniform, badges of rank and weaponry. The mansion itself provides rooms for the 'teaching' on some of the courses. Those rooms are called, 'The Great Drawing Room', 'The Chapel Drawing Room', 'The Morning Room', 'The Zouche Room' (after Lord Zouche - who bought Bramshill in 1604). Placed in various parts of the mansion itself are various items of literature presenting the work of National Police Training (NPT). This literature attempts to show how the relatively new training organisation is taking good care of police training. McDonald (1999) points to the extensive and complex iconography as well as the meaning(s) of the College in the following way:
"The title 'Police Staff College' conjures up many images. For those living in North East Hampshire it may be a place of history and mystery - a large Jacobean mansion set on a hill and yet largely hidden from view. For those who work there it may be a picture of contrasts - the still beauty of the grounds and the hi tech bustling activity needed to meet the needs of more than twelve thousand course participants every year." (McDonald, in Villiers 1998: 4)

Such 'hi tech' emblems include the publicity materials. In both 'form and content' the literature of the establishment attempts to sustain the image of the 'bustling activity needed to meet the needs' of those people who attend courses and programmes of study at Bramshill each year. The examples noted below illustrate how NPT and Bramshill have copied marketing techniques adopted by organisations across the private and public sectors. Thus NPT and Bramshill sloganises itself in the following ways:

'NPT is the leading provider of police training and development' (NPT annual report 1998/99)

'NPT is setting the pace in police training worldwide' (NPT annual report 1998/99)

'NPT invests in people - its a great place to work' (NPT annual report 1998/99)

The author(s) of these claims to actual states of affairs remain anonymous. They appear to approximate the types of communication used by any large contemporary corporation to market its goods and services.

The text of the NPT annual report provides an introduction to the nature of the organisation itself and then begins to speak of the work of the different 'business areas'. The vertical career path of courses (within which this study took place) has become organised within the 'professional development business area'.

Woodcock (1992) used the term, 'the reinvention of police' in his attempt to provoke change in police organisations related to the ACPO statement of Common Purpose and Values. An actual attempt at re-inventing the institution of Bramshill has steadily taken place as it has been placed within the wider NPT organisation.

Creating identities at Bramshill

As the visitor approaches the mansion something else occurs. In recent times the
reception area has been moved out of the mansion house itself. The original entrance hall in the mansion is replete with symbols of the past, of royalty, of an aristocratic heritage, and of an ecclesiastical patrimony. But visitors and course participants now travel past the mansion and are welcomed in a different area. The institution begins to develop its discourse and construct the identity of the police who attend programmes of study at Bramshill. In this next section, I shall develop a picture of this identity. I shall also include notes concerning identity problems experienced by both the civilian and police tutorial staff.

In the course of curriculum development meetings, the following observations were made to me, by the tutorial staff (allocated to the Police Management Programme), about the participants attending that programme during the last year of the study reported here:

"These people are really constables with two pips or three pips [badges of rank for Inspectors and Chief Inspectors respectively] on their shoulders" (T. A. a civilian tutor - with extensive contacts amongst rank-and-file police officers - on the Police Management Programme)

"The way you have to manage the people who come on the programme is by going along with - becoming a part of the police culture" (D. R. A police tutor on the Police Management Programme)

"They are different from Superintendents. They are more literal - what I mean by that is that you cannot have an abstract discussion with them. You cannot work for any length of time with concepts. You cannot speculate." (H. J. a civilian tutor on the Police Management Programme)

"You have to find a way to get through whatever you have to do as a tutor as quickly as possible and get them talking about police. They'll go on happily for hours. They love talking about themselves, telling stories, swapping anecdotes - most of it has little if anything to do with the content or purpose of the course." (W. D. a civilian tutor on the Police Management Programme)

"It beats me what you have to do to drag these people out of their narrow, bigoted, unsophisticated views. They resist everything - find faults with everything. God knows how we are to achieve punter satisfaction" (A. R. a police tutor on the Police Management Programme)
"I've been damaged working on this programme - I don't quite know how - but I have to spend ages recovering from the experience. Its made me far more aggressive and it means I'm not at all frightened when working with other occupational groups outside this place." (G. J. a civilian tutor on the Police Management Programme)

These remarks demonstrate that not only do the staff develop views about the nature of programme participants as a whole but also that they meet a patterned response from those participants. How might I account for the patterning of response?

Holdaway (1983) based on covert participant observation study explores the folk narratives of police that function to keep the tradition of the culture alive. He remarks on a noticeable feature of police - and something both recognised and exploited by the tutorial staff at Bramshill. Stated most generally, police talk is replete with stories about police, policing and police work. However, Holdaway points out that those individuals who 'spin a good yarn' are also 'popular policemen' (sic). He also alludes to the mild contempt in which a category of researchers are held in the following observation:

"... they [popular police officers] can hold their own in the canteen, billiard room or station office at three in the morning with a 'goodly one' about a chase and a fight. the finale is generally a description in fine detail, of the last sociologist who tried to research them." (Holdaway 1983: 138)

A corroboration of the latter point about the response of police to researchers working in a sociological tradition emerged in the course of my inquiry when a police member of staff described to me how, within his own force, participants taking part in a socio-anthropological study vied with each other in inventing the most far-fetched story involving police as they, systematically, set about sabotaging the integrity of the research. He added that, subsequently when the work was published an enormous amount of glee, mirth and pleasure was expressed by the participants as they indicated to each other which particular fiction they had created.

Holdaway moves on to analyse the jokes and stories told about policing in terms of discourse that serves both to preserve the traditions of the occupational culture and to sustain its definitions of reality 'against the odds of experience'. Contemporary discourse psychologists would quarrel with Holdaway because he
wants to pit the 'real' nature of police work against the constructed experience of police as if the latter were an inferior and inaccurate version. This would be similar to denying the reality of the possession oracle by asserting that Basanti Devi merely mistakenly believes that she is a conduit of divinity. However, this should not detract from the actual account Holdaway then provides concerning the way the discourse of police-on-the-ground functions to sustain a special 'in-the-know' status. He writes:

"If you listen carefully to PC 123 (sic) holding forth during a game of cards you will hear how his (sic) values and strategies of policing are pitted against alternative and more authoritative definitions of policing which can constrain his and his colleagues. When policemen tell jokes and stories to each other they are sustaining their definition of policing as the practical, common sense way of working. That definition is compared with and triumphs over the potentially cogent definitions framed by senior officers, the law, courts and the range of people with an interest in police work." (Holdaway 1983: 139)

The tutorial staff at Bramshill find themselves engaging with persons who have been immersed in the folk narratives of police discourse. To the extent that Bramshill reflects 'alternative' or, even, 'authoritative' definitions of policing then the tutorial staff may be defined as 'impractical' and lacking 'common sense'.

However something else has occurred when police officers come to Bramshill. Whilst a remarkable feature of police discourse is the extent to which they confidently speak of 'we' - as in "We'll find a way around this one' or 'We're a 'can-do' culture' - they also discourse at length in terms of the way they do things in their own forces. Police officers are creatures of locality. They police a territory and they speak of the things that happen on their 'patch'. When they come to Bramshill they are, quite literally, dislocated. The important sense of control that police have of their territory is subverted. Understanding Bramshill as a form of 'holiday' experience constitutes a successful device for coping with the temporary loss of control. It also subtly links to the idea of a 'holy day' - and thereby continues to support the sense that a sacred aura attaches itself to the institution - its buildings and its landscaping.

Individual police managers in the rank of Inspector or Chief Inspector enjoy a sense of status on their own 'patch'. However, now dislocated, they discover that they have to by-pass the mansion and are everywhere reminded of their lowly status in the discourses of Bramshill. Whilst the Home Secretary will address the Strategic
Command Course, Commanders from the Metropolitan police will give presentations to the Operational Commanders Programme for Superintendents, and, the 'high fliers' of the Accelerated Promotion Course are treated to an assortment of Chief Constables, Senior Academics and 'significant' persons, the middle-managers do not enjoy this kind of treatment. Thus, within the confines of Bramshill, the Inspector or Chief Inspector is, according to one police member of staff, 'suddenly rendered a nobody'.

The difficulties of adjustment for police middle-managers are compounded when one compares 'police time' with 'Bramshill time'. Holdaway finds that the lower ranks, exploit the freedom they have within the formal organisation to 'mould the nature of policing so that it conforms with their image of it'. He summarises that image as follows:

"Policing is defined as work which is full of action and fun." (Holdaway 1983: 62)

He notes that:

"Story-telling, joking and banter are typical and important aspects of life at a police station. At H. it is noticeable that stories are told at quiet times and are often associated with car chases or other incidents involving an element of action and excitement. Drama, elaboration and embellishment are used to transform narrative description of mundane events into a series of vignettes of significant moments which might confront the police officer at any time. Quiet and boring aspects of policing - non-work - are forgotten as a plethora of exciting tales are recounted to the relief." (Holdaway 1983: 55)

Holdaway notes that neophyte police officers soon learn that policing is based on a foundation that is firm and secure. He writes:

"The uncertainty of the neophyte has to be glossed over with certainty. Policing is straightforward and speedy work, the essence of which is prompt and resolute decision-making." (Holdaway 1983: 63)

The busy-ness and speediness of police work contrast with the slowing down of time at Bramshill. Tutors at Bramshill speak of the experiential learning cycle and the importance of 'time to reflect'. Thus, and again, a part of the culture of the institution is set against the phenomenal world of police middle-managers. Foster (1998) describes her experience of teaching applied criminology to the strategic
command course in the following way:

"We [the tutors] are frequently told that they do not like the change of pace (too slow) and style we adopt. We want them to be independent learners and set this as an expectation and in the way we structure the timetable (we have a lot of study periods where they work independently) and we hold sessions in the evening (which disrupts their normal pattern of working and many of them don't like this). The macho culture of the organisation .. confuses being busy with being productive!" (Foster 1998: written personal communication)

Foster's observations are echoed on the Police Management Programme. This is clearly demonstrated in the way participants on that programme dealt with certain learning structures: many of them were completed with enormous rapidity. So, for example, explorations of personal and professional values within groups of three could be finished within five minutes. Once 'finished' participants would look towards members of staff waiting for the next set of instructions. Inevitably this rapidity meant that there was a relative absence of significant analyses in relation to the tasks that were completed. Thus, for example, when 'culture audits' (Johnson and Scholes, 1993) were taken, plenty of material - reflecting various cultural phenomena - was surfaced but it was accompanied by a minimum level of interpretation concerning its meaning.

The folk narratives or semi-public discourses of police also provide definitions of the people who are encountered in the course of policing. Holdaway builds upon Manning's (1977) observation that there is a 'common sense' theory about human nature and characterises the typical police view as follows:

"The police view is that humanity has fallen. People do not really understand the nature of their fellows; their gullibility, their lack of stability and common sense ... There are good grounds for this view - at least if you are PC 49. If people are on the edge of chaos, they need to be restrained ... Further given this view PC 49's is superior to that of members of the public. They may be naïve; he (sic) is not." (Holdaway 1983: 65)

Holdaway continues by finding a way of characterising a core belief shared by members of the Police rank-and-file occupational culture:

"He (sic) subscribes to an attitude that brooks no appeal: We, the police have real knowledge; they the public, do not have access to it. Policing has a strangely
In the police world, people who are non-police - 'the public' - are arranged along a continuum from the domesticated but naïve through the fickle, the incompetent and pathetic to the downright evil. All non-police - including those on the tutorial staff at Bramshill - are inherently suspect characters. If Holdaway's analysis might be criticised as outdated, more recently Brown (1992) considered the extent to which police culture - as a whole - was changing. In the course of her review of the occupational culture she described those characteristics which seemed to remain intact over time and which appeared no matter which force was studied. Those features are: a sense of mission; pessimism - that the morality police officers adhere to is being eroded on all sides; suspiciousness; conservatism; and, machismo.

Despite the fact that she identifies a number of factors that might facilitate culture change - such as the increasing number of graduates in policing, the impact of 'equal opportunities' and an increased civilian presence within the organisation - she cites the 'power of the prevailing culture' in the 'socialisation of recruits'. Brown concludes by drawing attention to the fact that the 'grass roots cultural milieu of the Police' continues to 'subsume and subvert' change initiatives and policy emphases. Thus, Brown's comments suggest that the features Holdaway identified still remain socio-cultural characteristics of police.

The tutorial staff at Bramshill conceptualise the 'mass' of programme participants as persons who express the dominant features of the occupational culture. However, a complication is added because they (the course participants) are 'supposed to be managers' - and therefore they are expected to have achieved some distance and/or differentiation from the attitudes and values of street level constables. The programme participants conceptualise the staff in ways consistent with the general assumptions held about people within the folk narratives of the occupational culture. That is to say, they are intrinsically suspect. Moreover, since Bramshill is not a University it means that they have somehow 'failed'. They have not the intellectual capacity or the competence to have found employment in a top rank educational institution. They are, therefore, second rate. In addition, the tutorial staff are Bramshill tutors: their identity is constructed by the police as emblematic of the fanciful world of Bramshill.

As these identities become complexly constructed through the interplay of symbolic interaction, the educational or training encounter is fraught with a unique set of difficulties for both parties.
The tutorial staff construct the identity of programme participants as 'resistant', tendentious and contrary. The dislocation of programme participants and their temporary loss of status takes place alongside the more chronic status problems suffered by the staff. They know that they are, at best, 'on trial'. Their status has to be earned each time a course is delivered and they know that they may do or say something in an unguarded moment that earns the opprobrium of the student group.

**Ethnopsychology in action: exploring the cultural exchanges in the educational encounter**

Schein (1987), in an extension of Goffman (1959), identifies a centrally held North American/European cultural assumption about the nature of relationships: relationships depend upon mutual co-operation giving all parties to the relationship as nearly as possible what they claim to need. He adds:

"*Human dramas must come out equitably between actors and audiences ... "* (Schein 1987: 84)

However, the tutor experience at Bramshill in general (and mine in particular) does not seem to result in feelings that the 'drama' has always come out equitably - and this is especially the case when the tutor delivers a central presentation or lecture. In those situations staff do not feel they have been given their due. The sense that 'worth' has not been recognised and effort has not been rewarded indicates how breaches of the social rules that make life safe and predictable are regular occurrences at Bramshill. A 'fair exchange' has not taken place. Schein (1987) observes that if we pay close attention to the way we use language as we discuss social encounters that language tells us that a great deal of what goes on between people reflects both a form of social economics and a form of social drama.

As he turns to discuss social behaviour in terms of social economics he writes:

"*We all learn early in life that human interaction is reciprocal. If someone is talking to you, you are paying attention; if someone gives you something, you say thank you; if someone insults you, you defend yourself in some manner or another. We also learn when the reciprocating action is inappropriate and when it is not, and we have a quantitative sense about this. If we are saying something important, we expect 'more' attention and get annoyed when the listener seems to pay too little attention."* (Schein 1987: 79)
However on the Police Management Programme these reciprocations are not guaranteed. If the tutor tries to give something - there is no certainty that it will be well-received. If they 'front' a learning structure (into which they have put a great deal of effort) its conclusion may be met with:

"Where do we get our sandwiches from?" or "The game of football begins at 6 this evening."

These remarks suggest that the lecture might never have really happened. It constituted a waste of time. In other words, the due 'owed' to the tutor is not forthcoming.

When Schein moves on to examine the idea of 'sacredness of the person' another problem involving the interaction between tutor and police student is foregrounded. Thus, whenever a lecture or other related learning structure is offered by a tutor he or she is implicitly claiming that they are about to say something interesting in relation to (and relevant to) the practice of police management. The wider cultural rules dictate that the social self and the relationship(s) into which it has entered must somehow be sustained. If the lecture is, in fact, rather boring or seemingly irrelevant, the cultural rules dictate that the audience will try to disguise these feelings and help the lecturer 'save face'. If the audience manifestly 'switch off' or respond at the close of the performance by immediately changing the subject then they have not sustained the claim and the lecturer has lost face. In effect the lecturer is told that their social value - at that moment in the relationship - is less than they had claimed it to be. However Schein underlines how unusual it is for persons in social interaction to abandon 'face work' and thereby allow a person to lose face:

"Cultural rules dictate that you will not [give me reason to lose face] except under extreme circumstances." (Schein 1987: 85)

The tutorial staff at Bramshill are very aware of the judgements not only of lecture/learning structure content but also of the lecturer/presenters themselves which have been publicly voiced by programme participants and which have featured on written course evaluation forms. They learn that there is always some likelihood that any educational or training event and/or its author will attract a strongly negative response. In part this explains why they adopt an 'impresario' role.
Since the tutorial staff run the risk of losing face they are careful not to claim too much in the first place. 'You are the experts on this one', they may say, or, 'I'm a bit of a novice in this area'. Thus, in the politics of the social exchanges, they adopt the obverse of the strategy 'the more you have, the more you have to lose'; it is psychologically safer to play out the encounter in terms of 'the less I have the less I have to lose'. The tutorial staff who work on the vertical career path management programmes rarely give 'central presentations' to these programmes. Instead they work as discussion leaders/facilitators with their own student groups, and when they 'lead' programmes they take on an impresario function. Programme managers arrange for a variety of 'outside experts' and 'specialists' to provide the specific content of the learning structures. (Thus, for example, in the three years that I directed the Accelerated Promotion Course on only three separate occasions did the police tutors who were assigned on a full time basis to the programme provide any form of central presentation to the complete student group.)

Why, though, do police fail to 'give tutors their due' or set aside the social practices of 'face work'?

A part of the answer appears to lie in the conceptual frameworks that come to be established through the discourse of the folk narratives that Holdaway describes. Police are 'primed' to be sceptical of the citizenry or 'public' as a whole - and this attitude is generalised to include persons at Bramshill. Moreover, there are no penalties if they choose to commit acts of social murder. If anything, these acts confirm the definitions they project of themselves as 'hard-bitten, practical men (and women)'. Superimposed upon these are the symbolic communications taking place within the institutional context at Bramshill. I have already mentioned the problems of spatial and psychological dislocation. In addition, 'Bramshill' is constructed as one those sources of erosion of police morality to which Brown (1992) refers. It becomes a vesicle into which the frustration, ire and bile of police can be projected. It functions as the 'dumping ground' for their cultural 'baggage' and the tutorial staff find themselves most exposed to these processes.

To illustrate how dangerous the response patterns of the participants within the Police Management Programme can seem to be, I recently invited the tutorial staff from the Leadership faculty to attend a lecture on the Accelerated Promotion Course that was to be given by a professor of human rights law. A number of staff attended the lecture and expressed a very positive response to the event. However, when I mentioned to the leader of the Managing People module that I was lucky
to be able to call upon such resources he replied that, despite the fact he thought the content was excellent and very relevant to the practice of policing, he would not be able to risk including such a speaker on the Police Management Programme.

"They would miss the subtleties, they wouldn't understand the humour and they'd end up giving the guy a hard time."

A further part of the answer lies in a more general pattern of engagement summed up by Bauman (1993) in his discussion of postmodern types. Thus, a major postmodern figure is the 'tourist'. But Bauman finds that 'tourism is no more something one practices when on holidays'. He writes:

"Normal life - if it is to be a good life - ought to be, had better be, a continuous holiday." (Bauman 1993: 243)

And he continues:

"Ideally, one should be a tourist everywhere and everyday. In, but not of. Physically close, spiritually remote. Aloof. Free - the exemption from all non-contractual duties having been paid for in advance." (Bauman 1993: 243)

Thus, just as police themselves began to practice their version of a 'quality of service' philosophy so they have begun to construe themselves as customers of National Police Training services. And this means that wider cultural developments find themselves imported into the educational contexts at Bramshill.

Bauman summarises the wider cultural pattern as follows:

"It is a 'your value for my money' situation: citizenship means getting better service for less expense, the right to pay less into the public kitty and get more from it .... The ideal for the citizen is a satisfied customer. Society is there for individuals to seek and find satisfaction for their individual wants." (Bauman 1993: 244)

How then, did I prepare for the transformation from unknown member of college staff to 'ethics tutor' on the Managing People module of the Police Management Programme?
Acts of enchantment: staging ethics education

Discourse psychology (after Harre, 1995) enjoins us to follow Wittgenstein's (1953) advice. Thus, where possible we should discard our theories of what might be going on and, in their stead, we should look at what people are actually doing, in context and in the full concreteness of their situation.

In the final section of this chapter I shall try to just that and take a look at what I ended up doing 'in context and in the full concreteness of my situation'. I shall try to show that whatever it was I did it had some similarities with - (it paralleled) - Basanti Devi's performances as a possession oracle. This will enable me to raise the possibility that I failed in my attempt to 'win over' the totality of my police groups because my 'personality' was unable to 'articulate' with the identities at large in my social environment of face-to-face education and training.

The transformation of Basanti Devi to the Mother reported by Much and Mahapatra through the ritual of the puja leads them to write:

"... she has communicated an extraordinary amount and has done the foundation work for establishing her transformation to a Goddess moving in the world. People have seen an elegant ritual performed with concentration, and then, before their eyes, the transformation of her identity from that of a housewife to the wild unpredictable and dangerous, though compassionate, Mother. This drama is enacted in an environment saturated with sacred symbols, symbols of the divine realm and the person's relationship to it. It is constituted by a series of actions each of which represents a form of communication with the divine realm..." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 61)

This is an important summary because it invites comparisons with my own transformation from an 'ordinary husband and market-town dweller' to 'ethics educator'. My own preparations began, however, in relative privacy. First, I would be informed by the module leader of the Managing People module about the nature of the group I would come to meet.

If he had managed to get through unscathed he would say: 'They are as good as gold'. If some of the group would signal resistances or dismissiveness I would be told: 'One or two need a finger-wagging job done on them' or 'Some of them are a disgrace to the service' or 'You're going to have to watch some of the bastards'.
In the main, however, my family and my administrative assistant would act as supporters. They would help in the backstage activities that would be followed by my attempt to stage a performance representing a form of communication with the 'ethics' realm. How would an ethnopsychologist give an account of my 'transformation and 'performance' as I sought to become a conduit through which ethics would 'come alive'? A shortened account (which could easily be written in the third person) could run as follows:

I - a white European male - would begin to prepare for the 'ethics unit' of the Managing People' module several days in advance of the event itself. I would locate several different documents for photocopying including one that I wanted reproduced in colour; it was a nineteenth century painting entitled 'Deserted'. It featured a number of persons including two police officers, one of whom was holding a baby. I thought that it represented an archetypal image of the 'helping' image of police. My other material included miniaturisations of my computer screen presentations, three original questionnaires I had designed, several exercises and a range of texts including a complete introductory course to the subject 'ethics'.

On the evening prior to presenting each formal ethics unit my preparation would continue as I 'set up' the room. I would spend a great deal of time attending to detail. So, I would arrange the seating for the class, try to adjust the heating and lighting - so that it might be most comfortable for the students - place the photocopied 'hand-outs' carefully and neatly in the order I intended to distribute them to the students, check that the projection system was working, and, then, vacuum-clean the entire surface area of the floor. I would remove old newspapers, empty (or half-full) beer cans, plastic cups, and all the debris left behind at the end of the preceding teaching sessions by the class of students. I wanted the 'ethics education' to be given in an environment that was as enjoyable and pleasant as I could make it for the course participants.

Then, my rehearsal would begin. I would walk back and forth at the front of the large room talking to imaginary students. As I did this I would sometimes stop and upbraid myself as I stumbled over my lines or failed to make easy fluent links between points of information or argument along the streams of discourse. I would then note down, on an unmarked piece of plain white paper the main points of the introduction. I would say to myself: 'Remember - this is the first time for them - and it's important to bring freshness to each new occasion.' I would make sure that each of the hand-outs had four holes 'punched' in them - so that they would fit
easily into the student folders.

On returning home in the evening I would quietly talk with myself about the material - and make notes in my diary concerning any variations that I might be introducing to the performance. At some point - in mid evening - I would turn to consult my texts on ethics. Typically, these would include the Socratic dialogues, Mill's 'On liberty' and MacIntyre's 'After Virtue'. I needed to feel alerted to the nature of the subject.

I would finish my preparations by selecting the music I would arrange to have playing as the students came into the room in the morning. I would choose from Allegri's 'Miserere', or Beethoven's violin concerto in D (opus 61) or Rodrigo's guitar concerto. At some point I would have to ask my family to stop watching the television whilst I checked that all the videos I might use were ready to be played at the correct starting point.

Before going to bed I would 'look out' my best suit, choose a white shirt and a soberly coloured silk tie, polish my shoes and make my sandwiches. The sandwiches were important. They meant that I could eat my lunch alone and prepare myself for the afternoon session without disturbance. Finally, to still my nerves and the excited voices of my inner dialogues, I would retire to bed and read Montaigne or La Rochefoucauld or Augustine. Montaigne would encourage me to be humane and tolerant. La Rochefoucauld was witty. Augustine was grave.

My alarm would sound at six thirty. I would run a bath, bathe, shave, dress, check that my 'lucky stone' was in the right hand jacket pocket of my suit, eat a light breakfast, say 'goodbye' to my family and drive through the country lanes to work.

I needed my lucky stone. I had received it from a class of co-learners at the end of a two-year programme designed to develop facilitators of adult learning. In the closing ceremony of that course I was told that it would be my 'power object'. 'Touch it', one of the group leaders said, 'and let it be the source of the power you need'. Over the years I had come to rely on the stone - especially when the going got tough.

I would park my car immediately outside the Assembly Hall and begin to unload the videos, a few books and an old leather bag in which I carried the computer disks on which had been saved the lecture presentations - along with my sandwiches.
At this point, as the time moved on towards eight a.m., I would begin my final preparations.

I wanted the environment to work for me. I needed to use lighting, music and the symbols of study and scholarship to support a transition from the mundane world to the magic of 'ethics'. I wanted the course participants to enter a fuliginous and partly supernal atmosphere - and I was conscious that such an atmosphere was likely to be conducive to reflection and contemplation.

When everything was completed I would remind myself that I was about to undergo, metaphorically, a 'long distance race' and that meant I would have to 'pace myself'. I would remain separate from the programme participants as they gradually filed into the hall. I did not want to become distracted. Nor did I want to find myself responding to any sarcastic jibes.

Then, if it seemed that almost everybody was ready to begin, I would start, softly, with a ritual opening:

'Good morning ladies and gentlemen - I'd like to begin by giving you some idea of what it is we will be covering in the next two days' and then, after giving a few background details about myself, I would begin by trying to convey a little of the nature of ethics - using Frankena's introduction to morality and moral philosophy. His introduction explores Socrates' argument - presented in the Crito - that illustrates why he, Socrates, should not take the opportunity to escape from prison and should abide by the sentence of the court of law - a sentence that has condemned Socrates to death.

As I would speak my eyes would scan the room and the form of my communication would gradually reveal its basic 'question and answer' pattern. Once I had felt that a sufficient grounding in the very basic aspects of 'ethics' had been established, I would use video featuring an undercover operation - which put the lives of police officers at risk - to help in the process of 'bringing ethics to life' and locating it within the operational and professional practices of the police.

The computer screen presentations included selections designed to highlight the fundamental human concerns with which ethics deals. One such slide simply consisted of a set of questions taken from the cover of Best and Kellner's (1991) 'Postmodern theory - critical interrogations': 'Who is free to choose? Who is beyond

They also included the remark made to me by a Detective Inspector who had been among a team of officers investigating cases of paedophilia and child murder. A television programme had been broadcast featuring the inquiry. Its content included the identification of the leader of the paedophile ring - who had been committed for trial, found guilty and sentenced to prison. As the programme was broadcast the ringleader was serving his sentence. The Detective Inspector had then reported to me:

'One good thing did come out of the programme. As a result, A. [the ringleader] had his throat cut in prison'.

'How', I asked the group, 'should one respond to such an observation?'

In the whole of this process I had become transformed from an ordinary to an extraordinary person. During her possession, the Kalasi is in the rare position of absolute social ascendancy over the audience of devotees, supplicants and followers. She gives hukum (directives) which mainly consists of advice on how to cope with personal problems and illnesses. Occasionally, Basanti Devi - the Mother - would give 'unsolicited predictions' about local events. Much and Mahapatra interpret the process of hukum as follows:

"During the hukum, a socially shared illusion is created wherein participants have the experience of darshan and receive personal attention and advice directly from the Goddess." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 76)

In contrast I was disinclined to dispense hukum. Instead I invoked the Goddess of conjecture and refutation. I imagine that an ethnopsychologist might find that I worshipped at the shrine of uncertainty.

Much and Mahapatra examine the constitutive features of hukum and find that it has a high proportion of imperatives. This marks the speech as that of someone in a 'very special' position of social and moral ascendancy. The Mother speaks to men and women alike as 'boy' and 'girl' respectively. By referring to the persons in the audience as 'boy' and 'girl' the Mother takes on a position of unilateral power. This, along with my absence of supernatural powers provides, at first glance, a major contrast between my situation of practice and that of a possession oracle.
However, a part of my performance was built upon the assumption that the audience was composed of 'hard-pressed' professionals - who, by implication, would not want to have the additional chore of coping with 'difficult' learning foisted upon them. So, if I were to redescribe my teaching in the terms of transactional analysis I could find evidence for a continual movement between 'nurturing parent' and 'adult' modes of address. Moreover, my performance intimated the existence of a divine and heavenly reality. So, whilst I had no pretensions to bearing supernatural powers I did manifest a 'contact' with the possibility of paradise on earth. My references to Plato's 'Republic' hinted at the fact that the earliest recorded writings on 'ethics' contained esoteric designs concerning the model for an ideal society. My references to Rawl's 'Political Liberalism' sustained the idea that ethicists were engaged with constructing forms of heaven on earth. Just as the Kalasi's speech included features functioning to index the divinity of the speaker so my discourse would include markers of 'scholarship' and an apparent appreciation of the police situation. These manoeuvres, in strategic terms, were risky undertakings. Scholarship could betoken the presence of 'the academic' - and thereby attract a palpable or concealed scorn. A claim to know about the police situation might have been 'read' as a contemptible act of ingratiating or dismissed as something both presumptuous and arrogant.

Reflecting on the transformation

Much and Mahapatra discuss Basanti Devi's transformation (and the manifestation of alternative states of consciousness and significantly different types of conduct) in relation to the wider cultural symbol system. They note that all of puja (the ritual) that they observed in Orissa is notable for its aesthetic qualities. The effect is to help move outsider and onlookers to feelings of communication with a sacred order. This is paralleled by my arrangement of the seats, the position, slightly off-centre, of the lectern - made of solid oak and donated to the college by a distinguished public servant - the flip chart stands - and the use of a form of 'question-answer' style of public discourse. All the 'props' were designs helping both to sustain my own transformation and suggesting to programme participants access to a realm of special knowledge.

Much and Mahapatra note that the clients of Kalasis, and Kalasis and other folk healers themselves, often state that if the client does not have the faith, the cure will not be effective. At its very simplest, this applies straightforwardly and directly to a proportion of my 'clients'. Frequently, I would be told by 'devotees' that some officers would not 'play the game', would not 'give it a go', would not 'dip their toe
in the water' or would not want to 'get involved'. They had 'the shutters up'.

As my inquiry has shown, a small but significant proportion of my 'clients' remained aloof and rejected the invitation to discourse with the ethical realm.

Much and Mahapatra conclude their analysis of the cultural symbol system of traditional Hindu culture with an observation that might overemphasise the distinctiveness of that culture. They write:

"To us the most outstanding feature of the entire 'magical' universe of traditional Hindu culture is its skilled use of ritual with imagination, drama, humour and beauty, to evoke or bring to the forefront a 'magical' (that is a meaning-saturated, value laden, surprising and sometimes awesome) world of order, from just behind the mundane, chaotic, sometimes harsh, images presented by the material 'reality' of the ordinary social world. This 'magical' world is understood as an order of reality in its own right, correlated with, though not identical to, the 'ordinary' world." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 66)

It seems perfectly possible to say that in the Western world generally and in specifically structured educational events (such as 'ethics education') in particular, a pristine world of order, rationality, logic and conceptual analysis is brought to the 'forefront' and mundane ordinary reality is relegated to the shadow of consciousness.

I was, in fact, trying to evoke a type of direct communication with the ethical realm and I was foregrounding the ethical order. I was trying to show that moral values form part of the texture of the everyday world (in its concerns with turn-taking, promise-keeping, justice and fairness, impartiality, care etc.) whilst at the same time constituting a major element in our imaginings of a better world - and which have become so much a part of the discourse of management and leadership development in its advocacy of the 'vision' and the 'mission'. I was, following, Gibran (1980) and the transpersonal psychologies of Houston (1987) and Heron (1988) setting out to evoke a mode of perception attuned to the sacredness, fineness and delicacy of the everyday.

This aspiration was set within the framework of a social encounter embodying status concerns. Much and Mahapatra (1995) examine the social identity of Kalasis in Orissa and show how persons who are recognised as truly adept in visionary and ecstatic states enjoy more social prestige than they would otherwise have if they
were 'ordinary' persons. They find that Kalasis also acquire a social importance or 'centrality' that they would not emerge if they did not have Kalasi status. The prestige they have is sustained by the visible life-style of the Kalasi. This is more disciplined, austere and devoted to worship than others.

I have already indicated the 'suspect' status of the tutorial staff at Bramshill and the elaborate nature of my preparations (along with its function of equipping me with a kind of psychological armour and weaponry) illustrates a part of my strategy for coping with the discomfort of knowing that I was such a suspect person. I was, for example, reminded of the status problems I had when an officer I had taught a number of years previously joined the 'Managing People' module as part of his own professional development plan. A few days after my work he sent me a long letter commenting upon his experience during the ethics unit and included the following:

"I had forgotten how much difficulty some police officers have with civilian instructors and in this particular case the approach is very different from conventional police training, presenting a cultural barrier to be overcome. Great efforts were made to present the work in a comfortable, caring environment and the use of music and video suggests someone going out to meet his audience .... I think students did become engaged, animated and energised and I sensed that many were less hostile to you, the tutor, at the end of the day."

And yet, there still remains a similarity between the Kalasi and myself-as-practitioner. Thus, as I claimed the status of an ethicist I came under pressure - if I were not to be an impostor - to be perceived as an exemplary person. This was particularly demanding because a central theme in the folk narratives of police is the image of humanity as fallen. How was I to cope with the demands of appearing as an exemplary person? Logically and most absurdly this meant that I would have to embody the moral virtues of a latter day Christ and the intellectual virtues of a contemporary Socrates. This I knew, was both impossible (I did not have the capacities) - and dangerous. Kazantzakis (1977) had reminded me how sainthood was a perilous undertaking.

In practice, it meant that I had to try and become an icon of tolerance, impartiality, reasonableness, empathy and benevolence. It meant that I could not afford to upset anybody. This latter proved to be remarkably difficult. On a number of occasions individuals (or even the majority of module participants) would find evidence for a 'lack of ethics' on my part if they were able to perceive that I might be disquieting or disturbing persons in the group.
Much and Mahapatra report that a Kalasi, because her work is now the work of the Goddess, becomes more central in her household. Kalasis are also accorded a special position in the local and wider community. People come to them for advice on all sorts of matters. These increased social contacts mean that Orissa Kalasis also come to have access to a greater stock of knowledge and their status also confers on them greater autonomy than is normally accorded to 'ordinary' village women.

The social position 'ethicist' functions in a somewhat similar way. Although the status of tutor may be 'suspect' the position legitimates access to the stories police have to tell about moral matters. In consequence, the ethics tutor comes to hear about the nature of the moral dilemmas police face and the nature of the moral ethos of the organisation. The ethical character of police and policing are given further expression within the different learning structure - and most obviously through to life in the 'ethics plays'. I had regular glimpses into the backstage features of policing. These glimpses were extended through the medium of the ethics questionnaires. Together they revealed the moral difficulties in policing and relative unfamiliarity of making salient ethical concepts and discourse in decision-making and problem-solving.

However, what this analysis underlines is the problematic nature of the practice of ethics education with police groups. If the social status of the practitioner is suspect, an unusually large amount of effort must go into the staging of 'ethics education'. Once staged - as the data reported in earlier chapters shows - there remain a number of moments when the progress of the educative experience may be derailed. In trying to provide a thorough account of this tendency for derailment to occur, I shall conclude this chapter by re-visited the institutional context that is 'Bramshill'.

_Bramshill as distinguished from the University College and from the police 'university of life'_

Game and Metcalfe (1995) examine the cultural forms and practices constituting the institutions of the academy' and note:

"Academic thought generates physics, medicine and nuclear bombs, it produces doctors, lawyers, architects and sociologists, it remakes our self-understandings ... But for all its power and excitement, academic thought remains one form of
knowledge among others, neither transparent nor absolute. It is a specific institutional product." (Game and Metcalfe 1995: 7)

Whilst Game and Metcalfe do not list those other forms of knowledge it seems reasonable, following Elbaz (1981) and Tongue (1997) to distinguish the 'theoretical knowledge' that is produced by the academy with the 'practical knowledge' created by practitioners in their dealings with the experiences and phenomena of practice. Game and Metcalfe move on to illustrate how academic production is characterised by a daily dependence on the discipline, organisation, management and power that constitute the institution that is the university. If the university is a producer of academic thought and knowledge what does Bramshill produce? Richards (1999) has highlighted the role Bramshill plays in relation to 'inducting' police leaders and managers into the appropriate executive style required by the Home Office in the practice of policing. Thus, Bramshill is constituted to produce Home Office thought in police practice. Put somewhat differently, Bramshill is a conduit for 'state thought' or 'administrative thought'. It is designed to produce persons who will abide by the emerging rules governing policing. It is, therefore, concerned to generate a type of rulership. However, whilst Bramshill is constituted to produce this distinct form of thought, the power it has at its disposal to achieve this objective is incomplete. Game and Metcalfe demonstrate how, in the university, the researcher/lecturer and student are structured into a type of power relationship which reprises the archetypal encounter between God and Moses and resonates with the practices of ancestor worship. 'School' - the university institution - is a place where the academic researcher/lecturer can context his or her work within a patrilineal and 'high priestly' tradition. The dice of power are, as it were, loaded on their side rather than that of the students. Their knowledge of the works of the 'founding fathers' accords them authority. To contest the stories academics come to tell is a risky business - unless it is done by fellow academics. The examination and/or grading process continues to shore up the considerable power of the university institution.

In contrast, the tutor at Bramshill has no such tradition and form of knowledge upon which to base his or her authority. There is no set of texts establishing the foundations for the practice of police leadership and/or police management. Moreover, whilst the organisation is designed to 'refine' or 'transform' its intakes of police officers - so that they become exemplars of Home Office thought - the cultural tradition, with its privileging of 'practical knowledge', remains deeply sceptical of 'outside' interference. In consequence the authority of the tutorial staff is permanently in jeopardy and permanently vulnerable to contestation by the
individual police officer or groups of police officers. Dissent, acts of resistance and subversion are frequent occurrences during the middle-management programmes of study at Bramshill. The audience has the power to be critic and destroyer. One way of understanding this dissent is to see it as a response to the way Bramshill serves to demean the practical knowledge of the police practitioner that has been developed in the 'university of life'. For very many police middle managers, whatever is staged at Bramshill, the sacred order, is staged in a context that is 'removed from reality'. Its mouthpieces (the tutorial staff), therefore, are 'out of touch'. Yet they have the 'temerity' and 'gall' to try and 'tell me how to my job'. Bramshill, an apparently comfortable and privileged world, represents the quintessential opposite of the 'real worlds' of Coventry or Newcastle or Bristol city centres on a Saturday night.

Bramshill thus becomes a location where a contest takes place between attempts to ensure that police adopt the attitudinal and behavioural requirements of new policy and new law and attempts by police to resist alterations to their values hierarchy and definitions of reality. This process of contestation helps to explain both the tenseness surrounding the staging of ethics education and the one almost constant finding concerning the overly academic and theoretical nature of its content.

Much and Mahapatra conclude their discussion of possession oracles by suggesting to their readership that the subject of their study would, in conventional psychology, fall under the heading 'personality'. This allows them to contend that personality forms or components can be regarded as skills. This idea emphasises the idea that 'features of personality function to articulate the organism with the object environment'. They write:

"The object environment is social - animate and inanimate, but always communicative or symbolic and meaning laden. Different cultures and various social systems within them, emphasise and privilege rather different personality skills." (Much and Mahapatra 1995: 82)

It remains possible, therefore, that despite all my attempts to design and produce a valued ethics education, it may be the case that my skills of personality were insufficiently developed to help me 'articulate' with the animate persons situated within the production processes of Bramshill.
Chapter thirteen

Governmental rationalities in police leadership training and development

"The content of discipline is nothing but the consistently rationalised, methodically trained and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the command. In addition, this conduct under orders is uniform. Its quality as the communal action of a mass organisation conditions the specific effects of such uniformity. Those who obey are not necessarily a simultaneously obedient or an especially large mass, nor are they necessarily united in a specific locality. What is decisive for discipline is that the obedience of a plurality of men is rationally uniform." (Weber 1967: 235)

In this chapter I shall deepen the exploration of a theme raised in the previous chapter concerning Bramshill as a 'site of contestation'. I shall attempt to show how the practice of police leadership and management, as well as the 'official' police 'training designs', can be understood in terms of complex and competing governing rationalities.

In November 1998 I presented a brief account of the main findings of my research - as they are described in the middle section of this dissertation - to a group of six tutors within the Police Leadership Faculty at Bramshill. The group had been convened to help me develop an interpretation of the data. Following Winter's (1998) suggestions concerning the development of theory in action research, I asked them to 'speculate' upon the data and to suggest how they would begin to explain the findings. In the discussion that followed my colleagues concluded that my ethics teaching resulted in a 'clash of knowledges' along with a resultant 'censure' which attended this 'clash'. In this way, they opened up the idea that my 'presentation' of an ethics education to the particular client group was linked - somehow - to a conflict between different forms of knowledge. My work was understood in terms of a political struggle - involving specialised 'academic' knowledge on the one hand struggling against and being resisted by 'practical' knowledge on the other. In the discussion which follows I shall summarise how the line of inquiry - which their remarks provoked - led me to explore the governmental rationalities characterising police leadership itself and their training within the context of Bramshill.

I think it reasonable to argue that, in the context of Bramshill, an ethics education experience 'stands' for something. It is not entirely disinterested. It implies a
critique of the present and a critique of the self. It suggests a better state of affairs. It is also situated within a wider 'programme' framework concerned with the 'making up' of police. The 'make up' of persons has been a central concern of Foucault and so it was to the development of some of Foucault's ideas, initially in the field of criminology, to which I turned. There was, however, a further reason to explore my work within a Foucauldian framework. Rabinow (1991), in his introduction to the nature of Foucault's thought, points out that Foucault himself believes we are engaged in political struggles all the time, the purpose of which is to alter power relations. Here, then was the direct and explicit link between ways of understanding my work and a wider theoretical structure.

Foucault's (1991) analysis of the modalities of power and his reflections on 'Governmentality' provide a fairly direct entree to examining governance in the educational setting. In Foucault's (1994) text 'On Governmentality' he traces significant shifts in the very idea of government itself. He suggests that from the Renaissance onwards the concept of government was extended from an initial concern with the nature of the state and how best a ruler might guard his or her power to the governance of almost every conceivable human activity including families, households, children, religious orders and provinces. Political thinking was therefore deployed across that extensive range of human activities and it was concerned with how each activity could be best accomplished. For Foucault, 'best' meant 'most economical'. With an eye to the micropolitical Foucault elaborates upon the notion of good government as follows:

"The art of government ... is concerned with ... how to introduce economy, that is the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family .... how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family, into the management of the state." (Foucault 1994: 8,10)

Government thus became concerned with the population - its life, care and growth - as a whole and with this central concern a new regime of disciplinary power took hold. Foucault (1991) analyses the emerging 'disciplinary technology' in detail and persuasively argues that its aim was (and is) to forge a 'docile body' that may be used, transformed and improved. Whilst the prison came to represent, in its purist form, the production of such docile bodies, Foucault illustrates the pervasiveness of disciplinary technologies and observes:

"Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?" (Foucault 1991: 228)
It became possible for me to explore the notion of the 'governance' of a 'classroom' within a relatively closed institution (The Police Staff College) and to view individual police officers as arranging themselves along a continuum from 'docile bodies' to 'resisting subjects'.

First, I examined Foucault's idea of 'governmentality' and 'governmental rationalities'. Then I developed a genealogy of police leadership and management practices - which relied, in part, on deductions deriving from the way police were portrayed in historical research - and finally I turned to examine the micrologics of power involved in the tutor/client relationship and encounter at Bramshill.

In the first section, I shall illustrate the idea of a 'governmental rationality' by reproducing Garland's (1997) description of 'economic' rationality. I shall then characterise two other rationalities at play in police leadership and management. In addition I shall simply note that, although attenuated, there are some signs of a 'critical' or 'emancipatory' rationality at work in the practice of police leadership and management.

I shall then move on and attempt to provide a plausible account concerning the genealogy of contemporary police leadership and management training and development that finds itself manifested at the Police Staff College, Bramshill. This account will locate the college within a complex structure of centres of calculation exercising 'power at a distance'. It will also illustrate how the staff/student relationship can be understood in terms of a specific encounter within wider and longer chains of actors and it will claim that the practice of police leadership training and development is subverted both by those competing rationalities within police leadership as well as by the resistances and value preferences of the student 'subjects'. In this latter part of the discussion I shall describe a 'Social Darwinist - elitist' governmental rationality which, somewhat tacitly, characterises aspects of police leadership and management and which can play a significant role within the 'educational encounter'.

**Governmental rationalities**

Garland (1997) discusses how fruitful the governmentality analytic and the wider Foucauldian approach can be when the field of criminology in general and crime control in particular are studied in these terms. He highlights the way in which an economic rationality is manifested both in the 'reading' of the problem of crime and in those strategies to do with its management, containment and 'reduction'. Governmental rationalities can take a number of forms and Garland argues that 'the
idea of a 'governmental rationality' is of crucial importance in pointing us towards a quite specific dimension of crime control that otherwise goes unnoticed. He is keen to clarify the nature of a 'governmental rationality' and does so by contrasting the idea with that which it is not: thus, a governmental rationality is not equivalent to a policy statement nor the legitimatory rhetoric of officials used to put a 'gloss' upon the practice of institutions. Simply stated:

"The idea of 'governmental rationalities' refers instead to the ways of thinking and styles of reasoning that are embodied in a particular set of practices. It points to the forms of rationality that organise these practices, and supply them with their objectives and knowledge and forms of reflexivity" (Garland 1997: 184)

Garland is quick to make the observation that rationalities are practical rather than theoretical or discursive entities. Indeed, they are forged in the business of problem solving and attempting to make things work. He then suggests that it seems plausible to argue that a new rationality for the governance of crime and the governance of criminal justice is coming into existence. Garland describes this governmental style as one organised around economic forms of reasoning. In contrast to social and legal rationalities (which he perceives to have been the predominant forms for most of the twentieth century) an economic rationality, developed first in the private sector, appears to enjoy a certain pre-eminence in criminal justice 'practice'. In identifying the pre-eminence of this rationality Garland's thought accords with Bourdieu's (1998) critical observations concerning contemporary politics. Bourdieu reflects upon 'the silence of the politicians' and contends that 'they are terribly short of ideas that can mobilise people'. He believes that this is partly because the new professionalisation of politics has led to the exclusion of inspired personalities and partly because a new political class has learned that it is better to talk of management rather than self-management and that they must take on the appearances (that is to say, the language) of 'economic rationality'.

Garland moves on to explicate the nature of an economic rationality - and, in so doing, he clarifies the nature of a 'governmental rationality'. Garland portrays economic rationality as follows:

"By an 'economic' rationality, I don't mean simply that value-for-money considerations and fiscal restraint have nowadays become predominant and explicit aspects of crime control discourse and practice - though this is certainly a feature of the contemporary scene. I mean to point to (i) the increasing reliance upon an analytical language of risks and rewards, rationality, choice, probability,
targeting and the demand and supply of opportunities - language that translates 'economic' forms of reasoning and calculation into the criminological field; (ii) the increasing importance of objectives such as compensation, cost-control, harm-reduction, economy, efficiency and effectiveness; and (iii) the increasing resort to technologies such as audit, fiscal control, market competition and devolved management to control penal decision making." (Garland, 1997: 185)

So, described, a governmental rationality manifests three features. First, its specific concepts stem from an overall form of reasoning derived from an identifiable practical deliberative enterprise - such as politics, economics, law or morality. Second, the particular objectives to which the practice aims are consistently related to the underlying deliberative enterprise. Third, distinct and distinguishable technologies are employed and deployed to control the conduct of human actors.

Whilst an economic rationality as identified by Garland might adequately characterise the 'foregrounded' style of thinking in certain 'centres of calculation' - such as the Treasury, the Audit Commission, the Home Office (albeit not exhaustively so) and ACPO - I contend that at least two other such styles of thinking co-exist within the practice of police leadership and management. Police leadership and management training and development stands in a curious relationship to these governmental rationalities. It has to respond to all these rationalities such that it equips police leadership with their appropriate concepts and techniques but it is also enjoined - at least if it is to be education at all - to expose, justify and critique those same rationalities. Perhaps this rationality might be conceived as a meta-rationality concerned with 'truth and critique'.

I also contend that these other rationalities compete with and subvert an economic rationality.

Of these two, the first is perhaps the most powerful of all. I understand it as an archetypal rationality - more arational (Egan, 1985) than rational - which I describe as a 'moral panic' rationality. The second I see as more related to the development of special and relevant police knowledges. I describe this as a 'socio-political professional' rationality.

The Brixton riots, the Scarman report (1981) on the Brixton riots, the MacPherson report (1999) on the death of Stephen Lawrence and its attendant 'issues' along with 'events' such as the miner's strike and the ability of the media to portray apparent social dramas of national consequence all contribute to a construction of reality made sense of in terms of a 'deep structure' moral panic rationality.
The analytic language that derives from 'moral panic' forms of reasoning includes: the threat of chaos and disorder, the danger of a descent into anarchy, the loss of 'face', an emphasis upon moral contrasts, and, the invocation of a timeless struggle between the forces of law, order and the 'good' and their opposites.

The important objectives enmeshed within this rationality are connected with 'panic reduction'. They include: community reassurance, combating crime and disorder, 'cleaning up' the streets, establishing trust and confidence in the probity of police and, the responsibilising of the citizen.

The technologies deployed include the discourse of persuasion, 'manicured' image management, 'community consultation', press releases, symbolic manipulations (e.g. the 'crime statistics') and the cognitive structuring of 'reality', the manipulation of fear, and all the anthropological paraphernalia - symbols, myths and arationalities - protecting the appearance of those social conditions securing control, progress and the ultimate triumph of the 'right' and the 'good'.

The 'moral panic' rationality moves in to foreground when it is no longer possible to rely upon police competence in a technical sense or when it is no longer possible to sustain the image of police as fair and just. Miscarriages of justice, abuses of power and the perceived failure of police to live up to the demands of human rights provisions and standards all occasion the subsequent expression of 'moral panic' rationality. The role of the media is especially significant in this respect. The presentation of policing issues in the media along with the media penetration of the police organisation has ensured that moral panic rationality is constantly nourished and mobilised.

In contrast to a 'moral panic' form of rationality is a cool socio-political (professional) rationality founded upon ideas fundamental to the very constitution of police in a liberal democracy. This rationality is rooted in the conceptual frameworks established for the 'modern' police that were articulated by Colquhoun (1806), Peel (1829) and, Rowan and Mayne (1829) and more recently by Newman and Laugharne (1985), ACPO - through its Statement of Common Purpose and Values (1990) and, the Quality of Service Committee report, 'Getting Things Right' (1992). It also embraces Foucault's three distinct rationalities of governing which I elaborate below.

The style of reasoning embraced by this rationality is non-critical and functionalist. It distinguishes a set of functions for police and applauds the acquisition of relevant specialist knowledges. The analytic language that derives from socio-political
rationality includes references to the primary objects of policing, the rule of law, the maintenance of order, securing the 'Queen's Peace', science, professionalism, and responsibilities.

Its objectives are to uphold the law, secure social peace, prevent crime, apprehend criminals, prosecute offenders, protect the innocent, deliver on a wide menu of responsibilities, and inculcate 'civility' and reasonableness amongst the citizenry.

The technologies a socio-political rationality employs are all those associated with the specialist knowledges, methodologies and technical aids that have gradually accumulated over the history of policing itself. Most recently, these include, at the macro-organisational level, 'Problem-oriented-policing', 'Zero-tolerance' and 'Intelligence-led policing'. Specialist squads, support groups, the targeting of local criminals and criminal families, neighbourhood watch, inter-agency collaboration, corporate plans, clear standards, statements of what is expected from all staff, 'best practice' exemplars, surveillance, scientific aids, crime pattern analysis etc. all constitute technologies supporting the achievement of the traditional socio-political purposes of the police.

This rationality is probably mobilised in the context of reflection upon the founding principles of policing and assumes what Taylor (1997) describes as the 'Whiggish' view of police history.

I should add that, in theory at least, it would be possible to find a 'critical' or 'emancipatory' rationality at work in the practices of police leadership and management. If such a rationality exists at all it is, at best, underprivileged. However, the value frameworks of 'Equal opportunities', 'Managing diversity' and the feminist critique of patriarchal society - along with the 'rebirth' of 'ethics' - all provide foundations for the expression of such a rationality.

A genealogy of police leadership and management training

Before I advance an account concerning the ancestry of police leadership and management training it is sensible to refer to Foucault's genealogy of the modern state. This should enable me to gain some sort of purchase upon the more specific practices of that training. Garland provides a summary of Foucault's genealogy (of the modern state) by describing how, according to Foucault, state power is organised around a series of rationalities, each of which is distinct in terms of its objectives, its ways of knowing and the subjects to whom it is addressed. Those three rationalities are: 'raison d'etat', 'police' and 'liberalism' - each of which
emerged quite separately in different parts of Europe in the period between the 16th and 18th centuries.

Raison d'etat was a reaction to the religious wars that engulfed Europe for centuries following the Reformation. Rather than have the state subordinated to religion in the form of 'divine command', a more secular state emerged which was more concerned with the creation of national wealth. The creation of wealth meant that states were increasingly brought into economic competition with one another. To create wealth and to compete effectively, new technologies of governance had to be developed. The state needed facts, information and knowledge of itself. So, the objective of 'Raison d'etat' was self-knowledge. The first duty of the state was to know itself. In consequence, statistics began to be accumulated - statistics which attempted to describe the empirical facts as a basis for the practice of statecraft. Its distinct way of knowing was that of social science and its subject was the well-being of the population.

The development of measurable forms of knowledge gave rise to 'policing' - which can be described as a general programme of detailed regulation (from which the specialist agency called police emerged in the nineteenth century). The objective of 'police' was the promotion of public tranquillity and security and all those additional conditions that might promote the flourishing - the wealth, health and prosperity - of the population. Its way of knowing was the focused accumulation of details concerning the conduct of the individuals and groups comprising the population. As Garland writes:

"Its programme envisaged a minutely detailed knowledge of the population, its habits and activities, obtained by means of censuses and close inspection, as well as an encyclopaedic range of regulatory controls governing everything from trade and foodstuffs to manners and dress" (Garland 1997: 177)

The subject of 'police' was the control of the population. Garland argues that, like raison d'etat, the science of police helped to forge the idea of 'population' as an entity with its own inherent dynamics and laws of development and in so doing created a new practicable object of governance.

Liberalism offered a contrast to the policing project of total surveillance, knowledge and control. The objective of liberalism was an opposition to the 'police' rationality of 'total control' and to administrative despotism as well as the securing of those conditions that would lead to social prosperity. Its way of knowing was to stay close to the grain of human experiences and understand the
economic and social subjects who make up the population. Liberalism took as its subject the human actors within the economy and the civil society along with the delicate art of government and the facilitation of 'natural' interactions.

Foucault's genealogy of the modern state provides a lucid 'analytic' within which to locate both the constitution of the modern police as well as the more specific practices of police leadership and management training. Indeed much of the controversy concerning the establishment of the new police at the beginning of the nineteenth century can be theorised in terms of the clash between the rationalities of total control and liberalism. In general terms 'raison d'etat' encouraged a social scientific perspective and has culminated in the concept of police science. The rationality 'police' (as distinct from that corpus of people, the police) has culminated in surveillance, intelligence gathering and intelligence-led designs for police organisations as well as control mechanisms such as performance indicators. Liberalism finds expression in concerns with human rights, ethics and a close attention to the principles of policing. Thus, each of the major rationalities can be shown to exert a major influence on police practices.

To discover the governmental rationalities embodied in police leadership and management training I have turned to histories of the police as well as certain archival materials in order to provide a more specific and detailed account. First I shall try to indicate how the 'new police' were born as part of the Foucauldian rationality 'police' - and that their contemporary 'make-up' continues to express the adversarial character lying at the very basis of policing itself. To do this I will make extensive reference to Palmer's (1988) study of police and protest in England and Ireland between 1780 and 1850. By way of continuing the 'story' I shall also include reference to Petrow's (1987) study of the increasing duties of the Metropolitan Police between 1870 and 1914. I shall then turn to consider, more specifically, the governing rationalities in police leadership and management training and development.

The adversarial foundations to police and policing

Palmer (1988) has authored an extremely comprehensive and detailed history of the 'new' police in the United Kingdom. His work draws from the most complete range of histories - that were available to him - include archive materials - from, for example the Public Records Office. Palmer shows how the new police in Ireland (beginning with the Dublin police in 1786) served as a 'laboratory' and testing ground for the subsequent introduction of police into the Metropolis in 1829. He amasses convincing evidence to support his view that the new police were created
primarily to quell the rising levels of popular protest. From its inception, the main purpose of the new uniformed police was to maintain the King's (or Queen's) peace.

Palmer's work is primarily concerned with examining the social and political context shaping the creation of police in the period between 1780 and 1850. His analysis helps to develop insights concerning critical social-psychological features embedded in police history and tradition. Palmer's work makes it possible to uncover experiential themes emerging in the unfolding history of police. Here I shall indicate how police were initially structured (or formed) as *gens d'armes* and I shall suggest that police have continued, since their very beginnings, to be 'made up' in an adversarial combative culture.

Palmer begins with a criticism of the early histories of the English police finding, on the one hand, the popular pre 1920 works to take a complacent and inaccurate view of police as a home grown institution descended from the Saxon tithingman, and, on the other the 'more scholarly' works of Melville Lee (1901), Moylan (1929), Reith (1938, 1943, 1948), Hart (1951) and Critchley (1967) to be 'steeped in Tory bias'. Moreover, these works mythologise police officers; so, he writes:

"*Policemen (sic) emerge as heroes warding off revolution and performing miracles in bringing order out of chaos.*" (Palmer 1988: 7)

He moves on to build upon Bailey's (1981) notion that it is possible to distinguish two schools of historical thought amongst the historical works explaining the emergence of the English police - the 'consensual' historians and the more recent 'conflict' school. Amongst the consensual historians he (Palmer) identifies Reith (1938), Browne (1956), Radzinowicz (1948 - 68), Critchley (1967), Tobias (1979) and Miller (1977). For Palmer, these historians argue that the architects of the new police - Peel, Chadwick and Benthamist social thinkers - were reformers acting outwith narrow class bias with a 'benign regard for the public interest'. Their designs for a new police were taken to reflect a rational attempt to impose impartial order and to introduce efficiency into certain of the country's civil institutions. In contrast, the 'conflict' historians such as Hart (1955), Silver (1967), Foster (1974) and Philips (1977) believe that the foundations of the new police were based on a class-based need to secure state power in the face of a gathering and strengthening working class radicalism and popular public protest. Palmer summarises the view of the conflict historians as follows:

"*Class conflict, not social consensus, provided the spur to the creation of the new police.*" (Palmer 1988: 8)
The contrast so drawn proves, however, to be facile. Palmer finds that the 'consensual' historians show that the police reformers were, in fact, acting as if they were enlightened statists. They were aware both of the opposition from within the elite to a proposed new police and the threat to the establishment from working class radicalism. The conflict historians downplay the resistance shown by that same establishment and exaggerate the 'threat from below'. So, Palmer argues that it would be more accurate to adopt a middle position and to base the origins of the new police as somewhere between the enlightened statist and conflict schools. He writes:

"Chadwick, Peel and the other police proponents were, I believe, seeking to establish a new principle of governance - law enforcement above local or petty interests - but they were also inevitably enmeshed in the values of their own class. They were revolutionaries in both their impatience with local civic "rights and liberties" and their disrespect for the traditional value systems of working class culture over both they wanted to ride roughshod." (Palmer 1988: 8)

However, Palmer subsequently emphasises the particular significance of the emerging working class claim to be included within the process of governance (through, inter alia, securing the right to vote). This, specifically roused to action the 'enlightened statists'. Somehow, a design for police had to be created that would both fend off riot and insurrection and that would discipline the less privileged classes. This allows Palmer to support Storch's (1975) idea that the new police were created to embody a certain type of missionary function. Palmer writes:

"This convergence of the state's imposition of norms of social order (police) and the workers assertion of their rights (protest) has led a recent scholar, Robert Storch, to see the new police as "missionaries" bringing alien values of work and discipline to a reluctant proletariat." (Palmer 1988: 8)

Whilst Palmer makes no reference to Foucault's science of discipline and the development of the carceral society it would be possible to redescribe both his and Storch's analyses in Foucauldian terms where the new police can be understood as an extension of the state's disciplinary apparatus. Historians are united in finding that the creation of the new police was unrelated to questions of ordinary crime. Thus, students of police highlight the fact that the early police emphasis was on the maintenance of order. It was only later that importance began to be accorded to the detection of crime. So, Palmer writes:
"In explaining police origins, I would argue that if in the formative period 1829-56 the authorities' dominant motivation had been to apprehend felons and prevent serious crime, the new police forces would have developed rather differently; we would expect to see, early on, efficient detective units and constables skilled in crime detection rather than drilled in military style patrolling." (Palmer 1988: 9)

Palmer notes that the new police were created amidst alarms and concerns raised by actual and anticipated civil commotions. The production of police as a device to quell popular resistance to government can be taken to constitute a more general theory of police with international application.

From the outset the new police needed to be disciplined to secure the state's objectives. There is considerable evidence that a great deal of care went into their construction - a construction reflecting a paramilitary modus vivendi. So, for example, Commissioner Rowan, acting on Peel's instructions, drafted a plan for a force in London organised along military lines. 'Lengthy discussions' according to Reith (1948) led to the decision that police should be uniformed. Although the police were unarmed - in the sense that they carried neither pistols nor cutlasses - they did carry a truncheon (which was initially hidden from view). Palmer surfaces a particular feature of the new police which suggests how their psychological experience is likely to make for an unusual occupational culture. He writes:

"In the initial recruitment of 1829-30 it appears that the commissioners gave a preference to men with military backgrounds ... But many of these men found it difficult to adjust to the civil and often solitary duties of a policeman." (Palmer 1988: 300)

Thus, although Peel and Rowan valued discipline at least a major part of the practice of policing involved coping with solitariness. Self-discipline (or self-determination) was a feature of the police experience. A different form of discipline was also at work - and to a remarkable degree. Thus, of the first 2,800 constables enrolled 2,238 were at some point dismissed. The main reasons were drunkenness, lack of punctuality and lack of discipline. Police, on the one hand were subject to exacting disciplinary requirements that were imposed upon them through the militaristic nature of their organisation. They also had to show self-discipline and self-regulation as they patrolled and interacted with the citizenry.

For those officers who did withstand the pressures of the early police experience they subsequently had to cope with 'civil commotions' and with hostile responses from sections of the population. They had to learn the techniques of riot control
and came to perfect - in the very first years of their establishment - the baton charge. Thus, a salient feature of the early police experience was its association with combat. Pringle (1955) notes that the force was 'opposed and hated by all classes of the general public whilst Reith (1948) claims that almost everyone had a reason to dislike the police. Palmer amasses considerable documentary evidence indicating how reviled the police were in various quarters. It would, therefore, be reasonable to assume that the police will have experienced a distance between themselves and the 'people' and that this will have been augmented by their crowd control functions.

Another significant aspect of police practice helping to establish 'distance' between police and the people most immediately affected by their presence was their participation in a wider social trend - discussed by historians such as Thompson (1967), Malcolmson (1973), Hearn (1978) and Storch (1982) - which attempted to shape the values and conduct of the less privileged class(es). Thus, as constables began the practice of 'moving people on' and insisting to gatherings of workingmen that they should 'break it up' and 'go about their business', they enacted policies concerned with transforming working men into time-oriented, sober and diligent workers. Moreover, the police presence at fairs, the races and wakes, their suppression of gambling, prize fighting and popular blood sports were, as Palmer puts it, 'visible signs of Evangelical and Radical sentiments that sought to "improve".'

For Palmer the practice of 'moving people on' was 'especially resented' and 'workers resentment' was also related to the fact that they perceived the constable as an ex-working man who had little to do and yet enjoyed both job security and wages that were higher than most labourers and factory workers. In return the police resented the abusive comments to which they were suspect. They were having to adjust to the requirements of patrolling, the long hours of shift work and the fact that they only had one day free from work in every five weeks. Thus, the adversarial nature of police-citizen encounters and feelings of hostility and resentment in the police-public relationship characterised some of the primordial experiences of the new police in England and Wales. Whilst police went on to develop their investigative and community relations functions - and to secure a large measure of public support - it is probably unwise to underestimate the impact of that fundamental part of policing concerned with maintaining public order. As Holdaway's (1983) study of the police occupational culture shows, a central notion held by the police he observed was that their 'territory' was on the verge of chaos.

Palmer finds four factors underlying the expressions of hostility towards the first
of the new county police:

- their military nature

- the perception that their primary use was against crowds and the Chartists rather than criminals

- their monitoring and missionary function in relation to the workingman

- the fact that police were often strangers or outsiders

On this latter point Palmer writes:

"From time immemorial, English policing had been rooted firmly and locally in the parish. The revolution brought about in those counties adopting the 1839 County Police Act involved the introduction of strangers to the parish ... many English constables were strangers to their county of service, and many more whose counties of birth and police service were the same were strangers to the parishes where they worked. Like the New Poor Law, the civil army of uniformed strangers was visible evidence of the new intrusiveness of the state into the parish ..." (Palmer 1988: 450)

The military nature of police was reflected in the composition of the Chief Constables appointed to command the first county forces established in 1839-40. Two were 'professional police officers' with 'professional police experience', five were army officers, three were navy officers and the remaining two were civilians. Although the history of the English county police is relatively scant Palmer is confident enough to assert that:

"Each force, being locally controlled, reflected local circumstances and needs and the personality of its Chief Constable." (Palmer 1988: 453)

The disciplinary practices of the military are revealed in the astonishing rates of dismissal recorded in the historical records. So, in addition to the evidence concerning the London and Irish police, Midwinter (1969), for example, in his study of the police in Lancashire show that one quarter of the men were dismissed - mainly for drunkenness. Other familiar causes of dismissal were neglect of duty, breach of the regulations, and, insubordination.

As Palmer draws his monumental study to a close he notes that after the mid-
nineteenth century 'all of the police forces in England and Ireland did maintain their military character'. Gradually, with the 'decline in major crimes' police began to take on a number of administrative tasks - and, for the first time in his text, Palmer introduces the idea of 'service' to the public. He writes:

'The police, increasingly thick on the ground after midcentury, justified their expense by acting as servants of the public. In both countries they inspected weights and measures, enforced vagrancy laws, assisted Poor Law guardians, registered dogs and supervised animals' diseases, enforced fishery and game laws, and carried out the decennial census. In England they watched juveniles and controlled (sic) prostitutes." (Palmer 1988: 533,534)

Palmer also suggests that from 1850 onwards the police - who were 'just another agency of government' - became 'a conservative bureaucracy'.

Petrow (1987) in his doctoral thesis which examined the methods used by the Metropolitan police to control or regulate perceived moral threats to the social order (such as habitual criminality and prostitution) in late nineteenth century London argues that the police 'were crucially important agents of the State enforcing laws which they helped to draft' and which 'largely embodied the moral values of politically active middle-class reformers'. Thus, the police were neither in fact, 'the autonomous and impersonal enforcers of a politically neutral law' nor were they the 'servants of the public'. He contends that English politics, between 1870 and 1914, was preoccupied with the moral welfare of the nation. The preoccupation, according to Petrow, stemmed from two sources: widespread urban poverty, and, industrial decline. He notes:

"Searching for the causes of poverty and industrial decline, middle-class reformers tended to blame 'the great problems of crime, drink and vice' emanating mainly from the thirty percent at the bottom of the social scale, which threatened to undermine the moral values of respectability, work, discipline and the family, upon which social stability supposedly depended ..." (Petrow 1987: 1)

Petrow traces the ways in which the Metropolitan Police was used by successive Liberal and Conservative governments under the co-ordinating direction of the Home Office 'to experiment with various methods of control'. He finds that of all administrative agencies 'it was the police' who were 'central to the State's attempt to impose a certain social discipline on the working class through law'. Although the Metropolitan police was originally established as part of a need to secure order Petrow shows how the force came to represent the presence of central authority
throughout the basic fabric of daily life. He indicates the expanding nature of police duties and function in the following paragraph:

"According to one estimate, in 1829 seven Acts of Parliament related to the duties of the Metropolitan Police; by 1961 there were 'as many as seventy five'; between 1861 and 1868 'scarcely a session of Parliament' ended without further duties being added relating to the supervision of a vast multitude of details of more or less importance' on 'an immense variety of ... subjects'; between January 1868 and January 1978 a further thirty Acts were passed 'entailing new duties and responsibilities'; and the trend continued until 1914. These duties were so extensive ... that they limited 'in almost every direction the freedom of action of every Londoner.'" (Petrow 1987: 12)

The work of the Metropolitan Police - whose numbers grew from 9,160 in 1870 to 22,048 in 1914 - demanded a large degree of administrative ability on the part of the leadership; Petrow points out that each of the five Chief Commissioners responsible for the administration of the Metropolitan Police (from 1869 until the second decade of the twentieth century) either had extensive military, or similarly extensive colonial police administrative experience. He also draws attention to one origin of that feature of the psychology of police, namely, cautiousness, watchfulness and reserve, when he mentions an observation by Chief Commissioner Edward Henry; so, he writes:

"... as Henry spelled out in 1910: 'where new legislation is imposed it is naturally incumbent upon the Police to proceed with caution in order that the real intention of such legislation may be elucidated and proper effect given to it from the first ...'" (Petrow 1987:13,14)

Petrow's research supports the Foucauldian identification of Police as a major entity within the newly emerging science of discipline. He found that as public order 'was gradually established' from 1829 onwards, the emphasis in police work 'began increasingly to be placed on enforcing the law against those groups of people who were 'responsible for sustaining various immoral activities'. The police came, more and more, to use 'methods such as supervision, surveillance, clandestine investigation and information gathering. They also co-operated with bureaucratic departments, other than the Home Office, such as the Foreign Office and the Commissioners of Inland revenue.

Together, Palmer and Petrow's work points towards a police experience rooted in
its hierarchical command structure and disciplined military nature. Crime fighting and crime investigation along with the 'service' orientation emerged as core modes of police experience after the middle half of the nineteenth century as the police organisation(s) increasingly became established as conservative bureaucracies. His analyses provide the historical underpinnings to understanding why police deploy the language of battle in their discourses. This characteristic was picked up by Palmer himself in his summary of the 'English police today' where he drew from Rhind's (1981) discussion on the need for police accountability. Palmer writes:

"The English police today ... represent "a peculiar British compromise". The forty three forces act independently but are accountable to Home Office standards of professionalism. The system is a delicate balance of intermeshed obligations and sometimes unclear lines of authority; at a time when police work is increasingly scientific and professional, the police feel more than ever "beleaguered by bodies exerting pressure upon them." " (Palmer 1988: 541)

Rhind - a former tutor at the Police Staff College, Bramshill - was acutely aware of the readiness with which police would become defensive and hostile towards reform and change initiatives. That this remains a strand in police responsiveness was acknowledged by Bunyard (1993) - a former commandant of the Police Staff College - when he found that the police were perceived by the others in the criminal justice system as 'difficult artisans'.

In short, the police are so structured that their experience comes to render them 'difficult' and 'intractable'. Their discourse is marked by the metaphors of combat and war. In part, because all police are susceptible to the language forms of their culture (and to its modes of apprehending reality), their leaders and managers, who are promoted from within and who all serve - at some point on the 'front line' as constables - are liable to sustain these forms of discourse. I shall return to consider the implications of this in my discussion concerning the micro-logics of power in the teaching encounters at Bramshill. Before that I shall try to uncover the governmental rationalities at play in the provision of police leadership development and training.

**Governmental rationalities and the provision of police leadership development and training**

When the Metropolitan Police Act became law on July 19 1829 and Sir Robert Peel appointed the first two Commissioners, Colonel Charles Rowan, a retired officer, and Richard Mayne, a barrister, if there was anything that could be called police
leadership and management training it lay in the patterns of interaction contributing to the social construction of these and similar persons. To that extent it would be absurd to ignore the impact of social class and exclusivity in relation to the 'make-up' of the first police leaders and managers. However, apart from the commissioners there existed a deliberate policy to recruit men who, as Critchley (1967) puts it 'had not the rank, habits or station of gentlemen'. Critchley elaborates briefly on the formation of the new police in the metropolis by noting that there was 'to be no caste system as in the Navy or Army' and that the ranks up to superintendent 'were to be drawn, typically from ex-warrant officers and Non commissioned officers'. He adds that promotion to higher rank was to be given to men from within the force. Critchley himself claims that the new police were supposedly constituted in something of an egalitarian manner and states:

"From the start, the police was to be a homogenous and democratic body, in tune with the people, understanding the people, belonging to the people, and drawing its strength from the people" (Critchley 1967: 52)

However, it is difficult to imagine how a uniformed and disciplined service - especially one constituted within the context of a class system and its associated ideologies - could, in truth be democratic and, social historians such as Storch (1975) have rejected Critchley's notion of a police belonging to the people and have argued instead that the new police reflected an extensions of the bourgeoisie's control over the 'dangerous classes'.

Critchley (1967), Emsley (1996) Taylor (1997) all include details allowing certain inferences to be drawn about the nature of police leadership and management but there appears to be scant detail concerning the actual training, development or education they received in relation to their responsibilities. After observing that some of the early chief constables of the smaller borough forces could 'strike terror' into the young constables of their forces, Critchley includes the text of an address by the Head Constable of the Liverpool police to young men joining the force in 1879 and thinks that it illustrates a 'paternal attitude' of the chief constable towards the rank and file. Interestingly that address includes the following passage which is suggestive of the 'formation' of the supervisory ranks:

".. ask yourself the question, Do I know the name of the very street in which I have been walking for the last three hours, or the name of the church "whose lofty spire points to heaven?" If you thus make your duties the subject of your conversation and thoughts, you will get to be intelligent, and intelligence with good conduct leads to promotion ..." (Critchley 1967: 149)
Emsley reports that in the wake of the Parish Constables Act (1842) which directed that the parish constables were to be supervised by new superintending constables appointed by the quarter sessions the fact that:

"The superintending constables, many of whom were recruited from the London or new county forces, had considerable difficulties in smartening up the part-time parish constables; they were professionals, yet those who they supervised were not" (Emsley 1996: 49)

Taylor in his exploration of the development of police forces from 1830 - 1914 describes a number of trends including the transition from very high turnover rates and short-term careers to more stable forces characterised by well established internal hierarchies along with the beginnings of a new sociology of police. In the late nineteenth century Taylor finds that:

"There was a cadre of experienced men in senior position, many of whom, especially in the borough forces, had worked their way up through the ranks. There was a body of practical experience to hand on and, perhaps not coincidentally, the 1880's saw a number of training initiatives developed to ensure that recruits were aware of the rudiments of the job. Educational classes were also introduced for existing officers and, at the same time, the appearance of such publications as Bicknell's Police Manual, which was first published in 1877, was a further means of ensuring a minimum standard of knowledge of their responsibilities within the law among police constables. Most importantly, policing was being seen as an occupation with its own sense of identity and worth." (Taylor 1997: 66,67)

However despite these developments, a select committee was appointed in 1908 (to look into settling the matter of a weekly rest day for police officers) and surfaced deeper issues concerning the quality of police leadership. Critchley remarks that the police service the Edwardians had inherited was 'leaderless and lacked inspiration' and that policemen were 'groping for a sense of unity and means of corporate expression'. Those deeper issues concerning the quality of police leadership were eventually to lead to the creation of a police college. Villiers (1997) contends that for the first one hundred years of its existence Peel's dictum that leadership would be found from within the service itself remained unchallenged.

The Post-war committee (set up in 1944) considered higher police training and recommended, inter alia, setting up a national police college the objects of which were:
"To raise the standards and reputation of the police service by giving to selected officers who have shown promise and passed the prescribed qualifying tests an opportunity of receiving higher education and training designed to fit them for the higher ranks of the service, or more briefly, a liberal education ..." (Scollan 1982: 19)

Whilst it is possible to make educated guesses on the nature of the processes of induction concerned with developing police leaders and managers over the first one hundred years or so since the creation of the new police in the metropolis, the establishment of the Police College (later to become the Police Staff College) in 1948 allows a much more certain picture to emerge. Villiers (1997) provides a relatively thorough discussion of the history of the college and this history makes it possible to uncover the governmental rationalities embodied in higher police training. The 1946 Police Post-war committee had observed that 'the growth of the broad outlook, the quality of leadership and the independent habits of mind' were all essential requirements if a senior police officer 'were to command the respect of his (sic) men and the confidence of all classes of the community'. On 1 April 1948 Ryton-on-Dunsmore became the site for the college. Villiers asks: 'What are we to make of the Police College's beginnings? (at Ryton-on-Dunsmore). Drily, he observes: 'then as now some attention was paid to what went on in class'. The conditions were 'rough and ready' and yet, a great deal can be gleaned from an analysis of the curriculum at the college.

In the very earliest days two courses, 'A' and 'B' were run. Course A - the Junior Course for potential inspectors - lasted from 15 June 1948 until 26 November 1948. It was organised into a six day week with each day (except Saturday - which was a half-day) beginning at 8.50 a.m. and finishing at 5.50 p.m. The course consisted of General Subjects, History and Law, Police Administration, Police Duties, Crime and the treatment of offenders, Traffic and Communications, Physical Education, Drill, 'Questions and Answers', as well as certain more enigmatic sessions entitled 'Recapitulation and Conferences'. A closer inspection of the timetable reveals the fact that a large number of either senior police officers, specialists in police subjects as well as public servants and figures - lectured to the course on a very wide range of topic areas assembled in a rather haphazard order.

What rationalities are expressed in this educational process? The economic rationality Garland has described seems entirely absent. Whilst the college itself and the specific curriculum content might be an outgrowth of 'moral panic' rationality (in the sense of trying to secure an effective police leadership) there is
nothing on the formal curriculum which directly reveals this rationality. In addition, there is an absence of a 'critical' or 'emancipatory' rationality. There are the first glimmerings of the new 'managerialism' - in the form of two lectures, one on 'Personnel Management' and the other on 'Incentives in industry'. Overall, the college *modus operandi* appears to interweave the Foucauldian governmental rationalities of control (police), raison d'état and liberalism - into what I have called a 'socio-political' professional rationality. However, it would be naïve to overlook the meanings of the rituals and symbols manifested across the wider college regime. These suggest that a more implicit 'Social Darwinist - élitist' rationality was at work sustaining a conception of human social order based upon a hierarchical and graded valuation of human worth. Later in this chapter I shall return to explore this idea.

For something more than the first ten years of its life the college offered the bulk of its courses to middle-aged sergeants and inspectors but in 1961 the Government announced the introduction of two new courses. The first, an accelerated promotion course, was for 'exceptionally able' young men and women, whilst the second, the senior staff course, started in 1963 as a means of training selected officers for the highest posts in the service. Critchley, in discussing the senior course (subsequently to be called the senior command course) describes how it was 'adapted and modernised' with the aid of a team of specialist inspectors from the Department of Education and Science. According to Critchley, the review of the course by those inspectors was important for two reasons:

"In the first place it marked a recognition that the senior police officer of today requires a thorough grounding in management and scientific studies as well as the training in police duties, liberal studies, and trends in society, that was thought to be adequate ten years ago. In the second place the review heralded the start of an association between the police and academic educationists which is bound to affect many concepts of police training that have hitherto owed more to tradition and commonsense than to educational theory." (Critchley 1967: 319)

The Police Training Council, created in 1971, with a duty to keep under review all aspects of police training was, for Critchley, an expression of the formalisation of that 'association' between police and educationalists.

Meanwhile, Villiers illustrates how the earliest and complex governmental rationality expressed in the practice of police leadership and management training began to find itself in some sort of competition with a 'new' contender. Thus, in 1968 - sometime after the college had moved from Ryton to Bramshill - the Home
Office archives reveal that their economic adviser asked, in a memorandum, how it could be possible to justify the expenditure of scarce public funds on the provision of residential general culture courses in the Hampshire countryside. Together these developments illustrate the gathering complex of forces shaping the evolution of police leadership and management training. So, for example, Villiers discusses the 'era of management', the 'rise and fall of facilitation' and the 'new fashion' of 'learning from experience'. Police leadership training had become increasingly unstable. It reflected what Baudrillard (1994) has described as the 'acceleration of all exchanges'. In very broad terms this could be theorised in terms of the condition of postmodernity. However, an alternative perspective - and explanatory framework - derives from the concept of 'government-at-a-distance'.

**Government at a distance**

Rose and Miller (1992) note that as post-war 'welfare states' in the West and centralised 'party states' in the East have come under challenge, contemporary political debate has demonised the state and presented it as malign and potentially monstrous. On this account only a life 'beyond the state' is one worthy of the free autonomous human being. But Rose and Miller challenge this conception of an opposition between the state and civil society by asking how, in fact, rule is exercised in advanced liberal democracies. They offer the following complex proposition - which, as a description of an actual state of affairs seems surely to be the case - concerning the nature of political power in those democracies:

"**Political power is exercised today through a profusion of shifting alliances between diverse authorities in projects to govern a multitude of facets of economic activity, social life and individual conduct. Power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as of 'making up' citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom"** (Rose and Miller 1992: 174)

Rose and Miller understand 'government' in the liberal democratic state as an historically constituted matrix within which are articulated the hopes, wishes and calculations of authorities that seek to shape the beliefs and conduct of others in desired directions. Plainly, the design and practice of police leadership and management training is one such instance of government so understood. However, the historically constituted matrix comprises many entities all of which 'endeavour to administer the lives of others in the light of conceptions of what is good, healthy, normal, virtuous, efficient or profitable'.

The political rationality of liberalism establishes a realm outside 'politics' into
which the state - in any direct sense - may not enter. Instead, liberal government seeks to manage this realm or domain without destroying its existence and its autonomy. Rose and Miller argue that this is made possible through the activities and calculations of a 'proliferation of independent agents' and 'experts' - such as doctors, hygienists, managers, planners, parents and social workers. Importantly they add:

"And it [liberal government] is dependent upon the forging of alliances. This latter takes place on the one hand between political strategies and the activities of these authorities and, on the other, between these activities and free citizens, in attempts to modulate events, decisions and actions in the economy, the family, the private firm, and the conduct of the individual person " (Rose and Miller 1992: 180)

Power then, in the modern liberal democratic state, is a matter of networks and alliances within which, as Garland (1997) puts it, 'centres of calculation' exercise 'government-at-a-distance'. Thus, power is not straightforwardly a matter of imposing a sovereign will, but instead is a process of enlisting the cooperation of chains of actors who 'translate' power from one locale to another. Garland also recognises that this process allows the 'subjects of power' to resist or raise private objections to the activities of the authorities.

Police leadership and management training can be understood in terms of a set of shifting alliances not only between centres of calculation themselves but also in terms of the activities of the 'authorities' who construct and deliver the training. At a micropolitical level the activities of those latter authorities is experienced by the 'subjects of power' who enjoy a freedom to resist or object to the 'authorities'.

Government-at-a-distance for police management and leadership training can be viewed in terms of a highly complex flow and exchange of power. The 'centres of calculation' include Parliament, The Home Office, the tripartite system (Chief Constables, Police Authorities and the Home Office) concerned with the administration and running of police forces, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC), The Audit Commission, The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), The Police Federation, Royal Commission reports, The Police Research Group (PRG), the Press and Media, and Bramshill. All these sources problematise police training simply because they reveal a gap between the real (i.e. the current knowledges and practices of police) and the ideal.

Government-at-a-distance through its centres of calculation suggests, requires, advises, emphasises and expects the content of police management training to
embodies a number of rationalities - which might take as their foundational form the Foucauldian genealogy of the welfare state. In other words, police management training should reflect 'raison d'etat', 'police' and 'liberalism'. However, whilst 'raison d'etat', 'police' and 'liberalism' coalesce in the cool socio-political professional rationality the centres of calculation have had to draw from moral panic rationality and economic rationality in their exercise of power.

I shall now, illustrate briefly, some of the ways in which the centres of calculation have embodied the three different rationalities.

Moral panic rationality has been expressed as a result of all those phenomena evoking anxieties about police themselves and the essential security of those who get to have a voice in the wider political arena. Richards (1985) identifies a number of 'incidents, investigations and inquiries' from the 1960s onwards which, cumulatively, began to erode public confidence in the integrity and competence of the police service. Amongst these incidents he includes the riots of 1981, the Yorkshire Ripper investigation and inquiry, Michael Fagan, Grunwick, Lewisham, and Southall and the death of Blair Peach. He was able to observe that these and similar happenings:

"Lent credibility to the growing accusations about abuses of suspects while in custody, racism, corruption, the excessive use of force in effecting public order, and scepticism about police effectiveness and efficiency in dealing with crime "
(Richards, 1985: 15)

In addition, the miner's strike and the analysis of police violence (Scraton 1985), the 'high-profile' miscarriages of justice involving the 'Birmingham six' and the 'Guildford four', The portrayal of police in 'fly-on-the-wall' television documentaries, revelations made by police officers themselves (in the media) concerning police sexism and racism, and the MacPherson inquiry into the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence have all led certain 'centres of calculation' to respond with a variety of measures designed both to control police and reassure the public. The Operational Policing Review (1990) in its strategic focus concerned with policing in the 1990s (authored by police officers) acknowledges the fact that 'a series of police scandals has raised questions over police integrity'. The review recognises that scandals do occur from time to time and capture media attention but its authors point out that 'recently' there has been a succession and they note 'Stalker, Wapping, the acquittal of the Guildford four, Kent crime figures and allegations concerning the West Midlands Crime Squad'. The review moves on to say:
"To this might be added, though not in the same sense of being scandal, the damaging effects of the Hillsborough tragedy. A series of critical newspaper articles have questioned not only the competence and integrity of the Service, but again drawn attention to apparent inadequacies of training, organisation, complaints procedures and leadership." (Operational Policing Review 1990, section 7: 5)

Moral panic rationality finds expression in new legislation e.g. P.A.C.E., new policy emphases e.g. Ethics and codes of ethics, and, new concepts e.g. 'The duty of care'. The Scarman report - with its many recommendations concerning training, supervision and management can, in part, be seen as an instance of moral panic rationality. Foster (1998) in her Report on Police Training and Recruitment to the Home Affairs Select Committee succinctly captures the prevalence of moral panic rationality throughout police as a whole when she notes that a characteristic of police officers at all levels of the organisation is that they, the police, represent the 'thin blue line' maintaining order amongst chaos in an increasingly hostile public and political climate.

Socio-political professional rationality itself reflects the hopes of the enlightenment and is situated within that stream of thought predicated upon the idea of 'progress'. It is expressed whenever the 'fundamental' purposes or 'objects' of police are revisited and re-stated. In relatively recent times, for example, the Scarman report, in addition to moral panic rationality, reflected a socio-political rationality. Thus, in Part V of the report, 'Policing - Proposals and Recommendations' Scarman develops the application of two policing principles - 'consent and balance' as well as 'independence and accountability' - to the maintenance of public order in a multi-racial society and, in the course of his discussion observes that the police are now professionals with a highly specialised set of skills and behavioral codes of their own. He argued that in virtue of the new professionalism of the police they ran the risk of becoming distanced from the community and this led him to commend the debate on policing precisely because it 'restated' points fundamental to the British policing tradition - including the importance of policing by consent.

Following Scarman particular emphasis was placed upon re-securing an ethos for the police finding expression both in processes of community consultation and in ACPO's Police Service Statement of Common Purpose and Values in October 1990. In addition, the development of 'professional knowledge' has grown through the research activities of 'centres of calculation' such as the Police Research Group and the National Crime and National Operations faculties established within
National Police Training at the Bramshill site.

Socio-political rationality lies at the heart of the Crime and Disorder Act with its emphasis upon redefining the core purpose of police in terms of 'crime reduction' effected through multi-agency collaborative partnerships and finds specific expression in the Home Secretary's insistence that police policies should be 'evidence-led'.

Economic rationality began to seek prominence from the 1960s onwards as successive governments attempted to control public expenditure. Between 1969 and 1974, the Home Office tried to introduce the Planning, Programming and Budgeting system (P.P.B.S.) the intention of which was to encourage police managers to use budgeting information to help them make decisions about the most effective use of their resources. It is expressed, in a relatively explicit form, in the Home Office circular, 114/1983 entitled 'Manpower, efficiency and effectiveness'. This circular observes that - as a result of a marked increase in police strength - the cost of police services has 'increased substantially'. The circular continues by saying:

"After this rapid growth a period of consolidation is desirable, not least because the constraints on public expenditure at both central and local government levels make it impossible to continue with the sort of expansion which has occurred in recent years. Yet the workload shows no sign of diminishing. If the police service is to deal with this situation and retain public confidence it is essential that it should make the most effective use of the substantial resources now available to it."

(Home Office circular 114/1983: 1,2)

In the subsequent text the circular defines the criteria that would govern the Home Secretary's assessment of bids for increases in establishments the first of which states categorically that additional posts will not be authorised unless he (or she) is satisfied that the force's existing resources are used to best advantage. To that end, the Home Secretary would 'look to' HM Inspectors for their professional assessment of whether resources are directed 'in accordance with properly determined objectives and priorities'.

The Audit Commission further elaborates economic rationality especially in the 1990 police paper: 'Effective policing - performance review in police forces'. In that paper its authors note that whilst the police made considerable progress with its management systems throughout the decade of the eighties, the attempts to improve 'performance review systems' had only mixed success. The paper provides
a critique of performance review practices including the fact that of poor monitoring of cost-effectiveness before detailing the improvements needed. The paper then provides a perspective on the 'police manager' as follows:

"The management style in the police service should be governed by the fact that its officers are all professionals, paid salaries commensurate with other public sector professionals. Management systems should delegate responsibility to them for taking decisions using individual initiative ... sub units and individuals should have the freedom to contribute to quality of service in the ways best suited to local circumstances.

The corollary is that they should be held accountable for their actions. Better measurement of output makes line managers more accountable and reduces the need for the centre to make detailed decisions about the resources used. Strengthening the performance review system is as much a matter of culture as of management systems." (Audit Commission 1990: 2)

This is a significant observation because it begins to formalise the role of the new professional manager in the police service and the 'making up' of a cost conscious 'subject of power'. Most recently, Foster (1998) advocates that the police service should seek and attract highly qualified recruits because they will not only be more professional but will also 'save the organisation money'. In an extremely clear expression of economic rationality she refers to the work of Carter and Sapp (1989) who state:

"Police ... must be concerned with reducing liability risk not only because it is an ethical responsibility but also because of the pragmatic implications of resource management." (Carter and Sapp 1989: 163)

She develops the theme of economic rationality by referring to Guyot (1991) who has pointed out that organisations staffed by professionals do not often bear the cost of the professional training but place that burden upon the individual. Foster herself can be located within a more or less influential 'centre of calculation' - the University - directly involved with the training and development of police leaders and managers.

It seems valid to argue that centres of calculation continue to infuse police leadership and management with the extraordinary challenge of reconciling three powerful rationalities. The challenge is made even more demanding because of the 'chains of actors' involved in the power translation and power consumption
processes.

Nonetheless, because police leadership and management training takes as its responsibility the presentation of the new skills, knowledges and concepts wrought from the work of the centres of calculation, it necessarily involves grappling with the three rationalities - even when those rationalities are in conflict or demand more attention.

In the next section I shall examine the micrologics of power where the tutor meets the 'client' against this backdrop of governmental rationalities.

**The micrologics of power**

Whilst Bramshill (as the National Police Training site where a proportion of police leadership and management training occurs) might have claims to be itself a 'centre of calculation' it is also the locale where the training actually occurs. In terms of the governmentality analytic, the individual tutor has the problem of governing the 'client' group of police officers who occupy 'managerial' roles. That same tutor may be attempting to enact one or more rationalities, such as fostering ways of thinking and acting within an economic rationality or developing an analysis of the Crime and Disorder Act within the tradition of socio-political rationality or even providing a critique of the occupational culture and thereby embracing moral panic rationality.

Power, though is both given to and arrogated by the 'client' - who might also conceptualise him or herself as the 'customer' - in the form of formal/official, informal/unofficial and naturally expressive or directly communicative feedback mechanisms. So, for example, throughout the last twenty five years the staff at Bramshill have utilised a variety of instruments to secure data concerning the 'evaluation' or valuation of the various 'inputs' that have taken place on courses. (In addition, overall course evaluations have also taken place.) These instruments have variously been entitled, 'Course evaluation', 'Course critique' or more recently, 'Quality of Service' questionnaires. Not only has the 'input' been graded on some form of rating scale but a space has been provided for free text response (should the 'client' wish to elaborate upon their experience). Moreover, the feedback has often been given anonymously. In consequence, the tutorial staff have been made aware of the way their work has been received and 'evaluated'.

The informal feedback mechanism works its way through the conversations that occur as a result of social interactions and encounters. These take place in
corridors, over meals, in bars, back in the setting and context of an individual's home force - and includes the observations of other members of the tutorial staff at Bramshill. These forms of feedback are in addition to those more immediate signals that occur during the actual tutor-client group encounter.

There is an unusual dance of power in terms of the relationship between the tutor and client group within police management training. A dance cannot, by definition, continue for too long if one or both parties refuse to lead or follow. If the material the tutor works with is confronting, disturbing, challenging, critical, 'difficult' or paradigmatically oppositional then it is hard to sustain the dance. Who, though, is out of step?

The staff generally recognise that they are engaged in a process that they come to describe as 'survival'. Different members of staff would adopt different survival strategies. Some take on a jovial, genial persona and teach from a basis of apparent ignorance or place themselves 'one down' in relation to police. Others use humour and jocularity to keep the students amused (and distracted). Others again, would use highly impactive and emotive video as a kind of shock tactic. These (and other) strategies all reflected ways of coping with the occupational culture. As one member of staff put it:

'To survive you find yourself having to conform to the occupational culture.'

So, the tutorial staff develop a variety of survival strategies - keeping one step ahead, avoiding being trodden on etc. - as they attempt to manage the 'resistances' and 'private objections' of the individuals within the client group.

Leadership and management training events within Bramshill reveal a curious reversal of the more usual dynamics of power in professional development settings. Thus, rather than the client having to impress the tutor (in relation to their professional knowledge and managerial skills), the tutor has to impress the client(s). This is an ambiguous situation. It illustrates a refusal by the client to be a mere object of power but it also implies the refusal to be subjected to any governmental rationality.

I think it is possible to account for this phenomenon by exploring some features in the 'making - up' of police. To do this I shall refer not only to certain Foucauldian concepts but also to Bourdieu's (1985) notion of 'habitus'. I shall suggest that, in addition to moral panic, socio-political and economic rationalities that can be discerned in police leadership and management practice there is also a 'Social
Darwinist - elitist' rationality expressed \textit{sotto voce} in terms of 'we know best.'

Foucault has stated that:

"The goal of my work during the last twenty years has not been to analyse the phenomena of power ... My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects." (Foucault 1982: 208)

His exploration of the production of such subjects finds three modes of their objectification. The first mode concerns 'dividing practices' - where the subject is given both a social and personal identity. The second mode for turning human beings into objectified subjects is called by Rabinow (1984) 'scientific classification'. The 'divided off' person can be studied and viewed through the conceptual frameworks of the different natural and social sciences. The third mode of objectification concerns, as Foucault puts it, the way 'a human being turns him or herself into a subject'. Whilst in the first two objectifications the person is basically passive and constrained in the process of self-formation people perform a variety of operations on their own bodies, souls, thoughts and conduct (This is probably why the French intellectuals describe, somewhat pejoratively, manuals on self-management as 'psycho self-service').

Police are, once they accept the identity of 'recruit', divided off from the rest of the citizenry and inducted into a 'disciplined service'. As Rabinow writes:

"Discipline proceeds from an organisation of individuals in space, and it requires a specific enclosure in space. Once established, this grid permits the sure distribution of the individuals who are to be disciplined and supervised. In a factory, the procedure facilitates productivity; in a school it assures orderly behaviour; in a town, it reduces the risk of dangerous crowds, wandering vagabonds, or epidemic diseases" (Rabinow 1984: 17)

So divided in space, they become subject to Foucault's 'science of discipline' (Fillingham, 1993), which has five principles:

- Spatialisation: a place for everyone and the place indicating who and what a person is

- Minute control of activity (especially through the use of timetables)
- Repetitive exercises (such as drill, recitation etc.)

- Detailed hierarchies (where each level of the hierarchy keeps watch over the lower ranks)

- Normalising judgments: disciplinary power both rewards and punishes. That which transgresses its dictates tends to be defined not only as bad but as abnormal.

Like the prison, the factory, the school and the hospital, the police organisation uses space, the control of activities, repetitive exercises, hierarchies and normative pressures to 'make-up' the body/thought of its members. In this process police are differentiated from the citizenry. Police discourse confidently includes references to the 'we': 'We are a 'can-do' culture'; 'We came up with the idea of partnership - the government kidnapped our idea'; 'Only we know what is going on'; 'If we were organised we'd be dangerous'; 'We like structure - we prefer it that way'.

However, citizenship is not a term extensively used in police discourse. Persons are aggregated into a more amorphous category: The public. Once police are 'separated off' they exist within a relatively steep hierarchy within which a careful 'Social Darwinist - elitist' rationality is enacted. Profiles of the police occupational culture (after Johnson and Scholes) show it to be drenched in rituals and routines which serve as technologies sustaining a world-view that is more or less overtly 'supremacist'. This is difficult to describe precisely because it is neither officially condoned nor explicitly expressed. It is manifested more as a fractal form of a wider cultural pattern of social division and gradings. It is reflected in such observations as: 'I've spent most of my professional life climbing the ladder - getting out of the mass'; 'The people (in area X) really are an underclass' and is expressed through the acquisition and mimicry of the upper middle class symbols of the bourgeoisie.

The analytic language of 'Social Darwinist - elitist' rationality is often mannered and discreet. It refers to hierarchy, superordinates and subordinates, levels of civilisation, levels of development, lineage, and breeding. It reflects paternalism and accepts the 'establishment'. It uses concepts such as 'the front line', 'the troops on the ground' and even 'the boys and girls', as well as 'out there' (meaning the suspect world of 'the public'). People are 'in the know' or 'stupid'.

Its objectives are to achieve the correct and worthy order, to 'manage' (i.e. control) diversity, the accurate grading of individuals and social groups, the 'correct' distribution of the good, the proper organisation of society - along socio-biological
lines, education and re-education, training and re-training.

Its technologies are rewards for model behaviour and punishments for deviation within a 'detailed hierarchy', rituals confirming levels of status and esteem, an economy of power symbols, power structures, control structures, the cultivation of fear, rhetoric, the privileges of command, exclusion, and a strategy of change management where change is a design 'to stay the same'.

Although this rationality is distinctly conservative and 'traditional' and might be, in genealogical terms, headed for extinction, it is sustained by the exclusive communities of discourse enjoyed by police leaders and managers and the very heritage of the police organisation itself. Lest this analysis be taken as inaccurate I should like to defend it by citing the type of evidence emerging from cultural audit processes.

Since 1991 one of the educational structures used on the leadership development programmes at the Police Staff College, Bramshill has been a version of the cultural audit process suggested by Johnson and Scholes. After the briefest of introductions to the notion of occupational culture small groups of police leaders and managers have been asked to generate information concerning the types of symbols, rituals and routines, stories and myths, organisational structures, control structures and power structures that characterise, or are expressed in, their police organisations. These data allow certain interpretations to be made concerning the way that social interaction is both shaped and shapes police behaviour and experience.

To exemplify some of those 'shaping' processes I have selected from recent data generated by police middle-managers in the early part of 1998. In response to the question, 'What rituals and routines are practised in the police organisation?' groups (six per group) of middle managers produced the following types of list - along with the meaning they were able to attach to the practice:

Ritual/Routine: 'Initiation ceremonies / attestation of newcomers'
Meaning: 'Do people fit in?'

Ritual/Routine: 'The wind-up'
Meaning: 'Testing people - they need to be able to 'take it''

Ritual/Routine: 'Humour valve'
Meaning: 'The functions of humour - release of tension, showing hardness ...'
Ritual/Routine: 'Drinking - nights, earlies, lates (shifts)'
Meaning: 'Bonding, unwinding, acceptance, fear'

Ritual/Routine: 'Morning prayers'
Meaning: 'Control, a need to know'

Ritual/Routine: 'Meetings, bloody meetings'
Meaning: 'Control, information dissemination'

Ritual/Routine: 'Tea making and other menial tasks'
Meaning: 'Know your place'

Immediately these data point to patterns of interaction indicating that police are inducted into cultural forms which are hierarchical ('know your place', 'control') and demand certain sorts of psychosocial responses if the individual is to be a fully-fledged cultural member or player ('bonding', the acceptance and use of a certain sort of humour etc.).

The dividing and disciplinary practices of police create (after Bourdieu, 1985) a distinct 'habitus' - a disposition of dispositions. This 'habitus' has been explored from the onset of the sociological, anthropological and psychological study of police (Banton, 1964, Skolnick, 1967, Neiderhoffer, 1967, Wilson, 1968, Rubinstein, 1973, Ker Muir, 1977, Reiner, 1985, Brown, 1992). Lodged within a steep hierarchy - where power is perceived to be used as a weapon over others and the self - and 'normalised' - police become disposed to denigrate non-police and to see them as 'mere civilians'. In consequence, the 'exchange' process in the context of police leadership and management education is rendered unusual. Bourdieu's outline of a theory of practice illustrates how social practice is 'all a question of style'. The educator (or trainer) finds him or herself operating in ways analogous to gift exchange. They offer the gift of practical or theoretical knowledge. The 'feedback' mechanisms reveal that the gift is rejected. The adversarial, suspicious, dismissive habitus of the client group prejudices and condemns.

Conclusion: The problem

The governmentality thesis and the concept of government-at-a-distance are remarkably illuminating in the understanding of police management training. The client group exercises a high level of power over the tutor and makes the
government of the 'learning setting' especially problematic. The content of police management training embodies a number of rationalities but it is not at all clear whether any of these rationalities are truly congruent with the modal rationality of the client group. It is not entirely clear what this rationality is although students of the police occupational culture point to its gnostic character.

I want to argue that police management training continues to be liable to domination by a moral panic rationality - which finds itself having to emphasise the image-management of police. The emphases within police management training emerge as responses to crises. Government-at-a-distance through' centres of calculation' determine those patterns of emphases that are designed to continue to reassure a citizenry fearful of threat and concerned with 'justice'.

The centres of calculation and their subtly or grossly different governing rationalities infuse the content and methods of police leadership and management training with conflicts and contradictions. A moral panic rationality is always likely to resurface because of the 'deep structure' moral values underpinning the modern liberal, welfare or even neo-liberal state. Should police be perceived either as incompetent or unjust then the curriculum is, momentarily at least, dominated by the task of responding to the 'crisis' or the panic. So, the first problem stemming from the processes of power in the modern state concerns the instability of the curriculum.

The liberal governmental rationality has allowed a new police figure to emerge - the police officer as a customer or consumer of the training experience. Customers are intrinsically 'picky'. So, the more unpalatable, difficult, disturbing, paradigm breaking, challenging, critical or demanding the curriculum material and methods the less likely is the customer to be pleased. Thus, the second problem for curriculum delivery lies in the 'resistances' and 'private objections' of the 'subjects of power'. This is especially worrying because higher police training and development stands in danger of being little more than 'infotainment' or 'edutainment'. As one senior police tutor on the staff at Bramshill remarked recently in a research seminar: "I don't think we ever get to the real issues"

It is the social interactions in the milieu of the police organisation - its occupational culture(s) - that come to 'make-up' police. Foucault has correctly identified a science of discipline which shapes and constrains the mind and body of its subjects and, uniquely, the police 'make up' themselves in terms, it seems, of a rationality like no other. It stems from Foucault's rationality 'police' (i.e. total control) and a distinct view of the nature of human nature: homo fallibilens.
There are strong grounds for arguing that moral panic rationality will continue to exert a powerful influence upon the practice of police leadership and management because of the significance granted to ethical concepts in the practices of liberal democracies. The enquiry into the police investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence conducted by Sir William MacPherson of Cluny resulted in the publication of a report which not only reproduced earlier concerns about the ethics of the police organisation voiced in the earlier part of the decade by Woodcock (1992) but also saw the expression of a rationality that, were it to be expressed, would cast police leaders and managers in the role of social philosophers attempting to enact a 'Human rights - diversity' governmental rationality. This rationality is nuanced less towards the 'panic' side of moral consciousness and experience but more towards a critical emancipatory rationality and is captured in Woodcock's (1990) critique of the police institution:

"What is happening to the police is that a nineteenth century institution is being dragged into the twenty first century. Despite all the later mythology of Dixon, the police never really were the police of the whole people but a mechanism set up to protect the affluent from what the Victorians described as the dangerous classes."

(Woodcock, 1990: 12)

Human rights considerations have come to the fore and one can confidently predict that police will be under especial pressures to meet their exacting criteria in the decades ahead. However, the fact that it is possible to discern competing or conflicting rationalities in police leadership and management - as well as within the provision of police leadership and management training - is not, it itself, intrinsically worrying. A dialectical view of reality would take such a situation as inevitable - and would see in it the basis for change. Equally, it is possible to understand the expression of economic, moral panic and socio-political rationalities as different moments in the search for accountability.
Chapter fourteen

Action research and the genesis of professional knowledge: data gathering and analysis in support of educational conversations

"One does not teach what one does not know. But neither, in a democratic perspective, ought one to teach what one knows without first, knowing what those one is about to teach know, and on what level they know it; and second, without respecting this knowledge. One begins with that which is implicit in the reading of the world of those about to learn what the one about to teach knows." (Freire, 1996: 130)

In this chapter I shall describe and discuss the data patterns emerging from successive versions of the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'. I shall similarly attend to the information generated by the 'Moral Ethos Questionnaire' and the subsequent 'Organisational Ethics Questionnaire'.

These questionnaires were designed, primarily, to act as learning structures in the service of an 'ethics' education. The relative absence of teaching material - and particularly instrumentation to help facilitate awareness-raising, personal auditing and diagnostic processes, and, discussion amongst peers - meant that it was possible for me to construct a series of questionnaires that might make a contribution to these aspects of the overall educational experience.

In addition, I imagined that the data yielded by the questionnaires would enhance the quality of the content of the 'ethics unit', and, that the information would contribute new knowledge concerning the perceptions of and the psychological development of police managers - as well as the 'moral' character of police organisations.

I hoped that, through the process of introducing the information arising from the questionnaires to course participants, I might be assisted in achieving both the immediate goal of 'making ethics come alive' and also the deeper goals, for an ethics education, of 'reinforcing moral resolve', increasing 'moral sensitisation' and 'impacting moral expertise' described by Kleinig (1990). I also imagined that the data patterns might come to help contribute to a wider debate about the nature of police ethics and police integrity.

However, I should emphasise that despite discovering certain findings that have interested a number of persons in academic communities (e.g. Caless, 1998, Foster,
1999) not one single reference was ever made to the data patterns emerging from the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire by any course participant in the written evaluations of the 'ethics unit'. On three occasions, however, individual officers did speak to me about the data. One noted how 'remarkable' the co-incidence was between his own responses to the questionnaire and the overall data pattern. Another said he was 'glad that at least some research' was 'taking place' on the subject because it was 'sorely needed', whilst the third asked me if he could include some of the data in an essay he was completing for a first degree. I was informed by two staff colleagues - at different stages of the inquiry - that some groups of students resented providing data and information. They were, however, unable to estimate the frequency and pervasiveness of this sentiment.

Beginning the process of constructing a picture of the moral characteristics of police managers and their organisation

In November 1993, a few months after laying the foundations for the inquiry, I included, amongst the teaching materials, a diagnostic instrument - which came to be known as the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'. This first instrument was wide-ranging in scope and constituted the first occasion upon which I was attempting to gather information from a large group of police middle managers; I was more concerned, however, that the course participants use the instrument for discussion purposes in the service of educational aims.

72 Chief Inspectors were asked to provide written information to questions organised under the following five headings:

- Moral development - including an identification of the elements at the heart of the individual's moral code

- The moral dilemmas in policing

- Self-perception of personal ethical standards

- The moral character of the police organisation

- The response to the police service statement of ethical principles

I collected their responses, sorted the data into a number of simple categories, and reflected the pattern of data back to the student group.
Through using this first instrument I was able to begin developing a picture of the 'moral world' of police leaders and managers. The main features emerging from the written responses to the questions were:

- A majority of officers described the core of their moral system as organised around moral principles such as 'justice' and 'equality'

- Immediate family members had exerted most impact upon the individual's moral development

- The police service had, in the long run, enhanced the moral development of a small majority of the respondents. 20% of respondents had experienced moral corrosion whilst another 20% found that the police experience had exerted both positive and negative effects

- The conduct of fellow police officers was identified most frequently as the source of moral dilemmas

- A very large majority of respondents had experienced some type of moral conflict in the course of their career as a police officer

- A very large majority perceived themselves 'highly ethical'. Almost 80% had engaged in unethical conduct at some point in their police service

- The most commonly identified barrier to ethical behaviour within the police organisation was the 'police culture'

- A majority of respondents identified at least three ways to improve the moral character of the police organisation. The commonest response was to advocate a change in police culture

- Almost 60% of the respondents had a positive reaction to the draft statement of ethical principles

- Just under 50% of the respondents thought that if the police service were to adopt the statement of ethical principles then it would lead to improvements in the professional standards of police officers. However 50% thought that adoption would make no real difference to the conduct of the police

I was able to include these general findings in the actual lecture/presentation
content given to the successive intakes of police leaders and managers throughout 1994. I then began a more systematic process of data collection in the search for answers to a set of emerging questions.

_Focusing the inquiry - the search for information in support of an 'ethics education'_

The decade of the 1990s had begun with the closely interrelated emphasis upon clarifying the ends, means and values of policing as well as the development of a 'quality of service' philosophy. Central to both lay the articulation and adoption of the police service statement of common purpose and values.

The first _research_ version of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire sought to examine how police middle-managers conceptualised the purpose of the police service and the related primary duty of the police service. In addition, since the role 'police manager' necessarily carries with it additional obligations, the questionnaire examined the way police managers construed their primary responsibilities. Finally, and because the ethics educational experience was designed for police leaders and managers, I wanted to begin the process of understanding more about the moral character of the police organisation. The initial indicators from the first informal questionnaire had suggested that police culture (and the 'climate' of the organisation as a whole) contained features that constituted barriers to the expression of high ethical standards.

In consequence, the first version of the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire' asked four questions:

_Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (Version 1)_

Question 1: What, in your opinion, is the most important objective or purpose of the police?

Question 2: What, in your opinion, is the most important duty of a police officer?

Question 3: What, in your opinion, is your most important duty as a police manager, administrator and supervisor?

Question 4: What help would you like from the police organisation to sustain and enhance your moral standards?
Prior to administering the questionnaire I generated the following hypotheses (or, more accurately, 'conjectures'). These conjectures represented my general expectations in relation to the pattern of responses that would be revealed.

Conjecture 1: If the ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values had become integrated into the fabric of UK policing then a majority of respondents would refer to it (or substantial aspects of its content) in their answer to question 1.

Conjecture 2: The ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values - as well as the draft statement of ethical principles - had provided authoritative statements outlining the role-related duties of police officers. If these instruments had been integrated into the conceptual frameworks of police managers then the responses of a majority of respondents to question 2 would be related to these instruments.

Conjecture 3: The anthropological and social scientific literature had presented an image of the police organisation as hierarchical and militaristic. At the same time, the police organisation embraced aspects of solidarity and a welfare culture. Police managers would, therefore, be likely to exhibit considerable variation in their response to question 3.

Conjecture 4: It appeared that the 'police culture' had become a 'catch-all' term for all police ills. In consequence, it would not be surprising if 'culture change' were to be identified as the most helpful way of providing support to the individual in relation to question 4. The police organisation had been depicted as a 'power' and 'role' culture (Plumridge 1985). In consequence, police middle-managers - in virtue of their structural position - would be likely to show concerns about the quality of senior police leadership.

60 Chief Inspectors responded to the questionnaire in the Spring of 1994.

Results

Question 1: What, in your opinion, is the most important objective or purpose of the police?

26 different categories of response were distinguished. These were amalgamated into 12 combined (aggregated) categories. The four largest categories were:

- The protection of life and property, to protect the innocent and society, to protect the public from the 'forces of evil' (N = 14)
- The maintenance of law and order, to maintain order, to maintain the normal state of society (N = 9)

- Public safety 'in all its guises': The safety of the community and all individuals, public security and tranquillity 'such that each and every member of society can go about their daily lives without fear from others' (N = 9)

- Uphold the law and/or uphold the 'rule of law' (N = 7)

Discussion

At first glance the data suggest considerable variety amongst the responses to the first question. It would be tempting to say that there is a real difference of opinion amongst police leaders and managers in relation to their views concerning the most important purpose of police. This may be misleading. It is possible that the apparently different individual responses were trying to say the same thing. Thus, for example, the reply 'maintaining law and order' might have been understood to entail the 'protection of the community'. Similarly, 'upholding the rule of law' may have been understood as embracing the idea of public service.

In addition, the question itself might have been interpreted by several of the respondents to mean that there was, in 'fact' (i.e. known by some ultimate authority) one aspect of policing that was, truly, more important than the others. If respondents interpreted the question in such a fashion then they would have suppressed a response that might have tried to synthesise a number of police functions.

Nonetheless, it would have been possible to provide a more abstract and inclusive form of response e.g. by stating that the objective/purpose of police has been articulated in ACPO's Statement of Common Purpose and Values or to have used a more personal way of integrating the several ends and means of policing into a single coherent statement.

No respondent made any explicit reference to the varieties of definition concerning the core purpose or role of police that have been suggested in the academic literature. Nor did any person refer to the more standard 'official' documents defining the purpose(s) of police such as the original instructions to the Metropolitan Police, the Royal Commission on Police (1962) or the Scarman report (1981). In relation to 'Conjecture 1' the data suggested that 'official authoritative'
definitions had not been internalised by the respondents.

The actual wording of the responses generated by the respondents to the first question shows that two-thirds brought some individuality to the way they expressed their responses. However, of this two-thirds only twelve officers introduced a distinctly discernible personal voice. The remaining respondents 'borrowed' their response from pre-existing and well-worn phrasings. At a much later phase of the inquiry process I was to learn that the police organisation was perceived by a majority of the middle-managers as a 'rules and procedures' organisation - a consequence of which is to suppress individuality and autonomy as well as the habit of asking 'fundamental' kinds of question. It is, therefore, not surprising that the respondents were prone to cliché and the familiar.

Rather surprisingly, only five out of the sixty respondents reprised the much cited sentence from the original instructions to officers in the Metropolitan police i.e.:

"It should be understood, at the outset, that the principal object to be attained is "the prevention of crime." To this great end every effort of the Police is to be directed." (Instructions to the Metropolitan Police 1829: 1)

In fact, not one single respondent wrote simply: 'The prevention of crime' in response to the first question.

The largest category (N = 14) emphasised the importance of the 'protection' police provide to the people policed. If, to this category were added those categories emphasising the 'safety' afforded to the public by police then almost one half of the respondents would be included.

'Law enforcement' was chosen by only two of the sixty respondents. This, added to the relatively infrequent occasions when the word 'law' was used in the responses, suggests that police middle-managers do not limit their conception of the police purpose to something as narrow as the application of the law.

It might have been the case that the encompassing notion of 'upholding the Rule of Law' would have been identified by police middle-managers as the most important purpose of police but this term was chosen by only two of the sixty respondents.

Importantly, the idea of police working as partners within the more general field of community safety and public service provision was never explicitly mentioned by any officer.
Overall, the data suggest that different police managers do hold subtly (or perhaps significantly) different opinions on the most important of police purposes despite the fact that the ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values had been published four years previously and had been both commended to the service as a whole and widely recommended for acceptance by police officers as providing an adequate answer to questions concerning the proper raison d'etre of police.

**Question 2: What, in your opinion, is the most important duty of a police officer?**

28 different categories of response were distinguished. The categories were amalgamated into 13 combined (aggregate) categories. The three largest categories were:

- To provide a service to the public (N = 14)

- Conduct expressing virtues (e.g. honesty) (N = 12)

- To protect life and property/preserve the quality of life (N = 11)

**Discussion**

Although Laugharne and Newman (1985) had discussed a set of duties both of 'function' and 'method', no mention was made of this potential resource either as a device to help effect a synthesis of the purposes of police - or as a way of providing an answer to the question concerning the 'most important duty' of police. Nor was any reference made to the draft statement of ethical principles as a source for defining the most important duty (or duties) of a police officer. In relation to 'Conjecture 2' the data suggested that formal definitions had not become integrated into the discourse of the respondents.

The responses to question 2 suggest that the 'Quality of Service' philosophy had begun to be embraced by almost one fifth of the respondents. Thus, 14 out of 60 officers, made some reference to providing a 'service' to the public. This data begins to establish a link with Waters (1996, 1999) finding that, in the main, police managers were not averse to the 'Quality' philosophy; this philosophy was becoming relatively pervasive as a managerial doctrine in policing. The second largest category (N = 12) noted that the most important duty of police was to display conduct which embodied moral virtue. These officers, in their responses, showed similarities of emphasis with some of the statements in the draft statement
of ethical principles.

A noticeable feature of the data was the lack of a discernible personal voice in the written responses. In the main, the responses were not original; they were derivative. So, for example, respondents reproduced pithy statements such as 'the prevention and detection of crime' or 'upholding the Queen's Peace' without any personalised elaboration. A 'personal' voice indicates that a person, has begun to embrace the Socratic injunction that we must 'think for ourselves'. The fact that only a quarter of the respondents provided some evidence that they had genuinely grounded their answer in an autonomous reflective process illustrates how a wider educational design process providing those same individuals with a 'reflective space' was likely to be an alien form of experience.

It could also serve as a rough indicator pointing towards the absence of autonomous self-managing and self-monitoring professionals. However, the third question did appear to draw out from the respondents a more personal voice:

**Question 3: What, in your opinion, is your most important duty as a police manager, administrator and supervisor?**

The responses were sorted into five categories:

- An expression of the new 'service philosophy' (N = 11)

Example: *To enable the front line officers/supervisors to provide a service to members of the public and to give support and guidance to officers themselves*

- Effectiveness and efficiency (N = 10)

Example: *To make the most cost-effective use of the resources I control towards achieving the stated/agreed aims of the service and within clearly identified priorities*

- Managing in accordance with moral values/moral consciousness - including support and empowerment of colleagues (N = 32)

Examples: *To lead by example and uphold the professional integrity of the force in general; To uphold the principle of ethics, discipline code etc. within the police service. In addition to stamp out bigotry, oppression, racial/sexual harassment of colleagues*
- An emphasis on achieving police objectives (N = 3)

Example: Ensure that the unit under my command is operating smoothly in conjunction with Police units towards the common aim of achieving the overall police objectives

- Miscellaneous (N = 4)

Discussion:

Emerging from the responses is, prima facie, something unmistakably commendable. These are impressive responses - even though they are contingent on the nature of the question. They suggest how important explicit ethical discourse might be in helping police practitioners to guide, influence and inform their decision-making and conduct.

Although the data were sorted into five categories an actual reading of the original responses shows how varied they are. Thus, the largest category, 'Managing in accordance with moral values/moral consciousness - including support and empowerment of colleagues' includes a loosely associated collection of responses which directly or by implication include some moral features.

The data also shows that the relatively new 'service' philosophy and the somewhat older 'economy, effectiveness and efficiency' philosophy (which itself was captured in Home Office circular 114 of 1983, and was an ancestor of the quality of service' philosophy) had come to provide ways of conceptualising the most important duty of police managers by twenty one (i.e. one third) of the respondents.

The most striking feature of the data is the amount of variety and contrast amongst the responses. The following comments exemplify this:

- To ensure that policing is implemented equally and fairly to internal and external customers which must be designed to meet the needs of the local community not political dogma

- To direct resources towards upholding the rule of law

- To support those I manage, and to encourage the most conducive environment and opportunities for free-thinking individualism and respect for others (police and
public)

- To provide the kind of guidance, direction and influence that enables my staff to maximise their potential

Thus, in relation to 'Conjecture 3' the data confirms the notion that there is considerable diversity amongst the middle-managers of the police service.

However, these responses inevitably raise the question of a possible contrast between espoused theory and theory in practice. Richards (1990) in the course of his analysis of police occupational culture asserts that police take on a chameleon character and become highly skilled at reproducing for their audience that which they think will seem appropriate (or satisfactory) for that audience. On this thesis, police will learn, rapidly, what it is they need to present whilst they are in 'management mode'. In short, they 'learn their lines' quickly and well.

**Question 4: What help would you like from the police organisation to sustain and enhance your moral standards?**

The data were organised into five categories. (The responses of some respondents were sorted into more than one category)

- Senior (and other) management change - e.g. 'improved integrity' (N = 18)

Example: *Acknowledgement that some wrongdoing does occur and that there should be greater training for supervisors with a clear message to them that the responsibility lies with them as individuals*

- A general organisation and/or culture change (N = 28)

Example: *The establishing of a service wide culture that - to have standards is to be 'in', to belong, rather than to be ridiculed and isolated as an odd ball. Compulsory job rotation for all officers every three years. Even a temporary lateral move to a diametrically opposed sphere of work will spread knowledge, experience, and expertise throughout all branches of the service, and at the same time will destroy the canteen culture and clique mentality which leads to problems*

- A specific organisation change (N= 4)

Example: *Regular meetings with peers which specifically deal with the subject*
ethics. Understanding on the part of supervisory senior management ranks

- No change needed (N = 9)

Example: I am unconvinced that any external measures would fundamentally influence my moral integrity

- Allowing the person to be more able to be more of themselves (N = 6)

Example: I should like always to be treated with respect and compassion in particular as an individual

- Miscellaneous (N = 7)

Discussion

In the course of designing for the ethics education experience I had studied an enormous range of television documentaries featuring police in action. On occasion, those documentaries had featured police managers - at both strategic and middle-management levels. Those managers had demonstrated a range of styles of interaction and distinctive ways of using discourse. All were instructive. However, and consistently, the response of course participants to the video clips I would use - that featured police managers in action - was usually negative. Thus, for example, one exchange involving a strategic level manager and a 'business unit' manager - which, to my eye, seemed entirely reasonable, was ridiculed by my audience. The superintendent (the business unit manager) was going, in fact, to be 'chastised', 'hung out to dry', 'up against the firing squad', 'disembowelled' and worse, by the strategic level manager.

So, it was unsurprising that slightly more than one quarter of the respondents (18 out of 60) identified 'senior management change' as a specific feature that might help them sustain and enhance their moral standards. The wording of the question probably minimised the extent of the negativity that was likely to be felt because it asked what 'help' police managers would want. The police culture appears to be simultaneously a welfare culture and a culture of self-sufficiency. In general police managers would not be especially disposed to ask for or expect 'help'.

Half the respondents wanted to see a general or specific organisational change. Plumridge (1988) had underlined the extent to which the police organisation was perceived as a mixture of a 'power' and 'role' culture and how a majority of its
managers wished, in preference, for an 'achievement' (or even a 'person') culture.

Together, these two response themes support 'Conjecture 4'.

The data collected here was beginning to suggest that police managers were practising within a cultural milieu that departed from exemplary moral standards and that they wished for a more 'ethical' organisation.

The following remark is not atypical of communications made by police middle-managers in the discussion contexts which took place during the ethics education experiences. It not only points to the need for a culture change but also highlights the contradiction between the fact that the individual respondents tended to have a positive view of their own moral standards whilst participating in an organisation that was morally defective:

'A culture change that puts the service second to the primary object of serving the public. An acceptance that honest self-criticism and self-appraisal is a positive thing, not one that can be used against the individual in selection for promotion/specialist posts. Currently it pays to fabricate.'

**Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (Version 2)**

The second version of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire had four objectives.

First, I wanted to understand how police middle-managers would choose to characterise their 'moral code'. Would they, for example, portray themselves as persons who were 'principled' or morally expedient?

Second, I wanted to discover how 'ethical' they perceived themselves to be.

Third, I wanted to gather more data concerning how improvements might be made to the moral character of the police organisation.

Finally, and related to this latter point, I wanted to discover their reaction to the publication of the draft statement of ethical principles. A 'service wide' consultation process was taking place in relation to the statement of ethical principles and I thought that my data might help to inform that process.

As with the first questionnaire, this questionnaire consisted of four questions. Course participants were asked to provide written answers to each question. They
were also told that they would receive - on their return to Bramshill - a presentation describing the data patterns emerging. The constituent questions were:

Question 1. If you were to describe your moral code in one or two sentences how would you do so?

Question 2. How ethical do you perceive yourself to be?

Each respondent rated themselves on an analogue rating scale ranging from 'Extremely ethical' (100) to 'Extremely unethical' (0)

Question 3. If you were to improve the moral character of the police organisation what, in your view, would be the most effective way of doing so?

Question 4. The police service is developing a set of ethical principles. Please would you describe your reaction to such a set of principles. (Each respondent was given a copy of the draft statement)

Results: N = 63 Respondents (Chief Inspectors) - Late Spring of 1994

Prior to administering the questionnaire I generated the following 'conjectures':

Conjecture 5: Because of the 'moral muteness' of managers generally I imagined that the moral code of police middle-managers would be expressed in conventional terms - e.g. 'the golden rule'.

Conjecture 6: Jackson (1993) had suggested that people generally perceive themselves as 'ethical' rather than 'unethical'. I supposed that police middle-managers would incline towards the 'highly ethical' region of the continuum.

Conjecture 7: Police culture would be identified as the target' for change in order to enhance the 'moral character' of the police organisation

Conjecture 8: If police were change-resistant then a majority would have a form of negative reaction to the draft statement of ethical principles

Question 1. If you were to describe your moral code in one or two sentences how would you do

The data were sorted into six categories:
- Moral values/principles made explicit (including, rarely, a mention of the importance of 'human rights' concerns) (N = 22)

Example: *The promotion and protection of human dignity in the face of ever increasing opposition - ultimately impossible to achieve*

- The golden rule/a close variant of the golden rule/Christianity-referenced (N = 15)

Example: *To treat everyone as I would expect to be treated*

- The end justifies (or can) justify the means (N = 4)

Example: *The end justifies the means - so long as it is an honest end (I leave 'honest' to my own interpretation)*

- A general non-specific response (N = 11)

Example: *Adherence to a clear value system*

- 'Original' statements (N = 8)

Examples: *To maximise contentment of me and mine with smallest detrimental effect upon those surrounding and if possible to benefit greatest number in so doing; Do as you would be done by and (paradoxically) do unto others before they do you*

- Miscellaneous (N =2)

Example: *A Kantian concept of the self from which the good action will be in accordance with the intrinsic worth of every individual. This concept of the self generates obligations from which correlative rights can be derived*

**Discussion**

A small group of officers (approximately 10%) admit that their moral code is best characterised in terms of the 'ends justifying the means' - or the related 'flexible according to the circumstances'.

The category 'a general non-specific response' - included eleven respondents. These
officers were unable to specify any content in relation to their moral code and suggested that they were, in fact, unfamiliar with explicit ethical discourse.

The category - 'The golden rule' - accounted for almost one quarter of the respondents. This is unsurprising except it does refer to a highly conventional way of summarising a moral code and points again towards the pattern of response noted in relation to the first version of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire - i.e. a lack of originality.

To counter this, however, the category 'Moral values/principles made explicit' accounted for slightly more than half the respondents. Here, individuals chose to name specific moral values or specific moral principles as they characterised their moral code. Prominent among the responses were references to 'honesty' and 'integrity'. I was to learn that issues of 'honesty' and 'integrity' were particularly salient for police middle-managers when they addressed moral questions and reflected upon ethical issues. In relation to 'Conjecture 5' the content of the responses indicates a mixture of 'conventional' and contrasting 'individualised' characterisations.

Overall, the data point towards an apparent diversity, difference, variety and non-uniformity amongst police middle-managers.

**Question 2. How ethical do you perceive yourself to be?**

Each respondent rated themselves on an analogue rating scale ranging from 'Extremely Ethical' (100) to 'Extremely Unethical' (0)

Data summary: (N = 63 Chief Inspectors)

Range: 99 - 19

Mean: 78.6  Standard deviation: 14.27

**Discussion:**

In general, police middle-managers perceive themselves as highly ethical. A mean score of 78.6 is well above the mid-point on the scale 'extremely ethical' to 'extremely unethical'. The modal interval was 81 - 90.

Only one person rated him (or her) self below the midpoint and towards the
unethical' pole.

16 out of 63 rate (approximately 25%) themselves below the 75 mark. Thus, it is possible to assert with confidence that the respondents - as a whole - see themselves as 'ethical' rather than unethical'. This finding accords with a more general impression created by the responses across the different questionnaires.

'Conjecture 6' is confirmed by the data.

**Question 3: If you were to improve the moral character of the police organisation what, in your view, would be the most effective way of doing so?**

Overall, a total of 28 different (or differently nuanced) responses emerge in reply to this question. The responses were organised into thirteen themes. The three most commonly identified were:

- Different emphases on the part of senior managers (N = 12)

  *Example: The need for senior managers to be seen and heard pressing for change*

- Culture and organisational ethos change (N = 13)

  *Example: Removing fear of speaking out and living out in the open. Officers who did not fear organisational reprisals are more likely to be prepared to say: 'I got it wrong - I'm sorry'*

- New emphases in education and training (N = 20)

  *Example: Education let the police fully understand their role*

**Discussion:**

Whilst the question did not insist that the moral character of the police organisation was defective, the content of the responses conveyed a definite sense that the organisation could improve its moral character. So, for example, twelve respondents emphasised the need for change on the part of senior managers and included observations such as:

- Only when the upper echelons improve and truly endorse a code of ethics will the code achieve credibility in the rest of the organisation. The apple is rotten at the
Overall, there was no shortage of different suggestions for improving the moral character of the police organisation - if police middle-managers were to take on such a task.

The largest theme - i.e. new emphases in education and training - attracted almost a third of the respondents. However, it may be even more significant that two thirds did *not* mention the contribution that the training school (and/or police training/development programmes) might make to raising the moral quality of the police organisation.

Only two officers noted that no change was necessary. The responses of a small number of officers suggested the need to return to an original more disciplined service.

Once again, the data highlight the variability that appears to characterise police middle managers. Their responses range from the most basic and taciturn to the highly sophisticated and academic. Overall the data suggest that 'Conjecture 7' was only partly supported.

*Question 4. The police service is developing a set of ethical principles. Please would you describe your reaction to such a set of principles. (Each respondent was given a copy of the draft statement of ethical principles)*

The responses were classified into four categories:

- A positive reaction/agreement etc. (N = 31)
  
  Example: 'I am in total agreement'

- A negative reaction/unnecessary etc. (N = 11)
  
  Example: 'An insult to my own standards/principles'

- Equivocal (N = 13)
  
  Example: Whilst the idea is good it has not been "sold" to junior officers in the best way. It is badly worded and comes over as yet more HQ waffle
- No indication of positive or negative reaction ($N = 7$)

Example: *They reinforce the principles within which I already work*

**Discussion**

A minority expressed a negative reaction to the draft statement of ethical principles. Almost a half expressed an unequivocal positive reaction. Some responses were classified as 'equivocal' because, whilst not expressing an absolute rejection these respondents perceived factors within the police organisation that compromised the value of the statement. Conjecture 8 was not fully supported.

The data also illustrates themes that typify police discourse. I have selected five such examples of 'typical police voices':

The first voice identifies an apparently permanent characteristic of the police - i.e. defensiveness:

Example: *I support them but feel they have been introduced too soon after other reforms thus falling into 'flavour of the month' syndrome. The police are at present in a defensive (as always) mood and this is not likely to fall on fertile ground. Incongruity with the discipline code.***

The second voice illustrates the familiar appeal to 'culture change' as the solution to police problems:

Example: *Its going to take a whole new culture to change the police behaviour. Its happening at the bottom but a policy statement is superficial - lip service*

The third voice illustrates the way police anticipate how their colleagues will respond to 'reform' attempts:

Example: *An excellent idea that the majority will only pay lip service to*

The fourth voice expresses police resistance to 'outside interference':

Example: *I see these principles as a back door con trick to introduce a replacement discipline code which will prove to be wider than it. Added to a lower level of proof of probability against officers on discipline matters, I see it as an erosion of police officers rights*
The fifth voice is a very good example of the type of dismissive, negative (and even paranoid) reaction that seems to exercise a disproportionate influence on police perception of themselves:

Example: *I dislike this 'show' type of statement. I do not believe anyone believes if so it is worthless. My oath of office is sufficient and police officers should not resort to this propaganda.*

Together, these voices reveal the difficulties facing police strategists because they illustrate the 'contrary', 'difficult' and 'defensive' nature of middle-managers.

The first two questionnaires had helped to demonstrate 'difference' amongst police leaders and managers attending the middle-management programmes of study at Bramshill. The responses had revealed a contrast between some officers comfortable with reform and those who resented any form of interference from the 'outside'. The data also suggested that a substantial minority (if not a majority) lacked confidence in the ethics of senior management; there was also evidence that changes to the police organisational and occupational culture might be welcomed. In the third version of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire I wanted to examine perceptions concerning the proper moral foundations of leadership. I also wanted to uncover the moral 'priorities' of police managers. From a small number of moral values, which would they select as the most important'? I also wanted to clarify which values the middle-managers thought were most important in relation to the development of the police organisation. Finally, I thought that it was important to try and uncover the views middle-managers had about their own 'human' nature and their view of human nature generally. A part of police folklore asserted that police were cynics. Would they see themselves as cynics rather than persons who, following Ker Muir (1977) embraced the 'tragic' perspective? In consequence, I developed four questions as follows:

*Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (Version 3)*

**Question 1**: The police service is exploring the development of a 'statement of shared values' with an emphasis on the moral dimension of policing. If you were to define three values that you earnestly believe police officers should genuinely share what would those three values be?

**Question 2**: Please rank the following five 'moral' values in terms of their importance to you: Truth, Benevolence, Loyalty, Justice, Tolerance
Question 3: The 'Eight E' organisation: The 'Eight E' framework has been developed at Bramshill and it can usefully be used to facilitate the development of any police organisation. The eight 'Es' are:

Economy, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Education, Empowerment, Ethics, Ecstasy (Quality of Service) and Ecology.

Respondents were provided with short definitions of each 'E and asked to rank order them in terms of value for the developing police organisation.

Question 4a. Perspectives on human nature and on your own 'nature': Respondents were asked to indicate whether they viewed human nature as 'humanistic', 'animalistic' or 'rational'. They were given short definitions of each perspective taken from Pfeiffer (1992).

Question 4b. Respondents were asked to rate themselves on a bipolar scale: cynic perspective versus tragic perspective. They were given short definitions of each perspective taken from Ker Muir (1977).

Prior to administering the questionnaire I generated the following 'conjectures':

Conjecture 9: The diversity of responses that had been provided by the different intakes of police managers gave me reason to believe that the responses to question 1 would be similarly varied.

Conjecture 10: I imagined that 'Justice' would be endorsed as the most important value.

Conjecture 11. The emphasis that had been placed on police effectiveness (through, for example Home Office circulars and the ACPO Quality of Service Committee) led me to anticipate that the 'effectiveness' would be identified as the most important value emphasis for the developing police organisation.

Conjecture 12: Police regularly drew attention to the fact that their organisation was made up of 'cynics'. They also seemed to endorse a negative view of human nature. In consequence, they might profile themselves as 'cynics' and, similarly, might incline towards an animalistic view of human nature.
N = 64 Respondents (Chief Inspectors) - Autumn 1994

**Question 1:** The police service is exploring the development of a 'statement of shared values' with an emphasis on the moral dimension of policing. If you were to define three values that you earnestly believe police officers should genuinely share what would those three values be?

The most commonly identified value was 'Honesty' (N = 47)

The second most commonly identified value was 'Integrity' (N = 37)

These were the only values that secured an absolute majority endorsement.

Integrity and Honesty together were chosen by 28 of the 64 respondents.

Other qualities mentioned included 'fairness' (N = 16), 'compassion, caring and understanding', (N = 15) and 'justice' (N = 11). Small numbers of officers mentioned 'consideration for human rights', loyalty, courage, impartiality. Other values mentioned once (i.e. by a single respondent) were: sincerity, valuing difference/diversity, reliability, respect, trustworthy, dignity, self-discipline and control, passion, professionalism, and, belief in democracy.

**Discussion**

In principle, because police work and its leadership is rooted in the executive function(s) of government and requires conduct oriented towards securing social peace as well as the application of law it would have been perfectly plausible for police middle-managers to opt for any one of a wide range of values. However, the two values, 'Honesty' and 'Integrity' dominate. The data pattern coincides exactly with the pattern reported by Jackson (1993) - following an exercise examining the qualities of an 'ethical' person. Jackson's data was based on over twenty workshops involving adults in Australia. This appears to be a doubly significant finding; first, it indicates that police middle-managers share their emphasis with non-police; second it represents a relatively unusual moment when police as a whole demonstrates a commonality of response. Therefore, 'Conjecture 9' was not supported.
Question 2. Please rank the following five 'moral' values in terms of their importance to you: Truth, Benevolence, Loyalty, Justice, Tolerance

The data showed the following mean rank order:

1. Truth - Mean Rank = 1.303, S.D. = 0.557
2. Justice - Mean Rank = 2.191, S.D. = 0.913
3. Tolerance - Mean Rank = 3.392, S.D. = 1.105
4. Loyalty - Mean Rank = 3.825, S.D. = 1.101
5. Benevolence - Mean Rank = 4.158, S.D. = 0.787

Discussion

The data reveal a clearly defined pattern: a large majority rank 'truth' number one. Of those respondents who ranked 'truth' number 1, 35 ranked 'justice' number 2. Thus, an overall majority ranked 'Truth' 1 and 'Justice' 2. Benevolence was ranked lowest of the five values. Conjecture 10 was not supported.

One way of interpreting this finding is to recognise that police are trained to prove that something is the case 'beyond reasonable doubt'. In other words, police are socialised into an occupation where a straightforward priority obtains. They must, in principle, find the truth and present the truth. The emphasis on the 'search for truth' was particularly profiled in the early part of the 1990s by for example, police leaders such as Woodcock (1992) and Imbert (1992). (Moreover, the 'distance learning' reading material sent to course participants included extracts from Woodcock's paper advocating that police officers should increasingly come to see themselves as gatherers of evidence as they sought to uncover the 'truth'.) The 'privileging' of the value 'truth' also correlates with the emphasis on 'honesty'. Put most simply, the honest person tells the truth.
Question 3: The 'eight E' organisation

Data summary: The rank ordering of the eight 'E's was:

1. Ethics: Mean rank 2.190 S.D. 1.644
2. Effectiveness: Mean rank 3.269 S.D. 1.919
3. Efficiency: Mean rank 4.142 S.D. 2.213
4. Empowerment: Mean rank 4.286 S.D. 1.773
5. Education: Mean rank 4.635 S.D. 1.928
6. Economy: Mean rank 5.032 S.D. 1.874
8. Ecstasy: Mean rank 6.269 S.D. 2.009

34 respondents (out of 63) ranked 'ethics' number 1. 15 out of 63 respondents ranked effectiveness number 1.

Discussion

In the decade leading up to the date upon which the data were collected a considerable emphasis had been placed on improving the efficiency and the quality of service provided by public service sector organisations. The Home Office circular 114 of 1983 had stipulated the need for police organisations to be 'effective, efficient and economic'. This value framework had been re-emphasised by the 'Quality of Service' committee in 1992. The formal content of the seminar at Bramshill had included presentations on 'Performance indicators', 'Value for money', 'monitoring the quality of service', 'Quality of management'. All these presentations reinforced and extended the underlying trend concerned with providing effectiveness, efficiency and best use of resources. The seminar also highlighted the developments concerning a code of ethics for police (and saw the publication of the draft statement of ethical principles).

Thus, it could have been anticipated that 'effectiveness' would have emerged as the most valued emphasis for the developing police organisation. However, an absolute
majority selected 'ethics' as the most important value emphasis for the police organisation. Therefore 'Conjecture 11' was not supported. It was scarcely surprising that 'ecstasy' attracted the lowest overall rating; the choice of the label 'ecstasy' was injudicious and did not allow the idea of providing a high quality of service to 'customers' to be appropriately considered.

The relatively low ranking for 'economy' reflects a disturbing phenomenon concerning the attitude police managers have towards the resources they expend. They are disinclined to include financial concerns and budgetary considerations in their discourse concerning policing priorities and police matters generally - except to complain about the difficulties they face with managing overtime payments.

**Question 4. Perspectives on human nature and on your own 'nature'**

Question 4 a: Respondents were asked to indicate which of three views 'Animalistic', 'Humanistic' and 'Rational' best described human nature.

Data summary

Animalistic N = 17, Humanistic N = 24, Rational N = 12, Mixed nature N = 8

**Discussion**

Generalisations made on police - both by themselves and by police scholars - could provide grounds for hypothesising that the 'animalistic' view of human nature might predominate in the responses to this question. However, only a third of police middle-managers come to indicate that they view human nature in these terms. Nonetheless, one third of the group constitutes a significant proportion and the attitudinal correlates of this view i.e. anti idealism etc. might go some way towards explaining the cool reception I experienced from numbers of police officers in the course of presenting an ethics education. The 'humanistic' view was the chosen by the largest number of respondents although it failed to secure an absolute majority of endorsements. The data again point to the variability of outlook that characterises police middle-managers and suggests that, in the face of such potentially profound levels of difference, it remains remarkably difficult to secure a shared positive response to strategic or educational initiatives.
Question 4b

Respondents were asked to examine the contrast between the 'tragic' perspective and the 'cynic' perspective and then rate themselves on a scale from 0 (cynic) to 100 (tragic). Scores below 50 incline towards the cynic viewpoint. Scores above 50 incline towards the tragic viewpoint.

Result: Mean = 59.492, Standard deviation = 21.464

Range of scores = 93 - 6

Discussion

Stated most crudely, the data suggests that, overall, police middle-managers incline towards a 'tragic' rather than a 'cynic' mode of self-conceptualisation. Conjecture 12 was not fully supported. However, 40% of the sample show leanings towards seeing themselves as cynics. Again, this might go some way towards explaining why I frequently encountered an unenthusiastic audience and a negative valuing of my work. Thus, cynics have tended to 'give up on humanity' and remain fundamentally sceptical about 'ethics'.

Nonetheless, as the responses to the first question on version four of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire were to show, a majority of the police middle-managers in the sample group thought that the study of ethics could, in fact, lead to improvements in the overall professional standards of the police organisation.

Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (Version 4)

Since 'ethics' had emerged as the value identified as 'most important' for the developing police organisation, I wanted to discover what respondents might think the study of ethics would achieve for police and policing. As my inquiry had progressed the quality and integrity of police leadership had come under national scrutiny. What, according to my respondents were the most important moral qualities of the police leader? I also wanted to clarify the positive and negative aspects of police culture in relation to the moral standards of police officers. In consequence I designed version four of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire as follows:

Question 1: In your view, what, if any, contribution to policing can be made by the study of ethics?
Question 2: Leadership needs to be based upon a moral foundation. What, in your view, is the most important moral quality of a leader?

Question 3. Much has been written on the police occupational culture. What features of the police culture enhance the ethical character (moral quality) of police officers?

Question 4. What features of the police culture work against the ethical character (moral quality) of police officers? (Note: in essence, this question deals with the opposite 'pole' that was examined in Question 3)

As with all the previous questionnaires I developed a preliminary conjecture in relation to each question:

Conjecture 13. I imagined that the study of 'ethics' would be considered to make an improvement to police conduct.

Conjecture 14. If 'honesty' and integrity' are identified as the most important moral values generally, then they would be selected as the most important foundations for police leadership

Conjecture 15. I imagined that the virtues of police would be identified as positive moral force fields as well as the moral aspects of the police ends and means.

Conjecture 16. The social scientific literature on police had stressed group solidarity and pressures to conform. I thought that these pressures would be identified as the main barriers to ethical conduct.

The questionnaire was administered in the Spring of 1995: N = 50 Respondents (Chief Inspectors)

*Question 1: In your view, what, if any, contribution to policing can be made by the study of ethics?*

Two main themes emerged:

Theme One: The study of ethics is related to sustaining and/or improving the moral quality of the police organisation/ the moral tone of conduct/ the moral standards
of policing, now and in the future: (N = 38)

Examples:

*Ethics has a central part to play in policing. If we do not have ethics then the whole structure/organisation is open to corruption, poor standards which result in a poor or improper service to the public*  

*There is a widespread ignorance of what ethics is and addressing that must be beneficial* 

*An awareness that ethics is an important development stage in all individuals and as one grows older we learn that in ourselves we cannot accept anything less than complete ethics and it is to where we must get* 

*It will raise the professional standard of the force* 

*Is probably fundamental and instrumental to changing police culture and thereby raise professional and public esteem* 

Theme two: an 'educational' function: (N = 10)

Examples:

*It will provide an opportunity to delve below the assumptions, and artifacts that have shaped our behaviour, rituals etc. that create our culture* 

*The reasons for change after the existence of the Police service (sic). Is there more to ii than miscarriages of justice? What are we about? The study may enlighten us* 

Difficult to classify: (N = 2)

**Discussion**

The comments suggest that a majority of respondents imagine that the study of ethics could play a significant role in helping to enhance the professional standards of the police and the moral tone of the organisation. This finding links to the importance given to 'ethics' as a value in the developing police organisation that was revealed by the third version of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. Conjecture 13 was supported.
Question 2: Leadership needs to be based upon a moral foundation. What, in your view, is the most important moral quality of a leader?

A majority identified honesty or integrity as the single most important moral foundation of the leader. The 'moral foundations' for leadership noted by the respondents were as follows:

- Honesty/Integrity (N = 27)

Examples:

Integrity. Many failures can be forgiven if the leader displays this quality e.g. rudeness, incompetence etc.

Honesty is of utmost importance as is integrity and fairness. I believe Police officers must treat people with respect and impartiality. Treat others as you would want to be treated yourself

- Fairness (N = 6)

Example: Fairness and impartiality. No prejudiced or bigoted views - if the second is put into practice with junior officers or others - could create aggressiveness. To treat everyone on his/her merits and listen to all sides

- Compassion/care/regard for others - and 'treat people as one would wish to be treated' (N = 6)

Example: Compassion - a caring leader reaps the benefit of both internal and external customer care

- Others (N = 7)

- Unanswered (N = 1)

Discussion

This data pattern suggests that 'trustworthiness' and those attributes constituting integrity as it is commonly understood - i.e. 'uprightness', 'wholeness', 'soundness' and 'honesty' are perceived by police middle managers to be of especial importance
in relation to the character and practices of the leader. Alternative conceptions, such as the 'just' leader or the 'caring' leader are not weighted by the group as a whole at the same level of importance. Therefore, 'Conjecture 14' is supported.

Again, this finding links with the earlier pattern where 'honesty' and integrity were identified by police managers as the moral qualities they thought should be shared by police officers in general.

**Question 3. Much has been written on the police occupational culture. What features of the police culture enhance the ethical character (moral quality) of police officers?**

Six themes emerged:

- **Theme one:** Moral values salient within the culture e.g. justice, altruism (N = 17)
  
  Example: *Sense of vocation, altruism, concept of service - particularly public service*

- **Theme two:** Comradeship, team work etc. (N = 19)
  
  Example: *Mutual support in times of crisis. Co-workers can feed off success of the good practice of others*

- **Theme three:** The emphasis on 'service' (quality of service) to the public - helping the public - caring for the public (N = 16)
  
  Example: *Integrity, honesty, the desire to serve the public. A drive towards greater openness. The willingness to reflect and change*

- **Theme four:** A willingness to change/openness (N = 2)
  
  Example: *A willingness to change, openness, and to be self-critical of our conduct*

- **Theme five:** A definite sense of being on the side of that which is 'right' - we are the 'good guys' (N = 8)
  
  Example: *A belief that the police are guardians of society which leads them to make decisions which they believe are for the general good*
Discussion

The largest number of respondents (19 out of 50) picked out comradeship, camaraderie and team spirit as the feature of police culture helping to enhance the moral qualities of police officers. This is complemented by the second most frequent response that identified the positive moral values salient within the police organisation. Significantly neither 'leaders' nor 'leadership' nor police training emerged as chosen responses. However, again, the desires to ‘help’, ‘care for’ and ‘serve’ the public were selected as positive moral force fields. In general here was some support for 'Conjecture 15'.

Question 4. What features of the police culture work against the ethical character (moral quality) of police officers? (Note: in essence, this question deals with the opposite 'pole' that was examined in Question 3)

Four themes emerged from the responses:

Theme one: Adhering to group norms - following traditional practices - CID culture and the 'old boys club' - misplaced loyalty (N = 22)

Examples:

Being one of the boys - requirement for conformity

Peer pressure against 'whistle blowers' in the form of ostracisation. Denial of equal opportunity etc.
The belief that the team is all important. This also lead to misguided action

The feeling that we can't be wrong/we can't have made a mistake, closing of ranks, a failure to respond to criticism

- Theme two: Pressures to get results/Quantity based results (N = 5)

Example: A misguided sense of duty (to get results), a tendency to help only those whom we think deserve it
- Theme three: Rule bending/the end justifies the means (N = 6)

Example: An inherent sense of justice can result in reverse ethically - that the end justifies the means

- Theme four: Organisational character/culture - mistrust, denial of equal opportunities (N = 18)

Examples:

Blinkered, tunnel vision. Single mindedness, unable to see the other side of the coin

Racist and sexist attitudes

Cynics - the thin blue line

Others (N = 7)

Example: Chief officers not practising what they speak/advocate. Ethics is for everyone and must be seen in the work of the whole organisation. Chief officers/senior officers who push for results regardless of the consequences or difficulties and will not listen to reason

Discussion

This latter data set allows an unusual insight into the judgements police middle-managers themselves make in relation to identifying those features of their culture which can be reasons for deviating from the highest standards of professional integrity. The most frequently recurring themes included references to the way group processes could thwart adherence to morally exemplary conduct as well as features of the occupational/organisational culture which were morally disappointing or worse. Conjecture 16 was supported.

Summary

The first four versions of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire had provided a vivid sense of the complexities of the police managerial world. On some issues - such as the most important purpose or objective of policing - there appeared to be a multiplicity of perspectives. On others - such as the moral attributes deemed most important and desirable for police officers - there was a definite convergence of
view. Many police middle-managers seemed to respond with remarkable candour and were not afraid to present a critical view of their organisation. The responses also captured the contrasts amongst the characters of police middle-managers. Some respondents were terse and taciturn. Others were staid and conventional. Yet others drew from processes of careful reflection and considered analysis. Thus, it would be misleading to oversimplify through providing a comprehensive set of generalisations about 'police managers'.

The different versions of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire had enabled me to present a detailed description of the response patterns to the different intakes of police managers. Even though this data was not referred to explicitly in the 'ethics unit' evaluations, it served to help me gain in confidence as I presented the subject.

At the beginning of the new Police Management Programme in 1995 I was able to provide one lecture/presentation outlining the data patterns. In addition, I constructed a more general version of the instrument (see Appendix O) which was used to stimulate discussion in small groups throughout the subsequent phases of the action research inquiry. This enabled me to begin the process of exploring 'organisational ethics' by focusing on the construction of a 'moral ethos' questionnaire

**The Moral Ethos Questionnaire**

The Moral Ethos Questionnaire was derived directly from the work of Snell (1993). I have discussed his work in chapter 5 of this dissertation. He proposes an 'original' model not only composed of six types of moral ethos but also featuring sixteen dimensions that he describes as the 'salient properties of a moral ethos within organisations'. Snell believes that these sixteen dimensions may be regarded as variables which are not, however, entirely separate and discrete. It was his identification of the sixteen specific dimensions that led, immediately, to the development of a questionnaire (see Appendix P) expressly designed to begin the process of mapping the 'moral ethos' of police organisations. An example of a dimension is 'moral tone': Snell characterises this (by means of contrasting opposites) as follows:

'How far are people expected to hold to 'high' principles or, rather, does action tend to be expedient or exploitative?'

I developed a questionnaire examining police middle-managers perception of the moral dimensions of their organisation. Each dimension was characterised by two
questions intended to represent two ends of a continuum. The answers to those questions provided first glimpses of the moral properties of the organisation.

4 successive groups of middle managers attending the 'Managing People' module completed the 'Moral Ethos Questionnaire' in the second half of 1996.

A total of 111 individuals completed the instrument (including 7 civilian managers).

The pattern of responses to each of the 16 dimensions can be summarised as follows:

- Moral tone: A slight tendency for individuals to indicate that: 'People are expected to hold to 'high' principles'.

- Tightness: A slight tendency away from 'tightness' towards: 'There is room for individual judgment'.

- Deference to hierarchy: overall the respondents profiled the organisation as midway between: 'The prerogatives of rank (pressures to obey 'rank') are strong' versus: 'People are allowed to challenge more senior members'.

- Positional abuse: overall respondents profiled the organisation as very slightly towards: 'Power is used as a weapon over others' rather than: 'People are careful not to take unfair advantage'.

- Spread of trust: A slight tendency to endorse the statement: 'People are suspicious of those they do not know'.

- Dependence on allegiance: A clear tendency to endorse the statement: 'Trust is important in running the organisation'.

- Regulatory formalisation: A clear tendency to endorse the statement: 'Duties are clearly spelt out' rather than: 'Roles and codes are unspecific'.

- Adherence: A slight tendency to endorse the statement: 'People stick to what is expected of them'.

- Respect for dignity: A slight tendency towards endorsing the statement: 'People are valued in their own right'. 
- Intensity of political stakes: Overall the responses fell mid-way between: 'The consequences of losing in a conflict (within the organisation) are severe' and: 'People are 'safe' among fellow members'.

- Concentration of power: A slight tendency to regard power as concentrated at the centre of the organisation rather than being dispersed to the periphery

- Need for stability: A slight tendency to endorse the statement: 'The organisation is very open to change'.

- Breadth of constituency: A clear tendency to endorse the statement: 'There are many influential organisational stakeholders' rather than: 'The organisation has responsibilities only to a few'.

- Openness to criticism. A moderate tendency indicating that the organisation: 'is open to and addresses public feedback and criticism'.

- Demands on loyalty: A moderate tendency to perceive that: 'a great psychological commitment is required by the organisation'.

- Developmental openness: A moderate tendency for respondents to endorse the statement: 'performing one's role in the organisation extends one's talents, opens new horizons and yields significant self discoveries'.

Snell (1993) describes the specific quality of moral ethos resulting from pairs of dimension in combination. So, for example, a high moral tone combined with a low level of tightness results in an ethos of thoughtful self-regulation. By contrast, a low moral tone in combination with a high level of tightness produces an ethos that is characterised by an expedient 'get the job done at all costs'.

Table 3 represents the relevant description that may be applied to the results of combining the scores on pairs of dimensions. Thus, it may be read as a first summary of the overall moral ethos of the police organisation in England Wales, and Northern Ireland.
Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Description most characteristic of the police organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 and 2 combined</td>
<td>Thoughtful self-regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 and 4 combined</td>
<td>Oppression and coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 and 6 combined</td>
<td>Secretive scheming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 and 8 combined</td>
<td>Strictly rule-bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 and 10 combined</td>
<td>Intimate confrontation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 and 12 combined</td>
<td>Flux and transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 and 14 combined</td>
<td>Dialogue seeking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 and 16 combined</td>
<td>Symbiotic relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Moral Ethos Questionnaire was used to gather more data in the first half of 1997. A total of 100 respondents completed the instrument in the four module deliveries from February until May 1997.

Respondents were located in one of four quadrants (following the combination of pairs of dimensions) in total there were eight sets of four quadrants.

Table 4 indicates the highest frequency within any one of the eight quadrants.
Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of moral ethos</th>
<th>Number of cases (out of 100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thoughtful self-regulation</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppression and coercion</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretive scheming</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strictly rule bound</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat arena</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rigid command</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue seeking</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbiotic relationship</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Moral Ethos Questionnaire had provided original data and some insight into the 'moral force fields' at play in the police organisation. The instrument was succeeded, in early 1998 by an 'Organisational Ethics' questionnaire. This questionnaire, comprising three complementary sections, was designed to test the validity of the 'moral ethos' data and to establish the extent to which the police organisation approximated the 'quality' specification that had been articulated by police leaders such as Hirst (1992). 84 officers (Chief Inspectors and Inspectors) attending the Police Management Programme completed this instrument in the first half of 1998.

The 'Organisational Ethics Questionnaire'

The questionnaire (see Appendix O) consisted of three parts:

- Part one included nine statements and respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they were characteristic of the police organisation

- Part two consisted of 8 pairs of contrasting statements and respondents were asked to indicate which statement was more characteristic of the police
- Part three provided 3 sets of 6 descriptions. The descriptions each represented one of six levels of organisational development ranging from 'fear-ridden' to 'soul-searching'. Respondents were asked to identify, in each case, which description was most characteristic of the police organisation.

The data emerging from this questionnaire revealed the following patterns:

- The police organisation was profiled as a stage 4 (regulated) rather than a stage 5 (quality-seeking) organisation. Thus a very large majority of respondents selected the following 'Stage Four' (regulated) characteristics as typifying the police organisation rather than the alternative 'Stage Five' (quality-seeking) descriptions:

**Stage Four (set 1)**

*Decisions are governed by formal procedures, rules and regulations. Quality criteria and standards are set by the law, official requirement, professional regulation or strict contractual agreement. Performance is subject to audit. There is room for individual judgements within the bounds of set by the rules and procedures but bias and idiosyncrasy is deplored. The immediate answer to cases which would create a precedent is 'No', but these are referred upwards for arbitration.*

**Stage Five (set 1)**

*The organisation stands for a set of principles regarding justice, development, compassion, ecology etc. which serve to focus the actions of its individual members. Personal idiosyncrasies and differences in lifestyle are accepted among members, provided that these do not compromise core values. Rejecting the latter is incompatible with membership. A common feeling is of guilt: not doing enough, letting the cause or the side down.*

**Stage Four (set 2)**

*People are valued for their expertise. So long as they follow clear rules and conventions, broadly understandable to others, and make a tangible contribution to the organisation, they will suffer no ill. The most painful lessons are reserved for those in marginal positions, if they expect equal treatment, for in times of threat to the organisation and/or financial constraint they are the most vulnerable. Conflicts*
typically stem from disputes about resource allocation. There are established ways of settling them, either by reference to a professionally established hierarchy of values, or by coalition and majority ruling. Should the performance of particular individuals become a focus of concern, formal counselling and disciplinary procedures may be applied.

Stage Five (set 2)

People are not just vehicles for policy: the organisation is also a supportive community. Those under stress and/or performing badly are helped to recover and improve. No one is 'written off'. Those not suited to the organisation, due to values divergence, are helped to find suitable alternative work. Policy decisions are made in a representative forum, accountable to diverse stakeholders. Disputes revolve around applying and refining values rather than discarding them, and are resolved by seeking a wide consensus among all stakeholder groups and encouraging win-win attitudes. The most painful lesson (for visionaries) is that one will not win others over unilaterally - decisions emerge slowly, through dialogue. One has to learn humility. In tough times, the prevailing argument is for everyone to share some of the sacrifice and work for better times.

- The respondents showed a modal response of 'moderate agreement' to the following statements:

'Overall, the people in the organisation are trustworthy (e.g. there is little if any 'backstabbing', people 'mean what they say and say what they mean' etc.)'

'The people in the organisation are very willing to spend time helping and supporting one another'.

'The people in the organisation enjoy considerable (but appropriate freedom) in the way they fulfil their work tasks'

'The different needs and sensitivities of the individuals in the organisation are respected and appreciated'.

- The respondents showed a modal response of neither agreement nor disagreement to the following statements:

'The people in the organisation (when they are at work) are mainly interested in the
well-being of the organisation rather than their own careers (i.e. the people in the organisation are not particularly selfish)'

'If people make mistakes in the organisation the emphasis is upon learning from the mistake rather than punishment'

'The managers in the organisation genuinely try to empower organisational personnel'.

- The responses revealed a bimodal distribution to the following statements (i.e. equal proportions of respondents endorsed 'moderately agree' and 'moderately disagree'

'In the organisation people are rarely, if ever, intimidated by other persons (who are members of the same organisation)'

'People in the organisation make sure that their decisions are guided by moral principles such as tolerance, justice and benevolence'.

Finally, respondents confirmed the data pattern revealed by the 'moral ethos questionnaire' and profiled the police organisation as 'mixed' in terms of its moral 'health'. In addition, a small majority perceived that the leaders of the organisation put their own interests above the interests of the organisation.

**Discussion**

The most positive features of the moral ethos of police organisations revealed by the groups of respondents were: 'Thoughtful self-regulation', 'Intimate confrontation', 'Dialogue seeking', and, 'Flux and transformation'.

The constitutional position of the constable (an officer independent under the crown), the social psychological realities of independence and a relative absence of 'supervision' as well as the fact of discretionary powers might well be a constellation of factors prompting an organisational ethos of 'thoughtful self regulation'. Loyalty is inculcated in the service. Added to this are the structural features of police work - periods of inactivity in which officers find out about each other (hear the stories that colleagues come to tell) as well as the more active and 'dangerous' occasions when 'backs have to be watched', where individuals need each other for support, 'back up', 'corroboration' and 'assistance', and, conditions are
designed such as to facilitate 'intimate confrontation'.

The other 'stage six' (after Snell 1993) characteristics could be deductively arrived at through acknowledging a genuine desire or wish by police in the United Kingdom to police by, and, with consent. Police also embrace, for the most part, an appreciation of 'difference'. This work at Bramshill reveals a positive disposition to promote a high quality of community and ethnic relations i.e. 'dialogue seeking'. The organisational structure has the capacity to respond to environmental changes because directives from the centre allied to a capacity to form and reform, squads, project teams and specialist task forces etc. promotes an ethos of 'flux and transformation'.

But, other features of the police organisation can be isolated and identified which, through socio-political processes or social-constructivist means, generate less positive features of the moral ethos. These areas might properly be taken as a focus for leadership, managerial and cultural change processes: the military/colonial legacy bequeathed to the police organisation coupled with the dynamics of hierarchy - badges of rank, the notion of differentially valued classes of personnel etc.- as well as institutional phenomena such as the 'discipline code' and a curiously pervasive paternalism (in the language of transactional analysis there is a particular emphasis upon the 'rescuer' style during many intraorganisational interactions) - together provide a ground upon which an ethos of oppression and coercion can grow and, even, flourish.

Whenever I presented the data, the attribute, 'secretive scheming' - as an organisational 'characteristic' - was never challenged or doubted by those police officers in the middle managerial ranks of the service. The culture does seem to be one where 'deals' are struck in the never ending quest to 'mind one's back' and to secure some kind of safety zone for personal and professional operation.

The overall picture points to something puzzling and something immensely difficult to articulate. On the one hand, police impress as morally sophisticated or morally courageous or 'good, upright and conventional' citizens. Moreover, such a moral outlook is not merely a reflection of the characterological virtues which Aristotle began to map. Police genuinely wish to establish dialogue with the people policed, genuinely wish to police by consent and to develop morally principled organisation and leadership. On the other hand - and simultaneously - police seem wedded to 'terms of engagement' which veer towards the deceptive and deceitful, the calculating and guileful, as well as a stance of resistance to much of the disinterested and 'theory/practice' commitments (the straightforwardness) of the
other professions.

Police, it seems, take nothing at face value. Everything, for them, heralds a potential deception; everything is, *in potentia*, 'not quite what it seems'. 'Time will tell', seems to be the psychological attitude, and, sooner or later, an 'indiscretion' or moral stain will be revealed. 'The truth will out' if one were to 'wait and see'. If this analysis is fair, then it is to the sociologists, the social anthropologists and the social psychologists - as well as the personality theorists - that we must look for explanatory concepts, theories and ideas. The patterns described here should be of especial interest to police strategists and senior management. Considerable work needs to be done to achieve the ethos specifically articulated in the 'Quality of Service' committee's 'manifesto', 'Getting things right' (1993). Using the rich descriptions provided by Snell (1993) would be one concrete starting point to facilitate diagnosis and discussion concerning the moral health of police organisations.

Standing in contrast to those less positive features concerning the organisational moral ethos is the overall ethical tone emerging from the responses to the 'Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire'. Perhaps it is the individual who, ideally, would like to be 'ethical' in his or her practice of policing but who finds that a set of organisational pressures subverts his or her good intentions. If this is the case, then an 'ethics education' that seeks to promote human flourishing and combat human limitations through the provision of a comprehensive set of ethical skills will have much to offer the individual practitioner.

**Conclusion**

There are, plainly, some grounds for optimism concerning the moral ethos of police organisations. There are also grounds for optimism concerning the 'moral sensitivity', 'moral resolve' and 'moral expertise' of police in the middle managerial ranks of the service. This outcome of the inquiry process suggests that, in general, police middle-managers estimate that some of the 'surrounding' or 'enveloping' moral force fields in the organisation are likely to coincide with the 'Quality of Service' committee's strategic agenda for the police service. The overwhelming majority of police officers who have participated in this inquiry report that 'things have improved', 'things have changed', and, 'things are different now'. However, during and subsequent to the 'case study' emphasis it appears that the pressures to meet performance targets has threatened to lead to a lowering of the overall moral tone of police organisations.
Notwithstanding, at the beginning of the new millennium, it seems possible to point to a mix of characterological virtues, professional aspirations and commitments, as well as an increasingly informed managerial consciousness that, together are striving to embrace an ethos of customer service, social sensitivity and commitments to high levels of professional integrity. Set against this are those features of an occupational culture - based upon a complex constellation of social psychological and socio-political features of police - which conspire to distance police from any consistent and meaningful adoption of the moral highground.

This research suggests that there are foundations in place which posit a police committed to human rights provisions, the 'duty of care', and, in broad terms, those sorts of dispositions specified in the police service statement of ethical principles. In support of the claim that police middle managers are well placed both to lead ethically and are disposed to create ethical organisational forms and practices I should point to those patterns discernible from the questionnaire/survey data: thus, the majority of officers have a self image that is very highly or highly ethical. Significantly, the police experience is seen more to facilitate the enhancing of a personal moral system than exerting a corrosive influence on such a system. Moreover, only a minority of respondents have a negative attitude towards the police service statement of ethical principles.

I would wish to add, however, the following sobering qualifications to these contentions. I notice a contrast between those claims to the highest ethical standards which police managers are likely to make for themselves and a certain 'unforgivingness' that many are, in fact, prone to exhibit. It seems that the moral virtues of benevolence, tolerance and mercy are not writ large in the generalised moral expressivity of police. Indeed, they are often in short supply.

Furthermore, I still encounter many individual police managers who seem not only distant and remote from the urges towards the new professionalism but who also seem reluctant to value the demands for continuing learning, education and development. Perhaps too much of the career trajectory of police is tied to individual status needs and the long-term promise of security through a generous pension. To this extent I remain somewhat disappointed, and, I would argue that a great deal still needs to be done to approach, genuinely, the exacting demands of a full blown 'quality' culture.

Raiborn and Payne (1996) correctly identify the confluence between widely endorsed ethical values and the specifications for total quality organisations. There is sufficient evidence from the moral ethos questionnaire and the organisational
ethics questionnaire to suggest that some of those key values e.g. empowerment, involvement, trust and helpfulness are compromised and sometimes subverted within the police organisation because of the established pattern of its moral ethos.
A concluding chapter

Concluding the project: A summary of the major learnings and a statement concerning the place of the subject, 'ethics' on the police leadership development curriculum at Bramshill at the dawn of the new millennium

"I'd moved to Vermont .... I'd written one book, and then nothing in the two years following its publication. I began teaching in September; in September I began writing again, writing poems entirely different from those of Firstborn. This difference was intended, at least hoped for. What you learn organising a book, making of a pile of poems an arc, a shaped utterance, is both exhilarating and depressing; as you discern the book's themes, its fundamental preoccupations, you see as well the poems' habitual gestures, those habits of syntax and vocabulary, the rhythmic signatures which, ideally, give the volume at hand its character but it would be dangerous to repeat. Each book I've written has culminated in a conscious diagnostic act. A swearing off." (Gluck, 1999: 17)

In this chapter I shall begin with a brief review of a range of publications and developments concerned with the moral aspects of policing in order to illustrate how the ethics of police remains a continuing strategic concern. I shall include reference both to the HMIC report into 'Police Integrity' (1999) as well as Laughrane and Newman's (1985) analysis of the principles of policing. The latter work, with its emphasis upon the need for police to uphold the 'Rule of Law', thereby places human rights considerations at the heart of the police mission and purpose. To the extent that police strategic discourse has consistently and explicitly recognised the need for the police to embrace the concept of citizen as a bearer of rights then the police organisation finds itself relatively well-placed to adapt itself readily to the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998. This review will help to provide a context within which to locate the current approaches to 'ethics education' on the police leadership and management development curriculum at Bramshill.

I shall then describe the actual form in which ethics, as a subject, is presented on development programmes and courses within the institutional context of Bramshill at the dawn of the new millennium. I shall also provide a summary concerning the major learnings emerging from the action research process which began in the first part of the decade and which took as its goal the attempt to secure 'ethics' on the police leadership and management development curriculum. In this last section I include a brief outline of some of the knowledge generated by the project.

In conclusion, I will end with a closing vignette concerning reactions by police to
my presentation of the subject 'ethics' on the middle-management programme at Bramshill. The fact that my work has been re-established on that programme provides positive evidence for the effectiveness of the individual educational action research process that began in the winter of 1992.

Part One: Ethics and police strategic concerns in the latter part of the twentieth century

The decade of the 1990s reveals a curious but elegant symmetry in relation to the police strategic discourse on ethics. It began with an especial emphasis upon the moral dimensions of policing and it ended with an emphasis – via the concept of 'police integrity' with those same concerns. In October 1990, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) published its statement of common purpose and values. This short statement identified both the valued ends and the morally acceptable means of policing. In the same year, the several authors of the Operational Policing Review published their findings amongst which they included 36 recommendations positioned at both the strategic and tactical levels of the police organisation. The first of those recommendations was concerned with the complex issue of the integrity of police and was phrased in the following way:

"The police service sees its integrity as paramount and its commitment to the highest values should be re-emphasised and stated at every opportunity." (Operational Policing Review, 1990: 9)

The relatively abstract concept of 'integrity' can refer to the manifestation and development of those proper and/or exemplary standards of conduct commensurate with filling a social role. Thus, in the context of policing, it embraces notions of duty, obligation and the appropriate styles of conduct that should be expressed both inside and outside the organisation. Police 'integrity' is therefore both a cause and effect of the social interactions that create and sustain police culture.

Woodcock (1991) voiced major concerns with the nature of police culture and began to underline aspects of the changing context of policing that might have a major impact on that culture. A part of that context concerned the gathering significance that needed to be accorded to human rights considerations. He believed that 'major change' for police culture was 'in the wind' and he imagined that 'rights' issues would play a major role in changing aspects of the police culture. He also, and subtly, pointed to the need for the police occupational culture to take itself as an index of the extent to which fairness and impartiality was extended to the public policed.
These emphases were followed by Woodcock's (1992) landmark paper, 'Trust in the police - the search for truth' in which he explored the consequences of 'corner-cutting' in the working culture of the police and recommended that the 'full weight' of the service be put behind both the statement of common purpose and values as well as the draft statement of ethical principles which was published in December 1992 at Bramshill by the 'Quality of Service' committee. Again, whilst the statement gave an extensive coverage to the major moral dimensions of policing it also made reference to the importance of 'upholding fundamental human rights'. Thus, the fourth of the statements (in that draft statement of principles) read as follows:

'I aspire to uphold fundamental human rights, treating every person as an individual and display respect and compassion towards them.' (ACPO Draft Statement of Ethical Principles, 1992)

Woodcock included the following observations concerned to capture some of the experiential realities and the consequences of those realities that lie at the heart of (and help to generate the very fabric) of police practice:

"I believe that an everyday proximity to the effects of violence and an everyday experience of competing moral imperatives have a corrosive effect on policing culture, which tends to make most police officers uninterested in the fine details of procedure."

The police working environment is one in which some procedures compete with others - the impetus of investigation versus the rights of suspects - so that crime control is in conflict with due process. From the beginning of a police officer's career he or she finds that the demands of the tasks in front of him or her tend to overwhelm the procedures laid down to deal with them. There is a constant sense of urgency in the police world which often leads to corner cutting." (Woodcock 1992: 2)

Woodcock moves on to examine the reasons for 'corner-cutting' and 'expediency' and suggests that the actions of the 'misguided' reflect a collective failure as supervisors. This concern about the quality of 'supervision' (and therefore of management and leadership) was reprised by Bunyard (1993) in the Frank Newsam memorial lecture, 'the future of policing' - which itself reflected the work of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 1993. Bunyard devoted a specific part of his address to the subject of supervision within which he made a number of
significant observations and recommendations. Bunyard recognised that although there have been relatively recent improvements in managerial and supervisory styles nonetheless 'there remain needless elements' of Rowan's nineteenth century quasi-military approach. (My own research on the nature of the moral ethos of the police organisation supports his assertion. Thus, for example, a substantial proportion of police managers indicated that 'oppression and coercion' constituted one of the ways of characterising the psychological character of the organisation.)

He also observed that detectives experienced little in the way of 'supervision'. He moved on to say:

"Unsurprisingly, left to their own devices and free to apply their own individual ethics to their work, the standards of detectives vary widely." (Bunyard, 1993: 8)

He continued by making a reference to a cultural characteristic of detectives and the related importance of police supervision:

"Many detectives openly admitted to members of the Royal Commission that they regarded it as their duty to 'make sure the guilty were convicted' and if necessary to bend the rules. The irony is that their attempts to 'improve' the evidence to gain convictions, have caused police officers in general and detectives in particular to be widely disbelieved by juries.

The role of supervisors is absolutely fundamental to the future of policing. There needs to be a very strong and purposeful drive towards quality assurance at all levels. Senior officers should set priorities and standards and really know what is happening within their area of responsibility and be accountable for it."(Bunyard 1993: 8)

Not only does Bunyard surface concerns about the quality of 'supervision' within the police service as a whole but his writing presciently foretells the model of supervision advocated by Smith (1999) in HMIC's 'police integrity'.

Lee (1993) complemented the emerging consensus concerning the importance of police ethics by attempting to identify the appropriate parameters of the field itself. He underlined the primacy of policing by consent and noted the extensive moral complexity attaching to the policing of a liberal democracy. He also staunchly advocated the need for police to adopt a code of ethics (Lee, 1992) as a support for police professionalism and ethical policing.
Zander (1994) presented a seminal paper on the ‘ethics of crime investigation by the police’ in the first seminar of its kind to take place in the United Kingdom at Bramshill in January of that year. He examined ‘what can and should be done’ to alter conduct and made eleven significant points. These included the need ‘to acknowledge that unethical conduct may not be uncommon’, the need ‘to stop condoning unethical conduct’, and, the need ‘to improve supervision and monitoring of police work in criminal investigation’. Zander argued that it was difficult to over-emphasise the importance of these matters for the well-being of the criminal justice system - and he concluded that ‘it is excellent that the police service is beginning seriously to grapple with the issues’.

Police leaders continued to endorse the importance of moral standards in policing as they contributed to programme of professional development at Bramshill. Grieve (1994) for example portrayed police as ‘sentinels in the mist’ – evoking an image of police holding the moral line in the face of moral ambiguity and opacity. Sir Paul Condon (1995) elegantly contended that it was ‘better to lose performance than integrity’. Whitehouse (1996) introduced the ‘thoughts of the police service’ on moral and ethical issues facing the police service to the multilateral meeting, convened in Strasbourg by the Council of Europe, to help develop police in the newly emerging liberal democracies of eastern Europe.

The specific interest in police ethics was paralleled by a somewhat wider interest in the ethics of public servants. Thomas (1993) published a collection of papers taking as their subject the teaching of 'government ethics'. These included discussions of the ethics of civil servants and other public servants but also, in an Appendix, Thomas included Richards (1985) original text, 'A plea for applied ethics' - which, itself, constituted one of the first explicit works by an ethicist concerned with the teaching of ethics to police in the United Kingdom - as well as a postscript authored by Richards some eight years after his paper first appeared. In that postscript he remarked that, on re-reading his original work, he experienced 'a deep sense of deja vu'. He points out that when, in 1983, he wrote the article, the police service was the subject of considerable criticism. Ten years later he observes that:

"They are still the object of intense criticism, and yet during the last decade the service has been the subject of strenuous attempts at reform ..." (Richards, 1993 : 676,677)

Although something of a 'managerial revolution' had, according to Richards, taken place in policing, the service as a whole had not managed to secure complete trust...
and confidence in the quality of its moral ethos. So, Richards asked:

"How might ethics be expected to contribute to these [reform] measures to further improve police practice?" (Richards, 1993: 677)

He answers this question by recommending that more attention be paid to some of the findings in social psychology - especially in relation to our knowledge about the behaviour of individuals in groups (such as conformity to group norms e.g. Brown, 1986) and in relation to our responses to authority such as the 'Becket syndrome' (e.g. Milgram 1974) - which identify the circumstances that make difficult the to exercise clear and independent judgement - and which, therefore, subvert integrity. For Richards, this knowledge must be applied to the workings of the police culture. He suggests that:

"This may enable us to ameliorate the worst effects of such processes in future. Applied ethics will enable us more readily to identify such situations, and match our 'oughts' to our 'cans' in ways that are more sensitive to our human limitations and thus help to avoid deleterious practices." (Richards 1993: 679)

The work of Thomas was followed, in 1995, by the publication of the report by the Lord Nolan, entitled, 'Standards in public life' (Cm 2850-1) This report was presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister of the day and it includes an observation made by an Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan police which, again, points to problems intrinsic to police discretion:

"It is apparent that guidelines where matters are left to the judgement of individuals are not effective." (Veness, in Nolan, 1995: 88)

Nolan made a small number of recommendations intended to have application across the entire public service. These included a 'restatement' of the seven principles of public life, namely, 'selflessness', 'integrity', 'objectivity', 'accountability', 'openness', 'honesty', and 'leadership'. The meaning of each term was subsequently defined. So, for example, 'openness' means that:

"Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands." (Nolan, 1995: 14)

The Nolan report also recommended that all public bodies should draw up 'Codes
of conduct' incorporating the seven principles of public service and the report made references to the need for there to be 'education' in relation to the observance of these and other principles.

In addition to outlining a number of recommendations the first report of the Nolan inquiry included a short review of standards in public life throughout the twentieth century. This review culminated by including references to 'current public opinion' concerning different occupational groups. The report refers to a survey conducted by the Market and Opinion Research International (MORI) organisation, which, in 1983 and again in 1993, offered respondents a list of different occupations and asked:

'Would you tell me whether you generally trust them to tell the truth or not?'

In 1993 both doctors and teachers attracted a figure of 84% (i.e. 84% of respondents believed that, generally, such persons could be trusted to tell the truth) whilst the police attracted a lower figure of 63%.

The gathering disquiet about and interest in police ethics was given authoritative academic foundations in 1996 with Kleinig's publication, 'The ethics of policing'. Kleinig's comprehensive work explored, in three parts, 'professional ethics' including his analysis of the moral foundations of policing, 'personal ethics' in which he examined the major categories of ethical dilemma experienced by police practitioners, and, 'organisational ethics' where he discusses the nature of authority and accountability as well as the ethical challenges for police management.

Kleinig's scholarly work was complemented by the coming together of a range of persons in the United Kingdom to form the Police Ethics Network – an independent and non-profit making organisation founded in London. The second publication of the network appeared in 1999 and emphasised its applied or practical nature. It stated that:

"The Network consists of police officers and other individuals who share a common interest in exploring, at both strategic and operational levels the ethical issues of working in the field of criminal justice within a diverse, multicultural society. Much of the work in this field has been overly theoretical and somewhat obscure, often divorced from the day-to-day realities of contemporary policing. Policing faces challenges and tough decisions in the context of ethical tensions and pressures to compromise personal values." (Police Ethics Network, 1999: 4)
Again, the 1999 network publication included references to the absence of 'training in ethics'. So, one discussant remarked:

"Why should the police service be thinking about ethics? I think it's rather like interview technique training in the police service. It's a very basic requirement and yet the nettle was not grasped for many years. It was a long time before officers were taught how to talk to witnesses and suspects. Similarly with ethics, I think. It's such a core thing to the police service, and yet there's no training, there are no support mechanisms in place for police officers who are involved on a daily basis doing a very difficult job." (Police Ethics Network, 1999: 6)

As a factual claim this remark is not entirely true. However, it does continue to point to a perceived dearth or absence of proper professional development across the police service as a whole. It does prompt the question 'How far has the field of criminal justice ethics education developed?' since Sherman's (1982) original monograph set an agenda for developing this field of practice. A part of the answer was supplied in 1997 by Kleinig and Leland Smith following the 1996 workshop examining criminal justice ethics teaching held at the Institute for Criminal Justice Ethics in the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York. Kleinig and Leland Smith edited a collection of papers presented at the workshop; in the introduction to this collection they point out that from 1990 onwards a gradually increasing number of texts designed for courses in criminal justice ethics became available. They cite seven such works; Pollock Byrne (1994), Schmalleger (1990), Cohen and Feldberg (1991), Braswell, McCarthy and McCarthy (1996), Souryal (1992), Close and Meier (1994) and Kleinig (1996). The relative recency of these achievements builds upon the earlier work of Heffernan and Stroup (1985) and Elliston and Feldberg (1985) and provides Kleinig and Leland Smith with a justification for their view that 'criminal justice ethics courses are only now coming of age'. After their review of the general development of the subject 'police ethics', Kleinig and Leland Smith organise the papers in their collection under four headings:

- Aims in criminal justice ethics education
- Integrating criminal justice ethics into the curriculum
- Strategies in teaching criminal justice ethics
- Evaluating the teaching of criminal justice ethics

They recognise that the weakest aspect of teaching criminal justice ethics is in
relation to its evaluation. In relation to 'strategies in teaching criminal justice ethics' they observe:

"... there is strong backing for a pedagogy that centres on, or at least has a significant place for case studies." (Kleinig and Leland Smith, 1997: xvii)

They move on to cite the work of Whitbeck (1997) - who distinguishes between using five kinds of case materials and the skills needed for each kind of case - and Winston (1997) who illustrates how using a particular incident which is embedded in a larger social context, can 'provide a particularly rich moral resource'.

Whilst their work represents an exceptionally useful exposition of critical issues in the teaching of criminal justice ethics within an educational setting, it could not consider the teaching of ethics in something as distinct and particular as the institutional context of Bramshill, devoted, as it is, to 'higher police training'. Thus, the contributors never make mention of the resistance or hostility of students to the basic educational situation. As this project has shown, the tutor, at Bramshill, has first to become accepted by the student groups, before the study process can properly get under way.

Villiers (1997), following his long association with police leaders and managers in the United Kingdom, published 'Better Police Ethics'; this work was designed to help the working police officer make informed and thoughtful choices when confronted with actual ethical dilemmas. In common with the contributors to Kleinig and Leland Smith (1997) he defends the use of case studies in 'police ethical training' and, like them, he includes a method (in his case the 'Warnambool method') to be used as a logical and systematic approach to help with ethical problem solving. To the extent that Villiers produced his work independently of the authors such as Davis and Welfel featured in Kleinig and Leland Smith (1997) there is some evidence for the existence of a partial consensus of opinion amongst ethics educators in relation to some of the elements making for an effective educational design.

As the decade entered its latter stages two developments sustained the momentum given to the moral aspects of policing: the Human Rights Act 1998 and HMIC's (1999) report on 'Police integrity'.

Whilst the Nolan report clarified the standards of conduct expected from public servants in the United Kingdom, a wider programme of modernising politics, through, inter alia, constitutional reform, was initiated by the new Labour
government in 1997. Before the general election the labour party published a consultation document, 'Bringing Rights Home' that set out the case for incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into the law of the United Kingdom. The subsequent White Paper explained the proposals contained in the Human Rights Bill: Rights Bought Home. In the preface to that White Paper the Prime Minister noted that it was right to 'increase individual human rights' and he moved on to say:

"The Bill marks a major step forward in the achievement of our [government's] programme of reform. It will give people in the United Kingdom opportunities to enforce their rights under the European Convention in British Courts rather than having to incur the cost and delay of taking a case to the European Human Rights Commission and Court in Strasbourg. It will enhance the awareness of human rights in our society." (Home Office: Bringing Rights Home 1997: 1)

The main reasons prompting this aspect of constitutional reform stemmed from the fact that it was both a costly and a lengthy process taking a petition concerning an alleged infringement of convention rights to the European Commission, and, the rights detailed in the Convention were no longer actually seen as 'British rights'.

In order to 'bring rights home' the government set out to make it unlawful for public authorities to act in way that was incompatible with the Convention rights. Police were defined as 'Public authorities'. So, as the new millennium approached, the police were, through this definition, subject to the incorporation of the European Convention into British law. The White Paper noted:

"A person who is aggrieved by an act or omission on the part of a public authority which is incompatible with convention rights will be able to challenge the act or omission in the courts. The effects will be wide-ranging."(Home Office: Bringing Rights Home: 8)

The White paper - and the subsequent legislation, the Human Rights Act 1998 - came to provide unprecedented backing for the rights-based aspects of police ethics that had been promulgated and advocated over the preceding two decades. The passing of the Human Rights Act in 1998, led to the creation of an Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 'Human Rights Working Group'. However, before I examine the developing response of the police service to the Act I should acknowledge the evidence which points to a more general strategic awareness of the newly emerging 'rights' culture (Gearty, 1999).
This awareness is reflected in the Association of Chief Police Officers' (1998) revision of policing priorities which found expression as the 'overarching aims and objectives of the police service' and included a statement of the purpose of the police service, a synopsis of the guiding principles governing police action and a succinct identification of the main aims of the service. This statement emphasised the 'helping' role of the police in relation to securing a 'safe and just society'. In addition, the police service was reckoned to be explicitly concerned with the promotion and observance of individual and community rights and responsibilities. The statement phrased the policing purpose as follows:

"To help secure a safe and just society in which the rights and responsibilities of individuals, families and communities are properly balanced." (ACPO, 1998)

The guiding principles began with the following statement that recaptured the emphasis taken in 1990:

"The police should carry out their functions with integrity." (ACPO 1998)

In May 1999, the ACPO Human Rights Working Group issued a newsletter - which already found itself included in the study material for the Accelerated Promotion Course in June of that year. The newsletter asserted that the 'human rights agenda heralds a new era in policing' and went on to summarise, for its readership, the impact and consequences of the act on police. It noted that:

- Police officers and managers will need to consider the European Convention on Human Rights principles when exercising their professional judgements
- The Police Service will need to review its policies and procedures for compliance with convention rights
- Staff will need to be trained in awareness of convention rights
- The service will need to assist in an audit of legislative compliance

Just as 'human rights' issues, in part because of the passing of the Human Rights Act, were becoming increasingly 'foregrounded' in police thinking, the MacPherson report examining the reasons and causes of the tragic death of Stephen Lawrence was published in the Spring of 1999. This report, inter alia, found that police organisations were 'institutionally racist'. Therefore, it underlined how relevant and appropriate were those earlier concerns with the moral quality of policing services.
Finally, in June 1999, reprising the theme of 'integrity,' Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary published the results of their inquiry into police integrity. The Inspection made specific mention of Newburn's (1999) literature review and conclusions concerning how both to understand, and to develop ways (of attempting) to prevent police corruption. This important review included a conclusion: 'Towards 'ethical' policing'. Newburn made eleven 'key points' that, for him, summarised the general messages arising from his review. In themselves, his points enjoin police managers and leaders to seek ways of preventing malpractice and corruption. He notes, for example that 'Police corruption is pervasive, continuing and not bounded by rank', that 'the boundary between 'corrupt' and non-corrupt' activities is difficult to define, primarily because this is, at heart, 'an ethical problem' and that 'continued vigilance and scepticism is vital.

Newburn continues with a thoughtful discussion of ways to work with the empirical findings and, in the course of his discussion, once again draws attention to the absence of training for police officers in ethics. He states:

"Relatively little emphasis, if any, is put on ethics training for new recruits or for those in service. Indeed, statements or codes of ethics, where they exist, often tend to be little more than general statements of intent which simply sit in folders or hang decoratively on office walls, rather than living documents which inform day-to-day practice and are the subject of active discussion and debate. Without doubt, a much more sustained focus on what might constitute 'ethical policing' is not only a key challenge for the police service in the next century, but an important element in the attempt to control corruption." (Newburn 1999: 48)

Newburn's work was incorporated into HMIC's inspection into police integrity and demonstrates yet again concerns to achieve an 'ethical police'. The Inspection itself was conducted, according to its authors:

'... against a background of increasing concern that on occasion the level of integrity within the service fails to reach the desired standard. " (HMIC 1999: 72)

In addition, the Inspection embraced comprehensive terms of reference that included determining the extent to which the Police Service worked within the 'spirit of the statement of common purpose and values.' It seems, therefore, reasonable to contend that the moral dimension of policing has found itself continuing to attract consistency of attention in police strategic thinking. It also seems possible to argue that the drive towards establishing a 'performance culture'
is also part of a more general application of moral values criteria - especially those values subsumed under the idea of accountability.

The formulation of the priorities in policing by the association of police officers in 1998 could be said to have reflected a subtle shift in emphasis. So, the sanctity accorded to the 'prevention of crime' - which was still privileged by Laugharne and Newman in 1985 - has been succeeded by concerns with securing the 'rights and responsibilities' of the citizenry. In the same way that Laugharne and Newman (1985), the ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values (1990), and, Woodcock (1992) provided an authoritative and exclusively police-generated 'backing' for the exploration of ethics in relation to police leadership practice and development in the first part of the decade, the HMIC examination of police integrity provides a revitalisation and re-enchantment with the practice of ethical leadership and ethical policing at its end. The Inspection report suggests, by implication, that there remains an important role in higher police training for the provision of skills in 'principled' or 'ethical' police leadership and that, if Bramshill is to remain a site within which higher police training takes place, then a part of its function will be concerned with the provision, ideally, of a valued and effective 'ethics education'. What, though, did the Inspection discover? I shall, in the next short section, elaborate upon some of the detail of the HMIC exploration of 'police integrity'.

**Her Majesty's Inspection into 'Police integrity'**

The Inspection was carried out between July 1998 and January 1999 by a team of police officers, Home office civil servants and civilian support staff. The authors of the report assert that it was initiated because of 'evidence that the public were becoming increasingly concerned about a suggested decline in the integrity of the police.' The authors continue:

"Whether or not the Police service is now healthier than at any time in its short (sic) history, it is a fact that the public's confidence in it has been declining in recent years. The high profile miscarriage of justice cases arising from earlier police activity were followed in 1998 by concern over the actions of a handful of chief constables, and by the emerging consequences of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police seeking to root out corruption in the Capital's police - addressing issues with greater effectiveness than previously, ironically, exposes them to public attention. There has also been understandable concern about the apparent inability of the police on occasions to deal impartially with different sections of society, with ethnic minority issues predominating." (HMIC 1999: 7)
Four inquiry teams of police and civilians were constituted and each team concentrated upon one of the following areas:

- Management and systems to maintain integrity
- Prosecution of offenders and complaints and discipline
- The public interface and public perceptions
- Personnel and training

A précis of the findings of this Inspection were presented in an executive summary which was supplemented by a number of chapters elaborating the details of the findings. Appendix B summarised the responses of the chief constables to an 'Inspection' questionnaire asking for their personal views on a wide range of 'integrity' issues. A close reading of the text suggests that the Inspection team was critical of the quality of police leadership in relation to 'standards'. Thus, for example, the author(s), in relation to whether or not there existed 'reinforcement of the Statement of Common Purpose and Values' wrote:

"The questionnaire asked for details of subsequent actin to re-enforce the SCPV and how corporate values are communicated to new and existing staff and the public. A wide variety of responses were received but many mentioned were uninspiring and of a very passive nature." (HMIC 1999: 76)

Additionally, the authors observed:

"When asked if any specific document had been published to their forces on expectations of integrity, few forces appeared to have undertaken such an exercise." (HMIC 1999: 78)

They added, in relation to processes (including training) for maintaining integrity, the following:

"The questionnaire asked if the concept of 'integrity' featured specifically in their internally run training courses. Overall, few forces responded with any specific details of how these issues are included in internal training to help maintain standards." (HMIC 1999: 78)
The Inspection report moved on to include an analysis of the theories advanced by chief constables to account for lapses in integrity. Fourteen 'causes' are cited - paramount amongst which are the nature of supervision and management. The Inspection report states:

"The main theme of the responses was that supervision at middle-management level and the leadership from the top were vitally important." (HMIC 1999: 84)

Thus, once again, the HMIC report reproduces a leitmotif running through the study of police and policing. It reflects concerns about the quality of supervision, management and leadership in relation to the embodiment and expression of moral standards in the police service. In addition, although the Inspection report seemed determined to emphasise that only a small minority of police staff were manifesting 'bad behaviour', it appeared to raise serious doubts about the ability of police managers to fit the requirements of their role. So, it made the following observations:

"The Inspection found many chief officers have no personal systems to inform them directly on the health (sic) of integrity within their functional responsibilities. Too often reliance is placed on the fact that authority has been delegated, forgetting responsibility remains theirs. Many admitted they only became aware of problems after they had occurred ... But the most important point is every supervisor, at every level, should have their own systems to become aware of issues before they progress to becoming serious." (HMIC 1999 (Executive summary): 3)

"The most important factor in bringing about the necessary improvements in all aspects of integrity is the quality of leadership provided by all police managers. The chief officer team should demonstrate commitment and firm leadership in the drive to create and maintain integrity within their force, and they should at all times give out a consistent message to their staff, in other words 'practice what they preach'." (HMIC 1999 (Executive summary): 3)

These remarks (and the one hundred and twenty five questions the Inspection report includes as a 'good practice' guide) serve to underline the continuing emphasis on the standard and quality of police ethics. That emphasis has, to a certain extent, been given fresh impetus by the ascendancy, in the last part of the decade, of a human rights perspective. It is to this that I now turn.
The steady rise of the 'human rights' emphasis

Immediately after the Second World War, a part of the response to the Nazi atrocities was captured in the slogan, 'Never again'. In the effort to ensure that those atrocities were not repeated the General Assembly of United Nations famously developed and then, on 10 December 1948, adopted and proclaimed the 'Universal Declaration on Human Rights'. The current Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, introduces the 'Declaration' by reminding its readers that:

"Following this historic act, the Assembly called upon its member countries to publicise the text of the declaration and to "cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories". " (Annan, 1999: 3)

The emphasis on the importance of human rights, has not only a long history in moral and political philosophy, but also in the philosophical thinking on police. Laughame and Newman (1985), in their analysis of the duties of police, provide perhaps the most extensive discussion of the way in which 'human rights' and the idea of a moral law together inform the priorities of the police function. Cherrett (1997) notes the strong connection between their work and the subsequent final form of the ACPO statement of Common Purpose and Values (1990).

At least a part of the impetus behind their analysis was the Policy Studies Institute report (1981) examining the conduct of the police of the Metropolis as well as the Scarman report (1981) into the Brixton disorders. These latter reports had highlighted shortcomings in terms of the way police understood and expressed their duties. Richards (1999) (personal communication) pointed out that Sir Kenneth Newman, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, recognised that if police were not able to be kept under surveillance by their supervisors then they would need some form of 'internal surveillance'; this would be the main function of a code of ethics (or its equivalent). Laughame and Newman subsequently sought to articulate such a code of ethics - which came to find itself expressed as a 'code of professional duties'.

The work of Newman and Laughame is, though, much more than the promulgation of a code of professional duties. It represents an attempt to provide a thorough analysis of the principles that should govern policing within, as Newman puts it in the forward to the work, 'the new requirements of a vibrant democracy'. Laughame and Newman were also concerned to help develop the police organisation in such
a way that it could move from a 'comparatively-inward looking' profession to one which was 'more attuned to other people's needs.'

Laugharne and Newman's work is especially significant because it is cast, in part, in a jurisprudential framework through its emphasis on appreciating the meaning of the term, 'The Rule of Law'. In their analysis of the 'Policing Principles of the Metropolitan Police', Laugharne and Newman begin with a statement of police objectives. They assert that:

"The primary aims and duties of the Metropolitan Police are to uphold the Rule of Law, to protect and assist the citizen and to work for the prevention and detection of crime and the maintenance of a peaceful society, free of the fear of crime and disorder. They will carry out these aims and duties in consultation and cooperation with others in the community." (Laugharne and Newman 1985: 9)

Subsequently they provide a rationale for this framing of the police objectives through and explanation and expansion of the main phrases in their statement. As they turn to the meaning of the 'upholding the Rule of Law' they emphasise a complex of concepts attaching to the term which, importantly, include the traditions and achievements of human rights. They clarify the idea of 'Rule of Law' as follows:

"The phrase 'Rule of Law' is a general term, of wide meaning, incorporating a number of the ideals and principles which are crucial to the process of government and justice in a free society. It includes also some of the provisions on human rights propounded by bodies such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations." (Laugharne and Newman 1985: 40)

The primary requirement of the police to uphold the 'Rule of Law' involves two inter-related duties. First, according to Laugharne and Newman, police must apply the law of the land as enacted in statutes or as established by the Common law. Second, they stress the fact that upholding the 'Rule of Law' in its 'full sense' means that police must keep within prescribed powers, abstain from arbitrary action and respect the rights and freedoms of all citizens. Laugharne and Newman are keen to place the very idea of the 'Rule of Law' within a tradition of rights and values that are 'maintained by British society as a whole' and which provide a set of principles for the correct governance of policing. They identify six such principles, the first of which underlines the need to respect the individual rights and freedoms of all citizens. As they develop the content of their principles they note that the fundamental values of British society are underpinned by procedure and legal rules
and assumptions which they subsequently turn to identify. The rights, values and
entitlements they describe reflect a long tradition of political liberalism, given
especial force by Mill (1859) concerned with creating a just, free and orderly civil
society. Laughame and Newman find the following 'of particular importance in the
context of police duty':

- The presumption of innocence
- The right to free speech
- The right to free association
- Restrictions on powers of arrest and detention
- The right to silence
- The right to access to legal advice
- The prohibition of discriminatory behaviour towards individuals, classes of
  persons and minority groups
- The observance of suspects rights
- The requirement of reasonableness when acting upon suspicion
- Integrity in the collection and presentation of evidence
- Respect for human dignity
- The need to use only such force as is necessary to accomplish a legitimate
  purpose

In addition they argue that the 'British ideal' of policing is that it should be shaped
by the consent of the population and that such consent depends upon the
observance, by the police, of the individual's rights and liberties.

The primacy given to the idea of the 'Rule of Law' by Laugharne and Newman was
not matched in the subsequent ACPO (1990) Statement of Common Purpose and
Values - which simply remarked that the purpose of the Police Service was to
'uphold the law fairly and firmly' - nor in ACPO's (1998) statement of the
overarching aims and objectives for the Police service. In that latter publication, one of the three main aims of the police service is to 'contribute to delivering justice in a way which secures and maintains public confidence in the rule of law.' No longer is the idea of the 'Rule of Law' given quite such a profound emphasis. Nor, I want to add, should the subtlety of the fact that it is no longer expressed using capital letters be ignored. Whilst Laugharne and Newman's work did not enjoy the prominence it might have deserved (Cherrett 1997) the importance of the concept of the Rule of Law continued to be central to Richards' teaching of ethics to the most senior leaders in the police service whenever he addressed them at Bramshill. Moreover, it seems possible to argue that, if the richness of meaning constellated by the term the 'Rule of Law' was rather overlooked in police strategic thinking, the importance given to the study of human rights increased as a direct result of the passing of the Human Rights Act (1998). Most obviously, in March 1999 the executive seminar programme at Bramshill under the stewardship of Villiers, in conjunction with the British Institute of Human Rights, organised a two-day 'Police training seminar' entitled, 'Understanding Human Rights and their effect on Police work'.

In concluding this review of the sustained commitment given throughout the 1990s by police leaders to the importance of police ethics, moral standards and the respect for human rights, the separate themes were conjoined by Crawshaw, Devlin and Williamson (1998) in their publication that argued for a change in police culture driven by embracing and expressing an enhanced human rights consciousness. This publication was itself complemented by Crawshaw's (1999) teaching manual designed to help present human rights programmes to the police themselves.

This review has shown that 'police ethics' and human rights considerations have featured as major strategic, culture change and organisational development concerns for police leaders throughout the 1990s. I attempted, throughout the decade, to support the culture change process through the provision of learning structures and learning designs on the middle-manager programme(s) at Bramshill. It remains puzzling (and, in truth, indefensible) that the inclusion of the subject 'ethics' rests less upon coherent and consistent educational decision-making by the leaders of the institution but more on an admixture of student preference and tutor dispositions. My colleagues have noted that, had it not been a change in relatively junior staff at Bramshill, then 'ethics' might still be excluded from the middle-manager programmes.
Part Two: Teaching ethics at Bramshill: the current position

Ethics is included as a named subject on the curriculum of the Strategic Command Course (the most senior course) and it also continues to be included on the Operational Commanders Programme (a short programme for senior 'business unit' managers within the police service). It has reappeared on the Police Management Programme. It receives sustained attention on the Accelerated Promotion Course - the course for the 'high-fliers' in the police service. I shall outline the specific detail of the different educational designs on those separate courses at a later point in this section. In addition to my own endeavours, two other Bramshill tutors have taught the subject and I shall begin with a summary of their teaching experiences.

Reflections on teaching ethics to police leaders and managers: the view from practitioners

In 1998, Villiers authored a short paper, 'Teaching ethics to police officers: experiences and reflections' which, along with Richards (1998) briefing to the Council of Europe and my own publications (Adlam 1998b, 1999) constitute, I think, the sum total of public statements concerning 'ethics education' which have been made by tutors operating within the contemporary leadership and management development context at Bramshill. Certain additional statements concerning the teaching of senior police officers have been made by tutors as a result of their work at Bramshill (e.g. Foster 1998) and I shall make selective reference to those statements in the following discussion.

Villiers begins his reflection on the teaching of ethics to police leaders and managers at Bramshill by observing that, in general terms, the staff are concerned to review and raise ethical standards within the police as an explicit part of the institution's activities. He points out that the difficult question is not why ethics should be taught but how to do it. He then moves on to consider some of the methods tried and, in so doing, he highlights the difficulties that are encountered with each method. To underline the fact that the teaching of ethics has been problematic, he lists the following barriers that he has regularly encountered:

- Anti-intellectualism
- Naïveté through to cynicism
- The desire for certainty
- Playing the game: ethics as the new fad

- Confusion over moral and cultural relativism

- Management that is seen to lack integrity

Here, I should note that each of these 'barriers' was repeatedly displayed by some members of the client groups that I took throughout the duration my inquiry.

Villiers suggests that the original and preferred general teaching model adopted by the Police College in its early years - which featured a lecture followed by discussions with a 'directing staff present to spot and emphasise key points' is no longer regularly practised. He recognises that, notwithstanding my own research process, no 'formal evaluation' of the effectiveness of different ways of teaching ethics has been attempted. To the extent that he is referring to conventional evaluation research his statement is factually correct. In the absence of such a formal evaluation programme he notes that the tutors responsible for designing and delivering ethics programmes continually attempt to monitor and evaluate the impact of those programmes and their effectiveness by informal means. Those informal means include regular, intense and serious discussions amongst the tutorial staff. Villiers believes that those discussions have led to a number of 'generally agreed' conclusions. First he considers the lecture:

"The lecture can be helpful in teaching and promoting ethics, provided that the lecturer has some credibility in this area. In the police world, that credibility does not arise from the lecturer's grasp of moral philosophy as a discipline, nor on his (sic) ability to relate abstract concepts to real life dilemmas - although, other things being equal, this is a useful asset. Credibility means that the lecturer has wrestled with the sort of moral dilemmas police officers face. In other words, he must work or recently have worked as a police officer or something like it, and he must have been in the arena himself and faced Caesar's thumb. A background in administration or training is irrelevant. The police officer gains credibility from his experience on the streets." (Villiers 1998: 2)

It follows, from his description, that civilian tutors, unless they can represent themselves as 'similar' to police lack 'credibility'. But Villiers moves on, as I have noted in an earlier chapter, to provide a devastating comment on the difficulties that a 'credible' police lecturer encounters: they are deemed to be morally dubious because it is assumed they that will have had to act unethically. So, not only is the non-police tutor liable to lack credibility but the police tutor is seen as hypocritical,
disingenuous and incongruent.

By way of consolation, Villiers suggests that senior police officers can have an effect as lecturers because they are able to warn a police audience that the climate has changed and that previous indiscretions will 'no longer be tolerated'. Wittily he adds:

".. we believe that exhortations and warnings come under the general heading of ethical discourse. Let us not be too discriminatory!" (Villiers, 1998: 3)

Next, he considers the more thorough and 'academic' route to 'achieving ethical progress'. Villiers clarifies his understanding of this approach as follows:

"By this I mean that we give out reading lists, set and mark essays, encourage student-led syndicate discussion, conduct tutorials and the like. The problem with this method, which is the best way to inculcate a deep and clear understanding of ethical issues in those who accept its discipline, is that it is a discipline, and a strict one. We are aping what happens at a University, and neither the Police College students nor staff may be willing or able to do it. Bramshill was not set up as a Police University, and .... there is no general move to the academic method." (Villiers, 1998: 3)

If the lecture method is problematic and the 'academic' method is beyond the institutional capability of Bramshill, then, for Villiers, the staff consensus has it that tutoring in ethics at Bramshill is a matter of 'pragmatic experimentation'. He asks, 'How, then, do we teach ethics?' and notes that:

"As in other parts of the curriculum, to some extent we proceed simply by trial and error - or occasionally by trial and success." (Villiers 1998: 3)

This is an important observation and can be taken as a form of corroboration for my account and especially for my way of characterising the second major phase of the inquiry i.e. 'Eclecticism and pragmatics'.

He mentions three methods for teaching ethics. First, he considers the use of role play and psycho-drama - and he recognises that this method, with the help of professional actors, is now in common use at Bramshill and that it represents an attempt to explore the ethical awareness and 'capacity' of the police managers on its development programmes. Second, he gives cursory attention to 'project work' - involving an examination of police from the moral point of view - which he
dismisses as something which does not create 'a model for further progress'. Third, and finally, Villiers considers the use of 'case studies'. Again, a careful reading of his text is important because it reveals, again, the daunting nature of tutoring at Bramshill. In his attempt to reflect the consensus of staff opinion at Bramshill, Villiers writes:

"... the right use of the right case study is probably the most effective way to generate real ethical debate in syndicate, although what is learned therefrom remains open to many interpretations. The sort of case studies often used in moral philosophy involve making a forced choice under life-threatening or tragic circumstances. Police officers will not usually engage with these in class, whatever their experience in real life..... However, it is possible to create and use realistic and challenging case studies which point towards general ethical principles."

(Villiers 1998: 4)

This is an important observation, because my own findings suggest that through the medium of creating plays and playlets, police officers developed powerful and often authentic 'living' case studies for the benefit of their peers, and that these 'case studies' make it possible to develop the application of ethical principles and analytical skills.

As he concluded his review Villiers mentions that:

"Many police officers simply want to compare their ideas on ethics and its challenges with those other people who face similar dilemmas. On the assumption that the group is likely to achieve a better solution than the individual - a hotly debatable assumption under some conditions, but nevertheless one with some validity - it is to the public good that police decision-makers should have their mental processes exposed to scrutiny, if only the scrutiny of their peers... Peer analysis can be devastatingly incisive and questions such as; 'What was wrong with that?' or 'What other options were there?' or 'What would you have done?' can lead to significant gains ..." (Villiers 1998: 5)

To sum up, Villiers' brief review of the attempt to teach ethics at Bramshill illustrates its many difficulties - although the willingness of police officers to 'talk' and to execute the tasks they are set means that, serendipitously, their ethical discourse may be enhanced.

Richards (1998) has continued to emphasise the importance of the idea of upholding the 'Rule of Law' as the fundamental priority in policing. He also
advocates that courses in police ethics should, at least in the context of the United Kingdom, begin by addressing and debating the meaning of ACPO's (1990) statement of common purpose and values. His concern lies more with uncovering an appropriate content for police ethics education rather than trying to discover the most effective methods from among a variety of learning structures.

He entitles his most recent (unpublished) paper, 'The British police service statement of common purpose and values: its ethics and implications for policing' - which includes references to the actual teaching of ethics. A part of the significance of Richards' paper lies in the fact that it is written after he, himself, had spent two decades both developing and teaching police ethics to senior managers in the police service.

He begins by noting that the ACPO Statement of Common Purpose and Values was developed by police officers in the hope that it would help fellow practitioners bring some certainty of purpose to their difficult and demanding roles. In other words, the statement of common purpose and values attempted to provide a general framework of answers to questions about the ethics of policing. Richards indicates, however, that these questions were never made explicit. He believes that seven questions are presupposed by the statement. They are:

- What professional, legislative and public needs must we fulfil to meet the demands of our roles?

- What are the values that we should defend during our daily practice?

- What sort of moral world should we strive to uphold?

- Are the values and ethics that we represent similar to or different from those of the public we serve?

- How do we harmonise police values and needs with public values and needs?

- What part should a police code of ethics play in helping to solve the problem challenges raised by these questions?

- How can I be prepared through training and education to meet the ethical demands of my policing role?

In his subsequent text, Richards stresses the way the ACPO Statement of Common
Purpose and Values attempted to harmonise the values of the public and the police - through, for example, insisting that policing by consent would be jeopardised if police were to deviate from seeking morally worthwhile ends in a morally acceptable manner. He also underlines the fact that the Statement of Common Purpose and Values itself was embedded in a wider and far-reaching 'Quality of Service' programme initiated in October 1990 and that a major part of the implementation of that programme was focused upon training 'with the statement playing a key role'.

Richards recognises that it is not uncommon for police codes of ethics to be at the core of ethical training within a police service. He regards them as:

"... authoritative statements that are often used to encourage officers at all levels to reflect on their experiences of policing, on the moral dilemmas that they have faced or might face, and to rehearse their critical moral reasoning and moral decision-making in the safety of the training room. " (Richards, 1998: 9,10)

Here, he appears to place more faith in 'code ethics' than does, for example, Sherman(1982).

Richards then goes on to analyse, painstakingly, the Statement of Common Purpose and Values as a moral code and, thereby shows how it has entered (or might enter) into British police training as a 'valuable educational and training tool'. Richards finds that the statement of common purpose and values measures up well to three main purposes of morality. First, it enjoins police officers to cultivate those dispositions which lead us, generally, to avoid harming others, to treat others with sympathy and benevolence, to act honestly and to act fairly - and, in consequence to act as an antidote to our limitations. Second, the statement supports those activities which, generally, promote human flourishing and which protect those social arrangements that help us to secure those desirable outcomes. Third, the statement is partly designed to help morality safeguard its own possibility by striving to guarantee a zone of freedom where choice - and therefore moral choice - can, itself, be expressed. Thus, for example Richards points out that the phrases in the statement that 'urge the police to reflect public priorities and respond to well-founded criticism' help prevent the police from becoming too insular and professionally arrogant. Their 'openness' to variation and difference provides them with a constant source of 'choice-making' scenarios.

The careful analysis of the moral content of the ACPO statement allows Richards to show how, necessarily, it must be a valuable device to use when focusing upon
ethics in police training and education. He adds:

"In the training environment, the nature of the moral consensus represented by a code can be explored, along with such dimensions of policing as the moral identity of the police role, the setting of that role by the rule of law, the practical moral dilemmas faced, on a day-to-day basis, by police officers, the exercise of discretion, the use of force ..." (Richards, 1998: 19)

As he draws his paper to a conclusion Richards, as a teacher of police ethics, makes a remark about the relationship between theory and practice in an activity such as policing. Elsewhere (Richards 1999, personal communication) holds that practice precedes theory defending his position by asking the question, 'Just as cooking preceded recipes, did morality exist before the subject 'ethics'? In his paper, he goes on to argue that in the practical business of cooking, theory is likened to a recipe. Moreover, a recipe is an abstraction from the practical 'business' of action and conduct in the kitchen. The statement of common purpose and values might be taken as a 'recipe' encouraging police officers to debate how they have both succeeded and failed to follow its guidelines. Richards continues to press his metaphor home by claiming that:

"... the best way of encouraging a thorough exploration of the practical and moral kitchen that is policing is as age-old as the symposiums of Plato. It is that of producing a lively, open learning climate in which police practitioners can engage in the logic of question and answer, with critical attention to the moral pros and cons of police practice." (Richards, 1998: 21)

Significantly, he is not willing to make compromises in his approach to teaching ethics; the last remark in his text is emblematic of his personal commitment to recreating an educational context similar to the symposia of Plato. He is not prepared to relinquish his educational beliefs and he contends that a 'thorough' exploration of the moral aspects of policing is something that cannot be avoided if the programmes of study are to reflect professional integrity and, in the longer term, to have any real effect. He himself attempts to promote and engage in such a 'thorough' exploration of police ethics during the relatively infrequent occasions he is able to address the Strategic Command Course, the most senior course at Bramshill. However, Richards (1999) (personal communication) has conceded that few police officers genuinely relish a truly critical and philosophical approach to the study of ethics and that alternative approaches, whilst more superficial, might now be better designs if police leaders and managers are to test their conduct and decisions against, inter alia, frameworks of ethical principles.
A source corroborating the findings of Villiers and Richards has emerged from the work of Foster (1998). In her submission to the Home Affairs committee concerning how police training and recruitment might be improved, she makes a number of points about some general response patterns and characteristics of the police (as a whole) that thwart training endeavours. Foster, a university lecturer, arrives at her conclusions partly as a result of her extensive knowledge of police research and partly on the basis of her teaching experience in Bramshill itself. She finds the following number of impediments to the overall educational process:

- An indifference to or lack of awareness of research

- An absence of an awareness and understanding of the broader context in which policing takes place

- A feeling in police circles that time spent out of the classroom (during the training experience) is not productive

- A devaluing of the principles underlying reflective practice

These tendencies themselves reflect some of the core elements of the police working and occupational culture i.e. a bias for action, the cult of the 'practical police officer' and 'insularity'.

The observations of Villiers, Richards and Foster - along with the earlier remarks made by Plumridge (1988) and my own writings - constitute the sum total of published material in relation to teaching on management and leadership development programmes at Bramshill. Despite the difficulties 'ethics' has managed to establish itself patchily on the curriculum. I shall now summarise how it manifests itself on those programmes.
At the very beginning of the Strategic Command Course, Richards underlines the central importance that must be given to the moral dimension of policing. The staff of the programme report that the ethical dimension is made salient in the majority of syndicate discussions that follow the various lectures and presentations. One half-day is devoted to a 'dilemma workshop' run by the Institute for Global Ethics during the middle part of the course. Course participants are invited by the Director of the Institute, a few days before the workshop to complete an 'assignment'. They are briefed as follows:

"We much prefer to use fresh, real-life material rather than canned case studies. So, would you please come with at least one example, drawn from your own personal experience, of a challenging ethical dilemma that you have faced or witnessed." (The Institute for Global Ethics, 1999 - memorandum to SCC participants)

Course participants - during the workshop itself - are provided with a definition of ethics, a subsequent exploration of dilemma paradigms (such as 'truth versus loyalty' and 'justice versus mercy') before considering how to resolve ethical dilemmas. Three 'principles' for tackling dilemmas are advocated; they are:

- 'Do what is best for the greatest number of people'
- 'Follow your highest sense of principle'
- 'Do what you want others to do to you'

In this way, the Institute for Global Ethics tries to create an environment that releases the energies of the participants as they examine the nature of their experience with ethical dilemmas. At the same time, the three principles - for resolving dilemmas - represent an attempt to offer solutions to ethical problems. This design has received positive feedback from course participants.

I should also add that the staff of the Strategic Command Course prepare reports on the students of that course and that the content of the reports can have a bearing on an individual's future career prospects. It is, therefore a risky move to adopt an overly negative view towards the learning structures that have been organised by the staff of the programme.
Ethics and the Operational Commanders Programme

The Operational Commanders Programme (mainly composed of superintendents) features a half-day session given over to 'ethical issues in police leadership'. A presentation - along with questions to the directed to the speaker (a senior police officer who offers what he describes as a 'road show') - is then followed by syndicate discussion facilitated by the tutorial staff.

However, I should add that the course director (personal communication) remains unconvinced that the deep and significant issues in police leadership and management are properly addressed.

Ethics and the Police Management Programme

The Police Management Programme included until the autumn of 1998 a session, on the Managing Operations module entitled 'Principled leadership' - which was concerned with the moral aspects of police management - but this was then discontinued. During the final stages of writing this dissertation 'ethics' has been reintroduced as a half-day long unit. The pattern of feedback has begun to show, consistently, a very positive response and a positive valuation of the educational experience.

Ethics and the Accelerated Promotion Course

In my role as Director of the Accelerated Promotion Course I was able to build upon many of the key learning points emerging from the action research process. The subject 'ethics' has received an unequivocal positive evaluation from the client group. The explicit commitment to ethics is reflected in a vision for the course; it seeks to 'develop leaders with justice, integrity and humanity'.

The course includes a one-day introduction to ethics and policing on the Sergeants course. This is followed by a week-long reconvention which takes as its theme, 'Integrity in police supervision, management and leadership'. At a later stage of the programme, course participants examine the moral component of leadership. It has also been possible to identify, on the Inspectors phase of the programme how to present the subject in such a way as to achieve the three aims for ethics education that were specified by Kleinig (1990).

The design for examining the subject 'ethics' on the Inspectors' course begins with an examination of the basis of each individual's claim to lead. Specifically, course
participants are asked by a consultant: 'You have made a claim to lead: upon what moral foundations do you base your claim?' This half-day long session is followed by a review, conducted by a member of ACPO, of some of the moral pressures impacting upon police strategic leaders and the service as a whole.

Then, in another half-day session, an experienced, sophisticated, and, informed police leader examines, through the use of an actual practical example (policing demonstrations involving environment protection protests), how to enhance moral sensitisation, inspire moral resolve and develop moral expertise. A part of this analysis includes an extensive dialogue with the student group which is encouraged to identify the components involved in the unfolding scenario. It is here, I think, that one can identify four ingredients that enable the teaching event to achieve those aims of ethics education identified by Kleinig.

- First, the presenter has a relatively thorough grounding in the subject 'ethics', introduces it in a way that suggests something of its inspirational and challenging nature, and has integrated the concepts of the subject into their everyday discourse.

- Second, the presenter has developed the ability to make general comments about working with a moral consciousness and that this will, at some point involve making painful decisions. Moreover, in the context of policing, it must be recognised that in making decisions it will be impossible 'to please everybody'.

- Third, the presenter examines and presents a vivid, accessible and personal case study full of decisional dilemmas - and invites the participants (or learners) to identify the ethical issues that are involved.

- Fourth, the presenter is sufficiently self-aware not to be perceived as sanctimonious nor as coldly rule-bound. In short, the presenter must show appropriate humility.

Kleinig and Leland Smith (1997) have found that there is strong support on the part of criminal justice ethics educators for 'a pedagogy' that gives a significant place to case studies. My research, along with the conclusions of Villiers (1998) and a personal communication from Richards (1999) agrees with this view.

In addition to the specific teaching of ethics on the police leadership and management development programmes, a short three day course, entitled, 'Better Police Ethics', which is run four times year continues to attract support from an average of fifteen officers per course. The course itself employs a number of
'expert' visiting speakers - a number of whom are members of the Police ethics network.

Finally, and most recently, the study of human rights - following the enactment of the Human Rights Act (1998) - has been the subject of a special seminar organised at Bramshill. An emphasis upon the importance of supporting and appreciating 'human rights' has also been included as a special study area on the Accelerated Promotion Course. In July 1999, a group of student presenters on that concluded that the passing of the Human Rights Act was a 'phenomenal opportunity' for the police service and offered the service the possibility of achieving the highest standards of professional policing.

**Part Three: A summary of the learnings emerging from and the achievements of the research inquiry**

It is not a straightforward task to conclude my inquiry with an identification of the main learnings that have emerged over a period of study that has lasted for more than six years. The process of action research generates data, information, explanations and conduct at many different epistemological levels. It involves personal development, the focus upon a practice (Tongue, 1997), and the challenge of attempting to effect change; it involves the management of a research approach and the search for new knowledge; it entails making knowledge claims; and, it is a socio-political process located in local and distinct contexts where the praxis of human enterprises unfolds and expresses itself.

Lewin (1946) acknowledged the 'multi-variable and multi-discipline' nature and character of managing change in real, concrete social situations and the inquiry I have reported here simply and obviously underlines this fact. Because of the complex and holistic nature of 'action research' I have no option but to leave out most of the detail of the learnings and achievements emerging from the study; I have left out the extraordinary and heartfelt poems crafted by a handful of my students - poems speaking of hope abandoned and left on my lectern as emblems of lives not quite ruined; I have left out the remarkable tragic drama of an 'ethics play' featuring the mysterious death of a child and the wretchedness of suspicion left hanging - left dangling - over the beleaguered and desperate parents; and I have left out exploring the meaning of particular responses related to my 'ethics' teaching - such as the piece of rock from the site of the concert at which Bob Dylan played in 1969 on the Isle of Wight (something 'from Desolation Row') or the setting of the detail of social trends in the United Kingdom to the Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel's *The sounds of silence*. 
Moreover, many of the learnings have to remain unarticulated. Gluck (1999) has noted how somethings just cannot be said; they are felt - like awe - and elude language.

Many of my learnings really constitute reminders of or refinements to older learnings - such as the delicacy that is needed if someone- anyone - begins to discuss another domain of practice (such as policing) when that same person is not a selfsame practitioner; so to do, risks the charges of arrogance, insensitivity and indignity.

Here, I want to begin the review and précis of the learnings emerging from the inquiry by revisiting an issue raised in the introduction to this dissertation. In my introduction I noted that my work was 'fired by hope and ideals'. At the beginning of the project I drew - in equal measure - from some of the great philosophers as well as from writings more passionately commonplace. I set out to create an experience that would do some sort of justice to these writings and that would come to achieve a practical goal. I understood that the process of individual educational action research could support me in my 'struggle and adventure'. The research reported here tries to indicate how an ethics education was designed and developed in the pursuit of that practical goal. So, major learning is that the form of action research adopted in my work represents the expression of a deeply creative process. It is analogous to experimental art; its reception remains uncertain. Each 'delivery' or 'performance' of the ethics unit was like a reworking of a theme. Each shift in the phase of action research was analogous to the investigation of a new expressive medium, or subject matter of artistic genre. The artist 'signs' his or her work; it reflects the choices made by and the value preferences their person. This feature of action research allows the approach itself to carry the potential for a responsible form of personal liberation. The practitioner has a freedom to make something out of their part of the world - to leave their imprint on it. Because action research unfolds its moments over time it benefits form the enriching inclusions of new ideas, new knowledges and the incorporation of older learnings - sometimes in fresh and unexpected ways. So for example, Levi's (1986) allusive and metaphorical work, *The periodic table* offered me new ways of thinking about my work itself and the possibility of freshness and wonderment that lay, in fact, in each occasion I taught 'ethics'. Levi reflected on his work analysing rock samples taken from a mine as follows:

"For the first time after seventeen years of schoolwork, of Greek verbs and the history of the Peloponnesian War, the things I had learned were beginning to be
useful to me. Quantitative analysis, so devoid of emotion, heavy as granite, came alive, true, useful, when part of serious and concrete work... The analytical method I followed was no longer a bookish dogma, it was put to the test every day, it could be refined, made to conform with our aims, by a subtle play of reason, of trial and error." (Levi 1986: 71)

As I lived out the inquiry process I was re-invigorated by Terkel's (1975) conclusion that 'work' is about a search for daily meaning as well as daily bread, for astonishment rather than torpor as well as 'for a sort of life rather than a Monday through Friday sort of dying'. And, as the inquiry progressed I began to infuse the learning design with these kinds of sentiments. Increasingly, fragments from literary sources were included in the presentations and resource materials accompanying the teaching sessions. I referred, for example, to Heaney's (1990) poem 'Digging', to Auden's (1995) 'Refugee blues' and Joseph's (1987) 'Warning' and, differently, to Paine's (1969) 'The Rights of Man' - and, again, to Plato's 'Phaedo'. My own practice increasingly sought to embody and express these conceptions and modes of experience.

If it is the case that the form of inquiry described here approximates to a more general creative process then it may reflect an unusual amalgam of scholarly pursuit and artistic endeavour. Recently, Gluck (1999) has drawn attention to the similarities and dissimilarities between these two types of endeavour. She writes:

"It is commonplace among many creative writers that passion is exactly what the academic lacks; we live, we tell ourselves, turbulent, invested lives, whereas academics invest their narrower energies in a kind of historical tidying-up service, their zeal for detail compensating for lack of creative intensity. But the passion for knowledge I see among scholars is as much a quest as what drives any artist - it too seeks illumination, but the terms (and results) of illumination differ from the artist's." (Gluck 1999: 1)

The similarity of the two endeavours lies in the passionate quest for illumination. Gluck then moves on emphasise the difference:

"I have learned ... deep respect for scholarship: opinions and beliefs no matter how compelling or moving, cannot answer to that name." (Gluck 1999: 1)

Individual educational action research constitutes an approach to knowledge that can embrace both passion and the genesis of justifiable and warrantable assertion. It offers the possibility of arriving at something more than 'opinions and belief'. 
Individual educational action research (as I have presented it in this account) leads to the telling of a teacher's story. As Carter (1993) points out, the focus of such stories 'often ranges beyond the immediate technical issues' of curriculum and classroom lessons 'to encompass teacher's biographies'. Thus:

"...teaching events are framed within a context of a teacher's life history. as a result, the central themes are often moral and philosophical, having more to do with feelings, purposes, images, aspirations, and personal meanings, than with teaching method or curriculum structures in isolation from personal experience or biography. It is teaching ... 'up close' rather than 'out there'." (Carter 1993: 7,8)

The process of individual educational action research facilitates the telling of a teacher's story and because of the nature of the 'action/reflection' cycle I think that the process is iconoclastic. It is iconoclastic in at least two ways. First, during the reflection process, at some point, a basic question is raised concerning the need to identify whatever it was (or is) that lay behind a perception or decision. And so, gradually, the action researcher is led to examine his or her self - in terms of modes of construing, the actual quality of emotions, the pattern of bias in judgements and so on. Therefore, and inevitably, aspects of the self of the researcher are laid bare for scrutiny and for criticism. The limitations of the person are made salient. Established (and comforting) self-conceptions are demolished. This is the first way in which educational action research is iconoclastic.

It is also iconoclastic in a more general way. It leads the researcher to examine the situation of practice within which they too are embedded. In so doing, it begins to expose and confront the nexus of power relations and sectional interests sustained by and sustaining the context of practice. It radicalises the action researcher and surfaces problematic truths about the dominance of the arational over the rational and the truth of politics over the politics of truth. This second iconoclastic feature of action research raises searching question for the action researcher - at the heart of which is the most basic of all: 'Do I opt for the comfortable and expedient life of graceful and sophisticated expert craftsmanship or do I conduct the political struggle concerned to effect justice and rationality in my situation of practice and beyond?'

In addition to these specific claims that I have made concerning the fruits of individual educational action research I have organised other learnings against a framework advanced by Freire (1996). He finds that there are four major components to the basic situation of educational practice. These are:
- A person who instructs or teaches

- The person (or persons) who learn

- The content

- The methods used

He writes:

"The first observation I make is that any educational practice always implies the existence of (1) a subject or agent (the person) who instructs and teaches; (2) the person who learns, but who by learning also teaches; (3) the object to be imparted and taught - the object to be re-cognized and cognized - that is, the content; and (4) the methods by which the teaching subject approaches the content he or she is mediating to the educand." (Freire 1996: 108)

Freire's straightforward conceptualisation of these basic components allows me to organise a summary of the learnings emerging from this study. I shall also make reference to a number of achievements and conclude with some recommendations for the teaching of ethics to police leaders and managers. However, Freire makes no mention of the context in which the educational enterprise is situated. The study reported here took place within an unique institution and the fact that, despite the consistent importance given to police ethics and police integrity by police strategists, it was, temporarily, discontinued on the Police Management Programme. I shall therefore include reference to the 'context' in which the study took place.

In the sections that follow I will, in turn deal with learnings in relation to the content of ethics education for police, the methods (or strategies) for its delivery. I shall then comment upon significant features of the client group before making some observations about myself. Last, I shall mention two key learnings in relation to the context.

**The Content**

- Achieving a new understanding of the role of police in liberal democracies

As I built the actual content of ethics education I took, initially, my lead from
writers who had a long experience with the subject. Kleinig (1990) had argued that the aim of ethics education should be threefold: moral sensitisation, increasing moral resolve and the development of moral expertise. To achieve these goals he argued that the content of ethics education should include four areas; an introduction to moral philosophy, the study of codes of ethics, case studies and lastly, 'middle level enquiries' which took as their focus topics such as discretion, loyalty and impartiality. Richards (1985) had argued for a study of applied ethics, the goal of which was to make moral dilemmas more tractable and had concluded that the most helpful normative ethical framework for police was a sophisticated utilitarianism. He also, cryptically, stressed that 'critical thinking' would be the ultimate aim of an ethics education.

As I came to present a content for ethics to police leaders and managers I found myself understanding ethics as that which was supportive of and central to the ends and means of policing. Whereas Kleinig defended a conception of police in terms of social peacekeepers, I went beyond his characterisation and argued that the purpose of police was to help secure those conditions within which humans learn and learn well.

I arrived at this position after some four years of developing the subject. I presented these thoughts for the first time in the winter of 1996 to a group of very senior ranking police officers. I was delighted with the calm acceptance of such a definition. One feature of action research is the steady encouragement it gives to the process of reflection on practice and thereby the most fundamental questions connected with the ends and means of any enterprise are, necessarily, raised. Without the process it is far less likely that I would have asked the kinds of question that I did and for which I was able to provide some sort of answer.

In the light of such a definition of the role of police in a liberal democracy it becomes clear that the police are essentially in the business of producing moral products - helping to secure those conditions in which the citizenry can both enjoy the pursuit of human flourishing and avoid the worst consequences of human limitations and liabilities.

Significantly, given such an understanding of the role of police, an ethics for police should come to include a content which examines those features of ourselves which may impede our ability to secure the conditions for learning and good learning. In other words, we need to ensure that we are not at the mercy of our own unaware distresses or psychodynamics that both distort ourselves and constrain the life possibilities of those around us. In consequence, a part of the ethics education I
created, included biography work, the 'unravelling' (Heron 1989) or 'unveiling' (Freire 1996) of our personal nature, and, the exploration of the social construction not only of men and women but also of police themselves. In addition, the work of social psychologists has illustrated how the individual is influenced by a number of the characteristic features of human groups - such as conformity to group norms, and, obedience to authority. Thus, a part of the content of the ethics education I presented included an examination of those relevant findings.

So, rather than limiting the content of ethics to the conventional discourse of descriptive, normative and analytical ethics, I have widened the scope to include the achievements of the personal development psychologies as well as a more conventional social psychology.

- Achieving an extended answer to the question, 'What should we expect from police leaders?'

Schein (1976), in his discussion of social interaction, highlights the importance of 'face'. He suggests that when we inhabit a social role we make a claim to be a certain kind of person - and that important 'work' goes on to ensure that we sustain and validate the 'face' that we claim. Schein's observation and Keeble's (1997) question, 'What is the basis of your claim to lead?' led me to ask the general question, 'What should we expect from police leaders?'

Building upon Frankena's (1973) characterisation of the 'good' person which included 'a disposition to find out and respect the relevant facts' I suggested (Adlam 1998c) that we should, similarly, expect from police a disposition to find out and respect the relevant facts of policing. From police leaders and managers we should expect an additional knowledge concerning those facts relevant to the leadership of a police organisation. I found five such categories of fact:

- The history, nature of, and, purposes of police
- Leadership of an organisation in the public domain
- Knowledge of the practice of policing
- Knowledge of 'work', organisations and the 'contemporary'
- Personal knowledge and knowledge of the social construction of persons
I developed a first draft of these ideas in the spring of 1998 and, subsequently they were adopted by the newly constituted 'Leadership faculty' at Bramshill as part of its 'leadership development' framework. (The original draft paper is used to support the teaching content on various programmes of study at Bramshill.)

- Developing an enhanced appreciation of the moral ethos of police organisations

During the study I developed the 'moral ethos' questionnaire and later, the 'organisational ethics' questionnaire. Whilst the primary purpose of both questionnaires was to help elicit considered discussion on the part of course participants, the data patterns emerging from the two instruments threw some light onto the 'moral health' of the police organisation. The data also suggested, in part, why the teaching experience at Bramshill is difficult and uncomfortable for its tutorial staff. In Adlam (1998b) I included some of the details emerging from the 'moral ethos' questionnaire.

Middle managers from across the United Kingdom provided the following modal descriptions of the police organisation:

Dimensions 1 and 2 (i.e. 'moral tone' and 'tightness') combined to reveal the modal description: *Thoughtful self-regulation*. However, almost as many respondents provided the description; *Permissive self-indulgence*

Dimensions 3 and 4 (i.e. 'Deference to hierarchy' and 'Positional abuse') combined to reveal the modal description: *Oppression and Coercion*.

Dimensions 5 and 6 (i.e. 'Spread of trust' and 'Dependence on allegiance') combined to reveal the modal description: *Secretive scheming*.

Dimensions 7 and 8 (i.e. 'Regulatory formalisation' and 'Adherence') combined to reveal the modal description: *Strictly rule-bound*.

Dimensions 8 and 9 (i.e. 'Respect for dignity' and 'Intensity of political stakes') combined to reveal the modal description: *Combat arena*. However, almost as many respondents provided the description: *Supportive community*.

Dimensions 11 and 12 (i.e. 'Concentration of power' and 'Need for stability') combined to reveal the modal description: *Rigid command*.

Dimensions 13 and 14 (i.e. 'Breadth of constituency' and 'Openness to criticism')
combine to reveal the modal description: 'Dialogue seeking'

Dimensions 15 and 16 (i.e. 'Demands on loyalty' and 'Developmental openness') combine to reveal the modal description: 'Symbiotic relationship'.

Four descriptions of the organisation are 'endorsed' by a majority of the client group. They are:

- Secretive scheming
- Strictly rule-bound
- Dialogue seeking, and
- Symbiotic relationship

It would, therefore, be sensible to recognise that amongst the descriptions noted below, these four characteristics are likely to be dominant features of the police organisation.

Whilst this data points towards some positive 'moral force fields' in the organisation, other features are less positive. These latter areas – such as 'secretive scheming' – might properly be taken as the focus by police strategists and change agents for culture change initiatives.

Thus, the inclusion of the structures designed to help examine the moral character of the organisation not only revealed problematic organisational features but also provides a framework and set of concepts that might be deployed by police leaders in their interventions to development both 'quality' organisations and 'organisations fit to house the human spirit'.

_The Methods_

- Moving towards a way of 'delivering' ethics education which maintains an idea of educational 'integrity' but meets the needs of a 'mixed ability' police managerial group

In the early stages of my research I attempted to find a way of presenting the subject which took account of all those variables over which I had control. Unwittingly, I thought that if I was sufficiently disciplined and canny I could
identify those aspects of delivery that would appeal to and please the audience. So, I developed beautifully illustrated computer screen based presentations and selected from a range of riveting and beguiling films and television programmes. I did everything in my power to identify and present an attractive subject matter. Yet underneath these moves and manoeuvres something was telling me that I was a 'living contradiction' (Whitehead, 1989). To that extent, I was helped by Holden (1995), who provides an account where he contrasts one set of motives - those of the educator - with another set - those of the classroom manager. The former defend practices in terms of a genuine educational rationale whilst the latter organise practices in order that the days pass smoothly and without too much fuss. As I reflected upon my efforts I realised to my horror that I was not providing any real education at all. In fact, I was quite unwittingly, enacting and reproducing a positivist ideology. Underneath it all, I was proceeding on the basis of the assumption that if I was sufficiently ingenious to identify all those variables contributing to student experience I could manipulate them in such a way to secure the outcomes I wanted. This was a very disturbing realisation that left me feeling both depressed and alienated. I went through a period of self-disgust and described my work as 'infotainment'. Nonetheless, it was an important moment in the enquiry process because I realised that the methods used at Bramshill for evaluating the educational experience (i.e. based upon the learner-as-customer/consumer) play into the hands of very questionable educational goals because they focus upon crude aspects of the learner experience and not the developmental processes - such as the development of concepts through discourse and debate - provoked by the learning structures.

As a response to this realisation, I drew support from several sources in the literature. One such was Rudduck's work on innovation and change from which I derived a more defensible way of creating an overall 'learning design'. What style of teaching - what methods - would be commensurate with the outcomes towards which my project was aiming? Rudduck (in the context of an humanities project) frames it in the following way:

"The teaching style must be one that supports the exploration of evidence in the pursuit of understanding. If pupils are to arrive at a sense of responsibility for action, then they must be sure that the judgement that determines action is based on careful weighing of evidence and sensitive consideration of different perspectives. They have to realise that in the complex arenas of social action, answers cannot be dictated but must be constructed responsibly by individuals. The process of construction is fostered by dialogue that is questioning, critical but essentially co-operative. Through such dialogue, the individual learns how to
manage the task of looking at issues from different angles - a task that he or she may at times have to manage alone in adult life, without the support that fellow questioners provide in the classroom." (Rudduck, 1991: 20)

Increasingly, my methods have come to try and create the sorts of condition which enable the type of processes to take place which Rudduck identifies. So, for example, the opportunity to create plays representing ethical dilemmas in policing along with the subsequent analysis fosters 'dialogue that is questioning, critical but essentially co-operative'.

- The evolution of styles of 'ethics education' culminating in one that was grounded in 'personal experience, practical concerns and individual wishes'

After the 'reconnaissance' phase the inquiry process adopted different methodological emphases but, until the last design, a proportion of the client group showed a continuing rejection and devaluation of anything 'academic'. In consequence, I came, in the last phase of the project, to adopt an informal approach which elicited from the client group their preference from a range of activities. With this approach, the proportion of time I spent addressing the group and the reliance I placed on technological supports was reduced. The evaluation data suggested that this method - which actively played down the academic aspect of the subject 'ethics' - was likely to be most effective with a mixed ability group of police middle managers.

- Achieving a range of learning structures

By the end of the project I had created more than twenty different learning structures for the 'ethics unit' which constituted a method of delivering the unit marked by variety and contrast.

- The failure of the attempt to conduct 'collaborative' action research

The client group reacted negatively on the two occasions I attempted to introduce a genuinely collaborative way of working with the client group. Aspects of the police culture and the data emerging from the moral ethos questionnaire provide very clear reasons why such an attempt would fail. A senior police officer conducting a doctoral enquiry using an action research approach contended that I would never, on short programmes such as the Police Management Programme 'be able to build a sufficient level of trust for 'collaborative action research' to have a cat's chance in hell'.
The client group

- learning to adjust to particular characteristics of the client group

It was the client group that exerted the most massive influence upon the inquiry process. Students of police generally hold that there is something distinctive about interacting with police officers - especially when they are aggregated into groups.

The social scientific literature on police supports this observation. On the one hand, ethnographic studies identify a powerful occupational culture into which individuals are socialised and from which shared values, outlooks and constructions of reality emerge. On the other hand psychological studies focusing upon the psychological development of police provide suggestive evidence not so much for a 'police personality' but more, the accentuation and clustering of particular character traits along with certain, more specific, learned patterns of response. For example, one such pattern of response is to remain enigmatic, taciturn and unresponsive in social situations where there is an uncertainty of outcome. It is known, in police parlance as 'Don't show out'. Another is to 'Face people down' by gazing at them fixedly and for longer than the culturally accepted duration. So, police are generally depicted as suspicious and mistrusting in their outlook, sceptical of the value of theory and somewhat anti-intellectual. They are also 'experts' on the distinction between the 'real world' and some inaccurate romanticised or idealised alternative - which, they think, are those held by non-police professionals. So, whilst the contributors to Kleinig and Leland Smith's (1997) quite properly debate the efficacy of different approaches to the teaching of criminal justice ethics, they are able to assume a broadly willing and docile body of students. This is not the case with the middle management groups of students on leadership and management development courses at Bramshill. Here, the first task of the tutor is to earn some sort of standing or credibility with the student body before any sustained and rigorous study can begin.

I came to realise that often the educational integrity of my work was under threat as I tried to find ways of 'satisfying', 'pleasing' or 'placating' the participants. Buried beneath my choice of film such as 'Bridge on the river Kwai' or 'A man for all seasons' or even, 'Mutiny on the Bounty' illustrating, as they do, a range of considerations with which ethics deals, was a recognition that the content appealed to deep-structure features of police culture. As Holden (1995) observes, my success depended upon:
"...the canny use of techniques and tricks designed to subdue and mollify the class"
(Holden, 1995:141)

In the last analysis I think my tactics were defensible because, as this study has shown, it is fundamental, if a topic area is to be included on the curriculum, that it excites a positive valuation from the client group. This choice of video played some part in that process.

- The data emerging from the interviews following the 'ethics unit'

The data emerging pointed both to a very gradual increase in the proportion of participants who asserted that they valued their experience of ethics education and to one constant problem. It appeared that, by the end of 1996 - i.e. three years after reintroducing the subject 'ethics' to the middle manager programme - the majority were valuing and appreciating the process.

The one constant problem or theme recurring in most of the interviews concerned the problem with 'theory'. The theoretical components were either seen as too 'difficult', too 'abstract' or 'irrelevant'. This finding remains a problem for me because without some reference to the nature of ethical reasoning, types of ethical theory and conflicts emerging between different ethical principles it is difficult for me to argue that we would be 'doing' ethics at all. However, in the 'final' design reported in the fourth research cycle I did succeed in reducing the 'academic' content to a minimum and focused upon the 'raw' lived experience of the client group.

The interview data also demonstrated the following four dimensions or features, which, in terms of the way they are managed by the educator, make a considerable difference to valuation of the ethics education experience. So, I want to make four statements concerning how ethics education should be conducted in order for it to be valued by this client group: the issues described are necessary (but not sufficient nor exhaustive) conditions which need to be met if a positive evaluation of ethics education is to occur.

- 'Cognitive structuring' versus 'Assuming a positive disposition towards learning':

Unless very careful preparatory work is done to orient participants towards the subject 'ethics' including illustrations demonstrating its contemporary significance, importance and everydayness, participants might choose to devalue the subject. The
initial assumption of many within the client group was that here was yet another 'dose' of moralising. Worse, ethics was construed as something which would be used to 'beat' police. Ethics educators cannot assume that participants will have a positive disposition towards the subject.

- 'Real-world basis' rather than 'Purely theoretical':

Ethics needs to be grounded in the perceived 'real world' concerns of the clients. To be positively valued, it needs to be demonstrated either by readily identifiable example, with videos showing police grappling with problematic ethical dilemmas, or, as 'the plays and playlets revealed in this study, by the dramatic presentations of the participant group itself. However, a very fine line has to be discovered here between a catalytic educational event and passive voyeurism.

- 'Emotional commitment' versus 'Disinterested raconteur/rapporteur':

The evidence I have collected indicates that the personal commitment of the ethics teacher a) to the subject and b) to the adherence of generally accepted moral principles such as tolerance, benevolence and justice is appreciated and valued by the participants. Espoused theory and theory-in-practice should not be too disparate. Participants, generally, do not like an intellectual and disinterested approach. They preferred to see a more impassioned approach.

- 'Giving a permission to be' versus 'Taking the moral highground'

Grounding the content of ethics education in a 'search for the good life' - within which permissions are clearly given to participants to express themselves, to 'be' themselves, and, to recognise that the 'good life' will be a mixed life of the sensual, the aesthetic and the moral is preferable to that alternative where participants sense that ethics educator has 'taken the moral highground'. Participants wish to see ethics educators as tolerant and forgiving.

- The achievement of a significant re-evaluation of personal and/or professional purpose on the part of a small minority of the client group

Throughout the duration of the study a small number of police officers were substantially affected by their experience with the 'ethics education' unit. Not only
did three officers volunteer to help with the delivery of the module but a small number of others, in conversation with me, made the following remarks:

"Ethics changed my life"
"I suddenly realised that 'integrity' was our business"
"I found enlightenment in ethics"
"It was unforgettable - I think about it everyday now"
"Looking at ethics was the most significant experience in my life"

In addition, some persons made changes to their life situations as a result of the module. So, one officer chose to take out a grievance against his force on the grounds of racial discrimination. Another opted to pursue a Masters degree that offered the chance to deepen the study of ethics. Lastly, other officers chose to utilise some of my educational materials in local training and development initiatives.

**Learnings in relation to myself**

- The benefits of 'self-awareness'

One of the particular problems I experienced as I presented ethics education was the relentless and puritanical scrutiny to which I was subjected. I was criticised for examining certain issues because some members of the client group thought that the topic areas might upset others in the group. This, they reported was 'unethical'. So, there are particular pressures upon whoever delivers an ethics curriculum to be as free from hidden agendas and dysfunctional psychodynamics as possible. Inevitably, this means that the ethics educator will have done considerable 'personal' work in order to unveil their own social construction (with all its conventional limitations) and distresses.

I am certain that, had I not spent two years working intensively on such a process I would either have slipped into glib moralising or the unaware filling of distressed roles such as 'persecutor' or 'rescuer'. I will never be entirely certain that I was free of such liabilities however. And yet, I always remembered that whatever the response to myself or my work was, there were good reasons for it. Everyone has their story to tell.

Because of my relatively increased confidence - something which is a direct outcome of action research and critical reflection - my work was able to move towards a more informal style of interaction' with the client group and I was able
to offer, at each point of the design, a choice of activity.

I was also able to risk trying out new activities:

The first, entitled, 'The play's the thing' was a design making reference to the device used by Shakespeare in 'Hamlet' (where there is a play within the play). Plays can reveal truths but in a way that is slightly distanced from actual threatening reality. We are, therefore, protected from ourselves. In order to help bring ethics to life' I indicate that sometimes we discover and manage truth by using structures such as theatre which are, as I have noted above, one step removed from our daily affairs. So structured, we set out to script and enact plays which reproduce policing moral dilemmas in areas such as 'loyalty', 'deception' 'power' and 'discretion'.

The second was to use the vehicle of psychosynthesis and the recapitulation of the learners' individual life journey and personality development as a way of achieving insights into those particular experiences and social phenomena which had constructed the person as he or she 'is'. In the light of such insights, each learner is given the opportunity to 'remake' themselves.

Third, building on Mackie's (1977) view that it is to literature we should look for portraits of the 'good life', I used and provided a wide range of literary text ranging from poetry (e.g. Walt Whitman, Rupert Brooke, Jenny Joseph, Philip Larkin and Seamus Heaney), to religious and semi-religious writings (e.g. The Dhammapada, Gibran's,'The Prophet') and the specific works of philosophers (e.g. Socrates, Machiavelli, Luther, Rousseau, Mill, Kant, MacIntyre and Lyotard).

- learning about my limitations

This study has illustrated that I was always liable to criticism from members of the client group and that sometimes this criticism was caustic or malevolent. I think that some of the learning structures I chose reflected my desire to 'show 'em' that I was tough enough to 'take anything'. The fact that some of these structures (such as certain video material) reflected a form of retaliation is not at all commendable. Nonetheless, there is personal learning here because it confronts me with a limitation to which I am subject.
The Context

- The power of the arational over the rational

At the beginning of the account reported here I provided a description of the context in which the project took place. I shall conclude this final chapter by emphasising the triumph of the arational over the rational in the curriculum management of courses for police leaders and managers at Bramshill.

Throughout the last decade of the twentieth century an unprecedented emphasis was given, in policing, to a 'quality of service' philosophy and to police ethics. However, although I continued to explore how best to create and deliver a positively valued ethics education and despite the fact that I am able to produce evidence for some success of my designs, the ethics unit was discontinued from the Police Management Programme. The main reason for the discontinuation was because the subject was 'difficult' and that this could elicit negative affect from a proportion (sometimes a majority and sometimes a minority) in the group. As a result, subsequent 'inputs' from other tutors could be affected - and the overall effect would be a poor evaluation for the module.

Thus, arational factors, rather than rational factors, can be shown to be more important in aspects of educational decision making within the institutional context of Bramshill.

- Cultures in conflict

The nature of decision-making at Bramshill itself reflects tensions between different cultures. The rise of the idea of 'quality of service' and the demands of a performance culture combine together to generate 'satisfaction' measures which are based on the student ratings of their experience. Co-existing with this cultural paradigm is a commitment to the professional development of police leaders and managers within a contemporary social context. This entails confronting hard questions and hard facts (such as institutional racism) which are unlikely to elicit a warm affective glow. More profoundly, Bramshill is characterised by differing occupational cultures and an identity fragmented by the creation of three faculties. It has lost its identity as 'The Police Staff College' and become a National Police Training site. In consequence its curriculum content is rendered unstable and
subject to individual preference.

**A closing observation**

On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Amnesty International took out a full page 'advertisement' in a national newspaper entitled, 'You have the right to remain silent'. The text in that advertisement began:

"This week marks the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Well, happy bloody birthday human rights. We'd love to celebrate the fine words set forth by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948. But they are words that have been written a million times over in the blood of those who have been murdered, massacred and mutilated in the last fifty years" (Amnesty International, in the Independent on Sunday newspaper, 13. 12. 98)

Yet, despite these bitter words, the text of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and that of other human rights documents continues to inspire a sustained quest for justice on the part of students attending programmes of study at Bramshill. I think that this is so because human rights can be enjoyed as 'possessions' or entitlements by each and every person in virtue of their own personhood. Duties, by contrast, are a trifle more burdensome as are the virtues. But with rights, humans are both individualised and made one of a piece. In advocating the importance of human rights any person safeguards their own liberty and simultaneously excites a positive emotional charge from others. In the context of Bramshill, this study has underlined how important it is to excite such a positive emotional charge in the face-to-face situation of the training arenas.

**A final recommendation**

This research and the reports of two fellow tutors who have been concerned to present 'ethics' to police leaders and managers finds that there are indications that one strategy is likely to succeed both in securing the necessary positive valuation and providing a real depth of analysis. This involves engaging the client group either through using a 'real life' case study that has faced an actual police practitioner or involves the groups of participants in presenting an unfolding and representative dramatic performance. However, in both cases the tutorial staff need to be able to facilitate the 'moral sensitisation', the strengthening of moral resolve and the exploration of moral expertise that Kleinig (1990) astutely advocated as the aims for police ethics education. This approach embraces and extends the
suggestions of both Villiers (1998) who emphasised the efficacy of the 'case study' method and Richards (1998) who contended that the most effective form of ethics education lay in the recreation of the types of dialogue enjoyed by Socrates, Aristodemus, Aristophanes and other guests reported in Plato's 'Symposium'.

Closing vignette: 'We took a holiday from ethics'

The nights were drawing in. Now, when the sun shone it was less brilliant than it had been in the summer months. But more light flooded into the interiors of the buildings at Bramshill.

A new member of the tutorial staff had become interested in my research and had decided that the topic 'ethics' should be included on the erstwhile 'Managing People' module of the Police Management Programme. The module had been re-titled 'Advanced People skills'. He invited me to run a half day session on the module; it would be called 'ethics and leadership'.

Quite unexpectedly, after an absence of eighteen months from the middle-manager programme, 'ethics', as a named topic, was scheduled to make its re-appearance on that programme in late October 1999.

As I prepared for the session I recalled the challenge - perhaps it was an injunction - issued to me by Bob Brownhill, the social philosopher and supervisor of my inquiry project.

He had said: 'If you are doing 'action research' you don't just give it up. You find a way of continuing. You don't give up hope.'

I had come very close to giving up hope and yet, here, and again, I had the chance to make ethics 'come alive'. Is it the case that, just as in art, some themes never quite go away? Did this turn of events confirm some of the ideas of the 'depth psychologists' such as Jung or the insights of the poets such as Whitman?

Depth psychologists have likened the human mind and the unconscious to the still waters of a lake. Experience and sensation, discourse and interventions become pebbles, and stones, and boulders slipping unobtrusively or clattering loudly into those same still waters. Quietly or noisily, they break the surface, only, apparently, to disappear. But, they remain, unnoticed, ceaselessly exerting their effect on the ecology of the liquid system.
Similarly, Whitman, in his 'song of myself' has written:

"Whoever degrades another degrades me ... and whatever is done or said returns at last to me, and whatever I do or say I also return." (Whitman 1995: 33)

And so, on a fine October afternoon, I walked across to the mansion at Bramshill, entered by the West gate, set my papers down on the grand piano in the 'Chapel Drawing Room' and readied myself for action. I wondered at the contrast between my first hesitating attempt to talk about ethics some six years earlier and the informed confidence in my learning and knowledge as a new century approached.

The group consisted of twenty Inspectors and Chief Inspectors. It was the second day of their programme. What struck me, as I discussed the nature of 'ethics', the particular aspects of policing that accentuate ethical complexities, and, the issue of ethical leadership was the contrast within the group between a minority of officers who showed some form of animation and responsiveness with the enigmatic, expressionless, impassivity of the majority. This latter group observed me with - and this was the problem - with what? I made points, developed arguments, declaimed on this, opined on that. Their gaze bored into me. It was uncomfortable.

After a while, I moved on to examine some of the data patterns emerging from the various versions of the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. This included a reference to the fact a large majority of the respondents rated themselves at the 'highly ethical' point on a continuum ranging from the 'extremely ethical to the extremely unethical'. I asked the group how this might be accounted for if there was a simultaneous finding that the 'organisation' was not especially 'ethical'. I also mentioned that, as member of staff, I had not always thought that programme participants meted out 'fair' treatment to the course tutors. I tried to say all this without any touch of rancour.

At this point, one officer, remarked, 'What do you expect? You put yourself on offer.'

I had often heard members of police staff say that anyone who addressed groups of police officers 'put themselves on offer'. I suddenly realised that I had never asked what it was that they meant by this expression.

And so I replied: 'Yes, I've heard this expression, people put themselves 'on offer' before. But what does it mean?'
'It means', he said, 'that you put yourself on offer to be shot down'

'Is that it?' I replied. 'Whoever comes in here faces a metaphorical firing squad?'

'Yes', he said, 'But that can be fun for the performer.'

'Oh well', I remarked wryly, 'To avoid the big guns of the artillery, I've got the HMIC 'Integrity' report for you to have a look at - it provides something a bit like an 'integrity test'.

I handed out the executive summary of the report - and small groups chatted away as they roamed over the recommendations. I concluded the session by making a reference to something one of my colleagues had said when he first tried to introduce 'ethics' as a subject to police leaders and managers. He had remarked:

'You can't take a holiday from ethics'.

There was a pause. And then, with great conviction one officer announced:

'That's exactly what we have done for the last few years. We did take a holiday from ethics.'

The unit evaluation showed a perfect fifty-fifty split between those who took considerable value from the unit and those who had gained little or no value. I thought about their response and how I had not done enough, in the eyes of the institution, to guarantee the survival of my work.

Two evenings later, in the sports hall - when I was about to take part in a team game, I saw one of the module participants.

'Well', I said to him, 'I've looked at the course evaluation of my work. Do you think I should try and continue? - the feedback wasn't too bad but it wasn't too good either.'

'I loved it', he said. 'Mind you, Rob, it's all down to the first ten minutes. You've got to get them in the first ten minutes. Some of them thought you were 'half a beer'.'

'What's 'half a beer'? ', I asked.

'Half of beer? - You know - it means 'queer' - gay.' He immediately added: 'I knew
you weren't because I'd checked up on you before the course began.'

When I mentioned this story to a police officer colleague on the staff at Bramshill he simply said:

'That's police culture for you.'
Appendices
Appendix: 'A picture of Bramshill'

A selection of photographs illustrating aspects of the institution
A ‘Passing Out’ parade in front of the Mansion

A ‘Passing Out’ parade marching to the front of the Mansion
The Mansion - Rear view

The Mansion - Side view
The oak panelling in the Mansion

The prominent display of NPT and police in the Mansion
Reception for the Students on the Police Management Programme

The Dining Hall
A notice board at the entrance to the Dining Hall

The Bar in the Mansion adorned with gifts from visitors to Bramshill
Syndicate Facilities for the Police Management Programme

Lecture Room Facilities for the Police Management Programme
Staff Study for staff on the Police Management Programme

Computing Facilities - A Computer Crime Course in Progress
Foxley Hall - The home of the National Crime Faculty

The Home Secretary, Jack Straw, visiting Bramshill
The Reception area at Bramshill

The main Dining Hall at Bramshill
A 'self-development' process involving Inspectors in a typical 'Syndicate Room'

A small Lecture Theatre at Bramshill
The Television Studio - Training in progress

The 'Briefing Room', Foxley Hall
Appendix A

Selected documents from Richards' (1982) original 'Police Ethics Exercise'

- Introduction to the programme

- Programme timetable

- Towards a police professional ethic

- Police and the professional ideal (authored by Norman Greenhill)
Introduction

It is not the intention of this input to teach people how to be moral. Besides being a practical impossibility in the time allotted such an exercise would be presumptuous in the extreme. Every member of the course will be practiced in guiding both his public and private life according to those fundamental principles which are an indispensable part of a good upbringing. Rather it seeks to foster a critical awareness of the way in which such principles together with certain values make their contribution to successful police professionalism. In devising the content of the input we have been mindful of the leadership and training roles of officers as well as their more direct operational concerns.

Many have attested to the remarkable achievement of the British Police Service in being able to combine a high order of public acceptance with the discharge of its duties. That it has, through the one hundred and fifty or so years of its existence, managed to police in a generally mild and unaggressive way says much for both police and citizens. However, a very considerable challenge now faces the service if it is to continue policing in this style. During the past thirty years there have been considerable social changes in British society which have affected all sections of the community and hence both parties to the police-public relationship. Just to instance some of the main ones relevant to the police: the amount of unpopular laws the police have been required to enforce has increased (for example, laws relating to traffic, drugs and pornography); the development of protest marches as a regular occurrence; the rise of welfare agencies which have diminished the service function of the police; the increased awareness on the part of citizens of their legal rights; the continuing articulation, through
growing anti-authoritarianism among many people, and especially among young people. The combined effect of changes brought about by the Police Act, 1964 and a programme of amalgamating police forces to form larger units, has been to weaken democratic control generally; the introduction of police strategies which have increased efficiency but at the price of a loss of direct contact with the public; the increase of police pay and status which has distanced them from some sections of the community which they police. The police, knowing that they cannot effectively police without the support of the public and conscious that many of these factors might work to imperil a good police-public relationship, have initiated the modernisation of training programmes, organised conferences, appointed community relations officers and changed policing styles. It is in the spirit of such initiatives that this input hopes to make a contribution.

With its tradition of success and resourcefulness, the British Police Service, when challenges are made to it, can usually, by exploring the intimations of its own practice, identify values and principles by which to further guide its development. This we have sought to do. By making explicit those values and principles which are relevant to the practice of police professionalism in Britain, we hope to show the contribution which they can make towards sustaining good police-public relations and the standing of the Service and its members.
# POLICE ETHICS EXERCISE

Programme for the Junior Command Course on Monday, 13th., Tuesday, 14th. and Wednesday, 15th. of December, 1982.

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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Monday, 13th. December</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>General Introduction to the Programme</td>
<td>The Deputy Commandant Assembly Hall</td>
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<td></td>
<td>The Character of the United Kingdom</td>
<td>Mr. Watt</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Seminar I</td>
<td>½ Syndicates</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>The Idea of Professionalism</td>
<td>Mr. Greenhill</td>
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<td>- Seminar II</td>
<td>½ Syndicates</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Film: The Offence</td>
<td>Assembly Hall</td>
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<td>5, 6</td>
<td>Impartiality, Discretion and Due Process - Seminar III</td>
<td>½ Syndicates</td>
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<td>Assembly Hall</td>
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<th>Period</th>
<th>Tuesday, 14th. December</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Roles and Values - Seminar IV</td>
<td>½ Syndicates</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ethics: an introduction</td>
<td>Mr. Richards</td>
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<td>Exemplary Moral Tales - Case Studies and Discussion</td>
<td>½ Syndicates</td>
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<td>3, 4</td>
<td>Police-related Case Studies - Discussion</td>
<td>Syndicate Rooms</td>
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<th>Period</th>
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<tr>
<td>1, 2</td>
<td>Police-related Case Studies - Discussion</td>
<td>Syndicate Rooms</td>
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* Allocate Case Studies Nos. 1 - 7 to each half syndicate. Support student prepare 5 minute presentation and allow about 10 minutes for discussion. 2 syndicate will only 6 students. Omit Case Study No. 4. Work with the syndicate - Case Studies 1-13 1 per student. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

To understand fully the function of a professional ethic it is necessary to understand what part morality plays in human life generally. I believe that the views put forward here as to that part will stand up to our critical understanding and enjoy the broad support of those who give thought to such matter.

Morality - Its Purpose

Moral discourse, like any other mode of discourse, has a limited scope. Not all uses of such words as 'good', 'ought' and 'right' are moral uses. Examples: 'That is a good car'. 'To get to Birmingham by the quickest route you ought to use the M5'. 'That is not the right way to tighten a nut'.

When are the questions about rule bound activity moral questions? The best way to answer this is to come to understand the distinctive role of morality in human living. Once we see the overall rationale or function of morality, we can come to understand readily enough what questions are moral questions, what considerations are moral considerations, and what reasons can count as good reasons in ethics. What is the point of having moral institutions, practices and rules?

Rather than try to catalogue all the rationales for morality I will state and explain a central one, a rationale that would remain central no matter what additional ones morality might have. It is by virtue of this rationale that one can come to understand that - and why - certain reasons must be good reasons in ethics.

The Human Situation: an exercise in philosophical anthropology

Human beings have many diverse and frequently conflicting wants, needs and interests. Given these, there are also persistent limitations built into the human condition which are such that things are liable to go badly - badly in the non-moral sense that human wants, needs and interests are likely to be frustrated in large measure.

The limitations: limited resources - competition - need for co-operation; limited information - lack of knowledge often frustrates human purposes; limited rationality - human beings do have some ability to perceive alternate courses of action, to appreciate what there is to be said for or against alternatives, to make a choice or decision, and to act appropriately - but this ability is
limited intelligence - power of rationality and depth of comprehension; limited sympathies - in the pursuit of wants, needs and interests human beings have a strong tendency to discount the feelings, needs, wants and interests of others. These limitations should be read off against a background of physiological and psychological vulnerability and approximate equality.

To counter-act these limitations we need some socially recognised device more pervasive and ubiquitous than the law - and without which the law could not operate. The device must be such that the parties to it, if they reason with average rationality, will regard it as equitable, and it must be sufficiently comprehensive and stable to enable the agents involved to form some expectations concerning ranges of permissible human behaviour regarding each other. It is such a role that morality plays in human life; it is that sort of system of social control. I should add that morality is fundamental to practice; it both sets the standards for it and makes mutual co-operation possible.

All this suggests the following definition of 'morality'. By 'morality' is meant a system of principles whose main purpose is to protect the interests of other persons as well as the agent and which present themselves to the agent as checks on his natural inclinations or spontaneous tendencies to act.

Having provided this definition and emphasised the social control character of morality, it is now necessary to specify what kind of system of social control is required and indicate its salient features.

A Normative Ethic

A morality which meets the requirements outlined above, with their emphasis upon the harms which are resultant from some fundamental features of the human situations, would be utilitarian in the sense that it takes human well-being as its foundation. My claim at this juncture is that the required system of social control which will serve to check harms and promote well-being can be generated by one ultimate moral principle:

An act ought to be performed if and only if the sum of preferences of the of the persons involved is favourable.

If 'pleasure' is defined as roughly, a preferred state of consciousness then this becomes:

One ought to act if and only if its effect is to maximise happiness among all concerned.

Besides being more workable this is very much the traditional hedonistic act-utilitarian formulation.
Three features of moral principles ought to be noted.

a) They are prescriptive. So, 'You ought to do A' strongly prescribes doing A, or, more simply, expresses a strong desire that A be done. One way of attending to the world is to be concerned to describe it and we present our observations about what is the case in the form of statements. But when the object of our attention is either to maintain things as they are or to change things, then we express our desires in the form of prescriptions and they are the language of doing. All practice has this concern and its prescriptions are larded with words concerned to effect practical activity such as 'will', 'must', 'should', 'ought'. Moral prescriptions are a species of such practical prescriptions.

Care should be taken not to confuse prescriptions with descriptions. It is all too easy to pass deductively from a description to a prescription: from an is to an ought. That is to infer directly from 'Bombing is the cause of horrible suffering' to 'Bombing ought to be stopped'. For a valid argument what is required is the expression of a suppressed major premise - a moral prescription to the effect that 'An act ought not to cause horrible suffering'.

We should note too that prescriptions do have a descriptive content. If I say 'Close the door' then the demand for action will only make sense if the door referred to is open. This is important for moral prescriptions in general and the ultimate moral principle in particular. Given the rationale for morality which has been sketched out, they are meant to cope with the conditions of this world not all possible worlds.

b) They are universalisable. This unwieldy expression is, in effect, a demand for rational consistency. If I say you ought to do A, I implicitly affirm that everyone ought to do A in identical circumstances - and that includes me if I were in your position (i.e. the same circumstances aside from location in space-time and the individuals involved). This feature builds in a formal principle of fairness as far as the ultimate moral principle is concerned. Universalisability demands that we apply a moral principle impartially and without regard to who a person is. We are to neither accord privilege nor deny it. Strict impartiality is required of us. When it comes to summing preferences or calculating which action would maximise happiness each person to be affected by the action enjoys equality of consideration - the right to have his preferences or happiness considered. As the Utilitarian Bentham put it, 'Everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one'.

c) Overridingness. If we commit ourselves to moral principles and are sincere in our commitment we shall treat them as overriding other prescriptions.
to visit my sick friend' overrides 'I ought to cut the lawn because it looks untidy' given that only these two courses of action are open to me. The moral prescription overrides the aesthetic. An ultimate moral principle has the feature of overriding all other moral principles.

There is one more feature that needs to be noted about the application of moral principles and it is of great importance. Moral judgements are not sound if they depend on mistaken factual beliefs. This may be brought out with the following three line moral argument:

1. I will so act as to maximise the happiness of all concerned.
2. Conditions XYZ will maximise the happiness of all concerned.
3. Therefore I will act to bring about conditions XYZ.

The second premise is factual and had my factual judgement been wrong then I should have acted wrongly. Often moral disagreement is disagreement about facts, not principles.

Having said all this about moral principles in general and the ultimate moral principle in particular, how is it to be used to direct our actions?

A Two Tier Moral System

A superhuman mastermind could, no doubt, apply the ultimate moral principle directly. He would have superhuman powers of thought, superhuman knowledge and powers of prediction and no human weaknesses. When presented with a novel situation, he would be able at once to scan all its properties, including the consequences of alternative actions and frame a universal principle (perhaps a highly specific one) which he could accept for action in that situation, no matter what role he were to occupy in it. Being perfectly rational and lacking partiality to himself, he will act on that principle if it bid him to act.

Critical and Intuitive Moral Thinking

For the most part we are not like this and we regulate our lives by the application of 'intuited' moral principles. We just do not have the time or the capacity in most instances to apply the ultimate principle. So we direct our lives according to principles which exhort us to keep our promises, to make reparation for past wrongs, to care for our parents and children, to act with honesty, to respect the rights of others - and one could go on. Indeed, so habitual is our application of such principles that they inform our perceptions and we are hardly aware of applying them at all.

The suggestion here is that principles, to the extent that acceptance of them will normally, but not necessarily always, lead to what the ultimate moral principle requires should be adopted. And not merely adopted but inculcated.
Once inculcated then, many moral issues would be resolved, as they are, by 'intuitive thinking'. Those directing their lives by them would become strongly averse to infringing them, would feel strong compunction if they did so and would be highly indignant if others infringed them.

There will still, however, be a very important role for 'critical thinking', the application of the ultimate moral principle. It will play a vital part in selecting intuitive moral principles and will lead to some being justified and others being modified or rejected. For example, the intuited principle that one ought not to take human life might be modified if rescue in an extreme hostage/terrorist situation would otherwise be impossible. Given the importance of facts in moral judgement and an ever-changing world we need to be on the alert to review our moral commitments to be sure that they are still the ones which will normally lead to utility - maximising acts (the ones we ought to perform).

Critical thinking has a further function: that of resolving conflicts between intuited principles. Often we are torn between keeping a promise and offering help to somebody. Critical thinking would have a part to play in this. Again, suppose a racist organisation seeks to reserve a public hall for a meeting and it is obvious that if the meeting is held there will be incitement to racial hatred and a danger of violence. The public authority, on the advice of the police, refuses to make the hall available (it controls the hall). The racist organisation then protests that it is being denied its right to free speech. The public authority protests the right of minorities not to have hatred preached at them and the right of the public to be protected against outbreaks of violence. Here is a typical case of a conflict between rights. Again, critical thinking should be brought into play. Intuitive thinking flounders in such situations. Further, and allowing that generality is the opposite of specificity, that of the two principles 'Never kill people' and 'Never kill people except in self-defence' the first is more general than the latter, and intuitive moral principles must be general. This is for two reasons: they must be simple enough to be learned and also able to handle a fairly wide number of situations. Fortunately the world is such that they can do this, there are sufficient similarities between situations, in relevant respects, for general principles to get a hold. Sometimes, in unusual situations, they do not do their job very well and they do not lead to maximising happiness. For example on this basis, in certain situations, we would wish to make an exception to 'Never kill people' to allow for self-defence. Again critical thinking would have a place. Hence, with the plethora of intuited moral principles and the rights, duties and obligations to which they give rise, the ultimate moral principle, through selection and arbitration, would fit a system of moral social control for its task in counter-acting the limitations of the human situation.
Morality and the Good Life

A number of further features should be noted about the character of 'morality' as envisaged here. In the first place it is tolerant of the vast majority of human goals. People, obviously and fortunately are different, have different capacities and different notions of what they expect to find satisfactory. In consequence they embark upon any number of different ways of life; become artists, sportsmen, bankers, men of action or religious recluses. Morality allows for all of these and more. This is because its business is to propound principles to which, by and large, our conduct should conform in the pursuit of our valued ends, whatever those ends may be. A note of caution is in order here. Morality does set limits upon what is allowable in the pursuit of personal ends and condemns some ends as immoral. For example, the ambitious musician with a sick wife is morally required to forego at least some of his ambitions to care for her and morality condemns achieving the perfect murder as an end. In general, people who recognise exactly the same intuitive principles and who conform to them equally satisfactorily in all they do, may nevertheless be doing quite different things, living quite different lives, pursuing widely differing ends. In that sense there is no one way in which morality requires them to live.

But does morality require a particular way of life in the sense that it dictates a supreme goal or good, the character of which ought to determine the character of one's life generally? From the foregoing remarks there seems no reason to think so. What of the life that makes morality itself the goal? Perhaps a remark of the moral philosopher C.D. Broad is appropriate here, 'A healthy appetite for rightousness, kept in due control by good manners, is an excellent thing; but to "hunger and thirst after " it is often merely a symptom of moral diabetes'. Morality itself does not seem to require that we make it the sole end of our lives. In keeping with this while it does demand that its principles be overriding, it does allow for the operation of other non-moral principles which function as guides to conduct. For instance, a sportsman may regulate part of his life according to the principle, 'I will practice morning and night' and the artist bind himself according to the principle 'I will practice my brush technique until it is perfect'. Such principles are neither universalisable nor overriding.

To sumerise all this, morality is concerned to counter the limitations of the human situation and prescribes conditions within which lives are to be lived and valued ends pursued. But for any good life much more is required than
simply that those conditions should not be transgressed. Indeed, an unsuccessful, unhappy life may well be led*1 in strict conformity to moral principles.

Morality and the Liberal Democratic State

It is one of the remarkable achievements of modern liberal democratic states that they generally facilitate a wide range of life-styles for their citizens in a manner which broadly satisfies the demands of morality. In Britain there is a high degree of public order because social control is largely effected voluntarily by a citizenry who generally adhere to intuitive moral principles. This same population also, through its democratic political arrangements, brings into existence rules which are enacted by the Queen - in - Parliament and upheld by the courts; in short, the law. Such laws are both substantive and procedural and one of their functions is to reinforce with an elaborate battery of sanctions and penalties those intuited moral principles which are central to social control. Under the same arrangements the Police Service as a public body is entrusted to uphold the law, prevent crime and promote public tranquility and individual police officers are invested with rights and duties which define their role, provide them with authority and give them the necessary powers to discharge their duties. Because the Police Service observes the same morality, the same system of social control, as that adopted by the generality of citizens its services are valued by them. The requirements of professionalism, when observed, serve to sustain the police role and the value placed upon it.

A POLICE PROFESSIONAL ETHIC

That I intend to use the same procedure for developing a professional ethic that I used when developing a rationale for morality as such should come as no surprise at this stage. Morality is to the limitations of the human situation as a police professional ethic is to those factors which impede the essential relationship of trust and confidence which a profession hopes to enjoy with its clients. If for no other reason, it is prudent for the police to be concerned about this relationship because, in a liberal democratic society, without the general support of citizens, their work would be impossible.

By 'professionals' is meant a body which provides a service deemed both essential and worthwhile by its clients, exercises skills resting upon a systematic body of knowledge and is governed by a concern for principles and values which sustain both the commitment of members to each other and to their clients. A code of ethics is therefore a requirement of professionalism and it is through honouring its code that a body is enabled to earn and enjoy the status of a profession.
What then are the intuitive moral principles which suggest themselves for a police professional ethic appropriate for the British Police? One fundamental source lies in the tradition of the Service itself. It has been well served, for example, by the principle which exhorted it to treat the public with civility. Another source is the human rights provisions of such bodies as the Council of Europe and the United Nations. A third way of proceeding takes account of those practices which tend to undermine public confidence and trust in its service. If these are thought undesirable then intuitive moral principles may be devised to counter-act them. This is, of course, the strategy employed above for morality itself. The principles themselves will implicitly point to the undesirable practices that they are framed to counter-act so I will not rehearse the practices here. The contributions of the other two sources should be fairly obvious.

SUGGESTED POLICE ETHICAL CODE

AS A BRITISH POLICE OFFICER AND CITIZEN I WILL ON BEHALF OF MY FELLOW-CITIZENS

detect and prevent crime, apprehend offenders, protect persons and property, and by preserving public tranquility maintain the Queen's peace

do my duty and, when situations demand it, be a credit to the Police Service by doing it to the limits of my capacity

be fair and impartial to all people, no matter what their social position, race or creed, and actively seek the support and goodwill of my fellow-citizens

have a compassionate respect for the dignity of the individual and behave to all with courtesy, self-control, human understanding and tolerance

never use more force than is necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose nor subject anybody to any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

strive continually to increase my professional skills so that I can exercise my discretion with ever greater skill and judgement

uphold the law, observe due legal process and obey orders which conform to such law and process
keep matters of a confidential nature secret unless the performance of police duty requires otherwise

act with honesty and integrity towards colleagues and fellow-citizens and be mindful of the reputation of the Police Service

The code is deliberately presented in this form to resemble an oath. It is also intended to be reasonably memorable and to foster professional pride and self-respect in any officer who endeavours to apply it. All the principles in it have the quality of overridingness; they override non-moral principles. The fact that a police officer is the subject of them does not affect their universality because his role characteristics - rights and duties as a police officer - are part of the circumstances of any situation within which, as an individual, he may find himself. Thoughtful consideration of the principles should reveal that they meet the requirements of critical moral thinking, provide moral guidelines for the police code and qualify as a professional ethic.

It is intended that they be inculcated through training programmes. There will be situations in which the principles of the code come into conflict with each other. To resolve them is an excercise of discretion guided by critical moral thinking and it is intended that, as far as is possible, the resolutions of such conflicts will correspond to the scale of ranks: the graver the situation in which such a conflict arises the higher the rank of the officer applying his critical moral thinking. Training programmes will also take this requirement into account.

Neil Richards - 9/82
1. **Introduction**

1.1 **The search for an ethic of policing**

Human behaviour in every sphere is normally subject to moral evaluation in terms of some code of conduct, whether formal or informal. There is frequently, however, a problem in deciding which particular code is applicable in the context in question. Universal standards are seldom of practical relevance: 'situational ethics' are called for. Occupations provide just such situational contexts in which codes of practice operate, and 'professions' are a category of occupations in which such codes are more formally established than in other occupations.

The object of this paper is, therefore, to examine the idea of a profession - or more strictly of 'professionalism' - and to consider whether the occupation of policing may properly be called professional. The answer to this question will have considerable relevance to the search for a policing ethic.

1.2 **The problem of defining a profession**

A number of occupations normally enjoy professional status, whilst several more make professional claims which are not entirely granted outside the occupation itself. An examination of professions and would-be professions leads to the identification of a number of common, though not universal, features and it is possible to combine the most salient of these to construct a logically coherent 'model profession' or paradigm of professionalism. (It should be emphasised that the term 'model' here is not evaluative but merely descriptive). Moreover, rather than producing a classification of occupations into those that are professions and those that are not, it is possible to identify professional attributes ('professionalism') and to speak of one occupation being more or less professional than another and in what respect.
2. The paradigm of professionalism

2.1 Components of the paradigm

The paradigm, constructed from a comparison of such occupations as those of doctor, lawyer, teacher and social worker, consists of ten central characteristics which relate to three underlying factors. These factors, the cornerstones of professionalism are:-

(i) the social value of the work;
(ii) the technical skill required to do the work;
(iii) the control over the work exercised by its practitioners.

These 'cornerstones' themselves rest on what may be termed the foundation of professionalism, which is the relationship between the profession and its clients, whether seen in individual or organisational terms. The essence of this relationship is ministering to the pressing needs of those who, owing to the intrinsic circumstances of their condition, cannot manage for themselves but must rely on the services of others. This relationship is essentially one of confidence and trust on the part of the client and of capacity and commitment on the part of the supplier of the professional service. Technical proficiency, social esteem and a large measure of autonomy appear to be necessary to the adequate fulfillment of this relationship.

2.2 The 'ten central characteristics of professionalism

Social value of the work:

(i) Essential public service (especially handling people's emergencies, crises etc.);

(ii) High public esteem and social status enjoyed by practitioners;

(iii) High degree of pride in belonging to the profession;

Technical skill:

(iv) Expertise based on a systematic body of knowledge (applied science or study);

(v) High standards of admission and fitness to practise;

(vi) Lengthy candidate training and continued commitment to learning;
Internal control of the work:

(vii) Autonomous control by the profession (codes of ethics or discipline rather than, or in addition to, external legal or administrative controls);

(viii) Individual responsibility for actions;

(ix) Moral or vocational commitment to the service aspect of the work;

(x) Functional exclusiveness and specialization.

2.3 Further 'problematic' characteristics found in particular professional organisations.

(i) Bureaucratic organisation

The principles of bureaucracy and professionalism are in many ways antithetical. Though both are concerned with the provision of services, the former is more concerned with routine efficiency and quantity, the latter with effectiveness and quality. They are not, however, incompatible (e.g. hospital medicine).

(ii) Professional gradient

There is often a gradient between the most highly skilled members of a profession and the ancillary workers, who are relatively unskilled but organisationally essential. The latter may be said to be part of the 'greater profession' though not themselves strictly professional.

(iii) Restrictive practices

Some supposedly professional practices appear, on closer examination, to be designed to serve the narrow interest of the members of the profession at the expense of their clients. This may be said to be unionism in the guise of professionalism.

(iv) 'Semi-professionalism'

Teachers and social workers sometimes lay claim to professional status but for a variety of reasons fail to achieve it. Two factors may be mentioned in this context:

(a) lack of professional autonomy in the large majority of practitioners;

(b) dubious technical base of the 'professional' skills concerned (i.e. teaching and social work as such)
3. Police and the paradigm of professionalism

3.1 Rating on the ten factors

It is not immediately clear that policing is a professional occupation
akin to medicine, architecture or even the law. It is contended
here, however, that only a close examination of police work and
organisation, both as they are and as they might feasibly become,
in the context of the ten components of the paradigm will reveal
the nature and extent of the similarity or dissimilarity. Certain
it is that the helping relationship and other aspects of the
foundation of professionalism described above are present in police
work even if they are sometimes given less emphasis than they meant.

There is insufficient space here to consider all ten factors in detail
but suffice it to say that, at the risk of over-simplification, it is
possible to rate current policing correspondence with each factor as
high, moderate and low as follows:-

High: factors (i), (vii) and (viii)
Fluctuating high/moderate: factors (ii) and (iii)
Moderate: factors (iv), (v), (ix) and (x)
Low: factor (vi)

3.2 The further 'problematic' factors

It is also pertinent to consider the position of police in relation to
the 'problematic' factors: bureaucratic organisation, professional
gradient, restrictive practices and semi-professionalism. None of
these disqualifies police from professional status.

4. Implications for the further professionalization of police

4.1 Implications of the enhancing of technical proficiency

It would appear, if the 'professionalism ratings' of the previous
paragraph are valid, that it is in the area of technical skill that
the greatest discrepancy between current policing and the paradigm of
professionalism lies. For reasons of economy, overcoming this would
almost certainly involve formalising a professional gradient between
the fully professional (say, Superintendent and above), the semi-
professional (say Inspector and Chief Inspector) and the sub-professional
(say Sergeant and P.C.) Achieving this would imply a more professional
senior police management and a less professional Sergeant and P.C. - more precisely, the individual autonomy and responsibility of these ranks would be diminished.

4.2. Professional ethics

Paradoxically, although it is argued that police professionalism may be enhanced chiefly by achieving greater technical proficiency, attaining a more fully professional status will also involve more attention to professional ethics. This is principally because professionalism implies a high degree of autonomy/freedom from external control, rather than because of any substantial ethical shortcomings. However, current tendencies towards enhanced police accountability, by diminishing autonomy also run counter to professional status (and, indeed, professional status for police is sometimes opposed on the very grounds that it is contrary to the need for greater accountability). It is to be expected, therefore, that pressures towards greater technical proficiency and greater accountability will simultaneously pull in opposite directions. Such contradictory forces will probably produce a kind of dynamic equilibrium or 'moving balance'.

For fuller treatment of the above topic, and additional references, see "Professionalism in the Police Service" by the present writer, in D.W. Pope and N.L. Weiner, "Modern Policing" (Croom Helm 1981)
Appendix B

Contrasting case studies of 'action research'


Appendix B

Contrasting case studies of action research

Carr and Kemmis (1994) include a study by Reid (1982) which meets their various criteria by which inquiry work may be described as 'full' action research.

I shall describe her study in some detail here because it both illustrates 'emancipatory' action research and it can be used to serve as a template against which other studies may be compared - to determine whether or not they can be called 'full' action research. This characterisation of 'full' or 'real' action research needs to be treated with caution however in the light of Whitehead's (1989) discussion of action research - which places the living 'I' at the heart of the research - and Reason and Rowan's (1981) sourcebook on 'new paradigm research' - in which they include an outline of 'the new paradigm research manifesto'. This manifesto makes it entirely possible to conduct a more individualised or personal strategic action research.

I will now turn to provide an account of Reid's study in order to illustrate action research understood more as the enactment of a critical social science embracing an appropriate research methodology for educational practitioners in 'educational' situations.

A case study of 'emancipatory' action research

The study involved Reid, an advisory teacher, in an investigation of the role of language in learning in the classroom. This was a particular concern of a national working party into the role of language in learning; the working party wanted to examine the notion that students learn through using language. It followed from this that teaching and learning strategies 'which recognised and extended children's own language could more surely engage children in particular learning tasks.' From this proposition, the slogan 'negotiating the curriculum' was fashioned.

In a negotiated curriculum the following sequence of steps would take place: first, at the invitation of teachers, students would identify what they already knew about a subject. This would constitute a personal 'starting point'. Second, students would decide what more they would like to know about the subject. Third, they would consider the ways and means to find out what they wanted to know. Fourth, after negotiation with peers and teachers they would implement plans to find out more about that which they had defined they wanted to know. Lastly, they would evaluate
the success of their enquiries by reflecting on what they had learned in the light of their initial aims and plans.

In this process, the teacher would function in these enquiries in three ways:

- a stimulus and catalyst for students (exciting reflection, for example, on the part of students)

- A resource and helper, providing ideas and information

- a constraint and boundary setter/maintainer, limiting the scope of enquiries. This was particularly in terms of a) relating individual student plans to others in order to facilitate collaboration and b) to the areas in which the teacher was willing and able to act as a resource.

In order to explore the idea of curriculum negotiation further, Reid 'borrowed' a class of thirty four, year 9 students for sixteen periods over eight weeks in 1979. Carr and Kemmis describe Reid's approach to curriculum negotiation in the following way:

"Curriculum negotiation involves giving students a voice in the choice and development of learning opportunities in the classroom: both the 'what' and the 'how' of curriculum. As a stranger to the class Reid needed a topic area which could interest the students rapidly; it was the International year of the child; so Reid chose the topic 'Kids in schools' ... in the spirit of negotiating the curriculum, Reid was thus constituting the class as a reflective and self-reflective community of participant researchers.' (Carr and Kemmis 1994 : 171)

An analysis of the situation shows that Reid was creating five separate levels of reflection. They are:

1. Students substantive reflection on the topic of 'kids in schools'

2. Students' self -reflection on the processes by which they pursued their investigation of the topic

3. Reid's reflection on the practices involved in negotiating the curriculum; i.e. Reid as teacher

4. Reid's reflection on these practices as educational practices within the broader
framework of strategies for English teaching with what she was concerned as an advisory teacher in English; i.e. Reid as advisory teacher.

5. Reid's self-reflection on her own processes of reflection and enquiry; i.e. Reid as teacher/researcher.

At the conceptual level I wanted to aim towards this process of negotiating the curriculum with the participants on the police leadership and management development programmes at the Police Staff College. So, ideally, I wanted to include:

1. Participants substantive reflection on the topic 'ethics and management in the police organisation'

2. Participants' self-reflection on the processes by which they pursued their investigation of the topic

3. My own reflection on the practices involved in negotiating the curriculum in the specific cases

4. My own reflection on these practices as educational practices within the broader framework of strategies for ethics teaching

5. My own self-reflection on my own processes of reflection and inquiry

It is here that Carr and Kemmis identify key criteria by which studies are understood by them to be action research studies. Thus, Reid's study demonstrates that at each of the levels of reflection that have been organised, participants were collaboratively involved in reflection and self-reflection. They were planning, acting, observing and reflecting together. The classic Lewinian process has been reproduced. The conditions of participation and collaboration, characteristic of critical social science, were, therefore, fulfilled in the study.

Throughout Reid's study the students kept journals recording their activities and progress as did Reid herself. These data provided not only a documentary record but also stimulated and recorded reflection and self-reflection on the processes. Carr and Kemmis describe the role and function of the journal keeping process in terms of facilitating a critical perspective in the following way:

"Keeping a journal helps participants to become....'reflexive spectators' who reflect
on their actions and transform their ideas and their future action in the light of reflection. In these ways, the study was beginning to develop an critical perspective: it was creating the conditions under which the participants could consider their own interests (as students, teacher, etc.) and, perhaps, how they related to wider social interests.

Perhaps also, the topic 'kids in school' (for students) and 'the negotiated curriculum' (for Reid and the other teachers and advisers she worked with) began to provoke an emancipatory interest in how schools and teaching are shaped and formed that is, in ideological questions, and in how they might be made better (through changing conditions of communication decision making and educational action)." (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 173)

However, Carr and Kemmis comment that they remain uncertain as to the degree that the study realised emancipatory intent.

Lastly, before a re-iteration of the 'basic' action research spiral of cycles - planning, acting, observing and reflecting, Carr and Kemmis point out that the study was truly practical both for student and teacher. It engaged them directly in considering their own practices and in modifying those practices in the light of reflection and self reflection. Carr and Kemmis illustrate the specific practical aspects of the study as follows:

'For students, it provided an opportunity to think about their learning practices and the conditions of their learning; for Reid as a teacher, it provided an opportunity to reflect on the practices of negotiating the curriculum; for Reid as advisory teacher, it provided an opportunity to reflect on curriculum negotiation in relation to other teaching practices in English; for Reid as teacher-researcher, it provided an opportunity to reflect on action research as a way of improving teaching.' (Carr and Kemmis 1994: 173)

If this study does offer a template for emancipatory action research embedded within an emerging critical social and critical educational science paradigm it is identified in terms of the following characteristics, criteria and intentions.

- The study is conducted in the spirit of an inquiry into social practices and processes

- The study has three foci of concern: a) improving the practice itself; b) improving understanding of the practice; c) improving the social circumstances in which the
practice occurs

- The study is conducted with full or increasing participation of those involved with the practice in question

- The study proceeds with the full increasing collaboration of those involved and affected by the practice

- Through the establishment of participative and collaborative methods and processes the study develops through a sequence of steps; planning, acting, observing and reflecting

- The study is established to promote and develop levels of reflection and self-reflection on both substantive questions and the development of personal and practical knowledges

- The study develops towards a critical perspective through creating the conditions under which participants can consider their own authentic interests (after Fay, 1985)

- The study provokes and promotes an emancipatory interest in how practices are shaped and formed. In its way, the study provides the conditions for developing a) critical theorems; b) organisations for enlightenment; c) organisations for strategic action

In this way, Carr and Kemmis provide a detailed description of one way to proceed as an action researcher in ways congruent with a wider critical theorist stance.

In contrast to Reid's approach, there are a number of published case studies featuring detailed descriptions of attempts to improve the quality of education in a specific situation of practice conducted independently of a critical theory framework. Here I shall refer to one such study in order to illustrate how a practitioner attempted, through the meticulous observation of children, to enhance his understanding of the way children developed their knowledge. The study itself can be located within a tradition of inquiry which sets out to help teachers and educators acquire knowledge appropriate to their profession.

A case study concerning an individual teacher's professional interest

In Nixon's (1981) collection of papers illustrating the practice of action research by teachers he includes four pieces of research featuring developments in the classroom
itself. The most individual in its focus is that written by Armstrong who investigates the 'case of Louise and the painting of landscape'. He introduces his work with an observation concerning the 'distance' between the 'high hard ground' of research-based theory and technique and the 'swampy lowland' of practice (Schon, 1987). Armstrong writes:

"How are we to understand the growth of understanding? Most attempts by students of human development have been made outside the classroom, in laboratories and clinics, or in the studies and libraries of universities and research institutes. Or if research has taken place within classrooms, it has been conducted by outsiders who have played little part in the daily life of the class, least of all in teaching. Participant observers have not, for the most part, been observant participators. It is commonly assumed that the requirements of objectivity oblige us to eliminate teaching from the list of serviceable research techniques: The unfortunate consequence is that we deprive ourselves of a powerful, if rarely articulated, source of evidence and insight as to the nature of intellectual growth."

(Armstrong 1981: 15)

In the autumn of 1976 Armstrong began his inquiry which, through reducing the daily pressures of teaching, would open the way for sustained observation of pupils' thought and action. Throughout one academic year Armstrong focused upon a large class (numbering 32) of 8 to 9 year old children recording his observations, interpretations and speculations about the 'significant' events taking place in the class. Throughout the process he worked alongside the permanent teacher of the class who helped to authenticate his observations and interpretations. In the course of his description Armstrong came to be impressed with the 'appropriative skill' of the children:

"The more closely Stephen [the class teacher] and I studied the various absorptions of the children in our own class the more impressed we were by the evidence of their appropriate skill, whether as writers or artists, scientists or inventors, however primitive their technique or limited their understanding. It seemed to us that from their earliest acquaintance with the various traditions of human thought - literature, art, science, mathematics - our pupils were engaged in a continual struggle, by turns satisfying and frustrating, to make use of whatever limited knowledge, skill and experience they possessed to examine, extend and express in an appropriate form their own particular understanding of the world in which they lived, to 'reproduce knowledge in fruits of their own, as Coleridge once put it."

(Armstrong 1981, 18,19)
Armstrong turns to tell the story of a particular example of appropriation which takes the form of a very detailed and sensitive examination of the artistic development of one pupil, Louise. Armstrong accepts his research is anecdotal but he takes this form of expression to be a 'richer sense of the particular' which is 'indispensable' for the theory and practice of education as a whole. His account endorses his appreciation of that part of the art of teaching which consists of eliciting, analysing and seeking to make more reflective the thought and action of others.

He illustrates how the landscape painting of Louise reflected the story of previous events, the way she increased her powers of visual representation and how she developed two styles of painting - over the course of the spring and summer of 1977.

Armstrong's work stands in sharp contrast to the self-conscious, self-critical, critical and collectivist approach practised by emancipatory action researchers. It emphasises uncovering some of the detail concerning learning and development in a real and concrete situation of practice.
Appendix C

The programme details of the first 'trial' re-introduction of 'ethics' to the police middle-management development programme
Aim
To relate ethical theory to practical police difficulties.

Content and timings

0900 - 0930  Amphitheatre
Robert Adlam (Applied humanistic psychologist)
Ethics and the nature of human limitations - talk.

0930 - 1000
Neil Richards (Moral philosopher: Director of Short Courses)
What does it mean to have integrity? - talk.

1000 - 1030
Question and answer.

1100 - 1230  Amphitheatre
Brendan Gibb-Gray (Detective chief superintendent: Co-director, Short Courses)
Practical ethical issues - talk & structured experience.

1230 - 1250
Participants will be asked to opt for one workshop each from the range on offer.

1400 - 1540  Locations to be announced
Ethics Workshops.

1600 - 1800
Course workshops and tutorials.

Choices
The choice of workshops will include:

Paul Forrester (JCC staff)
A broken-down old war-horse screams in pain: equal opportunities.

Norman Greenhill (Sociologist: College staff)
Professions and professional ethics.

Vadna Murrell-Abbery (JCC staff)
Ethical career development.

Margaret Scorer (Lawyer, magistrate, Europeanist, senior command course staff)
Everything you've always wanted to know about equal opportunities, but were afraid to ask.

Keith Shipman (Chief superintendent; SCC staff)
How an area commander manages an ethical culture.

Bernard Sleigh (JCC Course director)
Ethics and public life.

Peter Villiers (JCC staff)
How far can you go? The ethics of leadership investigated in regard to stress.

Robert Adlam  Peter Villiers  Bramshill Directing Staff
Appendix D

Excerpts from Colquhoun's (1806) 'Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis'
Appendix D

Colquhoun and the constitution of the new police

Writing in an evocative and persuasive style, Colquhoun (1806) articulates a moral basis for police stemming in part from a traditional concern with law and order but also from a 'scientific' concern with the prevention of crime and those conditions facilitative of crime and delinquency. It is also possible to discern, in his writing, an appeal to the moral status and dignity of such a policing function.

Part of Colquhoun's intention in writing the treatise is made clear in his dedication of the work to the Sovereign, 'who has graciously condescended to approve of the Author's efforts, "To establish a System of Morality and good Order in the Metropolis"'. However, his vision of the main purpose of the Police is made clear in his 'Preface', in which states:

"Police in this Country may be considered as a new Science; the properties of which consist not in the Judicial Powers which lead to Punishment, and which belong to Magistrates alone; but in the Prevention and Detection of Crimes, and in those other Functions which relate to Internal Regulations for the well ordering and comfort of Civil Society.

The Police of the Metropolis, in every point of view, is a subject of great importance to be known and understood; since every innocent and useful Member of the Community has a particular interest in the correct administration of whatever relates to the Morals of the People, and to the protection of the public against Fraud and Depredation.

Under the present circumstances of insecurity, with respect to property and even life itself, this is a subject which cannot fail to force itself upon the attention of all" (Colquhoun, 1806 : Preface)

Colquhoun, at the outset, wished for a change in the 'Plan' of police so that the role of a police could be founded upon a 'preventative' basis. His treatise begins with a general view of the 'Evils existing in the Metropolis' and the causes from which they arrive before he moves on to proposing remedies by asserting the 'Necessity of a well-regulated Police'. So he writes:

"Next to the blessings which a Nation derives from an excellent Constitution and System of general Laws, are those advantages which result from a well-regulated
and energetic plan of Police, conducted and enforced with purity, activity, vigilance, and discretion. Upon this depends, in so great a degree, the comfort, the happiness and the true liberty and security of the People, that too much labour and attention cannot possibly be bestowed in rendering complete the domestic administration of Justice in all cases of criminal delinquency" (Colquhoun 1806:1,2)

Vividly - and perhaps a little melodramatically - Colquhoun captures the fear of crime present in the metropolis, as follows:

"In vain may we boast of the security which our Laws afford us if we cannot lie down to rest in our habitations, without the dread of a burglary being committed, our property invaded, and our lives exposed to imminent danger before the approach of morning" (Colquhoun 1806:2)

Colquhoun moves on to analyse the causes of the general criminality in terms of a mix of contributory factors, including the nature of the various laws and the penalties attaching to law breaking - which are so severe that few wish to find a person guilty, the absence of some relevant laws, and, the absence of a 'plan of Police'. His catalogue of the many and varied problems in relation to law and order in England is drawn to a conclusion by his identification of two major causes concerning the 'lamentable' state of affairs:

"... is it not fair to conclude, that the want of security which the Public experiences with regard to life and property, and the inefficacy of the Police in preventing crimes are to be attributed principally to the following causes?

1. The imperfections of the criminal code ....

2. The want of an active principle, calculated to concentrate and connect the whole Police of the Metropolis and the Nation; and to reduce the general to system and method, by the interposition of a superintending agency, composed of able, intelligent and indefatigable men, acting under the direction and control (sic) of His Majesty's Principal secretary of State for the home Department. - On these persons, it is proposed, should devolve the subordinate care and direction of the general Police of the Metropolis ... " (Colquhoun, 1806:24,25)

Colquhoun's treatise documents the various 'evils' at large in the capitol city; these include chapters on the cause and 'progress' of small thefts, on burglaries and highway robberies, on cheats and swindlers, on gaming and the lottery, on the
coinage of counterfeit money, on river plunder, on the plunder of the dockyards, on
the receivers of stolen goods, as well as speculations upon the origins of criminal
offences which, inter alia, acknowledges the impact of poverty and socialisation,
before he turns to the detection of offenders where his proposals for a 'well-organised Police' emerge.

Colquhoun believed that some positive remedies - especially with his concept of the 'science of police' - could be found, and, part of the solution lay in a system of police. So he argues:

"As it must be admitted, that the evils arising from the multiplied crimes detailed in the preceding Chapters, render a correct and emerging System of Police with regard to the detection, discovery and apprehension of offenders, indispensably necessary for the safety and well-being of Society." (Colquhoun 1806: 382)

He then goes on to explain how this public service will be reformed so as to make improvements on the present offices. In this explanation he was keen to emphasise the need to applaud the respectability of the office of Constable and he regretted that 'these useful constitutional officers destined for the Protection of the Public' were, in fact, 'so little regarded, so carelessly selected, and so ill-supported and rewarded for the imminent risques (sic) which they run'. Against this, and any prejudice towards those constables and peace officers, Colquhoun is adamant and, trenchantly clear:

"The common Law, as well as the ancient Statutes of the kingdom, having placed extensive powers in the hands of Constables and Peace Officers - they are, on this point of view, to be considered as respectable - and it is in the interest of the Community, that they should support that rank and character in society, which corresponds with the authority with which they are invested. If this were attended to, men of credit and discretion would not be so averse to fill such situations; and those pernicious prejudices, which have prevailed in vulgar life, and in some degree among the higher ranks in Society, with regard to thief-takers, would no longer operate; for it is plain to demonstration, that the best Laws that ever were made can avail of nothing, if the Public Mind is impressed with an idea that it is a matter of infamy, to become the casual or professional agents to carry them into execution." (Colquhoun 1806: 385, 386)

Reminding his readers that the office of Constable is as old as the Monarchy of England, and recalling that the office was to be executed without malice, affection or partiality, he traces the governmental constitution of the office from Saxon times
onwards. Finding it an office subject to low status, inappropriate reward and imperfect management, Colquhoun advocates reforms such that 'good and able men even look up to such a situation'. In short, Colquhoun wants the office of constable reformed so that it is psychologically attractive.

His subsequent designs and remedies can be read both as furthering and evolving a particular tradition of policing. He emphasises the prevention of crime and the peacekeeping role, impartiality, fairness and a proportionate use of force in the administration of the executive function, a proper appreciation of the significance and status of police and, an effective management of the police. He wanted to see proper rewards and emoluments for constables, appropriate numbers constituted to carry out their functions, and, proper management and training. The latter recommendation included the following counsel:

"... it should be the business of the parochial Chief Constable ... to impress upon their minds the necessity of purity, vigilance, and attention to orders - and of being humane, prudent and vigorous, in the execution of such duties as belong to their functions. " (Colquhoun1806 : 407, 408)

Thus, Colquhoun's text illustrates less a reliance upon a contractarian rationale for police but a recognition that the office of constable is central to the wellbeing of the citizenry, an office which must be animated through the expression of a set of characterological virtues.
Appendix E

A personal statement concerning my beliefs about education and learning
Appendix E

A personal statement on 'education and learning'.

1. We - as human beings - have a natural potentiality for learning (unless our curiosity has been blunted by the experiences we have had in the educational system)

2. Although we are natural learners - much of our learning is likely to be more-or-less painful. That is, we have to 'struggle' (at least to some degree) to learn anything of significance.

This means that we have a rather ambivalent attitude towards learning 'things' of significance.

3. Significant learning takes place when the subject matter is perceived by the would-be learner as having relevance to his/her own purposes.

For example, imagine the following contrasting circumstances. In the first instance, we take a course in statistics because we need it for analysing the data we have collected in a research project (in which we are very interested and committed). In the second instance, we find ourselves obligated to take a course in statistics, the benefits of which are not obvious to us, in order to fulfill the requirements of a wider programme of study. In the first case we will attach meaning and significance to our learning. In the second instance the learning will take on quite a different character. We will probably do enough to 'get by'.

4. Much significant learning is acquired through doing.

In this context, Rogers (1969) writes:

"Placing the student in direct experiential confrontation with practical problems, social problems, ethical and philosophical problems, personal issues, and, research problems, is one of the most effective modes of promoting learning. Illustrations range from the class group which becomes involved in dramatic production, selecting the play and the cast, designing and making the scenery, and costumes .... to much more sophisticated confrontations. I have always been impressed with the fact that brief intensive course for individuals on the firing line facing immediate problems - teachers, doctors, farmers, counsellors - are especially effective because the individuals are trying to cope with problems which
they are currently experiencing" (Rogers, C. 1969 : 162)

I take this observation as central to the emerging design for 'ethics education'. It is far more important for us to examine 'problems' and issues experienced by participants rather than to impose any overly specific content and methods.

5. Learning is facilitated when the student participates responsibly in the learning process.

When the learner chooses his/her directions, helps to discover his or her own learning resources, formulates his or her own problems, decides on his or her own course or courses of action, and, lives with the consequences of each of these choices, then significant learning is maximized.

6. Self-initiated learning which involves the whole person of the learner - feelings as well as intellect - is the most lasting and pervasive.

7. Independence, creativity and self-reliance are all facilitated when evaluation by others is of secondary importance. In other words the locus for judgment should come from within the learner him or herself.

8. The most socially useful learning in the modern world is the learning of the process of learning - a continuing openness to experience and incorporation into oneself of the process of change.

It is these - and related - principles that I wanted to lie at the core of the educational process underlying the provision of opportunities to inquire into the subject area, 'ethics' - for managers and leaders in the police organisation. I wanted to derive the educational design for an ethics education - wherever possible - from these principles.
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
Appendix G

The interview data from the first six interviews
Appendix G: The Interview data from the first six interviews

Interview schedule

An exploration of the individual's experience on the ethics unit of the Managing People module

P 1

1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the 'ethics' unit of the Managing People' module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

Intellectually challenging. Initially negative but I wanted to 'tough it out' - Gradually became absorbed. The low was - too theoretical in part. The high - plays. Enjoyable - but also good learning points.

2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?

Before this he wasn't aware of ethics in police context - now he is. Will monitor himself in future and will not get carried away by other pressures (i.e. to get the job done).

3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?

He was prepared to do poem (an exercise) on Tuesday (the first 'ethics' day) and was disappointed with colleagues. So, he has gained from the unit. Found this (the unit) positive.

4. How might your experience on the 'ethics' unit influence your practice as a manager?

Now more aware of problems and will look at himself and job more carefully and critically. Will look at work situations more carefully and critically.

5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?

Difficult question: Would start from practical to get positive response and move towards the theoretical - but, K_____ is not sure. Difficult and Rob (the tutor) knows best.

6. Anything else?

No. Rob comes across as committed and he K_____ has an affinity with Rob

Notes:
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim (goal) of the Action Research process

B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first Action Research aim

C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been achieved

This interview surfaces the following points:

1) The problem of the content being 'intellectually challenging' - which, in this case created an 'initially negative' response.

2) The high was the experience of the 'playlets' - which were 'enjoyable' but also contained 'good learning points'

3) A 'lack of awareness' of ethics in police context

4) His intention - in the light of the 'ethics education' experience to 'monitor' himself in future

5) The intimation that organisational pressures 'to get the job done' may make adherence to ethical standards problematic

6) He was prepared to do an exercise e.g. share something (a poem) he was 'disappointed with colleagues' (who would not do the exercise)

7) Managerially he is now 'more aware' and will 'look at himself and the job more carefully and critically'

8) Although he found it difficult to answer the question concerning 'how to improve the ethics unit' he would 'start from the practical and move towards the theoretical'

9) He thought that the tutor knew 'best' (how to deliver the content)
Interview schedule

An exploration of the individual's experience on the ethics unit of the managing people module

P2

1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the 'ethics' unit of the Managing People' module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

'High' - an interest in the topic. (First two hours - 'dreadfully theoretical' - heavy going- found it difficult to understand and may have 'turned-off'. Why not pause after thirty minutes then relate to practice?). Role play of moral dilemmas was very interesting. Reading from Pollock was very interesting.

'Low' too much on theoretical - not sufficiently based on practice

2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?

Emphasised moral dilemmas that police officers have. First training he had ever had on 'ethics'. He will get books out on ethics. It was interesting - and he had not thought of various points

3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?

Looking at what we do and why and also what we don't do and why as police officers is interesting. But what can we do for those/to those who work under others?

(Comment: The last sentence is interesting but does not appear to be answering the question)

4. How might your experience on the 'ethics' unit influence your practice as a manager?

A difficult question. He has genuinely been wondering about this including things about complaints against police. The experience on the unit reinforces his own views and practices. But he is no longer on the ground - can he influence those on the ground? He will consider this - it relates to 'discretion'.

5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?

Cut first part by at least 50% i.e. Rob's part - then bring in a police officer - a police scenario to show effect wrong decisions make later on (e.g. Guildford four) After Wednesday (the first day) was good - the role play and professional ethics. Rob's journey on Friday was fascinating - he [the respondent] understood forty percent - the rest was over their head. Why redefine society? Was 'Ultima Ethica' relevant? - he thinks not

6. Anything else?

Nothing else

Notes:
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim (goal) of the Action Research process

B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first Action Research aim

C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been achieved

This individual surfaced the following points:

1) A 'high' experienced because he was interested in the subject.

2) The first two hours - i.e. the lecture/presentation defining ethics and describing the nature of three normative ethical theories was 'dreadfully theoretical' and this was linked with the psychological state of being 'turned off'. The 'low' was 'too much' on the 'theoretical'.

3) This was the first training the interviewee had ever had with 'ethics education' and the study of police ethics.

4) Despite his reservations with the theoretical aspects of the experience with 'ethics education' 'it was interesting' and he 'intends to 'get books' on ethics.

5) His suggestions for improvement suggest cutting my own part/contribution by '50% and bringing in a police officer'. (In many ways I would love to do this - but the previous - and as it turned out, subsequent, experiences with using police officers did not prove successful)
Interview schedule

An exploration of the individual’s experience on the ethics unit of the Managing People module

P3

1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

The presentation was too 'high brow' - too academic or intellectual. The main points of the presentation should be put in a modern day context - Policing or 'the environment' - it would be more relevant to what followed next (in the learning design)

2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?

Already happy with personal values and beliefs. The group discussion - attention was paid as to how to communicate these and moved on to explore those (people in the group) who are being managed in a positive way.

3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?

Useful to revisit this issue. Don't know how it fits in to the rest of the course. Don't feel that adequate recognition has been given to the varying levels of experience within the group.

4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?

Need to reflect more deeply when the course ends

5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?

Felt unit was O.K. apart from the opening address - (as already stated above)

6. Anything else?

None
Notes:

Classification: B

A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim (goal) of the Action Research process

B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first Action Research aim

C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been achieved

1) The 'presentation was too 'high brow' - too academic' and 'The main points of the presentation should be put in a modern day context'. This respondent, therefore, makes two critical (or negative) observations.

2) The respondent states that he is 'already happy with personal values and beliefs'. This suggests a connection with one implication drawn by police leaders and managers in 'ethics education' events which concerns the possibility that their moral uprightness is being impugned.

3) In relation to the value assigned to this part of the module he states that it was 'useful to revisit the issue' but then hints at two features which compromise his/her positive feeling: 'Don't know how it fits into the rest of the course' and 'Don't feel that adequate recognition 'has been given to the varying levels of experience with the group'.

4) In relation to improving the design, this respondent offers little - because 'Felt unit was O.K. apart from the opening address'

Interview schedule

An exploration of the individual’s experience on the ethics unit of the managing people module
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

**High** - enabled him to take critical look at himself as an individual - his beliefs, his own stance and what he does in workplace

**Low** - first input. Accepts theory important but timing wrong. Too late in afternoon for this important topic.

2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?

Most impactive thing was Rob's journey and 'child question' (i.e. Is the 'little person' that you once were 'there' any more?) This made him stop and reflect on himself as an individual a manager and a person

3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?

Extremely important. Awareness and appreciation of 'where you are coming from' and help to think about things in the workplace

4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?

By taking stock of self and being critical of self will affect his management style. May well realise others have a different ethical standard to himself

5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?

Only criticism is the timing of the important ethical/theoretical lecture. Rest good

6. Anything else?

No. An awakening for himself as an individual and manager. Reflection is vital. Argument this p.m. was useful. Why wouldn't people take a chance. He, B______, wants to' put toe in' - but, have issues been cleared?

Notes:

Classification: A

A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim (goal) of the Action Research process
B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first Action Research aim
C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been achieved

1) This individual illustrates what might be taken as a significant achievement and which is something made explicit (through individuals volunteering this information) on each delivery of ethics education: he 'now begins to understand himself'.

2) The initial presentation concerned with clarifying the nature of the subject 'ethics' and outlining three major normative ethical theories was badly timed - 'timing wrong'.

3) He assigns considerable value to the experience: 'Extremely important. Awareness and appreciation of 'where you are coming from' and help to think about things in the workplace' Again, this reflects the achievement of the first Action Research goal.

4) This respondent illustrates the fact that it is sometimes an unusual activity (in this case a guided phantasy) was 'most important thing'.

5) An observation that other participants 'would not take a chance' indicating (again) the reluctance of individuals to participate fully.
Interview schedule

An exploration of the individual’s experience on the ethics unit of the managing people module

P 5

1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

   a) In terms of experience, it was massively significant - I got the opportunity to put a theoretical structure to the topic. I have given a lot of thought to the subject also.

   b) The highs were the presentation by Rob Adlam - very different, very articulate

   c) The lows - the plays

2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?

   My ethical stance is my own - I am responsible for it. I am not convinced that I have the right to impose this on others. Also learnt (in some ways reinforced) that police personnel are not always welcoming of something that is perceived to be different

3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?

   Very high value

4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?

   On a daily basis - more interested in the ethical judgments, rather than what we physically do

5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?

   The playlets took too much time. There were learning points - but took too long to develop. A lot of time was used up physically - it would have been better to have a bit more theory and then some discussion

6. Anything else?

   This should be a standard item not only in the module but on all police courses
Notes:

Classification: A

A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim (goal) of the Action Research process

B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first Action Research aim

C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been achieved

1. This respondent indicated that the experience was 'massively significant' - and now has a 'theoretical structure' for the subject

2. He stated that a high was the presentation(s) - in contrast to some of the other respondents

3. Again, by way of contrast, the 'low' consisted of the 'plays' - the structures the course membership itself had the responsibility for designing and delivering

4. He assigned 'very high value' to the experience

5. He advocated including an ethics education experience on all police courses

There is evidence of success at achieving the first goal for the Action Research process
1. Please would you describe (tell me about) your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit of the Managing People’ module - what was significant for you? What were the highs and lows? etc.

*The low was the first Ethics presentation on Wednesday p.m. It was pitched too high for comprehension*

*The 'high' points - the following two days: the theory was put into practice on Thursday and Friday and these aided the understanding of the initial delivery*

2. On reflection, what if anything, did you learn from the unit?

*I learnt what the term 'Ethics' meant and its application in the police environment*

3. What value do you assign to this part of the module?

*It is important - all about standard-setting and in relation to the whole module (i.e. Managing People). It is a fundamental principle of understanding people and what people are all about*

4. How might your experience on the ‘ethics’ unit influence your practice as a manager?

*I don't think it will influence practice - however, there is now a clear and deeper understanding of what I already do*

5. How, if at all, would you improve the ethics unit?

*Revisit the first presentation on 'Ethics': I would 'tone it down' - make it simpler and easier to understand*

6. Anything else?

*None*

Notes:
Classification: B
A) A clear positive evaluation - sufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first aim (goal) of the Action Research process

B) A 'mix' of positive and negatives - insufficient evidence to be confident at achieving the first Action Research aim

C) A negative response - no evidence that the first aim of the Action Research process has been achieved

1. The low was the first 'ethics' presentation - 'it was pitched too high' for comprehension

2. This respondent indicates a lack of prior knowledge of 'ethics' as a subject

3. The respondent assigned 'importance' to this subject

4. Although he does not believe that the experience will influence practice there is now a 'clearer and deeper understanding' of ongoing practice
Appendix H

An outline of Lomax (1994) criteria for the 'quality assurance' of action research reports.
Appendix H

Lomax (1994) describes how action research studies and reports, sequentially, can test themselves for educational rigour against the following criteria:

Stage one is concerned with the educational intention(s) of the researcher(s). The three criteria she surfaces here are:

- Research context explained
- Educational intention exposed
- Rationale given

Stage two highlights the development of strategies for action. The criteria here are:

- The link between reflection and action is established
- A collaborative intent is realised
- The research process is made transparent
- Ethical principles are developed and applied

Stage three focuses upon monitoring the action taken. Five criteria are provided:

- Comprehensive data is collected
- Data from different sources are confronted
- Patterns and contradictions are appreciated
- Analysis is exposed to critique
- Alternatives are considered

Stage four is concerned with evaluation. The sorts of question Lomax suggests here are; 'Are the outcomes significant? Has there been any practical change? Has the researcher developed professionally? and she suggests that four criteria need to be met in this stage:

- The claims are important
- The explanations provided are convincing and authenticated
- Individual findings are related to critical professional discussion
- Further questions are generated

Stage five, the final stage of the process, features the reporting of the project. I should add that Lomax sees action research as 'a journey rather than a destination' - so the presentation of the report should not suggest 'termination' or finality but hint
at the continuation of learning and development. The criteria the report needs to meet are articulated by Lomax as follows:

- The report has clear frames of reference, is well-constructed and is written with minimum jargon
- The report presents succinct yet comprehensive accounts that describe the strengths and limitations of the research
- The implications of the research are spelt out and evaluated critically in relation to other sources of information
- The report provides sufficient information for readers to follow up issues that are of interest

Lomax emphasises the need for teacher action researchers in their research to be emancipated from the methodological strictures of the natural and social sciences. Her concern is to propose a set of criteria relevant to the field of 'education'.
Appendix I

The questionnaire designed to elicit basic data from the client group in order to help with the preparation of the 'ethics education' design
Appendix I

In order to organise materials and methods for the forthcoming 'ethics education' on the 'Managing People' module and to help achieve the most value from the time at our disposal, I would be pleased if you could spend a few minutes providing me with information concerning the following points and questions:

1. What is your age (in years and months)?

2. What is your length of service (in years and months)?

3. With which types of work have you spent most of your time in the police service e.g. Uniform, Traffic, CID, Mixed etc.

4. What is the estimated length of time you have spent on courses within the police service (excluding full or part time degree programmes)?

5. What is the highest level of academic qualification you have attained?

6. Please describe the nature and quantity (if at all) of your experience on courses with something labelled or described as 'ethics'

7. In relation to the forthcoming two day unit on 'ethics education' what are you expecting to cover?

8. What topic areas would you like to examine during the two days on 'ethics'?

9. With reference to the pre-course work on learning styles, which style are you (i.e. Activist, Pragmatist, Reflector, Theorist)?
Appendix J

The chronology of activities and structures included on the first ‘case study’ delivery
Appendix J

An outline chronology of the activities and structures included on the first 'case study' delivery.

My introduction outlined the aims and objectives of the unit and included a reference to the four 'learning log' activities. This was followed by a short presentation concerned to describe the overall 'territory' with which ethics was concerned before I screened a fifteen minute clip from the film 'Schindler's List' which served as a prelude to a small group exercise concerned to develop a definition of 'ethics'.

This was followed by another video clip from the film, 'Four weddings and a funeral' designed to illustrate Ker Muir's (1977) idea that 'we measure a life in terms of the moral distance a person has traversed'. This was supplemented by another short computer screen presentation designed to provide an orthodox introduction to the subject ethics including brief notes on its history. Course participants then had the opportunity to complete - in small groups - the Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire. This was followed by another short computer screen presentation reflecting the overall data patterns emerging from the questionnaire.

After lunch, I screened a more lengthy video featuring a management consultant attempting to introduce a 'quality' philosophy to a 'hi tech' factory. This served as a prelude to a brief discussion on the idea of the 'moral ethos' of organisations. Course participants were then asked to complete and discuss the 'moral ethos of organisations' questionnaire (based on Snell's (1993) analysis of the levels of moral development in organisations). The discussion was then followed by a computer screen presentation initially describing the different types of organisational moral ethos and then moving on to provide a description of the data pattern emerging from the way police middle managers had profiled their organisation.

After tea, I returned to the idea of the 'personal' nature of our inquiry by using a short biographical video as a catalyst to a piece of work on the 'social construction of persons'. This involved small groups of participants using an exercise designed to examine the 'social construction of police' and this served as a 'closure' to the day. The second day began with a video trigger from the film 'Mutiny on the Bounty' which was designed to illustrate the fact that ethics examines how we might deal with 'hard choices'. I then delivered a short computer screen presentation, entitled, 'What we may be' - which was followed by a 'biography' exercise that I had written for the unit.
After coffee, I formed the overall group into four subgroups based upon their learning styles and asked them to create a learning activity examining ethics and policing that 'would be riveting, creative, profound and would move us all forward'. The groups presented the results of their inquiries and endeavours after lunch. They were encouraged to 'use the techniques of theatre' in these presentations.

By way of conclusion, I suggested that, gradually we might be able to point to 'moral progress' and I cited the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and then concluded with a screening of the dramatic opening to the film, 'Full Metal Jacket' which, some police officers had informed me, had, in an attenuated form, reflected aspects of their induction into policing some twenty years ago.
Appendix K

A statement of my educational objectives – made available to my client groups from the Spring of 1997 until Autumn 1998
Appendix K

'These are my educational objectives prior to the ethics education unit, Spring 1997.

I am hoping to:

- Engage, animate, energise, excite and focus the attention of learners

- Expand awareness - indicating the nature of the subject ethics and the moral point of view

- Develop concepts - e.g. the moral ethos of organisations, as well as the provision of materials which refer to normative ethical theories etc.

- Enhance thinking (in part, through the provision of concepts)

- Provide information and frameworks for the analysis of self and organisation

- Develop powers of analysis, evaluation, judgment, decision making

- Challenge complacency, confront inadequacies (and injustices) of current social forms, arrangements, institutions and their practices

- Help in the process of practical decision making - e.g. even by simply providing something such as the police service statement of ethical principles

- Encourage autonomy - trust and confidence in persons themselves (I mean by this that I am keen that the curriculum style or experience is one where individuals might 'sort things out' for themselves)

- Provide a catalyst for living a life appreciating one's own and others flourishing (in countless and myriad ways) - validating and legitimating ethics as the promotion of human flourishing and the combating of human limitations
Appendix L

An example of a completed experiential record
Appendix L

An illustrative experiential record

Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module (P11)

Day 1. Coffee break

1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
   
   Concentrated

2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
   
   Think, reflect, understand

3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
   
   Apart from group discussion, no contribution from floor. Within group - low key discussion re definition of ethics but this work not used in class

4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
   
   Well prepared introduction to subject. Clear objectives. Up to date - 1996

5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.
   
   Useful scene setting

6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)
   
   Enthusiastic. Dry sense of humour. Could speak up at times.

7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
   
   Attentive and with varying degrees of perplexity / understanding (from facial expressions)

8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
   
   Sound introduction/overview of course
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module

Day 1. Lunch break

1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
   
   *Focused*

2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.

   *Feeling challenged and uncomfortable about the ethics questionnaire*

3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.

   *More discussion*

4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?

   *Good awareness raising and reflecting*

5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.

   *Long-term benefits of reflection*

6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)

   *Emphasis on punctuality. Good mix of tutor-led student centred, text based (including videos) methods*

7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?

   *High levels of attention. Some concerns/ disquiet - feelings of threat? Receptive.*

8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?

   *Focus on personal values*
An experiential record  
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module  

Day 1. Tea break  

1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?  

*Not as focussed - post prandial effects?*  

2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.  

*Observing (videos and others), discussing, feeling, reflecting (re video Sid's heroes)*  

3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.  

*Poor quality discussion due to lack of knowledge*  

4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?  

*Cold have been a better separation of personal/organisational issues. Pre-read would have been useful.*  

5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.  

*Impact of 'Sid's Heroes' both immediate and longer term*  

6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)  

*Starts before half the class have returned from lunch - will he develop this? Too academic for audience.*  

7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?  

*Less attentive. Discussion more desultory.*  

8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?  

*Examining organisational; ethos with reference to rules, openness etc.*
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module

Day 1. Evening time

1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?

*Had to make lengthy telephone call therefore missed half of presentation*

2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.

*Thinking, reflecting - Connolley video*

3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.

*Blank*

4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?

"Moral distance" e.g. Connolley - not too clear how you would actually measure this.

5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.

*Longer term benefit*

6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)

*Blank*

7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?

*Getting tired!*

8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?

*As a springboard for reflection and learning log. Would suggest a more impactive end to day*
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module

Day 2. Coffee break

1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?
Blank

2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.
Thinking, feeling, understanding, observing, imagining

3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.
Bligh - no contribution
Discussion re biography - entered sensitive/deep areas. Very self-analytical and acknowledged as worthwhile

4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?
Brief overview (at start) of yesterdays programme and plan for today - good (see 3 re biography)

5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.
The value of taking time to cast one's mind back but not in a nostalgic way

6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)
Difficult to decide whether sincere/flippant/playing games

7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?
Willing to participate even/especially when some areas personally exposed

8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?
Varied methods. Most important is biography session
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module

Day 2. Lunch break

1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?

Maintained due to interest

2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.

Thinking, imagining Education presentation [i.e. the plays]

3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.

Discussion, good quality, decisive, scenario developed promptly. Consensus.

4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?

Involved, committed, satisfied

5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.

Reinforces ongoing programme

6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)

Nil

7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?

Only own group

8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?

Team work to develop learning experience for course
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module

Day 2. Tea break

1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?

*Sustained due to involvement in discussion/presentations*

2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.

Thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, observing

3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.

a) Good quality discussions/presentations
b) Case studies

4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?

Beneficial - long term benefits e.g. what to do on return to force

5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.

Not clear of benefits/advantages (if any) of working in activist/pragmatist etc. groups?

6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)

Supportive of group efforts

7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?

Good group efforts / team work

8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?

Exploration of practical policing issues from ethical view
An experiential record
Ethics education at Bramshill - the 'Managing People' module

Day 2. Evening Time

1. What happened to my energy and attention during the last couple of hours?

*Variable. Not just because it is late and end of programme*

2. How did I spend most of the time? e.g. thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, not understanding, observing, imagining, puzzled, bored etc.

*Thinking, feeling, understanding, reflecting, observing, contributing*

3. What sorts of things were going on around me? e.g. if there was discussion, what happened?, how would I describe the quality of discussion?, who said what to whom? etc.

*Good quality thorough discussion examining range of issues*

4. What did I feel about the whole thing and why?

*The case studies should have been four not two - there was unnecessary duplication: 2 groups covering ground did not add value*

5. What might I take from the experience? e.g. significance, nothing whatsoever etc.

*Blank*

6. How did I perceive (if at all) the tutor? (What judgements did I find myself making?)

*He took 'back seat' which was appropriate but a more detailed review of progress made would have been useful to 'close' the course*

7. How did I perceive my classmates? How would I sum them up?

*To the end they sustained a high level of interest, commitment and involvement*

8. If I were to describe the preceding session(s) to somebody completely external to the whole programme - e.g. my partner - what would be the things I would say?

*The two case studies did provide useful contrasts/comparisons highlighting both large and small scale ethical issues in the service and society in general*
Achieving the educational aims of the unit

Was I the tutor able to:

(1) - Engage, animate, energise, excite and focus the attention of learners?
- Yes - most of the time

(2) - Expand awareness - indicating the nature of the subject ethics and the moral point of view?
- This was the greatest achievement of the course for myself (and others)

(3) - Develop concepts - e.g. the moral ethos of organisations, as well as the provision of materials which refer to normative ethical theories etc.?
- Yes - and I intend to delve further because there was insufficient time to do justice to this

(4) - Enhance thinking (in part, through the provision of concepts)?
- Definitely

(5) - Provide information and frameworks for the analysis of self and organisation?
- Yes (see (3)

(6) - Develop powers of analysis, evaluation, judgment, decision making?
- Ethics should more overtly inform these aspects

(7) - Challenge complacency, confront inadequacies (and injustices) of current social forms, arrangements, institutions and their practices?
- Yes - to which I would add the challenge/confrontation was at a personal level as well as an organisational/societal one

(8) - Help in the process of practical decision making - e.g. even, by simply providing something such as the police service statement of ethical principles?
- Yes - See (6)

(9) - Encourage autonomy - trust and confidence in persons themselves (I mean by this that I am keen that the curriculum style or experience is one where individuals might 'sort things out' for themselves)?
Yes, reinforced existing principles and practices, enhancing underlying/pervasive framework of morality, values and ethics in general at an individual (practical) level and at a philosophical (academic) one

(10) - Provide a catalyst for living a life appreciating one's own and others flourishing (in countless and myriad ways) - validating and legitimating ethics as the promotion of human flourishing and the combating of human limitations?

See 9 above
Appendix M

A statement of the values I was seeking to embody in the conduct of the 'ethics education' experience. This statement was given to participants in the client groups during the second and third phases of the action research process.
Appendix M

'Values and the 'Managing People' module:

This module is for you, the people around you - both within and outside the police organisation - and, for the service and the public as a whole. This is a critically important aspect of the module. I want the experience to be valuable and personally significant for you.

I noticed an observation in a very recent work (1996) authored by three people committed to improving educational practice and the situations in which that practice takes place. That work is entitled, 'You and your action research', and is written by Jean McNiff, Pamela Lomax and Jack Whitehead. They include the following lines in their text - and this is something with which I agree:

"As educators we are always faced with questions of encouraging people to express values of freedom, democracy, fairness and self-determination without stifling these qualities through the imposition of inappropriate conceptual structures and power relations." (McNiff, Lomax and Whitehead, 1996 : 2)

From this observation, I produced the following general values statement reflecting my stance towards the design and delivery of the 'Managing People' module and the 'ethics unit' within the module:

I hope that we will, consistently, be able to express:

- Freedom: Here, I understand 'freedom' to mean: the freedom to 'be' and the freedom to dissent.

- Democracy: I take 'democracy' to mean 'government of ourselves by ourselves'.

- Fairness: By 'fairness' I mean that we try to ensure justice and equality for all. I think it important that everyone enjoys an equal voice and is given an equal hearing.

- Self-determination: I assume that we are autonomous agents capable of making choices, and that we take responsibility for those choices, as well as the way that we use our time.

These are the most general values which I hope will underpin the experience you have of the module and the ethics unit. Tell me if I deviate from these value commitments.'

The statement continued:

'Action research and ethics education:

For my action research inquiry concerned with creating an effective ethics education for police leaders and managers, I have developed a statement of my educational values. I would like you to read and critique the statement. You may notice that I am aspiring to values which I do not really bring to 'classroom' practice or others which I do bring but which I have, for whatever
reason, omitted to make explicit. The statement is organised under four headings although there is considerable overlap between them:

- **General level**

As an educator, I value the development of the 'educated' person. An educated person is: self-determining, self-monitoring, self-adjusting, self-creating and self-transforming. An educated person is both autonomous and co-operative. An educated person both moves into and away from 'authentic' hierarchy. And, an educated person is creative - infusing life and work with ethical, aesthetic, technical and practical value and energy.

- **Person level.**

At the personal level, I wish that I and others might be:
Respectful, empathic, thoughtful, tolerant, questioning, searching, open-minded, self-aware, critical and self-critical in ways which protect and educate, maintaining commitments to benevolence and justice as cardinal moral virtues, conscientious, consistently demonstrating moral courage and a respect for the moral law, disposed to find out relevant facts, disposed to think clearly, committed to making a difference to the well-being of persons and other sentient beings on this planet.

- **Professional level.**

At the professional level, I value the stance and approach of the 'professional'. That is I am committed to the well-being of clients, I adopt methods and procedures based on theoretical knowledge and its derivative practices, and that I and fellow professionals are autonomous agents ready and willing to provide accounts and justifications for our actions.
I value the thoughtful following of both the letter and the spirit of professional codes of practice.

- **Ethics education level**

This is what I aspire to achieve in experiential terms for participants on the 'ethics' part of the syllabus.
- Understanding and valuing the history of ideas in relation to ethics
- Recognising the everyday and commonplace nature of ethical reasoning and ethical action
- Focusing ethical principles and theories on the analysis of policing and police leadership issues and practices
- Promoting and realising an active learning process on the part of participants where, ultimately, agendas are co-operatively negotiated and learning structures are developed to meet participants wants, needs and interests
- Providing a learning climate within which participants have freedoms to learn and enjoy exploring ethics as a domain of enquiry

- **An afterword.**

The framework established by Heron (1989) concerning 'client outcomes' to which persons in positions such as my own, might aim, has been a source of inspiration and challenge to me and
to my own process of clarifying my educational values.

For Heron, certain client outcomes were 'ideals that illumine the more immediate interaction. They nurture and guide the facilitation process'. Those outcomes are:

- Self-direction and co-operation
- Informed judgment and open communication
- Self-development and social change
- Emotional competence and interpersonal sensitivity
- Self-awareness and social perception
- Celebration of self and others

I have also been influenced by Rogers' remarks concerning the role of the educator and that an emphasis should be placed on learning rather than teaching.

Finally, what I wish to note is that I am always extremely impressed with the kind of 'work' that is exhibited by art and design students in the United Kingdom especially in their final degree shows. This work strikes me as a real achievement because (in the vast majority of cases) it reflects not only mastery of a medium or media, an understanding of artistic conventions within an area of the arts, something new and different and refreshing or challenging or provoking, but also a process of enquiry. The work represents a point on a journey - and the journey is as much personal as it is concerned to be public art.

I would like my work - and the experience of participants who work with me - to mirror at least some of that content and style which characterises the 'artistic' inquirer.
Appendix N

The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire (final version): Two completed examples
Appendix N

The Bramshill Ethics Questionnaire

Two completed examples:

Example 1

1. If you were able to describe your moral code in one or two sentences, what would they be?

   To live life honestly, fairly, being responsible and accountable for my actions. To be able to look people in the eye after every decision I take

2. With respect to your life so far, who or what exerted the most moral influence upon you?

   Parents/Self/Police

3. How would you describe the relationship between religion and morality? Which is more important i.e. religion or morality?

   For my part I see very little relationship as a moral code is something to live your life by. A religious code is for hypocrites (a cynical view but ..!)

4. Police work is like no other work in all sorts of ways. How has it influenced your moral development? On balance, would you say that your occupational experience has served as a positive or as a negative force upon your moral development?

   On the whole it has been positive

5. Police work is full of demanding and critical incidents. Could you describe an event which has had an effect upon your moral development? what was it and how did it influence you?

   It was to do with dishonesty and I came away from it with a clear ethical code

6. How hard do you find it to challenge a decision which you believe is morally wrong, but where the consensus is against you? (Please circle or tick the appropriate category below)

   a) Extremely hard
   b) Fairly hard
   c) Neither hard nor easy
   d) No real difficulty
   e) No problem at all

7. Have you ever faced a demanding problem at work, where a decision was right from one point of view, and wrong from another? If so, what was it? What else can you say about it?
The majority of these dilemmas have fallen into the area of charging/cautioning or not. In that you gave official guidelines, moral decisions and the question of success at court.

8. What are the particular moral dilemmas a police manager faces?

The balance between work efficiency and personal problems
The balance between a qualitative and quantitative approach
There being no shared standards
The hypocrisy of the state

How confident are you, that if you face a moral dilemmas at work, the organisation will be able to help you resolve it calmly and effectively? (Please tick or circle the appropriate response)

a) Very confident  
b) Fairly confident  
c) Not very confident  
d) Not confident at all

10. The police occupation confronts the 'big' questions of 'law', 'morality' and 'personal values'. How ethical do you perceive yourself to be? (Please circle the appropriate response)

a) Very highly ethical  
b) Highly ethical  
c) Fairly ethical  
d) Just about ethical  
e) Moving towards the unethical  
f) More unethical than not  
g) Decidedly unethical

11. What factors within the police organisation help police officers to attain exemplary moral standards?

Officers are striving to get there mainly because of exposure
A drive to do a good job
A new type of recruit
A change in moral behaviour in general

12. Conversely, what factors act as barriers to exemplary moral standards?

Dinosaurs in the service
League tables
Government drives to a quantitative approach

13. If you were to improve the moral character of the police organisation, what, in your view, would be the most effective means of doing so?
Go for a qualitative approach as opposed to a quantitative one
Give praise where it is due
Get the judiciary to question its own ethical standards
Also get the state to question its own ethical standards

14. What is your reaction to the set of principles set out by the 'Quality of Service' committee and published as the 'Police service statement of ethical principles'?

I am happy with it, however, how does it translate to the operational officer?

15. If you were to choose one principle as most important, which would it be and why?

What does 'important' mean? I would like to know more about personal accountability

16. If your organisation were to adopt an explicit ethical code

a) what impact would it have on you?

I would be very supportive, I feel the need for a standard I may not agree with it completely but it is necessary

b) what impact would it have on the service as a whole?

The difficulty would be managing the consequences. For years people have manipulated figures (as does everyone) it would require an inner strength from the Government
Example 2

1. If you were able to describe your moral code in one or two sentences, what would they be?

Aspire to do right things - asserted principally by what may be determined deontological criteria. Utilitarianism is specifically rejected - the ends cannot justify the means.

2. With respect to your life so far, who or what exerted the most moral influence upon you?

Reading

3. How would you describe the relationship between religion and morality? Which is more important i.e. religion or morality?

It is futile in the present time and place to seek to divorce religious influence (Christianity) from contemporary views of desirable morality. I cannot meaningfully answer the second question at this time.

4. Police work is like no other work in all sorts of ways. How has it influenced your moral development? On balance, would you say that your occupational experience has served as a positive or as a negative force upon your moral development?

My moral development has been largely independent of the service.... conversely it has been a positive influence in a 'negative' way. That is to say whenever 'dilemmas' have arisen it has reinforced a determination to stick to my own rules rather than 'theirs'.

5. Police work is full of demanding and critical incidents. Could you describe an event which has had an effect upon your moral development? what was it and how did it influence you?

As a probationer in a large city it became apparent that it was expected that evidence would be 'gilded' to ensure conviction or to minimise court attendances (officer A found an exhibit. The arresting officer, B, would say that he'd found it, to save officer A going to court). There was not enough 'whistle blowing' but the determination not to participate was reinforced.

6. How hard do you find it to challenge a decision which you believe is morally wrong, but where the consensus is against you? (Please circle or tick the appropriate category below)

a) Extremely hard
b) Fairly hard
c) Neither hard nor easy
d) No real difficulty
e) No problem at all

7. Have you ever faced a demanding problem at work, where a decision was right from one point of view, and wrong from another? If so, what was it? What else can you say about it?
Preventing an incursion of 'new age travellers'. Right: enthusiastic support of community/colleagues/supervisors. Wrong: interfering with alternative lifestyle; to live where one would wish; oppression of the vulnerable

8. What are the particular moral dilemmas a police manager faces?

Speaking for myself, relatively few decisions have to be made supporting the freedom of those to carry of which I disapprove: Blood sports for example. Another is where the interests of the organisation compete with those of the individual - working socially disruptive shifts for example.

How confident are you, that if you face a moral dilemmas at work, the organisation will be able to help you resolve it calmly and effectively? (Please tick or circle the appropriate response)

a) Very confident  
b) Fairly confident  
c) Not very confident  
d) Not confident at all

10. The police occupation confronts the 'big' questions of 'law', 'morality' and 'personal values'. How ethical do you perceive yourself to be? (Please circle the appropriate response)

a) Very highly ethical  
b) Highly ethical  
c) Fairly ethical  
d) Just about ethical  
e) Moving towards the unethical  
f) More unethical than not  
g) Decidedly unethical

11. What factors within the police organisation help police officers to attain exemplary moral standards?

A complaints and discipline procedure seen to be fair rather than vindictive - that is capable of understanding weakness.

12. Conversely, what factors act as barriers to exemplary moral standards?

The Government - the Home Office - the Force - District requirement that ends are important ... e.g. reduce burglaries, reduce violent crime. Without concerns for means, this is deeply corrupting. (Watch this space!)

13. If you were to improve the moral character of the police organisation, what, in your view, would be the most effective means of doing so?
Relates to number 12 ... encourage in individual officers ethical (or, at least rule bound) behaviour. For example ethical interviewing is now an important new training initiative. Stop rewarding by promotion officers who lie, cheat and are self-serving.

14. What is your reaction to the set of principles set out by the 'Quality of Service' committee and published as the 'Police service statement of ethical principles'?

Neutral

15. If you were to choose one principle as most important, which would it be and why?

4. Upholding fundamental human rights. This underpins all others - however what is/is not a human right is open to argument (even agreed by charter). ECHR says can live where you will - Police regulations do not.

16. If your organisation were to adopt an explicit ethical code

a) what impact would it have on you?

Increase confidence (slightly) in challenging senior officers (especially very senior officers).

b) what impact would it have on the service as a whole?

A gradual improvement - clearly signalling behaviour is unacceptable can eventually lead to the acceptance that is unacceptable, finally to elimination; torture has been largely eliminated in this country.
Appendix O

The 'Moral Ethos' questionnaire and the 'Organisational Ethics' questionnaire
Introduction:

The most recent work of ethicists has taken us beyond the concept of organizational culture and has begun to identify the salient features of a distinctive moral ethos within organizations. In organizations we encounter moral 'force fields' which exert enormous pressures upon the decisions and actions of organizational members. They may even make the difference between organizational survival and collapse. The purpose of this questionnaire is to profile the moral ethos within the police organization (as you experience it).

For what reason should we profile such a moral ethos? The answer is that we need to take stock of the moral force fields in organizations so that we can make judgements concerning the 'health' of the organization. Change, if it proved to be necessary, could then proceed from a position of informed awareness rather than unproven assertion.

The aim of this questionnaire is to begin the process of developing an informed awareness concerning the moral character and climate of the police organization so that police leaders and managers can fill their managerial roles as effectively as possible.

Instructions:

This questionnaire explores your perception of the nature of the moral force fields within the police organization. Sixteen dimensions which make up the force fields will be described. Each dimension is defined by two statements. It is important that you imagine those two statements to be at opposite ends of a continuum. On reading the statements you may perceive that both apply to your organization but this questionnaire is interested in which statement best describes your organization.

Please read both statements and then tick the box which best describes your view of the organization. You have, for each dimension, a choice of eight responses. However, you must make only one choice for each dimension. The next page illustrates what you are asked to do by means of an example.
An example:

If the moral ethos questionnaire for example included the dimension, 'Chief constable reverence' it might be completed as follows:

Dimension *Chief constable reverence*

A) Chief constables are revered
B) People are contemptuous of Chief constables

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☒ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B

In this example, the respondent has decided that s/he perceives that the organization is 'Moderately A'. This means that, after reading the two statements, the person decided that statement 'A' applied more to the organization than statement 'B' and that statement 'A' characterized the organization to a moderate extent.
The moral ethos of the police organization - the sixteen dimensions:

In each case, please would you read each of the two statements and decide which one applies most to your organization. Then, please tick the box which describes the degree to which that statement characterises the organization.

Dimension 1 - *Tone*

A) People really do hold to high principles  
B) Actions tend to be expedient and exploitative  
Response:  
My organization is:  
☐ Very highly A  
☐ Highly A  
☐ Moderately A  
☐ Just A  
☐ Very highly B  
☐ Highly B  
☐ Moderately B  
☐ Just B

Dimension 2 - *Tightness*

A) Action and feeling are rigidly programmed (i.e. there is little sense of 'personal space' for individual feeling and action)  
B) There is considerable room for individual judgement  
Response:  
My organization is:  
☐ Very highly A  
☐ Highly A  
☐ Moderately A  
☐ Just A  
☐ Very highly B  
☐ Highly B  
☐ Moderately B  
☐ Just B
Dimension 3 - *Deference to hierarchy*

A) The prerogatives of rank (pressures to obey 'rank' and privileges accorded to rank) are strong
B) People are allowed to challenge more senior members

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☐ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B

Dimension 4 - *Positional abuse*

A) Power is used as a weapon over others
B) People are careful not to take unfair advantage

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☐ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B

Dimension 5 - *Spread of trust*

A) People trust those outside their immediate circle
B) People are suspicious of those they do not know

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☐ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B
Dimension 6 - Dependence on allegiance

A) Trust is important in running the organization
B) All people have to do is operate procedures and follow instructions

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☐ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B

Dimension 7 - Regulatory formalization

A) Duties are clearly spelt out
B) Roles and codes are unspecific

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☐ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B

Dimension 8 - Adherence

A) People stick to what is expected of them
B) It is common for people to deviate from the standards expected of them

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☐ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B
Ethics, leadership and professionalism

Dimension 9 - *Respect for dignity/integrity*

A) People are valued in their own right  
B) People are used as pawns or tools

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A  
☐ Highly A  
☐ Moderately A  
☐ Just A  
☐ Very highly B  
☐ Highly B  
☐ Moderately B  
☐ Just B

Dimension 10 - *Intensity of political stakes*

A) The consequences of losing in a conflict (within the organization) are severe  
B) People are 'safe' among fellow members

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A  
☐ Highly A  
☐ Moderately A  
☐ Just A  
☐ Very highly B  
☐ Highly B  
☐ Moderately B  
☐ Just B

Dimension 11 - *Concentration of power*

A) Power is widely dispersed  
B) The power centre is strong compared with the periphery

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A  
☐ Highly A  
☐ Moderately A  
☐ Just A  
☐ Very highly B  
☐ Highly B  
☐ Moderately B  
☐ Just B
Police Management Programme

Ethics, leadership and professionalism

Dimension 12 - Need for stability

A) People seek to maintain the organizational order and maintain the status quo
B) The organization is very open to change

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☐ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B

Dimension 13 - Breadth of constituency

A) There are many influential organizational stakeholders - i.e. people and groups to whom the organization is responsive. These may range from staff and customers to future and as yet unborn generations
B) The organization has responsibilities to only a few

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☐ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B

Dimension 14 - Openness to criticism

A) The organization deters outside feedback or is defensive towards outside feedback
B) The organization is open to and addresses public feedback and criticism

Response:
My organization is:
☐ Very highly A
☐ Highly A
☐ Moderately A
☐ Just A
☐ Very highly B
☐ Highly B
☐ Moderately B
☐ Just B
Dimension 15 - *Demands on loyalty*

A) A great psychological commitment is required by the organization  
B) The emotional attachment to the organization is weak  
Response:  
My organization is:  
☐ Very highly A  
☐ Highly A  
☐ Moderately A  
☐ Just A  
☐ Very highly B  
☐ Highly B  
☐ Moderately B  
☐ Just B

Dimension 16 - *Developmental openness*

A) Performing one’s role in the organization extends one’s talents, opens new horizons and yields significant self discoveries  
B) One has to suppress creativity and self-awareness is deadened  
Response:  
My organization is:  
☐ Very highly A  
☐ Highly A  
☐ Moderately A  
☐ Just A  
☐ Very highly B  
☐ Highly B  
☐ Moderately B  
☐ Just B
Organisational ethics - a questionnaire

The following questionnaire consists of three parts. Please complete each of the three parts and then hand the completed questionnaire into the facilitator who will score it and then return it to you. The data will remain confidential.

Name: 

Organisation: 

**Part One**

Please read each statement and then place a tick in the box which, in your view, characterises the extent to which the statement describes your organisation.

1. Overall, the people in this organisation are trustworthy (e.g. there is little if any 'backstabbing', people mean what they say and say what they mean etc.)

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<tr>
<th>Very strongly agree</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Moderately agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
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2. The people in the organisation (when they are at work) are mainly interested in the well-being of the organisation rather than their own careers (i.e. the people in the organisation are not particularly selfish)

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<th>Very strongly agree</th>
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3. The people in the organisation are very willing to spend time helping and supporting one another.

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4. The people in the organisation enjoy considerable (but appropriate freedom) in the way they fulfill their work tasks

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5. In the organisation people are rarely, if ever, intimidated by other persons (who are members of the same organisation)

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6. The managers in the organisation genuinely try to empower organisational personnel.

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<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
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7. People in the organisation make sure that their decisions are guided by moral principles such as tolerance, justice and benevolence.

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<th>Moderately agree</th>
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8. The different needs and sensitivities of the individuals in the organisation are respected and appreciated.

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9. If people make mistakes in the organisation the emphasis is upon learning from the mistake rather than punishment

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<th>Moderately agree</th>
<th>Neither agree nor disagree</th>
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Part two

Please indicate which statement in each pair below *most* applies in the organisation - by circling either the letter A or B

1.  
A. People really do hold to high principles  
B. Actions tend to be expedient and exploitative

2.  
A. People are careful not to take unfair advantage  
B. Power is used as a weapon over others

3.  
A. People are suspicious of those they do not know  
B. People trust those outside their immediate circle

4.  
A. People are used as pawns or tools  
B. People are valued in their own right

5.  
A. People in the organisation are committed to helping each other  
B. The actions of the people in the organisation tend to be self-interested

6.  
A. An atmosphere of goodwill pervades the organisation  
B. An atmosphere of negativity and 'dysfunctionality' pervades the organisation

7.  
A. Morale is fairly high in the organisation  
B. Morale is fairly low in the organisation

8.  
A. The leaders in the organisation put the interests of the organisation above their self-interest  
B. The leaders in the organisation put their self-interest above the organisation's interests
Part Three

This part of the questionnaire contains three sets of descriptions characterising different types of 'atmosphere' that can be found in organisations. Please read the first set of descriptions which are arranged in six stages and then decide which stage most characterises your organisation. Place the number 1 by that description. Then place the number 2 by the description that next most characterises the organisation. When you have done this for the first set of descriptions please do the same for the second and third sets. N.B. Please make sure you read all six descriptions in each set before making your first and second choices concerning the degree to which they characterise your organisation.

Descriptions - Set 1

Stage One
The onus is on carrying out orders at all costs, so that one may maintain one's position. Fear of failure is so great that anything out of the ordinary, or any sign of possible difficulty, tends to give rise to desperate measures.

Stage Two
Greed, ambition and ruthless pragmatism hold the organisation together; action is regulated by the expectation of reward. Those who have staked most in the organisation's success ensure that others find it worth their while to contribute. No questions are asked so long as targets are met and budgets are kept to.

Stage Three
Life is pleasant and comfortable, so long as one fits in. One gets things done by reading the 'unwritten rules' and following them, by being seen as proud to belong. Non-conformity raises doubts about one's loyalty and reliability. Known deviants are swiftly marginalised and made to feel ashamed. Membership is established by adopting the house style, drawing on skills of tact and diplomacy, being nice to colleagues, and, avoiding upsets or abrasions.

Stage Four
Decisions are governed by formal procedures, rules and regulations. Quality criteria and standards are set by the law, official requirement, professional regulation or strict contractual agreement. Performance is subject to audit. There is room for individual judgements within the bounds of set by the rules and procedures but bias and idiosyncrasy is deplored. The immediate answer to cases which would create a precedent is 'No', but these are referred upwards for arbitration.

Stage Five
The organisation stands for a set of principles regarding justice, development, compassion, ecology etc. which serve to focus the actions of its individual members. Personal idiosyncrasies and differences in lifestyle are accepted among members, provided that these do not compromise core values. Rejecting the latter is incompatible with membership. A common feeling is of guilt: not doing enough, letting the cause or the side down.

Stage Six
Members are expected to negotiate, explain, justify and reflect on their own principles and to question and challenge those of others. Learning stems from continual dialogue conducted with compassion in an atmosphere of curiosity and openness. There are no fixed canons (commandments from 'on high') and there is no set schedule for achieving results, only the pressure to create projects and to explain the rationale behind them. The organisation is characterised by an environment which is catalytic of thought and imagination.
Stage One
People are valued only in terms of their consistency and success in carrying out instructions. There is no room for mistakes, illness or incapacity. Personal problems are kept secret. If they jeopardise one's performance, one becomes disposable. A run of failure which is attributable to a person or persons results in the removal of the person(s). If orders conflict due to power struggles located in the upper echelons of the organisation, then siding with the losers is fatal; survival means learning to size up who has the most power. If austerity measures are needed, those with the weakest power base are sacrificed.

Stage Two
Subordinates carry out their bosses' most risky moves; they pay the price for mistakes. Those with least power, and who have outlived their usefulness, are readily jettisoned. Policies shift to reflect the ascendancy of different groups. Disputes are decided by the balance of power. Conflict stems from different material interests, and is resolved through bargaining and trade-offs. The painful lessons include discovering the loss of power, that one's network has been penetrated, or that one's base of ideas or information has been stolen or superseded.

Stage Three
Disagreements within the inner circle are rare, and are settled with everyone saving face. At lower levels, conflict between groups or individuals is usually calmly settled by compromise or reference to higher authority. People are not manipulated; they are simply respected for going along with what they sense is expected of them. Challenging beyond one's station or going outside the 'envelope' of consensus is a mistake: one risks being sidelined or thought of as 'dangerous'. More seriously, vehement dissent or whistle-blowing is regarded as gross misconduct or betrayal: the heretic's career will be destroyed, not out of malice, but simply in order to preserve organisational 'integrity'.

Stage Four
People are valued for their expertise. So long as they follow clear rules and conventions, broadly understandable to others, and make a tangible contribution to the organisation, they will suffer no ill. The most painful lessons are reserved for those in marginal positions, if they expect equal treatment, for in times of threat to the organisation and/or financial constraint they are the most vulnerable. Conflicts typically stem from disputes about resource allocation. There are established ways of settling them, either by reference to a professionally established hierarchy of values, or by coalition and majority ruling. Should the performance of particular individuals become a focus of concern, formal counselling and disciplinary procedures may be applied.

Stage Five
People are not just vehicles for policy: the organisation is also a supportive community. Those under stress and/or performing badly are helped to recover and improve. No one is 'written off'. Those not suited to the organisation, due to values divergence, are helped to find suitable alternative work. Policy decisions are made in a representative forum, accountable to diverse stakeholders. Disputes revolve around applying and refining values rather than discarding them, and are resolved by seeking a wide consensus among all stakeholder groups and encouraging win-win attitudes. The most painful lesson (for visionaries) is that one will not win others over unilaterally - decisions emerge slowly, through dialogue. One has to learn humility. In tough times, the prevailing argument is for everyone to share some of the sacrifice and work for better times.

(Continued)
Stage Six
Disputing parties seek to help one another articulate differences, settle them by open discussion, discuss what they have learned in the process, and report their discoveries to a wider forum drawn from the rest of the member community. Where there are no signs of resolution, the case will be treated as an exciting opportunity for the development of the whole community. The only pain in learning is that of self-discovery and self-creation: realising how difficult it is to live one’s values, and facing up to the fragility of any particular set of values. Those finding these depths too difficult to face are nurtured and revitalised. Those wanting to remain are helped to develop to the full; those who do not are helped to leave gracefully. Collective spirit governs, not the will to power.

Descriptions - Set 3

Stage One
Members suspect peers and fear superiors. People trust only inoffensive, predictable colleagues with no motive to do harm. There is constant mutual surveillance. Trust evaporates at the slightest sign of irregularity. Relationships are guarded; people venture only viewpoints conforming to the local leadership, and only if pressed - since leaders may lose favour. Implementation of decisions depends on chains of command, so one must show at all times a keenness to do as one is told.

Stage Two
The main questions, where trust is concerned, are: 'If I ask them to do X, will they do X?', 'If they promise Y, will they deliver Y?', and, 'If they say they need Z for a project, how much of Z are they actually using?' Trust may develop if there is a history of honouring agreements, and resources are allocated accordingly. Relationships sour on failure to 'deliver'. Members are rivals for promotion. Co-operation between departments occurs only if seen by both parties to be of immediate mutual benefit. More commonly, departments will dump problems and 'blameability' on to one another, as will individuals.

Stage Three
The place is superficially friendly and there is mutual tolerance between departments, but one must 'look the part' in order to receive favourable resource allocation. The most senior managers form a closed circle based on common values, interests and lifestyles. Some junior staff, if they have an appropriate background and manner, may earn the status of 'one of us' by acts of loyalty and devotion over a long period. Many lack the particular style and instincts or ethnic and gender characteristics deemed appropriate for the highest positions - the ability to exert authority without issuing commands. Most 'outsiders' get nowhere and vote with their feet - but those who try to fit in will eventually be found peripheral posts (e.g. Training manager, Projects co-ordinator etc.).

Stage Four
Some specialisms are 'mainstream' and others are 'marginal'. Because the 'new' is not established, it is not widely trusted; mainstream specialisms form a dominant coalition and tend to attract resources at the expense of marginal ones. One's own specialism is worthy of expansion - while others appear to consume more than their fair share of resources. Rivalry between established specialisms may thus exist, but day-to-day co-operation is not jeopardised: established people trust one another to operate according to the rules and procedures governing their practice. For marginal specialisms it is a different matter: they must continually account for their activities and explain mysteries. Good personal relationships may improve information flow, but are not allowed to distort objectivity.
**Stage Five**
Goodwill can be counted on: the mission overshadows feuds or vanities. The judgement of the most senior members is particularly respected. Some friendships are closer than others, and there may be coalitions around particular values, but members do not let these obstruct organisational purposes. Newcomers find colleagues tough going - they will be challenged all the time - until they appreciate the value-driven nature of the work. Then they will accept that tough, principled debate is required for getting the work done. Managers give support to new members and ensure that counselling for established staff is readily available. They also make sure that everyone feels happy about the resources that they have to do the job.

**Stage Six**
Trust and friendship are maintained by taking an active interest in others' work, mutually questioning values and action. Where activities intermesh, there is the fullest co-operation. Where separate activities coexist, discussion ensures that there follows, at the very least, a sharing of lessons learned. Distinct roles and agreements emerge and are continually reviewed but people are not forced to adopt roles or make particular changes in them. Resources for activities are allocated on the basis of unforced consensus. Members take out just enough to sustain a self-questioning existence; any more than that would be extortion. Any proposal that affects the projects of others requires consensus; vetoes are unnecessary, since members seek to minimise the risk, pain or inconveniences suffered by any one person.
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
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