The New Labour and Conservative-led Governments’ Articulation of Immigration Control Policies in Britain: Securitization, Governmentality and Risk 1997-2017

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Statement of Originality

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the political discourse on immigration control in Britain between 1997 and 2017 and examines why and how the articulations of policies displayed patterns of rupture and continuity between the Conservative-led and the New Labour governments. In particular, it highlights the significance of the critical engagement with both the structure and organization of the articulations within and across texts and their variability and contingency over time. The thesis adopts a multi-perspective framework: Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse analysis underpins all the analytical work in this thesis, supplemented by models of securitization, risk and governmentality. The analysis of political discourses reveals that the Conservative-led governments’ articulations displayed patterns of rupture rather than continuity with those of the preceding New Labour governments.

The empirical data reveals that while the articulated discourses were used in a variety of ways simultaneously, the articulation by the first and second New Labour governments was generally exemplified by the evolution of a discourse of opportunity, informed by an opportunity-linked risk logic which clearly and consistently embodied values and beliefs consistent with liberal orientations. The discourse of problematization which was articulated by the third New Labour government hovered between opportunity and threat and brought them together as two dependencies that offered a reconfigured discourse which modified the two discourses as opposite forces through strategic readjustment of the heterogeneous elements. The Conservative-led governments articulated a discourse of threat which was often used to frame quite specific fears as a way to generate constructed meanings in which threat-linked logic informed the articulations.

The findings highlight the variability and contingency of the articulations in which the discourses evolved, became intertwined and replaced one another. Moreover, the thesis interrogates the claim that threat and problematization-linked logics represent the unique rationalities of these articulations and puts forward an alternative conceptualization of an advanced understanding of risk.

Keywords: Immigration control policy; Discourse theory; Securitization; Governmentality; Risk; New Labour governments; Conservative governments
I dedicate my thesis to my best friends.

I would like to reserve a special feeling of appreciation for my beloved parents, Ibrahim and Saadet, who are themselves very special, and whose words of encouragement keep me dedicated. I also dedicate this dissertation to my family, the members of which are all my best friends, who have supported me throughout the research project. I will always appreciate all they have done so far, which means everything to me. I also dedicate my dissertation and give a very special thanks to my best and wonderful friends, Bilge, Mehmet Alperen, Omer Farukhan, Ibrahim Bugrahan, Yusuf Batuhan and Yakup M. Metehan for always being there for me and keeping encouraging me throughout the entire programme. All of them have been my best supporters.
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[Abbreviations]

Abbreviations

CAQDAS    Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software
EU        European Union
FRONTEX   European Border and Coast Guard Agency
UK        United Kingdom
US        United States of America
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The political discourse on immigration control through which the articulations of immigration control policies are constituted is the underlying theme in this research. The thesis investigates the patterns of rupture and continuity between the discourses of the Conservative-led governments and the New Labour ones on immigration in Britain between 1997 and 2017.1

Drawing on discourse theory and discourse analysis, the thesis seeks to provide a more robust understanding of the articulation of immigration control policies through investigating the order of discourse and the distribution of discourses in the immigration domain, as articulated by different actors in different settings. The research argues that the Conservative-led government’s discourse on and around immigration control displayed patterns of rupture rather than continuity with that of the preceding New Labour governments in Britain during the studied period.

In stating the topic, giving the background, providing an encapsulated review of the literature related to the topic and defining the terms and scope of the topic, this introductory chapter has been organized into five sections. The following two sections set the stage for the research, state the significance of the problem and establish the territory of the research. This is followed by a highlighting of the aim and objective of the research and an introduction of the research question and expectations (hypotheses).

Section 1.3 provides a brief roadmap of the research methodology and introduces the theoretical framework and its basic components. Section 1.4 offers the definitions of the key terms, and the last section, 1.5, provides the structure of the thesis.

1 Conservative-led governments is used to refer to both the Conservative-led coalition between 2010-2015 as the fourth term and the Conservative government between 2015-2017 as the fifth term. The first, second and third terms are used to refer to the New Labour governments between 1997-2001, 2001-2005 and 2005-2010.
1.1 Problem Statement

Political discourse on controlling immigration has expanded noticeably. The discourse has been constructed neatly around the changing patterns of global immigration and the perceived implications of these patterns. As identified in Chapter 2, the changing patterns of global immigration, in terms of route, volume and composition, have, to some extent, provided a fertile ground for immigration discourses to evolve. In part, changing that made immigration a highly salient issue (see Lahav, 1997; Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Lavenex, 2006; Anderson, 2013). The immigration phenomenon, therefore, can be best described as a highly politicized subject. The patterns have assisted an accent to evolve through constructing immigration as a site of fear and anxiety, on the grounds of so-called mass immigration and immigrant crises. However, while the general trend is to construct immigration as a site of fear and anxiety, its articulation has also posited various forms of discourses rather than a certain type. Discourses on immigration, therefore, have reflected various forms of consideration, rationalities and strategies.

The immigration reality, as identified in Chapter 2, is informed discursively by the relevant discourse in which the articulation is structured and organized through rationalities informed by various aspects, namely economic, public services, political, politicization, societal, and security considerations. Often some of them are used against or in relation to each other by different actors in different settings so as to endorse one another or they can come into conflict with each other. Thus, different dynamics can inform the articulations in different settings differently. The discourse can be articulated by one actor in a setting on the basis of fear, anxiety and a threat-linked or problematization-linked consideration through which immigration is constructed as having an adverse effect on the host society. Thus, the constructed meaning of immigration mirrors being a site of fear and anxiety; or the same actor’s articulation in different settings, or different actors’ articulations, can be informed by a constructed meaning that reflects the constitution of immigration as a contributory social force and an opportunity (see Borjas, 2003; Dustmann et al., 2005; Clark and Drinkwater, 2008; Cattaneo et al., 2015; Giovanni et al., 2015). Immigration discourse, therefore, may reflect articulations informed by discourses linked to either opportunity, problematization or threat, or by any combination of these three
discourses, which are all filtered and defined, and in turn, are constituted within a discursive context by different actors differently. The articulation of immigration, therefore, reflects a number of different discourses and distinctive logics which are based on a number of different conceptualizations; and these are open to different forms of conceptualization that can emerge in the future.

While it has been argued that, as discussed in Chapter 2, opportunity-linked liberal immigration control policies can be a constructive force for developed countries (e.g. Borjas, 1999, 2014), paradoxically, immigration has become a subject of a more restrictionist articulation on the grounds of problematization and being a site of fear and anxiety. In turn, such a construction is partly informed and used to justify restrictionist immigration control policies (e.g. Bradford, 2013; Peters, 2015).

The existing immigration control literature, on one hand, has discussed immigration control policies, in essence, in terms of a threat-linked logic and securitization nexus, through which immigration is seen as a source of fear and anxiety and a real or perceived immediate threat (see Huysmans, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Squire, 2009; Lahav and Courtemanche, 2012). The emergence of restrictionist patterns has been explained through the securitization of immigration. However, securitization has largely been regarded as something negative: It has its own offsetting which is much more impactful and, therefore, much less appreciated; thus, it should be avoided (Floyd, 2007:337). The securitization of immigration indicates that a dramatic transformation of the control framework is required (Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002). Securitization is characterised by a discourse of threat and extraordinary moves; it reflects the transformation of an issue from the landscape of normal politics to the structure of extraordinary politics by structuring an issue in a different logic, which involves urgency and exceptionalism (see Buzan et al., 1998). The exceptional politics of securitization, therefore, might undermine democratic normality and might reproduce an environment that could intensify the use of extraordinary measures (Aradau, 2004).

In addition to the securitization model, a second strand of immigration control policies perspective has entered the field relating to the notion of a governmentality-linked logic, which draws on Foucault’s (2007) governmentality concept (see Morris, 1998;
Drawing on Foucault’s (2007) work, a governmentality-linked logic is offered to refer to a dispositif that conceptualizes the actions and decisions taken to address the problematization of specific social problems (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007). Governmentality-linked logic pays attention to the constructing and organizing of a dispositif to address the problematized social issues, which informs the multiple and heterogeneous practices instigated to tackle a problematized social issue (see Aradau and Van Munster, 2007, for a governmentality-linked dispositif of risk).

Van Munster (2009) argued that the coexistence of restrictionist policies and the liberal policies alongside them in controlling immigration requires a particular logic that fit into immigration control policies with which the interrelationship between the policy and underpinning rationalization can be fully examined. Sticking to a securitization logic – rather than moving to a governmentality-linked logic of risk management – cannot help in understanding the paradox which is posited by pursuing a restrictionist and a liberal stand at the same time (Van Munster, 2009). From the governmentality point of view, similarly to the model of securitization, immigration is defined as a social problem: the problematization stems from the expectation of a future or a virtually present constructed problem. The problematization of immigration allows the instigation and operationalization of various apparatuses which otherwise not have been justifiably possible and plausible to perform (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007).

The existing immigration control literature, therefore, suggests that threat-linked logic (the model of securitization) and governmentality-linked logic (the model of governmentality) can explain the emergence of the recent approaches on immigration control management. In other words, it is suggested that the underpinning logic can be informed by either a threat-linked articulation in which securitization (see Buzan et al., 1998) informs the logic or a problematization-linked articulation in which a governmentality-linked logic (see Aradau and Van Munster, 2007) informs the articulations. These two models represent the efforts to explain the logic that underpins immigration control policies.
Along the way, the review of immigration literature, particularly the literature focused on the case of Britain, has suggested evidence for generating a research problem that grapples with the standpoints of the New Labour and Conservative-led governments on immigration control policies and the variability and contingency of the articulation of control policies. The case of Britain points to an awareness that immigration might come to be constituted as variable, not only as a certain type. A certain structure and organization of an articulation of immigration control policies can be informed by a discourse that fits neither a threat-linked logic and a discourse of threat nor a governmentality-linked logic and a discourse of problematization. Therefore, taken alone, the threat and/or governmentality-linked logics (the models of securitization and governmentality) imply a potential impediment, whereby knowledge is informed only by problematization and threat lines.

The intensification of immigration discourse that draws on threat and/or governmentality-linked logics, on the other hand, has the potential to generate a further and deep new problematization- and threat-linked conceptualization. From this point of view, such a construction can itself become a threat-generating knowledge production process. But the articulation is more complicated, involving multiple layers and voices and open to different forms of conceptualization that can emerge and evolve. Therefore, following a threat- and/or problematization-linked logic is an impediment to advancing a theoretical understanding of immigration control policies. Pushing on the boundaries of this theoretical impediment depends on assessing the conflicting discourses through consciously incorporating multiple logics, which also includes the voices of an opportunity-linked logic as well. Introducing an opportunity-linked logic as the locus of a knowledge production process can assist in exploring different and perhaps contradictory voices of researchers and informants, without privileging any single model.

The literature has revealed a knowledge gap in the understanding of how immigration control policies are presented and constituted and how the displayed patterns of rupture and continuity across actors and over time can be epitomized in the light of the social theories. More precisely, there are three interrelated gaps.
First, the previous studies have focused more on the case of the US (e.g. Castles, 2004; Ackleson, 2005; Rudolph, 2006; Adamson, 2006; Faist, 2006; Hollifield et al., 2014), as well as on the EU (e.g. Huysmans, 2000; Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Geddes, 2005; Schierup et al., 2006; Boswell, 2007; Léonard, 2010). The case of the UK, on the other hand, epitomizes the recent immigration pattern precisely. As a liberal western country offering a wide range of economic opportunities, peace and stability, the UK attracts more and more immigrants (Somerville and Cooper, 2010:134). It is a country that has transformed itself from a traditionally emigration country to an immigration one and hosts diverse immigrants from a wide range of source countries; thus, one can assume that it has been affected by the recent global immigration in many ways as public opinion and attitudes towards immigration exemplify the overall trend (Ipsos, 2015; 3-17). Consequently, the UK provides a well-suited case for exploring how discourses and ideas can define, form and mobilise changes in the immigration field and immigration control policies. The UK represents an excellent research opportunity for advancing an understanding of the immigration discourse that defines and determines immigration realities regarding immigration control policies in a liberal and economically advanced nation-state. While the UK epitomizes the recent immigration pattern precisely, it has received far too little attention compared to other studied areas.

Second, despite numbering very few, the previous studies, in terms of the case of Britain, have largely focused either on the Labour or on the Conservative government administrations (e.g. Layton-Henry, 2004; Malloch and Stanley, 2005; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Ibrahim and Howarth, 2017). Therefore, far too little is known about whether the Conservative-led governments’ immigration discourse displayed patterns of rupture and continuity with that of the New Labour governments. As immigration is a more dynamic phenomenon which is constantly defined and redefined, and, thus, is subject to constant change, taking into account the governments’ embeddedness in controlling immigration to understand the changes over time is vital. There is a significant gap in the current understanding of the research problem, and this thesis, therefore, grapples with a fresh account of how the articulation of immigration control policies has evolved, been intertwined and been replaced across actors and over time.
Third, the previous studies have focused primarily on problematization- and threat-linked articulations, which often suggests that centring problematization- and threat-oriented theoretical lenses can be illuminating (see Huysmans, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Malloch and Stanley, 2005; Huysmans and Squire, 2009; Lahav and Courtemanche, 2012; Ibrahim and Howarth, 2017). However, utilizing a range of theoretical lenses can provide a more promising theoretical framework through which immigration control-oriented research problems can be looked at. The research, therefore, argues for a theoretical framework that focuses on how governments define the immigration reality and articulate their control policies using multiple theoretical lenses. Thus, rather than focusing on problematization- and threat-linked logics of immigration control policies (i.e. looking from securitization and governmentality models), the research argues for utilizing multiple lenses jointly. An opportunity-linked logic and risk lens (the model of risk) has the means to push on the boundaries of previous immigration control studies. This model can fill a significant gap by assisting in the forming of a comprehensive set of theoretical lenses that can shed light on the current understanding of immigration control-oriented research problems.

In other words, (a) less attention paid to the UK case, (b) a limited account of the patterns of rupture and continuity between the New Labour governments’ and the Conservative-led governments’ articulation of immigration control policies and (c) the impediment to advancing theoretical understandings of the multidimensionality of immigration control policies due to the utilization of problematization- and threat-linked models (the model of securitization and governmentality) appear as significant gaps in the current understanding of the research problem under study.

The research seeks to extend the theoretical understanding of the research problem under study by pushing on the boundaries of the threat- and problematization-centred previous immigration control studies by emphasising the less pronounced side of the risk, which is brought into play as an additional theoretical lens through an empirical investigation of the immigration control policies articulated by the New Labour governments and the Conservative-led governments between 1997 and 2017.
1.2 Research Question

The goal of the thesis is to deconstruct immigration discourse by revealing the structure and organization of its articulation in light of social theories. The research seeks to develop an understanding of how and why different actors articulated immigration control policies differently. The research seeks to pursue a research question that focuses on the importance of the variability and contingency of immigration control policies that seem important and worthy of in-depth investigation.

Pursuant to investigating the structure and organization of the articulations that informed and mirrored immigration control policies for a better understanding of the research problem under study, the following question is raised. It forms the basis of the expectations and the research objectives, which all are important and worthy of in-depth investigation.

The central research question of this thesis is: Did the Conservative-led governments’ immigration discourse display a pattern of rupture or continuity with the New Labour governments’ approach in Britain between 1997 and 2017?

The research problem and the research question are more focused. Therefore, in seeking to investigate the patterns of the articulation of the immigration control policies, and to map out the evolvement, intertwinement and replacement of the articulation, the thesis has developed and, proposed hypotheses (expectations), which form the basis of the research objectives and are worth a more detailed investigation. In keeping with the research question outlined above, the framework of the thesis has been designed to confirm or disprove the following hypotheses.

Hypotheses: the displayed patterns of the articulation differ significantly between the Conservative-led governments and the New Labour governments, as well as between the studied parties at the government level and when out of office, between the studied centre-right parties and their centre-left counterparts, and between the spoken and written rhetoric under study.
1.3 Research Methodology

The research argues that the Conservative-led governments’ articulations displayed a rupture rather than a continuity with the New Labour governments’ articulations during the studied period. The duration of the analysis starts from May 1997, when the New Labour government came to power, and finishes at the UK general election of June 2017. The chosen duration of the research offers a perfect representation of its scope, i.e. the range of governments that were formed by the New Labour, the Conservative-led coalition and the Conservative government as well as of the political parties and setting of the government and office exclusion, which has enabled to form and test the proposed hypotheses. To support the argument, the research has designed a theoretical framework that serves as a basis to provide a conceptual foundation to guide the research. This argument is developed through a multi-perspective framework, which is discussed in section 3.2 in detail, with reference to the research aims and objectives:

Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse theory and analysis underpin all the analytical work in this thesis. The main axis of the research’s theoretical framework is the discourse analysis, which proceeds with discourse theory supplemented by multiple social theories in the form of a multi-perspective framework. In essence, the research is concerned with the performative power of the political discourse articulated by the governments to present, justify and mobilize support for privileged immigration control policies. Therefore, it focuses on providing a systematic analysis of political discourses through the discourse analysis. The research has opted to follow Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse theory and discourse analysis, which offers an unbiased description of the world and its mechanisms (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:22), rather than Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, in which the discourse acts ideologically and the researcher agrees with and supports the oppressed social groups (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:64). As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:4) maintain, Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse theory shares the premises of social constructivist discourse analysis. From an epistemological point of view, as the research views the world through the lens of discursively defined reality and draws on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and discourse analysis, social constructivism’s
epistemological premises are assumed to be a well-suited choice for the research’s theoretical framework.

Secondly, the research identifies the possible theoretical lenses that can be used to shed light on the articulations. When it comes to the supplemented social theories, as introduced in the section 1.1 and developed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, the literature indicates that the immigration reality might be constructed as a security issue, and, in turn, the model of immigration control policies is securitization-based (e.g. Bigo, 2002; Léonard, 2010; Lahav and Courtemanche, 2012; Lahav et al., 2014; Messina, 2014). Where securitization is absent, on the other hand, it is argued that governmentality might be the logic (e.g. Neal, 2009; Van Munster, 2009) in which the articulation of immigration leads to discourses of problematization. In turn, such an articulation affects the outlook on immigration control policies (e.g. Bradford, 2013; Peters, 2015). However, while the more restrictionist approaches are significant, they are not a unique form in defining and articulating control policies. A different form of conceptualization and a different logic may constitute a meaning that derives from a conceptualization that fits neither threat nor problematization.

That is, while it can be argued that immigration can be constructed as a site of fear caused by real or perceived immediate threats, or as a site of problematization, the situated meanings2 for immigration control might be informed by a conceptualization that differs from these two forms, positing an opportunity-linked logic (e.g., Düvell and Jordan, 2003; Jordan et al., 2003) which differs from the securitization and governmentality-oriented logics. Therefore, the lens of opportunity-linked logic, which draws heavily on a generic risk and liberal immigration control and managerial logic, must also be taken into consideration and the generic risk logic should join the utilized set of theoretical lenses. Accordingly, acknowledging that multiple lenses are required to get at multiple understandings of the articulations, the research supplements the discourse theory with social theories as well. The thesis argues that existing immigration control studies should push on the boundaries to discover more about the articulation in question. This argument is made by showing that most of the

2 See Gee (2004) for a detailed definition of situated meaning.
key elements of immigration discourse reveal that a comprehensive theoretical framework, working through multiple lenses and models, may yield a more robust inference than either a problematization- or a threat-oriented design or a single-logic model using only one theoretical lens.

Thirdly, the research analyses a substantial quantity of rhetoric to reveal the articulation across the actors and over time. The researcher is interested in providing a comprehensive understanding of the research problem. Therefore, the analysis of political discourse is based on four sources: (1) manifestos, (2) leaders’ and government elites’ speeches, (3) parliamentary debates and (4) policy papers. Accordingly, the analysis draws on five terms of office, namely the first, second and third terms of the New Labour governments, the Conservative-led coalition and the Conservative government. Three political parties are involved, namely the Labour party, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats. There are two settings, in office and out of office, and there are written and spoken discourses. The systematic analysis of the four sources which cover the discourses of different actors in different settings required the assistance of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (hereafter CAQDAS).

And finally, for the about noted reason the research supplemented discourse analysis with CAQDAS: NVivo. NVivo was largely utilized for coding and retrieving the data and texts, comparing, contrasting and differentiating coded data with regard to their attributes. It mainly assisted in the coding process. It was used to inquire into the conceptual relationship. The discourse analysis proceeds through investigating the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses, which mainly identifies the observed competing discourses. In order to systematically document the findings that can assist comparison across the actors and over time consistently, it was, therefore, considered reasonable and plausible to produce a quantitative dimension of the discourse analysis by producing numerical data through a matrix that would allow the analysis of these produced numerical data with SPSS. Hence, the research produced a quantitative dimension of the qualitative inference to interact with the data more complexly; to run a statistical analysis; and to test the proposed hypotheses that are
linked to the displayed patterns in order to explore the patterns of rupture and continuity within and across the studied actors in Britain during the studied period.

According to a line of argument introduced above and developed in Chapter 3, sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, discourse analysis, supplemented theoretical lenses and software are linked at the data analysing stage, where all parts were in conversation with discourse analysis. More precisely, the elements of discourse analysis, as provided by Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse model (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002), were informed by the theoretical lenses. In turn, discourse analysis and social theories with the assistance of NVivo enabled the production of numerical data and running of matrix queries, which all served to develop a more complex understanding of the research problem.

In other words, the aim and the objective of the research required a theoretical framework that would incorporate a multi-perspective framework, by which the discourse theory and discourse analysis are supplemented by three theoretical lenses: risk, governmentality and securitization, which are combined with CAQDAS, using NVivo. A multi-perspective method is employed because of the nature of the specific research question that the research seeks to answer.

1.4 Definition of Key Terminology

Immigration is a process of entering and settling into a new country, while immigrants are people who cross borders with the intention to settle in a new country (see Segal et al., 2010:3; Anderson, 2010). Regarding the typology of immigration and immigrants, various categories are defined, such as permanent versus temporary and international versus internal, and, moreover, regular versus irregular or illegal versus legal, and voluntary versus forced or economic versus refugees (for a typology of immigration, see Castles, 2000; Segal et al., 2010; King, 2012; Faist, 2012; and Boyle et al., 2014). While such typology and categorizations, to some extent, are helpful, certain categories overlap. Anderson (2010) maintained that the categorization is difficult to maintain in practice. For instance, immigration within the EU is both internal, with the free movement of the EU member states, and international. An intended temporary stay can switch to a permanent settlement or conversely the permanent settler might
decide to leave, or irregular immigrants might be granted legality or, conversely, regular immigrants might become irregular after continuing to remain without permits. Therefore, the research has preferred to use the terms of immigration and immigrants to refer to economic immigrant, refugees, asylum seekers, forced migrants, family reunification and international students. This concept is in line with the UK case, as ‘immigration’ is official terminology in the UK, such as in the Immigration Bill, and in immigration control and immigration policy (see Castles, 2000; Segal et al., 2010; Anderson, 2010; Faist 2012; Boyle et al., 2014). The term of the ‘entities’ is used to refer to immigration and immigration control policies and to shorten these two definitions. The term of ‘perspective’ is used to refer to a particular way of considering immigration by which the government interprets and defines, in turn, constructing a control policy to act upon it. Within the research context, the term ‘perspectives’ is used to represent and shorten ‘the perspectives on immigration control policies’. As noted in section 2.3 of Chapter 2, the articulations of immigration control policies are used to refer to the articulation of a set of control mechanisms, which is designed to manage immigration control through inclusionary and exclusionary aims and objectives and to the way by which the government presented the regulations and measures that are constructed and implemented to regulate immigration flows that started before, during and after entering a foreign country, while the integration of immigration and integration policies are excluded from the scope of the research even though both come under the immigration policies umbrella (see Money, 1997; Givens and Luedtke, 2005; Lahav and Guiraudon, 2006; Hollifield et al., 2014). The term Conservative-led governments is used to refer to the Conservative-led coalition and the Conservative government together, while the Conservative-led coalition and Conservative government are used to refer to those two governments respectively. Immigration control discourse is used to refer to the political discourse on immigration control policies produced by the governments by means of the written and spoken rhetoric during the studied period. Within the research context, while ‘the discourse’ is used to mean ‘the political discourse on immigration and immigration control policies’, the term ‘articulation’ is used to represent and shorten ‘the articulation of immigration control policies.’
The term ‘generic risk’ is used to refer to a future-oriented manageable uncertainty, in which profit is prioritized and uncertainty is governed through a logic of opportunity. The term of ‘securitization move’ (see Buzan et al., 1998:25) is used to refer to (a constructed) perceived or real immediate threat-linked discourse that is articulated by an actor to create a securitization. The term of ‘the discourse of opportunity’ is used to refer to an articulation that draws on an opportunity-linked logic. The term of ‘the discourse of problematization’ is used to refer to a discourse informed by a problematization of a social issue, which is based on governmentality-linked logic. ‘The discourse of threat’ is used to refer to a discourse informed by a (perceived or real immediate) threat-linked logic that draws on securitization move-linked articulation.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

The research is organized into six chapters. This introductory chapter has set the stage for the research and made the case for the significance of the problem, contextualized the research and introduced the basic components of the theoretical framework and research methodology.

Chapter Two reviews immigration related bodies of literature and appraises the literature in three areas to identify the critical theoretical and research issues related to framing the context of the research problem. It provides a critical evaluation of the literature on the specific research problem. First, in section 2.1, it reviews and identifies the recent patterns pertinent to immigration reality and immigration control policies. Section 2.2 seeks to draw insights from the recent patterns and associated dynamics of identifying the implications of these patterns and the associated dynamics of the theoretical account of the underpinning logic. Section 2.3 reviews the relevant literature and previous studies in terms of the perspectives on contemporary immigration control policies and, in the case of Britain, to point out to particular gaps in the field. Finally, in Section 2.4, the chapter reviews multiple theoretical lenses through which the articulation of immigration control policies can be investigated. It offers a detailed consideration of the core assumptions and benchmarks of the theoretical lenses utilized to explore the multiple logics on understanding the
immigration control policies and to piece the multiple lenses together, which allows the research to seek to push on the boundaries of the way by which understanding the complexity of immigration control policies should proceed. Thus, it seeks to demonstrate a significant gap with regard to the current understanding of the research problem under study.

Chapter Three presents and discusses the research design and methodology used in the research. The chapter reviews the methodology for the theoretical perspectives and the methods used as tools for analysing the research data. Section 3.1 presents the nature of the research and the research design and revisits the research question and the hypotheses which are proposed for further testing. Section 3.2 details the components of the multi-perspective framework. It provides a detailed discussion of the multi-perspective framework of the research design and the discourse theory and the supplemented CAQDAS. Section 3.3 presents the data sources, while section 3.4 provides the analytical strategies, tools and methods used for the data analysis and explains the way in which the data is analysed and presented. Section 3.5 is devoted to the limitations of the research methods applied in the research.

Chapter Four presents the findings of the study in the form of the produced numerical data. It begins by presenting the research findings of the quantitative dimension of the discourse analysis inference in the form of the produced numerical data. Section 4.1 presents the results of the statistical analysis. It reports the main findings of the displayed patterns of the rupture and continuity across the governments through the dominant articulated discourses, the benchmarks and the explanatory dynamics linked findings for the first, and second New Labour governments, the third New Labour government’ and the Conservative-led governments respectively. It also provides the research findings in terms of party, office exclusion and instrument settings. Section 4.2 presents the results of the statistical tests that were performed by running the relevant statistical tests on the produced numerical data to confirm hypotheses statistically and to explore the variations and significances between different setting, namely, the terms, the government and opposition, the political parties and the discourse instruments through the measure index of the order and distribution of discourses (see the index in detail in Chapter Three, section 3.4 ).
Chapter Five offers a detailed qualitative analysis and discussion of the findings. In order to critically evaluate the displayed patterns of the rupture and continuity and explore the variability and contingency, the chapter takes up the focus on providing a more detailed evaluation of the evolvement, intertwinement and replacement of the articulation through investigation of the articulation in line with the actors and over time, which are presented in detail in Chapter Four. Drawing on the discourse analysis results and the quantified dimension of the discourse analyses inference detailed in Chapter Four, Section 5.1 focuses on the implications raised by the findings in term of the critical patterns and themes which were identified through discourse analysis, as well as epitomizing the articulation of the immigration control policies by looking at how the political discourse was structured and organized in light of the social theories. Section 5.2 provides the explanatory dynamics as reasons that inform the articulation and their emergence. It focuses on the explanatory dynamics presented by the government to justify the approaches on immigration control policies and highlights how different actors utilized the dynamics differently in different settings to justify a number of different articulations. Chapter Five, therefore, provides a detailed analysis and discusses the empirical evidence that is presented in Chapter Four to account for the theoretical foundations that add much to the understanding of the research problem.

Chapter Six offers a summary of the main conclusions, the theoretical contributions, implications, suggestions and avenues for future research.

Setting the stage for the thesis, the following chapter provides a thorough review of the literature pertaining to immigration control.
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Imigration reality is constituted within a discursive context. The conceptualization involves a representation of priorities, objectives and interests and the changing circumstances through which immigration is indexed. It is often conceived partly as a story of intersections of two or more dimensions, where patterns and discourses connect, overlap and intersect, which provide a mode of interpretation and a particular way of looking at how the situated meaning of immigration changes.

This chapter aims to provide a review of the immigration-related body of literature to reflect recent immigration patterns, associated explanatory dynamics and perspectives in general and the case of Britain in particular, to explore and identify how and why the constructed meanings are articulated differently and how these different articulations can be epitomized theoretically. Drawing on the identified research issues, the chapter appraises the immigration control literature and identifies the theoretical lenses to frame the context of the research problem.

The chapter is organized into four sections. Section 2.1 starts with reviewing the literature to explore the patterns in terms of the direction, composition and volume of the movement. Section 2.2 continues by exploring underpinning considerations and explanatory dynamics, which are the reasons utilized by an actor to inform an articulation. The section reviews the economic and public services, the political and politicization, and the societal and security dynamics, which all posit the multiple layers of the articulation through which different actors constitute the meaning of entities at different settings differently.

Section 2.3 reviews the perspectives in general and the case of Britain in particular and appraises immigration control-related studies to provide the setting for the specific research issues associated with the previous studies in detail. Section 2.4 turns to appraising a range of theoretical lenses that can shed light on the articulations. It provides a definition and general assumptions of theoretical lenses and encapsulates
the elements of the models as core benchmarks through which the underpinning logic of the immigration control policies can be understood. Drawing on the reviewed literature, the chapter demonstrates the existing significant gap in the current understanding of the research problem under study and offers to piece the multiple theoretical lenses embedded framework together in order to understand the complexity of immigration control policies.

2.1 Recent Immigration Patterns

Current global immigration is largely characterized by intensification, which is mostly associated with the advance of globalization (Castles et al., 2013). The literature indicates that notable changes have been taking place in several aspects of global immigration, and the recent patterns of immigration have been driven by a combination of the relevant pull factors and push factors. The pull factors, for example, are the existent relatively stable social, political and economic structure, as is the case for the liberal Western countries (Massey, et al., 1993). In contrast to the pull factors, the push factors reflect the absence of the above-mentioned pull factors (see Goldin and Reinert, 2006: Bosworth, 2008:200). Mayda (2010) pointed out that pull factors play a more important role than push factors in global immigration. Determined by pull and push factors, current global immigration, Lee et al. (2014) proposed, is shaped by a change (a) in route and an increase in the range of sending and receiving countries, (b) in composition, such as in ethnic, social and economic backgrounds, and (c) in the level of the numbers of the people on the move.

In terms of route, the number of people crossing borders was typically dominated by flows from Europe to the New World or to European colonial bases (see Massey, 1990; Segal et al., 2010; Okólski, 2012). However, from the end of World War Two, immigration started to take place in a reverse direction, largely from south to north and from the less developed to more developed countries, mainly in an opposite direction of transatlantic migration (Castles et al., 2005; Putnam, 2007:140). During this period, Asia, Africa, and Latin America became the main sources of migrants to Australia, Canada, the United States and Europa, in which Europe itself switched into
being an immigrant-receiving continent. Western countries have become important migrant destinations because of relatively stable social, political and economic structures (Massey et al., 1993:455). The end of colonization, economic growth, and high employment opportunities have led Europe to emerge as a global immigration destination instead of being an emigration continent (Triandafyllidou et al., 2014:2).

With regard to the composition of the immigration, Castles (2002:1147) argued that the vast majority of the current wave of immigration consists of immigrants with diverse ethnocultural backgrounds. The new patterns, therefore, imply a settlement of culturally, religiously and ethnically diverse groups into the new societies (Lahav, 2004; 1). This trend is assumed to have changed since the end of the Cold War. In particular, the 1990s flow of refugees and asylum seekers from the Balkan area and the Middle East and the 2000s family reunification trend are assumed to be important factors that might have contributed to the new pattern significantly (Lolle and Torpe, 2011:201). In light of these changes, the new configuration of global immigration patterns not only posits the changing routes and the destinations but also the changing nature of immigration and, in turn, defines immigration as well, all of which has provided a lucrative ground for immigration discourse.
When it comes to numbers of immigrants, on the other hand, the literature and the published data indicate that the main trend in global immigration flows shows a continuous increase over the last few decades (e.g. Castles, 2000; Hollifield, 2004; Castles et al., 2005; Scheibelhofer, 2009). In contrast to Abel and Sander’s (2014:1521) and De Haas’s (2005:1270) argument, which suggests that there has been no increase in immigration flows compared to the growth in the world population, Giovanni et al. (2015; 168) point out that substantial portions of the total population in many developed countries are immigrant ones, with immigrants accounting for 8–20% of their populations. The United Nations Population Division (United Nations, 2017) reported that migration is at an all-time high. While immigration flows continue to be higher than ever before, at the global level (see Table 2.1 above), the total number of people immigrating to the UK has increased from four million in 1995 to nine million in 2017, an increase of 125 per cent (see Table 2.2 below). The number of asylum seekers, on the other hand, makes up a smaller share of net migration in the UK, ranging from 3 per cent to 10 per cent of net migration (Blinder, 2017).

### Table 2.1: World International Immigrant Stock 1990–2017

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>152,542,373</td>
<td>160,700,028</td>
<td>172,604,257</td>
<td>190,531,600</td>
<td>220,019,266</td>
<td>247,585,744</td>
<td>257,715,425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 2.2: UK International Immigration Numbers 1990-2017

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value</td>
<td>3,650,286</td>
<td>4,155,293</td>
<td>4,730,165</td>
<td>5,926,156</td>
<td>7,604,583</td>
<td>8,411,021</td>
<td>8,841,717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The above-mentioned shifts in the nature of global immigrations are linked, mostly, to structural dynamics in which global immigration is significantly affected by inequalities in wealth and labour market variations and employment opportunities across countries, as well as differences between economic, social and political stability (see Massey, 1999; Czaika and De Haas, 2013), and in part by global interactions and developments in the world economy. It is argued that the globalized world, which has been facilitated by economic, social and political dimensions of globalization, has markedly eased previous difficulties inherent in the movement of people (Segal et al., 2010:14; Bacigalupe and Cámara, 2012:1425). When pointing out the unique effect of globalization, Ariely (2012) claimed that there is evidence which indicates a correlation between the level of globalization and attitudes toward immigrants, noting that higher levels of globalization correspond to a high level of negative attitudes towards immigration. Therefore, the uncertainty and future-oriented anxiety of global migration are intensified by the increased number of immigrants mainly assisted by primary aspects of globalization.

Highlighting the changing pattern and related context, the research suggests that recent immigration is informed by the contemporary economic, social and political process that produced a dynamic concept, rather than static and bounded one, implying that the constructed meaning attached to immigration may change. At this point, the next section turns to explore the implications of the above-noted patterns to examine perspectives in the form of dynamics through which discourse evolves to form and bring immigration into a socially constructed being.
2.2 Associated Dynamics on Immigration

Associated dynamics are the underpinning considerations that put the pieces of the construction together and posit how dominant discourse serves to articulate and maintain existing knowledge. As specific dynamics, they individually or jointly serve to include and exclude some differing points of view that serve to construct the reality. As Exadaktylos (2012) pointed out, the complex policy areas need to be deconstructed into their basic components. The research, therefore, seeks to appraise the associated dynamics separately and then combine them to form a general conclusion. In terms of the explanatory dynamics, immigration scholars have offered various sets of explanatory dynamics and models that inform and define the immigration reality and control management (see Meyers, 2000; Tichenor, 2009; Schain, 2009; Money, 2010; Hollifield et al., 2014). Comparative immigration studies, therefore, have offered a varied set of understanding of how the explanatory dynamics might vary over time and across governments.

Immigration control policies are articulated through a set of explanatory dynamics that posit a form of compromises which take place between several competing interests which can broadly be linked to being for and against immigration groups, while the composition of the groups and their interests and priorities may change and differ over time (e.g. Freeman, 1995; Boswell, 2007; Tichenor, 2009; Boswell et al., 2011; Czaika and De Haas, 2013). Money (2010), for example, offered national identity, economic considerations, national interest and security and international pressures as the main factors that act as explanatory dynamics set in determining immigration control policies. Mayda (2006) preferred a relatively broad classification that divides the dynamics into economic dynamics and noneconomic dynamics, such as security, cultural and political considerations.

Tichenor (2009), on the other hand, captured well what might cause immigration control policies to change. According to Tichenor (2009), economic conditions, social interests, national values and electoral realignments might be seen as a set of explanatory variables. However, he argued, when the above-mentioned variables are taken into consideration separately, they might be inadequate for capturing the whole picture of the change. For example, regarding the US case, he argued, in contrast to
the above-mentioned dynamics, `the political institutions`, `policy alliances`, `privileged expertise` and `international pressures` consist of a set of factors jointly. In terms of the EU case, Boswell’s (2003) account is worth noting. Boswell (2003) highlighted the institutional context and the domestic political dynamic, while Spencer (2011) argued for the impact on the labour market, public services and societal dimensions.

Therefore, the set of the explanatory dynamics that can be offered as factors that might account for a change in immigration control policies involves various dynamics which might change from government to government, country to country and over time. The crucial point is that they provide a basis for the rationalization of defining and managing the entities, having a functional insight into unfolding the scope and the range of the articulation of the immigration control policies. Accordingly, to tap into the set of the associated dynamics being offered by the immigration scholars in order to gain a better understanding of the way in which the relevant explanatory dynamics function to provide grounds to articulate immigration control policies, the thesis has opted to review a comprehensive set of the dynamics though breaking them down into their basic components, involving economic and public services, political and politicization, and societal and security dynamics.

2.2.1 Economic and Public Services Dynamics

The literature holds that knowledge building and the construction of an immigration reality are always partly based on economic considerations (see Borjas, 1989) and can be reflected in two aspects: fiscal effect (see Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hanson et al. 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014) and labour market competition (see Mayda, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). According to Borjas (1989), not only the immigration issue itself but also any consideration related to concerns of immigration are controversial; this is largely because the economic impact of immigration varies considerably. In the same vein, Pécoud and De Guchteneire (2006:80) and Freeman (1995:889) pointed out that immigration flows are not homogeneous universally; therefore, different immigration patterns may affect different countries or parts of an economy within a country or different group in the population and the society.
differently. Still, immigration may have positive and negative impacts at the above-noted levels at the same time (Keijzer et al., 2016). Still, as Borjas (2014) maintained, the consideration related to the impact of immigrants seems to consist of a number of politically sensitive issues which are mainly underpinned by economic dimensions and, therefore, require economic-oriented approaches.

Regarding the economic impact of migration, in terms of fiscal burden, the evidence suggests a relatively positive impact and benefit of immigration (see Borjas, 2003; Dustmann et al., 2005; Clark and Drinkwater 2008; Cattaneo et al., 2015; Giovanni et al., 2015). For example, Bonin et al. (2000) argued that the overall economic impact of immigration is small but positive; still, high-skilled immigration might increase this positive impact and immigration is more likely to generate economic benefits for host countries. Therefore, the overall economic impact, which might partly depend on the characteristics of immigrants, is more likely to be positive.

Likewise, Rowthorn (2008) claimed that immigrants, particularly high-skilled immigrants are more likely to make a positive net economic contribution than those unskilled. The bigger the structural demand for immigrant labour, the more the need to sustain global immigration flows; thus, the government struggles between the demands of the openness to meet the requirements of national labour markets, on the one hand, and public considerations and pressures to restrict immigration flows, as will be discussed in the next few paragraphs, on the other hand.

In terms of the UK case, for example, Dustmann et al. (2005) argued that there is no clear negative fiscal impact of immigration as it is assumed into the economy and relieves pressure on employment and the wages of the indigenous population. Vargas-Silva (2013) noted that the evidence and the results for the UK are subject to some assumptions; nonetheless, the evidence points out to positive but small fiscal impacts. Hanson et al. (2007) made a very interesting point – that states tend to liberalize trade policies but limit immigration; however, they argued, immigrants pay taxes for receiving public services, but imports do not.

According to Mayda (2006), the economic consideration of the attitudes towards immigration and the correlation between skill levels and attitudes are obvious, and
non-economic considerations are relatively less important in shaping attitudes towards immigration. In line with Mayda, Goldstein and Peters (2014:380) pointed out that during times of economic downturn, industry segmentation becomes more prevalent and attitudes toward immigration vary according to characteristics of migrants; thus, economic recession changes public opinion, but indigenous populations are more favourable about high-skilled immigration than about others. Therefore, when economic conditions worsen, the indigenous population feels threatened partly because immigration, it is assumed, increases labour competition.

According to interest-based theories, opposition to immigration stems primarily from economic concerns (Hampshire, 2013; 23). For that reason, any negative change in the economic environment is likely to influence the way in which immigration is constructed. Consequently, Dancygier and Donnelly (2012:18) argued that economic factors shape views on immigration. During an economic downturn, the perceived threat is that immigrants pose a challenge to economic security through their impact on people’s economic well-being by depressing wages and taking jobs. However, Anderson (2010) maintained that in contrast to the common belief, immigration control itself supports a certain type of labour. In this case, employers mainly press for an increase in the number of immigrants instead of relaxing the rules regardless of the crises and the high employment.

While the economic considerations mainly posit the link between immigration and domestic labour markets, such as the wage and employment opportunities and the fiscal effect nexus, the public services dynamic refers to access to public services such as education, health, housing and social benefits by immigrants.

Access to social services and benefits of immigrants has been a long-standing source of considerations where, according to Bommes and Geddes (2003:2-3), the issues of the benefit dependency of immigrants has remained central to public debates (see Pierson, 1998; Korpi, 2003; Sainsbury, 2006; Hemerijk, 2013). Emmenegger and Careja (2012) argued that the current intense public debates are based on the premise that immigrants are potentially more likely to be dependent on government funding and less likely to be economically self-supporting. Thus, the argument that immigration threatens the welfare state reflects deep-seated conflicts over the extent
of benefit dependency. On the other hand, Alesina and Glaeser (2004:175) noted that relatively small numbers of immigrants arrive in their host country to escape ethnic tensions and poverty; consequently, they are disproportionately dependent on benefits and the entitlements of the welfare state.

Debate continues over the extent of the economic impacts that migrants have on the welfare state. Cohen and Razin (2008:28) noted that skilled immigrants are less likely to gain an economic advantage in terms of social services as they are more likely to contribute more in paying tax than they receive in government funding (see also Ruhs, 2008:406). To reduce the negative impact of immigration on social services, restricting accessibility and controlling immigration have been proposed (see Boswell, 2003; Barrett and McCarthy, 2008:558). The consideration that the overall immigration level is too high might give rise to the belief that immigration is more likely put a burden on social services as well as the infrastructure such as health, education, and housing (Dancygier and Donnelly 2012). According to Dancygier (2010), allowing more immigration but failing to provide sufficient physical infrastructure, such as housing, schools and hospitals, might serve to leave economic scarcity as a consideration for the indigenous population.

In sum, this part of the section provided a review of the literature within the context of economic and public services considerations and noted that immigration impacts the whole economy in various ways. However, the effects of immigration on host countries are more likely to be small, but positive. From this point of view, the contributory aspect serves the discourse to proceed on the grounds of opportunity; thus, the discourse of opportunity can largely be determined by positive outcomes-linked considerations and articulations. However, as not all impacts are positive, large-scale immigration can be understood as posing challenges to a welfare system and to the public and social services of the host country. Therefore, despite the possible economic contribution, immigration might be defined by the host country as an economic burden on the economy, leading to jobs losses, bring down wages and putting a burden on public services. From this point of view, the adverse economic outcomes embedded with the public services-oriented considerations result in the
discourse being formed around anxiety, fear and threat-linked considerations, by which the discourses of problematization and threat emerge.

In this regard, economic and public services dynamics can inform and mirror immigration either as a contributory force or as a problem and/or a threat. While the overarching implications of the economic dynamic are to inform the articulation from the expansionist perspective and the public services dynamic from the restrictionist point of view, the economic and social process allows the meaning to be driven by different considerations for different actors and with a different state of affairs. Of course, it must be noted, again, that economic and public services dynamics play a significant role in the construction of an articulation by their own distinctive characteristics as well as by part of some integrated characteristics. Furthermore, economic and public services dynamics, like all of those dynamics, interact with each other in complex relations of alliance and contestation, with some important overlap between constructed meanings. Therefore, looking at whether different dynamics are found within one discourse and whether they overlap can provide an important signifier for epitomizing the discourses.

Therefore, economic and public services dynamics, as well as the other dynamics, which will be discussed further down, can assist the research in acquiring specific considerations and rationalization issues and concerns as a part of a set through which the presentation of immigration control policies can be viewed. Here, the economic dynamic seems to serve to spark new insights into how the articulation can be epitomized. Accordingly, it can be suggested that while economic dynamics can largely but not exclusively be used as a base for the discourse of opportunity and contributory force, conversely, the public services dynamic largely can be used to inform the discourse of threat and problematization and fear and anxiety-linked perspectives.

Having reviewed the economic and public services consideration, next, the political and politicization dimensions are discussed.
2.2.2 Political and Politicization Dynamics

Recent political transitions such as the breakup of the former Soviet Union followed by the changes in Eastern Europe posit an important aspect in shaping the recent patterns of immigration which assist large-scale migration flows towards Western Europe (Heleniak, 2004:99, Mansoor and Quillin, 2006:3). In addition, while being a polity block set up with the aim of sustaining a durable peace, economic strength and prosperity (see Usherwood, 2011; Pinder and Usherwood, 2018), the EU has also affected immigration movement, in particular, the EU citizenship aspect, increasing integration and EU enlargement (see Geddes, 2003:26; Lahav, 2004:5). The 2004/2007 enlargements of the EU amounted to their biggest expansion and resulted in huge demographic changes (Okólski, 2012:31-33). As Pinder and Usherwood (2018) pointed out, the enlargement can be read as reaction to Soviet domination, aimed at pursuing a more secure, safe and prosperous future under the EU polity as benefits; however, the enlargement also led to a concurrent rise in costs concurrently, which, in part, means more immigration, as was experienced in the UK case, were uncontrolled immigration, in part, led the UK to hold the Brexit referendum and trigger the departure from the bloc.

Within the research context, by political dynamics, the research refers to considerations related to the asylum seekers and refuges. The changes in the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, the literature revealed, are largely determined by the ebb and flow of conflict situations, with 111 armed conflicts in 74 locations around the world seen during the 1990s and 2000s (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 2001). The main source countries for refugees and asylum seekers were northern Iraq, Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Somalia, Yemen and Kosovo in the late 1990s and Afghanistan in the 2000s. Even though the number of asylum seekers has fallen over the period, concerns have remained high (Whittaker, 2006:36) and deepened due to the widening chaos and turbulence in the Middle East and North Africa, such as the Arab Spring and the civil wars (Economist, 2014). The international obligation, which is based on the UN Convention 1951 and its 1967 protocol relating to the status of refugees and moral obligations, forced states to adopt appropriate strategies which posit a pressure
in finding a way that meets the public perception and the moral obligation on one hand and international obligations and national interests on the other (Guild, 2006).

The literature indicates that the way in which asylum seekers and refugees are constructed indicates various articulations. Schönwälder et al. (2016), for example, pointed out that a positive discourse on asylum seekers seems less pronounced in public debates. Zorlu (2016) maintained that the overall attitudes towards asylum seekers in local communities where new immigrants are located are not as negative as suggested. In contrast, Hatton (2015) argued that overall public attitudes towards asylum seekers are negative and mainly stem from economic, political and societal considerations. The negative attitudes towards asylum seekers, Hatton and Williamson (2006) argued, might be caused by the phase of the development of immigration policies, which have not kept up with the increased numbers of asylum seekers; therefore, the high numbers of asylum seekers are understood as posing a real pressure on the economic and social life of the host countries.

Despite the change in the construction of meaning for asylum seekers from threat perception to being a burden, the way of defining them still serves in a negative way (Klocker and Dunn, 2003). From this emerges a discriminatory viewpoint towards asylum seekers (Every and Augoustinos, 2007). Therefore, Zetter and Pearl (2000) argued that the politics and policies in relation to asylum seekers and refugees are more likely to reflect a restrictive approach, particularly with regard to access to housing, benefits and relocation policies during the last two decades. In a similar vein, it has been proposed that as they are preoccupied with further controls, governments not only opt to differentiate between genuine and bogus asylum seekers but also between refugees and asylum seekers, while the former has been labelled as ‘deserving’, the latter has been depicted as ‘undeserving’ immigrants (Sales, 2002). Phillimore and Goodson (2006) argued that the dispersal policy of asylum seekers in the UK not only alienates asylum seekers but also is subject to suboptimal outcomes.

At this point, the discussion of the political dynamic has logically moved to consider the politicization dynamic, by which the research refers to politicization of immigration through the discourses articulated by the government and political parties which posit the interaction with public opinion towards immigration, the party
positions, and the interplay of populist parties. But, before moving to public opinion and party positions, it is worth noting the gap between the immigration rhetoric and immigration control policies. As Boswell (2007) pointed out, the rhetorical construction of immigration and the pursued immigration control policies can conflict. While the rhetoric is the prominent element affecting the construction of the migration reality, a gap might exist between the immigration control rhetoric, which could be mainly highly restrictionist, and the immigration control policies, which might reflect a more liberal approach. Yet, this gap might also create a risk of raising the expectation of delivering a more restrictionist immigration control through affecting the dynamics of the attitudes towards immigration.

While the different forms of immigration discourse instruments can, broadly, provide valuable insights into how and why different goals and particular policies are pursued in terms of immigration control, the existing literature also points to office exclusion as a factor that provides a causal mechanism (Schumacher et al., 2013), which can also account for the variation in the construction of the immigration reality between being in office and in opposition in responses to this inclusionary and exclusionary movement. Statham and Geddes (2006) demonstrated that the party affiliation of government is also important in forming approaches towards immigration. Hence, ruling parties’ construction of immigration not only is informed by the specific stand of the political parties and its ideological view (see Boswell and Hough, 2008: Geddes, 2008), but also by the changes in the political landscape such as the change in the party affiliation of government (see Statham and Geddes, 2006). Accordingly, being excluded from office and moving to the opposition and vice versa may also contribute to changing the position relating to the construction of immigration. As Schumacher et al. (2013) pointed out, political parties mainly change their policy positions in response to office exclusion. Therefore, political parties are more likely to alter and shift their stance when losing the votes that result in them being excluded from office.

The literature indicates that individual-level attitudes towards immigration have changed in a negative way in recent years in the developed liberal countries (see, Van Klingeran, et al., 2014; Gorodzeisky, and Semyonov, 2015; Bos, et al., 2016). Bearing in mind the limitation of the surveys, the survey results suggest that nearly four in five
respondents in the world’s more developed countries believe that the number of immigrants has increased over the last five years (Ipsos, 2015: 3). Similarly, more than one-third of respondents thought there were too many immigrants in their respective countries (Transatlantic Trends, 2014:38). The figures are 71% in Italy, 61% in Belgium, 60% in France and Britain, 48% in Spain and 43% in Germany and Sweden (Ipsos, 2015:17). Héricourt and Spielvogel (2010:116) pointed out that public opinion surveys in most developed countries indicate that public attitudes towards immigrants have become more negative in recent years. The percentage of people who thought that their government did not do well on the immigration issue was 60% in Europe and 71% in the US. Anxiety in Europe was most evident in Spain (77%), the United Kingdom (73%), and Italy and France (both 64%) (Transatlantic Trends, 2014:34).

Public opinion plays an important role in the policy-making process of liberal democracies and the formation of state preferences (Risse-Kappen, 1991). Political parties are the most important communication channels of public opinion to influence the decision-making process; therefore, due to the interaction between the public and political parties, the latter plays a significant role in shaping public policies and meeting the demand of the former (Schmidt, 1996; Webb, 2005:633). Schain (2008), for example, argued that political parties are a driving force in framing immigration control policies, in particular, the centre-right parties.

Based on a similar consideration, Hampshire (2013) moved a step further to account for the restrictionist versus a liberalization-oriented construction by emphasizing the crucial role of the representative democracy in functioning to mobilize the above mechanisms and actors when defining the entities on a restrictionist basis and the role of political economy and constitutionalism for a relatively more liberal stand-construction. Liberal immigration policies, argued Freeman (2011), have been followed more by left-wing parties and despite their working-class voters’ support for less liberal stands, they mainly have opted to support more immigration. Political parties on the centre-right, while holding a more moderate view on immigration compared to their more radical counterparts (Bale, 2008), are also keen to adopt more restrictive approaches on immigration compared to centre-left parties (see Boswell and Hough, 2008: Geddes, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm, 2008). Massetti
(2015), on the other hand, pointed to the structure of party politics in which the mainstream right and left are more likely to be pushed to define an immigration reality and in turn to construct immigration control management on a different basis despite some ideological and policy convergence.

In the UK case, for example, Smith (2008) argued that the Conservatives follow a more restrictionist approach on immigration than Labour, although, while in office, this difference is less apparent between these two parties. Bale (2013), on the other hand, argued that while the extent might vary depending on who is in government and in opposition or on prioritizing the public concerns, in contrast to commonly held assumptions that centre-right parties mainly opt to adopt restrictive and populist strategies, the Conservative party approach in the UK has varied over time. But the restrictions-oriented approach has still been the main path while the variation mainly depends on leaders’ attitudes, on the one hand, and on the consideration of not alienating the middle class, on the other hand. Therefore, as expected, as a result of the partisan effects of public policy, office-seeking parties, whether right or left wing, broadly appear to follow different views from the incumbent parties, but becoming the incumbent party affects their view.

However, while Liberal, Conservative and Christian Democratic parties were involved in immigration issues before the rise of the populist radical right, the recent reconfiguration of the political landscape of Europe has changed the political context in the EU and the immigration discourse accordingly. The growing public interest in populist parties across Europe has affected the approach of the mainstream parties as well (Bale, 2008).

Populist parties and Eurosceptic movements have gained momentum in the last few decades in several EU countries (see Usherwood and Startin, 2013). Ongoing political changes have affected the way in which immigration is defined, and the anti-immigration parties’ electoral pressures have affected other parties’ preferences on immigration (see Van Spanje, 2010; Hampshire, 2013). The high degree of consensus among the populist parties lies in their focus on being against something rather than for something, such as opposing migration and any steps towards further European integration (Heinen et al., 2015:5). Still, Usherwood and Startin (2013) noted that
contrary to being a passing European phenomenon, deep-seated Euroscepticism seems constant. In the UK case, for example, opposing immigration was obvious during Brexit. As Usherwood and Wright (2017) noted, immigration was one of the specifically focused themes the Leave groups. Brexit also needs to be read from the anti-EU perspective, which is mainly underpinned by the perspective that consists of being against EU and immigration at the same time and it should also be noted that the UK is a fertile ground for mobilizing support for an anti-European agenda within the national political party arena (Usherwood, 2009). The literature indicates that the recent pattern of immigration is being read through a negative construction of posing specific challenges to the interests of the indigenous population by the against-immigration parties; therefore, the immigration discourse has been articulated through problematization and threat. In turn, such fear and anxiety have served to define political behaviour and reasoning (see Brader et al., 2008: 975).

It appears that the increased level of asylum seekers has been critical to understanding how immigration is constructed. From the political dynamic point of view, immigration is situated within two levels of construct: the moral and international obligation perspective, which settles for less restrictive approaches, and the public opinion and electoral consideration perspective, by which the perception of high levels and overcapacity of immigration drives expectations for a better performance on control immigration and, in turn, pushes for less liberal approaches. The literature suggests that political considerations have logically driven the politicization of immigration and, in turn, the creation of more demand for more restrictions approached on immigration control; however, the restrictionist-oriented discourses do not always lead to equally restrictive control policies (see Hampshire, 2013), and faced with the pressure for a more restrictionist stand, liberal governments still seem not to forsake opting for relatively liberal approaches (see Freeman, 1995: Wright, 2015) in which immigration is constructed as an opportunity at the same times as being constructed as a problem and a source of fear and anxiety.

It can, therefore, be argued that while the ethical and international obligation might assist to form relatively less restrictionist approaches through discourses that articulate the humanitarian aspects rather than focusing on the adverse outcomes, the
negative public opinion towards immigration and, in turn, the electoral-linked consideration might serve to inform threat and problematization-linked discourses through which relatively less liberal approaches are articulated. Furthermore, the literature suggests that, in this sense, centre-left parties, centre-left governments, being in office and written discourses as settings are more likely to mirror more liberal and less restrictionist perspectives compared to their counterparts. But more than this, these patterns also reveal a conflict between the standpoint of the former and the latter, as well as the possibility of the order of discourse and distribution of discourses to fix the overarching meaning.

The different conceptualization in which the meanings of the entities are constructed, in turn, may have the effect of deepening the existing conflict further and turning it into a more a challenging set of tasks. The research mentioned this implication, here, not with a view to arguing that point at this stage, but just to illustrate the direction that the different conceptualization may take the issue in framing the immigration control policies.

In sum, the political and politicization dynamics inform and mirror a space of construction where a framework based on deeply-held beliefs about the role of immigration issues on the electoral calculation often contests and overlaps with other beliefs concerning the ethical and moral obligation about asylum seekers and refugees that reflects different elements of a knowledge. Accordingly, multiple dynamics with contesting and overlapping interests contribute to discursive processes of construction of the entities in a different way.

2.2.3 Societal and Security Dynamics

The reviewed literature suggests that societal considerations are influential in shaping perspectives and ways of reasoning towards immigration; therefore, not only economic and political dynamics but also societal dynamics play a crucial role in explaining how immigration is constructed (e.g. Martin, 2009:24; Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2013: 452).
As noted in Section 2.1, the new patterns imply that the majority of the current wave of migration consists of immigrants with diverse ethnocultural backgrounds (see Castles, 2002:1147; Lahav, 2004: Winders, 2014:150). Examining the relation between immigration and ethnic diversity, Cheong et.al. (2007) argued that the relationship between immigration and ethnic diversity is underpinned and determined by value based and the socially constructed considerations; therefore, the framing of immigration largely reflects the contextual surroundings.

The literature indicates that the current migration discourse often emphasizes increased ethnic diversity and a large-scale global immigration nexus (Dancygier and Donnelly 2012). In particular, the 1990s flow of refugees from the Balkans area and the increased numbers of asylum seekers from the Middle East and the 2000s family reunification trend, as noted in the previous section, are considered to be important factors that have led to increased diversity (Lolle and Torpe, 2011:201).

While the economic dynamic has an important role in shaping the construction through the consideration of the economic impact in terms of the interest-based theory, which has been discussed previously, the societal dynamic also has its own power in the construction, which is mainly operationalized through considerations linked to the concepts of the citizen and citizenship and the tight link between citizenship and the notion of national identity and sovereignty (Koopmans and Statham, 1999; 652,688; Bloemraad et al., 2008:153).

As noted in section 2.2.1, Hampshire (2013; 23) pointed out that `interest-based theories` assume that immigration attitudes are shaped by economic concerns, that is anti-immigrant sentiment starts to be constructed at the individual level and stems from self-interested concerns about economic wellbeing. In contrast, according to Hampshire (2013; 23), `identity-based theories` emphasize the interaction of in-group and out-group attitudes and assume that individual predispositions and values are important determinants for anti-immigration sentiment, that is, opposition to immigration is mainly driven by identity-linked and deep-seated beliefs with predisposition to certain ways of living. Natives have a tendency to favour an in-group and be biased against out-groups’ interactions and are much more likely to retain their ethnic identities and cultural practices that persist across centuries. When ethnic
diversity changes rapidly, mainly driven by immigration, the natives much more likely to be against immigration. In other words, the ethnic majority often responds with strong opposition to increased immigration as immigrants move in. Sides and Citrin (2007) argue that identity-linked considerations function more effectively than economic-linked ones.

The literature stresses that the societal consideration in the knowledge-building process to define immigration reality is relatively more powerful in promoting the restrictive perspectives by defining immigration as a problem and a source of fear and anxiety, which assists explicitly in bringing communities together for the common purpose of opposing more immigration (see Putnam, 2007; McLaren and Johnson 2007; Lolle and Torpe, 2011; Dancygier and Donnelly, 2012; Czaika and Haas, 2014). As Hampshire (2013:32) pointed out, the knowledge-building process that defines immigration is partly constitutive of preferences and interests, defined and manipulated by actors; if actors perceive that immigration is a threat, then, in the public domain, immigration is more likely to become a threat.

In essence, Rudolph, (2003) argued that immigrants have various challenges, including threats to the identities, the culture and the ways of living of host countries. Putnam (2007:150), for example, argued that partly related to the shift in characteristics, the global trend of international immigration from South to North has been one of the big issues that seem to alienate people in Western societies, reshaping societies towards segregation and isolation as people have started to withdraw from the connectedness in their communities.

However, comparing the US and UK, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010) argued that the evidence for the UK is more mixed and different groups respond in a very different way; therefore, immigration might be beneficiary as well as a challenge. Similarly, Letki (2008) pointed out that, in contrast to the common belief that diversity is the key driver in eroding trust within the community, the evidence suggests that the low level of the interaction between communities is the key factor in the loss of the trust while the role of the diversity is limited. Additionally, the literature also indicates that societal security and economic security can be challenged together (see Rudolph, 2003). Kymlicka and Banting (2006) argued that in contrast to the common belief that
immigration-oriented ethnic diversity leads to the welfare state to be weakened, the evidence reveals that the assumption is exaggerated and there is no significant evidence that the welfare state is adversely affected by immigration-related ethnic diversity.

Recent years have witnessed an increased trend of discourse linking immigration with security (see Faist, 2006; Hampshire, 2013:32), and scholars have presented evidence of a positive correlation between immigration and security nexus (see Buonfino, 2004; Diez and Squire, 2008; Léonard, 2010; Humphrey, 2013; Bourbeau, 2015). Immigration has become, according to one side of the debate, a security and safety issue (Weiner, 1992/1993), which, in turn, has been securitized; therefore, such framing has led to restrictive immigration control policies being implemented.

According to Humphrey (2013), for example, debating immigration within the context of border security, the war on terror and terrorism, and assimilation and integration, particularly during election campaigns, not only intensified during the post 9/11 period but also led to framing immigration as a security issue and securitizing it. Bourbeau (2015) argued that mass immigration -as an external factor and exogenous shock- has led to a socially constructed securitization of immigration. Diez and Squire (2008) pointed to the citizenship practices which have been influenced by the political debate. Such practices have framed immigration as a security issue and citizenship processes have reflected the securitization of immigration. Still, exploring the challenge of the mass immigration at the national level and, in turn, moving towards the EU level, Buonfino (2004) argued that the immigration discourse, which is supported by public opinion, the media and politicians, has reflected the immigration security nexus, and such a pattern exists at the EU level as well. Léonard (2010), on the other hand, in examining the border control practices at the EU level, argued that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (hereafter FRONTEX) is not a securitization actor in itself – the activities of FRONTEX are mainly reflected by the securitization of immigration.

In addition, some scholars have concluded that mass immigration -related to security challenges- affects national security and leads to more crime and violence. Adamson (2006), for example, argued that significantly increased immigration with new
patterns challenges the state’s capacity and autonomy to secure itself and it affects states’ power and the balances of power among states and changes the nature of violence and conflict. Still, this stream of research pertaining to the concept of the immigration security nexus has also argued that a substantial set of serious security threats exist, reflecting the broad security considerations associated with mass immigration, for example, the threat to societal security from inter-state or internal conflict, the threat to economic and social stability, and the threat of terrorism and transnational organized crime (see Weiner, 1992/1993; Bali, 2012; Williams, 2012).

Another stream of research pertaining to immigration, on the other hand, -based on empirical observation-, argues, for example, that, in contrast to the argument that mass immigration as a security and safety issue leads to more crime and violence, immigration does not boost the violent and crime rates but, instead, lowers them by strengthening the raising of children within a family structure (Ousey and Kubrin, 2009). Related to that, Reid et al. (2005) maintained that the argument of the new characteristics of immigration, subculture and social dysfunctionality supporting more crime and violence is inaccurate. Instead, recent immigration, in fact, has had a preventative effect and reduced the crime by regenerating new functional and living settlements. Stowell et al. (2009) stated that in contrast to the common belief, the concentration of immigration in a metropolitan area is more likely to decrease the crime and violence rates. Similarly, Wadsworth (2010) argued that metropolitan areas that hosted the greatest number of immigrants during the 1990s saw the largest decrease in crime and violence rates. In the same vein, Bosworth and Guild (2008) maintained that in contrast to the argument that immigration and border control policies are increasingly underpinned by a criminalization perspective and security and safety considerations, the national identity and societal consideration play a crucial role in shaping approaches to controlling immigration; thus, when it comes to security, citizenship and immigration control in Britain, the focus should be moved from governing through crime, they argued, to looking at the implications of the national identity consideration.

It appears that the immigration security nexus related perspective stresses that mass immigration should be recognized as a threat; thus, it is argued, immigration is a
source of fear and anxiety in which the perspective of the definition focuses on the existence of an immigration security nexus, highlighting the role of mass immigration, which leads states to create threat-specific constructions (see Weiner, 1992/1993; Adamson 2006). Another perspective that pertains to the absence of the concept of immigration security nexus has concluded that mass immigration should not be recognized as a threat, as discussed above, but should be seen as mediator in reducing the greater security need, and the rate of crime, highlighting the role of immigration in complex societal life and pointing to the success of reducing criminalization, in part, as a function of the newcomers (see Reid et al., 2005; Ousey and Kubrin, 2009) Thus, they assume a contributory perspective to immigration, in which the focus is on the contributory process.

Societal and security dynamics, therefore, can be understood as a basis on which the problematization of a social issue takes place and anxiety and fear-linked considerations largely form the discourses of threat and problematization, which are powerful instruments for restraining the liberal perspectives. The reviewed literature provides an instructive discussion about the conceptualization of the constructions of immigration: that the entities do not exist independently of the construction of the relevant actors but are discursively constructed. The construction is multidimensionally determined by the economic, public services, political, politicization, societal and security dynamics, depending on the preferences-oriented articulation in which the articulation is rationalized through.

It should, in fact, be noted that the literature reveals the importance of multiple understandings as an important source of the construction. The discussion of the six associated dynamics shows that immigration and immigration control can be constructed in multiple ways; thus, it is important to be open to multiple meanings. This part of the section suggests that political and politicization dimensions combined with the economic and public services dynamics and societal and security considerations can provide the researcher with a way of placing the related construction in a wider context that can be used to model the setting for immigration discourse, assisting in the exploration of any contradictions in the statements, ideas and features of the articulated reality at different setting.
2.2.4 Summary

In this section, the research reviewed the recent immigration patterns and the associated dynamics that more closely align with articulations. It introduced the importance of recent patterns and provided a more detailed grounding of the associated dynamics. It highlighted that different dynamics which inform the constructed meaning, -differing in scope and range-, may contest, overlap and intersect within the construction process through which the actors incorporate those dynamics in various ways and make use of the advantage of the differences and overlapping between them. Thus, the order of discourse and the distribution of discourses can be identified with the assistance of different situated meanings, as discourses struggle and compete with one another to construct the articulation in their own way.

Based on this foundation, the following section turns to the perspectives in general and the case of Britain in particular.

2.3 Perspectives on Immigration Control and the Case of Britain

The review of the literature pertinent to immigration control, as discussed in the previous section, shows that immigration discourse posits, to some extent, contradictory perspectives on potential effects of immigration on the various aspects of the host countries, reflecting the views, insights and interests of the actors which reflect the meanings produced or constructed within given settings.

Therefore, an understanding of the contradictory perspectives and perceptions of the constructed entities does not necessarily centre on one perspective; nor is there necessarily any exclusion of the other perspectives. Sharing multiple perspectives of an understanding of the entities, immigration control discourse necessities the deconstruction of the articulation of the immigration reality by uncovering multiple perspectives and by revealing how immigration discourse informs the conceptualization of immigration control policies.
2.3.1 Immigration Control

The reviewed literature stresses the links between immigration and control. Czaika and De Haas (2013) argued that immigration policies are strategies which are defined, formulated and adopted by governments to realize their goals through regulating the level, source and combination of the immigration. The government’s articulation, they pointed out, might reflect management strategies through suggesting increasing or decreasing numbers, such as the immigration cap offered by the UK, as well as differentiating between the countries of origin, say EU and non-EU citizens, and types of immigration that ease the regulation for one type but not the others. This broad definition of the management of immigration mainly falls into immigration control policies.

On the other hand, it has been argued that immigration policies are a much broader concept (Money, 1997), involving immigration control as well as the integration of immigrants. Accordingly, immigration scholars have tended to divide immigration policies into two subfields: control policies and integration policies (see Money, 1997, 2010; Boucher and Gest, 2014; Hollifield, et al., 2014). The differentiation of control policies from integration policies has been pioneered by Hammar (1985; 7-9); his definition divides immigration policies into two interrelated dimensions: a) regulation of the entrance b) and regulation of residents (immigrants). This typology has also been followed also by Money (2010), Boucher and Gest (2014); Hollifield et al. (2014) and Spencer (2011).

Integration policies mainly focus on the process of settling into host countries which aim to manage the interplay between the natives as the majority and foreigners as a minority through addressing diversity-related problems (Favell, 2016). Immigration control, on the other hand, can broadly be defined as regulating and restricting immigration flows (Czaika and De Haas, 2013). Immigration control inherently functions as a filter for the streaming of immigration; therefore, it is characterized by both exclusionary and inclusionary dynamics which are determined by a range of factors (Smith and Marmo, 2014). Pursuant to exploring the articulation of the immigration control, the research has followed the separation of control and
integration, and, the immigration integration policies have been ruled out from the research scope, as they are considered to require further research.

The literature suggests that immigration control policies are mainly defined as a combination of regulations to determine the level and composition of immigration flows (e.g. Money 1997; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006; Hollifield et al., 2014).

The literature also reveals that the nation-state created the notion of immigration through bordering and keeping the foreigner outside the state (Joppke, 1999; Goldin and Reinert, 2006:14; Anderson, 2013). Previous studies are mainly focused on the US (e.g. Castles, 2004; Ackleson, 2005; Adamson, 2006; Faist, 2006; Rudolph, 2006; Hollifield et al., 2014) and the EU (e.g. Huysmans, 2000; Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Geddes, 2005; Schierup et al., 2006; Boswell, 2007; Léonard, 2010).

While it is argued that immigration challenges some features of the modern liberal nation-state (Bloemraad et al., 2008), as Joppke (1998) pointed out, the nation-state is neither declining nor facing any serious challenge to its being from international immigration (see also Mann 1997; Jones 1999; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Hampshire, 2013). However, Emmenegger and Careja (2012) argued that the success of the comprehensive and generous welfare system and conflicts over benefits dependency remains central to public debates (see also Hemerijk, 2013; Barrett and McCarthy 2008:558). Immigration, therefore, it is argued, has been constructed as a challenge for the boundaries of the welfare state (see Bommes and Geddes, 2003: 2-3; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004:175). The mentioned dynamics, which are referred to as a burden, have served to define immigration control policies within the restrictive oriented discourse, which, in turn, have served to shape political and policy debates accordingly (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

More precisely, the idea that immigration might be putting an overcapacity pressure on infrastructures such as education, health, housing and social services, leading to new conflicts (Dancygier and Donnelly 2012), challenging the long-held concept of the citizenship (Bloemraad et al., 2008:153) and making immigrants potentially dependent on the state and welfare system (see Barrett and McCarthy 2008:558;
Emmenegger and Careja 2012; Hemerijk, 2013), seems to frame the setting to articulate a more restrictionist approach on managing immigration. It is stressed that, for one reason or other, states have become reluctant to accept more immigration (e.g. Krause and Williams, 1996; Bigo, 2001; Karyotis, 2007; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Geddes and Taylor, 2013; Lesińska, 2014; Thörbjørnsrud, 2015; Morales et al., 2015).

The discussion so far has revealed that the new patterns of global immigration have had an important impact on the extent to which immigration reality is defined. The increased immigration level and the changed composition, as well as its associated demands for limitations on immigration make control-oriented discourses and control management more salient and more likely to become the dominant articulation and the basis on which immigration is constructed and governed. A range of explanatory dynamics as an important rationalization device, it is noted, reveals different patterns and helps pinpoint the nature of discourses and an understanding of the articulation that can take on more than one perspective. In essence, it is noted that the changing patterns provide a fertile ground to define immigration as a problem and a source of fear and anxiety or as an opportunity and the way in which the associated dynamics characterize these perspectives. In reviewing the immigration control perspective, next, the case of Britain is discussed.

2.3.2 The Case of Britain

The literature indicates that immigration control policies in the UK have been subject to continual change that to some extent have accompanied and or have been informed by changing dynamics (see Ford et al., 2015). According to Smith and Marmo (2014), economic considerations, politicization, international obligations, family reunification and societal considerations might be seen as factors that influence immigration control policies, often through contradictory interests.

Exploring the major changes in the immigration policy over the last thirty years by looking at the interplay between public opinion, external and internal factors, Ford et al. (2015) proposed that immigration control systems might be grouped into relatively different three periods: a restrictionist perspective, despite low internal and external
pressure, from 1982 to 1997 under Conservative governments, followed by a more liberal approach that was underpinned by more internal and external pressures during the first two New Labour governments between 1997 and 2005, and, finally, a more restrictionist approach, between 2005 and 2015, under the third New Labour government and the Conservative-led governments. The view that New Labour adopted a liberal approach between 1997-2005 and turned to following a restrictionist approach during the last term is also proposed by Wright (2012), who argued that restrictionist immigration politics are deep-seated and far more prevalent, and, therefore, adopting liberal approaches would be short-term development in UK immigration control policies. For example, the Blair governments shifted the previous restrictionist strategies and followed a liberal strand between 1997-1905. The liberal approach, then, was curtailed due to persistent restrictionist immigration politics.

In contrast to the arguments by Ford et al. (2015) and Wright (2012), which proposed differences between Labour and the Conservatives, Bloch (2000) argued that there existed very few differences between their respective governments. The continuity was a result of several factors, such as consideration of the pressure on the welfare state, the continuity of the civil servants, adopting the same neoliberal approach, and Labour adopting a similar position with the Conservatives in main policies; therefore, the continuity might be explained as being a result of voting considerations. Similarly, Smith (2008), proposed that in contrast to widely held expectations that the Conservatives would be more restrictive, the Labour governments pursued more or less the same approach adopted by the Conservative government on immigration in general and economic immigration in particular. Smith (2008) argued that the pursuit to restrict immigration by Labour risked the support of many moderate voters and left no option for the Conservatives but to adopt extreme political language on the immigration control issue.

In the same vein, Schuster and Solomos (2004) have argued that despite very few differences, the similarity in logic and approach to immigration policy between Labour and the Conservatives was remarkable and deep-seated, reflecting the Cold War-period consideration that restrictive immigration control policies play an important role in keeping communities together; therefore, treating asylum seekers and refugees
as a threat was obvious. The construction of asylum seekers as a threat not only was maintained in the political discourse but also mobilized support for anti-immigrant sentiment that then might lead to criminality and violence between immigrants and natives.

In contrast to studies that have tended to propose the similarities between the New Labour governments and the Conservatives and, in turn, the restrictionist approach, which was adopted more or less similarly by both, the other stream of the relevant studies focuses on the New Labour governments and proposes a liberal approach. Düvell and Jordan (2003), for example, pointed out that the New Labour governments mainly focused on modernizing the public service in general and modernizing the immigration system in particular. Limiting asylum seekers as a priority, on the one hand, and the transition to facilitating economic immigration, on the other, were influenced greatly by globalization-led push and pull factors.

Relevantly, Consterdine and Hampshire (2014), argued that the New Labour governments’ immigration control policies, which might arguably have been the most liberal policy in Europe, significantly differed from the previous Conservative government policy, where more restrictive policies were adopted. This was done, Consterdine and Hampshire (2014) argued, because of the interplay of the economic success and increased demand for the labour force, as well as the commitment of government and non-government actors, in contrast to public demand for the more restrictive approach. Similarly, Somerville et al. (2009) maintain that immigration policy underwent a big shift after the New Labour governments came to power. Paradoxically, particularly after 9/11, the Labour governments adopted a firm stand on border control and, selectively, a liberal policy towards economic immigration. In contrast to the previous Conservative governments, the New Labour governments changed the priority of the immigration policy from a limiting one towards openness. The selectiveness, Somerville et al. (2009) pointed out, was implemented through a visa regime. Labour also expanded the possibility for skilled immigration, on the one hand, and unskilled from the new EU members, on the other hand, while pursuing a restrictionist framework for asylum seekers.
Emphasizing the role of political parties, Hampshire and Bale (2015) maintained that in terms of the Labour party, the 2000s was marked by liberalized immigration control strategies. The early 2010s, however, reflected a transition towards a more restrictive approach. During the Conservative-led coalition, the Conservative party adopted a more restrictive approach regardless of the opposite demands of the more liberal ally pro-immigration actors. Similarly, Bale (2013) argued that in contrast to commonly-held assumptions in which the extent of controls might vary depending on whether a party was in government and or in opposition, or in line with public concerns, centre-right parties mainly opt to adopt restrictive and populist strategies, the Conservative party approach has varied considerably over time. However, a restrictive approach was still the main path and the variation mainly depends on leaders’ attitudes, on the one hand, and considerations about not alienating the middle class, on the other hand.

Still, Consterdine (2015) argued that assisted by a third way approach, which prioritized business preferences and globalization immigration policies, the controlling of immigration has seen a transformation from a restrictive to a more liberal system during the New Labour governments between 1997-2010 in Britain. This was not because of an organized public or in line with public opinion, but because immigration is subject to an elite-driven decision-making policy. Therefore, she argued, the liberal approach was adopted regardless of public opinion and in contrast to restrictionist demands. In addition, Jordan et al. (2003) argued that UK migration control policy can be linked less to guardians and more to managers, reflecting a focus on management rather than the discipline. In the same way, Düvell and Jordan (2003) argued that immigration control during the New Labour governments focused on business-friendly management, reflecting a perspective in which modernizing the public services to improve their performance was accompanied by an approach to migration control that defines immigration as a labour market issue.

The sharp distinction between the Labour and the Conservative parties has been also proposed by Quinn et al. (2011), who pointed out that during the Conservative-led governments, immigration was one of the main issues for the coalition parties; however, in contrast to the position of the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives insisted that the government would not be soft on immigration control. During the
opposition years, they argued that the approach towards immigration was relatively soft; however, while in office, the approach towards immigration returned to the common held right-wing position and the restrictionist approach was adopted regardless of the Liberal Democrats’ position.

The literature also reveals that the government tended to differentiate between asylum seekers and economic immigration. Flynn (2005), for example, argued that New Labour governments differed significantly from the previous governments by adopting a liberal approach towards economic immigration, differentiating immigration categories, which not only restrained the provisions for asylum seekers but also affected the immigration system as a whole adversely. Similarly, Mulvey (2010) argued that the discourse adopted by the Labour governments throughout their years in office resulted in constructing the asylum seekers as a threat. Such a discourse, Mulvey argued, not only served to move immigration to the security realm but the constructed crisis also, as a result, led to hostility that undermined the very pursuit of the immigration policy. The suboptimal outcomes, he argued, were initially triggered by placing the asylum seekers on the negative end of the spectrum and the economic immigration on the positive end; however, he argued, such a presentation moved beyond expectations and served the opposing immigration in general. From a different angle, Somerville (2007) pointed out that the first term of the New Labour governments’ immigration policy was driven by political considerations accompanied by a rigid asylum seeker approach and relaxing economic immigration. The second and third terms were mainly marked by support for economic immigration. During that period, the focus shifted from emphasizing asylum seekers and refugees to conveying the benefits of economic immigration.

The literature indicates that the immigration discourse has linked the rationalization of the control logic to several factors. Somerville and Goodman (2010) maintained that immigration policy as a whole is a complex phenomenon and that several factors play a crucial role. However, the economic consideration seems to have been more powerful during the New Labour governments. In contrast, Johnson and Rodger (2015) argued that within the UK context, societal considerations, party identification and policy attitudes played a more crucial role when compared to economic considerations.
While the effect of the economic consideration is small, they argued, the effect of the cultural variables is more significant, as well as the party position; the Conservative party policies, they argued, were more restrictive than the Liberal Democrats. A different point was raised by Wolton (2006), who argued that in contrast to the common belief that mass immigration has led to an ethnically diverse society and transformed the texture of the society and, in turn, altered the common culture, it is the adopted immigration policy itself that adversely diverted the British values rather than mass immigration. The mass immigration discourse is mainly mirrored through the increased net immigration; however, Hatton (2005) argued that the increase in net immigration to the UK might be explained through skills-related selectiveness; thus, not only the UK but the countries that Britons emigrate to also became more selective.

Pulling together the third section, which sought to discuss the various perspectives, it appears that different considerations and their relevant consequences have served to construct the necessity of which immigration is to be limited; therefore, the concept of control has become a characteristic of immigration policies. However, the reading of immigration and epitomizing of the construction of control policies have varied within the field of the immigration literature. From this point of view, it appears that epitomizing the articulations closely correlates with how immigration is constructed, and, in turn, with the way in which discourses are presented and articulated.

Therefore, the literature stresses that while immigration has become increasingly informed by fear and anxiety-oriented rationalities, the construction can also be informed by opportunity-oriented perspectives. Therefore, articulation of the immigration mutates and creates new possibilities for the definition of immigration. For this reason, an understanding of current immigration calls for explicitly taking both threat and opportunity-linked perspectives into account, given that an understanding and appreciation of the potential contributions of different perspectives bring different viewpoints which provide a complete understanding of the articulations.

The immigration control literature pertinent to the case of Britain also reveals a new conceptual space to rethink immigration control policies: the more liberal
immigration control policies that posit a business-friendly perspective. Therefore, a threat-linked logic alone may not be able to provide a complete understanding of immigration control policies; hence, a theoretical lens, which draws on an opportunity-linked logic, is needed to uncover the multiple understandings of the articulations.

In essence, the research argues that in terms of discourses and articulations, so far two inter-related gaps have become apparent: First, the previous studies have been focused more on the US (e.g. Castles, 2004; Ackleson, 2005; Faist, 2006; Adamson, 2006; Rudolph, 2006; Hollifield et al., 2014), as well as the EU (e.g. Huysmans, 2000; Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Geddes, 2005; Boswell, 2007; Schierup et al., 2006; Léonard, 2010). Even though the UK case, the research argues, epitomize the resent immigration pattern precisely, it has received far too little attention, compared to the other studied areas. The research insists that state-level intervention is crucial to understanding how immigration is defined, and the UK case, the research argues, is a unique case. For example, (a) the UK has transformed itself from an emigration country to an immigration country, (b) it receives relatively more immigrants from a wide range of source countries, (c) it is about to leave the EU and is already outside the Schengen and EU immigration policy, (d) as a liberal western state with economic opportunity, peace, and stability, the UK attracts more immigrants, (e) this is assumed to be affected by recent global immigration in several ways, (f) public opinion and attitudes towards immigration exemplifies the overall trend, (g) very little research on the UK case has been carried out (Somerville and Cooper, 2010:134).

Second, the UK-related previous immigration control studies largely focused more either on the Labour or the Conservative governments empirically (e.g. Layton-Henry, 2004; Malloch and Stanley, 2005; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Ibrahim and Howarth, 2017); therefore, far too few studies have addressed how discourses and ideas define and mobilize the change in the articulation of immigration control policies and the variations between the New Labour governments and the Conservative-led governments empirically.
2.3.3 Summary

This section has sought to identify the key arguments in the immigration control policies field based on the previous section’s discussion of patterns and explanatory dynamics that informed the construction of the discourses and articulations.

The literature revealed that opportunity, threat and problematization logics can be primary tools of inquiry for looking at how immigration control policies are informed by a certain meaning that has multiple and ever-changing located meanings that were structured and adapted through specific articulations by the various governments. Those mirror how governments gave the entities specific meanings within specific situations. While it is suggested that the threat- and problematization-linked logics and discourses inform the articulations, at the same time the articulations may integrally be linked to opportunity-linked logic in ways that transcend the problematization- and threat-linked logics. Therefore, the order of discourses should involve opportunity discourses as a part of a set of the discourses that compete to fix the meaning and dominate the articulations. Accordingly, opportunity-linked logic and discourses may also be successful in informing and representing the framing and reframing of the articulations.

Based on this foundation, to begin to develop a set of theoretical lenses, the research considers three areas: opportunity-linked logic, problematization-linked and threat-linked logics, where it is clear that different actors utilize these logics to construe immigration to mean different things. The next section focuses on the theoretical lenses through which the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses can be investigated and, in turn, how the articulated discourses can be epitomized.
2.4 Theoretical Lenses

Introduction

The aim of this section is to draw a comprehensive picture of the theoretical lenses and concepts in the current immigration control literature and thereby identify and categorize the existing immigration control-related lenses to account for how immigration control policies might be defined in the light of the identified theories. The previous sections have proposed that the changing patterns of global immigration in terms of the route, volume, and composition have, to some extent, affected the related considerations and, in turn, the discourses and articulations.

It must be noted that immigration control policy inherently functions as an instrument that filters the streaming of movement; therefore, it is characterized by a multiplicity of inclusionary and exclusionary aims and objectives as a set of control mechanisms designed to manage immigration control (e.g. Money 1997; Givens and Luedtke 2005; Lahav and Guiraudon 2006; Hollifield et al., 2014).

When it comes to how these multiple inclusionary and exclusionary aims and objectives as a set of control mechanisms are defined and constructed, while some scholars have offered empirical evidence of the liberalization of immigration policies as a contributory force to the developed countries (e.g. Borjas, 1999, 2014), the interpretation of negative consequences associated with increased immigration has dominated the new outlook on immigration control policies (e.g. Bradford, 2013). Governments therefore, have arguably become inclined, to some extent, to articulate a rhetoric of a restrictive logic, which might be seen as a paradox when the positive effect of immigration is taken into consideration (Peters, 2015). As Geddes (2000) pointed out, while a liberal immigration approach has been the consistent features of liberal western states, which is in part due to well organized pro-immigrant interest groups, contemporary immigration control policies have increasingly become a form of restriction, although variations between countries and within countries over time can also be mapped (see also Freeman, 1995; Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Lavenex, 2006; Van Munster, 2009; Anderson, 2013). These variations suggest that the set of
control mechanisms may be constructed through a multiplicity of viewpoints that posits either a logic of opportunity or a logic of problematization or threat. As discussed in the previous section, the construction of immigration does not only posit a problematization and a real or perceived threat-oriented perspective; indeed, a different conceptualization may construct immigration as an opportunity.

This part, therefore, develops the theoretical discussion through reviewing the literature to explore and assess the merits, for understanding the scope of immigration control policies, of the theoretical lenses and concepts that embody the multiplicity of construction of immigration control policies as mechanisms articulated through a logic of (a) a real or perceived threat (b) a site of problematization and (c) an opportunity. By depicting the entity of immigration and immigration control policies through a multiplicity of conceptualizations, the thesis seeks to shed light on how they can be complexly interpreted.

Accordingly, first, this section reviews the literature relating to the securitization and discusses the implications of the threat-linked logic and a threat-linked articulation (the model of securitization) on immigration control. In particular, it focuses on the Copenhagen School’s securitization concept and raises the Paris School’s premises in terms of the securitization of immigration. It aims to identify the core concept of securitization and the theoretical foundations for the empirical analysis and related typology benchmarks as reference points for a threat-linked articulation (the model of securitization) which draws on a securitization-move based articulation of the immigration control policies, followed by the discussion of the relevant limitations of securitization and the related gaps in the literature. Then, the section turns to discuss the risk-linked logics. It focuses, in particular, on the implications of the risk notion. It, first, considers the opportunity-linked logic of risk, which draws heavily on the generic risk notion, embodies a liberal immigration control and managerial logic and provides the core benchmarks of the opportunity-linked risk concept and the model of risk. This is followed by a discussion of the logic of governmentality and the problematization-linked logic and provide the core benchmarks of the governmentality-linked logic, which draw on the governmentality and problematization-linked logic and the model of governmentality.
2.4.1 Securitization and Threat linked Logic

As discussed in the previous parts, global immigration is a comprehensively complex issue, having several implications, which might be constructed either opportunity or threat (Portes and DeWind, 2004). However, 9/11, in particular, prompted the threat-oriented consideration, and the attacks in Bali (2002), Madrid (2004) and London (2005) gave a further impetus to linking immigration with security in the liberal western states. Even though it is argued that immigration had been constructed as a security issue long before 9/11 (see Weiner, 1992/93), 9/11 was a vital sign of the escalating fundamental changes in the immigration policies of the liberal Western governments (see Guiraudon, 2003; Rudolph, 2006; Johnson and Trujillo, 2006; Chacón, 2007; Brader et al., 2008; Neal, 2009). According to Cornelius (2005), for example, the U.S. government transformed border and employer sanctions enforcement dramatically to restrict admission and to curtail employment prospects. Rees (2008) pointed out that the EU proposed and encouraged non-EU neighbours to implement the immigration control-related security measures that were being adopted by the EU.

Conceptualizing immigration as a security issue has, arguably, been made possible by the role of critical security studies, in particular, the Copenhagen and Paris schools’ securitization scholars. While traditional security approaches have focused primarily or exclusively on military-oriented threats to the states as an object, critical security studies, on the other hand, whilst noting that military-oriented threats and states as referent objects still matter, consider that states should be viewed as an element among various object-subject combinations (see Booth, 2007; Floyd, 2007). The Copenhagen School’s (Buzan et al., 1998) securitization notion is the more popular conceptualization that is linked with immigration policies, followed by the Paris School premises.

In terms of immigration control, as Huysmans (2006:43) pointed out, the central referent object of security has been moved from state to non-state actors, which means individuals and society might be seen as potential referent objects of security (see also Buzan et al.,1998; Booth, 2007). In other words, in this context, the expanded security agenda includes a variety of issues as security challenges (Lohrmann, 2000). The new
definition and reading of the security concept, which includes economic, societal, political and environmental security as well, therefore, has allowed the possibility of considering current global immigration as a security issue that may have evolved from a variety of security considerations (Buzan et al., 1998).

From the securitization perspective, immigration might be constructed as challenging the state’s capacity and autonomy to secure itself, affecting states’ power and changing the nature of violence and conflict (Adamson, 2006). It is argued that the main impacts of global immigration on states and citizens are, particularly, violence, prolonged fragility and conflict (see also Bali, 2012; and Williams, 2012 for security considerations associated with relatively high global immigration).

The securitization theory as a theoretical framework of the securitization process is related to the referent object’s survival. Within this context, in becoming a security matter, the relevant issue must pass through securitization steps successfully. That is, an issue must be identified as an existential threat that affects inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules and then, in turn, it is assumed, requiring a response proximately (Buzan et al., 1998:26).

From the securitization point of view, the threatening subject in terms of immigration, then, would be the immigration. The securitization actor would deem that immigration threatens, say, economic or societal security. Accordingly, society, in such a case, would be assumed as being threatened as the referent (threatened) objects (Huysmans, 2000). The securitization process starts to develop when securitization actors identify and convey that a referent object is being threatened by the threatening subject. However, to prevent and overcome securitizing virtually anything, the relevant threat must be presented as an existential threat that endangers the very survival of the referent object, where, in turn, neglecting the eradication of the threat might lead to being wiped out (Buzan et al., 1998:25; Floyd, 2011:428).

In other words, in combining the politics and management of threat, the construction of securitization transform reality (Balzacq et al., 2016). Accordingly, therefore, the securitization actors demand that the relevant emerging threat is threatening enough that it must be addressed proximately. Furthermore, the reaction involves the
justification and implementation of exceptional measures (Balzacq, 2005:173). One of the assumptions of securitization theory, on the other hand, is that successful securitization relies on the agreement of the audience. According to Buzan et al. (1998:25), an issue can only be securitized if the audience agrees it should.

More precisely, according to the Copenhagen School’s notion, discursively articulating an issue as a security threat does not solely results in securitization, but mirrors what they call a ‘securitization move’ (Buzan et al., 1998:25), since the securitization process is completed when the audience accepts it is (Buzan et al., 1998:25). While the acceptance of the audience is equally important for a successful securitization process, as Balzacq et al. (2016) argued, the audience perspective is the least developed aspect and has been left rather vague. How the agreement of the audience operationalizes in practice has not been precisely defined.

Drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse theory and analysis that deal with the discourse itself and concerned with the articulation, the research followed the typology of Buzan et al. (1998:25) and used the ‘securitization move’ to develop a threat-linked articulation and the relevant discourse aspects to epitomize the articulations, instead of securitization that requires examining the audience and the acceptance of the audience aspect as well.

In terms of immigration control, while, as mentioned above, the Copenhagen School emphasized the speech-act process (see Huysmans, 2000) the Paris School highlighted the bureaucratic routines, in which securitization is particularly evident in the developments and implications of the practices of security professionals. Therefore, an issue, they argued, can be securitized without the speech act process (see Bigo, 2002; Balzacq, 2005). The Paris School, in particular, Bigo (2002) argued that the securitization of immigration is embedded in the conceptualization of the state and the way in which the state notion is constructed by politicians, professionals and the public. Therefore, he argued, the contest of not losing control over the state that occurs between politicians and professionals and the unease of the public that stems from uncertainty has led immigration to be securitized. According to Bourbeau (2014), the Paris school has brought the focus on the logic of routine.
As McDonald (2008:569-57) pointed out, the Paris School tries to overcome the narrowness of the Copenhagen School, which exclusively focuses on speech-act processes by offering a form of securitization that highlights the routinized practices of securitization professionals, which enables further measures to be implemented as well, instead of the only the processes of speech-acts. Therefore, the securitization process is based on actions rather than discourse; thus, the idea of the speech act has been replaced by practices. But still, the survival and the exceptional exercises of power are at stake.

Reviewing securitization theory, the section now turns to discuss how immigration might be constructed as a security issue. According to Sasse (2005), immigration associated matters might be classified into three broad groups: their impact on political stability, on societal and economic dimensions and on a different level of governance. All three group of concerns, she argued, are attached and constructed through a security-linked perspective. According to Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002), immigration matters have been viewed within a consideration related to ‘identity, security, and well-being’. The articulation of the securitization of immigration, they argued, can be grouped into four broad categories: public services, security, identity and political. Within the public services category, immigration, they argued, is linked with employment and adverse effects on wages and the benefits system. The security category reflects immigration and sovereignty, and an internal and external security nexus. Identity displays the threat to national identity and demographic concerns. The political category reflects an anti-immigrant discourse. Accordingly, the perception of immigration, they argued, has been transformed into constructing immigration, to some extent, as harmful to the labour market, the social benefits system and social cohesion and identity.

The model of securitization and the threat-linked logic, which draw on a securitization-move based articulation,³ are informed by the discourse of threat, where the fear and anxiety stem from a (constructed) perceived or real immediate threat. As Browning and McDonald (2013), argued, in terms of an immigration security nexus, the concept

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³ By a securitization move (Buzan et al., 1998:25), the research refers to a real or perceived immediate threat-linked discourse that is articulated by an actor to create a securitization.
of securitization captures how a political language can transform an issue that has not traditionally been assumed as a security issue into the security realm. The concept of securitization, Browning and McDonald (2013) argued, is based on the conceptualization of threat. Constructed fear and anxiety provide the securitization actors with a tool to deploy extraordinary measures through the construction of immigration as a real and immediate threat, say, to national security; otherwise, it would not be possible to implement such tools, which reflect the characteristics of a time of war. Global immigration is securitized, argued Huysmans (2000), through a widely politicized speech act process. Securitization actors, he argued, mainly frame immigration as a threat either to the society’s security or to economic security, in particular, to the state’s welfare system.

Furthermore, in accounting for the growing salience of immigration control, in particular, the immigration security nexus, Huysmans (2000) argued that inserting immigration control at the core of the internal security framework not only has led to immigration being securitized but also to the politicization of immigration. With opposing and mainly negative implications, then, the discourses of securitization of migration have led to the issue to becoming salient and to being framed in a way that is subject to suboptimal outcomes (see also Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Lahav and Courtemanche, 2012). The Paris School scholars, on the other hand, also pointed to the presence of the securitization of immigration. But they tend to explain it in a different way. The securitization of immigration, they argued, is produced by the practices of security professionals, and it is embedded in the context of a struggle between politicians and security professionals (see Bigo, 2002; Balzacq, 2005).

Bourbeau’s (2011) study revealed that the construction of the securitization of immigration processes is rooted in complex cultural settings. He claimed that when securitization actors transform a social phenomenon into a security domain, an interaction takes place between agents and structural factors reciprocally. The presence of the securitization of immigration varies across countries, he argued. For example, in Canada and France, the securitization of migration has been observed as having considerable variation. Baele and Sterck (2015) pointed to a similar view due to the variations within and between countries over time and between the immigration
categories. They argued that existing security language in the immigration field should be treated within a broader perspective in attempting to evaluate the salience of immigration control.

In terms of the UK case, Buonfino (2004), on the one hand, argued that immigration has been securitized. Looking at the former British Home Secretary David Blunkett’s statements made within a policy paper and during a parliamentary debate, Buonfino argued that border controls were not aimed at preventing the entry of asylum seekers but to deter the misuse of the asylum system. Boundaries, he argued, were aimed at securing the borders to protect society. These securitization discourses, he argued, had been constructed socially and were mainly not evidence-based. Therefore, he argued, the unintended consequences, in dominating the political landscape, led to ‘unease’. Huysmans and Buonfino (2008), on the other hand, while maintaining a similar view in terms of the side effect of an unease in societies, concluded that despite revealing and strongly emphasizing more migration controls, the parliamentary debate did not reflect a strong immigration security nexus. The politicians, they argued, had not been inclined to debate security and the threat of the terrorism exclusively through immigration; therefore, they argued for governance through unease cautiously instead of obviously arguing for the securitization of immigration in the UK.

This is because securitization has been mainly seen as a negative (Floyd, 2007:337). Even though immigration issues might be securitized, Sasse (2005), argued, ‘the concerns that have given rise to the securitization of immigration are best addressed through rights-based policies’ (2005:675). The securitization of immigration, Ceyhan and Tsoukala (2002) argued, requires a transformation of the control framework dramatically. In the same way, Aradau (2004) pointed out that securitization is defined by a specific discourse structure and an extraordinary move. Securitization reflects the transforming of an issue from the realm of normal politics to extraordinary politics by structuring an issue in a different logic that involves urgency and exceptionalism. The exceptional politics offered by the securitization, therefore, she argued, might undermine democratic norms and might reproduce circumstances that amplified and extended the need for extraordinary measures.
However, securitization scholars have been criticized for over-emphasizing speech-acts at the expense of empirically-based assessments of what structural factors underpin the issues to be seen as a security issue in which its own aspects make it salient and lead it to be framed accordingly. Knudsen (2001) questioned whether the reverse processes of un-making security – desecuritization – actually led to increased confidence and safety (Collective, C.A.S.E., 2006:457). The Paris School, in particular Bigo (2002), offers the exercise of power through a governmentality perspective, but the core pillars of securitization have been reserved.

The point here is not to suggest that securitization studies on immigration control fail to account for how immigration has come to be seen as a security issue (see, for example, Huysmans, 2000; Lahav and Courtemanche, 2012, for the immigration security nexus; Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Squire, 2009, for the securitization of immigration and policy-making; and Lahav et al., 2007, 2014, for the contributory impact of the politics of immigration control), or that they fail to consider the various aspects that might be argued as a threat to the host society (e.g. societal security) but, rather, to draw attention to the apparent inconsistency of the claim that the salience and framing of immigration controls are produced by the securitization of immigration. A disproportionate amount of focus has been put on the securitization process, in which migration is seen as a security issue; thus, while implying non-securitization logic might be operating in immigration control, they have paid less attention to conceptualizing differently and producing a fresh account that does not operate on a securitization logic.

More specifically, the concepts of securitization go some way to explaining why and how global immigration is securitized. The discussion so far has shown that efforts to construct an issue as a security threat, in this case immigration, are necessarily embedded in securitization theory.

The development of the model of securitization and production of the relevant knowledge follow from the constructions of the control policies being constrained by the range of threat-based discursive elements. The model of securitization assumes that an object is threatened by an existential or present threat, and then assumes that an exceptional and urgent exercise of power is required to act to minimize the threat.
This model also assumes that the construction of urgency is necessary to convince the audience and limit the opposing tendencies, in order to use exceptional measures in the pursuit of security. In fact, it has often led to the conclusion that the fear and anxiety are the major factors to construct the course of actions with the basic premise that actions are informed by the urgency and exceptionality jointly. Drawing on securitization theory, this model focuses on the adverse effects of immigration and the consequences of the constructed threat rather than on its contributory aspect. The causes of threat follow the pattern of the applicability of the urgency and exceptionality where a disruption of routine occurs.

The model of securitization casts light on the analysis of the discursive process that the governments follow, and the rhetoric of the techniques they apply to cancel out the constructed threat; and gives insight into how governments’ constructions of immigration as a threat are designed to counter present threats and undermine the alternative approaches. The idea is that it is through securitization-based discourses the governments present an approach, and at a more general level, justify the exercise of power to minimize the constructed threat. Constituting immigration as a threat makes certain actions possible and relevant, so that a discourse of securitization does not only assist in defining a threat but also takes part in constitution of the action in reaction to the threat. The securitization-based discourses about immigration control, thus, assist the actor to rationalize the chosen approach between the available different approaches and invest in it.

The model of securitization, the threat-linked logic and discourse of threat, therefore, in terms of the characteristics benchmark, are informed by the discourse of real or perceived immediate threat and a threat-linked articulation, which convey an existential and/or a present threat. Thus, the loss is prioritized discursively. In terms of the exercise of power benchmark, the model is informed by exceptional and urgent measures, where urgency and exceptionalism are the core benchmarks that define a threat-linked logic and a discourse of threat (the model of securitization) and differentiate them from other discourses, articulations and models of control policies.

More precisely, in light of the review of the literature, the section has encapsulated the core elements of the model of securitization within the two main categories, which are
the characteristics and exercise of power pillars so as to serve to differentiate the model of securitization which embodies a threat-linked logic and discourse of threat from the others, as reference points for the subsequent empirical analysis. As illustrations of this model as a tool of analysis, the elements of the model of securitization can be summarized as follows:

1 (a) There exists an existential and or present threat to the referent object; (b) therefore, the loss is prioritized;

2 (a) accordingly, exceptional measures are performed; (b) through reacting to the current situation immediately; as the core pillars of the securitization perspective (see Buzan et al., 1998; Floyd, 2011; Balzacq et al., 2016).

When it comes to how the logic that underpins the immigration control policies can be epitomized, the literature indicates that previous studies have tended to view the logic underpinning immigration control policies as a threat-linked device that very often works in quite a specific way. Therefore, accounting for the restrictionist immigration control policies has been largely inspired by security studies that assume immigration as a security issue and, therefore, immigration control policies, according to them, are securitization-based (e.g. Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2000, 2006). The perspective taken here views immigration as a site of fear and anxiety. Building on the reviewed literature and discussion so far, immigration might be constructed as a threat and security issue (see, Huysmans, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Huysmans and Squire, 2009; Lahav and Courtemanche, 2012). However, Van Munster (2009) argued that the coexistence of restrictionist policies and the liberal policies alongside them in controlling immigration requires a liberal risk logic that fits into immigration control policies with which the underpinning logic can be fully examined.

As discussed in section 2.3.2, when it comes to the case of the UK, the relevant literature suggested that particularly the New Labour governments’ articulation and the construction of the immigration control might posit a different picture (see Düvell and Jordan, 2003; Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; Hampshire and Bale, 2015); therefore, a different type of construction might also be true, thus, a model of securitization and a threat-linked logic cannot or at least may not be sufficient to
explain the whole picture of the political discourse on immigration control policies, particularly when there exists a possibility of conflicting discourses and alternative dominant discourse. The construction of immigration does not only posit a real or perceived threat-linked logic; indeed, as discussed in the previous section, a different conceptualization may construct immigration as an opportunity. This is the point at which the research seeks to push on the boundaries of the existent immigration control literature. In order to do so, in the next section, the research seeks to develop an additional tool through which an articulation can be epitomized.

2.4.2 Risk and Opportunity-Linked Logic

In terms of the articulation of the immigration control policies, the second relevant strand that can shed light on the underpinning logic of the control policies is a risk-inspired perspective. The risk perspective in immigration control is inspired by risk studies in which the risk-linked logic is proposed as an alternative tool to exploring the logic behind controlling immigration (e.g. Vukov, 2003; Aradau, 2004; Ackleson, 2005; Van Munster, 2005, 2009; Malloch and Stanley, 2005; Amoore, 2006; Neal, 2009; Fassin, 2011; Ibrahim and Howarth 2017). As an analytical instrument, the risk concept and risk perspective have recently evolved as an alternative approach to securitization in security studies (Collective, C.A.S.E., 2006:467).

Introducing a risk perspective to immigration control policies basically stemmed from the necessity to think outside the securitization sphere and to seek out a perspective that allow a new standpoint to take root as securitization theory seems to be inadequate to account for and explain the existent paradox of restricting immigration control policies, on the one hand, and sustaining immigration flows, on the other hand. Therefore, it is assumed that a risk-based approach might be a better tool to do so. That is, recent immigration control policies, is suggested, might be patterned through a risk-based approaches (e.g. Van Munster, 2005, 2009).

While a model of securitization reflects the furthest points, following securitization logic, arguably cannot help in understanding the paradox which is posited by pursuing a restrictionist and a liberal stance at the same time (Van Munster, 2009). Accordingly,
governmentality-linked risk (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007) – which will be discussed in the next section – is proposed as a possible alternative tool to explore the logic behind controlling immigration that can overcome the limitations of the securitization notion (e.g. Aradau, 2004; Amoore, 2006; Van Munster, 2005, 2009; Neal, 2009). The governmentality-linked dispositif refers to a risk perspective (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007). However, before discussing the offered governmentality-linked risk lens, it would be better to discuss the risk notion and put it into the context of immigration control.

Accordingly, this part begins by reviewing the key concepts of risk theory and seeks to specifically identify a prior set of benchmarks derived from the risk notion. This discussion leads us to consider the logic of opportunity, which in turn provides a ground to identify the core concepts of the risk perspectives that reflect the specific benchmarks of the logic of the risk-linked articulations and the model of risk.

The risk approach offers a broad range of research opportunities. It has inspired scholars from a variety of disciplines, such as sociology, politics, international relations and criminology (e.g. Beck, 2000; Luhmann, 1993; Giddens, 1998; Lash, 2000; Hill 2001; Bougen, 2003; Lyon, 2003; Ericson et al., 2003; Aradau and Van Munster, 2005; Rasmussen, 2006; Mythen and Walklate, 2006; Van Munster, 2009).

The literature indicates that the definition of risk varies among scholars and across disciplines, and it seems the variations mainly occur in the relevant aspects; thus, risk is identified through numerous definitions rather than there being a single definition (Haines, 2009). Risk is a likelihood (Lupton, 1999), possibility and uncertainty (O’Malley, 2004), which is intensified by future-linked considerations (Beck, 2000) and the current risks are manufactured as a side effect of late modernity (Beck, 2000; Giddens, 1998). Risk is the probability of a future event and, therefore, risk is embedded in probability and uncertainty (Jaeger et al., 2013; Ericson et al., 2003), in which profit is prioritized (Luhmann, 1993:24).

Common to all definitions, however, is that risk is connected to future possibilities. Risk is a specific way of understanding changes in society (Zinn and Taylor-Gooby, 2006). In technical and statistical terms, a risk is the ‘...cumulative effect of the
probability of uncertain occurrences that may positively or negatively affect...’ (Ward, 2000, p.172). Risk, therefore, is inherently an event that has either positive or negative consequences (Drennan et al., 2015). Risk denotes a possibility of managing and preventing undesired consequences, but it is also associated with managing uncertainties in the name of enterprise and exploration (Giddens (1999). Risk inherently posits managing the uncertainties in the name of opportunity, enterprise, and value creation as well (Power, 2007:27, 195).

In very broad sense, future uncertainty and manageability are the main axes that define risk. Beck (2000) reflected the future uncertainty through the notion of the intensified likelihood of an uncertain future in form of modernization risk (cf., O’Malley, 2003; Bougen, 2003; Ericson and Doyle, 2004). The modernization risk perspective, Beck (2000:216, 2007:4) argued, results from the successful modernization of society. Jaeger et al. (2013:18) argued that based on past experience, risk refers to the alternatives, which evolves neatly from a causal connection being established between future probability and present actions.

Despite variations in the reading of risk, ‘future probability’ is the unifying feature that constructs the boundary of the definition of risk (e.g. Beck, 2000; Giddens, 1999; Luhmann, 1993; Lupton, 1999; O’Malley, 2004; Ericson et al., 2003; Drennan et al., 2015; Jaeger et al., 2013). A risk is a man-made decision and actions that reflect future uncertainty. Therefore, as Luhmann (1993:51) puts it, the concept of risk indicates an uncertainty represented by the future; risk is attributed to future probability.

In essence, as Giddens (1999:3) argued, ‘risk implies a possibility to prevent undesired consequences; therefore, it is used in negative response. However, the result may be either negative or it can quite often be seen in a positive light’. Giddens (1999:10) continued by pointing out that ‘the fact that risk is often a positive or energizing phenomenon...A risk is not only closely associated with responsibility, but also with initiative and the exploration of new horizons’. Therefore, according to Giddens, in contrast to danger, risk reflects inspiring initiatives positively.

Luhmann (1993: 24) emphasized that risk marks the priorities of profit, while security marks the priorities of loss. He argued that the risk perspective, unlike those of threat
and security, suggests making a decision about future probability and the control of risk through decision-making based on manageability that prioritizes profit and opportunity. More precisely, Luhmann (1993: 24) maintained that in a risk case, the profit must be at stake and clearly distinguishable in respect of the possibility of profit and loss occurring; otherwise, in a case of absolute loss or absolute profit, there would be no risk. In other words, as he put it, ‘marking security allows the profits to be forgotten that could be earned if the risky decision is made’. Additionally, according to Luhmann (1993:21), a risk is a rational decision not to oppose the possible gain since the possible loss might not be realized.

Accordingly, risk can be conceptualized as referring to humans’ own actions and decisions relating to future probabilities when a benefit is at stake (e.g., Luhmann, 1993; Giddens, 1999; Ward, 2000; Taylor-Gooby and Zinn, 2006; Drennan et al., 2015).

Future probability is a result of man’s own actions – which refers to the internal cause. Luhmann (1993:22) makes this aspect much clearer by pointing to the significance of risk as the cause and the decision. Thus, a risk is created and attributed to a decision. Therefore, the man-made aspect of risk requires human action and decision. In turn, this aspect not only helps to differentiate the risk from the destruction that is caused externally but also to differentiate it from the damage.

This leads us to consider the second main aspect of risk: manageability. Power (2007:6), pointed to the logic of the grammar of risk. If an issue, he argued, is constructed or comes to be seen as a risk, then it can be assumed to be within the range of the expectation of manageability and decidability. The located meaning and understanding of the risk, therefore, also reflect it as a socially constructed manageable entity. When an actor points to this socially constructed entity, then he is expected to be acting to manage the risk. Therefore, Power argued that risk is inherently expected to be manageable.

It might be argued that even though Beck (2009:11) has problematized the risk concept by claiming that the world has transformed itself from a governable risk domain to an ungovernable risk phase, he also pointed to governments’ responsibilities to take the
required preventive actions. The requirements, he argued, must be performed by governments. Beck’s proposal of a lack of control of risk has been criticized by several scholars (e.g. Dingwall, 1999; O’Malley, 2004; Ericson and Doyle, 2004; Collier, 2008; Dingwall, 1999; O’Malley, 2004), who have all similarly argued that risk cannot be seen as an uncontrollable phenomenon. Dingwall (1999:481) asserted that the history of risk management has varied over time, but, in essence, it has aimed to achieve a similar purpose: to control risk, indicating the increased range of rationalities, programmes and activities (O’Malley, 2000:458). Bougen (2003:272) pointed out that modernization not only has created its own risks but also offers a comprehensive knowledge and network to address the risks. Ericson and Doyle (2004) argued that the combination of the state and the private sector has offered empirical evidence that risk is controllable and manageable.

Future uncertainty and manageability that prioritizes profit and opportunity as core assumptions of the notion of risk can serve to initiate or spark a new approach through which the understanding of the articulation can be pursued in depth. Drawing on this foundation, the research has developed the opportunity-linked risk perspective to account for the liberal control logic. The research has developed the opportunity-linked risk perspective on the basis of the generic risk notion.

Therefore, a generic risk notion, which involves an internally caused future oriented and manageable uncertainty that is constructed through a rhetoric of opportunity in which profit is prioritized (Luhmann, 1993), can obviously provide invaluable insights into the meaning and significance of the rhetoric and articulation of immigration control policies.

Based on this foundation, the research suggests and presents a model that connects a liberal logic to immigration control by taking some key insights from risk studies. The thesis has classified it as ‘the model of risk’, which embodies the future uncertainty and manageability, as well as the opportunity and profit aspects of the generic risk assumption, which is labelled as an opportunity-linked risk so as to differentiate it from governmentality-linked logic, which will be discussed in the next part.
The model of risk is built on three key assumptions of the risk theory. First, it assumes that the risk is future-oriented (e.g., Giddens, 1999). Then it assumes that risk is manageable (e.g., Power, 2007). And finally, risk marks the profit which is prioritized (e.g., Luhmann, 1993). The risk model generates opportunity-driven articulations in immigration control policies that in turn assist a more liberal control logic in the immigration field. This model fills the gap in immigration control literature.

The above discussed core assumptions of the risk notion underpin the risk model. For this reason, in the research framework, the risk lens and the opportunity-linked logic draw heavily on the generic risk notion and embody a liberal immigration control and managerial logic. The development of the model of risk and opportunity-linked logic is inspired largely by the works of Düvell and Jordan (2003), Jordan et al. (2003), Wright (2015), and De Haas et al. (2016) and was also based on Power’s (2007) work.

Opportunity-linked logic and the model of risk are considered as a form of an instrument of a normal politics where a fundamental departure from securitization theory happens and desecuritization takes place. In terms of risk perspective, Power (2007:195-202) maintained that in contrast to Beck’s perspective, in which risk posits harm and danger, the risk is linked to the rhetoric of opportunity and value creation, and in turn to the logic of opportunity (p.27).

Power’s perspective matches that of Luhmann (1993: 24), which that prioritizes the profit and opportunity stance. Actors, Power (2007:28) argued, engage in defining, constructing and producing a knowledge in which risk and governance are socially constructed and mutually reconstruct each other, which also constructs the demand for risk management. Therefore, opportunity-linked risk is not only constructed to lessen harm but is also constructed in the name of opportunity and benefit, which posits the opportunity-linked risk perspective. Organizations are supposed to manage the risks in the face of uncertainty.

Power (2007) pointed to a wider range of risk concept and rationalities. Commonly held assumptions, Power (2007) argued, are that governments are expected to organize future uncertainties as manageable through ensuring that rational risk management is in operation. Whilst a developed and enhanced knowledge of risk
might produce various type of man-made new risks, a man-made risk management system should not be downgraded. The rhetoric of risk management constantly reconstructs the need for controlling and managing the future through developing new agents, structures, procedures, categories and definitions (Power, 2007:195-202).

From Power’s (2007:68) point of view, opportunity-linked risk logic encompasses a wide range of organizational functions to manage uncertainty and a base on which a number of devised functions operate. It is a discourse, he argued, which reflects the similarity between the underpinning logic of control and the investigated control processes.

Signifying the logic of opportunity which embodies risk-linked good governance and a moral economy idea, the rhetoric of risk conveys that organizations are capable of managing the probabilities in a rational way. Therefore, the rhetoric might be seen as an administrative suggestion for the neoliberal demand to shift the conceptualization of risk from its negative and pessimistic form and harm-linked perception to a manageable, optimistic and opportunity-linked perception (Power, 2007). Power (2007) suggests that the rhetoric of risk and related risk management, and in turn the articulations, are virtue-based; opportunity and benefit are the central components of the production of this virtue.

When it comes to a stance towards immigration control, hardly anyone totally believes in completely open borders, but also hardly anyone believes in entirely closed borders either. Most countries require some form of immigration, for example to fill a gap in the labour force. Wright (2015) pointed out that regardless of political risk, governments actively articulate more liberal immigration control policies; these cannot be explained only through political economy. Similarly, De Haas et al. (2016) maintained that in contrast to common held assumptions, while the trend seems slowed down, pursuing a liberal immigration control policy is still more common than the restrictionist ones. Despite some variation across policy types and immigrant categories, they asserted, the overall change has been characterized by a less restrictive approaches over the last few decades. Freeman (1995) argued that the United States, Canada and Australia, which all posit an immigration-dominated tradition, have adopted expansionary immigration control policies. Jordan et al. (2003) argued that
the important part of the UK’s migration control policy is mainly linked to management, in which the practices focus on management rather than discipline. Therefore, the management of immigration control is formulated and implemented by assessing immigration from the economic benefit point of view. Immigration control logic, they argued, not only operated through flexibility and efficiency to serve the labour market’s needs, but also prioritized the national interests and considered the views of natives. The business-friendly and national interest logic, they argued, implies regulating immigration to push the labour market and the economy forward and protect the natives. Therefore, immigration is mainly viewed from an opportunity perspective as contributing to economic development, and this contributory movement needs to be regulated through an immigration management that facilitates the contribution, while the assumed economic benefit of migration is filtered in line with national interests.

In the same way, Düvell and Jordan (2003) argued that immigration control during the New Labour governments should be read alongside the New Labour governments’ commitment to modernizing public services. The new aspect of modernizing public services to improve performance, Düvell and Jordan (2003) argued, influenced the formulation and implementation of immigration control policies. Therefore, the modernizing perspective facilitated the adoption of a new approach to migration control that defined immigration as a labour market issue intensified by the globalization process. The focus was put on a flexibility that would facilitate the development of a business-friendly management. Immigration policy, according to Düvell and Jordan (2003), is formulated to strengthen economic performance through developing an opportunity-oriented approach, such as meeting economic demand and being competitive, on the one hand, and addressing misuse of the system and deterring illegal immigration on the other. The rhetoric of immigration control, therefore, might be seen as an example of the opportunity-linked risk perspective on the basis of the generic risk notion, which facilitates interests through regulating entry and prevents the abuse of the system.
The discourse that underpins the model of risk which embodies the opportunity-linked risk perspective, therefore, is a discourse of opportunity. It reflects the logic of opportunity-linked articulation. The model of risk which embodies opportunity-linked risk and the discourse of opportunity, therefore, is informed by an administrative manifestation of a liberal control logic that reflects opportunity-oriented risk-taking and an opportunity-oriented standpoint by which immigration is governed through routine measures that embody the generic risk notion. As Corry (2012) pointed out, generic risk management is marked by maximizing the overall utility.

The idea that immigration is constituted as an opportunity does not mean that immigration does not pose any challenges at all, or that no adverse aspects exist; the point is that the constitution concentrates on how immigration can contribute to the economy and society through hard work and entrepreneurship and what it can deploy in these practices. Hence, the construction contributes to creating a way in which the discourse is evolved towards articulation of immigration as a contributory social force. The model of risk places weight on the active role of marking the profit (Luhmann, 1993) in constructing the model of immigration control policies.

From the characteristic benchmark, the model of risk which embodies opportunity-linked risk and the discourse of opportunity are informed by discourses structured and organized largely on the basis of future oriented contributory aspects of immigration, which prioritize profit and filter the adverse effects rather than prioritizing worse scenarios. Immigration is mainly assessed by its potential economic contribution; therefore, immigration is manageable. In terms of the exercise of a power benchmark, an opportunity-risk based articulation is informed by long-term objectives, which are carried out through conventional measures and actions.

The section has revealed the elements of the model of risk and the core benchmarks of an articulation of opportunity-linked risk and the discourse of opportunity, which serve to differentiate the discourse of opportunity and an opportunity-linked logic from others as indicators for the subsequent empirical analysis. As demonstrations of this model of analysis, the elements of the model of risk can be summarized as follows:
1 (a) There exists a future-oriented manageable uncertainty, in which (b) the profit is prioritized:

2 (a) Manageability is governed through a logic of opportunity, which aims to select the most beneficial option through long-term objectives-oriented conventional measures; (b) which seeks to avoid future uncertainty; these are the core benchmarks of the opportunity-linked risk perspective (see Luhmann, 1993; Power, 2007).

The model of risk, on which the research has chosen to focus as a theoretical lens for the analysis of immigration control policies, as discussed above, has a range of premises, including future uncertainty, manageability and prioritizing of profit. It assists a focus on particular aims and empirical focal points which are key elements of how entities are to be understood. That is, it enables the investigation and formulation of the control policies from which an opportunity-linked logic of such modelling can be made, with an eye on the possibilities in relation to which this approach to immigration control diverges from the previously adopted modelling.

The research offers opportunity-linked risk (the model of risk) as an additional theoretical lens that embodies liberal immigration control logic, to look at how the discourse can be articulated through a discourse of opportunity.

Opportunity-linked risk provides an analytical tool for distancing the modelling from the threat and problematization-linked lenses, in order to look at the articulation from the opportunity perspective, establishing such a model to move away from the previously utilized lenses. The perspective of the model of risk provides the researcher with material that helps to cast light on how liberal immigration control policies have taken a specific form. By drawing upon opportunity-linked material, researchers can establish a site for epitomizing a model of control policy outside threat-based conceptualization, from which new explanations can be provided that open up the possibility to explore how the elements of the underpinning logic might be combined and articulated differently.

This part has reviewed risk theory and conceptualized the elements of the model of risk, opportunity-linked risk lens and the discourse of opportunity. In the next part,
the chapter turns to discuss the model of governmentality and problematization-linked logic, following the research avenue offered by Van Munster (2005, 2009), which is proposed as a tool to overcome the limitations of securitization.

2.4.3 Governmentality and Problematization-Linked Logic

Governmentality refers to governing a population through a dispositif which embodies discourses, institutions, inclusionary and exclusionary regulatory decisions and measures in Foucault’s sense (see Foucault, 2007). A dispositif, accordingly, is an arrangement of rationalities and technologies that is instigated as a response to the problematization of specific problems (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007). Michel Foucault (2007) formulated the notion of governmentality to reveal how and why institutions, techniques, knowledge and practices that facilitate the exercise of power through an adopted form and style are deployed to manage a population. A dispositif, as Foucault (1980b:194) classified it, is a heterogeneous ensemble of “discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions and the relations that can be established between these elements”. This concept enables us to shed light on exploring the constitution of an entity as a social problem through analyzing discourses and practices in terms of their constitutive interrelation. Foucault (1980b:195) also maintains that “between these elements, whether discursive or non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and modifications of function which can also vary very widely. I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of shall we say formation which has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function”.

In Foucault’s (1980b:195) term, a dispositif is determined by the genesis that “on the one hand, there is a process of functional overdetermination, because each effect-positive or negative, intentional or unintentional-enters into resonance or contradiction with the others and thereby calls for a readjustment or a re-working of the heterogeneous elements that surface at various points. On the other hand, there is a perpetual process of strategic elaboration.” In other words, a dispositif is determined by multiple and often opposed forces – say, negative and positive, urgent and usual –
leading to modification and the reconfiguration of the articulation based on the continuous process of strategic formulation. The relationship between the multiple and opposed forces involves the existence of separate factors and while each factor alone can bring about a particular meaning, the ‘process of functional overdetermination’ results in a modification and readjustment of being and the apparatus based on their differences or contradictions. A dispositif can thus be said to be a modified element in which the ensemble of the opposite forces and contradictions that make up a system of a heterogeneous elements are reflected by a governmentality logic. Where concepts such as threat and opportunity function as contradictory opposite forces, contributing to the modification, there is then a wide range of centres that produce new constituted meaning. This can be understood as production of reconfiguration, where the previous conceptualization (for example, threat or opportunity) has been replaced by a new concept (for example, problem), created through modification.

According to Foucault (1980b), produced by a readjustment of the opposite forces and contradictions, a dispositif functions strategically to bring the problematization into being. A dispositif constitutes a phenomenon as a social problem, and, in turn, operates to form the needs of responding to the social problem and instigate the relevant apparatus. Foucault mainly focuses on power and knowledge. Power is not abusive and disciplinary but is productive. It articulates the discourse and knowledge, which, in turn, rationalizes the instigated apparatus; therefore, what makes the power hold is the relevant discourse (Foucault, 1980a:140-142). Therefore, power and knowledge mutually construct each other: power with the help of the discourse creates the social world in a particular form, in which the entity is defined and formed in a particular way through ruling out of being and discoursing alternative ways. This is done through the truth effect, which posits that the true effect is fixed and produced through power; therefore, the attention should be paid to how this is produced and articulated in discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:13).

Accordingly, governmentality helps one understand how an issue is constructed discursively in a way that reflects the issue as a social problem and leads to the need to address the problematized issue (Lim, 2011). According to O’Malley (2008),
focusing on the discourse which defines and forms the functions and implications of the various governmental apparatuses devised to address the problematized issue, governmentality can function as an analytical approach to explore how, why and when at-work, risk-linked governmentality techniques are developed.

From the governmentality perspective, Lupton (2006:87) pointed out that discourses and articulations based on calculability and rational manageability have been deployed as means to order society through governmental logic by positing that the social problem is manageable. Therefore, he argued, the discourse and the relevant articulation construct the dispositif, bringing it into being; and the particular discourse offers the manageability and means of managing.

From Foucault's 'governmentality' approach point of view, therefore, Dean (1999) argued that the discourse and articulation-linked knowledge serve to expose the prospect of linking the underpinning rationality and the change in society which takes place in a constructed direction through devices that are constructed to govern society as it is governed. It is considered, he argued, that risk is linked to the adopted devices of governmentality.

As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:13) pointed out, Foucault has played a central role understanding discourses and discursive construction of knowledge to identify the logic that is at work in a situation. However, in terms of the dominant knowledge and divergence, Foucault's conception is restricted as his focus is on one knowledge, neglecting a more contradictory condition in which different discourses co-existent mutually or conflict to define the dominant articulation.

According to Aradau and Van Munster (2007), a dispositif of a precautionary risk as an apparatus of the governmentality-linked logic sheds light on the arrangement of heterogeneous ensemble of elements that is formulated to govern society strategically, in which the underpinning rationality is articulated to instigate an apparatus that brings the problematized social issue into being and link and the instigated apparatus. The articulation, therefore, serves rationality to link a governmental logic to the development of various mechanisms. Without that, it would not be justifiably possible or plausible due to a lack of a common rationality.
Aradau and Van Munster (2007) argued that based on the various ways of assessment, a dispositif of a precautionary risk-based logic combines the rationalities and technologies of governmentality, which is constructed not only to rationalize that a management of a social problem is feasible and manageable but also to influence and order society as a part of a problematized social reality.

Based on this foundation, the articulation of governing through governmentality-linked logic (the model of governmentality), then, is informed by a discourse of problematization that stems from the constructed expectation of future or virtually present threats. The articulation of a governmentality-linked logic (the model of governmentality) indicates future-oriented probabilities; therefore, a dispositif posits that risk management focuses on precautionary actions in order to prevent a risk from becoming an actual threat through calculating, assessing and reducing the likelihood of the occurrence of the harm through the instigation of various measures (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007).

Drawing on the Aradau and Van Munster`s (2007) explanation, the model of governmentality, which embodies articulation of governing through governmentality-linked logic, is informed by a discourse of problematization which reconfigures and reformulates the threat-linked and opportunity-linked logics as opposite forces. Accordingly, in contrast to the model of securitization and threat-linked logic and the discourse of threat, in which the foe threatens the threatened object, and model of risk, the opportunity-linked risk lens and the discourse of opportunity, which are based on the generic risk, the model of governmentality is built on the assumption that a dispositif is instigated through modifications and reconfigurations of apparatus which has a dominant strategic function that operates as of responding to a social problem (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007).

The model of governmentality implicitly assumes that multiple and often opposite forces collaborate to constitute a conceptualization which is produced by a process of functional overdetermination, in which the dispositif is determined by multiple and often opposite forces through modification and reconfiguration of the apparatus. The model of governmentality assumes that the modifications and reconfigurations through combining (a) a future-oriented consideration (opportunity-linked logic) with
a present threat (threat-linked logic) and (b) urgency and exceptionalism (threat linked logic) with routine and usual practices (opportunity-linked logic); the problematization constructs the possible irruptions of a problem in which (c) the profit is counterbalanced by a loss-linked construction as an opposite force in which the profit is forgotten, by highlighting the need to deploy precautionary elements where the costs are likely to exceed the benefits. The dilemma of the exceptionalism versus routinization and future orientation versus the present as opposite forces are reconstructed through a modifications and reconfigurations within a governmentality-linked logic (for a dispositif and overdetermination see Foucault, 1980b:195; and for dilemma and the modification see Aradau and Van Munster, 2007:98,106).

The discourse of problematization which is articulated through governmentality-linked logic (the model of governmentality) serves to convince the targeted population of the necessity of governing in this way in order to deter or minimize the predicted adverse effects of the expectation of future or virtually present threats. The discourse prioritizes the loss and emphasises the (constructed) problem; the rationalities are used to justify the available devised and deployed apparatuses (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007:98,107).

In other words, as Aradau and Van Munster (2007:107) put it, governmentality-linked logic reformulates the debate between securitization and risk, which brings together urgency and routine, the present with the future, and exceptionalism with governance to tackle the problematized social issue. Therefore, while the risk requires the construction of the entities as governable in the name of opportunity, governmentality-linked logic suggests constructing the issue as a problem that possibly causes harm; therefore, precautionary risk-linked measures are needed; and securitization, on the other hand, suggests moving the issue from normal politics to exceptionalism and urgency (Corry, 2012).

While the model of securitization and the benchmarks for the discourse of threat and threat-linked logic draw on the assumptions of the securitization lens, and the model of risk and benchmarks of the discourse of opportunity and opportunity-linked logic are based on the generic risk, the model of governmentality and the benchmarks of the
discourse of problematization and the articulation of governing through governmentality-linked logic draw on a governmentality-linked dispositif.

The model of governmentality and governmentality-linked logic reconfigure and modify the generic risk and securitization as opposite forces through which securitization is counterbalanced by risk so that the discourse of problematization does not have too much of one particular characteristic of risk or securitization but a modification and configuration of them. Therefore, governmentality-linked logic reconfigures the existential present threat with the exceptional and the urgent, and links them to future-linked uncertainty and management through routine measures (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Corry, 2012). Thus, in the model of governmentality, risk and securitization have an opposite effect to determine the dispositif and the modification is a continuous process of strategic elaboration.

The literature indicates that the risk- and governmentality-linked logic offers an expanding frontier for analysing immigration policies, in which risk and governmentality are applied to explain the relevant policies. From this point of view, Ackleson (2005), Boswell (2007), Neal (2009), Van Munster (2009), Malloch and Stanley (2005), Williams and Baláž (2012), and Ibrahim and Howarth (2017) linked migration control policies to the notion of governmentality. Ackleson (2005) referred to the risk society and reflected the risk perspective in border control practices, and he discussed the roles of the smart border in which free trade is facilitated and risk is prevented. The point he put is that not only the risks and uncertainties but also the changing focus towards minimizing the risks while maximizing the movement through monitoring by more extensive use of technologies have been created and affected by the processes of modernization itself. Neal (2009), for example, argued that EU immigration control policies and practices, in particular, FRONTEX, need to be evaluated on the basis of risk management instead of securitization processes.

Furthermore, demonstrating how immigration control issue is carried out at the EU level, Van Munster (2009) argued that the coexistence of restrictionist policies and liberal policies in controlling immigration needs to be explained by the particular logic of a risk management perspective. Since immigration has come to be seen as a complex issue that forces change, continuing with a securitization view, rather than moving to
a governmentality logic and a risk management, cannot help in understanding the existence of the EU as a liberal polity and in explaining the restrictionist and liberal stand which might be taking place at the same time. The migration security nexus is making it harder than it perhaps should be. In a similar view, Williams and Baláž (2012) pointed out that governmentality might work well for the practices of the government and Beck’s perspective for providing a tool to explain how risk both informs and is informed by immigration. Arguing for the absence of the securitization of immigration, Boswell (2007) offered an account of the development and implications of migration control policies through differentiating between political and administrative levels and emphasizing the organizational culture. The interaction between these two operates in a two-way process, where the political system and organizational interests affect each other mutually. Van Munster (2009), on the other hand, claimed that both political and bureaucratic levels have cognitive limits, but the former often plays a greater role in creating, authorizing and legitimizing decision-making rules to help produce the process of the risk management of immigration by reproducing trust and fear.

Other scholars such as Fassin (2011) evaluated immigration control, in particular the work of bureaucracies, from a governmentality perspective and pointed to the evaluation of border policing in response to globalization. Darling (2011) dealt with political practices and governmental rationalities. Alternatively, Pyykkönen (2007) applied a governmentality approach for analysing rationalities and techniques to determine the means of governance of immigrants.

In terms of the UK case, Morris (1998), evaluated governmentality as an explanatory tool to consider reading rationality in the practice of the UK controlling immigration in terms of the concern over public funds- by analyzing the rationale underlying benefits regulations and immigration rules. Malloch and Stanley (2005), for example, argued that the New Labour governments’ immigration and asylum seeker policy in the UK might be identified as operating through governmentality-linked logic and risk management. While the media framed asylum seekers as unwanted, risky and dangerous, the government, they argued, followed the same line. While the rationality behind the policies seems to be to protect genuine asylum seekers and to deal with so-
called bogus immigrants, the adopted instrument has gone further and mainly operated through stigmatization and criminalization in the name of deterring asylum seekers. The pursuit of risk management, in turn, they argued, led to several related laws and a shift in policy towards restricting border controls and empowering internal controls as a means of governmentality. Looking at conservative-led and conservative government immigration control policies, Ibrahim and Howarth (2017) argued that they had constructed immigration as a societal and economic risk and that such a construction was governed through a governmentality approach. The persistent problematization of the uncertainty, in turn, facilitated the adoption of an increased sense of control and related instruments. The rationality, Ibrahim and Howarth (2017) argued, conveyed by the argument that stopping an increase in net immigration through preventative and number-oriented measures would move the UK towards a better place compared to its European counterparts.

Overall, the research suggests that a governmentality-linked logic is largely informed by the discourse of problematization consisting of opportunity and threat-linked discourses as opposite forces in a reconfigured form that construct the articulation jointly. The articulation of governing through governmentality-linked logic and the discourse of problematization are informed by discourses that are structured and organized on the basis of the discourse of problematization which combines the future with the present, the existential with the non-existential and urgency with routine through precautionary risk management.

The model of governmentality can cast light on these patterns, focusing on the relationships between the discourses that convey the present and the future, exceptionalism and routine through the modified position they constitute, while the model can give insight into the approach by which governments position the control policies in ways that support the construction of the social problem by generating a problematization based knowledge. Governmentality-linked logic, as Aradau and Van Munster (2007) argued, is discursively constructed through prioritizing the loss. It aims to convince the targeted population of the necessity of acting to deter harm through deploying all available technologies.
Pulling together the literature, the section has encapsulated the elements of the model of governmentality and the core benchmarks of governmentality-linked logic and the discourse of problematization, which can serve to differentiate the model of governmentality, the articulation of governing through governmentality-linked logic and the discourse of problematization from the others as indicators for subsequent empirical analysis. As illustrations of this model of analysis, the elements of the model of governmentality can be summarized as follows:

1 (a) A (non) existential, virtually present or future-oriented problem exists; (b) therefore, profit is counterbalanced by a loss-linked construction in which the profit is forgotten;

2 (a) Governance is performed through a precautionary risk management, which is responsive to (b) an immediate and future-oriented problem through the devised sophisticated apparatus (see Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Corry, 2012).

Taking governmentality-linked logic’s assumptions, the (non) existential, virtually present or future-oriented problem and precautionary risk management indicate that a governmentality-linked logic (the model of governmentality) primarily provides a ground for the discourse of problematization to proceed.

However, while governmentality is offered to overcome the negative implications of securitization (see Van Musters, 2009), it still manifests problematization-oriented articulations; therefore, it can be limited to shedding light on opportunity-linked logic and the discourse of opportunity.

In essence, similar to securitization, governmentality goes some way in explaining why and how immigration reality is problematized. A model of governmentality posits a discursively problematized social reality and the instigation apparatuses to stop possible threats (Aradau and Van Munster, 2007). Therefore, while offering a relatively different form of the construction of the immigration reality, governmentality still treats immigration as a problem.
However, as sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 reveal, discursively constituted entities are subject to constant dynamic change and redefinition through various types of construction. Therefore, not only the problematization and threat-linked lenses but also the opportunity-linked theoretical lens are required. This can be illuminating for overcoming the limited understanding offered by the former.

The point here is to draw attention to an apparently exclusive claim that the immigration reality and control policies are defined and produced by a problematization and threat-oriented logic, and to a disproportionate amount of focus on problematization and threat-linked perspectives, through which immigration is depicted as a problem, as a threat and a site of fear and anxiety.

Van Munster’s (2005, 2009) risk approach to immigration control explicitly focuses on devising apparatus and actions that follow the construction of immigration as a problem and pay less attention to the opportunity-based side of the risk. Therefore, a significant gap in the immigration control literature is the absence of an opportunity-linked liberal risk lens. While studies (see Van Musters, 2009) have suggested inserting a risk perspective as an alternative tool to account for the dilemma in immigration control policies as a more promising approach than a securitization perspective, the research takes this a step further. To fill this gap, it empirically utilizes the lens of an opportunity-linked logic of risk that draws heavily on the generic risk notion and embodies a liberal immigration control logic. It argues that the profit and opportunity-focused risk lens has the same power to produce understanding as the problematization and threat-linked lenses offer.

The model of risk takes the opportunity-based side of the risk largely as an inherited postulation (see Luhmann, 1993). Still the opportunity aspect is so fundamental in the risk notion that the literature on risk frequently refers to it as a core assumption (e.g. Luhmann, 1993; Giddens, 1999; Power, 2007). The opportunity-linked consideration extends the problematization-linked frontier of the immigration control literature to include a broad reading of risk. This broad scope can allow immigration control research to span a wide variety of articulations.
Stressing the importance of offering multiple understandings of the articulation of an immigration reality, particularly when this pertains to immigration control policies, the research seeks to push the boundaries of the immigration literature.

In essence, immigration can be understood as a social problem or a threat and defined and reframed as a site of fear and anxiety or it can be perceived as a contributory social force and constructed as an opportunity. In broad terms, these multiple constructions of the immigration reality, in which possible discourses might be competing to define and form the reality and the articulation of the immigration control policies, require multiple theoretical lenses.

Drawing on the multiple constructions of the immigration reality, the research argues that when the goal is to discover more about the multidimensionality of the articulation of the immigration control policies, a multi-layered theoretical framework is required. The theoretical framework, therefore, should encompass a set of theoretical lenses that can shed light on the multidimensionality of immigration control policies which might help to overcome the limitations of the previously offered theoretical lenses.

A multi-layered articulation of immigration control policies, the research has noted, is required to mirror a discourse of opportunity alongside a discourse of threat and a discourse of problematization. A theoretical lens that sheds light on the articulation of immigration control policies from a liberal risk logic, which the research suggests is opportunity-linked risk, has become apparent as a gap in the immigration control literature. Seeking to fill this gap in the literature, the research focuses on the neglected side of the risk notion and offers a discourse of opportunity, and an opportunity-linked risk lens to push on the boundaries of the previous immigration studies. The research seeks to fill this gap by inserting opportunity-linked risk as a liberal risk lens as part of a set of multiple theoretical lenses to look at immigration control-oriented research problems.
2.5. Summary

The chapter has focused on the recent immigration patterns, associated explanatory dynamics, perspectives and theoretical lenses related to understanding immigration control policies.

First, it noted the recent features of global immigration and suggested that the features associated with different contexts, such as volume, direction and composition, which inform the construction of immigration, hang together to form a pattern that constitutes and inform many constructed meanings.

These features and their implications, as considered here, are flexible and transformable such that they can be constructed by an actor in certain ways but not in others. It was noted that the construction of immigration is informed by a set of dynamics that involves economic, public services, political, politicization, societal and security-linked aspects. These dynamics are utilized on their own or melded with others to construct forms that represent the interests of different perspectives. The dynamics that associate various features with each other contribute to the construction of entities differently, and the contribution may be done by more than one dynamic at the same time. The construction, therefore, is filtered and defined, and, in turn, re-expressed in a highly rationalized discursive form.

Second, immigration control perspectives in general and the case of Britain in particular were noted, and it has been suggested that the variations in the construction of the entities have also informed and mirrored the rhetoric of immigration control policies. It was also noted that while a liberal logic of immigration control approach may be a constructive force, paradoxically, immigration has become a subject of problematization, threat and fear and anxiety-oriented constructions, which, in turn, have partly informed restrictionist immigration control policies.

The chapter noted that the underpinning logic of immigration control policies is assumed to be informed either by a model of securitization and threat-linked articulation or by a model of governmentality and governmentality-linked articulation. The two logics represent efforts to explain immigration discourse and the rhetoric of control management from problematization and threat-linked discourses.
and perspectives. However, the UK case suggests patterns that may go beyond the proposed model of securitization and governmentality. In addition, it was noted that previous Britain-oriented immigration control studies have largely focused either on the New Labour governments or the Conservative governments empirically. Therefore, far too little is known about the displayed patterns of rupture and continuity in immigration discourses between the Conservative-led governments and the New Labour governments.

Third, the relevant theoretical lenses and concepts were noted. Existing immigration control-related lenses which can be utilized to account for how an articulation can be epitomized were identified. It was noted that the previous immigration control studies have focused primarily on problematization and threat-linked logics, in which the model of securitization and governmentality are centred. Stressing that multi theoretical lenses-linked perspectives can provide a more accurate picture, the research argues for a theoretical framework that utilizes opportunity-linked logic and generic risk based on a more liberal risk model jointly as part of a set of multiple lenses.

The following chapter presents the methodological approach and the research design used in the thesis.
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The discourse analysis of (a) the political discourse on immigration control policies and (b) the notions of securitization, governmentality and risk provide the basis for the theoretical framework, research design and methodology utilized by the research. These two areas shape the research design of this study and assist in an understanding of the research problem. The main axis of the research's theoretical framework is grounded on the social theories and the discourse analysis that proceeds with discourse theory.

The research argues that Conservative-led governments’ articulations have displayed a rupture rather than a continuity with New Labour governments’ articulations during the studied period. To support this argument, the research designed a theoretical framework that serves as a basis to provide a conceptual foundation to guide the research. As Grant and Osanloo (2014) pointed out, a theoretical framework is a plan of research and a model which establishes a sense of structure that offers a rationale for a study.

This chapter is organized into five main sections. Section 3.1 indicates the nature of the study, poses the research question and elaborates on the hypotheses introduced in Chapter One. Section 3.2 presents the multi-perspective framework and its components, while section 3.3 presents the data sources and collection. Section 3.4 provides the analytical strategies and operationalization and presentation of the findings. Finally, section 3.5 is devoted to the limitations of the research methods applied in the research.

3.1 Research Design, Question, and Expectations

The research is based on discourse theory and a discourse analysis utilized to investigate the discourse in Britain during the New Labour governments and the
Conservative-led governments between 1997 and 2017. The objective is to develop a fresh account of the discursively constructed articulations over time and across actors.

The research has sought to identify the empirical patterns of the rupture and continuity between the actors and the change over time through a discourse analysis supplemented by an inclusive set of relevant theoretical lenses.

As noted in section 2.4, risk and securitization posit socially constructed beings and entities. While the securitization focuses on specific speech acts and on their capacity to form actions and their related articulations of what makes something a security problem (Buzan et al., 1998), a governmentality-linked risk perspective suggests that, in Foucauldian (2007) terms, a socially constructed discourse and knowledge rationalize the instigated apparatus to make the power hold, in which power and knowledge define and form each other mutually (Foucault, 2007). Therefore, opportunity-linked risk, governmentality-linked risk and securitization posit a socially constructed phenomenon. Accordingly, the research proceeds on constructivist premises. The research posits that discourse analysis, which is qualitative, interpretive, and constructionist (Hardy et al., 2004), is more likely to allow a better understanding of how social problems and relevant control models have been understood and constructed. Therefore, the above-noted theoretical lenses have the common core assumption that a reality is socially constructed and that discursively constructed meanings are a critical component of the articulation of knowledge.

The epistemological premises are important for reflecting knowledge and the ways of conceptualizing that knowledge and, in turn, social realities and problems. Thus, as the research views the world from the lens of a discursively defined reality, the social constructivist’s epistemological premises are a well-suited choice to the research’s theoretical framework. According to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:4), Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory (1985, 1987) shares social constructivist premises. From a social constructivist discourse analysis point of view, the discourse plays an active role in creating knowledge and constantly defining the world, its identities its social relations, as well as redefining them. Therefore, discourse analysis is based on the premise that the articulated discourse and the way in which spoken or written
discourses take place define how the world and the knowledge are constructed (Willig, 2013).

In a broad sense, social constructivist, on the other hand, posits that defining an entity does not occur freely from the material world, As Wendt (1995:73) put it, defining a reality embodies three elements: the shared knowledge, the material resources, and the practices. Material resources only gain meaning and are put into practice through the structure of shared knowledge. A real world exists, but it is only a part of social structures. As Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) maintained, outside of any discursive context entities do not have being, they have only existence; and the being of the entities is different from their existence; being is always articulated within discursive power of discourses. When it comes to immigration reality, for example, according to Huysmans (2002), a socially constructed definition explains the definition of immigration and the salience of the immigration control issue. The research method that the research utilized entails, therefore, having a strong connection to a discursively constructed social reality.

From this point of view, the perspective of the discourse analysis, which is grounded in a social constructivist premises, seeks to use analytical rationality to enrich the understanding of the construction of immigration control policies under different logics-oriented discourses, which characterize the continual process of the construction of a socially constructed immigration reality for control management and articulates it in a constant state of construction. The research takes this picture of a discursively constructed immigration reality and control policies as its point of departure and identifies the articulation in the light of securitization, governmentality and risk notions to provide a comprehensive and theory-linked explanation and rationalization of it in the form of a socially constructed realm through a multi-perspective research design.

The next section discusses the research design.
3.1.1 Research Design: Case Study

Research design posits the overall strategy that the researcher formulates to map data collection methods and analysis (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2009). As Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2012) noted, the level of awareness of the research design and the research design features affect the analysis and the logic of explanation. Research design reflects a framework for the analysis of empirical evidence and provides a detailed map that guides the research of how to proceed productively in a systematic way (Burnham et al., 2008:45). Qualitative research designs can take the form of numerous research designs, and a case study (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2011) is a frequently used qualitative research design (Creswell, 2012, 2013). Several prominent authors, on the other hand, have contributed to the developments of a case study design across disciplines (e.g. Stake, 1995; Merriam, 2009; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011; Creswell, 2012, 2013; Yin, 2012). Case study design involves an in-depth analysis of a particular research problem and enables verifying a theory-linked model empirically (Creswell, 2012:73-75; Yin, 2008: 18,250). As Titscher et al. (2000) pointed out, the case study refers to a research design and strategy rather than a research method. It allows one to investigate the relationship between the variables in detail; thus, it can be used to test hypotheses.

As Gee (2004:125) pointed out, discourse analysis is not primarily about counting things; however, the numerical findings produced through discourse analysis can guide the researcher in terms of the hypotheses being investigated and tested through detailed analysis. Therefore, as a research strategy, the case study design was utilized as an umbrella that accommodates the discourse analysis as the main axis of the qualitative aspect of the research and the numerical data that produced through discourse analysis, which refers to the quantified aspects of the qualitative analysis that enabled the researcher to analyse the produced numerical data statistically. The main advantage of the case study is it allows for the application of a variety of methodologies and combining a range of analysis methods for making use of data to investigate a research problem (De Vadus, 2001:11; Berg, 2004:225; Walliman, 2006:45-46; David and Sutton, 2011:165)
The case study design is commonly used to push on the existing boundaries or strengthen previous studies and understand how a phenomenon operates and functions in a social setting. Case study research is chosen mainly when the research is designed to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and to illustrate how and why a certain social reality operates in certain ways, as it provides an opportunity to define and explain a phenomenon effectively and serves to embrace the social constructivist premises (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2008; Merriam, 2009; Creswell, 2012).

The case study, as Gerring (2004:342) and Thomas (2011:513) similarly maintained, involves systematically gathering evidence about a single unit level in order not only to understand how it functions but also for the purpose of understanding larger levels. The unit, therefore, can be a state, government, a political party, an election, decisions, policies, institutions or systems observed at a stage in time or over some period of time. Considering the above noted advantages associated with the use of case study research design, this research adopted a case-study approach.

The case study research design relies on a number of steps. In very broad terms, (a) after identifying the case study research design as a fit approach, (b) the researcher identifies the case under review and its boundaries. The research design can involve a single case or a combination of several cases, (c) followed by deciding on the data gathering methods in which a single or a number of data-gathering methods can be included; (d) the researcher finally interprets and presents the finding. (see Stake, 1995; Merriam, 2009; Creswell, 2012:74-76; Yin, 2012).

Conceptually, the considerations or, arguably, the limitations, which the research should address when conducting a case study are the objectivity or reliability and the generalizability. As Berg (2004:232) maintained, objectivity posits the ability of replicability and consistency rather than whether or not a subjective decision is made; therefore, the research should provide a clear articulation of which aspect is being investigated and through what means; therefore, the case study is as objective and reliable as any other social science research methodology.

It is commonly argued that a single case or a small number of cases can offer little grounds for meeting the requirements of reliability or for making generalizations at a wider level; however, as Berg (2004:232) maintained, a case study should not be
understood as only fitting a specific unit. It also provides an understanding of similar units or suggests explanations for why similar units are likely to function in a similar way. In the broader terms of the predictability of human behaviour, the case study can provide a general conclusion. Yin (2012) maintained that depending on a piece of research’s theoretical framework and theory-linked tools, the case study allows for making generalizations.

3.1.2 Research Question and Expectations

The following question is posed, which forms the basis of the hypotheses and the research objectives.

The central research question of this thesis is: Did the Conservative-led governments’ immigration discourse display a pattern of rupture or continuity with the New Labour governments’ approach in Britain between 1997 and 2017?

While the research question was structured at the beginning and planning stages of the research, during its initial phase, the literature also served to give a first impression of the corpus of the texts to develop and propose the hypotheses. When it comes to proposed hypotheses, while Gee (2004: 96) mentioned the terms ‘theme’ or ‘point’ (hypothesis), he also referred to ‘form’ and ‘tests’ of hypotheses (see Gee, 2004:99); this research, on the other hand, has preferred to use the term hypotheses. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:149) clearly noted that during the initial phase of the analysis, hypotheses that are worth more detailed investigation can be formed and proposed.

Accordingly, the research formed expectations identical to the hypotheses that reflects the endeavour of observing and investigating the patterns and linking them within and across texts in order to investigate how immigration and control management were constructed and organized at the discourse analysis phase. The term of ‘hypotheses’ was used at the statistical analysis phase of the investigation and the interpretation of the numerical data produced through discourse analysis, as the term of the (hypothesis) is more appropriate to use when testing numerical data. However, it should also be noted that, as Gee (2004:99) pointed, out the terminology the research
opts to use should be less important than the patterns the research looks for and the hypotheses it proposes and tests.

Kelle (2000) maintained that the nature and the investigation process of qualitative hypotheses are different from statistical hypothesis testing. On the one hand, testing and confirmation findings are carried out through returning to the data to explore the supporting and confirming or disconfirming empirical evidence; accordingly, the hypotheses are tentative and imprecise. On the other hand, investigating the hypotheses through ‘cooccurring codes’ on more a formal basis entails utilizing the information represented by the codes themselves as a basis for testing the data matrix. Should a hypothesis be tested, then, it needs to be precise and empirically testable. Codes should be clear and distinct, and the testing need not be performed between the empirical data and the derived data from the empirical data. In such a case, a numerical data matrix needs to be produced through the coding process, followed by a statistical analysis of the data—which can be carried out by means of SPSS. Accordingly, following the proposals of Gee (2004: 96) and Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), the research established hypotheses that merited detailed investigation and, during the discourse analysis, looked for patterns within and across the discourses and articulations that would support or refute the hypotheses. Each hypothesis was, thus, formulated to guide the research during the quantitative analysis of the produced numerical data.

Investigating the displayed patterns of the articulation of the immigration discourse of the New Labour governments and the Conservative-led governments and the extent to which these perspectives were informed by securitization, governmentality, and a risk notion between 1997 and 2017, and in keeping with the question outlined above, the research formed the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The displayed patterns of the articulation differ significantly between the Conservative-led governments and the New Labour governments.

Hypothesis 2: The displayed patterns of the articulation differ significantly between the government level and when out of office.
Hypothesis 3: The displayed patterns of articulations differ significantly between the studied centre-right parties and their centre-left counterparts under study.

Hypothesis 4: The displayed patterns on immigration control policies differ significantly between the spoken and written rhetoric.

Considering the nature and process of testing hypothesis statistically as noted above, this research formed the hypotheses on a more formal basis, which, in turn, tested them statistically through analyzing the systematically documented patterns identified through the predefined categories and codes based on the theoretical lenses-linked benchmarks.

The research has proposed hypothesis 1 as the main hypothesis, and hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 as interrelated hypotheses. These represent the efforts to explore and account for the articulation of the perspectives through investigating the displayed patterns of rupture and continuity of the immigration discourse of the Conservative-led governments with that of the New Labour governments. The research question and the hypotheses posit the efforts of constructing a deep understanding of the articulation of perspectives through a process that focuses on the understanding of how discourses and ideas can define, redefine and form the perspectives and mobilize changes in the immigration control field.

Hypothesis 1 and hypotheses 3, which are interrelated, are predicated on the following two assumptions. The first is that left-wing governments and left-wing parties structurally posit a liberal representation of immigration construction (Freeman, 2011), in which immigration is referentially coindexed with a more liberal construction. The second is that right-wing governments and right-wing parties are reasonably considered inherently restrictionist in comparison with their counterparts in constructing an immigration reality and articulating immigration control policies (see Boswell and Hough, 2008; Geddes, 2008; Green-Pedersen and Odmalm, 2008).

In essence, hypothesis 1 and hypotheses 3 predict that Conservative-led governments and the studied centre-right parties’ immigration discourse, which were informed by the articulation of the dominant discourse, differ significantly from that of the New
Labour governments and their centre-left counterparts under study. Accordingly, evidence for the validity of these hypotheses can be obtained if the Conservative-led and the Conservative governments and the centre-right parties’ discourses display rupture rather than continuity with the New Labour governments and their centre-left counterparts. The displayed pattern is expected to change from more liberal positions, in which immigration control reflects a relatively flexible approach in which the definitions of immigration were informed by its construction as a contributory social force, to a problematization and threat-linked stance to implement a more rigid approach in which relatively restrictive approaches were informed by the construction of the immigration as a problem or a threat and a site of fear and anxiety during the studied period.

Hypothesis 2 is predicated on the assumption that being excluded from office is more likely to force change in a party’s stance (Schumacher et al., 2013), which can account for the immigration discourse, and ruling parties are more likely to support relatively less restrictive or rigid approach-linked immigration discourses compared to those in opposition. Conversely, opposition parties are more likely to place more importance on supporting relatively more restrictive or rigid approaches towards immigration compared to those in office.

Concerning Hypothesis 2, supportive evidence would be obtained should the in-office groups demonstrate a pattern of a less restrictive approach compared to the in-opposition approach. On the other hand, the stance towards immigration is expected to display a relatively more restrictive approach while in opposition, given that being excluded from office is more likely to involve a change in stance and interpretation of the immigration reality.

As regards Hypothesis 4, it is predicated on the assumption that the rhetorical construction of an immigration entity, which mainly aims at voicing a specific ideology-motivated and conceptualized view, and articulated immigration control policies, which mainly seek to maximize material goals associated primarily with the party’s policy preferences, can conflict (Boswell, 2007). Accordingly, supportive evidence for the validity of this hypothesis would be obtained if manifestos and policy papers as written discourse instruments were to demonstrate patterns of supporting
relatively less restrictive strategies with more flexible approaches and, conversely, the leaders’ speeches and parliamentary debates as the spoken discourse instruments were to demonstrate patterns of the necessity of adopting relatively restrictive or rigid approaches when thematizing the articulation of the dominant discourse.

Here, it becomes clear that the aim and objectives of the research plausibly imply the necessity of supporting a discourse analysis by systematically documenting the order and the distribution of discourses-linked findings, which in turn, requires producing numerical data that refer to the quantitative dimension of the discourse analysis.

3.2 Multi-perspective Framework

Building on the immigration control literature, the research proposes and seeks to empirically demonstrate the extent to which the Conservative-led governments’ immigration discourse displayed a pattern of rupture rather than continuity with that of the New Labour governments. Specifically, it hypothesizes that the immigration discourses of the studied centre-right parties-dominated governments are more likely to display a rupture with those of the centre-left parties-dominated governments rather than continuity. The articulation of the former, which is characterized by a more restrictive approach, and the latter, which is informed by more liberal approaches, is more likely to differ significantly. The research provides empirical support for these hypotheses and propositions.

The four hypotheses depict the key aspects of the construction and emergence of an immigration control mode for the management of immigration control and the extent to which the Conservative-led governments’ immigration discourse displayed a pattern of rupture and continuity with that of the New Labour governments. The efforts involve constructing a fresh account of how political discourse on immigration and ideas can define and mobilize changes in the immigration field. The research supports the proposed hypotheses and tests four hypotheses using a dataset that covers five government periods, three different political parties in office and in opposition, and written and spoken discourse instruments in the UK between 1977 and 2017. The datasets are an excellent sample because of the variation in actors and
instruments involved. The research findings speak to the literature on the articulation by highlighting the importance of utilizing a comprehensive set of social theories to epitomize observed logic systematically.

These research aims, and objectives pushed the research framework to incorporate a multi-perspective approach and, based on the reviewed literature on immigration control, to adopt an in-depth analysis of immigration discourse from the perspective of three theoretical lenses: risk, governmentality and securitization. It investigates and evaluates the discourse of threat, the discourse of problematization and the discourse of opportunity, which all inform the articulation of immigration control policies. In turn, it assists in identifying empirically the patterns of the rupture and continuity. Therefore, the reason for employing a multi-perspective method is based on the nature of the specific research questions that the research seeks to answer and the aims and objectives that the research seeks to achieve.

Specifically, in order to generate useful insights that contribute to the research objectives, the researcher argues to incorporate a multi-perspective framework that deals with variations between governments, and across political parties and instruments, as well as tracking the changes over time. The framework has to serve as a model that deals with both cross-actor structures, that is, patterns of rupture and continuity as well as time dependencies.

In order to track the change across the actors and over time, the research supplemented the discourse analysis with CAQDAS. The multi-perspective framework posited the form of the effort of linking discourse-centric analysis and fitted the proposed method to answering the research problem and questions. As Neuendorf (2004) pointed out, discourse analysis provides an in-depth understanding of the data corpus and the big picture of the social realm through taking every aspect of the text into consideration. CAQDAS, on the other hand, will help to document the recurring patterns and their frequency for statistical purposes. From this point of view, the purpose of the multi-perspective framework strategy is to develop more specific ideas for the overall understanding of the studied phenomenon. Therefore, the multi-perspective approach will function as macro-level observation.
The methodology used for the analysis of the data is a discourse analysis, which allows developing a more specifies ideas for overall understanding, supplemented with CAQDAS, which serves to document the order of the discourse and the distribution of discourses by categorizing, coding and clustering the data for statistical inference. As noted above, (a) the relatively far too many numerous texts set, (b) the qualitative axis of the analysis, (c) systematically recording the distribution of the discourses and (d) the objective of comparison across numerous variables have been the main factors for utilizing a multi-perspective framework.

More precisely, the multi-perspective framework has employed both qualitative and quantitative techniques concurrently for the following reasons: First, with regard to the qualitative dimension, the model of risk, governmentality, and securitization can provide valuable insight to identify the possible and competing discourses and the relevant order of the discourse that form the articulations. The researcher’s theoretical framework fit the proposed theoretical understanding of the given problems, thus, the research insists that the proposed theoretical understanding serve more to capture an important aspect of knowledge building that has been left out in providing a better understanding of the problem so far.

Second, the discourse analysis, which is concerned with the performative power of the discourse in which written and spoken language that constantly define and mediate realities (Willig, 2013), can assist to take up the focus on providing a more systematic analysis of specifies ideas for overall understanding of how perspectives were structured and organized, and in light of the theoretical lenses, how political discourse on immigration that define, redefine and change the perspectives can be reflected through discourse theory.

And third, in terms of the quantitative dimension, NVivo is utilized to assist in the qualitative analysis (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2011) as a tool to add a more concrete quantitative dimension to the analysis of discourse where the systematically produced quantitative dimension may be important, especially for large qualitative datasets (Krippendorff, 2004). The discourse analysis draws on political discourse on immigration control articulated by five governments: the first, second and third terms of the New Labour governments, the Conservative-led coalition and the Conservative
government, by three political parties: the Labour party, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats, two settings: in office and office exclusion, and written (manifestos, and policy papers) and spoken (leaders’ and government elites’ speeches and parliamentary debates) discourses. The systematic analysis of this substantial quantity of rhetoric required the assistance of CAQDAS: NVivo, and comparing, contrasting and differentiating the displayed patterns of the rupture and continuity with regard to their attributes, combined with the objective of testing the proposed hypotheses, required and supported producing numerical data.

NVivo can assist in converting and grouping long texts into related categories and registering and clustering the frequency of recurrence of the critical patterns and in verifying hypotheses (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2011). Therefore, supplementing discourse analysis with CAQDAS enabled the research to systematically map out the order of the discourse and the distribution of the discourses, and which reflected a quantitative dimension. In turn, the research not only qualitatively supported the hypotheses but also statistically tested the proposed hypotheses. NVivo served to help with understanding the overall picture in a broad sense and assisted the discourse analysis by putting the focus on providing a more systematic analysis of specifies ideas. NVivo was used to record the clustering of the frequency of the recurrence and distribution of the discourses to explore the patterns that were identified abductively, rather than creating themes from the data deductively (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2007).

This design serves to answer the research question. To explore and identify the nature of the cause and describe it requires following a rigorous research strategy linking the qualitative and quantitative divide (Exadaktylos and Radaelli, 2012). Neuendorf (2004) maintained that qualitative and quantitative analytical tools should regularly be used together; it would be unwise to conduct quantitative research without including a conceptualization derived from the qualitative perspective, or equally, to propose qualitative-oriented conclusions without combining quantitative evidence on the frequency and patterns of recurring critical patterns and clustering. Therefore, he argues, discourse analysis and the quantitative analytical tool can fit together nicely. In turn, they might provide an example of robust methods by which the conclusions of the researchers are more strengthened.
The chapter now turns to discussing the components of the multi-perspective framework more in detail, beginning with the discourse analysis.

3.2.1 Discourse Theory and Discourse Analysis

A discourse is a particular way of constructing, articulating and representing the world which makes social configuration meaningful (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 1987; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:143) As Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) pointed out objects only have ‘being’ through a discursive configuration, otherwise the objects have only ‘existence’; therefore, a certain discursive configuration constitutes the being of objects and the discursive configurations are open to different and various from of conceptualization, which may develop and emerge in the future.

Discourse is used to refer to all forms of speeches and texts; thus, it involves spoken and written texts of any kind; and discourse analysis is interested in texts in their own right rather than connecting them with something else (Gill, 2000).

Discourse theory posits that social configuration is meaningful, and the meaning is socially constructed; from this point of view, discourse constitutes the social world (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 1987). Therefore, a change in the discourse implies changing and reproducing social reality (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:22). Accordingly, discourse theory is concerned with how the written and the spoken language define, construct and mediate realities, in which the performative power of the discourse constantly defines and redefines the entities being prioritized; therefore, discourse analysis is based on the assumption that the reality is constantly constructed discursively (Willig, 2013).

In Foucault’s perspective, an entity is defined and formed in a particular way discursively; therefore, power and knowledge are discursively defined, formed and constructed by each other mutually (Foucault, 2007). Power, from the Foucauldian perspective, is dispersed through knowledge widely, and in turn, is held everywhere and exists essentially within language itself (Esin et al., 2013). Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:14) maintained that Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse theory largely follows Foucault’s discourse and power and knowledge perspective. However, as they
maintained, Foucault addressed and focused on one discourse for each regime. Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987), discourse theory, on the other hand, posits a conflicting discourse which struggles to define and form the dominant discourse, positing that the articulation creates and, recreates itself and, in turn, transforms the discourse constantly.

Depending on the research question and the aims and theoretical perspective, an analytical framework of discourse analysis can be formed in various ways (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:141). The method employed for the analytical framework of the data is discourse analysis, which is one of three social constructivist approaches: Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse theory, critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2001), and discursive psychology (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). As Gee (2005) pointed out, any research method should be accompanied by a theory since the method is a way to investigate a certain issue.

The research’s starting point is to investigate what has been actually said and written in political discourse on immigration control policies; thus, the research lays much emphasis upon cumulative articulation and on the accumulated knowledge of immigration control policies in the process of the articulation and presentation of immigration control policies. It looks for the patterns of rupture and continuity across the actors based on the definitions and classifications informed by social theories. It focuses precisely on the articulated discourse through a way of understanding the process by which the construction of the entities evolves and changes. Basically, the research endeavours to produce as neutral as possible an explanation of the construction and mechanisms of the construction of the immigration reality and the articulation of the immigration control policies.

It should be noted that as Gee (2004:5) pointed out, there exist several different approaches to discourse analysis, and none of them stand out uniquely as a fit for all purposes approach; therefore, research can opt to utilize an approach that fits the research problem and the research question better than the others, even though different approaches can reveal somewhat similar conclusions. From this point of view, seeking to understand how and why immigration as a social phenomenon is articulated and held so, discursively, the research has not aimed to work out whether
rhetoric of the statements, discourses, and articulations is right or wrong. Therefore, rather than following Fairclough’s (2001) critical discourse analysis, in which the discourse acts ideologically, the surrounding context is taken into consideration simultaneously and the researcher is supposed to be ideologically critical and take the side of the oppressed social groups rather than being neutral (see also Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:64), the research opted to follow Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse theory and analysis which identifies itself in the form of poststructuralist approaches. Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) maintained that their discourse theory draws on a conceptualization that the world is an entirely social construction of human beings, which is not grounded on any necessity external to it (cf., Gill, 2000; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:22) suggested, Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse theory offers an unbiased description of the world and its mechanisms.

As Laffey and Weldes (2004) pointed out, discourse analysis is to do with power and politics. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:34), for example, pointed out that Laclau and Mouffe paid particular attention to political processes, whose political articulations and discourses influence how we consider and form reality. As an example, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) maintained that transcending the capitalist society, and in turn, power, political transformation and social changes, are founded on the plurality of the actors and their struggle. Therefore, the struggle is complex and flexible and open to further change and is extended rather than reduced to certain forms of a social agent such as a privileged agent of socialist change. Power, therefore, produces the social world discursively. The discourse analysis performed by Laclau and Mouffe posits a more overarching abstract mapping of the discourse that is at play (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002).

As the literature indicates, immigration can be constructed as an opportunity and a contributory social force, on the one hand, or as a threat and security issue, on the other hand. At the same time, these related discourses compete with one another at various levels to different degrees in defining and forming the construction of the articulation. Therefore, conceptualizing the struggle and the openness to the further change, discourse theory is more suitable to looking at how articulations produce, reproduce and change the construction of perspectives that have emerged and
changed over time. Drawing on the research question and aim, therefore, based on the plurality, antagonism and struggle Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse theory and discourse analysis are more promising. The order of discourse in which each discourse competes to construct the meaning in its way that presents the floating process of construction as the main axis of the research question and aims have been the preliminary aspect in the formulation of the analytical framework.

As Gill (2000) noted Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse analysis is inspired largely by the Foucauldian approach. It is interested not so much in the details of spoken or written texts specifically, but in looking at how it is constructed, articulated and held in power.

In conducting the discourse analysis of political discourse on immigration control policies and discerning the criteria for distinguishing a discourse of opportunity, a discourse of threat and a discourse of problematization, the thesis utilized the benchmarks of risk, governmentality and a securitization-linked theoretical lenses to proceed through the analysis strategy offered by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002). The analysis strategy was realized in the text through identifying the object as explanatory dynamics and the subject as immigration control, that is, the consistent way of establishing meanings of a dominant discourse that referred to and that excluded other discourses.

When it comes to discourse analysis method of research, as Gee (2004:6) pointed out while the method might change in line of the theory it should not be seen as an ‘algorithmic procedure’, a set of rules that needs to be followed step by step rigidly to get a guaranteed result, but rather the tools and strategies should flexibly adapted in line with the research problem and the context of the study. As Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:24) pointed out Laclau and Mouffe has not provided a specific method for the discourse analysis.

Accordingly, Laclau and Mouffe`s model operationalized through a strategy offered by Jørgensen and Phillips’s (2002:165) strategy highlighted the analytical focus-points of the discourse model of Laclau and Mouffe. The tools and strategy were adapted to guide the inquiry in line with the specific dataset, research problem and research question. The discourse analysis was performed through investigation to identify the patterns within and across the texts by appraising:
the articulated discourses,
- the established and excluded meanings,
- the nodal points and master signifiers, which are the central signs in which the meanings’ related signs are included and the other possible meaning oriented signs are excluded,
- the struggle and competition in fixing the meaning,
- the taken-for-granted meaning,
- the discursively constructed entity,
- and the genre,

through constant comparison strategy. Therefore, because the research was investigating the order of the discourses that compete and struggle to locate the meaning in their own way and the distribution of these discourses, the comparison method was a well-suited one, as it assists in uncovering the existing possibilities of the struggle in constructing the meaning and enables the researcher to distance his own assumptions and the material itself. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002:24) also proposed that as Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory did not offer specific and explicit analytical tools for the discourse analysis, supplementing analysis with methods from other approaches would be more constructive. Moreover, in contrast to critical discourse approaches which focus on people’s talk and detailed aspects of the written language as well as the surroundings, Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse approach focuses on more general and overarching patterns through a more abstract mapping of the discourse itself, and this might be the reason why they did not provide a detailed analytical tool.

Since the research’s aim is to develop an overall understanding of the articulation of control policies in light of the proposed social theories, Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985, 1987) discourse analysis was considered as a well-suited approach. It could meet the research’s particular aim in seeing how the construction of immigration control policies was articulated and presented through political discourse by governments
rather than how the language is constructed itself. This means that the research will focus more on the articulation of the function of the discourse so as to grasp an understanding of the general and predominant patterns through a more abstract mapping of the discourses.

Not all ideas and themes have the same reach in defining reality; thus, the more important part of the rhetoric and immigration control-linked ideas and thematizations should be identified, analysed and discussed; therefore, it should be clear that the focus of the analysis in the design of the research is not in dealing with everything in the discourse texts. As Triandafyllidou (2000) suggested, particular attention will be paid to use of the discourse to evaluate the specific concerns, representation and argumentation and the relationship between the contested discourse and its impact on the overall construction (see also Reicher and Hopkins, 1996). Accordingly, the relevant part of the texts will be analysed rather than analysing all of the general election manifestos, or, in case of the leaders’ speeches, the whole speech. The research will concentrate on the immigration-oriented part, as the aim is not to identify what the manifesto or the speech deals with but how the immigration issue is constructed.

Next, the discussion turns to discussing CAQDAS.

3.2.2 CAQDAS: NVivo

NVivo, as a type of CAQDAS, is a categorization sensitive tool used to assist the analysis of large datasets which otherwise would not be practicable (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2011). Lester and Paulus (2011) utilized CAQDAS as part of their discourse analysis research, and Paulus at al. (2013) call for greater interaction between the qualitative research process and the use of technologies. The research utilized NVivo as part of the discourse analysis since it is one of the most established qualitative analysis software packages, largely used by researchers for the coding and retrieval of the data and texts, and for comparing, contrasting and differentiating coded data with regard to their attribute and inquiring into their conceptual relationships (Woods at al., 2016).
The advantages and disadvantages of utilizing NVivo, similarly to other CAQDAS in qualitative research design studies, are discussed extensively in the literature: NVivo facilitates coding, clustering, retrieving and differentiating coded data and identifying conceptual relationships by speeding up the retrieval of text and processes of comparisons (Woods at al., 2016). Qualitative data analysis, which entails organizing and exploring data followed by a process of interpreting and reflecting, can be greatly assisted and facilitated by a software tool that manages data by tracking and retrieving according to attributed variables and supports the interpretation and reflection process by displaying the connections between data (Gilbert at al., 2014).

The claims made against the software, as Paulus at al. (2013) discuss in detail, are that they may put a distance between the data and the researcher, replace the researcher, quantify empirical data, lead to the collecting of more data and result in mechanical thinking. Concerned that CAQDAS would supplement discourse analysis, Macmillan (2005) argued that while the tool can help with coding, it does not organize text for detailed analysis. It can strain the scope of a study, it is time consuming and it distances the researcher from the dataset. Therefore, he argued, it does not help in discourse analysis. However, Paulus at al. (2013) show that claims about CAQDAS supplementing discourse analysis have not been fully explained and empirically investigated. In contrast, Paulus at al. (2017) claimed that CAQDAS can help discourse analysis perform more productively and make the research process more transparent.

The empirical study of this research supports the concept of using NVivo in the discourse analysis. As experienced during this study, CAQDAS can speed up reaching, retrieving and rereading from a large dataset, enabling comparisons across a large number of cases which would not be feasible manually. As Gilbert at al. (2014) noted, complex challenges which exceed one’s capacity to map out and remember detailed characteristics and connections can be managed through NVivo.

As a CAQDAS, NVivo does not itself carry out the analysis and quantify data: the analysis is still done by the researcher, as Gilbert at al. (2014) noted it provides various ways to stimulate new ideas. In this research, the discourse analysis was performed in its own right and NVivo served to bring together the data according to the research aim and objectives by clustering the data in line with the codes and categories and
quantifying the derived data that was determined by the researcher. This research sought to produce a numerical data matrix through the coding process, which was directed by the discourse analysis for further analysis with SPSS.

While an inductive form of analysis progresses from the particular to the general, such as by aiming to generate a theory, conversely, a deductive approach, which is largely informed by theory and progresses from the general towards the particular, is mainly used to test hypotheses (Kelle, 2000; Marshall and Rossman, 2014). Accordingly, the research utilized a deductive way of discourse analysis.

As Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2011) noted, software is a systematic method of illustrating coded and categorized data. Thus, software has become an intensively used means of facilitator of qualitative analysis (Gilbert at al., 2014). As Kelle (2000) suggested, if the research seeks to test a hypothesis, a more formal strategy of utilizing an assistive software need to be followed.

The research designed a framework that allows the confirming and testing of the hypotheses. Thus, as it sought to link qualitative analysis with quantitative inferences, the research followed a more formal strategy. It started by formatting the textual data, defining and structuring the coding scheme in line with the elements of the models and the benchmarks of the theoretical lenses and structuring a numerical data matrix in the first phase. Secondly, it defined the analysis unit. It selected `the content unit` as a unit of analysis which is the whole the relevant parts of the text, such as the migration sections within manifestos, and the immigration-related parts in a leaders’ speeches as the units of analysis.

Thirdly, the research proceeded with discourse analysis to reveal the patterns within and across texts and linked them in order to identify how meaning was constructed and organized in light of the theoretical lenses used. Discourse analysis, as Gee (2004:96) pointed out, is concerned with certain relevant data that support or refute a given theme, a point or a proposed hypothesis; therefore, research cannot and should not ask all possible questions, engage with every linguistic detail or cover all part of the data under analysis. As the research is concerned with the more general and overarching patterns identified through a more abstract mapping of the discourse, the analysis proceeded by looking at the articulated discourse and exploring the discourse
order, the established, excluded and taken-for-granted meanings, and the conflict and competition between the discourses in light of the theoretical lenses. It systematically and concurrently coded the data according to the predefined categories and compared the texts segments by which the same code and categories had been attached to ensure the consistency.

At this phase, NVivo facilitated the coding and retrieval of the data. It assisted in differentiating the coded data according to the attributed variables and characteristics. It supported to track the coded data through the matrix queries and the comparisons within and across the texts in terms of the attributes. Therefore, while the discourse analysis provided a ground for NVivo to assist in producing quantitative data, at the same time NVivo helped to reveal the overarching patterns and cluster them, and in turn, to extend the discourse analysis and the investigation more deeply.

Fourthly, the research ran a matrix query within NVivo, which linked the cases to the nodes and given attributes in a table, followed by exporting the matrix query to MS Excel so as convert the produced data into a numerical data matrix by computing the observed benchmarks. The numerical data matrix was then exported to SPSS to test the hypothesis.

In sum, the research argues that NVivo combined with discourse analysis served the research aim and objectives in adding depth to the analysis of the articulations of discourse and the variability of the discursive constructions over the studied period and across the actors by enabling the production and operationalization of numerical data systematically, adding a quantitative dimension to the discourse analysis to support the findings.

3.3 Period and Data Sources

In setting the duration of the analysis, the research chose the period between May 1997 and June 2017 which starts from when the New Labour governments came to power and finish at UK general election of June 2017. One reason for this is that the previous studies on immigration control policy in Britain either focused on Conservative
governments (1979–1997), such as Bloch (2000) or on a part of the New Labour era (Malloch and Stanley, 2005; Bosworth and Guild, 2008). Only a few studies, such as Schuster and Solomos (2004), have compared the previous Conservative governments with a part of the New Labour governments. While the thesis is centred on the New Labour and the Conservative-led governments, the previous studies, therefore, represented a basis of research on the previous conservative governments that the thesis referred to. The second reason is that, as discussed in detail in section 2.3, the previous immigration control researchers assume that control logics are problematization and threat-linked (e.g. Buonfino, 2004; Malloch and Stanley, 2005; Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Ibrahim and Howarth, 2017); therefore, the first and second New Labour governments` articulation has seemed more promising to reveal the opportunity-linked logic. Embracing booth (a) liberal articulations as well as threat and problematization linked articulations; (b) as well as offering a venue to fill the gap of the lack of comparison of the New Labour (1997-2010) and the Conservative-led governments (2010-2017); the duration represents an excellent foundation for the research to establish its parameters. The selected period provides the opportunity to investigate the immigration control discourse across the New Labour governments, the Conservative-led coalition, and the Conservative Government, and the ruling political parties and their position of being in power and in opposition.

As Benoit et al. (2009:441) maintained, the analysis of the political texts provides an effective and efficient means for identifying a proposed position, and the relationships between policymaking and political strategies (Laver et al., 2003:331). The political discourse analyst’s strategy is based on selecting the two forms of discourse: written and spoken discourses. The concern in selecting the dataset for the multi-perspective framework has been the comprehensiveness. To have confidence in the overall understanding of the immigration control policies. Exploring the actors and year effects, and tracking changes and variations, the research sought to include all available relevant materials. The concern of varying the data sources has been also the fact that the immigration discourses took place at various levels and stages and in various degrees.
Since the thesis has focused on political discourses produced by governments rather than practices, it has sought to keep the practices-linked policy papers range as wide as possible to meet the governmentality requirements within a government-produced discourse range.

The thesis defined the search strategies for identifying the datasets by including keywords, sources and databases. The political discourse analysis is based on four sources. The first is the manifestos. Political party manifestos are an important data source for studying a party’s policies on defining and forming a social issue. The degree to which political party functions as a power to define and construct an issue and a political agenda depends on both on the degree of a party’s interests in an issue and its relative position in their national party system (Taggart, 1998).

Party manifestos are texts in which political parties propose their ‘policy alternative’ to the voters (Lo et al., 2016), and are the markers for highlighting how their policy preferences and the positions of the political parties are constructed (Protsyk and Garaz, 2013:296). While election manifestos are only one of the numerous communication channels in which political parties construct social entities and define and form their stand (Dolezal et al., 2012:869), it is generally assumed that they are designed as a highly sophisticated reflection of the capacity to influence the public, in which the construction is accepted as displaying more concrete knowledge of the strategies that help to identify the constructed positions of the political actors (Laver et al., 2003:331). Dinas and Gemenis (2010:427) maintained that the analysis of party manifestos is fruitful for identifying party stands; thus, they have been used more commonly in recent empirical research due to the strength of their neutrality, in which manifestos, it is argued, involve a purer and neutral form data. From this point of view, the research will be investigating the ruling parties’ manifestos. The ruling political parties’ general election manifestos consist of seven manifestos. In addition, 11 opposition party manifestos have been also collected and analysed for comparing government and opposition level stances. The Labour party, the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrat party ’s manifestos – a total of 18 – have been collected for the chosen period, and the immigration-linked sections have been analysed (see Appendix A).
However, providing a reliable source of data for understanding the construction of government party policies, the election manifestos mainly cover the core points of the issues only. Therefore, this limitation is addressed by utilizing other sources.

The second source is leaders’ and government elites’ speeches. The immigration-related sections of leaders’ and governments’ speeches are important sources for capturing the immigration-related strategies that exemplify how particular discourses are developed, maintained or changed (Boswell and Hampshire, 2017). While, it has been argued that governmental decision-making and policy-making processes are complex, and so cannot be attributed solely to political leaders (Preston and t Hart, 1999:58), they have an important role in defining and forming the outlook of political parties and in the governmental power case, they play an important role as decision-makers (Goemans et al., 2009:269).

According to Finlayson and Martin (2008:445), the construction of political issues can be explored through a systematic analysis of political speeches in which the adopted political strategies might be explained. Therefore, political leaders’ speeches provide an insight into understanding why and how an issue comes to be constructed in a way that defines and forms and, in turn, determines the stands that political actors prefer to take (Chilton, 2004).

Leaders’ and government elites’ speech datasets consist of 103 speeches. In addition, in order to investigate the opposition level and compare the articulation of government and opposition party positions, 62 opposition-level leaders’ and elites’ speeches have been collected, as mentioned above, for comparing the relevant level settings, while the immigration-linked parts of the speeches have been analysed (see Appendix A). The chosen leaders’ and government elites’ speeches were delivered mainly at party conferences.

The third source is parliamentary debates. Proksch and Slapin (2010:589-590) argued that parliamentary debates are an important alternative to recorded votes for understanding the construction of the social issues. Parliamentary debates offer more scope for understanding how the voting is constructed, and the parliamentary debate mechanism, argued Cobb (2009), is an important feature of parliamentary life.
Parliamentary debates provide an important insight into understanding how governments construct the immigration discourse and make it public, with the ability to create specific legal constructions of immigration by initiating legislative actions. However, although parliamentary debates are important mechanisms that enable a government to publicise and defend its stance and define policy preferences, the limited amount of time for debate and the restricted number of members who have an opportunity to deliver a speech have been posited as important limitations to the parliamentary debate (Slapin and Proksch, 2010:335).

In terms of access to the data, the accessibility to the primary data provided by parliamentary sources offers an excellent opportunity for the researcher (Leston-Bandeira and Thompson, 2013); however, this accessibility also poses the challenge of presenting a huge volume of data. Therefore, the researcher is forced to restrict the range and content of the analysed data (Laver et al., 2003:314).

The thesis generated the dataset of the parliamentary debates using the Hansard database, which provides a comprehensive collection of parliamentary debates. All the transcribed debates on immigration-oriented legislation’s second readings are included. In addition, the thematic immigration debate and answers to oral questions have been included. In terms of the content, as the government’s construction of the immigration and control perspective is the subject of study, the analysis has been carried out within the introduction and conclusion provided by the government for the second reading debate, presenting the government view in the introduction and summarising all contributions and final thoughts in the conclusion. The parliamentary debate dataset consists of 97 parliamentary debates (see appendix A).

The fourth source is policy papers. Policy papers are governments’ official papers, reports or guides, which are made public to outline the government’s stand, view or policy proposal on an issue or guide in which a pathway is provided to explain how an issue is addressed (Oxford Dictionary, 2017). The policy papers dataset consists of 99 policy papers related to the immigration issue and found through gov.uk (see Appendix A). The reason for including the policy papers is to investigate how the immigration control policies were made public in the form of written discourse; this aims to provide a more detailed map of the government’s stand and policy proposals.
to address and respond to the immigration issue. While the general election manifestos reflect the promises and proposals of the political parties, the policy papers reflect the operationalization of the policies. The policy papers inherently address specific aspects and the proposed ideas; therefore, they can provide a detailed discourse of the addressed aspects of immigration.

To fulfill this objective, searches of policy papers and parliamentary debates were carried out through the official gov.uk website and Hansard; leaders’ speeches and government elites’ speeches searches were found through gov.uk, political party websites, the leaders’ own websites, and archives that document such speeches. General election manifestos were sourced through the political party websites. The search was conducted through keyword searches of the relevant documents. The words and phrases sought were ‘immigration’, ‘immigration control’, ‘immigration control policies’, ‘asylum seekers’, ‘refugee’ in isolation and in combination with the identified leaders and elites, who were largely prime ministers, home secretaries and secretaries in charge of immigration policy.

The strategy produced a final dataset of 379 discourse documents. The reason that the research utilized various kind of discourses was to gain a comprehensive view of governments in constructing immigration issues and control policies.

Despite having its strengths, each dataset also reflected a certain weakness. For instance, political leaders play a prominent role in the construction of the main point of political strategies. The consideration of political advantage may force the narratives to include a part of an articulated discourse. Likewise, election manifestos provide a precise source of data for understanding how party policies are constructed, but the limitation is the limited coverage, in which only the main points of the issue may be included. Similarly, parliamentary debates are important to gain an insight into a government’s perspective but are limited by the time allowed; and while policy papers document the formulation and means of implementation of government policy, the limitation is that they have mainly been constructed to deal with a specific aspect of a relevant issue. Consequently, the research argues that the additional data provided by each dataset enriches the analysis and findings and serves to track the change in the articulations across the instruments and over time.
3.4 Data Analysis, Operationalization and Presentation of Findings

From a multi-perspective point of view, the analytical framework of the discourse analysis made use of the utilized theoretical lenses’ strong points in the analysis. Risk, governmentality, and securitization theories were used to identify the order of the discourses. They served to identify the analytical focus points in which the discourses worked, emerged, struggled, dominated or gave way and changed. Immigration control policies and the boundaries between the form of discourses, therefore, were identified by a theoretical lens and differentiated through the elements of the models based on the core benchmarks of the social theories. The benchmarks, therefore, served as a criterion for defining the displayed patterns.

The order of the discourse and the floated constructions (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 1987), in which different discourses competed to fix the meanings and the discourses deployed to construct the immigration control policies, were identified in the light of the theoretical lenses. As the literature review suggested and the dataset revealed, several contradictory discourses were evident within and across texts, namely (a) an opportunity-linked logic and a discourse of opportunity (the model of risk); (b) a governmentality-linked logic and a discourse of problematization (the model of governmentality) and (c) a threat-linked logic and a discourse of threat (the model of securitization).

As illustrated in Table 3.1, (on page 127), the three models, types of logics and articulated discourses are based on the theoretical lenses and distinguished through the core assumptions-based benchmarks of the theoretical lenses, which involve the nature and language benchmarks under the characteristic categories, and management and temporality under the exercise of power categories. The benchmarks assisted in exploring, defining and differentiating the logic, discourse and model in line with the relevant theoretical lenses, which, in turn, assisted in epitomizing the articulation in line with the defined models. This classification reflects the proposed distinction identified in Chapter Two. As Table 3.1 indicates, the analysis model of the discourses is the research question and the research objectives, and theory driven.

Accordingly, the elements of the models are the central elements of the analytical tools by which the established and excluded meanings, the nodal points and the master
signifiers in which the discourse evolves through included and excluding meanings, the struggling to form meanings and the competition between the possible alternative discourses to dominate and form a discourse are understood and differentiated (see Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:24). These benchmarks assisted the analysis of the distribution of discourses through looking for the patterns of structuring and organizing the meanings so as to trace the displayed patterns of the rupture and the continuity through articulations. As Gee (2004) noted, in order to understand the articulated discourses and perspectives, it is necessary that articulation-related inquiries be concerned with a consideration of different indicators and building tasks. Thus, the research needs to look for benchmarks-related details that support a certain logic and opposes others.

While the risk, governmentality and securitization notions themselves are complex and multifaceted, the identified benchmarks set is an important tool because of its exploratory and theory-linked nature. The four benchmarks (see Table 3.1 on page 127) constitute the driving signifiers of the three models, discourses and articulations.

Firstly, there is a discourse of opportunity, in which immigration is seen as a potentially contributory force and as an opportunity, is based on risk theory. The thesis applied it to discourses that lead to more liberal approaches on immigration, as illustrated in the chart (see Table 3.1 on page 127). The risk model and the discourse of opportunity is informed by a political discourse that highlights and emphasizes general, future-oriented uncertainties, the priority of profit and routine measures aimed at managing a governable risk subject and avoiding future uncertainties. The discourse of opportunity, as discussed previously, are constructed through a liberal risk logic, which is developed on the grounds of opportunity-linked risk (see Power, 2007) that informed by a generic risk notion (see Luhmann, 1993) that posits opportunity-linked articulations.

Secondly, in contrast to a discourse of opportunity, a discourse of threat, which positions immigration as a specific (constructed) perceived or real immediate threat, is linked to securitization theory and applied by the thesis to the model of securitization and discourses that lead to more restrictionist approaches by which the articulations are largely informed by threat-linked logic. Accordingly, it diametrically
refers to opposite to the discourse of opportunity. It prioritizes the loss that linked to real or perceived immediate threat that leads to fear or points to the threatened society which sets a set of circumstances that go beyond the routine actions and controls, thus, exceptional measures that aim to react to the current station is essential. The discourse of threat draws on the notion of securitization (see Buzan et al., 1998 for securitization). The degrees of exceptionalism and urgency are the major signifiers that establish a discourse of threat through a securitization move that results in a threat-linked articulation.

Thirdly, a discourse of problematization, on the other hand, locates immigration as a problem, in which the problematization caused by a virtually present or expected future problem through which the loss is prioritized, is based on the model of governmentality and governmentality-linked logic. As proposed by Foucault (1980b) and indicated by Aradau and Van Munster (2007), it refers to an arrangement of governmentality formulated to govern a problematized social issue and instigated apparatus. Thus, a discourse of problematization appeals to the problematization of immigration as a starting point, from which the relevant devices can be justified and deployed. The discourse of problematization draws on the notions of governmentality-linked logic and governmentality (see Foucault, 1980b; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007 for governmentality). The discourse of problematization entails the reconfiguration of exceptionalism versus routinization and a future versus present orientation as opposite forces, in which the generic risk logic develops into governmentality-linked risk and, similarly, the securitization contracts into a governmentality-linked risk (see Aradau and Van Munster, 2007). Accordingly, based on the governmentality notion, the discourse of problematization is used by the thesis to epitomize the articulation in which immigration was problematized; the discourse of problematization contrasts the future with the present and exceptionalism with routine, profit with loss and reaction with prevention as opposite forces, through strategic rearrangements in which the boundaries between each pairing are blurred.

As discussed previously, the multi-perspective framework also aims to map out the quantitative dimension of the analysis. The operationalization of the produced data and the quantitative dimensions are discussed in detail here, but before that the section deals with the coding phase.
It is a commonly held assumption that there exist various ways of defining a unit of analysis depending on the aim of the study. As the research aims not only to identify the dominant discourse but also to document the struggling and competing discourses at play as well, the unit of analysis is chosen to serve this particular aim. Therefore, as Stemler (2001:140) proposed, the ‘content unit’ is a well-situated unit of analysis since the physical limits of the content unit depend on the kind of the data the research is interested in. Thus, it could be a paragraph, a section, a part or an entire statement of purpose, for instance, the immigration section in manifestos, an immigration-linked part of a speech, or a whole speech on immigration. Each case is reserved for one content unit; thus, a whole text might form the content unit in which many generic units might be recorded. From this point of view, the content unit is chosen to represent the whole case and facilitate the coding of the dominant discourse and documenting the observed competing discourses-linked benchmarks under the content unit umbrella.

Therefore, the content units are the whole rhetoric instruments in which the observed dominant discourse as a main unit and the benchmarks as generic units are coded. When the rhetoric instrument, such as a leader’s speech, articulates one discourse and the observed benchmarks satisfy the criteria and form a discourse, the content unit, such as the leader speech’s immigration part, is coded under the observed discourse alongside the number of benchmarks, which are coded as generic units. In the case of a struggle between the discourses in defining the dominant discourse, then, the observed rival benchmarks are coded under the relevant generic units as well as the dominant discourse is coded under the content unit by means of a statistical tool.

When it comes to the coding scheme, the configuration of the benchmarks of the notions of risk and securitization plays a central role in coding the displayed patterns. As previously noted, the four benchmarks classify the sub-generic categories, which collectively constitute the relevant theoretical lens. That is, the four benchmarks are assigned to two generic categories, and each generic category is divided into two different functional sub-generic categories for the relevant lens, namely ‘the characteristic’ as a generic category, ‘nature’ and ‘language’ as the linked sub-generic categories and ‘the exercise of power’ as a generic category, and management and ‘temporality’ as the linked sub-generic categories. The cases were measured against
the ideal type of the theoretical lenses. That is, the process of interpretation of the data and coding were based on a set of ideal types of theory-based benchmarks. In addition, the research also coded the explanatory dynamics according to the referent object referred to by the actors within the texts.
Table 3.1 Criteria for Evaluating Model, Logic and Discourse Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourse/Model (Opportunity-Linked Logic)</th>
<th>Generic Categories</th>
<th>Sub-generic categories</th>
<th>Function/Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discourse of Opportunity</td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>There exists a general, future-oriented and potentially contributor manageable risk subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise of Power</td>
<td>Management</td>
<td>Governance through rational risk management, aims to select the most beneficial option through long-term objectives oriented conventional measures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Seeks to manage future uncertainty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse of Problematization</td>
<td>Governmentality</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>There exists a (non) existential, virtually present or expected future problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise of Power</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>The profit is counterbalanced by loss-linked construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Governance through precautionary risk management,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discourse of Threat (Threat-Linked logic)</td>
<td>Securitization</td>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>There exists a specific (constructed) perceived or real present threat to the referent object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise of Power</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Negative acknowledgement, security issue, the loss is prioritized</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporality</td>
<td></td>
<td>Exceptional measures are performed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reacting to current situation immediately</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The operationalization of the discourse analysis, as discussed previously, proceeded through investigating the displayed patterns through the three models qualitatively: the models of securitization, risk and governmentality. The coding phase, however, proceeded through recording the benchmarks through two models: securitization and risk and let the third model: governmentality to surface statistically. For instance, as risk and securitization logically have an opposite contribution effect on framing the discourse of problematization, accordingly, the model of governmentality embodies the reworks and rearrangements of the resonance or contradiction of the opposite forces. Thus, governmentality does not display the exact characteristics of risk and securitization but the strategic modification and rearrangements of them. In other words, the governmentality-linked logic embodies patterns in which the boundaries of the opposite forces were blurred due to rearrangements and modification of the opposite forces based on processes of functional overdetermination in which the opposite forces enter into resonance or contradiction. Compared to the risk and securitization benchmarks, the governmentality benchmarks consist of risk and securitization as opposite forces, thus, it became more clear and reasonable to document risk and securitization and assess whether they were counterbalanced by each other to form the governmentality through strategic readjustment and rework of the contradictions of the opposite forces.

Therefore, when the securitization and risk benchmarks were coded simultaneously, governmentality can be revealed statistically. Therefore, the quantified dimension relies on the risk and securitization benchmarks as opposite forces to reveal the governmentality-linked logic statistically, which this rationale will also be discussed later; for now, how a pattern might be coded into ‘risk’ or ‘securitization’ model are illustrated, through illustrative examples, as follows. A statement is coded in nature sub-generic category under ‘risk’ if it denotes ‘a general, future oriented and potentially contributor manageable risk subject’ as a master signifier, such as:

“We want to take advantage of the increase in global migration, but in a controlled way that is right for Britain. We want the right people to come here to work and study—people who will contribute positively to our society and economy” (HC Deb, 5 Feb 2007, UK Borders Bill).
“Managed migration allows those throughout the world who have a contribution to make, and who are seeking a better life for themselves, to enter this country through a system of economic migration that is properly organised and trusted by the British people...Millions of people aspire to better their economic circumstances and, understandably, want to migrate in order to do so. At the same time, modern transport systems have facilitated mass movement across the world. Alongside that, we face the challenge of failing states...” (HC, 2002, 24 April Second Reading Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill).

“Migration is a consistent feature of human history. But in recent years, the changes associated with globalisation have led to greater complexity in patterns of migration, and new domestic and international challenges for government and communities to address. Migration brings huge benefits: increased skills, enhanced levels of economic activity, cultural diversity and global links. But it can also raise tensions unless properly understood and well managed” (PP, 2002, 7 February 2002).

Conversely, statements that posit ‘a specific (constructed) perceived or real present threat to the referent object’ as master signifier, such as:

“We know what damage uncontrolled immigration can do. To our society, as communities struggle to cope with rapid change. To our infrastructure, as our housing stock and transport system become overloaded. And to our public services, as schools and hospitals have to cope with a sudden increase in demand” (Theresa May, 2011, 04 October).

“Uncontrolled, mass immigration undermines social cohesion. And in some places, it overburdens our infrastructure and public services. It’s behind more than a third of the demand for all new housing in the UK. And the pressure it places on schools is clear” (Theresa May, 2012, 9 October, Birmingham).

“Under Labour we experienced unprecedented levels of immigration. Between 1997 and 2009, net migration to Britain totalled more than 2.2 million people.
That is more than twice the population of Birmingham” (Theresa May, 2010 5 October Conservative Party Conference Birmingham).

were coded under the securitization category. A statement was coded in a language sub-generic category under the risk category if phrases ‘priority to profits, positive acknowledgement’ appeared as master signifiers, such as:

“Those who do come here make a huge contribution, particularly to our public services. So, far from always or even mainly being a burden on our health or education systems - migrant workers are often the very people delivering those services” (Tony Blair, 2004 Tuesday 27 April 2004).

“Migration is an inevitable reality of the modern world and it brings significant benefits. But to ensure that we sustain the positive contribution of migration to our social well-being and economic prosperity, we need to manage it properly” (PP, 2002, 7 February 2002).

“Migration is of enormous benefit to a country, when it is managed properly. I believe this new points-based system will allow us both to manage migration” (PP, 2006, March 2006).

Conversely, if a statement denoted ‘negative acknowledgement, security issues, priority to loss’ as master signifiers, such as:

“The rate of immigration over the past decade has led to great public anxiety about its impact on transport, jobs, employment, change within our communities and the provision of public services. We have promised to get a grip on the situation, and that is exactly what we will do” (HC Deb, 07 September 2012).

“And we must be honest about the fact that, in some cases, uncontrolled mass immigration can displace local workers and undercut wages” (Theresa May, 2012, 9 October, Birmingham).

“when net migration is too high, and the pace of change is too fast, it puts pressure on schools, hospitals, accommodation, transport and social services,
and it can drive down wages for people on low incomes” (HC Deb, 2015, 13 Oct Second Reading Immigration Bill).

the statements were coded in the securitization category, and these two sub-generic categories were aggregated to the relevant characteristic generic category.

When a statement posited ‘management aims, governance to select the most beneficial option, standard/conventional measures’ as master signifiers, such as:


“The purpose of the strategy is to make migration work for Britain. It includes measures to make our immigration system simpler, clearer and more robust. The reformed system will explain publicly and clearly who we will admit to the UK and why, and who we will allow to stay in the UK and why” (HC, 2005, 5 Jul 2005 second reading Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill).

“We are putting in place a fair and effective way of managing the flow of people coming in and out of the country; selective migration which attracts those who can bring economic benefit to the UK” (PP, 2008 June).

it was coded in the risk category under the management sub-generic category; conversely, if phrases conveying that ‘exceptional measures are performed, immediate/short-term management’ were master signifiers, such as:

“We will strengthen the enforcement of immigration rules. We have introduced a ‘deport first, appeal later’ rule for foreign national offenders” (GEM. Conservative, 2015).

“So, this is the progress we are making on cutting legal immigration and clamping down on the abuse of legitimate entry routes. And we are cracking down on illegal immigration too” (David Cameron, 2011, 14 April).
“If we don’t get our people back to work - we shouldn’t be surprised if millions want to come here to work. But we must act on immigration directly too - and we are” (David Cameron, 2013, 02 October, Manchester).

“That’s why we’re cutting immigration across the board” (Theresa May, 2013, 30 September, Manchester).

they were coded under the securitization category. Finally, a statement was coded in the risk category under the temporality sub-generic category if phrases ‘avoiding of future uncertainty, probability of anticipated future’ appeared as master signifiers, such as:

“The issues are complex and difficult, and we must battle constantly to solve them. We must combine legislative change with sensible administrative change to achieve the improvements that we all seek.... (it) is a big step forward in the reform of our entire nationality, immigration and asylum system to meet the new challenges that lie ahead....” (HC Deb, 24 Apr 2002, Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill).

“We have made our legal routes for migration much more robust against abuse. The challenge of the next five years is to build on these successes in a clear and robust way....” (PP, 2005, February 2005).

“Our policy will yield significant macroeconomic benefits to the UK. But, in addition, our ambition is that, alongside these very evident macroeconomic benefits, migration should have a positive influence, in wider terms, upon every community in Britain” (PP, 2008 June).

Conversely, if a statement phrased ‘reaction to current situation, responsive to immediate threat’ as master signifiers, such as:

“shut down 700 bogus colleges – that were basically visa factories...kicked out people who don’t belong here...” (David Cameron, 2014, 01 October, Birmingham).
“will do everything I can to restore sanity to our immigration system and get the numbers down. Economic migration – capped. Abuse of student visas – stopped. Automatic settlement – scrapped” (Theresa May, 2011, 04 October, Manchester).

“Over the past five years we have taken firm action to reform the chaotic and uncontrolled immigration system we inherited, and to ensure that people are coming here for the right reasons” (HC Deb, 2015, 13 Oct)

these were coded under the securitization category, in which these two sub-generic categories constituted the relevant exercise of power generic category (see Appendix B for the codebook).

The observed patterns would reflect the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses, which refers to the observed number of competing discourses and the benchmarks. The content unit codes were reserved and assigned with regard to the dominant discourse and the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses, as will be discussed later, and computed statistically.

The discourse analysis and the supplemented software were linked at the data analysing stage, where NVivo was in conversation with the discourse analysis through matrix queries to elaborate the analysis and interpretation at the relevant point to enrich a more complex understanding of the research problem. The operationalization of the data analysis was organized to fit the purpose of the research aims and objectives. Using the master signifiers, nodal points, the struggle in fixing the meaning, included and excluded meaning, meanings taken for granted and discursively constructed entities to explore the studied discourse, the research has been more comfortable to produce a numerical data matrix through a coding process, followed by analysing this data with SPSS to test the proposed hypotheses.

Supplementing, the NVivo, therefore, assisted the purpose of the research. From this point of view, the operationalization of the data analysis allowed the research to group the discourse analysis findings into categories and produce a numerical data matrix which reflected the inference of the discourse analysis in a quantified dimension and linked to the quantitative variables.

[Chapter Three: Research Methodology]
The displayed patterns of rupture and continuity were identified on grounds provided by the discourse analysis and a systematic documentation was carried out through the categorized codes. In turn, the issue was reliability was raised when these findings, as the quantified dimension of the research were calculated and computed with statistical tools. This was addressed by the assessment of intercoder reliability.

To ensure intercoder agreement, two reliability subsamples were used; first, the consistency was checked by pilot reliability testing the coding strategies with a sample of 10 cases with the supervisor and engaging regularly with the supervisor on emerging issues, during which the structured coding scheme was refined, and a codebook constructed. In addition, the independent coding of the subsamples of the data, which consisted of 25 cases for the existing discourses and benchmarks, was done by two Ph.D. students after the coding process was finished. The intercoder per cent agreement settled at 90% for the pilot testing and independent coding. As Wynd at al. (2003) recommended to report, the proportion agreement was 94%. In addition, the coding inter reliability agreement was checked via SPSS and the Kappa Value was computed as .905, which is recognized as being almost perfect.

The operationalization of the analysis followed two main phases, (a) a discourse analysis phase, the qualitative analysis level. Since the discourse analysis is not primarily concerned with counting things, the research also incorporated (b) a statistical analysis phase. The analytical framework was constructed to serve the research aim, dealing with the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses. Accordingly, the analytical framework, logically, mirrors the distribution of the discourses. Therefore, while the two phases appear to be separate, in practice the two phases are interlinked, as the latter mainly guided the research to identify the pattern systematically; it also assisted the former in going over and investigating the data in more depth; thus, during the operationalization, the two phases performed alongside each other where closer scrutiny was required (see Gee, 2004:96-125). The statistical analysis phase also provided the possibility of performing statistical techniques on data that previously were qualitative and assisted in testing hypotheses. The analysis of the data, therefore, were mainly guided by the interaction of the discourse analysis and the systematically documented numerical data produced through the discourse analysis.
As discussed previously, the discourse analysis sought to explore the articulation of immigration control policies through the predefined three models and discourses; therefore, it proceeded through looking for the patterns and details that supported or opposed the predefined three models. However, when it came to coding processes, as introduced previously, the risk and securitization-linked benchmarks were coded through NVivo. This was because the structured coding instrumentations were developed on the assumption of the risk and securitization notions (see Appendix B for the codebook). This resulted from a concern about quantitatively locating governmentality model when the risk and securitization were coded simultaneously. The discourse analysis revealed the discourse of problematization through the governmentality-linked logic by looking at the strategically readjusting and reworking the contradictions of the opposite forces, which means risk benchmarks were counterbalanced by the securitization benchmarks, such as a rhetoric bring together the future with the present; the exceptional with routine; profit with loss; and reaction with prevention as opposite forces, so resonance or contradiction calls for a readjustment where the boundaries between each pairing start to be blurred. While the discourse analysis phase identified and differentiated the patterns of the discourse of problematization qualitatively, the quantified dimension phase did the same quantitatively.

In order to operationalize the statistical inference, during the coding phase the research followed a consistent way of identifying the discourse of problematization by leaving it to statistically surface by computing the observed numbers of the risk and securitization benchmark. If one wished to, then, one could create separately a discourse of problematization category and add it to the scale, although this would make little differences, since, as noted above and discussed in the literature review, the governmentality-linked logic is informed by a process of functional overdetermination, in which opposite effect enters into resonance and/or contradiction with each other, therefore, necessitate a modification and readjustment through strategic reconfiguration of risk and securitization in which one counterbalances the other as an opposite force.

In order to operationalize the statistical inference, the research developed an original measurement scale and index. The idea of developing this resulted from devising an
instrument that could be used to test the hypotheses reliably. While it might seem strange to such a device for the discourse analysis, this is not the only case where it has been done: the research was inspired by the work of Steenbergen et al. (2003), who developed a measurement instrument for a discourse quality index. Drawing on Habermas’ discourse ethics Steenbergen et al. designed the discourse quality index to measure the extent to which discourse is deliberative. In terms of developing a measuring index, they pointed to four different criteria that should be met: it should be theory-based, establish an empirical connection, be general and be reliable.

While the discourse quality index serves a different inference, nonetheless, it also provides a perspective to develop an original structured ‘the order and distribution of discourses measure index’ as a measurement instrument since the thesis focused on the dominant discourse and the articulated perspective rather than the quality of the discourse. When it comes to meeting the set of criteria proposed by Steenbergen et al., the research and, in turn, the measurement index draws on the theoretical lenses of securitization, risk and governmentality; therefore, it is theory based. It links the rhetoric and discourse with the theoretical logic and measures the empirical data; thus, it taps into the empirical data. It operationalizes the analysis and the measurement processes through a structured and specified coding matrix, which draws on the developed criteria for evaluating models, logics and discourses matrix (see Table 3.1 on page 127) in which the categories are clear, and the classification is consistent, and it was informed by the theoretical lens benchmarks; therefore, it is assumed to be replicable and reliable.

Although the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses served as measurement instrument to operationalize and quantify the level of discourse, it was not concerned with the degree of excellence or whether the perspective implied or led to better or poorer outcomes; it posited the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses.

The order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses’ score not only facilitated the operationalization of the analysis through transforming data but also provided an overview that uncovered the models as well helped in gaining a more complex
understanding of the studied problem. The transformation process, therefore, can be seen as producing numerical data from the qualitative analysis.

Table 3.2 The Order and Distribution of Discourses Measure Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Governmentality</th>
<th>Securitization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R4</td>
<td>R3: R4/S1</td>
<td>S1: S4/R3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3: R4/S2</td>
<td>R4/S3</td>
<td>S2: S4/R2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2: R4/S3</td>
<td>R3/S2</td>
<td>S3: S4/R1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1: R4/S4</td>
<td>R2/S1</td>
<td>S4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>R</th>
<th>S</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: R: risk, S: securitization, the numbers accompanied R and S (e.g. R4/S1) refer to the number of observed benchmarks

The initial phase of analysis of the data illustrated that the dominant discourse might be articulated on the grounds of one logic dominated discourse or of competing logic involved discourses. Therefore, during the initial phase of analysis, the form and composition of the dominant discourse and the struggling discourses of the articulated discourse were noted, and these combinations were used as a basis to develop the structured measure index of the order and distribution of discourses (see Table 3.2).

The observed articulated dominant discourses were assigned and coded consistently by means of the structured index in which the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses` score ranges from 1 to -1, permitting each benchmark to score 1/4 in equal intervals between 1 and -1 (see Table 3.2). Accordingly, the content units code and, in turn, the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses` scores were assigned with regard to a computed number based on the calculation of the observed risk and the securitization benchmarks. As the risk and securitization were located diametrically, and as the observed number of benchmarks was measurable as 1/4 for each individual benchmark, the total score was the sum of the two logics based on the observed benchmark numbers in a given case. Accordingly, an equal-interval scale of measurement was devised in which each observed benchmark got 1/4 point; thus, the observed 4 benchmarks in sum come to 1. The content unit score was obtained by
adding all the observed benchmarks, while the negative number of the observed benchmarks that fell on the securitization side was added to the positive number of the observed benchmarks that fell on the risk side.

The displayed patterns within a text were identified through identifying the existing discourses and the degree of the competition in line with the order of the discourse. This reflected the score of the text. In the same vein, the displayed pattern across the texts and the articulated dominating discourse for the overall perspective of the relevant settings were identified by adding and computing the involved individual scores. While the score value does not indicate better or worse logic, logically locating the opportunity-linked logic and threat-linked logic diametrically opposite each other meant that governmentality-linked logic was located in the middle; thus, risk was shown with positive numbers and securitization with negative numbers. Accordingly, the score value is represented on positive and negative sides of the scale respectively, and a positive value would simply indicate an opportunity-linked logic and conversely a negative value would mean a threat-linked logic, while the zero would show a governmentality-linked logic. The scores were measured on the basis of the computed observed benchmarks; therefore, they displayed similar results across similar texts and across similar settings involving various texts.

The presentation of the findings and the discussion of the discourse results are tightly linked to and determined by the research question and the research problem.

The presentation of the results initially begins by presenting the findings of the statistical analysis phase, which entails displaying the research findings in the form of the numerical data based on the discourse analysis and produced through the coding process by NVivo and computed through SPSS. At that stage, the research findings are presented in the form of graphs and tables jointly. Analysing and discussing the research findings to fit the pieces of the research puzzle together proceed through merging the discourse analysis findings and their quantified form.

Therefore, while the presentation of the quantified dimension of the discourse analysis results focuses on the overall understanding of the research problem through statistical data and performed statistical tests, the presentation and discussion of the qualitative dimension focuses on developing more specifies ideas for an in-depth
understanding of the research problem and epitomizing the logics by providing a more critical analysis of the investigation of the displayed patterns of rupture and continuity.

3.5 Limitations and Delimitations

Investigating how immigration control discourse is articulated, in which the alternative discourses compete with one another to define, redefine and form the articulation of immigration control policies, the thesis has drawn on the immigration control policies and left the integration policies-oriented articulations out of the research context. Accordingly, the research has not collected integration-focused data; however, integration is also a part of immigration policy. Even though the included dataset pertinent to the articulation of immigration control policies is immense, integration-oriented data regarding assimilation, multiculturalism, community cohesion and citizenship might have provided an additional insight into the understanding of the articulations of the control policies.

In terms of the methodological procedures, the research did not conduct interviews due to two sensitivities. First, two major political events, the EU referendum and the 2017 General Election, took place during the data collection period; and second, the immigration issue is itself a sensitive issue to be spoken about in ordinary times, let alone just before and after elections and a referendum. While the discourse analysis of a wide range of written and spoken discourses has been done, the elite interviews as an additional dataset might have provided an additional in-depth context for the underlying rationale of the defining of an immigration reality by government elites. Therefore, as potential avenues for future research, the research might provide baselines to assist new research efforts, which aim to manipulate and compare generated results with elite interview-based studies.

3.6 Summary

This chapter provided the research design and methodology of the research. The chapter began by providing the nature of the research and restating the research
question and the hypotheses, followed by the epistemological premises of the qualitative research and a description of the multi-perspective framework of the research design. In terms of the research design, the research took the form of a case study, which served the purpose of the study. In keeping with the importance of the researcher standpoint, the type of method, analysis and interpretation that shape the understanding of the research problem were noted as pivotal in guiding the selection of the research design. The discourse theory and the theoretical lens of the securitization, governmentality and risk models relate back to the research’s theoretical perspectives.

The research selected a multi-perspective framework as an analysis method, in which the discourse analysis is embedded with risk, governmentality and securitization theories and the discourse analysis were supplemented by NVivo to add a more concrete, quantitative dimension for coding and retrieving the data and texts, comparing, contrasting and differentiating coded data with regard to their attributes and showing the conceptual relationships in order to test the hypotheses. The chapter further presented the data sources, which consists of political party general election manifestos, leaders’ speeches, parliamentary debates and policy papers. It discussed the methods of data analysis, and the operationalization and presentation of the findings, followed by the limitations of the research.

The following chapter provides details of the quantitative findings that were produced in the form of numerical data through the systematically documenting of the discourse analysis findings.
CHAPTER FOUR: QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS – THE NUMERICAL DATA OF THE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter Four presents the data that collected from general election manifestos, leaders’ and government elites’ speeches, parliamentary debates, and policy papers between 1997 and 2017. As discussed in Chapter Three, seven general election manifestos, 103 leaders’ and government elites’ speeches, 97 parliamentary debates, and 99 policy papers were identified as relevant and serving the objectives of the study. All share immigration control-related thematizations. Additionally, for the purpose of comparing governments and the opposition, party position and instruments settings 11 opposition-linked general election manifestos and 62 leaders’ speeches were collected which this dataset only emerged during the comparison of the governments and opposition level, the party level and the instruments level. The analysis of the data that proceeded through a systematic recording of the discourse analysis findings provided a wide understanding of the articulated discourse and perspectives and of the displayed patterns of the rupture and the continuity across governments, political parties, instruments and over time from the perspective of the theoretical lenses in Britain from 1997 to 2017.

The analysis of the 306 written and spoken discourses confirms that the Conservative-led governments’ discourse displayed rupture rather than continuity with the New Labour governments. While the first and second New Labour governments’ discourses were largely defined and constructed on a discourse of opportunity and an opportunity-linked risk articulation, the third New Labour government departed from the previously adopted opportunity-linked perspective to move towards a discourse of problematization and a governmentality-linked perspective. The dataset confirms that the Conservative-led governments disproportionately defined immigration control policies through a discourse of threat by which immigration was constructed as a site of fear and anxiety. Moreover, the analysis of the dataset provides empirical evidence for utilizing a multi-theoretical lens to uncover the multidimensionality of the
Chapter Four: Quantitative Findings

discourse and for the requirement of inserting the risk theory and the entrepreneur risk notion into immigration control studies.

The presentation of the quantified dimension of the discourse analysis findings – which are the quantitative findings of the numerical data of the findings of the discourse analysis – focuses on the overall understanding of the research problem and guides the research in terms of presenting the observed patterns within and across the texts systematically in order to test the proposed hypotheses. Accordingly, at this stage, the research findings are presented in the form of graphs inserted into and tables.

Chapter Four is organized into two sections. Section 4.1 presents the research findings of the quantitative dimension of the discourse analysis inference in the form of numerical data produced through a coding process that is computed with the assistance of NVivo. The section presents the finding of the articulated discourse, the deconstruction of the dominant articulation, and the explanatory dynamics findings through the graphs inserted into tables that was produced by exporting the matrix query run by NVivo to MS Excel. While the articulated discourse on immigration control posits the fixation of meaning, the benchmarks and the explanatory dynamics-linked findings display the deconstruction of the articulated discourse and the multi-layers of the construction of the articulation. Section 4.2 presents the results of the statistical tests. The statistical tests were performed to explore the variations and significances of the different settings, namely the different government levels, the opposition level, the different political parties’ level and the different discursive instruments level.

4.1 Patterns: Statistical Analysis

This part provides the quantitative dimension of the discourse analysis with the details of the produced numerical data. This phase facilitates the overall understanding of the studied phenomenon and, in turn, assists tracking the conceptual relationship and critical patterns and themes which requires more specific investigation, as well as enables testing the hypotheses and reporting the results.
4.1.1 The First and the Second New Labour Governments

The analysis of the discourse reveals that the articulations defined by the first and second New Labour governments were similar to each other, while some slight variations from government to government for the first and second New Labour governments were also mapped.

The discourse of opportunity that informed the immigration reality was deeply informed by sustained constructions of immigration as a contributory social force and as an opportunity, and in turn, the construction of the model of immigration control was characterized by an opportunity-linked risk in which immigration was assumed to be managed through risk management in the form of a flexible approach during the first and second New Labour governments.

Table 4.1 Articulated Discourse, First and Second Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articulated Discourse</th>
<th>The Order and Distribution of Discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st T</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd T</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses, during the first and second New Labour governments, the articulation was dominated by the discourse of opportunity and largely informed by the opportunity-linked logic (61% in the first term and 62% in the second term), followed by the discourse of problematization, which was informed by governmentality-linked logic (27% in the first term and 28% in the second term). During this period, support for the discourse of threat was notably low, with a percentage of around 11% for the overall articulated discourse. Thus, the result was an exemplification of the conception of the articulation of opportunity-linked risk which informed by the discourse of opportunity (see Table 4.1 above).
The discourse of opportunity is identified as the first articulated discourse in Britain during the studied period. The discourse of opportunity was based on opportunity-linked logic and rational risk management, which largely constructed immigration as a contributory social force and as an opportunity which, in turn, served to inform a more liberal approach on immigration control. The discourse of opportunity emphasized the future-oriented and opportunity-linked construction by which selection of the most beneficial option was aimed through routine measures that sought to manage governable risk subjects and manage future uncertainties.

Further examination of the composition of the discourse of opportunity articulated by the first and second New Labour governments, despite some variations, displayed an epitomization of a model of risk in which immigration largely was framed as a general, future and object-oriented manageable uncertainty (79% on average), in which profit was prioritized (80% on average); therefore, immigration was seen as an opportunity rather than a threat. The adopted language in immigration discourse, according to the dataset, encompassed a prioritizing of profits consideration. The discourse displayed a pattern of governance through rational risk management, which aimed to select the most beneficial option through long-term objectives-oriented conventional measures (80% on average), and preventative actions sought to avoid future uncertainty (79% on average). Thus, the control approach was based on preventive actions being aimed at reducing the need for the later immediate actions; accordingly, entrenched long-term objectives were pursued through routine measures (See Table 4.2 above).
[Chapter Four: Quantitative Findings]

Table 4.3 Explanatory Dynamics, the First and Second New Labour Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Societal</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Public Services</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Politicization</th>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st T</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd T</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to the explanatory dynamics, the results reveal that immigration control was structured and organized on the grounds of economic dynamics, which are identified as being the most prevalent rationalization theme (39% in the first term and 36% in the second term), followed by political dynamics (36% in the first term and 26% in the second term), and with a significant gap, by the public services dynamics (8% in the first term and 12% in the second term) during the first and second New Labour governments (see Table 4.3 above).

The results illustrate how the discourse of opportunity came to be strongly influenced by an articulation that conveyed immigration control from an economic point of view, in which the articulation posited the potential economic contribution and opportunity. A peculiarity was observed, however, in the political dynamics, which were at an all-time high rate during the first New Labour government concerning asylum seekers, which illustrated a variation in the form of a constriction aimed at lessening the pressure so as to ensure the constructed immigration system would not be undermined.

The results confirm the research’s proposal of utilizing the generic risk notion and opportunity-linked logic. The empirical data reveal that the articulation of immigration control policies in Britain between 1997 and 2005 suggests a distinctive dominant immigration control discourse which largely encompasses a profit- and opportunity-prioritized model of immigration control management. The displayed patterns, therefore, suggest that the articulations during the first two New Labour governments were largely informed by an opportunity-linked logic draws heavily on the generic risk notion and embodies a liberal immigration control and managerial logic.

The empirical data clearly suggest that the discourse on immigration was structured and organized through a multiplicity of inclusionary and exclusionary aims and
objectives as a set of control mechanisms. Thus, there are strong conceptual reasons for utilizing multiple theoretical approaches. Inserting an opportunity-linked logic into immigration control studies has provided an additional insight into the immigration control context.

4.1.2 The Third New Labour Government

The third New Labour government’s discourse to some extent differed from that of the previous New Labour governments. Immigration started slowly to be constructed as a problem, and the idea of opportunity was counterbalanced by the expectation of future threat-linked consideration.

Governmentality-linked logic started to sweep through the discourses; thus, the problematization was grafted on to an articulation in which the precautionary risk-linked perspective became the prevailing characteristics to flow through a government discourse in which governmentality-linked logic was embedded (see Table 4.4 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articulated Discourse</th>
<th>The Order and Distribution of Discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd T</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the order of discourse and distribution of the discourses, the dataset revealed that the change in the displayed pattern and in the model of immigration control took place during the third New Labour government in which the discourse of problematization became the dominant articulated discourse (52%), followed by the discourse of opportunity (39%) and the discourse of threat (10%) (Table 4.4 above). It seems that the previously adopted opportunity-linked perspective morphed into a precautionary risk management perspective during the third term of the New Labour government.
The discourse on immigration control articulated by the third New Labour government suggests a different pattern: a discourse of problematization, which was identified as the second articulated discourse during the studied period. The discourse of problematization, in which the emphasis was largely placed on the governance of immigration control from a governmentality-linked logic point of view, posited the modification of the previously articulated discourse of opportunity.

The discourse of problematization constructs immigration as a source of problems. Drawing on the governmentality and governmentality-linked logic offered by Aradau and Van Munster (2007), the discourse of problematization brings together the future with the present, profit with loss and reaction with prevention in which the boundaries between each pairing are blurred and a modification and readjustment of risk and securitization through strategic reconfiguration take place, in which one aspect was counterbalances by the counterparts as an opposite force.

The results reveal that while the discourse of opportunity largely informed the articulation during the first and second New Labour governments, the discourse of opportunity became intertwined with the discourse of threat, by which this intertwining and modification as to form the discourse of problematization represents the second distinctive discourse and control perspective identified for the 2005-2010 period. The discourse of problematization encompasses a model of governmentality for immigration management in which immigration control is informed largely by the construction of immigration as a problem, which led to less liberal control policies that were sought to limit more immigration.

The displayed form of the articulation of immigration control policies, on the other hand, was largely structured and organized through a rhetoric based on governmentality-linked logic and the discourse of problematization. But the awareness that immigration was a contributory force and opportunity also played its part in forming the control perspective; therefore, the view of immigration as a contributory social force was maintained, but it was relatively less pronounced in defining the entities during the third New Labour government.
Further examination of the deconstruction of the discourse of problematization reveals that the third term was marked by a notable change in the displayed patterns. The patterns of articulation of immigration control policies within which the problematization-linked logic operated was epitomized by the model of governmentality. The pattern posited an intertwinement of discourses, in which the discourse of opportunity is intertwined with the discourse of threat, which reveals a modification of the articulation towards an articulation which encompasses mainly a non-existential, object-oriented and future-oriented uncertainty (53%), in which profit (49%) was counterbalanced by loss (51%). The intertwinement was forced by the increased share of the threat-linked discourses. Therefore, the third New Labour government opted to formulate a discourse mainly around a formulation in which the future was counterbalanced with the present but with a non-existential threat consideration. The priority for the profit’s consideration, which was the dominant discourse during the previous New Labour governments, was counterbalanced by the opposing acknowledgment and priority of a loss consideration. Therefore, the definition of the immigration reality as a constructive social force and opportunity was replaced by the construction of it as a social problem. The scope of the opportunity started to give way to a discourse of problematization. Thus, a more precautionary-oriented risk management strategy, which aimed to adopt urgent and sophisticated measures, started to take place and took an increased share (51% on average) (see Table 4.5 above).

In other words, while, the average rate of the discourse of opportunity and opportunity-linked logic were higher than the discourse of problematization and the discourse of threat during the previous the New Labour governments, the third New Labour government, in contrast, opted to follow a discourse of problematization and a
precautionary risk-based approach more frequently, in which the discourse of opportunity was intertwined with the discourse of threat.

The modification of the two discourses as opposite forces through strategic readjustment led to heterogeneous elements of the discourse of problematization to surfaced at various levels. The governmentality-linked logic informed the articulation through reflecting a modification of the two models through rearranged objectives and sophisticated measures. Still, the third New Labour government, as well as the previous New Labour governments, abstained from conveying the existential threat consideration, which is the main component of the securitization notion when articulating the immigration control discourse.

Table 4.6 Explanatory Dynamics, the Third New Labour Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Dynamics</th>
<th>3rd T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Services</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicization</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the third New Labour government, similar to the previous New Labour governments, the economic dynamic is identified as being the most prevalent rationalization theme (32%). However, it should be noted that during this term, the political dimension was surpassed by the public services consideration; accordingly, the economic rationalization (32%) was followed by the public services dynamic (26%) and the political (18%) dynamics (see Table 4.6 above). The results illustrate that the economic dynamics, which were linked to the rationalization of defining the immigration reality and the construction of the control perspective, started to be accompanied more by a public services dynamic.

The section now turns to the articulation of the Conservative-led governments.
4.1.3 The Conservative-led Governments

The analysis of the discourse reveals that the articulation during the Conservative-led coalition and the Conservative government posits a strikingly different story from the preceding first and second New Labour governments and also a notably different picture from the third New Labour government. The results illustrate that the new model, structure and organization of the articulation that informed the control policies drew selectively on the construction of immigration as a present or perceived real threat.

Table 4.7 Articulated Discourse of the Conservative-led Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articulated Discourse</th>
<th>The Order and Distribution of Discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th T</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th T</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main feature that collectively reveals the outlook of the government on immigration control policies was significantly changed, in which the discourse of opportunity was replaced by a discourse of threat. The considerable increase in the share of a discourse based on a threat consideration and the decrease in opportunity-linked discourses marked two important patterns.

The order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses and the score value moved to the negative sides of the scale that represented the securitization side (see Table 4.7 above), which posited the greatest change in the position of the adopted discourse and in the government’s view on immigration control. Second, for the first time, the discourse of threat dominated the articulation that informed the immigration control policies (51% at the fourth and 52% at the fifth term). The discourse of threat was supplemented more by a discourse of problematization (36% on average) (see Table 4.7 above). The results also reveal that the percentage for the discourse of opportunity was higher during the fourth term compared to the fifth term. This might have resulted from the coalition effect, since the Liberal Democrats’ discourse was more moderate compared to the discourse of the Conservatives.
The changing pattern of the articulation describes the context in which the discourse of threat came to be entrenched in the immigration discourse. While the threat consideration scarcely existed as a form of definition of immigration during the preceding first and second New Labour governments and started to be intertwined with the discourse of opportunity during the third New Labour government, from the Conservative-led coalition onwards, there was a rapid expansion of the threat-linked construction of the control model. Therefore, these discourses led to the articulation of a threat-linked logic embedded immigration control perspective.

The discourse of threat is identified as the third articulated immigration control discourse in Britain during the studied period. It represents a recurring mode of immigration discourse that constitutes the influential discursive suggestions which were threat oriented. It justifies the desire of the governments to pursue a more restrictive control approach on immigration flows in general and to restrict immigrant access to social services and welfare system in particular. Additionally, it represents an influential discursive that focused on the adverse effect on public services as well as the societal impacts of immigrants. The discourse of threat emphasizes loss and constitutes immigration as (a constructed) perceived or real immediate threat; thus, the governments sought to stop mass immigration, with the aim of preventing Britain’s social, economic and societal aspects from being threatened.

Table 4.8 Deconstruction of the Articulated Dominant Discourse of the Conservative-led Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Exercise of Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th T</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th T</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The deconstruction of the discourse of threat which articulated by the Conservative-led governments, despite some variations, reveals that the rhetoric mainly conveyed the reality of an object-oriented and present threat (66% on average), in which loss
was prioritized (70% on average) (see Table 4.8 above). Therefore, in contrast to the preceding New Labour governments, the loss consideration was highlighted. This fundamental change was entirely consistent with relational values and ways of organizing the discourses which conveys immigration as a threat. What characterizes this model of securitization was an emphasis upon the present or perceived real threat consideration which became a significant part of the discourse. Despite some variations, the Conservative-led coalition and the Conservative government’s strategies focused more on adopting immediate short-term objectives (70% on average) followed by a management aimed at applying extraordinary measures as a reaction to the current situation and responding immediately (69% on average) (see Table 4.8 above). Conveying an extraordinary measure more frequently was a notable shift, which posited the main differences from the preceding governments. Therefore, during these terms, immigration control discourses were articulated mainly on the grounds of precautionary oriented, urgent and sophisticated usual/unusual measures. The problematization-linked discourse overlapped considerably with the threat-linked discourse, which might be understood as justifying precautionary-linked immigration controls. This means that the constructed immigration reality had more emphasis on a threat consideration, which made the discourse of threat an important aspect that informed the articulation of the immigration control policies.

The analysis of the discourse reveals that the Conservative-led governments sought to adjust their approach towards immigration. Central to this adjustment was the growing definition of immigration within a threat linked logic, which included emphasizing loss as the basis for the immigration discourse which epitomized a model of securitization. This major change intensified during the fifth term, which aimed to reverse the net immigration trend. This was a big shift in defining the reality that took place to replace the discourse of opportunity and the opportunity-linked logic approach which flowed during the first and second New Labour governments as the dominant discourse, and the discourse of problematization during the third New Labour government with the discourse of threat. The immigration-related concerns that were accompanied by a logic of opportunity, therefore, were transformed into a (constructed) perceived or real immediate threat-linked logic. Immigration was subject to precautionary-risk management. The new form of discourse assisted the
construction of the instigated devices; thus, in this way, the articulated immigration control policies held sway.

Table 4.9 Explanatory Dynamics of the Conservative-led Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Dynamics</th>
<th>4th T</th>
<th>5th T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Societal</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Services</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicization</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When it comes to associated dynamics, in contrast to the previous governments, the Conservative-led governments’ discourses were dominated by linking immigration control to the public services dynamic and the relevant rationalization (31% at the fourth term, 33% at the fifth term), followed by the economic dynamic (23%) and societal (17%) dynamics (see Table 4.9 above). Without discounting the other associated dynamics, the explanation for the rise in the prevalence of the public services dynamic suggests that a public services thematization becomes institutionalized as a consistent form of rationalization for controlling immigration, while the societal dynamic started to become an important player in shaping the configuration of the immigration control policies. The public services and societal thematization-oriented discourse, as noted in Chapter 2, however, links a fear and anxiety-linked rationalization to the perspective and interprets immigration as a burden and threat, and, in turn, a site of fear and anxiety.

In summary, the findings suggest that, initially, the articulated discourse evolved in the form of a discourse of opportunity, in which it reflected opportunity-linked logic by privileging the contributory aspect of immigration and, then, was modified by intertwining the discourse of opportunity with a discourse of threat. This modification and intertwinement led to a discourse of problematization, finally, the intertwining followed by the replacement of the discourse of opportunity with the discourse of threat, which was filtered and re-expressed in a highly rationalized way over time.

The language and construction of immigration as a source of fear and anxiety, and in turn as a threat become consistent and widely diffused as the prevalent immigration
discourse, in which the patterns displayed rupture rather than continuity with the previously adopted opportunity linked construction of immigration as a constructive force. The articulation of immigration control policies became a form of construction that heavily embodies a problematization and threat-linked logic and precautionary-risk management, through which threat came to be merged with immigration control management predominantly.

The following second turns to illustrating the findings related to the party’s position, government versus opposition and the party when in opposition and the discursive instruments.

4.1.4 Party, In Opposition and Instruments

The findings reveal that the articulation of the dominant discourse on immigration differed between the Labour party, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative party in Britain during the last two decades.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Articulated Discourse</th>
<th>The Order and Distribution of Discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Gov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LibDem</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the preferences for moving towards the party ideology, it is to be expected that the Labour and the Conservative would tend to diverge, as the Conservative would tend to be more restrictive and the policy positions would diverge from the Labour. In terms of the order of discourse and distribution of the discourses related to the party position, analysis of the political discourse reveals that while the Labour party preferred largely opportunity-linked logic and a discourse of opportunity (53%) to present immigration control policies, support for the threat side constituted a small percentage of the overall articulated discourses (12%). The Liberal Democrats preferred governmentality-linked logic (42%), supplemented with opportunity-linked
discourses (39%). The Conservative Party, on the other hand, opted to follow a threat-linked discourse (56%), supplemented with governmentality-linked discourses (31%) to articulate the immigration control policies (see Table 4.10 above). Overall, the Labour presented control policies that were not only far more moderate than those of the Conservative, they were even less restrictive than those of the LibDems.

Table 4.11 Articulated Discourses of the Government and the Opposition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articulated Discourse</th>
<th>The Order and Distribution of Discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov/Opp Risk Gov. Sec.</td>
<td>1 0.75 0.5 0.25 0 -0.25 -0.5 -0.75 -1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>37% 36% 27% 11% 12% 8% 7% 36% 13% 4% 5% 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition</td>
<td>19% 15% 66% 2% 6% 6% 6% 15% 31% 9% 12% 14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of the political discourse makes clear that the overall saliency of the discourse of opportunity has clearly increased when the setting moves from office exclusion to the government level. With regard to office exclusion level, in terms of the order of discourse and distribution of the discourses, the research findings illustrate that the governments tended to articulate immigration control policies more on the grounds of opportunity-linked logic (37%), followed by governmentality-linked logic (36%) and a threat-linked logic (27%), while the articulation while in opposition was dominated by threat-linked discourses (66%) followed by opportunity-linked logic (19%) and governmentality-linked logic (15%). Therefore, the government level posited a relatively more moderate articulation compared to the articulation of being in opposition (see Table 4.11 above). Overall, the prevailing results that the political parties reconsidered its policy positions and the discursive articulation when moving to government should be stated.
Table 4.12 Articulated Discourse of Parties at Government and Opposition Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Articulated Discourse</th>
<th>The Order and Distribution of Discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Gov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor/Gov</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour/Opp</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative/Gov</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative/Opp</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LibDem/Gov</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LibDem/Opp</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of the political discourse makes clear that the Labour tended to keep a distance from a discourse of threat, while Liberals were slightly restrictive, they tended to maintain a preference for a discourse of problematization. The Conservatives tended to be restrictive and they were continuously quite rigid with respect to control policy for newcomers. Further investigation of the government versus opposition level through deconstructing the articulations into party positions linked to government and office exclusion reveal that the political parties tended to increase the preference for a discourse of opportunity, and moderate their stance when moving into office, for instance, in terms of the percentage of the threat linked logic, the preferences decreased from (29%) to (9%) for the Labour Party and from (19%) to (17%) for the Liberal Democrats. This change was more notable in the Conservative Party case. For instance, threat-linked discourses were (74%) at the opposition level but dropped to (52%) while in office (see Table 4.12 above). Overall, moderating the positions when moving to government appears to be a common phenomenon among the studied parties in this policy field.

Table 4.13 Articulated Discourse Through Instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Articulated Discourse</th>
<th>The Order and Distribution of Discourses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Gov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manifesto</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speech</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debate</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Paper</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When it comes to instruments settings by which the immigration control policies were presented, this analysis indicates that the written discursive instruments followed a fairly consistent preference for a discourse of opportunity, while the spoken discursive instruments were far less tempted to opt to articulate a discourse of opportunity, which they tended to maintain the restrictionist approaches. Analysis of the political discourse makes clear that, in terms of the order of discourses and distribution of their discourses, while the manifestos and policy papers draw on opportunity-linked logic and the discourse of opportunity (94% and 65% respectively), the speeches and parliamentary debates draw largely on threat-linked and the discourse of threat (39% and 45% respectively) followed by governmentality-linked logic and the discourse of problematization (32% and 45% respectively) (see Table 4.13 above). Overall, the displayed patterns of written discourse tended to follow more liberal approaches while the spoken discourses largely conveyed less liberal approaches.

In particular, the research findings highlight how the articulations varied across different contexts, both within a given context (e.g. that governments) and across different discourses (e.g. between policy papers and debates).

The findings also can be read to understand how the articulations might be connected to different settings and linked to specific groups and their characteristic discourses and the way that these different contexts were often in competition with each other over the constitutions of the articulations. In addition, particular discourses did not just exist in one setting but were often shared across different settings through various instruments. Thus, the constructed meanings and the articulated discourses did not just reside in an individual setting; but very often the discourses were in conversation and negotiation between the settings through the interactions of the instruments. Furthermore, as discourses, and, indeed, the articulations developed and evolved, the settings often continually revised and modified their standpoints. All these settings together constitute an interrelated network, within which each of the components sequentially provided a particular style of structure and organization that gave meaning to the discourses that were articulated.

In particular, the findings revealed how the discourses operated to create complex patterns of articulation across actors and over time. The results also revealed that the
articulations were variable; they were different across different governments, political parties and settings, including the New Labour governments, which were formed by the same political party. The articulations changed with time and with other changes in the political landscape, as well as with the used instruments (see Tables 4.1 to 4.13 above).

Therefore, the definition of immigration and control management were presented through a changing and dynamic assembly of discourses which can be articulated differently through different discourses by different actors over time. The whole idea of seeing ‘control of immigration’ as an investment in politics that ‘pays off’ was a dominant discourse that was used predominantly across many actors and over time. ‘Control’ was a rich source of immigration politics, though, of course, it was not signalled by all actors to the same degree. For example, immigration was signalled by a set of settings pertinent to the Conservative party in ways that were a source of fear and anxiety.

While the discourse of opportunity reflected a predominately constructive set of circumstances and liberalization, the discourse of threat largely represented a concern of negative outcomes and the determination to favour more restrictive approaches; the discourse of problematization, on the other hand, was configured the former and, later, through strategic readjustment and reconfiguration, discursively.

The analysis of the quantitative dimension of the discourse analysis reiterates the strengths of the utilized lenses in accounting for the displayed patterns. Therefore, the research argues that using only one theoretical lens can limit one’s perspective on understanding the construction of an articulation. It is also clear from the findings that the set of different theoretical lenses used needs to be considered when studies attempt to gain a comprehensive picture of articulations.

The point here is that an openness to multiple theoretical understandings through a juxtaposition of the multiple theoretical lenses assisted the research to uncover the complexity of the construction of the articulation and revealed that an opportunity-linked logic lens is also valuable; an opportunity-linked logic, which entails prioritizing profit and opportunity as an essential aspect of establishment can simultaneously
construct and, in turn, reflect the situation or context in which it was used to inform the articulation.

The chapter turns now to the statistical tests’ results.

4.2 Rupture and Continuity: Statistical Tests

This section presents the results of the statistical tests performed to explore the variations and significances of the displayed patterns between the different settings: terms, government, opposition, political parties and instruments of rhetoric.

The research ran the statistical tests to ascertain the significance of the findings in which the quantified data were generated from the qualitative components.

4.2.1 Governments

The section starts by investigating the significances across the governments over the studied period. The research tested hypothesis 1, that: The displayed patterns of the articulation will differ significantly between the Conservative-led governments and the New Labour governments. In other words, the form of the articulation of immigration control policies will display a rupture rather than continuity and differ significantly between the Conservative-led governments and the New Labour governments. The test resulted in the confirmation of the prediction at a $p < .05$ level\(^4\) (see Appendix C for the tests results.)

To identify which government differed from the rest, post hoc comparisons test were performed and the post hoc test comparisons indicated that the model and articulation

\(^4\) A Kruskal-Wallis (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952) test was run to assess if there were differences in the order of the discourse and distribution of the discourses’ score between governments: the first term ($n = 59$), second term ($n = 58$), third term ($n = 62$), fourth term ($n = 69$) and fifth term ($n = 58$). The distributions of the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses’ scores were not similar for all terms, which is checked by visual inspection of a boxplot. The immigration control discourse’s score was statistically significantly different between the governments, $\chi^2(4) = 80.603$, $p = .000$.  

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of the dominant discourse of the Conservative-led governments significantly differed from that of the New Labour governments \( (p < .05) \), while the comparison between the former and the latter displayed non-significant \( (p > .05) \) differences.\(^5\)

The analysis of the testing of the hypothesis 1 results reveals that while there existed statistically significant differences between the New Labour governments and the Conservative-led and Conservative governments, which supports the overall hypothesis, the articulation of the third New Labour government was peculiar and did not match the overall prediction for the New Labour governments.

4.2.2 Government versus Opposition

The analysis of government/opposition settings involved comparing the dataset between government and opposition-related datasets. The research tested the hypothesis 2, which proposes that: The displayed patterns of the articulation will differ significantly between government level and when out of office. In other words, based on the assumptions that while in opposition, the immigration control discourse and the views on immigration control will reflect a more restrictive approach for which the government could be held responsible for the policy output, which the opposition discourse will differ from the articulation of the dominant discourse of the government.

With regard to the hypothesis 2 tests, the results indicated that the immigration control discourse significantly differed between being in office and in opposition at a \( p < .05 \) level and findings posit that the ruling parties were tempted to follow more

\(^5\) Post hoc comparison test were run by Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction to carry out multiple comparisons. The results are presented using adjusted \( p \)-values. The test revealed statistically significant differences in the immigration control discourses between the fourth term (mean rank = 105.30) and the first term (mean rank = 195.86) \( (p = .000) \); between the fifth term (mean rank =98.30) and the first term \( (p = .000) \); between the fourth term and the second term (mean rank=200.35) \( (p = .000) \); between the fourth term and the third term (mean rank=174.62) \( (p = .000) \); between the fifth term and the third term \( (p = .000) \); and between the fourth term and the third term \( (p=.002) \), but not between any other governments combination.
moderate views on immigration control when compared to being out of office\(^6\) (see Appendix C for the tests results).

The research findings posit that the ruling parties were tempted to moderate their views on immigration control and soften their stances compared to their opposition stands. Another dimension of the moderation of views on immigration might be that a government, faced with the task of managing immigration control policies, tends to choose a pragmatic path of immigration management which might require a flexible stance, rather than one which is necessarily rigid. Therefore, the opposition level’s articulations appear concerned more about electoral interests and the office exclusion effect associated with the concerns of voters, while the ruling level posits the recognition of the need, such as, for economic immigration within a less restrictionist approaches oriented framework that deals with, such as, the structural demand and needs of the labour market. Overall, the results of this analysis indicate that the political discourse of a government can be read as more moderate and even less restrictive than those of the office exclusion.

4.2.3 Political Parties

To explore whether the articulation of the dominant discourse, the model of the immigration control policies differed regarding the political parties, the research proposed hypothesis 3, which is that: The displayed patterns of articulations differ significantly between the studied centre-right parties and their centre-left counterparts understudy.

\(^6\) A Mann-Whitney U (Mann and Whitney, 1947) test was performed to determine if there were differences in the order of discourse and distribution of discourses’ score between government (n=306) and opposition (n=73) level discourse on immigration control policies. Distributions of the score for government and opposition were not similar. The scores for government (mean rank = 195.47) were statistically significantly higher than for opposition (mean rank = 167.05), \(U = 9.494\), \(z = -2.039\), \(p = .041\).
According to the dataset, the result supports hypothesis 3 and reveals that the immigration control discourse was statistically significantly different between the studied political parties at $p<.05$ level\(^7\), for the studied period.

To explore which party differed from the rest, post-hoc comparisons were performed, and the analysis revealed that the Conservative differed significantly both from Labour and the Liberal Democrats, while there existed no significant differences between Labour and the Liberal Democrats\(^8\) (see Appendix C for the tests results).

In other words, the findings posit that the Conservative party tended to take a stronger and firm stand in which immigration was perceived as a real or perceived threat that reflected the threat perspective. The Labour and the Liberal Democrats, on the other hand, were inclined to opt for a more flexible approach, which posits the benefits of immigration and managing immigration control, reflecting a model of risk and an opportunity-linked perspective.

The findings reveal that the articulation of the dominant discourse differed statistically significantly between the studied centre-right parties and their centre-left counterparts in Britain during the last two decades. As the literature review indicated, while a liberal immigration perspective and supporting immigration are more likely to be adopted by left-wing parties, the political parties on the centre-right tend to support more restrictionist perspectives (Freeman, 2011; Bale, 2008). The discourse analysis and the performed test supports these proposals. More generally, this is not surprising as not only it might be assisted by the structure of the party politics (Massetti, 2015), but also the notable differences between the two political parties, in terms of party ideology and the stances towards immigration support the discrepancies between their

\(^7\) A Kruskal-Wallis (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952) test was performed to evaluate if there were differences in the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses’ score between political parties that differed in their discourses on immigration control policies: The Labour Party (n = 193), the Conservative party (n = 148) and The Liberal Democrats (n = 38). Distributions of scores were not similar for all parties, as assessed by checking through boxplot. Scores were statistically significantly different between the different political party levels, $\chi^2(2) = 98.464$, $p = .000$.

\(^8\) Post-hoc comparisons test using Dunn’s (1964) procedure was run with a statistical significance that accepted at the $p < .05$ level. This pairwise comparison revealed statistically significant differences in the articulation scores between the Conservative party (mean rank = 122.98) and the Labour party (mean rank = 238.56) ($p = .000$) and the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats party (mean rank= 204.42) ($p = .000$) immigration control discourses, but not between the Labour party and the Liberal Democrat party.
respective articulations of immigration control policies. The investigation also shows that the Conservative party appears to be more concerned about immigration and hesitates to support a liberal approach, thus being more amenable to favouring restrictions on immigration strategies compared to their counterparts.

4.2.4 Discourse Instruments

When it comes to instruments, the research investigated the relevant datasets to explore whether the various discourse instruments posited a significant different articulation of the dominant discourse. The research proposed the following hypothesis 4, which is that: The displayed patterns on immigration control policies differ significantly between the spoken and written rhetoric. In other words, general election manifestos and policy papers as written discourse instruments are more likely to place greater importance on supporting relatively moderate strategies with more flexible approaches, while leaders’ speeches and parliamentary debates as the spoken discourse instruments are more likely to express the necessity of the need for adopting relatively restrictive/rigid approaches when articulating control policies. Based on the dataset, the results of the tests show a significant difference between the four instruments at p<.05 level.9

To identify which instrument differs from the rest, post-hoc comparisons were carried out and the analysis revealed that there was a statistically significant difference between written discourse instruments and spoken discourse instruments; however, there were non-significant differences at (p < .05) level in terms of a comparison within the set of the former and the latter.10 The results also suggest that the former

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9 A Kruskal-Wallis (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952) test was conducted to see if there were significant differences in the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses’ scores between discourse instrument groups: the manifestos (n = 18), Speeches (n = 165), Debate (n = 97) and policy papers (n = 99) rhetoric instruments groups. Distributions of the scores were not similar for all instruments, as assessed by looking at a boxplot. The order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses’ scores were statistically significantly different between the different instrument groups, χ2(3) = 103.297, p = .000.

10 Using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, a pairwise comparisons test was run. The results were presented by the adjusted p-values. The pairwise comparison test reveals statistically significant differences in articulation scores between speech (mean rank= 166.03) and
and the latter posited different nuances: the spoken discourse did not always match up with the written discourse. Moreover, while the former indicates a more moderate and flexible stand, the latter posits a relatively firmer and more rigid stand (see Appendix C for the tests results).

4.3 Summary

In Chapter Four, the findings of the discourse analysis were presented according to the research question and its aims.

In summary, the data provided information about the displayed patterns of articulation as well as the displayed patterns of rupture and continuity among the governments, the different groups and the settings for the last two decades in Britain. Statistically significant differences were found between the New Labour governments and the Conservative-led governments, as well as between the parties when forming government and being in opposition, between the Labour party and the Conservative party and between written and spoken discourse settings.

The key findings are that the Conservative-led governments’ discourse displayed rupture rather than continuity with the New Labour governments’ perspective, while the first and second New Labour governments also differed notably from the third New Labour government. The analysis of the discourse casts no doubt on the validity of the proposed hypotheses. In a very broad sense, the articulation became less liberal when the sets changed from the New Labour governments to the Conservative-led governments, from government level to an out-of-office level, from the Labour party to the Conservative party, and from written discourse to spoken discourse. Nuanced variations were also mapped out within the component of each set, such as within the New Labour governments, parties while in government and in opposition, the Labour party and the Conservatives and written and spoken discourses.

manifesto (mean rank = 300.44) (p = .000); between debate (mean rank= 133.55) and manifesto (p = .000); between speech and policy papers (mean rank = 265.18) (p = .000) and debate and policy papers (p = .000), but not between any other instruments combination.
Altogether, these different settings spell out immigration control policies, with special reference to constructing the articulations in certain ways. Political discourses used by the different settings assisted in assembling or triggering specific situated meanings in complex ways for specific purposes. In turn, these situated meanings informed certain discourses predominantly, and not others. These situated meanings, thereby, intensified the public-sensitivity issue with the potential of risking the specific purposes of the articulation. Thus, a relatively more restrictionist discourse may trigger or intensify the unease that aggregates fear and anxiety levels, which, in turn, might potentially contribute to broadening the gap between discourse and policy outcomes.

Informed by the findings from the quantitative dimension of the discourse analysis, the next chapter moves to a more detailed and a more critical qualitative analysis of the articulations.
CHAPTER FIVE: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction

In this chapter, the discourse analysis focuses on developing more specific ideas for gaining an overall understanding of the articulation. It provides a more critical analysis of the investigation of the displayed patterns within and across texts, assisted and guided by the systematically noting of how immigration control policies were constructed, organized and presented by the relevant actors, and how the articulations evolved, were intertwined and were transformed into specific forms over time.

Chapter Five is organized into two sections. Section 5.1 provides an interpretation of a detailed and critical analysis of an investigation of the displayed patterns and knowledge building through exemplifying of the epitomization and variations of the articulations. Section 5.2 discusses and evaluates the explanatory dynamics and reveals the complexity and flexibility of the explanatory dynamics through the interaction to structure and organize the articulation.

5.1 Discourses, Epitomization and Variations

This section discusses the findings of the discourse analysis performed on discourses articulated by the British governments from 1997 to 2017. The results were divided into three periods, which correspond to periods which epitomize three discourses, and three perspectives came to the fore. Accordingly, it starts by discussing the discourse articulated by the first and second New Labour governments, followed by the third New Labour government, and then the Conservative-led governments.

Framing the analytical framework to deal with the order of the discourses and the distribution of the discourses, the research deconstructs the discourses to look at the order through the characteristics and exercise of power components as core elements of the models. These played a role in mirroring the order of the discourses and their
distribution and, in turn, the structuration and organization of the patterns of articulation of the immigration control policies. As the quantitative dimensions of the discourse analysis were provided in Chapter Four, Section 4.1 and 4.2, in detail, this section focuses more on qualitative interpretations.

5.1.1 The Discourse of Opportunity on Immigration Control: 1997-2005

The articulations by the first and second the New Labour governments was opportunity-linked logic based, with the main purpose of ensuring effective immigration control management. The initial reorganization of the immigration control system was initiated in 1998. It was introduced to address immigration management strategies through strengthening long-term planning based on a ‘fairer, faster and firmer’ strategy as a modern approach (PP, 1998, 27 July 1998), followed by a series of policy documents, such as Secure Borders, Safe Havens: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain (PP, 2002, 7 February 2002). Consistent with the ideas of liberal immigration control politics, a clear distinction that prioritized opportunity and profit mirrored clearly a logic of opportunity-based ideas and values in form of a model of risk. The discourse analysis reveals that the prevailing presentation adopted to support and promote the reorganization in immigration management structure during the late 1990s and early 2000s was related to opportunity-linked logic and the discourse of opportunity.

For instance, in terms of the characteristic benchmark, the first and second New Labour governments articulated an immigration control model mainly through future-oriented, manageable and contributory-based conceptualizations that fall into the discourse of opportunity and opportunity-linked logic; the model drew heavily on the generic risk notion and embodied a liberal immigration control and managerial logic. While the articulation is dominated by the discourse of opportunity, the struggle and competition took place largely with virtually present problem-oriented discourses, which falls into the discourse of problematization and the governmentality-linked logic. The existential and present threat-oriented thematization, on the other hand, which falls into the discourse of threat, was notably excluded during the articulation of the dominant discourse.
The immigration discourse was largely focused on general, future and object-oriented thematization. The below quoted statement made by The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Angela Eagle, during a parliamentary debate, like many similar statements posits how immigration was constructed as a general phenomenon.

“...we face the ever-greater effects of globalisation.... Millions of people aspire to better their economic circumstances and, understandably, want to migrate in order to do so. At the same time, modern transport systems have facilitated mass movement across the world” (HC, 2002, 24 April Second Reading Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill).

Similarly, during a parliamentary debate (HC, 1999, 18 January), for example, the government revealed an object-oriented perspective, which referred to implementing a comprehensively integrated strategy to reform the immigration system in which the government suggested that the organization and system for controlling immigration would be reorganized. The distinctive challenge to the immigration control was the system itself and therefore, the government insisted, it needed to be effectively managed. The thematization suggested the whole purpose of the new approach.

The articulation amounted to a typical presentation of the general, internal and object-oriented construction and noted the increased number of economic migrants and asylum-seekers and the related pull factors.

"There is nothing more controversial, and yet more natural, than men and women from across the world seeking a better life for themselves and their families. Ease of communication and of transportation have transformed the time it takes to move across the globe. This ease of movement has broken down traditional boundaries. Yet the historic causes of homelessness, hunger or fear – conflict, war and persecution – have not disappeared. That is why economic migration and the seeking of asylum are as prevalent today as they have been at times of historic trauma" (PP, 2002, 7 February 2002).

The statement below clearly posits the overall articulation of the government, suggesting that the New Labour administrations were keen to ensure that their
immigration control policies were based upon the prospective benefits that migration could bring to British economy and also recognising that long-term contribution could be maintained if the reconstruction of the immigration system could potentially provide a solution to the challenge of increased asylum claims.

“Migration is an inevitable reality of the modern world and it brings significant benefits. But to ensure that we sustain the positive contribution of migration to our social well-being and economic prosperity, we need to manage it properly .... Those who wish to work and to contribute to the UK, as well as those who seek to escape from persecution, will then receive the welcome they deserve ... the perception that Britain is a stable and attractive place in which to settle. This view arises not simply because of our buoyant and successful economy, and the employment opportunities it has brought, ...We should be proud that this view of the UK is held around the world...” (PP, 2002, 7 February 2002).

The belief was that Britain was prosperous, safe and stable, and desirable country to live in, one where English was spoken and there was a successful economy, an investment environment and employment opportunities (PP, 2002, 7 February 2002). The statements and related discourse suggested that immigration was seen as a general element linked to contributory discourses focusing on internal determinants, such as the qualities that Britain possessed. Immigration control, therefore, is understood as a tool which needs to be constitutive to assist competitive and effective governance.

The articulation of the government’s approach towards immigration was largely determined by contributory-based considerations, without downgrading the awareness that there was a need for improving the existing system and implementing more comprehensive and fair immigration control policies. It also does not discount the peculiarity of asylum-seeker-related explanations in specific cases, particularly for bogus asylum-seekers, which can be seen from the below statement.

“Modernising our controls and simplifying our procedures will help to tackle that problem. The current arrangements for supporting asylum seekers are a shamble. New arrangements are needed to ensure that genuine asylum seekers
are not left destitute, but which minimise the attractions of the UK to economic migrants” (PP, 1998, 27 July 1998).

Nature benchmark was denoted more or less by similar considerations during the New Labour governments’ first and second periods, for example, speaking about attracting more international students, Tony Blair (1999, 18 June, Speech on Attracting More International Students) talked about beginning long-term strategies to endorse Britain as the first choice for economic immigration, particularly for international students. To grasp the articulation, it is necessary to understand the variety of discourses aiming to articulate the perspective. The research identified that despite the variations which will be noted and discussed in immigration control discourse, in the broadest terms, Tony Blair had his own conceptualization and methodology for immigration and related controls, which embodies a number of neoliberal ideas. From this point of view, immigration was seen in its variety as a potential contributory resource and a basis for an opportunity-linked logic that needed oversight. For example, during the conference speech 2005, Tony Blair (2005, 27 October, Brighton, conference speech 2005) stated that as a liberal economy, the UK must act to remain competitive in a globalized world; foreign investment, he noted, contributed to the economy, and he added, in contrast to what the Conservatives stated in their campaign, immigration made Britain stronger, not weaker.

It appears that the government’s interests with regard to immigration grew in response to neoliberal ideas and an economic climate which favoured immigration and labour market access for immigrants. The government also emphasized that economic prosperity and long-term economic development would not be maintained without facilitating and attracting the needed immigrants. Therefore, the governments called for less restrictive immigration control policies in order to facilitate immigrant access to Britain.

It seems nature benchmark-linked thematization played the role of including internal, general and future-oriented considerations and an opportunity perspective and excluding the existential and immediate threat-oriented consideration as well as the fear perspective. However, the competition to establish the meaning between the discourses mainly took place within the asylum-seeker and illegal immigration
context, as can be seen from the below statements taken from a parliamentary debate made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Jack Straw:

“...is to do with tightening controls on illegal immigration and against the abuse of the asylum process, but immigration control must also act fairly in respect of all those lawfully resident in this country who, for example, wish to receive visits from family members abroad...” (HC, 1999, Feb 22 second reading Immigration and Asylum Bill).

And from the Minister for Citizenship and Immigration Beverley Hughes:

“We are working closely with the French Government to deal with the problem of illegal immigration from France, and the trafficking networks which bring so many of these illegal immigrants across Europe. We are making efficient use of intelligence to target resources against organized immigration crimes, and we are investing in new technologies to detect and deter those attempting to enter the United Kingdom” (2002, 08 July HC Deb, Parliamentary Debate).

The peculiarity of the competition and the struggle of the discourse within the case and across cases reflect the specific consideration, which will be discussed throughout the section. An illegal immigration thematization provided the discourse of threat with a base to flow, while an asylum seeker thematization assisted the governmentality-linked logic and the discourse of problematization. As will be discussed in Section 5.2.2, the relatively high rate of a political and security dimension, which was informed by the asylum seeker crises and 9/11 fears, affected the discourses and assisted the competing discourses in dominating the immigration control policies.

Therefore, it can be suggested that the nature subcategories displayed that a discourse of opportunity and opportunity-linked logic were unfolding.

The language used to link the risk of the subject to the referent object, similar to above-discussed nature sub-indicator, was largely positive and privileged profit during the first and second New Labour governments, which posited the discourse of opportunity and an opportunity-linked logic, competed with balanced statements and the priority of a loss consideration, which reflect a governmentality-linked logic.
The competing discourses, for example, expressed the notion of protecting genuine refugees, on the one hand, and addressing abuse, on the other hand. Tony Blair’s statement made during the Party conference speech clearly posited the relevant articulation:

“Britain should always be open to refugees. We can be proud of the part immigration has played in this country. But economic migrants should come in through a proper immigration process. Changing the law on asylum is the only fair way of helping the genuinely persecuted…” (Tony Blair, 2003, 30 September Bournemouth, Labour party conference)

During the first New Labour governments, a policy paper noted the perceived concerns and pointed to reforming the immigration system by which genuine asylum seekers would be welcomed, but the attractiveness of the relevant accessibilities was to be minimized (PP, 1998, 27 July 1998). Also, the contributions of previous asylum migrants were emphasized, a statement taken from a parliamentary debate made by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Mike O’Brien, illustrates how the government viewed the issue.

“We all agree that immigrants have made an enormous contribution to Britain: every area of British life has been enriched by their presence. The Government welcome immigrants who are lawfully in this country and who make a contribution to our society. We also welcome genuine visitors…” (HC, 1999, Feb 22 second reading Immigration and Asylum Bill).

The government noted the enormous contribution made by immigrants to Britain and offered the possibility of welcoming immigrants who would make a contribution to society.

The adopted language followed similar characteristics, avoiding a subtle tone of blame and emphasizing attractiveness. From Power’s (2007:68) point of view, opportunity-linked risk management operates in the sense of attracting rather than a disciplining manner.
During the New Labour governments, the dominant perspective that marked the language was making the most of the economic migration and benefiting positively, while advocating the humanitarianism and moral obligations in addressing the asylum seeker numbers. This perspective clearly conveyed in the statement made during a parliamentary debate by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, David Blunkett:

“We need a balanced approach, managed migration allows those throughout the world who have a contribution to make, and who are seeking a better life for themselves, to enter this country through a system of economic migration that is properly organised and trusted by the British people ... to ensure that new forms of economic migration can meet the needs of the service economy and of those who have high skills, to contribute their diversity and strengths to the well-being of our country, we must also strengthen the welcome for those who seek asylum from death and persecution ... If we can take nationality and asylum out of the political football arena for the main political parties, not by ignoring the subject or by burying our heads in the sand and hoping that it will go away—or by ignoring people’s fears or the criticism that comes from the media—but by tackling it head on” (HC, 2002, 24 April Second Reading Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill).

This perspective revealed that the government promised to meet international obligations to accommodate asylum seekers, while ensuring the economy would be positively contributed to by the economic migration. It gave the assurance that the immigration system would deal with related challenges firmly but fairly and would minimize the scope for the far right to the play immigration card.

Therefore, the findings reveal that the governments were in agreement that more liberal approaches facilitating labour immigration were a necessity. At the same time, they suggested that the political dynamics should be carefully presented to correspond and assist the overall perspective and harmonize with the economic dynamics.
As an illustration of how the situated meaning was structured and organized on the basis of the opportunity linked construction, Tony Blair, speaking to the Confederation of British Industry on migration (2004, 27 April 2004), stated:

“So those who say migration is out of control or that the UK is taking more people than other countries are simply wrong. As are those who suggest that we exert no control over who comes here. Those who do come here make a huge contribution, particularly to our public services...far from always or even mainly being a burden on our health or education system migrant workers are often the very people delivering those services ... Government to put in place the policies and rules that make migration work for Britain” (Tony Blair, 27 April 2004).

As can clearly be seen from the above statement, the articulation indicates a model of risk embodied positive representation that encompasses ideas of contribution and proper management. The priority for profit was linked to managing immigration control, where the opportunity-linked discourse was established and the threat meaning excluded. Similarly, for example, during an election speech on asylum and immigration, Tony Blair (2005, 22 April, Dover, Tony Blair’s election speech) stated that no government would stop going forward with immigration that contributed to the economy and society, and that made London the financial capital of Europe, and filled a gap in the NHS. So, the politician’s duty was not to exploit worries, but to offer effective solutions. Therefore, the language adopted by the New Labour governments reflected the preferred attitude: balanced, but mainly positive, expressing the preferred actions and expected results. The language linked the outcomes to the strategies that reflected evaluating and avoiding expected consequences that might undermine the recommended goals.

In terms of the exercise of power thematization, as the second benchmark, the first and second New Labour governments were keen to highlight that immigration control required a modern and comprehensive management strategy. The government’s pursued an objective of facilitating economic migration and modernizing the asylum system, aiming at tackling abuses of the system. A policy paper, for example, noted the aim of developing a modern and comprehensive immigration control system which
would deliver fairer, faster and firmer control as can be seen from the following statements, taken from a policy paper and a parliamentary debate, made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Jack Straw:

“To set out a comprehensive, integrated strategy to deliver a fairer, faster and firmer approach to immigration control as we promised in our manifesto. Fundamental to the whole strategy is the need to modernize procedures and deliver faster decisions” (PP, 1998, 27 July 1998).

“Reform is fundamental to the Government’s long-term strategy for a fair, fast and firm immigration and asylum system. The current system is complex... We are past the point at which we can tinker with the system: radical reform is needed” (HC, 1999, Feb 22 second reading Immigration and Asylum Bill).

A statement made during a parliamentary debate provided the preferred approach and measures which revealed the restoration of the system, the provided source and relevant legislation (HC, 2000, 02 February 2000 Asylum and Immigration). Speaking to the Confederation of British Industry on migration, Tony Blair (2004, 27 April 2004), for example, as noted above explained the related rationality clearly, which revealed the instigated apparatus on one hand but argued for the continuity of structuring immigration as a contributory social force while not minimising the abuse of the system:

"A recognition of the benefits that controlled migration brings not just to the economy but to delivering the public and private services on which we rely. Being clear that all those who come here to work, and study must be able to support themselves... a single tier of appeal and clamp down on asylum seekers who deliberately destroy their documents and lie about their identity... the introduction of ID cards and millions invested in strengthening our border controls in ports and airports across the world. But precisely because stopping migration altogether would be disastrous for our country and economy, it is all the more vital to ensure the system is not abused" (Tony Blair, 2004 27).

The management and actions were aimed at enhancing the immigration system’s capacity to identify and facilitate the prioritized immigration and to address the
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care of managing public expectations around controlling immigration. These ideas
drew selectively on discourses of immigration and related perceptions. Indeed, the
governments emphasized more on contribution than on problematization of the issue.

The particular relationship between the conceptualization of immigration and the
related managerial perspective mirrored a model of risk that included material on
opportunity-linked logic and the discourse of opportunity, indicating a prima facie
receptivity to immigration issues from the neoliberalist point of view. This
management approach was followed at various levels of discourse and practice during
the first and second New Labour governments.

For example, a policy paper stated that the UK had been contributed to profoundly by
the enterprise and energy of immigration over centuries. It was vital for the economy
and essential public services were dependent on skilled immigration; therefore, the
government was committed to transforming the immigration system through long-
term management by reforming the asylum system, ensuring immigration would keep

Drawing on Power's (2007:195-202) works, risk is linked to the rhetoric of opportunity
and value creation, in turn, to logic of opportunity. Accordingly, the governments
conveyed the idea of the necessity of attracting skilled immigrants to fill the relevant
gap; therefore, the discourse focused on overall profit instead of a loss.

Rhetoric related to management of the immigration control, which emphasizes the
evaluation of abuses and taking preventive action to ensure that long-term objectives
are being achieved, is the core function of a management approach on immigration
control. Thus, the government sought to link its immigration control approach mainly
with governance-aimed management in junction with long-term measures. The focus
was put on the objective of assisting the flow of economic and social benefits. The
interpretation emphasized intended long-term planning and actions that provided
details on the way in which the immigration was to be controlled strategically, which
mainly excluded exceptional measure-focused discourses.

In terms of the temporal orientation of the exercise of power, the actions were mainly
intended to prevent the development of predicted challenges competing with the
reactions to the current situation. The preferred actions were less directly attributed to short-term interventions; instead, the government intended to follow a prevention programme that included changes in conditions or structures related to long-term objectives through operating an effective control to prevent future challenges. Therefore, while the perspective on immigration control, for the most part, was concerned with facilitating economic development and filling the existing shortages in the labour market, at the same time, it was concerned with the possible impact of political dynamic-oriented immigration and designing an immigration control system that would work for Britain’s future as can clearly be seen form the following statements taken from parliamentary debates, made by the Minister of State, Home Office, Barbara Roche, and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Angela Eagle, respectively:

“IT is important that we restore integrity to the system. That is why we are providing resources, and it is why we introduced the Act. We shall ensure that we honour our international obligations and deter unfounded applications. We shall make sure that this country’s proud record is upheld” (2000, HC Deb 02 February 2000 Asylum and Immigration Parliamentary Debate)

“a big step forward in the reform of our entire nationality, immigration and asylum system to meet the new challenges that lie ahead. It encourages legitimate primary immigration to Britain for the first time in many years (HC, 2002, 24 April Second Reading Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill).

The rhetoric conveyed the immigration control logic drew on actions that were less directly attributed to short-term intervention but instead the government intended to follow a prevention programme that included changes in conditions or structure related to the long-term objectives. The government frequently highlighted developing preventative actions aimed at managing future uncertainty, as reflected in a policy paper:

“We have made our legal routes for migration much more robust against abuse. The challenge of the next five years is to build on these successes in a clear and robust way, showing who we admit to the UK temporarily and who we allow to
stay permanently and why we do so; and operating an effective control to prevent those who do not meet our criteria from getting here and ensuring people leave when they are no longer entitled to be in the UK.” (2005, February 2005 Controlling our Borders Making Migration Work for Britain Policy Paper).

The analysis and discussion so far suggest that immigration control policies were largely articulated on the basis of a discourse of opportunity that was reflected through an opportunity-linked logic, epitomizing a model of risk in which a general, future-oriented and profit-prioritized constructions were backed up by long-term solutions aimed at management through preventative actions. The government was less likely to see immigration as a burden or a problem, let alone a threat. In essence, the entities were constructed as a contributory social force and an opportunity during the first two terms of meeting the objective of selecting the most beneficial option and minimizing the expected uncertainties.

As revealed while presenting the results of the instruments (see Chapter Four, 4.1.4 and 4.2.4), different settings contributed to the articulation of immigration control policies differently. When empirical data derived from the leader’s speeches and manifests for this period are taken into conservation, the discourses analysis of the immigration control policies reveals that when the New Labour government first came into power in 1997, immigration control policies were not substantial issues on either Blair’s agenda nor did the manifests feature the issues in a highly politicized way. Tony Blair, for example, between 1997 and 2005 deliberately and effectively avoided politicizing the immigration issue and presented the opportunity and contributory aspect of immigration (see Tony Blair, 1997, 30 September, Brighton; Tony Blair, 1998, 15 December; Tony Blair, 1999, 8 March; Tony Blair, 1999, 14 September; Tony Blair, 2002, 10 September; Tony Blair, 2002, 12 March; Tony Blair, 2003, 30 September; Tony Blair, 2003, 30 May; Tony Blair, 2003, 18 November; Tony Blair, 2004, 27 April; Tony Blair, 2004, 28 September; Tony Blair, 2005, 22 April; Tony Blair, 2005, 06 May; Tony Blair, 2005, 27 October; Tony Blair, 2006, 27 September, for where and when the speeches were made, see Bibliography of Primary Data and Appendix A Data Sources).
Similarly, the 1997 Labour party manifesto (GEM. Labour, 1997), for example, noted the need for restoring the system and to ensure fast and fair control management, the 2001 Labour manifesto (GEM. Labour, 2001), meanwhile, seemed to neutralize the immigration issue by not making it an election issue; thus, no immigration section was included. The 2005 Labour party manifestos (GEM. Labour, 2005), however, reflected the approach of the policy papers’ rhetoric and addressed the immigration control in more detail while highlighting the contributory aspect and the need for proper control.

The parliamentary debate and policy papers, as discussed above, revealed the nuances on the development of the structure and organization of the articulation. In contrast to Tony Blair’s and the manifestos’ approach, which avoided emphasizing immigration and flagged it as an electoral issue, the parliamentary debates, and the policy papers also demonstrated the government’s efforts to respond to the asylum crises.

Numerous studies on immigration control policies in Britain have already proposed that the New Labour governments tended to resist more restrictionist immigration control policies and supported liberal control policy approaches (Jordan et al., 2003; Düvell and Jordan, 2003; Somerville, 2007; Spencer, 2011; Consterdine and Hampshire, 2014; and Hampshire and Bale, 2015). Ford et al. (2015) proposed that the Britain immigration control system was a more liberal regime during the earlier New Labour period in government, and a more restrictive regime from 2005 to 2015. Wright (2012) suggested that restrictionist immigration politics became more prevalent under the subsequent governments; thus, liberal approaches did not last long.

Somerville (2007) concluded that despite the variations between asylum and economic immigration, the overall Labour immigration control policies reflected a more liberal approach compared to the Conservative governments’ approaches. In the same vein, Consterdine and Hampshire (2014) maintained that as probably the most liberal immigration system in Europe, the New Labour governments’ immigration control policies differed from the previous more restrictive immigration policies of the Conservative government. Consterdine (2015) pointed out that in transforming the immigration system from one of the most restrictionist to the most liberal, Labour governments adopted an elitist strategy where the relaxation was carried out.
regardless of public opinion. Düvell and Jordan (2003) maintained that the New Labour governments’ commitment to modernizing the public services facilitated the adaptation of a new approach to migration control which defined immigration as a labour market issue intensified by the globalization process; therefore, they argued, the governments sought a flexibility that facilitated the development of a business-friendly management approach. Moreover, Jordan et al. (2003) maintained that the management of immigration control was formulated and implemented from an economic benefit point of view. Immigration control management, they argued, might be seen as a blend of a marketization perspective and a nationalist perspective. As they argued, the New Labour governments’ migration control perspective was formulated to strengthen economic performance by developing an entrepreneur-oriented approach to meet economic demand and be competitive.

The analysis of the discourses supports the above-noted studies and suggests that the discourse of opportunity and of opportunity-linked logic that draws heavily on the generic risk notion and embodies a liberal immigration control and managerial logic maintained a dominant position and dominated the articulation of immigration control policies. Opportunity-linked logic, as Power (2007), argued, might be seen to be an administrative suggestion of a neoliberal demand to shift the conceptualization of risk from a negative and pessimistic form and a harm-linked perception to a manageable, optimistic and opportunity-linked perception. Opportunity-linked logic suggests that risk and related risk management discourses are virtue-linked; therefore, opportunity and maximizing the profit are the central components of the production of this virtue. From this point of view, the displayed patterns of the immigration control discourse during the first and second New Labour governments can be explained better through a model of risk and an opportunity-linked logic that embodies a generic risk lens in which opportunity and profit oriented articulations are uncovered, rather than a governmentality and threat-linked lenses. It is reasonable, therefore, to argue that incorporating an opportunity-linked logic and generic risk lens assisted the research to uncover the construction of entities from a point of view that encapsulates the boundaries of understanding immigration control policies from multiple understanding points of view.
5.1.2 The Discourse of Problematization on Immigration Control: 2005-2010

From the mid-to-late 2000s, the wave of managerial reform that aimed at a ‘fairer, faster and firmer’ modern approach to immigration control, which was mainly informed by opportunity-linked logic and the generic risk notion that embodies a liberal immigration control and a discourse of opportunity, was discarded in favour of restrictionist approaches. In particular, the rhetoric of the control management strategies seemed to go back to strengthening the construction of immigration as a problem. The dominant discourse started to revolve around restrictionist structures and systems, in which a discourse of opportunity was counterbalanced with a discourse of threat. In addition, the focus on negative outcomes of immigration surfaced with new and increased strength. Looking at the development of the articulated discourses over time and across the actors, the empirical findings seems to suggest that a discourse of opportunity was intertwined with a discourse of threat which re-emerged with relatively increased strength of a discourse of problematization, which modified the two discourses as opposite forces through strategic reconfiguration of the heterogeneous elements that surfaced at various points.

As noted above, the discourse of opportunity and opportunity-linked logic marked patterns and tone were more or less consistent during the first and second New Labour governments. However, the third New Labour government’s immigration control discourse, particularly after the change in leadership as Tony Blair left office, became part of a less liberal discourse dissimilar in scope to the collection of ideas embodied in a liberal immigration control and managerial logic. The governmentality-linked logic and the discourse of problematization started to sweep through the articulation

The articulation of immigration control policies by the third New Labour government displayed a struggle between a general, future and opportunity-oriented discourse and a real and perceived present problem, exemplifying a model of governmentality. For example, while this may come as a surprise, the New Labour government started to introduce the idea that economic dynamic was not the whole story, the pressure put by immigration on local communities in terms of social services, schools, housing and
other services, as well as on social cohesion, should also be taken in to consideration to manage immigration properly, as can be seen from the following statements, taken from a parliamentary debate made by the Minister of State, Home Department, Liam Byrne, and from a speech made by Gordon Brown at the Labour Party conference in Manchester:

“it is not sufficient to set immigration policy simply with an eye on the economy. We must consider what is going on in Britain as a whole, and we are establishing the migration impact forum to take account of the wider evidence of social and other impacts of immigration on British life before setting the points threshold” (HC Deb, 2007 17 July WH).

“In addition to rules for managed migration and the decision we will apply to Romania and Bulgaria, it is right that people who come to and are in this country to stay learn English; Have some sense of what it means to be British, of our history and our culture; And through citizenship tests and citizenship ceremonies take British citizenship seriously” (Gordon Brown, 2006 25 September the Labour Party conference Manchester)

The government suggested a change in immigration control policies and revealed the objective of considering the impact of immigration on British life as a whole and reflecting on Britishness.

Epitomizing a model of governmentality, the discourse displayed a discourse of problematization by which the diffusion of the idea that relevant precautionary measures and practices of many different kinds of a governmentality apparatus started to become a ‘must be’ approach; thus, one of the benchmarks of governmentality-linked logic was evident in the widespread immigration control discourse as can be seen from the statement below, made during a parliamentary debate by the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Nationality, Liam Byrne:

“First, we will introduce a new strategy to bring together government... will provide new resources to help double the budget for enforcement and for the removal of individuals who break our immigration laws. ...will introduce new technology to count everybody in and out of Britain.... will establish stronger
international partnerships because, in an era of global migration, it has become impossible for nation states to manage the issue on their own. ...will provide new powers for the border and immigration agency” (HC, 2007, 5 Feb 2007 UK Borders Bill).

The language conveyed immigration control in two aspects, (a) emphasizing the need to more control and restriction through an instigated apparatus, and (b) being selective in serving the mentioned aspects, such as attracting skilled worker and investors, so that a first-class economy would be still competitive in the world arena. Accordingly, the language-related patterns carefully intertwined conflicting interpretations, such as suggesting the enriching aspect of immigration and stressing the global challenges and, thus, the need for a stronger sense of national purpose (see Gordon Brown, 2007 27 February, speech on Britishness at the Commonwealth Club). Therefore, during, the third term, the articulation came to include conflicting reactions in which meaning was established and informed by a governmentality-linked logic and a discourse of problematization. The loss prioritized ideas competed with profit to establish the meaning and to construct the entities as conveyed through a statement taken from policy paper:

"The UK needs a world class migration system ..., while at the same time being more robust against abuse. We welcome people who come to this country to work and to study, but we need to ensure that they come here legitimately. Migration is of enormous benefit to a country, when it is managed properly. ... this new points-based system will allow us both to manage migration and secure our borders against those who want to abuse them" (PP, 2006, March 2006).

As can be seen, while the contribution made by immigration was implied, being more robust about abuses within the immigration system and controlling immigration by backing it with a points-linked system and more secure borders was stressed (PP, 2006, March 2006). While the simplifying the immigration control system was the objective of the New Labour governments from 1997, during the third term, the government started to highlight strengthening a system that was fair for immigration and in which the public had confidence of (see PP, 2006, July 2006).
The management and temporality benchmarks displayed a structural change in immigration control policies, moving from attracting to disciplining and dealing with fear and anxiety and a lack of restrictionist control policies, as well as dealing with instigating the relevant apparatus, especially regarding the strengthening of border controls, as can be seen from this statement taken from a policy paper.

"We need to anticipate the challenges ahead and put in place a programme of radical change, founded on four objectives. Strengthen our borders; use tougher checks abroad so that only those with permission can travel to the UK; and ensure that we know who leaves so that we can take action against those who break the rules. Fast-track asylum decisions, remove those whose claims fail and integrate those who need our protection. Ensure and enforce compliance with our immigration laws, removing the most harmful people first and denying the privileges of Britain to those here illegally" (PP, 2006, July 2006).

The government emphasized utilizing the intelligence apparatus and a risk assessment system to target people, routes and places that posed a threat or harm as well as devising cross-government enforcement action and removing non-entitled immigrants with the help of the public and private sectors jointly (PP, 2006, July 2006).

As will be discussed in detail in section 5.2, the change in the economic climate also affected and was reflected by the form of discourse; however, it should also be noted that the contributory aspect of immigration was not completely ruled out, for instance, assessing the economic impact of immigration in a policy paper noted that the ageing population would affect the dependence ratio, and this would be considerably worsened by zero-net immigration. It also pointed out that there already existed a sufficient labour force to meet the requirements of the UK economy; therefore, allowing in Bulgarians and Romanians might worsen the situation (PP, 2007, 16 October 2007). Similarly, a policy paper noted that while carefully controlled immigration might benefit the country the government’s ambition was to take the necessary steps to ensure a positive influence on every community in Britain (PP, 2008, June 2008).
Reforming immigration system by creating a new path for citizenship, earning the right to stay by learning English, paying tax and obeying the law and order and contributing the communities, the reformist approach was constructed on the basis of the consideration linked to controlling immigration by reinforcing shared values and increasing the cohesion between communities (PP, 2008, July 2008). This can be understood as an articulation that offers problematization on the ground of negative impact on communities, and measures for minimizing such anxieties.

During these years, the modification and intertwinement in the immigration control discourse was reflected through devising a points-based system, strengthening borders through fingerprint visas, e-Borders and ID cards, as well as additional rules and policies on earning citizenship, adopting tougher border controls and having a border force with new powers (HC, 2008, 21 Oct 2008 Immigration Controls). A policy paper made public during a time of recession, when opposition to immigration is expected to intensify, noted the urgency of the need for controlling immigration and reducing the numbers of immigrants:

“… we all know that since last June the context has changed dramatically. The global economic slowdown affects migration as it does virtually every other area of life ... But now more than ever it is crucial that we control migration and migrant numbers for the benefit of the country and refine our understanding of how the downturn will affect different areas. ...We will make the most out of migration by being robust in our explanation of its benefits, active in our management of its impacts, and dynamic in our response to its changing patterns and strong where we identify evidence of abuse ...” (PP, 2009, March 2009).

Similarly, the 2010 Labour party manifesto (GEM. Labour, 2010) highlighted the importance of strong borders and the proper control of immigration through an Australian-style, points-based system and the recognition of the potential pressures on public services. The following statement made during a parliamentary debate by the Minister for Borders and Immigration, Phil Woolas, highlighted the adopted logic.
“...it is that controlled migration is necessary, beneficial to the country and provides the public with the reassurance that was concerned about. The measures that we have put forward have brought about the biggest shake-up in migration controls since the exit control changes in 1994 or 1997. The fact is that this country has never had as strong migration controls at its borders as it has now” (HC Deb, 2010 6 Jan 2010).

Again, the competing discourse is clear, in which immigrants who can contribute to Britain are welcome, while being tough and selective mainly about the skills levels of immigration through introducing new measures due to economically tough times (PP, 2009, 29 June 2009). In insisting on taking a tough approach to immigrants who wanted to stay in Britain, the prime minister highlighted the problematization and the changed consideration towards immigration (Gordon Brown, 2009, 29 September, Labour Party Conference in Brighton). The instigated measures the government insisted on, in particular the e-Borders system, worked effectively, and the border protection system dealt with non-European immigrants (HC, 2009, 23 Mar OAQ). A policy paper (PP, 2010, February 2010) noted the complex and evolving challenges of illegal immigration and the harm that could be done by unchecked and uncontrolled illegal immigration to communities, public services and businesses, and the economy. It stressed the aim of strong border controls and elaborated the objectives of the UK Border Agency.

The analysis of the political discourse reveals that in contrast to the previous governments, the third New Labour government was concerned more with negative outcomes of immigration; thus, it tended to favour less liberal immigration control policies, particularly for asylum seekers, family reunification and illegal immigration. Even though the Labour party was in government, during its third term, it was not overly keen to accept further immigration, including economic immigration. At the same time, a problematization based stance towards immigration informed immigration control policies and policy formation.

These discourses reflect a model of governmentality and the ways in which the instigated apparatuses serve to promote less liberal immigration control policies by privileging precautionary measures over an opportunity-linked logic, looking at the
management objective as managing immigration by strengthening the system, restricting access to social benefits, introducing ID cards and strengthening border controls accompanied by intelligence and risk-based assessments.

As Aradau and Van Munster (2007) maintained, governmentality is discursively constructed and aims to convince the targeted population of the necessity of acting to deter possible harm through deploying all available technologies. Therefore, utilizing a governmentality-linked logic in the service of understanding the perspectives provided an insight into the role of the discourse and the instigated apparatus to construct the meaning that the dominant discourse had on defining the entities. As the findings reveal, the discourse and the instigated apparatus can be understood better through a governmentality lens, which embodies discursively created and constructed dispositif through a process of functional overdetermination in which opposite forces contradicts each other and calls for readjustment of the heterogeneous elements that surfaced at various levels (see Foucault, 1980a, 1980b, 2007).

Pulling together the New Labour governments’ discourse-related findings, the study proposes that the discourse of opportunity articulated by the first and second the New Labour governments informed the articulation through which the governments opted to exclude the threat perspective from the immigration control framework. The discourse of opportunity posited that governments preferred to focus on the contribution of economic immigration and intertwining the asylum seekers carefully through addressing the underlying causes of the malfunctions in the immigration control system, rather than including them as a threat. Accordingly, the findings show that the discourse of opportunity and opportunity-linked logic were empirically supported. It posited the construction of immigration as a contributory social force and subsumed this opportunity-linked logic into most discourses, with persistent demands for openness and increased capacities for attractiveness. Recognizing that the long-term objectives, in terms of economic development, could not be achieved and maintained should more restrictionist approaches be adopted, the governments deliberately articulated a discourse of opportunity in order to facilitate economic immigration, while, at the same time, regulating asylum seekers policies to prevent negative outcomes that might undermine the overall objectives.
The New Labour governments, in particular, the first and second governments, placed more emphasis on the themes of general, future-oriented and manageable considerations. Accordingly, the articulation of immigration control policies conveyed the internal strengths and certain internal advantages which referred to core competencies that gave the UK an advantage in attracting immigration, such as stability and economic prosperity, which, in turn, assisted more immigration. This can be understood, partly, as a side effect of economic prosperity and stability. Therefore, the first and second New Labour governments’ immigration control perspective posited generic risk and opportunity-linked logic management, which linked an immigration control approach with a long-term objectives-oriented management by means of convenient measures. Therefore, the first and second the New Labour governments were most concerned with the economic development and meeting the structural demand for more immigration.

However, during the third New Labour government, a characteristic thematization started to convey a real or perceived problem and, thus, the opportunity became a less pronounced theme; accordingly, the articulation was modified to focus on the existing situation and on preventative responses which were also enhanced by precautionary risk management. This important modification in the immigration control discourse is particularly pertinent to the change in leadership, as well as the change in settings, which will be discussed later. What can be suggested is the articulated discourse suggests that the articulation of a discourse of opportunity and an opportunity-linked logic aimed at delivering governments’ objectives relating to immigration control tasks had to be adjusted due to changing conditions. Yet, the new articulations were more precautionary risk-oriented than opportunity-linked logic, which suggests a model of governmentality that embodied relatively less liberal approach.

Therefore, while the gestures towards immigration control policies informed by opportunity-linked logic were reflected through a sustained focus on contribution and opportunity aspects during the first and second New Labour governments, the discourse of opportunity gave way to an idea and construction in which the boundaries between opportunity and being a site of fear blurred. The third New Labour government was concerned more with the adverse impact of immigration, which could
be amplified by the existing economic downturn. Therefore, when it comes to the last term of the New Labour governments, a discourse of opportunity was intertwined with a discourse of threat that was configured in the form of a discourse of problematization, which modified the two discourses as opposite forces through strategic readjustment of heterogeneous elements.

The articulated discourse of problematization suggests that the governments sought to modify the immigration control policies in the form of a less liberal perspective: a governmentality-linked logic. The third New Labour government placed more emphasis on precautionary risk management. As Aradau and Van Munster (2007) argued, a governmentality-linked logic reflects a reconstruction of knowledge and rationalization so as to allow rethinking the insufficiency of the available knowledge and control logic. Therefore, the usual managerial logic and measures, which embody contribution, gave way to precautionary-linked logic, in which the manageable entity became a virtually present and acute problem that required instigating sophisticated apparatus.

The findings provide evidence of a gradually subsuming a model of governmentality and governmentality-linked logic into the articulation, which posits a change from opportunity-oriented liberal control logic to governmentality-linked and less liberal control logic during the third New Labour government.

However, the third New Labour government’s immigration control policies should not be understood as clearly and completely opposing or being hostile to immigration. Quite the reverse, the findings suggest a considerable awareness that immigration was fundamentally a contributory force during this period. Notwithstanding that, the changed setting reproduced the obsession with the potential negative outcomes of immigration and then informed the articulation in a form that had previously been avoided and had been regarded as inappropriate.

It is clear that multiple lenses shed light on the understanding of the articulation and assists in uncovering distinct and complex articulations. From this point of view, the findings illuminate an important reason for why multi theoretical lenses are needed. Although previous immigration control researchers assume that control logics are
problematization- and threat-linked (e.g. Buonfino, 2004; Malloch and Stanley, 2005; Huysmans and Buonfino, 2008; Bosworth and Guild, 2008; Ibrahim and Howarth, 2017) the thesis tends to treat the articulation as multiple layered and complex.

As the structure and organization of the articulations are uncovered through utilizing multiple theoretical lenses, the findings reveal that the opportunity-linked liberal control logic began to decrease as it became more difficult to maintain it, since the articulation informed by governmentality-linked logic began to change the nature of the articulations. In turn, as opportunity-oriented discourses decreased, problematization-linked ideas in immigration control management increased, it resulted in the intertwining of opportunity with threat. This led to the emergence of a discourse of problematization, which intensified the demand for restrictionist and less liberal approaches.

This modification and intertwinement opened the door for maintaining the construction of the entities as a social problem and a source of fear and anxiety in the immigration field, and the Conservatives took power at this critical juncture of change in the articulation of immigration control policies.

Having discussed the New Labour governments’ discourse through the theoretical lenses, the next section maps out the Conservative-led governments’ immigration discourse, followed by a comparison of the displayed patterns and ruptures and continuity across the studied governments.

5.1.3 The Discourse of Threat on Immigration Control: 2010-2017

Restrictionist approaches, which had already prevailed in the articulations during the late 2000s, have a tendency to survive and replicate themselves and were constantly in the background of the context of every immigration control policy to different degrees. The 2010s clearly highlighted how more restrictionist logic-oriented discourses of threat and articulations were grafted onto perspectives which, in turn, conveyed and intensified the introduction of these approaches to immigration control. The discourse of threat assisted in replacing the discourse of opportunity with new
structures and organizations and in shifting from a more liberal immigration control logic to a threat-linked restrictionist logic.

The analysis of the political discourse reveals that the Conservative-led governments’ discourse exemplified a discourse of threat through which the control logic was predominately concerned with negative immigration outcomes. The model of securitization and the discourse of threat informed the articulation of favouring restrictive immigration control policies. In terms of the characteristics of the adopted discourses, the Conservative periods show that the immigration control policies displayed an intersection between a governmentality-linked logic perspective, on the one hand, and a threat-linked logic, on the other. The model of securitization suggests that immigration is presented as a real and perceived immediate threat to the social and economic dimension and subject to exceptional measures and immediate reactions to the current situation; thus, the immigration control perspective reflected the aims of minimizing the constructed threat. During the Conservative-led governments, threat-linked logic, which is more rigid, came to dominate the discourse. The threat-linked logic involved an expanding frontier of control in which various apparatuses were applied to address the threat.

From this point of view, the Conservative-led governments’ immigration control discourse and practices flowed in a very high level of fear and anxiety-based thematization particularly involving a present, real or perceived, subject-oriented threat to social and economic life, which in turn, inevitably informed the articulation of immigration policies. While, the New Labour governments’ immigration control perspective included general, object and contribution oriented thematization, the Conservative-led governments’ characteristics of thematization were a part of a more present and significant threat as a source of an unease, fear, and anxiety.

Consequently, the immigration control discourse, in particular, the spoken discourse, therefore, was far from being a simple future-oriented and opportunity-linked characteristic of thematization but the struggle and completion to establish the meaning by existent threat. As an example, during a parliamentary debate (HC, 2010, 6 Sep OAQ), for example, the government proposed that while immigration might have served, it needed to be controlled. Therefore, the various types of the non-EU
immigration, which were taking place in noticeable number, to be fully controlled, the taken step not only to address the economic immigration but all type of the existed immigration flow as to ensure that the only those who would not aim to take the advantage of the system would be allowed. David Cameron (2010, 7 May, Westminster Election 2010 speech) stated that the government would not be weak or soft on the immigration issue.

When it comes to written discourse, on the other hand, while initially the Conservative party revealed a more moderated vision on control immigration at the general election manifestos by noting the contribution made by immigration -to the economy, culture and national life- and highlighting not to attracting immigration to do the jobs that could be carried out by British citizens (see GEM, Conservative 2010), the tone was evolved through emphasizing the pressure put on schools, hospitals and transport and social services that make hard to integrate the communities (GEM, Conservative, 2015) and stressing the difficulty in building a community cohesion the and keeping with reducing the number of the net immigration (GEM, Conservative 2017).

This was the puzzle of the immigration control perspective, admitting the previous opportunity and future possibility on one hand, and proposing the high impact on many aspects of the life and therefore the necessity of treating immigration as a present and acute threat on the other hand. Speaking tough on the one hand and policing moderately on the other hand. Damian Green (2010, 6 September), for example, stated that:

“In recent years we have spent increasing amounts of taxpayer's money on palliatives for immigration levels which have been too high. Instead of this inefficient cure, we should reach for more effective prevention, and keep immigration at sustainable levels in the first place” (2010, 6 September Damian Green speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society)

The government insisted that Britain had been spending significant public funds to control immigration, but the immigration level was still too high. In essence, the government sought to frame the immigration issue as an existing threat and were taking place for a long time. The articulation of immigration revealed that the
conservative governments were concerned with the existing high level of immigration, thus, they constantly call for more restrictionist control policies.

In a parliamentary debate (HC, 2012, 06 September), for example, the government repeated the commitment to control the all-time high immigration, through changing the system to deter the non-EU immigration as to prevent the misusing of the system which put a great pressure on the economic and social aspect. Noting the danger, during the Conservative Party Conference 2012 in Birmingham, David Cameron (2012, 10 October, Birmingham, the Conservative Party Conference 2012), for example, mentioned the undesired immigrants that lived off the taxpayer. Therefore, while the discourses posited the threat as a non-existential threat, they still conveyed the present threat and therefore, the government suggested that proper immigration control could only be achieved if the restriction were sufficiently high enough to address the flowing mass of immigration.

Nature benchmark-linked thematization signified immigration as a present and subject-oriented threat which excluded the opportunity and profit-oriented discourses from establishing the meaning, which provided a base to rationalise increasingly prominent precautionary measures to play a critical discursive role. Such thematization signified recapping the language more for a form of threat-linked logic which suggests a defensive view of immigration control perspective.

The statements made by David Cameron on immigration, and Theresa May at the Party Conference, below, reflect these considerations:

“Under Labour we experienced unprecedented levels of immigration. Between 1997 and 2009, net migration to Britain totalled more than 2.2 million people. That is more than twice the population of Birmingham. Clamp down on work visas and student visas will shoot up. Clamp down on student visas and family visas will shoot up. Clamp down on family visas and asylum claims will shoot up” (Theresa May, 2010, 5 October Conservative Party Conference Birmingham).

“So yes, immigrants make a huge contribution to Britain. We recognise that - and we welcome it. But I’m also clear about something else: for too long,
immigration has been too high. Between 1997 and 2009, 2.2 million more people came to live in this country than left to live abroad. That’s the largest influx of people Britain as ever had. Not just pressures on schools, housing and healthcare - though those have been serious, but social pressures too.” (David Cameron 2011 14 April immigration speech).

Even though the patterns of language characterized by a variety of conflicting interpretations implied the awareness of the need to attract skilled immigrants, the government highlighted the overall loss instead of the profit. Thus, such constructions made particular aspects of immigration more salient, highlighting the adverse effects, and thereby articulated a threat-linked discourse.

Therefore, following nature benchmark-linked thematization, the language also emerged and acted similarly, seeking to explain and justify the threat-linked logic with plausible reasons. Similar to the nature benchmark-linked patterns, the language patterns articulated by conservative-led governments reflected loss and highlighted negative acknowledgments, in which the language emphasized immigration as a source of fear to the economy and the society.

Accordingly, the language benchmark, once more, reflected the differences between the New Labour governments and the Conservative-led governments, which the third government as the closer to the Conservative-led governments compared to the previous the New Labour governments still reflected a balanced acknowledgement.

While a number of different tones of the threat-linked conceptualization existed and competed to establish the meaning, the discourses mainly focused on highlighting the adverse effects of immigration on the economy and community. For example, highlighting that mass immigration increasingly led to crowded cities and suggesting that public funds acted as a magnet for immigrants manifested the conceptualization and led to the opportunity-linked implications being forgotten. Similar to the above quotation, David Cameron (2011, 10 October) insisted that economic and social services were thought to be overburdened by mass immigration, he, also insisted that voters believed that immigrants were simply taking advantage of the NHS, that they were taking the jobs that needed to go to British workers and that communities were
being torn apart; and such concerns should be heard by mainstream political parties so as not to leave room for those who wanted to exploit the issues. This conceptualization suggests that the discourse changed fundamentally, with a discourse of opportunity being replaced by a discourse of threat; thus defensive-oriented precautionary measures were called into play to prevent the threat.

The analysis of the political discourse reveals that the discourse of threat maintained the dominant position within the Conservative-led governments’ perspective and the governments were predominantly concerned with the immigrations negative effects; they tended to favour more restrictionist immigration control policies through the proposal of reforming the immigration system. The following statements by David Cameron, in a speech on immigration in Ipswich at University Campus Suffolk, captured the government`s viewpoint on the articulation of immigration control:

“… I’ve also always believed that immigration has to be properly controlled. Without proper controls, community confidence is sapped, resources are stretched and the benefits that immigration can bring are lost or forgotten ... under the previous government immigration was far too high and the system was badly out of control. Net migration needs to come down radically…” (David Cameron, 2013, 25 March in Ipswich at University Campus Suffolk).

As can be seen from the above statement as an example of numerous similar statements, the Conservative-led governments insisted that the benefit brought by immigration was not the only factor that needed to be taken into consideration; accordingly, they called for the patterns adopted by the previous New Labour governments to be reversed.

Thus, a demand for a more restrictionist approach and instigating a relevant apparatus in the form of reform become the core thematization of the immigration control discourse. It is reasonable to argue that such thematization and interpretation in part made the particular perception of immigration as a threat more salient. In turn, it increased the demand for more restrictionist approaches as a side effect.

In contrast to the New Labour governments’ approach, the Conservative-led governments focused on mass immigration and taking advantage of the system. The
below statement made by David Cameron during a speech on EU Reform conveyed the patterns of such assumptions:

“We wanted to reduce the very high level of migration from within the EU by preventing the abuse of free movement and preventing our welfare system acting as a magnet for people to come to our country. After the hard work of the Home Secretary we have secured new powers against criminals from other countries including powers to stop them from coming here in the first place, and powers to deport them if they are already here” (David Cameron, 2016, 22 February speech on EU Reform)

As quoted above, David Cameron (2016, 22 February), insisted that the government was determined to reduce EU immigration as it was too highly facilitated by the free movement of the Union and the magnet of Britain for its public funds. The government’s discourse displayed a shift towards subject orientation as well, particularly in differentiating between EU and non-EU immigration since controlling non-EU immigration was relatively easy compared to EU citizens. David Cameron offered the Brexit referendum to deal with the issue of EU citizens. During the EU referendum, the EU immigration issue monopolized the political debate and the relevant discourse associated with immigration control. A policy paper (PP, 2017, February) stated that:

“In the last decade or so, we have seen record levels of long-term net immigration in the UK, and that sheer volume has given rise to public concern about pressure on public services, like schools and our infrastructure, especially housing, as well as placing downward pressure on wages for people on the lowest incomes. The public must have confidence in our ability to control immigration. It is simply not possible to control immigration overall when there is unlimited free movement of people to the UK from the EU. We will design our immigration system to ensure that we are able to control the numbers of people who come here from the EU” (2017, February, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union Policy Paper)
The above quoted policy paper (PP, 2017, February) clearly displayed the exclusionary aims and objectives as a set of control mechanisms; for example, it noted that during the last decade the UK had seen record levels of net immigration which gave rise to public concern about pressures on public funds and social services, particularly on schools, hospitals and housing, as well as on wages, and pointed to the commitment to control immigration from the EU as well following Brexit. The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice of in the UK and immigration within the EU were also presented as major concerns in controlling immigration particularly from the EU (see PP, 2017, 26 June 2017).

The analysis of the political discourses reveals that the Conservative governments were not inclined to accept more immigration, including economic immigration, and the articulation, which was mainly based on a threat-linked logic, was notably informed by the discourse of threat. A new form of presentation, which was mainly exclusionary, emerged. The new form of the rhetoric pointed out the replacement of the previously evolved and intertwined articulation. The discourse of opportunity was replaced by the discourse of threat. The following statements made during party conference speeches by Cameron and May clearly displayed the replacement of the discourses:

“...we need controlled borders and an immigration system that puts the British people first. That’s why we’ve capped economic migration from outside the EU ... shut down 700 bogus colleges – that were basically visa factories...kicked out people who don’t belong here ... But we know the bigger issue today is migration from within the EU. Immediate access to our welfare system ... Numbers that have increased faster than we in this country wanted ... at a level that was too much for our communities, for our labour markets. All of this has to change...” (David Cameron, 2014, 01 October, Birmingham, speech to the Conservative conference).

“...when immigration is too high, when the pace of change is too fast, it’s impossible to build a cohesive society. It’s difficult for schools and hospitals and core infrastructure like housing and transport to cope. And we know that for people in low-paid jobs, wages are forced down even further while some people
are forced out of work altogether....” (Theresa May, 2015, 06 October, Manchester speech at the Conservative party conference).

The political discourse displayed a different form of presentation, exemplifying a model of securitization, mainly exclusionary, which sought to demonstrate the present threat. The general argument asserted that an opportunity-linked logic and generic risk-oriented liberal control management was not a self-sufficient approach as the immigration challenge extended beyond the opportunity level and had become a significant constraint on social and economic life. The discourse might be seen in the form of a conservatism committed to countering external forces causing major changes in social life. Thereby, the rise of the threat consideration led to an intensification of the discourse of threat, which assisted in assigning new roles for an apparatus which had more to do with expanding the sense of immigration control.

The articulations, which were informed by the discourse of threat, posited a model of securitization that embodied present and immediate threat. These discourses led to a sustained focus on the need for a certain kind of precautionary approach on controlling immigration. It should also be noted that there was also a concern to control immigration to meet intensified public expectations.

Regarding to the exercises of the power benchmark, as suggested in the previous section, while a governmentality-linked logic and a discourse of problematization started to take place during the third New Labour government, during the Conservative-led coalition and the Conservative governments, on the other hand, informed by a discourse of threat, the threat-linked logic came to be strongly intensified, which constantly informed the articulation of immigration control.

The Conservative-led governments’ discourses conveyed the sense directly concerned with fear and anxiety related to pressures on the economic and social sphere, which come to informed by a threat-linked logic that stemmed from (a constructed) perceived or real immediate threat; therefore, discourses referred extensively to addressing the present threat through precautionary measures in a consistent manner. The reason for this consistency lies in a deep-seated difference between the New Labour governments and the Conservative-led governments’ approaches to
immigration. While the New Labour governments infrequently adopted such a representation, the Conservatives took every opportunity to insert these ideas within the available frameworks.

On the one hand, the discourse analysis also revealed that presentations through the written discourse were rather moderate (see Table 4.13 for the overall articulated discourse through instruments). For example, the government made changes to the immigration rules in pursuit of reforming the migration routes, which was mainly technical, and tightening the rules, as well as some relaxation of the points-based system (PP, 2012, February 2012), such as the closure of the post-study work route and the introduction of graduate entrepreneurs (PP, 2012, November 2012). The government revealed the ambition of reducing immigration by reconstructing a restrictionist immigration control, reducing net immigration and addressing abuses, as well as capping welfare payments (PP, 2014, 7 January 2014; PP, 2014, 6 February 2014).

The spoken rhetoric, on the other hand, presented immigration issues more rigidly (see Table 4.13). Speaking to the Conservative Party conference, Theresa May (2011, 04 October Speech to Conservative Party conference), for example, suggested that the government was aware of the damage that could be done by uncontrolled immigration. Labour, she argued, had lost control. The government, she argued, would cut immigration across the board, but this would require tough new rules that needed to be enforced. Economic migrations were capped, abuses of student visas were stopped, and the automatic settlement scheme was scrapped while the Conservatives fought to cut immigration.

Two years later, at the Conservative party conference, Theresa May (2013, 30 September, Manchester) stated that the government was committed to deporting all unwanted immigrants; she argued that the Labour had failed to take the necessary steps and lost the control, even though spending more public funds. Teresa May (2014, 30 September, Birmingham) noted the difficulty in controlling immigration from the EU and insisted that the government was working hard to cut numbers and take them down to 1990 levels. In 2015 during the speech at the Conservative Party conference, Theresa May (2015, 06 October, Manchester) as quoted above, highlighted the
negative outcomes of immigration on all aspects of the life: community cohesion, public and social services, and economic and social life, she also clearly noted that:

“So, reducing and controlling immigration is getting harder, but that’s no reason to give up. As our manifesto said, ‘we must work to control immigration and put Britain first’. We have to do this for the sake of our society and our public services – and for the sake of the people whose wages are cut, and whose job security is reduced, when immigration is too high” (Theresa May, 2015, 06 October, Manchester).

Yet, speaking ahead of the Queen's Speech, David Cameron (2015, 21 May) for example, exposed the government view by stating that mass immigration put uncontrolled pressure on social services, public demand was huge for more restriction, thus the government were doing whatever needed to be done, such as bogus colleges, free NHS, relevant driving license were all scrapped. New checks were introduced and the benefits available to people from the EU were restricted. Firmer action was taken to prevent illegal migration and deter abuses (HC Deb, 2014 13 Oct).

These discourses posited a new structure and rationality to the entities presenting (a constructed) perceived or real immediate threat that required instigating measures urgently. A rhetoric of a threat-linked exercise of power, which was based on insufficiency and loss as a result of an inadequate or failed generic risk management became a prominent and a central thematization. The suggested logic, therefore, posited the threat perspective, which entailed a range of precautionary practices that focused on a range of present threats. These narratives of immigration control mirrored the notion of the discourse of threat described in previous chapters. The narratives show how immigration control policies informed by a discourse of threat that functioned to bring together the construction of a real or perceived threat to targeted populations and the instigating of apparatuses, on the one hand, and the related rationalization of the logic and management practices, on the other hand.

The Conservative-led government’s approach to immigration control mainly focused on providing the reassurance that the government would not facilitate more net immigration. While the precautionary measures continued to be significantly
performed to control immigration, there was also a marked growth in the discourse of threat. An urgent reaction was the main aspect of the logic of immigration control perspective to minimize the damage. The discourse clearly took the rationalization of uncontrolled mass immigration as posing a real or perceived threat which required immediate action, bringing precautionary management into the heart of the debate.

The urgency and unusual reactions and responses to an immediate threat were normally recognized by temporality and determined on the basis of closeness in terms of direction and time orientation. During the Conservative-led governments, the concerns about the immigration challenge might be better placed as a reaction to the current situation and a response to an immediate threat which exemplified the threat-linked logic.

The second benchmark which mirrors the rhetoric of the management and temporality category of an immigration control logic and style of management came to reflect an urgency and response within a defensive reaction. In addition to the characteristics benchmark, which posited the real and perceived threat and loss prioritization, the exercise of power benchmark posited the emergence of precautionary management and a defensive response to minimize the real or perceived harm. This rhetoric is clearly reflected in the following a statement made by Theresa May during a speech to the Conservative Party conference:

“as Conservatives, we understand too the need to reduce and control immigration. That’s why we’ve made it our aim to get net migration back down to the tens of thousands... But we know what damage uncontrolled immigration can do. To our society, as communities struggle to cope with rapid change. To our infrastructure, as our housing stock and transport system become overloaded. And to our public services, as schools and hospitals have to cope with a sudden increase in demand. Yet that is exactly what Labour let happen. That’s why we’re cutting immigration across the board. Work visas are down by seven per cent. Family visas are down by a third. And student visas – which were abused on an industrial scale under Labour – are also down by a third” (Theresa May, 2011, speech to the Conservative Party conference).
Most of the discourse on the immigration control topic signified a rapid expansion in reaction to the then current situation in order to minimize the constructed threat; similarly, the responses to the immediate threat were rationalized as a reaction to the present threat. As can be seen from the quotation below, the temporality aspects supported the pattern of increased threat-linked consideration:

“if you have uncontrolled immigration, you have uncontrolled pressure on public services. And that raises basic issues of fairness. Uncontrolled immigration can damage our labour market and push down wages. And working people want a government that is on their side. Uncontrolled immigration means too many people were entering the UK legally but staying illegally. And people are fed up with a system that allows those who are not meant to be in our country to remain here. Bogus colleges – we shut them down. Paying the rent and dole of jobless migrants – we stopped it. Illegal immigrants were driving on our roads – we revoked their licences – over 9,000 of them. People from outside Europe using the NHS for free – we’re now charging them and putting the money back into our health service” (David Cameron, 2015, 21 May Speech ahead of the Queen’s Speech).

Most discussions of immigration topic referred to governments being aware of an existing situation in the UK that required, in terms of immigration control, reacting to the situation by positing what they referred as an ‘out of control’ circumstance that ‘cannot be maintained’, and, thus, needed an immediate response.

The emergence of the thematization of ‘mass immigration’, ‘out of control’, ‘real and great pressure’ signalled a control perspective intended to give greater priority to precautionary measures implemented proximately to maintain manageability. These articulations also led to considering whether the previous immigration control management was ineffective and whether the previously adopted policies had come into question, as can be seen from the following statement made during a parliamentary debate by the Minister for Immigration, Damian Green:

“We have reversed Labour’s open-door immigration policy; we have capped economic migration; we have clamped down on student visas; we have
restricted family migration; and we are breaking the link between temporary migration and permanent settlement” (2011, 10 November 2011 Parliamentary Debate).

The government insisted that its approach to immigration had to be implemented to address the challenges of immigration proximately through reversing the previous governments’ open-door immigration policy. The control logic conveyed a reaction to a current situation that was referred to as ‘out of control’, that ‘cannot be maintained’, thus must be immediately tackled. As a result, economic immigration was capped considerably, along with student visas, family reunification and preeminent settlement.

In addition to developing and implementing these reactions, there was a specific focus on the rationalization of such actions: for example, the government revealed that the process of developing these policies for controlling immigration more was to restore public confidence. This also reveals that public confidence was lost by pointing to the previously implemented management perspective. Considerable progress was made, they argued, and it should not be understood only in terms of the numbers. The management approach was developed on the basis of aspects of defensive measures; therefore, it mirrored a rigid control system. The government mainly sought to ensure that public expectations were met, as can be seen from the below statement taken from a parliamentary debate made by the Minister for Immigration, Mark Harper:

“…general point about the immigration system is that we are determined to take control of it and to restore public confidence. We have made considerable progress with the changes on numbers, reducing net migration by more than one third since the election. The issue is not just about numbers” (2013 19 Jun WH Parliamentary Debate).

The government insisted that the aim was to ensure that the public’s expectation of an immigration control system was being met (see also HC Deb, 2015, 13 Oct Second Reading Immigration Bill). Government speakers conveyed the idea that controlling immigration required implementing numerous apparatuses properly, as can be seen
from the following statement made during a parliamentary debate by the Minister for Immigration, James Brokenshire:

“The Immigration Act 2014 and related changes have expedited the removal of more than 2,000 foreign national offenders from this country and stopped illegal migrants from having access to services such as bank accounts, driving licences and rented accommodation. The Immigration Bill will go further, enabling the seizure of earnings from illegal workers, further penalising rogue employers and extending the deport first, appeal later principle to more cases”

(2016 11 January HC OAQ immigration system Parliamentary Debate)

The government insisted that it was determined to stop persistent uncontrolled immigration – starting with illegal immigrants – through stopping immigrants from having access to services, bank accounts, driving licenses and housing, as well as seizing illegal earnings, penalizing wrongdoing employers, and, more importantly, instigating deportations first and allowing appeals later. Still, aiming a more independent and robust immigration control system, during her conference speech, Theresa May (2016, 05 October, Birmingham, Conservative conference), for example, noted that leaving the EU would enable to Britain to be a fully sovereign and independent country that could control immigration and would be outside the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (see also PP, 2017, February; PP, 2017, 26 June 2017). The above evidence demonstrates two critical points about immigration control. It posits not only taking a precautionary approach but also acting proximately to the already developed threat to minimize the damage. The narratives, therefore, mirrored a discourse of threat. The discourse of threat articulated by the Conservative-led governments was increasingly informed by rationalized constructions of fear and (a constructed) perceived or real immediate threat.

The analysis of the discourse reveals that the model of securitization and discourse of threat had at least two critical effects. Firstly, it made not only immigration control enforcement agents but also different professional groups to act accordingly, which in turn, secondly, meant the targeted people as well as these different professional groups began to consider that the new immigration control agenda was a necessity for controlling immigration.
The analysis of the relevant political discourse reveals that the Conservative governments were, more than any studied government, preoccupied with the existing and constructed negative effects of new immigration. The articulation manifested itself in the Conservatives’ insistence on varying and intensifying the control policy apparatus that was aimed at cutting the high number of net immigrations.

Common to the articulations of the Conservative-led coalition and the Conservative governments’ discourses, it was highlighted that the immigration issue was not simply a matter of economic contribution but was mainly a source of fear and anxiety.

The salience of the restrictionist immigration control policies triggered the idea of analysing and assessing the reasons why the discourses were articulated as they were. The discourse often contained reasons that guide the structure and organization of the discourse and allows one to construe the situation (Gee, 2004). The articulation, therefore, is a building task that is developed through collaboration with other discourses in interaction with it.

The dataset provided an opportunity to compare discourses for an understanding of the salience and their patterning within and across texts and, in turn, across the actors and over time. However, as the research draws on the discourse analysis and is interested in how the articulations structured and organized the entities, following a poststructuralist view, in which the being of objects is constituted within a discursive context, and is always articulated within discursive totalities (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 1987). Accordingly, the reasons were defined simply within and across a discursive context. The reasons and their calibrations were taken into consideration when they were clearly represented within a discursive context. The research, therefore, inductively derived a set of reasons that can be offered as factors that might account for the involvement, intertwinement and replacement of discourses across the actors and over time. The identified reasons, however, do not cover the variety of all reasons or the range of all determinants but should be considered as a set of reasons that emerged from the discourses themselves during the course of the analysis phase.

The development of articulation on immigration control was informed by a number of interacting reasons (factors). Firstly, the development, in part, was informed by the
relative degree of the opposition’s discourse. The quantitative dimension revealed the
government and the out-of-office setting displaying significantly different patterns,
and the out-of-office setting mirrored less liberal approach-linked articulations when
conveying the party’s position on immigration control (see Section 4.1.4). As
Schumacher et al., (2013) pointed out, being out of office is a causal factor that can
account for the changes in party position with regard to immigration control, while the
party affiliation of the government can also be seen as a factor when framing specific
immigration control policies (Statham and Geddes, 2006). For example, the general
election manifesto of the Conservative Party (2005) indicated that under Labour,
immigration was not only out of control but also in chaos; the immigration system was
not a deterrent but, instead, was encouraging illegality. Britain had reached a turning
point. Thus, the Conservatives would restore the immigration system. David Cameron
(2009, Manchester), for example, suggested that the government had to understand
the great pressure of mass immigration, and had to deliver the proper control.
Therefore, the Conservative party’s unfavourable attitude on immigration can be
interpreted as a calculated strategy that aimed to convey the constructed and/or
existing fear and anxieties about problematized immigration and its economic and
social impacts on societies.

Secondly, the development was informed, in part, by a relative degree of the Labour
and Conservative party’s ideology and the stance on immigration. Similar to Freeman
(2011), Bale (2008) and Massetti’s (2015) proposal, the findings revealed that the
differences between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party reflected existing
statistically significant differences. The Conservative Party appeared to have been
more concerned about immigration and favoured more restrictionist immigration
strategies compared to their counterpart (see Section 4.2.3).

The third reason is, in part, due to the relative degree of the argued ‘failure’ of the New
Labour governments to control immigration. As the data revealed, the period between
1997-2005 brought about a significant change to the articulation, but Labour was also
criticized constantly by the Conservative Party and governments, as well as by its own
party. For example, while Ed Miliband (2010, 28/09/2010, party conference in
Manchester) acknowledged that Britain had benefited greatly from immigration, he
also admitted that Labour should have heard the people’s concerns relating to the impact of immigration on communities, and they should have tried more to deliver on the expectations and understand these considerations to manage the impact of immigration on economic and social life. Similarly, he later (2011, 27/09/2011 speech to the Labour conference in Liverpool) pointed out that even though Labour believed in long-held values and long-term considerations, the economy was affected, and immigration control policies did not work for people whose jobs and living standards were adversely impacted.

The politicians would mainly rationalize the new approach by criticizing what their opponents were doing or pointing to the previous ‘unfit’ approaches or to the new challenge or opportunities. Theresa May (2011, 04 October, Speech to Conservative Party conference), for example, revealed the preference of policymakers on immigration and how they sought to approach it. The government would deliver on the public’s strong desire for clearing up the mess that Labour made during the New Labour governments’ terms. Net migration to Britain was more than four times that of Manchester, but the government would change the rules and cut immigration, she insisted. David Cameron (2013, 25 March in Ipswich at University Campus Suffolk), similarly, stated that while the contribution was understood, uncontrolled immigration would make all contributions useless. These discourses and arguments extended the reach to increased demands, on the one hand, and to new domains of immigration control, on the other, where a distinctive politics of immigration toned the discourse. Therefore, conveying the idea that only known problems, superficially those that resulted in the mass spending of public money on immigration control, gave rise to intensified concerns about immigration and the administration’s responsibility. During a parliamentary debate (HC Deb, 2013 22 Oct Immigration Controls Parliamentary Debate), the government claimed that previous Labour governments had let migration, as well as the asylum system, get out of control, the lack of transitional controls in accession countries during the 2004 EU enlargement was the main reason behind the immigration issue and was described as a bad mistake.

Fourth, in part, is informed by a relative degree of change in certain circumstances, such as increased numbers of asylum seekers (see HC, 1999, Feb 22 second reading
Immigration and Asylum Bill; HC, 2000, 22 May Asylum Seekers; HC, 2001, 01 February Asylum System Commons Sitting Opposition Day), the 9/11 (HC, 2001, 15 October Anti-terrorism Measures; HC, 2001, 19 Nov second reading Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill), the EU enlargement (Tony Blair, 2004, 27 April 2004; HC, 2010, 19 Nov; HC Deb, 2013 22 Oct), the great recession (Gordon Brown, 2008, 20 February Speech on Managed Migration), and the experienced record levels of long-term net immigration (PP, 2017, February). It is obvious that the change in certain circumstances not only provided a ground for public concern to rise to some extent itself, but also informed the discourses as well.

Fifth, the negative framing discourses of immigration by a section of the mass media (see Blinder, 2015) also contributed to the momentum of the logic of threat (see David Blunkett, 2002, 7 October, Labour Party conference in Blackpool) as can be seen from a statement taken from a parliamentary debate made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department David Blunkett:

“not a single day went by when national newspapers or BBC and ITV television news broadcasts did not cover the dispersal problem in one form or another, tragically, because of a murder and some attacks that took place on asylum seekers in communities” (HC, 2002, 24 April Second Reading Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill).

Finally, the development of the articulation was informed, in part, by the relative degree of the impact of the mismatch between the written and spoken rhetoric. Boswell (2007) pointed out that the rhetorical constructions of immigration and policy formation can conflict with each other and the mismatches might lead to a gap to emerge between the discourse and the policy preferences, where the discourse might be more restrictionist while the implementation might posit a less restrictionist approach. The empirical evidence reveals that the manifestos and policy papers conveyed more moderate preferences and differed significantly from the speeches and debates, which were largely restrictionist, while Tony Blair was an exception. The spoken discourse, therefore, was more likely to give rise to expectations and demands for more restrictionist policy formulations.
As a consequence of these reasons (factors), the structures and organizations of the rhetoric of the articulation of immigration control policies evolved, intertwined and replaced one another over time. As Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) pointed out, the articulations are open to different and various forms of conceptualization, which may develop and emerge in the future. Different reasons and different knowledge, had, in turn, different implications for the articulation. All these reasons together interacted to constitute an articulation within which each of the factors provides a reason for the other and receives a reason from the others. However, different settings contributed to the articulation differently to constantly construe an articulation in a certain way. The research, therefore, suggested that the articulation revealed the informative role of the above-noted reasons. More generally, the particular articulation and the deviation within and between the above-noted settings, and the different contribution of the above-noted factors, to some degree intensified the conceptualization of immigration as a threat and, in turn, augmented the problematization of immigration.

A number of studies on immigration policies, which the research discussed in Chapter 2, have already considered that in becoming a site of fear and anxiety, immigration has become subject to ever sophisticated restrictionist regulations in liberal Western countries, which is produced by the critical junctures of the changing patterns of global immigration and the perception of immigration with regard to the relevant impacts on different levels of society (see Lahav 1997; Money 1999; Karapin 1999; Givens and Luedtke 2004; Cornelius 2005; Lavenex 2006; Anderson 2013; Bradford, 2013; Hampshire, 2013; Borjas, 1999, 2014). From this point of view, numerous studies on immigration control policies have also proposed that restrictionist approaches have become evident in the UK and the Conservative governments tend to articulate less liberal immigration control policy perspectives and promote restrictive control policy approaches and measures regardless of which types they belong to (Bloch, 2000; Schuster and Solomos, 2004; Smith, 2008; Wright, 2012; Ford et al., 2015). While these studies largely propose similarities in restrictionist policies on immigration between previous Conservative governments and the New Labour governments, nonetheless, they provided the New Labour governments’ perspective, which the research engages with.
Accordingly, the findings show that the Conservatives tended to follow a more restrictionist perspective on immigration control. In addition, while the study supports the Conservative governments’ perspectives proposed by the previous conclusions, it challenges their conclusions with regard to New Labour governments’ perspectives on immigration control policies.

In essence, the previous studies offered the following conclusions: Ford et al. (2015) proposed three relatively distinct periods in the Britain immigration control system in the last three decades: a more restrictive regime during the Conservative period, 1982-1997; a more liberal regime during the Labour period, 1997-2005, and, then again, a more restrictive form from 2005 to 2015, during the last term of the Labour and Conservative-led governments. Wright (2012) noted the importance of resistance to liberalizing immigration policies dominating the perspective, and the previous Conservative government’s restrictionist approach, concluding that the adopting of liberal approaches would not last long.

The significant differences between the New Labour governments and the Conservative governments in immigration control policies seem partly in line with the argument put forward by Ford et al. (2015). The proposal of these studies that the New Labour governments’ first two terms’ approach was marked by more liberal strategies is supported by the research findings. When it comes to the last term of the New Labour governments, however, the research suggests a different proposal and argues that a statistically significant difference existed between the New Labour governments and the Conservative-led governments.

Therefore, given that the Conservative government adopted a restrictionist approach from 1982 to 1997 (Ford et al., 2015), Smith’s (2008) argument that the New Labour governments adopted more or less restrictive strategies corresponding to previous Conservative governments is not supported by the findings of this study.

Smith (2008) concluded that the New Labour governments demonstrated more or less restrictive strategies similar to the previous Conservative governments. In particular, the adopted language of the New Labour governments reflected more or less Conservatives’ language, risking many moderate voters. The language left no space for
Conservatives to play the immigration control card. That there was continuity of a restrictionist perspective between the Conservative governments and Labour Governments is also concluded by Bloch (2000). Like Smith (2008), Bloch (2000) concluded that when it comes to immigration control, there existed slight differences between the Labour and Conservative governments in that both adopted a restrictionist approach partly due to continuity in the civil servant structure and partly because of the electoral consideration. Schuster and Solomos (2004) concluded that the New Labour governments pursued a relatively less restrictionist approach towards selected economic immigration and restrictive strategies towards asylum seekers and refugees. The construction of asylum seekers and refugees as a threat not only surfaced in the political discourse but also served as a ground for mobilizing support for anti-immigrant sentiment. When it comes to comparison between the New Labour governments and the Conservatives, the similarity was remarkable.

The findings also do not support Smith’s (2008), Bloch’s (2000) or Schuster and Solomos’ (2004) conclusions. Interestingly, not only the continuity between the New Labour governments and the Conservative but also the argument of considering the asylum seekers and refugees as a threat are the main divergences from the research’s proposal. What the research has argued, on the other hand, is that the articulation during the New Labour governments is based on a balanced language that priorities profit, encouraging economic immigration and welcoming genuine asylum seekers not only because of the international obligations but also because of the traditional British moral approach of giving a hand to those in need. While Britain selected an opt-out choice in border control and immigration and asylum seekers policy previously, the New Labour governments preferred not to have the seven-year transition period and lifted the barrier instantly during the largest EU enlargement. In terms of the similarity between the New Labour governments and the Conservative governments, the research findings reveal that while the first and second New Labour governments’ perspective displayed a more liberal approach and an opportunity-linked logic, and the third New Labour government adopted a governmentality-linked logic and a less liberal perspective, the Conservative-led governments, on the other hand, followed a threat-linked logic and more restrictionist perspective.
Therefore, the reason why the study disagrees with the above-mentioned studies is because of their conclusion of the similarities between the Conservative governments and the New Labour governments. In fact, the research suggests that the Conservative-led governments’ articulation displayed rupture rather than continuity with that of the New Labour governments.

Accordingly, the findings for the Conservative-led governments reveal that immigration control policies became restrictionist. This had its origins in the construction of immigration as (a constructed) perceived or real immediate threat, which is more concrete than being a site of problematization. The real or perceived immediate threat was the main manifestation of the model of securitization and the discourse of threat. From this point of view, while the articulation was informed by a discourse of problematization during the third New Labour government, during the Conservative-led governments, the discourse of threat informed the articulation.

The first and second New Labour governments’ articulation of immigration control policies, however, revealed that governmentality and threat-linked lenses alone cannot be a sufficient tool to provide a complete understanding of the structure and organization of the articulation. Inserting generic risk and opportunity-linked logic as a component to the theoretical lenses can uncover the pivotal role of the discourse of opportunity in informing the articulations. The analysis of the political discourse suggests the importance of taking into account opportunity-linked logic and generic risk in understanding the construction of immigration control policies over time.

The next section focuses on providing a more critical analysis of the explanatory dynamics.

5.2. Explanatory Dynamics: Rationalization and Justification

Explanatory dynamics are strong conceptual resonances that interact to construct and construe the discourse, in this case of immigration; they contain the rationalization cues and clues that structure and organize the articulation. Different explanatory
dynamics contain different aspects and rationalizations; that is, they inform an articulation in a different way as a resource for a privileged standpoint.

As noted in Chapter 2, the review of the literature, which was also supported by the analysis of the immigration discourse, assisted in identifying six underlying explanatory dynamics within the discourse. The explanatory dynamics are identified according to government’s presentation within the immigration discourses. Economic, political, politicization, security, public services and societal were major dynamics that had their own rationalities, which were presented to assist in shaping immigration control perspectives in their own right.

The point is that the more frequently diffused dynamic as a source of justification of the construction of immigration has a functional insight, which resurfaces in various discourses to reveal the scope of the adopted perspectives. From this point of view, the explanatory dynamics are the important part of the conceptualization of the immigration control discourses, by which the governments presented the rationalization for immigration control management so as to make a relevant policy choice more acceptable. Therefore, explanatory dynamics posit the rationalization and provide a ground for the perspectives, which can serve to expand liberal policies or build pressure for restrictionist policies. The chapter will discuss the economic and political, politicization and security dynamics mainly through the discourses articulated by the New Labour governments, which were the more prevalent thematization, while the social-economic and societal dynamics will be discussed mainly through the discourse articulated by the Conservative-led governments.

5.2.1 Economic Dynamic

The literature indicated that immigration-oriented economic thematizations function to adopt largely, but not always, more liberal immigration control policies in general, while in specific circumstances, such as economically hard times, they might interact to link or assist less liberal approaches. The New Labour governments, in a broader sense, stressed the contribution of economic immigration to the UK economy. This idea shaped policy preferences and actions because it re-expressed the conformity
between practices and policy ideas in a highly rationalized form. As noted in Section 4.1, during the New Labour governments, the economic dimension dominated immigration control policies and it was identified as the main thematization, which provided the rationalization for more liberal immigration control policies. The political dimension followed the economic dimension during the first two of the New Labour governments and then gave way to a public services dimension during the third New Labour government. The political and public services dynamics constrained the range and scope of the liberal policies and while the former linked less liberal policies, the latter interacted to link restrictionist policies. The economic dimension, therefore, was more powerful than the other dynamics in shaping the perspective on immigration control during the New Labour governments.

The sense of contribution to the economy was expressed in such a way that the government, for example, stated the need to facilitate immigration in key areas to keep up with a globalizing world. Being a contributory social force that was built upon opportunity-linked logic therefore also explains the fact that gaps in skills and enterprise can be filled by immigrants such as young scientists, as exemplified by a policy paper quoted below:

“3.98 The UK also needs to attract the most skilled and most enterprising people from abroad to add to the skills pool of resident workers. This will increase the quality of the UK's human capital and will allow greater economic activity and more employment opportunities for all in the longer term. Skilled foreign workers will help the UK address skill gaps, both where there are transient shortages in particular areas, for example amongst IT workers, or where skills shortages persist. 3.99 The Government is therefore making it easier for skilled foreign workers in key areas to come and work in the UK, where they have the skills and attitudes to help generate an enterprise economy” (PP, 1999, November).

Emphasizing the ideas about an enterprise, investment and skilled workers represent a distinctive formalization of opportunity-linked logic. From, this point of view, economy dynamic-linked immigration control fits largely with the principle of assisting a prosperous future that serves the country, which mirrors the discourse of
opportunity. Within the context of a discourse, the government’s awareness of global competition for skilled immigrants and of the demands of the labour market explained the aim of the more liberal policies, as can be seen in the following quotation from a parliamentary debate. The Minister for Citizenship and Immigration, Beverley Hughes, revealed the government’s approach:

“welcoming legal migrants where they can contribute to our economy, the government are managing migration actively and continuously to ensure that, on the one hand, the UK is well positioned to gain the benefits of migration in an increasingly competitive global market while at the same time making sure that we are integrating newcomers successfully into our communities. We are responding flexibly to the needs of our labour market while making sure that, when we allow people to come here and work, we can accommodate them successfully” (HC Deb, 2004 19 January).

The crucial implication of the discourse was the opportunity concept, in which the discussion of economic contribution was informed by an interest in competitive global markets. In this way, control policies were related to the level of the structured demand of the labour market and industries.

In this perspective, the emphasis was placed on economic immigrants, particularly skilled immigrants, and their economic contribution. The statements mainly conveyed the notion that economic immigration was necessary for sustaining economic growth and meeting the structural demands for skilled labour migration. David Blunkett (2002, 7 October), for example, addressing the Labour Party Conference in Blackpool, confirmed the enthusiasm of the New Labour governments for supporting economic migration through new routes and channels:

“I spelt out how we intended to ensure that new routes for economic migration, for new channels of coming into our country, would be developed. We have already started to do it. I have put in place that we will have a doubling of the number of visas for work permits given in the year ahead to 175,000 – the largest number in Europe, six times the number of work permits granted in
Germany this year” (David Blunkett, 2002, 7 October Labour Party conference in Blackpool).

The construction of contributory social force was clearly visible, and was readily acknowledged, in the articulation of the New Labour governments and their position that managing immigration required the active creation of an opportunity-linked logic in which the labour market conditions would determine the extent to which opportunity-linked logic was necessary. The articulation of the immigration control mainly reflected positive representation and a priority of profit. Therefore, the economic immigration-oriented contribution and the opportunity perspective are to be understood as an example of the diffusion of neoliberal ideas that dominate and drive the immigration agenda.

The Labour Party’s 2005 manifesto (GEM. Labour, 2005), for example, pointed to welcoming economic immigration and modernizing the immigration control system to fit the needs and interests of Britain. The government also constantly highlighted the relative opportunities of the wave of EU enlargement and the likely contribution of economic immigration related to EU enlargement. The government supported the further expansion of the EU and campaigned in favour of the positive economic contribution of immigrants. Tony Blair (2004, 27 April, Speech to the Confederation of British Industry on migration), just before the EU enlargement, stressed that there were a large number of vacancies in the labour market and that immigrants from the ten accession countries would help fill those gaps. A similar discourse was prevalent in parliamentary debates as well. The government stated that immigration was needed to fill the workforce gap (HC, 2005, 5 Jul 2005 second reading Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill). These discourses show that, in keeping with a need to be competitive and to maintain a world-class economy, the contribution of immigration was suggested as a new opportunity to address the existing labour market shortage. Therefore, the thematization flowed through the consideration of long-term developments as well as the concern of current labour shortages in Britain. Economic thematization provided a basis for the New Labour governments to call for more liberal immigration control approaches.
As discussed in the literature review, the associated economic consideration is mainly divided into labour market competition and fiscal burden subcategories (see Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda, 2006; Dustmann and Preston 2007; Hanson et al. 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Regarding the economic impact of migration from the fiscal impact perspective, as Borjas (2003), Dustmann et al. (2005), Cattaneo et al. (2015), Clark and Drinkwater (2008) and Giovanni et al. (2015) pointed out, the evidence suggests a relatively small but positive impact. While Bonin et al. (2000) pointed out that highly-skilled immigration might increase this positive impact, Rowthorn (2008) pointed out that there was no strong economic case for or against mass immigration. Dustmann et al. (2005) argued, for the UK case, that there was no clear negative fiscal impact of immigration as it is assumed on the economy, but rather a positive one. In terms of labour market competition, as Rowthorn (2008) pointed out, certain interest groups might argue or press for more openness to sustain global immigration flows if the structural demand for immigrant labour was bigger. Dustmann et al. (2005) also argued that there was no evidence of pressure on employment or on the wages of the indigenous population.

In contrast, Keijzer et al. (2016) argued that immigration is considered a threat rather than an opportunity. The finding, in terms of the first and second New Labour governments, however, support the former stand and suggest that the first and second New Labour governments’ articulation of immigration reflected an opportunity. The immigration control policies steadily emphasized the structural demand for more immigration and pointed to the vacancies that could only be filled by relevant immigrants.

Along the way, the articulation was informed by a discourse of opportunity rather than threat-linked discourses. Appropriately, the New Labour’s first two governments strongly supported this argument. During the parliamentary debates, the Minister for Citizenship and Immigration, Beverley Hughes, stated that:

“The government's progressive policy is to welcome migrants where that helps our economy and to give opportunities to people from less developed countries” (HC Deb, 2003, 17 Dec.).
“Many thousands of people come to this country each year for entirely legitimate reasons — and often support our economy — to work, study, join families or marry and settle with their spouse. Patterns of migration are constantly changing, and we need to ensure that our immigration rules keep up with them” (HC Deb, 2003 12 June.).

In addition to the construction of immigration as a contributory social force, which is clear from the quoted statements, the governments constantly encouraged investment by immigrants and access of immigrants to Britain who would contribute to the economy, sought to create new channels for skilled immigration and to attract hard workers (see David Blunkett, 2002, 7 October; Tony Blair, 2003, Bournemouth; Tony Blair, 2004, 27 April; PP, 2006, March 2006). The immigration theme was organized on the basis of contribution and regulation, seeking to motivate the relevant immigrants. The analysis of the political discourse reveals that the in New Labour’s first and second term, they were very keen to facilitate economic immigration and the articulation was predominately informed by the contributory aspect of immigrants. The economic thematization underpinned the dominant articulation, notably in a way in which the governments mostly acknowledged the severe global competition over skilled immigrants and the dependence on skilled professionals to maintain the British economy’s success.

However, the economic dynamic, as noted above, was not based on all positive and opportunity-linked considerations and can be utilized for different purposes. That is, based on the actors’ language, the specific situations and the interactions of the differing settings. In this sense, an economic dynamic, like all dynamics, is a constructed entity. It does not stand alone, but, rather, is part of an interaction. Therefore, the extent to which a different aspect of the economic dynamic becomes prevalent depends on the interactions of the settings. During the third term, the articulation revealed a number of critical developments that took place, and which were marked not only by Tony Blair’s leaving office but also by the great recession.

In times of great recession, for example, as might be rationally acceptable, economic hard times can lead to high unemployment and job scarcity in which jobs and wages related consideration might lead a negative view of immigration. The third new labour
government, as can be seen from the statement below, taken from a parliamentary debate and made by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, Jacqui Smith, opting to convey the idea of cutting more immigration:

“The impact of that, alongside the economic circumstances that we face, will be fewer migrants coming to the UK from outside the EEA. We will successfully reduce the number of migrants coming in during these difficult economic times. If we are talking about honesty, as the hon. gentleman favours a cap, although I do not know what sort of a cap it is—a UK Tory cap—perhaps he would like to give us some background” (HC Deb, 2009 23 March).

As noted in the literature review, one argument related to an economic dynamic that forms the consideration is the immigrant-native conflict linked to the effects on wage levels and employment opportunities (see Dancygier and Donnelly 2012; Hampshire, 2013). As Goldstein and Peters (2014:380) pointed out, when economic conditions worsen, the indigenous population feels more threatened and anti-immigrant sentiment emerges. Nativism increases with economic hard times, partly because immigration increases labour competition between groups of immigrants and natives.

It is assumed that during the third term of the New Labour governments, particularly after Tony Blair, the political discourse started to indicate that immigration control required a new perspective in which a new risk consideration and particular regulations had to be embraced and sufficient resources had to be allocated. More generally, the government sought to convey a sense in which immigration was understood as being a kind of challenge and was affecting the economic situation adversely. According to Hampshire (2013; 23), from an ‘interest-linked theories’ point of view, anti-immigrant sentiment originates in the individual-level and stems from self-interested concerns about economic well-being. When natives presume that immigrants take jobs and depress wages, they are more likely to oppose more immigration as job opportunities and incomes are more likely to be adversely affected.

Under Tony Blair, as Consterdine and Hampshire (2014) maintained, the New Labour governments, between 1997-2007, followed one of the most liberal immigration systems in Europe, despite no public demand for relaxation; however, the change in
the settings provided a mechanism for changing the ways in which immigration control policies were constructed.

While multiple objectives are often contained within any given discourse, ways to tackle some of the great recession-related dimensions reflected how interest-linked conflicts can serve to further restrict objectives. Therefore, even though the third New Labour government use economic dynamic-linked language, they tended to use varieties of language that were complex rather than conveying an opportunity-linked articulation. In essence, even when they conveyed an economic linked consideration, they were actually trying to point to a different view, which displayed how a dynamic can be used complexly. An economic dynamic, therefore, like all dynamics, can be used in a more arcane and complex way when attempting to create, modify or transform a meaning.

For example, the economic-linked language came to reflect a modification of meanings in which an overlapping and intertwining with the public services dynamic took place. The public services dynamic embedded economic dynamics became more complex and frequently overlapped with the public services dynamic. The modification arose during the economic downturn, being the consequence of the great recession of 2008 and 2009. The discourse of immigration moved towards a less liberal stand and a more selectiveness-linked tone. To illustrate this point, it is helpful to refer to some statements. A policy paper (PP, 2008 June A Cross-Government Approach) stated that:

“Migration has the potential to be hugely beneficial to society. Migrants fill skills gaps in sectors ranging from agriculture and hospitality to science, technology and the City. But we also need to be frank that the scale and pace of recent migration has had an impact in some places where local people, businesses and public services have had to adjust to change. It is essential that we recognise and properly address the challenges that changing patterns of migration bring in order to ensure all are able to share in the benefits. That is what we are committed to do. The work that is already underway in helping local services and communities manage the local impacts of migration. ...is
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offering support to local authorities and their partners to help them manage the issues that affect them locally” (PP, 2008 June A Cross-Government Approach)

The modified perspective implies that taking the public services impacts and relatively adverse economic impact into account were fundamental to the solutions to existing challenges. Thus, the modified articulation about the economic consideration was the source of less liberal approaches and emphasis was placed on how the impact on the local communities could be addressed. Concurrently, the contributory aspect of immigration was assumed to be constant, meaning that control policies should be balanced. For this reason, the construction accordingly is a dynamic process in which different discourses of the various logics are continually in interaction and mutual flux. As can be seen from the statement below taken from a policy paper:

“The fact is that migration brings benefits – social, cultural and economic – at national and local levels. But it is also a fact that population change, especially at the rapid rate we have seen in recent years, can cause transitional pressures in local communities. Since last June the context has changed dramatically. The global economic slowdown affects migration as it does virtually every other area of life. In these tough times, migration will continue to bring benefits to the UK: and it will be vital to ensuring our economic recovery. But now more than ever it is crucial that we control migration and migrant numbers for the benefit of the country and refine our understanding of how the downturn will affect different areas…. our response will be our fund of £35 million per annum provided to local service providers such as schools to help communities manage the transitional impacts of migration” (PP, 2009 March).

A basic insight from the articulated discourse is that the vast majority of discourses of the third New Labour government were articulated through a less liberal logic rather than the opportunity-linked one. The governmentality-linked conception, informed by problematization, conditioned the articulation whether to pursue a more problematization-linked logic and less opportunity-linked one, and if so, how to pursue it. This can be seen from statements below taken from parliamentary debates, delivered by the Minister for Borders and Immigration Phil Woolas:
“The immigration system is undergoing the biggest shake-up in a generation. We have strengthened our borders, started the roll-out of local immigration teams, introduced civil penalties for rogue employers who knowingly hire illegal workers, and introduced tier 4 of the points-based system for students. We are committed to removing those with no right to be here, targeting the most harmful first” (HC, 2008, 13 May)

“Britain’s migration policy needs to strike the correct balance, weighing the economic benefits with the impacts on communities and public services...People understand that migration can bring benefits to our country, but they also rightly demand robust systems so that we can control who comes here and so that migrants abide by our laws and contribute to our society. There will be tougher border controls... This Government have put in place the most significant changes in immigration policy since the 1950s” (HC 2008 21 Oct 2008)

In view of the above quoted statements and discussion, it could be argued that the third New Labour government developed an immigration control model driven by increasing returns to less liberal logic. In this context, the ongoing framing effects of problematization conditioned the capacity of the control policies to instigate new apparatus, which were a prerequisite for governmentality-linked logic. In this sense, the government’s focus was on the changes in employment conditions and the social factors, articulated through a relatively negative and less liberal representation (see, Gordon Brown, 2008, 20 February, Speech on Managed Migration and Earned Citizenship). The emphasis was on prioritizing skilled immigration and creating an effective migrant system, such as creating a selection scheme that prioritized the skills as selective criteria (see Gordon Brown, 29 September, Brighton Labour conference speech). Therefore, relatively different discourses within the emerging new risk perspective, not only conveyed the new prime minister’s perspective but also the way in which interpretations were linked to change in the economic environment and its effect on the context as a rationalization of the change in immigration control policies towards less liberal approaches.
For example, taking public opinion and the mass media’s attitude towards immigration into account, Gordon Brown (2007, 27 February London speech on Britishness at the Commonwealth Club) stressed the government had sought to listen to people’s concerns. Britain was facing particular circumstances in which the new challenges had to be confronted (see also Gordon Brown, 2008, 20 February). In another example, the new conditions, Gordon Brown (2009, 29 September, Brighton) stated, meant becoming much tougher on immigration and taking a precautionary approach.

The analysis of the immigration discourse reveals that the third New Labour government was largely concerned with immigration’s adverse outcomes; thus, it tended to favour less liberal approaches, particularly targeting the high numbers of asylum seekers, family unification and illegal immigration, as well as permitting more economic immigration. The government, therefore, came to stress the power dynamics in the knowledge-building process and sought to convey that the government was emphasizing the importance of meeting people’s concerns and being mindful of how immigration might adversely affect social and economic life. The third New Labour government’s articulation underlined how a dynamic can be quite complicated and flexible but has a reproductive and transforming function.

In summary, the analysis of the discourse suggests that during their first and second terms, the New Labour governments sought to extend the UK’s attractiveness for economic immigration in an era of globalization on the grounds of the opportunity-linked logic. The governments were aware of the widespread competition over high-skilled immigration and of the structural demands of the labour force; in part, these assisted modernising the system to facilitate immigrants to access Britain and to help to keep up with the world’s economic development by forming an immigration control perspective on the grounds of a business-oriented risk approach in which the economic dynamic was interpreted as contributory and opportunity oriented.

The economic-oriented rationalization came to be seen as an important underlying theme and the main driver of the construction of a perspective in which governments were particularly keen to show that immigration control policies had been implemented to support the British economy, and they claimed the perspective on
immigration control was serving the interests of the UK. The economic consideration, therefore, was largely informed by the government’s approach towards immigration. Economic thematizations were used to convey the keenness to favour more immigration. This suggestion does not mean that the economic thematization can only be used to articulate liberal perspectives. As discussed in section 2.2, all dynamics are open to further consideration and dispute, and their status can go up or down with the interactions of the settings and with time as the articulation develops.

In this sense, the economic dynamic started to become part of the articulation that required that immigration control be linked to, and flow from, a consideration centring immigration as a burden rather than an opportunity. The status of the economic dynamic, therefore, evolved towards informing governmentality-linked logic during New Labour’s third term, and it differed from the previously adopted opportunity-linked logic and generic risk-oriented immigration control policies.

It can be argued that, in terms of the dynamics, the articulation of the immigration control policies posits a reflexive process in which the governments progressively refined their focus on immigration and their understandings of the control policies.

The next section turns to the political, politicization and security dynamics.

5.2.2 Political, Politicization and Security Dynamics

The political dynamic, within the research context as a dimension of explanatory dynamic, is itself a thematization category, under which largely asylum seekers and refugees-related articulations are defined and constructed. The discourse analysis revealed that the status of the political dynamic mainly functioned as a restriction-oriented factor, which largely displayed different patterns from the economic dynamic. The political dynamic, while made immigration more salient, was less likely to provide a supportive ground for immigration.

The political dynamic, therefore, largely served to rationalize and justify the less liberal immigration control policies. It had a boundary spanning capacity to create a mixed pattern of interests. From this point of view, the political thematization operated to
cement the ethical and international obligation, which entailed relaxation, on the one hand, and the increased number of asylum seekers and the abuse of the system that served the restrictionist consideration, on the other hand.

As discussed in the previous section, the political dynamic followed the economic dynamic during the first and second New Labour governments while during the third term, it was replaced by the public services dynamic (see Tables 4.3, 4.6, 4.9). In terms of political dynamic, the New Labour governments’ immigration discourses mainly reflected a struggle between genuine and non-genuine asylum seekers and focused on distinguishing the genuine and so-called bogus asylum seekers. Despite the idea of protecting the former and discouraging the latter, the overall objective was to reduce the number of asylum-seekers through reorganizing an immigration system that could not be abused. For example, a parliamentary debate (HC, 1999, Parliamentary Debate, 18 January) illustrated the government’s construction of the rationality through the political dynamic; the government suggested that the implementation of a sophisticated strategy aimed at changing the system fundamentally to make it capable of protecting genuine asylum seekers and deterring the so-called bogus asylum seeker. Similarly, a policy paper (PP, 1998, 27 July 1998) noted that the existent immigration system was a disaster when asylum seekers’ access to social services was taken into consideration; therefore, new provisions were suggested to ensure that genuine asylum seekers were not deprived, and economic asylum seekers would not be attracted.

The discourses pointed to a struggle between multiple conceptualizations, which included conveying conflicting approaches to regulate immigration control by balancing moral obligations in terms of human rights and British values, and deterring fraudulent practices, including the problem of control itself as the number of asylum seekers increased. The characteristics of the political thematication, however, were dominated by a reflection on a general challenge, largely determined by the push factors, such as armed conflicts, and object-orientated pull factors, such as access to the welfare system and labour market as a result of the prosperity and the stability of the UK. Push factors included political instability and civil war. During a parliamentary debate (HC, 1999, 18 January), the government, for example, stated
that the main reason for the increased number of asylum seekers was the increased instability in parts of the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

As noted in the literature review, it is a commonly held assumption that public attitudes towards asylum seekers are mainly negative in Western liberal countries (see Hatton, 2015). Politically motivated negative attitudes can trigger economic, social and societal considerations, which can be understood as forces entailing restrictions of immigration flows (Hatton and Williamson, 2006). Not only public opinion, but also government elites might construct asylum seekers in a negative manner, and despite the variation in the construction of the perceptions of asylum seekers, labelling them as a burden serves to support restrictionist perspectives (Klocker and Dunn, 2003). Still, differentiating asylum seekers and refugees does not prevent negative attitudes towards immigration (Every and Augoustinos, 2007)

The discourse on immigration, particularly in terms of asylum seekers, displayed a different pattern, in which, as discussed, the relevant strategies were mainly balanced. The struggle and competition between the discourse to articulate the perspective revealed that the statements expressed the notion of protecting genuine refugees, on the one hand, and addressing the abuse, on the other hand. Nevertheless, the overall dominant discourse emphasized the protection of asylum seekers and the benefits provided by previous asylum immigrants. For example, the following statement expressed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department Jack Straw, during the second reading of the Immigration and Asylum act in the parliamentary debate illustrates its view:

“We will continue to protect genuine refugees, but we will deal firmly with those who seek to exploit the system...immigrants have made an enormous contribution to Britain: every area of British life has been enriched by their presence. The Government welcome immigrants who are lawfully in this country and who make a contribution to our society.... We must be able to provide support to those in genuine need, but we must do so in a way that minimises the incentive to economic migrants who undermine public support for genuine refugees” (HC, 1999, 22 February second reading Immigration and Asylum Bill).
It posited the conceptualization of the contribution of the asylum seeker to Britain’s every area; similarly, as can be seen from the following statement made by the Minister of State, Home Office, Barbara Roche, during a parliamentary debate, the government stated that:

“We are trying to honour our international obligations to genuine asylum seekers.... It is important that we restore integrity to the system. That is why we are providing resources and it is why we introduced the Act. We shall ensure that we honour our international obligations and deter unfounded applications. We shall make sure that this country’s proud record is upheld” (HC, 2000, 02 February Asylum and Immigration).

The aims of modernizing the system were for it to work efficiently to meet moral and international obligations and also to minimize the abuse of the system. Thus, while human rights and humanitarian-linked assistance require a liberal approach, non-genuine and overcapacity considerations were utilized to rationalize the less liberal approaches.

Therefore, in contrast to the above-noted scholars’ conclusions, the research proposes that the government’s articulation of asylum seekers was dominated by a balanced and positive attitude rather than a negative and opposing perspective, while asylum crises as external shocks adversely affected the overall articulations. This argument is also supported by the offered management, as noted above, in which the objective was to restore the system and address the lack of existing provision for genuine asylum seekers.

Political dynamic more or less reflected a consistent view that the articulation revolved around human rights-linked and humanitarian and moral obligations accompanied by a critique of abusing the system. The consistent view flowed regardless of the criticism; the humanitarian-linked moral approach was sustained across the governments.

Politicization on immigration was never completely structured through not including the ‘counterparts’, rather, it was constructed through interaction, with more or less variations, over time and across the actors. Such interaction tends to problematize the immigration issue to varying degrees, that is, to cause the articulation to be
constructed with variations. When political actors talked about their stance and their counterparts’ shortcomings, the problematization and the politicization of immigration become highly salient. While Labour was tied to the notion of inheriting an ineffective system, the Conservatives were tied to a growing desire of getting power through denoting a chaotic system. For example, the argument that the ineffective system inherited from the Conservative party required reform partially consciously or unconsciously implied the problematization of immigration through an ineffective system. As an example, during a parliamentary debate, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Mike O’Brien, stated that:

“The previous Government left tens of thousands of asylum seekers in a backlog for six or more years, many of them on benefit, without the Home Office taking a decision on whether they were refugees. The Tory record was shameful. We are now clearly trying to tidy up the mess that we inherited from the Tories. Instead of scoring mere party-political points, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman would apologise for his Government’s shameful failure to deal with those issues” (HC, 1998 26 October).

For similar discourses, see HC, 1997 24 November; HC, 1999 15 February; HC, 2003 16 June among the numerous narratives. Similarly, while the discourse articulated by the Conservatives, which denoted a chaotic system that was no longer able to control immigration (see William Hague, 2001 1 June, Bradford; Iain Duncan Smith, 2003 09 November Blackpool; Michael Howard, 2004 19 Feb.; Michael Howard, 2005 28 Jan.; David Cameron, 2007 03 November, Blackpool: see Appendix A), reflected how the problematization of immigration can be an investment that will pay off, but, at the same time, such a discourse is widely informed by a number of different settings as well as mirroring the partialities and inconsistencies within and across the discourses.

The partialities and inconsistencies across the different settings were sometimes the results of the fact that one setting can incorporate different and conflicting values or values that connect to a setting do not serve the other settings’ interests better than their own. For example, the New Labour governments were aware of the danger of politicization of the issue (see Tony Blair, 2004, 28 Sept., Labour conference in Brighton), and the government sought to avoid playing politics with the issue of race.
and immigration. It intended to publicly convey the idea that the media were fuelling the negative framing (HC, 2007, 17 July Immigration), which posited that certain parts of the media were fuelling the hate and negative perception towards people who were really in need of humanitarian protection.

Political and politicization dynamics were the main dynamics in which partialities and inconsistencies took place across the settings. The research suggests that the New Labour governments’ perspective aimed to establish a ‘fair, fast and firm’ approach to the immigration system. The governments were keen to incorporate a humanitarian and moral consideration into their strategy and justification. The perspective suggested a balanced version and pointed to a positive and inclusive approach that advocated humanitarianism as a principle while noting the abuses taking place of the system. The data also indicated that the government differentiated between genuine and bogus asylum seekers, rather than between asylum seekers and refugees, and in broader terms, welcomed genuine asylum seekers. Therefore, the research supports Sales’ (2002) argument partly that while the argument of differentiating between genuine and bogus asylum seekers is supported, differentiating between refugees and asylum seekers and labelling the former as ‘deserving’ and the latter as ‘undeserving’ immigrants are challengeable.

The differentiation between genuine and bogus asylum seekers is based on the consideration that a bogus movement had principally stemmed from the economic consideration rather than genuine reasons and therefore the procedural changes aimed to lessen the system’s attractiveness by reinforcing border controls and curtailing public funds and access to the labour market. As noted above, the rhetoric was twofold: welcoming the genuine asylum seekers but preventing those who were seen to be abusing the system by seeking to reduce the attractiveness of the system. In the UK, the foremost concern in this respect was that asylum seeking was regarded as being driven not only by conflicts but also by economic considerations.

Constructing the asylum seeker as a threat that leads to restrictionist immigration control policies (Innes, 2010) is contradicted by the research’s results. Innes (2010) claimed that the asylum seeker has been constructed as a threat within the government and mass media perspective, which such a perspective portrays asylum seekers as a
threat to economic and social life. Even though Innes’ account well captured the changed pattern of the asylum seekers, the conclusion of the immigration (asylum seekers) security nexus is not supported in the UK case. In terms of the government perspective, the research argues that Innes failed to capture the whole picture of the articulation of control policies. As the research argues, the characteristics and exercise of power benchmarks, in terms of the political dynamic, do not seem to offer a basis for such a conclusion.

Similarly, Schuster and Solomos (2004) argued that the similarity between the New Labour governments and the Conservatives in their approach to immigration policy was remarkable and that both treated immigration as a threat. Moreover, the view of the construction of asylum seekers as a threat not only constrained the political discourse, they argued, but also mobilized support for anti-immigrant sentiment. Even though the details of the account they propose are somewhat complex, the argument of treating asylum seekers and refugees as a threat has not been supported by the research results. In the same vein, Mulvey (2010) also argued that the discourse adopted by the Labour governments throughout their years in office treated asylum seekers as a threat. Such a discourse, Mulvey argued, reflected Schuster and Solomos’ argument. It not only served to move immigration to the security realm, placing asylum seekers on the negative side of the spectrum and the economic immigrants on the positive side, but it resulted in the opposing of immigration in general. The research challenges this proposal, when the characteristics and exercise of power benchmarks are jointly intertwined with the explanatory dimensions, it is difficult to support their argument. In contrast, the research findings suggest that the New Labour governments’ perspectives did not reflect a political dynamic that offers an immigration security nexus or the construction of asylum seekers as a threat.

Despite some variations across the terms, the research’s argument is that the New Labour governments’ articulation of immigration was not dominated by a security and immigration nexus for immigrants in general and asylum seekers in particular. This is supported by Somerville’s (2007) and Düvell and Jordan’s (2003) conclusions. Somerville (2007) pointed out that during the first two terms of the New Labour governments, immigration policy was driven by considerations related to asylum
seekers and refugees. The limiting of asylum applications and clearing the huge number of asylum requests were sought through restructuring the immigration system, which aimed to limit political dynamic, on the one hand, and relaxing economic immigration, on the other hand. Furthermore, Düvell and Jordan (2003) argued that the New Labour governments mainly focused on modernizing the public service in general and modernizing the immigration system in particular and managing asylum seeker-related challenges by lessening the attractiveness of the related context.

When it comes to the security dynamic, security-linked dynamic posits a construction where immigration is linked to security concerns, making the supply of a threat-linked consideration a critical factor. Labelling this as a threat and security issue to construct a process can result in an avalanche of threat-linked articulations, in which the increased attention to the negative effects of immigration can result in more restricted control policies. Security dynamic, therefore, inherently provides grounds for the securitization of immigration control policies and it might lead to securitizing immigration. From this point of view, security dynamic functions to assist a restrictionist perspective and conveys the rationale of a minimization of a threat.

As noted in Chapter 2, security-linked considerations considerably amplify an articulation. They inform and reflect the steps taken to minimize the constructed threats. These steps are difficult to take in the absence of such a thematization and rationalization. 9/11 had a relatively significant impact on how the discourses on immigration control policies were informed by a security consideration. There was a rapid expansion of the immigration discourse referred to as a security nexus and the role of illegal immigration. These developments led to some form of constructing an immigration context within which the threat thematization came to be embedded in the discourse.

This style of discourse posited a specific emphasis on controlling illegal immigration, which posited a security concern, and particularly fighting against illegal immigration through intensifying border control measures and practices. The approach in the presentation of immigration during this period seemed to differentiate between immigration and illegal immigration very clearly; thus, concern over the security
consideration was mainly linked to illegal immigration. Nevertheless, 9/11 had an impact on how the subject of immigration might be associated with a security consideration. Following the 9/11 attacks, the New Labour governments engaged in a rapid response and pronounced the adopting of more restricted procedures to deal with illegal immigration. During a parliamentary debate, the Secretary of State for the Home Department, David Blunkett, revealed the government’s view of pursuing a major review of the migration system and promising a shift towards a modern system of managing immigration and overturning asylum seekers’ claims if they were suspected of being members of terrorist associations:

“there is a compelling need for more effective powers to exclude and remove suspected terrorists from our country. We rightly pride ourselves on the safe haven that we offer to those genuinely fleeing terror. But our moral obligation and love of freedom does not extend to offering hospitality to terrorists. I am also looking to take power to deny substantive asylum claims to those who are suspected of terrorist associations, and to streamline the existing judicial review procedures while retaining the right of appeal. Appropriate safeguards would apply to any such derogation. I also intend, following an announcement to the House in the weeks ahead, to modernise our nationality and asylum system” (HC, 2001, 15 October HC Deb Anti-Terrorism Measures),

It might be argued that 9/11 provided the grounds to consider immigration as a security issue. Weiner (1992/1993), on the other hand, insisted that long before immigration became a security issue. Some scholars have presented evidence of a positive correlation between immigration and the security nexus; Bourbeau (2015), for example, argued that mass immigration led a socially constructed securitization of immigration. According to Humphrey (2013), the discourse of border security, the war on terror and terrorism, and assimilation and integration intensified during the post 9/11 period, which, in turn, led to the securitization of immigration. Léonard (2010) pointed to border control practices and the activities of FRONTEX at the EU level in terms of the securitization of immigration case. Similarly, Buonfino, (2004) argued that with the help of the media and politicians, and, in turn, public opinion, immigration was constructed as a security issue at national and EU level. Diez and
Squire (2008), on the other hand, pointed to citizenship practices for framing immigration as a security issue. The thesis, however, indicates that the first and second New Labour governments sought to differentiate clearly the immigration control function from addressing illegal immigration. This separation revealed the struggle between the opportunity-linked logic and the precautionary risk management. The former cut across the latter to dominate the articulated perspective. While such a separation led to questions on how immigration control management was integrated, the New Labour governments’ discourse explicitly noted targeting illegal immigration and facilitating the immigration movement as a whole. Accordingly, in addition to the previous discussion of the government’s response to 9/11, during a parliamentary debate the Minister for Citizenship and Immigration Beverley Hughes revealed the government’s approach, insisting on working with the French government to address the problem of illegal immigration and taking relevant precautionary measures to target illegal immigration and related organized immigration crimes as follows:

“We are working closely with the French Government to deal with the problem of illegal immigration from France, and the trafficking networks which bring so many of these illegal immigrants across Europe. We are making efficient use of intelligence to target resources against organised immigration crimes, and we are investing in new technologies to detect and deter those attempting to enter the United Kingdom clandestinely in road freight vehicles. We are working to introduce a range of measures, including improved security and identification of illegal immigrants, a joint reporting system and shared intelligence. We are trying to make illegal working more difficult under measures in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill, which the Conservative party opposed. Through the institution of non-suspensive appeals for clearly unfounded cases, we are making it possible to remove people very quickly—again, the Opposition parties opposite will not support us” (HC, 2002, 08 July)

The government considered illegal immigration as a big issue, which required all relevant measures to be taken to strengthen border controls and have a secure method of establishing identity (HC, 2003, 24 February 2003).
This emphasis on illegal immigration reflects a preventative strategy which led to a control logic for precautionary control strategies which focused on systems designed to make the overall objectives work. The articulation conveyed the idea of preventing the unintended consequences of the agenda of pursuing a more liberal logic for immigration control and minimizing the negative effects so as not to undermine the overall strategies that largely were aimed at more liberal strategies. However, the security dynamic partly functioned to constrain the scope of the expansion-oriented logic and competed with expansion-linked dynamics in articulating the dominated discourse.

In summary, this part of the section considered a specific analysis of political and security dynamics and their emergence as a constraining category to give rise to a number of different considerations within a common framework that affected the way in which immigration control policies were informed. The findings show how, under specific conditions, concerns and considerations in the form of a limiting force have the power to inform the articulation. The economic dynamic largely called for more liberal approaches, and in the New Labour governments’ case supported expansionist policies. Conversely, the political dynamics, with intensified politicization of immigration during the election campaigns giving a high level of salience to the problematization of immigration, and the security dynamic, intensified by 9/11 and linking immigration to security, together underpinned the concern with immigration’s negative outcomes and informed articulation in the shape of more restrictive immigration policy frameworks. During the New Labour governments, while the economic dynamic remained an important feature of a more liberal immigration control perspective, the political and security dynamics restrained the scope and range of the perspective.

The section turns to public services and societal dynamics as the main thematization of the Conservative era.
5.2.3 Public Services and Societal Dynamics

The public services and societal dynamics largely informed a relatively different form of immigration control perspective as they functioned in a specific and intensified way, similarly to the security dynamic, in restricting immigration control policies. These elements accentuate tendencies towards more concerns and delineate a conceptual framework for presenting immigration control policies. Therefore, these dynamics are mainly problematization and threat oriented, which provided grounds for further acceleration of the precautionary approaches utilized to rationalize immigration as a site of fear and anxiety that required precautionary management. As discussed in the previous section, in terms of immigration control, the economic dimension mainly reflected the immigration impact on the domestic labour market and the fiscal effect. The public services dimension, on the other hand, primarily mirrored the link between immigration and welfare dependency considerations, and pressure on public services such as on education, health, housing, social security and social welfare.

While these thematizations continued to be insignificant during the New Labour governments, a marked growth of involvement took place during the Conservative-led governments. Therefore, as noted previously, the research will reflect the articulation of the Conservative-led governments, which was dominated by public services and societal thematizations. The Conservative-led coalition, in particular, marked a critical turning point. Following meaningful and notable changes in the associated dynamics patterns of the previous terms, the perspective on immigration might be defined as having reached a turning point. Among the dynamics, for the first time, the public services consideration came to be widely diffused in the immigration control discourse. Notably, this particular presentation seems to be very different from the previous ones, which sought to convey the sense in which immigration was predominantly understood as a threat, and, in turn, immigration has been constructed in a highly politicized form, involving a threat embedded articulation.

The discourse, from an access to the public services point of view, became consistent and widely diffused to articulated new form a control logic, which differed from the previous counterparts in addressing strategies on immigration control. It created a sensitive rationalization for immigration within a controlling framework.
The statements made by David Cameron delivered at 10 Downing Street, and in a speech on EU immigration, reflect this consideration:

"Yes, some immigration is a good thing, it is right that we should attract the brightest and the best to Britain. We genuinely need foreign investors and entrepreneurs to come here..... But excessive immigration brings pressures, real pressures on our communities up and down the country..., perhaps seeking simply to take advantage of our NHS, paid for by our taxpayers, there is a discomfort and tension in some of our communities. And there is also the concern that relatively uncontrolled immigration can hurt the low paid and the low skilled while the better off reap many of the benefits... So, I think it’s absolutely right to address all of these concerns, because if people don’t feel that mainstream political parties understand these issues they will turn instead to those who seek to exploit these issues to create social unrest" (2011, 10 October David Cameron, Conservative Prime Minister's speech on immigration).

“So many people, so fast, is placing real burdens on our public services. There are secondary schools where the turnover of pupils can be as high as one third of the entire school in a year. There are primary schools where dozens of languages are spoken with only a small minority speaking English as their first language. There are hospitals where maternity units are under great pressure because birth rates have increased dramatically. There are Accident and Emergency departments under serious pressure. And there is pressure on social housing that cannot be met” (David Cameron 2014 28 November speech on EU migration)

The statements made by Theresa May during the Conservative conference of 2012 (2012, 9 October, Birmingham, Conservative Party conference 2012), for example, stressed that the government would not be soft on immigration or muddle the issue. The government was keen to ensure that it would address the concerns of mass immigration, segregation of communities, overburdening of infrastructure, housing, and public services, pressure on schools, and uncontrolled immigration displacing indigenous people from the workforce and undercutting wages. While this intensification of problematized mass immigration was an important feature of the
immigration control discourse, it was mainly conveyed through the idea of reducing net immigration and bearing the burden of immigration as a site of fear and anxiety.

The same year, for example, Theresa May (2012, 12 December a keynote speech on immigration to the centre-right Policy Exchange), speaking on immigration, precisely revealed how immigration was constituted:

“Why we need to control immigration, I believe there are three main reasons: its effect on social cohesion, on our infrastructure and public services, and on jobs and wages. First, social cohesion. This isn’t fair to anyone: how can people build relationships with their neighbours if they can’t even speak the same language? After years of mass immigration, we now face the enormous task of building an integrated, cohesive society. Allowing more and more immigration would make that impossible. The second reason we need to control immigration is its impact on infrastructure and public services. It seems obvious that immigration should have an impact on things like the availability and cost of housing, the transport system, the National Health Service or the number of school places. The third reason we need to control immigration is its effects on jobs and wages” (Theresa May, 2012, 12 December Policy Exchange),

It is clear how the debate around immigration which revolved around an economic point of view in terms of costs and benefits, moved towards arguments that evolved around a societal and public services dynamic which was suggested as the noneconomic consequences that were often overlooked. More immigration, she argued, would mean tearing apart communities. The discourse to represent the values, fears and anxieties of people became a part of a mood of threat-linked perspective, derived from fears of eroding social values, welfare and a collective future. The fear and uncertainty were organized within the threat-linked logic in such a way that it provided an operational platform for transforming the moral and material concerns into a catalysing concept which linked interests to new threats.

The next year, Theresa May (2013, 30 September, Manchester), addressing the party conference again highlighted the public services and societal dynamics:
“It is a simple question of fairness. Because it’s not the rich who lose out when immigration is out of control, it’s people who work hard for a modest wage. They’re the people who live in communities that struggle to deal with sudden social changes, who rely on public services that can’t cope with demand, who lose out on jobs and have their wages forced down when immigration is too high. That’s why we’re cutting immigration across the board. Let’s not forget about Labour. In just thirteen years, up to four million people settled in Britain. But they still won’t admit they let immigration get out of control. In fact, in June, Chuka Umunna let slip they’re considering a target to increase immigration. I suppose at least this time they’re being honest about it” (Theresa May, 2013, 30 September, party conference Manchester),

The thematization pinpointed the source of fear and anxiety and the prioritizing of loss conveyed through highlighting the hard-hit areas. It was argued that people had lost their jobs, wages had decreased, community contact had been lost and the unprivileged had less access to social services. In the immigration control discourse, the representation of immigration seemed to be nearly emptied of opportunity content, and of any content in terms of opportunity-linked logic and the generic risk notion that embodies a liberal immigration control and managerial logic. Rather, immigration became defined and represented as part of (a constructed) perceived or real immediate threat to the social fabric. The analysis of the discourse reveals that the Conservative-led governments were less likely to support more immigration; their apprehensive attitudes towards a higher level of immigration considerably informed not only immigration discourse but also dominated immigration control policies as well.

Therefore, during the 2010s, immigration control discourses began to include a more developed and sophisticated rationalization of the adverse effects on public services and public funds and the perceived erosion of the societal component of the community. Beneath the discourses, the articulations conveyed the idea of how immigration could be a destructive force and a source of societal insecurity.

In general, indeed, while Theresa May’s discourse seems tougher and more extreme, tending to convey a defensive amplification of the perspective, it was also notably rigid
and exceptional in character, David Cameron, on the other hand, seems to have had an incentive to create the government’s perspective in terms of considering immigration to be less risky to economy, and adopted a relatively less rigid stand on immigration. This, in part, might have resulted from the coalition member, as the Liberal Democrats’ stand on immigration differed from the Conservatives (see Nick Clegg, 2011 3 March; Nick Clegg, 2013 18 September; Nick Clegg, 2013 22 March). The Liberal Democrats, as Clegg (2013 22 March major speech on immigration as Deputy Prime Minister) pointed out, mainly sought not to flag the immigration issue in a populist way so as not to polarise the debate. The findings, as presented in section 4.2.3, illustrated that the immigration control policies differed significantly not only between the Labour party and the Conservative party but also between the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats as well.

David Cameron (2011, 5 October Conservative conference speech, Manchester) stated that the New Labour governments talked about opportunity, but they had lost control; his government was committed to controlling immigration, in particular non-EU immigrants, but would not exclude the talented, thus, the best and brightest would be welcomed, but the government would be tough and would clamp down on all wrongdoing. Similarly, David Cameron’s immigration speech (2013, 25 March, Ipswich) stressed that while the government believed in the benefits and contribution of immigration, it also believed in proper controls; uncontrolled immigration would cause the benefits that immigration might bring to be lost or forgotten. Immigration was too high and net immigration had to be radically reduced. While the previous discourse targeted the non-EU immigration particularly, from 2014, immigration from within the EU became part of the discourse, David Cameron (2014, 01 October, Birmingham), during the speech to the Conservative conference, for example, stated that border and immigration control would aim to put British people first; thus, not only would non-EU immigration be capped but EU citizens would be subject to restricted accessibility to social benefits.

The analysis of the immigration discourse reveals that the public services and societal dynamics conveyed immigration’s negative outcomes and assisted in informing more restrictionist immigration control policies. The Conservative-led governments
engaged more with the public services and societal dynamics than the New Labour
governments and were more concerned with the existing adverse impacts of mass
immigration. Therefore, the Conservative-led governments’ critical stance on a high
level of immigration and its existing and perceived negative impact on economic,
social and societal aspects predominantly informed the articulation within a more
restrictionist stand. The Conservative-led governments’ approach to immigration can
be interpreted as opposition to any form of more immigrants in general. The
Conservative-led governments were more motivated to protect social, economic and
societal dynamics; thus, they tended to oppose any further immigration let alone any
liberalization of immigration control policies.

Common to these varied discourses of immigration control, immigration was much
cited as a burden on social services. Chapter 2 has suggested that the rise of anxiety
about mass immigration is a story of the welfare state phenomenon. The welfare state
was intended to serve the citizens (Sainsbury, 2006). The welfare state’s expansion has
faced growing political contradictions around the feasibility of further expansion
(Pierson, 1998; Korpi, 2003). The extent to which immigrants can access social
benefits and the benefit dependency have become central to public debates as it is
assumed that immigrants do not contribute enough to the benefits system and take
advantage of the liberal welfare state (Bommes and Geddes, 2003; Emmenegger and
Careja, 2012; Hemerijk, 2013). The debate, argued Dancygier and Donnelly (2012),
might assist with the backlash to immigration in general.

However, Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Ruhs (2008), and Cohen and Razin (2008)
concluded that relatively small numbers of immigrants escaping ethnic tensions and
poverty and disproportionately dependent on benefits and skilled immigrants are less
likely to gain an advantage as they contribute more in taxes than they receive in social
services. In contrast to these conclusions, the Conservative-led governments’
perspective and the articulated discourse were consistent with threat-linked
conceptions of immigration as a burden.

Writing in the *Daily Telegraph*, David Cameron (2014, 28 Jul) revealed the deeply
defensive position towards immigration:
“There was an increasingly generous, no-questions-asked welfare system which drew migrants to Britain for the wrong reasons. And unforgivably, while we had the highest rates of migration in our modern history, we also had well over five million people of working age on out-of-work benefits. Over the past four years, we have been single-mindedly turning this around. Our goal is clear: an immigration system that puts Britain first. Achieving that means doing three things: clamping down on abuses of the system; making sure the right people are coming here for the right reasons; and ensuring the British people get a fair deal” (David Cameron, 2014, 28 Jul).

The defensive preferences revealed the heated debates, revolving around the extent to which the strategies ought to be adopted to deal with the constructed issue by noting that the government not only planned to cut benefits for immigrants, but also was extending controls to within the country, in addition to having pre-exit controls conducted outside the UK, employers, institutions and agencies would work as border checks agents as well, for example, recruiting agencies, employers, universities, schools, hospitals, doctors’ and dentists’ surgeries, housing agencies, banks, DVLA: all relevant sectors would be working as immigration enforcement. They would have a legal obligation to check immigration status and have the duty to report any illegal immigrants to the authorities (David Cameron, 2014, 28 Jul). Obligations and duties became registered in a much broader social space than directly in border security and immigration control enforcement. Devising a new apparatus for immigration control in the form of disciplinary code which was deeply defensive became central to the existing political discourse. This defensive dimension of immigration control management might be seen as a function of threat-linked activities and pushing reputational sectors to become a sub-set of an expanding fear and threat-linked perspective. This suggests that the threat-linked logic was embedded to cut across usually separate functional sectors in society.

Explaining how immigration came to be seen as a major socio-economic challenge to social services and social cohesion, Theresa May (2017, 17 January, Brexit speech) suggested that Brexit was a result of a greater demand for controlling immigration. While controlled immigration might bring benefits and contribute to the economy,
mass immigration put great pressure on infrastructure, education, health, housing, welfare systems, jobs and wages. The statement revealed a highly defensive character to the immigration control perspective. The public services thematization pervaded the political discourse of immigration and assisted in a broad shift within the immigration control perspective from a relatively opportunity-linked logic to a threat-linked immigration control logic.

The societal dynamic also came to the fore during the Conservative-led governments. The discourse suggests that the societal dynamic had little to do with opportunity inherently but more to do with threat. Numerous political discourses represented and intensifying the concerns of pressure on social services and societal security in the form of a presumed mass immigration impact during the Conservative-led governments.

The statements made by David Cameron in a speech on immigration in April 2011 reflect this consideration:

“Immigration has been too high....and it has placed real pressures on communities up and down the country. Not just pressures on schools, housing and healthcare - though those have been serious, but social pressures too. That's why, when there have been significant numbers of new people arriving in neighbourhoods, perhaps not able to speak the same language as those living there, that has created a kind of discomfort and disjointedness in some neighbourhoods. This has been the experience for many people in our country - and I believe it is untruthful and unfair not to speak about it and address it, but also its impact on our public services, communities and society” (David Cameron 2011 14 April immigration speech).

The function of the discourses was not to embody opportunity-based considerations or even necessarily bring the articulation closer to them, but merely to guide further threat linked articulations. The government linked immigration control to the constructed threat by stressing the adverse impact on the society. This structure thus supported a threat logic that generated a flow of information in the pursuit of controlling immigration. In that model the gradual increase of threat logic caused a continuous attack on the previous governments’ approaches. As an example, Theresa
May (2011, 04 October), during the party conference, revealed the articulation as follows:

“But we know what damage uncontrolled immigration can do. To our society, as communities struggle to cope with rapid change. To our infrastructure, as our housing stock and transport system become overloaded. And to our public services, as schools and hospitals have to cope with a sudden increase in demand. Yet that is exactly what Labour let happen. Under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, net migration to Britain was in the hundreds of thousands. That’s why we’ve made it our aim to get net migration back down to the tens of thousands” (Theresa May, 2011, 04 October, Conservative Party conference, Manchester)

The discourse pointed out the pressure mass immigration can put on society, and the struggle of communities in absorbing the rapid changes, as a critique of the previous governments. Similarly, during the party conference in 2012, May (2012, 9 October, Birmingham) suggested that the government would not be soft on controlling immigration as it was conscious of the impact of uncontrolled immigration on undermining social cohesion. As noted above, Theresa May, during the party conference (2013, 30 September, Manchester) maintained that the government aimed to address the great pressure on people who were financially struggling in life, a sector of society which was most challenged by the sudden social changes.

The discourses suggested that the main rationalization for controlling immigration was to address the pressures on public services and societal challenges of uncontrolled immigration. The governments were centrally, even definitionally, concerned with the adverse effects of mass immigration and the coordination of control mechanisms to design a robust control system for identifying the threat and taking appropriate decisions. As noted in Chapter 2, societal rationalization is influential in shaping perspectives and ways of reasoning immigration control. The government’s perspective posited that immigration would be viewed not only from its economic consideration but mainly from its social and societal aspects (e.g. Martin, 2009:24; Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2013: 452). The new pattern of immigration reflected a changing pattern of culturally and ethnically diverse immigration (see Lahav, 2004;
Castles, 2002:1147; Winders, 2014:150). The government’s perspective seemed in line with the Putnam’s (2007) argument. He argued that global immigration was one of the big issues that seemed to alienate people in Western societies. He suggested that new patterns of migration were gradually reshaping societies towards segregation and isolation, in which people had started to withdraw from connectedness in their community.

However, comparing the US and UK, Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010) argued that immigration concentration might be beneficial as well as challenging. It should be noted their study was published before the Conservative came to power; therefore, the evidence for the UK is more mixed and different groups have responded in very different ways. Similarly, Letki (2008) pointed out that in terms of a key driver in eroding the trust within a community, the low level of interaction between communities is more important while the role of diversity is limited.

The Conservative governments’ immigration control policies, on the other hand, displayed patterns proposed by Putnam’s (2007) perspective. The rationalization of controlling immigration on the grounds of the public services and societal threat perspective suggested much more than an apparatus of control; they became a form of threat-linked rationality for introducing new functions to traditionally non-enforcement sectors, which reflected a certain style of immigration control that reaches into every corner of life. The discourse of threat was itself implicated in the amplification of the perception of immigration as a threat.

In summary, in terms of public services and societal dynamic, the Conservative-led governments strongly emphasized and favoured restrictive immigration approach in light of widespread fear, anxiety and threat-oriented constructions. Accordingly, immigration control policies were largely informed by public services and societal dynamics and often rationalized through the idea of protecting Britain’s interest and maintaining the well-being of the people. The discourse of threat strongly emphasized that the economic dynamic should not solely determine immigration control policies. Overall, the findings suggest that the Conservative-led governments believed that effective immigration control management in Britain must go beyond economic considerations and that there was an important social and societal dynamics of which
the government must be aware. Immigration did not merely have a fiscal effect and was not merely a burden on the labour market. But while the outcomes on the economy were important, the considerations adversely affecting the social and societal dynamics of the societies had an equal effect, if not being more important.

Pulling together the explanatory dynamics, it should be clear that the articulation of immigration was deeply implicated in explanatory dynamics. The discussion of the six explanatory dynamics concludes that the articulation, was complexly, though flexibly, structured and organized through explanatory dynamics. Each dynamic was associated with others in different ways in different settings. The dynamics interacted, not only to inform the articulation but also to inform each other.

It can be argued that, in terms of the dynamics, the articulation of the immigration control policies posits a reflexive process in which the governments progressively refined their focus on immigration and their understanding of the control policies. Complexity and flexibility are related to the type of complex embeddedness that each dynamic is also embedded in and related to the other dynamics.

Economic dynamics were mainly utilized to prioritize the contributory aspect and the positive outcomes of immigration that serve Britain’s interests and the existing structural economic necessity by a setting. The first and second New Labour governments conceptualized immigration as a labour source that could fill the shortages and assist in maintaining the geared economy development on track. As Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 1987) state, the discursive constructions are always open to different and various forms of conceptualization, which may emerge in the future. Accordingly, a dynamic can emerge in different forms over time. Different settings, for example, at different points in time, utilized the economic dynamic to inform less liberal policies; the articulation by the third New Labour government mirrored partly the adverse impacts on the economic climate. At the same time, political and security thematizations were strongly tied to international politics, and partly to the domestic landscape, informing the articulation within a preventive formation rather than an expansionist one. Therefore, the analysis of the political discourse reveals that the articulated perspective on immigration control during the New Labour governments displayed complexity and flexibility, whereby the struggle to dominate the articulation
between the discourses took place between economic dynamics, which posited seeking to meet the increased labour market demand and maintain successful economic development, and political and security dynamics, which posited the need to minimize the adverse outcomes and to cut illegal immigration.

Therefore, the analysis of the political discourse indicates that more liberal perspectives were often and largely, but not always, justified on the grounds of the economic dynamics: immigration was proposed to serve to fill labour shortages, to assist competitiveness, and to maintain and gear economic development, thus serving the national interest and ensuring economic well-being. Conversely, the more restrictionist perspectives were often and largely justified on the grounds of the political, public services, societal, and security dynamics: measures were proposed to minimize existing and potential undesired outcomes and to protect the national interests and the social and economic well-being of the society.

The previous studies that investigate explanatory dynamics largely focused on these dynamics separately or jointly, and while offering important findings and providing a helpful insight into the determinants of the immigration policies, the proposed set of explanatory dynamics(s) are applicable to particular types of perspectives and types of immigrants connected to these perspectives.

Therefore, it may be difficult to explain the similarities between different dynamics and the dissimilarities within a dynamic through fixing one static constructed meaning for each dynamic, since a dynamic can inform different perspectives in different settings differently. For instance, while the economic dynamic largely serves to assist liberal immigration policies, during recession times, it might assist in articulating less liberal approaches. Similarly, a political dynamic can serve to follow a restrictionist approach due to the politicization of the issue, or an excessive number of asylum seekers, while a human right and humanitarian consideration can assist to liberalize in liberalizing perspectives. Public services and societal dynamics, on the other hand, largely serve to articulate more restrictionist approaches. But the perspective can be justified on the grounds of threat or opportunity-linked considerations, which reflect distinct perspectives.
A set of theoretical lenses, therefore, is more promising for grasping what a dynamic means and gives specific meanings within specific situations on how and why they are significant for an articulation.

5.3 Summary

This chapter has considered the epitomization of articulated discourses and the models of the control policies and their variations and contingency, as well as the functions of the explanatory dynamics. The chapter has revealed the epitomization of articulated discourses as discourse of opportunity, discourse of problematization and discourse of threat as well as the complexity and flexibility of the explanatory dynamics and their interaction to structure and organize the articulation and identified the emergence of the dynamics of expansion and restriction that informed immigration control policies. The findings revealed how different settings understood and articulated the same dynamic differently.

Based on the preceding discussions and data presented, it can be suggested that none of the previously proposed theoretical lenses and models, that is to say, securitization and governmentality, can in isolation provide a comprehensive understanding of the articulation of immigration control policies. The evidence confirms the relevance of the generic risk notion that embodies a liberal immigration control and managerial logic for gaining a better understanding of an articulation. As the analysis and discussion showed, a comprehensive set of the theoretical lenses facilitates the research and allows to understand the complexity of the studied phenomenon through which political discourse can be deconstructed and interpreted. The analysis noted the significance of the risk notion through which opportunity discourse and opportunity-linked logic informed articulations as well as sought to explain how a generic risk notion can lift the barriers that were restricted by the models of securitization and governmentality and related lenses to push the boundaries of the understanding of the articulation of the immigration control policies.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION

Introduction

This thesis analysed the discourse on immigration in the UK between 1997 and 2017 and investigated the displayed patterns of rupture and continuity between the Conservative-led governments’ and the New Labour governments’ discourses in light of securitization, governmentality and risk notions.

The main objective of this research was to understand how the articulations evolved, became intertwined and were replaced by one another over the studied period. The research argued that the Conservative-led governments’ articulation displayed a rupture rather than a continuity with that of the New Labour governments.

The thesis contributes to the immigration control literature by proposing a theoretical framework that contributes to knowledge building by challenging widely held assumptions concerning how immigration control policies can be epitomized.

6.1 Articulated Discourses on Immigration Control Policies

The displayed patterns of the articulated discourse empirically revealed that the New Labour governments’ rhetoric on immigration control policies differed considerably from that of the Conservative-led governments during the last two decades. This is not surprising since there are notable differences in terms of party ideology and preferences towards immigration.

The articulations of the discourse in the UK posit three distinct immigration control discourses, which can be epitomized as: (1) the discourse of opportunity, which is informed largely by opportunity-linked logic which draws heavily on the model of risk, and was articulated by the first and second New Labour governments from 1997 to 2005; (2) the discourse of problematization, which is informed largely by governmentality-linked logic and is linked to the model of governmentality, and was articulated by the third New Labour government from 2005 to 2010; and (3) the
discourse of threat, which is informed largely by a threat-linked logic which draws on the model of securitization, and which was articulated by the Conservative-led governments from 2010 to 2017.

The discourse of opportunity that reflected the articulation by the first and second New Labour governments was informed by an opportunity-linked logic of risk that draws heavily on the generic risk notion and embodies a liberal immigration control and managerial logic. The opportunity-linked logic was an important sense-making tool, and the first and second New Labour governments encoded them and their attempts to make sense and resolve the immigration-related problems into the narratives through the situated meanings that worked to structure and organize the articulations. The discourse of opportunity that drew on the opportunity-linked logic was a matter of a situated meaning that was clearly structured by the governments in a consistent style that held values and beliefs consistent with liberal immigration control orientations.

The discourse of opportunity exemplifies how immigration control policies came to be strongly influenced by a model of risk and opportunity-linked logic and the assessment of immigration from an economic point of view. More importantly, emphasis was increasingly placed on the potential economic contribution, and on the content and process of risk management that focused on flexibility and efficiency to serve the economic consideration, which prioritized national interests rather than focusing on worst-case scenarios.

The result was an exemplification of the conception of a model of risk and generic risk logic, heavily influenced by an economic point of view on immigration control strategies. The flexibility and marketization-oriented structures were an important feature of the immigration control perspective during the first and second New Labour governments. Thus, the governments insisted that the access of immigrants to the labour market would be supported and maintained. However, the discourse of opportunity also had to do with reorganizing the management of immigration control systems to alleviate the burden of increased numbers of asylum seekers.
It is apparent that the first and second the New Labour governments sought to extend the UK’s attractiveness for economic immigration in an era of globalization on the grounds of an opportunity-linked logic. In part, this was to do with modernizing the system to facilitate the immigrants’ access to Britain and to help to keep up with a competitive economic world through constructing immigration control policies within a business-oriented approach, in which contribution and opportunity ideas were the central axis of the articulations. The contribution of immigration, therefore, came to be seen as the leading driver of the discourses. It also provided a fertile ground for adopting more liberal immigration control policies that were assisted by liberal ideas and objectives.

The discourse of problematization, which reflected the third Labour government’s discourse and articulation, was informed by a governmentality-linked logic and the problematization of immigration, which stemmed from an expectation of a virtually present and or future oriented problems. The model of governmentality and the discourse of problematization mediated between opportunity and threat and used them as dependencies that specified a reconfigured and modified a discourse about the state of affairs in a specific way to define the articulation. It focused exclusively on the intertwining between opportunity and threat and their implications, which modified the two discourses as opposite forces through strategic readjustment of heterogeneous elements. The discourse of problematization and the governmentality-linked logic formed an important tool of inquiry because it mirrored the two situated meanings and the intertwining between them and operated to create a complex pattern of articulation of immigration control policies informed. Thus, the discourse of problematization gave the articulation a new situated meaning and applied it by a process of functional overdetermination.

Even though the contribution of immigration was widely acknowledged, during the third New Labour government’ period, the potential negative effects of immigration were undeniably articulated. The contribution of immigration was offset by the problematization. While the pattern and tone were more or less consistent during the previous New Labour governments, after Tony Blair left office, the immigration control discourse came to be part of a less liberal articulation, which was not similar
in scope to the collection of ideas embodied in the opportunity-linked logic. The discourse of problematization started to sweep through the articulation, and it seemed governmentality-linked logic had grafted on to related frameworks. The opportunity-linked logic perspective was intertwined with threat-linked ideas during the third term of the New Labour governments. The discourse of opportunity was counterbalanced by the idea of immigration being a site of anxiety and the opportunity-linked logic was replaced by the precautionary risk-linked mode. Governmentality-linked logic became the prevailing characteristic flowing through government discourse, in which the model of governmentality was embedded in immigration control frameworks. This model of immigration control exemplified the discourse of problematization that encompassed strategical readjustment and rework of the contradictions of the opposite forces.

The evolution from an opportunity-linked logic to a governmentality-linked logic illustrated a new form of articulation that nurtured the promise of re-designing the system to take account of external forces that affect internal forces. The direction of the evolution was informed, in part, by the change in leadership, and in part by the effects of the great recession, which both cumulatively affected the perspective in which the economic contribution was reversed, and the more liberal ideas abandoned. The emphasis was then on robust control systems, forsaking the more liberal logics of immigration control policies, which were regarded as a legitimate response to the crisis.

The discourse of threat, on the other hand, which mirrored the Conservative-led governments’ articulation of immigration control, was informed by a threat-linked logic, which typified the model of securitization. The discourse of threat was often used to bring about quite specific fears as a way to generate situated meanings utilized by the Conservative-led governments to craft an articulation that was marked or accompanied by real or perceived immediate threat-linked conceptualizations. Fear and anxiety were the important part of the function of the discourse that informed how one can constitute the situated meaning. The articulation of the model of securitization and the discourse of threat were informed by real or perceived immediate threat-
linked conceptualizations, and, in turn, it assisted in replacing the discourse of opportunity with the discourse of threat.

The Conservative-led governments were strongly opposed to the liberalization of immigration control policies and, in particular, facilitating immigrants’ access to the government funding system in Britain since immigrants were perceived as potentially dependent on the welfare system. Therefore, during the Conservative-led governments the immigration control discourse was predominately constructed by a consideration that demands restrictions to access to the welfare system and the labour market. The governments succeeded in modelling the control policies in the form of a securitization model and articulating a discourse of threat by placing an unequal importance on constructed possible damage to the social and economic environment from negative outcomes of immigration to Britain. The governments had a clear and comprehensive vision of negative outcomes; thus, they conveyed negative immigration outcomes, linked largely to the experience of the previous New Labour governments’ approach to immigration. The articulation of immigration control policies during the Conservative-led governments took shape as a discourse of threat drawing on the model of securitization, in which the perspective on immigration control was increasingly framed as defensive.

The Conservative-led governments, therefore, sought to convince the public of the necessity of the instigated apparatus for controlling immigration in order to minimize the constructed real or perceived threats. The logic was grounded on the idea that the objectives as a set of control mechanisms should be performed by many different actors. The discourse of threat, therefore, reflected a broad shift in the articulation of immigration control policies in which the opportunity-linked logic and more liberal control approaches were replaced by threat-linked restrictionist approaches.

The Conservative-led governments’ discourse displayed a pattern of rupture rather than continuity with the New Labour governments’ approach. The Conservative-led governments’ perspectives were more restrictionist, with origins in a discourse of threat, by which immigration was constructed as a perceived or real immediate threat. The discourse of threat and threat-linked logic became grounds for the articulated immigration control policies. The first and second New Labour governments’
articulation, on the other hand, displayed patterns of an evolving discourse of opportunity. Still, the third New Labour government adopted a discourse of problematization by which a governmentality-linked logic that had its manifestation in problematization-linked construction was less concrete than a fear and threat-linked considerations. While the New Labour governments’ strategy was to minimize the negative outcomes of the immigration, the Conservative-led governments’ strategy was first to make it clearly visible, and, in turn, to prevent it from taking place.

The articulated discourse revealed that the patterns of rupture and continuity were largely informed by the different reading and situated meaning constructed by different settings. That is, the situated meaning was constructed differently through written and spoken rhetoric, government settings, party position, and office exclusion. The research findings illustrate that the discourses between written and spoken rhetoric were statistically significant, as were those between the political discourse of the political parties and the rhetoric of the government and parties when not in office.

These divergencies were informed by several factors. Firstly, the differences between the spoken and written rhetoric provided convergent powers that gave rise to the expectation of more restrictionist approaches. Secondly, office exclusion was a factor that informed the development of the articulation in a more restrictionist form; the ruling parties opted to moderate their views on immigration control and soften their stances compared to their opposition and, conversely, the parties adopted a firmer stance when in opposition than when in power. Thirdly, as the meanings constructed by the party ideology and party position towards immigration differed, this defence provided a base to inform the development accordingly; the left-wing parties largely favoured liberal policies while the centre-right parties leaned towards restrictionist policies. Fourthly, the interaction between the governments’ articulation and the insistence of the opposition on the failure of the governments as well as the mass media also brought about and amplified different situated meanings. Finally, the interaction of the particular circumstances: the intensified concerns after 9/11 that linked immigration to security; the economic climate due to the great recession that increased conflict over scarce resources; and the level of immigration due to the
asylum crisis and EU enlargement that led to mass immigration flow, all mutually informed and guided the articulations.

The empirical data revealed that the articulated discourses were used against or in relation to each other by different actors and different settings. The research argues that any articulated discourses active in a given context were linked to other related discourses and situated meanings. All situated meanings, which are open to different form of construction that may emerge as articulation changes, help to organize and transform the discourses in which the articulation is evolved, intertwined and replaced by another as the articulation develops.

6.2 Explanatory Dynamics: Flexibility and Complexibility

The explanatory dynamics assisted the logic that situated the meaning which informed the articulation in a certain way for mobilizing support and underpinned governing preferences on immigration control. The analysis of the discourses revealed that the New Labour governments and the Conservative-led governments preferred a different set of explanatory dynamics. More precisely, the economic and political dynamics were identified as primary explanatory dynamics during the New Labour governments while the public services and security dynamics were secondary. Therefore, four broad categories of situated meaning markers were utilized by the New Labour governments complexly and flexibly.

An economic dynamic was largely utilized to prioritize the contributory aspect and the positive outcomes of immigration. Based on more liberal ideas, the economic dynamic largely pushed towards expansion, which was an influential reason than informed the first and second New Labour governments’ articulations. While the New Labour governments’ articulation was largely informed by economic considerations, the economic climate and the state of the economy also largely informed the form of the situated meaning; accordingly, while economic prosperity and structural demand assisted the more liberal approach during the first and second New Labour governments, the economic downturn and stagnation served to contribute less liberal approaches during the third New Labour government.
The political dynamic illustrated the struggle between the humanitarian consideration of asylum seekers and the requirements of resident citizens, while the public services and security considerations tended to restrain the scope for restriction.

The Conservative-led governments’ discourse, on the other hand, were largely presented and conveyed through public services and societal dynamics. The Conservative-led governments were determined to cut the net number of immigrants, thus, favouring restrictive immigration policies in light of widespread fear, anxiety and threat-oriented considerations often justified on the grounds of a rationalization which stressed the taking of advantage of the welfare system, the high pressure on public services and the societal effects that led societies to fall apart and cohesion in communities to erode.

The Conservative-led governments opted not to follow the New Labour governments’ articulation on immigration as a contributory force from the economic point of view but instead conveyed a strong protectionist and restrictionist emphasis from the public services and societal point of view to cancel out the constructed threat.

Moreover, the empirical data revealed that the discursively constructed situated meaning of the dynamics were open to further different and varied forms of conceptualization which might emerge in future; thus, a status of the explanatory dynamics could change with the interactions of the settings and with time as the articulation develops.

6.3 Variability and Contingency

The thesis concludes that the political discourse on immigration control policies in the UK between 1997 and 2017 clearly reveals that the articulation of discourses in and around immigration control policies evolved, became intertwined and replaced one another over time.

The first and second New Labour governments’ articulation largely conveyed the aim of managing immigration control in an opportunity-linked logic in which a discourse of opportunity evolved.
The patterns were an exemplification of a conception of risk governance heavily influenced by the economic point of view and were variably intertwined with political and security dynamics, in particular, asylum seekers and an illegal immigration-oriented managerial process. While the former points to a significantly globalization inspired perspective and to a demand to keep up with external counterparts and to a responsiveness and engagement with the world, the latter is more limited and aims to focus on minimizing the adverse outcomes and constructing the issues for relevant regulation. Therefore, while the intensification of flexibility and marketization-oriented structures were an important feature of the generic risk notion during the first and second New Labour governments, the perspective also had to do with the reorganizing the management of immigration control systems to minimize the negative outcomes.

Immigration control policies are a complicated and multidimensional task that involve various entity interests which have different preferences, and in turn, are subject to many implementation difficulties. Therefore, the immigration control policies, like immigration reality itself, underwent significant critiques of being out of control by various actors in the form of demands to cut the increased numbers of immigrants.

These critiques created an opposing, if not a hostile, climate and intensified the need for a new representation which requires more restrictive logics. Immigration is a more dynamic phenomenon, in which governments must increasingly take internal and external factors into account and restructure the system for conformity between the logic in immigration control and determining factors.

The articulation of the third New Labour government suggests a new emphasis on immigration control governance. In part, this may reflect relative degrees of change of instigated institutions, knowledge and practices, and relative degrees of more demands for a precautionary risk management and, in turn, greater instrumental rationality in risk handling within which the governmentality is operated. The third New Labour government shifted the pattern of migration control in pursuit of minimizing the adverse effects caused and that could be intensified more by the great recession. The shift was in form of a risk governance which was proactive.
Insisting on addressing the argued failures of the previous immigration control policies, the Conservative-led governments in the UK, on the other hand, articulated a distinctively different articulation on immigration control policies which was characteristically defensive. It took shape through a threat-linked logic. The articulations of immigration control policies were transformed within a broader setting from being a constructive social force and an opportunity to being a site of fear and anxiety. In such a setting, the government adopted very consistent strategies to rationalize the production of relevant knowledge and norms. At the heart of this articulation of immigration control policies stood the construction of a real or perceived immediate threat. The model of securitization, which was informed by a threat-linked logic, gained ground in the articulations during the Conservative-led governments and became a process of the rationalization and instigation of the relevant apparatuses. This discourse created and amplified a more defensive mode and a context for immigration control.

The Conservative-led governments had a well-articulated understanding of the negative aspects of immigration and, therefore, placed a disproportionate emphasis on its negative impacts. From this point of view, the rise of concerns due to the intensification of the threat-linked considerations reflected much more inward-looking perspectives than a progressive one. The first and second New Labour governments’ perspective was relatively progressive, informed by the opportunity-linked logic, and mirrored the approach of responsiveness and engagement with the world; loosening restrictions on immigration reflected a globalization-inspired interconnectedness and desire to keep up with external counterparts. The Conservative-led governments’ articulations were informed by the threat-linked logic, thus, was more inward-looking, focusing on defensiveness and the removal or restriction of provisions that were previously designed to facilitate immigration.

The analysis also reveals that in order to provide a multiple understanding of the immigration control policies, the utilized spectrum of theoretical lenses that shed light on the multidimensionality of the immigration control policies should include an opportunity-linked logic that draws heavily on the generic risk notion and embodies a liberal immigration control and managerial logic. The set of theoretical lenses, which
have previously been occupied largely by models of securitization and
governmentality, therefore, should also draw on the generic risk and opportunity
which previously have been hardly taken into consideration. The findings of the
analysis reveal that the articulation of immigration control policies cannot be fully
understood by looking through securitization and governmentality-linked lenses since
articulation does not only posit the problematization- and/or the threat-oriented
articulations.

Looking at the variability and contingency of the articulations over time, the evidence
suggests that the articulation of multiplicity of inclusionary and exclusionary aims and
objectives as a set of immigration control mechanisms is constituted within a
discursive context which is open to different forms of conceptualization that may
emerge in the future.

6.4 Theoretical Contributions and Implications for Research/Public Policy, and
Limitations

The research contributes to the immigration literature by showing how discourse
analysis supplemented by social theories and combined with NVivo can help achieve a
better understanding of the articulations, and the way in which related patterns are
structured and organized.

The first theoretical contribution and primary implication of the thesis is that an
opportunity-linked logic that draws heavily on the generic risk notion and embodies a
liberal immigration control logic is an illuminative tool to explore and epitomize an
articulation. Discourse analysis provided evidence of the importance of the generic
risk notion and opportunity-linked logic, which are significantly less pronounced
within the literature. The thesis notes that the ways in which immigration control
policies are investigated vary, with consequences for how researchers are likely to
understand the relationship between immigration control policies and the
underpinning discourses or articulated logics.
While the risk notion as a tool in understanding the immigration control policies are proliferating (see Collective, C.A.S.E., 2006), immigration studies have not yet systematically taken up a how the risk notion can be used to shed light on immigration control policies. The thesis draws on Van Munster’s (2009) claim that immigration control policies should draw on the risk notion. Inserting the risk notion is clearly important. It challenges, to some extent, the way in which immigration is linked to security, which can often result in negative side effects. However, so far, the claim of using the risk notion has tended to be in a governmentality notion, of selecting one side of the risk, in which the negative outcomes form the articulation on immigration control. Therefore, even though Van Munster (2009) pointed to the liberal stand and the risk logic to account for the underpin logic of the immigration control policies, drawing on governmentality notion the proposal is still accommodated within the problematization logics. While the proposal has provided an important insight into understanding immigration control policies, it is still limited. It is true that governmentality-linked logic can serve and make it possible to overcome the limitation of securitization. However, it does not draw on the other side of the risk, in which the profit is prioritized: this is the equivalent or even most relevant feature of the risk notion. The thesis has sought to reveal empirically that the risk notion not only posits preventing the harm but also entails the construction of a social entity in name of profit and opportunity. Indeed, the profit and opportunity-linked logic have not been sufficiently pronounced within immigration control studies.

Although referring to the risk notion is not a new argument (e.g. Van Munster, 2009), the researcher has not inclusively referred to the generic risk notion which embodies a liberal immigration control logic and its implications for shedding light on more liberal approaches. The main theoretical contribution of the empirical findings, then, is that immigration control policies cannot be fully explored with model of securitization and governmentality-linked theoretical lenses in isolation. Immigration can be constructed differently, and policies are not always constructed only on the grounds of threat and problematization, nor are they caused by static conditions. Immigration does not simply imply a construction of being a site of fear and anxiety, nor are the ideas, attitudes, motivations or offered control practices of governments homogeneous. Problematization and threat-linked theoretical lenses are limited.
Therefore, taken alone, securitization and governmentality-oriented logics imply a potential impediment, whereby knowledge is informed only by problematization and threat lines.

The empirical data analysed by the thesis highlights the need for researchers to use a combination of more than one theoretical lens to analyse immigration control policies. The thesis asserts that immigration control scholars need to utilize various theoretical lenses in order to grasp the multidimensionality of immigration control policies.

Incorporating the opportunity-linked logic and generic risk lens, therefore, can provide a more promising structure for understanding the articulation that the securitization and governmentality logics may lack to offer. A generic risk notion embodies a valuable analytical tool with which to influence the immigration control scholars' debate on the articulation of the immigration control policies’ process.

The deconstruction of the articulations played an important role in epitomizing the articulation of the control policies, which mirrored the rationalization, specific procedures and approaches in light of the theoretical lenses of securitization governmentality and risk jointly. The research suggests that such a comprehensive theoretical set is particularly relevant, and that securitization and governmentality cannot be considered as the only available significant theoretical models.

Therefore, immigration control scholars should also insert the opportunity logic and generic risk in conjunction with securitization and governmentality as an additional model to the knowledge building that embodies an opportunity-linked logic. This, in turn, will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the puzzle between liberal stances and contemporary immigration control policies.

Therefore, the thesis suggests that the model of risk can help explain and classify certain logics of immigration control policies that are open to different forms of conceptualization. This contribution can serve as a starting point for inserting a discourse of opportunity and the generic risk notion to better understand immigration control policies. However, the thesis is not arguing to use the risk notion in isolation all the time; but insisting that the potential of the risk lens should not be ignored or utilized only on the grounds of governmentality-linked logic.
The thesis hopes that by supplementing discourse analysis with the theoretical lenses of the risk, governmentality and securitization, and combining them with NVivo, it provides insights into how immigration control studies can be done to reveal the multidimensionality of the construction of immigration control policies. Inserting a discourse of opportunity, and the opportunity-linked logic could provide insights for scholars into the ways in which this theoretical tool could overcome the limitations and constraints of the model of governmentality and securitization.

Furthermore, the second contribution of the thesis is the potential productive outcomes of supplementing discourse analysis with NVivo. The analysis stresses the relevance of CAQDAS in better operationalizing a discourse analysis. The thesis highlights, in addition, its potential contribution. As shown, a clear and consistent conceptualization of the entity of the analysis, which was formed by the displayed patterns that were investigated in the light of the relevant theoretical lenses, operationalized through a predefined coding matrix and a structured measure index that was assisted by NVivo, allowed the researcher to grasp the complexity of tracking the evolution, intertwinement and replacement of the articulations over time.

The empirical findings suggest that discourse analysis can be productively supplemented with CAQDAS. In contrast to Macmillan’s (2005) argument that CAQDAS can strain the scope of the research and move the researcher away from documents, the adopted multi-perspective framework productively served the aim and objective of the research and contradicted the claims made against using these tools. The combination of the multi theoretical lenses and discourse analysis allowed the thesis to epitomize different articulations and different discourses. CAQDAS was used for data management such as organising and preparing the data for analysis as well as for data analysis such as the coding of materials. The software supported grasping the overall analysis of the data and tracking the knowledge building offered by different actors and over time. Additional important implication of this choice, therefore, lies in the assistive aspect of NVivo. Indeed, NVivo assisted by extending beyond the limits of manual techniques, systematically tracking and noting the displayed patterns through the analysis of a large number of political discourses articulated over a long period. Furthermore, it supported the discourse analysis findings by producing
numerical data and tables of occurrence that led to finer analysis at the specified settings or points in time.

The multi-perspective framework, thus, deepened the analysis of the datasets, enriched the strength of the discourse analysis and provided elements which enabled a critical engagement not only with the discourses being articulated but also with the variability and contingency of the discourses over time. Therefore, the opportunity provided by the multi-perspective framework to get more out of the discourse by using a multiple theoretical lens and discourse analysis embedded with CAQDAS is significant in enhancing the quality of the inferences.

The thesis, like any piece of research, has limitations but offers stimuli for developing further studies. First of all, the research investigated an all-inclusive immigration typology due to the difficulty in maintaining categorizations in practice. Thus, while the research dealt with an exhaustive range of immigration discourse on immigration control policies, it provided introductory discussion related to the breaking of immigration typology down into a number of sub-categories, such as asylum seekers, economic immigration, illegal immigration and EU-linked immigration. The offered conclusion here, therefore, is based on what the research takes to be reasonable judgments about this matter. The identified typology of immigration discourses and the model of the control logics tend to be operationalized through an all-inclusive immigration typology and the encapsulated assumptions of the models, which might be imperfect in the context of subcategories, such as in the context of asylum seekers. Therefore, the imperfection and whether the offered discourse types and the model of the control logics are likely to be observed within the subcategories of immigration typology is a question of further research.

Secondly, the results are influenced by the strong emigration and immigration traditions of Britain as the selected country. Future researches might extend the use of the multi-perspective framework and discourse analysis supplemented with NVivo to investigate and compare the articulation of immigration control policies in countries with different immigration traditions.
Thirdly, while the selected country and period under study are exhaustive, the thesis surmises that for further illumination of the offered set of the multi theoretical lenses, a cross-country variation is required. New research into the multidimensionality of immigration control policies across liberal democracies might further illuminate the feasibility of the offered framework that is based on a set of theoretical lenses.

Fourthly, the research investigated the discourses in terms of the governments’ perspective, and the political discourse may be only loosely coupled with the immigration discourse articulated and used by different actors. Further studies might investigate the perspectives articulated by differing actors at differing settings (such as mass media and social media, interest groups, experts and policy analysts, civil society) to explore how different settings structure and organize the immigration discourse and whether their patterning impacts policy formation and outcomes.

Moreover, the articulation of immigration control policies may not be exactly coupled with the actual policy implementation; thus, while the thesis dealt with the articulation of immigration control policies that involved the articulation of management and implementation strategies, future studies might explore the implementation of immigration control policies in practices in the light of the offered set of theoretical lenses, such as the adopted management strategies and the exercise of power to see whether and how the opportunity-linked logic of risk that draws heavily on the generic risk notion and embodies a liberal immigration logic might be influencing the ways in which inward-looking and disciplinary norms are counterbalanced by forward-looking, anticipatory and contribution-friendly norms.

Finally, future studies could also explore an articulation of certain settings, such as the ways in which parliamentary debates interact with the policymaking process of immigration control in light of the offered set of theoretical lenses, or to what extent and how policymakers’ motives might affect domestic political considerations and parliamentary debates and legislation in framing immigration control policies.

The thesis has also important implications for policymaking. From a policy perspective, any form of immigration control is a form of limitation which posits a multiplicity of inclusionary and exclusionary aims and objectives as a set of control
mechanisms, that is based on specific considerations, which are necessarily a source of new considerations. Immigration control policies are inherently paradoxical, signifying overlapping interests and efforts to construct immigration control policies on the grounds of specific considerations that create new forms of consideration. The articulation seems to continue to draw on the source of being a site of fear and anxiety, but opportunity logic and being a constructive social force also deserve attention. The thesis suggests that as outside of any discursive context immigration does not have any situated meaning, immigration control policies cannot and should not be engineered in isolation at the level of threat and problematization-linked logics. If anything, as a dynamic entity construction of immigration is open to different forms of conceptualization, thus, it can be built upon opportunity logic.

One line of interpretation the thesis suggests is that when the level of the domination of the threat and problematization discourses are low, opportunity-oriented politics prevails, and, as it offers a more flexible approach on immigration control, where governments are more likely to produce a varied mode of immigration control policies. In the case of the domination of a threat and problematization discourse through which immigration control policies are presented and justified on the grounds of threat and problematization-linked discourses, there is a tendency for a more restrictionist and rigid approach to emerge and be held in power as an overarching approach.

The discourse of opportunity seems more likely to mobilize less support in the short term, and since the existing public attitude towards new immigrants is largely negative, thus, policymakers are more likely to struggle to convince the public to form more liberal immigration control policies and it might not be trouble-free to maintain them in the long term. Therefore, tensions or inconsistencies between a government and the public perspective on immigration control in the long term are more likely to result in an adjustment of government approaches on immigration control. In the case of the adjustment, however, if drawing on public concerns without manipulating them, a government is more likely to address the issue in a flexible way compared to the threat and problematization discourses.
The discourses of threat and problematization seem more likely to mobilize more support in the short term as it would seem to, in general, appeal to broad strands of public opinion. However, as these discourses tend to support responding to public demand and favour more restrictionist approaches, they may be more likely to result in running risky policies due to the securitization effect as they are more likely to increase public demand and intensify the necessity of restrictions.

The presentation of immigration by a government, also, not only reflects the perspective and construction of immigration control but also largely underpins the way in which immigrants and the indigenous population interacts. The policymaker, therefore, needs to further dissect the articulation of the immigration issue and the way in which immigration control policies are constructed by recognizing the considerable difference between threat, problematization and opportunity-linked discourses and their interpretation and implementation in practice. Regarding immigration, the threat framework seems more likely to capture support; however, construction of immigration that is articulated in a hostile environment context is more likely to turn into an uncertain undertaking for immigration control policies, even more institutionalizing the restrictionist policies as normality.

Threat-linked immigration discourses are constructed around a consideration that largely depicts immigration as a burden, a social problem and as a site of fear and anxiety; therefore, they are more likely to augment the consideration and produce a hostile environment, and not only for newcomers, they may also trigger a backlash against settled immigrants as well. Therefore, a threat and problematization-linked articulation cannot be seen or described as a fashionable trend that does not leave a significant trace in the rhetoric, perceptions or attitudes towards immigration but, rather, the existence of a threat and problematization-linked articulation has a long-lasting and significant effect on structuring the entities. This is often more prevalent when the discourse of threat surrounds the articulation and the constructed meaning become far from being contributory. Thus, policymakers should pay greater attention to the structure and organization of the discourses used for the rationalization of policies that legitimize and advance perspectives and also be aware of their possible interactions and outcomes.
The extent to which immigration control policies are determined varies widely and depends on the weighing of different and potentially competing policy priorities, and while politicians often seem tough on immigration and present restrictive aims or insist on introducing robust measures to cancel out the constructed threat, governments in practices are often more likely to follow and implement relatively moderate approaches on immigration control.

As immigration is constituted within a discursive context and its classification is open to different form of conceptualization that can emerge in the future, over time, immigration control policies are more likely to change and the extent to which they change is framed greatly by the discursive context of the way they are classified. However, sooner or later seeking to adjust the classification in the form of more liberal logic is more likely to be more difficult, as most threat-linked approaches appear to prolong rather than reduce the demand for more restriction. Therefore, there is no doubt that the institutionalization of threat and problematization-linked logics that draw on models of securitization and governmentality comes with the side effect of a further intensification of the threat and problematization-oriented articulations, which become much harder to deliver than when initially constructed.
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#### 88. HC Deb 14 December 2015, a debate on the relocation of migrants in need of international protection Parliamentary Debate

#### 89. HC Deb 11 January 2016, HC OAQ Immigration System Net Migration Figures Immigration Of Children Overseas Student Visas PD

#### 90. HC Deb 29 Feb 2016, HC OAQ Child Refugees Calais Parliamentary Debate

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Appendix B – Code Book

- R Risk Logic (Main Category)

- The Characteristics (Risk Generic category)

  - R1 Nature of the Risk (Sub-generic category); (Characteristic: a general, future oriented and potentially contributor manageable risk subject)

- R11 Example:

  - “We are living in an age in which the world is becoming smaller because of more accessible and affordable travel routes. In response, we need to step up our border controls to cope with increasing demands. We want to protect the public and their interests, so we must provide a fair and effective immigration system in which immigration is controlled and the immigration laws are enforced and therefore respected. We want to take advantage of the increase in global migration, but in a controlled way that is right for Britain. We want the right people to come here to work and study—people who will contribute positively to our society and economy” (HC Deb, 5 Feb 2007, UK Borders Bill).

  - “Managed migration allows those throughout the world who have a contribution to make, and who are seeking a better life for themselves, to enter this country through a system of economic migration that is properly organised and trusted by the British people.......Millions of people aspire to better their economic circumstances and, understandably, want to migrate in order to do so. At the same time, modern transport systems have facilitated mass movement across the world. Alongside that, we face the challenge of failing states... (HC, 2002, 24 April Second Reading Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Bill).
“Migration is a consistent feature of human history. But in recent years, the changes associated with globalisation have led to greater complexity in patterns of migration, and new domestic and international challenges for government and communities to address. These challenges are cultural, economic and social. Migration brings huge benefits: increased skills, enhanced levels of economic activity, cultural diversity and global links. But it can also raise tensions unless properly understood and well managed” (PP, 2002, 7 February 2002).

- **R2 Risk Language (Sub-generic category); (Characteristic: positive acknowledgment, opportunity and profit are prioritized)**

- **R21 Example:**

  “Those who do come here make a huge contribution, particularly to our public services. So, far from always or even mainly being a burden on our health or education systems - migrant workers are often the very people delivering those services” (Tony Blair, 2004 Tuesday 27 April 2004).

  “Migration is an inevitable reality of the modern world and it brings significant benefits. But to ensure that we sustain the positive contribution of migration to our social well-being and economic prosperity, we need to manage it properly” (PP, 2002, 7 February 2002).

  “I think most people know the huge contribution that immigrants have made to our country. All these migrants are part of the rich fabric of our nation, every bit as British and valued as any other member of our society. We also see the positive contribution of contemporary migrants all about us today” (Tony Blair, 2005 22 April Dover)
“Migration is of enormous benefit to a country, when it is managed properly. I believe this new points-based system will allow us both to manage migration” (PP, 2006, March 2006).

The Exercise of Power (Risk Generic category)

- R3 Risk Management (Sub-generic category); (Characteristic: governance through rational risk management, aiming to select the most beneficial option through long-term objectives oriented conventional measures)

R31 Example:


- “The purpose of the strategy is to make migration work for Britain. It includes measures to make our immigration system simpler, clearer and more robust. The reformed system will explain publicly and clearly who we will admit to the UK and why, and who we will allow to stay in the UK and why” (HC, 2005, 5 Jul 2005 second reading Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill).

- “We are putting in place a fair and effective way of managing the flow of people coming in and out of the country; selective migration which attracts those who can bring economic benefit to the UK; providing asylum to those fleeing persecution overseas; and ensuring that those who do not have a legitimate claim to come here are dealt with fairly and effectively” (PP, 2008 June).
R4 Risk Temporality (Sub-generic category); (Characteristic: management seeks to manage future uncertainty)

- R41 Example:

  "The issues are complex and difficult, and we must battle constantly to solve them. We must combine legislative change with sensible administrative change to achieve the improvements that we all seek.... (it) is a big step forward in the reform of our entire nationality, immigration and asylum system to meet the new challenges that lie ahead...." (HC Deb, 24 Apr 2002, Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill).

  "We have made our legal routes for migration much more robust against abuse. The challenge of the next five years is to build on these successes in a clear and robust way...." (PP, 2005, February 2005).

  "What is key is selecting and attracting the right mix of skills to help keep wealth creation, employment and productivity high and rising. To deliver this we are introducing a points system to ensure that only those with the skills that Britain needs will be able to come to work and study, and further reforms to ensure that newcomers earn the right to stay. Our policy will yield significant macroeconomic benefits to the UK. But, in addition, our ambition is that, alongside these very evident macroeconomic benefits, migration should have a positive influence, in wider terms, upon every community in Britain” (PP, 2008 June).

S Securitization Logic (Main Category)

The Characteristics (Securitization Generic category)
### S1 Nature of the Security (Sub-generic category); (Characteristic: a specific (constructed) perceived or real present threat to the referent object)

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<td>“We know what damage uncontrolled immigration can do. To our society, as communities struggle to cope with rapid change. To our infrastructure, as our housing stock and transport system become overloaded. And to our public services, as schools and hospitals have to cope with a sudden increase in demand” (Theresa May, 2011, 04 October).</td>
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<td>“Under Labour we experienced unprecedented levels of immigration. Between 1997 and 2009, net migration to Britain totalled more than 2.2 million people. That is more than twice the population of Birmingham. Clamp down on work visas and student visas will shoot up. Clamp down on student visas and family visas will shoot up. Clamp down on family visas and asylum claims will shoot up” (Theresa May, 2010 5 October Conservative Party Conference Birmingham).</td>
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<td>“Uncontrolled, mass immigration undermines social cohesion. And in some places, it overburdens our infrastructure and public services. It’s behind more than a third of the demand for all new housing in the UK. And the pressure it places on schools is clear” (Theresa May, 2012, 9 October, Birmingham).</td>
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### S2 Security Language (Sub-generic category); (Characteristic: negative acknowledgement, security issue, the loss is prioritized)

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<td>“There is a need to address the issue of uncontrolled immigration and its impact on our society and infrastructure.” (Theresa May, 2012, 9 October, Birmingham).</td>
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“The rate of immigration over the past decade has led to great public anxiety about its impact on transport, jobs, employment, change within our communities and the provision of public services. We have promised to get a grip on the situation, and that is exactly what we will do” (HC Deb, 07 September 2012).

“And we must be honest about the fact that, in some cases, uncontrolled mass immigration can displace local workers and undercut wages” (Theresa May, 2012, 9 October, Birmingham).

“I said in my recent speech, when net migration is too high, and the pace of change is too fast, it puts pressure on schools, hospitals, accommodation, transport and social services, and it can drive down wages for people on low incomes” (HC Deb, 2015, 13 Oct Second Reading Immigration Bill).

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<th>The Exercise of Power (Generic category)</th>
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<td>S3 Security Management (Sub-generic category) (Characteristic: exceptional measures are performed)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

S31 Example:

“We will strengthen the enforcement of immigration rules. We have introduced a ‘deport first, appeal later’ rule for foreign national offenders” (GEM. Conservative, 2015).

“So, this is the progress we are making on cutting legal immigration and clamping down on the abuse of legitimate entry routes. And we are cracking down on illegal immigration too” (David Cameron, 2011, 14 April).

“If we don't get our people back to work - we shouldn't be surprised if millions want to come here to work. But we must act
on immigration directly too - and we are” (David Cameron, 2013, 02 October, Manchester).

- “That’s why we’re cutting immigration across the board” (Theresa May, 2013, 30 September, Manchester).

- S4 Security Temporality (Sub-generic category); (Characteristic: reaction to current situation immediately)

- S41 Example:

- “shut down 700 bogus colleges – that were basically visa factories...kicked out people who don’t belong here...” (David Cameron, 2014, 01 October, Birmingham).

- “will do everything I can to restore sanity to our immigration system and get the numbers down. Economic migration – capped. Abuse of student visas – stopped. Automatic settlement – scrapped” (Theresa May, 2011, 04 October, Manchester).

- “Over the past five years we have taken firm action to reform the chaotic and uncontrolled immigration system we inherited, and to ensure that people are coming here for the right reasons” (HC Deb, 2015, 13 Oct)
Appendix C – Statistical Tests Results

Terms 1\textsuperscript{st}, 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 3\textsuperscript{rd}, 4\textsuperscript{th}, 5\textsuperscript{th}

A Kruskal-Wallis (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952) test was run to assess if there were differences in the order of the discourse and distribution of the discourses’ score between governments: the first term (n = 59), second term (n = 58), third term (n = 62), fourth term (n = 69) and fifth term (n = 58). The distributions of the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses’ scores were not similar for all terms, which is checked by visual inspection of a boxplot. The immigration control discourse’s score was statistically significantly different between the governments, $\chi^2(4) = 80.603$, $p = .000$.

Post hoc comparison test were run by using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction to carry out multiple comparisons. The results are presented using adjusted p-values. The test revealed statistically significant differences in the immigration control discourses between the fourth term (mean rank = 105.30) and the first term (mean rank = 195.86) ($p = .000$); between the fifth term (mean rank = 98.30) and the first term ($p = .000$); between the fourth term and the second term (mean rank = 200.35) ($p = .000$); between the fourth term and the third term (mean rank = 174.62) ($p = .000$); between the fifth term and the third term ($p = .000$); and between the fourth term and the third term ($p = .002$), but not between any other governments combination.
Hypothesis Test Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null Hypothesis</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Articulation_Level_Scr.25 is the same across categories of</td>
<td>Independent-Samples</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Reject the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERM_12345.</td>
<td>Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

![Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>306</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Test Statistic</td>
<td>80.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees of Freedom</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The test statistic is adjusted for ties.
### Pairwise Comparisons of TERM_12345

Each node shows the sample average rank of TERM_12345.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample1</th>
<th>Sample2</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Std. Test Statistic</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Adj.Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015</td>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>90.560</td>
<td>15.271</td>
<td>5.930</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-2017</td>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>97.554</td>
<td>15.924</td>
<td>6.126</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>95.049</td>
<td>15.341</td>
<td>6.196</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-2017</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>102.043</td>
<td>15.992</td>
<td>6.381</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2015</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>60.317</td>
<td>15.070</td>
<td>4.600</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015-2017</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>76.311</td>
<td>15.732</td>
<td>4.851</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2001</td>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>-4.689</td>
<td>15.924</td>
<td>-.926</td>
<td>.776</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each row tests the null hypothesis that the Sample 1 and Sample 2 distributions are the same. Asymptotic significances (2-sided tests) are displayed. The significance level is .05. Significance values have been adjusted by the Bonferroni correction for multiple tests.
Government/Opposition

A Mann-Whitney U (Mann and Whitney, 1947) test was performed to determine if there were differences in the order of discourse and distribution of discourses score between government (n=306) and opposition (n=73) level discourse on immigration control policies. Distributions of the score for government and opposition were not similar. The scores for government (mean rank = 195.47) were statistically significantly higher than for opposition (mean rank = 167.05), U = 9.494, z = -2.039, p = .041.
Hypothesis Test Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null Hypothesis</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The distribution of Articulation_Level_Scr.25 is the same across categories of Gov_Opp.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Mann Whitney U Test</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>Reject the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Independent-Samples Mann-Whitney U Test

Gov_Opp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>gov</td>
<td>opp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120.0</td>
<td>120.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130.0</td>
<td>130.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140.0</td>
<td>140.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160.0</td>
<td>160.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170.0</td>
<td>170.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180.0</td>
<td>180.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190.0</td>
<td>190.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>200.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 306
Mean Rank = 195.47

N = 73
Mean Rank = 157.05

Total N 379
Mann-Whitney U 9,494.000
Wilcoxon W 12,195.000
Test Statistic 9,494.000
Standard Error 821.635
Standardized Test Statistic -2.039
Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test) .041
Political Parties

A Kruskal-Wallis (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952) test was performed to evaluate if there were differences in the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses` score between political parties that differed in their discourses on immigration control policies: The Labour Party (n = 193), the Conservative party (n = 148) and The Liberal Democrats (n = 38). Distributions of scores were not similar for all parties, as assessed by checking through boxplot. Scores were statistically significantly different between the different political party levels, χ2(2) = 98.464, p = .000.

Post-hoc comparisons test using Dunn’s (1964) procedure was run with a statistical significance that accepted at the p < .05 level. This pairwise comparison revealed statistically significant differences in the articulation scores between the Conservative party (mean rank = 122.98) and the Labour party (mean rank = 238.56) (p = .000) and the Conservative party and the Liberal Democrats party (mean rank= 204.42) (p = .000) immigration control discourses, but not between the Labour party and the Liberal Democrat party.
Hypothesis Test Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null Hypothesis</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 The distribution of Articulation_Level_Scr.25 is the same across categories of Party.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Reject the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Articulation_Level_Scr.25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>![Boxplot for LABOUR]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>![Boxplot for CONSERVATIVE]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBDEM</td>
<td>![Boxplot for LIBDEM]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total N</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>Degrees of Freedom</th>
<th>Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>379</td>
<td>96.434</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The test statistic is adjusted for ties.
Pairwise Comparisons of Party

Each node shows the sample average rank of Party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample1-Sample2</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Std. Test Statistic</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Adj.Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE-LIBDEM</td>
<td>-81.445</td>
<td>19.463</td>
<td>-4.185</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE-LABOUR</td>
<td>115.581</td>
<td>11.693</td>
<td>9.884</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBDEM-LABOUR</td>
<td>34.136</td>
<td>18.994</td>
<td>1.797</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each row tests the null hypothesis that the Sample 1 and Sample 2 distributions are the same. Asymptotic significances (2-sided tests) are displayed. The significance level is .05. Significance values have been adjusted by the Bonferroni correction for multiple tests.
Instruments

A Kruskal-Wallis (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952) test was conducted to see if there were significant differences in the order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses’ scores between discourse instrument groups: the manifestos (n = 18), speeches (n = 165), debate (n = 97) and policy papers (n = 99) rhetoric instruments groups. Distributions of the scores were not similar for all instruments, as assessed by looking at a boxplot. The order of discourse and the distribution of the discourses’ scores were statistically significantly different between the different instrument groups, $\chi^2(3) = 103.297$, $p = .000$.

Using Dunn’s (1964) procedure with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, a pairwise comparisons test was run. The results were presented by the adjusted $p$-values. The pairwise comparison test reveals statistically significant differences in articulation scores between speech (mean rank = 166.03) and manifesto (mean rank = 300.44) ($p = .000$); between debate (mean rank = 133.55) and manifesto ($p = .000$); between speech and policy papers (mean rank = 265.18) ($p = .000$) and debate and policy papers ($p = .000$), but not between any other instruments combination.
Hypothesis Test Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Null Hypothesis</th>
<th>Test</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 The distribution of Articulation Level Scr.25 is the same across categories of Instruments.</td>
<td>Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Reject the null hypothesis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Articulation Level Scr.25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MANIFESTO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPEECH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_DEBATE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICY_PAPER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total N               | 379                       |
| Test Statistic        | 103.279                   |
| Degrees of Freedom    | 3                         |
| Asymptotic Sig. (2-sided test) | .000                 |

1. The test statistic is adjusted for ties.
[Appendix C – Statistical Tests Results]

Pairwise Comparisons of Instruments

Each node shows the sample average rank of instruments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample1-Sample2</th>
<th>Test Statistic</th>
<th>Std. Error</th>
<th>Std. Test Statistic</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Adj.Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPEECH-MANIFESTO</td>
<td>134.414</td>
<td>26.566</td>
<td>5.060</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_DEBATE-MANIFESTO</td>
<td>166.893</td>
<td>27.466</td>
<td>6.076</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPEECH-POLICY_PAPER</td>
<td>-99.146</td>
<td>13.606</td>
<td>-7.287</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_DEBATE-POLICY_PAPER</td>
<td>-131.625</td>
<td>15.290</td>
<td>-6.069</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P_DEBATE-SPEECH</td>
<td>32.479</td>
<td>13.693</td>
<td>2.372</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICY_PAPER-MANIFESTO</td>
<td>35.268</td>
<td>27.423</td>
<td>1.286</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each row tests the null hypothesis that the Sample 1 and Sample 2 distributions are the same. Asymptotic significances (2-sided tests) are displayed. The significance level is .05. Significance values have been adjusted by the Bonferroni correction for multiple tests.