Arguing Against the Expressive Function of Punishment: Is the Standard Account that Insufficient?

Lee, Ambrose Y. K. (2019) Arguing Against the Expressive Function of Punishment: Is the Standard Account that Insufficient? Law and Philosophy, 38 (4). pp. 359-385.

Preview

Text Against the Expressive Function of Punishment (Deposit).pdf - Accepted version Manuscript Download (540kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper critically appraises the arguments that have been offered for what can be called ‘the expressive function of punishment’. According to this view, what distinguishes punishment from other kinds of non-punitive hard treatment is that punishment conveys a censorial/reprobative message about what the punished has done, and that this expressive function should therefore be accepted as part of the nature and definition of punishment. Against this view, this papers argues that the standard account of punishment, according to which punishment is a kind of hard treatment that is imposed on an alleged offender in response to her alleged wrongdoing, can already properly account for punishment and distinguish it from other kinds of hard treatment when it is properly clarified and understood. Thus there is no need to accept the expressive function of punishment in addition to the standard account when it comes to the nature and definition of punishment.

Item Type:	Article
Divisions :	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Law
Authors :	Name Email ORCID Lee, Ambrose Y. K. y.a.lee@surrey.ac.uk
Date :	August 2019
DOI :	10.1007/s10982-019-09353-7
Copyright Disclaimer :	© Springer Nature B.V. 2019
Depositing User :	Clive Harris
Date Deposited :	28 Mar 2019 08:57
Last Modified :	17 Mar 2020 02:08
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/850895

Actions (login required)

View Item

Downloads