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On the Existence of Limit Admissible Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

Carmona, Guilherme (2019) On the Existence of Limit Admissible Equilibria in Discontinuous Games Journal of Mathematical Economics, 81. pp. 14-21.

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Abstract

We consider the existence of limit admissible equilibria, i.e. Nash equilib- ria in which each player assigns zero probability to the interior of the set of his weakly dominated strategies, in (possibly) discontinuous games. We show that standard sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibrium, such as better-reply security, fail to imply the existence of limit admissible equilibria. We then modify better-reply security to obtain a new condition, admissible security, and show that admissible security is sufficient for the existence of limit admissible equilibria. This result implies the existence of limit admissible equilibria in a Bertrand-Edgeworth competition setting with convex costs analogous to that of Maskin (1986).

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Carmona, Guilhermeg.carmona@surrey.ac.uk
Date : 11 January 2019
DOI : 10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.004
Copyright Disclaimer : Copyright © 2019 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license
Depositing User : Diane Maxfield
Date Deposited : 10 Jan 2019 14:34
Last Modified : 14 Mar 2019 11:22
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/850118

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