Resilient Civic Republicanism

by

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Declaration of Originality

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Summary

Advanced liberal democracies today can be conceptualised ontologically as complex dynamic systems, characterised by increasing interconnectedness and interdependence. Neoliberal globalisation has been a key driving force behind this systemic evolution. This thesis claims that emerging global trends, such as climate change, illustrate the flaws in the dominant political philosophy of procedural liberalism. Freedom, understood as non-interference within this model, has permitted social fragmentation, atomisation and degradation of socio-political institutions. As a result, the latter are argued to rely on top-down impositions of the common good to facilitate adaption to new socio-political challenges, which undermine democracy. This calls for a need to find a political philosophy that can foster adaption to new circumstances, whilst maximising the democratic empowerment of individuals in the Western world.

This thesis constructs a unique civic republican model based upon a revision of the scholarship of Michael Sandel, termed resilient civic republicanism (RCR). It contends that this is an appropriate political philosophy for the 21st century, in virtue of its capacity to underpin a resilient democratic socio-political institutional model in the face of contemporary challenges. This is due to being based on an alternative conception of liberty, freedom as self-government, which reinforces principles such as public deliberation, civic virtue, civic spaces, and federalism. These are subsequently argued to foster the self-reflection and adaption that resilience demands. By facilitating the acknowledgement of mutual self-realisation and collective responsibility, in that today one’s self-realisation is dependent on others, RCR can reconcile the imposition of new obligations (deemed necessary to attend to systemic challenges) with individual empowerment. Hence the claim that RCR would not result in socio-political institutions being corrupted by contemporary developments. The thesis therefore maintains that RCR can preserve liberty, and accommodate new constraints being imposed by emergent social and political changes within a democratic institutional model, in contradistinction to procedural liberalism.
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Introduction – Empowerment in a Complex World

The 21st century represents a key moment in the trajectory of political thought. The nature of today’s world raises many challenges for both communities and political philosophy, as new constraints are imposed around liberty, security, the environment, the global economy, and other political and social phenomena. Globalisation, transnational political institutions, international terrorism and climate change underscore the interconnectedness and interdependence that individuals are subject to today. Although these examples highlight how human beings can exert influence on the global systems that they form a part of, new understandings of how complex dynamic systems operate, such as ecosystems, the brain, ant colonies and human societies, constitute a further need to reinterpret guiding political philosophies, as interactions themselves, without conscious determinism, can lead to system change. In other words, numerous and diverse interactions between elements (e.g. organisms, cell, ants, humans), can create macro-level phenomena that constitute more than the pure sum of the parts of the system (Chapter 1). For example, the individual actions of economists and stockbrokers can create a global economy, whose properties cannot be equally divided to the individual level. Hence the global economy can be said to possess properties that are unknown to the individual parts. The important point about this understanding of complex systems, stemming from the physical sciences, is that it posits systems as ‘open’, as the elements not only interact with one another, but also their environment: consequently, these systems are not static, and their ‘status’ can fluctuate, change and create novel phenomenon (surprise), and contain inherent unpredictably, as financial crises illustrate. Henceforth these characteristics of complex systems are

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1 Regarding political communities, this thesis is primarily concerned with advanced liberal democracies (ALDs), such as the United States and United Kingdom, due to the theoretical grounding of their guiding political principles, and the heritage of political philosophy exhibited within these states. This arguably makes them the most appropriate to direct the analysis and arguments presented here towards. The term ALD could relate to other societies that can be deemed largely similar to the US and UK, however this will be left to the reader to determine as there is not room for a wider discussion in this thesis.

2 See Folke (2006: 254) for these notions outlined in the ‘original’, ecological system, usage of the term.
Introduction

referred to as ‘systemic interconnectedness’ (Chapter 1). A further two key points regarding systemic interconnectedness are firstly, that the notion of human interdependence becomes more prominent and in fact unavoidable; and secondly, there exists a need for resilience, and for the purposes of this thesis, the need for resilient communities. In brief, if micro-level interactions can create unpredictable macro-level phenomena, then societies need to be able to survive despite these disturbances to their social systems, and hence be resilient.

Resilience is one of the primary threads that runs through this thesis, because the theoretical model the thesis constructs is deemed necessary today due to the need for resilient communities (considering systemic interconnectedness) (Chapter 1). Resilience itself has become somewhat of a modern ‘buzzword’ and has been deployed in many social and scientific settings. Therefore it is essential to outline the character of resilience for this thesis. Firstly, it can be said that there exist two main conceptions of resilience, descriptive and normative, and some that fall in between which can be considered hybrid (Thorén & Olsson 2017). The descriptive use of the term is often associated with early theorisations of the concept (e.g. in the field of ecology), whereby resilience can be considered a measure of survivability, the ability a system has to survive, or absorb, any changes in its environment (Holling 1973). Put differently, resilience

“is the buffer capacity or the ability of a system to absorb perturbations, or the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a system changes its structure by changing the variables and processes that control behaviour”

(Adger 2000: 349)³

From these definitions the descriptive, in other words the more normatively neutral aspect of resilience is seemingly obvious, as what constitutes systemic resilience is merely reporting the elements that make the system adaptive, without questioning the ‘direction’ the adaption takes. For example, human civilisation constructing self-sufficient habitation domes to reside in when the natural earth climate becomes

inhospitable due to climate change is an adaption to a change in environmental circumstance, which does not necessarily involve theorising whether this solution is ‘good’ or not, as the system still persists despite the change, and can still be considered resilient. Thus resilience in the descriptive sense refers to “the ability of a system to adapt to change, but also the ability for a system to persist despite change” (Keessen et al. 2013: 45, also Gunderson & Light 2006).

Social scientists have utilised the descriptive notion by outlining the need for a community to be able adapt to new circumstances, and also self-learn, thus creating the foundations of resilience (Chandler 2014a, 2014b):

“[Resilience] encourages actors to learn from catastrophes so that societies can become more responsive to further catastrophes on the horizon. It promotes adaptability so that life may go on living despite the fact that elements of our living systems may be destroyed. And it creates shared knowledge and information that will continually reshape the forms of communities and affirm their core values, thereby determining what is absolutely ‘vital’ to our ways of living”

(Evans 2013: 39)

Now, the idea that resilience involves self-learning begins to incorporate a normative element, as it raises a question of what communities should be learning, and as Evans points out in this process, determining what ‘core values’ may also be considered ‘vital to our ways of living.’ Therefore “[f]rom a normative perspective, resilience can function as a criterion to evaluate the quality of a strategy for adaption” (Keessen et al. 2013: 45, italics added).\(^4\) The normative aspect of resilience is perhaps best definitionally expressed in the following way: “Resilience is the ability of a system \(S\) to absorb some disturbance \(D\) whilst maintaining property \(I\)” (Thorén & Olsson 2017: 4, original emphasis).\(^5\) ‘Property I’ is important, as “\(I\) stands for the identity of the system; if \(I\) is maintained the system is the same”, it is the “persistence criteria for that system” (Thorén & Olsson 2017: 4, original emphasis). Hence resilience can be understood as “the ability

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\(^4\) See Adger (2006) and Driessen and Van Rijswick (2011) for this notion explored in the context of climate change.

\(^5\) This schema is based on Thorén (2014: 311).
of a system to absorb a disturbance whilst retaining, through that disturbance, some property or set of properties” (Thorén & Olsson 2017: 4). In sum, what is important about a system can be said to be what counts as the potential set of properties it seeks to preserve in the event of a disturbance. This is the point at which resilience can take on a normative character, one that this thesis subscribes to.

This thesis follows the definition above, and as a consequence resilience is both functional and normative-teleological, and these are not considered mutually exclusive. Institutions are a good starting point. Following Adger they are “defined in the broadest sense . . . [including] habitualized behaviour and rules and norms that govern society, as well as the more usual notion of formal institutions with memberships, constituencies and stakeholders” (2000: 348). Adger argues that “[s]ocial resilience is institutionally determined, in the sense that institutions permeate all social systems and institutions fundamentally determine” social subsystems such as the economy (2000: 354). Thus the functional aspect of resilience would entail adaption and efficiency, making these qualities of institutions. In other words resilience, as conceptualised here, helps institutions efficiently adapt to changes. Yet ‘efficiency’ is normative, as what counts as efficiency is determined by a particular set of values, such as democratic decision-making and citizen participation. As Sclove articulates:

“An action is efficient if it accomplishes its end without the unnecessary expenditure of resources. However, in a strong democracy social ends are not simply given. They must be formulated via a strong democratic process. Thus, rather than conceivably impairing economic efficiency, democracy is a precondition for legitimately specifying ends with respect to which efficiency is defined”

(Sclove 1995: 48)

Hence the functional aspect of resilience for this thesis entails making institutions efficient, that is, able to make political decisions based on a normative conception of efficiency. In other words, expending additional resources in political decision making is not necessarily inefficient, if those resources are used to promote democratic
This sentiment equates to Thorén’s ‘persistence criteria’, or \( I \) value. Put differently, the theoretical model introduced in this chapter and developed throughout the remainder of the thesis, aims to engender resilience, that is, communities that can adapt to internal and external changes (surprises), whilst retaining certain normative characters (such as democratic decision-making and citizens’ dispositions towards the common good). By preserving certain normative characters, resilience takes on a normative-teleological aspect, as it also enhances democratic values, decision-making and norms in society, as individual conceptions of the good life are aligned with the common good via the process of adaption. Thus as resilience is conceptualised here, in-line with what can be broadly termed democratic values, its functional element can help achieve normative goals. This is because resilience is not used in its descriptive sense, that is adaptability in terms of the mere delivery of political changes, but instead is conducive, and can accommodate, highly democratic decision-making. The symbiotic relationship between resilience’s functional and normative-teleological aspects highlights why they are not mutually exclusive in this thesis’ understanding. By increasing adaptability and efficiency, democratic decision-making processes are also increased, due to the fact that resilience is committed to certain values (such as more direct forms of democracy). The values that resilience is committed to converge on the notion of empowerment, this being the core normative goal. Again this is connected to adaptability and efficiency as individuals within communities need to be democratically empowered in order to contribute to political decision-making, particularly in the context of today’s interconnected and interdependent world. The latter remark concerning the ontology of the contemporary world is pertinent because both systemic interconnectedness and neoliberal globalisation can be disempowering (Chapter 1), and thus make the practice of democracy vulnerable. Vulnerability is another element of resilience scholarship (Adger 2006), and is essentially the opposite of resilience, that is, where a community is vulnerable to environmental disturbances, which in this case can

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6 Yet, economic considerations, for example, could “legitimately” trump [f]reedom and democracy . . . as highest order social values . . . when the latter both unequivocally and inescapably translate into offsetting threats to freedom and democracy” (Sclove 1995: 48)
be disempowering, as disturbances can potentially corrupt the democratic credentials of institutions.

To help explicate the way resilience has been sketched here, and ensure that it can be used effectively in the remainder of the thesis an example is called for. Climate change is the illustrative case study used in this thesis (Chapter 6), where resilience, empowerment and the theoretical model developed in the thesis are deployed. Therefore it is a suitable example to illustrate this thesis’ conceptualisation of resilience. For the case of climate change, resilience entails the ability of, say, the UK ($S$), to absorb the necessary reduction in pollutant emissions to meet climate change targets ($D$), whilst maintaining the democratic ideals of its political institutions ($I$). The functional aspect of resilience refers to UK’s institutions’ abilities to adapt efficiently to the new constraints being imposed by climate change (e.g. by sustainably extracting resources for production and switching to energy sources that do not emit CO$_2$). The normative-teleological element stipulates that these changes must comply with democratic procedures, rather than say adopting an authoritarian government that imposes ‘green energy’, thus disregarding the notion that liberty entails citizens of a community being able to shape the forces that govern their society. This in turn requires individuals and communities to be empowered to participate in collective decision-making, thus necessitating opportunities for, say, political participation and deliberation. It may also require that citizens possess civic virtue and civic training, so that their interests can be aligned with the common good (of attending to the disturbance), which would constitute further normative elements of resilience. This conceptualisation is particularly suitable for today’s interconnected world as it enables liberty to be exercised within a system that has inherent unpredictability and potential for the emergence of macro-level phenomenon, rather than these changes subverting liberty. Finally, it is also clear that the functional aspect of resilience cannot be detached from its normative element, as detaching them would thus forgo the ability for liberty to be exercised as communities adapt to climate change.
Introduction

The normative characteristics of resilience are important because they carry implications for the way politics is performed. Resilience requires a community to be sensitive to its environment and the consequences of its actions, both direct and indirect. For example, with regard to climate change, environmental sensitivity, self-reflexivity, self-awareness and self-monitoring (Chandler 2014b: 16.00) may entail questioning entrenched patterns and norms (Chandler 2014a: 3), and subsequently amending them. Arguably top-down governance and a passive citizenry may not be conducive to this aspect of resilience, as it is unlikely that it will engage all members, and thus take advantage of decentralised forms of knowledge, regarding both its internal and external relations (Chandler 2014b: 16.40). Thus hierarchical forms of governance may allow gaps to occur between unexpected events (and relationships) and governing (and knowing) (Chandler 2014b: 17.00). Consequently, resilience thinking can critique principles such as liberal universalism and hierarchical governance, due to their inability to engender real-time self-reflexivity. Self-reflexive thinking, can thus be translated into the ability for socio-political institutions to be able to adapt to changing circumstances - which may entail an expansion of their responsibilities, functions or mandate – yet retain their identity and the ideals (principles) that underpin them, such as liberty and democratic decision-making, as opposed to these being usurped as a result of a new systemic change.

The puzzle then, is to theorise how resilient communities can be constructed in a world of increasing interconnectedness and interdependence, whilst retaining a conception of liberty and democracy. This equates to maintaining a sense of (democratic) individual empowerment in a complex world. Empowerment refers to processes, approaches or capacities that enable citizens to “take control of their circumstances” (Adams 2008: xvi), and the forces that govern their lives (Sandel 1998a). In other words, citizens should be helped to “gain mastery of their lives” (Rappaport 1984: 3), and not feel powerless and disconnected from the political governance they are subject to. Certain political

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7 Unless one disagrees with the core premise of these principles, that is that individuals should be treated as equals and have a say in the rules that govern them, which this thesis does not.
8 For example Klein (1994: 147) defines power as referring “to the ability to influence decision making”, and to possess “power is to be able to exercise significant control over the decision-making process.”
philosophies could arguably be problematised as a result of this claim. For example, Chandler argues that

“The process of governing complexity through adapting to life as emergent causality means rejecting modern liberal understandings of life as inert, passive and governable in ‘top-down’ ways, from above. The problem, for governance is that of understanding the power of life and how complexity – as a technology of emergent order – operates” (2014: 33)

Therefore conceptualising liberty as a way of ‘doing politics’ that empowers people in a complex and interdependent world has become a priority. As Chandler alluded to, such a conceptualisation may not be found within the liberal tradition of political theory. This thesis argues that the theoretical model put forward here, Resilient Civic Republicanism (RCR), is a resilient political philosophy because it is able to underpin socio-political institutions in a resilient manner, that is, in a way that enables both conservation (I) and change. Whereas a political philosophy such as procedural liberalism has a greater tendency to turn to more techno-bureaucratic forms of governance, which rely on the top-down construction and imposition of a common good, thus problematising the conception of empowerment and democratic decision-making that reflect the underpinning ideals of socio-political institutions.

Towards a Civic Republicanism

The 21st century can be considered a unique period, which brings potential upset to the traditional liberal settlement that has guided advanced liberal democracies (ALDs) for the last 400 years. Liberalism has, in simple terms, coalesced around the idea that freedom (or liberty) equates to non-interference. Liberalism can be considered a family of related concepts (Chapter 2), with different sub-disciplines adding subtly and nuance to the broader concept of non-interference. Here two related liberalisms are deployed as a point of comparison to RCR, these are neoliberalism and procedural liberalism. The

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9 If one takes the 17th Century as the earliest and most prominent expression of liberal thought, principally by John Locke.
10 These terms will be used interchangeably.
former is well established in both academic and non-academic literature, and requires little further explication here, especially as it is elaborated in the following chapter. The latter is more closely associated with the scholarship of Michael Sandel, who is the primary conceptual inspiration for RCR. Sandel defines procedural liberalism as an embodiment of predominantly Rawlsian liberalism (Rawls 1971; Sandel 1998a, b), which despite the difference principle, largely adheres to non-interference through the idea that the state should be neutral concerning different conceptions of the good life. As both these terms appear throughout the thesis, it is useful to briefly discuss their usage within it.

Procedural liberalism is the datum point for Sandel’s (1998b) critique of Rawls, and as such must feature here, primarily because it serves as a springboard for his civic republican thought. Consequently the liberalism that is primarily referred to in this thesis will, for theoretical consistency, be procedural liberalism. Two further points need to be made at this stage. The first is that procedural liberalism does not have its own dedicated chapter, as it would largely be repetitive of existing literature (namely Sandel’s), but rather is referenced and detailed where necessary (primarily Chapter 3). The second point concerns Chapter 1, where a significant amount of analysis concerns critical reflections of neoliberalism (or neoliberal globalisation as it is referred to in Chapter 1). This concept is located more readily in the common parlance and the literature used in Chapter 1, due to its atomising and disempowering effects on the individual, and for this reason it is also needs to be referenced.

Both procedural liberalism and neoliberalism are referred to in the thesis. Under procedural liberalism, political “decisions occur through procedural mechanisms”, which can diminish “deliberative decision making [and] comprehensive doctrines of the good” (Johnston 2007: 470). Namely this is due to the prioritisation of a framework of rights that avoids substantive moral questions, based upon the core liberal tenets of non-interference, autonomy, separateness of persons and toleration. Arguably neoliberalism

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1 Rawls’ particular “proceduralisms” regard “his overlapping consensus and publicity conditions; his original position and veil of ignorance” (Johnston 2007: 469, n. 1).
is more all-encompassing, a political ideology that includes both theoretical conceptions and empirical realities related to political, economic and cultural practices (Dawson 2013: 3-7; Chapter 1). Where further explication or nuance is felt necessary regarding these terms, then it is offered at the time of usage. The essential point that connects these two positions concerns economics. Notwithstanding the egalitarian posture of Rawls’ liberalism, the other tenets of the theory permit neoliberalism to exist. In its avoidance of taking a positive stance on different conceptions of the good, an economic status quo is accepted whereby “capitalism’s endless pursuit of accumulation” renders the dichotomy between “ethico-political liberalism and economic liberalism” as “in some ways satisfactorily manageable and not problematic in any radical sense” (Hayward 2009: 280; also Calder 2011: 162-166). Hence whilst procedural liberalism may not be considered the public philosophy of neoliberalism, it permits neoliberal principles and governmentality, and thus is able to fit into the neoliberal order. Arguably the disempowering empirical features of neoliberalism are perpetuated by its ideological influence (Dawson 2013; Chapter 1), cannot be addressed from within procedural liberalism’s own resources, which, along with the fact that it forms a substantial part of the guiding and dominant political philosophy at present in ALDs (Calder 2011: 156), is why it remains a key referent for the thesis.

The problematisation of procedural liberalism lies within Barry’s sentiments regarding the starting point of republicanism: “[p]olitics, for republicans, is an attempt to build an enduring home for human lives in a world ruled by contingency and filled with potentially hostile agents, both human and nonhuman” (Barry 2008: 6). The issue is that unlike the period from the 17th to 19th centuries, emerging socio-political challenges such as climate change, bring into sharp relief the interconnectedness of individuals, and the difficulty of positing any individual’s actions as wholly self-regarding. Yet non-interference and individualism that have characterised liberalism since Locke, still underpin ALDs today (Bellah et al. 1992). It is argued that modern life has become too complex for the traditional liberal settlement (Chapter 1 & 2). A philosophy that

Arguably Sandel acknowledges this by detailing procedural liberalism (1998a,b) and then focusing on what can be said to be the political externalities of neoliberal politics (2012).
espouses a framework of individual rights, a neutral state regarding questions of
morality and the good life, a ‘relatively’ unconstrained free market, and little civic
demands placed on citizens is not conducive to building enduring homes for humans
today. This is because, simply put, a theory focusing on non-interference will struggle
to accommodate interferences that systemic interconnectedness posits as unavoidable.
Although many liberal principles such as rights, autonomy, and protection from
arbitrary interference are still immensely valuable to contemporary societies, this thesis
argues that to meet new emergent demands, they need reconfiguring within a civic
republican framework.

A key argument in this thesis, is that the increasingly interconnected, interdependent
and neoliberally globalised world challenges procedural liberalism, particularly in the
form of democratic decision-making and empowerment, which underline flaws in its
conceptualisation of freedom: climate change (Chapter 6) being one example. What RCR
offers is a model that is resilient, in other words socio-political institutions are not
corrupted or degraded by contemporary developments, as it adopts an alternative
conception of freedom that facilitates both preservation (e.g. of democratic ideals) and
change (e.g. new restrictions on pollutant practices); this logic being applied to the
example above. It is asserted, that the emphasis placed on public deliberation,
participation, character cultivation, federalism and ultimately freedom conceived as
self-government, can create both cohesive and resilient communities that can
accommodate the demands of emerging socio-political challenges and systemic
interconnectedness: something that remains elusive to predominantly liberal inspired
political philosophies.

Freedom as self-government equates to individuals being able to exercise control of the
forces that govern their lives (Sandel 1998a). This is a different philosophical starting
point than non-interference. By positing self-government as control over political life, it
can attend to the tension that manifests between freedom, empowerment and
interdependence that is characteristic of procedural liberalism today (Chapter 1).
Although the underpinning political philosophy of procedural liberalism has not
rendered ALDs completely impotent, this thesis argues that RCR would be more successful under current circumstances. This is because giving individuals and communities the capacity to exercise self-government promotes resilience: (1) by nurturing self-learning, through inclusive deliberation for example, which is perceived as a legitimate method for informing policy (Pateman 1970); and (2) by ensuring that adaption is based on democratic decision-making, whereby new initiatives that could be considered curtailments of liberty, such as those surrounding climate change, manifest as self-imposed obligations: hence retaining the principle of empowerment. The alternative, as Chandler drew attention to, is that of centralised governmentality that imposes politics and the common good from above. Therefore exploring the efficacy of RCR in today’s world is essential, as issues surrounding immigration, controlling the potentially corrupting influence of capital, and the social incorporation of new rights such as LGBT, and climate change, present new challenges for today’s political communities, which are seldom accommodated with ease.

The Digital Age

The digital age presents many opportunities for conducting politics in the 21st century, namely by its ability to create interconnections between the local, national and the global. Such technological advances, permitting the high-speed transfer of information across boundaries, could also amount to a further fragmentation or redundancy of the nation state as digital communication can enable direct connections between individuals, local communities and global actors. There is further potential for digital interconnectedness to permit local participation in local spaces to influence wider global issues, and thus pursue the common good in this manner. However, “[t]o suggest . . . that the Internet is already creating a publicum that embodies meaningful civic discourse on a day-to-day basis seems premature” (Franda 2002: 151).

Before further explicating Franda’s claim, it is useful to detail the potentialities that contemporary information and communication technologies (ICTs) can have for democracy. Perhaps the predominant advantage, in terms of connecting the local to the
global, is the potential technology has to overcome the oft-cited scale issue associated with direct and deliberative democracy (i.e. that it can only be conducted in city-states and not beyond). Hence “participatory decision making as expedited by electronic and digital communication . . . promised a global agora, and electronic and digital commons that might for once and for all overcome the old problem of scale” (Barber 2003: xiv). The assumption is that ICTs that are capable of creating cyberdemocracy and e-government platforms, via the fast transfer of information across borders (24/7), are altering the ways individuals are engaging “in social relations” and giving rise to the emergence of multilayered communities (Regulska 2004: 340). Essentially ICTs can align with the aims of democracy by providing opportunities for widespread citizen participation, for example by facilitating cooperative relations between distantly located communities and providing the infrastructure for creating “democratically federated macrocommunit[ies]” and complex networks of secondary institutions (Sclove 1995: 74). This could occur via community-to-community video-conferencing or virtual communities, which transcend “any sense of spatial confinement” and where “people can interact electronically with a ‘community’ of fellow citizens spread across entire regions or continents” (Sclove 1995: 79, 74). It is not only distant groups that can take advantage of ICTs, but also disadvantaged and marginalised groups, such as civil rights activists, as they can act as a useful tool for self-organisation and coordination (Sclove 1995: 112-3, 117).

The essential foundation of ICTs and where they can interact with politics, relates to the potential they hold to “foster greater discussion between and among citizens, groups, and politicians”, and create “new mechanisms though which individuals and groups can enter political space” (Regulska 2004: 341). The idea is that by lowering the cost of political participation, “broadening citizens’ access to information and enhancing political participation opportunities in decisionmaking as well as in actual organizing and mobilizing, and also disseminating and exchanging information . . . citizens will become further empowered, better informed, and more autonomous as political subjects because of access to ICTs” (Regulska 2004: 342-3). One avenue that can be taken from this foundation, and where ICTs have been used in the political realm, is electronic
activism and cyberdemocracy; whereby the use of technology can increase the speed, frequency and accuracy (in terms of reaching the right audience) of “interactions between individuals, NGOs and formal and informal groups in virtual communities” (Regulska 2004: 350). ICTs thus provide a platform for “decentralized and nonhierarchial networking” where citizens can use new linkages to build alliances and coalitions, and share the latest information and plan new actions (Regulska 2004: 349-50). Hence the creation of both virtual and non-virtual communities.

Another role that ICTs can play relates to e-government, whereby governmental services can be delivered faster, made more accessible, and at lower cost, whilst increasing “transparency and accountability of governments across geographical scales” (Regulska 2004: 355). Typically these initiatives allow citizens to introduce legislative proposals or comment on draft laws; discuss government policies, and in some cases citizens can send questions and comments, and receive answers from the appropriate ministers; create public policy communities via websites that constitute a virtual community, where contributions to public policy can be made and issues important to citizens can be placed on the agenda (Regulska 2004: 351-6). Various incarnations of these initiatives have been used in central and Eastern Europe (Regulska 2004), as well as the British Parliament (Leston-Bandeira, Thompson & Mace 2016). Therefore ICTs and the Internet arguably enable the sharing of information, enable activist groups to form across boundaries and at lower cost, allow governments to consult citizens on issues in an electronically mediated fashion, which can include citizens active participation in aspects of political decision making. However as Franda’s remark above alluded to, there are substantial concerns that accompany the use of ICTs in the political realm.

The limitations of digital connectedness

The primary concern for this thesis, considering liberty centres on the ability for citizens to exercise control of the forces that govern them, is the superficiality of electronically mediated communication (EMC). The central point is aptly summarised by Barber:
“[The] breakneck speed and instant accessibility [of new technologies] . . . actually encumber and compromise democratic deliberation, which demands slow and deliberate pace for rational, democratic decision making. Instant polling via the Internet is less a recipe for strong democracy than for plebiscitary tyranny . . . The tendency of the Internet to speak to distinct private audiences segregated according to special interests undermines the democratic need to compel and encounter among strangers with hostile interests, who nonetheless must learn to live and govern together”

(2003: xv)

Here Barber is underlining the fact that there is a difference between the face-to-face townhall democracy that is associated with Tocqueville, and the electronic participation and interactions that individuals and groups experience when using ICTs. The difference is that virtual communities and “electronically mediated communication filters out and alters nuance, warmth, contextuality and so on that seem important to fully human, morally engaged interaction” (Sclove 1995: 79; Avritzer 2009). Furthermore, Sclove outlines further concerns that “screen-based technologies . . . are prone to induce democratically unpromising psychopathologies, ranging from escapism to passivity, obsession, confusing watching with doing, withdrawal from other forms of social engagement, and psychological distancing from moral consequences” (1995: 79-80). There is therefore a certain ‘richness’ that is missing for EMC, whereby one’s interlocutor is more likely to be viewed a-contextually, less as a neighbour and someone with whom one shares mutual dependence and self-realisation, and more as a rhetorical competitor that must be overcome. This is perhaps why political use of ICTs and rise of the Internet has been claimed to strengthen factional divisions (especially in regions with ethnic strife, unstable political systems, and weak political cultures), as there is “greater opportunities for groups to be unaccountable for their actions” (Regulska 2004: 346). For instance the “emergence of hate groups and reinforcement of lack of tolerance” could be due, in part, to the anonymity offered by Internet, where individuals can “hide their identity and mislead others about their physical location as well as institutional affiliations, or about the intent of their actions”, which can again weaken “a sense of being accountable to others” (Regulska 2004: 346). The compromises and context that face-to-face interaction entails, when located within an appropriate setting, and where there is space for a meaningful dialogue to emerge, thus corresponds more with aligning individual interests with the common good and eliciting civic virtue, as there is more time for the richness of interactions to be captured
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within political deliberations, which is a key problem when using ICTs and EMC (Johnson et al. 2016). In addition, even when the recognition for richer data from digital initiatives is recognised, the practicalities of obtaining and analysing this is still a significant obstacle (Johnson et al. 2016). This is perhaps why questions have been raised over the ability for digital initiatives to promote long-term engagement of those it initially engages (Norris 2001: 22), and also whether it is truly capable of changing the status quo; as Norris argues, “established political institutions, just like major corporations, can be expected to adapt the Internet to their usual forms of communication, providing information on line, but not reinventing themselves or rethinking their core strategy in the digital world, unless successfully challenged” (Norris 2001: 19). Similarly Dempsey claims that “[t]echnological innovations will not change the mentality of bureaucrats who do not view the citizens as . . . participant[s] in decision-making” (2003: 22). Therefore, issues such as increasing passivity, factionalism, and superficially of deliberation are significant hurdles to democratic initiatives that use digital platforms, namely as it is difficult to replicate a sense of democratic community, that is, providing ample opportunities for face-to-face interaction that enables citizens to know each other in context and thus more completely.

There are also further issues related to ICTs and EMC that bear on its appropriateness for furthering democratic governance. Somewhat counterintuitively, rather than lowering the cost of participation, and accessibility, ICTs can in fact result in forms of exclusion. For instance unequal access to digital platforms can result from low information technology literacy (such as amongst the elderly), a lack of infrastructure (for example in more rural areas of a state that lack a high-speed internet connection), and relatively high costs of use (i.e. payments to internet service providers and personal computers), which can contribute to further social stratification as not every citizen can automatically become a user (Regulska 2004: 343). In Regulska’s words, ICTs can lead to further societal fragmentation and division because “[t]he initial required input of time and the high costs involved in obtaining the necessary equipment and learning computer skills prevents those who already find themselves socially and economically marginalized from having opportunities to reap the benefits from the new technological
developments” (2004: 344). In this case, those who advocate the use of ICTs are asking citizens to invest time and capital into learning the way each platform operates and how to deliver their input through digital media, and then invest further resources in developing, what could broadly be described as, civic virtue (i.e. the civic skills citizens learn through their encounters with other on issues of common concern). Correspondingly, citizens who are already ‘tech-savy’ could be considered “hyperempowered”, that is, they possess a privileged position regarding democratic participation via ICT platforms (Sclove 1995). For these reasons Norris (2001: 4) argues that pre-existing social divisions (along gender, race, class, age, education and ethnicity), which can see a reduction in the participation of these groups and an increasing indifference towards politics, will be paralleled on ICT media. Not only would there be a divide between users and non-users (Regulska 2004: 344), but resultant social fragmentation (Norris 2001) essentially creates homogenous enclaves, whereby physically gated communities in the real world are replicated in the digital world, which can create obstacles to sharing in a common good (Barber 1984). For example two recent political events generated deep divisions in their respective populations, the election of US President Trump in 2016 and the UK’s referendum on whether the state should leave the European Union. Despite occurring in the digital age, the aftershocks of these events manifest in deeper partisan political divides. Hence ICTs and ECM used for democratic means can suffer from the same criticisms of associational democracy, such as developing bridging social capital (Putnam 2000) and those detailed in the following section.

A related issue with the use of ICTs regards their ownership. Barber for example argues that “ownership [of technologies] is ever more monopolistic with tendencies that are narrowing. The triumph of marketization and commercialization in the sector, mirroring the marketization and commercialization of society generally, has meant that whatever considerable potential the Internet has had for democracy and the pursuit of public goods has been seriously compromised in practice” (2003: xv). The key point here is that certain groups or actors can gain power through their use and/or governance of technologies, and the information/data provided by them. Similarly to the concerns
above, Sclove highlights that “[i]llegitimate asymmetries in social power are reproduced through clandestine technological means” (1995: 241). This is in part due to a problem regarding accountability, as holding transnational corporations democratically accountable, regarding technology that is not a priori legislated for, can allow these actors to manipulate politics (Sclove 1995: 116). The recent scandal surrounding social media platform Facebook and online data collection firm Cambridge Analytical (BBC News 2018, The Guardian 2018), underline how the data obtained from virtual communities can be used to generate and deliver “highly targeted messaging” to voters which can influence elections (Bartlett 2018: n.p.). Furthermore these mechanisms are not easily visible to regulatory bodies, and can exploit “people’s psychological vulnerabilities”, where a large public sphere of political information is transformed into millions of smaller private spheres which consequently makes compromise between citizens more difficult, as citizens operate in differentiated realities regarding their socio-political world (Bartlett 2018: n.p.). Hence why it can be claimed that “those who envision modern technologies conveying societies effortlessly toward democratic utopia are dangerously naive”, as “[t]echnological power is thoroughly entwined with other sources of power such as great disparities in wealth, influential acquaintances, class stratification, disproportionate cultural influence, and so on” (Sclove 1995: 116).

Therefore, as beneficial and empowering as technology can be to citizens, in terms of allowing them to organise and coordinate themselves, and access information more easily, it must be borne in mind that technology and digital connectedness can enable certain groups to become “hyperempowered”, whereby organisations can use technology and information to “much greater relative advantage” (Sclove 1995: 117). The Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal illustrates how ICTs can be susceptible to being disproportionality used by elites, potentially to drown or promote certain messages (Regulska 2004: 350). This can also occur in cyberdemocracy initiatives, for instance in the Public Reading Stage of the Children and Families Act in the UK, where citizens were invited to leave comments (digitally) on draft legislation, research found that NGOs utilised this opportunity to mobilise their members en-masse and help coordinate the content of their comments (Leston-Bandeira, Thompson & Mace 2016).
Hence one can argue that the digital platform was, in one way, used as a more opaque form of lobbying, which does not represent the transparency, equality, and accountability that stronger forms of democracy demand. It is also worth noting that one of the recommendations of the report was that additional resources would be required to enable a thorough analysis of the data and ensure that ministers were properly briefed on the contents and relevance of the data obtained (Leston-Bandeira, Thompson & Mace 2016): again, reinforcing the notion that ICTs may be incapable of obtaining ‘rich data’. When this criticism is viewed alongside further concerns: that “hyperempowerment may also arise when an organization creates or governs technological systems on which many other institutions, people, or technological systems depend” (Sclove 1995: 115); that there exists potential for affluent elites and professional to “be disproportionately active in global electronic communications networks” (Sclove 1995: 237); and thus that digital technologies could “support illegitimately hierarchical power relations between groups, organizations, or polities” (Sclove 1995: 114); ICTs’ potential for engendering appropriate and accountable participation and deliberation should not be overstated. Whilst technology can lower the cost of participation, the content and meaningfulness of the participation it generates can be questioned.

The relationship between digital connectedness and the ‘scale issue,’ that is, ICTs ability to facilitate connections between the local and the global, are also not self-evident. One such issue relates to the notion that virtual communities could replace, or are of the same nature, as local face-to-face ones. As touched upon above, one issue with EMC is that:

“Even nascent or hypothetical new electronic media that convey a dimensionally richer sensory display are not a substitute for face-to-face interaction, because electronic media implicitly choose how to decompose holistic experience into analytically distinct sensory dimensions and then transmit the latter. At the receiving end, people resynthesize the resulting parts into a coherent experience, but the new whole is invariable different . . . part of what is lost is that the original whole was partially constituted by a context that was essentially tacit, open textured, and nonspecifiable. Hence, when one analytically or technically decomposes a whole into parts, some of the context that was essential to the original whole is invariably omitted . . . [Hence] technologically mediated interactions are qualitatively altered and sensorially deprived”

(Sclove 1995: 108)
This limitation of EMC connects to the scale issue as the contextual reductiveness of EMC can make social relations less thick, that is, “less embedded in a context saturated in shared meaning and history” (Sclove: 1995: 80). This could lead to communications between people within virtual communities being less conducive to compromise as they know less of each other, perhaps a symptom of participants not engaging in “long-term, relationships and life in a community of considerable duration” (Kegan 1982: 218). The idea here is that without a thick sense of a shared history, individuals will be less invested in political participation, which is magnified in a practical sense as “no matter with whom one communicates nor how far one’s imagination flies, one’s body-and hence many material interdependencies with other people-always remain locally situated” (Sclove 1995: 80). This raises two concerns: one is that it “seems morally hazardous” for citizens to interact and commune with individuals far from their own locales, “if that means growing indifferent to physical neighbours” (Sclove 1995: 80).

Sclove observes that there exists a “disturbing precedent in the extent to which wealthy suburbanites manifest indifference to the social condition of adjacent urban centres from which they draw material and cultural sustenance” (1995: 255, fn. 63). The second concern relates to the function of democratic community, which seeks to empower individuals in an egalitarian manner by enabling them to exercise a degree of control over the forces that govern them, which in turn means that community boundaries should correspond approximately to existing territorial boundaries where meaningful political agency and accountability can be practiced (Sclove 1995: 80). The reason for this being that “the criterion of local self-governance will be breached if involvement in spatially dispersed social networks grows to subvert a collective capacity to govern the locales people physically inhabit” (Sclove 1995: 80). This could result from the problematising influence that distant social networking can exert on generating a shared sense of mutual indebtedness at the local level, which is important, as it is here where many aspects of positive liberty are promulgated. For example the welfare state (traditionally located within nation states) requires citizens to pool their resources in order to provide the basic foundations for egalitarian individual self-development, which as expressed in the sentiment above, could be problematized if individuals
become disinterested in their more local neighbours. Essentially an ‘indifferent neighbours scenario’ would signal a move away from welfare state liberalism and towards libertarianism, whereby individuals choose their own allegiances beyond the nation state (in zero sum fashion), which would then require either a complete re-imagination of welfare services on a global egalitarian scale, or a fully privatised system, as provision of welfare services would no longer turn on the shared mutual obligations of a territorially bound community. The other point pertinent to the scale issue regards hyperempowerment, whereby certain actors who are able to take advantage of digital connectedness, are empowered to lobby elected officials, whilst “their technopoor neighbors are excluded from the circuit” (Sclove 1995: 80). Therefore notwithstanding the potential benefits of digital connectedness, including overcoming issues of participation and scale, as a contextually impoverished form of communication that can dilute common concern for mutual self-governance, enable hyperempowerment, and pose issues for political accountability, ICTs and EMC do not make their alternative, face-to-face deliberation, necessarily out of date from the perspective of engendering a strongly democratic community.

Given the limitations of ICTs and EMC, several provisos can be put forward regarding the efficacy of digital connectives, technology and democracy. The core maxim is that technologies should “structurally support the social and institutional conditions necessary to establish and maintain strong democracy” (Sclove 1995: 30). This would entail designing ICTs and EMC systems that: nurture mutual respect and recognition of shared commonalities; are fully inclusive, culturally plural, and empower disadvantaged groups; allow for the development of moral autonomy; enable meaningful opportunities for shaping political agendas; be monitored in such a way that ensures technologies do not perpetuate new or existing inequalities; present obstacles to hyperpowered/privileged groups; and should capture contextual knowledge (Sclove 1995). Arguably a substantial amount of capacity building within polities is needed in parallel with the development of ICTs and EMC, so that the importance and capability of scrutinising technologies can be institutionalised in such a way that ensures appropriate accountability, as within them lies the potential for “ideological
obfuscation” (Sclove 1995: 10). If therefore, the use and democratic credentials of ICTs need to be publically debated, then it would seem that these debates would in large-part need to be undertaken along more traditional face-to-face media, as it is the digital itself that is being scrutinised.

Furthermore, when formulating what meaningful participation consists of, one can postulate that it ought to nurture skills in the citizenry that enable them to resist becoming conformist, uncritical, and “fatalistic about the possibility of desirable social change”, and instead further mutual self-realisation (Sclove 1995: 84-85), and elicit critical reflection on social circumstances and needs (Sclove 1995: 183). The rationale for these provisos is that technologies can influence individuals’ preferences and needs, whether these are ICTs, or more tangible technologies such as highways which can induce dispersed living patterns, increasing personal private automotive ownership, and demand for gasoline and repair services (Sclove 1995: 162). In addition, a-contextual encounters between citizens can lead to division, asymmetries of power, and indifference. A central point is that as individuals “are the evolving products of structures that they help continuously to reconstitute”, and thus are part of a social model of structuration (Sclove 1995: 164), then it is important, from the standpoint of democratic governance, that the participation and deliberation that citizens take part in align with normative conception of resilience put forward at the beginning of this introduction.

**RCR, technology and digital connectedness**

Undoubtedly ICTs and personal computers “harbour the potential for allowing more democratic, decentralized, and debureaucratized social coordination” (Sclove 1995: 232), and there exists the possibility that they can help in “combatting local parochialism; helping to establish individual memberships in a diverse range of communities, associations, and social movements; empowering isolated or marginalised groups; and facilitating transcommunity and intersocietal understanding, coordination, and accountability” (Sclove 1995: 81). Yet what the concerns detailed
above illustrate, is that “much remains to be learned about effective strategies for realizing that potential” (Sclove 1995: 232). There are several question marks over digital connectedness’ and EMC’s ability to move beyond being a simple tool for activists to mobilise and generating purely short-term political engagement, and whether they can connect the local to global in a way that captures the full context of democratic relations and principles, and thus realise their empowering potential.

In terms of communication taking place across digital media, Barber warns, when speaking of “electronic town meetings”, that they sacrifice intimacy, diminish the sense of face-to-face confrontation, and increase the dangers of elite manipulation (2003: 274). There consequently exists an issue of re-creating the conditions most conducive to producing democratic compromise between citizens via digital platforms. Where deliberation is not the prime object, technologies can be used in a more ‘practical’ sense, such as being used to “collect public opinion” (i.e. consultation) and act as voting devices (i.e. digital voting) (Johnson et al. 2016: 2945). Yet these initiatives also encounter problems “related to: forming of right questions to be posed on devices; identification of and gaining access to right locations for promoting engagement and discussion; and the difficulties community organisations face in using and responding to the data and insights collected through novel consultation technologies” (Johnson et al. 2016: 2945).

Hence even where complex deliberation reminiscent of townhall democracy is not the primary object, the use of ICTs to gather and exchange data between citizens and governments still encounter data collection and processing issues. Furthermore, part of the ‘richness’ omitted from such data regards how ICT systems “fit into the much wider, complex network of processes and actors of varying degrees of power and influence at play”, which importantly includes questions of who owns the data obtained, and “ignores pre-existing issues around trust between different parties . . . [: it] is not just mistrust of decision-makers and authorities by certain groups of citizens, but also mistrust from certain decision-makers as to the legitimacy and value of contributions in certain formats or from specific groups of people” (Johnson et al 2016: 2953). This could further problematise the incorporation of expert opinion, as how experts’ testimonies are perceived by citizens and whether these are trusted could detract from their value.
Therefore although consultation and digital voting technologies can reduce the costs of participation and can “create a buzz and dialogue around local matters of concern”, they miss increasing stakeholders’ understanding of “why people say what they do”, and thus “such interactions lose the richness and discursive, dialogic element of debate”, which even if obtainable, practical difficulties of data collection and issues of mistrust may make “any such attempts meaningless” (Johnson et al 2016: 2954). It would therefore appear that for ICTs to be used in a meaningful sense, then a wider spectrum of civic-democratic initiatives and approaches are required, that is something that goes beyond consultation and opinion sharing. Whilst ICTs may be efficient and lower the cost of participation in a technical sense, they are seemingly inefficient in a democratic sense (when relied up at the cost of more traditional means).

ICTs ability to overcome the scale issue also cannot be taken for granted. Firstly, there is a possibility for macro governance to displace local, by generating disinterest in local affairs and creating opportunities for certain actors, who may not be local citizens, to have hyperempowered influence within such mechanisms. Secondly although locally implemented ICT solutions (i.e. on a more intermediate rather than national scale) could be democratically worth any potential increase in costs related to economies of scale - as they could mitigate against hyperempowered actors and other undesirable power relations, and potentially reduce externalities (i.e. the effects of ‘transactions’ on those not party to the transaction) (Sclove 1995) - the Johnson et al. (2016) study illustrates how locally administered ICTs still encounter significant issues. Furthermore, the scale issue remains salient as it is also unlikely that individuals acting alone and operating in private civic spheres, as opposed to public gathering spaces, will be able to “reconstitute a vibrant community or polity in which to become engaged”: hence before ICTs are welcomed and embedded into politics it would seem, from those who favour stronger forms of democracy, that first, political work is needed to “establish the democratic structural conditions that would make” choices regarding the use of ICTs “(as well as other substantive choices) widely practicable” (Sclove 1995: 266, fn. 11). It is this notion of democracy being prior to technology that this thesis takes as its foundation, when questions of digital connectedness arise.
The role of digital connectedness and associated technologies, when modelling a theoretical model that is normatively resilient in the context of the 21st century, can take Barber’s following remark as a starting point:

“In sum, because technologies have tended, at least initially, to mirror and reinforce rather than transform the societies in which they emerge, the new protodemocratic electronic and digital technologies that seemed so promising twenty-five years ago have in fact become part of the problem that confronts strong democrats, not part of the solution. Finding ways to reincorporate technology into a strong democratic strategy will depend not on the technologies themselves, which will remain protodemocratic in many of their aspects, but on political will”

(2003: xv)

Barber’s use of ‘protodemocratic’ parallels the one above in the sense of democracy coming prior to the unfettered use of technology. In essence this thesis argues that whilst digital technologies could give rise to “virtual communities” (Sclove 1995:79-81), help connect the local to the global and empower disadvantaged groups, they should not be the foundation of a democratic society, rather they should be used as aids to, or as a means of supplementing democracy. Therefore the RCR model put forward here can also be considered normatively resilient in the sense that it could enable technological democratic design criteria (Sclove 1995), and responses to technological innovation, to remain within the sphere of democratic practice and accountability. Consequently this does require a capacity to be cultivated within ALDs (e.g. civic virtue and opportunities for participation). Hence the RCR model could be used to deliberate and determine the democratic credentials, and potentially anti-democratic externalities, of the use of technologies in a resilient manner, as it does for climate change (Chapter 6).

The principle behind RCR and the role of digital connectedness in contemporary times relates to the notion that politics today, especially in the case of climate change, requires individuals to align their interests with that of the common good. Put differently, part of cultivating the common good today may require that citizens “become willing to entertain compromises-trading off their initial sacred valuations against newly acquired ones-that would have previously been unconscionable” (Sclove 1995: 160). In other
words, political compromises today may involve the trade of sacred objects (i.e. things that citizens highly value), such as the comfort and luxury of commuting in their personal sports utility vehicle (SUV), for public transport, which through the participatory processes and civic education that gives rise to awareness of mutual dependence, they would also come to value highly. Yet this relies on the extent to which the democratic procedures in a society, and the citizens who participate in them, “elicit sufficient respect to earn a kind of sacred status of their own” (Sclove 1995: 160), which can be problematised by ICTs. However if this does occur, “[t]he resulting increased level of mutual respect and flexibility would enhance the prospects for achieving consensual democratic decisions” (Sclove 1995: 160), which importantly makes the democratic system of deliberation and participation self-reinforcing, and thus normatively resilient by the fact that a democratic system operating according to its foundational principles further perpetuates the end of inclusive democratic politics, such as in the form of a democratic feedback loop. For example “even if consensus remains elusive, only when all parties feel respected by a process are they in turn warranted in honouring it and its outcomes—even particular outcomes they disfavour” (Sclove 1995: 160). For this form of compromise or reasoned dissensus to occur requires a way of ‘doing’ politics that captures the context and richness of the individuals involved and the reasons that lie behind their viewpoints, which, as illustrated above, is significantly problematised by EMC. The problematisation of democracy by technology arises because, as Sclove states:

“The opportunity to engage in a vibrant civic life and its accompanying informal politics is often preempted by such modern technological complexes as shopping malls, suburban subdivisions, unconstrained automobilization, and an explosive proliferation in home entertainment devices. Thus people have diminished access to local mediating institutions or to public spaces that could support democratic empowerment within the broader society . . . The need to manage translocal harms, coupled with widespread dependence on large, centrally managed technological systems and growing local integration into global markets, has helped render local governments relatively powerless, thereby reducing everyone’s incentive to participate at the local level. Meanwhile, there is little compensating incentive to engage in national politics, which network television reduces to a passive spectator sport, where hyperempowered corporations exert disproportionate influence, where deep questions of social structure are slighted and where the average citizen has a negligible effect”

(1995: 241, italics added)
The essential diagnosis that Sclove is making is that technology, whether considered purely along the lines of ICTs and EMC, or larger institutions such as automobilisation and out-of-town shopping complexes, is that it ‘pre-empts’ democracy. Hence ICTs ability to subvert democracy, and susceptibility to contextual contingency, occurs because a full complement of democratic procedures are missing from contemporary societies, which RCR aims to address. Once a broader set of democratic foundations has been laid, technology can then be used as a useful supplement to democracy. RCR can aid the development of conditions where “[e]ven if citizens lose an immediate political battle, provided that they have expressed themselves in a nondebased language of democracy, they affirm the dignity of all and help create a political climate conducive to that critical scrutiny of a society’s basic structures that is democratically essential” (Sclove 1995: 178). It is for this reason that ICTs and EMC should be treated with caution and hence why RCR can be viewed as prior to technology. For example if a quasi-political technology such as a social media platform is producing anti-democratic externalities, then the society it affects should be capable of recognising this and bringing about some change. In this case normative resilience would follow the principles of democracy and self-governance as starting points. In this sense liberty, as this thesis argues (Chapter 2 & 5), is better conceived as self-government, rather than simply negative or positive, because “democracy calls for a relatively high degree of local self-government, in part because an everyday citizen has greater potential to exert influence in smaller, immediate settings than elsewhere” (Sclove 1995: 119). This relates to normative resilience, as due to the fact that societies, political environments and technologies continually change, and thus no institutions can be said to be indefinitely appropriate or effective into the future, then societies should cultivate the capacities needed to both modify their institutional structure, or resist social-political transformations that may run counter to democracy (Sclove 1995: 143). Consequently, as such transformations can be technological, it follows that normative-teleologically resilient societies be cultivated in advance or prioritised ahead of technology.

13 I.e. where it would be beneficial to monitor and limit its deployment to those situations for which its specific ‘advantages’ are deemed useful, for example where only lean data is required, or where it could aid participation of disadvantaged groups.
This thesis puts forward RCR as a model and a framework that defines resilience in a normative-teleological sense, and liberty as self-government (with its other associated components that the remainder of the thesis details), which are argued to foster empowerment in ways that address the deficiencies and concerns of technology stipulated above. Local communities are postulated as a central foundation to ALDs because of the fact that there is less opportunity for citizens to withdraw from political differences, and the fact that there exists a greater chance for citizens to exert control at a more local level. Empowerment, for this thesis, goes beyond consultancy and activism, which consequently limits the use of technology in certain ways. However the role of ICTs and digital connectedness are not dismissed wholeheartedly, they are rather contextualised as a support to more thoroughgoing democratic programmes. The Cambridge-Analytica scandal, and the reported lack of accuracy with news reported by the media (and the influence of private biases within these institutions) (Regulska 2004: 345), emphasise the need for a greater capacity within ALDs to act in a normatively resilient manner. For instance rather than individuals posting comments in a uni-directional conversation, and relying on their own critical skills to find and research socio-political issues in a a-contextual environment, democratic politics should revolve more around “face-to-face politics in open, egalitarian social settings” (Sclove 1995: 137, 136), which are context-rich, can enable meaningful deliberation and cultivate civic virtue (Chapter 3 & 4). Hence once the foundations of democratic politics are re-invigorated, such as by reinforcing and expanding conventional public spaces, then one can envision striving to engender “complementary electronic spaces for geographically unrestricted forms of democratic deliberation” (Sclove 1995: 138; Chapter 6). Hence the core point is that once a “democratic local community already exists” and citizens have been trained in civic practice, then the use of ICTs can be considered and designed in such a way that they become “structurally compatible with democracy” (Sclove 1995: 136).

Technology and digital connectedness, as it stands today, remains at a stage where its capability for supporting democracy and resilience (as defined in this thesis) remains an
open question, due to the numerous cautionary observations regarding its use up to this point: namely its inability to contend with the deliberation of citizens’ sacred values that are essential to the formation of the common good, which itself is essential to contending with issues salient to the present time such as climate change (Chapter 6). Hence this thesis’ treatment of digital connectedness relates, in the first instance, to the claim put forward here that a democratic society first needs to be instated, along the model of RCR, before wholeheartedly embracing ICTs and EMC; this claim then provides the rationale for the proceeding treatment of technology in the thesis, that is, as certain technologies and digital initiatives could prove useful to RCR in a 21st century context, they will be specified in specific areas of the thesis where they are deemed appropriate supplements to democracy (Chapter 5 & 6). This targeted deployment of digital connectedness in the thesis is thus the result of conscious decisions to only introduce those technologies that may be considered compatible with RCR.

**Contribution to Knowledge**

This thesis makes two key contributions to knowledge. Firstly it constructs and presents a unique interpretation of Michael Sandel’s civic republican thought, under the name resilient civic republicanism (RCR). Unlike his republican contemporaries, most notably Phillip Pettit, Sandel has not published a manuscript solely dedicated to putting forward his own theoretical model, which is why he can, and has been referred to more as a social critic. Thus creating a cogent theory from his publications, which has been revised in response to his critics, is a useful addition to civic republican literature. In working through the criticisms of Sandel’s work, new conceptual allegiances have also been forged and refined, such as by incorporating the work of the British Idealist T.H. Green. Green does not only shore up Sandel’s model, but also demonstrates how traditional liberal concerns can be addressed within a civic republican framework.

Scholarship into Sandel is also valuable as he can arguably be presented as one the most prominent public philosophers in America and the UK today. For example, in the UK, Sandel regularly contributes to BBC Radio 4 programmes, culminating most recently in
his BBC series *The Global Philosopher* that seeks to promote global ethical public discourse, with contributors from over 30 countries (BCR4 2017). His philosophy also appears in broadsheet newspapers such as The Guardian and TED talks. Thus if the assumption that political philosophy should have a place in wider public life, which this thesis holds, then increasing knowledge of Sandel’s work is also beneficial.

The second contribution, and perhaps the most intriguing one considering the claims put forward in Chapter 1, is that RCR can be perceived as a resilient political philosophy. If individuals and societies are as interconnected, interdependent and subject to emergent phenomenon as Chapter 1 argues, then finding a suitable guiding political theory for these socio-political circumstances is essential. Babcock’s (1997) scholarship has come the closest with respect to sketching the relationship and connections between civic republicanism (à la Sandel) and complexity theory. This thesis agrees with her premise, yet also argues that there are limitations with her main article on this theme (Chapter 5). These limitations are addressed more fully in the thesis, and justify the unique framing of Sandel and Green, which together constitute key aspects of RCR, such as its conceptualisation of rights and the common good. In addition, this thesis explicitly draws the conceptual link between RCR, systemic interconnectedness and normative-teleological resilience, which is a novel usage of republican political philosophy: a point further entrenched by grounding these claims in examples of contemporary socio-political life (Chapter 1 & 6). This approach also enables RCR to be positioned, and distinguished, from similar political thought such as that offered by communitarian and capability approach scholars (Chapter 2). Furthermore it enables RCR to adopt a standpoint with regard to the use of digital technologies in today’s ALDs, which has been outlined above.

Making the conceptual linkages between RCR, systemic interconnectedness and resilience constitutes a further nuanced contribution to republican political theory. This contribution takes the form of shaping the ‘debate’ or ‘relationship’ between ‘neo-Roman’ and ‘neo-Athenian’ republican theories (Laborde & Maynor 2008: 3; McBride
Introduction

2015; Honohan 2002). Use of these terms thus helps frame and position the thesis within the field of contemporary republican political thought. The former relates primarily to Pettit’s (1997a; also Lovett 2010) republicanism that focuses on freedom as non-domination, and the procedural and instrumental nature of Roman republicanism; whilst the latter refers to a “perfectionist, populist” approach “that defines citizenship in terms of one’s capacity to take turns in participating directly in collective self-government” (McBride 2015: 350), associated with Sandel and Arendt (1958), the lineage beginning with Aristotle’s more participatory Ancient Greek republicanism. Admittedly this contribution is not pushed to the forefront of the thesis, as the dominance of procedural liberalism in ALDs, and the way this continues to frame societies at present, necessitates this being the primary referent. However contributions to the ‘neo-Roman – neo-Athenian debate’ are made and signalled where appropriate (Chapter 2 & 6).

Considering these contributions, the thesis can be said to have two core objectives:

1. To advance a uniquely interpreted civic republican political theory RCR, primarily inspired from the scholarship of Michael Sandel.
2. To demonstrate how RCR can better accommodate the demands of the 21st century than procedural liberalism. Thus reconciling the tension between empowerment, freedom and systemic interconnectedness.

Interestingly, before putting forward his theory of freedom as non-domination, Pettit (1993) asserted the idea of “resilient non-interference” as an addendum to the concept of negative liberty (à la Berlin). For Pettit, this notion of resilience equates to what can essentially be described as protection, that is, ensuring negative liberty can be enjoyed and not usurped by unpredictable events. For example, although a person may enjoy negative liberty under a monarch, as Hobbes claimed, this is reliant on the monarch’s will. This is a classic republican concern, which Pettit suggests can be mitigated by creating resilient non-interference, namely producing negative liberty via the rule of law. Yet as Chapter 2 argues, in the context of the 21st century, negative liberty alone cannot empower people. Thus merely protecting non-interference, and not reconfiguring the concept of liberty itself, would not equate to resilience within the context and aims of this thesis.

Justifying the usage of Sandel has been made above, and as Arendt’s philosophy was not conceived during the ascendency of neoliberalism, it can be largely omitted from this thesis.
It should also be noted that RCR does not constitute a libertarian socialist approach to politics. The latter following GDH Cole, refers to “creating the conditions under which the associative spirit or will can thrive and become the central force mediating social relations” (Masquelier & Dawson 2016: 12). Although both approaches share similarities such as encouraging more direct forms of democracy and political decentralisation, RCR distances itself from libertarian socialism most notably by retaining a significant role for the state. Essentially for RCR, the state can act as an institution that can symbolise the common good, which can underpin communal life on a state, as opposed to associational, level. Thus the capabilities of the state cannot be ignored when attempts to reform the economy, such as with climate change, are argued to be necessary, and require the adoption of a large-scale common good (Chapter 6). Also as associations can offer ease of exit, only aggregate members voices, and may be exclusionary regarding non-members (Warren 2001: Ch. 5, 75, 80), then they do not follow neo-Aristotelian sentiments that are asserted throughout the thesis. Finally, it is argued that RCR does not require a full-scale displacement of current political governance in ALDs, the argument being that politics, to begin with at least, could be done better and more in-line with RCR’s principles. Hence it is not viewed as necessary to fully adopt libertarian socialist principles at present, as encouraging civic spaces, civic virtue, federalisation and democratising the workplace may be enough, especially as this is not representative of ALDs today. RCR aims to bring the public sphere closer to the realm of the state, unlike pure associational theories (Warren 2001: 77). The issue at hand is promoting the democratisation of the state, so that it can release itself from the problematic implications of neoliberalism, such as the infiltration of market norms into areas of life not traditionally governed by them (Sandel 2012), and engender empowerment in a systemically interconnected world.

**Thesis Outline**

The thesis is split into six substantive chapters. Chapters 1 to 5 develop the core argument and theoretical model of the thesis, whilst Chapter 6 concentrates on the application of the RCR model.
Chapter 1 sets the foundation and rationale for the thesis. It puts forward a view of today’s world being characterised by two phenomena, neoliberal globalisation and systemic interconnectedness. Hence it focuses on neoliberalism more than procedural liberalism, due to the objective of the chapter. The central claim is that individuals and societies are on one hand becoming increasingly interconnected and interdependent, yet on the other, becoming more isolated and fragmented, which essentially disempowers the individual. The forces of a neoliberal globalisation are posited as both individualising, through the downplaying of the intrinsic value of common life, and interconnecting, through globalisation. Systemic interconnectedness draws on complexity theories to make sense of the reality of living in ALDs today, which can be viewed as complex dynamic systems. Thus RCR is a model derived from the idea that complexity theories do explain, in-part, the ontology of societies at present. The important consequence of this is that communal life is posited as an inescapable web of interdependencies, which, because these interactions can cause emergent phenomena, calls on societies to be resilient. The latter claim thus forms one benchmark from which RCR can be assessed. The chapter also founds the dualist approach, by introducing the comparison between procedural liberalism, and its implications as a governing philosophy that facilitates neoliberal globalisation, and RCR. Hence this chapter’s investigation of the sociological nature of life in ALDs today, forms a solid base for the formulation of RCR.

Before the formulation of RCR takes place, Chapter 2 presents several key tenets of the concept of liberty. Although this is a fairly broad-brushed analysis, due to the wealth of literature on liberty and the space limitations of the thesis, it again forms a useful framework for the following analysis of RCR. In brief, Chapter 2 isolates key elements of liberty that can be seen as problematic regarding the sociological claim of Chapter 1. Essentially, through the use of a tripartite liberty framework (liberal, idealist and republican), counter-resilient aspects of liberty are underlined, such as state neutrality and *a priori* individual rights. This chapter also notes the possibilities for finding a conception of liberty that fits the demands of the 21st century, which have been identified
through scholarship on differing conceptions of liberty. Therefore similarly to Chapter 1, this chapter sets out a number of conceptual benchmarks that can enable RCR’s conception of liberty as self-government to be articulated with relative clarity in the following chapters.

Sandel’s civic republicanism is introduced in Chapter 3. It begins by elucidating his premise which serves to underscore the difference between RCR and procedural liberalism. After presenting Sandel’s starting point, the chapter moves to put forward the first key tenet of RCR, civic virtue. RCR’s unique interpretation of civic virtue is achieved namely by addressing critiques of Sandel’s articulation of the concept, namely that he is too vague on this matter. However vagueness is in fact argued to be an advantage of RCR that enables virtues to emerge and change in relation to changing socio-political circumstances.

Chapter 4 examines the theoretical coupling of Sandel and T.H. Green, underscoring the uniqueness of RCR. The reason for turning to Green is again to rebut critiques that (1) Sandel lacks conceptual depth regarding his oft-used principle of the common good; and (2) that the more perfectionist ideals of Aristotelian (or communitarian) influenced political theories could undermine individual rights and autonomy. To the contrary, Green’s dual concepts of the common good and self-realisation are shown to be compatible with civic republicanism, thus deepening Sandel’s insights within RCR. The common good is thus postulated as essential to meeting the demands of the 21st century, and capable of accommodating traditional liberal fears associated with reversing Rawls’ axiomatic arrangement of the right and the good.

The central aim of Chapter 5 is to illustrate how the theoretical tenets of RCR can be brought to life: aided by its principles of civic spaces, federalism and the RCR political economy. Civic spaces are essentially places where individuals can meet and interact. They can be both formal (townhall) and informal (public park). Informal spaces serve to increase individual interactions and thus help citizens learn to interact with each other, and thus mitigate the atomisation of individuals and tendency towards living
increasingly separate lives, which can undermine the common good (Sandel 1998a, 2012). Formal civic spaces can be sites for the devolution of sovereignty, offering concrete opportunities for empowerment by bringing politics in reach of individuals. The main thrust of the RCR political economy regards democratisation of the workplace. Simply put, engendering workplace democracy can serve to cultivate the character, skills and dispositions needed for individuals to partake in self-government. It also enables citizens to regain a degree of control over the economic forces that govern them, which have been distanced under both procedural and neo liberalism.

Chapter 6 applies the principles of RCR to an illustrative example, climate change. It starts by illustrating how climate change is a pressing issue for ALDs today and characteristic of systemic interconnectedness. It then moves to present the limitations of the procedural liberal approach, namely that it cannot engender the emergence of new environmental norms, the common good and a sustainable economy that the challenge of climate change demands. It argues that RCR’s principles can make resilience possible under climate change, by ensuring that individuals recognise that collective responsibility can be empowering. Freely chosen (or self-imposed) lifestyle constraints can be perceived as legitimate when freedom is understood as self-government, as opposed to being imposed top-down by the state. Now the thesis will turn to Chapter 1, which explicates a key sociological claim that justifies the rationale for constructing RCR from its Sandelian roots.
Chapter 1 – 21st Century Society

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to put forward a sociological claim about the nature of society in the 21st century. The claim is that today’s societies are characterised by increasing systemic interconnectedness and interdependence, but also social fragmentation and individual disempowerment. This chapter argues that procedural liberalism, the main underpinning philosophy in advanced liberal democracies (ALDs), has contributed to these socio-political developments and is resultantly unsuitable for empowering citizens. Although interconnectedness and interdependence are not problematic necessarily, such ontological precepts can generate new social and political challenges. The issue these raise is that societies need to be capable of adapting to these changes (i.e. be resilient). The thesis argues that a governing RCR political philosophy is more likely to empower citizens in the face of complexity, unlike procedural liberalism.

The contemporary world is a very different place to when key philosophical traditions, which still inform current thinking, were first articulated, such as classical liberalism, republicanism, British Idealism and so on. To explore the implications of contemporary societies becoming increasingly interdependent, interconnected, socially fragmented and individually disempowering, this chapter sheds light on the challenges that 21st century presents to societies in ALDs. This will set the groundwork for Chapter 2 on liberty, by illustrating how certain conceptions of freedom are problematised by contemporary socio-political challenges. The chapter also forms a broader base from which the investigation in Chapter 6 can be explored, as climate change is also symptomatic of the interconnectedness and interdependence of today’s world. The social topography sketched below can be said to apply to life in ALDs, principally
Western societies, Western Europe and North America (Dawson 2013: 14; Beck and Grande 2010).16

It is not clear that all citizens of ALDs benefit fully from their political systems, or at the very least not in equal measure. Perennial philosophical, political and moral debates persist and continue to emerge, as societies, individuals, and science and technology continue to evolve through time. Political societies are open-systems, and must absorb and adapt to changes in their environment, including those that emerge from their own evolutionary processes. These ideas are postulated by complexity theory and resilience thinking. Adopting a complexity framework further problematises the procedural liberal approach as socio-political changes can occur unexpectedly, due to emergence, and require complex solutions since they are more than the sum of their parts, and thus non-reductive. These claims are explored in the penultimate section of this chapter.

Understanding the behaviour of complex social systems has coincided with other new framings of social reality, symbolised in notions of “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2000) and “late modernity” (Giddens 1991, 1990). Following this logic, the argument here is that individuals and societies are increasingly becoming ensconced in networks of dependence that have emerged in recent times, yet there is a growing pressure for the individual to be responsible for their own fate and attainment of the good life (Honneth 2014: 250-53). The world is more ‘global’ today, and despite the contestability of the term globalisation (Baylis et al. 2008: 8-12), a number of social processes, or cosmopolitan imperatives (Beck and Grande 2010: 417), have emerged in the 21st century which present novel challenges for political communities. Although there has been a deepening of interconnectedness and interdependence permeating both the local and the global - through mechanisms such as international financial markets, transnational governance and advanced communications technology - individuals are (1) becoming increasingly responsible for their own fate due to the receding normative ground that was once the realm of the state; and (2) highly dependent on other factors for their survival and the good life, from complex security services to combat international

16 The concept of the West remains contested (Browning and Lehti 2010).
networked terrorism, to supermarkets which are part of global supply chains that provide food. Thus individuals are now further disconnected from the things they depend on. To be self-reliant with regard to the provision of basic needs, financial stability and prosperity depends on the ability of an individual to navigate through networks of dependence. Individuals are also bombarded by choice in a differentiated and plural world, being constantly asked about who they are (identity), whilst being disembedded from social relations (Giddens 1991; Putnam 2000). This poses a problem for collective action, and any notion of the common good. If individuals rely on communal dependencies on one hand (i.e. cannot be truly self-reliant), and on the other, operate practically as atomised social and political animals, then generating the collective action necessary to meet emerging global trends such as climate change will be extremely difficult. The difficulty lies in the absence of a rich communal life that raises sentiments of communal solidarity, obligations and responsibilities, which are based upon a shared life in common.

Mutual dependence has been further obscured by the roll-back of the state (from the 1970s), in-line with principles such as *laissez faire*; based on the assumption that the market is a fair and efficient way to distribute goods, and conducive to individual liberty as freedom of choice. Yet the social processes modern societies now encounter, such as financial liberalisation, attending to terrorism and climate change, signal a need for increased state intervention. Similarly, new forces appear to be challenging the ability of the state to remain neutral in decisions that affect the good life, such as the potential banning of e-cigarettes (Fairchild *et al.* 2014) and whether fertility treatment should be state funded (McTernan 2015). The agora now arguably reflects a mere relic of antiquity (Bauman 2000), and as procedural liberalism remains a dominant force in modern politics (Sandel 2012; 2009a; 1998a; 1998b), it is no surprise that these decisions often catalyse long standing contested debates. Normative fragmentation and individual atomisation leave little space for the state to develop a cohesive common good. Yet as it is plausible to assume that novel socio-political challenges will continue to emerge, due to complexity and the increasingly differentiated nature of contemporary social life, further theorising about how to empower citizens in these circumstances is required, if
the proper functioning of political institutions is to be secured, and the tension between freedom and empowerment overcome.

**Neoliberal Globalisation**

Whilst elucidating the term “late modernity”, Dawson asserts that it is not intended to be a synonym for “neoliberal capitalism”, rather “late modernity encompasses the logic of social processes while neoliberalism classifies a type of capitalist economy” (2013: 13). Although this appears logical, a ‘chicken and egg’ scenario is also presented when considering late modernity. It is debatable whether social processes such as those associated with globalisation, emerge and are driven via the conception, adoption and implementation of neoliberal political and economic theory, or that these social processes have themselves catalysed the creation of neoliberal theory, to which states are attempting to adapt. This is perhaps due to the notion that neoliberalism has both ideological qualities and empirical realities that influence contemporary governance. Although this is an interesting topic for discussion, it is on one hand conceptually moot within the context of this chapter, as its core aim is to establish a foundation for discussing the factors that have problematized liberty in the 21st century. Yet on the other, the penultimate section (systemic interconnectedness), does postulate a somewhat novel answer which falls within this chapter’s frame of reference.

At this stage though globalisation is a useful starting point. Despite having its roots in modernity, this section aims to demonstrate, following Kaldor, that since developments in the 1980s and 1990s, globalisation is illustrative of a “qualitatively new phenomenon” (2006: 4). It is best described as “a historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents” (McGrew 2008: 19). It thus encompasses ideas of the shrinking world, or what Harvey calls “time-space compression” (1990), which emphasises the “[d]e-territorialization - or . . . growth of supraterritorial relations between people” (Scholte 2000: 46), “the integration of the world-economy” (Gilpin 2001: 364), and the “intensification of
worldwide social relations” (Giddens 1990: 21). Many of these themes would not have emerged without an accompanying “revolution in information and communications technology” (Kaldor 2006: 75). This has both opened-up new worldwide nodes of interaction, and also “accelerated the pace”, depth and intensity of such interactions; consequently intensifying interconnectedness across the globe, to the extent that political events in one state can now cause worldwide crises (McGrew 2008: 18). Classical republicanism is often critiqued as being applicable only to small city states, yet even the arguably less demanding political theory of classical liberalism, in terms of state interference and citizenship requirements, is now facing incredibly complex challenges along the lines of climate change, terrorism, and new sources of economic inequality.

Notwithstanding the ‘chicken and egg’ problem stated above, several global processes have been facilitated through the deregulatory practices of governments in ALDs, which represent a paradigm shift in what can be broadly called social organisation. Such themes are prominent within the notions of “liquid” (Bauman 2000) and “late” (Giddens 1991; Dawson 2014) modernity, and the changing face of capitalism that reflects today’s socio-political terrain (Harvey 1990; 2005). Neoliberalism materialised and gained considerable traction in the late 1970s and 80s as a cogent and systematic critique of the welfare state, and the Keynesian economics that underpinned it (Keynes 1946; Hayek 2001; Friedman 2002; Heywood 2007: 189-191; Budge et al. 2007: 50-58). Broadly speaking Keynesianism was charged with being inefficient, limiting choice, and restricting individual freedom and social progress. Central (classic) liberal principles were reasserted by the Thatcher / Regan administrations such as self-reliance, the privileging of autonomy, freedom of choice, free market economics and property rights (Harvey 2005: 64-86). This altered the socio-political topography by placing emphasis on the individual and bemoaning the collective. Margaret Thatcher’s statement that there is no such thing as society is a poignant example (Thatcher 1987). It signalled the recognition and need to permit economic markets to indulge in their interdependence, whilst attempting to isolate this from the remit of the state and collective control. Therefore a tension arises regarding empowerment, as individuals living in societies
depend on the form, structure and operation of the economy, as it provides them with
the income they require to secure their basic needs, impacts on the biosphere they share,
and can frame their conception of prosperity.17

Bauman provides a lucid appraisal of one of the processes which catalysed a move
towards neoliberalism, the liberation of capital from labour, and labour from capital.
Bauman notes that the increase in mobility of both elements is a key characteristic of
liquid modernity, the era of the job for life has come to an end (2000: 116). In the period
before late modernity, an individual could work for the same enterprise, live in the same
town, and socialise with the same colleagues for an entire career. Automotive factories
provide good examples, such as the Ford plant in Dagenham (UK). This situation
created a mutual dependency between the workers and the owners of the factory. One
was dependent on employment for their livelihood, and the other was dependent on
the availability of a labour force to produce their products. State deregulation of
financial markets, instruments, and labour regulations - notably the reduction of state
support for trade unions - when combined with the opening-up of the free-market,
transnationally via the forces of globalisation, dissolved the bonds of dependency
between workers and shareholders. Thus “depriving labour of its bargaining power”
(Bauman 2000: 122). This is disempowering because when employment security is
removed, employees are more susceptible to domination, that is, being subject to the
arbitrary will of employers, whose directives may not “track the interests and ideas” of
employees (Pettit 1997: 55; Hsieh 2005, 2008a, 2008b; González-Ricoy 2014). It also
distances this realm of life beyond democratic control, which is a traditional source of
empowerment.

These developments have been facilitated by the rise of post-Fordism (Jessop 1994;
Jessop 1995; Harvey 1990; Kiely 1998; Lipietz 1997; Baca 2004; Kumar 2004). In brief,
these theories highlight how capital and production in late modernity are far more
mobile and flexible then they once were, both can now travel to wherever is most
profitable. Thus the adoption of laissez-faire in the 21st century provided unprecedented

17 See Chapter 6 for a more detailed treatment of this point.
opportunities for generating capital, especially when projected against the picture of a heavy and inefficient welfare state that scholars such as Hayek and Friedman painted: a state that was unable to react to continually changing local demands, which could only be addressed by the sophisticated market tools of supply and demand. In this case capital could demand the most cost effective labour. Thus far from employment at the Ford factory being a given for a resident of Dagenham, she was now part of a (trans)national competitive labour market. Therefore if one accepts the post-Fordist thesis, then individuals are simultaneously being immersed in the ‘globalising’ world, and also experiencing a retrenchment of state intervention in the economy and labour market. Consequently the social landscape has been redefined by “the dramatic decline in the importance of territorially based mass production, the globalization of finance and technology and the increased specialization and diversity of markets” (Kaldor 2006: 75). It is now the individual’s responsibility to draw a new map of success, through their own choices and initiative.

Free-market economics, within the neoliberal scheme, involved the privatisation of state owned assets (Harvey 2005: 160-1). Notably in the UK this included utility companies, transportation, healthcare to a certain degree, and the ability for residents of state owned housing to purchase their properties. Again inefficiency was cited as one justification for privatisation (Meggison & Netter 2001). Although the efficacy of the rationale is debatable, this move signalled a change in accountability for essential public services, their employees and customers were now dependent on private shareholders as opposed to ministers of Parliament. Although they do have to operate within the law, and in accordance to public regulatory bodies such as the ombudsman, the nature of democratic accountability has been altered, being one key way for individuals to exercise control over the forces that govern their lives. Furthermore privatised companies are subsequently driven by the desire to operate with a healthy profit for their shareholders (Jackson 2017: 104-5), as opposed to the public interest. One example is the complaint raised by the Ofgem, the UK regulator, that energy companies were not lowering their prices in-line with falling wholesale energy costs (BBC 2016). Therefore privatisation can be viewed as an encroachment of market principles into areas of public
life that were previously not governed by such norms (Sandel 2012). This trend speaks to the notion that individuals are increasingly becoming responsible for their own fate (Honneth 2014: 250-53), as grievances that may arise, say with a utility company, have now become legal battles between an individual/group and a corporation, which requires the individual/group to possess the resources necessary to launch their case. Whereas such grievances, if the company was publicly owned, would also be able to be addressed through democratic means, such that accountability would rest with a minister of Parliament. To the contrary citizens are conceived as consumers with consumer rights, which underscores another tension between the jurisdiction of markets, and the jurisdiction of citizens.

The increasing trend towards marketisation, facilitated through the opening-up of financial markets, both public and private, fulfilled the principles of choice and plurality espoused by neoliberalism. Not only did globalisation offer numerous new opportunities for individuals to pursue their interests, but also amplified pluralism, that is the highly-differentiated character of everyday life (Dawson 2013): in particular cultural difference. The perhaps unintended consequences of this, and the other factors above which here fall under the umbrella of neoliberalism, is the withering away of a normative guide to socio-political life (Crouch 2011). State neutrality, regarding differing conceptions of the good life, is posited as central for procedural liberalism, and thus is compatible with a neoliberal interpretation of individual freedom: whereby moral value is combined market freedom (Dawson 2013; see below). Hence notions of self-realisation, and the perfectibility of individuals and society are replaced by the drive to create a neutral starting point from which individuals can pursue their own conception of the good life unhindered by state interference, markets being perceived as a suitable replacement for the allocation of goods. It is the ideological component of neoliberalism that perpetuates and gives rise to the empirical realities discussed above, as well as their incorporation into international institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and Eurozone bailout schemes (Dawson 2013: 5): Harvey asserts that the theoretical – ideological thrust of neoliberalism consists of
“[a] theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices . . . Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture . . . [it] cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals (prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state interventions . . . for their own benefit”

(2005: 2)

A connection can be drawn between increasing individual responsibility, interdependence and state intervention. Harvey’s articulation of the key aspects of the neoliberal age highlight the displacement of the normative and perfectionist state, and the emergence of a consumer one, accompanied by globalisation. Bauman asserts that late modernity can be characterised by the fall of the “gardening state”, one which aims at perfectionism (1991: 20; 2000: 137), and the rise of marketisation and the consumer society. In this case the right is prior to the good, and Bauman’s assertions therefore mirror claims made by communitarians in the “liberal-communitarian” debate (Mulhall & Swift 1992). In the neoliberal conception, “individual freedom . . . is located in the ability to pursue whatever work one wishes, and to sell one’s own labour power for a wage that reflects the social values of one’s work to the highest bidder in the free labour market” (Bradedley & Luxton 2010: 10). There is no overarching normative framework as such, rather “agents increasingly become empowered to create their own self, identity and, to some extent, lifeworld, removed from societal constraints and/or precedent” (Dawson 2013: 21). The synergy between consumerism and neoliberalism manifests itself, according to Bauman, as a pendulum swinging towards freedom and away form (economic) security, an alternative source of freedom and security than the one promised by the ‘gardening state’ and collective action: “the consumer market is . . . a place where freedom and certainty are offered and obtained together; freedom comes free of pain, while certainty can be enjoyed without detracting from conviction of subjective autonomy” (1988: 66). Therefore the issue with procedural liberalism’s conception of freedom, symbiotically connected to the wider neoliberal project, is problematic as increased individual freedom has been accompanied by a lack of control of the forces that govern individuals’ lives, particularly with respect to the
empowerment required for a vibrant democratic regime. The “consumer targeted economy”, which flourishes on the “non-satisfaction of desires” (Bauman 2005: 80), is disempowering as the democratic apparatus of ALDs has been hollowed-out by markets and a purely procedural role for state. Put differently, increased responsibility for one’s self-realisation does not equate to possessing the capacity to exert control over, or hold accountable, the elements that condition individual and communal self-realisation in a systemically interconnected world. Consequently the evolution of technical and social forces, generically termed globalisation, underscores the tension between freedom and empowerment. Notably, this is not just a matter of empirical and theoretical composition of neoliberalism, but also a theoretical problem concerning procedural liberalism’s conceptualisation of liberty (Chapter 2).

Security

The notion that individuals are freer (in the procedural liberal sense) yet less empowered, resonates with the view that as the state aims to make itself secure, it in fact generates insecurity, which can be damaging to liberty. Lemke (2014), whilst discussing security, notes how liberalism is in the business of producing and creating the conditions for freedom. In this sense liberalism “consumes freedom” (Foucault 2008: 63). However for Foucault this is problematic, as liberal government creates a paradox whereby freedom cannot mean unrestrained freedom, but regulated freedom (Lemke 2014: 64). Using concepts such as biopolitics and technologies of security, Foucault illustrates a shift in the, or rather the imposition of, a new historical framework, whereby western liberal societies can be perceived as moving from disciplinary societies to “security societies” (Foucault 2007: II; Lemke 2014: 65). Foucault attributes this to the paradox above by using the example of free trade:

“There must be free trade...but how can we practice free trade in fact if we do not control and limit a number of things, and if we do not organise a series of preventative measures to avoid the effect of one country’s hegemony over others, which would be precisely the limitation and restriction of free trade?”

(Foucault 2008: 64)
In essence “the problem of liberal government is to ensure that the pursuit of individual or collective interests does not endanger the general interest” (Lemke 2014: 64). Although this sentiment is not at all different from that of say Locke’s liberalism, the 21st century has a different frame of reference. Whereas securing individual liberty against the state was Locke’s core concern, Foucault highlights that “a general guarantee of security” is now the defining characteristic of the state citizen relationship (Lemke 2014: 66). His critique highlights how the state operates through technologies of security to protect communities from strangers; whether they are external such as terrorists, or internal, such as those individuals deemed to be social failures. Therefore although security still remains central, today’s conception and desire for it is far more nuanced than Locke’s (Jarvis & Holland 2014). This is the case because fear, danger and insecurity are essential and complementary features of liberal governmentality (Lempke 2014: 65):

“Everywhere you see this stimulation of the fear of danger which is, as it were, the condition, the internal psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism. There is no liberalism without a culture of danger”

(Foucault 2008: 66)

Foucault identifies this phenomenon in liberal states’ reactions to the threat of terrorism. The dominance of security measures that increasingly travel beyond “legal prescriptions and codes” cultivate fear – in that the state security apparatus cannot, in fact, protect its citizens – and legal uncertainties create ‘the state of fear’ that is “the other side of the legal state” (Lempke 2014: 66). These can be seen as the general contributing factors towards the security society, the new relationship between the citizen and the state:

“Especially since 9/11, basic rights are no longer conceived as rights of defence against the state, but allow the state to intervene in realms that were formerly regarded as private spheres by referring to security as a ‘super-right’”

(Lemke 2014: 69)

Hence citizens can be considered recipients of ‘security’ via securitisation, that is the “strategic process of interrelated discourses that result in the social construction of an issue as a threat” (Skleparis 2016: 93; Buzan et al. 1998). In this case, political elites can
be considered the most effective securitising actors (Waever 1995). In their attempt to
address systemic global trends, such as terrorism, insecurity can often be generated
through the pre-emptive actions of liberal states (Bigo 2008), which can fall outside of
established understandings of liberty. Thus rather than engendering social solidarity
and cohesiveness, the interaction between security professionals in fact generates risk,
fear, and unease (Bigo 2002; Bigo 2006; Huysmans 2006; Mythen & Walklate 2006; Evans
2013). Scholars do of course approach this issue from various perspectives; however
contemporary liberal governmentality is a common theme that pervades most.

Contemporary liberal governmentality therefore does not necessarily create more space
for individual liberty, but rather generates a culture of fear and insecurity. The tension
between security and freedom can therefore be conceived as a constitutive part of liberal
governmentality (Lemke 2014: 67), which is nested in complex systems of dependency,
whereby “transience, instability, and incertitude” are “elementary ingredients of liberal
governments in which freedom and fear refer to one another” (Lemke 2014: 67). Thus
when traditional liberal conceptions of freedom, along with the rights they bestow, are
mixed into the melting pot of systemic interconnectedness and neoliberal
governmentality, then their impact on the individual is not wholly emancipatory but
rather help to instil a culture of fear. This is because the individual is confronted with
ultimate responsibility for their success in the social marketplace, whilst having the
systemic threats of modern life, such as climate change, amplified through globalisation,
state governments and the media. Therefore rather than these problems being diffused
through the cohesive and cooperative social fabric, they become individually
internalised.

Interestingly Lemke’s analysis of Foucault also highlights the link between the
individualising forces of neoliberalism and the absence of normative social guides, and
in this sense is reminiscent of Bauman. Foucault identifies the shift towards security
societies by recognising that “frameworks of knowledge and modes of understanding
are themselves always changing” (Lechte 2008: 140), Foucault’s method of social critique
being aimed at interrogating the “government of individualisation” (Foucault 2000:
330). He thus “reject[s] all strategies designed to isolate and separate individuals from ‘community life’”, and sees his own contribution – that is the questioning of the status quo, which he deems to atomising individuals from society – as a part of process which helps “constitute . . . new subjectivities and alternative norms that offer more space for autonomy and ethical self-formation” (Lemke 2014: 72). Hence Foucault’s insights speak to the tension between freedom and security created under liberalism. He underscores the elevation of individualised responsibility for the pursuance of the good life, within a seemingly confused and contradictory role of the state in relation to its systemic environment and underpinning political philosophy.

Terrorism, a current security priority, has underlined another phenomenon characteristic of contemporary times, risk. The relationship between risk, complexity and security is articulated in the World Economic Forum Report 2012:

“As the world grows increasingly complex and interdependent, the capacity to manage the systems that underpin our prosperity and safety is diminishing. The constellation of risks arising from emerging technologies, financial interdependence, resource depletion and climate change exposes the weak and brittle nature of existing safeguards – the policies, norms, regulations or institutions which serve as a protective system...The interdependence and complexity inherent in globalisation require engaging a wider group of stakeholders to establish more adaptable safeguards which could improve effective and timely responses to emerging risks”

(WEF 2012: 10)

Risks therefore are acknowledged as being endemic to contemporary society, and offer a narrative for calculating the incalculable (Evans 2013: 37), “a way of representing events in a certain form so they might be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular goals” (Dean 1999: 177). To illustrate, consider car insurance; predicting whether a person will be involved in road traffic collision (RTC) is not simple. Fortunate individuals may never be involved in an RTC for the entirety of their driving career. However for those less fortunate, they may be involved in one or many. The emergence of an RTC can depend on many different elements of driving, speed, weather, volume of traffic, road layout, the roadworthiness of a person’s car, mental state of the driver, age and so on. It is impossible to precisely predict when
one or more of these elements may interact and cause an RTC. Without this foresight, car insurance companies utilise various computational algorithms to predict the likelihood of an individual being involved in an RTC by considering things such as their age, experience and what they use their car for. Thus a value derived from probability can be applied to a seemingly incalculable event. Hence risk, fear and security “is the fateful paradox of contemporary liberal rule”, as “[t]he more we seek to secure, the more our imaginaries of threat proliferate . . . a recombinant logic that connects all things connectable” (Evans 2013: 88).

The corollary effect is that “liberal rule” has become “hyper-paranoid”, a culture of fear or catastrophe around the next corner is created and accepted (Evans 2013: 195). The 21st century is characterised by systemic interconnectedness, and the receding remit of the state in certain activities. In a sense, the focus on individual perfectionism has shifted towards a predominant concern with security, both bodily and of the neoliberal conception of freedom (Chapter 2). However the tension between empowerment and freedom remains, as attempts to increase security, can in fact lead to insecurity (Bigo 2002; 2008). These ‘social processes’ broadly conceived, also bear on wider debates of security such as post-structural critiques that suggest that individual freedom is limited by the current logic of security (Neocleous 2008), and also environmental security (McDonald 2010; 2012; 2013), which illustrates the unique and differentiated character of 21st politics, and its emphasis on individual responsibility within an interdependent social - political system.

The State

The implications of securitisation highlight the contradictory role of the state. Current security concerns require increased state intervention through prevention, which can destabilise established conceptions of freedom, democracy and privacy (Bigo et al. 2009; Bigo 2012), to the extent that it is argued that illiberal practices are engrained within “[l]iberal forms of governing” (Balzacq et al. 2010: 9). Interestingly this deepens the notion that the state as a concept itself is contestable.
From a cosmopolitan standpoint, as Dawson explains, “globalisation ha[s] lessened the power of the nation-state . . . not only in the face of the growing power of international capital but also because of the creation of global regimes (international human rights and non-state actors such as Greenpeace . . .) which undermine the ability of a state to self-rule and claim a monopoly of allegiance from its citizens” (2013: 46). Thus it can be taken that cosmopolitan democracy brings the gradual withering away of the state, along with its sovereignty, to no longer be the “sole centre[s] of legitimate power” (Held 1995: 233). This gives rise to notions of citizenship beyond the nation state, whereby citizens begin to align themselves with global causes, leading to a form of ethical universalism that dissolves the strength of the bonds an individual may have with their national community. For Beck this outlook represents “boundarylessness”, a “reflexive awareness . . . [and] blurring” of cultural contradictions and differentiations (2006: 3). Hence it is the “the recognition of difference, both internally and externally” that constitutes cosmopolitanism (Beck 2006: 57). Beck argues that the theoretical foundations and institutional support for such a framework is missing, and thus creates an individualising effect as “[g]lobalization is something that takes place ‘out there’ . . . [c]osmopolitanism, by contrast, happens ‘within’ . . . the realms of the nation, the local and even one’s own biography and identity” (Beck 2010: 68-9). Despite criticisms of Beck’s analysis (Martell 2008; Calhoun 2010: 607-16), the notion of both local and global processes challenging the power of the state do speak to empirical changes in the world, some of which, such as new landmark climate change deals (BBC 2015), engender a more positive outlook, whereas others, such as Britain’s strained relationship with the EU (Oliver 2013; Weiler 2015), are rather more perplexing. Yet as the currently unfolding Brexit negotiations and the US withdrawal from the Paris climate accords illustrate, ideals and the political institutions characteristic of globalisation exist in a state of fluidity, uncertainty and change.

The processes of globalisation slowly rendering the state obsolete, essentially means that it “is too small to deal with the big problems which are now projected on an

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18 Quill outlines four approaches to cosmopolitan thinking (2006: 90-2).
international or global stage and too clumsy to deal with the small problems which are increasingly displaced to the local level” (Hay et al. 2006: 14). This pertains to neoliberalism with respect to the power of multinational corporations and how they can or cannot be brought into line with traditional communal obligations. For example companies such as Amazon, Google and Apple have been heavily criticised for adopting tax avoidance practices (Fisher 2014). Hence whilst states remain the central actors in socio-political organisation, the context in which they operate has changed since the emergence of neoliberal globalisation. This signals the need to revisit political theories, concepts and philosophies that frame socio – political organisation in ALDs, and investigate whether they possess the capacity to absorb emerging global trends. The state retains an important role within RCR, as an institution capable of nurturing the common good (Chapter 4) and summoning substantial political agency when necessary, such as with climate change (Chapter 6). The important point is that provided the state is underpinned with RCR’s principles, it is capable of furthering the potential for self-governance by bringing it within range of its citizens (Chapter 5), which globalising forces such as the transnational economy could upset.

*The passing of the agora*

So far the chapter has maintained the notion that individuals and societies are becoming increasingly connected and interdependent, yet also increasingly atomised. The forces of globalisation, neoliberalism and the potential erosion of the state has underlined the tension between freedom and empowerment, calling for an attempt to rethink institutions capable of underpinning the common good. Two distinct features make the 21st century novel in comparison to past stages of modernity: one being a loss of normative social direction, that is “a social telos of historical change” which is moving toward a state of perfection; and the other being the “deregulation and privatization of . . . modernizing tasks and duties” (Bauman 2000: 29). It is not difficult to draw parallels between Bauman’s assertions and neoliberalism. Justifications once used to defend the welfare state, that is the perfection of individuals and of society (Green 1906: sect. 247), has been replaced by desires for individuals to live lives of their own choosing: what
could be termed a neoliberal conception of freedom, permitted under procedural liberal philosophy (Chapter 2). Thus the search light is placed on rights that give the, albeit negative, opportunity to pursue a plurality of life choices, whilst placing the ‘social good’ into the shadows.

The notion of the consumer citizen therefore poses a problem for the formulation of the common good, as political action becomes increasingly privatised. In almost Benthamite fashion, pleasure and desire take centre stage in this social paradigm. As Dawson asserts:

“The reality principle no longer rules over the pleasure principle: instead they become mutually sustaining. The satisfaction of the pleasure principle becomes the very basis of maintaining the reality principle. This is most significantly a capitalist process: whereas previous, simple modern, forms of capitalism were based on delaying gratification in order to maintain the security of the present (most notable in Keynesian policies), the focus is instead upon instant gratification, expressed most prominently via consumerism”

(2013: 16-17; also Bauman 1982)

Moreover the infiltration of market principles into public life has the effect of detaching individuals from society (Sandel 2012), as living becomes an individual struggle for survival and prosperity. This is especially evident when public services such as legal aid in the UK are proposed to be dramatically cut (Bowcott 2015), as this emphasises that the individual herself must possess the resources, either financial or intellectual, in order to successfully advance legitimate grievances. Similarly to the privatisation of utility companies, accountability between government and its citizens becomes increasingly indirect. Essentially citizens are passive recipients of state and privately provided utilities and services, as opposed to being embedded within a larger common good project. Consequently, regulatory norms and social approval fall by the wayside, to be replaced by the theoretically level and equal playing field provided by the quasi-market state (Bauman 2000: 76). Consumer society therefore prioritises self-realisation as individually construed, as opposed to life chances being collectively construed. In this case society acts purely as a vehicle for individuals to satisfy their desires, rather than
something which represents a society of mutually developing individuals ensconced in a social order that is constructed in terms of justice and citizenship (Simhony 2001: 71).

The modernising influences that Bauman highlights - such as the encroachment of market forces in areas not traditionally governed by such things (also Sandel 2012), the privatisation of the public sphere, and growing absence of regulatory social norms and a common good – constitute the “emptying of the public space”, explainable in terms of the loss of the “agora”; a space where citizens in ancient Greece would meet and deliberate the socio-political issues of the day, or the “common, private, and public good” (Bauman 2000: 39-41). This has an individuating effect on individuals by internalising both private and public concerns, that is, into personal as opposed to public struggles. Thus posing a further problem regarding how a common good can come to be formulated, when individual responsibility has not been matched by a strengthening of democratic practices within socio-political institutions capable of empowering individuals.19

Importantly Bauman sees these “late modern process as forms of stratification rather than of integration” (Dawson 2013: 18), which is embodied in a definition of individualisation that on the one hand posits identity as a “task” as opposed to a “given”, for which the individual is responsible for performing (Bauman 2000: 31-2), whilst simultaneously showing it to involve “the dissolving of both collective allegiances and orientations in favour of individuals being given greater responsibility for their own social positioning and activity” (Dawson 2013: 19). Thus the forces of neoliberal globalisation appear to be playing homage to an overarching conception of freedom which looks to expand the individual private sphere, yet neglects the communal element of empowerment. This theme connects to Giddens’ concept of life politics, which is

“A politics, not of life chances, but of life styles. It concerns disputes and struggles about how (as individuals and collective humanity) we should live in a world where what used to be fixed either by nature or tradition is now subject to human conditions”

19 Honneth (2014) frames this form of claim as a need for a normative reconstruction of society.
Similarly to Beck’s remarks concerning globalisation, the social processes that characterise socio-political life in the 21st century, have arguably led to an individualised banal democracy. The socio-political institutions and traditions that once pervaded ALDs, have been displaced by the increasing presence of market forces, which thus constitutes a form of disempowerment. It is therefore plausible to argue along Bauman’s lines, whereby the loss of the agora has led to a privatisation, and individualisation of what used to be public problems. Although evidence has been cited here regarding the coming together of states to solve global problems, such as climate change, there remains little support to the view that contemporary societies galvanise, in a meaningful and thoroughgoing way, notions of citizenship and the common good as they once did (Bellah et al. 1992). At the very least, reasonable doubt has been cast over neoliberal, and thus procedural liberal political ideals, and their ability to empower individuals in the face of complex problems (Chapter 6). However there is an ontological viewpoint capable of casting political communities as atomised in mind, yet holistic in reality.

**Systemic Interconnectedness**

The inertia of the state, with respect to the social processes outlined above, is problematised further by an interpretation of a social onto-epistemology derived from the physical sciences, which was alluded to in the ‘chicken and egg’ problem in the Introduction. It postulates that societies are not merely the assemblage of separate parts bolted together, but rather holistic in a relational and complex sense (Olssen & Mace 2016). It is a conception that societies operate as complex dynamic systems (Sotolongo 2002), which produce novelty, self-organisation and emergence. Cilliers offers a robust summary of the character of complex systems, which is important to quote at length:

1 Complex systems consist of a large number of elements that in themselves can be simple.

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20 See Introduction for the distinction between these two formulations of liberalism.
Chapter One

2 The elements interact dynamically by exchanging energy or information. These interactions are rich. Even if specific elements only interact with a few others, the effects of these interactions are propagated throughout the system. The interactions are nonlinear.
3 There are many direct and indirect feedback loops.
4 Complex Systems are open systems—they exchange energy and information with their environment—and operate at conditions far from equilibrium.
5 Complex systems have memory, not located at a specific place, but distributed throughout the system. Any complex system thus has a history, and the history is of cardinal importance to the behaviour of the system.
6 The behaviour of the system is determined by the nature of the interactions, not by what is contained within the components. Since interactions are rich, dynamic, fed back, and, above all, nonlinear, the behaviour of the system as a whole cannot be predicted from an inspection of its components. The notion of ‘emergence’ is used to describe this aspect. The presence of emergent properties does not provide an argument against causality, only against deterministic forms of prediction.
7 Complex systems are adaptive. They can (re)organize their internal structure without the intervention of an external agent.”

Hence there is no necessarily pre-defined progress (or teleology) through time (contra Hegel) for a complex system. Similarly to globalisation, complexity theory developed during the relatively recent “quiet revolution” in the physical sciences (Kauffman 2008: preface), and thus constitutes a new backdrop and understanding on which to discuss social organisation and the role of politics.

The level of connectivity and interdependence between individuals and societies in the 21st century, which is referred to as systemic interconnectedness, is a highly complex form of social organisation. The number of elements (individuals, institutions, businesses, states and so on), and the interactions between them in today’s societies are far higher than that of the 17th century, due to globalisation and hyper-connectivity.
Thus systemic interconnectedness brings the holistically interdependent character of modern societies into sharp relief. A conception of how parts and wholes interact on a systemic level, which is without “any pre-ordained hierarchy of control, such as monism”, has elsewhere been called “relational complexity holism” (Olsson & Mace 2016: 11). Within this conception, the whole can be said to be more than the sum of its parts, in that it possesses qualities unique to it, which are not possessed by individual parts alone, and do not represent a mere addition or aggregation of the qualities of the parts. The amount of control exercised by wholes over the parts is not fixed as “the
properties of each part are dependent upon the context of the part within the whole in which they operate” (Gilbert & Sarkar 2000: 1). Hence “wholes are conceptualised as relational assemblages of dynamic, interacting parts” (Olssen & Mace 2016: 11). Examples of such complex systems (wholes) can range from ant colonies, to brains, to global economic markets and human societies.

Organisation and emergence are two concepts that play a key role in complex systems, both of which illustrate the irreducible nature of complex wholes which is embodied in the idea that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Organisation captures the notion that systems change and organise through the interaction of their parts and the whole, connecting “parts to each other and parts to the whole” (Morin 1999: 115). Therefore the whole is “a structure of relations between components to produce a whole with qualities unknown to these components outside the structure”; consequently, to understand the nature of the whole, one needs to understand the nature of the parts and vice versa (Morin 1999: 115; also Cilliers 1998: viii-ix; Chandler 2014: Ch. 2). Interactions between parts and whole are central here. They can be linear, non-linear and “multi-referential” (Morin 1992: 4), can operate at multiple levels of a stratified system (Olssen & Mace 2016: 12), and ultimately “give birth to phenomena of organization” (Morin 1992: 47). Emergence refers to the new properties that manifest through interactions, thus emergents equate to the “effects of combined actions” (Morin 2008: 100). Therefore within all complex systems there is an “immersed, hidden and obscure zone, teeming with stifled potentialities” for emergence (Morin 2008: 102). Importantly, it is these notions of complexity, which illustrate a key part of the intrinsic nature of contemporary societies.

Societies, when posited as complex dynamic systems that are teeming with potential for emergence, need to be resilient. Adaptability and self-learning are essential for societies to absorb changes in their environment, due to the potential for emergent phenomena to occur such as a financial crisis. This ontological conception bears on central liberal themes that emerged during the Enlightenment, regarding negative freedom and autonomy. For Locke, writing in the 17th century, it is plausible to imagine that
individuals could be truly self-reliant and sufficient. However the systematic interconnectedness and differentiated character of the 21st century creates a plethora of new dependencies and interrelations between both individuals and states, which have unfolded in a political context of individualism. In other words, present socio-political challenges such as climate change were inconceivable to Locke, yet his legacy of individualism still underpins contemporary societies (Bellah et al. 1992). The problem is underlined by Chandler, who asserts

“that complex life is not bound by fixed laws or structures, [and] lies in direct opposition to Enlightenment understandings of knowable laws which can be understood and put to human purposes – setting up the liberal distinction between human as subject and the instrumentalisation of nature as a passive and malleable object”

(2014: 24)

Therefore if current political institutions are underpinned by a political philosophy that prioritises concepts that are not amenable to change, then their capacity for resilience is severely limited. For example, natural rights are of a partially fixed character, in that they are not malleable in response to the common good. A right to property thus remains largely context independent. Yet as relations are rooted in the irreducibility of part – whole relations (Morin 2008: 105), then context is everything. As the common good can be directed by emergent phenomenon such as climate change, it requires a political philosophy that can conceptualise it in a way that is compatible with other important political precepts like rights, yet does not assert a “determinate set of policies” (Sandel 1998c: 324; Chapter 4). The other side of this coin, regarding the suitable underpinning of political institutions, concerns centralisation. As complex systems are characterised by bottom-up behaviour, organisation without central direction, and ability to create macro-level phenomenon via interactions and feedback (Chandler 2014: 23; Johnson 2002), “old-fashioned or top-down, state-based, interventions of government at a macro-level” no longer seem appropriate (Chandler 2014: 3). Hence political philosophies that underpin societies and institutions in these ways cannot be considered resilient according to complexity theory, considering societies are complex, ‘open’, and thus subject to potentially unpredictable and novel environmental changes. RCR aims to capture the messages of complexity – resilience thinking and use this to
improve the resilience of today’s societies, whilst retaining individual empowerment in relation to emerging global trends such as climate change (Chapter 6).

Not only has the expansion of social systems and the corresponding developments in technology brought new interdependencies, but also the potential for almost limitless interactions between individuals. The implications are twofold: (1) the plurality of life choices becomes an embedded part of reality in modern life; and (2) the self can now become individualised in many more ways than previously possible. This will inevitably result in state governments having to respond to far more differentiated demands from their citizens than ever before. If one follows thinkers such as Derrida, identities can be constituted relationally through experiences and practices, and it is through these complex relations that identity can be individuated (Olssen 2008: 110). This adds a further complication to a neoliberally globalised society, as it essentially increases the diversity within communities, which according to the ideals of democracy and equality, requires representation at the political level. Hence inclusive bottom-up representation also contributes to communal resilience.

In sum, complex systems can generate novel and unpredictable events, and systemic properties that are possessed by a whole that can be considered more than the sum of its parts. These ideas, derived from complexity theory, capture an important essence of the reality of today’s world, and consequently justifies thinking in resilience terms (Chandler 2014). The central point is that although individuals in societies have always been systemically interconnected, the hyper-connectivity of the 21st century is unprecedented and requires political philosophers, and political decision makers, to rethink part-whole relations and whether such challenges change the weight, pertinence and survivability of certain social norms and practices (Chapter 6). For advocates of procedural liberal theory, it also raises questions over the seemingly contradictory relationship between autonomy and self-reliance on the one hand, and social obligations, dependencies and norms on the other. Although governments in ALDs have let out the reins in following neoliberal principles such as laissez-faire, the freedom this offers to citizens who exist in complex interdependent relations is questionable,
especially when one considers what resources are needed to live the good life today, how accessible they are for all equally, and whether this empowers citizens.

Conclusion

This chapter has maintained that there is an increasing tension between freedom and empowerment. Although neoliberalism emerged in response to critiques of Keynesian economics and a heavily interventionist state, it has not clearly resulted in empowerment. Systemic interconnectedness stipulates that emergent phenomenon are largely unavoidable, and therefore so will political interferences in individuals’ lives in response to changing environmental factors such as climate change. Thus the question is how to empower citizens to choose their own moral obligations, rather than simply having them imposed from above.

Neoliberal globalisation has manifested notions of social atomisation, increasing individuals’ responsibility for their own fate and disempowerment with regards to self-government. Polarisation between climate change deniers and advocates, and the stunted and slow political action towards mitigating this challenge, would be one illustration of this claim. Emergent challenges take on a new shape within a context of late modernity, as conceptions of individual identity and community are far more plural than in the past, and individuals are now embedded within a greater system of interdependencies. Yet they are also more responsible for their own fate, and subject to increasing social atomisation: the state today having shed itself of its perfectionist tendencies. Although there are of course well-founded concerns over the organic conception of the state (à la Hegel), the relational insights of this model can now be restated on more neutral principles of complexity theory. This places procedural liberalism and the processes of neoliberal globalisation, which have arguably enervated individual empowerment, in a new context.

It is difficult to perceive the benefits of this result, as the social processes and elements of neoliberal globalisation have not been adequately synthesised with the negative
externalities they create, such as wealth inequalities and individual disempowerment. Although this has not led to a full-blown catastrophe, as society still exists in familiar form, new socio-political challenges continue to challenge procedural liberalism’s theoretical formulation. For example, certain normative arguments available to say civic republicans, are void from a procedural liberal perspective. As the remainder of the thesis will demonstrate, these arguments are necessary to construct a society that is more amenable with systemic interconnectedness (including digital connectedness, see Introduction), and more capable of addressing the negative externalities associated with neoliberal globalisation.

The lessons of complexity theory provide a yardstick from which to analyse the effectiveness of the political philosophies that underpin socio-political institutions. After all, there exists a deterministic element in social systems. As the term ‘Anthropocene’ suggests, cumulative human actions can create macro level phenomenon, such as changing the global climate (Chapter 6). This also illustrates how interactions can feed into systems and allow them to respond (adapt) to changing environmental factors. Human interactions and the political theories and philosophies that can underpin them, allow humans, to a degree, to shape and control their environment, despite being bound by the physical laws of the universe and relational complexity. The key lesson of complexity theory and systemic interconnectedness is the need for normative-teleological resilience, which can also preserve political ideals such as democracy.

Societies today connect individuals to one another, and also to and between states, more than ever before, yet individualises them simultaneously. This is problematic for maintaining a stable and adaptable social system, firstly because an atomised society seems logically incompatible with a systemically interconnected and globalised community of societies and states; and secondly, discerning the starting point and framework for a conception of individual freedom for the 21st century is masked within this blurred tapestry. The movement towards liquid and contingent forms of social organisation do seemingly align with a systemically interconnected world, yet this remains problematic for philosophical concepts such as liberty, justice and equality.
Under RCR these concepts require deliberation, participation, cooperation and compromise to count as conceptually resilient (Chapter 4 & 5). Yet they have been eroded by neoliberal globalisation which makes societies less able to absorb both internal and external systemic changes, and also makes them less ‘fair’, as the “passing of the gardening state” allows instances of inequality to go unnoticed (Dawson 2013: 59). Consequently it is important to theorise and attempt to adopt the right political concepts, which can effectively guide today’s societies and engender a capacity for resilience.

This chapter has identified new challenges and contexts emerging from systemic interconnectedness, and a trend towards individualisation and the displacement of a normative social framework, manifesting in a tension between empowerment and freedom. Two important questions can therefore guide the remainder of the thesis: (1) how can individuals be empowered given the conditions of ALDs at present? And (2) what would a suitable alternative to procedural liberalism look like, considering that the complexity and interrelatedness of 21st century life was inconceivable to the founding liberal scholars of the 17th century. To probe this claim, the thesis will now examine different ‘liberty traditions’.
Chapter 2 - Liberty

This chapter addresses two important aims that are essential to developing the central argument of this thesis. The first purpose is simple, to frame liberty. The thesis argues that resilient civic republicanism (RCR) is a suitable governing philosophy for today, a key pillar of this argument is based on RCR’s notion of freedom as self-government. To coherently explore the relationship between this conception of liberty and the challenges of today (Chapter 1), it is key to consider alternative, historical interpretations of freedom that have shaped the evolution of political theory to date. Mapping a selection of concrete tenets of liberty is useful, as it forms a backdrop from which RCR can be postulated in relative contradistinction. Put differently, this chapter will serve to position RCR’s conception of liberty on the spectrum of some key existing formulations. It is worth noting that due to limitations of the size of this chapter, the following investigation will be rather broad brushed, focusing on core conceptual themes that thread interpretations of liberty together, and at times drawing specific focus on certain key thinkers associated with each ‘liberty tradition’.21

The second goal of this chapter is to underline that liberty continues to conflict with notions of increasing independence and decreasing individual empowerment, and that the connections between these ideas have still not been fully grasped, as the challenges of the globalised and systemically interconnected world illustrates (Chapter 1). In other words, liberty is not a temporally untouchable concept in theory or practice, rather it requires continual defence and to be re-articulated to meet the context of the time. This chapter reveals which aspects of liberty are vulnerable to emerging global trends, and consequently forms the foundation to begin theorising on a more appropriate governing philosophy and conception of liberty: one that can be considered resilient.

21 In addition, certain thinkers that bear on this discussion are omitted from this chapter, most notably John Rawls. The reason for this is that Rawls’ work (procedural liberalism) is attended to in other chapters of the thesis where necessary. This relates to the fact that procedural liberalism is often discussed in contradistinction by Sandel, who is the major source of inspiration for RCR. Thus it is deemed logical to discuss these thinkers in more detail when issues pertinent to them arise.
Liberty is a term that has been, most notably at least, debated since the 17th Century, and remains contestable. Hobbes argued that an individual enjoys liberty when he is free from “external impediments” (Hobbes 2008: 86), whereas for Algernon Sidney (1990) it is the mere possibility of being subjected to arbitrary coercion that violates liberty. Thomas Hill Green postulated that “[Freedom is] a positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, something that we do or enjoy in common with others” (1888: 21). To explore these differences and present the key aspects of liberty, and thus whether they are incorporated or omitted from RCR, this chapter will utilise David Miller’s (2006) tripartite framework of liberal, republican and idealist liberty traditions. He puts forward a useful approach to classifying key themes that can be used to present differing conceptions of liberty. Grouping conceptions of liberty under umbrella terms does provoke debate, however categories and assumptions are necessary in a thesis of this kind, as it allows particular theoretical issues to be extracted, examined and discussed in a focused manner. The following sections will be discussed in-line with these questions: what are liberty’s main features? How has it been articulated? On what grounds has its various meanings been contested? And what can these formulations say regarding the tension between freedom and empowerment (Chapter 1)?

**Liberty Traditions**

A conceptual starting point is needed to begin framing liberty. Miller (2006) offers a concise framework which suits the needs of this project. Miller’s approach consists of segmenting liberty into three groups: *liberal, republican* and *idealist* (2006: 2-3), which he terms “traditions” or “families of ideas...held together by a family resemblance among their members” (2006: 2). To use the notions ‘family of ideas’ or ‘family resemblances’ is an attempt by Miller, drawing from Wittgenstein, to emphasise the mixture of ideas that form concepts of liberty. He suggests on one hand that there are common links between these ideas, and on the other that such concepts cannot always be neatly packaged, and that ideas of liberty can cross-pollinate between the three traditions.
The primary feature of Miller’s liberal tradition is that freedom consists in the “absence of constraint or interference by others”, this, as will be shown below, acts as a baseline for freedom in the negative sense (Miller 2006: 3). It rests on the notion of individual freedom from constraint, for example a person should be free to “speak, worship, travel, marry – without these actions being blocked or hindered by the activities of other people” (Miller 2006: 3). The role of state is of particular importance. A liberal political system views government as the protector of individual rights. Only by imposing a fair rule of law and punishment in society can one’s liberty be secured against interference by others, as opposed to a Hobbesian state of nature. It is individualistic at its core, non-interference and individual autonomy being the prime operating principles. Yet what counts as interference, constraint, or the scope of government, is debated amongst the members of the liberal family. Thus “freedom is a matter of the scope or extent of government rather than of its form or character” (Miller 2006: 3).

The second family of liberty is republicanism. Its roots can be traced back to Greco-Roman times, and for Miller it is a distinctively political conception of liberty (2006: 2). Liberty is achieved through certain political arrangements, as Miller succinctly summarises:

“To be a free person is to be a citizen of a free political community. A free political community, in turn, is one that is self-governing. This means, first of all, one that is not subject to rule by foreigners, second, one in which the citizens play an active role in government, so that the laws that are enacted in some sense reflect the wishes of the people”

(2006: 2)

Similarly to the liberal family, debate resonates amongst republicans. Namely whether such political arrangements require democracy as its political arena or whether, under the right conditions, other forms of governance may be able to uphold republican ideas (McBride 2015). Miller’s summation of the republican tradition utilises the classic republican notion of tyranny, which it seeks to dislodge. Machiavelli (2005) articulates this idea: “the opposite of [republican] freedom...is despotism – the arbitrary rule of a

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22 This point attended to in more detail in Chapters 3-5.
tyrant who disposes of his subjects’ lives and possessions by means that they are powerless to resist” (Miller 2006: 3). This rationale was used by the English Parliamentarians in their missive against Charles 1 and Thomas Hobbes, where freedom was not merely absence of restraint or impediment, rather it was the positive opportunity for power to be exercised, in this case, by the English Crown over its subjects. Hence the significance of self-governance in the republican family, which is the key inheritance obtained by RCR from this heritage (Chapter 3, 4 & 5). Whereas for the most notable scholar of republican political theory today, Phillip Pettit, the predominant element of republican thought is freedom as non-domination (discussed further below).

Miller’s third tradition, *idealist*, focuses on the internal freedom of the person. Freedom for the person is freedom for him to act autonomously, following “his own authentic desires, or rational beliefs about how he should live” (2006: 3). In the words of Maslow, individuals desire “self actualisation”, “what a man can be, he must be” (1943: 382). Although this may appear to be a less political form of liberty, as freedom within the self does not necessarily depend on a person’s external environment, much of the debate within this disparate family is related to the scope of government. Mill argued that self-actualisation, or determination, requires a private space for each person in which he can realise his full capabilities with the absence of external interference, and the guarantee of such a space should fall within the role of government (Mill 1859). Therefore Mill’s invocation of the principle of non-interference places him within the liberal tradition, and yet his contention that liberty consists in a person’s ability to fully develop their own faculties, that their life should follow the path of their own choosing, simultaneously invokes idealist philosophy and a notion of self-mastery. The same can be said for Green when he articulates a ‘positive’ capacity for individuals to act, and that they should be doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying (1888: 21).

The *idealist* tradition requires an examination into what elements within a person are restricting their freedom to reach their “true nature”, such as “weaknesses, compulsions, irrational beliefs, and so forth” (Miller 2006: 3). An overarching question that can be asked by idealists, when speaking of liberty and politics, is whether government action
interferes with a person’s internal struggle for freedom, or whether government can in fact promote such action in its citizens. However the claim that a state can coerce its citizens into becoming higher forms of beings is severely critiqued by those in the liberal tradition, as they believe it can lead down the road to totalitarianism, a state second-guessing what is best for its citizens.\(^{23}\)

The importance of Miller’s threefold model is that it provides a method for analysing concepts of liberty. It provides a frame in which to read and understand writings on liberty. Thus broadly speaking, conceptions of liberty can be classed into three traditions; \textit{liberal} – freedom based upon non-interference; \textit{republican} – liberty secured in a free state which is characterised by freedom as non-domination and self-government; and \textit{idealistic} – individual freedom being obtained when a person follows their rational beliefs along the path to self-actualisation.\(^{24}\) However, Miller has also elucidated that although a conception of liberty may fall into one tradition, it is not prescribed to remain wholly in that field, it can intermarry (Miller 2006: 2). An exemplification of this point is reflected in the latter part of this chapter, where what can broadly be described as communitarian and capability approaches are analysed in order to position the thesis’s contribution towards what are arguably more similar theories to that of RCR, whilst maintaining its critical posture with respect to procedural liberalism.

Paradoxically, Miller does successfully offer a datum point in an investigation into liberty, yet he raises many questions regarding liberty’s family resemblances. Therefore it is prudent here to examine some of the questions that have arisen from this initial level of analysis; namely, can an individual’s liberty be based solely on the principle of non-interference or domination? Are the three traditions of liberty mutually exclusive? And which aspect(s) of liberty are being challenged by emerging global trends?


\(^{24}\) Berlin’s (2002) insights regarding positive and negative liberty will be noted below where necessary. Broadly speaking, negative liberty concerns the classic liberal tradition, emphasising non-interference and individual autonomy, whereas positive liberty, albeit less well defined by Berlin, speaks to idealist and republican notions. Berlin’s two concepts of liberty has been critiqued (Steiner 1975: 140; Miller 2006: 13), yet as it arguably remains the orthodoxy when analysing liberty (Skinner 2001), it will feature in this chapter.
The Traditional Liberal Settlement

Berlin offers a key insight into one of the founding elements of the liberal tradition by asking,

“[w]hat is the area within which the subject-a person or group of persons-is or should be left to do or be what he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons?”

(2002: 34)

For Berlin, negative freedom is concerned with a person being able to act unobstructed, which he argues is not mere physical ability, which disability could restrict, it is coercion. Coercion, in Berlin’s words, “implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act” (2002: 34). He speaks of freedom consisting not only freedom from physical restraint, but also access to a fair legal system and absence of poverty. In other words, if a person is unable to purchase a loaf of bread because he is impoverished, and thus prevented from buying essential food, he cannot be considered free. However, Berlin does make an important qualification:

“It is only because I believe that my inability to get a given thing is due to the fact that other human beings have made arrangements whereby I am, whereas others are not, prevented from having enough money with which to pay for [bread], that I think myself a victim of coercion or slavery”

(2002: 35)

Therefore, it is the fact that arrangements have been made by other human beings that renders a person coerced in this sense of negative freedom. Consequently, “the wider the area of non-interference the wider my freedom” (Berlin 2002: 35). In this view freedom concerns minimising the interference an individual is subject to, such as the state promoting or constraining a certain conception of the good life, restricting free trade, or imposing paternalistic legislation. The corollary being that the individual is the key site of value, and thus should be responsible for their own life. This idea was cemented in the liberal tradition by its principle originator, Hobbes.
For an individual to be considered free within Hobbes’ conception, she must be unimpeded by exercising her capacities in the direction of her desired will (Skinner 2012: 5). The state should therefore act in such a way as to prevent others from invading the rights of action of a person, and it should do this by imposing the “coercive force of law on everyone equally” (Skinner 2012: 5). Hobbes asserted that to be subject to the law of a state, or community, was the price to be paid for security. It is the only way to escape the state of nature, which unlike a community does not provide a place for freedom, but rather a place for brutish competition (Hobbes 2008: 82-86).

Influenced by physics, Hobbes delivered a theory with simple causality. An individual is free when unobstructed by external impediment. He viewed humans as objects, comparing the freedom experienced by humans to that of water being kept inside a vessel (Hobbes 2006: 139). Hobbes concluded that physical obstructions are the only barriers to both these freedoms. Hence the theory of liberty articulated in *Leviathan* places Hobbes in Miller’s liberal tradition. The theory is anchored in individualism, as a person enjoys liberty purely when he is free from physical impediments to motion, and civil society is required only to minimise such impediments. In *De Cive* he importantly defined liberty as “nothing other than the impediments to motion” (Hobbes 1983: 167). Following in *Leviathan*, he claimed that it is those impediments that are “not constrained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent” (Skinner 2008: 130). If a person were to be handcuffed for example, this would be perceived as an external, physical impediment and thus an infringement on liberty, whereas a person suffering from a disability would be classed as an intrinsic limitation and thus only a reduction in the agents’ power, not liberty (Skinner 2008). In addition, “the different ways in which a man can move himself . . . the more civil liberty he may be said to possess” (Hobbes 1983: 180). Hobbes therefore would advocate increasing individual responsibility within a private sphere of non-interference.

Chapter 1 alluded to the fact that conceptions of liberty need to reflect the complex and holistic nature of present society, which could be an issue for Hobbes, as he was “very
reductionist about the geography of the human soul” (Skinner 2008: 34). Security and peace were the primary reasons he gave for individuals to covenant their liberty (Hobbes 1969: 110). Berlin, following Hobbes in a sense, claimed that the “concept of interference must be central to any coherent account of human freedom” (Skinner 2008: 213). Notably this form of liberty can exist under more than one type of governance, in Hobbes’ case under monarchy or republican parliament. Similarly Sidgwick, in the 19th century, argued that “individual freedom has no necessary connection with forms of government”, since it’s perfectly possible for representative legislature to “interfere with the free action of individuals more than an absolute monarch” (1897: 375).25 Thus “so long as there is no law which your will must conform, you remain in full possession of your freedom as a subject” (Skinner 2012: 9). In other words, so long as an individual is not physically obstructed, she still retains the liberty to act as she desires, whether this be in accordance with the law or not. Nevertheless, Hobbes again asserted the beneficial quality of joining civil society, the only way to acquire “the ornaments and comforts of life” is by living together in “peace and security” (1969: 71-3).

Hobbes therefore acknowledged that there are certain ‘goods’ that can only be obtained in a community, but this notion appears separate from his conceptualisation of freedom, which could be adopted by different forms of government, and is thus not comprehensively political. It is anchored in the notion of freedom as non-interference, whereby the only substantial justification for a curtailment of liberty is the end of security. This notion is found in his formulation of liberty in the state of nature, a space where individuals can enjoy full liberty, defined as the natural liberty men possess “of governing himself by his own will and power” (Hobbes, 1969: 79, cf110). What is notable about this remark, is that it is the individual that should be capable of self-government, in the sense of being primarily responsible for their attainment of the good life, rather than seeing the political community and rule of law as a source of freedom and empowerment.

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25 Tyranny of the majority was a principle concern for J.S. Mill.
Similarly, Steiner (1975: 33) defines negative individual liberty as “an individual is unfree if, and only if, his doing of any action is rendered impossible by the action of another individual”. He claims that “judgements about whether an individual is free to do a certain action do not presuppose any judgement concerning either his desires or his obligations”, and that “offers and threats are interventions, by others, in [an] individual’s practical deliberations”, thus influencing the individual’s behaviour (1975: 36). Hence a more idealist or republican conception of liberty would not be prioritised by Steiner, as the individual should be given responsibility for their own deliberations and reasoning. For Steiner, the relationship between the physical space an individual may enjoy, and the opportunity to dispose of material objects as he pleases, amounts to possession. He argues that possession is consequently “a triadic relation obtaining between an agent, an object, and all other agents” (1975: 48). The extent to which I am free, then depends on whether I possess the physical space and material objects that are required for my proposed action, and that they are not possessed by another agent. The theorem put forward is that “freedom is the personal possession of physical objects” (1975: 48). Hence freedom cannot exist beyond the physical spaces and objects that exist in society.

This type of reasoning is akin to Hobbes, in that he focuses on constraint and external impediments to action. Although the advantage of Steiner’s theory can be said to be in its simplicity, it falls into a similar trap to Hobbes, in that it is a reductionist approach to human freedom (Miller, 2006). It speaks to a key limitation in the formulation of negative liberty in relation to today’s systemically interconnected world, whereby ‘interferences’ are posited as curtailments on liberty, and thus unjust, yet today they appear unavoidable. This is an issue because there is little left in the conceptual tool box to allow these unavoidable infringements to be theorised in a way that an individual can remain free and empowered.

*Inalienable rights*
Chapter Two

The notion of inalienable rights is another example of the ‘fixed’, or reductionist, nature of freedom as non-interference. A further founding element of the liberal tradition, is the view that central to the desire for individuals to move under the protective dome of civil society, is the notion that societies best secure individual rights and property (Locke 1980). Property is one of the fundamental elements of Locke’s political philosophy: “everyman has a property in his own person: [that] nobody has any right to but himself” (Locke 1980: 19). This conception leads Locke towards his consent based approach of social organisation, grounded in the notion that “the preservation of property [is] the end of government”, which should not “take any part of them at pleasure” (Locke, 1980: 73). Locke’s notion of arbitrariness speaks to the republican tradition, as it arguably parallels the master – slave relationship that percolates the contrast between monarchical and republican forms of government. Hence governments become illegitimate when they become arbitrary disposers of “the lives liberties, or fortunes of the people” (Locke 1980: 111).

Yet predominantly the state should be limited to protecting inalienable rights, those rights which cannot be given away by the possessor, or infringed upon by a third party. This prioritisation is central to the development of the liberal tradition, Locke defining liberty explicitly with reference to freedom from constraint (Locke 1980: 32). Natural rights are both pre-political and inalienable, and for Locke are life, liberty and property. They constitute, somewhat paradoxically, an essential part of a person, yet cannot be handed over by the possessor to another (Macpherson 1980: xv). The notion of property places Locke in the liberal tradition, as his reasoning dictates that individuals own themselves and possess property within them (Locke 1980: 19-21). Therefore the individual is the key sovereign unit, and should be protected from others. This can become problematic, as it also includes the acquisition of property and its relation to the commons, which is particularly pertinent today. The potential negative externalities of large accumulations of property, the ways in which certain property can be ‘used’ (e.g. polluting practices in relation to climate change), and the individualism it promulgates, will create a tension between individuals and the commons and are thus problematised by increasing interdependence (Chapter 6). As Bellah et al. surmise, “[t]o aggregate
measurable individual preferences is to undermine larger conceptions of the common
good, conceptions that start by recognizing the profound interdependences that
characterize our world”, the implication being that this is “undemocratic, for it does not
allow a genuine democratic consensus to emerge but depends instead on an uninformed
and undebated plebiscite of transitory and unexamined desires” (1992: 119). Similarly
to Chapter 1, it is argued that the uptake of Lockean individualism represents “the
fundamental error of replacing a genuinely democratic process with a consumer market

On Locke’s terms, conventional laws enacted by society are only legitimate if they
respect natural inalienable rights and are based on consent (Locke 1980: 111). Following
these contentions, Locke favours a limited form of government, primarily concerned
with the end of preserving citizens’ rights to individual liberty and property. However
he presents somewhat of a contradiction, whereby what counts as a person’s property
is for the legislature to decide and define (Locke 1980: 52), even though he maintained
that natural rights come from God rather than political convention (Locke 1980: 9-10;
Hoffman & Graham 2009: 186). Thus on one hand, natural rights are pre-political and
cannot be interfered with by a government, and on the other, individuals consent to be
governed by majority rule (convention). The distinction Locke draws regarding the
action that a government of consent can take, between natural rights and the role of the
state, is whether its policies involve the arbitrary taking of property (Locke 1980: 73).
Therefore, although a citizen cannot relinquish her natural rights and a government
cannot arbitrarily take them, provided a rule is general in application and accepted by
the majority, and thus is not arbitrary, as it is not a violation of a person’s natural rights.
Yet as rights are inalienable, and a common good would thus be secondary, the
reconciliation between the individual and the community would be difficult to achieve
if consent was not forthcoming. Whether Locke’s theory can sustain the demands of the
21st century is debatable, due to its ability to accommodate notions of interdependence
(Bellah et al. 1992). Questions over individual rights and the common good, and whether

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26 In § 96 Locke stipulates that every individual is “bound by that consent to be concluded by
the majority”. See also Macpherson (1980: xv).
an intrinsic value needs to be placed on, say, political participation to manage the
conventional aspects of his thought, remains open. However his focus is clear:

“[Liberty] is, to be free from restraint and violence from others . . . [and for an individual]
to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole property,
within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the
arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own”
(Locke, 1980: 32)

The minimal state

The idea of the individual as sovereign, freedom as non-interference and the
implications this has for the state was carried forward by Nozick. He opened Anarchy,
State, and Utopia with this question:

“Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without
violating their rights). So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the
question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do. How much room do
individual rights leave for the state?”
(1974: ix)

For Nozick, justice, the role of state, and liberty, are all derived from the natural right to
property. It is this aspect of the theory that promotes a minimal state, which draws
Nozick in-line with the negative liberal tradition (Nozick 1974: ix). His position is carved
out in the space between anarchism on the one hand and redistributive welfare
mechanisms on the other. A minimal state is central to his theory, one that is justified
by abiding to the “limited ... narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud,
enforcement of contracts, and so on” (Nozick 1974: ix). Any state which enacts more
extensive policies than these is consequently unjustified. “Two noteworthy implications
are that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting citizens
to aid others”, or in order to prohibit activities for an individual’s own good or

The anchorage of the theory is in the notion of self-ownership, which acknowledges the
fact that individuals live separate lives and that this separateness of persons needs to be
respected by a governing body. In other words, “only you have the right to decide what
is to happen to your life, your liberty, and your body, for they belong to no one but you” (Wolff 1996: 7). The implication for liberty is that this argument rests essentially on Mill’s harm principle (1859: 13), whereby one’s liberty can only be justifiably curtailed if it is infringing on another’s. The only justification for an individual or group to take property is if all parties consent. Similarly to Locke, consent marks another bulwark of Nozick’s reasoning. Provided that the acquisition of a person’s property is just, through entitlement, not need or desert, then no other agent may interfere with it, even if it were for the greater good. Moreover, the state should act as night-watchmen over its citizen’s right to non-interference. Rights are again the priority, the state therefore remains neutral regarding questions of the good life. Libertarians thus subscribe to the liberal tenet of being neutral towards competing conceptions of the good, they are essentially concerned “with what people may claim from each other as of right, and this comes to non-interference with self and with property” (Wolff 1996: 134).

Individuals should be allowed the liberty to choose their own path in life, and their own conception of the good. This freedom of choice essentially equals empowerment for Nozick, who affirms that libertarian principles offer the best chance of offering as many conceptions of the good to flourish, as no paths can be closed off by the coercive apparatus of the state. Citizens would enjoy greater opportunities because they would have complete control (and responsibility) over their own income, rather than having a portion compulsorily redistributed through taxation for example. Individuals would be free to form groups that ideologically conform to one another, such as Amish farmers or cosmopolitan city dwellers. For instance, Nozick’s (1974) tale of the slave neatly encapsulates this logic. The idea here is that liberal democracies which allow their citizens to vote does not assure them of liberty, as an individual’s empowerment is severely curtailed by being dependent on the will of the majority and, in Nozick’s view, the subsequent jettisoning of the notion of consent. It is for this reason that he makes the

27 Nozick invokes Kantian reasoning, in that individuals should “never simply [be used] as a means, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant 1948: 91).
bold claim that his theory is in fact inspiring rather than merely a method for procedural justice, because it gives individuals the opportunity, and groundwork, to form their own Utopia. Libertarianism, which is founded on the notion that the individual is prior to society and the common good, can consequently be perceived as a contribution to Miller’s liberal tradition.

The minimal state could arise without much human design, and would provide the most appropriate environment in which freedom, in the libertarian sense, would thrive. Yet as a state has no legitimate claim to interfere with a person’s rights to ownership over themselves or their property (Wolff 1996: 4), the redistribution of, or interference with individual property is rendered problematic. The issue for Nozick is that redistribution equates to installing a patterned form of justice (i.e. for need or desert), which would ultimately undo voluntary agreements and negative liberty, thus upsetting such patterns. Hence in this case a libertarian state may appear inflexible and counter-resilient to commons related challenges (Chapter 6). However, his theory is not quite as callous as it first appears. Interestingly, Nozick does not state that aid should not be given privately. He in fact plays a clever sleight of hand by suggesting that it is unjust for the state to lawfully interfere in a person’s property, yet it is not necessarily morally right for a person who is capable of acting, to not offer help to those in need (Wolff 1996: 12). Therefore, although Nozick would no doubt sympathise with the problems of growing social inequalities and the degradation of the environment, he would argue that resolving these issues through compulsory redistribution of wealth and property falls outside the scope of legitimate government, but could be attended to by private charity. Yet questions remain as to whether charity could do enough work regarding emerging global challenges, such as attending to climate change norms (Chapter 6); and if Mill’s conception of harm could be mobilised successfully without a

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30 See Nozick’s conception of the invisible hand, that is, how protective agencies could emerge from the state of nature (1974: 18-25). In a sense, this represents an alternative to addressing the notion of systematic interconnectedness (Chapter 1). Unfortunately there is not sufficient space in this thesis to explore this point further, however Chapters 3 – 6 elaborate how RCR represents a suitable approach to the demands of the 21st century.

31 He uses the example of the basketball player Wilt Chamberlin (Nozick 1974: 161).
thicker conception of the good, and more deliberative political communities premised on mutual interdependence.

_Laissez-faire and the private sphere_

The efficacy of Nozick’s Libertarianism regarding the context of the 21st century (Chapter 1) can be further tested by examining an oft-associated form of economics, _laissez-faire_. Both theories share an opposition to state intrusion.32 Hayek, noted critic of the welfare state and advocate of free-market economics, asserted that governments do not, and will never possess the correct information for successful intervention in their citizens’ lives (Lamont 2004). In other words, “political decision makers are and must be ignorant of the knowledge they would have to have in order to engage effectively in the central planning which they aspire” (Mack & Gaus 2004: 117). Therefore Hayek’s critique rests on the assertion that the state is inefficient at distributing resources, as opposed to relying on a conception of natural law. Similarly to Locke and Nozick, it is an individualist theory, which argues that individuals are the only ‘real’ things in society and that managing their subjective choices, in the form of centralised state planning, is impossible. Instead, the local knowledge found in markets which are self-regulated by price, demand and supply, are far better at allocating resources in society, and realising a notion of freedom as choice compatible with “late capitalism” (Salecl 2009; 2011), or neoliberalism. The scale of intervention required for a state to be effective at managing markets, and the inevitable lack of pace in a democracy, would lead societies down the “road to serfdom” according to Hayek (1944).

State neutrality is accepted by Hayek (1973), as the rule of law should not reflect some spurious societal end: it should instead facilitate each person’s pursuit of her own projects and ends. Thus “the task of a policy of freedom must ... be to minimise coercion or its harmful effects, even if it cannot eliminate it completely” (Hayek 1960: 80). Hayek takes care to differentiate coercion from other meanings of the word liberty _viz._ political

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32 It is notable that once examined, this form of libertarianism does not require capitalism, it merely permits it.
freedom, inner freedom and the physical “ability to do what I want” (Hayek 1960: 85). Freedom, in Hayek’s sense, refers solely to a relation of men to other men, and the only infringement on it is “coercion” (1960: 81). He aims to build the case that each individual possesses an “assured private sphere”, whereby there are “some set of circumstances in his environment with which others cannot interfere” (Hayek 1960: 82). This is a presupposition of liberty.

It is clear when he states that a definition of liberty “must not depend upon whether or not everybody regards this kind of liberty as good thing”, that he is looking to gain a level of abstraction away from the possibility that social justice could be rebalanced by human interference, which he confirms by adding: “we must recognise that we may be free and yet miserable” (Hayek 1960: 87). This allows him to posit his theory along Nozickian lines, whereby there is no legitimate reason that a state should do more than protect individual rights, and maintain the apparatus for the free-market and unconstrained individual choice.

The problem as Hayek sees it, is that when a person’s intelligence and knowledge is manipulated, it greatly frustrates their ability to reach their aims (Hayek 1960: 90). These definitions do support the charge for a minimal state, characterised by non-interference. Yet, Hayek concedes that it is inevitable that coercion will occur in men’s relationships with one another. He is not clear, when discussing the ‘levels’ of severity of coercion, what level is permissible in society and what is not. Although he offers one insight:

“so long as the services of a particular person are not crucial to my existence or the preservation of what I most value, the conditions he exacts for rendering these services cannot properly be called ‘coercion’”

(Hayek 1960: 91)

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33 For clarity on what counts as coercion see Hayek (1960: 89).
34 Although this does not suggest that he favours the same minimal state as Nozick or Locke.
This could appear contra to his main purposes, but seems to justify coercion so long it’s not crucial to a person’s existence. Nevertheless Hayek’s principal concern remains arbitrary coercion, when a person’s freedom is dependent on the arbitrary will of another. Accordingly governments should only seek to prevent severe coercion, not lesser forms (Hayek 1960). To prevent severe coercion, “governments must enable the individual to secure for himself some private sphere where he is protected against such interference” (Hayek 1960: 95). Hayek suggests that it is a legitimate expectation that one has “rights” that “result in the recognition of such a private sphere” (Hayek 1960: 95). He adds that coercion would be rampant if no such sphere existed, and further that “only in a society that has already attempted to prevent coercion by some demarcation of a protected sphere”, can a concept like “arbitrary interference” have a definite meaning (Hayek 1960: 95). Voluntary consent and competition further ensure that the scarce resources in society are not susceptible to arbitrary coercion, that is, under the control of one man (Hayek 1960: 97).35

The recognition of a protected individual sphere “has in times of freedom normally included a right to privacy and secrecy, the conception that a man’s house is his castle and that nobody has a right even to take cognizance of his activities within it” (Hayek 1960: 98). This illuminates Hayek’s underlying philosophy regarding the reach of the state. Yet as certain actions of state interference, which are applicable to all citizens such as taxation, are permissible (Hayek 1960: 98-9), it remains relatively difficult to precisely distinguish Hayek’s position, other than his notable support for laissez-faire, the free market, and principle of non-interference and protected individual rights. What again is absent, is a conceptualisation of what could count as permissible coercion (such as in the case of climate change), or how structural forms of coercion could be addressed (such as minority exclusion from equal treatment and representation), and what kind of institutional architecture could gather, disseminate and action the local knowledge he

35 Although it appears that Hayek is putting a substantial amount of faith in markets, and their agents, to act fairly and resist corruption, which is a contentious and important assumption.
reveres. These theoretical absences, and the attempt to institutionalise freedom as non-interference, thus commit Hayek to Miller’s liberal tradition.

*Tenets of the liberal tradition*

To return to Berlin (2002: 36), where the frontier is to be drawn for the “minimum area of personal freedom”, that is between private life and public authority, is a matter of argument and haggling. However, what institutional implications this may have, and the role of the state and citizen in the polity remains unclear. Yet it is agreed that “some portion of human existence must remain independent of the sphere of social control” (Berlin 2002: 36). Liberty in the negative sense represents “liberty from; absence of interference beyond the shifting, but always recognisable, frontier” (Berlin 2002: 39).

According to the liberal tradition, the frontier of liberty can be said to rest on several core principles. The first is that the doctrinal resemblance within the tradition is based upon shared normative principles and a shared appreciation of empirical generalisations about how the world works, and thus the legitimate constraints on a state. The second, concerns the commonality regarding how these normative constraints are then applied, in other words, what form of state is justified (Mack & Gaus 2004: 115). To justify one form of state or another, there are several philosophical strategies that are used for vindicating the normative elements of the doctrine, such as deontological, contractarian and consequentialist (Mack & Gaus 2004: 116). Hayek’s support of voluntary consent and the enforcement of contracts would be one example, and Locke’s notion of a social contract another.

Key to the liberal tradition is its characteristically individualist nature. In a normative sense this consists of placing supreme value on individual responsibility, well-being, and preference satisfaction in and of itself, rather than any contribution to a social good (Mack 1999). Correspondingly, this type of normative individualism holds that there are enforceable moral claims that could be made by an individual against interventions that
diminish their lives, well-being or preference satisfaction (Mack & Gaus 2004: 116). The significant point is that this account of freedom can present obstacles to societal policies that promote the well-being of others, as moral duties require stringent justification (Lomasky 1987: 94-6). In addition, these claims give rise to the ontological dimension of the liberal tradition, namely that the individual is the only agent, site of value, and only true bearer of rights and responsibilities, not nations or classes (Mack & Gaus 2004: 116). At this point the tradition encounters the problem of systemic interconnectedness (Chapter 1), as interdependence and interconnectedness can generate unpredictable emergent phenomena, which can cause (in)direct and often unavoidable interferences. This suggests that attempts to institutionalise freedom as non-interference may not successfully accommodate the demands of the 21st century, by purely seeking to protect individuals from others. In today’s context, freedom as non-interference and unrestrained choice does not necessarily entail empowerment, in the sense of gaining control over the forces that govern an individual’s life. For example, an individual seeking employment in markets framed by neoliberal globalisation, although not subject to interference and possessing the ability to choose their source of employment freely, may not be considered empowered. This is due to the lack of control over the conditions in which choice is offered, in that the individual is subject to the demand and supply mechanisms of the market which are external to them. Put differently, if these mechanisms do not track the individual’s conception of self-realisation, then there is little recourse for the individual to exercise control and change the system, as freedom is understood as non-interference rather than self-government.

In a society that subscribes to the liberal tradition, individual liberty will be the core political or legal norm (Robbins 1961: 104). Essentially this means that individual liberty is the only legitimate demand that a person or group of people may claim from others. Nozick concurred with this point, in that although there may be actions or special circumstances where it may be morally right to interfere with a person’s rights or property, such action cannot be legitimately demanded from a person. This reflects the

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36 See Nozick (1974: 30-2) and Machan (1989: 7-9) for more on the moral claim against interference.
inherent appeal to a negative conception of liberty, as in its most basic form, it is a conception that argues for the rights of individuals to be left alone to pursue their own goals and ends in life (Mack & Gaus 2004).

Private property is also a core tenet. Individuals should respect each other’s right to private property, provided that it has been acquired justly. There are four main themes that develop from this claim: (1) that “seizing another’s peacefully acquired holdings is itself a violation of her liberty”; (2) “seizing the fruits of another’s labour or what a person has acquired through voluntary exchange . . . violates that person’s entitlement or desert” (Mack & Gaus 2004: 117 in Gaus 1999: Ch. 8); (3) private property represents the necessary background to a general regime of liberty, as any system that may allow seizures would render liberty insecure (Gray 1986: Ch. 8); and (4) secure private property is inextricably linked to economic prosperity in this tradition.

Property and the free market, as protected institutions, thus guarantee a negative conception of freedom (Nozick 1974; Hayek 1944). Consequently the liberal tradition favours a certain social order. It is one that emerges when individuals make choices with respect to the rights, life, liberty and property, of others, and where there is no centrally planned conception of the good. Rather, individuals should be allowed to pursue their own legitimate ends but share no common goals (Oakeshott 1975). Political institutions should therefore only be created, and only use force, to uphold rights associated with freedom as non-interference. This is the legitimate reach of the state. Emphasis is placed on the separateness of persons, therefore everyone is equal regarding their rights: state leaders cannot therefore derive any legitimate power when appealing to one conception of the good. There is no moral distinction between a leader of a state and her citizen (Mack & Guas 2004: 117-8), which arguably positions them in purely procedural roles (i.e. bureaucrats).

Sympathisers with the liberal tradition hold that political authority is often misused, most political regimes have “continuously and grievously infringed upon people’s just

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liberties” (Mack & Guas 2004: 118). Political power, in their perspective, has the permanent tendency to be “oppressive, exploitative, and destructive of harmonious and mutually beneficial social arrangements” (Mack & Guas 2004: 118). Therefore, the members of this tradition argue that “even though some form of political authority is perhaps necessary and justified, citizens must always be jealous of such power, on their guard against it, be ready to condemn and resist its expansion and misuse” (Mack & Guas 2004: 118). Consequently, political leaders bear a very high burden of proof when attempting to justify infringements on individual liberty. Despite the arguable similarities with republicans in terms of what could be described as freedom as non-domination light (see below), the notion of citizens being the authors of the laws in a self-governing republic is absent. In effect, this could be said to posit the government as an ‘other’, it is the night watchmen whose existence relies on the consent of the governed, and not an embodiment of say Rousseau’s general will.

The liberal tradition’s conception of liberty may be being problematized by the social–political developments of the 21st century, such as counter-terrorism, globalised free-markets and climate change, as it fundamentally rests on the idea that the individual is the sovereign unit, and that liberty is something to be exercised at the individual, as opposed to communal level. Even MacCallum’s (1967) attempt to assimilate positive and negative conceptions of liberty into a triadic relationship between an agent, who through another individual or group’s action is being restrained, or prevented from doing or becoming something, also misses the mark. It is too simplistic of MacCullum to think that the complexities of liberty can fit into the formula he presents, basing his reasoning on “very different basic assumptions about human beings”, and his neutrality between the three traditions which suggests he is primarily sympathetic to traditional liberal theory (Miller 2006: 13). Reconciliation of emergent challenges would clearly involve infringing on individual rights or coercion to some extent, and would at the very

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38 Wilson (2009) makes the same point in a historical context. Looking at how liberty has been fought and won in the UK.

39 Skinner (2001: 243) also supports this position. He recognises the influence of MacCullum’s paper in propelling the liberty debate, and argues that for MacCullum, “to speak of the presence of freedom is always to speak of an absence: absence of constraint on an agent from realising some goal or end”.
least place a large burden of proof on the state, which can only justify its actions in-line with freedom as non-interference or the harm principle, who’s efficacy is challenged by systemic interconnectedness. RCR conceptualises sovereignty more as a communal endeavour, exercised with others, rather than individually. As individuals exist in a world of interferences, they need to work with, instead of in opposition to them. To shed light on the questions left open by this claim, it is now prudent to consider insights from Miller’s other liberty traditions.

**Beyond the Traditional Liberal Settlement**

To begin, it is logical to return to Berlin and his conception of positive liberty, which is to speak of the idealist and republican traditions of freedom (Miller 2006). Hence it concerns the theories which articulate freedom as more than individual rights and possession, rather than freedom from (interference) it concerns freedom to (become) (Berlin 2002: 39-42). Berlin offers a definition:

> “The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish . . . to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be . . . self-directed”

(2002: 43)

Self-direction is a key theme, and Berlin suggests that there are two selves: one where an individual is a slave to his passions and desires, the “lower” nature self; the other represents the liberation from appetites and desires, the “real”, “ideal” or “autonomous” self (1969: 132). Importantly, the “ideal” self is conceived as being “something wider than the individual . . . as a social ‘whole’ of which the individual is an element or aspect: a tribe, a race, a church, a state, the great society of the living and the dead and the yet unborn” (Berlin 1969: 132). Hence positive freedom can consist of both rational self-direction and social elements. The notion that an individual is part of social whole adds a communal dimension to freedom. Liberty in this sense means something other than the pure absence of external impediments. Berlin suggests that
individuals are social beings and consequently desire membership to a social ‘whole’. He terms this desire the need for social status, or recognition of being an individual, part of a race, nation, or class. Consequently an individual is not an “isolable atom, but an ingredient in the social pattern” (1969: 157).

“In the end, men choose between ultimate values; they choose as they do, because their life and thought are determined by fundamental moral categories and concepts that are, at any rate over large stretches of time and space, a part of their being and thought and sense of their own identity; part of what makes them human” (1969: 171-2)

Importantly Berlin suggests that not all an individual’s attributes, including social, are inalienable (1969: 161). He also retains the idea that “every interpretation of the word liberty . . . must include a minimum of . . . negative liberty”, and that “there must be an area within which I am not frustrated” (1969: 161). Hence liberty could be said to consist in balancing both negative and positive aspects, as conflicts between individuals’ conceptions of the good life are unavoidable, and not one aspect of liberty overrides others in the way of a unifying theory. Berlin suggests that in the real world,

“the bulk of humanity has certainly at most times been prepared to sacrifice [a degree of negative liberty] to other goals: security, status, prosperity, power, virtue, rewards in the next world; or justice, equality fraternity, and many other values which appear wholly, or in part, incompatible with the attainment of the greatest degree of individual liberty, and certainly do not need it as a pre-condition for their own realisation” (1969: 161)

Individuals who have fought for liberty, Berlin argues, have done so in order to govern themselves, and not necessarily because of a desire for freedom as non-interference. Consequently, a stalwart dedication to negative liberty can in fact neglect the variety of human needs such as those of fraternity and solidarity, and it leaves little space for other potentially irrational desires (1969: 162). High value is thus placed on the right to self-governance, which can ensure that negative liberty can be assured (1969: 165). Nonetheless he remains committed to the fact that negative and positive liberty are

40 Berlin is of course concerned about the dangers (potential oppression) of this ‘social aspect’ of liberty (1969: 133).
wholly distinct. The cardinal issue is that supporters of negative liberty want to curb authority, and the supporters of positive freedom want it placed in their hands (1969: 166).

What Berlin’s scholarship signals is that certain types of political judgments rely on an individual’s ability to determine good and evil, and can be based on “moral, religious, or economic grounds . . . bound up with our conception of man and the basic demands of human nature” (1969: 169). Therefore liberty in the positive sense does not rely on an a priori standard of freedom, the logical process of reciprocal respect for each other’s liberty, rather it can consist “simply because [of the] respect for the principles of justice, or shame at gross inequality of treatment, [that] is as basic in men as the desire for liberty” (Berlin 1969: 170).

Berlin favours pluralism with a measure of non-interference. He discounts the ideal goal of what he terms positive liberty, that of self-mastery, on the grounds that it represents somewhat of a falsehood. It is misleading because it can lead to the single-minded thinking that is associated with authoritarian and highly disciplined regimes, as its goal is rational idealism. To the contrary, his pluralist approach is more pragmatic as it

“recognise[s] the fact that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with each other . . . [and] it does not (as system builders do) deprive men, in the name of some remote, or incoherent, ideal, of much that they have found to be indispensable to their life as unpredictably self-transforming human beings”

(Berlin 1969: 171)

Again this signals that individuals require some form of political apparatus beyond the night-watchmen state in order to obtain freedom, that is, “freedom as collective self-determination, the condition where each person plays his part in controlling his social environment through democratic institutions” (Miller 2006: 10). Therefore the scope of liberty is broadened in relation to present socio-political challenges, as it is alluded to that liberty to some degree can be exercised through institutions. Whilst Berlin postulated that negative liberty equals non-interference and respect for one’s personal
sphere (the liberal tradition), he argues that positive liberty can consist of factors outside of a narrow view of *a priori* rights, such as rational self-direction and community traditions and inheritances. Importantly for this project, Berlin’s treatment of liberty indicates that an alignment of individual goals with the common good could be possible. The approach leaves some room for a common good, and also underscores the notion of self-government, usefully relating internal freedom (self-mastery) of individuals to the communal freedom of a polity. Although Miller (2006) concludes that Berlin remains rightly sceptical of the idealist and republican forms of liberty, his lack of clarity on the exact constitution of negative and positive liberty highlights that at the very least, several important elements of liberty are omitted from a purely negative conception.

*Communal and self direction*

Charles Taylor pursues Berlin’s line of enquiry, and contributes to Miller’s idealist conception of liberty. Taylor essentially adopts a positive view of liberty, subscribing to the notion of “self-mastery”, whereby a person “acts and lives in accord with her own will and is moved by her own reasons” (Friedman 2008: 247). With that established, liberty can be distinguished through the notions of ‘exercise’ and ‘opportunity’ concepts. Following the notion of non-interference, “negative theories can rely simply on an opportunity-concept, where being free is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open [for] us to do, [and] whether or not we do anything to exercise these options” (Taylor 1979: 143-4). Whereas according to the “exercise concept”, “one is free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one’s life” (Taylor 1979: 143). The exercise concept therefore demonstrates that freedom can represent the ability one has to exercise control and determine one’s life. Internal freedom consists in being able to realise oneself, not merely being offered non-interference, it must come from within. In Taylor’s words “we can’t say someone is free . . . if fulfilling his [potential] has never even arisen as a question for him” (1979: 144).
The process of self-realisation requires more than absence of interferences, rather it involves judging one’s liberty to act and exercise certain capacities which represent a person’s higher self, rather than hypothetical lower self. For capacities to be so, they must take account of, to some degree, “self-awareness, self-understanding, moral discrimination, and self-control, otherwise their exercise couldn’t amount to freedom in the sense of self-direction” (Taylor 1979: 146). Thus obstacles to freedom are consequently internal as well as external, and therefore potentially render freedom as non-interference deficient in this regard. Principally, for “exercise-concept[s] of freedom, being free can’t just be a question of doing what you want in the unproblematic sense” (Taylor 1979: 147). Instead liberty involves “discriminating between motivations and equating freedom with doing what we really want, or obeying our real will, or truly directing our lives” (Taylor 1979: 148, also 154). The point being made is that because a person’s desires and motivations are generated by authentic self-realisation, factors outside of the realm of external impediments must be considered. Notably Taylor illustrates the significance of a conception of self-realisation, which may not be fully obtainable within Miller’s liberal tradition.

State neutrality can be challenged because individuals can be mistaken about their desires (Taylor 1979: 155), which opens the door for some degree of state intervention. Thus “freedom only makes sense against a background sense of more and less significant purposes, for the question of freedom/unfreedom is bound up with the frustration/fulfilment of our purposes” (Taylor 1979: 160-2). Individuals thus conceive liberty and identity within society and in relation to a shared conception of the good, or shared moral principles (Taylor 1979: 156). Debates regarding liberty cannot occur in a moral vacuum, and it is mistaken for a society to perceive itself as merely a cooperation between separate self-interested citizens (Taylor 1979: 160-2). Though the question remains

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41 For further clarification on import-attributing desires see Taylor (1979) pp. 155-162.
42 Taylor does go into more detail regarding why certain important-attributing desires do not truly feel like they belong to an agent; and that a feeling being brute does not necessarily make a desire repudiable (1979: 157-60).
“whether...freedom [is] realizable or fully realizable only within a certain form of society; and whether in taking a step of this kind one is necessarily committed to justifying the excesses of totalitarian oppression in the name of liberty”

(Taylor 1979: 162)

Therefore it can be argued that self-mastery and self-direction at the individual level, needs to be replicated at the political level, in order to realise a positive conception of freedom. Hence a challenge is set “by those who believe that freedom resides at least in part in collective control over the common life” (Taylor 1979: 141). The republican tradition articulates a notion that “men’s ruling themselves is seen as an activity valuable in itself, and not only [or necessarily] for instrumental reasons”, that is the “collective control over the common life” (Taylor 1979: 142). The point is that “negative theories...want to define freedom in terms of individual independence from others”, and positive theories want to also “identify freedom with collective self-government” (Taylor 1979: 143). Broadening the scope of freedom to include internal constraints, which suggests that the ‘exercise’ of liberty should include a degree of participation in social life (Taylor 1979: 169), suggests a more compatible conception in relation to present day challenges (Chapter 1), as self-realisation appears to be able to track a shared life in common (and collective action), which can also propagate a common good (Chapter 4). Taylor’s republican leaning will feature again in the penultimate section of this chapter, yet it will be approached from an alternative angle.

Moral obligations

One key benefit of living a life in common relates to how individuals come to identify “precisely when an obstacle should be considered a constraint on freedom” (Miller 1983: 70). For Miller, there is something special about obstacles that are “attributable to human agency” (1983: 70). This is notable as potentially “many restrictions on freedom are justified, whether to protect the freedom of other agents, to promote competing values such as welfare and equality, or to protect the agent himself” (Miller 2006: 186). Therefore freedom can again be extended beyond non-interference, inasmuch as it may be one of many competing values in society, and that a certain-amount of second-guessing to prevent harm to an individual from themselves is permissible. Miller
invokes the notion of “moral responsibility”, whereby “the appropriate condition for regarding an obstacle as a constraint on freedom is that some other person or persons can be held morally responsible for its existence” (1983: 72). Therefore infringements on liberty which require justification, or bear a burden of proof, are those that can be attributed to human agency:

“When we describe a person as unfree to do something, we imply that an obstacle exists that stands in need of justification, and we are in effect calling upon the human race collectively to vindicate its behaviour in permitting the obstacle to exist”

(Miller 1983: 72)

Although this statement could reflect a call to uphold liberty from the perspective of the liberal tradition, that is, on the charge of a violation of individual rights, it does nonetheless invoke the tones of a theory more orientated towards collective goods and shared values. Miller suggests a call to the human race for collective action, rather than merely stating an objective fact that requires rectification (e.g. a violation of individual liberty). This is because Miller’s notion of constraint relies on a concept of obligation. The central issue of freedom is to ascertain what individuals, or groups of individuals, are morally responsible for, or obliged to do. Taylor suggests that liberty in this sense can be defined as: “X is unfree to do A when A has been made either impossible or less eligible under condition C” (1983: 77). He argues that “by showing that some agency (person or persons) is morally responsible for an obstacle to X’s action”, demonstrates that the origins and nature of an obstacle are such as to count it as a constraint on liberty (1983: 80). Thus, the size of an obstacle is almost irrelevant.

Interestingly Miller suggests that “the major constraints on personal freedom in modern societies are produced by collective entities, such as states and corporations” (1983: 80). Entities in this regard represent the collective actions of many individuals, whereby any resultant infringements on liberty “may not be intended by the individual participants” (Miller 1983: 80). A car manufacturer for example, may, to streamline production, hire more assembly line robots which may then lead to factory closures if production can be increased in one plant to the degree where another is superfluous. In this case, the factory closure was not initially intended by the participants. Therefore, if “an
impediment to someone’s action is attributable to a collectivity, then it must also be attributable to a number of individual actions; but not necessarily to individual intentions” (Miller 1983: 81). In short, Miller is arguing that on the one hand collective entities, not just individuals, can be held responsible for obstacles to freedom as they are the sum of many individual actions, and on the other, that constraints on freedom do not have to be intentioned to count as constraints.

Another useful example of Miller’s notion of moral obligation is the contrasting reasons for why the monopolistic behaviour of a well owner is unjust, with reference to Hayek and Nozick. The example describes the situation where one person owns the only source of water in the desert. Each theorist has their own answer to what is unjust about the owner refusing to sell his water to the other inhabitants of the desert at a fair price. Hayek would argue that the well owner is in possession of a commodity that is vital for a person’s survival, so it is therefore unjust to withhold its supply. Nozick would argue along the lines of the “Lockean proviso”, which states that one cannot justly acquire property when it results in there not being enough left to be shared in common with others. Finally, Miller argues that the well owner has a moral obligation to supply the water (1983: 82). He argues that Hayek’s argument involves, in the broader sense, an “unwanted subjective element”, as what is to count as something being crucial to a person’s existence and what they most value, which can be liable to change in many circumstances (1983: 82), is left as an open question. The weakness in Nozick’s reasoning is the fact that the well owner qua monopolist is not actually relevant, his reasoning could apply to a fair-minded well owner who supplies water at a fair rate, which would therefore not be coercive behaviour. Many of the scarce resources in ALDs are provided under the control of a small group of people, yet they do not all act as monopolists, even though their holdings do not allow enough to be shared between the rest of a population.

Miller asserts that the well owner has two moral obligations: (1) “to ensure that the needs of others are met”, and (2) “the obligation to deal fairly with people placed in a dependent position” (Miller 1983: 83). These positive obligations illustrate a divergence
in reasoning about liberty, namely regarding the principle of non-interference. The well owner cannot rely on the principle of non-interference, which rests on the premise that “all one man owes another is non-interference with his actions [..] I may not kill or imprison you, but I have no obligation to keep you alive or release you from your natural entombment (these things may be morally desirable, but are not obligatory)”. Rather the well owner is responsible for upholding “positive interpersonal moral obligations” (Miller 1983: 83). Notably, the moral obligations that individuals owe one another, as the example illustrates, arise from an assumption of mutual dependence. Hence attending to this mutual indebtedness and finding appropriate solutions for socio-political issues, such as water shortages, will involve a more positive conception of liberty and the state. Principally this is because freedom as non-interference is not sufficient to generate the sense of moral-communal solidarity and obligation that Miller sees as necessary.

This point also surfaces when examining the notion of capitalism. For example, the claim that “workers are unfree just because they are forced to work for capitalists” misses the point (Miller 1983: 84). Instead, to examine whether the obligation not to exploit those who are dependent on you has been violated, one must examine the terms that are offered, in this case from the capitalist to the worker. Miller holds the view that capitalists are in a privileged bargaining position over their workforce, as the workers need the capitalist more than the capitalist needs them. In these circumstances where an individual or group has the “power to control others’ fates”, the “obligations of fairness” are activated in order to ensure equal liberty (1983: 84). The market in this case is thus not “fully competitive” but one where the capitalist class represents “a position of monopoly vis-a-vis the working class”.43 To improve the bargaining position of the working class, Miller advocates “a state of affairs in which each person had equal access to capital” (1983: 84). In that situation, the worker would only contract with a capitalist if the result did not infringe on his freedom. Moreover, this conceptualisation of liberty again speaks to something more than non-interference, in this case it could suggest a move towards cultivating worker cooperatives. What the latter helps to realise is the

43 Miller is thus highlighting the earlier worry about Hayek’s faith in the market.
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notion that obligations could be self-imposed through deliberation, rather than being externally imposed. This represents a logical extension to Sandel’s notion of freedom as self-government, that is individuals taking control of the forces that govern them; and potentially constitutes a more liberating form of empowerment within a world of unavoidable interferences, via the activation of ‘obligations of fairness’. Yet more can be said on how empowerment would be actualised within society.

Non-domination

Pettit is one of the key exponents of contemporary republican theory, and clearly falls within Miller’s republican tradition. Interestingly, the role and importance of non-interference is not completely diminished by adopting a republican stance, as the traditional dichotomy between these two theories would suggest. Rather the former retains its place, but can be complemented by an additional dimension of liberty, that of freedom as non-domination:

“Assume that one person dominates another to the extent that they have the capacity to interfere arbitrarily—to interfere on an arbitrary basis—in some or all of the other’s choices . . . Freedom as non-interference makes the absence of interference sufficient for freedom; in contrast, freedom as nondomination requires the absence of a capacity on the part of anyone else—any individual or corporate agent—to interfere arbitrarily in another person’s life or affairs”

(Pettit 1997b: 224, also 1996, 1997a)

The role of the state is to actively promote non-domination, protecting both against private and public domination, as well as ensuring citizens are able “to exercise undominated choice” (McBride 2015: 352; see Pettit 2014: 77). In this sense “freedom as non-domination appears to sit somewhere between Berlin’s conceptions of negative and positive freedom” (McBride 2015: 352). The central point that Pettit articulates is that of arbitrary interference, which implies that there can conceivably be just interventions, so long as they are not arbitrary. Liberty consists in being free from “the potentially capricious will or the potentially idiosyncratic judgement of another” (Pettit 1997a: 5). Liberty within Pettit’s neo-Roman republicanism consists of liberty by the laws, not from
the laws (Pettit 1997a: 39). The state should, as expressed by other republicans, be represented as an “empire of laws, and not of men” (Harrington 1992: 8). Nevertheless, state officials do still pose an inherent threat, accordingly citizens themselves must “strive to keep [them] honest”, the price of liberty being “external vigilance” (Pettit 1997a: 6).

Freedom as non-domination requires the absence of arbitrary interference. Pettit states that “an act is perpetrated on an arbitrary basis . . . if it is subject only to the arbitrium, the decision or judgement, of the agent”, whereby “the agent was in a position to choose it or not choose it, at their pleasure”. In other words, for an act of interference to count as non-arbitrary it must “track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the interference” (Pettit 1997b: 225). This is where Pettit diverges from the liberal tradition, by emphasising that it is not freedom as choice per se that empowers individuals, but also the conditions under which choice is made. Under negative liberty the “regime of law, being necessarily coercive, systematically compromises people’s freedom”, and equals a “loss of liberty” (Pettit 1997b: 227). In contrast for the republican, living under the law does not constitute a loss of freedom, provided that the law is made, interpreted and implemented in a non-arbitrary way. Hence “provided that the legal coercion involved is constrained to track the interests and ideas of those affected”, it can be said “that the legal regime represents a fair rule of law” (Pettit 1997b: 227).

Non-domination does create space for legitimate interferences. Taxation does not represent arbitrary interference, as individuals qua individuals are liable to make inconsistent demands, and “nonarbitrariness consists in recognition of the relevant ones” (Pettit 1997b: 225). Hence an agent’s relevant interests and ideas are those which “are shared in common with others, not those that treat [he or she] as exceptional” (Pettit 1997b: 226). Such acts of interference are not considered arbitrary by Pettit as they are

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44 Frank Lovett (2010) shares Pettit’s focus on promoting freedom as non-domination.
45 See also Pettit (1997b: 225) and Miller (1990: 35).
46 And consequently “secures citizens from domination” (McBride 2015: 352).
integral to the state, which importantly must serve not only one person, but others too. Hence:

“The acts of interference perpetrated by the state must be triggered by the shared interests of those affected; and the interpretation of what those interests require must be shared, at least at the procedural level by those affected”

(Pettit 1997b: 226)

Pettit also alludes to the notion of attending to changing circumstances, as “what we can imagine civil society allowing the state to do, have shifted dramatically over the last couple of centuries or so” (1997b: 234). Thus there is a resilient (adaptive) capacity within the theory here, as new sources of domination could be recognised and then government action altered on this basis. This is evident in Pettit’s treatment of redistribution, that is, putting right the inequalities that exist in societies, such as

“with different levels of provision in basic goods like food and shelter . . . medical care, legal counsel . . . human capital of the kind associated with training and education; in social capital of the sort that consists in being able to call with confidence on others; in political capital such as office and authority confer; and in material capital that is necessary for production”

(1997b: 235)

If liberty and empowerment in some way rely upon mediating the inequalities that may occur in the examples above, it is difficult to envisage, within the confines of freedom as non-interference, how such complex inequalities can be remedied, as finding such remedies will clearly require “a much more substantial commitment to redistribution” (Pettit 1997b: 235). “[R]edistribution always entails a degree of interference by the state”, whereby the supporter of non-interference is thus committed to playing a probability game, where it must be shown “that the margin whereby redistribution will reduce interference in a society is greater than the margin whereby it introduces interference itself” (Pettit 1997b: 235-6). Arguably freedom as non-interference remains “a regime that allows great inequalities” (Pettit 1997b: 236).

On this basis freedom as non-domination gains considerable traction in terms of attending to empowerment, as under this view redistribution can be theoretically
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justified. Interference is acceptable provided it does not introduce a new form of domination and is enacted under a fair rule of law. Unlike non-interference, “if redistributive measures are used in the promotion of freedom of nondomination, the good at which they are directed does not have to be balanced against a violation of that very good” (Pettit 1997b: 237). If taxes were raised in a society to fund healthcare and education for example, and no individual would be more dominated as a result, the “conditioning of liberty” would thereby be permissible considering the improvement in the lives of those in need (Pettit 1997b: 237). Similarly in employment markets, the state could introduce regulations that employers must follow, such as providing a living wage. The aim of such initiatives would be to “reduce the employer’s capacity for arbitrary interference” (Pettit 1997b: 240). This parallels the scenario of the servant with a generous master, as “whether the employer interferes or not will no longer be dependent on their good grace, it will be substantially determined by factors outside the employer’s will” (Pettit 1997b: 240).47 Again this type of liberty speaks to something beyond mere non-interference, and in this case has a capacity to address changing circumstances, such as favourable employment markets for employers.48

However, any redistributive measures would have to be introduced under a fair rule of law, because any law introduced will to some degree “remove certain choices” that are available to citizens, or at least “raise the costs of pursuing them”, which is still concerning to republicans as well as libertarians (Pettit 1997b: 239). In addition, this represents one of the procedural ideals of republicanism, that is, that the state, or legislature, is placed under high levels of scrutiny. Although redistributive laws can be permissible from a republican standpoint, it is only up to a certain extent. If such laws were to allow individual agents of the state to act with unconstrained discretion, or if “the redistribution [was] so extensive, or subject to such frequent adjustments, that people [would] hardly know where they stand relative to the state”, then such laws look

47 Pettit also uses non-domination to suggest that “the fact that people are poor or illiterate or ignorant or unable to get legal counsel; or uninsured against illness or incapable of getting around – the fact they lack basic capabilities in any of these regards (Sen 1985a) – makes them subject to a certain sort of exploitation and manipulation”, improving these would thus “reduce the capacity for others to interfere more or less arbitrarily in their lives” (Pettit 1997b: 239-40).
48 This is also pertinent considering the character of modernity and post-Fordism (Chapter 1).
“very unattractive from a republican point of view” (Pettit 1997b: 238). Freedom as non-domination requires citizens to be “vigilant about not allowing the state certain sorts of power”, and must ensure that the legislature “is subject to all sorts of constitutional and other constraints”: if met, Pettit suggests that there is nothing objectionable about the state having “redistributive rights and responsibility” (1997b: 238). Hence:

“The republican ideal . . . may be capable of encoding the redistributive measures that many of us would think it reasonable to require of the modern state. While remaining an ideal of liberty, it may give adequate expression to the more demanding aspirations that the nonlibertarians amongst us find compelling”

(1997b: 241)

Nevertheless the central issue neo-Roman conceptions of republicanism encounter (i.e. Pettit and Lovett), is their closeness to the liberal tradition. Although they clearly deepen the conception of interference, Pettit retains focus on “freedom as independence”, resisting notions of perfectionism and the importance of political participation, which ultimately reflects an “underlying moral individualism” (McBride 2015: 350-1; Pettit 1997a: 8, 201). Thus the procedural nature of Pettit’s project brings him close to Rawls’ liberalism, which could arguably permit freedom as non-domination (Rawls 1993: 205, 412; Larmore 2003: 115; McBride 2015: 353-4). Self-mastery (personal autonomy) should not be the concern of the state within these views, it is something that belongs to the private sphere, as non-domination is essentially a “political ideal” (McBride 2015: 354; Pettit 1997a: 81-2), which should secure the conditions for individuals to pursue self-mastery without the aid of the state (McBride 2015: 355).

The permissibility of interferences depends on their “arbitrariness”, non-arbitrary interferences being those that “track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the interference” (Pettit 1997a: 55). However a familiar issue arises, whereby to avoid individuals being ruled by a “benevolent dictatorship” (McBride 2015: 356), they should themselves contribute to the construction of the laws that govern them (Brennan & Lomasky 2006: 241). In response, Pettit argues that domination can include “a government pursuing a rigorously rule-governed policy of discrimination” (McBride 2015: 356), which would equate to “uncontrolled interference” in an individual’s interests (Pettit 2012: 58). Nonetheless, “this revision . . . make[s] clearer the way in
which the practice of non-domination appears to depend upon some form of collective autonomy . . . [as] to be secure from public domination . . . we need to exercise control over the state ourselves” (McBride 2015: 356-7). Pettit (2012: 281) does acknowledge this point, and that democratic control depends on citizens sharing equally in the enterprise (2014: 77). Yet this remains problematic for neo-Republican theories, as “if this is so, then it cannot be the case that freedom as non-domination offers an alternative to the ideal of a self-governing political community as a necessary condition of freedom as non-domination” (McBride 2015: 357). Thus the question of empowerment returns to how self-government can be achieved. For example RCR revitalises Sandel’s neo-Athenian sentiments (Laborde & Maynor 2008: 3; McBride 2015: 350; Honohan 2002: 155-8), by emphasising the role that active citizen participation, interaction, civic virtue and deliberation play in realising an authentic common good, and self-government. Hence Pettit’s idea that non-domination equates to a common good that is secured when citizens “enjoy freedom from domination” (McBride 351; Pettit 1997a: 8), casts doubt over neo-Roman republicanism’s ability to empower individuals in the face of structural power and domination (McBride 2015: Schuppert 2015), as well as the emergent challenges of the 21st century (Chapter 1). Appeals to normative arguments may be necessary, which may be difficult to mobilise from a position of freedom as non-domination (Busen 2015), and could require an intrinsic value to be placed on democracy that Pettit’s proceduralism neglects (Rostbøll 2015).

Arguably Pettit inherits too much from the liberal tradition, by continuing to define freedom as ‘non’ something, rather than freedom being ‘for’ something. This has implications for resilience, as if interferences and potentially new sources of domination (that may be difficult to detect if they were say cultural), are going to continue to arise, then empowerment is going to lie in a community’s ability to choose the obligations (or constraints) that govern them. This argument is essentially an argument for self-government, which requires citizens to have the skills and dispositions necessary for this form of governing. The issue for Pettit is that this may constitute incorporating a moralised or perfectionist position into a governing political philosophy, which
freedom as non-domination may not be able to achieve within its own conceptual resources (see Chapter 5 – RCR, self-government and complexity).

**Community and capability**

The analysis of Pettit’s theory above, as arguably the most cognate position of republican thought (others largely refining his premises), revealed some limitations with respect to its ability to contend with the conditions presented in Chapter 1 and normative-teleological resilience. This penultimate section follows a similar objective. Whilst the approaches discussed below do not fit as neatly into Miller’s liberty traditions, often crossing and inter-marrying between them, their inclusion will help illustrate where the RCR model developed in the remainder of the thesis stands, with respect to them. Thus the originality of the RCR position will be more evident, as this section will fine-tune its location with respect to other pertinent scholarship. It begins with the communitarian thought of Michael Walzer.

**Walzer**

Michael Walzer (1983) puts forward an argument that essentially is a critique of Rawlsian liberalism. Whilst not committing him to a rejection of all liberal principles such as toleration (Mulhall & Swift 1992), it does cast considerable doubt over a conception of liberty that seeks to achieve an Archimedean viewpoint, from which to then formulate principles of justice. Walzer’s (1983) key area of focus, pertinent to this thesis, is his conception of social goods. He argues that to ensure that the distribution of social goods is properly autonomous and democratic (1) their inherently social meanings need to be acknowledged, and (2) it should be understood that as “different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons” (Walzer 1983: 6), goods from one ‘distributive sphere’ should not be allowed to be traded with goods from another, as this could lead to corruption. In other words, what Walzer is asserting is that a good such as health care has its own peculiarities, meanings and values for a society, and thus belongs to a sphere appropriate to this, with its unique principles of distribution. Money
can corrupt due to the nature of the purchasing power it offers the possessor. Using money as a mechanism to distribute health care could violate the principle that every citizen of a particular community should be able to have their illnesses treated and their well-being restored. The central point Walzer (1983) makes is that the meaning of the good of health care, and thus the distributive sphere it is placed in, is the result of historical and culturally relative meanings; which is where he takes issues with Rawls (i.e. with the original position), as essentially social goods can have “different meanings in different societies” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 132).

Walzer’s claim regarding the just distribution of social goods turns on them being attributed the correct meanings particular to a specific society, which can connect to notions of liberty, democracy and empowerment. Essentially the connection is predicated on how the meanings of social goods are realised in communities. For instance to figure out how health care is valued in a particular society, calls on some form of deliberation over social goods and how they should be distributed (Mulhall & Swift 1992). This, for Walzer, has implications for democracy, as any deliberation over social goods that is based on first seeking an Archimedean point of view from which to then value goods, one that is abstracted from reality and a society’s context, will ultimately be undemocratic, as it will lead to the goods being seen in the wrong way (Mulhall & Swift 1992). The undemocratic element results from Walzer’s (1981) notion that democracy should reflect the will of the people, in that “[t]he justification for democratic government is not that it is likely to yield right decisions . . . but that it yields decisions that embody the will of the citizenry”, as “citizens can only freely be bound by laws if they themselves make them” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 135). Walzer is essentially making an argument for self-government here, which is visible in his concern over the judiciary. The issue as he see it, is that in a procedural democracy, the judiciary are the sole interpreters of the constitution, and are tasked with protecting individuals from the majority via rights (Mulhall & Swift 1992); hence Rawls’ axiomatic arrangement of the right being prior to the good. Walzer’s point is that the predominance given to rights and judicial review being the primary arbiter/protector of the majority’s potential incursion on rights, can lead to judges awarding people more rights, which reduces ‘the
people’s’ ability to act as a “decision-making body” (Walzer 1981:391; Mulhall & Swift 1992). Thus “judicial activity” can be seen as “radically intrusive on what [Walzer] calls ‘democratic space’” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 136). Consequently Walzer (1983) raises questions of how far rights should extend in terms of constraining the decision-making power of the citizenry as a decision-making body themselves, and thus invokes some form of socially derived conception of rights. He also asks how a theory of justice can capture the notion that people are “culture-producing creatures . . . who make and inhabit meaningful worlds”, and thus anchor justice in the “distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs, things of all sorts, that constitute a shared way of life” (Walzer 1983: 314).

The logic of Walzer’s argument revolves around the importance it places on “social meanings . . . [and that] those meaning are inherently social – constructed by, derived from and maintained by the community and its practices and institutions rather than by the thoughts and deeds of any individual” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 154). It is therefore an argument that is compatible with the aims of this thesis, in the sense that it can be interpreted as follows: (1) it seeks to re-establish the community as a decision-making body, hence liberty is perhaps better understood as self-government; (2) rights need to be established more closely with community rather than prior to it; (3) that arenas need to be established so that the public meanings of social goods can be realised; and (4) that empowerment is important as certain goods in today’s world (e.g. money) can enable individuals/groups to corrupt other social goods (e.g. healthcare and education), which arguably requires societies to formulate some way of engendering the common good over atomistically formed conceptions of individual goods (Walzer 1983; Mulhall & Swift 1992). Walzer’s (1983) claim is essentially communitarian, pointing out why communal meanings should be central to justice, thus problematizing procedural liberalism (as a theory of justice). Yet regarding the points of convergence with this thesis, there is a lot more to be said regarding how Walzer’s ‘meanings’ could materialise politically, which the following chapters in this thesis aim to do, such as the socially derivative nature of rights being given substantial attention in Chapter 4. Thus in sum, Walzer’s arguments are certainly compatible with this thesis, but require a
broader model, such as RCR, to give them life in reality. In addition, RCR’s notion of normative-teleological resilience and systemic interconnectedness can also serve Walzer’s project, in terms of how social meanings can emerge in societies, that is, via the interactions of many interacting elements, and also how these norms can be posited as open to change, yet remain democratically anchored.

*MacIntyre*

Whilst Alasdair MacIntyre is most commonly claimed, by others, as a communitarian philosopher, his work can arguably be placed within Miller’s republican tradition. This is due to his reliance on a certain set of political practices and institutions in which his Aristotelian ethics are capable of re-establishing moral agency. As MacIntyre’s starting point, similar to Sandel’s (1998b), concerns cross-examining Rawls’ Theory of Justice, he can here be said to continue where Pettit leaves off, in terms of the criticism above regarding the latter’s closeness to liberalism.

Although MacIntyre’s (1981) central critique of Rawls’ liberalism arguably does not shake the foundations of the theory to breaking point, as his argument that a social context and overarching conception of the good is necessary for rational political action, effectively results in “accusing liberals of being liberal” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 99), the method by which he reaches his conclusion and later expands on it (MacIntyre 1999), reveals some pertinent insights to this thesis regarding empowerment and dependence: whilst importantly remembering that his reference point is moral agency. Working backwards, MacIntyre (1999) claims that small-scale political communities are the arena in which moral agency and rational practical reasoning can take place. What he rejects from his interpretation of Rawls’ work, which can be taken to be representative of the larger liberal tradition, is the “split between political and non-political matters” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 99). In brief, MacIntyre (1999) envisions communities as social networks of giving and receiving, and they are such because individuals share fundamental interdependencies with others in terms of realising both common and individual goods. He uses the example of mental and physical illnesses, whereby an individual suffering
from illness cannot rely on themselves for the provision of their own individual goods, and whilst individuals may not be suffering from such illnesses at present, they will eventually due to the inescapable aging process, and thus will rely on others to allocate the common resources they require to meet their needs (and hence maintain a common good). MacIntyre argues that there are certain virtues that enable individuals to recognise their interdependence with others, but importantly these virtues can only be acquired and exercised when “we participate in relationships of giving and receiving” (1999: 156). Therefore despite the fact that liberty is arguably not the principal driver in his work, he does underline the fact that moral agency and the ability for individuals to “function as independent and accountable practical reasoners” (1999: 156), which is necessary in order to give rise to common goods that enable the vulnerabilities of interdependence to be mitigated, rely on context-specific social arrangements that both enable the acquisition and exercise of certain virtues. For instance, to engender friendliness, solidarity, and acknowledgment of dependence, relies on shared deliberation over common goods, which for MacIntyre equates to reasoning politically (1999: 140).

Therefore MacIntyre’s claim that political deliberations cannot make sense outside of community, carries implications for both liberty and empowerment. To perceive liberty as requiring the allocation of resources in order to meet the demands of interdependence (in terms of securing both individual and common goods), MacIntyre appears committed to a form of liberty beyond that of the liberal tradition, and also beyond that of Pettit’s non-domination, due to the important role the social-political arena plays in giving rise to virtues that enable and sustain a common good. However, whilst MacIntyre provides persuasive arguments for a social telos, appreciation of interdependence, and the role that virtues and shared deliberation play in shaping the common good, that is, via communal political participation, he falls short of putting forward a concrete conception of liberty that can anchor his ethical framework. He again provides reasonable cause for pursuing the role of “face-to-face encounters” and seeking to improve the “quality” of communities, as they are essential to defining and delivering social needs (1999: 142). Yet the precise nature of how and where shared deliberation
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will arise, and how this can serve a conception of freedom that supports the possibility of a reasoned dissensus - which can also incorporate the potential for unpredictability in the narrative (future) history of individual and communal traditions (1981), in other words, how precisely his ethical framework would survive in this domain and would retain individual empowerment without a grounding conception of liberty - remains rather opaque. Thus although MacIntyre reaches a similar diagnosis regarding the issues of contemporary society that feature in Chapter 1 and Sandel’s work, and recognises the need for economic considerations to be subordinated to moral-social ones, which arguably supports the positioning of this thesis in terms of liberalism and freedom as non-interference, several gaps in his approach still remain.

**Honneth**

Honneth (2014) adopts a somewhat similar tack to MacIntyre, in terms of providing a social analysis of freedom via his historicist/sociological methodology of normative reconstruction. In terms of what he sees as social misdevelopments (such as neoliberalism and the commercialisation of the media), Honneth shares MacIntyre’s emphasis on the social, in that social freedom is capable, and should, accommodate negative and reflexive (internal) freedom, and that “freedom and justice are instantiated in culture, society and practices” (Chambers 2016: 506). Thus working from Hegel’s (1991) position he argues that individual freedom and autonomy is realised in the institutions of civil society, family and the constitutional state (2014). Hence these institutions, for Honneth, can be judged and viewed as legitimate on the basis of how well they actualise individual freedom. Analogous to MacIntyre, Honneth (following Habermas, Dewey, and Durkheim) focuses on the public sphere as the arena in which principles of freedom surface and where individuals can clarify their political intentions (2014: 269). Thus he places intrinsic value on “democratic public life as the central aspect of social freedom” (Laitinen 2015: 329), in terms of the communicative-deliberative space it provides to attend to social problems and actualise individual freedom. This is substantiated by his conception of mutual recognition of interdependence, whereby individuals come to realise that they depend on each other for the satisfaction of their
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aims, which relates back to social freedom in the sense that “[j]ustice must entail granting all members of society the opportunity to participate in institutions of recognition” (Honneth 2014: 6): being the state, civil society and family. Honneth’s project is therefore seemingly congruent with that of this thesis, as a key strand of his normative reconstruction appears to rely on notions that assert that legitimate political action results from the inclusive deliberation of a political communities’ citizens, and that the state should protect these mechanisms; hence the ‘will of the people’ is to be democratically negotiated and underpinned by social norms and values (2014: 305-6).

Another point of convergence, as noted in the Introduction, is Honneth’s scepticism over the role of the internet and “the digitally enabled expansion and unbounding of the political communicative space”, as a replacement for face-to-face interactions in societies. Here Honneth refers to the potential for digital connectedness to be exclusionary and marginalising for the lower classes, delocalising, possess a propensity to encourage irrational contributions from participants (due to say anonymity), and the broader dilution or destruction of “political culture in mature democracies that had previously motivated moral efforts to include all citizens in the space of collective self-legislation” (2014: 303-4). Again being charitable to ICTs, it could be said that they do provide potential to aid disadvantaged groups to participate, yet “the long-term political consequences of the generally increased usage of digital platforms remains entirely unclear” (2014: 302). Thus for Honneth, digital connectedness does not necessarily provide a fix for the receding normative resources and agora spaces that he identifies in Freedom’s Right, including the displacing effects of neoliberalism, which he asserts need to be accounted for to achieve social freedom (Honneth 2014; Chapter 1).

However the problem for Honneth lies in his attempts to free himself from what he sees as asocially derived principles of justice, in Kantian/Rawlsian terms, which are then retrospectively applied to the reality of political life, hence separating his model from the contestatory/dialectic and teleological aspects of Hegel’s philosophy (Chambers 2016). Whilst he pursues this course to ensure that his thought is never too detached from context, which is of course important (Chapter 5), his model is missing grounding
principles that can provide footholds and a way of managing contexts that change (potentially unpredictably) through time. Thus it can be argued that there is room for Honneth to say more regarding normative-teleological principles, which have the potential to frame his other insights more fruitfully, and importantly in a more resilient manner. To elaborate, whilst Honneth does criticise centralised politics in terms of its elitist character, that is, the distance created between governors and the governed, which leads him to support the notion (following Durkheim) that “bridges of communication between the organs of government and the population, over which information can flow not only from top to bottom but also from bottom to top” (2014: 268-9), his focus remains almost exclusively on communication. The issue for Honneth here is that, considering the social misdevelopments he identifies in his normative reconstruction, communication is left to do a lot of work. In other words, he does not fully address the question of whether communication, which could take the form of citizens being consultants to government, actually equates to empowerment in today’s ALDs. Arguably social freedom could be realised if citizens are provided the (institutionalised) opportunity to voice their opinions and debate, but how this squares with his aside regarding citizens self-legislating, and whether this equates to self-government, whereby citizens’ possess relative control over the forces that govern them, remains open. The gap left by Honneth, resulting from his normative reconstruction methodology, over “how we squeeze the ‘ought’ from the ‘is’” (Chambers 2016: 506), could well be made more robust if he was willing to concede to the need for, or postulate some underpinning normative principles, such as freedom as self-government and normative-teleological resilience. As without such principles, Honneth’s conception of individual freedom is in effect ‘merely’ a set of social conditions whereby freedom “is understood as constituted through processes of mutual recognition” (Chambers 2016: 507). In this sense it could be said that his model is lacking a degree of normative conceptual depth, which would be helpful/needed as it would provide the model some form of normative direction, that is, an ‘ought’ which could provide a guide towards the socially free society he envisages. Honneth’s desire to distance himself from Kant, and his method of normative reconstruction, arguably precludes him from retrofitting such concepts to his model. This is perhaps why it has been stated that Honneth’s (2014)
theory “should be judged on whether it identifies a real normative aspiration in the historical aspiration of our institutions”, and that is misfires regarding the question of why the framework for social freedom he sketches, should in fact be pursued, which unfortunately tethers him too closely to the realm of social criticism (Chambers 2016: 509, italics added). Resultantly this thesis will turn to another scholar to align and deepen the conceptual apparatus of RCR in-line with normative-teleological resilience (Chapter 4), where Kant’s kingdom of ends and Hegel’s mutual recognition are not posited as mutually exclusive, and which can appease liberal concerns of autonomy and rights, whilst accounting for the ‘complexity’ and interconnectedness of human societies and how these figure in relation to the common good, self-realisation, and how freedom is actualised within communities; based itself on an ideal of the good society.

Taylor

Revisiting the scholarship of Charles Taylor helps to further delineate where the RCR model will sit within political philosophy. There are several points of convergence between Taylor’s philosophy and the model put forward in this thesis, the first of which regards Taylor’s (1990; 1997) critiques of procedural (Rawlsian) liberalism. Without delving into a deep descriptive account, Taylor (1990) essentially argues that a person’s identity (the self) and their moral evaluative frameworks cannot be detached from community, and are, in fact “constituted by that self’s sense of meaning or significance of the objects and situations he encounters in life” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 107). This line of thought leads Taylor to a pertinent attack on atomism, whereby society is understood “as merely an aggregation of . . . [antecedent] individuated atoms” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 111-2, 113). The key problem Taylor sees with atomist or asocial individualism, is that it can lead people to ignore the fact that their interests and moral frameworks are derived from community. Thus a theory such as procedural liberalism, which side-lines conceptions of the good in favour of espousing individuals as capable of exercising free autonomous choice and neutrality, with respect to favouring a certain conception of the good (hence reasoning outside of communal influence), is not only an incoherent position, but also camouflages the fact that such theories do in fact rely on a more
substantive conception of the good than they are willing to admit to: moreover, such theories require society to be ordered in such a way that serves these ends, in his example, requiring “the maintenance of a distinctly liberal society” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 111-2, 113). This is a useful argument for this thesis, because, as noted above, if negative liberty and prioritisation of autonomy is seen as problematic for normative-teleological resilience, then attending to it within liberalism’s own resources may prove difficult, as there is an internal contradiction that needs to be resolved beforehand. However Taylor’s (1990) thought as this stage does not extend as far as developing a model that would constitute an alternative, rather his primary goal is philosophical, as opposed to substantive, in that his aim is to criticise “moral and political theories for ignoring or repressing the dependence of all conceptions and of the self upon social matrices rather than for ignoring or repressing the importance of conceptions of the good that are strongly communal in nature” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 121). Therefore whilst Taylor (1990) provides a persuasive attack on procedural liberalism, and implicates it in the issues identified in Chapter 1 by illustrating its limitations with regard to accounting for the social, he stops short of advocating a position that would attend to the issue of resilience and empowerment.

However Taylor, in Philosophical Arguments (1997), does provide an extension to his critique on liberalism. He discusses the concepts of practical reasoning and hypergoods; whereby he postulates that higher-order goods can be recognised and re-prioritised in relation to others, in the sense that a transition can occur by means of moving from a previously dominant hypergood to a new one, via practical reasoning, in which interlocutors can decipher the epistemic gains to be had from moving to the new hypergood, thus illustrating how a society may be able to “cope with [an] epistemological crisis” (Mulhall & Swift 1992: 115). The relational aspect of Taylor’s thought emerges in this latter work in a similar fashion, such that he again emphasises that identity and community are essential and “highly relevant” features of a theory of justice which require examination (1997: 186). As a result, and as alluded to earlier, Taylor is drawn to ancient republican thought as his point of comparison to procedural liberalism, and thus in this sense mirrors RCR’s approach.
One of the key questions of politics is how individuals’ competing demands should be arbitrated, for procedural liberal societies, this may take the form of the retrieval of entrenched rights, yet freedom for the ancient republican societies was based on a different notion of freedom (Taylor 1997). As opposed to viewing society as instrumentally valuable, composed of antecedently individuated persons, who operate on the principle of enlightened self-interest, republican societies, according to Taylor (1997), conceptualised freedom in participatory terms. In this case enlightened self-interest is replaced by a form of familial patriotism, which is bound up in the notion that citizens share their fate, and that the avoidance of despotism involves common actions and requires a mutual recognition of the common good. Common actions are simply those actions that participatory self-government requires, and in this sense can be viewed as a common good (Taylor 1997). The difference between republicanism and despotism is that “the disciplines which would be externally imposed by fear under a despotism have to be self-imposed in its absence, and only patriotic identification can provide the motivation” (Taylor 1997: 192-3): the latter thus expanding beyond Pettit’s (1997a) judicially compatible notion of non-domination. To restate, in a republic, it is the shared bond of familial-like solidarity that “underpins freedom, because it provides the motivations for self-imposed discipline; or else that it is essential for a free regime, because its members are asked to do things that mere subjects can avoid” (Taylor 1997: 193). Taylor’s observation of the republican polis creates a way of mobilising individuals to attend to, and make sacrifices for, matters of common concern such as those pertinent to this thesis (Taylor 1997: 193). Importantly, this may not be a viable option within the confines of negative liberty and procedural liberalism. Hence for Taylor, patriotism is an irreplaceable “bulwark of freedom”, and will continue to be so (1997: 195).

Participatory self-rule, Taylor argues, involves individuals having “some part in forming a ruling consensus, with which one can identify with others”, and should be secured as constitutive of freedom; whereas the liberal alternative turns on freedom as legal rights retrieval, which in-turn requires “having clout” (1997: 200). The latter is an issue because it creates the potential for corruption as lobby groups who push politics
towards single issues have greater space to manoeuvre, especially when politics is
practiced in an adversarial and distanced way by the governors (‘them’) and the
governed (‘us’); in contrast to the more inclusive republican participatory approach
(Taylor 1997: 200-1).

The vulnerability of democracy can be further heightened as a result of the liberal
conception of the public sphere. At a basic level the public sphere, for Taylor, is “a
common space in which the members of society meet . . . to discuss matters of interest;
and thus be able to form a common mind about those matters” (1997: 259). The
“common mind is a reflective view, emerging from critical debate, and not just a
summation of whatever views happen to be held in the population”, and consequently
due to its normative status “government ought to listen to it” (Taylor 1997: 263). The
distinction made between procedural liberalism and its republican counterpart is that
for the former, the public sphere of course should exist due to its connection to the
principle of sovereignty resting with the people, yet it is given “extrapolitical status”,
whereby it “is posited as self-consciously outside power . . . a discourse of reason on
and to power, rather than by power” (Taylor 1997: 265). This positioning of the public
sphere, which is also aiming to abide by the liberal neutrality doctrine, and
contextualised within centralised – bureaucratic polities is not only disempowering but
leads, as Taylor (1997: Ch 13) argues, to a Tocquevillian vicious circle whereby a lack of
empowerment, an atomistic conception of communities, and feelings of exclusion can
create further political apathy, and also rifts within communities that can cause political
fragmentation: rather than citizens rallying around common conceptions of the good,
they instead perceive themselves in an increasingly atomistic manner, and not as a
political community, which prompts them to ally themselves to single issues in politics;
this then weakens a community’s ability to mobilise as a democratic majority, which can
lead to a representative system becoming less representative: thus completing the
vicious circle. This phenomenon arguably stems from initial feelings of powerlessness
(Taylor 1997: Ch. 13).
Yet Taylor also sees a solution in Tocqueville (Chapter 5), which is not surprising as he attributes a lack of empowerment to centralised bureaucratic states that govern at a distance from their citizens and possess an ineffective public sphere, in terms of their capacity to enable citizens to have their views heard in a fair and empowered manner (1997). Therefore Taylor argues that Tocqueville’s approach, centred around “decentralisation of power . . . devolution, or a division of power as in a federal system particularly one based on the principle of subsidiarity, can be good for democratic empowerment . . . [and] more so, if the units to which power is developed already figure as communities in the lives of their members” (Taylor 1997: 286). Furthermore, in order for ‘the local’ to reach ‘the national,’ whereby the former can have an impact on the latter, Taylor envisages “smaller public spheres . . . nested within larger ones, so that what goes on in the smaller ones feed into the agenda of the national sphere” (Taylor 1997: 279). These spheres would then “mediate the input from masses of ordinary citizens, who otherwise feel excluded from everything but the periodic national elections” (Taylor 1997: 280). Thus what Taylor suggests is creating a “multiplicity of public spheres nested within each other . . . [with] a central arena of debate on national policy . . . [that is representative] of a central government in a federation” (Taylor 1997: 280). It is this approach that Taylor sees as more compatible with democracy than procedural liberalism, in that it facilitates what Taylor formulates as the aspirations and conditions of democracy and democratic decision making: (1) that the mass of individuals should have some say in what they are going to be, and not just told who they are, and thus have some impact on political debates; (2) that this say in political governance should be genuinely theirs’ and not manipulated (e.g. by propaganda and irrational fears); (3) it should also reflect the citizens’ considered opinions, as opposed to knee-jerk reactions which could be based on misinformation; (4) citizens need to recognise that they belong to a community with a common purpose; (5) all of these principles can depend on the democratic efficiency of the public sphere, as ‘being heard’ depends on individuals’ relation to common purposes, and the ability for political issues to swirl and be “thrashed out in the public sphere” (abridged from Taylor 1997: 273, 276-8). In sum, one is able to see the direction of Taylor’s thought from an argument that aims to solely underline a deficiency in the liberal conception of the self, in terms of
community playing an intrinsic and inescapable influence on individuals’ identities, which then evolves into a need to recognise, and institutionalise, the essential communal dimension of democratic decision-making that enables individuals to be empowered beyond mere attempts to recover entrenched rights when needed, as in the case of procedural liberalism, whose neutrality and tendency towards engendering atomistic political communities cannot deliver.

There are many concepts circulating with Taylor’s work that could create the architecture for a republican framework that is distinct from Pettit’s. For example, Taylor’s thoughts on the role of decentralisation, enlightened debate, nested public spheres, self-government, the common good, and how these can be viewed in contradistinction to contemporary liberal polities, are highly pertinent to this thesis and do feature in the following pages, yet some questions still arise. Firstly Taylor’s (1990) avoidance of asserting a more substantive socially-sensitive theory to procedural liberalism is a concern. It is not a concern for Taylor as such, due to the fact that his primary aim is to deliver a sound philosophical critique of procedural liberalism. However for this thesis, with the significance of normative-teleological resilience (Introduction), neoliberal globalisation and systemic interconnectedness (Chapter 1), an additional imperative towards the development of a more substantive account is created, and hence a further avenue of discussion which is pursued here. Despite the fact that Taylor (1997) does delve deeper into the disempowering effects of procedural liberalism, and turns towards a more seemingly republican response, the response still contains several gaps where greater specificity in-line with resilience would be greatly beneficial. For instance, Taylor emphasises the role of political parties and social movements as a means to institutionalise and decentralise the public sphere, yet arguably more needs to, and can be said regarding how to accommodate the key insights of liberal thinking into his communitarian approach (Chapter 4 & 5), and how the public sphere, or concern for the common good, can be expanded and institutionalised in other ways beyond these two, such as in the workplace and other civic spaces (Chapter 5 & 6); especially as political parties and social movements are susceptible to the limitations of associations (Introduction). Similarly, extending beyond
Taylor’s conception of patriotism and mutual recognition, in relation to its positioning in a more complete theoretical approach and its connection to nurturing the skills and dispositions within a citizenry to perform their civic duties (in the republican sense) (Chapter 3 & 4), hence expanding on his notion of practical reasoning (Taylor 1990: 115) in the context of the socio-political context of contemporary ALDs, would again make these arguments more robust. In sum, there is room for one to debate how far Taylor endorses a republican approach, and how far he would proceed in terms of jettisoning components of procedural liberalism, and whether this would be necessary for all or none of them (or somewhere in between); all of which leaves spaces that this thesis can fill, especially considering its original rationale that includes systemic interconnectedness and normative-teleological resilience. Yet it does appear that Taylor is best placed in Miller’s republican category, and at a distance from Pettit’s formulation, due to his socially ‘thicker’ conception.

**Capability Approaches**

One further framework can also be considered in this section, one that is generally referred to as capability approaches, which put forward what Sen calls “well-being freedom” (1992: 40); whereby freedom consists in the capabilities that people possess or have open to them. Put differently, freedom pertains to the real opportunities individuals have to obtain well-being. Nussbaum (2000; 2006) notably presents a defined list of capabilities, a selection of which include: life, bodily health, practical reason, affiliation, and control over one’s environment (both material and political: political relating to the “ability to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life”) (2011: 33-4). The latter is pertinent to liberty within this thesis, as it appears to equate justice and freedom with the ability to participate effectively in politics, which further correlates to some form of self-government. Hence some parallels are evident between capability approaches and the RCR model constructed in this thesis. For instance, concepts such as public spaces and civic virtue, which are posited as central to RCR, could be viewed as resources that enable capabilities (Drèze & Sen 2002), such that participatory spaces can allow individuals to exert ‘some form of control over one’s
environment,’ and perhaps shape their communities and attend to matters of common concern. In addition, freedom framed around self-government and normative-teleological resilience would also seemingly align with capability, in terms of resources needed for maintaining well-being and core capabilities in a complex world. Therefore what follows in this thesis seems compatible with capability approaches: RCR, as will be shown, is a holistic model that constitutes a group of its own capabilities that fulfil the normative requirements of resilience with respect to the socio-political conditions presented in Chapter 1. Hence RCR could be measured against some form of capability yardstick, for which it also provides its own criteria, that is, resilience, empowerment, and self-government; hence also positioning itself as a criterion or yardstick, as policies could be judged on, say, their ability to empower individuals. In addition, RCR could be viewed as putting forward capabilities, but placing more emphasis on communal freedoms, which would align with Sen’s view of capabilities and freedom being effective opportunities (Sen 1985a; 1985b; 2002), such as opportunities for citizens to partake in political participation, which is effective in terms of empowerment. Thus civic republicanism could converge with Anderson’s (1999) view that the capability for individuals to participate as citizens has predominant importance for justice.

However there is room to manoeuvre within the capabilities approach. For instance there is an apparent divergence between Sen and Nussbaum regarding the selection of capabilities. As previously stated, Nussbaum (2000; 2003; 2006; 2011) opts for a prescriptive list of capabilities, whilst Sen refuses to endorse such an approach, arguing instead that each society should be able to select and prioritise capabilities itself via public reasoning and deliberation (Sen 2004a,b; Sen 2005; Crocker 2008; Crocker and Robeyns 2009). Despite Nussbaum outlining that her list of capabilities should be implemented at the local level (Nussbaum 2000), Sen’s position relative to hers, illustrates the absence of a detailed discussion regarding the place of what could be referred to as deliberative processes in her work; and similarly, it is unclear from Sen what precisely would be involved in the public-practical reasoning of which he speaks, in arguably quite general terms. Thus the conceptual content regarding this issue can be found lacking in ways highly pertinent to this thesis, which takes its rationale from the
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notion of resilience. Consequently as Chapter 1 catalyses the development of an holistic model, which aims to institutionalise normative-teleological resilience, then the model put forward here would in fact offer capability approaches a more defined toolbox from which to explain how the democratic deliberation of a society’s pertinent capabilities could be achieved, and could thus extend Crocker’s project (2008: Ch. 9-10). Again, due to RCR’s holistic approach, it would go beyond Nussbaum’s “minimal account of social justice” (2006: 71), whose notion of threshold capabilities bears closer resemblance to a theory of negative liberty, in the sense that it stipulates a priori conditions for freedom, rather than a more fully fledged normative civic republican model. The latter may well be able to better accommodate the essence of the critiques of capability approaches, such as Richardson’s (2007) perception that capability approaches cannot adequately capture the institutional and social dimensions of basic liberties. Hence the waters left unchartered by Sen and Nussbaum’s capability approaches, in terms of corresponding to a full theory of justice, leaves many routes of expansion open to this thesis, along the lines of the necessary social and conceptual resources needed to give life to them (Chapter 3 & 4); as well as how they, along with collective responsibility and action, would be institutionalised with respect to the concerns outlined in Chapter 1 (Chapter 5 & 6).

Capability approaches can be used as a device to frame RCR philosophically, but clearly the latter’s principles, concepts and recommendations will be constitutive of its own model, which could help strengthen certain areas of the former approaches. Thus capability approaches may be used as a prism through which to analyse the following RCR model, but will not equate to a representation of the model itself. RCR is similar to capability approaches, as noted above, but also as it does not preclude ‘means’ from having intrinsic value, hence similarly beginning with ‘ends’ (Sen 1992). Whilst capability approaches may look at certain means as intrinsically valuable for achieving a certain end, such as access to medical care and real opportunities for individual flourishing; a civic republican model such as the one put forward here, would likewise posit political participation as an intrinsic means for achieving the end of empowerment and resilience. Whilst procedural liberalism could perhaps accommodate the capability
approaches’ concern regarding the ability of individuals to convert the means accessible to them to certain valuable ends, via mechanisms such as Rawls’ difference principle, the axiomatic prioritisation of the latter approach to basic liberties, arguably accords mere instrumental value to mechanisms that serve to maintain rights, thus excluding the possibility for a problematization of these rights by the common good, diversity of human experiences, and values that thinkers such as Taylor, Walzer, Sandel and MacIntyre insist are constitutive of living a human life in common with others. Hence the door is left open regarding which means can be considered important for achieving certain capabilities, as political participation, institutions conducive to democratic empowerment and self-government, along with social norms, can be perceived as important and intrinsically more valuable than other ‘goods’, such as financial resources which can be protected by certain rights, for example to property. Therefore it could be said that procedural liberalism problematizes individuals functionings, such as their ability to effectively participate in self-government, which can consequently reduce empowerment, and in turn also reduce well-being (Sen 1992).

In terms of the position of this thesis, the history within capability approaches of critiquing Rawlsian liberalism is important. For example Sen (1980) also argues that Rawls’s (1971) primary goods approach fails to account for the diversity of circumstances to which human beings find themselves, and that Rawls’ notion of attending to “normal” cases, in relation to distributive justice, before the “more extreme cases” (Rawls 2001: 176), still leaves out too much of human experience: due again to its focus on means (as opposed to ends) (Sen 1980: 215-6). Thus this reinforces the common thread shared within the literature discussed here, that is, the focus on using critiques of procedural liberalism as a platform for the development of other theoretical approaches (see also Nussbaum 2006), and hence why this thesis, for consistency in terms of the dominance of procedural liberalism, needs to do the same. Yet the critiques levelled at capability approaches from Rawlsian scholars, regarding its practicality in realising and deliberating capabilities politically, as well as the fact that they feel the capability approach equates to the endorsement of one particular conception of the good, or moral view (Kelly 2010; Pogge 2002; Freeman 2006) - which arguably are not
rebutted adequately by Sen and Nussbaum - can in fact be accommodated in the following chapters, which is a sense engages with the same issues but through a different theoretical prism (e.g. Chapter 4 & 5).

In sum, the approaches discussed in this section highlight that although there are schools of thought that make meaningful contributions to the debate at hand, there still remain nuanced gaps in which RCR will be able to carve-out its own space.

Conclusion

This chapter made two claims, the first was that this part of the thesis would discuss how liberty has been articulated since the 17th century, and underline some of its constituent features. The second claim was that within the broad conceptualisations of liberty, lies some elements that can be perceived as problematic regarding the emergent challenges of the 21st century (Chapter 1), and that a tension remains between liberty, interdependence and empowerment. Miller’s ‘tradition’ framework has been useful in illustrating how liberty can be categorised into three main types: liberal, idealist and republican. This type of categorisation supports the notions of theoretical family resemblances, that is, how theories of freedom may be differentiated in one or more ways. Yet it also illustrates that each one cannot fully grasp the key issue of realising political institutions that can attend to increasing systemic interconnectedness and decreasing empowerment.

The liberal tradition is based on a shared normative principle that: (1) promotes individualism, in that individuals are the only real things in society and require protection from external interference; (2) the separateness of persons is therefore evident and must be acknowledged by ensuring equal basic rights; and (3) societies and their institutions should not espouse any common goals or centrally planned conception of the good, rather their sole purpose is to uphold individual rights and promote freedom as independent choice. The laissez-faire economic model and neoliberal paradigm dovetail well with this model. Adopting the view that no one can interfere with another’s life
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does have intuitive appeal. Yet whether the liberal tradition is suitable in a world characterised by increased interdependence combined with increased powerlessness is debateable. Following Bauman (2000), RCR claims that liberty cannot be meaningful if it permits disempowerment, and that increased individual responsibility does not equate to empowerment today. The problematic aspects of freedom as non-interference relates to justifying interference on grounds other than harm, consent or mutual advantage. The complexity of modern societies, which are in part characterised by the whole being more than the sum of the parts, reflects the idea that issues surrounding ‘interferences’ or emergent phenomenon need to be solved collectively. The interrelated nature of production, consumption and the biosphere require whole social paradigms to shift, as disaggregating the contributing factors (and potential solutions) to individuals cannot be easily achieved, such as with climate change.

The idealist (positive) and republican conceptualisations of liberty do broaden the concept, and as such increase its malleability in response to socio-political circumstances. They are helpful as they identify areas of life that could be dominating and disempowering, which may not be strictly classed as interference in the liberal sense. Positive notions of liberty such as Taylor and Miller’s, illustrate how community can be constitutive of liberty and can postulate certain obligations beyond interference that individuals owe one another on this basis. Notwithstanding Berlin’s concerns over positive liberty – such as the diminished place for individual authority, and the overly-paternalistic state that coercively guides its citizens to what it believes is a higher state of enlightenment - realising additional communal obligations politically in a complex world, with the aim of engendering resilient communities, appears to have been overlooked. Similarly, Pettit’s reluctance to move beyond the procedural protection of freedom as non-domination thus falls foul of the same claim. Under the liberal and arguably neo-republican traditions, X’s relation to the state “is wholly instrumental” and based on self-interest (either in promoting non-interference or domination); hence under this scheme, the body politic cannot be an end in itself (Martin 2001: 66).

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49 See also Sandel (1998b) and Mulhall & Swift (1992).
The conceptual problem with negative liberty is that it’s founded upon the perception of the individual, and her rights, as sovereign and prior to any common good. This is problematic when tackling issues that require collective cooperation to solve. The strength of idealist and (neo-Roman) republican traditions is that they can acknowledge more of the nuances and intricacies of human existence that need considering when theorising liberty. Yet theorising an institutional framework capable of attending to all these nuances and rejecting the idea that un-dominated choice is all that empowerment requires in a complex world, seems to stretch non-domination beyond its boundaries. At the other end of the spectrum, the community and capability section demonstrated that liberty can be connected to community in quite distinct and fundamental ways, and basic liberties can include ones that speak to citizens participating in the politics of their communities. Yet as these theories share a different rationale to one in this thesis, such as normative-teleological resilience, and do not all constitute substantive theories, but rather more targeted insightful scholarship, they each again leave nuanced gaps, which a more detailed holistic model could overcome politically and with firmer normative direction.

A further element pertinent to this discussion is the notion of liberty in the digital age. From the proceeding sections it is quite clear that technology, such as the internet, can provide individuals within additional spaces to act unconstrained and without interference, hence arguably increasing their negative liberty. One could also argue that the internet provides a platform for the exercise of positive liberty. However this case is less obvious. For example in the introduction to the thesis several concerns were raised regarding the de facto empowerment that digital technologies actually provide. In addition, the scholarship analysed in the latter section of this chapter also provide strong arguments in favour of the idea that liberty, especially in its positive form, is closely tied, or inherently social. With this in mind, it is questionable whether the internet does in fact provide real opportunities for empowerment, in accordance with Sen’s ‘functionings.’ Whilst internet activities can often have (varying degrees) of social

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50 Despite concerns over government surveillance of the internet, both in terms of securitisation and militarisation (Deibert & Rohozinski 2008; Xu & Dinev 2012).
interaction, in terms of liberty conceptualised internally and in associational form, it perhaps does not represent a sea-change moment, as much of the positive liberty related activities undertaken by individuals on the internet take place outside of ‘thick’ communities, that is those activities that form a part of meaningful and democratically effective deliberation (Sclove 1995), and which have real prospects for empowerment and self-government in the context presented in Chapter 1. Thus the central point here is that although the internet provides opportunities for the exercise of liberty, they occur in an artificial social setting which does not capture the essence of positive liberty, such as that outlined by the thinkers and approaches at the end of this chapter. For instance rational self-development (e.g. Berlin) in a community, or the actualisation of the ‘higher self’ (e.g. Taylor) speaks towards a form of self-realisation that requires the critical enquiry and questioning from fellow citizens that is capable of sparking the question within individuals of what it means to be free (e.g. Taylor). Not only would this be a result of the ‘substance’ of interactions on the internet, but also due to the difficulty in establishing a digital context free from domination (e.g. Pettit). Digital media are profuse with opportunities to commodify internet exchanges such as through targeted advertising and the (unsolicited) production of valuable data generated by individuals on social medial. Hence the internet and other digital media can be tools for the reproduction of power and cultural relations pernicious to positive liberty in the sense expressed by the scholars in this chapter, and that envisioned by RCR. This is perhaps more of a concern given procedural liberalism philosophically underpins contemporary ALDs, which aims to avoid and be neutral towards conceptions of the good and leave capital relatively unconstrained. Thus one conclusion to reach would be that the internet can be a “public good [and] private bad”, yet the former requires substantial checks and balances that may not be feasible at present (O’Loughlin 2010). For example, when a democratically inspired extension of the public sphere has been trialled online, notwithstanding some positive results in overcoming several digital challenges, it remains that such initiatives are proceeding too far in advance of public reality; in that as the public is currently ensconced in an individualised and commercialised culture, realising the positive freedom enabling qualities of the internet are difficult to achieve
at present (Dahlberg 2010; Dahlgren 2006). Therefore it would appear that the jury remains out regarding the connection between liberty and technology.

The lines between the different liberty traditions, and their negative and positive components, are arguably more blurred than presented here, as the work of the “new liberals” could suggest (Simhony & Weinstein 2001: 2). Yet RCR takes the debate forward by concentrating on making choices collectively, rather than independently, and aiming to empower individuals to control the terms in which the choice is made, and thus attend to the fragmentation of the political lifeworld (Rehg 1996: xvii-xix). Under RCR the problem of interference is attended to in a collective and deliberative way, a claim that the remainder of the thesis develops. To begin placing a firmer grasp on the tension between freedom, mutual dependence and empowerment, the thesis now turns to Sandel’s premise, how his critique of procedural liberalism led him towards civic republicanism. This fuels RCR’s principle of civic virtue, and symbolises the first step in engendering de facto empowerment and resilience in ALDs.
Chapter 3 – Conceptualising Resilient Civic Republicanism

Introduction

The conceptions of freedom classified in the preceding chapter have served to frame the theoretical options available for meeting the demands of 21st century political societies (Chapter 1). The thesis now turns to an examination of the theoretical architecture that surrounds the alternative conception of liberty offered by resilient civic republicanism (RCR): the central claim of the thesis being that this approach is a political theory adapted to the contemporary age. Setting out the key premises of Sandel’s scholarship (1998a) is important at this stage, as it presents the conceptual heritage of RCR, including Sandel’s critique of procedural liberalism, which serves to illustrate how this premise can be used to extend Sandel’s scholarship towards resilience, and thus contextualise the exploration of liberty under RCR in the following chapters.31 Secondly, the chapter presents the first key principle of RCR, a revised conception of Sandel’s notion of civic virtue. It is an important tenet of RCR as it underpins the civic aspects of the theory, that is, the kind of character it seeks to cultivate in individuals and the connection this has to the common good (Chapter 4), both of which can theoretically underpin resilient political institutions.

RCR draws on Sandel’s (1998a) conception of liberty, which centres on the notion of freedom as self-government. Society in this case, should be organised (institutionally) with the aim of inculcating in citizens, the qualities necessary for them to govern themselves and other socio-political ‘forces’. Sandel is a republican as his approach supports and is compatible with notions of non-domination (Pettit 1997a), viewing citizens as the authors rather than the subjects of law, and as such, should not be subject to the arbitrary will of any political agent; it is ‘civic,’ as Sandel emphasises the intrinsic value of public political participation, deliberation, citizenship, and ultimately freedom

31 Including how it differs from Pettit’s republicanism (1997, 2012).
as self-government. In addition, Sandel seeks to address controversial moral debates politically, through republican mechanisms such as public forums. This distances Sandel from Rawlsian inspired liberal theories, and also Pettit’s instrumental model of republicanism (McBride 2015). This thesis thus claims that constructing a framework around Sandel’s scholarship, with revisions made, will address the key characteristics that were lacking from the conceptions of liberty discussed in previous chapter, namely individual empowerment and socio-political flexibility (i.e. resilience). The former is acknowledged by Sandel, embodied in liberty as self-government, whilst the latter is not explicitly discussed by him. These two factors are necessities after accepting the premise of this thesis presented in Chapter 1.

Societies of disempowered citizens, albeit free in one sense, still lack the capacities to direct the forces that govern their lives. Therefore they are unable to secure the necessary form of freedom that would enable them to meet the demands of the 21st century, such as climate change (Chapter 6). The latter is helpful as it illustrates how unavoidable interferences in people’s lives can be rendered legitimate under an alternative conceptualisation of liberty. Although ‘progress’ has been made in mitigating these types of challenges at present, the difference with RCR is that new approaches to managing such challenges emerge from an empowered citizenry and shared conception of the common good, as opposed to one that is manufactured and imposed from above.

A manufactured common good is one that liberal democratic states rely on (Masquelier & Dawson 2016: 10; Cole 1920: 150, 6), as they are arguably based on a “false theory of representation” (Cole 1920: 103). Essentially the liberal state has become a “single omnipotent representative assembly” (Cole 1920: 108), as the active citizenship required to count as representation only occurs at the time of elections and thus dissipates afterwards (Cole 1920: 110). Thus combined with the bureaucratisation of the state (based upon furthering economic efficiency) (Cole & Mellor 1918: 25, 36), and its role as an arbiter between “competing interests” (Masquelier & Dawson 2016: 10), it is unable to create a truly (fully inclusive) conception of the common good (Masquelier & Dawson 2016: 10-12). On the contrary, the deliberative and participatory politics RCR advocates, including civic virtue and culminating in freedom as self-government, represents an
adaptive social capability. Such a capability would enable societies to meet emergent challenges more efficiently and in a more satisfactory manner than liberal inspired models, by creating a more emergent common good based on inclusive public deliberation in civic spaces (Chapter 4, 5 & 6). RCR can thus accommodate the holist, interconnected and interdependent nature of the 21st century via collective control, and more inclusive and direct forms of representation. This claim is explicated through this, and the following two chapters.

This chapter begins by presenting Sandel’s premise. Exploring why he comes to defend a form of civic republicanism is important because it demonstrates why his theory is appropriate for this thesis. It also helps to illustrate where the premise of the thesis converges with Sandel’s, for example on the issue of disempowerment, but also how it ventures beyond, into complexity theory for example. The second move is to analyse one central aspect of RCR drawn from Sandel, civic virtue, which is reconfigured using the insights of Thomas Hill Green. This approach of re-framing Sandel’s insights into RCR also helps to collate Sandel’s arguably disparate writings, that is, from the problems he identifies with contemporary societies, to the solutions he provides. Further, it presents the opportunity to address, correct and defend Sandel’s theoretical arguments in a new guise, another novel aspect of the thesis. In brief, this chapter is the first stage in the process of addressing the challenges set out in Chapter 1.

Sandel’s Premise

In Sandel’s central statement on civic republicanism, within his book Democracy’s Discontent (DD) (1998a), he begins by noting a drift in American politics, from what he sees as its traditional republican foundations, to what he calls the procedural republic. The procedural republic has several characteristics, which he associates with Rawlsian liberalism. He argues that the procedural republic, most notably, prioritises the right over the good. By this he means that individuals are conceived as autonomous agents

52 This parallels Cole’s mission (1950: 91).
capable of free choice, and that the right to make a free choice as an autonomous agent, unencumbered by social factors, is central to the liberal freedom the procedural republic seeks to promote. Hence within this framework, individual rights come before public concerns (or the common good) when deliberating about politics, law and justice.

Consequently in the procedural republic the state should remain neutral towards different conceptions of the good life, which creates a politics “that brackets morality and religion” (Sandel 1998a: 24). Sandel demonstrates the move towards this by conducting a legalistic - constitutional analysis of issues surrounding, to name a few, religion (1998a: Ch. 3), abortion, same sex marriage and no-fault family (divorce) law (1998a: Ch. 4). In chapters 5 to 8 of DD, Sandel tracks socio-economic changes from what he terms “political economy of citizenship” to the “political economy of growth and distributive justice” (Sandel 1998a: 231, 242, 250). This essentially is a shift from agrarian forms of manufacturing to large scale industrialisation, which was combined with a nationalising political project that replaced more traditional small scale decentralised communities. Essentially Sandel perceives this change as a catalyst for growing citizen disempowerment, and is thus complementary to the issues raised in Chapter 1, such as the transient nature of capital today and the ‘emptying’ of public spaces.

The consequences of this drift in public philosophy and practice is, as Sandel writes, the growing “fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing control of the forces that govern our lives” (1998a: 3). This statement is particularly important, as its corollary is freedom as self-government. Again it parallels the claims made in Chapter 1, as within the context of contemporary societies, Sandel suggests there exists “the sense that, from family to neighbourhood to nation, the moral fabric of community is unravelling around us” (1998a: 3). This culminates in feelings of “the loss of self-government and the erosion of community - [which] together define the anxiety of the age” (Sandel 1998a: 3). These concerns are pertinent to Sandel and echo the claims of a range of contemporary sociologists (Chapter 1), as he is defending a republican form of liberty that “depends

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53 Sandel states: “By public philosophy, I mean the political theory implicit in our practice, the assumptions about citizenship and freedom that inform our public life” (1998a: 4).
on sharing in self-government” (1998a: 5), something which is being frustrated by the public philosophy of the procedural republic.

Unencumbered selves

One of the central pillars of Sandel’s scholarship, which formed his first major philosophical work (Sandel 1998b), was critiquing Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1999), on the grounds that he used an unrealistic conception of the self to support his theory of justice as fairness. Sandel claims, in-line with the scholars in the community and capability section (Mulhall & Swift 1992), that Rawls, in adopting a “deontological ethic, where the right is prior to the good”, posits the self as prior:

“We are distinct individuals first, and then we form relationships and engage in cooperative arrangements with others; hence the priority of plurality over unity. We are barren subjects of possession first, and then we choose the ends we would possess; hence the priority of the self over its ends”

(Sandel 1998b: 133)

This is a defective formulation for Sandel, as by working through his analysis of both Rawls’ (1999) and Dworkin’s (1997) arguments around the constitution of the self, he argues that when individuals self-reflect on their:

“achievements and endeavours . . . we may come to regard ourselves, over the range of our various activities, less as individuated subjects with certain things in common, and more as members of a wider (but still determinate) subjectivity, less as ‘others’ and more as participants in a common identity, be it a family or community or class to people or nation”

(Sandel 1998b 143)

54 As opposed to prioritising freedom as non-domination.
55 A key point to make here is that Sandel, according to critics such as Phillip Pettit (1998: 47), remains “studiously uncommitted” regarding the connection between self-government and liberty. This is a central issue that Chapter 3, 4 & 5 seek to address, but also sheds light on the lack of substantial definitions offered by Sandel.
56 I cite the second edition published in 1998, the first was published in 1982.
57 I cite the revised edition published in 1999, the original was published in 1971.
In other words he is pointing out a circular element in Rawlsian logic, in that if the individual self is conceived prior to its ends, then any attributes, qualities or character that attach to the individual subsequently will largely be the result of communal influences, as the choices available to an unencumbered self are constructed and conditioned by existing social forces. Hence emphasising the unencumbered self and the ability for individuals to choose, whilst demoting the constitutive effect of community, will result in disjointed societies. Sandel demonstrates that Rawlsian based liberalism can have an alienating effect on citizens, as key components of their identity and conception of the good life are bracketed from politics, which both affect, and are affected by communal forces. Similar to Bellah et al.’s critique of “Lockean individualism”, the problem is that under procedural liberalism the separation between individuals is a given, and entails an atomised, non-relational concept of the self, which is not suited to recognising interdependence, itself a crucial precondition for the formulation of a common good (1992: 112-4). This disconnect is heightened by increasingly interdependent societies, as the actions of others are rarely self-regarding. Subsequently contemporary socio-political institutions are founded on this conception of the atomised self. Therefore institutions meant to represent the common good are forced to manufacture it.

Adopting the perspective of the unencumbered self is consequently not just theoretically incoherent for Sandel, but also problematic for public philosophy in a substantive sense. Essentially it is exclusionary, in that many of the significant attachments that constitute a person’s identity - such as their religion, moral outlook and conception of the good life - are bracketed and thus impoverish the individual, political discourse and political possibilities:

“If the deontological ethic fails to redeem its own liberating promise, it also fails plausibly to account for certain indispensable aspects of our moral experience. For deontology

58 A similar claim could be levelled at Habermas (Johnston 2007).
59 Thinking in terms of interdependence, as opposed to say Habermas’s intersubjectivity (1984, also Giddens 1987: 229), is useful as it acknowledges a deeper level of mutual indebtedness between individuals, in terms of the provision of goods needed for survival, modern economies and the limitations of the notion of self-regarding actions (e.g. climate change).
insists that we view ourselves as independent selves, independent in the sense that our identity is never tied to our aims and attachments . . . no transformation of my aims and attachments could call into question the person I am, for no such allegiances, however deeply held, could possibly engage my identity to begin with”

(Sandel 1998b: 178-9)

This is a problem. For Sandel the costs of regarding individuals as independent of their ends and constitutive attachments are too high, as

“loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are – as members of this family or community or nation or people – as bearers of this history, as sons or daughters of that revolution, as citizens of this republic”

(Sandel 1998b: 179)

It not only makes it difficult to find solutions to the debates he considers in DD, but when a person is “incapable of constitutive attachments . . . without character, without moral depth”, then their “agency and self-knowledge” is limited to such a degree that “no person is left for self-reflection to reflect upon” (Sandel 1998b: 179). This is disempowering for the individual concerned and for her community, as “justice finds its limits in those forms of community that engage the identity as well as the interests of the participants”, thus forgoing the possibility for a “deeper commonality” (Sandel 1998b: 181), which is perhaps deeper than Habermas’ (1984) communicative action that posits individuals as a priori individuated. The latter notion is important for resilience as, in the case of climate change, a predisposition to the common good, or “active citizenship” (Cohen 1989), would help address this challenge.

Hence the problem of the unencumbered self that Sandel postulates within his theoretical premise is similarly an issue for the premise of this thesis, as it prohibits the advancement of a common good. This is because an a priori self is by nature atomised


Arguably for Habermas, universality is abstracted from individual conceptions of the good life. This reflects a Kantian element in his work in that individuals are a priori individuated, and therefore eventually forced to abstract universality from particular interests (Masquelier 2015: Ch. 3 & 4).
(constituent) from a community, and creates the difficulty of communicating a sense of mutual interdependence and indebtedness, which is essential when tackling complex (moral) social and political challenges:

“By putting the self beyond the reach of politics, it makes human agency an article of faith rather than an object of continuing attention and concern, a premise of politics rather than its precarious achievement. This overlooks the danger that when politics goes badly, not only disappointments but also dislocations are likely to result. And it forgets the possibility that when politics goes well, we can know a good in common that we cannot know alone”

(Sandel 1998b: 183)

Dislocations between the self and the political arena in which it necessarily interacts, is not conducive to a politics suitable for the 21st century. Dislocations between these two ‘spheres’ can cause alienation and apathy in political communities, thus breaking the bonds between the elements in the social system. The complexity and interdependence of life today suggests that communities, or systems, need to be adaptive in respect to the emergence of unpredictable and random acts of novelty, whether these be natural disasters or political events such as the fall of the Berlin wall, or the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Thus complexity implies that the formulation of the common good can no longer be manufactured and super-imposed, but rather should be an emergent quality of the interdependence of social systems, a property of the whole that cannot be disaggregated to individual parts. To paraphrase Sandel’s words, an emergent common good is ‘a good we cannot know alone,’ and should reflect the diversity of contemporary communities via inclusive deliberation.62 Hence a politics premised on the unencumbered self is antithetical to the problematic characteristics of 21st century society put forward in Chapter 1. For societies to be resilient, they must be cohesive and flexible. In other words, societies that possess civic virtue (see below), a common good, and institutional mechanisms through which they can be realised, are in a more suitable position to make the compromises necessary to meet, say climate change; at least more than one in which individuals are disembedded and only demand equal respect for

62 This would differ from Habermas’ theory of communication as its remit would include systemic elements, such as the economy and institutional power, that he has been criticised for oversimplifying (Fraser 1985; McCarthy 1991: 152-180; also Habermas 1991). Hence deliberation has intrinsic value in terms of self-government.
individual rights. Moreover, civic activities, such as public deliberation, provide additional lubrication to political machinery, as it is within such agora spaces that a common good can emerge (Chapter 5). As Sandel suggests, the notion of the unencumbered self impacts upon the ability to develop said social capacities. Therefore his theory in this respect seeks to address issues central to the premises of this thesis.

**Voluntarism and the formative project**

Defending a conception of the encumbered self is essential for Sandel, as a means of countering the rising primacy of the unencumbered self mirrored in the political ‘debates’ he discusses throughout *DD*; something central to the book’s project. For example whilst discussing the emergence of wage labour, thus displacing free labour (in the republican sense), he argues that,

“wage labour is consistent with freedom [associated with the procedural republic] . . . not because it forms virtuous, independent citizens but simply because it is voluntary, the product of agreement between employer and employee”

(Sandel 1998a: 171; also 184)

To defend wage labour here then is to say that it is not for public politics to judge individuals on their constitutive attachments or conceptions of the good, but merely perceive them as rational beings capable of free choice. Hence so long as choices are made voluntarily, within a fair framework of rights, then liberty and justice are served in accordance with Rawlsian liberalism. Liberty does not require political participation and deliberation on the scale civic republicanism demands, and even if recognised as important, its value is merely instrumental. As Sandel states, the emergence of the “voluntarist conception of freedom” has informed many aspects of American politics, namely “the notion that government . . . should be neutral towards the values its citizens espouse, and respect each person’s capacity to choose his or her own ends” (Sandel 1998a: 201). This is an inherently appealing mechanism, as it can manage a plurality of values within modern political societies. Sandel points out that this principle was invoked by defenders of the welfare state, whereby providing the “material prerequisites” for human dignity, reflected a desire to respect “people's capacity to
choose their ends” (Sandel 1998a: 201). In other words, the welfare state Sandel references sought to provide citizens with the resources needed to reach the ‘start line’ of modern life, but restrained from shaping the direction of the race. It was posited as way of managing the number of diverse paths that can be run in contemporary society, achieving an overlapping political consensus by bracketing controversial moral debates over citizens’ deep convictions.

If one were to extend the voluntarist conception of freedom to its conclusion, Sandel would arguably envisage a society which can be governed under conditions of concentrated political power, as opposed to notions of dispersed sovereignty that he advocates towards the end of *DD* (1998a: 345). This is plausible, he argues, because “[i]f government could provide a framework of rights, neutral among ends, then citizens could pursue their own values and ends, consistent with a similar liberty for others”; a conception of freedom that does “not depend, as the civic conception [does], on dispersed power” (Sandel 1998a: 278). Given this argument, it can be inferred that what Sandel is drawing attention to is the fact that a society premised on voluntarism could be purely an administrative state, which does not depend on active participation by citizens. Quite to the contrary, individuals could be viewed as merely passive recipients, or consumers of a framework of rights that “respect persons as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their own ends” (Sandel 1998a: 278). This is problematic as it engenders no sense of communal contribution or cooperation, as maintaining freedom as non-interference and choice can arguably be achieved by technocratic central governments, which result in “normative fragmentation[s]” not suited to nurturing the common good (Crouch 2011:180).

There is a parallel here with Habermas’s (1976, 1984, 1989) account of the depletion of individual and societal resources, which can obstruct the encroachment of systemic imperatives mediated by power and money onto communicative resources in spheres where public opinion is formed (Masquelier 2015: 5, 80-1). The state, when conceptualised in line with Sandel’s critique, cannot call on an informed and willing citizenry to help it deliberate and find “normative agreement” regarding common
interests, which would be based on a “discursive dialogue and a commitment to truth”, rather than “persuasion and propaganda . . . [that] opens up the possibility of the exercise of” power and domination (Plant 1982: 351). This could include, for example, deliberating the curtailment of liberties in line with a common good such as security or the environment. In contemporary times, socio-political circumstances change frequently, therefore it is plausible that such amendments will be necessary. Not only is this a problem for the state, which may consequently not track the will of the people, but it also restricts the kind of arguments that can be advanced by citizens themselves. For instance, certain deep convictions of the citizenry, or common goods that fall outside the concern of formal rights, will not resonate as they require a sense of communal interdependence and mutual understanding, and also autonomous self-mastery. It is here that Sandel’s problem with a purely procedure state arises.

With these points taken into consideration, what Sandel means by the “procedural republic” and “formative project” soon surfaces. The “procedural republic” is the “public life” that is informed by a version of liberalism that “asserts the priority of fair procedures over particular ends”, espousing governmental neutrality towards moral and religious issues and “a framework of rights that respects persons as free and independent selves” (Sandel 1998a: 4). The procedural republic is underpinned principally by Rawlsian liberalism (Sandel 1998a: 290; 1998b). Sandel sees this form of liberalism as ascendant, and juxtaposes it against the “formative ambition” (Sandel 1998a: 274), or “formative politics” (Sandel 1998a: 6). The latter is closely linked to the republican tradition by Sandel, who explains that it is “a politics that cultivates in its citizens the qualities of character that self-government requires” (1998a: 6). It is difficult to discern the precise causal factors of the procedural republic’s ascendency, yet Sandel’s diagnosis would seem to attribute it to political divisions that emerged in American society due to changes in economic arrangements and structures of power (Sandel 1998a: 338), notwithstanding the treatment given to this point in Chapter 1.  

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63 In a footnote Sandel also highlights Ronald Dworkin (1978; 1977), Robert Nozick (1977), and Bruce Ackerman (1980) as influential to this form of liberalism.

64 The procedural republic also relates to Berlin’s conception of negative liberty explored in Chapter 2 (Peterson 2011: 11).
Sandel remarks on the rise of “consumption communities” (Boorstin 1973: 89; Sandel 1998a: 222-6) and other globalising factors such as new systemic interdependencies (Sandel 1998a: 202, 206-7, 296, 307), which feature alongside the “erosion of community” (Sandel 1998a: 205, 208). These are again seemingly interlinked, the primary catalyst appearing to be the changing nature of the economy. Citing John Dewey (1926), Sandel states that “modern economic forces liberated the individual from traditional communal ties, and so encouraged voluntarist self-understandings, but at the same time disempowered individuals and local power units” (Sandel 1998a: 204). Thus a convergence between Sandel’s premise, and the one articulated in Chapter 1 becomes increasingly visible, as the ‘processes’ that Sandel identifies amount to a growing sense of individual and collective disempowerment, and what he calls a loss of self-mastery, or capacity for self-government (Sandel 1998a: 202, 275, 294-7). Hence:

The threat to self-government took two forms. One was the concentration of power amassed by giant corporations; the other was the erosion of traditional forms of authority and community that had governed the lives of most Americans through the first century of the republic . . . a national economy dominated by vast corporations diminished the autonomy of local communities, traditionally the site of self-government. Meanwhile, the growth of large, impersonal cities, teeming with immigrants, poverty, and disorder, led many to fear that Americans lacked sufficient moral and civic cohesiveness to govern according to a shared conception of the good life”

(Sandel 1998a: 205)

In sum, Sandel’s premise for defending civic republicanism is multifaceted; he adopts a historical narrative to trace the emergence of the procedural republic and the socio-economic processes that accompany it. Essentially, he notes increasing governmental support of policies that seek to bracket controversial debates and instate a framework of rights that prioritises the individual’s ability to choose their own ends. In addition, a globalising and interconnected economy, which became increasingly dominated by large corporations and economic concentration (Sandel 1998a: 243), helped to sever, or

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65 He again parallels Habermas here.

66 Part of Sandel’s conceptual vagueness concerning civic republicanism can also be related to the narrative he adopts in DD. In Pettit’s words, Sandel’s argument to give up on the procedural republic “is advanced, not by showing the merits of republicanism, but by displaying the weakness of the liberal alternative” (1998: 47).
free individuals from communal ties. Accordingly, it is argued that this greatly diminished the ability for individuals to control their own political and economic destiny (Sandel 1998a: 243). Thus although Americans experienced more connectedness than ever before in the twentieth century, in areas such as economics, communications and transportation, whether “few could comprehend much less embrace as their own the complex scheme in which they enmeshed”, was a looming question (Sandel 1998a: 207). Again drawing on Dewey, Sandel states that,

“the loss of community was not simply the loss of communal sentiments, such as fraternity and fellow feeling. It was also the loss of the common identity and shared public life necessary to self-government”

(1998a: 208)

Consequently this raises the question as to why the loss of the capacity for self-government matters for this thesis. Firstly, Sandel’s model, seeks to empower individuals for the end of self-government, enabling them to take control of the forces that govern their lives, thus directly addressing the questions of increasing interconnectedness, interdependence, and (dis)empowerment (Chapter 1). Yet the more nuanced argument that is beginning to be made in this chapter, is that the ability for self-government that Sandel advocates, also helps build resilience into a complex dynamical system, that is, in ALDs in the 21st century.

Managing complex emergent phenomenon today requires collective action, and simply put, Sandel theoretically outlines the tools that are needed to provide citizens with the resources they need to be effective systemic elements, capable of aligning and reconfiguring their interests with the common good. The self-reflexive aspect of resilience (Introduction), requires certain capabilities to be possessed by citizens, which in turn requires a certain political apparatus to nurture these, such as civic spaces (Chapter 5). As will become clear below, the principles Sandel advocates cultivate flexibility and adaptability within political communities by empowering citizens. Notably these principles can be implemented alongside key liberal precepts such as individual rights, which is important as procedural liberalism does not engender the necessary communicative resources (in the Habermasian sense (1976)) for resilience.
Thus Sandel’s premise, and the theoretical position he develops from this point, are significantly pertinent and appropriate for the thesis.

**A Sandelian Inspired Civic Republicanism**

Critics have pointed out, and rightly so, that it is difficult to ascertain and attribute a precise and applicable theoretical model to Sandel (Allen & Regan, Jr. 1998), no doubt due the historical narrative he adopts in *DD*, and the social critique style of his writing (Walzer 1998: 175). For this reason, the constituent parts of the RCR model postulated below will be a unique interpretation, being adapted in places to accommodate Sandel’s critics and the tensions outlined in Chapter 1. It aims to complement Sandel’s ambitions whilst demonstrating how they help accomplish the overarching goal of the thesis. To these ends the remainder of the chapter is structured around the first distinct theme found in Sandel’s work. However it is notable that some of the distinct concepts discussed in the following sections do not neatly belong in one theme, due to the inherent conceptual crossovers and inter-marrying within civic-republicanism. There are of course crossovers between the concepts discussed here and the following two chapters. Yet notions of civic virtue, self-realisation, common good, rights, and civic spaces each have a distinctly social component, and are discussed sporadically across Sandel’s publications.

An opposing perspective to the procedural republic, according to Sandel, is the Aristotelian conception of the polis:

“any polis which is truly so called, and in not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, a political association sinks into a mere alliance . . . [and] law becomes a mere covenant . . . instead of being, as it should be, a rule of life such as will make the members of a polis good and just”

(Aristotle 1946: Bk. 3, Ch. 9, 119-20; Sandel 1998a: 7)
In this case it becomes necessary for government to cultivate civic dispositions in its citizens, ones that enable them to act as good citizens, which Sandel supports. Following Tocqueville (2003: Vol. 1, Ch. 5) Sandel claims that,

“the republican tradition emphasises the need to cultivate citizenship through particular ties and attachments. More than a legal condition, citizenship requires certain habits and dispositions, a concern for the whole, an orientation to the common good. But these qualities cannot be taken as given. They require continual cultivation. Family, neighbourhood, religion, trade unions reform movements, and local government all offer examples of practices that have at times served to educate people in the exercise of citizenship by cultivating the habits of membership and orientations people to common goods beyond their private ends”

(1998a: 117, italics added)

Thus cultivating certain habits and dispositions serves several central purposes for Sandel’s civic republicanism, namely by helping to educate individuals to be good citizens and to orientate them towards the common good. Civic virtue can be broadly interpreted as “good citizenship, whose principal components are moderation, social sympathy and willingness to sacrifice private desires for public ends” (Will 1983: 134, 19, 24; Sandel 1998a: 310). This principle is a cornerstone of Sandel’s interpretation of republican political theory, “[c]ultivating in citizens the virtue, independence and shared understandings . . . civic engagement requires” (1998a: 274). Hence civic virtue can be simply understood as “a commitment to the common good” (Honohan 2002: 5). Accordingly, within the principle of cultivating ‘good’ citizens, five sub-elements emerge and require further analysis: civic virtue (below), self-realisation (Chapter 4), the common good (Chapter 4), rights (Chapter 4) and civic spaces (Chapter 5).

**Civic virtue**

The first of these is troublesome for Sandel, he speaks often of cultivating civic virtue (1998a: 319), yet only substantiates what exactly the virtues are by citing other authors, and speaks mostly in “generalities” (Pangle 1998: 21). In one paragraph he states that “[c]entral to republican theory is the idea that liberty requires self-government, which
depends in turn on civic virtue” (Sandel 1998a: 126). He then quotes John Adams, who states:

“public virtue is the only foundation of republics . . . [t]here must be a positive passion for the public good, the public interest, honour, power and glory, established in the minds of the people, or there can be no republican government, nor any real liberty”

(Adams 1917: 222)

He also speaks of virtue in relation to economics, in citing Thomas Jefferson’s remarks that the agrarian way of life is best suited to cultivating virtuous citizens, and that “large-scale manufacturing undermines the independence that republican citizenship requires” (Sandel 1998a: 124-5). Furthermore, “[c]ivic virtue require[s] the capacity for independent, disinterested judgement. But poverty bred dependence, and great wealth traditionally bred luxury and distraction from public concerns” (Sandel 1998a: 136).67 It is within these remarks that Sandel leaves clues as to his thoughts on what civic virtue consists in. Themes such as prioritising the common good and independence (regarding a person and her society’s capacity for self-government) seep through Sandel’s discussion.

However Sandel’s general remarks on civic virtue have formed a launching pad for his critics. For example Pangle identifies an extensive list of virtues found in DD, which can be categorised under five broad themes: the common good, republican, economic and household management, individual and religious.68 This wide-ranging list has led

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67 See also pp: 142, 145, 149, 150, 158.
68 The virtues include:
(1) Common good: ‘social sympathy’ and a sense of the rights and wants of others; ‘a positive passion for the public good, the public interest, and “a patriotic sense of union and national identity”
(2) Republican: “obedience [to the law], respect for [lawful] authority, orderliness, ‘equality of station,’ reverence for tradition”, manliness, manly pride, courage, the moral value of the ‘rigours of war’, honor, power, glory
(3) Economic and household management: “honesty, frugality, industry, craftsmanship, simplicity of manners, economic independence, self-sufficiency [such as] the yeoman farmer, the small businessman, and the self-employed craftsman or artisan”
Sandel to be accused of failing to address the specificity of the virtues needed for “multiply-constituted selves” (Connolly 1998: 210). The concerns that this list raises for Pangle can be summarised as: (1) that Sandel inherits a powerful aristocratic component from the civic republican tradition, implying that democracy and equality need to be tempered in order for the most virtuous individuals to lead (1998: 24-5); (2) whether the virtues DD presents are “compatible and harmonious with one another”, and whether they need to be prioritised in order of attainability (1998: 26-7). Yet arguably the critique with the most bite is the following question:

“Are the civic virtues, or republican self-government or participation in deliberative politics, to be understood chiefly as an end, that is, as intrinsically good, because constitutive of human fulfilment? Or is civic virtue to be understood finally and chiefly as instrumental, as a means for protecting and securing subpolitical or transpolitical goods”

(Pangle 1998: 28; Sandel 1998a: 26)

In other words, Pangle charges Sandel with being too vague as to whether the civic virtues he espouses are merely instrumental, such that they are valuable as a means to achieve liberty as non-domination (Pettit 1997a). Or on the contrary, does civic virtue speak to something more transcendental and intrinsic, in which case Pangle suggests Sandel should more fully embrace his reading of Aristotle’s conception of civic virtue, as something that should be seen as a partial constituent of human flourishing, “pointing beyond itself to a virtue that ultimately transcends politics” (Pangle 1998: 29-31). The issues Pangle identifies are no surprise according to Pettit. Whilst supporting many of Sandel's sentiments, Pettit argues that he gives too sparse an account of what the specific republican ideals are that “mandate civic virtue”, “the nature of the virtue they mandate”, and the “nature of the institutions and programs” that would promote and encourage such virtues (Pettit 1998: 45), essentially criticising Sandel’s vagueness.

In Sandel's response to these critiques (1998c), he does offer partial clarification of the issues raised surrounding DD and civic virtue. Firstly, in response to Pangle, he agrees

that he stands a certain distance away from the nature and specificity of the virtues he includes in *DD*’s narrative, and does not explicitly dismiss the aristocratic and ‘manly’ virtues that seem present in the civic republicanism he defends (Sandel 1998c: 324). Sandel replies that the reason for this distance is to illustrate

> “how republican ideals informed political argument through much of [US] history . . . [a]nd if republican ideals set the terms of political discourse, it would be a mistake to assume that they support a single, determinate set of policies”

(Sandel 1998c: 324)

It is not clear that this would completely satisfy critics such as Pangle, Pettit, Orwin or Galston (Allen & Regan, Jr 1998). However it does speak to an underlying theme in Sandel’s narrative, which surfaces more in a following passage: whilst citing a number of republican thinkers that appear in *DD*, Sandel states that

> “all invoked different conceptions of civic virtue and the formative project . . . [s]ome emphasised conservative virtues such as obedience, discipline, and reverence for tradition; others stressed the democratic virtues of active, critically-minded citizens who possessed sufficient economic independence and equality of condition to exercise political judgement and engage in public affairs”

(1998c: 324-5)

As Sandel himself mentions, this illustrates a capacity for republicanism to inform “different political and economic outlooks”, which “is no argument against it” (1998c: 325). It is in fact logical for Sandel to not specify virtues beyond giving broad references, as one of his overarching missions is to bring moral and religious questions back into political debate, hence his critique of the procedural republic (Sandel 1998a: 19; 2012). Therefore mirroring his argument that “a politics of moral engagement . . . is a more promising basis for a just society” (Sandel 2009a: 269). The logic being that the civic republicanism he supports does not prescribe what a just society is *per se*, but offers more a way of conducting politics. For example, he states clearly at the end of *DD* that

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“the civic virtue distinctive to our time is the capacity to negotiate our way among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim us, and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties give rise”

(Sandel 1998a: 350 italics added)

The emphasis on capacity is significant, as it is this aspect of the individual that Sandel seeks to cultivate and foster, and what he believes will, in part, bring about a greater degree of empowerment, which correlates to controlling the forces that govern our lives (Sandel 1998a: 3). Importantly Sandel claims that “liberty cannot be detached from self-government and the virtues that sustain it” (1998a: 323). On this reading it seems implausible that Sandel would be condoning virtues such as the patriarchal family or aristocracy, due to the fact that they can corrupt the common good. This would consequently not be conducive to empowering citizens for self-government as some groups would be excluded from deliberations. Subsequently the reader is led further towards the kind of virtues Sandel would, or does, defend. Yet before outlining these it is pertinent to consider Sandel’s defence of Pangle’s key critique.

In addressing the important question regarding the intrinsic or instrumental nature of civic virtue, Sandel clearly favours the intrinsic Aristotelian version, as opposed to the new-Roman conception that Pettit defends (Sandel 1998c: 325-7). For example Aristotle’s (2009) concepts of eudaimonia, phronesis and perfection surface in Sandel. For Aristotle, the telos of human beings amounts to moral self-perfection (flourishing); it is realised within the polis, which also facilitates the acquisition of virtue (via phronesis); most notably amongst the virtues is justice, where people do things for the right reasons; again this is learnt and eudaimonia amplified, as the case is made that the key purpose of the state is to promote the perfection of its citizens, that is, to promote the good life (Hurka 1996; Aristotle 1946, 2009). Hence “it is political society that makes it possible for individual human beings to live a ‘good life’ [eudaimonia] in the sense of the term” (Burns 2009: 84). As this point is central to Sandel’s republicanism, it is helpful to quote him at length:

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70 This parallels the sentiments (i.e. ability for politicians to compromise) of John F Kennedy (2006).
“The idea that political participation and civic virtue are important only for the sake of maintaining a regime that enables us to pursue our private ends is unlikely to be stable. Unless citizens have reason to believe that sharing in self-government is intrinsically important, their willingness to sacrifice individual interests for the common good may be eroded by instrumental calculations about the costs and benefits of political participation. The strong version of republicanism . . . finds the intrinsic value of political participation in a certain version of human flourishing. Sharing in the governance of a political community that controls its own fate calls forth distinctive human capacities – for judgement, deliberation, persuasion, and action – that would otherwise lie dormant. One need not believe that civic virtue constitutes the whole of virtue in order to view it as an intrinsic good, an essential aspect of human flourishing. While other practices . . . engage other noble faculties and intrinsic goods, the goods at stake in the practice of self-government are of a different kind. For republican politics does not just involve reflecting and deliberating, but doing so under conditions of responsibility for the fate of the community as a whole. This is why civic virtue cannot be fully developed among those who do not live in a political community that controls its own destiny in some meaningful sense”

(Sandel 1998c: 325-6 italics added)

By adopting the standpoint of the intrinsic value of civic virtue and political participation, Sandel distinguishes his conception of republicanism from Pettit’s (Sandel 1998c: 326-7). Although he refrains from specifically stating the civic virtues he supports, it is plausible to assume that the civic virtues he associates with democracy and active citizenship would fit within his intrinsic conception of civic virtue, whereby citizens are in a position to identify and contribute to the common good. Sandel does not deny that both the instrumental and intrinsic conceptions have been present in American politics (Sandel 1998c: 325), but it is the latter that he supports. In other, informal words, civic virtue represents the ‘grease in the wheels’ of the self-governing republic, and as is the case with most machinery, once the parts run dry, they cease to function properly. In Sandel’s case, the inertia surrounding controversial moral debates and the increasing encroachment of market norms in society represent warning lights for the breakdown of the civic republic.

The meaning of the warning lights amounts to an “impoverished political imagination”, which clearly does not address feelings of disempowerment and the lack of individual agency (Sandel 1998c: 328). The problem with the liberalism Sandel attributes to the procedural republic is that it is only capable of encouraging “thin” communal identities, which are unable to sustain the feelings of communal obligation, solidarity and responsibility which, for example, the politics of the welfare state requires (Sandel 1998c:
328-9). It is this argument that speaks directly to the key themes within this thesis. For to take civic virtue as Sandel expresses it - that is “the qualities of character that self-government requires” (Sandel 2005: 10), or as mentioned above “democratic virtues of active, critically-minded citizens who possessed sufficient economic independence and equality of condition to exercise political judgement and engage in public affairs” (1998c: 324-5) – reflects social factors conducive to resilience. This is because when his reluctance to state specific virtues is re-positioned in-line with the capacity for citizens to deliberate meaningfully about the common good (Sandel 2005: 10), then civic virtue finds its ground anchor. In other words, virtues can be considered emergent qualities of deliberation and the self-reflexive learning that takes place as a result, the latter concept being essential to resilience as it directs adaptability in a positive direction (Chandler 2014a, b). Hence encouraging civic deliberation would allow the citizens of a polis to deliberate over the specific virtues they do value and honour, based on inclusive contributions from all members of a community and their considered reflection. For Sandel:

“republican political theory . . . sharing in self-rule . . . involves deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the destiny of the political community. But to deliberate well about the common requires more than the capacity to choose one’s ends and to respect others’ right to do the same. It requires a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake. To share in self-rule therefore requires citizens to possess, or come to acquire, certain civic virtues. [Thus] republican politics cannot be neutral towards the values and ends its citizens espouse”

(Sandel 2005: 10)

This then begins to provide an answer to the ‘generality of virtues’ and ‘instrumentality’ critiques. For Sandel, the nature of civic virtue can be debated in general terms at the level of theory, and is of intrinsic value. This is based on his support of political deliberation and notion of liberty as self-government. These claims are developed below

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71 This is thus similar to Habermas’ public sphere (1989), yet it would not bracket aspects of people’s identity such as those that correspond with inequalities in status (Fraser 1992), or draw distinctions between public and private issues, in that there would be no limits to what is discussed (Benhabib 1992). It would also include informal civic spaces (Chapter 5), such as public parks and transport.
by using T.H. Green’s scholarship. The common good was a central tenet in Green’s political philosophy, and can consolidate and complement Sandel’s notion of civic virtue, and how it represents a resilient quality in societies.

**Premises for addressing Sandel’s limitations regarding civic virtue**

Deliberation is central for RCR, in the sense that there can be a “discursive formation of the public will” (Habermas 1974: 5), which can be essential to addressing the “civil privatization” and “moral individualism” that has become increasingly characteristic of contemporary life (Plant 1982: 345-6; Habermas 1976). Correspondingly for Green, “[a]ll virtues are really social” (1986a: sect. 247, p190). This helps Sandel. Also indebted to Aristotle, Green does not specify virtues. Instead he sets out a framework for virtue, which ‘socio-political acts’ can then be measured against. He explains that:

“Every virtue is self-regarding in the sense that it is a disposition, or habit of will, directed to an end which the man presents to himself as his good; every virtue is social in the sense that unless the good to which the will is directed is one in which the well-being of society in some form or other is involved, the will is not virtuous at all”

(Green 1986a: sect. 247, p. 190)

Therefore civic virtue is a disposition, “to be exercise[d] positively, in some way contributory to social good” (Green 1986a: sect. 248, p.190). As for Sandel, naming virtues does not matter much for Green (Green 1986a: sect. 248, p.191), what matters is that “[t]hey are all determined by relation to social well-being as their final cause” (Green 1986a: sect. 248, p.191). The interesting aspect of Green’s formulation is that virtues are to some degree malleable:

“[Virtuous] activities will take different forms under different social conditions, but in rough outline they are those by which men in mutual helpfulness conquer and adapt nature, and overcome the influences which would make the victims of chance and accident, of brute force and animal passion”

(Green 1986a: sect. 248, p.191)

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72 Sandel could therefore be considered quasi-Habermasian in this sense, notwithstanding fn. 58, 59, 61 and 62.
He expands further on this claim by suggesting that certain civic virtues can have a temporal quality, in that they cannot “go more than a certain distance . . . beyond the conditions of a given age” (Green 1906: sect. 268, also sect. 266, 267, 279). The significance of this quality in Green’s conception surfaces when he discusses virtue in relation to “the Greeks”: he states that “the will to be good” was exercised in a new way when compelled by “new social claims” (Green 1906: sect. 278). Thus apart from arguing that “[t]he conception of virtue is the conception of social merit as founded on a certain sort of character or habit of will” (Green 1906: sect. 246), civic virtues can remain relatively unspecified. Hence as Green again explains:

“when we come to interpret that formal definition of the good, as a realisation of the powers of the human soul or the perfecting of man, which is true for us as for Aristotle, into that detail in which alone it can afford guidance for the actions of, the particular injunctions which we derive from it are in many ways different from any that Aristotle could have thought of. For us as for him the good for the individual is to be good, and to be good is to contribute in some way disinterestedly, or for the sake of doing it, to the perfecting of man. But when we ask ourselves how we should thus contribute, or aspire, our answer is determined by the consciousness of claims upon us on the part of other men which, as we now see, must be satisfied in order to any perfecting of the human soul, but which were not, and in the then state of society could not be, recognised by the Greek philosophers. It is the consciousness of such claims that makes the real difference between what our consciences require of us, or our standards of virtue, and the requirements or standards which Greek Ethics represent”

(1906: sect. 280, italics added)\(^3\)

Therefore for Green, what it means to be virtuous can change with the evolution of a society, in his case Ancient Greek society could not envisage the spectrum of freedoms that 19\(^{th}\) century societies reached. Importantly this is the resilient aspect of RCR’s postulation of civic virtue, in that virtues are malleable to circumstance. This parallels Sandel when he argues that, “[o]nce character formation for the sake of substantive moral and civic ideals is accorded legitimacy, citizens can debate which virtues their community should cultivate and prize” (1999: 212 italics added). The central point is that in contending with contemporary political arguments, “we often glimpse another set of convictions – about what virtues are worthy of honor and reward”, which is Aristotelian

\(^3\) Direct quotes from Green are presented in the thesis in their original language.
in the sense that a just society is one that promotes virtue in its citizens (Sandel 2009a: 9). Yet Sandel’s virtue, arguably following Green, is the ability for individuals to align and contribute to the common good. Therefore cultivating and maintaining the free development of individuals’ faculties, and encouraging citizens toward civic activities that foster a common good, will ultimately begin to secure freedom as self-government, to the contrary of prioritising freedom of choice and non-interference (procedural liberalism). Again following Aristotle, Sandel implies that when it comes to virtues, citizens “learn by doing” (2009a: 197; Aristotle 2009: Book II [1103b], p23).74

Sandel does leave additional clues as to his thoughts on the matter, when discussing Aristotle he states that habit cannot “be the whole of moral virtue”, as new circumstances arise “we need to know what habit is appropriate” (Sandel 2009a: 198-9), for which Aristotle offers “practical wisdom [...] a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to the human good” (Aristotle 2009: Book VI [1140b], p 106). Sandel proceeds further by suggesting that “[p]ractical wisdom is a moral virtue with political implications”, as citizens

“with practical wisdom can deliberate well about what is good, not only for themselves but for their fellow citizens, and for human beings in general. Deliberation is not philosophizing, because it attends to what is changeable and particular. It is oriented to action in the here and now”

(2009a: 199)75

Therefore this approach, closeted within Sandel’s civic republicanism is hugely pertinent to the changing socio-political topography identified in Chapter 1, along with the challenges it brings. Essentially civic virtue of this kind is conducive to resilience, as it provides the ‘grease in the wheels’ for a society to be adaptive to changing political circumstance in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world. Apart from cultivating virtues that are conducive to active citizenship and the common good, others

74 Aristotle’s influence in this respect is also evident in Green (1986a: sects. 247-251, pp: 190-193; 1906: sect. 279).
75 Although Sandel is not explicitly advocating this position personally in this citation (2009), it is consistent with his position in other sources cited earlier in this section, as well as his remarks towards the end of this source, where he states that he favours this approach (2009: 260, 267-8).
can remain unspecified as citizens can deliberate on the merit of different virtues themselves, and in response to changing ‘environmental’ factors such as those associated with globalisation. This conception of ‘open’ civic virtues represents a resilient approach to underpinning socio-political institutions (Chapter 5), as they circumvent the obstacles to representation that are incurred by technocratic governance that rely on a manufactured common good. Critiques of communitarianism, concerning the reproduction and maintenance of existing social values and dominant discourses, would also be checked, as ‘open’ virtues are emergent qualities of deliberation, which under RCR, are necessarily inclusive.

In addition, this conception of civic virtue does not risk undermining autonomy - such as those found in Rousseau’s “unitary and undifferentiated [general] will”, which is thus rendered corrupt by particular interests (Sandel 1999: 214), as it is anchored in a robust conception of the common good and autonomy as self-realisation (Chapter 4). Although Sandel speaks often of the common good, turning to Green for a more thoroughgoing formulation of this, as well as the other concepts above, are useful revisions of Sandel’s model that help address the ‘vagueness’ critique that is often levelled against him.

*Global virtue, resilience and self-government*

The notion of global virtue(s) is a helpful way of (1) illustrating the role of virtue in a global context (Chapter 1 & 6); and (2) further clarifying the resilient character of virtue and how this corresponds to the conceptualisation of freedom as self-government. For RCR, the idea of a global virtue is perhaps best examined in line with a recent publication on the role of virtues in relation to what has been posited as the new ‘technosocial’ world. The claim is that the 21st century, which as witnessed numerous and profound technological advances theorised and implemented in human civilisation, represents a ‘new’ context in which virtues need to consequently be reconsidered (Vallor 2016). Hence the nature of the world Vallor (2016) posits and seeks to carve out a role for virtues within, is essentially a global world, and is thus suitable for this discussion
of potential global virtues. Now whilst Vallor does present a list of “technomoral virtues”, which are those that are “most likely to increase our chances of flourishing together . . . in a new setting: a globally networked and increasingly interdependent human community marked by rapid, complex, and ever more unpredictable technosocial and planetary change” (2016: 119), which are usefully summarised by Curzer (2018: 286), they do take on a fairly familiar appearance. What is pertinent for this thesis, is a more nuanced insight that lies, albeit too implicitly, within her project in relation to her emphasis on the need to cultivate the moral character of individual actors in light of the new technosocial world (Vallor 2016). The claim is drawn out of Vallor’s work and given life by Howard (2018), whereby emphasis is placed not on specific technomoral (or global) virtues per se, but rather cultivating social contexts in which more virtuous individuals can be cultivated.

Howard (2018) is essentially asking Vallor (2016) to take a further step, in the form of putting forward a mechanism that can embed, or institutionalise technomoral virtues such as empathy (Vallor 2016) in members of a community. In his own words, Howard recommends placing focus on the “virtues specific to the well functioning of . . . technomoral communities” (2018: 297), which appears congruent with Vallor’s argument to re-orientate “technology ethics from the questions of the rightness or wrongness of actions to questions about the moral character of the actors” (Howard 2018: 295). One of the key issues in the technosocial world is that it changes in, quite often, unforeseen ways, hence virtues need to take on some malleable quality or be conceptualised as “culturally fluid” (Vallor 2018: 307). Another prominent concern is that technology has a tendency to be opaque, in the sense that it can (un)wittingly camouflage its anti-democratic potentialities (Howard 2018; Vallor 2016; also Sclove 1995). This is therefore why Vallor remarks on the need to develop practices that promote moral attentiveness (2016: 116-7, 150, 173).

Again with technology, the aim is not purely to implement policies that evaluate the democratic credentials of technologies post hoc, but embedding moral-democratic attentiveness within technological “designs”, that is, ones “that can promote human
flourishing” (Vallor 2048: 313). Consequently as Howard (2018: 297, also 300) points out, the question then becomes how communities can be “so constituted as to inculcate, reinforce, and maintain habits of both individual and collective engagement with” moral challenges. For RCR, this question can be reframed by the concept of normative-teleological resilience; as institutionalising resilience, for this thesis, equates to creating the community Howard is asking for. To explain, as “all virtues are civic” (Howard 2018: 298), then they depend on a community for their maintenance: a community that is resilient, in that it is capable of adapting to changes in its environment whilst maintaining its normative direction towards democratic empowerment. It is for this reason that the thesis, following Sandel and the republican and communitarian scholars in Chapter 2, maintains a position contra to procedural liberalism, as it is claimed that it cannot reconcile liberty and empowerment, or produce the virtues (orientated towards the common good) suitable to meeting, in Vallor’s vernacular, technosocial contexts. RCR can incorporate the work of others here, such as Walzer’s (1974) list of virtues that includes participation, civility and tolerance, or Vallor’s (2016) virtue of empathy; yet it does this by positing these as the emergent quality of individuals participating in civic deliberation, along the lines of Aristotle and Habermas’ notion of practical reason, and also following the former’s notion of eudaimonia and Green’s self-realisation (Chapter 4); as opposed to a list of virtues being expounded a priori. Hence RCR would go some way to attending to the issue that both Vallor (2016, 2018) and Curzer (2018) underscore, which regards how to adapt old virtues to meet new technosocial contexts, as these would be amended naturally within the inclusive democratic deliberations that are catalysed by some socio-political change, such as the example discussed in Chapter 6. The notion of normative-teleological resilience thus aligns within this context, and also with Vallor’s maxim that human flourishing should not be sacrificed “on the altar of mindless technical compulsion” (Vallor 2018: 313). In this sense RCR subscribes to a more bottom-up approach, whereby the virtues of perspective and moral attentiveness regarding global issues (Vallor 2016, 2018) can emerge or become amplified through the civic practices of RCR (Chapter 5), and framed within its broader conception of rights, self-realisation and the common good. The propensity for virtues to adapt with the evolution of communities, rather than being a proscribed list, is therefore their resilient
quality, and hence is where RCR goes beyond Sandel and the other scholars discussed in Chapter 2. This claim is also visible in relation to the global dimension of virtue and civic virtues’ connection to self-government.

With regard to global virtue, RCR is both compatible and would support Vallor’s (2018: 314) “‘Star trek’ ethos” model, whereby:

“we might conceive of global public character as a body of norms and skills best suited to collective action in matters that directly impact broad cross-sections of the human family and systems on a planetary scale [i.e. the practices of the interstellar Federation], while leaving more or less intact those local and regional conceptions of the good life that do not themselves impede their members’ [i.e. the individual member planets of the Federation] simultaneous pursuit of global civic character or participation in global civic life”

(Vallor 2018: 314)

What RCR offers in relation to this theoretical postulate, which could be termed a subsidiarity approach to global virtue, will become more visible in Chapter 5 and 6. These chapters present the holistic body of mechanisms, which enable common good issues to be extrapolated from global settings to local ones, and vice versa; and which also facilitate the deliberation that accompanies the tensions that arise between local virtues and global practices. One way of conceiving the RCR model, inkeeping with the language of virtues, could be to deploy the virtue that Howard (2018: 293), in conversation with Vallor, terms “‘Socratism,’ the habit of regularly querying community aims and practices for the purpose of keeping community action focused on the goods internal to community practice, and the goods of the larger communities in which these local communities are embedded.” This is quite similar to Vallor’s (2016: 154-5) own virtue of “technomoral wisdom”

“a virtue in a different sense from the others . . . not [being] a specific excellence or disposition, but a general condition of well-cultivated and integrated moral expertise that expresses successfully – and in an intelligent, informed, and authentic way – each of the other virtues of character that we, individually or collectively, need in order to live well with emerging technologies. Each of the other technomoral virtues find their highest expression when integrated in the actions of a person with technomoral wisdom”

(2016: 154-5)
The point of referencing ‘Socratism’ and ‘technomoral wisdom’ is that they neatly parallel the orientation of RCR, that is, the notion that focus should be placed on promoting normatively-teleologically resilient communities, whose practices will enable the emergence of other virtues suited to the context in which they are required. Again in a similar vein, the Aristotelian virtue of magnanimity “represents a kind of sum of all of the virtues . . . its presence vouchsafes the moral fortitude necessary for confronting the difficult ethical challenges that accumulate as the pace of technological change accelerates” (Howard 2018: 294; also Vallor 2016).

The connections between self-government and RCR’s conception of civic virtue are: (1) sharing in self-government is key arena for the its development (à la Aristotle), as it is a place (Chapter 5) where citizens come together and form a common mind on issues of the day, and where they are empowered to take political actions on matters of concern. Therefore without an underlying conception of liberty as self-government, or even an normative ideal of self-government, makes civic virtue, to put it strongly, redundant, as citizens ‘real opportunities’ (à la Sen) are not guaranteed, as there exists the possibilities for forms of Pettitian domination. Thus the issue of procedural liberalism (Chapter 2) is encountered once more, as citizens, whilst having opportunities to deliberate on political matters and develop civic virtues, lack empowerment within the present socio-political context (Chapter 1). In this sense Howard’s virtue of Socratism would have some use, but if citizens are positioned as consultants in the polis rather than authors of the law, a key normative ideal is missing, empowerment through self-government; (2) self-government under RCR also prescribes other philosophical understandings (Chapter 4) and political mechanisms (Chapter 5) which together constitute an institutionalised resilient system. The resilience of civic virtue, in that virtues are malleable and boundaried by being orientated to the good society (à la Green), depends in turn on a resilient system whereby, say, inclusive democratic-decision making can both feed into and from discussions that bear on civic matters, which means that civic virtue cannot be discussed in isolation, but instead within a larger holistic RCR project, thus making the correction of Sandel’s usage of civic virtue, and its connection to Green, both necessary and uniquely RCR’s; (3) in essence civic virtue has a symbiotic
relationship with self-government, as on one hand civic virtue requires self-government to give it pragmatic normative purpose and provide a means for its cultivation (yet not the only means, see Chapter 5), whist on the other, self-government requires civic virtue in order for the members of a polis to maintain their positive disposition towards the common good, which together is capable of fulfilling the aims of normative-teleological resilience. The latter also illustrates the positioning of RCR alongside the communitarian thought presented in the proceeding chapter, via its compatibility and support of Howard’s (2018: 301) assertion that “all productive human activity, including all scientific and engineering knowledge making, [are] inherently social activities” and thus need to be directed “toward an end”.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has served two key functions, the first was to outline the relevance of Sandel’s scholarship for the premise of the thesis (Chapter 1), by means of evaluating the latter with Sandel’s own starting point, that is, the issues he sees surrounding procedural liberalism. The chapter also introduced a key principle of RCR, civic virtue, and alluded to how this relates to other principles such as the common good. For individuals to be considered empowered and society’s resilient, civic virtue needs to be present and cultivated. Sandel places a large amount of emphasis on this conception, yet he was widely criticised for being vague on the details. To address the critics, and preserve civic virtue’s place in RCR, the chapter drew on the work of T.H. Green which illustrated the communal and deliberative grounding of the concept, and how it can be interrelated to other key principles that will be analysed in the following two chapters, such as the common good (Chapter 4). Hence civic virtue was postulated as an ‘open’ concept, in that it relates strongly to other tenets of RCR, and plays an essential role in promoting resilience by providing individuals and communities with the social resources they require for self-government.

However, before discussing the other tenets of RCR it is pertinent to conclude this chapter by presenting several critiques that will help frame these key concepts. Richard
Dagger draws attention to Sandel’s conception of the (un)encumbered self, autonomy and rights (Dagger 1999a, 1999b; Sandel 1999). Firstly Dagger, although largely sympathetic to Sandel and an advocate of the formative project (Dagger 1999b), charges him with offering a misleading distinction between the encumbered and unencumbered self, which ultimately bears on the concept of autonomy. In simple terms Dagger argues that Sandel’s distinction between the encumbered and unencumbered self is a misnomer, as a key component of the self is the ability to self-reflect on its ends, which requires the self to, to some degree, rise above its encumbrances (Dagger 1999a: 184-195). Consequently a fully encumbered self, unable to self-reflect, would lack autonomy, thus violating a central tenet of liberalism, and more importantly would be unable to function in the civic republic Sandel advocates (Dagger 1999a: 194-5). Dagger, by means of offering a possible solution, suggests that,

“Sandel’s criticism could be aimed at what he takes to be a misconception of autonomy, that stands in need of correction. Sandel might then have his own, republican conception of autonomy – the autonomy of the encumbered self that governs itself in the full awareness of how much it owes to the community that partly constitutes its identity – to offer as a superior to liberal autonomy”

(1999a: 194)

Sandel’s response regarding why he connects autonomy to procedural liberalism is fair, as it reflects a “Kantian claim . . . [, that is] the idea that we should think about justice from the standpoint of persons who abstract from their particular interests and ends” (1999: 213), hence the “priority of the right over the good” (1999: 213). However this does not fully address Dagger’s argument that his “attempt to revive republican self-government itself relies on an implicit appeal to autonomy” (1999b: 216). Sandel’s retort is that the answer “depends on the moral importance of the preferences and desires in question compared to the moral importance of the public purposes that would challenge or override them” (1999: 214). Essentially this involves judging and balancing chosen private interests with the common good. Yet more theoretical depth could be added to

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76 Dagger also questions Sandel’s attribution of the self being prior to its ends to Rawls (Dagger 1999a 187-8), citing an argument put forward by Kymlicka (1989: 52-53), which is endorsed by Rawls (1993: 27, n.29). However as this point falls within the one currently under discussion, is in fact superseded by it, and would take the thesis on a tangential line of theoretical inquiry, it will not be pursued further in this thesis.
Sandel’s response, which would not only buttress his position in relation to Dagger, but would also illustrate how Sandel’s offerings can be taken up by RCR, furthering its resilient qualities. To that end, the thesis now turns to T.H. Green. Although he is not explicitly referred to as a civic republican, it is argued that his conception of self-realisation can form a useful appendage to Sandel’s model with respect to autonomy, the common good, (un)encumbered selves, and their place in RCR.77

77 Yet, Andrew Vincent does claim that Green did develop parallels with civic republican thought in terms of self-realisation and citizenship (2001:209).
Chapter 4 – Liberal Communitarianism

Introduction

This chapter follows directly on from Chapter 3, its primary concern being to explicate three additional concepts within resilient civic republicanism’s (RCR’s) framework. In addition to civic virtue (Chapter 3), RCR also places considerable emphasis on the concepts of self-realisation, the common good and rights. As the previous chapter put forward, these concepts are interrelated and are essential to constructing RCR from its Sandelian base, and in the case of this chapter, the influence it draws from Thomas Hill Green. The conundrum that this chapter aims to solve, is how the end of freedom as self-government can be served by underpinning it with the concepts of self-realisation, the common good and rights, which on the one hand accommodate liberal principles of autonomy and separateness of persons, and on the other, acknowledge the interdependence of individuals and complexity of communities; hence liberal communitarianism. Consequently these concepts aim to forward RCR’s conception of liberty as self-government, which engenders both individual empowerment and democratically organised communal resilience.

Green’s concept of self-realisation is argued to be a useful revision to Sandel in that it acknowledges the central importance of individual self-development, whilst being almost symbiotically connected to his conceptualisation of the common good. It thus reflects what could be regarded as a civic republican conception of autonomy. In brief, Green postulates that every individual has the capacity for self-development, but the route this takes can be different depending on the constitution and life path of each individual, and as such would prohibit an overtly prescriptive or overbearing state. Importantly, community plays a key role in this sense of autonomy. It is through community and the interactions of individuals that this capacity can become actualised, as individuals are not born into a state of nature but constituent of communities. Thus

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78 This claim is referred to similarly as ‘new liberalism’ (Simhony & Weinstein 2001).
it is only by acknowledging interdependencies and the potential for emergent qualities (both individual and communal), that autonomy can have meaning. Consequently as self-development requires community, a dependence exists between individuals regarding their mutual self-realisation. It is here that Green bridges the gap between a liberal conception of autonomy, the civic republican notion of the common good, and the constituent role of community, as essentially self-realisation and the common good are mutually reinforcing. Thus Green provides a more theoretically sound response to Dagger’s critique of Sandel (Chapter 3), which was that he fails to provide a suitable conception of autonomy for his vision of civic republicanism.

A full treatment of the notion of the common good is given in the middle half of the chapter, however it essentially manifests as an “ideal of the good society” based on an ethic of joint individual realisability and mutual indebtedness (or dependence) (Simhony 2001: 71). This formulation of the common good is closely tied to the notion of rights that RCR adopts. Again this is inspired from Green, and is used to address a question that Sandel leaves relatively unexpressed. The claim put forward here is that rights are inherently social. Green’s approach is particularly useful as he demonstrates how rights emerge from the aim to promote mutual self-realisation and the common good. Simply put, mutual dependence in relation to self-realisation, which can only occur within a community, requires communities to bestow rights on individuals that aim to protect and institutionalise a shared sense of mutual self-realisation. This is in part based on his combination of Kant’s community of rights (or kingdom of ends), and Hegel’s community of mutual recognition (Simhony 2001: 77-82; Kant 1948; Hegel 1977, 1991). It regards Kant’s notion of universalism, in that it acknowledges each person as an end in themselves; yet this is attached to an Aristotelian conception of republicanism which enables mutual recognition to be actualised in a polity. Hence it is the conceptualisation of mutual self-realisation and recognition that posits rights as inherently social, as opposed to a priori.

In sum, this chapter demonstrates how the concepts of self-realisation, the common good and rights remain central to RCR, and in the process, addresses several critiques
of Sandel’s thought, such as his vagueness concerning his conception of autonomy and the common good. It also illustrates how institutionalising these concepts within RCR and present-day societies can contribute to empowering individuals, by conceptualising responsibility in collective, as opposed to individual terms. Hence reconfiguring counter-resilient aspects of procedural liberalism. The chapter now examines the first concept, self-realisation.

Self-realisation

Self-realisation is a concept used in philosophy, theology, psychology and other schools of thought, the most neutral definition is the “fulfilment by oneself of the possibilities of one’s character or personality” (Merriam-Webster 2017). T.H. Green unpacks the concept further, considering it to occur when an individual is living in accordance with their “lifeplan” (Simhony 1993: 31). It is the conscious self-direction of one’s will towards activities that show “what he has it in him to be” (Green 1906: sect. 176), by exercising his “capacity of will and reason” (Simhony 1993: 31). More specifically Green explains that,

“[the] will is understood . . . [as] an effort (or capacity for such effort) on the part of a self-conscious subject to satisfy itself: by reason, in the practical sense, the capacity on the part of such a subject to conceive a better state of itself as an end to be attained by action”

(Green 1906: sect. 177)

It is a lifeplan in which “self-satisfaction is habitually sought” (Green 1906: sect. 177), “a habitual disposition to do what is good because it is good” (Nicholson 1990: 122). Therefore self-realisation is the goal of each individual to fully develop their human faculties, or to “fulfil his capabilities and in so doing satisfy himself (Green 1906: sect. 241). Self-realisation can therefore help organise an individual’s life, which is why it “can be understood in terms of a lifeplan”, gaining “coherence and order by the

79 Green (1906 sect. 178) repeats that “[f]or any truest idea of what is best for a man that can guide our action is still a realisation of that capacity for conceiving a better state of himself”. He also states that within what “we call . . . ’practical reason’ – rests the initiative of all virtuous habit and action”.

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(rational) ‘dominant interests’ which organize one’s life in an effort to realize one’s conception of well-being” (Simhony 1991: 306).

Self-realisation can be viewed as a particular form of “self-determination” (Green 1986b: sect. 7), as it is the individual that pursues “worthy objects”, and in this sense determines their own future (Simhony 2005: 128). Notably the objects which an individual can pursue are bound by, and are worthy within two constraints, “that they are neither selfish nor” exploit others (Simhony 2005: 128), and thus respect “the dignity of individuals” (Simhony 1993: 32). For this reason “the direction of a man’s dominant interests” flows towards objects that others can share (Green: 2011 sect. 123; Simhony 1993: 32; Simhony 1991: 307). This thought reflects the autonomy dimension of Green’s theory, by emphasising the need for citizens to foster their individual capacities (Boucher et al. 2005: 98). It is however a complex conception of autonomy that includes space for plurality and community.

Green acknowledges the subtle plural dimension to self-realisation in a passage discussing the difference between the sexes. Within this section he remarks that individuals can only realise themselves through society, “since society is the condition of the development of a personality” (Green 1906: sect. 191). However “[i]t does not follow from this that all persons must be developed in the same way” (Green 1906: sect. 191). He uses the existence of the sexes to illustrate this point, which is that “there must be a corresponding difference between the modes in which the personality of men and women is developed” (Green 1906: sect. 191). On initial reading this statement carries with it concerning gender biased tones, yet this is arguably not the point Green wants to make. It is an illustrative example. Rather he suggests that the “class-distinctions” philosophers have conceived as a priori, were shown to be untenable as society evolved, which underlined how such concepts were constituted through social interactions and changed through time (Green 1906: sect. 191). There is a strong parallel with complexity theory here, whereby multiple micro-level interactions can be uniquely individuating (Olssen 2008; Chapter 1), as new possibilities are opened and closed via individuals’

choices and interactions as they progress through their lives. It is therefore extremely useful that Green acknowledges this point, as it ensures that individual autonomy is acknowledged in his concepts of self-realisation and common good. Essentially the unique individuation of the individual and society is, to some degree, unavoidable. His point is to demonstrate that all human beings have the capacity for self-development, yet differences in “talent and opportunity” would result in one person's self-realisation, or “best position”, being “very different from another” (Green 1906: sect. 191).

Hence Green, perhaps too implicitly, recognises the liberal tenet of the separateness of persons. To the contrary of classic liberal doctrines that rank this as a primary component, it is placed and contingent upon a conception of the common good. The caveat Green attaches, is that society only fulfils its true function when self-realisation is “obtained for all who are capable of it” (Green 1906: sect. 191), and importantly not at the expense of any member. Thus Green conceptualises a version of autonomy based on self-realisation which, as it includes the rational direction of one’s will, should appease critics such as Dagger sufficiently. Furthermore, its connection with the common good enables it to be used as a correction to Sandel and thus deployed within RCR.

Green illustrates the connection between self-realisation and the common good by claiming that,

“human society presupposes persons in capacity – subjects capable of each conceiving himself and the bettering of his life as an end to himself – but it is only in the intercourse of men, each recognised by each as an end, not merely a means, and thus as having reciprocal claims, that the capacity is actualised and that we really live as persons”

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81 The theological references Green makes have been omitted from many of his quotes, such as the one in this quote. This is because they arguably reflect contextual considerations that do not undermine Green’s political theory, despite being prevalent in his early writing; they can also be better reflected by deploying a complexity theory ontology (Olssen & Mace 2016), or a conception of relational holism (Simhony 1991).

82 It is pertinent to note that Green believed that negative liberty had already been established and the task was now to conceptualise the ‘next stage’ of freedom (Green 1911a: 370-1; see also Simhony 1993: 37). Therefore ’autonomy’ in the sense described here is not a replacement for the autonomy associated with negative liberty, but a revision.
Here it becomes evident how Green acknowledges Kant’s conception of autonomy, but attaches it to a significantly thicker conception of the good. This could be considered a ‘new liberal’ conception of autonomy that would work for RCR.\textsuperscript{83} Green acknowledges the notion of mutual dependence, as the self-realisation of one requires the self-realisation of others. It is worth noting here that this conception of autonomy parallels the Habermasian one put forward by Warren, whereby “autonomy in its individual dimension has nothing to do with separateness and anomie”, but with “individuals’ capacities” to critically examine themselves and others, “participate in reasoning processes, and to arrive at judgments they can defend in public argument” (2001: 63).\textsuperscript{84} To further illustrate how Green draws the connection between this, self-realisation and the common good, it is worth quoting him at length:

“Our ultimate standard of worth is an ideal of personal worth. All other values are relative to value for, of, or in a person. To speak of any progress or improvement or development of a nation or society or mankind, except as relative to some greater worth of persons, is to use words without meaning. The saying that ‘a nation is merely an aggregate of individuals’ is indeed fallacious . . . The fallacy lies in the implication that the individuals could be what they are – could have their moral and spiritual qualities - independently of their existence in a nation . . . the truth is that, whatever moral capacity must be presupposed, it is only actualised through the habits, institutions, and laws, in virtue of which the individuals form a nation. But it is none the less true that the life of the nation has no real existence except as the life of the individuals composing the nation – a life determined by their intercourse with each other and deriving its peculiar features from the conditions of that intercourse”

(Green 1906: 184, italics added)

Therefore despite Green placing emphasis on the importance of individual self-realisation (in terms of ‘personal worth’), there is also a strong communal dimension. Self-realisation is developed in a context, that of a community of individuals (producing

\textsuperscript{83} The term “new liberal” is taken from Simhony and Weinstein (2001). It is a different conception of autonomy than that offered by neoliberalism, as it is actualised through the ‘intercourse of men’, for example democratic decision making, and not purely based on free choice, non-interference and a market approach to the distribution of resources.

\textsuperscript{84} Yet RCR’s version is different to Habermas since individuals are not posited as \textit{a priori} sovereign before deliberation, and can in fact be individuated (self-realise) via the process (of interaction).
multiple micro-interactions) which create emergent phenomena (i.e. more than the sum of their parts), such as the ‘nation’. These strong complexity theory overtones are highlighted in the final sentence of the quote above, and Green’s acknowledgement that individuals are “nested in social relations of mutual interdependence” (Simhony 2003: 272).

Another way of explicating the relation of the individual to the common good in-line with Green’s, and from a religious perspective, is the following:

“The common good refers to what belongs to everyone by virtue of their common humanity. The simple definition of the common good is ‘the sum total of social conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their fulfilment more fully and more easily’ (Catechism of the Catholic Church, § 1906). Promoting the common good cannot be pursued by treating each individual separately and looking for the highest ‘total benefit’, in some kind of utilitarian addition. Because we are interdependent, the common good is more like a multiplication sum, where if any one number is zero then the total is always zero. If anyone is left out and deprived of what is essential, then the common good has been betrayed”

(BCEW 2010: 8; also CoE 2015)

The non-aggregative nature of common good is evident in this definition, which can be further explicated by the complex relational aspect of the common good shared amongst individuals, which is clearly visible in Green’s conceptualisation of liberty as mutual self-realisation, underpinned by the common good and community relations. This conceptualisation is applicable to the thesis as it acknowledges a crucial ontological aspect of societies. Chapter 2 underlined the notion that previous theories of liberty often fail to address the tension, often highlighted by emergent phenomena, between interdependence, the (potentially just) role of interference, and empowerment. Within this conceptualisation of self-realisation and the common good, room is left for individual self-development and self-reflection, yet this is regulated by the common good: thus “affirming that . . . realisation and fulfilment can only take place in and

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85 See Simhony’s (1993: 40) interpretation of Green, although she never discusses complexity theory or systemic interconnectedness as theorised in this thesis, the parallel drawn here between Green and this ontological framework arguably represents a logical extension of her insights and analysis.
through society” (Green 1906: sect. 190). Therefore it can be argued that the common good is itself based upon the mutual self-realisation of individuals within communities. To further explore the substance of this claim, Green’s common good needs to be further explicated.

Common Good and the Role of the State

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86 It is prudent to consider Honneth (2014) once more here, as he, similar to Green, uses Hegel as a foundation for his normative reconstruction in Freedom’s Right. This chapter would support several of Honneth’s assertions that pertain to conceptualising liberty, such as: the importance of Hegel’s notion of mutual recognition which is discussed here through the analytical lens of Green; that rigid moral frameworks should be avoided; that the capitalist labour market and consumer culture are indeed problematic for liberty and need to be reconfigured more robustly in-line with democratic precepts (for this thesis’ purposes in relation to freedom as self-government); that individuals’ morality and the ‘public will’ can and should be shaped within the public sphere; and broadly speaking his historical analysis that makes a similar overall diagnosis to that offered in Chapter 1, albeit from a different starting point (Honneth 2014; Rendtorff 2012). Now whilst this may lead Honneth to postulate the institutionalisation of a ‘reflexive’ liberty of sorts, whereby the “[t]he rule of law is a reflexive dimension of the state”, the latter being “based on the legitimation by the people’s sovereignty in a democratic legislation process” (Rendtorff 2012: np), it is a different conception to the one offered in this thesis, and arguably flawed for the following reason: methodologically speaking his historical analysis is too illustrative, looking at the past rather than precisely explicating how the institutionalisation of a more socially attuned version of liberty may be realised in reality today. He argues that liberty should be theorised in legal, moral and social spheres, yet postulating this does not equate to attending to the issue of empowerment and positing citizens as more than consultants who can develop a public will in the public sphere; and in fact to institutionalise empowerment and deliberation more concretely, such as within the economy, and outside the spheres of friends and family that Honneth favours. Hence this position is not deemed resilient enough for use in this thesis. Rendtorff helpfully summarises the foundation of this critique: he points out that “it may be argued that the kind of combination of normative and descriptive analysis that Honneth proposes makes it difficult to advance any real argument of normative, ethical, legal or political theory . . . [the] book is not so much a normative argument as a presentation of some lines of development in modern society” (2012: np). Hence why Honneth’s application of Hegel is not viewed as substantive enough for the argument here concerning RCR and normative-teleological resilience. For instance, “[i]t is not clear how [Honneth’s] focus on individual rights makes the move from negative freedom to positive freedom”, as it “may be argued that the concepts of rights may destroy the possibility of really founding a political community based on the shared interests in the good”; to the point that his “position also becomes nearly neo-liberal” (Rendtorff 2012: np). For this reason, this chapter turns to Green to conceptualise rights in a way congruent with liberty as self-government. Finally, Honneth’s “analysis of economic life and freedom in the market is far from convincing” due to his lack of a strong ‘emancipating force’ in this sphere of life; and that he arguably does not present “anything new in comparison with Habermas” (Rendtorff 2012: np). Consequently, this thesis turns to other scholars such as Green, Habermas himself, and Wolff in chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.
Common good related arguments can be said to “assume that the value of political arrangements and forms of collective organization, along with beliefs about justice and other ethical ideals that hold them in place, must ultimately be explained in terms of their contribution to the well-being and happiness of everyone living within them” (Bird 2006: 33). Sandel often speaks of the common good, yet offers no substantial definition in his work. This may be because he feels it is self-evident, and can be gleaned from the context in which he uses it, such as the references he makes to past republican politicians in American political history in DD. However, as it is argued here that Green’s conception of self-realisation would be a boon for Sandel, it is also necessary to put forward Green’s more thoroughgoing conceptualisation of the common good; to firstly give the discussion above cohesion, and secondly, to demonstrate what it can offer by means of underpinning socio-political institutions within RCR.

Notwithstanding the sentiments above, Green also did not offer a single clear definition of the common good, yet it is far more prevalent in his writings than in Sandel’s, and arguably the central bulwark of his political philosophy (Simhony 2005: 128; Simhony 2001: 71). One helpful summary of his formulation of the common good states that it is

“an ethic of joint realizability which is an ethic of a certain kind of social life: co-operative individual-developing social life or harmonious individual-realizing sociability. The common good emerges as an ideal of the good society: a community of mutually developing individuals, the moral requiredness of which justifies the construction of social order in terms of both justice and citizenship”

(Simhony 2001: 71)

The individual-realising element reflects self-realisation and dependence on others, as it occurs with the acknowledgment of the mutual indebtedness of individuals within a necessarily co-operative community. The construction of Green’s common good has been described elsewhere as follows: to begin, “the common good . . . is common self-realization [exercising one’s human capacities]” (Simhony 2001: 72). Self-realisation is, in contrast to private goods, a “mutual good: no one can achieve self-realization in separation from and independently of others; one’s development is dependent on and is reciprocal with others” (Simhony 2001: 72). This is premised on the “view of a shared
social life” (Simhony 2001: 72; Green 1906: sect. 370, 288), and “on the moral equality of individuals which renders it an inclusive, rather than an exclusionary, ideal” (Simhony 2001: 73). The “‘[c]ommon’ in ‘common good’” is also common in the “distributive”, as opposed to “collective” sense (Simhony 2001: 73). Despite speaking of society as a whole in the collective sense, the good for Green pertains to “each and every member of society individually, though jointly and not separately (Simhony 2001: 73; Green 1986a: sect. 132, 142; 1986c: 199). Therefore the good is central for an individual’s self-development, but this in inextricably bound up, or actualised through society.

Green seeks to transcend two dualisms - “egoism and altruism”, and, “self-love and benevolence” - by basing the common good on an “ethic of joint realizability” (Simhony 2001: 73). This is a quite different approach to those who espouse negative liberty, and a useful extension of the school of positive liberty. It is a framework that is fundamentally grounded by the notion of human interconnectedness, in which “one’s good and the good of others are intertwined”, therefore liberal ethics that aim to rid the individual of interferences and merely promote freedom of choice, which can lead to competitive egocentric behaviour are mitigated, because one individual’s interest in their own self-realisation is not “pitted against one’s interest in the development of others” (Simhony 2001: 73).87

This is the case due to Green’s conception of social interest, in contrast to private interest. Green’s “distinctive social interest” (Green 1906: sect. 191, 200), corresponds to having an interest in others which is “intrinsic rather than instrumental” (Simhony 2001: 74). Social relations in this sense are not merely a means to self-gratification or material advantage, rather an individual’s interest in others is premised on the notion that they are seen as a central part of her own self-realisation (Simhony 2001: 74-5). For this reason the social interest is “neither merely selfish nor purely altruistic, but mutual” (Simhony

87 It is perhaps worth noting that the theme developing here corresponds to Sandel’s (1998b), as well as the other communitarian scholars featured towards the end of Chapter 2, rejection of Rawls’ original position (Mulhall & Swift 1992). The original position, whereby the self can be disengaged or disembodied from a community context, is indeed a misnomer under this Greenian framing, due to the intrinsic role community plays in self-realisation, and also its ability to ‘refine’ or ‘redefine’ the nature of the right.
This is particularly relevant for Sandel and RCR, as Green essentially “rid[s] liberalism of its self-centred individualism”, by rejecting “private society as the ethical core of liberalism”, that is

“see[ing] society as nothing more than a cooperative venture for the pursuit of individual advantage, as an essential private association formed by individuals whose essential interests are defined independently of, and in a sense prior to, the community of which they are members”

(Simhony 2001: 75)

This is an important move made by Green, which is useful for RCR for three reasons: firstly, it postulates the need for republican citizenship, and the relation this creates with the state; secondly, it illustrates how RCR’s adoption of the common good and self-realisation can retain key liberal principles such as autonomy, separateness of persons and pluralism; and thirdly, by grounding the concepts of self-realisation, common good and rights in a fundamental recognition of human dependence, they are well placed to serve resilience. Under resilience thinking, “[b]ehaving ethically in a complex world is to live one’s life as a resilient subject, understanding ethical self-reflection as an ongoing process of work on the self” (Chandler 2014: 202). Both of Green’s conceptions are compatible with the resilience maxim of life and governance being an ongoing process of self-reflection and adaptability, and their normative orientation. He fundamentally acknowledges the implications of the multiplicity of interactions between individuals (the ‘intercourse’ between men) that can create emergent phenomenon, and then seeks to empower citizens, guided by the principle of self-realisation, on this basis. Hence there is a clear affinity between Green’s work and the notion of complexity, which captures the essence of the dynamics of contemporary society (Chapter 1).

The implications concerning the ‘positive’ manifestation of Green’s common good, fall well within Sandel’s ambitions. These relate to “justice and citizenship”, which are required to “structure the social order” under his theorisation of the common good

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88 Simhony comments that this is apparent in Green’s “interchangeable use of social and mutual recognition to explain rights” (2001: 75), highlighting examples in Green (1986a: sect. 25-6, 136, 139).
based on an “ethic of joint self-realisation” (Simhony 2001: 86). Citizenship is key to understanding the connection to Sandel’s civic republicanism. Aristotle is a common influence, citizenship comprising an active role in the maintenance, or “rendering service to” (Green 1906: 263), the state (Simhony 2001: 86). The state for Green is “understood widely as the entire political community or scheme of social relations” (Simhony 2001: 86; also Green 1906: sect. 264). Suitably for Sandel and RCR, Green follows Aristotle by seeing the state as “intrinsically valuable” to promoting the opportunity for mutual self-realisation, through the political practices and mediating institutions that constitute it, importantly as a common cooperative venture in which all citizens share (Simhony 2001: 86). Therefore the state does not have to be one centralised institution.

Again similarly to Aristotle and Sandel, Green places substantial import on active political engagement with the state by its citizens, which cannot occur if individuals view their relation to the state as one where they are merely “passive recipient[s] of [its] protection”, in relation to individual and property rights for example (Green 1986a: sect. 122). Hence Green’s republican sensibilities, which occur once more when “he recognizes the need of the active citizen” (Simhony 2001: 27) to have a stake “in making and maintaining the laws which he obeys”, through mechanisms such as “provincial assemblies” (Green 1986a: sect. 122). Although not explicitly detailed by Green, “provincial assemblies” would function as formal civic spaces (Chapter 5), such as town halls and local government institutions, as Green’s emphasis is on individuals taking an active role in forming law. Thus Green is drawing conceptual links between citizenship, the common good, self-realisation and a federal form of political organisation (Chapter 5), which can be put together within RCR’s framework.

Arguably Green has a demanding approach with regards to citizenship, as it contains many interrelating concepts, which can only converge in a just polity (Green 1986a: sect. 121; Simhony 2001: 87). This highlights an important reciprocal element between the

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89 Simhony (2001: 86-7) uses Taylor (1989) to aid her explanation of Green’s view of citizenship, however this is not essential to the point made here, and has thus been omitted.
citizen and the state, whereby the common good requires pro-active engagement from citizens, whilst the state is simultaneously bound to provide services, or remove obstacles to the mutual self-realisation of its members (Simhony 2001: 87; Green 1906: sect. 191, 184). Therefore “a society of men really free . . . ‘really free,’ in the sense of being enabled to make the most of their capabilities “, needs to be established and maintained (Green 1986a: sect. 248; Simhony 2001: 87). When this is the case, and the state performs its “primary function” of “maintaining law in the interest of all” (Green 1986a: sect. 121), then individuals will acknowledge the intrinsic value of society through the recognition of mutual dependence and support it gives to the notion of mutual self-realisation (Simhony 2001: 88; Green 1986a: sect. 121). Such an identification with a political community would be far more opaque in a night-watchmen state (Chapter 2), from which citizens only demand the protection of rights. Therefore, as resilience requires collective action and cooperation to further self-reflection and social adaptability, then a federal system (Chapter 5) that citizens can normatively identify with, as opposed to say a Nozickian one (Chapter 2), would be more appropriate as mutual dependence would be recognised as underpinning political life. Thus it is important for citizens to see their relations with others and the state as intrinsically valuable.

This is useful in distinguishing RCR from Pettit’s more instrumental republicanism. Yet it does accommodate his concerns with arbitrariness and liberty as “non-domination”, including the notion of the “eye test” (Pettit 1997a, 2012). It does this by retaining a formulation of justice that involves the state performing its “primary function”, of “maintaining the [equal (Green 1906: sect. 258)) rights of its members as a whole or a system, in such a way that none gains at the expense of another (none has any power guaranteed to him through another’ being deprived of that power” (Green 1986a: sect. 132). This claim indicates the compatibility of RCR with Pettit’s republicanism, being founded on Green’s ethic of a common good of reciprocal joint self-realisation.

Green’s common good is compatible with other liberal precepts, in terms of its relation to justice, as the latter is a constitutive element needed to realise the former (Simhony
Similarly to Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism, a substantial proportion of Green’s philosophy is dedicated to ensuring the least well off are provided with the tools necessary for their self-realisation. This “special emphasis on the worse-off members of society illustrates that the good of the common good society is understood in benefit to each and every member of society, not separately but jointly”; hence “the good . . . is a mutual good, such that no member[s] . . . can enjoy their good at the expense of others’ real opportunity” (Simhony 2001: 88). The right is derived from the good, contra Rawls, thus showing that rights are “internal to the common good project such that justice is essential to the realization of the common good society” (Simhony 2001: 89, also 90). The significance of Green’s “justificatory sequence”, is “that normative reciprocity and citizenship [are] . . . ethical requirement[s] of the common good” (Simhony 2001: 89). Here Simhony’s analysis can be extended to claim that justice being internal to the common good would help Sandel and RCR respond to criticisms directed at civic republicanism, for example that it can create unjust communities which may impose certain pre-existing communal values that do not represent the plurality of conceptions of the good present in modern societies. The reciprocal nature of justice, for every member of society, underscores how a state underpinned by RCR could cultivate civic virtue (or take a stake in its citizens), whilst theoretically blocking exploitative and selfish policies, as they would privilege certain members of society at the expense of others. By connecting Green and Sandel’s notion of the common good, its underpinning role in RCR’s conception of liberty as self-government is insulated from the challenge that it dispenses with negative liberty altogether. Rather it can be considered more a reconfiguration, which postulates the common good and collective responsibility as necessary with respect to contemporary challenges (Chapter 1).

Pluralism can also be maintained within this conceptualisation of the common good and self-realisation, as there is a “great variety” of “dominant interests” that can make up an individual’s lifeplan (Green 2011: sect. 123; 1906: sect. 283, 234; Simhony 2001: 90). The number of pursuits available “depend[s] on the stock of social forms”, yet not all are

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90 Simhony (2001: 88) cites Hobhouse (1922: 40n) as a support of this interpretation.
“valuable”, that is, those pursuits that do not contribute to self-realisation (Simhony 2001:90). For example, “habitual pleasure-seeking [the voluptuary] is not self-realizing” nor are any that exploit, oppress, or degrade others (Simhony 2001: 90). Hence many options remain open within these boundaries. The key point is that “the good of self-realization . . . can be achieved only by one’s own effort” (Simhony 2001: 90). Green is indebted to Aristotle regarding self-realisation (1946: 59-61), yet “parts way inasmuch as he denies that it is the role of the state to legislate self-realization” (Simhony 2001: 90). Again this insight can be taken a step further by RCR, as dismantling the idea of the state being separate from its citizens,\(^92\) emphasises the need for understanding responsibility collectively, rather than individually or via a top-down imposition of the common good. As the latter cannot be forced on a person, it can be said to emerge from within a person’s own resources, which consequently requires individuals to partake in more direct forms of democracy and civic life. The role of the state is to remove obstacles to this, or provide services to aid the formation of good (civic) character (Green 1906: sect. 332).\(^93\) Notably this constitutes an extension to the obstacles that Green focused on, such as education (Plant 2006: 30), and represents an evolution in his thought from the context of the industrial revolution to today. Consequently if a citizen’s civic interests required reconfiguring in-line with the common good, it would not appear to the individual as an external imposition, but a collectively self-imposed obligation, hence retaining the notion of empowerment whilst satisfying the liberal precept of individual autonomy. Green states:

“it is the business of the state, not indeed directly to promote moral goodness . . . but to maintain the conditions without which a free exercise of the human faculties is impossible”

(1986c: 202)

There is therefore a balance that RCR needs to strike regarding the role of the state, yet it is essentially posited as a cultivator and promoter of Green’s common good, based


\(^{93}\) An analogy could perhaps be drawn here with the way individuals with drug and alcohol addictions are now being treated, that is with support services as opposed to prohibition and imprisonment. The aim of which is to enable the individual to reconcile the complexities and conflicts within them themselves, in a way that furthers a long-term solution to their issues.
upon mutual self-realisation of its members. Maintaining conditions for self-realisation today would include removing obstacles that obstruct self-government, and cultivating the individual’s skills and dispositions required for this. For example, welfare services that are provided to enable the least well off to pursue a meaningful career in life, should not avoid forming moral character and cultivating virtue (Sandel 1998a: 288-9), as doing so could enfeeble recipients’ ability to partake in self-government. Hence why RCR, following Sandel and Green, would support a politics of moral engagement, which does not necessarily involve legislation. It involves removing obstacles to empowerment in the face of the challenges of the 21st century, by providing civic infrastructure, such as both formal and informal places where the common good can be deliberated and emerge from public political participation; rather than moral conduct being legislated in the first instance. It is this approach that cements the common good with other pillars of RCR, such as the ‘federal’ and ‘dispersed sovereignty’ elements (Chapter 5). Focus remains not on legislating the good life, but removing obstacles to a politics of the common good, by creating more opportunities and incentives for increased political participation and bottom-up initiatives (Chapter 6).94

In the neoliberally globalised world of the 21st century, what is key is the ability for a community to recognise and adapt to socio-political changes, which could impede self-realisation. Consequently, democracy can be represented “as a mechanism to enable the responsive and adaptive capacities already possessed by individuals and communities, as the ultimate decision-makers” (Chandler 2014: 163). Obstacles to self-government, as Chapter 1 demonstrated, have now become more opaque, complex and orientated towards individual responsibility. For example the mobility of capital can make it difficult for individuals to obtain secure employment, as is exemplified with the rise of zero-hours contracts, whereby employers are not obliged to provide work to employees, who are not obliged to take it when offered (Gov.uk n.d.). In addition, individuals could be indirectly discriminated against if they are excluded from contributing to the

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94 This view also connects Green and Sandel, that is via the need to bring and support a politics of moral engagement in the public domain, as opposed to the neutralism associated with procedural liberalism, see Green (1906: sect. 180).
common good, as they could be subjected to the implications of say climate change, without having their interests meaningfully accounted for. RCR can respond to these challenges by adopting Green’s conception of self-realisation and the common good to underpin freedom as self-government. A self-governing republic which possesses these, and the participatory - deliberative infrastructure to realise mutual recognition (Chapter 5), is arguably better placed to identify and find solutions to systemic challenges. Citizens will be predisposed to align their own interests with the common good and understand responsibility in collective terms, if they are able to conceptualise and appreciate their mutual indebtedness with others. They would also be able to retain a sense of empowerment whilst acknowledging the need to, at times, reconfigure their actions to preserve mutual self-realisation. Thus the re-organisation of economic and political life would make the acknowledgement of mutual indebtedness possible, and make such a society more likely to be resilient in light of perturbations occurring within its environment; as opposed to a society that only agglomerates for individual self-interest.

Green’s conceptualisation of self-realisation and the common good also remain useful for addressing Dagger’s critique of Sandel, regarding the (un)encumbered self-distinction, and his lack of cogent statement concerning autonomy. Employing Green has demonstrated that a ‘new liberal’ conception of autonomy is compatible with Sandel’s civic republicanism, as the good remains prior to the right, and autonomy and self-realisation are intrinsically linked to a conception of the common good which suits Sandel. Therefore Green’s theorisation of the common good serves RCR’s conception of freedom as self-government well, by underscoring the importance of promoting an ethic of mutual self-realisation between members of a polity, which will inevitably involve adapting to socio-political challenges that may impede any citizens opportunity for self-realisation. Rights are also a key aspect of preserving this conception of the common good and enabling it to operate alongside freedom as self-government. Considering rights form one prong of Dagger’s critique of Sandel, it is prudent to outline Green’s formulation, illustrating how they again can be considered derivative of the good. This
insulates Sandel from a key area of critique, and therefore provides a useful appendage to RCR.

Rights

Rights refer to “entitlement[s] to act or be treated in a particular way” (Heywood 2004: 185). Green’s social conception of rights explores the relation between the notion of individual ‘entitlement’ and the wider community, and is therefore particularly pertinent for Sandel in relation to the priority of the right over the (common) good. The axiomatic arrangement of these concepts plays a central role in Sandel’s (1998b) critique of Rawls; whilst a priori rights can preserve an important sphere of individual freedom, not connecting to them to a notion of the common good can create difficulties when it comes to addressing systemic problems through collective action, such as mitigating climate change (Chapter 6). The claim is that rights which are deployed to further the end of non-interference, will not be as effective as rights based upon mutual self-realisation, with regard to empowering individuals within today’s societies, themselves characterised by increasing interconnectedness and interdependence. Freedom as self-government requires individuals to possess certain capacities to take control of the forces that govern their lives, which is premised on individuals living in and not being able to extract themselves from communities. In addition, as freedom as self-government relates strongly to resilience, then the conception of rights put forward here also plays are part in this aspect of RCR. It is beneficial to have a conception of rights that is fit for today’s ALDs, but can also subvert potential liberal criticisms that socially derived rights can place individual liberty in danger.

Green’s work is useful as his notion of the common good has an intrinsically Kantian element, thus the common good can be mobilised “within Kant’s own resources” (Simhony 2001: 76). For Green the right is internal to good (Simhony 2001: 75), and connecting this to Kant is the first step in grasping how rights take on their social, as opposed to potentially egoist dimension. To recap, Green revises Kant by placing emphasis on the universalising aspect of reason. By universalising, Green would
suggest, egoism is mitigated as it is essentially grounded by the notions of mutual recognition and respect, that is the respect of the fact that individuals share and are bound by a “common humanity”, which shifts focus from individualism to community (Simhony 2003: 277). It is this element within Kant, “the Kantian community of mutuality”, that not only resonates strongly in Green’s notion of the common good and self-realisation, but his “ideal community of mutual recognition” (Simhony 2003: 277). This is what mitigates the egoism and individualism associated with rights in the negative sense, as “to recognize someone is to acknowledge his or her equal status as being an end to oneself as is, to view others on a moral par with myself” (Simhony 2003: 277). Thus Green is stating that there is a foundational moral equality and reciprocity that exists between all members of a society.

Rights under Green are therefore seen in contradistinction to Hobbes. For the latter, it is in one’s self-interest not to violate another’s rights, as they may well do the same; whereas for Green, the reason that an individual claims rights for herself lies within the notion of mutual recognition of a jointly realising community (Simhony 2003: 278). Hence the key difference between liberty as non-interference and mutually recognised self-realisation. Green reconstituted the nature of rights by placing emphasis on their positive nature, which materialises out of the view that “invoking rights . . . reveals the communal ties of individuals as always equal members in a co-operative social life which rests on appropriate notions of mutuality and reciprocity” (Simhony 2003: 278).

At the core of mutuality and reciprocity is the mutual recognition for self-realisation, for which rights “aim to protect . . . individuals’ basic interest in self-development, [and] importantly institutionalize a sense of shared interest in joint self-development” (Simhony 2003: 278). Thus the view of individuals as rights bearers is the “basis of moral relationships” (Green 1986d: 311).

Rights cannot be purely negative - that is “defences against the intrusions that other persons or the government might try to make into the individual’s sphere of freedom” (Simhony 2003: 279; Taylor 1985: 195) - as non-interference cannot secure the “societal effort [needed] to meet the needs of the weakest members of society” (Simhony 2003: 278).
This is almost the same claim Sandel makes regarding the procedural republic’s ability to generate a common good necessary for the welfare state. In Green’s case, the positive role of the state in enabling self-realisation requires cooperation between its members, which is mediated across multiple social systems and institutions, in contradistinction to one which purely bestows rights to non-interference (Simhony 2003: 279). The foundational right that the state should be enabling is to a “free life” (Green 1986a: sect. 150), or the “capacity . . . for the determination . . . by the conception of well-being as common to others” (Green: 1986a: sect. 151, also 154-5, 207-8). In other words “self-development” (Simhony 2003: 280).

The communal element in Green’s conceptualisation of rights surfaces in his thoughts on punishment, where he considers not merely the violation of an individual’s, say property in relation to theft, but asks “whether the social organisation in which a criminal has lived and acted is one that has given him a fair chance of not being a criminal” (1986a: sect. 189, also 194). Therefore if a society allowed its citizens to starve, then punishing a person who steals a loaf of bread would be unjust. In this case, whether punishment of an individual is just or not depends not solely on the fact that they violated another’s property right for example, but on the whole collection and system of rights that exists within a community. It is only by examining this “community of rights” that one can assess whether each individual has been given a fair opportunity for self-realisation, the reason that rights are institutionalised in the first place (Simhony 2003: 280).

This point is hugely significant for Green’s over-arching philosophy, as although he does not explicitly state it, in certain circumstances the right to not starve can outweigh the right to property; hence the state rectifying this issue by not allowing its members to starve corresponds to upholding “all rights equally” (Green 1986a: sect. 194, also 189; Simhony 2003: 281). From this position Green can thus rid “interference’ of its pejorative associations” (Simhony 2003: 281). Within his own context, at the time of the industrial
revolution, this equated to defending state interference in contract law to improve working conditions, and advocating state provision of healthcare and education, thus a precursor to the welfare state. The logical extension of this precept, regarding the socio-political terrain of ALDs today (Chapter 1), would be an active role of the state, which seeks to enable the self-realisation of each citizen: thus this foundational right has remained the same since the industrial revolution, yet what it may involve in terms of today’s challenges would be rather more nuanced. For example, it may involve promoting civic education, civic spaces, and civic virtue, as these have now become more pertinent to solving issues surrounding neoliberal globalisation and systemic interconnectedness (Chapter 6), which require more than non-interference to mitigate.

Now although mention of the welfare state appears to be compatible with certain forms of liberalism such as Rawls’, the point that aids Sandel and RCR is that Green’s conceptualisation of positive rights is based on mutual recognition. What is particularly pertinent is that to assist the worst-off in society, which is justified by the moral stance of Green’s notion of positive rights, self-realisation and the common good, interfering in the free market and certain actions available to the well-off, for example limiting the number of residences an individual can purchase when there is limited supply, could be permissible (Simhony 2003: 281-2). Thus the welfare state can be compatible with RCR if it emerges from mutual recognition of interdependence and self-realisation. The well-off, whose liberty is arguably being interfered with, will in-fact be equal contributors to the interference, and thus not dominated, or prohibited from exercising self-government. Moreover, the notion of interference with liberty can be flipped from its negative conception to a positive one, as it aims to secure the resources for the mutual self-realisation of all members of society; the argument being, that non-interference in the market (with regard to the property of well-off) in fact counts as an interference with the least well-off’s opportunity for self-realisation (Simhony 2003: 282), thus adding a moral argument to public debates. Considering the dependencies that exist in polities, this approach is also beneficial for the well-off, as life is a complex scheme of social relations in which goods and services require inputs from all members.
The well-off are not being simply used as a means, “as their chance for self-development (their higher well being) is not significantly diminished”; and for the state not to interfere on behalf of the least well-off would be for it to fail in “its just role of protecting all rights equally”, as Green’s “guiding principle . . . is that no-one is justified in receiving resources for higher well-being unless all, and especially the worst off, are secured basic resources” (Simhony 2003: 282). There is a clear departure from procedural liberalism’s axiomatic arrangement of rights, liberty and the good:

“[Green’s] positive rights create community . . . [b]y securing effective mutual dependence between all members of society. Green . . . reconstructed rights both in form and in content. In form, rights are conceptually bound up with mutual recognition which, in turn, connects them with social interest, both of which render rights inseparable from community. In content, positive rights are essential to the creation of an effective community of mutually developing individuals by including the worse off members of society. Positive rights are not about dependence of one group of persons (worse off) on another (well off). Positive rights are about mutual dependence of all members . . . The well off recognise that their obligation to help the needy, as expressed in legislation securing positive rights, is grounded in effective equal rights for all, and acknowledge that society (of which the law is the organized voice) is essential to the equal rights of all, including themselves”

(Simhony 2003: 282)

To speak of rights is thus more than purely an entitlement, it is to acknowledge the connectedness of individuals, who both contribute and benefit from sharing a life in common (Simhony 2003: 283), which requires collective action and cooperation to secure the joint self-realisation of all members of a community, thus Green’s rights are a communal good themselves (Simhony 2003: 283). They can underpin a welfare state in a resilient manner, as self-realisation could be used as a marker, as opposed to a narrower conception of natural rights that may not capture the breadth of implications brought forward by the socio-political challenges of the 21st century. Rights are grounded on a conception of the common good and self-realisation, which is not the axiomatic starting point of Rawls, the key influence of procedural liberalism, nor is it utilitarian. They are normatively significant as they enable, to a significant degree, self-realisation and autonomy, and importantly posit these within a community of mutually developing individuals. It is this that makes Green’s positive conception of rights
conducive to a form of democratically organised resilience that can align the common
good with individual conceptions of the good life.

Rights are grounded in the common good of mutual self-realisation, cooperation and
collective responsibility. Consequently liberty can be retained in a world where
unavoidable interferences to liberty may call on individuals to more strongly align their
private interests with that of the community, as potential curtailments to liberty would
be self-imposed, which fulfils the criterion of liberty as non-domination, while fulfilling
those of liberty as self-realisation. Rights serve the end of joint realisation of all citizens
equally, who share mutual dependencies. Individuals would therefore be empowered
to mitigate systemic events, rather than perceiving that their inalienable rights are being
violated, as they are derivative of their shared life in common with others, and do not
merely exist to preserve a private sphere in which no other can venture. Rights that do
not facilitate equal self-development for all can be subject to public scrutiny and
potentially revised, therefore making them more amenable to changing socio-political
circumstances.

Furthermore, Green’s specific teleological conception of rights is not vulnerable to the
criticism of being

“merely instrumental and therefore morally subordinate . . . [f]or while it is the case that
they are derivative of and relative to the well-being of society (common good), the goal of
society is to enable the development of all its members. Accordingly it should be ‘so
organised that everyone’s capacities have free scope for their development’. Rights, and
particularly positive rights, constitute that organization. This double relation—rights are
derivative of the good of society, the only purpose of which is to enable the self-
development of all its members—may be described as ‘internal teleology’ which aims at
going beyond the abstraction of means and ends”

(Simhony 2003: 285)96

Green’s formulation of rights therefore combines both liberal and communitarian
concerns, they are derivative of community, yet allow scope for individual self-
realisation and a plurality of interests, which largely adheres to liberal conceptions of

96 The internal quotes are from Green (1986a: sect. 171).
autonomy. What is vital to RCR, and why it attaches this to Sandel’s scholarship, is that
Green reconciles the tension between a changing political topography and liberty, by
grounding rights in a conception of community, which is one where individuals are
mutually dependent and self-realising. For example, restricting the types of vehicle
individuals’ can purchase within the context of climate change would be permissible, as
driving uneconomical vehicles can endanger self-realisation (i.e. good health), as a result
of the interdependent nature of social reality today. Hence this grounding serves to
preserve empowerment, as constraints would be self-imposed following individuals’
recognition of their place in community, and that other members play a central role in
their own self-realisation.

**Conclusion**

Why is the tripartite conceptualisation of self-realisation, the common good and Green’s
formulation of rights useful for RCR? Firstly, by utilising the conceptual apparatus of
Green, which girder his own conception of liberty, a Sandelian inspired conception of
the common good, republican autonomy and rights can be theorised, which are linked
by the requirement of being actualised in community. This underlines the resilient
characteristics that underpin RCR’s notion of freedom as self-government. For example
when rights are understood as the outcome of deliberation, as opposed to *a priori*, they
are more malleable to changing circumstances. Therefore freedom as self-government
is now better positioned to serve RCR, having been grown from the seeds of Sandel and
Green’s scholarship.

Secondly, the conceptual amalgamation presented here helps to assuage liberal
anxieties, as RCR now has a conception of rights and autonomy that promotes mutual
self-realisation, without relying on an ‘organic’ conception of state (*À la Hegel*). This
again addresses a weak point in Sandel’s model, by ensuring that the commonness of
his common good is not a danger with respect to merely imposing pre-established
communal values and subsuming the individual into society. Green’s theory of rights is
in fact developed in part through liberalism’s own resources, rather than rejecting all its
central principles such as autonomy and rights. This aligns with Sandel’s concession that it is procedural liberalism specifically, rather than the larger liberal tradition, that he takes issue with (Sandel 1999: 210).

This point correlates with the earlier discussion of capability approaches (Chapter 2). One of the criticisms of capability approaches from a procedural standpoint related to their ability to incorporate a plurality of conceptions of the good life into their model. Here we can see that the theoretical underpinnings put forward in this chapter can offer some help to capability approaches in this regard. Essentially RCR does not need to endorse a particular set of capabilities itself due to its philosophical grounding in mutual self-realisation, yet if such a list such as Nussbaum’s was to be advocated, the theoretical base of RCR articulated here could provide a useful grounding. To actualise the list of capabilities would arguably require some manifestation of them within community institutions, the continued development of an on-going public dialogue, and crucially, a comprehensive understanding of mutual self-realisation to launch the argument. Thus RCR offers a theoretical toolbox that can be drawn on to defend the notion of capabilities. For example, Nussbaum’s ‘control of environment’ capability (Chapter 2) requires justification, as from a procedural liberal standpoint, the presence of a state that allows a plurality of conceptions of the good to flourish (i.e. a state that is neutral), and protects the liberty of individuals to pursue their own conception of the good life by protecting and enforcing negative rights, does not need to take the further step of institutionalising freedom as self-government, as it is philosophically moot from their own viewpoint. Similar claims could be made with respect to, what could be termed, ‘welfare-related capabilities’, as there needs to be some normative argument regarding mutual self-realisation in order to justify political policies and the mechanisms that can aid their implementation and legitimisation. Hence RCR provides the theoretical architecture for capability claims to be propelled and gain some political traction, as it is posited on mutual self-realisation (and the ‘fundamental recognition of human dependence’), which in-turn requires the mechanisms of self-government and the common good to actualise empowerment within the context presented in Chapter 1. This highlights the other aid to capability approaches that RCR can offer, resilience; in
the sense that capabilities would benefit from being malleable or revisable, and thus remain applicable in multiple contexts and time periods. Chapter 3 illustrated the (theoretically) resilient character of civic virtue in relation to its adaptability to circumstance, which can be deployed to serve the revisability criterion of capabilities in the political sphere as well. This chapter has underscored the boundaries to this adaptability in terms of mutual self-realisation and a revised conception of autonomy suitable for RCR; and the following chapter presents more practical mechanisms to institutionalise this form of resilience, one that is congruent with systemic interconnectedness. Similar to Green’s postulation that citizenship and obligations need to be realised in a ‘just polity,’ it could be argued that capability approaches also require this, for which RCR offers a potentially useful blueprint. This blueprint essentially seeks to remove the obstacles to a politics of the common good, on which capabilities, which could be framed in parallel with Green’s socially-derivative rights, also turn. Simultaneously, RCR would also help insulate a critique of capability approaches that could centre on the blurred line of positive and negative liberty on which capabilities sit, and thus are open to the charge of articulating a single, a-contextual, conception of the good and thus violating liberal conceptions of autonomy; as such principles should arguably be subject to democratic deliberation and decision-making themselves. This approach would also help address the limitations of Pettitian republicanism (Chapter 2), such as its inability to account for deep structural issues, which could here be understood in terms of an inability to engender mutual self-realisation, thus supplementing the notion of freedom as non-domination.

As Green’s three key concepts fit Sandel’s ambitions, in that society and active engagement from citizens is more than merely instrumentally valuable (Simhony & Weinstein 2001: 86), RCR’s conception of the common good is more than a mechanism to further private interests, but rather as a matrix of social relations that seeks to enable mutual self-realisation: thus a precursor to liberty as self-government. It is aided by further conceptual similarities between Green and Sandel, most notably that neither prioritise the right over the good. Green’s view is also teleological, in that society exists to ensure every member has the tools required for their own self-development, and that
this is a mutually reinforcing relationship between the activity of the state and the citizen, which underscores the influence of Aristotle in both thinkers. A key implication of the intermarrying of concepts used by these thinkers is analogous to Russian dolls, in that each one is internal to the other, and they cannot be meaningfully discussed in separation. For this reason RCR can be considered a holistic approach, whereby all its principles (Chapter 3 & 5) need to be promoted within a polity for it to be considered resilient (Chapter 6).

In sum, drawing the connections between Sandel and Green in these respects fits the aim of the thesis, as Green’s concepts further individual empowerment, but remain distinct from those offered by procedural liberalism and non-interference. They can aid the justification of a positive state which aims to cultivate and enable individuals to obtain self-realisation. Freedom as non-interference does not go far enough to empower individuals, that is giving them control of the forces governing their life. Although Rawlsian inspired procedural liberalism incorporates what is essentially a welfare component to enable citizens a fair chance of following their own conception of the good life, it falls into the same trap as non-interference, whereby the “lack of concern for the well-being of others, especially in societies where great inequalities of wealth and power exclude many from effective membership” (Simhony 2003: 279). Not only this, but it also does not do theoretical justice to the possibility that constraints to liberty, if self-imposed via collective self-determination, can still be considered an empowered act. Thus citizens remain free when they are capable of self-government. It is this claim that is implicit in Sandel’s work (2012), where he attempts to justify arguments that undermine civic virtue and community, such as the intrusion of market mechanisms into areas not traditionally governed by such norms. Although freedom of choice exists, effective empowerment does not.

Essentially Sandel demonstrates that the gradual replacement of civic republicanism by procedural liberalism is having the effects of undermining civic virtue and the common good, by depleting action based morality in favour of competitive utility maximisation. There is therefore a lack of emphasis on mutual obligations, reciprocity and well-being,
similar to Habermas’s (1976) claim regarding the loss of communal resources (Chapter 3). These principles are not only essential to a mutually self-realising community, but also to communal resilience. Green’s model incorporates a degree of communal flexibility, as although rights are protected, they are not immutable in relation to circumstance, for they are understood as the outcome of communal and sustained deliberations. Essentially as the needs and tools that individuals require to have a meaningful opportunity for self-realisation inevitably change, so does the common good, and so do rights. Yet as Green’s underlying guiding principle is mutual self-development, then these changes will not lead to the kind of abuses and coercive interferences by the state or the majority that worry both liberals and republicans alike.

Now the thesis moves to investigate how the principles of RCR discussed here, can be inculcated and institutionalised within a contemporary polity. To bring these concepts to life in a resilient socio-political institutional model, the latter need to entail opportunities for democracy (that is input from all members), and the cultivation of civic virtue.

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97 Although this thesis retains emphasis on interdependence, rather than Habermas’ mutual understanding and intersubjectivity.
98 This motion takes the thesis beyond Green, who has been criticised for not developing an institutional framework for reconciling rights and common good (Martin 2001).
Chapter 5 – Bringing Resilient Civic Republicanism to Life

Introduction

Jeremy Waldron claims “it is incumbent on any defender of civic republicanism to ponder whether traditional ideals of civic participation can possibly make sense when we shift from the Athenian polis . . . to a continental nation of a quarter of a billion people” (Waldron 1998: 35; Connolly 1998: 206).99 Thus he poses the classic republican critique that its style of politics is only suitable for the small city-state, and has been surpassed by today’s globalised world. To address this challenge and support the central claim of the thesis, this critique will be shown to be unfounded. This chapter will demonstrate that neoliberal globalisation and systemic interconnectedness makes a revised conception of Sandel’s civic republicanism (RCR) necessary, not merely nostalgic (Connolly 1998: 209), and more than capable of operating within the “accelerated tempo of contemporary life” (Connolly 1998: 210). The aim is therefore to illuminate how civic virtue (Chapter 3) and common good (Chapter 4) can be actualised and institutionalised with contemporary ALDs.

Sandel argues that “self-government today . . . requires a politics that plays itself out in a multiplicity of settings, from neighborhoods to nation to the world as a whole” (1998a: 350). Hence what is needed, is to increase or reinvigorate the number of ‘spaces’ where individuals can come together and “bump up against one another” (Sandel 2012: 203). The key principle here is to foster interactions and deliberation between individuals from all demographic groups. As Sandel explains:

“A politics attentive to the civic strand of freedom might try ‘to restrict the sphere of life in which money matters’ and shore up the public spaces that gather people together in common experiences and form habits of citizenship. Such a politics would worry less about the

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99 This also relates to civic virtue (Waldron 1998: 39), which Sandel himself acknowledges (1998a: 338).
distribution of income as such, and more ‘about rebuilding, preserving, and strengthening community institutions in which income is irrelevant, about preventing their corruption by forces of the market.’ It would encourage ‘class-mixing institutions’ like public schools, libraries, parks, community centres, public transportation, and national service. Although such policies might also be favoured for welfare-state liberals, the emphasis and justification would differ. A more civic-minded liberalism would seek communal provision less for the sake of distributive justice than for the sake of affirming the membership and forming the civic identity of rich and poor alike’

(1998a: 333, italics added)

In other words, civic spaces can nurture and catalyse the emergence of the common good through the cultivation of common experiences. The affirmation of communal membership, civic virtue and development of civic character are essential to resilience, as simply put, a cohesive community is an adaptable community (Chapter 6). To illustrate how this capacity can be brought to life, this chapter will firstly elaborate the theory of civic spaces, underlining how individuals encountering one another, and the deliberation they facilitate, can lead to the emergence of a common good. Secondly, it will put forward the federalism principle of RCR, which imbues civic spaces with a tangible source of empowerment through the dispersal of sovereignty. Thirdly, the principles that underline RCR’s standpoint regarding the economy will be outlined. Central here is bringing economic forces under democratic control, thus enabling the economy to contribute to self-government, rather than subverting it. One example would be democratising the workplace. Finally, the chapter provides a detailed account of how freedom as self-government can attend to systemic interconnectedness and the relationship between the local and the global. With regard to the former, it achieves this by addressing the criticisms levelled at Sandel from a complexity theory perspective. Attending to these criticisms maintains the novelty of this thesis, that is, the claim that RCR can accommodate the systemic challenges of the 21st century whilst engendering individual and communal empowerment. This should also dispense with Waldron’s city-state critique. But first, discussion must turn to RCR’s principle of civic spaces, which forms a central pillar of freedom of self-government and is essential to bringing RCR to life.

100 The quotes within this section are from Kaus (1995: 18, 21-22, 96-100). Sandel also cites Walzer (1983) for “[a] political theory based on restating the sphere in which money matters”, and Oldenburg (1989) “[o]n class-mixing places”.
Theory of Civic Spaces

Perhaps the most appropriate way of conceiving civic spaces is to picture them as places where citizens encounter one another, either formally or informally. As Sandel states, these could be “public schools, libraries, parks, community centres, public transportation, and national service” (1998a: 333). As the common good often requires individuals to compromise, that is aligning their interests with others, increasing the number of encounters and deliberations between citizens should help cultivate this aspect of civic virtue. Yet it does of course require a certain ‘infrastructure’, say a town hall or public park.

The reason Sandel sees civic spaces as essential in the contemporary world is that neoliberal globalisation has enabled the market to enter more areas of life than ever before, which crowd out communal norms of reciprocity and the common good: examples include paying children for good grades at school (2012: 51), corporate sponsoring of lifeguards (2012: 190), or betting on people’s life expectancy (2012: 161). The issue Sandel highlights is that money can be used by individuals to buy their stake out of society, and importantly, some of the inevitable compromises that living in a community involve, such as carbon offsetting schemes (Sandel 2005: Ch. 14). Money today can secure a safe, stable and prosperous future for one person (or group), without this being contingent on other members of society’s fate. Sandel remarks that “[a]s rich and poor grew further apart, their sense of shared fate diminished, and with it the willingness of the rich to invest, through higher taxes, in the skills of their fellow citizens . . . . Affluent professionals gradually secede from the public life into ‘homogenous enclaves’ where they have little contact with those less fortunate than themselves” (1998a: 331). Furthermore “[a]s municipal services decline in urban areas, residents and businesses in upscale districts manage to insulate themselves from the[se] effects by . . . [providing their own] private garbage collection, street cleaning, police protection” and so on (1998a: 331; 2009a: 266). In this sense individuals can be seen to

be living increasingly separate lives and not sharing common experiences. It is therefore unlikely that a common good will emerge, as the “public realm [is] not only . . . a place of common provision but also as a setting for civic education” (Sandel 1998a: 332). Public schools for example, should be “places where children of all classes . . . mix and learn habits of democratic citizenship”; and “municipal parks . . . were not only places of recreation but also act as sites for the promotion of civic identity, neighborliness, and community” (Sandel 1998a: 332). Hence civic spaces are incubators for the common good (Chapter 4).

Deliberation and interactions between citizens is therefore essential to RCR and realising the common good. Taylor underlines the role and importance of deliberation for free societies (1998), claiming that “while the . . . procedural [liberal] model sometimes seems the obvious one, even the only one . . . it may in the end be more of a source of discord” (Taylor 1998: 215). This is because the model “does not encourage us to learn about other people’s outlooks. Indeed, it may sometimes seem that the less we know, the easier it is going to be to treat people equitably, because their actual views are so offensive to us that it is hard to ignore them once we come to know them in all their repulsive detail” (Taylor 1998: 215). Thus similarly to Sandel, Taylor argues that procedural liberalism cannot deliver the freedom it promises, as it neglects “a crucial feature of . . . modern political soci[eties]”, that they need to be “deliberative communities” (Taylor 1998: 220). By calling on individuals to abstract from their differences - when deliberating about political debates such as mandatory prayer in schools (Taylor’s example 1998: 216-7) - “modern democratic societies [become] extremely vulnerable to citizen alienation . . . because this alienation delegitimates . . . the very underlying ideas of popular sovereignty” (Taylor 1998: 222). Clearly this would represent a counter-resilient polity, whereby political decisions would rely on a centralised government imposition, which does not equate to empowerment in the democratic sense, that is, a community of individuals making collective decisions. Today’s democratic societies thus require more from their citizens in terms of political participation. Contrary to elites making political decisions, citizens in democratic societies need to form a “decision-making unit” themselves, through which decisions
are made on a consensus, whilst viewing all individuals as “equal and autonomous” (Taylor 1998: 220), in-line with the common good (Chapter 4). For popular sovereignty to work, a “degree of cohesion” is needed to form “strong common identity” and trust in “reciprocal commitments” to carry out “common work” fairly (Taylor 1998: 220-1):

[M]istrust creates extreme tension, and threatens to unravel the whole skein of the mores of commitment which democratic societies need to operate. A continuing and constantly renewed mutual commitment is an essential basis for taking the measures needed to renew this trust”

(Taylor 1998: 221-2)

Deliberation is key to forming an “associative bond” that enables individuals to make necessary accommodations in changing political circumstances (Taylor 1998: 218), which is inevitable considering the mutual dependence and systemic interconnectedness of today’s political communities. The problem with debates underpinned by procedural liberalism is that when complex problems are deliberated on the terms of “one big meat cleaver principle” such as the separation between church and state, then further seeds of alienation are sown (Taylor 1998: 218). When moral and religious views are bracketed, constitutional challenges are all that remain, and this creates a “winners and losers” situation, and as the ‘losers’ demands are delegitimated by this process, without respectful compromise or at least concession to others viewpoint, then it becomes difficult to maintain cohesion in a group and “mobilize the majorities which might have dealt effectively with other, economic and social sources of alienation” (Taylor 1998: 218). Despite procedural liberalism’s apparent complementarity with pluralism, a paradox appears as “a theory which is meant to be based on equal respect ends up offering what many supposed beneficiaries cannot help seeing as the very opposite of respect” (Taylor 1998: 219). This is both a strong challenge to freedom as non-interference, and the value of representative democracy.102 Civic spaces thus offer an alternative form of representation to that of procedural liberalism. The latter is limited by the conditions under which it is formulated, that is, without widespread inclusion and deliberation. Hence the common good under RCR is more

102 See Castiglione (2015) for an analysis of democratic disempowerment and representation.
emergent (Chapter 1), resulting from the interaction and contribution of many individuals. This engenders it with a stronger sense of being bottom-up, the contrary being more akin to a top-down imposition of a manufactured common good, one formulated primarily by elites on the basis of what they take to be in the interests of all. As this is less likely to track the plurality of viewpoints in contemporary ALDs, it is more likely to encounter resistance and thus be less resilient (Chapter 6).

Put simply, deliberation between citizens is a prerequisite for communal solidarity and identity, and is required for a genuine common good to be realised. It enables citizens to begin to understand others’ views, which can lead to a “fusion of horizons, a broader set of basic terms in which the other’s way of being can figure undistortively as one possibility among many . . . mean[ing] that our way too figures as one possibility among many, and this precisely constitutes the revolution in self-understanding” (Taylor 1998: 215-6, also 218-220). RCR can mobilise this argument, by underlining the importance of maintaining civic spaces. These can aid the emergence of the common good, whilst mitigating the tendencies of individualism and atomisation that, say, growing wealth inequalities in the 21st century exacerbate. Green expressed this argument in relation to the provision of state education:

“Common education is the true social leveller. Men and women who have been at school together, or who have been at schools of the same sort, will always understand each other, will always be at ease together, will be free from social jealousies and animosities however different their circumstances in life may be”

(Green 1911b: 457-8)

Both Green’s and Taylor’s arguments help square Sandel’s circle. They draw attention to the dual purpose of civic spaces. Firstly, they facilitate the ‘rubbing along’ together of individuals from different social backgrounds, engendering shared common experiences and importantly the common good. Secondly, they form part of the deliberation, common identity and common understanding that liberal democracies based on conceptions of popular sovereignty depend. Therefore the combination of Green’s common good and Sandel’s notion of civic spaces illustrates the resilience of RCR, as the common good is emergent from a plurality of citizens’ viewpoints, and thus
more genuine than procedural liberal models, which makes societies more congenial to adaption and self-learning. Although it is possible to defend civic spaces from a procedural liberal position, the argument would rest on more instrumental grounds, in-line with Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism. They would consequently neglect the resilient effects of cohesive communities that embody civic virtue and a democratically deliberated common good. For example public schools are necessary inasmuch as they provide a minimum level of education for individuals who cannot pay for education themselves, however for RCR, it is the fact that individuals from different backgrounds are brought together and interact in these spaces that is important. Interactions between individuals from a range of socio-economic groups lead to Taylor’s notion of a fusion of horizons (above) and self-reflection, which can prefigure the common good and resilience. Accordingly these effects would be obstructed if a school enrolled the majority of its students from one socio-economic group, and therefore would not cultivate the skills and dispositions required for the common good to flourish.

Hence RCR enables a certain line of arguments, including those from communitarian and capability scholars, to be made more forcefully than can be afforded by procedural liberalism. For example, increasing public spending on municipal parks could be defended not just because they increase well-being for citizens, but because they can provide a space for common experiences. Limiting the number of private schools could also be defended from a RCR standpoint, as the existence of private institutions enables wealthy individuals to ‘buy out’ their stake out of society, which contributes to children from different economic backgrounds leading increasingly separate lives thus problematising the cultivation of civic virtue. The latter being less acceptable to RCR than procedural liberalism. Similarly to the American associations that impressed Tocqueville, civic spaces can “stem the dangers of anomic individualism” (Warren 2001: 43). Participation in civic spaces, in Mill and Rousseau’s terms, forces individuals to “widen [their] horizons and . . . take the public interest into account” (Pateman 1970: 30). It is for this reason that RCR combines Green’s common good and Sandel’s notion of civic spaces, as the former captures the interdependence of contemporary societies, and the latter helps actualise this notion in a genuinely inclusive manner within
societies. On the contrary, philosophies that permit increasingly anomic, privatising and atomising societies to take hold can be considered counter-resilient. When difficult debates arise, such as climate change, a society where different demographic groups struggle to understand the perspectives of their counterparts, will struggle to formulate a conception of the common good that can engender the communal self-learning and adaption required to meet the challenge. Thus the possibility of empowerment in the face of inevitable interferences with individuals’ conceptions of the good life is kicked into the long grass under procedural liberalism, as the ethic of mutual self-realisation underpinning the common good is missing, and thus requires an imposition of a common good from above to compensate, which may not be a genuine reflection of the citizenry. This approach would also insulate communitarian and capability approaches from the same charge of imposing a common good. Federalism is a key way of capturing an emergent common good, which is also a form of empowerment that is resilient.

**Federalism**

Civic spaces can be formal (e.g. a town hall) and informal (e.g. a municipal park), thus direct political engagement is not a prerequisite for their existence. RCR adopts the notion of freedom as self-government, which draws on Sandel’s interpretation of Tocqueville. The key point is that by decentralising and dispersing sovereignty, that is creating smaller political units, individuals are better able to learn and acquire the skills self-government requires:

“local attachments can serve self-government by engaging citizens in a common life beyond their private pursuits, by forming the habit of attending to public things. They enable citizens, in Tocqueville’s phrase, to ‘practice the art of government in the small sphere within [their] reach’”

(Sandel 1998a: 314)\[103\]

The significance of this kind of ‘federalism’, that is practicing government in small spheres, is that it is capable of institutionalising freedom as self-government. It does this

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\[103\] Internal quotes are from Tocqueville (1945: 68).
by cultivating civic virtue (Chapter 3) and the common good (Chapter 4) in civic spaces that are within the reach of citizens:\textsuperscript{104}

“Town institutions are to freedom what primary schools are to knowledge: they bring it within people's reach and give men the enjoyment and habit of using it for peaceful ends. Without town institutions a nation can establish a free government but has not the spirit of freedom itself. Brief enthusiasms, passing interests, the instability of circumstances may grant the external forms independence but that despotism which has been forced back into the depths of the social fabric resurfaces sooner or later”

(Tocqueville 2003: 73)\textsuperscript{105}

Tocqueville’s conceptualisation of townships is central to RCR, as the participation that takes place within them can provide the environment in which civic virtue and the common good can be nurtured. The persistent nature of deliberation in these spaces also highlights the potential mitigating force RCR can produce in light of unpredictable and changing socio-political circumstances, by ‘checking’ the potential for ‘despotism’ that may arise as a result, hence its resilient quality. A politically astute citizenry that recognises its mutual dependence, will be better placed to recognise and attempt to address emergent challenges, to the contrary of politically apathetic societies in which individuals lead largely separate lives.\textsuperscript{106} Moreover, federalism can also mitigate the intrusion of market-norms into society, which can displace the common good (Sandel 2012).\textsuperscript{107} When money can buy more than ever before, such as the potential to genetically customise children (Sandel 2007), having empowered political units that are within the reach of citizens will enable them to better contend with complex debates, as they can both generate a democratically deliberated common good, and then act upon it. This claim will be illustrated in the following paragraphs, which detail RCR’s inheritance from Sandel’s interpretation of Tocqueville.

\textit{Dispersing power}

\textsuperscript{104} The word ‘federal’ or ‘federalism’ is used to express Sandel’s interpretation of Tocqueville’s description of the America political system in \textit{Democracy in America Vol. 1}.

\textsuperscript{105} This passage is referred to by Sandel (1998a: 25-8).

\textsuperscript{106} This claim is implicit in Sandel’s remarks on Jefferson’s ‘ward system’ (1998a: 348).

\textsuperscript{107} This parallels Tocqueville’s concerns (2003), that in the future, American “[b]usinessmen would emerge as the new aristocracy” (Kramnick 2003: xxxvi).
Tocqueville (2003) describes the American Township system in detail, focusing on the practice of local governance, sovereignty resting with the people, and the effects of administrative decentralisation. According to Tocqueville, part of the new republic’s success derived from the fact that American citizens were largely left to their own devices with regard to governance, which generated feelings of self-reliance in the citizenry: “the efforts of individuals, combined with those of society, often achieve what the most intense and energetic administration would fail to achieve” (Tocqueville 2003: 113). This thought expresses keen republican sentiments, as an overly paternalistic state can effectively represent a beneficent master. It also addressed the issue that governments “are often overly encumbered by bureaucratic structures . . . [and] [in]sensitive to local circumstances . . . given their rule-based and procedural natures” (Warren 2001: 191). Consequently for Tocqueville, individuals will waver “between slavishness and license”, and transform from citizens into subjects (2003: 111).

Subjects, as the constituent elements of a community, are not as resilient as citizens as they are unable to contribute to self-government or “collective judgement” (Warren 2001: 60). Importantly, dispersing sovereignty to formal civic spaces such as town halls, can empower resilient citizens to make change based on their deliberations, thus making communities more adaptable at the local level, by “bringing collective actions closer to the people who seek and are affected by them … [thus] shortening the distance . . . between self-governance and collective action” (Warren 2001: 190-1).

It is worth making a brief aside here, as to why deliberation is essential. Particularly in formal civic spaces such as town halls, deliberation can mitigate against corruption and

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108 This is akin to Pettit’s theory of freedom as non-domination (1997).
109 Although deliberation is arguably a timely endeavour, initiatives such as deliberation days (Fishkin 2009: 29-31) could be implanted within current methods of political scrutiny, such as public reading stages of Bills in the UK (ParliamentUK 2014), which could streamline the process, by distilling the breadth of the publics’ argumentative points before submitting them to the legislature; information could also be sent to citizens before deliberations take place; and in certain situations longer deliberations could be an advantage, when securing more public acceptance of policy would be desirable, such as the UK referendum on its membership of the EU. Additionally, discretionary powers could be devolved to governmental agencies that respond to immanent threats and emergencies.
legitimise political actions. Democracy entails individuals making collective judgements that contribute to self-government (Warren 2001: 63-4). “Referents invoked by participants—whether facts, norms, or inner experiences—come to have political influence only [when] mediated by argument and persuasion”, thus influence is gained when there is “agreement about the validity of statements” (Warren 2001: 66). As Habermas argued, legitimate laws result from an inclusive deliberative process (2008: 103), which emerges from informal and formal communicative arrangements (1996: 184-6, 301, 341). Thus RCR can broadly follow Habermas’s notion of communicative action as a mechanism (1984; 1998: Ch.7, 232), and also the presuppositions he presents for ‘proper’ deliberation (2008: 89). The core argument is that

“communicative rationality underwrites a discursive or deliberative democracy in which preferences are not taken as given or immutable and in which individual needs and public interests can be discovered and debated”

(Dryzek 1996: 146)

The resilience of Habermas’s “epistemic proceduralism” results from its emergence from the democratic deliberative processes, which will respond to present circumstances and are thus not ‘fixed’ as such, whilst cultivating reflexive learning (i.e. adaption) (Habermas 2009). It is here that the ideals of socio-political institutions can be preserved whilst adaption takes place, as they would feature in the scrutiny of public deliberation. Concurrently, when facts or norms are “empowered by coercion or money rather than argued in public . . . [they] lose their qualities of truth, rightfulness or authenticity” (Warren 2001 66-7), which is why a top-down imposition of a common good from a sovereign will appear manufactured. To take the point further, “it is only when power arrangements enable and protect processes of argument and persuasion, and do so inclusively, that politics can be guided by the force of talk rather than by other

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110 Hilmer (2010: 51) also provides a useful summary of deliberative democracy emphasising “rational public deliberation” concerning matters of “common concern”, which involves transforming “private preferences into public claims that pass or fail the test of public assessment”, leading to “legitimate subsequent policies”.

kinds of force”; importantly, “[i]t is only this mode of forcefulness that individuals will not experience as external to self-rule” (Warren 2001: 67, italics added).

It is therefore essential to RCR that “collective decisions are taken away from money and coercive power and toward communicative power or influence”, which often entails transforming “individual judgments” into “public reasoning” (Warren 2001: 67). In this sense, the results of deliberation, a common good for example, are more than the “sum of individual judgements” (Warren 2001: 65), and thus an emergent quality of multiple interactions between individuals. This is again why a top-down imposition of a common good could be less successful, as it is simply less inclusive. There is of course the potential for a similar emergence in a British cabinet meeting, yet the difference is that this involves far less interaction. Consequently it is argued that bringing politics closer to individuals would not only help check corruption, but would also create a democratically deliberated common good. In Tocqueville’s words, when administrative power is locally practiced, it “arouses neither jealously nor hatred because it is closely connected to those it governs and it represents” (2003: 112).

For Sandel, the federalism Tocqueville describes - that is the state consisting of the federal government, state government, and townships – “offers an alternative” political vision to the “sovereign state and the univocal political identities such a state requires” (1998a: 347). By dispersing sovereignty to within close range of citizens, that is giving local communities the ability to administer themselves to a significant degree, whilst preserving the federal government, can be an empowering institutional arrangement as it essentially amplifies the impact of citizens’ ‘votes’. Similarly it would also encourage inclusivity regarding representation, as those who are affected by a ‘vote’ would have easier access to the agora. An example that Sandel (1998a: 334-5) invokes relates to plans to open a Wal-Mart in Greenfield (Massachusetts). In this case local voters defeated plans to allow a hyper-market to be constructed in the town. Another example of the

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112 Similar sentiments are expressed by Habermas (1996: 121) and Arendt (1968: 246).
113 Yet RCR differs from Habermas inasmuch as it is based on the notion that self-realisation is mutually dependent, rather than simply a matter of developing a moral autonomy based on communicative action (as with Habermas).
empowerment that dispersing sovereignty can bestow on individuals occurs in the
management of many apartment complexes.\textsuperscript{114} The key element is the Annual General
Meeting (AGM) that each owner attends once a year. The AGM offers the opportunity
for owners to put forward and then deliberate issues affecting them and the apartment
complex. In many cases direct action can be taken to address these ‘grievances’ as a
result of a vote or deliberation. Thus owners have a real opportunity to take hold of the
forces that are impacting on this aspect of their life. This ‘community’ would be
considered resilient as the members would be self-reflexive and pre-disposed toward
the common good due to the deliberation and participation of members; they would
also be able to take advantage of all members knowledge, and ultimately then adapt to
the environmental change.\textsuperscript{115}

There is room for the Apartment complex example to be extrapolated to larger
communal bodies, such as the Tocquevillian Township or Province, when such agoras
are viewed as one node in a system of deliberative feedback. For example in the UK
system the Parish council would be one node, the county and borough councils would
be others, as would other federalised political institutions in other federal systems of
government. Deliberative feedback would then pass between these nodes (Chapter 6).
Thus the federal principle of RCR could be developed within existing institutional
frameworks, the core argument being that these need to be developed along the
deliberative, and other principles of RCR, without the need to adopt a full-blown
associational approach for example.\textsuperscript{116} To use a Marxian metaphor (Marx 1911), it is
difficult to posit a detailed account of the most appropriate ‘superstructure’ when the
‘base’ of ALDs is largely influenced by procedural liberalism, as opposed to RCR.
Therefore encouraging the principles of RCR to take hold, such as by dispersing
sovereignty to established formal civic spaces and increasing public and private
investment in the promotion of civic spaces, could foster the emergence of RCR and its

\textsuperscript{114} When the owners share the freehold equally, as opposed to being leaseholders.
\textsuperscript{115} It is the principle of this example that is key, as in situations where there are many complex
issues that require deliberations, meetings more often than once a year would be prudent.
\textsuperscript{116} Pateman (1970: 109) makes a similar point regarding the compatibility of a “participatory
industrial system” and a “representative system”, in that “one does not preclude the other”.

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conceptual apparatus, and would also constitute a step towards analysing the efficacy, resilience, and precise details of the ‘superstructure’.

What remains central is that RCR’s principle of federalism, bringing politics within the reach of individuals, would be resilient in and of itself, as it provides the means (i.e. sovereignty and formal civic spaces) for communities to govern themselves. Individuals would also have the opportunity to “learn democracy” and the “rudiments of self-government within a smaller [more accessible] unit” (Cole 1919: 157). These would serve to anticipate resilience for global issues (Chapter 6; Bellah et al. 1992: Ch. 7), as the deliberative and common good principles would be taken from the bottom-up into higher systems of governance, and be checked by a civic orientated citizenry who retain the ability to administer themselves. Hence Tocqueville’s praise for “provincial freedom” resonates strongly in RCR (2003: 115).117 It provides a platform for citizens to practice self-government and thus civic education. It would also address the issues with, for example, President Reagan’s federalism, whereby the proposals “did not address the disempowerment that local communities – and even nations . . . confronted as they struggled to contend with global economic forces beyond their control” (Sandel 1998a: 315).

Disempowerment can also be overcome, as Tocqueville argued, by the mediating institutions in American political society, those between the federal government and the citizen. Under RCR mediating institutions (otherwise termed civic spaces), could again be formal political sites to which sovereignty could be dispersed, such as Parish, local and county councils (UK), institutions typically identified with federalism. Yet they could also be informal, such as worker cooperatives, associations (Warren 2001), or public spaces (parks) and services (public transport). Tocqueville’s thoughts on mediating institutions were notably developed by Robert Putnam (2000), and feature similarly in Sandel. Putnam’s tracing of the collapse of American social capital, or community, parallels Sandel’s complaint that such communal infrastructure that

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affirms membership and forms civic identity are neglected by non-civic minded liberals (Sandel 1998a: 332-3). In his description of the “early republic”, Sandel states that

“liberty was understood as a function of democratic institutions and dispersed power. The relation of the individual to the nation was not direct but mediated by decentralised forms of political association and participation”

(1998a: 27)

Thus within RCR, decentralisation could take the form of the township, yet the notion of institutions is expanded to include informal civic spaces, the criterion being that they bring individuals from different socio-economic groups together to share common experiences, such as public transport. This is alluded to by Sandel, who notes that

“a certain distance between the people and their government was unavoidable, even desirable-provided that distance was filled with mediating institutions that gathered people together and equipped them to share in self-rule. This was the insight that animated the formative project from Jefferson’s ward system to Robert Kennedy’s community development corporations”

(1998a: 305)

Essentially the argument is that distance from government without mediating institutions (formal and informal civic spaces) can limit freedom as self-government, their advantage being the ability to link “the moral resources of community life to the exercise of freedom in the republican sense” (1998a: 337), and thus address citizen disempowerment (1998a: 312, 305, 314). For example ClientEarth prevented the UK government from delaying the release of new environmental policies, the aim of which being to hasten action regarding news that the UK has been in breach of NO2 emissions (Rincon 2017). The linking of moral resources is therefore central to resilience, as RCR would posit this as nurturing the emergence of a genuine common good. Encouraging civic spaces would therefore address the “rising discontent” Sandel identifies; an anxiety concerning

“the erosion of those communities intermediate between the individual and the nation, such as families and neighborhoods, cities, towns, schools and congregations. American democracy had long relied on associations like these to cultivate a public spirit that the nation alone cannot command. As the republican tradition taught, local attachments can
serve self-government by engaging citizens in a common life beyond their private pursuits, by forming the habit of attending to public things”

(1998a: 314)

The holistic nature of RCR is evident here. Federalism and mediating institutions (formal and informal civic spaces), can be strongly connected to Green’s conception of the common good (Chapter 4) and the cultivation of civic virtue (Chapter 3). All principles are mutually reinforcing, which is what constitutes RCR as a framework that goes beyond the key theorists it draws on, and those discussed in Chapter 2. The central point is that

“proliferating sites of civic activity and political power can serve self-government by cultivating virtue, equipping citizens for self-rule, and generating loyalties to larger political wholes. If local government and municipal institutions are no longer adequate arenas for republican citizenship, we must seek such public spaces as may be found amidst the institutions of civil society – in schools and workplaces, churches and synagogues, trade unions and social movements”

(Sandel 1998a: 348)

**Critiques of federalism and some institutional recommendations**

There are several critiques of the federalism RCR supports which require further consideration. Firstly as Sandel asserts, “[t]o accord the political community a stake in the character of its citizens is to concede the possibility that bad communities may form bad characters” (1998a: 321). Although Tocqueville was most impressed with the non-political associations in America (Ryan 2012: 757), they could also foster oppression and contain potential for “local politics [to] reflect . . . all the existing distributions of power, including social, economic and gender inequalities, often reinforced by denser social pressure to function consensually” (Honohan 2002: 239; also Warren 2001: Ch. 5). Hence federalism of this kind “may encourage the development and hardening of particularist loyalties in ‘little republics’” (Honohan 2002: 239). Secondly, and perhaps the most formidable critique of this federal vision, is underlined by Sandel himself:
“even a politics that engaged rather than avoided substantive moral discourse, that attended to the civic consequences of economic inequality, that strengthen the mediating institutions of society . . . would confront a daunting obstacle . . . the formidable scale on which modern economic life is organized and the difficulty of constituting the democratic political authority necessary to govern it”

(1998a: 338 italics added)

This obstacle can be divided into two further challenges, “[o]ne is to devise political institutions capable of governing the global economy”, and “[t]he other is to cultivate the civic identities necessary to sustain those institutions, to supply them with the moral authority they require” (Sandel 1998a: 338). Sandel cites the increasing difficulties of managing the forces of globalisation such as the flows of communication, information, pollution and capital across transnational boundaries, and the simultaneous disempowering of the nation-state (1998a: 338–9). This begs a seemingly obvious question, as Orwin notes, there is a dilemma between Sandel’s call to “retain enough power [in the public] to curb large corporations on not just the national but the international plane, but he [also] wants such public power dispersed rather than concentrated” (1998: 88). Finally, there are also issues surrounding the practicability of “devising effective strategies of the ‘dispersal’ of sovereignty” (Orwin 1998: 88), and whether political participation of the kind Sandel advocates is even realistic:

“[I]t is hard to imagine these changes making much difference to the way that too many of us live now: overworked, overstressed, economically pressed, without deep roots in the places where we live, or the leisure and energy for local citizenship”\textsuperscript{118}

(Orwin 1998: 87)

These critiques can be grouped into two categories, one which contains those arguments that the federalism RCR puts forward could create “bad communities” (Sandel 1998a: 321), being oppressive, parochial, exclusionary and so on. The second group, broadly speaking, questions the practicality of the civic republic in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. Each critique needs addressing for RCR to retain its first R. Bad communities cannot be considered resilient as they cannot foster the common good RCR requires. Additionally, if RCR’s

\textsuperscript{118} In essence Orwin is suggesting that the public already support low consumer prices and the economic and political arrangements that accompany them (1998: 88).
principle of federalism cannot be implemented in practical terms, then the resilience it offers cannot be achieved.

**Bad communities**

To address these critiques, incorporating Honohan’s claims over how mediating institutions need to be framed to remain civic republican is essential. It is necessary to distinguish between what is referred to as “civic society” and “the republican argument for multiple publics” (Honohan 2002: 233). Despite the ability of voluntary organisations such as churches and sports clubs to generate feelings of trust and responsibility within their members, there are three central tenets that make a civil association a republican public space. Firstly, organisations of civil society do not necessarily prioritise “deliberation and publicity”, many “are hierarchical, non-deliberative and operate out of the public eye” (Honohan 2002: 234). Thus many of the institutions that come under the umbrella of civil society, whilst good at generating social capital (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000; Maloney 2008), do not necessarily “lead people to engage with different others or to consider the wider common good” (Honohan 2002: 234; Maloney 2008; Theiss-Morse & Hibbing 2005). Hence these spaces lack the republican emphasis on inclusive “exchanges of opinion and deliberation about common concern in public between those who are different” (Honohan 2002: 234; Warren 2001: 80), which is essential to resilience.

Secondly, civil society institutions, in comparison to republican publics, draw a sharper distinction between the public and private realm. Thus “[i]nvoking civil society often constitutes a libertarian claim that its constituents are independent and properly free of interference by government, and that aims to bring about the retreat of the state” (Honohan 2002: 234). As Honohan underlines, Tocqueville viewed political institutions as a catalyst for civic and social activity. Hence “plural public spaces” in the civic republican sense, are best perceived as a continuation of “processes of formal-

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decision making and the state, recognising that these are mutually implicated” (Honohan 2002: 234). The role of the state is thus important in nurturing the principles of RCR, such as civic spaces and the common good, and as such constitutes an empowering element in socio-political relations and that should not be dispensed with. Considering that liberty is conceived as self-government under RCR, it is logical to therefore embrace the mutual indebtedness that exists in the relation between mediating institutions and the state. Therefore RCR would maintain a place for a federal government, as it can deliver quick political responses to emergencies, for example security and defence; and also supplement a democratically deliberated common good, which would then underlie formal and informal civic spaces, providing the systemic tapestry for the nodes (civic spaces) to attach to. This would help mitigate institutions pursuing private interests, if there was no federal government or nation-state, and could also posit the state as a norm entrepreneur (Chapter 6). The interaction between the state and civic spaces would also act as a feedback loop. The common good, although emergent from the bottom-up, would percolate into higher levels of governance (Chapter 6), as a result of “state-associated sites” experiencing “deliberative institutional innovations” such as “public inquiries” and “policy dialogue” (Dryzek 1996: 149), which would influence other vertically connected civic spaces. Additionally, similar instances of innovation regarding participation and deliberation, would facilitate and enhance self-learning and thus resilience.

Thirdly, accountability needs to be ensured, as “voluntary institutions [can] amplify the disparities of resources” in society, as although they are “pictured as multiple, independent and self-regulating, they are also largely unaccountable” (Honohan 2002: 235). Sentiments have been raised regarding The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which is a potential trade arrangement between the EU and US. Although contested, worries have been expressed that the power of communities will be subsumed by dominant economic forces, as it leaves the state open to legal prosecution if its actions reduce the profit of corporations (Peterson 2016: 388-93). These issues are especially acute if “civil society [is] left to itself” (Walzer 1992: 104). Sandel (2012) recognises that financial inequalities can drastically reduce freedom in the
republican sense, as did Warren (2001) above. Therefore mediating institutions that privately concentrate power run contrary to the RCR desire to counter and hold accountable institutions that foster material inequality. They would impede the emergence of an inclusive common good by asserting arguments on the basis of power, coercion and money, rather than public deliberation. Hence Sandel’s emphasis on inclusive deliberation and a politics of moral engagement reveals the RCR response to this accountability critique (Sandel 1998a: 343-251; 1998c; 2009a: 268-9; 2012: 202-3).

Again civic spaces that stifle the common good would be framed as counter-resilient. For example, Sandel argues that today markets are filling the vacuum that an increasingly impoverished public discourse is creating (Sandel 2012), whereas public deliberation would foster the common good by enabling individuals to come to appreciate the potential validity of others’ claims through interaction and “political learning” (Gutmann & Thompson 1996: 356). In this sense, questions over where the boundaries of markets lie could begin to be answered (i.e. adaption could occur), thus making these communities resilient.

Deliberation itself can ameliorate tendencies toward creating bad communities. As Honohan claims, the “contemporary articulation of republican politics does not mean directly establishing the shared values of an existing cultural community, since the values embodied are subject to the filter of deliberation, are politically constituted and contestable” (2002: 259). Thus RCR is congenial to pluralism, as although a community may embody certain values, all claims by members are taken seriously, are best considered as provisional in light of changing circumstances, remain open to “deliberative reconsideration”, and require “thorough public justification” (Honohan 2002: 265). What is central, is that the common good needs to be “politically determined”, premised on the fact that “precisely because citizens have different perspectives on questions of common concern”, pre-political values and practices cannot guarantee political loyalty (Honohan 2002: 214).121 Loyalty contributes to

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120 These are seen as dominating forces in society (Honohan 2002: 235).
121 Thus paralleling Pateman’s (1970: 27) interpretation of Rousseau and the communal integration and belonging that results from participation.
resilience by predisposing individuals towards the common good, and engendering civic virtue in the sense that citizens need to be open, respectful and ready to engage with other members, and other cultural viewpoints (Honohan 2002: 263). This echoes Pateman’s claims that participation “fosters the very qualities necessary for it”, a resilient feature that has an “integrative effect . . . that aids the acceptance of collective decisions” (1970: 42-3).122 Not only does the deliberative filter present sufficient obstacle to oppressive views becoming legitimatised in a polity, but it also helps create a deeper recognition, or respect of other members’ perspectives. Procedural liberalism neglects this, as what is central to this model is that people are free to choose their lifeplans, which does not require social approval or appreciation of the way others live their lives (Sandel 1998a: 107):123

“The feelings of friendship and solidarity result precisely from the extension of our moral and political imagination . . . through the actual confrontation in public life with the point of view of those who are otherwise strangers to us, but who become known to us through their public presence as voices we have to take into account”

(Benhabib 1988: 47)

Therefore despite RCR carrying certain risks, an inclusively deliberative and morally engaged approach to politics represents a valid alternative to addressing oppressive and discriminatory perspectives in a polity, via the emergence of a genuine common good rather than one imposed top-down. Thus within an appropriate institutional framework that includes rights, a politically determined common good (checked by the deliberative filter) (Benhabib 1996: 71-2; Honohan 2002: 228-9), and federalism, whereby all citizens are given equal opportunity to participate and contribute to political decisions, the emergence of bad policies and communities (i.e. oppressive, parochial, exclusionary) should be lessened. Hence the principles of RCR are mutually reinforcing, each one

122 This is further reflected in her treatment of Mill, regarding the education and fostering of democratic skills and cooperation at the local level (1970: 29-31).

123 Honohan also acknowledges that deliberation in civic republican politics “is an attempt to go beyond mere toleration or compromise to an agreement on public principles of justice on which all can agree as the base of legitimacy”, and rather to reconcile “different moral views fairly”, by ensuring that members “deep convictions” are not privatised or excluded (2002: 227). Hence aiming towards “the hope of the kind of richer public life which human interdependence suggests may be possible” (Frazer & Lacey 1993: 205).
contributing to its resilience by providing the opportunity for individuals to learn civic skills, creating more publically acceptable outcomes, and creating a common good that is better able to align individual and public interests. This claim manifests from the view that

“[p]ublicity, deliberation and accountability, and the connection of informal social interaction with the political decision-making process, are essential elements in the republican argument for expanded public spaces”

(Honohan 2002: 235)

Addressing the practicality of civic republics

The second category of critiques directed at the federalism Sandel and RCR adopt regard its practicality, and whether such an approach is even realistic given the circumstances of the world in the 21st century. Sandel brushes this argument aside swiftly:

“The problem is not . . . one of population or scale, or the fact that people have a hard time perceiving the effect of their individual votes on the outcome of the elections. It is rather that, whatever the outcome of elections, political communities large and small lack the agency or effective power to direct the social and economic forces that govern their lives”

(1998c: 326)

Thus Sandel argues that some readjustment to the way individuals currently live their lives may be necessary if they wish to regain a degree of empowerment over the forces that govern them. However a more detailed reply to this critique of the scope of civic republicanism would emphasise the need for a further pluralisation of public (civic) spaces (Honohan 2002: 231). Deliberation does not need to be merely formal, but can be understood broadly in terms of what counts as deliberation, its form, and where it takes place (Honohan 2002: 228-9).

Essentially this is what Sandel claims when discussing informal civic spaces, places such as schools, municipal parks and churches where citizens from different backgrounds meet and encounter one another (1998a: 348). Hence a distinction can be made between “strong and weak public's” (Honohan 2002: 232). The former relates to deliberative sites
that are directed toward “policy making and the authoritative state” (Honohan 2002: 232; Fraser 1992: 134), whilst the latter are “an overlapping set of asymmetrical spaces”, or forums, through which social opinion is formed (Honohan 2002: 232-3, 238): yet here the formal – informal civic spaces distinction will be maintained. Consequently RCR would argue for existing federalised systems to be supported and connected to a wider spectrum of civic spaces (Chapter 6).  

The key to deliberative politics is the requirement of “more inclusive political institutions at the formal level, with more decentralisation of power to regional, local, neighbourhood and workplace levels within current states” (Honohan 2002: 239).

The implementation of this approach today is far from unrealistic. It was prevalent across the vastness of America, and has become, albeit in piecemeal fashion, an increasing trend in the UK which has devolved parliaments in three regions, and more autonomy given to London via the city’s Mayor. Both America and the UK also have local institutions to which sovereignty has been dispersed, such as Parish councils in the UK which can provide community centres and grants to local organisations (Gov.uk 2017). Political decisions made on a deliberative basis are seen as more legitimate (Barber 1984; Walzer 1983; Dryzek 2002; Michels 2011), and there is evidence to suggest that, where implemented, online deliberative initiatives and mini-publics are delivering, at least in part, on their positive expectations (Giêl and Joas 2013; Fung and Wright 2003; Rosenberg 2007; Smith 2009; Gronlund et al. 2014; Christensen et al. 2016). Although many of these initiatives are in their infancy, and perhaps do not fully embody Tocqueville’s township, they do illustrate that there are plenty of mechanisms available to bring citizens closer to their governments and political representatives.

The UK Parliament for example, has introduced several participatory initiatives such as online Public Reading Stages (comment forums) of Bills, crowdsourcing questions for MPs via social media, and consultative public forums (Digital Democracy Commission 2015). There is also a surge in the emergence of deliberative mini-publics. Their most

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124 However civic republicanism does place emphasis on the need for accountability in the weak (informal) publics, to mitigate against parochialism.
notable weakness is their lack of policy impact (Grönlund et al. 2014), which would be addressed to some degree by further dispersing sovereignty. Digital democracy initiatives are also proliferating across the globe. These include citizens’ allocating local governmental budgets (‘Madame Mayor…’, France), citizen engagement in local planning and policy making (‘Decide Madrid’, Spain), crowdsourcing ideas for local improvements (‘Better Neighbourhoods…’, Iceland), large-scale deliberation over specific topics (‘vTaiwan’, Taiwan); and variations on these themes have been adopted by political parties that advocate greater political transparency, public engagement and public decision-making (e.g. Pirate Party, Iceland; Podemos, Spain and Five Star Movement, Italy) (Simon et al. 2017). Furthermore the ‘e-Democracia’ process created by the Brazilian government has created online forums and virtual communities for citizens to deliberate political issues, and the Chilean ‘Virtual Senator’ programme enables citizens to vote and comment on Bills. These examples demonstrate that even within the current political landscape, practical concerns do not restrict citizen participation and deliberation in large states. However as they are still in their infancy and due to their limitations (Introduction), they are best supplemented by other traditional forms of engagement such as face-to-face deliberation (Simon et al. 2017).

For instance Loader and Mercea (2011), in their special issue on networking democracy via social media, the internet and other online activities, suggest that “it is necessary to avoid the utopian optimism of the earlier experiments in digital democracy” (2011: 766), and that a “more cautious approach is needed” (2011: 757). They make a familiar conclusion that whilst online technology may have potential to engage more people in participatory activities, there is also the possibility for increased factionalism, superficial and sensationalist politics, which can merely engage those already engaged. In this

125 For further examples in Latin America, where citizens have been given the opportunity to participate in local decision making (such as community planning and budgeting) see Nickson (1995) and also Avritzer (2009).

126 As Honohan claims: “in principle . . . there are many ways in which large numbers of citizens can have a voice in making a decision – through referendums and citizen initiatives . . . [they] may be extensively involved in decision-making, not in a single forum, but at many levels in various kinds of process [in] participatory structure[s] in regions, localities, neighbourhoods or workplaces” (2002: 218).
sense their potential lies more closely to a role of a medium of dissent, with respect to disrupting existing power relations. Hence there is blurred connection between the empowerment sought in this thesis, and the potential for technology to create echo chambers and “undermine serious rational deliberation” (2011: 761). Papacharissi (2010) observes that “citizen-users can participate in campaigns whilst simultaneously enjoying television and/or chatting with family in the privacy of their own home” (in Loader and Mercea 2011: 761); therefore, whilst technology can enable individuals to connect their private identities to other political spaces by reducing such boundaries to participation, the medium in which this occurs is not representative of the authentic, meaningful, and inclusive deliberation that can engender the common good. In addition, although increasing participation can be viewed as advantageous within the broad scheme of RCR, it is important to remember that within this scheme, cultivating civic virtue and the other skills and dispositions required to partake meaningfully in civic activity is key, and that citizen-users in many cases do not require, and will not cultivate any meaningful civic skills during their participation. Hence the concern that such technologies can further the notion of “networked individualism” (Wellman 2001), which could negate resilience. In Dahlberg’s words,

“much of the discourse within [large online virtual communities] simply consists of titillation, gossip and slander, superficial banter and other kinds of lowest-common dominator exchange . . . many participants simply seek out groups of like-minded others where member’s interests, values and prejudices are reinforced rather than challenged. The result is a fragmentation of cyber-discourse into mutually exclusive cyber-communities . . . virtual communities offer at best a ‘weak’ form of democratic participation because of their exclusive nature. Members of virtual communities are not often forced to confront the full range of public concerns and value that are to be faced when living with difference in everyday offline life”

(2010: 618)

Dahlberg refers to these types of online space as being overly communitarian, which can be viewed in contradistinction to “liberal individualist” ones, which are orientated towards what was referred to earlier as e-government approaches, where the emphasis is on

“information provision and direct communication between individuals and decision makers. This emphasis assumes a political subject who only needs to be given appropriate
information in order to make the right choices. This subject suits governments and corporations because it fits a top-down consumer model of politics where individuals choose from an array of competing political positions displayed before them. Liberal individualist initiatives provide spaces for representatives to sell their positions directly to individuals, sidestepping critical public debate. Such initiatives are basically extensions of the partisan political websites of political parties and interest groups”

(Dahlberg 2010: 620)

Therefore the more liberal individualist virtual spaces, considering the internet is now a place “largely developed and controlled by corporate interests and online commerce” (Dahlberg 2010: 617), can merely help “reinforce the status quo” (Dahlberg 2010: 619). Hence why RCR forges its own path with respect to civic spaces, as online participation tends to fall into the extremes of communitarian and liberal ‘camps’ (Dahlberg 2010). Whilst it may be possible to structure online forums in ways that can lead to more considered exchanges of views (Dahlberg 2010), they still at present lack empowerment and consequently reduce the incentive to participate (Dahlberg 2010), as the UK Parliament’s consultancy approach with their Public Reading Stage illustrated (Leston-Bandeira, Thompson & Mace 2016). More traditional types of civic participation, such as citizen assemblies (Involve 2018), are perhaps less vulnerable to corporate, elitist, partisan group interests, similar to what can be termed a Habermasian “bourgeois public sphere” (Dahlberg 2010:628). The need to institutionalise the principles of RCR, if one wishes to be able to realise the potentialities of electronically mediated participation, is crucial as the “[m]arginalization of online-rational-critical deliberations will occur so long as consumerism and other non-critical private modes of interaction dominate cultural participation and individualized interaction dominates politics” (Dahlberg 2010: 628; Chapter 6; also Dahlgren 2006). Resultantly RCR emphasises the need to re-orientate existing formal civic spaces towards increasing public participation and deliberation, and would advocate investment in informal spaces such as schools, public transport, parks, as well as carefully designed digital democracy initiatives. Together these would constitute more opportunities for citizens to share common experiences and align their interests with one another. It would also promote participation, deliberation, and cultivate the skills needed for self-government, which is a core source of resilience.
Neoliberal globalisation and systemic interconnectedness may suggest a need for transnational forms of governance. Yet this does not disqualify formal civic spaces such as the ‘township’, provided “participatory procedures at local levels . . . are nested into larger hierarchies” (Honohan 2002: 239), for example in a federalised system that also promotes informal civic spaces (Chapter 6). The feedback loops generated by this tapestry of civic spaces would be resilient due to the skills they provide to citizens to practice politics, the more empowering opportunities they provide for self-government, and that the systemic conditions this creates could contribute to the emergence of the common-good from the bottom-up, thus enabling societies to learn and adapt to environmental change. It also parallels the notion of “deliberative systems”, whereby deliberation includes ‘talk’ from all civic spaces which thus distributes the responsibility of decision making, which is resilient as the participation and deliberation is more inclusive (i.e. more individuals contributing), to the contrary of deliberation only occurring in formal civic spaces (Mansbridge et al. 2012: 4-5). Hence local opportunities for political participation and deliberation help cultivate civic virtue, which can then reverberate outside of purely local concerns, to national or transnational ones (Chapter 6):

“[W]e may argue that small-scale politics provides a base where citizens can initially engage more immediately with issues in areas where they are better informed and have clearer interests. Decision-making in these areas can help to overcome a sense of powerlessness and develop a sense of responsibility”

(Honohan 2002: 239)

Therefore RCR can be seen as a precursor to attending to global issues, by not prioritising “the more universal communities we inhabit” over the “more particular ones” (Sandel 1998a: 343; Vallor 2018), or by pushing sovereignty upwards, as cosmopolitanism may suggest, but rather dispersing it (Sandel 1998a: 338-345). Yet RCR still needs to rebut Orwin’s second critique that citizens may not wish to engage in a more demanding politics than that offered by procedural liberalism. Individuals today

127 A further example is offered by Macpherson (1977: 108), who suggests a “pyramidal system with direct democracy at the base and delegate democracy at every level above that”.
are bombarded with almost infinite choices when forming their conception of the good life, whilst feeling responsibility to find good jobs, and spend time with friends, family and partners. Hence the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is characterised by the cult of being busy (Choi 2013). Without analysing the validity of this claim here, it still points to a pertinent critique of the potential success of a civic republican political philosophy.

However in Sandel’s words, “the republican tradition reminds us” that politics is about “equipping men and women with the habits and dispositions that suit them to self-rule” (1998c: 335). Despite individuals increasingly “understand[ing] the worth of citizenship more readily in terms of rights than duties”, the latter being “no more than to obey the law” (Honohan 2002: 149), civic virtue and the common good can still be propagated within a society, emerging from the interactions participation and deliberation that occurs in civic spaces. Again federalism itself could help generate civic virtue and engender a sense of responsibility towards polity:

“The larger size of modern states is often advanced as a reason why civic virtue is not possible today. But this may equally be a reason to articulate existing states internally into smaller, nested or parallel units, in which interaction is crucial in eliciting civic virtue. Where efficiency may suggest centralising government into larger units, in the long run moving too far in this direction may be counterproductive, creating the sense of powerlessness, dependency or disengagement identified in contemporary society by social critic of right and left”

(Honohan 2002: 172)

It is also plausible that if RCR’s principles, particularly the common good, took hold in society, stricter working time directives may result, so as to allow individuals more time for political participation, which would be valued more highly than at present under procedural liberalism. Another way this could arise would be via the democratisation of the workplace, by promoting Worker Self-Directed Enterprises (Wolff 2012) and cooperatives.\footnote{This is discussed further in the following section and in Chapter 6.} Notably, such approaches would also be the justified on the grounds of public deliberative argumentation, rather than the influence of power, money or coercion.
RCR can also be reinforced by civic education, which may take place formally in state schools or via interaction in less formal civic spaces (Sandel 1998a: 220). The central elements of such education would firstly be to create “an awareness of interdependence: a knowledge of the condition of other citizens, and the history and development of the republic”; and secondly, education would aim to develop

“an understanding of the effects of private and public actions, and the ability to form judgements, consider other points of view, and deliberate; to create trust, and learn to take responsibility not just for oneself but as a member of society . . . [which] would prepare future citizens to take up a concern for a common world and participate in deliberation and decision-making”

(Honohan 2002: 174)

These sentiments align with Sandel and RCR as they constitute approaches to cultivate the character for self-government across multiple public spaces. Other initiatives could involve creating a civic religion, employing forms of voluntary civil service, and offering social recognition as an incentive. With regard to the latter, the UK for example has a longstanding honours system, which rewards state recognition for citizens who have “made achievements in public life . . . [and] committed themselves to serving and helping Britain” (UK Gov 2016). Although such a formal system may not be necessary, social approval for community activities would help to provide alternative ambitions for citizens as opposed to mere wealth and celebrity (Honohan 2002: 173; Pettit 1997a: 228). A civic religion could be viewed as an extension of this. It could involve secular practices that seek to generate communal feelings of respect for the polity and communal unity, such as festivals, ceremonies and other joint activities that “foster interaction” and constitute a modest base for political action (Honohan 2002: 175-6; Sunstein 2000). For instance, sporting events such as the Olympics and football World Cup, also help connect local communities to global ones in this way. The purpose of such initiatives is to provide individuals with the skills they require for self-government, including caring for the common good, which would also be an emergent characteristic of these initiatives, thus making communities better able to accommodate change (i.e. be resilient). It is similar to placing firefighting equipment in areas that may be prone to forest fires, as a way of attending to emergent unpredictable phenomena.
Civic service is arguably one of the ‘stronger’ ways of bonding citizens and eliciting civic virtue. However non-military social projects such as caring, “environmental, educational and social work could contribute a sense of responsibility for the larger world” among citizens (Honohan 2002: 177). Such activities, Honohan argues, would be best aimed at younger citizens, viewed as a part of their compulsory education, or perhaps incorporated into a module of study in higher education. Again its purpose would be to

“create citizens who are active, responsible and aware of their interdependence on others . . . by mixing with a broader range of people than they would meet in their everyday life”

(Honohan 2002: 177)

Though more could be said regarding the specifics of each of these mechanisms, they do represent realistic ways of implementing the central tenets of RCR, and thus strengthen its theoretical position in light of the criticisms covered here. Moreover, many of the approaches are less demanding, and less susceptible to oppression than they first seem, as they do not involve imposing exclusive moral doctrines, but seek to foster interaction, deliberation, and a common good.

To recap, federalism is a central tenet of RCR, derived from Sandel’s civic republicanism. Dispersing sovereignty brings politics to a level where citizens can participate, and see the effects of their participation: thus combined with the other principles of RCR, this could constitute an alternative approach to the “standard account of representative democracy” (Castiglione & Warren 2013; Castiglione 2015). It represents somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy, whereby the more citizens participate and contribute, the more they develop the skills necessary for self-government. As self-government equates to members of a polity governing themselves, following the maxims of deliberation and participation, the actions taken and the resultant conception of the common good will make such societies more responsive to self-learning and adaption (as policies are more publicly acceptable and thus legitimate), whilst engendering empowerment. Societies will be more resilient in response to changing circumstances, which Chapter 6
demonstrates in relation to climate change. Critiques regarding the scale of politics and size of modern states, and the willingness of citizens to engage, are not groundless. However they are not powerful enough to fully undermine RCR. The structure of contemporary capitalism, to the contrary, continues to pose challenges to freedom as self-government. Although the principles discussed here do offer methods to addressing these disempowering effects, there is a distinctly Sandelian normative argument regarding the economy that needs its role in RCR underlining.

The Principles of RCR Political Economy

Sandel’s central question surrounding economic issues is, “what economic arrangements are most hospitable to self-government?” (1998a: 124). In other words, the economic arrangements that should be pursued are those that enable individuals to retain some degree of control over this aspect of their political lives, thus avoiding “the lack of forms of democratic governance within the economic sphere inevitably corrupt[ing] the forms of democratic governance in the political sphere” (Strain in Bellah et al. 1992: 100). Sandel shares the criticism that the direction of the contemporary economy has a tendency to corrupt and morally degrade areas of life not traditionally governed by such norms (Sandel 2012; also Bellah et al. 1992: 291; Habermas 1984, 1987; Polanyi 1947). The economy can problematise RCR by promoting neoliberal freedom (Chapter 1 & 2), which can dominate in terms of: creating unaccountable concentrations of economic power; promoting wage labour; corrupt by rewarding materialistic ambitions; neglect civic virtue; and erode “traditional forms of authority and community” (Sandel 1998a: 205, also 185). Consequently, the issue for RCR is that this situation is “destroying the qualities of character that equip citizens for self-government” (Sandel 1998a: 185), thus posing a counter-resilient force in ALDs. By neglecting the common good (Chapter 4), free-market economies struggle to generate the shared sense of mutual obligations and a common fate that are essential to sustaining public goods such as a healthy climate (Chapter 6). For American statesmen such as Hamilton, “Jefferson and Madison, economics was the hand-maiden of politics, not the other way round (Sandel 1998a: 138). This view was shared by R.H. Tawney,
who argued that the economy should be “the servant, not the master, of society”, the problem being that

“industry itself has come to hold a position of exclusive predominance among human interests, which no single interest, and least of all the provision of material means of existence, is fit to occupy . . . Industrialized societies neglect the very objects for which it is worth while to acquire riches”

(1922: 241)

The rise of free-market industrial capitalism today, enlarged through globalisation, has led to large concentrations of unaccountable economic power and a neoliberal conception of freedom to take hold. A catalyst Sandel identifies is the transformation from largely agrarian manufacturing to modern industrial capitalism, whereby “big business threatened self-government . . . by overwhelming democratic institutions and defying their control (1998a: 211, 214-5, 228). The emergence of large corporations essentially denied local communities control of the economic forces that govern their lives (Sandel 1998a: 215-7). In the late 19th century, these concerns prompted the Sherman Act, which moved to address the threat that large “corporations posed to democratic government” (Sandel, 1998a: 233, 232, 235, 256-7). The point is that once citizens lose control of the economic forces that govern them, they are also in danger of losing control over their “political destiny” as well (Sandel 1998a: 243). The republican theme of domination resonates here as a “new industrial dictatorship” could exercise “complete control over other people’s property, other people’s money, other people’s labor-other people’s lives (Roosevelt in Sandel 1998a: 256-7). For example, it is difficult for individuals to invest in environmentally sustainable businesses, as it requires shifting investment portfolios away from enterprises that extract material resources, chase labour productivity or produce “novelty”, and towards sustainable energy or public infrastructure (Jackson 2017: 149-153). Although the rise of consumer rights was seen as a way of restricting businesses from acting unscrupulously, Sandel saw the implementation of Keynesian economics as a key turning point, one which represented acceptance of procedural liberalism:

“First, it offered policymakers and elected official a way to ‘bracket,’ or set aside, controversial conceptions of the good life, and so promised a consensus that programs for
structural reform could not offer. Second, by abandoning the ambition of inculcating certain habits and dispositions, it denied government a stake in the moral character of its citizens and affirmed the notion of persons as free and independent selves, capable of choice”

(Sandel 1998a: 262)

Hence RCR is concerned by capital’s ability to displace civic virtue, the common good and democratic accountability, which equals disempowerment as citizens’ capacities for holding the economy democratically accountable is severely limited. This is a situation that can “simultaneously create disabled institutions and corrupted citizens”, which seek immediate material (consumer) rewards (Bellah et al. 1992: 96). Thus contemporary economic arrangements are still an important source of disquiet for RCR.

**Recommendations to mitigate the corrupting influences of the market economy**

To counterbalance the negative civic externalities of neoliberal economics RCR would posit several broad recommendations. The first relates to democratising the workplace through initiatives such as Worker Self-Directed Enterprises (WSDEs), cooperatives, shared (social) ownership, increasing participation and deliberation (i.e. practicing democracy) and ultimately realising self-governance within these projects (Pateman 1970, Dryzek 1996: 58-61; Warren 2001: 214; Bellah et al. 1992: Ch. 3; Wolff 2012; Jackson 2017: 144-149). They equate to providing a genuine alternative to wage labour in traditional capitalist enterprises (Wolff 2012: 15), and can be justified on the notion that democracy at the political level requires “forms of association ‘outside’ the state, particularly the economy . . . that strengthen and give substance to democratic citizenship” (Cohen 1989: 28). Additionally the “parallel-case argument” can be deployed (Breen 2015: 472), which claims that as “democracy is justified in governing the state”, workers “ought to have the [same] right to participate in” the “collective governance” of economic enterprises (Dahl: 1985: 56-62, 113-133; also Cohen 1989: 27; Walzer 1983: 291-303). Democratisation of the workplace also promotes resilience, as it

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129 This could include worker control of surpluses, or payments of social dividends.
makes enterprises more adaptable to changing circumstances, as their behaviour, when socially as opposed to ‘executive’ directed, can be more easily orientated towards the common good by cultivating active citizens “who believe they can determine their own futures and have the capacity to effect change”, and who possess a “willingness to adjudicate in-line with general interests” (Breen 2015: 472; Cohen 1989: 29). Democracy in the workplace suggests an alternative to state ownership – socialism (Bellah et al. 1992: 104; Wolff 2012: 119), and WSDEs an alternative to cooperatives, as land ownership and cooperative labour are not essential, rather it is the fact that the producers distribute the surplus that counts (Wolff 2012: 122). As WSDEs are the most encompassing and illustrative example of democratising the workplace, and cooperatives are also discussed in the following chapter, this section will focus on WSDEs.

WSDEs can be seen as a response to Woodrow Wilson’s complaint that industrial capitalism “reduc[ed] most men to the status of employee” (Sandel 1998a: 215). Wage labour, within a globalised world, places employers in a far more favourable bargaining position than workers, which essentially creates a state of dependence. Much like classic republican contrasts between masters and slaves, if employees feel they lack alternative employment opportunities, then they are more likely to accept unfavourable employment terms and feel at the arbitrary will of employers. Importantly today, there are few meaningful alternatives to this form of employment, which is an issue because the workplace is prohibited from becoming a civic space that could cultivate freedom as self-government:

“On the republican view, I am free only to the extent that I participate in self-government, which requires in turn that I possess certain habits and dispositions, certain qualities of character. Free labor is thus labor carried out under conditions likely to cultivate the qualities of character that suit citizens to self-government”

(Sandel 1998a: 169)

130 There is no reason why time-pressures related to responding to changing market demands would not be concerning to WSDEs, contrary to traditional capitalist enterprises. Moreover, initiatives similar to the digital democracy ones stated above, could also be used to increase the speed of decision-making in WSDEs.
Therefore “economic independence is essential to citizenship” (Sandel 1998a: 169), wage labour begetting subservience and placing no value on public spirit (Sandel 1998a: 187). In this sense sole traders and artisan craftsmen, small producers and entrepreneurs (Sandel 1998a: 236; Jackson 2017: 147-8), enjoy a level of freedom unobtainable to those who labour for a wage. WSDEs would be a prime example of how economic self-government can be achieved on a larger scale by democratising the work place.\textsuperscript{131} In this case the “employer and employee [distinction] would be integrated within the same individuals” (Wolff 2012: 13), as workers would be their own board of directors. The core argument is that when “the surplus-producing workers themselves . . . make the basic decisions about production and distribution”, the Marxian charge of exploitation would be redundant (Wolff 2012: 12, 123). In addition to contending with the imbalances of power and the genuine alternatives for workers and consumers WSDEs provide (2012: 172-4), they would also reduce the logic of growth, profit and accumulation (2012: 14). Furthermore, due to the need for workers to direct the business and distribute the surplus (via inclusive democratic decision-making) (2012: 166, Chapter 6), these enterprises would also serve as schools of civic education (2012: 145). Other benefits would be the ability for workers to take collective action to improve their well-being, through job rotation for example (2012: 136), which would enable more competencies to be learnt. Workers could also democratically address the implications of new technological innovations that could replace workers (2012: 130). Additionally, the relationship generated between WSDEs and their local community could be improved as mutual dependence would be more likely realised within an enterprise that is directed by those who live in the local community (2012: 118), and whom would have gained civic democratic skills at work, thus engendering civic virtue and the common good (2012: 145-6). For example research has found that richer working lives “affected ‘workers’ values, orientations to self and society and cognitive functioning primarily through a direct process of learning from the job and generalizing what has been learned to other realms of life” (Kohn & Schooler in Breen 2015: 473). This would be particularly useful when attending to environmental issues (Wolff 2012: 133-4), as workers would

\textsuperscript{131} The Mondragón Corporation in Spain is an oft-cited example (Wolff 2012: 128; Dryzek 1996: 59).
collectively determine what the enterprise produces, the appropriate technology to use, and the location of production and distribution: hence encapsulating the terms “self-directed” (Wolff 2012: 117-8) and democratic accountability.

WSDEs could thus express concern for the community and public affairs due to the civic education they provide through deliberative and participatory practices, which could bring workers and communities towards methods of collective self-help (Sandel 1998a: 186-8). They would “do more than give workers a fair share of the fruits of their labor; it would also restore to workers the independence the wage system destroyed” (Sandel 1998a: 186). Such organisations would imbue a sense of self-reliance, self-help, and importantly, self-government in their members (Sandel 1998a: 186-8). Democratising the workplace, such as via WSDEs, would also further the common good by raising the consciousness of the mutual indebtedness of individuals, highlighting that the consequences of economic actions are rarely private (Bellah et al. 1992: 108). They would emphasise that “a richer public life” can be a more “satisfactory life”, based less on individual success and more on “a healthy society”, which would benefit the least and most well-off (Bellah et al. 1992: 106). WSDEs could also serve to reduce the “punishments of failure and the rewards of success” associated with contemporary capitalism (Jencks 1982: 8). These sentiments are resilient as they contribute to the emergence of the common good, which creates cohesive communities by helping individuals realise their mutual indebtedness with others.¹³³

Awareness of the common good could enable policies that are difficult to enact in traditional capitalist enterprises more viable, such as shortening the working day (Wolff 2012: 135). The rationale behind the introduction of the eight-hour day in the past was the notion that “[r]educing the hours of labor would lessen intemperance, vice, and crime among the labouring classes and increase their use of newspapers and libraries,

¹³² These sentiments are shared by Patman (1970), Dryzek (1996), Warren (2001) and Bellah et al. (1992), albeit in broader terms concerning democratisation of the workplace, participation, associations and cooperatives.

¹³³ Notably this resilience would not be gained from a form of republicanism that focuses exclusively on non-domination (e.g. Pettit), as the argument turns on the intrinsic value of participation and freedom as self-government (Breen 2015).
lecture rooms, and meeting halls. In time, the eight-hour day would elevate and empower workers”, eventually leading them to question their place in society, and then lobby for better conditions (Sandel 1998a: 192). It connects to the republican fear of the corrupting forces, in this case the structure of economic markets that lionise luxury and materialism, which can “distract [citizens] from nobler ends” (Sandel 1998a: 219). “Declining work hours” is essential to allowing “family, community, and civic concerns” to flourish, as “genuine democracy has always required a degree of leisure” (Bellah et al. 1992: 107). Reducing working hours and work share initiatives are also key to meeting the demands of contemporary economy “when demand growth is hard to come by”, and ensure “everyone has access to a livelihood” (Jackson 2017: 145-6). This is also a resilient strategy, as work-share is capable of retaining higher levels of employment in times of financial crisis, rather than laying off workers (Jackson 2017: 146), which could reduce the systemic shocks of such events (i.e. by adapting to the change in a more resilient manner). The same could be said for technological developments which could be used to create more time for social and civic pursuits, rather than substantially threatening the financial security of workers (Bellah et al. 1992: 96).

The principles of democratising the work place, even if WSDEs were not immediately adopted, are a key way of reversing the notion of “scientific management” (which reduces the learning capacity of workers), by “sharing authority and responsibility among . . . workers and managers” (Bellah et al. 1992: 100). RCR’s principle of the common good and federalism chime with these sentiments, and would help to address the root cause of the current economic systems’ externalities; as contending with the short-term logic of growth driven by self-interest, requires the mutual dependence of corporations and society to be acknowledged, and the former to “become democratically accountable” (Bellah et al. 1992: 102, also 110). Investing in civic spaces and implementing the principles of WSDEs would help realise a restructuring of the economy, or redefinition of the institutions that constitute it (Bellah et al. 1992: 16), via the propensity for participatory and deliberative practices to create an emergent

134 The German company Trumpf being a key example (Jackson 2017: 146).
common good. Restructuring could involve positing corporations as “collective citizen[s]” with responsibilities (White in Bellah et al. 1992: 102). It could also aim to redirect economic investment towards long term productive investment rather than speculative profit (Bellah et al. 1992: 103; Jackson 2017: 101, 149-153). Social ownership could also be explored, which would give citizens a tangible stake in the productivity of the economy (Bellah et al. 1992: 104), and engender a larger public commitment to institution building, to which participation is key (Bellah et al. 1992: 105). This would create a more realistic environment regarding the dependency between individuals in the provision of the goods needed for survival and well-being (Stockinger in Bellah et al. 1992: 104). Empowering more individuals to become stakeholders in the economy, with a view to reducing the gaps between winners and losers in the current system, would make communities more resilient as they will be less prone to division, as wealthy citizens will be less incentivised to move from their original communities to say gated ones when wealth inequalities are not as severe (Bellah et al. 1992: 105).

Notably, it is the RCR principles put forward in this chapter and the previous two, which form promising springboards for arguments concerning economic reform. For example deciding the appropriate level for a minimum income or living wage, and what conditions should be attached to such a policy, are best determined through inclusive deliberation with respect to the common good. Moreover, the same approach could lead to the right kind of regulation (say towards the environment or working conditions), rather than merely increasing or lessening it (Bellah et al. 1992: 108). This could constitute a theoretically resilient feedback loop, whereby certain principles of RCR catalyse change (via deliberation), which result in more resilient outcomes (say a sustainable economy). Furthermore, democratisation and full participation in a corporation could transform it into a resilient community, as it would constitute a learning community (Bellah et al. 1992: 108). The role of state could supplement bottom-up approaches such as these, as RCR’s federal principle highlights, by nudging consumer citizenship away from “immediate private satisfaction” via “education, taxation and restrictions”, and towards “consumer intelligence, responsibility, and self-discipline” (Bellah et al. 1992: 108-9). Again this would be determined deliberatively and
in relation to the common good, which essentially is concerned with aligning individual interests with common concerns (Bellah et al. 1992: 109).

Sandel’s social critique in DD asserts that “Americans increasingly viewed economic arrangements as instruments for consumption, not as schools for citizenship” (Sandel 1998a: 274). This is not beneficial for freedom as self-government, or attending to the challenges of the 21st century. Consumers, preoccupied with consumption, morally disengaged, and disinterested in the political forces that govern them, do not possess the skills and dispositions, or the will to address complex economic issues that are highly interdependent with other areas of socio-political life, such as with the environment, individual well-being and community resilience. Thus reclaiming, at least in part, the political economy of citizenship would serve the aims of empowering citizens and reducing the effects of large economic perturbations in social systems, by reducing unaccountable concentrations of economic power. Therefore RCR’s principles of the civic republican economy can be viewed as a set of institutional arrangements (Bellah et al. 1992: 16), that is, “normative patterns embedded in and enforced by laws and mores (informal customs and practices)” that individuals “create and re-create through words and actions” (Bellah et al. 1992: 11). In other words, the tenets of RCR can aid the re-institutionalisation of corporate organisations in society by democratising the “underlying pattern of power and responsibility” (Bellah et al. 1992: 11). This holistic approach aligns with complexity theory (below), as the current institutionalisation of corporations based on procedural liberalism has led to the emergence of organisations that sustain a problematic conception of wealth as “merely the accumulation of consumer goods” (Bellah et al. 1992: 99; Jackson 2017), based upon moral individualism (Bellah et al. 1992: 6). Moral individualism is not suited to an ontological reality that is postulated as being characterised by relational holism (i.e. interconnected and interdependent), because it fosters an inability to acknowledge mutual indebtedness, which thus resists adaption in accordance with the common good (hence counter-resilient). RCR could sow the seeds of more deliberative, participatory and democratic corporations, which are capable of addressing the paradoxical relation between the opportunities that 21st century life creates for “self-rule” on the one hand, and its
propensity to dislocate “the institutions through which these capacities might be realized” on the other (Warren 2001: 7). Discussion now turns to detailing how the conception of freedom as self-government is compatible with the principles of complexity theory and the relational, interaction based, and interdependent nature of social systems (Chapter 1).

**RCR, Self-government and Complexity**

RCR is anchored in the conception of freedom as self-government. Not only does it expand on and address limitations of other conceptions of freedom (Chapter 2), but it has also been argued that it is the most resilient model. To recap then, RCR embodies the

> “idea that liberty depends on sharing in self-government . . . It means deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the destiny of the community . . . To deliberate well about the common good requires more than the capacity to choose one’s ends and to respect others’ right to do the same. It requires a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake. To share in self-rule therefore requires that citizens possess, or come to acquire, certain qualities of character, or civic virtues. But this means that republican politics cannot be neutral toward the values and ends its citizens espouse. The republican conception of freedom, unlike the liberal conception, requires a formative politics, a politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities of character that self-government requires”

(Sandel 1998a: 5-6)

This passage from Sandel defines RCR’s position well, illustrating how it goes beyond Pettit’s (1997a) conception of instrumental republicanism, as citizens are actualised through social political practices, obtaining a conception of freedom which, in Green’s words, equates to a situation where each person is his own master and brother’s keeper (Green 1986a: 283). Letting loose the moral dogs of war, which Pettit is reluctant to endorse (1998), is essential to Sandel (1998c) and RCR. It is crucial for citizens from different socio-economic backgrounds to learn to rub along together, as these interactions can contribute to the emergence of a common good, and consequently these societies are not only more likely to reach acceptable solutions to polarising moral and political debates, but are more adaptable to changing circumstances as a result. This is
the premise of this thesis, and justification for reviewing and revitalising Sandel’s civic republicanism within the framework of RCR. The skills and dispositions Sandel seeks to inculcate in citizens are sources of resilience, capabilities that enable them to move through the ever-changing and tumultuous political landscape of the 21st century. To reinforce this claim, discussion now turns to Babcock’s critique of Sandel from a complexity theory standpoint.

**RCR in a complex world**

So far the thesis has shown how the principles of RCR are resilient socio-political characteristics. Babcock (1997) strengthens this argument by positing a link between Sandel’s civic republicanism and complexity theory. However, as this ultimately results in a criticism of the efficacy of Sandel’s model, these arguments must be dispensed with in order maintain RCR’s compatibility with complexity theory. To begin, Babcock’s definition of complexity theory is as follows:

“[A]n overarching field of mathematical analysis of the behaviour of nonlinear dynamical systems. It offers a new way of thinking about the collective behaviour of many basic interacting units (e.g. molecules, atoms, cells) that have the potential to evolve (or change) over time. While the definition of complexity is context dependent, for complexity to emerge there must be both time (described . . . as an irreversible medium) and nonlinearity (a condition that produces complex and frequently unexpected results). Complexity shows why dynamic forces inevitably lead to unpredictable behaviour in nonlinear systems, and that the most successful systems are those that maintain a balance between stasis and change and accomplish that result by maintaining a chaotic, random component in their midst”

(1997: 2086)

RCR is compatible with this definition as it can ‘maintain a balance between stasis and change’ primarily by nurturing the common good, which is connected to the ‘random component’, deliberation. The inclusivity of undetermined plural viewpoints gives

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135 The reason for not adopting a fully centralised state, which could arguably be considered responsive, is that without the input of citizens and exercise of freedom as self-government, adaption made in response to changing circumstance are more likely to seem alien and engender disempowerment: rather than these changes being perceived as self-imposed obligations, which can consequently preserve the ideals of socio-political institutions.

136 See also Chapter 1, regarding ‘systemic interconnectedness’.
deliberation its ‘chaotic’ nature. Yet Babcock argues that complexity theory undermines Sandel’s project in several ways: namely (1) civic republicanism “explains emergent phenomena . . . in simple reductive terms”; and (2) “Sandel uses the concept of community to quiet and calm”, rather than embrace the “diversity and randomness, competition and cooperation, variables and interactions, surprise and indeterminacy”, which complexity theorists emphasise (1997: 2088-9). She consequently asks whether Sandel has

“missed an essential element for communal survival - the need for some amount of controlled (deterministic) chaos in a non-linear dynamic evolving system, like a political community?" [Also] [i]s the civic republican community too simple, too inelastic with too few variables and opportunities for interactions to survive?”

(1997: 2089)

Initially these critiques appear to run against what is most pertinent in Babcock’s analysis for this thesis. For example Babock usefully highlights the parallels between Sandel’s scholarship and complexity theory, which again is worth quoting at length:

“Sandel’s proposal to disperse sovereignty to a multiplicity of overlapping and potentially conflicting political and social institutions introduces a stochastic, random element into his otherwise stable political system. His civic strand of freedom, the capacity to self-govern, in complexity theory might be called an emergent property of a complex system. Sandel’s faith that debating communal values in dispersed social and political institutions will allow civic virtue (or order) to emerge is a demonstration of what complexity theorists . . . would describe as an example of the self-organized criticality of a nonlinear dynamical system, and others would refer to as deterministic chaos. The capacity of individuals to become good citizens once they re-engage in the dialogical process of republican citizenship shows adaption, an open-ended process in complexity theory by which a structure evolves through interaction with its environment to deliver better performance”

(1997: 2094, original italics)

Hence Babcock acknowledges that self-government can be an emergent property of a complex system, and that deliberation in civic spaces could lead to the emergence of civic virtue and adaption. This is because, under RCR, individuals would be more likely to orientate themselves toward the common good, which might not otherwise be the

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137 Babcock uses Coveney and Highfield’s definition of “[d]eterministic chaos’ . . . a term used in complexity theory to embrace both the chaotic behavior of nonlinear dynamical systems and the ‘deep order’ present in those systems” (Babcock 1997: 2089, n. 26).

138 Babcock’s footnotes have been omitted.
case. Yet Babcock levies a biting critique of Sandel’s model, arguing that his civic republicanism is reductionist: it represents “a search for a simple algorithm, a simple solution for solving democracy’s discontent that seeks to quell the complexities brought about by the pluralism inherent in a democratic state” (1997: 2103). She asserts that by focusing upon individual character and dispersing sovereignty to small homogenous units, civic republicanism is the “antithesis of complexity theory, with its focus on emergent or global properties and its study of the whole rather than individual parts” (1997: 2103).

Babcock’s critique is premised upon several notions. The first being that Sandel omits randomness (or diversity) in his conception of community (Babcock 1997: 2097-8), which is designed “to avoid surprise” (Babcock: 1997: 2102). One of the central lessons of complexity theory is that dynamic systems, such as communities, are subject to unpredictable events, randomness and novelty. Such perturbations often result in systems adapting to meet these new circumstances. One example Babcock offers in support of this claim is the construction of identity. She argues that forming an internal and external identity is a complex, dialogical, interactive and somewhat random phenomenon (1997: 2096). Sandel neglects this fact, Babcock claims, by conceiving commonality on too simple terms, by breaking community down to its simplest form, that is common shared values, experience and history (Babcock: 1997: 2096). Whilst this may appear as a fair critique given Sandel’s arguably communitarian sympathies, it does not hold within RCR. As Honohan (2002) is at pains to illustrate, civic republicanism is a model which embraces diversity and does not exclusively impose unitary or common shared values. RCR is concerned with bringing an inclusive plurality of viewpoints into the political arena, in which they can be deliberated. Hence unpredictability and randomness are not excluded from civic republican horizons.139 RCR’s emphasis on cultivating participatory and deliberative politics, as well as civic education and virtue, represent appropriate ways of managing unpredictable events precisely by including as many diverse perspectives as possible in deliberative civic

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139 Babcock claims that Sandel is missing the concept of a random unpredictability in dynamic systems (1997: 2095).
spaces. The common good being pre-disposed towards cooperation as opposed to competition (Babcock 1997: 2099) is not a major concern. On one hand, an element of Darwinism remains in the act of deliberation, since it is the fittest ideas that survive in the public forum (or the force of better argument in Habermas’s terms (1984: 25)), and on the other, RCR fundamentally focuses on fostering the mutual recognition of interdependence, which goes beyond exerting the force of the better argument by encouraging people to seek to understand what unites them in self-realisation. Thus the inclusivity and deliberation within civic spaces in fact acts as a method for attending to randomness, surprise and other systemic events.

Babcock suggests that Sandel’s notion of civic virtue, that is, citizens’ capacities to negotiate between the conflicting obligations that claim them, can be a source of elasticity (or resilience) (1997: 2100). Yet she argues that the self Sandel posits could be too encumbered by communal ties to take the risks needed to “jump from a communal peak . . . [a situation] that no longer provides the conditions suitable for optimized adaption” (Babcock 1997: 2101). Having emphasised the significance of feedback loops and feedforward in an earlier section (Babcock 1997: 2096), Babcock fails to appreciate that civic republicanism is able to soak up local knowledge (Chapter 6), which represents one of the most promising theoretical models which can empower communities to find the next best ‘peak’, and bring other members of the polity, in self-organising fashion, with them.

Babcock also underestimates the role of multiple sites of deliberative interaction, as an area for social adaption. She underlines the importance of elasticity, a self-organising motion that allows a system to progress and adapt, and argues that Sandel’s model is too simple and prohibits randomness or “deterministic chaos” (1997: 2089). Yet as Chandler notes:

“Resilience-thinking tells us that for governance to mirror the achievements of complex emerging order, it is better to allow for flexibility and variation in approaches to problems; in this way ‘life’ produces the strategies of governance from the micro-tactics of actors at the lower levels of engagement”

\[140\] Babcock (1997) talks further about adaption on p. 2095.
RCR’s principles align with this aspect of complexity thinking, as they encourage actors to engage at ‘lower levels’. The obstacles to complex order emerging, say the common good, is not always the result of mistaken political leadership, but a “top-down hierarchy” (Chandler 2014: 40). Federalism is pertinent as complex life cannot be governed through the imposition of policy-directives as the best strategy cannot be known in advance”, which calls on the notion of governance “through local adaption” (Chandler 2014: 40). Therefore a key link can be drawn between the authenticity of the common good that RCR postulates, and the appropriate mode of governance for complex life. “Resilience thinking” therefore encourages “the ‘reality’ of complex life as a diversification of power and responsibility and the growth of more empowered individuals” (Chandler 2014: 40), as does RCR. Therefore randomness, which Babcock argues is missing from Sandel’s model, does not need to be deliberately incite, rather it can be achieved naturally under RCR by bringing as many citizens’ viewpoints into civic spaces as possible.

Appropriate, authentic and legitimate outcomes will emerge from the multiplicity and diversity of interactions. This makes the outcomes more ‘adaptive’, as RCR recognises the transient qualities of social, political and environmental circumstances at its very core. Civic republican politics is based on “interdependence rather than commonality[,] created in deliberation, emerge[nt] in multiple publics to which all can contribute, and is not definitive but open to change”; in fact it “will depend on circumstances” where “the public culture itself is subject to political debate and deliberation” (Honohan 2002: 281, also 18,96, 164, 265). RCR can therefore follow Honohan’s maxims that citizens should have a say in how laws are formed (2002: 224), and that civic republicanism should facilitate Cicero’s virtue of moderation, that is individuals learning to act in ways appropriate to “the needs of specific circumstances” and “adapting to changing conditions” (2002: 34). This is perhaps an instance where the complexity theory framework requires adapting for the social sciences, as human beings today can exercise, notwithstanding catastrophe theory, significant acts of conscious determinism on a system, in other words, they “can collectively shape their destiny” (Honohan 2002: 64).
Again in almost paradoxical fashion, Babcock invokes Kauffman’s notion of patches. In other words, decentralised organisations which can potentially weave together like a quilt, and are argued to contain competitive, adaptive advantages, as the consequences of changes in one patch will lead to evolution in another, through the process of interaction (Kauffman 1995: 247; Babcock 1997: 2101-2). This concept is illustrated in the game SimCity which replicates the evolution of human cities pertinenty as an “emergent system”, whereby a “meshwork of cells that are connected to other cells . . . automatically alter their behavior in response to behavior of other cells in the network” (Johnson 2002: 88). Babcock’s argument in relation to Sandel is that he needs to think more about the size of his patch, for example the Tocquevillian Township (Babcock 1997: 2102). She implies that Sandel’s patch size may be too small to take advantage of the benefits of Kauffman’s procedure: “Sandel may have too quickly abandoned local government and municipal institutions in favor of smaller political spaces” (Babcock 1997: 2102). However she does acknowledge that dispersing sovereignty downwards may provide the optimal fitness landscape for a community (1997: 2103). Yet, as demonstrated above, Sandel is not committed to abandon local governmental institutions, quite the contrary in fact. He does underline the importance of other, sometimes smaller, civic spaces in which both formal and non-formal deliberations can take place, yet these contribute to the model by adding more nodes into the general ‘meshwork’. Although there is a distinction between political and non-political deliberation, dispersed and decentralised deliberative sites, even sidewalks serve as conduits for flows of information (Johnson 2002: 94), and can act as vital feedback loops that contribute to evolution, organisation and thus adaptability (Johnson 2002: 121). This point is overlooked by Babcock, which is also implicit in the notion of deliberative systems that are a “set of distinguishable, differentiated . . . parts . . . connected in such a way as to form complex whole” (Mansbridge et al. 2012: 4-5). Thus the township and the accompanying federal system of civic spaces do plausibly offer suitable patch sizes, and RCR is also more conducive to experimenting with new patch sizes, due to its emphasis on dispersing sovereignty and deliberation. Babcock is right to raise this question, yet it would seem to be a fairly minor issue considering the options available to address it.
In sum, whilst agreement can be found with Babcock in relation to the parallels Sandel’s civic republicanism shares with complexity theory, her critiques can be rebutted. Due to RCR’s argument for increasing civic spaces, federalism and inclusive deliberation, it is able to capture a plurality of viewpoints (and interactions), and reconcile these with the common good, enabling a community to adapt to emergent phenomena, whilst imposing a degree of determinism by contributing to the creation of a democratically deliberated common good and realising freedom as self-government. In addition, Babcock does not discuss alternative political theories in any significant detail, however the central point of comparison should be the prominent version of (procedural) liberalism that Sandel addresses. The key concern here, within the framework of complexity, is that the primacy of the individual and consequently atomising nature of such a theory is more antithetical to complexity theory than RCR. RCR reflects the aggregating, de-aggregating adaptive and interaction based behaviour of complex systems. Although centralisation of political power may be beneficial in making timely decisions when necessary, if these decisions do not reflect the will of the people, and are not underpinned by a democratically deliberated common good, then it is likely to lead to further discontent and political apathy, as individuals lose their sense of, and capacity for empowerment (Sclove 1995). Even though such an ‘unstable’ system could be seen as representing a state far-from equilibrium, argued as being the most optimal state for adaption according to complexity theory, what Babcock misses is that this is a wholly unsatisfying situation for humans to live within. The crisis in Syria, and previous destabilisation of Iraq, are but one example of the necessity of a stable economic and political system for human flourishing. Hence a common good is essential to ensuring the determinism that humans can impose on a system is resilient,\footnote{Unfortunately there is not enough space available in this thesis to explore the ‘amount’ of determinism humans can exert on the complex systems they live in.} thus creating what could be called a common good feedback loop, as the outcomes of deliberation under RCR would retain and reinforce the common good in light of changing circumstances. Therefore RCR provides promising opportunities to meeting the demands of the 21st century, as it is compatible with the precepts of dynamic complex systems.
Conclusion

The preceding sections have discussed three key principles of RCR, which can help bring it to life and realise freedom as self-government. This is the simple normative argument that citizens should have a say over the forces that govern their lives. In this sense citizens should be empowered in the face of an increasingly interconnected and interdependent world, which is subject to emergent phenomena. One way RCR can achieve this is by dispersing sovereignty and encouraging the expansion of civic spaces, which provides citizens with greater opportunities to contribute and direct the political and economic forces that govern their lives. This is in part realised by the ability for arguments to be made on the basis of an alternative conception of liberty to those traditionally associated with liberalism. As Sandel states:

“It [is] . . . defensible, from the standpoint of republican freedom, to discourage practices that glorify consumerism on the grounds that such practices promote privatized, materialistic habits, enervate civic virtue, and induce a selfish disregard for the public good”

(1998c: 329)

This does not only have an empowering value, but is also important for a second key reason. RCR shows considerable promise in relation to the demands of complexity theory. The fundamental role for participatory and deliberative politics, underpinned by civic virtue, is essential to providing the resilience in a system that enables it to meet novel and unpredictable events. Such events are considered more likely today due to the increasing interconnectivity and interdependence of political communities across the globe. The fact that a wider breadth of arguments in favour of the common good can be made within RCR means societies are more resilient and thus equipped to meet unforeseen political challenges. For example rights understood socially, as opposed to naturally, are more amenable to changing circumstances as they are grounded on a conception of the common good which can fluctuate with a society’s evolution, yet remain premised on an ethic of mutual self-realisation that can preserve the ideals of socio-political institutions. Furthermore, civic spaces and federalism offer a way of institutionalising “communicative rationality, and the associated conception of
democracy as public deliberation rather than preference aggregation”, which today’s capitalism can too easily subvert (Dryzek 1996: 115). This is noteworthy as “the more authentic, inclusive, and consequential political deliberation is, the more democratic a political system is” (Dryzek 2009: 1380).

RCR also creates a productive space for plurality. As Honohan’s (2002) scholarship clearly demonstrates, when equality and respect for all members of a political community is combined with deliberative forums and civic education, a plurality of views are brought into the political arena. Many of these views would be relegated to the side lines within a purely procedural conception of liberalism, and neo-Roman republicanism. Not only is this beneficial as it goes beyond mere toleration, by demonstrating respect for citizens’ deep convictions by engaging with them, but it is also valuable inasmuch as it fosters cooperation and the common good, which can mitigate the corrupting effects of neoliberal economic forces and the counter-resilient conception of freedom that enables them. Following Sandel, RCR emphasises the need for citizens to encounter one another, say at a townhall, school or on public transport, which aids self-reflective learning and nurtures the common good:

“Democracy does not require perfect equality, but it does require that citizens share in a common life . . . that people of different backgrounds and social positions encounter one another . . . in the course of everyday life. For this is how we learn to negotiate and abide our differences, and how we come to care for the common good”

(Sandel 2012: 203)

This holistic, as opposed to atomising quality, is again conducive to a complexity understanding of political communities, as it appreciates the role of interactions in creating emergent phenomena, whether in generating unpredictable environmental changes, or adapting to such changes. Freedom as self-government is the central overarching element in Sandel and RCR’s model, and is argued here to be a highly pertinent conception of freedom for life in ALDs today. It has been conceptually analysed in this and the preceding chapters. In the one that follows, RCR is theoretically applied to a pertinent political challenge, climate change (Chapter 6).
Chapter 6 – Resilient Civic Republicanism and Climate Change

Introduction

Concerns about the environment have been on the political radar for a significant amount of time, yet current data suggests that global climate targets are going to be very difficult to achieve. Here it is argued that Resilient Civic Republicanism (RCR) can play an important role in contributing to solving environmental problems while preserving liberty (in terms of self-government), as opposed to top-down decision-making processes. This argument proceeds as follows: firstly, climate change is a problem because the atmosphere has now been shown to not have a limitless capacity to absorb pollutants caused by human activity,\textsuperscript{142} therefore the private use of this resource needs to be limited “in some equitable way” (Singer 2004: 28). Hence the climate can now be conceived as a scarce public good. In other words the climate is now understood as the domain of the “commons” (Hardin 1968). Secondly, the implications of prosperity understood as economic growth, which is underpinned by material individualism, or the social logic of what has been termed “the iron cage of consumerism” (Jackson 2017: Ch. 6),\textsuperscript{143} presents substantial stumbling blocks to mitigating climate change. Of specific interest to this thesis is that material individualism is undergirded, or at the very least not substantially challenged enough by procedural liberalism. Thirdly, as mitigating climate change requires the uptake of new civic minded environmental norms, the manifest capacity for this within RCR is presented. In fact, it is the principles of RCR that both make it a useful framework for norm adoption, and also for building resilient communities.

\textsuperscript{142} This phenomena and geological age is often referred to as the ‘Anthropocene’, a new epoch that asserts that human activity is now a geological force (Henning 2016: 287-9; Zalasiewicz \textit{et al.} 2017).

\textsuperscript{143} See Weber (1958) and Ritzer (2004).
Recalling Chandler’s theorisation of resilience (Introduction), a resilient community is one that self-reflects, learns and adapts to new ‘environmental’ changes, whilst retaining its normative democratic direction. Public deliberation has been shown to be one way of facilitating reflexive learning (Fishkin 2009). Thus in the case of climate change, a resilient community would recognise its practices that are damaging the environment, and then be able to reorient its view of prosperity, or elevate the goal of sustainable living, to mitigate this challenge. The embeddedness of material individualism under procedural liberalism, along with its priority of state neutrality, is not conducive to this form of community as they force the state to rely on a top-down imposition of the common good. This is due to the neglect of meaningful public deliberation and participation (i.e. the exercise of self-governance), which consequently leaves responsibility with the state. The following sections of this chapter will demonstrate how this is so, and what RCR can offer by means of an alternative.

Attending to climate change requires amending individual lifestyles, as individuals can have direct influences on the climate by say not turning off their lights at home when they leave a room, and indirect, by purchasing goods that are not produced sustainably. Reconfiguring climate unfriendly attributes of individuals requires aligning individual interests with that of the common good, in this case with the end of preserving the commons. This can be achieved by the simultaneous creation and promotion of new environmental norms and self-reflexive learning, which lends itself to the model of civic society, liberty sustaining practices and conception of freedom as self-government that RCR advocates (Chapters 3 – 5). Importantly, a new environmental norm would also benefit from an additional underpinning norm of human prosperity, which holds water in a world of finite resources.

Jackson (2017) illustrates how life today in advanced liberal democracies (ALDs) is underpinned by a particular conception of prosperity which is both damaging to the environment and human wellbeing. It is represented in two dual notions, firstly, that there is an affinity between procedural liberalism and capitalism. The former creates, maintains and permits the latter to operate, by undergirding the state with its principles
such as liberty as non-interference, individual rights and freedom of choice. Neoliberalism is also responsible for further entrenching the logic of competition in society and turning political matters into economic ones, that is, reinforcing the conflation of economic liberalism with its political counterpart (Chapter 1). Similarly the second notion is that capitalism is fuelled by the self-fulfilling prophesy of material individualism. The latter refers to the relentless “chasing [of] material advantage” based on “selfish competition and the excessive commoditisation of everyday life”, which erodes “certain forms of human interaction” (Jackson 2017: 125). It concerns the “focusing [of] one’s life around the acquisition of money, possessions, and status” (Jackson 2017: 126). This “surge of materialism . . . and the economic model that sustains it” (Jackson 2017: 124), places no limits on the consumption and possession of material artefacts needed to secure individual wellbeing and economic growth today. This sentiment was notably pronounced in a speech given by George Bush at the 1992 Earth summit: “the American lifestyle is not up for negotiation” (in Singer 2004: 2).

What is required is the adoption of an alternative conception of prosperity that is suitable for humans living on a planet of finite resources. This alternative vision would be based upon a shared collective endeavour whereby human flourishing is not wedded to material individualism:

“[P]rospereity has to do with our ability to flourish: physically, psychologically and socially. Beyond sheer subsidence or survival, prosperity hangs on our ability to participate meaningfully in the life of society”

(Jackson 2017: 121)

This alternative conception of human prosperity ties in closely with RCR’s principles of self-realisation and the common good, whereby the self-realisation of one can be seen as interrelated with the self-realisation of others, in that it is something achieved through collective action (Chapter 4). This chapter asserts that its emergence can be

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144 Jackson also speaks of “hyper-materialism”, whereby social life is increasingly defined by “material expression” (2017: 140).
145 In other words flourishing within limits (Jackson 2017: 185).
146 This point is expanded further below, see Masquelier 2017 in A self-governed economy section.
furthered through decentralised civic spaces (Chapter 5), and the construction of a democratically deliberated common good. Hence a more sustainable vision of prosperity and a new environmental norm justified by climate change, appears more conducive to an RCR model than a procedural liberal one.147

A contemporaneous issue is thus raised, as once negative environmental ‘actions’ have been identified as such, for example once commuting by car has been recognised as detrimentally contributing to climate change, then questions of how societies and social norms can be adapted in light of this becomes a pressing concern. Arguments of this kind are theoretically difficult to make from a procedural liberal standpoint, whereby the right is axiomatically prior to the good. This is because lifestyle issues, and governments’ abilities to address them are, under the former, conceptualised as one conception of the good amongst many, which the state should be neutral towards. Procedural liberalism can therefore be claimed to be counter-resilient in this respect, as its priority of the right over the good can theoretically block adaption (below); and when adaption does take place, it often fails to preserve key democratic ideals. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of a shared conception of the common good and its connection to self-realisation are underplayed within procedural liberalism, due to the positioning of self-mastery and the pursuance of good life to the private sphere (below). Therefore it is not surprising that communities underpinned by procedural liberalism struggle to meet the challenge of creating an economy that is no longer driving “itself forward by using up more and more materials and emitting more and more carbon into the atmosphere” (Jackson 2017: 101). Essentially “ecological investment” turns on the notion that communities in ALDs are of the right kind, in that they are capable of delivering on normative, and not purely procedural goals (Jackson 2017: 101-2).

147 Arguably procedural liberalism is supposed to be neutral with regards to what may count as individual prosperity (i.e. by attempting to enable as many conceptions of the good to flourish as possible). Therefore the point made here could be put differently; that procedural liberalism does not espouse a conception of prosperity that is needed in order to reconfigure communities in-line with the challenges of climate change.
For RCR, as rights are derivative of the common good, these arguments are more easily advanced. Intrinsic value is placed on deliberation, participation, and freedom as self-government, which are valuable tools for addressing the lifestyle and structural economic challenges of climate change, and engendering a new sustainable vision of prosperity. RCR aims to capture the idea that positive environmental changes can be achieved by changing social norms, reimagining the economy and empowering citizens to be able to contribute to these socio-political adaptions.

To illustrate the efficacy of the RCR model, this chapter begins by briefly outlining the environmental challenge and why it is useful to discuss climate change as a public good, and within the terms of ‘the commons’. Following this, the chapter then analyses the limitations of procedural liberalism in addressing climate change, and thus represents somewhat of a recap and extension of Chapter 1. Finally in the second half of the chapter, the key aspects of the RCR model that pertain to climate change are outlined. Hence this is where the key claims of the chapter are made, that RCR offers significant potential for engendering new environmental norms, whilst simultaneously helping to build resilient communities.

**The Environmental Problematique**

Although uncertainty exists over the impacts of environmental degradation, global climate change and its drivers appear unambiguous:

- Human influence on the climate is clear, and recent anthropogenic emission of greenhouse gases are the highest in history.
- The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice diminished, and sea level has risen.
- Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven largely by economic and population growth.
- Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems.
Limiting climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adaption, can limit climate change risks.

(IPCC 2014: 4-10)\textsuperscript{148}

These bullets convey a number of important points: (1) humans are having a significant impact on global climate change; (2) humans and other ecosystems will face increasing numbers and severity of climate challenges; (3) mitigating climate change will require substantial human effort and adaption; and (4) that changes need to be made immediately as “Anthropogenic perturbation levels of four of the [earth system] processes/features (climate change, biosphere integrity, biogeochemical flows, and land system change) exceed the [planetary boundary] (Steffen et al. 2015).\textsuperscript{149} Climate change is a good exemplar of the usefulness of adopting a complexity theory framework, as it is a complex dynamical system itself (Steffen et al. 2015). It parallels the principles of “aggregate complexity”, whereby it’s defined by the relationships between the entities that compose it, which defines its structure; can change “in time according to rules based on localized interactions of entities”, and “can have emergent qualities that are not analytically tractable from the attributes of internal components”, potentially creating non-linear consequences (Manson 2001: 409-11). Macro-level emergent phenomena could be the warming and rising of the oceans. It also suits a complexity ontology as climate change demands communities to be resilient in the RCR sense, that is, to adapt to new constraints imposed by climate change, whilst conserving the capacity for a system to preserve liberty. This includes adaption as reaction, for example building new flood defences; and also adaption as pro-action,\textsuperscript{150} that is humans changing their behaviour in order to reduce global pollution. Furthermore discourses on climate change parallel the increasing move towards speaking about contemporary socio-political challenges in terms of risk and resilience. Hence resilient communities are

\textsuperscript{148} See also Stern (2007), Rockström et al. (2009) and Steffen et al. (2015).

\textsuperscript{149} See Shue (2016), Ison (2010: Ch.1) and McKinnon (2011a: 196-7) for a treatment of why action is required now and that the current generation are best placed to attend to the climate change challenge.

\textsuperscript{150} Giddens (2009) argues for proactive adaption.
better placed to deal with the risks associated with changing environmental, social and political factors that can be characterised as both emergent and novel.

“Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development”

(IPCC 2014: 13)

The consequences of climate change and natural disasters associated with it can be catastrophic, and often have the largest impact on the least well-off in developing states. Although discourses of risk can have practical benefits, since they can outline harms, and justify a call to create resilient communities. Contemporary politics in ALDs rely on top-down responses that generate mixed results. Today popular attitudes towards addressing climate change do seem to be gaining momentum, for example “73% of people want world leaders to agree a global deal and 66% think action must happen now” (Gov.uk 2014).\(^{151}\) However despite local authorities (in the UK) driving to increase the amount of household waste that is recycled, “rejected recyclable waste” has risen by “84% in England since 2011” (BBC News 2016a), which has been attributed to a myriad of factors, such as “green fatigue”, or apathy towards recycling, increases in consumer spending, changes to recycling programmes and increased home building (Cawley 2016; BBC News 2016a). This illustrates that there still remains a disparity between peoples’ laudable aspirations towards the environment, and the practical application of these ideals; despite the fact that the risks of climate change have been established for decades.

The stunted progress towards greener living may be explained by seemingly legitimate reasons, as recycling, using public transport, converting old technologies to greener ones in the home and industry, carries both expense and inconvenience to those who attempt to adopt them. Procedural liberalism and materialist individualism only seem capable of coercive top-down answers, or individualising/privatising solutions to environmental problems. Therefore within the fast paced, insecure, and atomised lives

\(^{151}\) See Babcock (2009a; and also 2009b, 2009c), who refers to the emergence of a second “republican moment” concerning climate change.
that individuals live today, it is not surprising that environmental programmes are struggling to take serious hold. In other words new environmental norms are still waiting to reach maturity in the populations of both developed and developing states. Before remarking on this observation’s connection to procedural liberalism, a more specific understanding of what the environment represents, in terms of it being something that humans interact with and value, is worth presenting.

The environment: a public good

The environment can be termed a public good, and thus derivative of the common good (Chapter 4). To recap, the common good is a fundamental principle of RCR, a notion that highlights the mutual indebtedness of individuals, who are pursing self-realisation for themselves and their fellow citizens (Simhony 2001: 71). Public goods are consequently recognised as “goods from which everyone benefits” (Honohan 2002: 152), and “public in the sense that they often need to be centrally provided, and if provided, it is not possible to exclude people from benefitting” (Honohan 2002: 295, n.4). The opposite of public goods, are thus “common bads . . . those from which everyone suffers” (Honohan 2002: 152). Adopting the assumption that a sustainable and flourishing environment is valuable to the human species and worth protecting for future generations, including the protection of animals and flora and fauna, then the environment is very much a public good. Public goods can also illustrate what Sandel refers to as shared fate or understandings of the community (Sandel 1998a: 5-6, 208, 274, 331; 1998c: 325-6; 2005: 10). This is similar to Arendt’s notion of a common world, a world where individuals share “common concerns and a common fate” (Honohan 2002: 155), to which their preferences can be orientated towards (Arendt 1968: 221). Public goods cannot be secured by political institutions alone, but require civic virtue, an individual possessing a positive disposition towards aligning community concerns with

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\(^{152}\) Global climate change could therefore become a common bad.

\(^{153}\) With the advances in science and technology in the 21st century, it could be argued that the human species could survive, even if it were to degrade the global environment almost completely, thus it is worth noting that here, the assumption that humans should strive to protect their global environment is adopted.
individual interests. Hence it is difficult to achieve environmental goals following purely instrumental means (Honohan 2002: 152). The presence of a public realm or agora is particularly useful for attending to climate change, as it is often during social interactions that public goods and the interdependence of individuals becomes realised; or where the connection between individual self-realisation and the self-realisation of others manifests itself.

The need to align individual preferences, desires and values with the protection of public goods, does not represent the majority overruling the minority, but in fact illustrates “a division in each citizen” (Honohan 2002: 150). As Honohan explains: “For everyone has a both a public and a private interest; even the industrialist qua citizen has an interest in breathing clean air” (2002: 159). The key is to attune societies with the preservation of public goods and current social, political and economic structures and contexts. In other words, there is a need for humans to alter their relationship with nature, to develop institutions that can frame nature as a partner in self-realisation, rather than something that needs to be dominated, especially considering the interrelatedness of humans and the environment in the global earth system (which again operates along the lines of systemic interconnectedness). Environmental interventions need to be made in a timely manner, before ecosystems are lost.

“We regret the loss of the countryside or wilderness only when these have been dramatically reduced by urban and industrial expansion. [Importantly] regretting does not itself counter the market forces that may have produced such results. Markets that are shaped by individual interests are good at providing individual goods; they are notoriously inadequate at providing – indeed tend to erode – public goods”

(Honohan 2002: 159)

This sheds light on a key issue that Sandel (2012) remarks on extensively, that is the capacity for markets to undermine or crowd-out morals or norms concerning the common good. It raises a concern reminiscent of Hardin’s (1968) conceptualisation of the tragedy of the commons. Notwithstanding his more contentious recommendations, his identification of the vulnerability of the commons, and that such issues cannot be
adequately solved by technology or the natural sciences – as “ecosystems lie outside the formal realm of the market” (Jackson 2017: 152) - are similar to Sandel, in that what is required is to bring morally contentious issues back into the public realm. In other words, the commons remains vulnerable to over or miss use in overt ways, such as from corporate interests that are driven primarily by market logic, and also more obscure individual lifestyle choices (below).

Corporate interests and coercive laws, such as those designed to reduce the amount of pollutants released into the atmosphere, appear to be struggling to rein in the predominance of market forces. For example, one of the largest transnational forms of government in the world, the European Union, appears to be failing to adequately support positive environmental norms. One of the largest EU-based corporations Volkswagen (VW), is confident that its ‘defeat devices’, designed to trick engine emissions tests, will not result in compensation for EU customers to the same degree that it was obliged to pay to US customers. This is due in part to weaker emissions laws in Europe; and the reluctance of the German federal motor authorities to respond to the scandal, and VW’s unwillingness to compensate European customers or the environment. The head of VW UK remarked that “to have compensation . . . you need a loss, and there is no evidence of a loss” (McGee 2017). Thus Hardin’s thesis regarding the vulnerability of the commons remains valid today, and illustrative of the persistence of economic liberalism since the 1970s. VW’s installation of defeat devices in their automobiles, its posture on compensation for European customers, and the EU’s response, reinforces the claim that markets are often incapable of protecting public goods. Hence unpacking the limitations of procedural liberalism is now necessary.

The Limits of Procedural Liberalism

Procedural liberalism further problematizes attempts to tackle climate change and other environmental issues. These constraints are imposed by its adherence to the priority of the right over the good, its inability to engender moral imperatives and active political communities. Put differently, the “definitive liberal commitment to non-interference in
individuals’ preferences is what has led many to assume a basic tension between liberalism and ‘green’ concerns” (Calder 2011: 157). Although there are those that maintain that liberalism can be extended to accommodate green issues (Bell 2002, 2004; Hailwood 2004; McKinnon 2011b; Wissenburg 1998: 20-34, 2006), the adherence to state neutrality maintains the tension above as “environmental sustainability by definition raises questions regarding the Good Life” (Dobson 2007a: 153). Hence in the case of climate change, communities would arguably be straying into the realm of morality (Hardin 1968), or would at least be imposing one, sustainable, vision of the good life. Changes in individual lifestyles and social norms are required to reduce pollutant emissions and recalibrate the current market-led conception of individual material prosperity. This would involve incorporating environmental concerns into a conception of the good life, which is a difficult claim to mobilise within the strictures of procedural liberalism.

In defence of liberalism

However liberal democracies are in theory disposed to freedom and the prevention of harm, and can potentially “take . . . care of the environment” (Payne 1995: 41). In brief Payne demonstrates that certain characteristics of liberal democracies can be helpful for advancing environmental goals. Firstly “individual rights and the open marketplace of ideas” (1995: 43-4). Here Payne observes that individual liberties, which contain rights such as free speech, assembly, and a free press, are a useful pre-requisite for voicing environmental concerns and lobbying governments. They also prohibit the harsh treatment or suppression of environmentalists and their views, which can be aided by media mechanisms that enable the free flow of information. “A free market in ideas” can help galvanise support for environmental protection (Payne 1995: 43), and create stronger public scrutiny and governmental accountability regarding

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155 Although the reality of this claim will be tested in the following section.
156 It is worth noting that Payne’s discussion (1995), regarding whether liberal democracies can take better care of the environment, is posed in respect of other, typically authoritarian, regimes.
environmental legislation. Following from this point, public opinion and pressure, including environmental pressure groups that can act as a counterweight to business interests, can make liberal regimes more responsive by means of accountability exercised through the “ballot box” (Payne 1995: 43-4). Moreover, property rights could also prevent polluting behaviour via the judiciary, say if pollutant waste infringes on private property, embodied in the principle of “not-in-my-backyard” (Payne 1995: 51).

“In sum, the power of business lobbies to influence government decisions can be overcome, or at least significantly constrained, by opposing social forces. Organized interest groups or grassroots social movements can help mobilize public opinion to work effectively towards environmental goals. The political liberties granted to citizens of free societies can thereby generate and sustain environmentalist policies” (Payne 1995: 45)

Environmental objectives, which characteristically rely on the creation and dissemination of new scientific knowledge, can also be served within liberal democracies as liberties and the free flow of information can create societies that are able to learn lessons from “environmental successes . . . and failures” (Payne 1995: 45). In essence liberal democracies can be viewed as “policy laboratories” (Payne 1995: 45). The results of trial and error in environmental policy can also be further expedited through free market mechanisms and international institutions. To the contrary of the free market being a substantial impediment to environmental protection, open markets could, and arguably have led to “green consumerism” (Payne 1995: 49), which can cause little inconvenience or expense to individuals’ lives (Harrabin 2017). Markets in environmental goods, such as solar panels, have emerged, and many market-based incentives have been offered such as carbon-offset schemes. Consumers qua consumers could also provide an impetus to businesses to operate in a more sustainable manner. Thus the argument is that markets could be a key driving force towards environmental reform (Payne 1995: 48-52; Saunders 1995).157

157 However Hobson points out that “free market environmentalism” has been “highly criticised” (2013: 58).
Finally neoliberal institutionalists (Young 1989: 70-80, 1994; Hass cited in Payne 1995: 53 n. 13), have claimed that international cooperation can be explained within the open market framework, which can lead to the creation of global institutions capable of improving the ends of environmentalism. In brief, “[g]lobal organizations can apply a variety of pressures – some subtle and some direct – to get governments to accept environmental norms” (Payne 1995: 47). In this way NGOs could adopt the role of norm entrepreneurs (Sunstein 1996: 909),\textsuperscript{158} as could certain states in the global political system, who could garner support from other states that wish to join global or regional political organisations and thus want to be seen to be following institutional standards (for example states that wish to join the EU). In addition international NGOs could also apply pressure and help strengthen domestic support for environmental policies.\textsuperscript{159}

To be fair to Payne, he is not prophesying on the efficacy of liberal democracies and caring for the environment as such, but offering useful insights into several characteristics and principles that could further environmental ends. This is prudent considering the disparaging data that continues to emerge from climate change organisations such as the IPCC. Payne makes two insights that are particularly pertinent for this thesis and chapter, namely the potential for change inherent in social forces, and the capacity within liberal democracies to adapt and learn. However it is argued here that both of these things are undermined by today’s established conception of prosperity. Jackson asserts that “[t]he prevailing vision of prosperity as a continually expanding material paradise has come unravelled”, and can no longer “rely on default assumptions about relentless material consumption growth” (2017: 47). The opportunity for relatively unchecked material individualism is perhaps the most cogent critique of procedural liberalism regarding climate change, and is clearly derivative from liberal

\textsuperscript{158} This concept is explored further below in the ‘Civic virtue’ sub-section.

\textsuperscript{159} However, as Castree (2010) argues, such processes are the logical conclusion of an adherence to neoliberal economics, which concurrently creates a greater degree of privatisation, or neoliberalisation, of nature, which displaces alternative ways of managing and valuing the commons that lie outside of neoliberal economic logic. Thus NGOs begin to fill the space, or management of the commons, from which the state has receded (Masquelier 2017: 85). Hence “the inextricable link between the re-organization of nature and the re-organization of society under the neoliberal condition” (Masquelier 2017: 88).
pathfinders such as Locke and Smith (Singer 2004: 27-31), thus remaining difficult to address within strictly Rawlsian frameworks (Gardiner 2011; Calder 2011).  

The procedural liberal problematisation

The core claim of this section is that liberalism has facilitated the uptake of a conception of prosperity that runs contrary to mitigating climate change. One of the starting points for this argument is the liberal notion that the self can be created, and individuals can operate self-sufficiently, outside of society (Taylor 1985). Although the formation of the self has been addressed to some degree by liberals such as Rawls (1971: Part III), it still represents one of the core liberal ideals that posit rights as prior to the good, in order to allow individuals to develop their own private conception of the good life. Hence one obstacle in the context of climate change “is liberalism’s commitment to minimal interference with individual liberty” (Calder & McKinnon 2011: 94).

Chapter 2 put forward that liberty has largely evolved from traditional liberal philosophy, notably associated with Locke and Hobbes, couched in the notion of non-interference and individual autonomy. A simple and unsurprising argument can be made here, that the right coming before the good makes it difficult to create a burden of proof sizeable enough to unseat Mill’s (2015: 12-13) harm principle (i.e. curtailments to individual liberty are only permissible “to prevent harm to others”). For example, building the case that an individual commuting to work everyday alone in their SUV causes sufficient harm to others in the community, which provides grounds for this behaviour to be prohibited, is a difficult claim to make from a procedural liberal standpoint. An individual’s freedom to purchase the vehicle of their choice, and to commute to work in the most pleasurable and efficient way possible, is a cornerstone of liberal political philosophy, and notably associated with individual autonomy; a free will making an unimpeded choice. It also encompasses the desire to not pass judgements on different conceptions of the good life.

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160 For example Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand of the market is perhaps no longer as persuasive as it was in the 18th century “when economies were smaller and the world less populated” (Jackson 2017: 47).
Yet the harm principle is not conceptually bound to oppose environmental concerns. For instance “ecologically cognisant thinking” is not prevented from becoming a harm, potentially reordering certain principles of justice towards sustainability (Calder 2011: 154; Cripps 2011). Rather the central “problem is that the normative challenges of climate change are difficult to accommodate within the set-up of Rawlsian liberalism” (Calder 2011: 154). To summarise Calder’s claims on this matter, the notion of climate change can be said to be “doctrine-relevant”, depending on the lens through which the perceiver views it:

“[[I]t is uncontroversially the case that different ‘ideals’ and ‘norms’ vis-à-vis the environment will operate with different understandings of what counts as a threat, or a crisis, or just an unacceptable state of affairs. This can lead to a sense of paradox, in that when we discuss nature, or characterizing the impact of the non-human environment on human prospects, we are always discussing a version of it, rendered in our own terms rather than its”

(Calder 2011: 161)

Hence the issue is that each individual is capable of perceiving climate change differently based on the norms they ascribe to it (i.e. ‘doctrine-relative’), say as a threat or not a threat. Yet climate change in reality is not subject to these interpretations, rather it is an objective fact that continues to develop regardless (i.e. not ‘doctrine-relevant’). The effects have been documented and the World Health Organisation has claimed that climate change was responsible for 150,000 human deaths in 2000 (McMichael et al. 2004 cited in Calder 2011: 162). A recent study has also highlighted evidence of environmental injustice with respect to the levels of pollution commuters who use public transport are exposed to, as those who commute by car (who in fact emit the most harmful kinds of pollution), are the least vulnerable to it (Rivas et al. 2017; BBC News 2017a). As Calder underlines, procedural liberalism’s adherence to reasonable pluralism, which aims to offer a way to find “a shared public basis for the justification of political and social institutions” (Rawls 1999a: 421), stipulates that “core liberal

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161 Calder (2011) ends this quotation with the term “constructivism”, yet due to the limitations of space available in this chapter, and as the point’s justification does not need to be replicated here, his treatment of the concept will not be explicated in detail. Hence the replacement with ‘liberalism’.
principles . . . must remain at a neutral distance from . . . questions concerning
metaphysical controversy” (Calder 2011: 163), of which climate change arguably is.
Climate change, as it stands today, exists within a procedural liberal framework, and as
a result constitutes a judgement on “the ethical worth of different lifestyles”, which is
consequently prohibited (Wissenburg 2006: 22).

Whether certain tenets of procedural liberalism can be retrofitted to meet climate
change, taking seriously the normative implications of this phenomenon, has been cast
into doubt (Calder 2011; Cripps 2011). Moreover without an established “environment
norm”, and when climate challenges are seen as “differing ideals in confrontation,
[where] we observe different perceptions of pollution and risk” (Evernden 1992: 5-6),
environmental obligations are vulnerable to being “overridden by other obligations that
humans have towards one another” (Calder 2011: 160; de-Shalit 2000: 63-4). US
President Trump’s desires to disband, or substantially reduce the scope and power
of the Environmental Protection Agency, and reignite the US coal industry (Neslen 2017),
is one example of an overriding of environmental obligations in favour of increasing
employment in certain regions of the United States and the provision of inexpensive
energy. This illustrates the argument put forward by Castree (2010) and Masquelier
(2017: 84-90) regarding the neoliberalisation of nature, whereby processes of
privatisation and marketisation begin to define humans’ relations with nature. Thus the
adoption of neoliberal principles in society are also reflected in nature. Consequently
“as the neoliberalization of nature advances, societies come to rely increasingly on the
supply and demand mechanism for the use and management of natural resources”
(Masquelier 2017: 86). This perhaps helps to explain how environmental norms can be
displaced or overruled by market mechanisms associated with neoliberalism.

In fact the acceptance of economic liberalism within the broader procedural liberal
framework, illustrates that the current capitalist system is a non-problematic element
and thus beyond serious revision. As Hayward contends:
“It involves a belief that whatever criticisms might be directed against economic liberalism as the ideological counterpart of capitalism, the values of ‘ethical’ liberalism or principles of ‘political’ liberalism are immune from any implication of those criticisms”

(2009: 280)

Nonetheless the normative goal of creating a new vision of growth or prosperity, which is not based upon the unending accumulation of capital, is now doubly unlikely within a procedural liberal system due to its affinity with capitalism (Introduction). The issue does not turn wholly on whether procedural liberalism requires capitalism (below), but that it offers little incentive to change the status quo. Paradoxically, judgements over the worth of different conceptions of the good life are argued to be beyond governmental jurisdiction, such as those related to environmental sustainability (perceived to be ‘doctrine-relevant’). The vision of material individualism remains largely unquestioned due to freedom understood as non-interference, and compounded by neoliberalism, which is responsible for further entrenching the logic of competition in society and turning political matters into economic ones. Even if the theoretical obstacles could be overcome within procedural liberalism, the relegation of civic life and the common good would make the dissemination of an alternate view of prosperity within societies doubly more difficult.

At the theoretical level arguments can continue to be batted back and forth regarding the space for environmental concerns within liberalism. However here it is argued, along with Cripps (2011) and Calder (2011), that this is most likely too demanding if one is to stay strictly within procedural liberal paradigm. If theoretical space could be found within the procedural liberalism, fostering a wide-scale public adoption of climate change friendly lifestyles would only be achieved via top-down initiatives, thus raising the question of the resilience of procedural liberal communities. In other words, even if the theoretical work had been done, regarding liberty and rights (to speak generally), then liberalism’s lack of civic minded institutions and resistance to cultivating civic virtue in citizens would still be an impediment to the social adoption of new environmental norms.
In brief, procedural liberalism cannot be categorically condemned on the grounds of individual liberty. Yet the question remains whether the axiomatic arrangement of the right and the good, combined with the trend towards the neoliberalisation of nature, can elicit socio-political change quickly enough to mitigate the irreversible effects of climate change. A liberal solution would require a top-down imposition of a manufactured common good (Chapter 3), which would not be resilient. This is because it neglects the need to address underlying social norms and the need for reflexive learning, as well as its incapacity to preserve liberty (below). It also neglects the potential for new norms to emerge through individual interactions in a complex system.

Hence what is under the spotlight is whether ALDs, in their current form of socio-political organisation, are responsive enough to meet the challenges of climate change. As Payne pointed out, they can be viewed as more responsive than authoritarian states - due to the potential for information and public opinion to thrive in ALDs, and that authoritarian states have historically not viewed the environment as a worthy political end to pursue - but they may not be responsive in the substantive sense, the one required to significantly impact on climate change. Responsiveness in this substantive sense is meant to imply the notion of resilience, that is to say communities can learn from, adapt and absorb environmental changes as a whole, while continuing to cultivate liberty. Despite the provision of mechanisms for citizens to express their views and form pressure groups in ALDs, the fragmentation and atomism engendered within contemporary societies, as directed by the status quo acceptance of material individualism, restricts the opportunity for serious political change to be made, such as the restructuring of economic liberalism. It is within this view that individual liberties, when divorced or prior to the good, become problematic. As Payne illustrated they are both necessary and useful for political change, yet societies that primarily favour the provision of a neutral rights framework (whether including a welfare component or not), which provides the foundation for individual and corporate free market

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162 For example one current goal is, “by 2050”, to “cut greenhouse gas emissions to 80% below 1990 levels (EU 2016; Gov.uk 2013).”
163 Payne (1995) provides evidence to support the view that authoritarian states historically do not prioritise environmental concerns.
competition to take place on a level playing field, places little socio-political demands on its citizens.

The need for decisions to be made on individual lifestyles, or conceptions of the good, are no longer avoidable. The scale and impact of climate change make it a new and profound challenge to procedural liberalism, both in the acceptance of its economic base and its ability to address questions of the good life; or put differently, to account for the more complex notion of interdependence and connectedness that is characteristic of today’s societies. It is for this reason that evolution with regard to what should count as growth and prosperity has been stunted for over forty years:

“Too much and for too long, we seemed to have surrendered personal excellence and community values in the mere accumulation of material things. Our Gross National Product, now, is over $800 billion dollars a year, but that Gross National Product - if we judge the United States of America by that . . . counts air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors and the jails for the people who break them. It counts the destruction of the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and counts nuclear warheads and armored cars for the police to fight the riots in our cities. It counts Whitman’s rifle and Speck’s knife, and the television programs which glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children. Yet the gross national product does not allow for the health of our children, the quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country, it measures everything in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. And it can tell us everything about America except why we are proud that we are Americans”

(Kennedy 1968)

What Robert F Kennedy aptly underscores, is the idea that individuals being “bound together by a common concern for each other” is dissolving (1968), and with it, the resilience needed for a community to meet the systemic demands of the 21st century. Freedom as non-interference, perhaps best associated with John Locke, and later championed by Bentham and Paley (Pettit 2012: 8-10), began a long tradition of emphasising individual rights in society. Yet interconnectedness during the early years of liberalism’s construction (say from the 17th – 19th century) was rather opaque. In the pre-globalised world, it was far harder to understand the impacts of unimpeded
economic activities, notwithstanding the welfarism that emerged alongside the industrial revolution. Although this did lead liberal scholars to rethink the nature of liberty (such as the British Idealists), the new costs of welfare could be incorporated within the principles of liberalism, culminating in Rawls’ liberal egalitarianism. In addition, material individualism was less of a threat when the world’s resources did not seem as finite, and the scale of the negative externalities caused by ‘using’ them (i.e. pollution) were understood, as they are today. Whilst the inequality that existed during this time was still a worthwhile debate to be had regarding justice, the impacts of exuberant, luxurious lifestyles today are more than just morally distasteful. The common good, being enjoyed by each member of a mutually indebted society, as T.H. Green conceptualised it, with its subterranean acceptance of human interdependence, has not materialised today, as procedural liberalism has continued to gain ascendancy.

Liberalism is “wedded to a capitalist free-market, growth-orientated economic order” (Barry 2008: 9). Combined with freedom as non-interference, the nature of liberalism’s relationship with markets has camouflaged the dependency humans have on the environment, which is treated largely as a tool in the growth-orientated economy; and undermined society’s civic resources and shared concern for the common good. It has also heightened the vulnerability of certain individuals and groups, such as those who inhabit the islands in the Pacific Ocean. Thus the neoliberalisation of the environment, which supplies the growth economy, based upon material individualism, continues to foster inequality (Barry 2008: 8; also Polanyi 1947), and is conceptually tied to procedural liberalism through the theoretical defence of freedom it offers to the contemporary capitalist economy, and the logic of the growth based economy (Jackson 2017). Consequently as climate change becomes more visible, liberalism is placed in the position of “simply ameliorating the worse effects of inequality” (Barry 2008: 10).

The imperatives of climate change do not appear to be reined in sufficiently by ‘amelioration’, at least to the level outlined in the IPCC reports. The ‘doctrine-relevanateness’ of climate change remains, and environmental issues can create a polarised disconnect within societies, such as the practice of fracking (BBC News 2015).
Despite earthquakes being felt after test drillings in the UK, which were judged to have been the most likely cause, and other environmental concerns over the volume of water used in the practice, and how it is transported to drilling sites, governmental rhetoric emphasises “gas security”, which fracking has provided to the US and Canada, its potential to “create thousands of jobs”, and its ability to contribute “significantly to the UK’s future energy needs” (BBC News 2015). Hence environmental obligations are overridden by, and viewed separate to other human needs, which are in fact interdependent and largely valued outside of market terms; therefore remaining unchallenged by economic liberalism. This is compounded by the fact that procedural liberalism permits a now inappropriate conception of prosperity, which focuses on growth and unlimited capital accumulation (Jackson 2017).

Alternative norms (see Norms below), such as living frugally within a world of limited resources continue to hit the rocks of economic liberalism. Unseating material individualism is not a liberal priority and is extremely difficult to achieve within its own resources. The assumption is that today’s societies require more and more energy, and that this must be secured at all costs, without examining whether the enterprises into which these resources flow serve a common good appropriate for the interdependent lives human beings now live. For example the quest for cheaper air fares and new finance options that enable consumers to trade-in their automobiles after short periods of stewardship, are not weighted against the cost these practices bear on the environment. Does the utility derived from an individual having a new automobile every two – four years outweigh the environmental costs associated with the extraction and manufacture of the raw materials? Simply put, procedural liberalism is not suited to regulating free-market capitalism to the degree necessary to combat climate change (Barry 2008: 8), based upon the atomised societies it creates, and its tendency to commodify and privatise public goods and the good life, namely the environment.

60% of the global supply of raw materials and precious metals goes to the automobile industry, and research has shown that substantial environmental benefits could be gained from recycling automobiles and reconditioning used parts (i.e. implementing the circular economy). For example “80% less energy, 88% less water, 92% less chemical products, 70% less waste production” and zero landfill waste (EMF 2013).
RCR, by placing a stake in the character of citizens, cultivating civic virtue and the common good, seeking to ultimately empower individuals in cooperation with others, presents a more capable approach. In this case environmental claims cannot be immediately dispensed with by appeals to state neutrality or liberty as non-interference, partly as norms can be framed as the emergent qualities of the deliberation.

Libertarians such as Nozick have argued that private individuals with the requisite resources could recognise common goods and attempt to promote them by means of private donations and investment, such as the Breakthrough Energy Coalition led by Bill Gates (BEC 2016). However it is unlikely that this will be sufficient to bring the changes in individual practices and public investment needed to realise Gates’ ambition of finding an “energy miracle” that can get CO₂ emissions to zero “by the end of this century” (Gates 2016). It has been put forward that a central tenet of the environmental challenge is that individual actions cause more pollution than industrial ones (Babcock 2009a). This fundamentally challenges the efficacy of procedural liberalism, as systemic connectedness illustrates the wholly other-regarding nature of individual actions, which now need addressing in relation to climate change. Thus Dobson’s remarks about the ‘environmental citizen’, chime with the claims that such a form of citizenship will require:

“the recognition that self-interested behaviour will not always protect or sustain public goods such as the environment. Thus environmental citizens make a commitment to the common good”

(2007b: 280)

Therefore what must be asked of current socio-political institutions, is whether they are able to bring the changes in behaviour, or norms, that both Dobson (2007b) and Babcock (2009a) call for. In other words, are they capable of transforming self-interested individuals into civic minded ones. This point also applies to communitarian and capability approaches. Therefore a more holistic programme is needed to realise these qualities. As Barry claims, “[c]itizens as well as cities are made not born” (2008: 7; also
Moreover fragility is not only a feature of humans’ relationship with the environment, but also their relationships with each other:

“Moral capital is the set of shared habits, norms, institutions and values that make common life possible. Left to our own, we human beings have an impressive capacity for selfishness. Unadorned, the struggle for power has a tendency to become barbaric. So people in decent societies agree on a million informal restraints — codes of politeness, humility and mutual respect that girdle selfishness and steer us toward reconciliation”

(Brooks 2016)

The point Brooks articulates here leads back to Payne’s, whereby the ‘opposing social forces’ that the latter speaks about do not appear strong enough to produce an effective counterweight to unregulated free-market capitalism. Hence what is required is a fuller institutionalisation of positive environmental norms. The themes presented in Chapter 1 and carried through the following chapters would argue that ‘common life’ and social capital (Putnam 2000) are becoming increasingly fragmented, resulting in increasing citizen disempowerment. Hobson’s research into the efficacy of public climate change forums in Australia shows that,

“[s]ending deliberative participants back out into unsupportive and seemingly disinterested (and at times even hostile) contexts once deliberation is over could potentially be more damaging than helpful, both to them and wider public discourses”

(Hobson 2013: 69)

Although public deliberation forms an important pillar of RCR, what Hobson highlights, is that deliberation, when situated in a procedural liberal context, is severely limited in creating changes in environmental norms across society. Therefore it can be argued that a manufactured common good placed on top of a procedural liberal society, whilst capable of creating gradual environmental improvements, cannot be entirely relied upon to bring the substantial social changes that environmental phenomena such as climate change require. Whilst one advantage of procedural liberalism is the space it

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165 Such a framework would also help create new relationships between producers and consumers in-line with Castree (2010) and Masquelier’s (2017) analysis of the neoliberalisation of nature.
creates for many different conceptions of the good to flourish, when some of these run contra to the social changes required to meet new systemic changes such as climate change, they are extremely difficult to rein in. Even if the harm principle could be invoked in the name of climate change and seek to reorient citizens away from material individualism, the methods for implementing such changes would be top-down. Consequently, as the necessary reconﬁgurations would involve lifestyles, they are, without unbearable surveillance, difficult to enforce, and will, as the polarisation within American views on climate change has demonstrated (Liptak & Acosta 2017), drawing substantial criticism by US citizens. What is needed is a more resilient bottom-up formation of new environmental norms, as the following section puts forward. Therefore attention will now turn to what RCR can offer with regard to climate change, that is, how it can help institutionalise environmental norms which are more congruent with the demands of climate change. It will also demonstrate how such an approach can be considered resilient.166

Resilient Civic Republicanism and Climate Change

Jackson is unequivocal in his recommendation for the state to adopt a far more interventionist position, to allow it to perform its central role of securing the long-term sustainability of public goods (2017: Ch. 10). He rightly contends that whilst nudge tactics (Thaler & Sunstein 2009) can aid climate change, for example by increasing road tax for vehicles that pollute more (Gov.uk 2016), more substantial social changes are needed that go beyond the nudge framework. The rather formidable tasks of aligning individual interests and actions with environmental sensibilities, and reforming the economy (by tackling its incentive structures and consumer growth logic), requires a succession from the procedural liberal governing philosophy, and a more practical philosophy approach than that offers by the scholars in Chapter 2. In addition, the role of social norms is also essential in creating more environmentally responsible citizens

166 Resilience can be conceptualised within RCR by its acknowledgement of the potential revise-ability of political decisions in-line with current circumstances (Honohan 2002: 166), which is married to its ‘open’ conceptualisation of civic virtue (Chapter 3).
(Babcock 2009b), and communicating Jackson’s ecologically sensitive conception of prosperity. Thus what is needed to tackle climate change, and remain “within ecological limits” is no less than

“[a] massive technological shift; a significant policy effort; wholesale changes in patterns of consumer demand; a huge international drive for technology transfer to bring about substantial reductions in resource intensity right across the world”

(Jackson 2017: 96)

Hence the central message that environmental scholars underline is the need for a holistic political approach to climate change (Babcock 2009b: 155, fn. 299), as neither relying on government regulation or norm creation alone will be sufficient to bring about the large scale socio-political change required. Several features of RCR can help cultivate new environmental norms and legitimise government intervention. Essentially the RCR framework aims to create a cohesive, active and vibrant civic society which is capable of self-government. As norms are inherently social, RCR based polities are likely to be more receptive to mediating their change or emergence as opposed to procedural liberalism which is founded on freedom as non-interference. RCR’s emphasis on the importance of individual interaction within a community, acknowledgment of rights as conventional (i.e. derivative of the common good), and willingness to incorporate moral debates that allow the questioning of differing conceptions of the good life, lends itself to the societal changes that are now demanded by climate change. Moreover RCR principles are, as argued throughout the thesis, the elements that make the communities it inspires resilient. Simply put, a society that can learn and adapt to environmental changes (both internal and external) by definition is resilient.167 In the current case this involves re-embedding the economy in a changing complex social system (Barry 2008: 8; Altvater 1993: 260), which requires citizens and their state to be able to regain control of the economic forces that govern their lives and increase the number of places and frequency of communal deliberative practices. It is the vibrant civic society that RCR can nurture that connects new visions of prosperity with the common good and the notion of resilience.

167 See Introduction to the thesis for a detailed definition of resilience.
To demonstrate how RCR as a governing philosophy, that is a one that guides practice, is compatible with aligning individual interests with the common good of a healthy climate, the role and dissemination of new environmental norms will be discussed, followed by how this can be supported by governance.

**Norms**

Babcock (2009b) comprehensively advances the argument that the creation and dissemination of new environmental norms is essential to guiding individuals away from environmentally unfriendly behaviour, which is a necessity as aggregated individual actions are one of the key drivers of climate change, paralleling the notion of aggregate complexity detailed above. “Norms are informal obligations or social rules that are not dependent on government either for their creation or their enforcement” (Babcock 2009b: 134). Regardless they require a suitable governing political philosophy if they are to be used to further the ends of common goods. Norms with regard to climate change aim to on one hand foster a norm of “environmental responsibility” (Babcock 2009b: 174), which could include an individual choosing to commute to work by bus rather than their own car; and on the other, to help embed a new sense of prosperity that is capable of redefining the economy, to one that is capable of aiding human flourishing within ecological limits (Jackson 2017).

There are numerous barriers to creating and sustaining environmental norms. Following Babcock (2009b: 125-134), these include, first, Calder’s notion of the ‘doctrine-relevantness’ of climate change, summed up in Vandenbergh’s observation that “the American public believes a number of environmental myths”, which includes “incorrectly attribut[ing] the causes of many remaining environmental problems to industrial point sources, rather than individual behaviour” (cited in Babcock 2009b:

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168 Babcock’s paper is extensively researched and referenced, therefore this section will draw heavily on her article to avoid merely repeating citations, unless they are particularly significant to the point being made.
Babcock intimates that US federal laws have also contributed and reinforced this myth. Second, such myths can be perpetuated by “cognitive dissonance” (Babcock 2009b: 126-7), whereby individuals struggle to reconcile the discrepancies, inconsistencies, or contradictions between their thoughts and actions. For example a person may support environmental protection yet not recognise that their actions “may actually be degrading the environment”, which can lead them to blame others such as corporate polluters (Babcock 2009b: 127). Cognitive dissonance also pertains to a third issue, which is the problems associated with how individuals process information. The accuracy of information that individuals possess, the over-simplifications and over confidence with which they hold their views, and tendency to merely build on conclusions they have already reached, which can in part explain the slow progress of climate change reform (Babcock 2009b: 127-8). Individuals are also susceptible to “alarmist” or “optimistic” bias about the current state of climate change, which can lead to “myopic” behaviour that is represented as thinking in “mostly psychological time”, whereby people “under-value the benefits of changes in behaviour that will not accrue for several years”, which clearly pertains to long term environmental investments (Lazarus in Babcock 2009b: 129). Thus as individuals are “not wired to care about, or even notice, the ordinary”, strategies need to be developed so that climate change does not fall foul of the “out of sight, out of mind” axiom (Doremus in Babcock 2009b: 129).

There are also the difficulties of altering people’s engrained habits. The issue being that individual contributions to reducing pollution are so small, susceptible to the free-rider problem, and that some individuals are utility maximisers and unlikely to be driven to change by harms external to them.¹⁶⁹ This is compounded by the difficulty in reconciling the distinction between citizen and consumer behaviour, and by people’s difficulty in restraining themselves, which poses a particularly biting issue in terms of reducing individual consumption (Babcock 2009b: 130-33). Additionally, environmental norms may conflict with others such as the autonomy and privacy norms, associated with procedural liberalism, which could thus demote the former. Finally climate change issues are complex and information is liable to change, hence one “could reasonably

¹⁶⁹ This is also true of utility maximising corporations (Masquelier 2017: 236).
conclude that there are no good alternatives to choose from (Babcock 2009b: 134). What can RCR offer in response to these myriad cognitive - social dilemmas?

**Civic virtue**

The majority of Babcock’s barriers to norm change relate to classic republican concerns, namely as Rousseau articulated, “to bring conscience back in line with reason” within society (Boucher 2003: 246). As Chapter 3 contended, civic virtue refers to a citizen’s disposition, or acknowledgement that there is an intrinsic value in sharing in the self-government of their community, whose fate they share an equal responsibility for (Sandel 1998c: 325-6). It is this disposition towards the common good that enables them to transcend pure utility maximisation with regards to political participation, and sets the important requirement that citizens require certain civic capacities to make this particular aspect of human flourishing possible (Sandel 1998c: 324-6). Civic virtue, as capabilities for self-government, is particularly pertinent here, as part of its purpose is to act as a tool to help citizens “shape the destiny of their political community”, and it is this concern for the community as a whole that stipulates that RCR “politics cannot be neutral towards the values and ends its citizens espouse” (Sandel 2005: 10). Again linking Sandel to Green’s scholarship helps reinforce the notion that civic virtues are those directed (Chapter 3), or “contributory to [a] social good” (Green 1986a: sect. 248, p.190).

Therefore the social good that civic virtue can be directed to, could be new environmental practices. Green notes, that part of the task of self-governing political communities is to realise “what our consciences require of us” in relation to the circumstances of the time (Green 1906: sect. 280). Thus one of the civic virtues of today can be to contribute to the emergence of environmental norms. It is quite clear from examining Jackson’s (2017) view of prosperity - a collective endeavour to restructure the

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170 For example an individual could be told that a Toyota Prius produces less emissions than many traditional automobiles, yet later told that the cost of manufacturing a Prius actually outweighs these emissions gains.
economy away from consumerism and to foster growth in areas of life that have been crowded out by markets, and remain within ecological limits - that a bridge has been made between this view and RCR’s conception of civic virtue, as they both ‘require’ the capacity for self-government, and are concerned with the fate of the community as a whole.

It is on this plane that civic virtue represents what Jackson would refer to as a stabilising influence, one that is required to “form cohesive social groups” (2017: 135), that are, in terms of this thesis, resilient. Civic virtue is in part resilient as it is not essential that virtues are specified a priori, but contained within the limitations of neither being exploitative nor selfish. By ensuring that individuals recognise their collective responsibility, they are more likely to adopt forms of behaviour that can accommodate freedom and decisions to change their lifestyles. This is what makes resilience possible under climate change, as self-imposed obligations (i.e. via self-government) can render lifestyle constraints legitimate, as opposed to being imposed by the state.

Although civic virtues can come under the umbrella of active citizenship (below), that is an individual having a disposition to participate in political activities, the environmental element is linked more specifically to the notion of the common good. Put simply, the virtue associated with being an environmental citizen would lead to a disposition in individuals to align the ends of climate change with their individual pursuits (those that may contribute to environmental degradation). Environmental challenges require individuals to adapt their own behaviour and contribute to building a broader environmental norm within their society. Babcock notes that “[b]ecause norms exist independent from government, they can ‘provide a decentralized, and competitive alternative to government control of social behaviour’” (2009b: 137).

171 Without exploring the specifics of what contributing to environmental degradation may involve (as it would at the level of detail require public deliberation), for the purposes of this thesis, such activities could include those currently focused upon by contemporary governments, such as recycling, using gas and electricity frugally, using green transport where available, renovating property to reduce energy consumption, and consuming manufactured items modestly.

172 Internal quotes attributed to Posner and Rasmusem, see Babcock (2009b: fn. 148).
Although norms, as a method of social control, can operate outside government, to be effective at influencing behaviour, they “must be internalized by a large part of the individual’s relevant community”, and

“For a personal abstract norm (environmental protection) or concrete norm (turn off the lights or take the bus) to be activated, a person must both understand how her action will affect the environment and be willing to ‘take personal responsibility for causing . . . those consequences’. . . . Therefore providing information tying individual behavior (turning off lights) to environmental harm (air pollution) appears to be an essential part of activating concrete environmental norms (like energy conservation)”

(Babcock 2009b: 137-9)\(^\text{173}\)

Consequently a duality emerges whereby norms can require cultivating individual characters, which can be achieved by both society and government. “Norms can supplement government action” by “controlling social behavior through personal guilt, community observation and sanctions like shaming” (Babcock 2009a: 10). They can also be usefully assisted by “norm entrepreneurs . . . [being] people interested in changing social norms [and who] can exploit this fact, by igniting a “norm cascade” or “norm bandwagon” which occur when people shift towards new norms” (Sunstein 1996: 909).

Environmental groups are well placed to become norm entrepreneurs (Babcock 2009a: 17), yet as Babcock and Sunstein recognise (Babcock 2009b: 144-145), they are “unlikely to succeed without government intervention (Babcock 2009b: 141). Hence the government has a “large role in norm management” (Sunstein 1996: 907), “inspiring political” leaders also being good candidates for norm entrepreneurs (Barry 2008: 7).

Consequently RCR’s emphasis on civic virtue, openness to character cultivation, and self-government, provides a malleable political terrain from which environmental norms can bloom. A governing philosophy based upon Rawls’ axiomatic arrangement of the right over the good, or Mill’s individual private sphere upon which no government should infringe, when combined with a relegation of the intrinsic role of civic virtue, will struggle to respond to today’s environmental challenges. These challenges demand certain civic virtues to exist in a polity:

\(^{173}\) Internal quotes attributed to Vandenberg, see Babcock (2009b: fn. 163).
“[R]esources are relative to needs: a disciplined and united people accustomed to frugality and modesty will not make as many demands on its national resource base and ecological hinterland”

(Barry 2008: 6)

Barry’s sentiments express the need to address the tripartite coalition of required environmental adaptions, individual behaviour, social norms and reconfiguring the political economy. For Barry, “the republican project is to create a secure home” for free persons, “not slaves”, and that this will “not occur ‘naturally’”, but requires “active citizens, political action and the creation of liberty-sustaining practices and institutions” (2008: 6). Clearly this draws heavily on the republican conception of freedom, which Barry attributes primarily to Pettit’s notion of non-domination (2008: 6; see Pettit 1997a, 2012). However as this thesis argues, RCR goes beyond Pettit’s conception of freedom by placing intrinsic value in civic virtue (Chapter 2 & 3), as a prerequisite for a resilient governing political philosophy.

RCR is a holistic family of principles, each one requires deployment in a polity for its effectiveness as a governing political philosophy to materialise. With regard to fostering environmental norms, two other tenets can aid the uptake of these norms; its provision for public deliberation and the need to maintain and increase civic spaces.

**Deliberation**

Freedom for RCR is founded on the idea of self-government, and one tenet of this conception is public deliberation. “Personal lifestyle changes”, as Babcock notes, often seem “beyond the scope of our environmental laws” (2009a: 5), which is why public deliberation can play a key role in creating new environmental norms. Within RCR, norms emerge out of a dialogical process (Sandel 1998a: 320; Babcock 2009c: 522-3). It is only through the interactions, contestations, and exchanges of critical thought between citizens in civic spaces that enable a normative consensus, or formulation of the common good to manifest. This is where citizens learn their similarities and differences, what
Seyla Benhabib refers to as “unity-in-difference” (in Babcock 2009c: 522), or “where individuals bump up against one another, in the course of everyday life . . . and learn to negotiate and abide our differences” (Sandel 2012: 203; 2009a: 267). Importantly in social interactions of this kind, citizens are required to justify their claims on the basis of the common good, the public as opposed to private concern (Sandel 1998a: 25). Contrary to republicans such as Sandel, procedural liberalism is largely incapable of changing norms beyond the status quo, and towards ideals that limit consumption and call for greater individual participation, not only in politics but also with regard to climate change in particular. Norms are, after all, “only informal obligations that tell us how we should behave to conform to some community standard of proper behavior” (Babcock 2009a: 10). Hence norms need to be communicated within cohesive deliberative communities that share a common good, as opposed to those that aim to facilitate individual and corporate utility maximisation.

Norms can be viewed as emergent phenomena, to use the language of complexity theory. Emergent phenomena are a property of the whole that occur as a result of many dynamically interacting elements. For this reason cohesive communities in which citizens deliberate with one another is essential. The emergence of norms through deliberation thus constitutes a method of resilience. Conducted within a RCR society, deliberation can synthesise diverse viewpoints, and provide individuals with information they may not have possessed prior to a deliberative encounter. Although a consensus may not always be reached, norms have a greater chance of being disseminated, tested and treated with mutual respect within this framework, rather than being construed by government or lobbied by interest groups outside of the agora. Public deliberation thus aims to address the retrogression of “public discourse, [which] lurch[es] from one news cycle to the next, preoccupied with the scandalous, the sensational, and the trivial (Sandel 2009a: 268). This can be regarded as resilient as the goal of public deliberation is to reduce political polarisation, via the inclusive exchange of diverse viewpoints, which enable citizens to negotiate their differences (Sandel 2012: 203) in a democratic manner, while preserving liberty. Thus deliberation, under RCR, has an intrinsic value in the sense of fostering a shared concern for the common good.
Deliberation helps cultivate a disposition to the common good which enables communities to move forward in the face of new socio-political challenges, and ultimately the outcomes from deliberation remain revisable in light of changing environmental circumstances; another resilient quality of this approach.

Given the doctrine relevantness of climate change and the barriers to norm adoption that Babcock put forward, a poor public discourse is anathema to addressing poor individual environmental behaviour. As Fishkin has demonstrated, when the public becomes informed, “and really discuss the issues,” it can change “voting intentions significantly” (2009: 8). Thus as climate change is often plagued with misinformation, then proper deliberation is essential. This is all the more important considering the technological advancements that have become characteristic of the 21st century. Developments in communications technology can lead to unexpected outcomes, for example, individual liberty is now not necessarily a guard against the tyranny of the majority in the Millian sense:

“[T]he technological expansion of our ease of choice backfires on the presumptions of a liberal-democratic society. Liberty allows us to choose less diversity and to self-impose a dialogue (to the extent we have one at all) mostly with ourselves or people like ourselves. There is no reason to presume that technology will counterbalance the tendency of face-to-face political conversation toward self-selection among the like-minded. There is a plausible case that it may make it worse”

(Fishkin 2009: 5)

This highlights that liberty as non-interference, which is not concerned with self-government, can be led in problematic directions with regard to individual – community interactions, as misinformation can lead to “mutually assured distraction (MAD)” (Fishkin 2009: 4). A society that can spin individuals off in competing and diverse directions, perhaps towards factionalism, fuelled with misinformation, and without a shared appreciation of the common good, is less likely to have the capacities for reflective learning and adaption. Hence such a society would not be considered

174 Similarly to Honohan (2002: 232), Fishkin claims that what makes a process deliberative is “that it provides information and mutually respectful discussion in which people consider the issue on its merits.” And what makes a process democratic is “that it requires the equal counting of everyone’s views” (2009: 11).
resilient. MAD may not be pro-actively nurtured within a procedural liberal framework, but it is fair to say that it is not addressed as an intrinsic communal concern, as it would be under RCR.

The atomisation of today’s societies is not just concerned with the lack of emphasis liberalism traditionally places on active cohesive and deliberative communities, but also to do with the increasing polarisation and sensationalist characteristics of contemporary politics. Apathy is central to this debate as “[m]ost people are not effectively motivated to get information, to form opinions, or to discuss issues with those who have different points of view”, which can be closely linked to the current form of politics, whereby one person’s vote is one in millions (Fishkin 2009: 7). This can not only disempower citizens, but makes them susceptible to “media extravaganzas” (Fishkin 2009: 14), factionalism, and the “mob-like behavior” (Fishkin 2009: 18; also Haidt 2016; Haidt & Abrams 2015). Resultantly the notion of “rational ignorance” is amplified, which is the opposite to “informed and deliberative public opinion” (Fishkin 2009: 25). It is a “debilitated public opinion based on a casual impression of sound bites and headlines that is common in mass democracy”, and reflects “‘raw’ opinion” that does not realise “the values of the town meeting” (Fishkin 2009: 25). The latter left a substantial impression on Tocqueville, and have been placed in the spotlight after the election of the new US president (Vaidyanathan 2017). Although climate change has arguably begun to move away from the complete polarisation between climate change deniers and advocates, if current politics does represent this analysis, then this remains an inhospitable environment in which to advance environmental norms.

The deliberation tenet of RCR, that deliberative democracy scholars give practical suggestions to implementing, aims to recreate the environment of Tocqueville’s town hall meeting that attempts to overcome “rational ignorance” (Fishkin 2009: 25). The notion of the deliberative filter (Fishkin 2009: 15-19; also Chapter 5), is a method that helps to overcome the problems of ‘raw’ opinion and create its opposite, “refined opinion”, which has been a feature of the American republicanism associated with

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175 Also Niemeyer (2013).
Madsion (Fishkin 2009: 14). The latter form of public opinion is regarded as refined because it is opinion that is expressed “after it has been tested by the consideration of competing arguments and information conscientiously offered by others who hold contrasting views” (Fishkin 2009: 14, also 17). This face-to-face approach to finding “solutions to public problems” (Fishkin 2009: 17) - which can be implemented via methods of “deliberative polling” and “deliberation day[s]” - is essential as it, as opposed to other deliberative approaches such as issue publics and citizens juries, fosters both the right kind of deliberation and an appropriate level of representation (Fishkin 2009: 21-31). Hence the purposes that generating refined opinion for RCR and the environment are primarily twofold: (1) communicating the imperatives of climate change and persuading citizens that the environment is a public good that all rely on and need to protect, thus reconfiguring humanity’s relationship with nature; and (2) deliberation is a key way of (re)formulating a common good, in this case changing and creating environmental norms. Such deliberative discussion, which informs citizens and enables them to listen and consider contrasting viewpoints, has been shown to have a “dramatic effect” on individual preferences (Fishkin 2009: 30). One notable case was

176 There is not space to discuss the various merits and drawbacks of alternative methods of deliberative democracy. The noteworthy points that Fishkin raises are, what counts as good deliberation, and that it is possible to scale-up quality and representative deliberation to the size of the nation state (2009: 21-31).

177 Although creating such environments of deliberation has intuitive and conceptual appeal, there are several potential critiques that require acknowledgement: the creation of regimented deliberative spaces, that is, deliberative spaces which may be dominated by good orators; and the accusation that deliberative spaces, rather than creating new positive socio-political norms, in-fact only serve to reproduce current norms that could privilege already dominant agents and exclude others. Now such critiques are not unexpected, and deliberative democracy scholars have sought to address many of them, by formulating ‘rules’ of deliberation which would ensure that all citizens have an opportunity to speak, and that no one person can dominate the conversation by using moderators (Fishkin 2009: 26). Also as Ancient Athens showed, problems of scale can be overcome within deliberative communities by employing sampling techniques (Fishkin 2009: 11), and the limitations of these can be addressed by creating nation-level alternatives such as deliberation days (Fishkin 2009: 29-31). The notion that formal deliberation could serve to merely reinforce existing norms, which may be counterproductive to environmental progress are fairly groundless. Not only can such norms be addressed via the use of moderators, but the very nature of good deliberation, or refined opinion, is that participants conscientiously listen and express contrasting arguments, and are given requisite information, such as empirical data on climate change. Furthermore, if critics were to press further on critiques of Fishkin-esk deliberation, then the burden of proof would be placed on them as to what alternative to deliberation could be used to work out socio-political issues, other than resorting to violence of course.
the substantial rise in investment in renewable energy in Texas as a result of deliberative polling (NREL 2003).

The central point that RCR puts forward is that climate change can be considered a subject that is susceptible to ‘contestable judgements’ which individuals disagree about. In addition, Jackson underlines how the social logics of consumerism and prosperity, understood as unabashed economic growth, have changed and crowded-out the intrinsic values associated with the environment. The complexity of climate change and norm management, as highlighted by Sunstein and Babcock, emphasises that solutions to the climate change question cannot be answered “without deliberating about the meaning[s] . . . purpose[s] of goods, and the values that should govern” it (Sandel 2012: 202). This links to the insights of the communitarian scholars in Chapter 2 such as Walzer. Hence RCR’s perspective and intrinsic valuing of deliberation appears essential to fostering the emergence of the environmental norms, which essentially aim to orientate individuals to the notion that they are stewards of the environment (Barry 2008: 9).178

Civic spaces

Chapter 5 underlined the central place civic spaces have in RCR, in no small part due to the fact that public deliberation requires civic spaces in order for it to take place. Town halls are the archetypal place for public deliberation, as Tocqueville notably remarked. Similarly to the deliberative settings Fishkin creates, town halls are relatively formal spaces. It is in these spaces where technical information concerning climate change can be disseminated and deliberated. Deliberative democracy research demonstrates that formal civic spaces have

“the potential to transform the public response to climate change, as demonstrated by the deliberative forums conducted in the Australian Capital Region. Deliberation increases the salience of common-good issues and engenders deeper forms of cognition on complex

178 Climate change requires moral discussions to be brought into public debates, which the discussion above regarding norms demonstrates; ultimately it illustrates one way in which RCR can be differentiated form Pettif’s republicanism.
issues in ways that produce outcomes reflective of a strongly held, if latent, desire to achieve action consistent with long-term management of and the need for urgent action on climate change”

(Niemeyer 2013: 448)

Moreover the increasing use of mini-publics has demonstrated that they “could be used to alleviate the problems of ‘deliberative deficit’ in contemporary democratic systems” (Setälä 2015: 183; also 171-5). One example was People’s Juries in Social Inclusion Partnerships (Scotland), from which certain recommendations from the mini-public were taken up, and “many people who were involved in the process continued to be involved with community activity afterwards” (Hamer 2015; also SEDD 2004). Hence an RCR perspective would support increasing the provision of formal civic spaces, which can not only serve to cultivate environmental norms, but also advance the ends of self-government by encouraging citizens to continue to participate in the politics of their communities.  

However RCR also places significant importance on less formal civic spaces, which Sandel refers to as “sites for the cultivation of a common citizenship, [where] people from different walks of life can encounter one another and so acquire enough of a . . . sense of a shared life that we can meaningfully think of one another as citizens in a common venture”, which include “public institutions [such as] public libraries, public transportation, public parks and recreation centres” (Sandel 2009b: 35.15; also Fishkin 2009: 23). Such spaces are “informal schools of civic virtue” that can “draw people out of their gated communities and into the common spaces of a shared democratic citizenship” (Sandel 2009a: 267). This drawing of citizens out into common spaces of everyday life is vital because the interaction can develop civic skills such as communication. For example an encounter on the London Underground between a banker travelling to Canary Wharf and a builder working on the new Crossrail station underneath, will at the very least highlight to each one that there are some aspects of...
life that they share, and are dependent on in common. The broadening of perspective
this can have on each person is captured in a sense by Kipling’s line: ‘If you can . . . walk
with Kings, nor lose the common touch’. This type of interaction also serves an
important function in complex dynamic systems.

What is needed when attempting to resolve the tragedy of the commons, is the
institutionalisation of more “corrective feedbacks”, which are not necessarily
implemented by top-down means (Hardin 1968: 1246). Indeed it is these feedback loops
that are essential in guiding citizens towards more climate change friendly lifestyles. In
the language of complexity, “[e]mergents feed back on the conditions and instruments
of their formation, and, in the process, maintain the perennial[ity] of the system . . .
Retroaction (feedback) is the return of an effect on the conditions that produced it”
(Morin 2008: 113). Systems require “matter/energy”, and also “information” (Morin
2008: 19). Hence in the case of political systems and climate change, both formal and
informal spaces act as conduits for feedback, which provide information vital to the
survival of a system. Norms can be considered emergent phenomena, emergence being
“at the very heart of the theory of the system”. Consequently in complex systems,
“emergents blossom”, as Morin notes:

“The duality between the immersed and the emergent, the potential and the actual, the
repressed and the expressed, is the source, in the great living and social polysystems, of
scissions and dissociations between the sphere of the parts and that of the whole”

(2008: 102)

A society with few institutional interactions between its elements - such as the trend
towards individualisation under procedural liberalism, for example individuals living
in gated communities, choosing private transport, healthcare and leisure facilities as
opposed to public ones – struggle to generate substantial feedback. Information
regarding the harmful effects of pollutant emissions, and the civic virtue needed to act
on them (a sense of common concerns), will be left wanting. It is in this sense that civic
spaces, understood as feedback loops and places where emergents (norms) can blossom,
constitute a resilient (reflexive learning and thus adaptive) element within RCR, which places an intrinsic value on their existence and social function.

A key liberal difficulty has been exposed, as attempting to cultivate citizens’ characters and civic virtue, postulated here as necessary to implementing new environmental norms and legislation, can be charged with undermining autonomy, choice and freedom as non-interference. This suggests, not forgetting that climate change remains liable to fall into the ‘doctrine-relevant’ trap, that an alternative conception of liberty may be more suitable to mitigating climate change.

**Governance**

RCR turns on its conception of freedom as self-government, as opposed to freedom as non-interference or purely freedom as non-domination (Chapter 2). Positive environmental developments cannot easily be advanced from procedural liberal or instrumental republican (i.e. Pettit) standpoints. Human beings are dependent on nature, and on one another to reduce pollutant emissions that harm the environment. Thus there is a “need [for] political institutions to order our common life so as to preserve and sustain some measure of equality and civil (if not natural) freedom and equality” (Barry 2008: 6). Freedom as self-government encapsulates the latter point, as individual empowerment constitutes citizens gaining control of the forces that govern their lives, such as those that impact on climate change like the economy.

Self-government and environmental norms will likely struggle to be realised by a *non* conceptualisation of freedom, which avoids debates on different conceptions of the good life, and does not attempt to cultivate the skills and capacities in citizens that they require to govern themselves. Climate change is a key exemplar of the notion that the self-realisation of one is connected to the self-realisation of others (Chapter 4; Masquelier 2017: 240, 242). It requires distinguishing “prosperity from opulence and [thus] reduc[ing] our dependency on material growth” (Jackson 2017: 72). To disseminate and achieve such normative positions necessitates a re-organisation of social, economic and
political life, such as federalised civic spaces and workplace democracy (Chapter 5). It is in these spaces where interactions between individuals take place, leading to emergent norms, and where the common good can be nurtured. Civic spaces would also serve as a platform to postulate rights “as common rights regimes”, that can displace the “opposition between private property and state power” (Harvey cited in Jackson 2017: 192). In this sense rights to private property are derivative of the common good, and thus bounded by it. Such a notion reflects Jackson’s support of “bounded capabilities” (2017: 62). In other words human flourishing within ecological limits. The conceptual link between rights, the common good, and freedom as self-government are underlined in the argument that “[t]he freedom to shop voraciously encroaches on the sociability of public space. The freedom to live a materialistic life undermines our freedom to empathise and care for others” (Jackson 2017: 69). These ideas, such as economic activities crowding-out civic virtue, strongly parallel Sandel’s philosophy (2012). Yet it is only through RCR’s deepening of Sandel’s insights (Chapter 3-5), such as employing Green to avoid charges that the commonness of the common good could be dangerous, that the tasks of aligning individual freedoms with the common good and altering the social logic of consumerism can be achieved.\(^{181}\) A political philosophy that does not place an intrinsic value on participation and democracy is unlikely to cultivate civic virtue, which Aristotle realised requires practicing politics.

Self-government is particularly helpful for bringing together the practicing of politics and promotion of environmental norms, as it addresses the idea that “[l]eft to our own devices . . . individual choices tend to be irredeemably myopic” (Jackson 2017: 194; Offer 2006). The argument is that humans have developed a number of “commitment devices” that ensure the wellbeing of society is maintained over the long term, however as these are social, institutional, or civic in nature, they are vulnerable to being crowded out by the “pursuit of affluence” in contemporary societies (Jackson 2017: 195). Put differently, today there is a “crisis of commitment” (Jackson 2017: 195). This crisis would

\(^{180}\) See Harvey (2014: epilogue).

\(^{181}\) Jackson speaks of the notion of social logic, and contends that helping to shift it away from consumerism is part of a government’s role (2017: 192). This will be discussed below.
be tackled directly by RCR, which places prime value on a community’s capacity for self-government, which facilitates the emergence of environmental norms and a shared sense of the common good: highlighting the need for institutionalising collective responsibility. Consequently RCR could help broaden the scope of desires that capitalism has narrowed by predominately focusing on those that are “primarily materialistic in nature” (Jackson 2017: 68). The practice of self-government can address the propensity that markets have to obscure less material (consumption related) sources of wellbeing such as civic life. Jackson postulates that “[a] different form of social organisation – a more equal society – in which social positioning is either less important or signalled differently – is a clear possibility” (2017: 71). Yet importantly for RCR, this would involve the notion of a self-governed economy. Hence the resilience of a self-governing community is thus underlined by the issues Jackson identifies with today’s capitalism, as it is through this concept that economic activities can be reconfigured in response to emerging global challenges such as climate change.

A self-governed economy

The key question that percolates through Sandel’s thoughts on the economy is “what economic arrangements are most hospitable to self government?” (Sandel 1998a: 124; Chapter 5). Pointing to classic republican sources, his concern is with large capital accumulation in the hands of the few, and the corrupting influence that the infiltration of market norms into areas of life not traditionally governed by such norms can have (Sandel 2012). In short, large concentrations of private capital make it difficult to operate in the interests of the common good (Sandel 1998a: 211). This notion interweaves with freedom as self-government because if citizens lose control of economic forces, they are also losing control of their “political destiny” (Sandel 1998a: 243). Clearly this tenet of RCR speaks directly to current environmental concerns. In dramatic terms, citizens in ALDs today cannot curb then own enthusiasm for consumption, which if it continues to grow at current rates, and if less developed states progress towards and share ALDs current economic models of prosperity, then the global economic system will one day collapse: “the [v]ision of social progress that drives us – based on the continual expansion of material wants – is fundamentally untenable” (Jackson 2017: 2). Of course
expansion in material wants is accompanied by expansion of industrial output, which again at current rates is untenable (Jackson 2017: 7). At an unknown point in time in the future, a peak will be reached when it is no longer economically viable to extract resources for energy and production:

“As more and more people achieve higher and higher levels of affluence, they consume more and more of the world’s resources. Material growth cannot continue indefinitely because planet earth is physically limited”

(Jackson 2017: 12)

This adds a not so subtle twist to the dominating affects of large private capital and markets as a distributor of justice. In addition to mitigating this, communities also need to learn how to “reconcile[e] [their] aspirations for the good life with the limitations and constraints of a finite planet” (Jackson 2017: 3). As the previous section demonstrated, civic republican principles are largely congruent with such social learning (Barry 2008: 5). Not only do environmental norms need to be developed to address the hunger in ALDs for “material comfort” (Jackson 2017: 4), but there is also the task of reimagining the current structure of the economy (Jackson 2017: 22). It is difficult to imagine procedural liberalism, with its strong neoliberal dimension, possessing the capability to address this issue, as the prevailing wisdom which it has played a large part in creating, holds that what is currently needed is more growth, higher GDP and “continually rising incomes” (Jackson 2017: 3-4). Consequently, as RCR is based on a different ethic (Chapter 4), it can be argued that it represents an alternative mode of governance, or underpinning political philosophy, which is capable of mobilising the vision of prosperity that Jackson calls for (2017: 22).

An RCR perspective can put forward a number of economic reforms that would otherwise break on the waves of liberal neutrality. The pertinence of the latter approach was evident in recent remarks by UK Transport Secretary Chris Grayling. Although Grayling suggested that motorists should “take a ‘long, hard think’ before purchasing a diesel vehicle, he was confirmed as saying (by the Department of Transport), that he “was not telling people to stop buying diesel vehicles” (BBC News 2017b). This is despite the fact that “the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)
found that NO\textsubscript{2} is estimated to be responsible for 23,500 deaths in the UK each year” (Willgress 2017). Such reluctance over more firmly attempting to align individual choices with the common good would not be so problematic from an RCR standpoint, as constraints would be self-imposed and based on the notion of collective responsibility (Chapter 3 & 4).

Consequently RCR is more congenial to re-nationalisation of utilities and national transport networks, limiting private capital and increasing the number of publicly owned enterprises, namely cooperatives. There are several examples of cooperative ventures that appeal to environmental norms, or put differently an “ethos of the commons . . . [that] presupposes a form of action that recognizes self-realization as something that is collectively achieved and shared” (Masquelier 2017: 238). “Worker-owned enterprises” have been shown to transcend the self-interest and competition that drive traditional enterprises, and instead attend to situations collectively by

“recognizing the underlying mutual dependence of their members in economic action. Through a collective responsibility facilitated by horizontal decision-making processes and shared ownership, workers are united in their pursuit of self-realization. They are in a position to protect themselves against the precarizing effects of economic facts” (Masquelier 2017: 241)

Indeed it is the understanding of realising “the self in collective and egalitarian terms” that can help resist “practices guided by economic rationality” (Masquelier 2017: 247). Worker cooperatives are thus well placed to attend to issues such as climate change “at the local level” (Renn et al. 2012: 120). One example of success in this activity, which could be termed the reclaiming of the commons, is the Maine Lobster fisheries. Through collaboration, the lobster fishermen in Maine have been able to instate rules, both conventional and legal, which have led to the successful management of this natural resource, based on a common understanding of mutual dependence (Brewer 2012: 320-3; Masquelier 2017: 249). The central advantage of cooperatives to issues such as climate

\footnote{182 Also p. 239-243.}
change is that they can operate along an alternative logic to the one offered by traditional economics; one that is more amenable to environmental norms:

“Commons-based rationality . . . changes what individuals regard as the logical course of action, in such a way as to compel individuals to favour cooperation over competition in the pursuit of their ends. It compels them to recognize the inextricable link between personal and communal well-being . . . the interest they share with other individuals in both meeting their needs and conserving natural resources. Unlike economic rationality, then, the rationality of “the commons” rests on an inclusive logic of action predicated upon a first-person plural ontology”

(Masquelier 2017: 253-4)

Both the notion of worker-owned cooperatives, and the commons-based rationality that underpins them, is a conception of freedom as self-government. It is similar to the argument for bringing transport services, such as rail networks, under public ownership, in terms of increasing democratic accountability.\(^{183}\) The argument is that these enterprises will be directly accountable to the citizens they serve, as opposed to private utility maximising stakeholders; namely by incorporating an appropriately strong sense of mutual interdependence.\(^{184}\) Attending to mutual interdependence would be served well by conceptualising freedom as self-government, as citizens (or workers), are capable of taking control of the forces that govern their lives, and thus able to address issues pertinent to them, such as in the case of the Maine Lobster fisheries. Shared ownership is a practical way of realising freedom as self-government, as it enables individuals to represent their interests directly in the institutions to which they are a part of. When each individual is treated as an equal (and with the same bargaining

\(^{183}\) Although there is of course a significant difference between worker cooperatives and public ownership, in that the latter does not require citizens to manage the business’ operations.

\(^{184}\) Two additional points can be made here regarding money. The first is that community banks can operate along similar lines, since depositors can decide where their investments are made, say into environmentally friendly enterprises (Jackson 2017: 154-7). The second is that there could also be a strong argument for introducing ‘sovereign money,’ whereby “governments would no longer have to raise money for public spending on commercial bond markets” (Jackson 2017: 157, 221). The second has particularly significant implications for freedom as self-government, and the ability for a state to not be at the behest of economic markets. It could also address the discontent that arose following the mismanagement of capital during the financial crisis, where citizens (tax payers) ultimately bore the costs; as they do for other environmental externalities caused by private organisations. In the UK après the financial crisis, state-owned banked were sold at a loss, which raises a question as to whether they could have themselves been sold to tax payers and thus mirrored, to some degree, a community bank.
power), profit could no longer act as a trump card. This can help redefine people’s relationships with nature, as they can feedback their interests, experiences and opinions into deliberative forums, and would be, like the lobster fishermen, empowered to design and implement strategies that preserve the use and flourishing of common goods. Arguments such as the cost of recycling being borne by manufacturers, rather than citizens or the state could also gain more traction in cooperatives (or WSDEs), as individuals would be bringing multiple identities into the boardroom with them, that is, a person as a consumer, as a citizen, and a stakeholder in a manufacturing enterprise. This creates a space for civic virtue by making mutual self-realisation a public, rather than private concern. It opens-up a greater possibility for worker, citizen, employer identities to be reconciled, rather than board meetings merely representing just enterprise stakeholder identities. Through its emphasis on civic virtue, civic spaces, public deliberative forums and self-government (Sandel 1998a: 262), RCR is well-placed to bring about economic changes that depart from the current status quo. The model is resilient, as self-governing communities are capable of adapting to the economic implications of climate change, whilst preserving liberty (via inclusive democratic decision making). It thus stands in contradistinction to procedural liberalism in this respect.

A key aspect of a self-governing RCR polity is that controversial moral views are deliberated in public. Considering consumer culture and its connection to wellbeing and the good life, which typifies life in ALDs today, it is not purely issues such as same sex marriage and abortion that fall into the category of controversial debates, but also living frugally. Frugality has been closely associated with republican politics, especially during the founding of the United States, illustrated in the support of an agrarian economy (Sandel 1998a). Such approaches to living also place value on individuals and businesses that encourage self-reliance and self-sustainability, which diverges substantially from current norms, as increasing consumer choices is not necessarily a positive development when looking through an environmental lens (Babcock 2009a: 4). For example today’s “competitive consumer” is an individual who is (Kysar in Babcock 2009a: 5):
“continually trading in perfectly good products for the most recent model with the most up-to-the-minute features because she wants to own something relatively few others can obtain, ‘an observable symbol that signifies success under prevailing social norms’”

(Babcock 2009a: 5)

In this sense the current pursuit “of the good life today” is “eroding the basis for wellbeing tomorrow” (Jackson 2017: 3), which may not necessarily equate to “material betterment”, an arguably “modern construction” (Jackson 2017: 229, nt. 2, 5). Therefore considering proposals that aim to satisfy flourishing within limits is now prudent. Proposals that could be explored in public deliberation may include taxing companies who produce un-recyclable goods, which after limited use are discarded. This could involve introducing new regulations to the novelty gift market for example, and tackling the scourge of built-in obsolescence that typifies the ‘throw-away society;’ hence a shift in focus to producing durable and repairable products would be beneficial (Jackson 2017: 113, 204, 220). A pertinent example of a how a civic space can emerge from the bottom-up to attend to the ‘durability issue’ is the Farnham Repair Café (UK). It is a community workshop where people “bring consumer products in need of repair, where they can work together with volunteer fixers to repair and maintain their broken or faulty products” (Charter & Keiller 2016; FRC 2017). This type of initiative is not only an example of an emerging community based approach to restructuring the current economic ethos (and an informal civic space), but illustrates how deliberative interactions between citizens can engender an environmentally friendly norm, which also directly impacts on climate change by reducing landfill and CO₂ emissions (FRC 2017).

185 Internal quotes attributed to Douglas Kysar.
186 On the contrary goods that are of high quality, long lasting and thus economically viable to repair could be encouraged. Thus limiting the need to continually manufacture new goods, which if of high-value, are often purchased on credit. The latter is also seen as a source of domination under republican political theory (Barry 2008: 11, nt. 35).
187 This approach closely mirrors the principles of the circular economy (Jackson 2017: 144; EMF 2015).
These initiatives, along with an artisan service style economy (Jackson 2017: Ch. 8), which help cultivate virtues such as self-reliance, can counter the potentially dominating bargaining positions of employers and businesses that sell products with little durability and impact on climate change significantly. These are proposals that could be welcomed into RCR’s civic spaces. Arguments aimed at developing state manufacturing and production of produce, as opposed to outsourcing or shipping from abroad, could also be fostered under RCR, and asserted with respect to the positive impacts not only on the public good of the environment, but also by bringing economic activities within the reach of self-governing citizens. In this way economic activity would not necessarily distract individuals from nobler ends, but could be a further site for the cultivation of civic virtue (Sandel 1998a: 219; Jackson 2017: 141, 144-9).

A central aim of reimagining the structure of contemporary economic activities is to bring the sense of shared responsibilities and obligations back to the surface. Sandel expresses this point regarding emissions trading. He opposes such schemes on the grounds that they enable “wealthy nations to buy their way out of global obligations” (2005: 96). His views on this are important to acknowledge as they mirror Jackson’s, inasmuch as Sandel is concerned with the preservation of a “sense of shared responsibility” which the market, via emissions trading, can undermine (Sandel 2005: 95). Importantly the impact of emissions trading is that it can “undermine the ethic we should be trying to foster on the environment” (Sandel 2005: 93). Not only does it create loopholes for wealthy nations, but also “remov[es] the moral stigma that is properly associated with” pollution; the problem being that the latter has been turned “into a commodity” that can be traded (Sandel 2005: 94). Hence RCR would place an intrinsic value in upholding the environmental norm from a moral point of view, something unique to the theoretical construction of the model.

Arguments related to the common good, which may stray into the realm of morality, can be made far more easily from an RCR standpoint. This is important when

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188 Jackson claims that renewing personal and social services, and craft industries would be carbon light, employment rich, and do not depend on material throughput (2017: 147-9).
addressing the challenges of climate change, particularly those that require the reimagining of the structure and orientation of the economy. Such arguments are more difficult to make against the backdrop of a political theory that prioritises the right over the good, and largely aims to bracket difficult moral issues from political debate, such as the procedural liberal and neo-Roman republican perspectives. This is particularly important if the current structure of the economy prohibits social investment (Jackson 2017: 153-7, 172, 181-3), particularly investment in sustainable economic practices (2017: 21). This calls for reform along the lines of sovereign money and worker cooperatives that seek to address the inequality generated by the unequal distribution of capital (Jackson 2017: 176).

It is also important to underscore the need to establish the relationships between key RCR principles, for example connecting Fishkin’s research on deliberative democracy with Jackson’s insights on the sustainable economy, and the undergirding role of freedom as self-government. To meet the demands of climate change, all these initiatives need to be pursued together, not in isolation, which perhaps explains the stunted progress towards a zero emissions future. It is particularly timely to investigate RCR’s positive potentialities regarding climate change, as “[a]nyone who believes that exponential growth can go on forever in a finite world is either a madman or an economist” (Boulding in Jackson 2017: 1). Empowering citizens to take hold of their economic destinies in an environmentally friendly way is essential. RCR can also offer an additional insight that can help environmental norms gain traction, that is via a form of federalism.

Decentralisation

To recap briefly on Chapter 5, the merit of federalism is that it enables citizens to practice government within a small sphere within their reach (Sandel 1998a: 314; Tocqueville 1945: 68). The key tenets of RCR’s model draw on dispersing sovereignty, decentralisation, mediating institutions and the practice of self-government. These

189 In particular, issues created by the debt-based economy and speculative investments. Money itself can be conceived as a social good (Jackson 2017: 158).
facets of the RCR model not only serve the goal of cultivating the character necessary for self-government in citizens, but also empowering them to take control of their political destinies. In simple terms, this is directly relevant to environmental concerns, as a certain environmental character (or set of norms) needs to be cultivated in communities, and there is a simultaneous need for citizens to then be able to bring about some form of political change in-line with the new norms. In addition, this serves to publicise environmental concerns and practices that are contributing to environmental degradation, which traditionally lie within the private sphere.

At present the state can play a key role in supporting the emergence of environmental norms. The signals the state emits - regarding what ‘practices’ can be incentivised, such as reductions in road tax for electric cars; the power it holds to attend to the structural deficiencies of the current economic arrangements via various policy and legal instruments, such as public spending on civic spaces and public infrastructure; and ability to impose penalties upon those who illegally pollute - demonstrate the central role it can play in tackling climate change. However these initiatives could be considered top-down impositions of the common good, as ALDs today do not operate according to RCR’s principles. The latter being the case, is perhaps why environmental economists like Jackson emphasise the importance of the role of the state, which exemplifies the claim that ALDs underpinned by procedural liberalism have little recourse but to rely on centralised solutions to socio-political challenges. Hence initiatives such as the introduction of a 5p charge for plastic grocery bags in the UK, having led to a marked reduction in litter being washed on British beaches (BBC News 2016c), would be more congruent with RCR if they were the result of public deliberation and a collectively self-imposed obligation.

The institutions of the state can aid the realisation of the common good (Barry 2008: 4-5), such as constitutionally. As Barry underlines, constitutions can embed “environmental rights”, such as rights to “information about environmental impact assessments” (2008: 5). The advantages of examining environmental reform at the

190 See Jackson (2017: 203-4).
“constitutional level”, is that firstly, it is “the highest political level institutionally” in which the state holds a “strategic/transformational potential”; secondly, it is also “the highest level of political authority” and thus “has a universal and binding character on all citizens”; and finally, “constitutional provisions can secure the regulation of economic actors such as corporations and legal definitions of such key economic relations such as private property” (Barry 2008: 5). It is perhaps in this vein that Jackson advocates the enlargement and empowerment of the state (2017: 209), so that it can perform its role of ensuring the long-term protection of public goods (2017: 197). Yet these initiatives – such as including knowledge of climate change in the national educational curriculum and imposing limits on resource use (Jackson 2017: 201-2191) – would, under RCR, be the result of democratic decision-making. The key point is that the self-imposition of such obligations would be resilient, as this enables adaption to circumstance whilst preserving liberty.

Progressive taxation is a prime tool that states could wield in the name of climate change, such as by incorporating environmental costs into ‘business rates’, which could include the emissions caused by resource extraction (Jackson 2017: 206-7). Yet with the continued proliferation of low-cost airlines such as EasyJet, Ryanair and Norwegian (the latter providing long-haul flights), it appears state power is quite limited within the current socio-political and economic terrain. For example, it is unlikely that a traveller paying £30 for a return airfare from London to a European city is paying their fair share of the environmental costs of the trip. It is difficult to imagine a state imposing tobacco level taxes on low-cost airfares for the common good of climate change, and is perhaps why the enlargement of the state must be more than purely instrumental. Rather it must be “the basis for a renewed vision of governance”, a “foundation for a lasting prosperity” (Jackson 2017: 209). Hence the issue is not necessarily that the state does not possess the formal tools and power to attend to climate change, but that the current institutionalised governing philosophy is based on procedural liberalism. The question is how to displace the former and replace it with something more akin to RCR. Whilst

191 See the embedding of the “rights of nature” into the Ecuadorean constitution (Jackson 2017: 6).
nudge politics can help, there is arguably need to go beyond this in order to cultivate environmental norms. The state is currently conflicted between the market and the common good (Jackson 2017: 198), and appears relatively impotent considering the scale of the challenge of climate change. Consequently imbuing the state with a moral purpose, that is to place an emphasis on the common good and make “all markets . . . answerable to ethical principles and to principles of social justice” (Sandel 2009b: 34:38), is an additionally helpful aspect of RCR which attends to the relationship and representation between the state and civil society. Hence inspiring political leaders are “not necessarily a danger to . . . democratic politics” under civic republicanism (Barry 2008: 7), but could in fact help to overcome the plague of short-termism in current governance, such as electoral pressures (Jackson 2017: 200). Yet it remains pertinent to acknowledge that top-down initiatives will not be sufficient to tackle climate change when used in isolation.

The emphasis RCR places on dispersing sovereignty is helpful in facilitating the bottom-up emergence of policy, courtesy of individuals in the citizenry generating more effective changes in comparison to those that would be centrally administered (Tocqueville 2003: 113). The potential ‘energy’ in the citizenry Tocqueville speaks of, says something important about the common good that could be generated by political participation, that is, that the resultant common good would be democratically deliberated, as opposed to manufactured and imposed from above. As Babcock underscored (2009b), there are many barriers to norm adoption and several reasons why individuals resist change. As studies in business leadership reveal, individuals are likely to resist change if: they feel they are losing control; the change creates feelings of excess uncertainty; “decisions are imposed suddenly”; the proposed change seems contrary to habits; change may involve people losing face; individuals feel the new course will involve more work, which changes often do; the change creates ripple effects, which can spread resistance; resentments resurface; and if the change can be perceived as a threat to people’s livelihoods (Kanter 2012). Therefore much like a board of directors imposing a new change that impacts on their employees’ working practices, governments also
Chapter Six

need to consider how to mitigate resistance to change, which is where bottom-up approaches may be more successful.

Notions of resistance to change chime well with the challenge of climate change, as citizens’ expectations of increased workload, for example recycling, expectations of increased expense and inconvenience, as well as other potential stumbling blocks described above, represent a formidable challenge to effectively attending to climate change. The civic virtue required to mobilise environmental norms can be fostered within the Township, as it on the one hand represents a public site for meaningful deliberation, and on the other, if sovereignty is dispersed, the members of the community will be able to implement some practical initiatives that surface form their deliberation (i.e. in a formal civic space). This would enable the resistance to change factors to be mitigated, and importantly, citizens would be able to retain a sense of control over their political future.

The township can also act as a central node in a complex communal system, whereby it is nested within other formal and informal civic spaces and sites of governance, such as repair cafes and community transport services (CtaUK 2009). Hence dispersed sovereignty speaks to “polycentric governance”, which is congruent with systemic interconnectedness as it represents “nested levels of governance from the most local to the most interconnected” (Jackson 2017: 191). Communities and the Township exist within a web of civic spaces, which feed them with information and proliferate the number of interactions between systemic elements that can serve emergence. Local knowledge can be soaked-up though informal civic spaces, and then be passed to formal spaces that are empowered by the dispersal of sovereignty. The subsequent actions taken are consequently more appropriate to the community, as will be the norms that sustain them. Actions are less likely to be resisted as they represent an inclusively deliberated common good, thus embodying a more direct form of representation. Management of the commons can therefore arise from the bottom up, such as with the

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192 Jackson is referring to Ostrom (1990) here.
Maine lobster fisheries, which represents a form of empowerment in a world of interdependence.193

**RCR’s federated polycentric governance system**

To further illustrate how the ‘local’ connects to the ‘global, presenting the ‘type’ of federalism that RCR adopts, which follows from the theoretical principles and roots presented in Chapter 5, is advantageous. It can be viewed as a version of polycentric governance (Carlisle & Gruby 2017; Ostrom et al. 1961). As Carlisle & Gruby explain,

“Polycentricity194 . . . connotes a complex form of governance with multiple centres of semiautonomous decision making . . . The decision-making units in a polycentric governance arrangement are often described as overlapping because they are nested in multiple jurisdictional levels (e.g., local, state, and national) and also include special-purpose governance units that cut across jurisdictions.195 This multilevel configuration means that governance arrangements exhibiting polycentric characteristics may be capable of striking a balance between centralized and fully decentralized or community-based governance”196

(2017: 1-2)

This quote underlines the similarity with the thoughts of Taylor (1997), T.H. Green (Simhony 2003) and Honohan (2002), noted earlier in the thesis, concerning the ‘nesting’ of local participatory publics into larger ‘hierarchies.’ Although polycentricity can be used as a synonym for institutions - understood as “formal and informal rules, norms, and strategies that structure human interactions” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 3; Ostrom 2005) – that “are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom 1990: 101), it also goes beyond “nestedness” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 4; Gruby & Basurto 2013). For

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193 The emergence of environmental norms in an interconnected and nested system is symbolised in Sandel’s call for more civic spaces, or informal cites of civic virtue. This parallels Jackson’s claim that “the seeds for . . . transformation [to a new service economy] already exist, often in local, community-based initiatives or in social enterprise: community energy projects, local farmers’ markets, slow food cooperatives, sports clubs, libraries, community health and fitness centres, local repair and maintenance services, craft workshops, writing centres, outdoor pursuits, music and drama, yoga, martial arts, meditation, gardening, the restoration of parks and open spaces” (2017: 143).

194 The term ‘polycentricity’ first appeared in Polanyi (1951).


196 A reference is made to Imperial (1999) here.
a polycentric governance system (PGS) to be classed as “functional,” it must align with the following claims: that PGSs “are better able to adapt when faced with social and environmental change”; produce effective institutions; and mitigate risks associated depletion and management of natural resource systems (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 3). This may result from the fact that multiple overlapping ‘decision-making centres,’ or ‘units,’ can grant “better access to local knowledge, closer matching of policy to context, reduction of risk that a resource [e.g. a marine fishery] will fail for an entire region on account of multiple avenues for policy experimentation, improved information transmission due to overlap, and enhanced capacity for adaptive management” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 5; Marshall 2009). Both adaption and effective common – public good resource management are highly pertinent for this chapter, more so considering that the focus of PGSs concerns “understanding how humans achieve and maintain self-governance in the context of complex and dynamic social and physical environments” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 4).

Central to a PGS is the presence of many overlapping units and the relations between them: Carlisle and Gruby’s minor revision of Vincent Ostrom’s (1991: 225) ‘original’ formulation is helpful in specifying that a PGS would be composed of “(i) multiple, overlapping decision-making centres with some degree of autonomy; (ii) choosing to act in ways that take account of others through processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, and conflict resolution” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 6). With regard to the nature of decision-making centres, they can be further explicated as

“diverse types of organizations drawn from the public, private, and voluntary sectors that have overlapping realms of responsibility and functional capacities . . . In addition, private corporations, voluntary associations, community-based organizations play critical supporting roles in a [PGS], even if they have not been assigned public roles in an official manner”

(McGinnis & Ostrom 2011: 15)

For RCR this definition can be translated in terms of formal and informal civic spaces. Under federalism (as presented in Chapter 5), decision-making centres that can possess a degree of autonomy in the sense of a PGS, would be those to which sovereignty can
be dispersed to, which would largely reflect the way subsidiarity works within the UK, that is with Parish councils for small communities (e.g. Tocqueville’s townhalls), city and borough councils (i.e. for larger communities or groups of small communities), regional councils and then a national assembly (such as Parliament). For RCR these formal civic spaces would act as interconnected nodes in the PGS. Other ‘units’ without formally devolved power could include NGOs, citizen associations, the workplace, and the more informal civic spaces where citizens encounter one another in everyday life; ones which can provide experiences that filter into citizens’ conceptualisations of the common good with respect to their own conception of the good life. These experiences and viewpoints can emerge within more formal civic spaces, as informal civic spaces can fulfil a ‘support’ role (below), and thus represent smaller nodes that help create a horizontal and vertical latticework within the larger nodes. The larger nodes, or formal civic spaces, would align with Ostrom’s notion that they possess “considerable independence to make norms and rules within a specific domain” (1999: 552). Conversely, other informal civic spaces can perform the “critical supporting role” McGinnis and Ostrom (2011) suggest, whereby they can provide and disseminate expertise, knowledge and services to formal civic spaces, potentially in a more efficient manner than formal spaces doing so themselves (Ostrom et al. 1961; Carlisle & Gruby 2017). Hence the form of federated structure that RCR ascribes to would thus parallel Carlisle and Gruby’s understanding of a PGS, that is, not “a tidy and static network of discrete, connected decision-making centres[,] rather, it is a dense and evolving web of decision-making centres-some transitory and others relatively fixed-and supporting actors from diverse sectors and domains” (2017: 7). For RCR the ‘relatively fixed’ elements would be formal civic spaces at the overlapping levels of federation mentioned above, with informal civic spaces facilitating further information flows. With regard to the term ‘overlapping,’ Carlisle and Gruby are again enlightening, as they assert that this describes “the jurisdiction or domain of decision-making centers”, which “may result from the layering of decision-making centers operating at multiple levels or jurisdictions when they share certain functional capacities or areas of responsibility”, importantly, “the critical function of overlap is to facilitate the flow of information among decision-making centers, enabling them to learn which institutions employed by
others have been successful” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 7; also McGinnis & Ostrom 2011; Ostrom 1999; Marshall 2008). Regarding the number, and level of autonomy, of potential ‘decision-making centres’, or civic spaces, RCR would follow Carlisle and Gruby’s (2017: 7) argument that this is largely “context specific”; whilst maintaining that formal civic spaces within vertical hierarchies operate along the lines of subsidiarity. The topic of vertical hierarchies, that is, the movement of information upwards and downwards between different federated formal civic spaces, including civic virtue and developing environmental norms, from the local to the global and vice versa, will be visited below shortly. Before doing so, a further addition can be made to the relationships between a PGS’s units, or civic spaces.

As mentioned earlier, Carlisle and Gruby underscore the notions of cooperation, competition and conflict between units in a PGS. They explain that, broadly speaking, the processes involved in a PGS that relate to the three notions above, “means that decision-making centers, even if formally independent of one another, base their decisions partly on the actions, inactions, or experiences of other members of the system . . . [i]n taking one another into account, decision-making centers and other supporting actors in the governance system interact in processes of cooperation, competition, conflict, and conflict resolution” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 8; Ostrom et al. 1961). This idea dovetails with this thesis’ conception of systemic interconnectedness, which calls for societies to become normatively-teleologically resilient, as otherwise they are vulnerable to potentially unavoidable and unpredictable systemic change, which could corrupt their democratic practices. The reason for this is that the ‘processes’ of which Carlisle and Gruby speak, “lead to self-organizing tendencies” (2017: 8; also V.Ostrom 1999). For instance cooperation, competition and conflict between actors will necessitate some form of reciprocal action between them, creating a set of behaviours that can become organised without a central director. Although cooperation can involve, for PGSs, the ability to find more efficient sources for the delivery of certain goods (Carlisle & Gruby 2017), and thus make them adaptable in this sense, for RCR the key form of cooperation would be the plurality of viewpoints on political debates that could be produced across civic spaces, which can then feed into a more inclusive deliberative decision-making
process in a formal civic space. Hence the increase quantity and dissemination of both lay and expert knowledge would create more options for attending to an issue such as climate change, or the management of a natural resource, then would be available under a centralised system, and thus would be adaptable and resilient in this case (Carlisle & Gruby 2017). Despite the possibility for competition to “undermine cooperation and impede a governance system’s capacity for self organisation” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017; Poteete & Ostrom 2004), this places more emphasis on the need for conflict resolution mechanisms and “designing institutions to manage or minimize competition over resources” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 9). The central place of deliberation for RCR, and its underpinning principles (Chapter 3, 4 & 5) essentially aim to provide these, by postulating spaces for citizens to put forward their views and move towards a deliberative consensus, or reasoned dissensus, and hence is again resilient in this manner.

To briefly recap on the ‘method’ of deliberation, Richardson offers a simple model, whereby a common mind is found by “formulating proposals; discussing their merits; coming to an informal agreement; and converting informal agreement into official decision” (2002: 164). Regarding deliberation and resilience: “[s]o long as conflicts do not escalate to a point where the governance system becomes dysfunctional, they can bring about learning and change as different interests, philosophies, and perspectives are aired in the process of deliberation and conflict resolution” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 9; Dietz et al. 2003). The “adaptive capacity”, specific to PGSs, relates to their ability “to first alter processes and if required convert structural elements as response to experienced or expected changes in the societal and natural environment” (Pahl-Wostl 2009: 355); the idea being that they are able to change “their rules and behaviour as they gain experience”, which can include their capacity “to experiment with different ideas and rule combinations which, when combined with information transmission and learning, can lead to institutional innovation to cope to change” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 10; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2012; Imperial 1999; Ostrom 1999); as well as “devising and continually adapting ever more effective institutions” by taking “into account the

107 For a fuller discussion see Crocker (2008).
successes and failures of others” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 11). A key link between PGSs and RCR is the role of interactions and deliberation, as this provides knowledge required for learning, which is why creating “ample opportunities for communication and interfacing”, such as through forums in which citizens can deliberate issues of concern, is vital (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 12; Crona & Parker 2012; Galaz et al. 2011; Dietz et al. 2003).

The term used to describe the points of interaction between units is “cross-scale linkages”, which can be both formal and informal (organisational) mechanisms that facilitate interaction and cooperation (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 12). In addition, they can “exist at different scales or at different levels of political or social organization”, and also those “at the same level . . . but across space”, and hence would be classed as ‘horizontal’ (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 12; Heikkila et al. 2011; Berkes 2002). In terms of connecting the local to global, it is important to remember that ecological systems can exhibit a “multilevel hierarchy of subsystems within larger systems”, whereby “the subsystems operate largely independently but also impact or depend upon the other subsystems to varying degrees” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 16). Hence why although climate change can be viewed as a global phenomenon, it in fact requires “place-specific responses to heterogeneity and uncertainties that a centralised system would make difficult” (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2012: 32). Hence why an RCR federated web of formal and informal civic spaces that permit cross-scale linkages becomes pertinent, as not only can it mirror the nature of the phenomenon of climate change itself, but it also, by essentially reversing the relation of the local to the global, whereby knowledge and action do not necessarily have to proceed upwards, postulates that various elements of global phenomenon can in fact be brought/broken down to the local level, which thus corresponds with the federal argument that fulfils the normative view of freedom as self-government. This notion parallels the claim that given “the complexity of natural resource systems, it is unlikely that any single decision-making center possesses the range of knowledge necessary for the production of” effective institutions (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 16-7). The notion of reversing the local to the global is well-grounded, for example Betsill and
Bulkeley (2006) have argued that climate change can be tackled effectively at the city (municipal) level, it worth quoting them at length on this highly pertinent point:

"First, in a highly urbanized world, cities are sites of high energy consumption and waste production. The influence of local governments over these processes varies but can include energy supply and management, transport, land use planning, building regulations, and waste management. Second, local governments have been engaging with sustainable development through LA21 ways that have implications for the migration of climate change. Third, local governments can facilitate action by others in response to climate change by fostering partnerships with relevant stakeholders, encouraging public participation, and lobbying national governments. Fourth, some local governments have considerable experience in addressing environmental impacts within the fields of energy management, transport, and planning, and to reduce those impacts, and have undertaken innovative measures and strategies that can serve as demonstration projects or the basis for new experimentation. Through these practices, local governments exercise a degree of influence over GHG emissions in ways that directly impact the ability of national governments to reach targets that they have agreed to internationally”

(Betsill & Bulkeley 2006: 143)

This notion of a local responses to “specific global environmental problems”, can operate within a PGS and connects to the theoretical foundations of federalism (Betsill & Bulkeley 2006: 143). For instance Kern and Alber (2008) make comparable claims and outline how self-governance, in terms of local level responses to climate change, can occur alongside horizontal and vertical collaborations with other actors in multi-level governance systems. PGSs still permit knowledge to travel upwards and across subsystems above the level of the nation-state. Carlisle and Gruby explain that PGSs can provide effective institutions for governing climate change, due to their ability to enable “decision-making capability at different levels (e.g., local, state, and federal) that generally correspond to the multiple spatial levels or dimensions of natural resource systems” (2017: 17). This quality of PGSs is not only implied via the concept of ‘multiple overlapping’ units, but also as “[l]ocal-level decision makers may be able to respond to environmental feedbacks more quickly than centralized decision makers”, thus why it is worth crafting “institutions that are better adapted to local interests and norms of behaviour”; and if they were to “lack the capacity or authority to deal with transboundary issues”, PGSs can provide “cross-jurisdiction decision makers . . . to deal with concerns that cascade across levels of jurisdiction” (Carlisle & Gruby 2017: 17).
Chapter Six

Now for RCR, local-level units would be formal civic spaces, which would run from say Parish to national levels, and ‘cross-jurisdiction decision makers’ would be more aptly reflected, with respect to ‘the international’ and self-government, in terms of a Kantian league of states. Before considering Kant’s ‘league,’ the notion of the local to global reversal, as well as the movement of deliberative knowledge throughout a PGS can be mirrored in Adger’s (2003) remarks on the role of social capital in relation to adaption.

Adger (2003: 396) argues that the “social dynamics of adaptive capacity are defined by the ability to act collectively”, which has been shown to be evident in “[r]esource-dependent communities” and aided by the presence of social capital. Social capital for Adger,

“describes relations of trust, reciprocity and exchange; the evolution of common rules; and the role of networks. It gives a role to civil society and collective action for both instrumental and democratic reasons and seeks to explain differential spatial patterns of societal interaction”

(2003: 389)

As social capital can aid the comanagement of resources, it can help facilitate the management of risk (i.e. resilience), especially as the future can be uncertain and information unavailable. Its definition can be expanded by adding that it is constituted by “the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively” (Woolcock & Narayan 2000: 226). The information that flows in these networks, similar to civic virtue (Chapter 3), “oils the wheels of [collective] decision making” (Adger 2003: 389) and provides the “necessary ‘glue’ for adaptive capacity” (Adger 2003: 392). Essentially by providing relations and networks of trust and reciprocity, the “quality” of interactions between individuals and their relationships with other actors in their specific communities can be increased and shaped, potentially overcoming issues such as the free-rider problem (Adger 2003). One way of postulating the move of social capital or civic virtue (Chapter 3) between the local and the national would be Adger’s model of the “‘well-functioning’ state”, whereby bonding social capital is present between individuals in a group, as is networking social capital, which illustrates horizontal flows of information and resources between groups at the local level, such as via inclusive
deliberative events; whilst simultaneously, there is an “[o]pen process of democratic participation and environmental governance”, represented in vertical relationships between the local and the state, constituting a “synergy between the state and civil society” (Adger 2003: 393-4). Hence the state can, via these linkages, “facilitate sustainable and resilient resource management and enhance adaptive capacity” (Adger 2003: 395). Thus civic virtue could ‘move’ within a PGS as Adger postulates that social capital does, that is via bonding and networking; consequently placing focus on the “processes by which the state and civil society interact through their embeddedness and complementarity” (Adger 2003: 395-6). For example in the case of protecting marine areas in Tobago, a distinction could be made “between institutions at the community, formal-organizational, and national-regulatory levels”, in terms of how they “characterized the means by which institutions adapt and learn about new issues in terms of networks of dependence and exchange” (Adger 2003: 398): the adaptive capacity in this case was increased by the inclusionary nature of the contributions, and the legitimising effect that social capital networks provided. Therefore “horizontal linkages in social capital are predicated on the legal and institutional structures that facilitate community association and networking” (Adger 2003: 400), which could use an RCR-amended PGS.

Adger contends that social capital helped “communities find strategies to manage risks through strategic and local networks and interactions”, which underscores an interesting point that resilience can have a “place-specific” character: paralleling the PGS literature, Adger asserts that localities may have specific needs and nuances to which “national and other levels of policy making may not be sensitive to” (2003: 400). However, this does not preclude lessons learned from ‘the local’ being generalised. Similarly to a PGS, “many aspects of adaptive capacity reside in the networks and social capital of the groups that are likely to be affected”, thus resilience can be promoted by “social and institutional diversity” (2003: 401). This leads Adger to the following conclusion, that

“[b]uilding trust and cooperation between actors in the state and civil society over adaptation has double benefits. First, from an instrumentalist perspective, synergistic
social capital and inclusive decision-making institutions promote the sustainability and legitimacy of any adaptation strategy. Second, adaptation processes that are built from the bottom up and are based on social capital can alter the perceptions of climate change from a global to a local problem. When actors perceive adaptation to and the risk of climate change as being within their powers to alter, they will be more likely to make the connection to the causes of climate change, thereby enhancing their mitigative, as well as adaptive, capacity”

(Adger 2003: 401)

Hence Adger’s systemic social capital system parallels that of a PGS, and also reaches a similar conclusion regarding his observation that climate change can be treated within localities, despite being a global phenomenon. Arguably RCR captures this notion of reversing the local to the global, by making global issues approachable at a local level. Yet some mechanism for generating and disseminating deliberative knowledge, and engendering a local common good that can be informed by a global perspective, suggests the need for some form of global institutional structure, which directs the present discussion back to Kant’s ‘league’.

A non-coercive league of states along the lines that Kant envisioned, can feature at the top level of a PGS. It is a useful arbiter as it “provides the means by which conflicting claims made by states vis-à-vis each other can be resolved in a rightful way. In this way it establishes the minimal conditions required for states to decide ‘disputes in a civil way’” (Mikalsen 2011: 315). States are free to make international treaties with one another to pursue an international common good, with the input of inclusive deliberation form the other units in a PGS. Units across-jurisdictions can feasibly contribute to deliberation at the international level, either via an international assembly such as with the United Nations, and also with the aid of NGOs. Kant’s non-coercive league of states needs to be so, as coercive powers could “destroy the ‘republican’ institutions through which the citizens of a particular member state give laws to themselves”, and thus will violate the autonomy of a collective (union) of self-legislating people; as in other words, what individuals “really want is to be in a position to decide

198 Kant’s writings on the issue of a ‘league’ or state of states (i.e. international relations), are spread across a range of his publications, such as Perpetual Peace and Metaphysics of Morals, for brevity, this section will not cite each one, but rather draw from pertinent Kantian scholars, namely Kleingeld (2004) and Mikalsen (2011).
for themselves” and not be subject to a paternalistic coercive body (Kleingeld 2004: 308-9). A feature of “the league is [that it is] not to have legislative or executive powers”, so as not to meddle in a state’s internal affairs; it is “a permanent congress of states”, which can leave and join at will (Mikalsen 2011: 302). Again, it positions itself more as “an international organization with arbitration capacities” (Mikalsen 2011: 303). Despite the non-coercive nature of the league, “Kant also holds that duty requires that states join a league of states with an eye to promoting international peace, so they ought to do so even though they should not be forced to do so” (Kleingeld 2004: 310). Hence there is a categorical rationale for such a league, as a coercive state of states can be liable to exercise Pettitilian forms of domination (Kleingeld 2004), such as militarily or through other forms of ‘soft’ power. A coercive state of states would thus also encounter the problem of individuals, if forced to do things via the compulsion of other states, to which they do not contribute to the governance of, then they are arguably being used as a means and not exercising autonomy (Mikalsen 2011). Again the league is valuable, as Habermas recognised, due to the difficulties in developing a cosmopolitan consciousness to the point of creating a coercive state of states, as “a dynamic array of deliberative democratic processes and organizations, at the national, international, and transnational levels, can greatly increase the level and legitimacy of binding regulation concerning matters of global concern . . . which could go so far as expanding the reach of “existing global regulating institutions” (Kleingeld 2004: 320-1; Habermas 2001). This characterising of the global also parallels Vallor’s (2018) Star Trek ethos, and hence enables Kant’s league of states to align with the over-arching principles of RCR, by permitting self-government whilst postulating mechanisms that can engender the common good beyond the realm of the state, via the self-imposition of common good obligations.

In sum, the federalism RCR puts forward is a combination of polycentric multi-layer governance that connects and feeds into a Kantian league of states, which can “create a permanent institutional structure for conflict mediation, opening channels for communication and offering structures for neutral arbitration and negotiation”: the key advantage being that such an institutional approach “can prevent, postpone, or mitigate
conflicts in a way that allows for internal improvement within states, and the gradual development toward a more peaceful world” (Kleingeld 2004: 315). In the case of this thesis, Kant’s notions of conflict and war can be replaced by climate change, which arguably has the same potentiality for destruction. Regarding Kant’s moral “developmental view”, along with Rawls’ in fact (1999b), might suggest that such a league with organisations such as the United Nations, will enable moral learning to take place and thus reinforce climate friendly norms, which requires the back “up [of] appropriate normative convictions” (Kleingeld 2004: 317). As these that could be supplied from the bottom up by RCR, Kant’s notion of a ‘state of states’” (Kleingeld 2004) may not be warranted.

Furthermore, a web of networked civic spaces (e.g. citizen assemblies and city/regional councils) which can be vertically linked to national and global governance institutions, along the lines presented here, do not need to rely on the use of ICTs. Whilst ICTs are not necessarily required by this approach, they can clearly facilitate fast communication and sharing of information, such as conclusions drawn from deliberations. Yet the deliberations themselves do not have to be electronically mediated. For instance, with regard to accountability, Avritzer (2009) demonstrates that ‘physical’ citizen assemblies can act as checks on the implementation of policies derived from deliberations by government administrators. Yet the potential for an online public sphere to inform more traditional forms of deliberation is not precluded by RCR, as in this case any issues that surface in this sphere still be ‘thrashed out’ and thematised in the public sphere (Avritzer 2009), and thus attend to the associated limitations that have been presented across this thesis. Overall the RCR-PGS framework, when complemented by the economic initiatives proposed such as democracy in the workplace, ascribe with Dahlgren’s notion of civic cultures, whereby a key parameter is making democracy a “concrete, reoccurring practice” (2006: 159). As Avritzer notes, “local public deliberation and citizen involvement in institutions help turn a vicious circle into a virtuous one”, showing citizens how they can “act in public to enhance full political equality” (2009: 163-4).
It remains plausible to argue that if a more decentralised system was more fully embraced, individuals would see some of the results of their green efforts and thus propel the emergence of environmental norms. Furthermore, if the Township was nested within other horizontal and vertical national political systems, then ecological norms could reverberate through the macro national political systems like a drop of water rippling in a lake, or put differently, as an emergent phenomenon. A more decentralised approach may stand a better chance of enabling many smaller environmental changes to be made that could lead to macro-level effects. For example proposals by London Mayor Sadiq Khan to phase out high polluting diesel vehicles in the city (Carrington 2016), would be far more difficult to implement on a national scale, and indeed if some degree of sovereignty had not been devolved to the Mayor of London.

In sum the key message of this section is that climate change reforms will potentially be more successful if they are accompanied by decentralised approaches. A holistic approach to governance is beneficial, as mitigating complex socio-political challenges does not necessarily require pushing sovereignty upwards, but dispersing it (Sandel 1998a: 338-345). The federalism of RCR is compatible with this requirement as it enables local responses to what may not be purely local issues, via empowering citizens to take control of the forces that govern their lives. For example mini-publics are limited in their ability to deliver reform and move past mere consultative functions, if they are not given delegated power (Hendriks 2013: 12:15). Not only does RCR’s federalism facilitate the emergence of new norms, but it can enable local communities to introduce relatively small local changes that can create a wider emergence of these norms at the macro level. RCR can also imbue state level initiatives with the moral legitimation to pursue climate change friendly policies, beyond that afforded by a state seeking to uphold liberal neutrality and impose a manufactured common good.

Conclusion

This chapter began by setting out the nature of the challenge posed by changes in the global climate and the degradation of the environment. The challenges are complex and
far-reaching across individual, societal, governmental and corporate - economic terrain. Changes in individual and corporate behaviours are required, which could include expending more effort to repair and recycle manufactured goods. This notion feeds into the idea that new social norms need to be created (Babcock 2009a, b, c), norms that help foster an environmental common good. This sentiment follows a key principle of RCR that underlines the need to acknowledge mutual human interdependence in a way that respects liberty and empowerment, that is, one that allows for self-realisation and self-government. Central here is the principle of collective responsibility, which RCR aims to institutionalise. There is a need to cultivate a shared sense of common fate between individuals, society and nature, whilst promoting environmental norms via RCR’s principles of civic virtue, public deliberation, and federalism. These can serve to reimagine the nature of the economy in-line with the work of environmental economists.

Another theme of the chapter is that neoliberal models of governmentality, permitted by procedural liberalism, have fostered climate unfriendly practices based on free-market capitalism, freedom as non-interference, and individualising responsibility, which limits the pace of positive environmental change. Environmental pollution could require further regulation, and thus be considered an infringement on individual liberty and privacy (Babcock 2009a: 6). Furthermore cognitive dissonance associated with climate change (Babcock 2009a: 6), can be associated with the individualising framework of procedural liberalism. In short, environmental degradation is an unsurprising consequence of neoliberal governmentality (Babcock 2009a: 6-8; 10; 12; 16). Although several positive measures have occurred under procedural liberalism, without a stronger emphasis on a communal base that could serve as a site for the emergence of new norms, it must rely on a top-down approach to climate change, based upon defining direct harms and a seemingly manufactured common good. By not recognising the intrinsic importance of realising communal obligations and the agora, resistance to change is increased. Plausibly RCR can foster substantial environmental initiatives in a more acceptable way by following its principles of public deliberation and citizen empowerment.
What has perhaps been missing from alternative civic republican and deliberative analyses, is the notion that positive environmental change will not occur if only one of RCR’s principles is adopted. For example public deliberation in an otherwise procedural liberal framework will struggle to bring about substantial changes, that is, if citizens continue to drift away from the agora and towards living increasing separate lives. Likewise research and proposals related to bringing forward a sustainable global economy, without public deliberation, will also be significantly stunted. Thus RCR represents a holistic and resilient approach to contemporary socio-political challenges by fostering adaption, whilst conserving liberty and the ideals of socio-political institutions.

Climate change is a phenomenon that corresponds to dynamic complex systems, and as such underscores the key notion that “reality is changing . . . [and] something new can (and will) spring up” (Morin 2008: 57). If individuals and societies “must learn to live with uncertainty” (Morin 2008: 97), then the political philosophy that governs polities in the 21st century should be compatible with these imperatives. Complex self-organising systems require information to survive (Morin 2008: 19), and systemic “stability depends heavily on the relative strength of positive and negative feedback loops in a dynamic system” (Jackson 2017: 16). Thus in the case of climate change, resilience equates to “planning early, long before scarcity arrives” (Jackson 2017: 17; also BEC 2016). Civic spaces can imbue individuals with the acknowledgement that they inhabit a common world (via interactions) (Honohan 2002: 125, 130), and place emphasis on active citizenship (though participation and deliberation), which can therefore help to promote a notion of ecological stewardship (Barry 2008: 5), or an ethos of the commons (Masquelier 2017). The principles of RCR cultivate a character in individuals that is compatible with climate change, where information is disseminated and processed through deliberation (i.e. feedback loops).199 This supports a strong sense of

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199 Such information could be the “myth of decoupling”, which reveals that much posturing about the increases in economic and energy efficiency, are in fact, if the accounting is performed correctly, obscuring increasing consumption and global resource intensity (Jackson 2017; Ch. 5). The same can also be said for the metrics that determine GDP (Jackson 2017: 54).
the common good and a shared fate regarding inhabiting a planet with finite resources. The ability for RCR to help individuals encounter one another in nested systems of formal and informal governance, thus implants a resilient quality within the model, which aids, rather than hinders self-organisation. As Morin explains, “[s]elf-organizing beings . . . are self-eco-organizing beings, which leads to this fundamental complex idea: all autonomy constitutes itself in and through ecological dependence” (Morin 2008: 113, original emphasis). Hence a conception of freedom is required that is compatible with the need for a system to “nourish”, “self-reorganize and self-repair itself” (Morin 2008: 114). Freedom as self-government thus appears to fulfil these criteria, by seeking to empower individuals to take control of the political and economic forces that govern their lives.

A cohesive and empowered community is far better placed to tackle difficult challenges, where traditional conceptions of liberty are called into question by new ontological understandings of communities, and environmental and technological developments. The environment can be considered a public good that requires an ethos of the commons to protect it. RCR, which can be viewed as a step beyond Pettit’s republicanism, merits further exploration as it places intrinsic value in public deliberation and participation, thus addressing Arendt’s sentiments on the public realm, which can now be seen as a necessity for environmental change:

“The loss of the public realm made talk of a ‘common good’, in Arendt’s view, absurd because the political imagination and impartiality it demanded was something that could only be exercised also with one’s equals in the space of the public realm. Quite simply, if you were not present in the public realm you were not engaging in politics”

(Quill 2006: 74)

The loss of the agora and common good therefore highlight a key liberal deficiency in the context of climate change. Even if liberal thought could reconfigure the harm principle, or a technological fix to climate change could be achieved, the intrinsic value of civic life is still required to align individual interests to the common good in an uncertain world, where reality is ever changing. Whilst procedural liberalism may be capable of improving sustainability at the individual, communal and corporate level, as
a number of recent environmental successes could attest to, the commitment to necessary social changes remains questionable (Vaughan 2017). Recent news, such as the drops in recycling rates in the UK (BBC News 2016b), illustrate that once the path to sustainability has begun, reaching its conclusion is not a given. Babcock (2009a, b, c) highlights that individual behavioural norms need to be altered, from simply self-interested ones that may prioritise personal convenience, towards ones orientated to an environmental common good. Barry (2008) and Jackson (2017) underline that the corporate and capitalist free market economy is a key stumbling block, which requires a large scale reimagining of social, political and economic relationships. If “polluter pays” taxes were to be imposed, which would focus on taxing manufactures who produce non-recyclable goods (BBC News 2016b), and recycling targets met, with the increase of individual effort this requires (BBC News 2016b), then societies cannot recoil from cultivating a character in their citizenry along the lines of RCR.

The challenge of climate change lies in the restructuring of established norms surrounding prosperity, human beings’ relationship with the environment (the commons), the common good, and the economic structure of ALDs. This could constitute a moment of “paradigmatic reform” (Morin 2008: 35), which makes a resilient governing political philosophy such as RCR more plausible, if not necessary. RCR aims to reinstate the agora, cultivate an active civic population who participate in socio-political life, and establish freedom as self-government. Political initiatives that may result from the uptake of new environmental norms should not appear as a top-down imposition of a common good as such, but rather as prudent action taken based on a shared understanding of mutual indebtedness and collective responsibility. Climate change reforms may not happen naturally or when left to economic markets. Whereas RCR’s principles that enable adaption to new socio-political contexts whilst preserving liberty, arguably offer a promising alternative approach to procedural liberalism. Rather than socio-political institutions being perverted by systemic challenges, in terms of relying on top-town solutions, individuals can be empowered through democratic

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200 This includes the “cult of the personally responsible individual” (Masquelier 2017: 216), which is situated within contemporary consumer culture.
decision-making (the self-imposition of obligations), and the acknowledgment of collective responsibility. By nurturing these qualities, RCR can engage climate change on resilience terms.
Conclusion

In many ways this thesis has contended with one of philosophies’ oldest observations, that political systems and democracy are vulnerable to degenerating into less desirable forms of government. Plato famously put forward his notion of how democracy, through human miscalculations, degenerates ultimately into tyranny. Although Plato’s views on democracy differ from those espoused in this thesis, his assertions regarding the longevity and vulnerability of democracy are highly pertinent today. From the perspective of systemic interconnectedness, vulnerability can be defined as “the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated with environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to adapt” (Adger 2006: 268). Thus the link between resilience and vulnerability is clear, as the latter “is influenced by the build up or erosion of the elements of social-ecological resilience . . . [such as] the ability to absorb the shocks, the autonomy of self-organisation and the ability to adapt both in advance and in reaction to shocks” (Adger 2006: 269). This thesis has argued that the value of RCR lies in its ability to engender normative-teleological resilience, which equates to aiding societies adapt to changes in their environment in a way that avoids the corruption of institutions and promotes democratic practices; hence making democracy less vulnerable. This point is of core importance, as the need to adapt can create imperatives to circumvent democratic procedures and liberty, thus creating tensions between freedom and empowerment (Chapter 1). The nature of today’s world, viewed through the prism of systemic interconnectedness, compounds this issue by positing that interferences are largely unavoidable (via emergence). This understanding of complex systems underlines the fact that new socio-political events and issues can arise unpredictably, and influence many aspects of life and politics today. As Adger (2006: 269) points out, “[i]n a world of global change . . . discrete events are becoming more common . . . [. ] risk and perturbation in many ways defin[ing] and constitut[ing] the landscape of decision-making for social-ecological systems”. Consequently, although the risk of degeneration as a theme has permeated democratic theory since
Plato, it is imperative to theorise a way of preserving liberty and empowerment in a world now influenced by increasing interdependence and interconnectedness.

A key contribution of this thesis is bringing political philosophy into conversation with systemic interconnectedness and complexity theory, namely by using this connection to launch a defence of a neo-Athenian version of republicanism. The attractiveness of this type of approach, lies in the claim that it can aid communities to become resilient, and overcome the tension between empowerment and freedom, which neoliberal globalisation and systemic interconnectedness bring to the surface. The use of this understanding in the thesis also added to debates concerning what form resilience should take within contemporary political philosophy scholarship. Here it has been argued that resilience is most usefully postulated as normative-teleological, in the sense that adaption entails both change and preservation. Thus a resilient society is one that can respond to changes in its environment, yet retain and reinforce its democratic credentials. However, despite some references to proto-complexity theory appearing in political philosophers’ work “for more than 100 years” (Hodgson 2000: 75), such as the non-reductive nature of T.H. Green’s philosophy, the translation of complexity theory and emergence from physics and biology to social systems, is still in its infancy.

The core idea is that “emergent properties” can be found “in any complex, evolving system, throughout the natural and social realm” (Hodgson 2000: 75), and it is these phenomena that need to be managed by resilient societies. Yet as Cilliers’ definition of complex systems in Chapter 1 highlighted, understanding social systems as complex (Sotolongo 2002) does not offer opportunities to make concrete predictions, as the precise boundaries and details of such systems are unobtainable. Hence as “[a] theory of complexity cannot provide us a method to predict the effects of our decisions, nor with a way to predict the future behavior of the system under consideration”, predictions can only be formulated “as a form of generalization” (Cilliers 2000: 28; also Mason 2008). RCR can therefore mirror this observation, as it is not possible to predict with certainty, what kind of decisions will be made from communal deliberations, which could be unsettling to some. Yet considering the link between normative political

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theory and the ethics of complexity, in the sense that systems “are determined by the collection of choices made in it”, and the fact that “[t]he individual and collective values of members of the system cannot be separated from their functional roles”, it would appear that the disciplines of philosophy, political science and sociology are well-placed to contribute to this field (Cilliers 2000: 29-30).

To explicate how additions can be made to this debate, this thesis applied RCR to climate change (Chapter 6). The investigation revealed that climate change is a phenomenon that fits neatly in the crosshairs of this thesis, as it is itself a manifestation of systemic interconnectedness. In other words, the change in the global climate is an emergent phenomenon that arises from the interactions of many low-level elements, and thus takes on the character of being more than the sum of its parts. It is therefore an apt illustration of the rationale for this thesis. On the other hand, Chapter 6 also demonstrated how nurturing an inclusive and democratically deliberated common good within civic spaces, could foster the emergence of new environmental norms, say by creating norm cascades in formal civic spaces, which could be capable of reconciling the tension between the ‘interferences’ deemed necessary as a result climate change, and individual empowerment. Self-government practiced within a federated polycentric system of civic spaces, illustrated how necessary ‘interferences’ that are publicly deliberated, chosen and self-imposed by a community, are no longer problematic from RCR’s conception of liberty. Moreover the ability for RCR to reverse the local to global relationship, provided a novel way of connecting civic republican thought to forms of governance suitable to managing global phenomena within complex systems, such as contending with today’s tragedy of the commons. Furthermore, the normative-teleological resilience offered by RCR is visible in this case, as ‘climate policies’ would remain revisable, contestable, open to change, and able to be influenced by the knowledge gained from multiple levels of nested decentralised civic spaces. This approach thus enables a greater plurality of potential climate change solutions to surface, and permit democracy on a global scale.
The generalisability of this claim also featured in Chapter 3, which conceptualised RCR’s principle of civic virtue. By buttressing Sandel’s argument for deliberative and emergent civic virtues, this element was shown to be compatible with systemic interconnectedness, and capable of maintaining the common good in this context. By elaborating on a form of global virtue, understood along the lines of technosocial virtues, this chapter underlined that civic virtue connects to resilience, self-government and complex systems, by re-orientating the notion of virtue, at least in the first instance, away from prescribed lists and towards creating and cultivating communities of the right character. ‘Right character’ in this sense referred to institutionalising democratic input and oversight, as well as moral attentiveness in ALDs, so that they would then percolate into deliberations over issues of common concern. Vallor (2016) and Sclove (1995) have argued that this is a promising approach when contending with the case of designing and deploying technologies in society, which may have unforeseen and concerning political implications. Hence why the potential for technology and digital connectedness to be positive forces for democracy in the future, is not prohibited under RCR. However, RCR has been theorised in such a way that it does not rely on technologies for it to enable normative-teleological resilience, namely due to the substantial doubts that surround the democratic and liberty enhancing credentials of technology at present. Yet it is plausible that these issues may be able to be overcome in a society that is more closely aligned with RCR, whereby individuals are acquainted with practicing, and possess the skills and dispositions for, self-government. Arguably in this case communities would be better placed to realise the potential lying within digital technologies, and again be more resilient in the face of its tendencies to corrupt political practices.

However these positive theorisations over climate change from an RCR perspective, do not necessarily equate to an precise ‘cure’ of the problem. As mentioned above, exact predictions are difficult to sustain due to the nature of systemic interconnectedness. Similarly, guaranteeing an overlapping consensus regarding climate change policies, that is one that tracks all individuals’ interests (i.e. those possessed before communal deliberation), is also not a certainty. There is the possibility that debates may produce a
“stalemate of cognitive incommensurability” (Strand 2002; also 2001). In response to these limitations, this conclusion can offer three replies, or themes, that may help guide future research.

The first reply centres on the nature of dynamic complex systems. The central idea being that they can maintain their own momentum via self-reinforcing practices. For instance, the practices of contemporary capitalism promote self-reinforcing feedback loops, which maintain this political-economic structure. Therefore attending to deep and “powerful structural forces”, and to ultimately generate “momentum in a new direction” (Mason 2008: 44), requires intervention in the system “at as many levels as possible” (Mason 2008: 42). Hence it can be argued that to overcome negative self-reinforcing path dependencies, such as practices that corrupt democracy or significantly degrade the environment, necessitates interventions in many areas of socio-political life. Despite the lack of precise understandings over the amount of determinism humans can exert on their social and global systems, and what the (unexpected) outcomes of this would be, it is plausible that in RCR’s case, promoting civic spaces, providing support to businesses to incorporate democracy in the workplace, encouraging the number of interactions between individuals which can nurture civic skills and feelings of mutual indebtedness, that societies may be able to engender normative-teleological resilience and sustain a positive, democratically-reinforcing, path dependency. Consequently, future research in this area could involve examining political events, political participation activities, and the proliferation of formal and informal civic spaces in-line with the principles of RCR: for example, exploring to what extent regional devolution in the UK, or the involvement of the public in drafting and implementing legislation, reflects freedom as self-government and normative-teleological resilience. Another avenue of investigation would be to pilot decentralisation and self-government of the kind advocated in this thesis, to the city level. Thus creating a case-study which could incorporate a wider variety of RCR’s elements in one context. These are both possible ways of capturing the breadth of interventions that can contribute to managing political phenomena on resilience terms.
The second theme relates to interdisciplinarity within political philosophy. Clearly there are advantages to disseminating knowledge in categorical form, such that drawing boundaries around topics can aid learning, as Miller’s tripartite framework in Chapter 2 demonstrated. Yet chapter 1, 2 and 6 highlighted how procedural liberalism is severely problematised by systemic events such as climate change, both in terms of theorising unavoidable inferences as legitimate, and promoting normatively-resilient societies. Essentially this is due to its adherence to liberty as non-interference, and subsequent support of asocially individualising societies, which runs contra to the view that human societies can be framed as complex dynamic systems. Similarly, neo-Roman republicanism’s reluctance to engage in more normative politics, and remain anchored to a non form of liberty, resulted in similar issues to that of procedural liberalism (Chapter 2). However liberal notions of autonomy and rights, and neo-Roman republicanism’s conceptualisation of non-domination, still underscore the need to account for some form of individual autonomy and sphere of freedom. Additionally, Chapter 2 highlighted clear parallels between RCR and communitarian-capability scholars. The communitarian scholars usefully highlighted how the constitutive relationship between individuals and their communities requires, for a genuinely inclusive democracy, far greater consideration of this fact, and the need for it to be actualised within the arena of politics. For example, Walzer’s notion of social meanings underscored the need for some form of mechanism to help determine the nature and implications of these meanings. Yet arguably he did not go far enough with regard to systematising a theoretical model that could give life to his insights. MacIntyre likewise illustrated the deep interdependence of human beings living in communities, which again calls on a context-relevant political-deliberative response, but without offering a compatible account of liberty, again limiting the practical application of his scholarship. Honneth was quite clear about the need to understand freedom socially, thus making links between democratic public life and the creation of the public will. Similarly to Walzer though, Honneth’s valuable historical account of the degeneration of social freedom, does not provide him with sufficient space to put forward a holistic political model that is capable of realising this form of freedom. He instead confines himself to elaborating on three main arenas of liberty, which equate more to a limited set of social
conditions conducive to social freedom. Taylor was arguably the closest to asserting a civic republican form of politics to attend to the inherently social nature of human communal life. However, he too was more concerned with making a philosophical point with regard to liberalism, rather than outlining a more substantive political theory. In addition, capability scholars such as Sen and Nussbaum have identified several capabilities that would further the end of RCR. Nevertheless, a holistic and normative model for philosophically justifying, and politically realising these claims, was largely absent. Overall, the connected and nuanced gaps left between these different philosophical approaches point to the position of RCR in these debates. Hence similarly to the first theme above, RCR could be viewed as a blueprint model that can accommodate the insights of other philosophies, which are pertinent to attending to the demands of systemic interconnectedness. Consequently, the method and interpretation of the civic republican political theory of RCR, aligns more closely with revision and reconceptualisation, rather than the wholesale acceptance and rejection of theoretical principles. In this way, RCR subscribes to its own premise in the sense that it cannot account for, or predict, all the possible theoretical inputs and exchanges that may shape it at this stage of its development. Yet it remains open to these interdisciplinary conversations, which could well be essential for keeping practical philosophy in-line with contemporary socio-political developments.

The third reply to the limitations of RCR noted above, concern the theoretical work undertaken in Chapter 3 and 4. Although this thesis is not a historical review of political philosophy that presents each philosopher’s contribution to date, Chapter 1 presented a novel theoretical challenge for contemporary philosophers to consider, which led to certain principles being posited as core to the RCR model. The theoretical couplings made between Sandel’s civic republicanism and T.H. Green - concerning self-realisation, the common good and rights - showed how the common good was arranged prior to rights, but significantly, insulated from critiques that it could be too ‘common,’ by tying it to the notion of mutual self-realisation, which prohibits it from becoming oppressive or patriarchal. These connections - including the fact that Green’s scholarship inherently acknowledges complexity, albeit obtained from the theological context in which he was
writing - provided a unique space for RCR, between procedural liberal, communitarian and capability scholars. Despite the claim that the common good is essential to disposing individuals towards shared goals and collective responsibility is not groundbreaking, Chapter 5’s bringing to life of these principles, via RCR’s other ‘practical philosophy’ elements (e.g. civic spaces, democracy in the workplace, and federalism), helped to further constitute the development of a more holistic model that was missing in Chapter 2. Therefore the thesis adds a theoretical assemblage that is not necessarily complete, in the sense that it is not ‘closed’ to further amendments, but one which is argued to be internally consistent and capable of fostering the deliberation and empowerment necessary to find communal solutions to systemic problems – and can thus act as a benchmark for further scholarship in this area.

The malleability that freedom as self-government and the role of inclusive democratic decision-making offers, is a strength of RCR in light of contemporary challenges. It allows pertinent normative political concepts (e.g. autonomy, rights and the common good), to combine and ground a more communal-democratic form of empowerment, such as via providing the theoretical and practical infrastructure for the self-imposition of obligations that result from systemic phenomena. Hence preserving liberty and engendering normative-teleological resilience in this schema, not only by understanding liberty in the way it does, but also incorporating a diverse range of approaches (e.g. democracy in the workplace and the promotion of civic spaces), helps create a holistic model that is distinct from both procedural liberalism, and other theories that fall within the predominant republican, communitarian, and capability approach schools of thought. Yet it is does not provide immediate solutions to all socio-political issues, or eliminate tension and conflict from politics. Attending to the scale issue of republican politics, and motivating individuals to partake in civic activities, which enable them to form a common mind on issues of mutual concern, are of course challenges to the RCR approach. Although these have been addressed in the preceding chapters (e.g. Chapter 5) - resolutions including creating more civic spaces for individuals to encounter one another, bringing politics into closer reach of citizens, civic education, and polycentric forms of governance - the normative argument put forward
in this thesis remains crucial. Similar to Wolff’s (2012: 181) research, RCR does not remove the political skirmishes that occur in contemporary societies, it rather constitutes a “moving from one set of problems that have become unbearable to a new and different set that we prefer”. More tensions will likely arise in the deliberative and polycentric civic spaces of RCR, as negotiations over ‘scared values’ take place between (groups of) individuals. However, the value of RCR is that it provides a model for enabling this negotiation to take place, which includes reducing the role of inequality in deliberative events (via empowerment) (Wolff 2012). Importantly, it aims to create resilient societies, whereby even if civic republican politics does not generate the preferred outcome of a citizen-participant, they can still feel respected by the process: the notion of a reasoned dissensus being a hallmark of the ideal of democracy (Sclove 1995). Thus paralleling Wolff again (2012: 183), it can be argued that RCR constitutes a “powerful and attractive program that belongs on serious agendas today”.

Taking its datum point from Sandel, the central claim of this thesis is that pursuing freedom as self-government, and thus enabling citizens to take more control over the forces that govern their lives, is a conceptualisation of liberty that fits the contemporary challenges. RCR aims to ensure that citizens retain a sufficient degree of empowerment in light of unavoidable systemic challenges they will continue to face. This is why RCR’s key inheritance from Sandel is his public philosophy, bringing seemingly irresolvable debates over the good back into the reach of individuals, where they can be publicly deliberated. The notion that “Sandel employs community in order to reestablish the source of the ethical ends individuals invariably carry with them”, and in so doing “reintroduces the political into our understanding of individual identity, which a neutral liberalism ostensibly eliminated” (Freeden 2001: 31), is one way of facilitating the inclusive self-learning and adaption that enables RCR, and the communities it could underpin, to be described as resilient. By inculcating citizens in the practice of democracy and including their ‘ethical ends’ in these activities, the ‘shocks’ that occur in politics can be absorbed and buttress democracy, rather than allowing it to degenerate into something less desirable. The saliency of this parallels the idea, albeit from an alternative angle, that
“[o]nce government is no longer understood to operate in a separate sphere from its economic, social and environmental context – from life itself – then government is an ongoing process rather than a series of discrete or separate acts . . . The process of governing is also an ever more inclusive one, always reflexively seeking to draw in actors and aspects which had previously been excluded”

(Chandler 2014: 203)

Although the roads to this kind of governing have not been forcibly closed to procedural liberal, communitarian, neo-Roman republican, libertarian and anarchist scholars, they would need to take account of certain questions in order to grapple with the challenges set out in Chapter 1. For instance, if societies did not wish to adopt the normative view of cultivating civic virtue and enabling more direct forms of democracy, then how will the communal obligations that are necessary to attend to interdependence arise, and be viewed as legitimate? If more universalist rights are relied on, who will be empowered to be part of this conversation, and how will the full implications of these be established, in light of systemic interconnectedness? In addition, what substitute form of liberty could sustain an alternative approach in this context? RCR argues that through emphasising the common good and civic virtue, and not being tentative towards cultivating these, future politics in ALDs can be practiced with less sensationalism, less factionalism, and less dislocations between the individual, her community, and her government. The problem with procedural liberalism is that under current conditions of existence, it fails to empower individuals; and communitarian and capability approaches are not substantive enough to cover the spectrum of issues that normative-teleological resilience requires. Whereas the principles of RCR can play a positive role in securing a stable home for individuals from different socio-economic backgrounds, in a world of profound complexity, contingency and emergence. The contribution of RCR thus lies in its potential to deliver a key requirement of societies framed by systemic interconnectedness, that is, instigating and managing social change via the establishment of “a dialectic between the . . . ‘individually social’ and the ‘collectively social’” (Sotolongo 2002: 114). New challenges will continue to be revealed as the arrow of time and the “breathtaking pace” of technology move forward, as Kennedy (1962: n.p.) notably remarked, “such a pace cannot help but create new ills as it dispels old,
new ignorance, new problems, [and] new dangers”. It would therefore be reassuring to think that these challenges will be met by individuals and communities with the skills, dispositions and energies to preserve their mutually indebted common life in a resilient and empowered manner, whereby success and prosperity is measured on these qualities of communities. Systemic interconnectedness and neoliberal globalisation thus offer a new reason for history’s longest conversation to return to its ancient thematic beginnings.
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