The European External Action Service in the Evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’: A Case Study of Somalia

by

Nikolaos Gkotsis Papaioannou

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Department of Politics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
University of Surrey

Supervisors:
Dr. Laura Chappell
Prof. Roberta Guerrina

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Declaration

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Abstract

This thesis explores the tensions between the underpinnings of Normative Power Europe (NPE) and the use of the military as a way of norm diffusion, with a focus on Somalia. It is specifically concerned with the impact of the European External Action Service (EEAS), as part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), on the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’. By focusing on this particular interrelation of normative and military power, this project will illustrate the importance of actorness as a constructive element of the EU’s normative identity in its external action.

This thesis’ contribution stems from critiques of NPE, particularly with reference to its discursive nature. Simultaneously, it emphasises symbolic manifestation as key in addressing the tension between “military” and “normative” power. Whilst it contributes to the literature on CSDP, this thesis is concerned with demonstrating the catalytic role of the establishment of the EEAS in the evolution of the EU’s normative identity.

Through the exploration of the EU’s military operations in Somalia - EUTM and EUNAVFOR - this research establishes the compatibility between normative power and military means. This is achieved through content analysis and subsequent critical frame analysis of official EU documentation. The critical frames of ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘partnership-ownership’ are applied to the strategic documentation, sub-strategies and EU documents relating to Somalia and the Horn of Africa in order to demonstrate the normative elements of the EU’s external action as well as how they have altered since the establishment of the EEAS. By examining the consistent operationalisation of the EU’s demonstrated intents and subsequent impact in Somalia, this thesis ultimately provides an evaluation of the Union’s overall power in normative terms. Most importantly, it makes the case for NPE’s pertinence in the study of external action.
Acknowledgements

At the end of arguably the most challenging experience of my life, intellectually but mainly emotionally, I cannot but sit back and reflect upon all the people who were there for me throughout my PhD. I was fortunate to have a supervisory team second to none. My supervisors, Dr. Laura Chappell and Professor Roberta Guerrina, have supported me throughout, demonstrating commitment and understanding. For this I am grateful.

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I will never be able to put into words the amount of gratitude I have for my parents. They have always been the bedrock of all my efforts and the spark of hope in whatever I do. I equally cannot put into words my appreciation for Nastasia Asimakopoulou, the unwavering bastion in all my endeavours. To Inci Parlak and Dr. Faidon Christakopoulos for always having my back and for being my family away from home, I express my immense gratitude and indebtedness. To Dr. Sam Cooke, my sounding board and exemplary friend, I would like to express my immense appreciation.

Last, but definitely not least, I would like to thank all my students. Although they may never have realised it, they put a smile on my face even during the most adverse of times.

Cavafy’s verses on Alexandria resonate with me.
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDCO</td>
<td>EuropeAid Cooperation Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>African Peace Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2C</td>
<td>Continent to Continent</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>Civilian Crisis Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CGPCS</td>
<td>Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Cotonou Partnership Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG DEV</td>
<td>European Commission’s Directorate General for Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>European Commission’s Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission’s Directorate General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG RELEX</td>
<td>European Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECAP</td>
<td>European Capabilities Action Plan</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
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<td>EDAP</td>
<td>European Defence Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCAP Nestor</td>
<td>European Union Maritime Capacity Building Mission in Somalia (renamed to EUCAP Somalia on 1st March 2017)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>EUFOR Chad</td>
<td>European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad</td>
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<td>EUGS</td>
<td>European Global Strategy</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Union Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUMSS</td>
<td>European Union Maritime Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EUNAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>European Union Training Mission in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGS</td>
<td>Federal Government of Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/ Vice-President of the European Commission</td>
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IGAD  Intergovernmental Authority for Development
INTCEN  European Union Intelligence Situation Centre
IPCR  European Union Integrated Political Crisis Response
JAES  Joint Africa EU Strategy
MDG  Millennium Development Goals
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPE  Normative Power Europe
PSC  Political and Security Committee
PSG  Peacebuilding Statebuilding Goals
RECs  Regional Economic Communities
SITROOM  EU Situation Room
SNAF  Somali National Armed Forces
SNSF  Somali National Security Forces
TEU  Treaty of the European Union
TFG  Transitional Federal Government
UN  United Nations
UN MONUC  United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
UNPOS  United Nations Political Office in Somalia
UNOSOM  United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSOM  United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
US  United States (of America)
WFP  World Food Program
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction
Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The introduction of a multifaceted new Agency, the European External Action Service (EEAS), in the EU framework on external action together with the increasing global turn towards the complex agency of normative power, are the two intellectual puzzles that underpin this research. Although the mechanisms underpinning the function of this new structure are essential to comprehending the role of the Service, the need to understand its impact in the evolution of EU external action is imperative. With consideration to the identity of the EU and how that has evolved through its operational activity, this thesis will focus on the normative elements and how they have been operationalised in view of the EEAS’ establishment. I will thus be approaching the normative power paradigm from the perspective of the EU but will also be accounting for the reverse course of diffusion¹ (that from the receiver-Somalia) as part of a discursive flow of power. The theoretical contribution will therefore stem from the work of Kavalski (2013), Diez (2005, 2007, 2012), Whitman (2002) and Lenz (2013) as far as the discursive nature of ‘normative power’ is concerned, while taking Manners’ (2000) emphasis on symbolic manifestation as a point of departure. Additionally, this thesis will demonstrate that ‘military’ and ‘normative’ power are not mutually exclusive by looking at ‘symbolic manifestations’ and will illustrate this through a critical frame analysis of the military operations it is carrying out in Somalia. Therefore, the main concern will be to demonstrate the

¹ The growing assertiveness of certain actors (particularly the ‘BRICS’) has demonstrated the global shift toward a new normative order. Therefore, the operationalization of the ‘normative power’ of a more traditional international foreign actor such as the EU, examined through the receptive lens of ‘others’ (in this case Somalia) is directly linked to the peaceful transition pointed out by academics (Hurrell 2006; Ikenberry 2008; Barma et al. 2009; Zhang 2011; Kupchan 2012) as potentially one of the greatest global challenges of our time.
normative impact of the EU’s operationalisation of external action both on its global actorness as well as its own identity.

The nature of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its role in the process of European integration has been widely debated. This thesis is less concerned with CSDP per se, although it will add to the literature on the operationalisation of the EU’s external action within a military context (as demonstrated in Chapters 3, 6 and 7). It will determine, however, the impact of the EEAS in the evolution of the Union as a ‘normative power’ and the potential repercussions on the character and the identity of the Union. Equally important, and accompanying this, is the de-codification of the normative core of the Union. This will be achieved through the frames of ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘multilateralism’ and the ‘partnership-ownership binary’, thus enabling the identification of the normative strand which runs through EU security and defence policy initiatives and which will form the nature of the future endeavours of the Union as a ‘normative power’ internationally.

1.2 Research Questions

This thesis explores issues of normative power, from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Specifically, the thesis will unpack the tension between the normative underpinnings of NPE framework and the use of military means as a way of norm diffusion. By focusing on this particular interrelation of normative and military power, I will be able to determine the importance of actorness as a constructive element of the EU’s normative identity in its external action.

The main research question underpinning this project is: Has the establishment of the EEAS in the context of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) contributed to the evolution of the Union as a ‘normative power’? Informing this analysis are two main theoretical questions: 1) Is the EU
a normative actor judging from its external action? and 2) Are military means compatible with
the NPE framework and, more generally, can they be used in normative diffusion?

The first question will be approached through an investigation of how the EU’s normative
actorness within CSDP is evolving in the context of EEAS’ creation. This will draw on the
theoretical elaboration of NPE (Chapter 2) and the discussion of the changes that occurred as
a result of the EEAS’ establishment as well as the unresolved issues that have been identified
in the literature as far as its role and function are concerned (see Chapter 4). The
operationalisation of the EU’s normative standing within its military operations will be
achieved through the critical frame analysis of EU documentation (see Chapters 3, 6 and 7),
thus completing the portrait of its normative identity and ‘power’.

The second question further examines the operationalization of military initiatives. The
analysis conducted will concentrate on the EU’s two military operations in Somalia as they
provide useful insights into the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’ and the role of the
EEAS’s establishment in operationalizing it. The analysis of the EU’s military operations in
Somalia, EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the European Union Military Training Mission in Somalia
(EUTM), provide a unique example upon which the research questions can be explored.
Because Atalanta (2008) was launched before the establishment of the EEAS (2010) and is still
ongoing, it enables the exploration of the EU’s identity and actorness before and after the
creation of the Service. Furthermore, as a military operation, it allows the exploration of the
‘normative’- ‘military’ power tension which lies at the core of this research. Additionally,
EUTM (2010) adds a second strand to the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia, this time
focusing more on military training rather than providing security, thus allowing for a more
comprehensive examination of the Union’s ‘normative power’. Seeing that both operations are
identified as military initiatives, yet serve different functions within the same host country
(Somalia), they constitute an uncommon combination of in-case case studies, suitable for the
exploration of the military-normative power tension. Therefore, the analysis of the EU’s operations in Somalia tests the compatibility of military operations and normative power, as well as how the core normative values of EU security and defence policy have been framed within the official documentation and what this means with respect to its argued evolving ‘normative power’. The civilian operations in the region will be referred to only as a means of providing context for the subsequent analysis.

1.3 Research Rationale

The evolution of the EU has been a constant and dynamic process since its conception. The multilevel development of policy and the range of the repercussions that have resulted from each stage of its transformations are indicative of the continuous changes taking place on a political and social level within and outside the geographic limits of Europe. In an effort to evolve together with its international environment and adapt its function to better address the complex and interconnected nature of the challenges it faces as a global actor, the EU has engaged in a series of efforts to ameliorate its ability to respond. These changes have affected the identity of the EU and have ultimately been portrayed in the institutional infrastructure which has been adapting to the needs of the actor known as the EU. It is these needs that the creation of the EEAS stems from. As will be further discussed in Chapter 4, the EEAS provides the potential for the EU to become an actor that is able to comprehensively address the threats it faces while creating internally a coherent mechanism that supports such an endeavour. Nevertheless, it appears that it has still fallen short in meeting its goals, especially when examining its operations. Therefore, the investigation of the EU’s actions together with its intended goals emerges as an essential requirement for the current research. The actorness of the EU has been an issue of discussion not only in its internal projection but also in its global standing. As globalisation becomes more of an issue of definitions and complex procedures,
particularly when dealing with questions pertinent to actorness and the forms of power employed, the role and identity of the EU becomes all the more intricate. This results in the debate on the normative character of its actions, given that it encompasses more facets of the ‘identity’ question than other approaches.

Keukeleire and Delreux (2014:140) argue that the problem in labelling the EU as a normative power stems from the fact that “action and success vary across countries”. The Council conclusions on Somalia (2014) underline three prominent normative objectives that should be safeguarded: state building; combating violations of human rights; fight against terrorism (Al-Shabaab) and insurgency (Ehrhart, Petretto, 2014). By jointly examining the aforementioned objectives and the way they were operationalized, a conclusion can be drawn as to whether the EU can be considered a normative power. The level of ‘success’ can be evaluated from the accomplishment of the proclaimed objectives and the alignment of their normative justification with the selected operationalization.

The most apparent link from an operational standpoint between these three core norms is reliance on military means. The most common understanding is grounded on the tautology between military means and the use of coercion. Within a normative power framework, Manners (2006, 2010, 2013) proposes an alternative interpretation of the military aspect. He argues that it can be viewed as symbolic presence, which may actually enable the diffusion of norms. The caveat to this is that coercion cannot be utilised (or, at least, not heavily resorted to according to the critiques discussed in Chapters 2 and 3). That is to say that the mere presence of a military force can be beneficial for the diffusion of norms as long as it does not actively resort to imposing those norms on the subject. The element of internalisation-acceptance, which is an inherent characteristic of normative power, would be weakened if this caveat were ignored. Therefore, by re-evaluating the normative power equation and reconciling the notion of military operations by viewing them as a symbolic presence and not another form of
imposition, the normative paradigm can become relevant again. If the military aspect is approached as a contributing factor to the instillation of normative values rather than one that reduces their prominence, the reconfiguration of the power balance could be reviewed.

The pertinence of the symbolic element to this research and its critical approach to the normative framework approach can be summarised in three points: a) it is directly provided for in Manners’ theoretical framework; b) it includes the discursive element highlighted by other academics such as Whitman (2002), Diez (2005, 2007, 2012), Kavalski (2013) and Lenz (2013); c) it results in the change of expectations (initially contradictory to the prominence of normative power because of the employment of military means) which would significantly alter and potentially reverse the existing analysis on the issue.

The manifestation of normative power becomes apparent by looking at the actions and proclamations of the two parties: the EU and Somalia. As far as the former is concerned: treaties, action plans, declarations and operational follow up are all important elements to consider. The treaties will act as a broader framework of interpretation for the more specified documents (strategies, sub-strategies, institutional conclusions, reports and decisions) that follow. The Lisbon Treaty specifically foresees the establishment of the EEAS and sets out its role within CSDP. Strategies, sub-strategies and mandates will provide the details pertaining to the deployment of the military operations in Somalia, thus demonstrating not only the rhetoric intent of the EU but also how it appears in the objectives it sets. The declarations made throughout the operations, from their proposal to their completion, are also important in order to comprehensively approach the rhetoric of the military operations. As far as the operational follow-up is concerned, this will indicate the level to which the intents or purported goals of the operations were ultimately accomplished. This follow-up will comprise of factsheets, reports from EU institutions as well as other official material which further complete the understanding of the EU’s ‘normative power’, particularly in terms of its efficiency as well as
its impact. This will be demonstrated as part of the critical frame analysis, thus completing the understanding of the EU’s actorness. In terms of ‘normative power’, the convergence of its intents, as demonstrated within the ‘strategies’ and action plans, with the reports on its impact, will allow the better evaluation of its current normative potency as well as a global actor (see Chapter 3).

Therefore, from the Somali perspective of norm diffusion the following will be sought: a) cooperation and involvement in the operationalisation of promoted initiatives, which proves acceptance and adherence to their normative underpinnings, b) imitation of language, which should focus on disentangling EU rhetoric from that of other multilateral or international partners, c) potential impact on subsequent EU rhetoric, which means that the dominant narrative may change in order to accommodate the needs of the partners. This final point would prove the discursive nature of normative power, as Kavalski (2013) has argued (see Chapter 2).

The question of intent and its separation from purposes is another point of concern. Intent can be viewed directly from the proclamation. Conversely, purpose is more covert. In the example of the naval operations in Somalia the intent was securing the naval passage for the provision of food by the World Health Organisation to the affected areas. Nevertheless, one could argue that the purpose of this operation was securing the mercantile lanes. Therefore, intent and purpose may not always coincide. They might even function to the detriment of each other.

Drawing on Nunes (2011), EU normative actorness can be seen as a dual analysis: while creating a normative internal actorness of consensus between the Member States’ normative identities, externally the EU has a separate actorness more inclined towards a globalist UN type. Therefore, theoretically, the problematic consequences of internal normative identities do not spill over into the external actorness of the EU due to its separate orientation. Even though
the interests of certain states may appear more prominently within EU external policy in certain situations, the fact remains that they are then promoted as EU ones. This is a case of a peculiar internalisation one may say of the Member States’ interests by the EU. As Kratochvíl et al (2011:395) assert, “the ‘exported’ norms are always attributed to the EU as a whole and are thus directly linked to the question of actorness”.

1.4 The NPE framework: outlining the puzzle

According to Manners (2006), much of the current focus in the literature on EU policies towards the rest of the world is misplaced. The EU’s normative role can be better determined through its symbolic manifestation and subsequently the political reality of its international identity can be more aptly evaluated. An important part in this theoretical framework (see Chapter 2) is played by ‘norm diffusion’. Manners (2006:76) argues that six factors contribute to norm diffusion: contagion, information, procedure, transference, overt presence and culture filter (Textbox 1), and will later be addressed in relation to their operationalisation within CSDP. Procedural diffusion, which is accomplished through the institutionalization of relationships), transference diffusion, which refers to the transmission of norms through the transfer of material and immaterial assets, as well as overt diffusion - physical EU presence in third party countries or organizations, can be identified and related to CSDP operations as well as foreign policy initiatives that fall in the realm of duties of the EEAS. The final type of cultural diffusion (the way that the process of creating a social and political identity by the subjects shapes and transforms the diffusion of EU norms) (Kinnvall 1995) will be illustrated through the case study of Somalia.
**Textbox 1: Manners’ (2013) six forms of norm diffusion**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contagion diffusion</strong></td>
<td>This is the diffusion of ideas between the EU and other global actor, i.e. the way ideas and means of regional integration have diffused between continents. Such ideas as ‘common high authority’, ‘four freedoms’ and ‘single currency’ are seen in other regions as being worthy of imitation (Manners, 2013:315). This form employs mechanisms such as imitation, emulation and mimicry/mimétisme including the persuasive attraction of ideas, as well as the prestige and status associated with regional integration organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Informational diffusion</strong></td>
<td>It takes place through references to a range of strategic communications (policy initiative by the EU, including declaratory communications such as initiatives from the Presidency of the EU or the president of the Commission). This type of diffusion is encountered in cases such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) (with reference to ‘complex causes’ of terrorism, ‘pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies’ (Solana, 2003:3)). The mechanisms that appear are initiation, declaration and communication including persuasive attraction and argumentative promotion of ideas (Manners, 2013: 316).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Procedural diffusion</strong></td>
<td>This form appears through the institutionalisation of relationships between the EU and third parties, including political partnerships as seen in inter-regional cooperation agreements, membership of an international organisation, association agreements or enlargement of the EU itself. It relies on mechanisms such as partnership, cooperation, association and membership, includes persuasive attraction and argumentative promotion of ideas, the possible prestige and status of associating with the EU and other international organisations. Within this category Manners (2013:317) includes the EEAS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transference diffusion</strong></td>
<td>This occurs when the EU is involved in the transfer of material and immaterial assets such as humanitarian aid and technical assistance. It may be the result of exportation through ‘conditionality clauses’, but equally of more basic engagement of EU agencies and support for NGOs on the ground without such conditions. It relies on mechanisms of aid and assistance, engagement and support, dialogue on and transference of ideas (Manners, 2013: 317).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overt diffusion</strong></td>
<td>This is the result of the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organisations, such as EEAS delegation and embassies of MS, may involve the presence of one of the presidents of EU institutions, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or peacekeeping/peacebuilding operations. It employs mechanisms of presence, diplomacy or actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This thesis will emphasise the importance of 'symbolic manifestation' in determining the EU's normative role in international politics. This element focuses on the EU’s military role in safeguarding the continuity of norms in the causes of a conflict (not confined to the narrow meaning of an armed conflict) rather than in its eventual outcome (Manners 2006). On a theoretical level it is possible to envisage conditions under which ‘military operations’ (normally associated with coercion) and ‘normative power’ (normally based on consensual internalisation), can be combined in an effort to increase an actor’s global presence. Manners’ (2000) initial aim was to refocus the emphasis of current analysis away from an empirical study of European institutions or policies, and towards a more detailed understanding of cognitive processes. For Manners (2000) this shift needs to include both substantive and symbolic components. The two last characteristics can be covered by a military presence, without the need for coercion. Manners (2002) rejects the idea that the EU can or should use force instrumentally. He emphasizes the unique character of the EU as an international organisation highlighting how this trait shapes the way it is seen by third parties/countries. Specifically, he sees the Union as pre-inclined to act in a normative way (Manners 2002). This thesis will thus break away from Manners’ argument about NPE in as far as it is not the identity of the EU that shapes its role as a ‘normative power’ so much as the way it behaves as an international actor.
1.5 How CSDP and the EEAS fit into the puzzle

According to Whitman “the TEU (Treaty on European Union 1991) had signalled the intent of the Member States of the Union to move beyond a civilian power Europe and to develop a defence dimension to the international identity of the Union” (1998:135-136). As CSDP evolves and comes to encompass more areas of policy, particularly on the nexus of security and development (see Chapter 4) it should create a ‘bridge’ in the “capabilities-expectations gap” identified by Hill (1993) in the early days of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Given that the military means are far from sufficient for the operations it carries out worldwide (see Chapters 4, 6 and 7), the EU has managed to become an acknowledged actor by employing means more akin to soft-power competencies, such as diplomatic means. The EEAS was established as part of the intergovernmental CSDP in order to provide a unified EU front in external action. This initiative acts as a precursor to the new ‘comprehensive approach’ in intervention: one that efficiently combines and implements military as well as diplomatic/non-forceful means in accomplishing the goals it sets. Howorth (2007:205) points out that the new attributes set out by the European Security Strategy (ESS) (2003) suggest the surfacing of a new normative approach to international relations. He goes even further and argues that the EU is attempting to systematically implement a new normative approach to international relations (Howorth 2007:205). Within my research I will be investigating the role of the EEAS and the way its introduction in CSDP has contributed to the EU evolving as a 'normative power'. This will be achieved through the examination of the critical frames (Chapter 3) through an NPE lens. In identifying the responsibilities allocated to the EEAS within the operational setting, as well as how they were incorporated in the mandates of the military operations, the normative importance of these changes will be evaluated in terms of an NPE understanding. Therefore, in analysing the normativity of the mandate prescriptions as well as how they reflect the incorporation of the EEAS in the CSDP structure, this thesis
will illustrate: firstly, that the way military operations were carried out are mostly compatible with NPE; secondly, that the creation of the EEAS acted catalytically in the inclusion of a normative understanding of military operations; thirdly, that the EU maintains and diffuses ‘normative power’ through its military operations to a certain extent (see Chapter 8).

Nevertheless, the aforementioned turn to a more comprehensive approach as far as means are concerned is not unproblematic. Literature ranging back from the immediate post-Cold War period expresses a clear concern about the ability of a new organisation, such as the EU in 1992, to function and develop an external policy that is independent and separate from any influential international pressures. Member States’ interests and internal power politics within the European Council were clearly played out throughout the 1990s and shaped decision-making processes associated with the development of CSDP (Bickerton 2010, Howorth 2003/2004, Cornish and Edwards 2001). Similar considerations are articulated in various theoretical critiques of the NPE (Whitman 2002; Haukalla 2008). They concern whether the EU’s actorness is distinct from that of its Member States. Furthermore, they touch upon its normative identity and whether it is separate from or the result of the cumulative normative power of the Member States. These points of inquiry will be addressed in this thesis, using the case of Somalia to explore the identity of the EU’s normative power and how it is reflected in its operations. This is particularly important with reference to the EU’s actorness in external action. Thus, this thesis argues that the employment of the selected critical frames highlights the EU’s turn towards a hybrid actorness, one that bridges a civilian identity with the use of military means in order to establish itself as a global actor. This is accomplished by the construction of a normative power that relies heavily on reference to the EU’s norms and further operationalised through the repetition of its commitments to its partners within the operations. The critical frames demonstrate its three-fold normative foundation: a) the comprehensive approach: demonstrates the willingness to retain traits of a civilian actor with
the employment of military means, b) effective multilateralism: the EU’s attempt to create an autonomous presence through its cooperation with other actors within the operations, c) partnership-ownership: the actorhood it is promoting hinges upon the empowerment of self normatively via the empowerment of the other (Somalia and regional actors) thus further supporting its separation from any form of coercion.

The question of identity which ensues from the above discussion, remains to be researched and determined. As Smith (2000:27) underlined “the normative dimension is important because the ‘debate about civilian power involves fundamental choices about the EU’s international identity’”. The question of whether NPE, when put into action, presupposes that the EU is a normative actor rather than an actor administrating normative power, is complex and requires a detailed assessment of institutional structures and politics, and policy implementation. On this point, the EU’s commitment to normative intents must also come under scrutiny. If the EU proves not to be a distinguishable single normative actor but a construction that externalises the cumulative normative intent of its Member States, then the state remains the central concern. In this case an issue of multiple representations from within would arise. This could further translate into a mismatch with the unified front the EU is attempting to create in external relations. Particularly cases of initiative-taking on behalf of the member states, as well as the dual obligations stemming from participation in other regional organisations, can be cause for separatist behaviour, hence disrupting the unified attempts of the EU to promote and carry out its aspirations in external action. Nevertheless, this research does not focus on the dynamic created between the EU and the Members States. Echoing Nunes (2011), this thesis sees the EU as having a separate actorhood externally and it is a defining element of the EU’s identity in external action (see Chapter 2).

The causes of EU inconsistency in its foreign action are not created solely by its external representation. The horizontal relations on the level of EU institutions are also an area which
has been identified as problematic (Edwards 2013:277; Whitman 2011:3). The Lisbon Treaty seeks to deal with the issue of institutional inconsistency and ‘squabbling’ (particularly that between the Council and the Commission). The creation of the new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the establishment of the EEAS to support her mission, create a focal point for the EU’s external identity. The Service brings together personnel from the EU Council and the European Commission together with seconded Member State officials. Menon (2011:78) points out that, even though the EEAS draws on personnel from diverse backgrounds, the differing national preferences and priorities as well as the lack of clear appointment of responsibilities in the Lisbon Treaty itself, are adequate to sustain the ‘bickering’ within the EU. The establishment of institutional structures and mechanisms is important in creating a unified and coherent external identity. However, it is not enough. Issues of internal coherence in this new Agency, particularly within the security-development nexus of its responsibilities (Avery 2011, Overhaus 2013, Smith 2013, Tannous 2013) as well as the absence of a unique esprit de corps of its staff (Hemra et al 2012) are needed in order to create and sustain an effective normative role in international affairs (see Chapter 4). Moreover, the provision of a long-term, explicit plan for the EU’s intended goals in foreign action is imperative. This will be identified within the literature review concerning the evolution of the EU’s CSDP, demonstrating the evolution of its international actorness and situating the EEAS in normative terms within that trajectory both in terms of its functionality as well as symbolic importance. This will be achieved through an overview of the nodal points in the EU’s foreign policy as well as an elaboration on the key academic discussions surrounding the EEAS and its impact on the EU’s identity as a global actor. As will be demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 4, NPE provides a novel point of view in the understanding of the EU’s external action and can be identified in the operationalisation of the EU’s military mandates with the EEAS assuming a central role in the delineation of the relevant policies
which define it. Particularly through the critical frames presented in Chapter 3, the normative underpinnings of the EU’s actorness highlight the increasing pertinence of the selected theory not only in grasping the Union’s identity, but also identifying its manifestation through military operations.

Analyses of the EU’s role as an international actor (Hyde-Price 2004, Menon 2011) seem to be inhibited by fixed perceptions about the soft-power nature it demonstrates in international affairs. Focusing mainly on the need for the acquisition and sustainment of means of hard power, such approaches appear not to take into account the empirical evolution of the EU and its changing role. For instance, neo-realism’s concern with hard power limits its vision of what the EU can achieve as a security actor. From this perspective, the EU’s weak military capabilities prevent it from imposing its international presence and achieving its aspirations (Hyde-Price, 2002). This view is predominantly based on the fact that the EU is not and does not resemble a traditional nation-state power. The EU, however, does not appear to aim for such a presence nor does it identify its goals from that point of view.

As such, this thesis will examine whether the introduction of the EEAS, within the operations carried out in Somalia, has managed to establish the EU as normative power in its external action\(^2\). By examining the military operations, I will be focusing on the symbolic presence of the EU as a global actor, thereby shedding light on the connection between military and normative power. Within the critical frame analysis, reference to the EEAS will demonstrate the importance put upon its inclusion in the construction of an EU identity. What appears to be the case is a continuous and consistently increasing direct and explicit attribution

\(^2\) A clarification is required at this point. This research is concerned with the EU as a whole. The EEAS is an illustrative case and a key change in the institutional fabric of the EU that encapsulates the main research question of this thesis. The Service’s establishment is examined as a moment of evolution in the EU’s external action, one that signalled a turn towards a more normative global actorness. The selective choice of structures within the Service and their respective functions is made on the basis of pertinence to the illustration of the normative argument which is set by this research.
of power to the EEAS, culminating in the provisions of the most recent Global Strategy (June 2016).

1.6 EU intervention in Africa

Authors including Kaunert and Leonard (2012) and Furness (2013) claim that the EU possesses the capability to project force despite it being perceived as lacking competence to materialise its endeavours in an autonomous fashion. CSDP missions in Congo, Chad and the Gulf of Aden are evidence that the EU and its members are able to intervene militarily, provided that certain interests are at stake and given that no strong internal opposition has been expressed (Edwards 2013, Dijkstra 2012:455). Nevertheless, decisions concerning the use of force are volatile among Member States and hence are taken on an ad hoc basis (Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013:1320).

The majority of the EU’s initiatives in Africa are premised on the basis of development and have accordingly influenced partnership between the two parties. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries from 2000 (revised in 2005 and 2010), has a significant political and even security component. In contrast to previous agreements (Lomé and Yaoundé Conventions), the CPA reflects the EU’s intention in taking an increasingly political approach to developing regions in general and to Africa in particular (Gänzle 2009:39). The 2005 revision contains explicit references to security objectives, such as the fight against terrorism and the non-proliferation of WMDs, and makes the reduction of poverty the primary, but not the exclusive, goal of the agreement. Although not all crises have a direct impact on EU vital interests, the colonial legacy of certain Member States becomes apparent in the way they respond to them (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010:16). When seen through a normative spectrum, the fragmented normative identities and intentions of those Member
States, hinder the EU from taking holistic approach, ie. one incorporating military and civilian means. In turn, this challenges the unity of the EU’s endeavours and international presence.

On the other hand, the EU is gradually converging the varied institutional interests of the Council and the Commission through the creation of the EEAS. From a normative standpoint, the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty indicate the will to transform the EU into a strategic actor under a comprehensive 'grand strategy' - a reformed ESS (Biscop and Coelmont 2010; Matlary 2006). In June 2015 the HR was tasked with the responsibility to formulate a global strategy within a calendar year. The Strategic Review that was drafted outlines the challenges the EU faces and provides subsequent ways CSDP has to evolve in order to most effectively address those issues. Within the sections concerning the EU’s relationship with Africa, the critical frames of “comprehensive approach”, “partnership-ownership” and “effective multilateralism” (although the latter is not always explicitly mentioned) are prominent (see Chapter 6). According to Biscop and Coelmont (2010:23) the nature of the strategic actor the EU is aspiring to become through CSDP and the establishment of the EEAS, is not dependent upon its military capabilities but is determined by the use it makes of them.

A multilevel and complex case, the analysis of which could substantially shed light on the multiple facets of EU external action, is that of Somalia especially in view of the operations taking place in the Horn of Africa. The range of challenges that are present in Somalia, combined with the attention the broader region of the Horn of Africa has attracted (EU, UN and NATO), render it a pertinent case for the evaluation of the EU’s abilities as an international actor. The longstanding threat of piracy is one of the most interesting and complex challenges that have emerged in the region. The causes of this phenomenon are complex and interconnected: this problem can be seen as the result of state failure and subsequent disarray in Somalia combined with a weak economy. These deeper issues are not easy to eradicate. Although the maritime anti-piracy operations have proven thus far to be successful judging
from the significant decrease of incidents recorded from the beginning of this initiative up to the latest figures made public by EUNAVFOR Atalanta for 2014, they are still addressing the symptoms of a longstanding situation in Somalia (Biscop, 2010:17). As long as the latter is not resolved, the symptoms may remain or change form thus creating a vicious circle of untreated crises. The most recent resurgence of incidents of piracy that coincide with the latest famine and drought in the area can be seen as proof of this assertion (EUNAVFOR Somalia, Key facts and Figures, Accessed 29 May 2017). The training mission for Somali security forces (within the framework of EUTM) can be perceived as an initial step in the right direction. The CSDP structures that are part of the newly established EEAS (and particularly the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate – CMPD) will be of the utmost importance seeing that they have gained substantial experience and built valuable expertise through the deployment of the naval operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta. According to Biscop and Coelmont (2010:20) the latter can only succeed if EUTM Somalia succeeds.

In June 2010 the Foreign Affairs Council took a more strategic approach and, according to Quille (2010:60), made good use of the Treaty language when dealing with the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the Commission and Council attempts to approach the problem were fragmented; each instrument dealt with the facets present from its own area of competencies. The separate policy frameworks for engaging with Somalia were not adequately coordinated with the CSDP naval operation (EU NAVFOR Somalia) which was set up to protect the supply of humanitarian food as well as tackle attacks by pirates off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. The Foreign Affairs Council (3023/14 June 2010 and 3124/ 14 November 2011) acknowledged the multi-faceted nature of the problem and identified the root causes of piracy. The need to reinforce the stability of Somalia required a “comprehensive approach in the region, linking security policy with development, the rule of law, respect for human rights, gender-based aspects and international
humanitarian law” (Quille, 2010:60). It therefore called upon the HR to propose a comprehensive EU strategy for the Horn of Africa which would act as the foundation for continued multilateral cooperation, including regional partners. This strategy was adopted by the Council on 11 November 2011 (16858/11).

What becomes apparent is that the scale of the case of Somalia and the Horn of Africa demands substantial multilateral as well as EU coordination. The success of this endeavour will be unclear in the short term and building a long-term strategic plan for the region must be a priority. The Council’s conclusions are indicative of such an approach to foreign policy whereby the HR/VP is given a substantial mandate to prepare proposals and coordinate European action.

The interest of the EU in its involvement in Somalia is twofold and underlines the importance of maritime security as an element of CSDP and the delineation of strategy (see Chapters 5 and 6). Safeguarding a key trade route is undoubtedly of concern for the EU’s vital interests. Additionally, the close cooperation with the navies of three emerging powers (India, Japan and Malaysia) is a unique opportunity to enhance the credibility of CSDP and to demonstrate the scope of EU engagement (Biscop and Coelmont, 2010:18). The EU is entrusted with hosting the meetings among the involved navies, in order to ensure their efficient coordination, as the most acceptable actor to all. According to Biscop and Coelmont (2010:18) “any CSDP strategy must include a significant maritime dimension”. It is for these reasons that Somalia provides a unique case for examination, particularly when paired with the chosen theoretical framework.

The case study of Somalia has been selected because it coincides with the EEAS’ creation, is of geopolitical significance (e.g. piracy) and involves both civilian missions and military operations. Through the critical frame analysis presented in Chapter 3, this research will demonstrate the operationalisation of the normative underpinnings within the efforts of the
EU in Somalia. Given that the most recent strategic documents outlining the future trajectory of external action focus on the element of the EU’s global actorness, namely the European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) and its Implementation report, this study will also demonstrate the catalytic role of the EEAS in the evolution of the EU as a global actor in normative terms. This issue relates directly to NPE, seeing that it reflects the discussion on ‘symbolic manifestation’ and its pertinence (a discussion further expanded upon in Chapter 2 and demonstrated in Chapters 6 and 7). Furthermore, the EEAS chaired the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) for the calendar year 2014. This is particularly pertinent to the examination of this case study through the lens of normative power, given the academic discussions concerning its standing in relation to civilian and military power (see Chapters 2 and 3).

Although cases such as FYROM would lend themselves for this area of research, the selection of a country geographically distant from the European continent and with a significantly different cultural background, enables me to avoid following traditional approaches to normative diffusion largely relating to EU integration. Therefore, the possibility of the results being influenced by such explanations is eliminated and thus the analysis which will be carried out can go beyond the more traditional accounts that have been prominent in this area of research to date, thereby bringing a new perspective to the discussion.

1.7 Contribution and originality of research

Given the fact that the EEAS’ work in Somalia is ongoing, plenty of scope for offering original findings is provided. Furthermore, the EEAS is itself relatively newly-established; this means I can contribute to a new area of enquiry, especially in view of the continuous challenges the EU is facing as an international actor. Both its more (geographically) immediate
partners as well as those further situated present significant alterations in their behaviour as international interlocutors, mainly due to the radical nature of phenomena which appear.

This thesis’ theoretical contribution is two-fold; it will provide theoretical innovation by expanding on the debate regarding the operationalization of normative power as well as empirical originality via the selected case study. The theoretical contribution will be in the examination of the compatibility between military means and normative power, thereby addressing one of the main theoretical tensions of NPE (see section 2.4). This theoretical question will be explored empirically within the case of Somalia and, more specifically, through the two military operations carried out by the EU. Therefore, the contribution to theory will be incorporated within a case study that has not previously been explored through the normative lens whilst contributing to the literature on the case study itself. By identifying whether and how the EU can act has acted as a normative power/norm diffuser in the difficult case of Somalia, I will generate both useful material for policy makers and create new routes of enquiry for future research.

Building on this, this thesis also 1) providing an original critique of the NPE literature, focusing on key issues of its operationalisation and adding to its understanding through the selected critical frames; 2) it will investigate how the EU’s external action within Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is evolving in the context of the creation of the EEAS; 3) it will establish whether in the Somalia case military operations and normative power are compatible; 4) it will identify how the core normative values of the Union's foreign policy are perceived by third countries, in this case Somalia; this will also include the discursive relationship in the formation and diffusion of normative power as well as the subsequent dynamics created between ‘self’ and ‘others’ within the NPE framework.
1.8 Conclusion: Thesis Structure

This chapter has introduced the main tenets of the puzzle addressed in this thesis. It has introduced the main research question as well as the main theoretical questions underpinning the analysis. The main enquiry of this research concerns the creation of the EEAS and how it has contributed to the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’. Deriving from this, the theoretical questions addressed concern whether the EU is a normative actor based on its external action as well as if military means are compatible with the NPE framework and how they can be employed for norm diffusion. In doing so it describes the theoretical and empirical foundations for this project.

Furthermore, this chapter outlines the conceptual puzzle addressed within this thesis and provides an illustration of how the CSDP and EEAS fit in its exploration. This is followed by the research rationale for this thesis and a brief account of the EU’s engagement in Africa with particular emphasis on its military operations in Somalia. Additionally, this project’s contribution to knowledge and originality are presented through the argument that the EEAS’ creation has been catalytic to the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’, based on a critical frame analysis of the military operations in Somalia as an illustrative case, thus also establishing the compatibility of military operations with normative power on a theoretical level.

Chapter 2 serves as a critical review of the existing literature, with its objectives being to highlight gaps in current debates whilst simultaneously conceptualising the Normative Power Europe (NPE) theoretical framework. It contextualises the work of Ian Manners as the main theoretical axis of this research. Accompanying this, working definitions of ‘normative’ and ‘power’ will be provided following a discussion surrounding definitional ambiguities of these concepts. The nature of normative power and its analytic importance will be examined, especially in comparison to military and civilian power. Particular attention will be paid to
distinguishing normative power from civilian power. A focal debate will follow concerning the compatibility of normative power and military capabilities, as well as the role of military power within NPE. The discussion will move to examine the external elements of the proposed framework with relation to reflexivity: self-perception and perception of norms by ‘others’ will be explored, ultimately underlining the discursive nature of norm diffusion and the primacy of understanding ‘self’ and its role when dealing with ‘others’. An overview of the problematic aspects of NPE will then conclude this chapter.

This will lead to the third chapter which will present the theoretical scaffolding of this thesis as well as the exploration of methodological means that will be employed. Building on the previous chapter, I will begin to cover the theoretical gaps within the NPE as well as the contributions that will ultimately enable the operationalization of the framework. This will include the distinction of the internal and external manifestations of normative power within the EU grounded on existing academic literature, the reconceptualization that determines successful normative diffusion by reconciling military capabilities and normative power as well as the importance of focusing on EU actorness rather than EU identity as a relatively static representation of normative power.

The outline of the methodological approaches adopted for this project will follow, providing rationales grounded in the literature. It will also identify and justify the choice of content and critical frame analyses which will be carried out. The documents which will be co-examined will be both EU official documents (strategies, sub-strategies, decisions, resolutions and reports) and Somali state documentation - the Somali Compact (2013). Through critical frame analysis, the level of convergence between the particular language that is used in public documents and the underlying norms will be explored. Three frames of analysis will be employed: 1) effective multilateralism, 2) the comprehensive approach and 3) the partnership-ownership binary. The language of the selected documents will be analysed through these
frames in order to determine the normative elements that underpin the military operations in Somalia.

Chapter 4 will focus on the EEAS and how it is situated within the trajectory of the CSDP’s evolution. Throughout this chapter, relevant critiques within the literature will be employed in order to contextualise the EEAS’ role in external action as well as highlight the subsequent questions that arise concerning the EU’s identity and the nature of its actorness within CSDP. Therefore, the transformation of EU initiatives leading to CSDP will be presented, highlighting the changes they prompted to its overall structure as well as the issues that subsequently emerged. This will lead to the presentation of the Lisbon Treaty and its contribution, both in terms of structural reforms as well as in its overall impact on the EU’s international identity. To further illustrate the strategic vision of the EU, the European Security Strategy (ESS) will follow, thus adding insight to the subject of this chapter from a policy perspective. Building on this, the EEAS’ role and importance will be elaborated upon including emerging criticisms with regard to its bureaucratic cohesion and why the absence of a unique *ésprit de corps* is an important factor in this. This point relates to the definition of the comprehensive approach as well as its pertinence to an NPE approach: according to De Zutter (2010:1111), continuity between internal and external practices is characteristic of normative power (see section 2.6). Furthermore, the security-development nexus in the EU’s external affairs will also be covered, providing context to the examination of the EEAS which is also relevant to the case study of Somalia. This chapter will end with a presentation of previous EU operational efforts, highlighting key areas and the shortcoming of CSDP, thereby acting as ‘lessons learned’ for the future endeavours.

The fifth chapter will provide a historic overview of the political changes in Somalia from the fall of the Barre regime (1991) until the Somali Compact (2013). Within this, the EU’s institutional engagement through conventional agreements with the African continent as a
whole, particularly the Yaoundé association agreements (1963), the Lomé conventions (1975-1995), the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES) (2007), will be presented and subsequently the current links with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) will be traced, thus outlining the political elements of the EU’s relationships in normative terms. Furthermore, the EU’s efforts in the Horn of Africa and military operations in Somalia (EUTM and EUNAVFOR) will be introduced briefly, thus setting the ground for the presentation of the coding and critical frame analysis in the following chapter. Therefore, this chapter will illustrate the normative background of the intent-principle element within my analysis (see section 3.3) as well as the reasons why the selected critical frames are pertinent in the contextualisation of the EU’s engagement in Somalia.

The following two Chapters comprise the main empirical sections of this thesis. Chapter 6 will concentrate on the examination of the normative landscape upon which the military operations in Somalia are carried out. Therefore, it will focus on the elements of ‘intent’ in the examination of the strategies and sub-strategies. Chapter 7 will concentrate on the documents relevant to the EU’s engagement in Somalia, wherein the element of ‘action’ in the mandates of both EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia, as well as ‘impact’ mainly within the Somali Compact (2013) are demonstrated. The coding of the critical frames within the EU official documentation will be structured in the aforementioned fashion, thus providing a comprehensive account of the normative underpinnings. This will serve the purposes of this thesis in the following ways: 1) it will demonstrate the trajectory of the EU’s actoriness in normative terms, highlighting the changes in its evolution, 2) it will identify the role of the EEAS within this process, underlining its role within it, thus justifying its characterisation as a catalyst within this thesis and 3) it will show the pertinence of the military operations in the evaluation of the EU through a normative lens, thereby addressing the theoretical tension in
NPE regarding military means and normative power whilst indicating the role of the critical frames in its operationalisation.

Chapter 8 will bring together the conceptual framework constructed throughout this thesis. It will demonstrate the importance of the critical frames employed with reference to their operationalisation within an NPE context and highlight their contribution to the examination of the EU as a normative power in its external action. This chapter will also identify how the establishment of the EEAS was a catalyst in the evolution of the Union’s normative actorness and, subsequently, its identity. Within this, it will further highlight the relevance of the EU’s military operations within this research, both with respect to the theoretical tension within NPE concerning military means in norm diffusion as well as their pertinence in a normative evaluation of the EU’s actorness.

The concluding chapter will introduce some final thoughts on and an evaluation of the EU’s actorness through military operations from a normative standpoint as well as how it reflects the Union’s identity in external action. The most important points raised by each chapter will be summarised and the key contributions of this thesis will be highlighted. Caveats and limitations of the current research will be acknowledged. Lastly, thoughts on how this research can be extended will be presented.
Chapter 2

Conceptualising Normative Power Europe (NPE)

2.1 Introduction

Manners introduces Normative Power Europe (NPE) as a framework for the analysis of the role of Europe in the world. Following his seminal piece which introduced the concept of NPE (Manners, 2002), he investigates ways in which this approach can be explained more fully and what it entails. Confusion lies predominantly in its relationship with military and civilian power. Manners (2002) finds the debate of whether the EU is a military or civilian power outdated especially due to the supranational development of European integration. He suggests that normative power is only a ‘valuable addendum’ to our understanding of these debates (Manners, 2002: 236). By setting the weight of Europe’s normative role on ‘what it is’ rather than on ‘what it does’ (Manners 2002:252), Manners attempts to anticipate certain objections that may arise from critiques on his approach. Nevertheless, this opens the debate on issues concerning the definitions of intents, the essence of its constitutive parts as well as the definitive character of the EU’s history in forming and exercising normative power.

Before presenting the critiques concerning NPE as an approach and as a theoretical structure for the understanding of the international actor which is the EU, I will briefly outline the main points of Ian Manners’ approach. Ian Manners (2002) finds that the EU promotes nine substantive normative principles: sustainable peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance. These fundamental norms are incorporated into the actions and policies of the EU in its international activity and are promoted by persuasion and attraction rather than coercive means (Manners, 2008). Manners (2013) also adds that the EU employs six means of diffusion: contagion,
informational, procedural, transference, overt and cultural filter (the definitions of the forms of diffusion as well as the mechanisms they employ are demonstrated in Textbox 1).

In my research I will identify the aforementioned elements and apply the framework, with due consideration of the critiques on its shortcomings, to the case study of Somalia. I will examine the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS), as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in the evolution of the operations carried out by the EU in the region and will thus determine the extent to which the Union can validly be considered a normative power (as outlined in Chapter 1).

In order to set the grounds for the analysis of the framework which is NPE, definitions must be provided for the two core terms within its very name: normative and power. As I will be presenting further, the most problematic issue of NPE is deciding upon the content of these two terms. Depending on the approach promoted within each critique, both ‘normative’ and ‘power’ prove to be fluid notions susceptible to multiple interpretations and, therefore, applications on a case-by-case basis.

I will be discussing the views put forward by academics on the following subject matters: a) the contested definitions within the framework of NPE and clarifications of terms; b) the standing of NPE (and normative power in general) with reference to civilian and military power; c) the relevance of normative interests and the accordance of normative actions with promoted norms; d) the issue of ‘self’ and ‘others’ and its importance as presented within the critiques of NPE. Within each section I will highlight the aspects which form the EU’s identity as an international actor as well as outline the limitations of NPE. By combining the theoretical underpinnings and utilising the framework of the NPE I will be providing a comprehensive overview of this approach. Ultimately, I will be able to demonstrate NPE’s importance in operationalizing the concept of normative power, as part of the EU’s international endeavours.
2.2 Contested definitions – clarification of terms within the NPE framework

Forsberg (2011) underlines an important dual distinction, prominent within the debate of NPE: that between ‘normative’ and ‘normal’, and the difference between ‘power as a powerful actor’ and ‘power as ability to cause effects’. Within his analysis he separates ‘normative identity’, ‘normative interests’, ‘normative behaviour’, ‘normative means’ and ‘normative outcome’ as features of normative power (Forsberg 2011). Although the fragmentation of these terms can be seen as beneficial for the analysis of the NPE approach, nevertheless, the lines drawn between the terms (which are interconnected and to some extent undivided) may be problematic in forming a coherent conceptualisation of Europe’s actions.

On the other hand, Forsberg (2011:1183) identifies the four basic mechanisms through which normative power is exercised, which may be seen as unifying procedures: persuasion, invocation of norms, shaping of discourse and leading through example. Therefore, a model of normative action could ultimately be constructed by combining the above mechanisms with the features of power: depending on the available means and the intended goals, actors can use this framework to mould a guideline for the operationalization of normative power. Defining the elements of this framework remains problematic within normative power; it is the clarification of the elements of normative power that consistently inhibit its ‘application’ but that simultaneously create potential leeway in forming subsequent initiatives.

Diez (2005: 615-616) challenges three definitions/aspects of Manners' approach and suggests clarifications of the terms used. The first issue concerns the term 'power': in Manners' original article (Manners 2002) the term 'power' appears to be synonymous with 'actor'. According to Diez (2005), the wording was intentionally selected in order to avoid the discussion on the nature of this power and to focus on its potency. What Diez further clarified is that the term 'power' also entails a form of 'relationship' and a set of 'means'. Kalypso Nicolaides and Robert Howse (2002: 770-771) support this view: 'Manners' notion of
normative power, has a “descriptive and prescriptive” dimension; it can be read as referring “to means or ends” and it is “about values” and “process”. Diez (2005) raises a second point pertaining to the influential power of norms. He suggests that the argument made concerning normative power focuses too much on whether the actor-EU employs normative means and omits examining the impact the EU has as a normative power (Diez 2005:616). In other words, the analysis seems to be directed in identifying the nature of the actor rather than in determining the relational importance of its policy. Lastly, he reiterates his position on the interaction of normative power with the two other types and the conditions under which the former can be seen as separate from the latter: the three notions of power can coexist and be seen separately as long as normative power remains irreducible to economic and military power.

Stivachtis (2007) supports the aforementioned perspective of Diez. He makes a clear distinction between the EU’s ‘identity’ and the ‘means’ it has at its disposal and argues that the former is not determined by the latter. He explains that the character of the EU is dictated by the way in which the means are employed (Stivachtis 2007:47). Nevertheless, he points out that this identity also depends on the reception EU actions have by other states (a point which will be further discussed in this chapter). Combining this point raised by Stivachtis (2007) with the aforementioned submission of Diez (2005) concerning the coexistence of types of power, this thesis explores the tension between the use of military means in the operations in Somalia with the EU’s ability to diffuse normative power. It is within this crux that the theoretical contribution lies, empirically identifying the establishment of the EEAS as a turning point in the EU’s pursuit of establishing global actorness as a normative power whilst engaging in military operations. This resides in the use of ‘symbolic manifestation’ (Manners 2006), a point which is further highlighted within the analysis of the military operations in Somalia (see Chapters 6 and 7).
Sjursen (2006b: 170) argues that NPE is more political than analytical in nature: she finds that this concept can be seen as promoting sympathy towards the EU and that it cannot be used for the purposes of analysis. The latter point is also supported by Pace (2007), who claims that NPE is “a semantically empty notion”. As Forsberg (2011:1183) concludes, “normative power is best seen as an ideal type—one which the EU approximates more closely than other great powers”. Although this last point takes the middle ground between the abstract ‘ideal type’ and the more tangible analytical framework, one can only agree with it given the complex nature of this approach. Even though ‘normative power’ cannot be rigidly defined or experienced, this does not negate its existence or diminish its importance (as Pace appears to argue). Following Forsberg’s (2011) take on the issue, normative power can be substantiated through examination by example (the EU) but within a rigid framework of analysis. This examination can be complemented by the points of Diez (2005) and Stivachtis (2007) presented above, viewing normative power as a relationship/dynamic process and evaluating its effectiveness by looking at the receptive end ensure that the analysis is kept rigorous and founded on empirical input.

2.3 NPE and Civilian Power

Ian Manners bases his concept of NPE on a reformulation of Duchêne’s (1972) notion of Europe as a “civilian power”. The latter argues that Europe can be distinguished from other actors due to its commitment to prioritise/promote economic and political means instead of military ones (Duchêne, 1972:43). Civilian means are promoted within the NPE framework while military force is almost excluded. Civilian power is preferred due to its foundation on concepts of ‘socialisation’ rather than ‘coercion’. As Diez (2005) notes, norms that are imposed cannot be valued equally as those diffused and integrated by others. Even though Manners (2002:240) initially defined civilian power by reference to civilian instruments, his subsequent
writings, with their connotation of civilian as civilizing, suggest that using economic means in an overly coercive fashion falls outside this category (Manners, 2006b: 183-184, 2010). This supports the aforementioned point concerning the distinction between imposition and acceptance through a discursive process.

Diez’s approach both on the nature and the importance of normative power takes NPE one step further and tackles most of its weak points. Diez (2005:616) views civilian power as a type of actor, role and instrument that subsequently creates specific relationships and forms of means. Furthermore, he points out that normative power shares the aforementioned characteristics with civilian power and, therefore, that the two notions are similar. The relationship between the two concepts appears to be circular: Diez (2005: 635) challenges Manners’ claim that the two notions are distinct by arguing that normative power is not easily distinguishable from civilian power since it is already embedded in it but also 'civilian power' in turn specifies a 'particular kind' of 'normative power'.

The relationship between normative and civilian power can more easily be seen as a framework of interaction rather than an issue of definition. In essence the two powers are almost identical in the means that they employ. Normative power becomes distinguished (and distinguishable) when analysed through its results. Civilian power tends to appear as the opposite of military power; both are defined by the coercive and non-coercive nature, respectively, of the means that they administer. In normative power the role played by the means and their impact are emphasized. In this sense, normative power may encompass both military and civilian power depending on the framework within which it is being operationalized. The important element in this approach is the non-coercive nature of measures and the extent to which the intended results are accepted and internalized by the recipients.
2.4 NPE and Military Power

Contrary to the relationship between civilian and normative power, the one between normative and military power is more problematic. Military power and the relevant means are understood as incompatible with the non-coercive foundation of normative power. Following Manner’s (2006, 2010, 2013) proposition of an alternative approach to the military aspect, one that is not only compatible with but can also be beneficial to the diffusion of normative power, the ensuing sections provide a discussion on two levels: a) the relationship between normative power and military capabilities, drawing from the point raised by Stivachtis (2007) who distinguishes identity from means and b) the way military power can be understood from an NPE perspective.

2.4.1 Normative power and military capabilities

The origins of the debate on normative power and military capabilities can be found in the discussion on the compatibility of military with civilian power. Hedley Bull (1982) argued that Duchêne’s (1972) notion of civilian power is an ineffective approach. This was due to the EU’s lack of self-sufficiency and its need to focus on enhancing its military capabilities. Following this line of argumentation, Adrian Hyde-Price (2006:217) provides his neo-realist approach to NPE and suggests that the very insufficiency of the EU in coercive instruments and its basis on soft-power are a strength rather than a weakness in its portrayal as an international actor. Similarly, Mark Leonard (2005:5), within what he calls ‘power of weakness’, affirms that ‘each element of European “weakness” is in fact a facet of its extraordinary “transformative power”’. Nevertheless, with particular reference to the ‘ethical power’ component found in NPE approaches, Hyde-Price (2008:29) underlines the danger of the EU indulging in ‘quixotic moral crusades’ after being ‘left as a weak and ineffective actor, unable to further the shared interests of its member states’; he concludes that the EU should act
as a ‘calculator not a crusader’ (using David Clinton’s expression, 1994:259) on the major
issues it will be called to tackle. In line with the aforementioned he supports the idea that
foreign policy should be based ‘on the common interests of the member states rather than
pursuing normative or “ethical” crusades’ (Hyde-Price, 2008:29).

Moreover Hyde-Price identifies the need to prioritize security policy over the ethical
dimension of EU foreign policy. He provides a restricted scope of circumstances wherein the
normative agenda could be applied on the basis of three principles: prudence, scepticism and
reciprocity. Nevertheless, the aforementioned should only be permitted when ‘vital interests
are not at stake’ (Hyde-Price, 2008:29). A more absolute stance on the matter is taken by
Therborn (1977:380): ‘[W]ithout the backing of force and a willingness to use it, “Europe” is
unlikely to become a normative power, telling other parts of the world what political, economic
and social institutions they should have’. Even though these critiques may be overlooked on
account of their apparent opposition to the notion of ‘normative power’ the issues they
highlight should be taken into consideration. In order to explore the EU’s international
actorness efficiently, one must assess such critiques and evaluate the shortcomings they
identify. In this case, the ‘purity’ of normative power should occasionally be reduced for the
sake of more pressuring realistic needs. The issue is not retaining an absolute normative
character but making sure that it is not outweighed by coercion. In some instances, measures
that are not distinctly normative must be preferred for the sake of completing the task at hand.

According to Hill (2004) the EU appears to be developing a more military oriented
foreign policy, especially through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and with
particular reference to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Prima facie that

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3 Hyde-Price (2008:42-43) succinctly outlines the three principles set out in Weber’s ‘ethic of responsibility’ within the
framework of realist ethics: prudence is presented as a form of modesty that avoids the pursuit of utopian visions, favours
the preservation of the status quo and safeguards order and security. Scepticism, which derives from the aforementioned prudence,
concerns the human ability to attain ‘perfect justice’ through political initiative (usually the ‘lesser of two evils’ has to be
chosen). Reciprocity appears in realist ethics as a ‘call for compromise, restraint, mutual accommodation, and “give and take”
between sovereign political communities, each with its own vision of the sumnum bonum.’
would seem to contradict Manners NPE approach and his claim that the EU is a normative actor. Nevertheless, one may argue that the establishment of the EEAS within CSDP tilts the balance of power towards the ‘normative’ side, although still not going as far as supporting that the EU is a purely normative power: the military aspect of CSDP is moderated and the role of diplomacy appears as a distinct element of both EU foreign policy and particularly security.

The component of instrumentality proves to be of the essence. The militarization of Europe has also been critiqued negatively as weakening the EU civilian international identity (Zielonka 1998:229) and as being a precursor of a state-like entity on a greater scale (with reference to the integration process) (Smith, K., 2000:27). The latter point directly contradicts Manners’ image of the EU as an actor beyond the Westphalian model (Manners 2000:239) and, consequently, challenges his vision of a *sui generis* EU ‘normative power’. Although this issue could be crucial in an analysis of the provenance of the norms and potentially create an interesting foundation for further research in the area of decision-making within the EU’s external action, this thesis focuses on the operationalisation of the norms in a military context and thus does not question the internal dynamics leading to the EU’s international actoriness. As further explained in Chapter 3, this research identifies three critical frames and provides an analysis based on NPE, therefore demonstrating the normative nature and impact of the EU’s actions as manifestations of its normative identity.

2.4.2 Military power within NPE

The discussion of the relationship between normative power and military power (as well as that with civilian power) has also been at the centre of theoretical debate within NPE. Manners (2006b: 194, 183) argues both a) that ‘the EU’s normative power is being undermined by the unreflexive militarization’ and b) that ‘militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power’ if the process is characterized by critical
reflexion. The last point is reaffirmed by Diez (Diez and Manners, 2007: 187; Diez, 2005) who finds that military power is not only compatible with normative power but also beneficial for spreading civilian values. Nevertheless, he stresses that if normative power relies on the use of military force, the repercussions are two-fold: a) normative power becomes indistinguishable from military power and, b) by no means is this ‘imposed’ power equal to ‘successfully changing others, which relies primarily on socialisation processes’ (Diez, 2005:621). This submission by Diez is enlightening in the debate on NPE on many levels. Firstly, he sets up the framework within which normative and military power can efficiently coexist. Secondly, he introduces the mechanisms which are employed in the diffusion of normative power. Furthermore, he provides the proper manner in which normative values should be spread, namely socialisation. Indirectly he appears to identify the strength of normative power within its ability to be distinguished from other forms of power (although within the same text he clearly argues that normative power is not completely a separate form of power and that it may be considered a category which includes civilian power and vice versa, Diez, 2005:617, 635).

Maul (2005:781), similarly to the aforementioned position of Diez and Manners (2007), states: ‘the widely held view that “civilian powers” want nothing to do with military force, and that an EU which is in the process of developing its own security and defence policy can no longer be a civilian power, is…quite misleading’. Moreover, Lisbeth Aggestam (2008:3) highlights a finer point on the relationship of normative power and military force; she claims that the concept of normative power is premised on the idea of declining utility of military force in international relations. Moreover, Whitman (2002:25) characterises the development of EU military power as a ‘residual tool’ while assertively stating that the acquisition of military means does not weaken the civilian character of the EU. On the same point, Larsen (2002) argues that irrespective of the presence of military capabilities, the EU continues to portray itself as a civilian power. Even though the promoted character of the EU
as a civilian power may not always be persuasive in view of its actions, it may be argued that it retains its normative nature and power based on two points: a) if military force is not overwhelmingly being preferred to the detriment of non-coercive means, it is acceptable within a normative framework and b) if the discourse is superior to the actions, this would still favour the normative potency of the EU. As can be seen throughout the literature providing constructive critique for the development of NPE, the EU’s preference in normative measures is more important than the actual existence of military power. This does not entail coercion. Military force becomes an instrument (or symbol in the case of the NPE approach) within normative power rather than an indication of a coercive nature. Therefore, agency prevails over capabilities in this case.

Cooper (2003) presents a middle ground between viewing the EU as part of a ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern world’ and realistically approaching it within the dynamics of foreign policy. He suggests that military force should still be a component of the EU’s tool kit as long as there are remnants of the ‘modern’ and ‘pre-modern’ world (Cooper, 2003:23) for it to address. He argues that ‘those who speak of Europe, as a “civilian power” do so under the illusion that this could have been done without military power’. Dunne (2008:15) shares this idea of the compatibility of military attitude with normative power; he argues that both can coexist on the basis of a ‘moral middle way’.

Stivachtis (2007:53) draws on the aforementioned points and concludes that although ‘normative and military power are not incompatible, they can be in a serious tension and therefore this fact should not be ignored in the development of ESDP’. He underlines that contradicting norms with reference to the use of power may in turn affect the EU’s normative direction. Nevertheless, he assertively claims that even though the EU develops military capabilities it does not risk its normative or civilian power as long as ‘it remains committed to international law and strictly observes international norms regarding the application
employment of military force’ (Stivachtis, 2007:55). This point has also been supported by Sjursen (2006) (and will further be elaborated upon in this Chapter). However, he does not exclude the possibility (provided that the aforementioned condition is not respected) of “normative power Europe” ultimately giving its place to “military power Europe” (Stivachtis, 2007:55).

Diez (2005) contributes to the debate by using the US as an example of a normative power abusing military means. He approaches the US not as a ‘traditional military power’ but as a normative power that relies too much on the use of military capabilities (Diez 2005: 622). He proceeds with an analysis of the reasons which led to the transformation of the US into the actor it is today by underlining the element of overseas intervention. As he explains, the ‘supplementation of norms with force...was partly as a response to calls for engagement from outside the US (as the EU is facing calls for more military power now)’ (Diez, 2005:622). Nevertheless, as he continues to underline, the possibility of this occurring in the EU is improbable since, unlike the US, the EU binds itself to international legislation while attempting to impart its norms (Diez, 2005: 622). This illustrates the possible outcome of an unbalanced relationship between the two forms of power presented above. Manners’ contribution on this issue is focused more on the extent of the two elements’ interaction and outcome than on their nature. He argues that ‘unreflexive militarisation’ may prove to be harmful to the balance between short- and long- term solutions and in the perception of the EU by local populations (in a conflict) (Manners 2006b: 194). He also finds this problematic since the weight will be set on ‘addressing the symptoms rather than addressing the causes of conflict or insecurity’ (Manners, 2006b: 192).

Stavridis’(2001:49-50) take on the reconciliation of the notions of normative and military power goes a step further than others. He finds that military means are essential for the EU in order to ensure civilian power. Furthermore, Mitzen (2006:272) finds that the
military element does not undermine Europe’s ‘civilising nature, because its identity is anchored deeply in multilateral security cooperation’. This last point may appear unrealistically reassuring on this matter. Nevertheless, issues of identity and the consensus to be reached among the member states may raise concerns for the overall coherence in policy (this will be separately dealt with in another part of the research).

The consensus on this issue appears to lie in the view that normative power does not automatically exclude military capabilities, but this can only be acceptable within the framework of an agreed ranking and a given instrumentality. The mere existence of military capabilities by no means negates the existence and potency of a normative dimension; it is the use of coercion that undermines normative power. Manners (2006) posits that the existence of military means may even enhance normative power through their symbolic presence. The issue changes if military power were to be prioritised at the expense of a normative resolution.

Aside from the perspectives which rigorously refute the coexistence of military capabilities and normative power (a view which in most cases can be attributed to the opposing theoretical positions of those academics), there seems to be a relatively wide agreement that the two terms are compatible. The points raised concern the setting of rules which prescribe the relationship of the two forms of power, the conditions under which they can both coexist and even benefit each other and the limits that have to be set in defining, using and qualifying them as terms depending on the circumstances.

2.5 NPE interests, normative actions and normative results

2.5.1 Normative interests: genuinely normative?

The issue of whether the EU is actually a normative power has drawn the attention of the academic community and spurred intense academic debate. The most important critiques focus on whether norm promotion is genuinely ‘normative’ or whether it relies on mere
instrumentalism and the questionable normative nature of certain EU actions. The pivotal role of 9/11 to the concept of NPE has put the approach to the test, mainly on the grounds of the superiority of human rights within the EU value system (Manners, 2007).

The intent of the EU in diffusing its norms has been taken on as a controversial issue. Definitions such as that of De Zutter (2010:1107) on what a normative actor is can be found too general: an actor is considered a normative power merely because it diffuses its norms into the international system. In this definition the intent for the diffusion of norms is absent. Sjursen (2006a: 244-245) narrows the scope of the aforementioned definition by introducing the distinction between acceptable and legitimate norms: a ‘true’ normative power is able to overcome power politics not only through enhancing international law but also cosmopolitan law. Reference to the legal framework and to higher values of legitimacy is indicative of the underlying reasons for diffusion. Through the invocation of international law, norms acquire an increased value and appear to be commonly accepted by virtue. On this point Manners (2008:46) agrees by contending that “the EU promotes a series of normative principles that are generally acknowledged with the United Nations system to be universally acceptable”. Through this approach he manages to circumvent the common critique that the EU is promoting its value system as a form of cultural imperialism or as a continuation of Europe’s mission civilisatrice of the former colonial powers.

Diez (2005: 624) investigates the origin of norms from interests of a similar nature by examining cases of EU policy within the framework of the ‘War on Terror’. He suggests that

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4 The importance of this distinction stems from the discussion on multilateralism and cosmopolitanism. Sjursen (2006a: 246-247) presents both sides of the argument on which would be better suited in the case of normative power: “Many will, however, consider that multilateralism is as good as it can get (Brown, 1999). Some would argue that this is due to inherent cultural differences that make it impossible to come to a rational agreement on universally acceptable norms. Others would rather emphasize the inherent characteristics of the international system leading to insurmountable practical difficulties in establishing cosmopolitan law, which would ensure that rights not only of states but also the fundamental rights of citizens.” Although through multilateralism (the agreement of states) cultural issues can be overcome more easily than addressing cosmopolitan law (agreement of individuals), nevertheless, the question that remains (if one were to enter the conversation on the ethical dimension of normative power) is whether the agreement and acceptance of norms should be aimed at reaching the individual level.
the increased securitisation of migration and the insistence on norms on behalf of the EU and its members post- 9/11 may stem from strategic and economic interests. Diez does not reject the possibility of these interests being promoted through the 'values and norms rhetoric' (Diez, 2005: 624). Nevertheless, he asserts that 'the assumption of a normative sphere without interests is in itself nonsensical’ (Diez, 2005: 625).

A milder approach on the relationship between normative intent and strategic interests is introduced by Youngs (2004:422). He argues that the two elements are connected and that one needs to approach them from both a rationalist and a constructivist standpoint in order to determine their respective impacts. Given that the distinction between normative power and strategic incentive cannot be clearly determined, Youngs (2004: 429) affirms that the EU's approaches seem less instrumental, especially when juxtaposed with those given by the US. Therefore, ultimately, he appears to support Manners' NPE approach rather than undermine it.

Within this project, the convergence of intents and actions is crucial. As will be further presented in the following section as well as in Chapter 3, intent underpins action and determines the nature of ultimate impact. The most important element in this project is "actorness" (see Chapters 1 and 3). Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, intent is used as the first indicator of normativity in action.

2.5.2 NPE accordance of actions to promoted norms

Inconsistencies have appeared in the EU’s normative behaviour with cases such as the following: a) the relationship between EU and Russia both on energy interests and the former’s lack of input on human rights matters in the Chechnya conflict (Fernandez, 2008); b) the failure to diffuse democratic values to states with authoritarian regimes and substantial economic power, such as Libya with its oil production (Martinez, 2008:123); and c) the inability of the
EU to maintain a normative identity where strategic security must be prioritised over development aid, such as the case of the “War on Terror” and CFSP practice (Manners, 2007).

The fact that the EU fails to be consistent in acting normatively, does not exclude it from being a normative power. Even though it lacks means of effectively imposing the norms it represents, nevertheless, it has been vigorous in raising issues on an international level, most prominently in the protection of human rights and environmental awareness. A good example of this is the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol (especially when seen in contrast to the US’ stance), followed by the internal measures from 1997 onwards concerning environmental issues (especially the reduction of CO₂ emissions). This line of action rendered the EU a leader of international policy-making in the field (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2007). Hence, NPE in this respect seems to still contribute valuably in the conceptualisation of the EU as an international actor. Nevertheless, it would not be realistic to evaluate the normative power of the EU based on an expectation that as an international actor it should be driven singularly by norms. In light of exceptional circumstances, especially when they include the tackling of threats, adaptation should be considered acceptable. This usually means adjusting (although not going as far as breaching) core principles for the sake of effectiveness.

Focus on the real impact of the EU is arguably lacking within NPE literature. This shortfall has been attributed in reference to the denial of the success of the EU in diffusing norms, but also to the normative nature of the outcomes when the EU is successful. Among these critiques, the most prominent concern the self-image of the EU as well as the subsequent role given to the ‘others’ within the equation of normative diffusion. Diez (2005) puts forward the argument that NPE rhetoric creates a self-identity for the EU by depicting third parties as ‘non-normative’ others. Scheipers and Sicurelli (2007) as well as Merlingen (2007) suggest that through the construction of self as a normative power, the EU may simultaneously empower some actors while disempowering others (the aforementioned discussion will
constitute a large part of the qualitative component of the content analysis that will be presented in Chapter 6 as well as Chapter 7. This discussion is increasingly pertinent to the research at hand given the rhetoric of ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ that has been promoted by the EU in the JAES (2007) as well as the relational identity construction that is built on the basis of this binary.

The issues of ‘intent’ and ‘action’ can become analytical pivotal points depending on the approach of normative manifestation. In the case of Manners (2002, 2006, 2008) the normative element of the EU is its ‘identity’. This is inextricably linked to the nature of its ‘intents’. Thus, in this approach, actions appear subordinate or complementary. This research departs from the aforementioned assertion and refocuses the scope of analysis to ‘actorness’. Subsequently, the accordance of actions to promoted norms becomes the central axis of analysis. The element of impact-evaluation (see Chapter 3) is added to the method of approach. Consequently, the operationalization of normative power within this project will be examined comprehensively, while highlighting the roles of ‘self-perception’ and ‘othering’ in the process of diffusion. These elements will be approached both theoretically and empirically through the case-study of Somalia (see Chapters 3 and 6).

2.6 Self-perception and perception of norms by 'others'

An aspect that has particularly attracted interest and has manifested as a critique of the NPE approach, is the clout that lies in the representation of the EU as a normative power (Diez, 2005:314). According to Diez, this representation is important as a precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out by the EU but also as a formative part of the EU's identity, especially when viewed against that of the 'outside world'. According to Leonard (2005: 34), the normative narrative created between the EU and 'others' constructs a particular self of the EU and aims at changing others through the diffusion of norms. Therefore, this relationship is
particularly important not only in understanding the factors that come into play with the diffusion of norms but also that the essence of 'normative power' is not so much a static form of influence but a dynamic interaction which shapes the participating actors as it progresses. As Tocci (2008: 9-13) reiterates: Normative powers are, substantively, ‘other empowering’. Nicolaidis and Howse (2002:782) point out that the narrative of NPE on this matter may lead EU actors to disregard their own shortcomings unless a degree of self-reflexivity is reached.

According to Diez (2005: 613), the narrative created by the EU forms its identity but also transforms third parties into 'others' while illustrating the EU as a positive force in world politics. He provides a thorough account of the forms and strategies by which the 'other' is constructed in international politics. The 'other' may be viewed in the following forms: a) as an existential threat (securitisation), b) as inferior (wherein the 'self' is presented as superior), c) as violating universal principles (in which case the 'self' is superior, of universal validity and responsible for convincing the 'other' to adopt the values of the 'self'), d) as different (without placing judgement on the 'other' from the very beginning) (Diez: 2005: 628-629). Diez concludes that the discursive power is present in all forms of power, therefore in NPE as well. He identifies self-reflection as the key element which ultimately may render the projection of norms problematic; the diffusion of norms (which is formative of the EU's identity), if unreflexive, may allow the continued violation of norms within the EU and could possibly lead to the rise of military power instead (Diez, 2005: 632).

Following Diez's point on discursive power, Kavalski (2013) approaches the issue by exploring the receiving end of the diffusion process. He argues that a 'normative power' exists when it is being recognised by others as one. He bases his analysis on social norms (within an intersubjective context) and provides three steps which link together interaction, deliberate relations, and communities of practice (Kavalski, 2013: 250). He maintains that through “dialogical” relationships normative powers can have an impact on the behaviour of target
states; it is by engaging in interactions that definitions of the 'normal' gain their causal effects. He emphasizes the role of interactions: normative powers should have the capacity to be introduced, put to the test and either fail or be accepted. It is this ambiguity of outcome that consolidates the effect of normative power. Recognition as normative powers is granted to those actors who make credible commitments to the intended target. This point complements the perspective of Diez (2005) concerning reflexivity. The issue of reflexivity is also approached by De Zutter (2010:1111) from the standpoint of internal and external practices. Circumventing the manner by which the two are related (internal practices inform external practices, the latter take place as a continuity of the former or the automatic practice of the latter based on the mechanisms of the former), she defines a normative power as ‘a political entity whose norms guide its internal and external practices’ (De Zutter, 2010:1111). By doing so she underlines the continuity of the normative thread which runs through both internal and external action. With reference to the issue of reflexivity, this would mean that if this normative thread is not being followed internally (although it is being promoted), consequently there would be an effect on the practice of external actions. Therefore, what seems to be key in approaching reflexivity, is the principle of leading by example (or contagion), a form of norm diffusion presented within the NPE framework.

The external image of normative power constitutes (and is constitutive of) specific identity politics. Kavalski (2013:257) bases this argument on the hypothesis that the arena of world affairs is populated by international identities (with their attitudes, attributes, and values) that are materialised by actors in the process of international interactions. Thus, the attempt to overcome past failures creates a critical reflexivity in the discursive formulations of external affairs (Diez, 2005:634). Such understanding infers that foreign policy is an identity issue which requires coherence in the context of negotiating national insecurities. The patterns of external relations simultaneously reflect, reiterate, and reconstitute its self-image.
Kavalski (2013) introduces his analysis on a cross examination of the EU and China as normative actors. He concludes that the EU’s normative power to affect others is dependent upon its own awareness of a particular kind of self, therefore agreeing with the findings presented by Diez (2005:614). Thus, the socializing actorness of the EU depends not so much on its capabilities, but on the way it constructs relationships through which its normative power is applied in different global locales. As Kavalski (2013:262) states, ‘the definition of what passes for 'normal' in global life entails a deliberate practice of interaction, informed by an actor's willingness to suspend evaluations of others as long as they engage in shared practices’. Normative powers demand recognition of promoted standards. It is intentionally sustained and purposeful interactions-practices that provide the appropriate environment for such recognition to occur. In the context of such deliberate relations, beliefs and perceptions about others' intentions both emerge and are transformed. This project incorporates the discursive approach to normative power argued by Kavalski (2013). By examining the normative impact of the EU’s military operations in Somalia and the way they are perceived (see Chapter 3), this thesis departs from the Manners’ initial conception of NPE as a one-way diffusion.

2.7 Problematic aspects of NPE

Diez (2005: 624) uses 9/11 as a point of reference and explores the issue of internal consistency (both concerning actors as well as contesting norms) jointly with the nature of EU interests. With reference to the increased securitisation of migration by the EU and its member states following 9/11, Diez identifies an arbitrary application of human rights.

On a conceptual aspect of NPE, Sjursen (2006: 98) proposes that in order for the 'normative, ethical civilizing power argument' to progress 'a further theoretical basis, a clarification of analytical concepts and clear critical standards is necessary.' Sjursen
(2006b:238) identifies two gaps: a) NPE scholarship so far has largely overlooked the task of rigorously reflecting on its key concepts – norms and power, resulting in a lack of conceptual clarity; b) Research has so far not attended to the mechanics of power in the articulation and deployment of NPE. 'It remains an open question as to what is the “normative mechanism” in normative power’ (Sjursen 2006b:238).

As previously presented, another important problem which the EU has to confront in its effort to preserve its normative identity, is the security challenge. As Ian Manners (2007:406) states: ‘the security challenge to the EU presented by acts of terrorism against civilians...In the face of such undifferentiating, non-negotiable new terrorism and the need for effective counter-terrorism strategy, what place is there for the niceties of normative principles such as democracy, human rights or good governance?’ Admittedly since 9/11, highly-ranked norms such as the preservation of the respect for human rights, have been at risk. There have been several cases of torture and extraordinary rendition by some EU Member States in the name of the War on Terror (Manners, 2007). With due consideration of the altering nature of the CSDP towards strategic security (this will be further discussed in Chapter 4), the importance of norms seems to lose ground in the list of the EU’s priorities. Nevertheless, considering the establishment of the EEAS within the CSDP framework, the importance of normative power seems to be reappearing to the forefront of the EU’s plans in foreign policy. The inclusion of a diplomatic arm could prove to be the catalyst in creating a balanced relationship amongst the forms of power the EU employs, hence leading it to be a more complete actor in the international arena.

What has also been viewed as problematic is the ‘uniqueness’ of the EU as a normative power, especially with reference to the way it is comparable with the US (Diez, 2005). From a realist perspective, Hyde-Price (2006) maintains that liberal-idealistic concepts of ‘civilian’ and ‘normative’ power disregard to an extent the dynamics of military and economic power.
From his point of view ‘the EU is far from being a “normative” power whose influence derives from “what it is” rather than “what it does”; the normative-transformative power of the EU derives from economic influence, the fear of exclusion from its markets and the incentive of future membership’ (Hyde-Price, 2008:31). This view appears to restrict the potency in its application geographically to Europe and the neighbouring regions.

From the above discussion, four issues are identified: a) an inconsistency between the identification of norms and their subsequent operationalization on a member state level, b) a lack of conceptual clarity of the normative power mechanism, especially with reference to its applicability, c) the rise of a strategic security challenge with a questionable role for normative power within it and d) the neglect of military and economic power in the normative power conceptualisation. Even though the first issue falls beyond the remit of the current thesis (this will be explicitly addressed in Chapter 3), it is an interesting aspect to consider for future exploration, extending on the current research (see Chapter 9). This research will focus on what the EU does and will particularly explore the impact of military operations in normative diffusion, thereby addressing the conceptual clarity of the normative power mechanism as well as highlighting its role as part of the EU’s initiatives as a security actor. The case study of Somalia will provide the empirical evidence, thereby demonstrating the extent of the EU’s ability to diffuse normative power even through the use of military means beyond regions in its geographical proximity.

### 2.8 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that there are four different definitions-explanations which can be applied to NPE. It has made the case that a military aspect can be included in a definition of NPE as long as it is non-coercive.
In the overview of 'normative power' one can distinguish four different definitions-explanations that can be applied in an effort to explain this approach. The first is the one provided by Ian Manners, which equates 'normative power' to 'normative identity'; he presents the EU as being 'normatively constituted' (Manners, 2002:252). A second point of view is that a 'normative power' can be defined by its normative interests. They also appear as the ends that are or that aim to be achieved and can be seen as the factor which defines a normative power (De Zutter 2010, Diez 2005, Manners 2006, Youngs 2004). Another approach is that a 'normative power' is defined by its actions, in other words, that its behaviour is rule/norm-based (Diez 2005, Merlingen 2007, Scheipers & Sicurelli 2007). Means of influence can be seen as a fourth issue that determines normative power (Nicolaides & Howse 2002, Stivachtis 2007, Whitman 2002). This thesis takes on board the aforementioned approaches to normative power by comprehensively identifying the normative element in the EU’s intents, actions and impact (see Table 3). The correspondence in normative terms between the three different stages is examined as part of the analysis following the content analysis of critical frames. This is further detailed in Chapter 3, which also demonstrates the way considerations of NPE are incorporated within the suggested analytical framework.

None of the aforementioned standpoints presupposes another. As Manners underlines, normative identity can explain both normative interests and normative behaviour. Furthermore, interests, irrespective of their nature, can coexist within a normative identity as long as its normative nature remains irreducible. As far as behaviour is concerned, normative goals can be achieved either by conforming to current rules and equally by breaking them in order to retain their nature intact.

Manners in his theoretical presentation of the EU remains unclear on where the bar has to be set with reference to the aforementioned criteria: should all of them be fulfilled? He suggests that in its ‘purest form’ the concept of normative power is ideational—that is, it relies
on ‘normative justification rather than the use of material incentives or physical force’ (Manners 2009:11). Although he states that merely accepting the normative basis of the EU does not make it a normative power, he goes no further than providing a framework founded only on principles, actions and impact (Manners, 2008 and 2009). Such framing involves a three-fold understanding of normative power which links its principles, actions, and impact: first, the principles underpinning normative power should be seen as legitimate by the affected parties (in other words conforming with the provisions of international and not breaching universally accepted values). Second, the actions undertaken by a normative power should be perceived by the recipients as persuasive. Third, if normative power is to be appealing, its impact must emerge from non-coercive internalisation. Thus, Manners’ (2009:14) claim is that the ‘consequences’ of the concept of normative power regard envisioning the possibility of ‘more holistic, justifiable, and sustainable world politics’.

A basic claim that Manners (2002, 2006) makes is that the EU is a normative power because it has a particular normative identity. He argues that the normative identity of the EU derived from the nature of its hybrid polity and its treaty-based legal order. He suggests that these elements predispose the EU to act in a normative way. What he fails to address persuasively is the fact that even with such a background an actor may behave in a non-normative way. It is hard to disregard that in the pursuit of values the need may appear to take political decisions which include contending norms. In extreme cases and for the sake of preserving certain values, ultimately, precedence may be given to non-normative initiatives.

It is therefore pertinent to claim that the tension described above will persist unless the EU manages to develop an understanding of ‘self’ and realise its role when dealing with ‘others’ (see Diez: 2012). In this manner, the EU will be able to live up to its aspiration of forming international politics as a normative power rather than remaining in its current state of simply being socialised in international norms.
Chapter 3

Analytical Framework

3.1 Introduction

This chapter outlines the analytical framework for this project. It will initially recapitulate the most important theoretical issues that have been highlighted in Chapter 2, as well as the elements of NPE that will be used in this thesis. Namely, the role of military power and the use of military means in normative diffusion as well as the importance of examining normative diffusion within the scope of the selected rhetoric frames will be highlighted. Within this discussion, a presentation of the issues that will not be utilized and a justification for doing so will also be provided. The following sections will deal with the methodological apparatuses of this thesis, namely content and critical frame analysis. A subsequent section will discuss the selected methods for this project, specifically the content analysis and subsequent critical frame analysis of the primary source documentation as well the supplementary secondary documentation. Within the aforementioned, the justification for the selected methods as well as their pertinence to the current analysis will be discussed. The operationalization of NPE and the introduction of rhetoric frames will follow. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a summary of the proposed analysis as well as its expected outcome.

3.2 Theoretical discussion: operationalising intent, action and impact

Contrary to Forsberg’s (2011:1183) view of NPE as an ideal type that is unsuitable for analytical purposes (Pace 2007) it can be operationalized through example. This approach must take into account both sides of normative diffusion, namely the subject –EU- as well as the recipient –case-study/Somalia. Methodological rigidity for this endeavor is imperative. This
project proposes the evaluation of the EU’s effectiveness with due consideration of the empirical input from both parties of normative diffusion (see Chapters 1 and 2).

Normative power emphasizes the role of means and impact (see Chapter 2). Tocci (2008:15) provides a comprehensive definition of normative power that incorporates the elements of intent, action and impact: ‘In order to have an effective or “powerful” normative foreign policy an international actor not only needs to pursue normative goals through normative means, it also needs to achieve a discernible normative impact’. This approach includes the majority of the aforementioned criteria, but this could lead to setting the bar too high in identifying a normative power, rendering the theory void of corresponding empirical examples. Nevertheless, she points out that “if by a normative foreign policy we mean pursuing normative goals through normatively deployed instruments and having a discernible normative impact, then what emerges, perhaps inevitably, is that the EU is not always a normative international actor” (Tocci, 2008:26).

Clarifications must be made at this point concerning the focus and limits of the current project: This thesis will focus on the military operations carried out in Somalia, given the particular tension between normative and military power (see Chapter 2). In this respect civilian missions will only provide the context for the analysis of the military operations. As presented in section 2.3, civilian and normative power are compatible (even overlap) to a large extent. By exploring the controversial relationship with military power, this project contributes to the understanding of normative power. Although the analysis of civilian missions in this thesis would provide a more comprehensive account of the EU’s operational abilities, it would detract from the in-depth exploration of the role of military operations. Additionally, this project aims at contributing to the understanding of normative power rather than to the exploration of CSDP (see Chapter 1). Therefore, the inclusion of civilian operations in this project will be restricted. Elements of civilian missions and their mandates will only be used
on limited occasions so as to provide a more vivid contrast with the provisions of the military operations. Furthermore, the accumulation of military capabilities per se will not be examined in depth. As described in Chapter 2, the use of certain means determines an actor’s identity. Therefore, this research will note the EU’s accumulation of military capabilities without *de facto* assuming an underlying intent or preference in coercion. Nevertheless, the actual use of military assets within the military operations will be examined in order to illustrate the convergence of ‘intent’ and ‘action’.

Whitman (2002:25) depicts the development of military power as a “residual tool” while clarifying that the attainment of military assets does not diminish the EU’s overall soft-power identity (see Chapter 2). Military capabilities in this sense are viewed as an instrument, or symbol in NPE, within normative power rather than an indicator of a coercive nature. Therefore, agency gains ascendancy over capabilities in this context. According to Manners (2006), military means, as symbolic presence, may even support normative diffusion as long as a preference for normative resolution is not subverted.

The establishment of the EEAS within the CSDP framework appears to be carrying out the mandated aspirations outlined in the ESS from a soft-measure oriented standpoint as will be highlighted in Chapter 4. This would indicate a resurfacing of the prominence of normative power in the initiatives of the EU in its foreign policy (Howorth 2007:205). The creation of a diplomatic arm may just as well be the catalyst in the formulation of a balance between the forms of power the EU employs, thereby rendering it a more comprehensive actor on a globalized scale. Nevertheless, even if the EU were to turn towards the advancement of military assets post-Lisbon, this would not automatically entail a change of its identity (see Chapter 2). Rather it is dependent on the intended use of such assets, the extent to which the EU eventually resorts to the employment of military coercion in order to achieve its designated goals and the way its actions are recognized by the norm-receivers.
Manners (2002:253) proposes three elements a normative power must demonstrate: “ontological quality to it – that the EU can be considered a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to it – that the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to it – that the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system.” Initially, norms were defined as standards of appropriate behaviour shared by a community of actors (Finnemore 1996:33; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998:891). According to Finnemore (1996:5), actors “are socialized to accept new norms, values and perceptions of interest”. Norms are therefore justified on the grounds of their underlying socially constructed interests (Ruggie 1998). As socially constructed understandings of reality, norms therefore permit actors to “redefine interests and preferences” (Elgström, 2011: 459).

Lenz (2013:213) portrayed the relationship between forms of power and forms of diffusion through relevant means (see Textbox 2). He illustrates dichotomies of coercion and socialization as constructed on the basis of material versus ideational diffusion. Furthermore the “active” and “passive” types of EU diffusion are presented as elements of the aforementioned dichotomy. This research will focus on the examination of the above divergent, possibly contradictory, components of the diffusion dynamic. The means of diffusion between military and normative power will be central as well as the “ideational, passive” type of EU diffusion. This last point referring to “emulation” will be examined through the content analysis particularly. The aim is to decipher its pertinence not only within the context of normative power per se, but in the broader framework of normative diffusion which incorporates military operations as well.
Textbox 2: Types of power and forms of diffusion (Lenz, 2013:213)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diffusion mechanisms</th>
<th>Type of EU diffusion</th>
<th>Means/channels of diffusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military power</td>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>Military imposition, threats (negative conditionality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian power</td>
<td>Rewards</td>
<td>Trade and cooperation agreements, technical and financial assistance (positive conditionality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Competition</td>
<td>Large, well-integrated domestic market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative power</td>
<td>Socialization</td>
<td>Cooperation agreement, political dialogue, technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emulation</td>
<td>‘Successful’ integration; discourse/narrative, symbolic representations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.3 Tackling the tension: reconciling military means with normative power

The main theoretical question that will be explored throughout this research concerns the compatibility of military means with the diffusion of normative power. Furthermore, what will be investigated are the limits and the context within which a normative power is able to use military means, without it being susceptible to being characterized as coercive. The point of departure for this enquiry can be found in the joint reading of Manners (2006) with Whitman (2002) and Larsen (2002). Whitman (2002:25) states, ‘EU military power is developing […] as a residual instrument’. From this, military assets are attributed instrumental value, without defining the nature of actorness (see section 2.1). Whitman’s proposed conceptualization can be read as a way by which the acquisition of military assets does not invalidate the civilian (or even yet normative) character of the EU. To this end Larsen (2002) furthers the argument by
introducing the aspect of the EU’s narrative. Although the EU has managed to increase its military capabilities, its rhetoric and self-portrayal remains akin to a civilian power. This is particularly interesting as part of the discursive relationship between norm diffuser and recipient. Manners appears to reconsider his unwavering initial position of military power being completely contrary to the nature of a normative power (Manners, 2002), and submits that “militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power” (Manners, 2005:182).

The issue of actorness (that is to say the nature of an actor) has been debated at length, predominantly with due consideration of the means and ultimate goal a specific set of practices aim at. This discussion is particularly relevant when considering the relationship between military means and normative power, as previously discussed in section 2.4. It is in this context that the distinction and limits of actorness must be set to avoid possible misconceptions and lack of clarity. The term “civilian power” has been approached in both as an issue of a teleological nature as well as agency. As Stumbaum (2015:7) clarifies, the nature of an actor will not be transformed from ‘civilian’ to ‘military’ if the ultimate goals remain of a civilian nature. This is most pertinent when examining the case of the EU and its policy in external action. The soft-power philosophy of EU policy is not affected by the acquisition of military assets or the seeming incorporation of already existing military means, but is rather deemed as an effort to cover existing inadequacies or an increase in overall visibility as such (Chen 2004; Wei 2004). On this issue, Chen (2004) and Xiong (2007) have further argued that the way military power is used is particularly important, i.e. as a last resort and/or with what type of justification-foundation in international law or mandates.

Sanctions and coercion can be introduced into the normative analysis of an issue. Although their existence and use are in tension with the theoretical framework, their agency is of particular interest. As presented in Chapter 2, the utility of certain assets does not prescribe
the identity or nature of an actor. Goertz and Diehl (1992:638) conclude that norms are more than a ‘series of “oughts”, but the possibility of sanctions is also an essential component’. According to Manners (2002, 2004, 2006), the fundamental characteristic of norms is their ability to prescribe the standard behaviour, the “normal”. Therefore, the gap between “prescription” and “retention” of “normal” is left untouched. In the aforementioned line of argumentation, sanctioning can include the use of military means. As discussed previously in this chapter, the caveat is the non-coercive employment of these means.

Table 3: Proposed framework for the establishment of a link between the NPE concept and the EU’s normative agenda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative interests/Intent</td>
<td>The EU’s military operations – Promotion of Norms</td>
<td>Somalia – military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framing of Narrative</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interpretation – Reception/Recognition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drawing from the above line of argumentation this project will be exploring the employment of military means in Somalia and the context within which they have been operationalized. It will therefore be able to decipher whether the EU has resorted heavily in its operational initiatives to imposition or whether it has incorporated its military means as a way of symbolic reinforcement in normative diffusion. This will be approached through the joint examination of its principles-actions-impact (Table 3). This will be particularly telling of the actual normative power the EU has accumulated as well as the extent to which it is capable of diffusing it. Stumbaum (2015:1) recognizes the limits of the EU in its normative diffusion internationally as being dependent upon the distance of the receiver from Europe. As she observes, the further away the receiver is from Europe, the less the EU is able to employ
traditional means of diffusion that are based on its extensive use of conditionality or neighbourhood policy tools.

The impact of a normative power particularly in fields related to security depends on the provision of military means as a form of credibility (Chen 2004; Xiong 2004; Zhu 2007). What is also important is the size of the military means that appear. That is to say, that promises for the provision of security can be contested on the grounds of insufficient means for the intended goal. Conversely, lack in military means is also telling of the nature of an actor. It tends to create the impression of an actor investing in more ‘peaceful’ means of resolution (as will be further presented in Chapter 4). Therefore, an actor that acquires military assets without imposing normative aspirations but ultimately resorts to them as symbolic manifestation, then that actor gains credibility while retaining a non-coercive identity.

Pursuant to the aforementioned discussions, Somalia proves to be an illustrative case study for the operationalisation of NPE. Therein, the EU demonstrates a questionable ability of coercion, a low potency in conditionality as well as an inexistent incentive of membership or neighbourhood policy privileges. In the particular area of security, NPE is seen as the ability of the EU to advance and diffuse its norms as they have been proposed through the ESS (Stumbaum 2015: 8). Diffusion has been defined as being a dynamic procedure with a nexus of locus, i.e. it appears as a process of promoting ideas, policies and institutions on a transnational level (Strang and Meyer 1993).

3.4 NPE from the “receiving end”

This project will be focusing on the aspect of symbolic manifestation provided in the NPE framework. By separating military assets from the actual use of coercion, what will be explored is the potential of military presence being a contributing factor to the diffusion of normative power. This will be accomplished in two consecutive steps through content analysis
and subsequently critical frame analysis of documentation relevant to the organisation and deployment of EU military operations in Somalia. The EU’s intent to use coercion and the level of willingness it exhibits to resort to it will determine whether military means are theoretically compatible or even beneficial for normative diffusion. By looking into the way operations were carried out as well as their results, this research will demonstrate the link between intent, action and impact (Table 3), thus comprehensively approaching the connection between military and normative power. The aim of this research is to demonstrate the way the critical frames have been employed to project the EU’s normative power through the military operations. The EU’s actorness, particularly the way it has evolved due to the establishment of the EEAS, is therefore evaluated in normative terms rather than whether and how the normative elements have been incorporated within the fabric of its structures. Therefore, the internal dynamics of the EEAS, in terms of the operating environment of the Service and the values they produce, are not examined in this research (although it could be pursued as a future endeavour – see Chapter 9). It is for this reason that interviews have not been employed, seeing that they would provide more insight into the internal function of the Service, instead of contributing to the understanding of the EU’s externally projected normative power. Nevertheless, the allocation of powers to the EEAS and the way it is presented through the critical frames within the primary sources is important in terms of NPE.

The argument of Kavalski (2013) for a non-Eurocentric approach to normative diffusion is important for this project. As presented in Chapter 2, Manners (2002:252) centres his theory in respect to the EU’s international presence on “what it is” rather than “what it does”. Kavalski (2013: 250) reverses the focus by proposing that “to be a normative power is oftentimes less important than to appear to be a normative power”. This shift in Kavalski’s theoretical approach alters the context of diffusion. The receiver in this conceptualisation determines normative power by acknowledging it. This is particularly important in the critical
frame analysis which will be carried out, specifically within the frame of ‘partnership-ownership’. As Kavalski (2013:250) further elaborates, the aforementioned contexts can serve as a “cause”, a “barrier” and even a “changing meaning”. To conclude his line of argumentation Kavalski (2013:250) maintains that “normative power…is not necessarily only about affecting the perceptions of other actors…but mostly about framing the responses of those other actors”. It is within this framework that an added element of agency is stressed: that of the receiving end in the normative message.

Alongside the issue of “what the EU does”, this research will also address “how the EU is recognised”, following the argument set forth by Kavalski (2013). The suggested analysis will therefore illustrate the EU’s aspirations/intent as a normative actor, but also extend the understanding of the EU within a global context as a dialectic relationship with other actors. This will provide insight of the standing of the EU not only as a normative actor, but also as a normative power. As prominent advocates for the further exploration of Manners’ (2002) seminal theory of NPE have underlined (Nicolaïdis and Whitman 2013; Björkdahl et al. 2015), it is imperative to shed light on the currently under-analysed conceptualisation of the receiver of NPE. The effectiveness of the exported norms by the EU can be evaluated when the ‘receivers’ of normative messages actually become “takers” of said messages. The element of agency thus becomes key (Chaban et al., 2015:2) in deciphering the relationship between the diffuser and receiver, as well as the reaction of the former to the response of the latter.

The EU aspires to support its security environment internationally through the advancement of effective multilateralism and good governance via a holistic/comprehensive approach (European Council, S407/08:8, Schroeder 2011:58-60, Zwolski, 2012:994). The incentives that it is able to employ in its global aspirations differ from those it has utilized to shape its Foreign Policy internally, specifically future membership and market access (Hyde-Price, 2008:31). Hence, as NPE provides, in order to promote its policies in regions that are
not in its direct proximity, the EU needs to build mechanisms of persuasion and communication while fixing issues such as visibility and capacity to effectively safeguard its commitments. This is a delicate balance given the tension, both theoretically and empirically (see Chapter 2), between normative and military power. The EU thus has to cautiously align its intents with its actions, without relying on coercion, in order to retain a normative impact. This puzzle will be explored in the current project while providing empirical evidence through the case study of Somalia (see Chapters 6 and 7).

3.5 Linking NPE with the EU’s normative agenda

Chapter 2 presented a variety of critiques pertaining to how NPE has evolved and subsequently been defined. The link between the explanatory, empirical and normative dimensions of this framework have been argued to be unclear and elusive (Aggestam 2009; Forsberg 2009; Haukkala 2008). The definitions and interpretations of NPE vary among academics (Björkdahl 2002; Diez 2005; Pace 2007; Sjursen 2006), therefore potentially making the purpose of this framework methodologically problematic. The reflective and self-reflexive aspects that have been added to the framework, most prominently by Diez (2005), Kavalaski (2013) and Manners (2007), complicate the understanding of the role of normative power and its pertinence in the examination of international relations. This is further made more complicated by the links that have been drawn with references to international law (Eriksen 2006; Sjursen 2006). Ultimately, the aforementioned components create a nuanced area of international relations, where norms, normative power and normative powers coexist within a flux of interpretation without a clear view of their ability to be operationalized within a methodologically rigid research framework. Björkdahl (2002:13) finds the issue of empirically distinguishing and identifying a diffused norm highly problematic. She identifies the existence of norms in the sphere of motivational factors that determine action. Therefore,
the only way of discerning the existence of a norm being successfully diffused is through “analysing the norm-induced pattern of behaviour” (Björkdahl, 2002:13).

Responding to the need highlighted by Björkdahl et al (2015) for a location-specific case, this thesis will examine the EU’s military operations in Somalia. By focusing on the ideational impact of EU norms as they are reflected within Somali official narratives (in English), this project will unpick the dynamics which form normative diffusion. Furthermore, heeding the call for an empirical dimension, the case study of Somalia will be employed to apply the NPE theoretical framework on an actual setting. Additionally, within the case study of Somalia, two military operations are examined to capture the projected normative facets of military operations. Thereby this project can examine the following issues: 1) the EU’s diffusion and operationalization of normative power; 2) the extent to which this normative power extends beyond geographical confines and diffused through military operations; 3) the role the EEAS has played in the aforementioned process and d) the way military means are employed and the extent to which they can be incorporated in the NPE framework without acting to its detriment. This last point is comprehensively addressed through the examination of two case studies- military operations (see Chapters 6 and 7), thereby highlighting the normative element within a military context in a comparative fashion, whilst providing further insight into the EU’s actoriness in Somalia.

The framework within which I will therefore be working (Table 3) will connect the three analytical approaches that have been proposed by Manners (2002: 238-252), in order to examine what the EU ‘says it is’ and what it actually ‘does’ as well as the ideational impact it accomplishes. As Shen (2015:8) points out “in order to evaluate the EU’s policy coherence and consistency and identify its normative impact…identify gaps between rhetoric and policy action, between EU policy objectives and the impact on the ground”.
3.6 Structure of Content Analysis

In this project I will be engaging in a content analysis of texts as a first step in my method. Using MAXQDA, the material from the primary sources is collected and coded on the basis of the selected frames and in accordance with the codebook in Appendix 1. The frames are selected on the following basis: a) they play a core role in CSDP and have a distinct normative undertone in the way they are defined as well as in the role they play within their operationalisation; b) they appear and are utilised within the primary documentation as such, thereby reducing bias on behalf of the researcher and provide the analysis with more objectivity; c) they are encountered at all stages of the proposed framework (Table 3), encompassing: i) internal practices, ii) external practices, iii) specific case-oriented operationalisation; d) all three frames directly reflect NPE core statements as well as the prominent critiques considered for this thesis (see Chapter 2); e) they have a clear operational orientation, detracting from the abstract nature of value/principle/normative claims. Therefore, the content analysis has not been carried out on newly generated codes. The frames themselves previously exist as terms within the primary documentation as such and within this research they are deemed of critical value for a normative evaluation of the military operations. MAXQDA has assisted in the organisation of the material. The research is therefore of a qualitative content analysis of the critical frames.

According to Bryman (2012: 289), a content analysis must be objective and systematic. Conversely, the theoretical premise of this thesis is founded on a social constructivist – NPE basis, whereby analysis is accepted as being subjective. Nevertheless, this project aims at

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5 Although the internal dynamics are not examined in this thesis as such, they are important to identify as part of a normative evaluation of the comprehensive approach. As clearly stipulated in the Comprehensive Approach (2013), it concerns the employment of “the full range of its instruments and resources- to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic” (CA, 2013:2) but also “refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States” (CA, 2013:3). More crucially, De Zutter (2010) identifies the continuity between internal and external practices as a core element of normativity. Therefore, the identification of internal practices (or their acknowledgement) is pertinent for the purposes of this research.
jointly examining both sides of normative diffusion (see Chapter 1) in order to explore its dialectic nature (see Chapter 2). Therefore, setting safeguards in the methodological approach so as to clearly encapsulate the divergences between the EU and Somalia becomes imperative.

On the one hand impartiality will be achieved two-fold: a) the frames that will be utilised for the current analysis already exist as terms within the primary sources and b) the reduction of my personal bias in assigning my sources to categories, since they will be primary sources. As will be further presented in the following section, the selected critical frames for this research are: the comprehensive approach, effective multilateralism and the partnership-ownership binary. With regards to the second component, the systematic and consistent application of the provided rules (also found in the Codebook – Appendix 1), will further suppress potential bias and allow the shifting of the focus from the norm-sender to the norm-receiver (see in Chapter 2).

The three critical frames appear in the primary documentation either explicitly or implicitly (please see Codebook – Appendix 1 for the relevant definition of terms). Therefore, the coding will include sections spanning from one to two sentences, which include either the terms explicitly or clearly define the terms (thereby making implicit reference). Given the complexity of the terms, the limit of two sentences as a single unit has been set as adequate to encapsulate the terms clearly enough that one can identify them and replicate the coding procedure (see Codebook, Appendix 1). The codes are then transposed into tables and charts, demonstrating the percentage each code occupies from the coded segments of the examined primary source. Seeing that the primary sources vary in length, this method of representation is suitable in order to achieve consistency in the reported data. Additionally, this form of reporting reflects the aim of this research which is not to demonstrate the prominence of the critical frames within the documentation, but to identify the normative underpinnings of the frames within the military operations. Depending on the dominance of one frame over the
others within the same document, the evaluation in NPE terms adapts accordingly to critically evaluate the importance of the frame’s use within the particular operational context. Furthermore, the analysis becomes more nuances given that the frames will be either explicitly or implicitly utilised and the extent to which they potentially overlap.

The outcome of this project is important theoretically, through the elaboration of NPE, and empirically, as a contribution to the current literature in this area on Somalia. Therefore, this research is aimed at providing more depth of analysis within the case study rather than the provision of replicable findings. As Mahoney and Goertz (2006:230) posit, generalizability is an uncommon goal of qualitative analysis. What is rather the aim of qualitative analysis is the understanding of the outcomes in individual cases and focus on the distinctive attributes that arise from an in-depth exploration of a particular case. They go further and state that research on a qualitative basis is not based on the idea that all cases are equal but that the selected cases are “substantively important” and worth exploring in depth (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006:242). The main goal of this project is premised on the interpretation and the provision of understanding rather than description/explanation (Caterino and Schram, 2006:5, Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2002:461). Nevertheless, caution must be paid in the subsequent analysis of the sources, more importantly due to the critical approach that will be taken. Although this method includes a highly quantitative element, this research deals with the underlying themes which are portrayed within the texts (Beardsworth, 1980).

However, disadvantages can be found in this apparatus, most prominently with relation to the inferences. As mentioned above, an inherent bias can be suppressed by the objective definition and implementation of the coding according to the codebook (see Appendix 1). Furthermore, problematic elements such as authenticity and credibility of the documents, are not pertinent in this project, given that primary sources will be used to carry out the analysis. The coding procedure involves interpretation on the part of the researcher (Bryman, 2012: 306).
Therefore, particular care will be taken in order to restrict this bias from becoming overwhelming in the interpretation of the collected data and thereby portraying one side of the argument within the final analysis. As Cicourel (1964) and Garfinkel (1967) point out, the coding process is affected by the preconceptions of the coders as a result of their worldviews. In the present research the coding of the content analysis is based on terms used within the official documents. The frames that have been selected and will be explored, are not created by the researcher but appear in the exact same for within the primary documentation. Therefore, bias in the coding process is averted.

3.7 **NPE evaluation through rhetoric and the link with critical frames**

Critical frame analysis is extremely suitable for the purpose of this thesis given that it provides a structured qualitative approach while enabling “a detailed examination of the dimensions of diagnosis and prognosis, revealing…implicit or explicit representations of who is facing the problem, who or what caused it and who should solve it” (Meier, 2008:156). The criticality of the selected frames is identified in the interpretation of the selected frames within the scope of a NPE understanding. Therefore, their repercussions on operationalisation is determined from their evaluation in normative terms, on the basis of the proposed intent-action-impact structure (Table 3).

Three discursive frames are utilised: 1) the comprehensive approach, 2) effective multilateralism and 3) the principles of partnership-ownership. The first “refers to the EU’s more pro-active, and more coordinated, integration of its various external policy tools to address specific international security problems” (Smith, M.E., 2013:25). Within the CSDP context, means at the EU’s disposal would include civilian and military. Therefore, through this frame, two objectives will be served. On the one hand, the identification of this frame within the ‘strategic’ documents will demonstrate what comprises the overall intent of the EU
within its external action. With reference to its ‘normative’ importance, the very core of this frame rests upon the combination of employed means. Seeing that one of the main theoretical issues argued in this thesis concerns the co-existence of military means with the diffusion of ‘normative power’ via symbolic manifestation, the ‘comprehensive approach’ as a critical frame will allow for the exploration of this tension and lead to an in-depth understanding of its employment within a normative context. Due consideration will be paid to the role of the EEAS in this endeavour. The second frame of ‘effective multilateralism’, concerns the extent and form of the EU’s collaboration in military operations with other organizations in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, specifically the African Union (AU), NATO and the UN. In view of the EU’s increasing ambitions as a global actor, which have become more explicit in the EUGS (2016), ‘multilateralism’ will provide insight into the level of coordination it has achieved within an operational setting as well as in what terms it distinguishes itself from its partners. This will therefore contribute to the understanding of its identity as well as the extent to which its aspirations concern support to current crises rather than creating an autonomous presence.

The third frame touches upon the particular relationship the EU has introduced with Africa in the JAES (2007). On a rhetoric level, this relationship is built on the binary of the promotion of “partnership” and “ownership” (Haastrup 2013:796, Rutizibwa 2010:216). This rhetoric still suggests a superimposition of the EU’s perception on the problems it identifies in Africa on its “partners”. This is important, theoretically, in relation to the EU’s self-portrayal (Diez 2005:636, Nicolaidis and Howse 2002:782) and, practically, in the way it shapes its actorness towards ‘others’ (Diez 2005, Leonard, 2005, Merlingen 2007, Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007).

The aforementioned frames will help illustrate the normative underpinnings existing in EU and Somali official documentation. The comparison of these underpinnings will then indicate the convergence of their understanding by the two parties. What must be clarified at this point is that discourse analysis will not be part of the method followed in this project.
Nevertheless, the element of language and the way it is employed within the selected documents for the purposes of analysis must be presented at this point.

The examination of the use of language is particularly useful in understanding what foreign policy entails (Pace, 2004:301). Pace (2004:292) defines ‘foreign policy as a discursive activity’. She finds that a critical theoretical approach benefits the exploration of this area particularly since it enables the unveiling of the construction of empirical phenomena. She reasserts Kavalski’s (2013) emphasis on the importance of the dialectic construction of self and the other. This approach is prominent in the NPE framework (see Chapter 2) and has influenced the focus of this project.

Hill’s (2003) reading into the particular language of policy is enlightening in the overall understanding of foreign policy. He emphasizes the importance that the representative aspect of language plays as a means of explaining actions and understanding the complexities of international relations (Hill 2003: 9). Furthermore Hill (2003: 9) identifies it as a formative as well as a descriptive underpinning of an actor’s identity, especially when framed as different from the “other” (please see Chapter 2).

The concept of frame, as well as “framing”, has been used increasingly in social sciences for descriptive and analytical purposes (Benford and Snow, 2000:611). Initially due to the influence of Goffman (1974), the concept of frame was particularly popular in sociological research. It has now gone beyond the subject area of sociology and infiltrated political science and policy studies (Schon and Rein 1994, Triandafyllidou and Fotiou 1998, Verloo and Lombardo 2007, Meier 2008, Bee and Guerrina 2013).

Within critical frame analysis, the use of language is indicative of the combinations of ideological factors (i.e. beliefs, norms, values, goals and emotions) that are employed for the attainment of power and influence (Koller, 2012:22). The action which is encapsulated within the text, can have a material impact (Verloo and Lombardo 2007:32). This project will explore
the potential of attaining normative power through military operations. It is therefore important for the purposes of this project to examine and unpick the underlying representations in the texts. In turn this will lead to deciphering the normative underpinnings within documentation as well as within subsequent operationalization.

The framing of norms also helps in identifying the effects of the construction of ‘self’ and ‘other’ (see Chapter 2) (Koller, 2012:22). With reference to the discursive dynamic of normative power taken by Kavalski (2013), the understanding of identity imbalances appearing within the text, can not only highlight the existing inadequacies of current practices, but can also provide scope into potential mismatches in the reflexive adaptation of the involved parties. The issue of whether the recipients of the diffused representations view them in the same context as the producers can also provide interesting insight into the co-constructed meaning of a particular initiative (Koller, 2012:23). That is to say that the adoption, reformation and response to a particular set of norms is increasingly important when examining the level of alignment and the extent of dialectic redefinition within normative diffusion.

Goffman (1974:21) defines “frame” as a denotation of “schemata of interpretation” that facilitate individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” events within their personal space and the world generally in a meaningful way (Benford 993:678). Thereby “frames” structure and organize experience and, subsequently, determine individual as well as collective action. Verloo (2005:20) defines “policy frame” as an “organising principle that transforms fragmentary or incidental information into a structured and meaningful problem, in which a solution is implicitly or explicitly included”. The process of meaningfully constructing and attaching significance to phenomena (“framing”) suggests a dynamic and systematic phenomenon that stems from a controversial reality construction (Benford and Snow, 2000:614). As Benford and Snow (2000:614) explain, the dynamic element of this phenomenon resides in the active character of the process’s evolution.
The way actors make sense of phenomena within frames, in turn attaches meaning to occurrences that may otherwise have seemed meaningless (Goffman, 1974:21). It is within this framework of understanding that the perception of norms by the receivers becomes important. The convergence of the meaning attached to specific actions may vary between the promoter and the audience-subject of norm-diffusion. It is within the level of this convergence that the following can be assessed: 1) the general acceptance of the diffused norms, 2) the disparity between the intent of the diffuser (see Chapter 2) and the subsequent action, 3) the impact of the cultural filter (see Textbox 1) in the promotion and diffusion of norms as well as 4) the self-perception of the norm-promoter and the norm-recipient in their interaction. This supports the focus of this project on “normative power” being considered as one based on the extent of its dissemination of norms but also on its recognition as such. Therefore, the examination of the official documentation concerning EU-Africa relations, namely the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES 2007), the strategic framework for the Horn of Africa, the Roadmap for 2014-2017 agreed at the 4th Africa-EU Summit, as well as the domestic Somali Compact (2013), will demonstrate the areas in which the EU is considered most potent within its partnership, both on a continent-to-continent level as well as more specifically with Somalia.

Meier (2008) employs critical frame analysis within the examination of women’s representation in EU gender equality policies. Within the policy she identifies the need for policy actors to “detect and solve problems” (Meier, 2008:156). In doing so they have to go through the following steps when drafting policy documents: 1) outline the problem they are addressing and its potential legitimisation, 2) present the reasons why the problem needs to be dealt with and 3) suggest ways to resolve the problem. Therefore, the description of the policy problem needs to contain a diagnosis (what the problem is) and a prognosis (its solution) of the subject at hand. She underlines that the interpretation of both aforementioned components may vary significantly (Meier, 2008:156) depending on the links that are made with the
conceptual questions that are posed (also in Lombardo et al. 2007:84). It is in the application of the critical frames that the primary sources obtain a normative interpretation and therefore indicate the underpinning notions that are relevant to this research.

Another issue pertinent to the conducted analysis concerns the actoriness of the EU internationally, more specifically whether it can be seen as a single actor. As Pace (2004:300) states that the “EU itself is not a unified actor, especially when it comes to foreign and security policy…The EU is a moving object and any attempt at a Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) will also reflect a moving target”. Given its predominantly intergovernmental nature and the constantly changing nature of the issues it is called to encounter, one may argue the same for CSDP. It is within this logic that the way the EU promotes itself through its initiatives will change and adapt to the challenges it faces. Furthermore, the means it employs as well as the way it deploys them is in constant flux. Consequently, this impacts on the overall identity of the EU as a global actor. Nevertheless, as Bretherton and Vogler (1999:170) argue, the EU’s presence is shaped by the common internal beliefs about the Union. This suggests that the EU has a single identity beyond that of the compounded identities of the Member States. In this line of argumentation, the EU’s presence derives from the aforementioned identity and thus is unique in its own merit. Therefore, within the framework of NPE, the diffusion of norms emanates from the EU as an actor, distinct from its parts.

In defining presence as an element of actoriness, Bretherton and Vogler (2006:27) identify its ability to influence externally and thereby define the “perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others.” They clarify that this ability is not necessarily intentional but rather the result of simply being. What they also posit is that the status of the EU is conferred upon it by its external audience as a result of its character and identity as well as by the perceived impact of its policies (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:27). It therefore becomes apparent that the normative diffusion of the EU externally is dependent upon its reception. Furthermore, it must
also engage in a reflexive process of its actions in order to eliminate the possibility of being misconstrued externally. On a theoretical level, this supports the critiques of NPE put forth by Diez (2005, 2012) and Kavalski (2013) (see Chapter 2).

This research will explore the use of the means the EEAS has at its disposal, as well as the justification it provides for their employment, by examining the normative frames within which it organises its military operations. Within an EU security context, Sjursen (2004:108) identifies an alternation in the understanding and operationalization of the most appropriate means in ensuring security. This hints to a change of theoretical scope and stresses the need to adapt the theoretical foundations of our perceptions in this issue accordingly. A growing amount of literature that deals with the understanding of the European security context, has placed the focus on the normative elements that are central in concepts like human security, soft security and comprehensive security (Adler and Barnett, 1998; Buzan et al. 1998; Gärtner and Hyde-Pryce, 2001; Farrell, 2002). This is indicative of the potential that lies beyond the military force-security nexus and touches upon the questions on normative actorness in this project.

The inclusion of the frames within the three stages of the EU normative power diffusion (intent-action-impact as presented in Table 3) create diverging interpretations as to their utility. Even though the intent projected may not be the actual reason for which a particular initiative has commenced, it remains indicative of a normative position that is incorporated within the identity the EU wants to present. The way this frame is then incorporated within a sub-strategy that is either geographically specific or concerns a particular military initiative produces a different interpretation that indicates a facet of the EU’s actorness. Lastly, the inclusion of said frame within the primary sources presenting the aftermath of an initiative or within a text that is produced by the ‘receiver’ of the normative diffusion, demonstrates the effective diffusion of the frame together with the underpinning normative context. Therefore, in looking at all
stages of the normative process, this thesis examines the full spectrum of potential interpretations of the norms, thereby mapping their actual connection to the EU’s identity as well as their potency in terms of external action. It is for this reason, that the analysis carried out in this research is quintessentially critical in nature, rather than an analysis of words or sentences regularly repeated to constitute the context of the examined ideas.

In this occasion the content of the frames is set by the primary sources. What is examined in this case is the operationalisation of the frames within the relevant military documentation to illustrate the continuity of normative diffusion from intent to impact, thereby: a) demonstrating the existence of normative power, b) supporting the characterisation of the EU as a normative actor, c) linking the normative actorness portrayed through the frames with its effective impact on the construction of a normative EU identity.

3.8 Case Study Design

Through the employment of a case study I will be able to research the complexities and the particular nature of the specific operations carried out in Somalia. This will also help me to further unpick the nuanced and multifaceted nature of the EEAS with reference to its external action in particular in the African region as well as the challenges that appear in the selected country. Furthermore, the choice of the country is interesting in itself. Not only does it go beyond the traditionally selected geocentric niche of the EU’s actorness (identified in the close proximity of the European continent) but goes further in broadening the spectrum of the applicability of the EU’s involvement globally. An additional element, which is increasingly important in this case, is the alleviation of the common historical and cultural background (and the subsequent world view of the actors in question) thus allowing my analysis to proceed into an account of the normative diffusion dynamic solely on the grounds of its operationalisation.
Although the use of a case study is susceptible to the faults arising from its place in the “inductive tradition of the relationship between theory and research” (Bryman, 2012:71), in other words to the ability of generalizing the findings from the specific case into a broader theory, it can also be seen as an illustration to the selected theoretical approach, thereby informing it and countering potential future flaws in its application. This is also a component of my research which touches upon the operationalization of the NPE framework (Chapter 7). As the selected case study is intended to allow a better grasp of the situations within which normative diffusion is successful, this would classify it as a critical case (Yin’s 2009). Therefore, the potential weakness in the generalisation of the findings is remedied by pointing out the particular elements that might in the future affect this endeavour in further research.

This thesis will provide an in-depth exploration of the role EU military operations have in normative diffusion and will focus on Somalia. Within this single-country case, this research will be focusing on the two operations carried out, EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Atalanta. By doing so, this project will extrapolate and highlight the diverse nature of the aforementioned operations, thereby demonstrating their commonalities as well as the unique features within each. This will be accomplished through the analysis of the selected critical frames. Consequently, this analysis will provide insight on the following levels: a) the EU’s identity as a result of its actorness through military operations, b) the level and nature of the normative underpinnings manifested through these operations, particularly with reference to Africa, c) the practical implications of the critical frames used within EU external action policy, d) the role of the EEAS in the formation and operationalization of these critical frames.

The selected case study may lead to further research being carried out on Somalia, specifically, or on a comparative regional/African basis more broadly. Given that the NPE framework has not been widely operationalized in the area of CSDP, this project aims at setting the ground for future projects rather than providing a comparative account with other cases.
Although interest in the African region from a normative power perspective has become apparent (e.g Haastrup 2013; Rutazibwa 2010), it still remains limited. Furthermore, this thesis aspires to depict the relevance of treating single country-cases, rather than approaching them as part of a region, especially when researching delicate and complex issues such as military operations in consistently unstable settings, such as that of Somalia.

3.9 Primary source documentation-research design

According to Bryman (2012:554), the “documents that an organization generates… are representations of the reality of that organization. In other words, we might take the view that such documents tell us something about what goes on in that organization and will help us to uncover such things as its culture or ethos. According to such a view, documents are windows onto social and organizational realities.” This project will use the official documents drafted by the EU and the Somali state as a source for the content and subsequent critical frame analysis. Within them, the changes that have occurred as a result of the EEAS will be accounted for. Through the examination of the host-country’s documentation, the underlying intents of the EU as well as those of the norm receiver –Somalia, will be compared. This will demonstrate their level of convergence as far as framing and incorporation of promoted norms is concerned, thereby constructing the foundation upon which the extent of normative diffusion will be argued. The parallel examination of the operational mandates and their impact will lead to the evaluation of achieved outcomes. By doing so an account will be created which will illustrate the effectiveness of the initiatives and the level of ‘success’ of normative diffusion.

However, considerable scepticism has been expressed concerning the role of documents as a source. Elgström (2011:466) underlines the importance of texts, especially within the EU context, and particularly legal documents. Although the latter in many cases may not be binding in all their aspects, they can be viewed as important points of reference. What
is further emphasized is their importance as far as normative impact is concerned with respect to future developments. Although documents may be viewed as a depiction of an underlying reality, academics such as Atkinson and Coffey (2011) have argued that they are a reality themselves.

The documents that will be used for the purposes of this research will be attributed roles. More specifically, documents which serve a broader function (such as the ESS and the Report on its implementation as well as the JAES) will be used as a guide in order to provide scope for the definition of terms that are presented in texts with a narrower scope (like sub-strategies such as the Gulf of Aden strategy, the EU Maritime Security Strategy and the Comprehensive Approach). The former will thus be utilised to provide context to the specific provisions that are foreseen within operational mandates. This context will not be limited to the definition of terms but will also concern the intent of the actors (EEAS). It will also be employed in detecting the continuity of intent through actions as well as in view of the accomplished goals/impact. The documents will not be taken as transparent representations of reality (Atkinson and Coffey, 2011: 79) but will be used as indications, the reliability and representative power of which will depend upon their convergence with the actual outcome.

The call within the ESS to think of a “wider spectrum of missions” (European Council 2003:12) is complemented by the EU Council’s claim that the use of force in situations where the state has failed would be acceptable “should it prove necessary, as a last resort” (Council of the EU, 2004:6). Bretherton and Vogler (2006:212) highlight the Artemis operation and reaffirm the EU’s intention of complementing its civilian initiatives (development aid, promotion of good governance, protection of human rights) with the use of military instruments. They add that a military solution was also resorted to only as an ultimate solution even after attempting to bring in African Union forces. The EU Council (2004:8) provides the limits and relationship of the means concisely as follows: “…the means should be proportional
to the objective, taking into account the need to prevent the recurrence and to ensure the
stability necessary for reconciliation and reconstruction; and that it should carefully weigh the
consequences of action against the consequences of inaction.”

What is particularly important and innovative in the ESS is not the enumeration of the threats that the EU would be called to face, but the need for a comprehensive approach and a multilateral actor in order to effectively counter the upcoming challenges: the EU is “particularly well-equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations” (European Council 2003:12). What is also interesting is the identification of the threats abroad as well as the purported stance the EU would take in tackling them: “With new threats the first line of defence will often be abroad…nor can any be tackled by purely military means” (European Council 2003:7).

Bretherton and Vogler (2006:223) conclude the EU has transformed its normative foundation into action while forming a distinctive approach from its Member States. They nevertheless submit that, given the security-oriented approach outlined by the ESS for the EU’s practice abroad, it is possible that its reading in the future might “undermine the Union’s value-based identity” (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006:223).

Under CSDP, the EU operates civilian missions and military operations worldwide that serve a variety of tasks. For instance, EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s mandated aims are tackling piracy and protecting humanitarian shipments of the World Food Programme. One of the key mandates of the EEAS is to ensure the effective and consistent performance of the EU’s abroad. Therefore, the EEAS is also responsible with the production of the documentation relevant to the organisation and operationalization of the aforementioned initiatives. Given the double hatted role of the HR/VP within CSDP, and the institutional composition of the EEAS itself, the role it plays in the overall delineation of military operations becomes all the more pivotal (this will be further discussed in Chapter 4).
To provide a more comprehensive and detailed account of EUNAVFOR and EUTM’s normative importance emerging from the content and critical frame analyses, the following structure will be followed throughout Chapters 6 and 7. Initially the content analysis of the critical frames appearing in the key EU strategic documents – European Security Strategy (ESS 2003), EU Global Strategy (EUGS 2016) and their respective Implementation plans as well as the Comprehensive Approach (CA 2013) and its Action Plan (2015)- will be presented in the light of the employed analytical apparatuses to provide a broader context to the EU’s actions within CSDP. This will construct a wider platform upon which the research questions are based, most importantly concerning how the EU has evolved as a normative power and whether the establishment of the EEAS can be considered a catalytic change to the Union’s actorness within a normative understanding. Building on previous discussions concerning the EEAS’ importance as well as shortcomings (see Chapter 4), it will become apparent how the vision of the Lisbon Treaty is echoed by the intents the EU puts forth in its strategic documents. The EUGS and its Implementation Plan will demonstrate the most recent conceptualisation of the EU’s normative basis with reference to the three critical frames, but also indicate the evolution of the EEAS into a pivotal actor bearing most of this normative actorness.

The EU sub-strategies – Join Africa EU Strategy (JAES 2007), EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa – will follow through a similar approach as the aforementioned category. As documents dealing with particular geographical regions and areas of action, this section will further narrow the focus of this analysis adding to the evaluation in normative terms. This will provide more specified insight into the employment of the critical frames and identify their pertinence within this thesis. Additionally, they provide a link between the broader EU intents in the area of CSDP and those

6 A detailed list of all the main primary sources as well as the supplementary documents used for the content analysis are included in Appendix 4.
expressly presented for Somalia. Furthermore, this section will demonstrate how the EU’s
general strategic concerns are operationalised in the context of its relations with Africa as well
as more narrowly with reference to its military initiatives, particularly those of a maritime
nature.

The EU’s documents relating to Somalia will follow. Although they may not be
strategies as such or deal with the elaboration of related concepts, these documents have
elements of these within them. Thus, the scope of the analysis will be further honed down to
the use of the critical frames within the case of Somalia. Most importantly, building on its
introduction in Chapter 5, the examination of the Somali Compact (2013) will add the
perspective of the Somali side in the dynamic diffusion of normative power (see Chapter 2).
Therefore, both sides to the normative process will be accounted for thus completing the
conceptualisation of NPE and, more specifically, how it is reflected in the impact of the EU’s
relations with Somalia.

Finally, the documentation relating to the two military operations, EUNAVFOR
Atalanta and EUTM, will conclude this chapter thereby completing the illustration of the EU’s
normative actoriness within a normative setting. This section will focus on the fluctuations (or
lack thereof) of the critical frames’ employment within the renewed versions of the operations’
mandates, highlighting the changes in their subsequent normative underpinnings. Furthermore,
the emerging comparison between the two operations will contribute to the construction of a
more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia as well as its
overall actoriness in normative terms. Thereby the element of ‘action’ will complete the
conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3.

To allow a more representative account of the strategies’ and sub-strategies’ normative
interpretation, factsheets, institutional reports and press releases will also be incorporated in
the content and critical frame analyses. These will thus support the conclusions drawn with
reference to the EU’s actorness. Additionally, for the purposes of thoroughness, supplementary coding concerning the EU’s global actorness, reference to the EEAS and attribution of credit (described in Chapter 3) will be referred to, to highlight the nuances within the frames, most importantly the partnership-ownership binary.

Therefore, the juxtaposition of EU documentation relevant to military operations with those produced by Somalia, will be telling of inconsistencies between the clauses they provide. This will also shed light on the extent of reflexivity the EU has engaged with in the formation and materialisation of its external action. This is crucial within the critiques of NPE (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, an in depth understanding of actorness will be evident not only in the numerical repetition of particular frames, but also through the language used in the documents. In turn this will validate a self-perception of a military or normative actor.

3.10 Operationalization – introduction of frames

Critical frame analysis is extremely suitable for the purpose of my research given that it provides a structured approach that enables “a detailed examination of the dimensions of diagnosis and prognosis, revealing…implicit or explicit representations of who is facing the problem, who or what caused it and who should solve it” (Meier, 2008:156). With reference to the puzzles examined in this research (and the way the diagnosis and prognosis of the identified problems will be outlined), this project will address: 1) the prognosis on the basis of the EU’s perspective of the problems it is addressing in Somalia, with due consideration of its normative standing (particularly with reference to effective multilateralism, its operational comprehensive approach and the partnership-ownership rhetorical proclamations) and 2) the diagnosis by comparing the EU’s justification of its operational choices (intent), its selection of military operations (actions), the impact of its actions as well as the meaning that is attached to them by the receiving end- Somalia. By doing so this analysis will have evaded the pitfall of applying
a biased approach to the treated issues while comprehensively covering the dynamic framework of normative diffusion. This will also indicate the extent of the discursive aspect of NPE (as argued by Diez 2005 and Kavalski 2013) and lead to the appraisal of the EU’s normative standing in its external action.

Frame analysis is founded on the assumption that policy-making is open to divergent interpretations. These interpretations can be either implicit or explicit and are premised on the representations actors offer about the issues themselves and/or their solutions (Verloo and Lombardo 2007:32). Giddens (1984) asserts that these representations derive from discursive consciousness, that is the way actors justify the frames they use, but also practical consciousness, which are the practices and rules routinely preferred in certain contexts. In either case, discursive and practical policy frames have real consequences that provide the foundation for future actions (Verloo and Lombardo 2007:32).

Within this project the documents drafted from both the EU and Somalia will be examined. This will not only demonstrate the convergence of the frames used, but most importantly highlight their divergence, thereby detracting as far as possible the impact of biases on the analysis. This additional point of view will indicate where the aforementioned biases are situated. Subsequently, the shortcomings in the normative diffusion will become more apparent.

This project will depict the normative underpinnings of the military operations carried out in Somalia. This will be achieved through a critical frame analysis of the relevant EU policy documents as well as those subsequently drafted by the Somali government. To achieve this, three discursive frames are employed: 1) the comprehensive approach, 2) effective multilateralism, 3) the principles of partnership-ownership. The first comprises of the way the EU combines the various means at its disposal within CSDP as well as the coherence it achieves between its internal and external practices (Comprehensive Approach 2013). Due
consideration will be paid to the role of the EEAS in this endeavour. The second concerns the extent and form of the EU’s collaboration in military operations with other organizations in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, specifically the African Union (AU), NATO and the UN. It also concerns the internal collaboration of actors on all levels (that is both the institutions as well as the member states). The third frame touches upon the particular relationship the EU has introduced with Africa in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). On a rhetoric level, this relationship is built on the binary of the promotion of “partnership - ownership”. Within this last frame dynamics of empowerment and disempowerment between the EU and the local actors is dominant (see Chapter 7). As Haastrup (2013) and Rutazibwa (2010) argue, this relationship is not unproblematic. Although it departs from a previous rhetoric of “mentoring” (Haastrup 2013:796) and conditionality (Rutizibwa 2010:216) which appear in the Cotonou, Lomé and Yaounde Agreements, this rhetoric still suggests a superimposition of the EU’s perception on the problems it identifies in Africa on its “partners”. This is important, theoretically (Diez 2005:636, Nicolaidis and Howse 2002:782) and, practically, in the way it shapes its actoriness towards ‘others’ (Diez 2005, Leonard, 2005, Merlingen 2007, Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007).

The connection between the aforementioned frames and the exploration of the EU’s normative power will be drawn with reference to Manners’ (2008:47-55) ‘substantive normative principles’. Through the content analysis, the regularity with which the aforementioned frames (or phrases that imply them) appear within the selected documents will be accounted for. This will show the links that are drawn within policy between the intended actions and the normative underpinnings. Furthermore, the pairing of frames will also demonstrate the dynamics that appear in the delineation of the missions. The density with which frames appear will determine the foundation of the subsequent analysis and provide initial indications which will be further examined. Ultimately, the analysis of the frames will
indicate their pertinence in the operationalisation of the EU’s intents as well as how they inform its overall actoriness in normative terms.

The way the substantive normative principles are presented through the proposed frames will indicate the level of ‘normativity’. Furthermore, the justification provided for the operational goals will be enlightening on two levels: 1) the extent to which the EU takes norms into consideration, and 2) through the mandated actions, the way the EU undertakes the operationalization of those norms. This will not only be important in illustrating the EU’s perception of its actoriness but also in deciphering its identity and self-identity. To this end, further coding will be carried out in order to inform the understanding of how the EU depicts itself within the official documentation as well as how it manages to do so within the rhetoric it employs. More specifically, within the coding, sections have been selected for cross-relations between the frames in order to enhance the contextualisation of the actions as well as their impact within the official documentation. The elements highlighted by this supplementary coding, together with the analysis of the critical frames, will allow for a more detailed evaluation of the ways the EU operationalises its normative power but will also reflect the issues raised within the literature concerning its reflexive ability and self-identification (see Chapter 2). What will also emerge from the combination of coded segments with the critical frames will be the pertinence of the portrayal of ‘self’ and ‘other’ within the operationalisation of the EU’s normative standing through military operations. In turn this will contribute to the discussion concerning the critique of the EU as mentor in its initiatives particularly with Africa and more specifically with Somalia.

Finally, further content analysis will be carried out within the documents to demonstrate the EU’s vision for global actoriness and how the EEAS is incorporated within it. The former will be indicative of the overall trajectory the EU has set for itself within its external action, while the latter will illustrate the role attributed to the Service within the critical frames.
Although global actorness and subsequent presence are more explicitly visible within the EUGS (2016) and its Implementation Plan (2016), it is interesting to identify the presence of this aspiration throughout its external action, particularly within the context of the EEAS’ creation. Therefore, this second additional coding will complement the critical frame analysis seeing that it will situate the EEAS within global actorness as well as how it overlaps with its commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ in normative terms.

What will also be highlighted is the uniformity of the actions taken in the case study. Although the EU is carrying out two military operations in Somalia (EUTM Somalia and EU NAVFOR Atalanta), the mandates and course of action each one takes appear distinct in the way they operationalise the underlying normative agenda (see Chapter 6). Although the “partnership-ownership” frame is present in both, the prevalence of the other two proposed frames alternates depending on the purpose of the document within the operation (see Chapter 6).

3.11 Conclusion

This chapter presented the methodological framework applied throughout this thesis as well as the analytical process that will be followed to demonstrate the relevance of the military operations in Somalia in demonstrating the pertinence of NPE. Through content analysis and subsequent critical frame analysis of EU documentation, this research will present the operationalisation of ‘normative power’ by the Union within its external action through military initiatives. The importance of this conceptualisation is twofold. On the one hand it will explore the theoretical tension between ‘normative power’ and the use of ‘military means’. On the other hand it will contribute empirically to the application of this theoretical argument on the EU’s external action within its operations in Somalia, thereby adding to the existing literature on the operationalisation of NPE. In serving these two purposes, this thesis will
highlight the role of the EEAS as a catalyst in the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’, both in terms of identity as well as actorness.

The critical frames employed within this thesis will be the ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘partnership-ownership’. Complementary coding will be carried out on the EU primary and secondary documentation in order to complete the understanding of the frames’ operationalisation within the context of its military operations in Somalia. More specifically, reference to global actorness as well as cross relations of frames will highlight the nuances existing within the main critical frames. Thus, a detailed examination of the normative standing of the EU will be presented thereby underlining the pertinence of NPE in the investigation of its external action.

For social constructivist approaches, values and principles are at the core of the research agenda. Principles, which translate values into policy action, closely relate to norms in social constructivist terms. Norms are defined as “collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity” (Jepperson et al 1996:54). Furthermore, norms can be constitutive (acting as rules defining an identity) or regulative, acting as “standards for the proper enactment or deployment of a defined identity” (Jepperson et al 1996:54). If the EU's international identity is pacific, principled, consensus-based, network-based, open and post-Westphalian (Manners & Whitman 2003:398-399), then it is only natural that its approach to international security and conflict resolution follows the norm of a holistic approach. It is therefore valid to argue that external objectives of the EU are largely characterized by 'milieu goals' rather than 'possession goals' (Elgstrom and Smith 2006:2).

The following chapter will build upon the theoretical elaboration of Chapter 2 and the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 3. It will present the trajectory of the EU’s evolution leading to the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and the establishment of the EEAS (2010). This thesis argues that these two elements are pivotal in terms of the EU’s normative actorness and
identity. Relevant literature will be discussed in this chapter to support the arguments put forth within this thesis, demonstrating their pertinence to the research questions as well as the overall goals of this research.
Chapter 4

The European External Action Service

4.1 Introduction

The issue of actoriness stemming from EU policy in external relations and the dynamics that come into play for its formation are at the core of interrogation in this research. The EU, undoubtedly an important global actor, has been evolving in order to meet current challenges. The Lisbon Treaty brought important issues in this area to the forefront especially through the institutional and political changes it brought forth. The unification to a large extent of its ‘external action’ and the creation of an institution specifically aimed at dealing with this sector of policy - EEAS- have justly drawn the interest of academia. Javier Solana succinctly managed to summarize the evolving aspirations of the EU in its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP): “in the past the EU was intended to secure peace in Europe; today, it is about being a peace-builder in the rest of the world” (Solana, 2007). This transformation of the EU from a regional to a global actor entails multiple structural accumulations so much internally, including subsequent political re-evaluations, as externally, both in the formation of foreign policy as well as in projecting its identity internationally. Contemporary European security policy, therefore, assumes a central role, given the innovations provided in the Lisbon Treaty and in view of the issues arising on a global level which have attracted the EU’s interest and invoked its involvement.

The question of identity and the nature of the EU’s actoriness appears to be the focal point of critiques (Stavridis 2001; Whitman 2002; Smith 2004; Zielonka 1998; Moravcsik 2003; Manners 2008; Haukalla 2007; Treacher 2004; Börzel and Risse 2012) put forth with reference to the CSDP; the institutional antagonism between Member States and the European Commission over the European External Action Service (EEAS) is indicative of the
shortcomings of the EU in formulating foreign policy and, subsequently, achieving and retaining a coherent, consistent and coordinated international policy while consolidating its role as a substantial global actor. Thus, the emergence of the EEAS within the CSDP framework is not only a thematic issue (i.e. foreign policy) but also one of conflict among the structural components of the Service.

The EEAS, has been formed on the basis of a mixed legacy, both institutionally and politically: this is the result of the role it has been assigned to by the Lisbon Treaty (2007) but also by its own internal bureaucratic constitution (Hemra et al 2012:1) as detailed in the Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS (Council of the EU, 2010/427/EU, 26 July 2010) which whilst being a key document, due its establishing and outlining the functions of the EEAS, must also be seen as a compromise and leaves many questions unanswered:

“The EEAS will support the High Representative, who is also a Vice- President of the Commission and the President of the Foreign Affairs Council, in fulfilling his/her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘CFSP’) of the Union and to ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action … The EEAS will support the High Representative in his/her capacity as President of the Foreign Affairs Council, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the General Secretariat of the Council. The EEAS will also support the High Representative in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission, in respect of his/her responsibilities within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations, and in coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the Commission services”.

(Council decision of 26 July 2010, 2010/427/EU, Para. 3) Article 2(2) of the Council decision (26 July 2010, 2010/427/EU) adds that, “The EEAS shall assist the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the
Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations”. Its role has been described as that of providing “support to the European Council, the Council, the High Representative and the Commission concerning the strategic overview and coordination necessary to ensure the coherence of the European Union’s external action as a whole.” (European Council Draft Conclusions, 16 September 2010, from the General Secretariat of the Council to the General Affairs Council, 13460/10, Brussels, 10 September 2010:8).

Nevertheless, questions pertaining to the institutional fit of the EEAS remain, given its particular nature of a decision-shaping body – rather than a decision-making body (Duke, 2011:45). The Lisbon Treaty did not alter the decision-making aspect of external relations, thereby leaving the communautaire aspects a matter for decision by the Commission (with increased areas of co-decision with the European Parliament) while the foreign and security policy aspects fall under CFSP and are thus subject to consensus by the Member States sitting in the Council. Therefore, the key in providing coherence between the aforementioned lies with the HR/VP, a position which combines the previously roles of High Representative for CFSP and that of the Commissioner for External Relations. Subsequently, the Service supporting this double-hatted position would also have to reflect the mixed nature of the HR, meaning that it would not emanate directly from the intergovernmental Council Secretariat nor from the communautaire Commission.

As part of its role within the CSDP framework it has been assigned the civilian missions and military operations from the European Commission. Consequently, this has repercussions on the EEAS’ institutional culture in issues such as training, staff background and bureaucratic mentality. The institutional identity of the Service will of course differ from those traditionally associated with diplomatic services due to its mixed polity. It has currently remained to a large extent akin to that of the Commission and therefore inhibits the creation of its own esprit de corps. The emergence of what is in fact, if not in name, a major new EU institution is a
noteworthy event (Duke 2011:61). The Service implies learning how to support the top EU external relations posts most effectively and to enhance the coherence of the Union’s external actions, as well as learning how to nurture the increasingly important European-level of diplomacy and this will, in particular, involve an adjustment of state-centric Westphalian notions of diplomacy.

According to Keukeleire (2014) and Nunes (2011) the EU’s internal policy and external projection in foreign policy should be analysed separately. With this dichotomy in mind, this examination of CSDP will incorporate three key themes: a) the EU’s institutional evolution in the area of foreign policy before and after the Lisbon Treaty, b) the EU as an actor in external policy; this part will focus on the main critiques concerning Member State-EU interaction and horizontal coherence (Edwards 2013; Smith 2013; Whitman 2011) c) the political aspect of CSDP with a focus on the EEAS, particularly with reference to its relations with the Commission, the importance of a Service *esprit de corps* as well as its role within the context of the security-development nexus. Their inclusion thus rests on their importance and relevance to the normative power paradigm. Lessons taught by operations will also be included in this chapter, thereby highlighting some of the shortcomings of the EU’s action in an operational setting whilst simultaneously complementing theoretical and practical understandings of the EU’s reflexivity. Seeing that this research employs the military operations in Somalia to demonstrate the pertinence of NPE as a theoretical lens to the analysis of external action, an overview of previous operational initiatives is relevant to the contextualisation of the EU’s actoriness.

The selected thematic axes consistently appear in the majority of academic discussions concerning the EU’s foreign action and, more specifically, the EEAS as themes of interrogation. They were further chosen on the grounds of their importance and relevance to the normative power paradigm, which comprises the theoretical orientation of this research.
The first part is important in deciphering the dynamics of the EU in external action and pinpointing the provenance of the decisions that comprise its foreign policy. This will be achieved through the presentation of the evolution of the EU’s institutional components (horizontal dynamics). In this section the focus will be set around the innovations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty with particular reference to the EEAS and the potential it carries for the EU. When seen through a normative lens, the EEAS is important both in terms of the power it has been allocated in the delineation of external action as well as the compilation of a novel international identity for the EU.

Strategy is a quintessential element of normative power as I will be presenting in the current chapter. Given that it provides insight into the long-term approach of an institution’s practices, it is important to make special reference to it in this research. Normative power, unlike military power, provides more sustainable results and is less drastic in its appearance. For this reason, the potential ‘strategic’ identity of the EU is important in completing the portrait of its normative power. A clarification is called for at this point. The terms ‘strategy’ and ‘strategic’ in this Chapter (as well as in this research more generally) does not refer to the particular area of strategic studies. The documents produced for the purposes of external action utilise this term to demonstrate a long-term plan, separate from the short-term provisions that can be seen in Council Decisions or other documents outlining immediate action. Furthermore, the importance of referring to the promoted long-term plan is increasingly pertinent in the current research from an NPE perspective as well. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, normative actoriness is characterised by a reliance on long-term foresight given the time required for the diffusion to be internalised. Therefore, looking at the ‘strategic’ elements of external action will allow for an overview upon which the ensuing chapters dealing with the case of Somalia will further expand upon.


4.2 Evolution of EU initiatives leading to CSDP

CSDP has been a contentious issue amongst its creators since its introduction, especially because of its nature and objectives. Seen as the starting point for CSDP evolution, the Saint-Malo Declaration of December 1998 (Bickerton, 2010:3) was characterized by the conflicting views of France and Britain and focused on the EU’s international identity as well as its relationship with other global actors. The meaning of the key ‘autonomy’, particularly with reference to its implications for the EU’s relationship with NATO, was the first point of disagreement (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:588). These opposing views of the two states were indicative of the dichotomy at the time between the so-called ‘Atlanticist’ and ‘Europeanist’ approaches. Cornish and Edwards (2001:598) posit the need to avoid viewing the “artificial”, as they characterize it, Atlanticist-Europeanist divide as a zero-sum relationship. Although this divide has been characterised as made up, it was demonstrative of the nuanced issue of the EU’s own international identity. As demonstrated in the most recent European Union Global Strategy (2016) and the Implementation Plan (2016), ‘autonomy’ and the relationship of the EU with international partners is still highlighted. The balance to be struck between the two facets of external action becomes more complicated. Furthermore, it also becomes normatively significant when seen in conjunction with the commitments of the EU towards regional and state actors, particularly through the frames of ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ (see Chapters 6 Chapter 7). This issue becomes even more pertinent to the discussion when considering the role of the EEAS in forming the ‘strategic’ elements of external action and continuously being explicitly mandated with the oversight and evaluation of the missions conducted globally (see Chapter 6).

The ‘common European security and defence’ was officially introduced at the Cologne Summit in June 1999 and subsequently labelled ‘European Security and Defence Policy’ (ESDP). Under the Lisbon Treaty, ESDP was converted into the ‘Common Security and
Defence Policy’ (CSDP)’. For the purposes of supporting CSDP, the EU established new structures and developed their mandate and role within the complex system of its external action so as to achieve a balance between the supranational and intergovernmental levels. Although the goal was (and still is) the promotion of a functioning unique actorness centred around Brussels, the maintenance of the capitals’ role in the delineation of policy remains crucial. A number of committees were created to ensure member states’ involvement, notably a Political and Security Committee (PSC) composed of Brussels based ambassadors dealing exclusively with CFSP and CSDP (inspired by the North Atlantic Council at NATO). In order to provide advice to the PSC, Military Committee composed of Brussels based senior military representatives and a Civilian Crisis Committee were established. As regards the Council Secretariat under HR Solana this was expanded to include not only the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (called Policy Unit) but also a military staff, two politico-military directorates dealing with both military and civilian crisis management, and a situation centre. These new structures had to work closely with existing EU institutions not least the European Commission and the rotating six-month member Presidencies.

The evolution of this framework was not merely a change of title. It was accompanied by substantial structural change and reflected the change of the EU’s approach to its international security actorness (as defined in Groen and Niemann, 2011:6) and identity. The Berlin-plus compromise framework introduced in the 1999 Washington Summit was a milestone in the evolution of the EU as an international-defense actor. It set the premises of the collaboration on a multilateral basis with NATO in the area of shared capabilities. The initiatives presented in this collaboration were the following: a) assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities; b) presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets; c) identification of a range of European command options and the further adaptation of NATO’s defense planning systems to incorporate more
comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations (Cornish and Edwards, 2001:590). The European Council meeting in Feira (2000) identified, amongst others, four areas of development in the relationship of the EU with NATO: security issues, capability goals, the modalities for EU access to NATO assets and the definition of permanent consultation arrangements (Cornish and Edwards, 2001:590). It also underlined four areas of importance in civilian capabilities: police judiciary, civilian administration and civil protection (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:805). Emphasis was set on the civilian dimension of ESDP in cases of conflict prevention and crisis management and setting the aforementioned priorities (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:807).

What can be seen in these stages prior to the Lisbon Treaty is the gradual focus of the EU as an external actor, not only with reference to its international actors, but also on the types of engagement it would further expand upon, most importantly within the ESS (2003) and its Implementation Report (2008). The combination of security with civilian capabilities is particularly telling of the trajectory the EU set for itself in a number of ways. Firstly, what can be seen is a propensity of the EU in committing itself to multilateralism in the area of security and defence. The relationship it has built with NATO in particular is still quite prominent, even more so in view of the recent European Defence Plan (2016) and the Warsaw Declaration (2016). Secondly, it indicates the focus of the EU on non-coercive actorness, even within its relations with NATO. Although the element of shared capabilities is prominent, the emphasis still remains on the importance of civilian cooperation. This leads to a third observation, the combination of non-coercive powers despite the use of military means; which speaks to the focal point of this thesis. Despite the interest shown in the practicalities surrounding the realization of initiative within an operational context (that is the sharing of assets), the element of civilian actorness remains dominant. When seen through the lens of NPE, this point
reinforces this thesis’ argument whereby the establishment of normative power can also include the employment of military means in a non-coercive fashion (see Chapter 2).

After a failed attempt to achieve the levels provided in the ‘Helsinki headline goal’ (for 2003), which envisaged an army corps of 50,000-60,000 troops available at 60 days’ notice and sustainable in theatre for up to one year (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:802), the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) introduced in 2001 during the Laeken European Summit, attempted to accomplish the rectification of the remaining deficiencies in the headline goal process by launching 19 bottom-up (by governments) panels proposing both qualitative and quantitative solutions for the shortfalls they identified (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:804). The EU proceeded with the concept of ‘Battlegroups’ (2004). It was aimed at improving the deployability of European troops by introducing small, self-contained force packages of around 1,500 troops would be available within 15 days to respond to a crisis, usually in support of the UN and sustainable for about 30 days. (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:804). Supporting the need for the creation of a European strategic approach which will attain the goals set in Helsinki; they suggest that this can be attained with an all-encompassing view of external action (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:803). They also underline the need to avoid creating EU capabilities which will rival or duplicate NATO’s competences or scope (Cornish and Edwards, 2001:603).

The comprehensive undertaking of external action therefore becomes a central focal point while simultaneously addressing cooperation with international partners. Although the complementary employment of capabilities is highlighted, the underlying question that emerges is the level to which organisational collaboration can be efficient and furthermore whether there is space for autonomous action. ‘Autonomy’ within actorness lies within the aspirations the EU has promoted in the EUGS (2016) (see chapters 6 and 7) and this becomes increasingly pertinent when exploring the evolution of the EU through a normative power lens,
especially in terms of its ability to establish an autonomous presence while being firmly committed to multilateralism.

The next phase in the EU’s evolution came with the adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003. Efficient crisis management was introduced as part of an EU strategic vision that would comprehensively employ all the means at its disposal in order to tackle emerging complex challenges (Quille, 2010:56). This initiative was quintessential to the EU’s identity as an international actor, not only because of the forms of intervention that were provided but also from an actor-identity point of view (section 4.5.1). The European Council’s ratification of a Headline Goal 2010 and the Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP included work on setting the Civilian Headline Goal (2008) further built upon the element of actorness introduced within the ESS. Initially, the European Council developed military and civilian capabilities equally but kept them as separate goals. Interestingly, the civilian aspects were kept briefer than the military operations and the new Civilian Headline Goal for 2010 was adopted in an attempt to converge the two strands (civilian and military) of crisis management goals. Therefore, coherence and the need to establish an effective combination of military and civilian initiatives is yet again underlined, thus demonstrating the pertinence of a normative power evaluation. Speaking to the discussion in section 2.4.2 and with due consideration of the combined contributions of Maull (2005) on the misleading view of civilian powers being incompatible with military force, Whitman (2002) and Larsen (2002) regarding the acquisition of military means as a ‘residual tool’ which do no reduce the EU’s civilian character and Dunne (2008) concerning the compatibility of military attitude with normative power, the aforementioned comprehensive employment of military with civilian initiatives underpins the value of an examination within a normative context. In this respect, the adoption of the ESS in 2003 marked a pivotal change in the development of the EU as an external actor, particularly with reference to the range of its interests (both geographically as well as thematically). Drawn
by HR Solana, the document entitled: “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, was meant to serve as a strategy that defines the EU as a global actor. The text outlines the key global challenges and threats faced by the EU, including terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. On this basis, the strategy enumerated the key objectives in addressing the threats - building security in the EU’s neighbourhood and contributing to an international order based on effective multilateralism.

The ESS emphasizes the comprehensive approach towards security by pointing out that none of the threats identified can be tackled by purely military means. However, in order to resolve regional conflicts and failed states (as is in the case of Somalia), military instruments may be needed to restore order and undertake humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, to accomplish a long-term resolution, other economic and civilian instruments need to be deployed subsequently to help the reconstruction and rebuilding of institutions. The strategy further emphasises the need for the EU and its Member States to act together and use the different instruments and capabilities in a coherent manner in order to achieve the best results. The strategy ends by calling for a more active, more capable and more coherent EU, working with its key partners towards “an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world” (ESS, 2003:14).

In the process of creating and maintaining coherence in the internal and external dimensions of the comprehensive approach, the ESS (2003 and 2008) plays an important role as a conceptual framework. Concerning the internal dimension, the EES states that “the challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member State and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security an on that of third countries” (ESS, 2003: 13). It highlights the security-development nexus by declaring that “Security is the first condition for development” (ESS, 2003: 13) and underlines
“building security in our neighbourhood” (ESS, 2003: 7) together with “international order based on effective multilateralism” (ESS, 2003: 9) as two of three core objectives. The ensuing Implementation Report of 2008 reiterates and broadens the risk analysis made by the ESS. It highlights that “for our full potential to be realised we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active” (European Council: Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, S407/08, Brussels, 11 Dec. 2008:2). The ESS was slightly updated in 2008 to take recent global developments into account. To the list of key threats identified in its previous version in 2003, the areas of piracy, climate change, energy security and cyber-attacks were added. The EEAS started in January 2011 when staff from the European Commission (almost all of DG External Relations and some from DG Development) was merged with staff from the Council Secretariat. Additionally, diplomats from member states were recruited to bring national diplomatic expertise in to the service. In essence the EEAS at the European level is a combination of a “foreign ministry” with geographical and thematic desks and a “defence” or “crisis management” ministry – as it also includes a military staff (EUMS), a civilian operations headquarters (CPCC), an intelligence centre (INTCEN) and a situation room (SITROOM) as well as directorates for crisis response, security and conflict prevention and crisis management planning.

What can be seen in the evolution of CSDP rapidly evolved from its very inception. The Union is engaged in a large number of interventions which vary in size and character (civilian-military) and range geographically from the immediate European area to Africa and the Middle East. It has also evolved from a military oriented scope in crisis management to deploying long-term civilian missions and other security-related activities. Those activities have also changed in order to address currently pressing issues such as counter-terrorism and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
4.3 The Lisbon Treaty and its contribution

Pre-Lisbon the member states serving their six-monthly rotating Presidency regulated the direction that was to be taken in foreign policy, including co-operation and integration initiatives. Initiatives were significantly influenced by national interests and reflected nation state policy. Although the alteration in influences may be considered advantageous in this area of policy making, the rotating chair system lacked consistency and specific direction. Usually the initiatives that were introduced did not provide for follow-up action therefore leaving the following Presidency to face a vacuum in the underlying rational of the policy it was called to promote.

For the most part of its history, the process of foreign policy initiation was determined by ad hoc resolution of current challenges (Vanhoonaker and Pomorska, 2013:1320). As there was no commonly accepted strategic agenda, the rotating Presidencies took advantage of their turn at the chair to promote national interests. At the end of their term, follow-ups were not provided, therefore leaving behind a fragmented legacy of policy initiatives. The European Commission, which could have functioned as an agent of convergence between the national agendas, was careful not to upset member states and used its right of policy initiative cautiously (Vanhoonaker and Pomorska, 2013:1320).

The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) introduced the new HR for CFSP. The person who would take on this role based at the Council General Secretariat. This initiative can be seen as a first attempt to forge an EU common identity in the area of foreign policy; this would have been the case if the HR had an autonomous role. It is also interesting to note the fact that although this symbolic formation of foreign policy was set under one representative, the role was based in an intergovernmental institution therefore making the transition from the previously presidency-dependent practice into a more unified approach milder.
The Lisbon Treaty was the first step in addressing the continuity and leadership problems mentioned above. It introduced a longer-term chair, which would bridge the European Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). This was the dual-hatted High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, with Baroness Catherine Ashton as its first incumbent. She was bestowed the position of chair in the FAC but also of Vice-President of the European Commission. Just like the member states previously serving their terms in the Presidency, the HR has the authority to put forward foreign policy proposals. In her demanding role she is being assisted by a newly formed foreign policy administration, the EEAS. The centralization of competence in foreign policy around the HR/VP, in Rynning’s view, may only benefit the accomplishment of compromise and will bear no results on the coercive power of the EU (Rynning, 2003:488). Rather than highlighting the centrality of capabilities, Rynning (2003) emphasises the pivotal role of the EU’s internal coordination particularly in view of the mixed legacy the EEAS is built upon. He echoes the vision set out in the Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS (Council of the EU, 2010/427/EU, 26 July 2010) which accentuates the importance of the HR/VP within her double-hatted role in external affairs. Nevertheless, this coordination remains problematic both in the allocation of clear responsibility between the Commission and the EEAS in the area of security and development as well as between the personnel which has not yet formed a coherent Service esprit de corps thus still maintaining their previous organisational perceptions (see sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2).

The Lisbon Treaty considerably strengthened the potential role of the HR in promoting foreign policy initiative. The HR is now an actor with an increased discretion ability to put forth proposals as well as assure their implementation. One must not overlook the symbolic value of this position, as a unifying element in foreign policy. Her authority in introducing proposals is shared in the area of CFSP with the Member States (Art. 30.1, TEU) and in the
other areas of EU external action with the European Commission (Art. 22.2, TEU). Nevertheless, success is not guaranteed by her being granted formal right of initiative. Other features, such as institutional rules, and the preferences and eagerness of other actors to achieve convergence of views (Pollack 1997:130) are of increased importance. The rule of unanimous decision (prevalent in CFSP initiatives) is a good example of restricting elements to policy setting.

The Lisbon Treaty creates a framework for the unification of external action. The responsibilities of the HR will touch upon external economic relations of the Union (in her VP capacity of the Commission) as well as CFSP related matters (in her HR and Chairman of FAC capacity). This can be seen as an attempt to create a more robust and all-encompassing, coherent external action (Laursen, 2010:6). From an EU-integration standpoint, the Lisbon Treaty recognized the ‘functional indivisibility’ of CFSP and external relations decision-making previously divided between the EU Council Secretariat and the European Commission. However, Furness (2013:110) finds that the Treaty did not alter the various legal frameworks and decision-making procedures for different policy areas with international implications, such as foreign and security policy, trade, enlargement, migration, environment and development; it also omits specifications about how the new institution setting would work in practice when it came into force.

Furthermore, within the expanded Petersburg tasks, the Lisbon Treaty allows the possibility of a ‘coalition of the able and willing’ to be allocated certain tasks. Although these flexible provisions within CFSP and CSDP can be seen as progressive, away from the restricting requirements of unanimity, nevertheless, one must not overlook the repercussions they have in creating and solidifying a collective common identity among all Member States. This common identity furthermore could provide more efficiency in some cases (Laursen, 2010:17). The repercussions of this initiative may result in two ways: a) the control of a
comparatively small number of countries over the decisions taken with respect to military matters (nevertheless assuring the required capabilities in order to cover the requirements of each initiative) and b) the more volatile response to challenges whilst relieving the countries that are unable to contribute. Nonetheless, the consensus-based EU identity (and especially its projection externally) might be significantly weakened. The effect of this from a normative standpoint is debatable (see Chapter 2).

Although the launch of a CSDP mission will be decided by the Council (acting unanimously) and development programmes adopted by the whole College of Commissioners, the Treaty adds that it is the HR “acting under the authority of the Council and in close contact with the Political and Security Committee, [that] shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks” (Lisbon Treaty, 28B.2) and “may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate”. The Lisbon Treaty sets the HR as the principle coordinator of civilian and military instruments. This pivotal role is supported by a specific mandate in order to acquire the highest degree of cooperation between Member State, CSDP and Commission external relations instruments. It therefore provides an opportunity to create a new EU foreign and security policy. The innovations it introduces in the area of CFSP and CSDP are significant, but the comprehensive approach it has on the issue of external action gives rise to new potential for the EU in attaining the status of an international actor. The upgraded role of HR/VP and the establishment of the EEAS reveal a more strategic approach to foreign policy formulation. It also provides substantial potential for a coherent and efficient employment of all levels of EU instruments (including diplomacy, CFSP and CSDP) while enhancing the role of the EU Member States throughout the policy making and implementation stages of foreign and security policy.

Henökl (2014:1) finds the EEAS as a step away from a state centred approach in public administration. He underlines the importance of such an innovation in the area of foreign
policy, given that it is traditionally based on values/principles of state sovereignty (Henökl, 2014:1). He approaches his analysis of the EEAS from an “administrative space” perspective; his goal is to conceptualize the nature of the polity which is the EU in this area (Henökl, 2014:2). His focus is on the organizational components of the EU which entail a multi-level governance approach (Henökl, 2014:2). He argues that capacity-building on the European level is being impeded by inter-governmental dynamics (which are driven by state interests) which, as he points out, mirror this conflict of interests in the vagueness of the EEAS’ legal and institutional status (Henökl, 2014:3).

Menon (2011: 79) identifies an issue concerning the insufficiency of military assets in order for the EU to play the role it aspires. Depending on the reading of this statement one can draw valuable conclusions. If it were to be viewed from a realist approach, it means that the EU needs a force of coercion in order to become a potent international actor and to some extent impose its dominance in the varied areas of its external action. From an alternative normative standpoint, one must comprehend that the significance of a military force (comprehensive in its competence and coherent in its organisation) is of increased symbolic importance in assuring the smooth implementation of any policy it engages, whether that is within civilian missions or other initiatives of a clearer normative nature. As further elaborated in Chapter 2, the safeguarding of initiatives within the competence of the EEAS can be accomplished with the symbolic presence of a military power without it resulting in the exercise of coercion.

The EU has made its aspirations apparent within the Lisbon Treaty to become an all-encompassing international security actor, consistently employing the whole scale of instruments at its disposal. This endeavour and self-identification becomes more apparent in the trajectory and language incorporated consistently in the Comprehensive Approach (2013) and most recently the EUGS (2016) and its Implementation Plan (2016). However, in its attempts to formulate a more integrated, ‘strategic’ international security policy, the EU has
risked undermining the apolitical character of its aid, a cornerstone of its much-coveted normative identity (Zwolski, 2012a:988). This discussion is essential in the evaluation of the EEAS’ efficiency as well as the impact of the institutional dynamics that appear within the security-development nexus of the EU’s initiatives (see section 4.5.2).

Regardless of this, the EU has long been promoting the view that security and development problems are closely interlinked. Therefore, they require a comprehensive response, including assets that can be deployed in the short, medium and long term. This view is instilled in the major strategic documents of the EU, such as the ESS (2003), the Comprehensive Approach (2013), the EUGS and its Implementation Plan (2016) but also in its regional multilateral agreements, such as the Cotonou Partnership, as well as the more thematically oriented documents, such as the EU Maritime Security Strategy (2014).

However, even though new Community instruments offered an opportunity for the EU to assume a more effective role as a comprehensive security actor, their formal separation from CFSP and CSDP undermined the consistency and strategic focus of the EU’s external action. The institutional reforms provided in the Lisbon Treaty, particularly the upgrade of the EU’s HR and the establishment of the EEAS, aim to alleviate this flaw. By effectively converging the variety of bureaucracies and assets of the EU, the EEAS can trigger the generation of more ‘strategy’ and the accomplishment of consistency in the EU’s affairs as a global security actor. However, the same consolidation that can turn the EU into a more ‘strategic’ and effective security actor raises strong objections from those concerned with the impartiality and credibility of the EU in the areas of development and humanitarian assistance (see Chapter 6 and 7 for a more case-specific evaluation). This debate demonstrates the conflict between two well-established EU norms: the norm of taking a holistic approach to international security, and the norm of apolitical development aid being deployed, solely on the basis of the economic needs of recipient countries (Zwolski, 2012:989).
The purpose of the reforms introduced with the Lisbon Treaty is to enable the HR to “ensure overall political coordination of the Union's external action, ensuring the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union's external action” (Council 2010:36). This also undermines the criticism that the EU lacks a 'grand strategy', and therefore is under-equipped to utilize the different security instruments that it has at its disposal in a consistent manner (Biscop 2009; Howorth 2010). It also challenges the criticism that Community instruments themselves have not been used in a sufficiently strategic way to have a sustainable effect on the structure of foreign policy (Keukeleire and Mac Naughtan 2008:228). Currently, the institutional structures have been set in place in order to allow for a potential increase in consistency as well as a more strategic scope to the EU's external action, which includes international security policy.

Kaunert and Leonard (2012) view the change in the institutional structure of the EU and the enhancement of the legislative framework deriving from the Lisbon Treaty as a result of exogenous factors-shocks (2012:417). They observe a turn towards an enhanced supranational security governance in the EU as well as a broadening of the EU security agenda. This perspective functions as an antithesis to the commonly perceived endogenous factors (commonly brought by the Member States) that pressure the EU into evolving its policy and thus coping with the need to address international issues. The involvement and interest the EU has shown in advancing itself in the sector of security is important yet contested by some depending on their theoretical standpoint. The expansion of the EU’s approach towards security has gone beyond the traditionally accepted military perspective. It has come to include threats that can only be resolved with ‘soft power tools’ (see section 4.5.2). It is at this point that the academic dichotomy takes place: those who engage in a military understanding of security view the EU as weak while the ones supporting a broader view of security consider the EU as an increasingly potent security actor (Kaunert and Leonard, 2012: 418). This becomes
especially important when taking into account the repeated formal expression of the EU’s ambition to become a global security actor (Kaunert and Leonard, 2012: 418), which is most recently underlined in the EUGS (2016: 3-4).

4.4 The European Security Strategy (ESS)

In 2003 the EU set out its strategic vision for what would become external action, known as the European Security Strategy (2003). This vision was later complemented and refined by its Implementation Report in 2008, thus setting the ground for the changes that ensued with the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and culminated in the establishment of the EEAS (2010). The nature of the threats and challenges was complex and therefore called for a comprehensive, all-encompassing approach which would employ the whole array of EU resources ranging from diplomatic and trade to development and crisis management instruments (Quille 2010:56). For this reason, emphasis was placed upon commitment to multilateralism thereby creating a need for threats and challenges to be addressed through international cooperation. A second important innovation was the express need for prevention (rather than resolution) as well as the link between economic development and the level of security, which would provide the post-conflict aims. The trajectory of strategic documents altered significantly after this point leading to the latest EU strategy, the EUGS (2016). This evolution of EU strategic documents will be examined in more detail through the coding of the critical frames (section 6.2)

The ESS remained the most comprehensive attempt to formulate an all-encompassing European foreign policy. Although it depicted the broader range of threats Europe was facing in 2003 and put forth policy implications, broadly providing manners with which the Union could become more involved, more competent and more coherent in its foreign action. Nevertheless, the level of explicit guidance it provided was quite vague. It introduces few explicit and specific recommendations, therefore leaving implementation processes and
measurement of success in a vacuum. Therefore, the ESS can only be seen as providing a
guideline. As Matlary (2006:115) points out, the ESS is an indication of a strategic approach
but is based on the values of intergovernmentalism and unanimity. It also does not explicitly
specify the importance of UN mandate nor does it provide the existence of a mandate as a
requirement for military force deployment (Matlary, 2006:115). This stresses the need to
develop a more complete strategic framework especially with the growing importance of the
role of external action and the establishment of the EEAS. Even more so, with the vision
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (2007) emphasising the importance of a more comprehensive
external actoriness, the ESS itself as a fundamental document falls short in clarifying the role
of institutions. These shortcomings became more apparent in the years to come, particularly
with reference to the security-development nexus (see section 4.5.2); this gap became even
more problematic with the establishment of the EEAS.

In the delineation of specific strategic provisions, the EU strategy lacked focus both on
geographic areas as well as areas of military engagement, namely maritime. As far as regions
are concerned, the eastern and southern neighbourhood, Central Asia, the Gulf and sub-Saharan
Africa were not explicitly provided for despite their importance with relation to the EU’s
international role. Until the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS, 2014), growing concern
had also been identified by the international community in the area of maritime security.
Although this threat was highly visible in certain geographic areas (ie Horn of Africa), it raised
global concerns, thus demanding coordinated efforts on the same scale. An opportunity to
address this issue appropriately appeared through the Lisbon Treaty’s provision for
multilateralism and more specifically as supporting the UN, especially in scenarios considered
to involve the responsibility to protect.

Although an explicit ‘comprehensive approach’ did not appear as such until 2013,
elements of this concept were included in the ESS. As presented in Chapter 3, this frame is
particularly important in normative terms, seeing that it provides for the employment of all the means at the EU’s disposal to tackle the challenges it would face. Therefore, it is important to point out that even ten years prior to the Comprehensive Approach (COM, JOIN (2013) 30 final, 11.12.2013), the idea of combining both military and civilian means in external action existed within the EU’s intents. What is also interesting is the fact that coordination was not only foreseen with reference to employed means but also related to the creation of horizontal coherence, both between institutions as well as their respective policy areas. Furthermore, as discussed in this Chapter, the vision created by the Lisbon Treaty and reflected in the creation of the EEAS was precisely to achieve this continuity in terms of cohesion internally as well as complementarity externally in the EU’s initiatives. Therefore, a continuum of intent can be identified, culminating in the establishment of the EEAS institutionally and the Comprehensive Approach conventionally.

According to Hynek (2011:82), the ESS referred to the notion of ‘comprehensive security’. This position underlines the direct connection between peace, development and political stability. It explicitly stressed the need for civilian and military instruments to be used together, promoting the development of “operations involving both military and civilian capabilities” (European Union 2003:13). This point is complemented by Cornish and Edwards (2005:810) who find the need for a more comprehensive approach to security related situations that would call for more than military action (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:810). They underline the need for civilian measures (ie. Political, economic, police intelligence and humanitarian action) and find the EU “particularly well-equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations” (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:810). Stress is put on the need for a more strategic approach in order to optimize and enhance this form of well-rounded action against security threats (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:810). They find the ESS as an important step towards the institutionalization of ESDP: at once it provided the response to the needs of the missions that
would be carried out as well as incentive to the states and the HR (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:810). Cornish and Edwards (2005:814), through the ESS document, identify an increased concern when it comes to preventive diplomacy over the past decade. They posit that in order to achieve the aforementioned manner of intervention and action (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:810), the gap in coordination which appears, even though agreement on which states can be considered as failed is wide, must be covered. Although this coordination is essential, reports reveal that in most cases it is still undependable. They underline the need for efficient interaction between member states, the Council (and its mechanisms) and the Commission in order to assert preventive diplomacy (Cornish and Edwards, 2005:814).

The 2008 Implementation Report of the ESS (S407/08, 11 December 2008) adds some new security challenges, beyond traditional threats, related to climate change, information systems and energy resources (ESS Implementation Report, 2008: 1). It also expands on the security-development nexus particularly with reference to terrorism and non-proliferation. Furthermore, it explicitly addresses the effect of state failure on EU “security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy” (ESS Implementation Report, 2008:1) thereby clearly stating its interest in tackling the previously untouched issues related to maritime security. Within the aforementioned phrase, the case of Somalia is essentially illustrated. What makes this reference to Somalia even more interesting is the fact that the EU’s first maritime operation, EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 10 November 2008), was launched a month before the publication of the Implementation Report. Therefore, the importance of the case itself, is raised to a level of strategic importance through its incorporation in this document. Additionally, the link presented between state failure and criminal behaviour, underlines the interconnected nature of deeply rooted causes with arising security threats, and it is this issue lies at the crux of the situation in Somalia (chapter 5). What the Implementation Report contributes to this discussion is the interest of the EU to address
both levels of the problem. When seen within the context of the ESS’ call for a comprehensive approach, one cannot fail to notice the similarities with the current operational setting in Somalia, whereby the military initiatives (EUNAVFOR and EUTM) are complemented by civilian missions (EUCAP Somalia) in an effort to accomplish both short term (security focused) as well as long-term (developmental) results. Further to the elaboration on the security-development nexus (section 4.5.2), the normative underpinnings of this conceptualisation emerge, particularly with reference to norm diffusion. The ESS and its Implementation Report would clearly fall under Manners’ (2013:316) ‘informational diffusion’ (see Textbox 1), but the provision of humanitarian assistance, engagement and support related to the long-term goals would also relate to ‘transference diffusion’ within the framework of NPE. Therefore, the contribution of the Implementation Report is not restricted merely to covering the gaps left by the ESS, but also compliments its normative significance through the expansion of the EU’s aims as well as the links it introduces between them.

Zwolski (2012) goes further in providing insight on the ESS from a discourse point of view. He argues that the rhetoric emphasizing a holistic approach to security, incorporating military as well as civilian and development policy instruments, has become dominant in the EU and remains largely uncontested (Zwolski, 2012:994). The 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS underlines that “there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace” (European Council 2008:8). Biscop and Coelmont (2010:9) reiterate that “in line with ESS, such a proactive policy will be preventive, multilateral and holistic, putting to use all instruments at the disposal of the EU, of which CSDP is an integral part”. From the aforementioned, the pertinence of the comprehensive approach as a critical frame becomes apparent. The ESS, as a first step in the conventional organisation of this concept, introduces the combination of military and civilian means as the way forward in CSDP. Following the
discussion presented in Chapter 2, the link with NPE is apparent: concerned with the employment of means rather than the nature of the means themselves, normative power as a conceptual tool foresees the employment of all means at the disposal of an actor as long as they are utilised in a non-coercive fashion. Furthermore, the ESS highlights a parallel between internal and external security. The notion of interconnectivity between these two elements is pivotal within the Comprehensive Approach (2013) as well as the relevant Action Plan (2015). Additionally, emphasis is put on the centrality of multilateralism in the effective operationalisation of the concept. This element is further expanded within the sub-strategies focusing on geographic areas (Horn of Africa, 2011) as well as areas of operational engagement (EU Maritime Security Strategy, 2014). Therefore, post-EEAS, the EU’s effort to compensate for the shortcomings of the ESS is more visible, thereby further illustrating the argument set forth in this thesis concerning the catalytic role of the EEAS’ establishment in the EU’s normative actorness. Following from the above, the creation of the EEAS appeared to be the institutional attempt to coordinate action taken within the internal-external security nexus as well as that relating to internal coherence. Although that may have been the vision of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and ensuing Council Decision establishing the EEAS (2010/427/EU), the case of its effective function is a debatable issue, both internally as well as externally (see section 4.5).

4.5 The EEAS: role and importance

The EEAS was created by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty to support the new ‘double hatted’ office of European Union (EU) High Representative for Common Foreign Security Policy/Commission Vice President (HR/VP). The “organisational hybrid” which is the EEAS, comprises of a broad range of structures encompassing foreign aid and development, international crisis management and defence units, with personnel including officials with
national and supranational organisational origins. As a bureaucratic actor, the Service is comprised of staff and departments from three sources: a) the former European Commission Directorates General (DGs) for external relations and development, b) the external affairs parts of the European Council Secretariat and c) Member States secondments. Its intended goal is to increase the capability of the EU to pursue its interests and values internationally ultimately strengthening Europe’s influence on global matters in a more multipolar world. This is a pivotal point for the EU's foreign policy and its own actorness. If the EU fails to reconcile the structural tensions within the EEAS, particularly appearing within the security-development nexus of its activities (see section 4.5.2) it cannot fulfil its role and the member states will lose confidence in the value of a common framework in foreign affairs. The opportunity, nevertheless, if it succeeds, is the reinvention of its role internationally (Hemra et al, 2012:2).

The Service has to face the additional difficulty of coordinating foreign policy previously formed and handled by the rotating EU presidencies. An important point that has been raised with respect to the delineation of EU external action is the strategic vacuum which is prevalent in dealing with the aforementioned issues (Hemra et al 2012:1). The absence of an explicit and comprehensive statement of the interests and objectives guiding EU foreign policy are highly detrimental to its acquiring a global identity in a constantly evolving international arena. Nevertheless, the consecutive steps that have been taken on a strategic level prove that the overall actorness of the EU in external action is further being specified through the interaction of the comprehensive approach with multilateralism. The first steps in overcoming the vagueness exhibited in the ESS (see section 4.4) appeared within its Implementation Report

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7 Although the internal dynamics of the EEAS are not questioned as such, elements of the functions carried out by the Service as a whole or by individual structures as well as subsequent critiques are accounted for to demonstrate the potential mis-alignments that may appear in the operationalisation of CSDP initiatives. This is particularly important in terms of an NPE evaluation considering De Zutter’s (2010) submission concerning the continuity between internal and external practices as a core element of normativity. Additionally, this aspect becomes more crucial for the purposes of this thesis in view of the comprehensive approach, which essentially encapsulates the continuity of the internal-external nexus within the CSDP framework more broadly, as well as the delineation of military operations more specifically.
(2008) and continued in the strategies that followed. More specifically the Comprehensive Approach (2013), which although not a strategy, defines the intent of the EU to progress in a fashion that employs and combines its military and civilian capabilities while interconnecting the relevant policies to facilitate this coordination, as well as the Global Strategy (see section 6.5) indicate the gradual refinement of the EU’s external action priorities as well as the ways by which it foresees them progressing. The elements that become apparent through the critical framework analysis of these documents are the following: a) the explicit global role the EU is determined to establish as an actor, b) the extensive outlining of the multilateral cooperation it is basing its initiatives on c) the willingness to develop an autonomous presence while retaining the aforementioned commitment to multilateralism and d) the increasing importance it sets on the role of the EEAS to bring together all the aforementioned tangents within the delineation of its external action (see Chapters 6 and 7).

4.5.1 Structural tensions: forming a Service ‘esprit de corps’

The internal coherence of the EEAS’ bureaucracy is also an element that has attracted interest, particularly around the subject of whether the officials functioning within it, despite their differing institutional backgrounds, can develop an esprit de corps. Juncos and Pomorska (2014:302) define it as “shared beliefs and values among the individuals within a group and their desire to achieve a common goal”. They find that this has not been achieved to a satisfactory degree thereby concluding that the lack of esprit de corps could become an inhibitory factor in the coherence and effectiveness of the EEAS itself. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty raised expectations about a more effective and coherent European foreign policy headed by the new HR and supported by the EEAS (Juncos & Pomorska 2014:302). Much commentary on the Service has revolved around the political circumstances of its establishment, its performance and the legal provisions regulating its functioning (for example,
Lehne, 2011; Smith, 2013; Wouters and Duquet, 2012). The fact that the EEAS is composed of officials originating from three different institutions (the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat and the foreign ministries of the Member States), with potentially different mentalities and values, has made this a particularly challenging process to manage. David O’Sullivan (2011:3), EEAS Chief Operating Officer, pertinently portrayed this challenge: “In terms of organizational culture, the merger of the different EEAS’ component parts is not unlike a merger between corporations: it brings with it the challenge of establishing a common identity.” Research has also shown that while officials identify strongly with the EEAS and believe that its establishment has been a positive step for the EU to take, they have complained about the lack of an esprit de corps within the organization (Juncos and Pomorska, 2013).

According to Tomic (2013:228) EU foreign policy is turning into an integrated bureaucracy also comprising of non-elected actors (such as seconded national diplomats) and slowly abolishing its intergovernmental character. The institutions assigned with the full range of the policy process are the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and its advisory bodies: the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). PSC has been characterized as the “de facto highest administrative body in the ESDP” (Vanhoonacker et al, 2010:9). The EUMC is the highest military body in the CSDP; it is assisted by a working group and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS). The latter consists of military and civilian experts and have been integrated into the EEAS (Tomic, 2013: 228).

The civilian aspects of CSDP policy have been allocated to CIVCOM and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). CPCC is now part of the EEAS (Tomic, 2013: 228). Aside from the specialized institutions on the military and civilian aspects, the CFSP/CSDP framework is also supported by the Crisis Management and Planning Directory (CMPD); it has
been integrated into the EEAS and charged with the representation of a single strategic planning structure in the CSDP (Tomic, 2013:228).

The EU is not adequately unified on this matter and this inhibits its ability to create a strategic profile. It is also found quite slow in its foreign policy action and lacks substantively in coercive diplomacy (Matlary, 2006:110). Matlary finds the EU to be an international actor in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria: it is premised on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and market economy principles; it also considers the satisfaction of the aforementioned values as preconditions in all its external relations-ie membership procedures and with third countries (Matlary, 2006:114). She provides the definition of strategic actor as: “the ability to threaten the use of force through coercive diplomacy and the ability to actually deploy force” (Matlary, 2006:112). She adds that both of the aforementioned have political will, political ability as well as military capability as prerequisites. She supports the use of coercive diplomacy, nevertheless she points to the inherent paradox: “The EU can be expected to be able to deploy force with more and more capability and legitimacy, but it cannot be expected to threaten the use of force effectively” (Matlary, 2006:112). On this point, Hyde-Price, (2004:341) concludes that there should be a new European approach towards the use of coercive military power: one that is aligned with the normative values and democratic political culture. He underlines the necessity of retaining military force as an instrument of last resort (Hyde-Price, 2004:341). Therefore, the importance of acquiring coercive means and employing coercion (or being expected to do so) in the arena of diplomacy becomes more of mixed image. This question lies at the crux of the theory underpinning this research and further demonstrates the difficulty in applying a normative power lens on the examination of the EU’s military operations as part of CSDP. Nevertheless, it employs military means as part of the diffusion of its normative intents without in fact (or scarcely) resorting to the use of force, thereby rendering it a normative power, both in identity as well as in actorness.
As pointed out by Lefebvre and Hillion (2010:2), the employment of diplomats in the staff ranks of the EEAS is indicative of the belief that diplomacy, although traditionally being considered an area of State sovereignty-policy and subsequently a domain suited for intergovernmental procedures, can include elements of a ‘functionalist’ method (Lefebvre and Hillion, 2010:2). An institutionalised cooperation between the seconded national diplomats could result in a new form of solidarity under an EU perspective. Henökl (2014:16) finds that “such phenomena of interwoven multi-level European bureaucracies deserve attention, since they are indicators of a transformation of the European political order and a rebalancing of the EU’s institutional equilibrium”.

Nevertheless, Riddervold and Trondal (2017) find that the EEAS has managed to establish a relatively independent mode of action (Bátora 2013; Blom and Vanhoonacker 2015; Henökl 2015), suggesting administrative autonomy from the member-state governments. They also identify that it has also integrated into the Commission thereby suggesting a potential “‘normalisation’ or ‘communitarisation’ of CFSP policy processes” (Riddervold and Trondal, 2017: 33), thus further demonstrating development beyond the formally intergovernmental procedures. An explanation to the aforementioned administrative integration can be linked to the EU’s comprehensive approach. Stemming from the Lisbon Treaty, this approach calls for “consistency between the different areas of EU external action and between these and other community policy areas” (Riddervold & Trondal, 2017:41). The broader initiative it reflects towards better coordination is seen both on horizontal and vertical relations. As Lægreid et al (2014) add, the administrative doctrines corroborate the need for ‘better coordination’. This quest for coordination of the EU administration has affected the way officials from the Commission administration and the EEAS administration work together and thus how the EEAS has settled within the Commission’s family of DGs.
As an important part of the general framework of the EU in international security and foreign affairs, CSDP overlaps partially with CFSP from an institutional standpoint. The first steps towards the determination of its infrastructure were taken with the establishment of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and the EU Military Committee (EUMC). This effort was followed by initiatives in the civilian dimension with the establishment of the Civilian Crisis Management Committee. Slow progress in this field is attributed to the preference shown by Member States for non-binding mechanisms in the field of improving capabilities (Reynolds, 2006; Witney, 2008).

From an institutional perspective, what is considered within the scope of Community as ‘external relations’ remains essentially within the range of action of the Commission (e.g. Trade, external aid programmes), while issues of “foreign and security policy” continue to be resolved predominantly by unanimous decision in the Council (and European Council) [Art. 31.2 TEU]. One of EEAS’ most important assets is that it could act as *sui generis*, without being confounded with the Commission and the Council Secretariat. It had also been approved that the crisis management structures (CSDP tools and CFSP budget) would fall under the authority of the Service while retaining their intergovernmental nature. The Commission delegations would be integrated into the EEAS and placed under the authority of the HR.

In relation to the organizational structure, Henökl (2014:10) expresses his concern about the ties with the Commission. He finds that the EEAS’ dependence on the Commission’s expertise and infrastructure complicates the autonomy of the Service’s standing and affects its freedom of creating an identity of its own. Although from an integration perspective, the bond between the two institutions is considered positive, it nevertheless hampers the evolution of the EEAS into something more in the future and living up to the expectations provided in the text of the Lisbon Treaty. What complicates issues more is the dependence of the EEAS from the
Commission when it comes to the latter’s competences (via DEVCO) in the Financial Instruments Service (Henökl, 2014:10).

Henökl (2014:5) also provides an interesting insight of the EEAS legal standing which affects both its independence as an institution but also limits its potential in creating an identity of its own, ultimately rendering it dependent upon the initiatives of other actors within the EU (both institutions and Member States). He underlines the EEAS’s lack of legal personality (unlike all other regulatory agencies) stemming from the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, he points out that from a legal perspective, the EEAS is endowed with a legal capacity to ‘perform its tasks and objectives’ (Henökl, 2014:5). It is apparent that the EEAS’ autonomy in its area of competence is to some extent reduced; although not fully capable of performing independently in the contraction of legal relations, it is given space to act freely in the formulation of the organization’s objectives (Henökl, 2014:5). He further argues from an institutional perspective that the EEAS is not considered a core institution, but rather a body created under secondary law (Henökl, 2014:5). Its legal standing is reduced given that no decisions that have legal effect can be produced by the EEAS (Henökl, 2014:7). Nevertheless, Henökl (2014:7) argues that through Service Level Agreements, the EEAS creates legal ties with other EU institutions. Therefore, one may argue, that indirectly the Service does have effect on the contractual relations of the EU without having to bear the full repercussions of the entailed obligations; this also means that it does not profit from the full extent of the benefits/rights foreseen within the legal agreement. A contentious point is also the Services limited legal standing before the Court. This is directly linked to the initial problem of its legal personality mentioned above. Therefore, for the time being the EEAS is once again bound by proceedings involving the European Parliament, Commission and Council (Henökl, 2014:7). In extension to this argument, the issue of the EEAS’ fit in the institutional framework is accentuated, particularly in view of its reduced legal standing. By not profiting from a full range of benefits, the
importance of the Service in a legal sense is presented as inferior to that of the other institutions with which it has to coordinate for the design of external initiatives. Furthermore, this undermines the pivotal role it has been allocated within external action, seeing that it will require the consenting opinion of an institution whose decisions have legal effect. Therefore, within a legal understanding, the EEAS’ impact is reduced even though its role has been presented as crucial. In turn, from a normative perspective, this issue indicates that although the EU has identified its intent in establishing a coherent and comprehensive actor in external relations – the EEAS- it appears to not reflect this vision within the relevant law. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, the creation of the Service may be seen as an important step towards evolving normative power through external action, nevertheless, it is not echoed within its legal framework hence reducing the normative impact of the EEAS and subsequently the EU.

According to Meyer (2005:537), the new European structures for decision-making in security and defence lend themselves for the creation of a convergent mode of strategic thinking (an issue further analysed below). The Office of the HR (and now the EEAS) can become the means appropriate for the institutional induction of a learning process, capable of delivering a socialization effect (Meyer,2005:537). Given their foundation in the very identity of the actors and that they have been deeply ingrained in their perception of defence and security, they could be taken as a point of reference for the creation of a collective set of rules for appropriate behavior (Meyer,2005:529).

Morillas (2011:243) argues that although the policy-making procedure within the two strands of foreign policy after the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty still remains to its majority intergovernmental, changes have been made as a result to the increased power of initiative bestowed upon the new structures introduced by the Treaty (with particular reference to the HR/VP and the EEAS). These newly appointed powers are now shared with the previously exclusive powers held by the Member states and the rotating presidency of the
Council (2011: 244). He posits that the innovations indirectly put forth a “process of institutionalization be practice” (2011:243) in foreign policy initiative, particularly through the prominent personalities allocated within the new EU structures, the reformulation of the procedures introduced in the formulation of policy papers and the tackling of crisis challenges. He underlines the potential in the institutionalization of foreign policy now appearing through the establishment of the EEAS which not only provides a rule-governed basis for taking action but also includes a budget of its own, staff and permanent headquarters for the sole purpose of external action (2011:244). The essence of Morillas’ contribution to the debate can be summarized as follows: although the policy-making framework has radically changed by alleviating the exclusivity of the power of the Member States and the presidency of the Council and bestowing upon the newly established EEAS and the HR/VP powers of initiative, the rule of unanimity (especially within the process of engaging with CFSP issues) remains prevalent hence keeping the decision-taking procedure highly intergovernmental. This can be seen as a balance being struck between innovation on the level of exterior presence of the EU in the area of external action while retaining the traditionally held power of effect on the Member States.

As Ioannides (2010:45) points out, one of the most crucial tasks the EEAS is responsible for is the enhancement of CSDP-CFSP coordination, given that the successful outcome of CSDP operations depends on the long-term sustainable political strategies which are associated with CFSP. The EEAS has the potential of evolving into a promoter of cooperation and cohesion spanning across the decision-making processes that include Member States, EU institutions and officials. By bestowing upon the HR and her supporting staff the formal right for policy initiative, the Lisbon Treaty has provided the foundation for a potentially new foreign policy advocator. Nevertheless, the influence that this actor can exercise is a process not an automatic attribute: this entails a masterful and effective use of the full range of assets combined with adequate strategic guidance.
4.5.2 The EEAS within the security-development nexus

An issue that has arisen within the external affairs that has attracted academic discussion is the reconciliation of the security and development policy objectives of the EU, with particular reference to international aid in conflict arenas. More specifically the reconciliation of short-term security and long-term development priorities lay at the crux of this discussion and become increasingly pertinent when examining the operational activity of the EU in the Horn of Africa through an NPE (see Chapter 2), especially Somalia (see Chapter 8). However, as Murdoch et al. (2014) observe, much of the available EEAS literature demonstrates a normative bias towards assessing how the new Service ought to be organized to make the EU a rational global actor (see for example Batora 2011; Carta 2011; Nivet 2011; Furness 2012). However, others offer more ‘positive’ analyses by examining its initial formation (Murdoch 2012), the roles and dynamics between its officials (Benson-Rea and Shore 2012; Duke et al. 2012; Juncos and Pomorska 2013; Vanhoonacker and Pomorska 2013), and discussing its initial vision for the harmonization of EU foreign policy (Duke 2012; Raube 2012; Furness 2013; Smith 2013; Wisniewski 2013).

The EU often struggles to support reconstruction and development in countries where insecurity and violent conflict coexist with deeply rooted socio-economic issues and extensive property (Overhaus, 2013:511). As witnessed in the Horn of Africa, and especially in Somalia, it has become increasingly apparent that piracy can be effectively dealt with only when maritime operations are complemented by parallel efforts at land. As Overhaus (2013:512) contends, the Treaty of Lisbon created “the prospect for better dealing with conflicts at the intersection of security and development” particularly through the creation of the EEAS. This research identifies this particular potential of the EU’s external action within NPE in theory and within the military operations in Somalia in practice. Normative power’s ability to combine
military means with non-coercive use (Larsen 2002; Maull 2005; see discussion in section 2.4.2) for the operationalisation of the EU’s intents largely in the area of development (see Chapter 6) demonstrates the pertinence of NPE when exploring external action and echoes this thesis’ argument that the creation of the EEAS is a catalyst in the establishment of the EU’s normative power.

The centrality of the security-development nexus within the critical frames of the ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘multilateralism’ and the ‘partnership-ownership’ binary also become apparent from the above. As Smith (2013:38) asserts “the comprehensive approach is largely about linking the EU’s new CSDP policing/military capabilities to its longstanding expertise in using civilian and economic foreign policy tools”. The need for a combination of means at the disposal of the EU is required to attain the effectiveness of its short-term (security) and long-term (development) goals – thus operationalising its “comprehensive approach”. As an international actor, it is required to cooperate with the other actors in the areas of interest as well as the recipient countries of its aid, hence demanding “multilateralism” in its action in order to achieve effective coordination. According to the World Development Report (2011, Conflict, Security, and Development 2 (World Bank 2011: 13) the swift availability of aid aimed at ameliorating living conditions in a timely and visible fashion can reduce tensions in the national governments. Nevertheless, the longstanding violence and state fragility can only be tackled with the coordination of short and medium-term aid which is supported by long-term approaches to establishing legitimate institutions (World Development Report 2011: 10). This has been the EU’s approach in its involvement in Somalia. By securing the transportation of aid to the population in need through EUNAVFOR Atalanta (within its multilateral cooperation with other international actors as well as more autonomously from 2015), training the local forces through EUTM while simultaneously promoting democratic governance culminating the 2017 elections, the EU has been operationalising the normative foundation
theorised within NPE. Furthermore, this conceptual understanding of effective aid provision demonstrates the importance of the coherence between intent-action-impact argued within this research. This comprehensive approach is reflected in the military initiatives of the EU and, due to the combination of non-coercive use of its means with civilian missions (EUCAP Nestor) that produce short-term as well as long-term changes, highlights the pertinence of the normative power paradigm and the focus of the EU in pursuing it through the multifaceted role it has attributed to the EEAS.

Additionally, seeing that the majority of CSDP operations are carried out in developing countries, the comprehensive approach is to a large extent an issue of bridging and coordinating the EU’s development cooperation agenda, which is mostly by civilian instruments and the Commission, with its foreign security policy agenda, which is dominated by EU Member States with reference to military/policing capabilities and the EEAS regarding strategic design and oversight. Furthermore, the comprehensive approach serves another purpose with regards to the timeframe set for the operationalisation of initiatives which also indicates the urgency for tackling the issues that arise. Seeing its pertinence to the security-development nexus, this approach attempts to link short-term crisis management/conflict resolution efforts with longer-term security sector reform and state-building efforts in order to ensure the sustainability of its results wherever the EU conducts its operations (Smith, 2013:38).

According to Overhaus (2013:511), the priorities proposed by the European Commission for the period following 2014 are mostly aimed at addressing the procedural and bureaucratic obstacles for EU aid in conflict states while neglecting to touch upon the underlying political problems. He posits that “It is unlikely that these problems will be solved by grand bargains and institutional design. Rather, confidence in the EU’s foreign policy system to deal with conflict states- and to bridge short-term crisis management and long-term development cooperation- will have to be created over time through practical cooperation”
Building on Overhaus’ (2013:511) observation, this research suggests that it is being seen to by the EU via the gradual establishment of a normative identity. Theoretically, normative power provides the opportunity for a long-term solution to be put in place through the diffusion of its intents. On a practical basis, the EU is demonstrating continuity through the implementation of its military means within the context of its operations in Somalia (see Chapters 6 and 7). The creation of the EEAS establishes a basis for a coherent operationalisation of the EU’s normative ambitions seeing that it is tasked with the oversight of the strategic planning as well as the operational practice on the ground.

The basis for the security-development nexus and the problematic operationalisation of the relevant intents is particularly apparent in the cooperation between the EU and the states of Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) within the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 (Overhaus 2013: 517). Based on this document, cooperation in this area included specific provisions on peace building and conflict prevention as well as on dealing with violent conflicts. Successive revisions in 2005 and 2010 put even more emphasis on the linkage between security and development in situations of fragile statehood. This becomes more apparent in a comparative reading of Art. 11 of the Cotonou Agreement from 2000 on 'Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and Resolution' and Art. 56 from the European Commission, Directorate-General Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid, Second Revision of Cotonou Agreement (European Commission, ACP- The Cotonou Agreement, accessed 20 June 2016).

Given the structure of the Service’s bureaucracy (see section 4.3.1), which includes personnel form the Commission and the Council Secretariat plus seconded diplomats from the member states, Avery (2011) foresees a “risk of friction and rivalry between EEAS and the services of the Commission”. Particularly when seen within the context of the security-development nexus, this friction could unfold as damaging since an important part of the EU’s
action in international affairs relates to common policies. The High Representative, who is also Vice-President of the Commission, could therefore steer the EEAS under its mixed institutional nature, both with reference to its internal makeup as well as to the institution which it would ultimately support within the double hatted role of the HR, to operate in many ways like a service of the Commission. Nevertheless, as Avery (2011) posits, this complication will require good cooperation on both sides in order to be averted.

The increasing overlap of security and development policy objectives has not yet prompted a better harmonization of these objectives within the EU's foreign policy system (Overhaus, 2013: 527). It was precisely the goal of the Lisbon Treaty to create the EEAS under the leadership of the HR as a systemic fulcrum for harmonizing different policies and objectives under a more strategic political framework, however, the new Service has not been able to exploit its potential in this regard. Instead, institutional rivalries between the Commission and the EEAS as well as within the EEAS between the sundry personnel backgrounds create an unsuitable environment wherein the initial objectives for the Service can be achieved. The nexus between security and development has also become more visible and has been accompanied with a widely concerning 'securitization' (Tannous, 2013: 350). More specifically the concern is identified in the merging of different policies under a single strategy which would be executed at the expense of genuine development matters. A number of intersections which have emerged support this fear, one of which being the strategy for the Horn of Africa (2011) (Tannous, 2013: 350). Even though these strategies have been prepared jointly with the Commission, it is evident, however, that the topic security and development is discussed in an increasingly political way, whereby issues such as piracy are more clearly linked with the EU's own security. Most importantly, the EEAS will only then become a systematic hub in dealing with the security-development nexus if Member States support it more forcefully than they did in the past - both in Brussels and in the partner countries. Based
on past experience, it is fair to say that the major obstacles for the EU to overcome the conflicts at the intersection of security and development are unlikely to be solved by grand bargains and institutional designs. Some country and regional settings seem to be more conducive to such cooperation than others (Overhaus, 2013: 528).

As part of the institutional re-allocation of duties, mainly from the Commission, the transfer of the DG Relex to the EEAS, especially country and region-related positions were transferred from the Directorate General for Development (DG Dev) to the EEAS. Staff from the former DG Dev remaining in the EU Commission now constitutes, together with the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO), the new DG 'Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid' (DEVCO). The new structure of DG DEVCO comprises of three political and thematic directorates (EU Development Policy, Human and Society Development and Sustainable Growth and Development), five geographic directorates (East and Southern Africa and ACP Coordination, West and Central Africa, Neighbourhood, Latin America and Caribbean, Asia, Central Asia, Middle East/Gulf and Pacific) and an administrative directorate (Tannous, 2013: 341). Therefore, the split existing within the Commission regarding developmental responsibilities into DG Dev (responsible for the ACP countries) and DG Relex (responsible for the ‘other countries’), has now been bridged. Within DG DEVCO the Directorate ‘EU Development Policy’ takes a leading role (Tannous, 2013: 341). It is tasked with the formulation of the general framework defining the direction of the Directorate General and is responsible for a range of initiatives ranging from budget support and policy coherence for development to assuring the effectiveness of aid and maintaining international development dialogue.

Even with the replacement of DG Relex by the EEAS, the cumbersome procedure was not simplified despite initial expectations that this would be the case (Tannous, 2013: 350). The EEAS, positioned outside the Commission, needs to maintain strong internal cohesion
within the complex system in order to avoid potential risk occurring from its operation parallel to the Commission as well as malfunctioning (Tannous, 2013: 350). This indicates the frail cooperation which is in place, despite the expectations which were put forward with the establishment of the EEAS. Although the assumption was that the creation of the new Service would simplify the processes taking place within a comprehensive approach to security and development, what appears to be a consensus within the literature is that they have fallen short. This gap between expectations and their operationalisation stems from the complex network of responsibilities, the heterogeneous nature of the personnel within the EEAS which lacks its own *esprit de corps* as well as the very core of the security-development nexus being disparate in terms of aims and urgency to be addressed. Ultimately, this particular element of the EU’s external action inhibits the very efficiency of its initiatives, given that the responsibility for making a decision and responsibility to act are situated within different parts of its institutional framework still without having achieved a smooth cooperation in bureaucratic terms.

An interesting element within the security-development nexus of the EU is highlighted by Terkovich (2014) with particular reference to the element of ‘crisis response’. According to Terkovich (2014: 150) the European Union (EU) has become a more prominent actor in the international realm of crisis management (Boin, Ekengren, & Rhinard, 2013). Within this area of external action, Member states acknowledge that they must increase their mutual cooperation capabilities given the rising number of transboundary crises (Ansell, Boin, & Keller, 2010). As she highlights (Terkovich, 2014: 151), the definition of an EU crisis is closely linked to and stems from the nature of the EU and rests upon the interpretation given to core societal values that necessitates immediate action (Rosenthal & Hart, 1989; Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort, 2001). Given its broad scope of applicability, ‘crisis response’ creates the space for overlap of institutional competences. More specifically, the emphasis on ‘crisis response’ can still be seen as competing with “the ‘crisis management’ competence of the CSDP and the
humanitarian/civil protection response led by DG ECHO” (Terkovich, 2014: 156). The tension within this nexus spill over into the lack of a straight-forward and precise system of competences is set within the EU, particularly the EEAS and EU Commission. The coherence and coordination of EU’s external action in the field of crisis management is the central aim of External Action Service’s Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department (CR&OC). This department was developed as one of the key foreign policy innovations of the Lisbon Treaty and tasked to ensure an effective horizontal Comprehensive Approach (Sherriff, 2013; Wollard, 2013) in responding to natural and man-made crises. This crucially includes the oversight of the member states’ involvement and ensuring effective exchange of information between them, as well as between member states and EU institutions (Terkovich, 2014:150). Different instruments have already been put in place or revised to accomplish better coordination: the EU Crisis Platform, the EU Situation Room, and the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements.

4.6 Lessons learned from operations

An important change in the traditional civilian character of the EU came with the “Petersburg Tasks”, thereafter permitting autonomous military crisis management operations (Adrian Hyde-Price, 2004:333). Adrian Hyde-Price (2004:332) argues that the lessons learnt in the 1990, with particular reference to Sierra Leone, the Balkans, and Somalia, are that seldom does diplomacy suffice for the resolution of complex situations such as incidents of aggression, human rights violations and or genocide.

Adrian Hyde Price (2004) presents one more key lesson gained by the aftermath of the situations in the 1990s: the crisis management and post conflict states required the collaboration of various actors and from the full range of possible action (economic, political, policing as well as humanitarian aid and military force). This emphasizes the need for bridging civilian
with military means in order to accomplish the most effective and efficient operational plan. He points out the need for a “comprehensive concept of security” and the necessity of examining “how the military dimension relates to other elements of a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional approach to international crises” (Hyde-Price, 2004:336).

Biava (2011:45) draws some conclusions about the scope of CSDP policy based on operations carried out. She finds that (as the ESS already states) CSDP operations have taken place within a multilateral framework of cooperation and acted complementarily to international operations (ie, EU in DRC: UN-MONUC) (Biava, 2011: 45). She also distinguishes the participation of the EU in long-term effects in the field as part of its global approach; these types of operations are comprehensive in their scope and aim at complementing broader strategic interests in the states/regions-fields (ie, operation Concordia-FYROM now an EU candidate state) (Biava, 2011:45). Furthermore, the EU appears to be interested in geographical areas surrounding it or that have historical links with the European continent; the majority of operations have been deployed in the Balkans. Biava (2011:45) purports that this engagement outside the limits of Europe “implies force projection” but also indicates “enlarged perception of the threats” and a “broader vision of security”.

According to Biava (2011:46), CSDP interventions are characterized by a high level of respect to international legitimacy. The interventions carried out within this framework have taken place after explicit invitation or based on agreement. In the few exceptions from the above, intervention was carried out after explicit demand by international organizations. Furthermore, CSDP interventions mostly take place after the actual conflict or crisis and aim at stabilization, peacebuilding or reconstruction (as was the case of the operations in the Balkans) (Biava, 2011:46). She also finds that most operations are of a civilian or civil-military nature (Biava, 2011:46). Additionally, civilian missions tend to be of a monitoring nature or supporting local authorities. Operations of a military nature appear small in scale and brief;
they are always based on explicit mandate and act as part of a broader operation sanctioned by the UN and in cooperation with other international organisations (either UN or NATO) (Biava, 2011:46).

Another important characteristic of EU operations is their level of adaptation on the field; the evolution of each situation is followed by a reconfiguration of the staff deployed on the field (ie. EUPM and EUFOR Althea) (Biava, 2011:47). It is interesting that CSDP missions are always followed up by another intervention or EU programme/initiative. This shows the long-term approach the EU takes on international operations and that the scope to its actions is not limited by ephemeral interests. It may also be considered a spark of a strategic culture, built on norm setting and value projecting rather than simple resolution and/or gain. On a military level, Biava (2011:47) posits that “this implies that an exit strategy is very often identified at the beginning”.

Menon (2011:80) underlines another practical shortcoming of CSDP which became apparent in operations. The aforementioned lack of military assets is not attributed to under investment. It mainly concerns the fluid consistency of the military forces deployed on the ground as well as the gap in their organisation. He finds that the “deployable forces, cannot always work together effectively” (2011:80). This lack of continuity, as goes on to analyse, has been partially covered by the Lisbon Treaty through the ‘permanent structured cooperation’ mechanism. This can only go that far. The broader issue which is actually identified in this instance is the lack of a cohesive and comprehensive strategic framework, capable of organising and effectively allocating the existing forces. This would not only increase the EU’s speed of intervention when that is of the essence, but it would also provide a clear goal to command of the units. An overall grand strategy is of dire need and, apparently, would be of the utmost importance in the creation, classification and solidification of the EU as a normative actor and power.
4.7 Conclusion

Since the Lisbon Treaty, the Union has been proposing the creation of a new security paradigm essentially adapted to international crisis management; this initiative is only barely challenged by the larger Member States (although this as an argument has been questioned with reference to the crisis in Libya, see Howorth 2012). That framework includes both a military and a civilian component but is continuously moving beyond the constraints of its constituents and creating a new compound identity. The fact that the EEAS is composed of officials originating from three different institutions (the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat and the foreign ministries of the Member States), with potentially different mentalities and values, has made this a particularly challenging process to manage.

The purported ambitions of the EU that are visible within CSDP could be summarized as follows: a) to create an institutional framework which would strengthen the ability to intervene internationally in situations threatening international security and b) to endow the EU with the material assets for intervening through co-ordination of military and civilian capabilities. CSDP has generated significant activity in both fields (military and civilian) which varied in terms of size, autonomously (Artemis 2003, in DRC, EUFOR Chad) as well as with the support of NATO (Concordia in FYROM, Althea). The number of requests now received for EU interventions indicates the enhanced role the EU has developed as a substantial partner in international crisis management (Bickerton, 2011:5).

Criticism concerning the role of Member States in the delineation of foreign policy (vertical coherence) and that of EU institutions (horizontal coherence) has been vigorous. The Union's ability to ensure post-conflict stabilization has been greatly hindered by shortcomings in resources, hesitation in implementation and bureaucratic rivalries. The result is absence of coherence in the EU’s approach for managing post-conflict situations in a comprehensive fashion (Korski & Gowan, 2009).
While the focus of EU institutions has increasingly revolved around development and security policies particularly in the mutual challenges of insecurity and poverty, the lack of a comprehensive strategy leads to significant improvisation. On the one hand, the ad hoc replies to this commitment have resulted in the development of a particularly fragmented EU toolbox to deal with these challenges. On the other hand, this raises important questions regarding the choice of appropriate legal bases for the various policy initiatives that span the security-development nexus. It is argued that the Lisbon Treaty, by interlinking the CFSP and development cooperation both constitutionally and institutionally, creates significant opportunities that, combined with the necessary political will, allow the EU to move beyond its ad hoc approach.

Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the EEAS present significant potential in the formation of a holistic approach of external action. Currently EU operations have been limited in range and more focused on underlining the role of CSDP than overcoming problems on the field (i.e. DRC 2006). Further steps have to be taken for the alleviation of the existing lack of coordination among the various components of external action, especially in the area of capabilities and the clear determination of the long-term goals of the EU as an international actor. The EU failed to participate in significant international crises in the Middle East, the Caucasus and East Asia as well as to intervene on a number of cases (Darfur, DRC 2008) thereby allowing for CSDP operations to have “come to serve as an alibi for a tendency to avoid broader international security responsibilities” (Menon, 2009:228; Bickerton, 2010:217-218). Pivotal in this last point is the exploration of a coherent strategic vision which will allow the EU to establish an identity founded upon coordinated action.
Chapter 5

Somalia

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide a historical overview of the main political changes in Somalia from the fall of the Barre regime (1991) and the first UN peacekeeping operation until the Somali Compact 2013. This overview will include the EU’s institutional engagement through contractual responsibilities with the African continent as a whole, particularly the Yaoundé association agreements (1963), the Lomé conventions (1975-1995), the Cotonou Agreement (200) and the JAES (2007). This will be followed by the tracing of the EU’s current links with the FGS, thus outlining the political elements of their relationship in normative terms. The EU’s military operations in Somalia (EUTM and EUNAVFOR) and its efforts in the Horn of Africa will be introduced briefly in this chapter to set up my argument for the empirical evidence which will be examined separately in the pursuant chapters given their increased weight in this research. This chapter will thus act as an illustration of the normative background of the intent-principle element within my analysis (see section 3.3). It will also delineate the reasons why the selected frames are important in contextualising the engagement of the EU in Somalia as well as highlight the points that will be further elaborated in the subsequent chapters wherein the content and critical frame analysis will be presented.

5.2 Historic overview of political changes in Somalia

Within this first section a historical overview of the domestic political scenery will be provided. Landmark political changes in the development of Somalia’s efforts to establish and reform its governmental structure will be highlighted within the framework of international
commitments more broadly and bilateral relations with the EU more specifically. The particular relations that derive from the operational involvement of the EU as well as the other international partners will be addressed in Chapter 6.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a contextual background which highlights the nodal points in the evolution of Somalia within the scope of international intervention, both within a humanitarian-development aid context as well as a security context. This will allow the drawing of conclusions concerning the problematic areas within which the impact of the EU’s involvement in the country was reduced. In tracing the origins of the problematic interaction of the two continents but also the alignment of the EU’s involvement within Somalia, the final Chapter will identify the issues that underlay the connection between the purported intents of the EU in its military operations, the actions that it underwent to operationalise them as well as the impact it intended to achieve as opposed to the effect that it actually accomplished. This initial overview of contractual relations between the two continents as well as between the EU and Somalia more specifically will also set the foundation for the analysis of the critical frames selected within this thesis. In understanding the root of the issues that arose in Somalia, the critical frames will focus on the ways the latter were perceived by the EU and thus allow for the evaluation of the operationalisation it selected in order to address them.

5.2.1 The fall of the Barre regime and UNOSOM

The chain of events leading to the EU missions started in 1991, when Somali dictator Siad Barre was ousted by a coalition of northern and southern based clans. The power struggle between the clans began shortly after the coalition’s victory, leaving the country in a war between warlords. As a result of the struggle, Puntland and Somaliland declared their independence. Of course, their sovereignty was, however, not recognized internationally.
Somaliland has been recognized as an autonomous region of Somalia. The former dictator and his followers remained in the south part of the country until mid-1992. The fighting in the rest of the country resulted in the devastation of Mogadishu and the agricultural areas in the country. This resulted in massive famine where approximately 300,000 people died. Due to the famine, the UN organized the peacekeeping mission: United Nations Operation (UNOSOM I) in Somalia I. UNOSOM I’s mandate was limited to self-defence and it was disregarded by the opposing warlords. This resulted in United States intervening in December 1992 by launching operation Restore Hope. The operation resulted in the end of the famine and when the American troops withdrew, they were replaced by UN troops (United Nations Operation in Somalia, UNOSOM II). Some militias saw the UN operation as a threat to their power resulting in large numbers of casualties, both military and civilian. The UN forces withdrew in 1995 without restoring rule of law. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), was formed in 2004 and has been the most recent attempt to restore the institution of the government in Somalia. Whether or not the intervention by Ethiopia in 2006, helped to give TFG support inside Somalia is debated. The African Union’s (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM) states that it did while other claims that TFG still struggle to gain popular support within the country (Oksamynna, 2011: 4). The intervention helped in driving out the Islamic Court Union (ICU) which splintered into smaller groups shortly thereafter. Some more moderate joined the first fight against TFG but later settled a peace agreement to end the bloody dispute. Another more radical faction, called Al-Shabaab still fights the TFG.

Following the fall of the Said Barre regime in 1991 the country had remained without a legitimate government until the institution of the TFG in 2004. Since the 1977-78 Ogaden War, the Barre government had focused all its efforts in sustaining the regime, while utilising money from aid-agencies in order to make ends meet (Menkhaus 1997). The very small circle of ministers during the regime rotated on a regular basis to avoid the rise of the opposition,
while it simultaneously preserved the interests of the most powerful clans and their leaders through its devolved security sector (Laitin and Samatar 1986). According to Henze (1991:125), the strategic location of Somalia allowed it to collect such an amount from foreign aid during the Cold War that it made up 57% of the country’s GNP by 1987. The aforementioned systematic corruption of the state, together with the predatory behaviour of its security forces (Menkhaus, 2014:156) were complimented by a “baseless optimism” on behalf of the donors (Rawson 1993:115) which led to a vicious circle of funding with no impact. The foreign funds that were meant for institutional capacity building were instead diverted outside the country by political elites, especially those closely related to the clansmen and the president (Menkhaus 2014:156). As Menkhaus (2014:156-157) observes this type of dynamic still persists. Therefore, the current state of Somalia cannot be attributed to relatively recent phenomena such as warlordism, but it is deeply rooted in the evolution of the state for the past 40 years. He goes even further on the matter of the political subculture that has appeared in noting: “To the extent that this behaviour has become the “new normal” in Somali politics, and deeply embedded in the shared norms of rival elites, it will be challenging to reverse.” (Menkhaus 2014:157).

The issue, therefore, that is highlighted can be detected within the normative foundation of the state and even further the profusion of this type of behaviour as the standard modus operandi. Subsequently, one can argue that the most effective way to tackle such a deeply embedded subculture and provide a long-standing solution to the appearing problems can only be through the effective diffusion of an opposing (or at least more functional) set of normative standards. As will be further demonstrated in ensuing sections, this understanding has been the basis of the EU’s efforts in the country. In deploying two complementary military operations as well as supporting them with a broader regional civilian mission (EUCAP Nestor now renamed to EUCAP Somalia), the EU demonstrates its commitment to operationalising a
‘comprehensive approach’, tackling both short-term security challenges as well as long-term development ones. The latter speaks most to the NPE framework, given its reformative character stemming from the diffusion of norms (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, it is telling of the approach the EU is taking in its external action, seeing that it has been geared towards a coordinated and holistic manner in resolving challenges within its global actoriness. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, this particular view is encapsulated and echoed within the establishment of the EEAS.

After the collapse of the regime an era of external efforts in state-building started. Pursuant to UNSC Resolution 794 in December 1992, the first peace keeping operation in Somalia – UNSOM – commenced as a response to the civil war and famine that ensued. The Resolution included a call for reconciliation for the revival of the state: “broad participation by all sectors of Somali Society (UN 1993), a task that was unprecedented (Clarke and Herbst 1997). Following a failed attempt to state-building “bottom up” -which included the empowerment of local communities to select their own leaders- and a four-month battle between the UN and a local warlord -peaking with the “Black Hawk Down” incident- UNSOM leadership decided to approach state-building in a “top down” fashion. This included a provision of power-sharing among the three dominant warlords of the country (Menkhaus 1994) which also failed and consequently, UNSOM was withdrawn in 1995.

Despite the international community’s continuous efforts to build and sustain a new government, the southern and central regions continue to be the arenas of insurgency and counter-insurgency, leaving the communities unprotected and facing famine. In the absence of a central government, the regional states such as Puntland, the secessionist state of Somaliland as well as districts and municipalities became the focus of institution-building post 1995. Since 2001, the efforts for institution building in the eastern parts of the country – Horn of Africa were more targeted towards increasing the state’s capacity to counter security threats,
particularly those connected to al Qaeda and its affiliates (Hammond and Vaughan-Lee 2012, 9-10). This new trajectory of ‘securitising’ the aid provided marks a shift from the previous “democratising” character of institution-building. In view of the rise of violent extremist movements, particularly the Somali based al-Shabaab, the process has been expedited (see Chapter 7). It has also broadened the type of donors and acting parties to include external militaries, UN peacekeeping operations and private defence contractors (Menkhaus 2014:158). The assistance in this direction which benefitted the entire eastern Horn of Africa region has also led to a shift in the provision of aid, henceforth emphasising security sector capacity building over human rights and accountability.

5.2.2 The Transitional Federal Government and Garowe Process (2011)

Although the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) (2004) made attempts to provide a new trajectory to Somalia’s domestic landscape which would advance from its previous dysfunctional character and allow the alleviation of the root causes for security concerns in the country, it has been accused on multiple occasions as perpetuating the aforementioned embedded corrupt practice (Hammond, 2013:184). The end of this period of transition commenced with what is known as the Garowe Process in 2011 when the representatives of the TFG, Puntland and Galmadug, together with a Sufi militia (Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a) aligned with the TFG decided to set the milestones out of the transition and decide upon the structure for the new government. This process was acknowledged as an effort to bring together actors beyond the TFG, therefore broadening the political process. Nevertheless, it was also criticised for the increased influence of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) as well as other western donors (Hammond 2013:184). An interesting point of contention was raised concerning the power-sharing arrangement that was set up (with a provision to be abandoned once the post-transitional government was established). It essentially institutionalized
discrimination against Somalia’s smaller clans (Garrowe Principles 2011, para. 1.c and later reintroduced in Garrowe Principles II 2012, Section II para. 3.1.b) which were granted half the rights of those attributed to majority clans in the selection of member for the new government.

When considering the efforts of the 1990’s in building the institutional layout of the periphery of the TFG, together with the discriminatory treatment of the smaller clans in the Garowe process, it is not difficult to foresee the perpetuation of tensions that would risk the unity of Somalia as well as the frail foundation for the establishment of a post-transitional government. Also taking into account the increased interest of the international community in “securitising” the eastern part of the Horn of Africa, particularly with the ongoing threat of al-Shabaab, the interest shown by the international donors appears to depart from the humanitarian concern (which was initially put forwards as the driving force for providing aid) and lead to an area that would make them appear self-interested. What is interesting is that the trajectory of the conventional framework set up with Africa, more broadly, and Somalia more specifically demonstrates fluctuations in the way it represents the donors as well as the recipients of aid. The initially almost controlling, portrayal of the EU for example in its involvement in the region (described also as “mentoring” by Haastrup (2013)) is softened in the later texts that focus more on presenting the concerned parties as partners/equals.

5.3 EU-Africa policy overview

Within this section an overview of the most important policy landmarks between the EU and Africa will be provided. These initiatives demonstrate the evolution of the relations between the two continents as well as highlight the changes occurring within the areas of cooperation. Therefore, this section will serve as a broader foundation which will contextualise the analysis of the EU military operations in the following Chapter.
The aim is therefore to demonstrate the nodal points in the relations between the two continents, both within a humanitarian-development aid context as well as a security context. This will allow conclusions to be drawn on the perception of challenges by the EU thus adding to the understanding of the operations it carried out (see Chapter 6). Adding to the previous section which presented the nodal political changes within Somalia, this section broadens the scope to incorporate the initiatives of the EU within the African region. Seeing that the majority of strategic documents concerning EU operational action are primarily on a continent-to-continent basis, this section will highlight the particularities of the two parties’ relationship and the domestic political issues of Somalia within them. This will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of the foundation upon which the analysis of the critical frames within this thesis rests. In understanding the perception of challenges within Africa, the critical frames will allow the EU perceptions to emerge and thus enable the evaluation of the operationalisation it selected in order to address them.

5.3.1 Yaoundé (1963) and Cotonou (2000)

The institutionalisation of the relations between EU-Africa were achieved through a series of policy texts from the 1960s with the Yaoundé association agreements. The first association agreement was signed in Yaoundé, Cameroon 1963 and subsequently renewed in 1969 (Yaoundé II). In this first instance, focus was set on reciprocal trade, technical and economic assistance. The accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973 led to a new single agreement with the additional former British colonies that led to the Lomé, Togo convention of 1975. The convention was subsequently renegotiated and entered into force in 1980 (Lomé II), 1985 (Lomé III), 1990 (Lomé IV), and with each renegotiation new issues were introduced which was a sign of the gradual development of the relations. These innovative issues included: non-reciprocal trade concessions (Lomé I); the globalization of EU-ACP cooperation (Lomé II);
economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as human dignity (Lomé III); and human rights, structural adjustment policy, economic diversification, intra-ACP regional cooperation, democratization and rule of law (Lomé IV).

The Cotonou Agreement (CA) 2000 was signed to provide the basic framework on how to pursue future EU-Africa relations. It set the ground for a more focused process, the Cairo process, that culminated into the 2007 and 2014 Joint Africa-EU Strategies; the latter two were more purpose-driven strategies, aimed at addressing the most pertinent issues in the EU-Africa relations. The new strategic partnership is based on a “Euro-African consensus on values and common interests” and is aimed at bridging the development gap between the two continents. It is broader in scope than the original agreements, seeing that it retains the concept of partnership which, in the early 1970s, was considered innovative in the conduct of North-South relations (Farrell, 2005). This notion of partnership is still fundamental to Africa-EU relations and has in fact been given stronger emphasis.

5.3.2 The Lisbon Strategy (2000)

In the Lisbon Strategy (2000), each of the eight strategic partnerships is presented separate from the Declaration with a rationale linking it to the overall objectives of the Joint Strategy. The Joint Strategy proposes a series of new approaches in order to respond to the following challenges: to move away from a donor-based relation towards a political partnership of equals; to build on positive experiences and lessons learnt from past experiences; to move away from inherited negative stereotypes and instead promote more accurate images of each other; to promote a mutual social and cultural understanding between the peoples of two Continents. The Joint Strategy thus establishes a partnership between Africa and Europe, in which both parties commit themselves to address a series of objectives on strategic priorities to support African countries in their efforts to achieve all Millennium Development Goals by
2015, and in general to promote political, economic and social development and the inclusion of Africa in the world economy. The Cairo Africa-EU Summit (2000) emphasised mutual benefits and both sides’ determination to strengthen their political economic and cultural understanding of the other through the creation of a constructive dialogue on economic, political, social and development issues. Europeans by and large were putting the accent particularly on peace and security issues, and Africans more and more on the trade and economic aspects of the partnership, including the need to address the debt problem. This disconnection is particularly problematic and simultaneously interesting within a normative evaluation. On the one hand, it demonstrates the perception of the EU side oriented towards providing security and therefore gearing its attempts towards short-term solutions. In turn this indicated the lack of interest in addressing the root causes of the challenges the Union perceived within its role as an international actor. Furthermore, what is implied is a fragmented and interest-driven approach to the evolving partnership. Given the increased power of the Council in the delineation of ESDP (at the time), this interpretation becomes more prominent seeing that the influence of rotating presidencies at the time essentially defined security priorities within an intergovernmental context rather than EU priorities in a supranational one (see Chapter 4). It further underlines the priority set by the EU in securing the area so as not to be affected by the arising issues, rather than aiding in the alleviation of the problematic issues it identified for itself. On the other hand, within a normative understanding, what becomes apparent is the absence of a dynamic construction of ‘normative identity’. Echoing Kavalski (2013) and Diez (2005), this process is essential to the substantiation of normative power. Therefore, within this period of negotiation, the EU falls short in addressing the needs of the party it is meant to support, thereby inadequately transforming its core norms into effective action.
5.3.3 The Joint EU-Africa Strategy (JAES) (2007)

The Lisbon Summit was the second EU-Africa summit held in 2007 which brought together the Heads of State and Government from the EU and Africa. At this Summit the JAES was adopted which was aimed at enhancing the already existing political dialogue in the following areas of partnership: Peace and security; Governance and human rights; Migration; energy and climate change; MDGs; Trade, infrastructures and development. To ensure a comprehensive implementation of the Joint Strategy and effective follow up mechanism, a first Action Plan was adopted. The dual concept of ‘one Africa and one Europe’ was the centrepiece of this strategy in that, for the first time, the EU wanted to “treat Africa as one” within a “continent-to-continent partnership” (JAES 2007, Section II para. 8) and act towards it in a more unified manner than before. But the EU also made it clear that the principal objective of its strategy towards Africa was to promote the achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (JAES 2007: 2, Section II, para. 8.ii).

The determination of these central objectives highlights an intent to evolve the EU-Africa relationship into a political partnership (see section 6.3.1) that goes beyond the issues that have traditionally dominated their relations (trade and development cooperation) and embraces a number of global concerns. Although this document will be examined in more detail in the following chapter, it is pertinent at this point to highlight two fundamental dynamics appearing within it that drive the current status of EU-Africa relations can be summarised as: deepening the relationship and jointly engaging the world community. To that end, the two parties have identified ten key political challenges that need to be addressed in order to achieve and maintain a successful partnership (JAES 2007:3-4, Section III, para. 9): a) to move away from their traditional relationship (aid-development) and forge a real partnership characterized by equality and the pursuit of common objectives; b) to build on positive experiences and lessons learned from the past; c) to promote more accurate images of
each other; d) to encourage mutual understanding between the peoples and cultures of the two continents; e) to recognize and fully support Africa’s efforts and leadership to create conducive conditions for sustainable social and economic development and the effective implementation of partner-supported development programmes; f) to work together towards gradually adapting relevant policies and legal and financial frameworks; g) to ensure that bilateral relations, dialogue and cooperation between one or more European and African countries contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in this Joint Strategy; h) to integrate in our agenda common responses to global challenges and strengthen our dialogue and cooperation in multilateral context; i) to encourage the full integration of members of migrant communities/diasporas in their countries of residence; j) to bear in mind that we can only achieve our objectives if this strategic partnership is owned by all stakeholders.

The Strategy for Africa (2005) is an interesting precursor upon which the JAES built and further elaborated upon, particularly with reference to issues such as ownership and partnership. Unilaterally formulated by the EU, this Strategy was received with scepticism and a great deal of criticism by key African players from its inception. Criticisms centred on the fact that the Africa Strategy had been developed without sufficient consultations and retained elements of a traditional, unilateral donor-client approach. It was also pointed out that the Strategy reflected a too biased European priority agenda, which would not be conducive to forging African ownership. In ‘The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership’ initiative, adopted by the European Council in December 2005, the primary goals of the EU’s Africa strategy were the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the promotion of sustainable development, security and good governance in Africa. Regional integration introduced under the heading Sustainable Economic Growth, Regional Integration and Trade is linked to the Economic Partnership Agreements, and to a whole array of objectives around the integration of Africa into the global economy, support for improved governance and for
compliance with EU rules and standards, aid for trade, and environment and climate policies. In this regard, the EU promoted African regional integration as a way to face the main problems affecting the African continent. According to the EU’s document, “The European Community’s Development Policy” (2000), regional integration and cooperation can both be considered instruments to tackle poverty and instability in developing countries, since they ‘facilitate integration into the world economy, conflict resolution and resolution of cross border problems, for example in the field of environment.’.

The Joint Strategy solidifies the relations between EU and Africa based on the principle of ‘a partnership of equals’. It contains several innovations. For the first time the EU treats Africa as a single entity, with the focus primarily on eight thematic partnerships that extend beyond the traditional spheres of aid and development (trade, regional integration and infrastructure, the MDGs) to peace and security, democratic governance and migrations. The comprehensive approach of the agendas includes issues such as energy, climate change along with science, information society and space. These partnerships are linked with periodic action Plans, with measurable actions and objectives to be taken jointly by the EU and Africa. These Plans provide for routine reviews at successive EU-Africa summits. In emphasizing this ‘partnership of equals’, The Lisbon Declaration- EU Africa Summit (2007:2) states: “In recognition of our ambitions...we are resolved to build a new strategic partnership for the future, overcoming the traditional donor-recipient relationship and building on common values and goals in our pursuit of peace and stability, democracy and rule of law, progress and development. We will develop this partnership of equals...”. What becomes apparent from this final quote is the recognition of previous shortcomings of the EU, particularly pertinent in a normative context. Initially what is recognised within this except is the implied confession on behalf of the EU that the previous relations with Africa were those of donor-recipient. To put it in terms of a ‘self-other’ conceptualisation, a potent donor-self and a weaker recipient-other
(Diez 2005:628-629). Echoing the contributions of Haastrup (2013) Rutazibwa (2010) with reference to the issues of EU (self)imaging and the Union acting as mentor (see Chapter 2), this statement is important through a normative lens.

Within the vision of a ‘partnership of equals’ the need for more coordinated decisions, reflecting the needs of both parties in equal proportions is highlighted thereby demonstrating the EU’s commitment to carry out regular meetings to accomplish this. Additionally, given the extensively normative language related to the Union’s core values (“common values and goals”, “our pursuit of peace and stability”, “progress and development”, “democracy”) as well as more formal manifestations of its normative foundation (“rule of law”), the EU demonstrates an intent to engage in a process of normative diffusion. The extent to which this intent has been translated into action will be further examined in Chapter 6 within the context of the military operations in Somalia.

5.4 The Somali Compact (2013)

The New Deal compact in Somalia (16 November 2013) appears to revolve around international policy rhetoric around Somali ownership and leadership (see section 6.4.2). Although this marks a turn towards incorporating the equal view of all parties (which had previously been the core of criticism for all the international efforts), the distrust of Somalis among themselves as well as between them and the western parties, may prove to be a hindrance in the evolution of formal institutions and the promotion of legitimate politics in the country (Hearn and Zimmerman, 2014:2). Therefore, despite the pivotal role the Somali Compact is intended to have, the remnants of the past attempts to cooperate still could prove to be detrimental to its operationalisation.

The FGS and the EU hosted a conference to endorse the New Deal Compact in Brussels on September 2013. The Compact foresaw “a new political, security and development
architecture framing the future relations between Somalia, its people, and the international community” (The Somali Compact, 2013:3). It was intended to align the international assistance to the country’s own national peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities, while preserving the principles of mutual accountability for the realisation on the commitments made from both parties. The nature of these commitments was influenced by two major shifts, one within Somalia and the other in the international development community. Internally, the newly elected President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in 2012, inspired optimism in Mogadishu as well as the donor countries about the prospects of peacebuilding (Hearn and Zimmerman, 2014:3). The new Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) pursued to take control over the country’s political and aid priorities so as to depart from the previously dominant supply-driven aid and humanitarian assistance. Before the Compact, the primary development framework in Somalia was the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) which, although well-tailored to the financial needs of the country, did not provide enough scope for Somali ownership or donor coordination. The external environment was also conducive to the changing nature reflected in the Somali Compact. The need to invest in local confidence building was recognised in the 2011 “New Deal for the Engagement in Fragile States”. This set of principles agreed upon between OECD donors and the g7+ group provided the alignment of aid to country-led and country owned transitions out of fragility.

The Compact consists of the five New Deal Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs), and subsets of priorities per goal. The five PSGs are: (1) legitimate and inclusive politics, (2) security, (3) justice, (4) economic foundations, and (5) revenue and services. The summer before the Brussels Conference, five corresponding PSG working groups were established, made up of representatives from the FGS, civil society, MPs, and donors. Each working group had one lead donor. The working groups produced the Compact within a limited timeframe, before the September Brussels Conference. What can be seen in the Compact (see
Chapter 6) is essentially the development of the foundation set within the JAES 2007. The goal of the incorporation of ‘non-state’ entities as well as the change of focus on a citizen-based concern for security, changed the focus of the needs within Somalia from broader state/developmental to more precise security on an individual basis. This is important when viewing this change through the scope of the critical frames. From the perspective of the comprehensive approach, this alteration called for the entirety of the spectrum of instruments at the disposal of the EU as well as the TFG and the AU. While the financial and developmental support could have been defined and operationalised through Summit meetings or institutional cooperation on a continent-to-continent level, the assurance of security for the citizens required the further development of the domestic structures of the Somali government. This in turn justifies retrospectively the turn in the EU’s operational stance in the country to incorporate training of the Somali National Forces through EUTM as well as its efforts to encourage democratic elections in 2016.

From the perspective of effective multilateralism, the narrow scope of international organisations was expanded to incorporate ‘non-state’ actors in an attempt to head the needs of the population rather than those of the government. In turn this not only complicates the framework of interactions but also shows a shift of focus to the receptive side of the intervention. In including these parties within consultations, the multilateral efforts demonstrate a shift towards understanding the potential gap between the governmental shortcomings in efficiently transferring the benefits of multilateral involvement to the population. From a normative perspective, it shows commitment to the principles underlined within JAES as well as the alignment of those with the EU’s own normative foundations (JAES 2007, Section 1 para. 1).  

8 JAES 2007:1, Section 1 para. 1: “Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common future, as well as by a community of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy as enshrined in the relevant international agreements and in the constitutive texts of our respective Unions”
5.5 Security and humanitarian aid: the role of the comprehensive approach

The institutional provisions set up by the Lisbon Treaty have not only created potential for a more uniform and comprehensive response to crisis but have also allowed for the rise of problems in coordination and cooperation between and within the supranational and intergovernmental levels (see Chapter 4). This issue of coordination becomes particularly important when one of the main pillars of the EU’s external action is the comprehensive approach. Even more importantly, it renders the work of the EEAS, whose staff combines the bureaucratic spirit of three different actors within the EU (Commission, Council and seconded diplomats of Member States), even more challenging especially when dealing with designing and implementing this approach within foreign and development policies. Although the provision of security and the short-term elements of the interventions taking place have to large extent been transferred to the competencies of the EEAS, the provision of aid still remains within the responsibility of DEVCO. In the case of Somalia this becomes a central issue concerning the gap between the initial intents of the operations carried out and the ultimate goals achieved. Although the mandate of EUNAVFOR is specifically targeted to the provision of security, the underlying normative justification concentrates on the provision of aid by the vessels which are being protected (see Chapters 6 and 7). Subsequently, the responsibility for the effective outcome of the combined initiatives cannot be decisively attributed to either one of the two actors involved, the EEAS and Commission. From a normative standpoint, the fact that the two form part of the same rhetoric promoted within a military mission demonstrates the existence of the comprehensive approach as well as the theoretical coexistence of normative power with the use of military means (see section 2.4.2). Nevertheless, the element of institutional incoherence and potential overlapping in the initiatives they undertake still remains an issue to be resolved, although does not concern the questions dealt with in this research.
A point that has been raised by academics with regards to the European humanitarian and development policies is an evolving tendency towards them being viewed complementarily to the provision of security (Furness and Gänzle 2012, Keukeleire & Raube 2013, Zwolski 2012b). This issue becomes problematic when considering that the principles, objectives and modes of intervention of development policy and humanitarian aid are considerably different from those of foreign and security policies. The Conclusions of the Council identify this issue in the case of the ‘Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa’ which only feature one out of five main areas of action linked to development, yet provide an overarching framework of foreign policy objectives for the region. According to Henökl et al (2014:527) the pivotal role to be played in operationalising the aforementioned incoherence, which could in fact prove to be highly problematic not only in its design but also in its intended impact, has been left to the EEAS and more specifically to the EUSR. It is this actor that is tasked to connect the security policy-oriented aspects with the more political work and then to DG DEVCO.

Additionally, Menkhaus (2011:29) has identified five reasons for which the international community, including the EU, had a belated and ineffective humanitarian response to the famine: 1) the restrictions imposed by al-Shabaab on the access of donors to the stricken areas; 2) the US-led suspension of food aid to areas controlled by al-Shabaab; 3) chronic insecurity he dates back to 2009; 4) the corruption of TFG officials who diverted food aid and 5) what he calls the ‘privilege gap’ which existed between the groups in Somalia that had access to the food aid and lateral assistance and those that did not. What is interesting is the consistent pattern that appears in the underlying root causes of the aforementioned example. The assistance provided by the Western donors was not distributed equally to the areas in need nor were the particular obstacles on the ground taken into account. Furthermore, the more hidden issues of distrust to the government and the subsequent rise of extremist groups, in this case al-Shabaab, can be traced back to the Barre government of 1991. The TFG was Western-
backed and thus the corrupt nature of its officials was also attributed to the humanitarian assistance coming from the international community. What becomes apparent from this is the need for a deeper understanding of the issues the international actors are trying to address. If only the symptoms are treated while neglecting the ideational root causes, the situations that arise will be perpetuated. It is due to this understanding that the EU has demonstrated an ability to formulate its long term ‘strategic’ external action based on the comprehensive approach. On this point Cordano (2015) contends that the strength of state institutions is identified as a weakness in Somalia and severely impedes the efficiency of the fight against al-Shabaab. As he goes further to explain, the “Somali armed forces have traditionally been an amalgamation of forces loyal to local clans and warlords” (Cordano, 2015:3). He accentuates the deeply embedded conservatism that feeds into the group’s resilience as well as its link to the growing Wahhabi preaching in Somalia, which is a stark contradiction to the predominantly Christian composition of AMISOM forces. He therefore underlines the importance of political and social considerations as imperative conditions for a comprehensive approach that would tackle the root causes of al-Shabaab, thus accomplishing a long-term and sustainable outcome. The element of Somalia’s international partners is identified as an inhibitory factor due to the high level of demonstrated dependence of the FGS not only in terms of security, but also economic and political.

During the humanitarian response to the famine, the areas that were not under the control of al-Shabaab were protected by the TFG, AMISOM and the allied international forces. Nevertheless, the governmental entity that was recognised by the international community as legitimate consisted of politicians with independent military groups operating in small fiefdoms (HënökI, 2014:532). What becomes therefore apparent is that the delivery of aid by the international humanitarian donors becomes a complex and dangerous venture given the numerous armed checkpoints for the payment of ‘fees’ (Menkhaus 2011). The challenge for
external actors, such as the EU, therefore becomes a politically complex framework of inter-clan alliances, the international donors combined with the absence of an overarching polity. Henökl (2014:532) highlights the propensity of external actors to reduce the aforementioned complexity. In the case of the EU’s Draft Report on EU Strategy for the Horn of Africa (21012/2026(INI)), Somalia is divided in to ‘terrorist groups such as al-Shabaab’, pirates and ‘the new government of Somalia’. Nevertheless, the latter is supported by and consists of several former Somali warlords and shady businessmen that maintain their private militias. This adds to the complexity of the several competing quasi-mini state administrations that are formed around clan identity, which is often overlooked or simplified by the EU within its policy. More importantly, the security concerns that arise from the multiplicity of conflicting interests can be misconstrued, thereby rendering the relevant policies ineffective. As mentioned above, the development and aid policies tend to be incorporated within security-centred contexts. Therefore, taking into account the misperceived homogeneous threats that can be confined into specified areas, the development goals are hard to achieve. Furthermore, the effect can then be traced and alter the long-term (or ‘strategic’) aims.

From the above the need for coordinating international efforts (multilateralism appearing as the dominant frame in the 3124 FAC Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, see Table 6.3 and 7) and complementing them with actions that bear a long-term effect becomes apparent. Combatting the symptoms of deeply rooted pathologies without changing the normative underpinnings, underlines the need for a comprehensive approach that provides solutions for short-term as long-term results. Even more so, the fact that external actors such as the EU fail to understand and consequently provide for the complexities of the social fabric on the ground, indicates the need for input from the side of the recipient of the aid. In order to counter this element, the EU has focused on introducing and operationalising a binary of partnership-ownership (see Chapter 6) which incorporates the host country’s point of view while
reaffirming its primacy in the way initiatives are conducted on the ground. In the case of Somalia, the fact that the EU has invested in the parallel and complementary military operations and civilian missions based on the principle of empowering the local and regional actors, demonstrates its commitment to attaining a sustainable result. Nevertheless, its indirect engagement also indicates a reluctance on behalf of the EU and the potential fear of responsibility, thereby detracting from it being considered as engaging essentially (see Chapter 7).

5.6 Contextualising effective multilateralism and the comprehensive approach: EU action in Somalia

The sole employment of either ‘soft power’ or ‘hard power’ has been vigorously debated, as presented previously in Chapter 2. The common agreement appears to be that neither of them are sufficient on their own to address the complex security challenges of today’s world. While the EU is often criticised for resorting solely to ‘soft power’, it is now appearing to be able to exercise a hybrid. Through the Comprehensive Approach (2013), facilitated by the Lisbon treaty, the EU can now use the various means at its disposal in a joined-up manner. This means that diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities are all foreseen to be utilised in a complementary fashion that enables the EU to address the challenges at hand and resolve them with a long-term scope for their effects. While a military- ‘hard power’ response would be able to alleviate threats at hand immediately, it would only be considered effective in its tackling symptoms of deeply rooted problems. Given the highly complex situations the EU has to encounter, Somalia being a prime example, a more long-term plan is required in order to make sure that similar concerns will not arise in the future. In order to accomplish a sustainable long-term effect, the EU in its military operations in Somalia has mandated a network of actors to
address the root causes of the security threats that have arisen and required its involvement as part of it global scope of external action.

With the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP is still an integral part of CFSP, and “it shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets”. These assets are for missions outside the EU in view of “peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security” (Treaty of the EU [TEU] art. 42). With regards to NATO, some military CSDP operations are planned and conducted with NATO assets. Other military missions have been autonomous and led from one of the EU operational headquarters (as has been the case for all operations in Africa). However, cooperation between EU and NATO is often very close on the ground, as EU civilian missions cooperate closely with NATO military operations in the same theatre. It should be noted that CSDP operations are increasingly working with the African Union, including its peacekeeping missions.

The “comprehensive approach” was initially set out as part of the ESS in 2003 and subsequently operationalised through the aforementioned instruments. In essence, this approach implies a systematic use of all the EU instruments available from soft power (diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, development) to hard power (military) if necessary. This overarching strategic approach which was supported by the permanent EU institutions as well as the Member States, can tackle not only the short-term crises but also the underlying pathologies, thereby countering the causes of the security challenges simultaneously with the symptoms. This is considered to be the manner by which the EU is deemed to become an effective foreign policy actor. The best to date example of the EU’s comprehensive approach can be encountered in the way it has been addressing the situation in the Horn of Africa. The issues that have plagued the region are numerous as well as multifarious. They range from the effects of natural disasters, struggling with a failed state (Somalia) and smuggling (drugs, weapons and human trafficking) to contested borders, insurgency and piracy. In order to cope
with the situation and attempt to aid in the resolution of this complex situation, the EU has made use of the following tools that have been provided to it both by its institutional setup as well as by the Member States:

1) Developing a strategic framework document for the Horn of Africa, describing the EU’s interests and objectives and the necessary actions to be taken;

2) Appointing an EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, to assist in the coordination of the many strands of efforts;

3) Embarking on EUNAVFOR Atalanta – the first EU naval maritime counter-piracy operation under CSDP, working closely with NATO and other naval forces in order to deter, prevent, capture and lead to the prosecution of pirates (comprises approximately of 1200 personnel from almost all EU MS, 4-7 surface combat vessels and 2-4 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircrafts);

4) Undertaking a military operation under CSDP to train Somali security forces in Uganda (EUTM Somalia)

5) Deploying a civilian capacity building mission under CSDP to develop a regional maritime capacity (EUCAP Nestor) in Somali and the countries of the region so they can deal with the challenge of piracy themselves;

6) Financing to fund the African Union peacekeeping operation in Somalia, AMISOM;

7) Making available development funds, not least to improve security and democratic governance in Somalia, but also to assist the wider Horn of Africa countries;

8) Providing humanitarian assistance to assist the people affected by the drought;

9) Supporting the judiciary in various coastal states so they can assist with the prosecution and judgement of pirates;

10) Undertaking various diplomatic initiatives, in close cooperation with international organisations such as the UN and the African Union including high level visits to
Somalia to support the transition and the organisation of international conferences in Europe.

The naval component of the EU’s involvement in Somalia was set up in 2008 (EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008), when the phenomenon of piracy off its coast appeared in the EU’s agenda. It was at that time that the Council decided to launch its first naval military mission EU Naval Force Somalia- Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR). The mandate of this operation is based on the direct request by the TFG for support from the international community to deal with piracy. The objectives of the missions were thus determined as follows: a) the protection of vessels from the WFP delivering humanitarian food aid and further the protection of AMISOM shipping, b) the deterrence, prevention and repression of actors of piracy and armed robbery, c) the protection of vessels in danger cruising off the Somali coast and d) the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008). Therefore, the political objective of the operation was ‘to improve maritime security in the region’ while its military objective ‘to deter piracy and to strengthen the security of main maritime routes (Conseil 2008, 12-13).

Parallel to the initiative on the naval front, the EU has also attempted to address the security concerns onshore and to improve the Somali Government’s effectiveness through EUTM. Since the beginning of the mission, the track record appears to be demonstrating a rather successful outcome. Many areas that had long been under the control of Al Shabaab, including the capital Mogadishu and the strategically import port of Kismayo, were regained under the control of the Somali Government. This was achieved mainly through the collaboration with AMISOM. EUTM Somalia was launched the 10th of April 2010, with the objective of training the Somali security forces. Together with Atalanta and the EUSR, EUTM is part of another goal of the EU to enhance its visibility in Africa (3124 FAC Conclusions 2011: 8).
The Council Conclusions on Somalia (Luxembourg 20 October 2014) (Art. 5) reiterates the role and work undertaken by the EUTM Training Mission in Somalia: “which undertakes advisory, mentoring and training activities, with the aim to developing the Somali national Armed Forces’ structures and their training capacity in Somalia itself”. The subordinate role played the EUTM in this instance is emphasize, thereby seceding primacy and acknowledging the elements of local initiative. As the conclusions continue in Art 6 of the same document: “The EU reiterates its strong and urgent call on other partners to seriously contribute to the sustainable and predictable funding of AMISOM and the Somali security forces. It underlines the importance of the Federal Government taking on an increased responsibility and ownership of the security sector” and “that it is essential that military operations be followed immediately by national efforts to establish or improve governance structures in the recovered areas and by the delivery of basic services, including security” as well as “that these stabilisation efforts are an essential part of AMISOM’s eventual exit strategy” (Council Conclusions on Somalia, 2014: Art. 6). Therefore, the EU recognises the contribution of the partners, mostly that of the FGS, even though the EU self-identifies itself as having a leading role in the fight against piracy as well as its root causes. Additionally, the Council refers to its Chairing the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) in 2014 while reinstating its commitment to EUNAVFOR Atalanta until the end of 2016. The comprehensive approach in this elaboration is completed by EUCAP Nestor, the Maritime Security Programme and the Critical Maritime Routes Programme. In the final articles of this document, an illustration of the different elements to the multifarious issue that is piracy in Somalia are referred to -drought, human trafficking, FGS corruption and accountability of government funding- which again are put under a context of securitisation and humanitarian crisis (see section 6.4.1.).
5.7 Conclusion: A Normative Evaluation

The further involvement of the western parties in military operations, seemingly abandoning the role of “donor” and taking on that of “supporter”-“security provider” is interesting in the scope of normative interests. The fact that the issues in Somalia have drawn this much attention both by the UN as well as the EU, provide an initial point of departure in our understanding of the normative dynamics at play in the region as well as the country itself.

As the following chapter will demonstrate, the military operations conducted by the EU, although military in essence, are heavily prescriptive in providing civilian support. The fact that this support is complemented by the presence of military capabilities is the reason why the argument of a holistic-normative actorliness (see Chapter 2) is being put forth in the current research. The comprehensive approach as a framework is particularly enlightening in this aspect. Furthermore, the interrelation of civilian with military power elements and the way they have been operationalised, justifies the pertinence of the selected critical frames.

With reference to effective multilateralism, the issue of locating the source of normative diffusion becomes more complicated. The following chapter dealing with the military operations separately will not only judge the actorliness of the EU itself but will also take into consideration the broader framework of contributing actors in the area as well. This will not only permit the identification of the dynamic between the donors themselves, but also evaluate that between donors and recipients. Furthermore, the link (or invocation) of norms is important in this instance. A step further into the examination of normative dynamics will be taken with the use of the “partnership-ownership” binary. This will in turn focus predominantly on the donor/EU-recipient/Somalia dynamic, thus informing and complementing the understanding of the two other frames.
Chapter 6

EU dimension: strategies and sub-strategies

6.1 Introduction

In seeking to understand the catalytic role of the EEAS’ establishment in the evolution of the EU as a ‘normative power’ as well as the compatibility of military means within the NPE framework and, more broadly, with normative diffusion, this chapter concentrates on the illustration of the normative landscape upon which the military operations in Somalia – EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM - are carried out. It will therefore focus on the element of “intent” within the proposed framework of analysis (see section 3.3), thereby providing a backdrop to the examination of the elements of “action” and “impact” in Chapter 7. The presentation of the content analysis will be presented to illustrate the distribution of codes within the coded segments. This in turn will lead to the analysis from an NPE standpoint, highlighting the normative underpinnings of the strategic documents and sub-strategies through the operationalisation of the proposed frames - the comprehensive approach, effective multilateralism and the partnership-ownership binary.

To provide a more comprehensive and detailed understanding of EUNAVFOR and EUTM’s normative importance in Chapter 7, the following structure will be followed throughout this Chapter. Initially the key EU strategic documents – ESS (2003), EUGS (2016) and their respective Implementation plans - will be presented in the light of the employed analytical apparatuses, thus providing a broader context to the EU’s actions within CSDP. This will illustrate a wider platform upon which the research questions are based, most importantly concerning how the EU has evolved as a normative power and whether the establishment of the EEAS can be considered a catalytic change to the Union’s actorness within a normative understanding. Building on previous discussions concerning the EEAS’ importance as well as
shortcomings (see Chapter 4), it will become apparent how the vision of the Lisbon Treaty is echoed by the intents the EU puts forth in its strategic documents. The EUGS (2016) and its Implementation Plan will demonstrate the most recent conceptualisation of the EU’s normative basis with reference to the three critical frames, but also indicate the evolution of the EEAS into a pivotal actor bearing most of this normative actorness.

The EU sub-strategies – JAES (2007), EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa as well as the Comprehensive Approach (2013) (although not a strategic document per se it encompasses an equally broad spectrum and bears comparable impact on the operationalisation of EU initiatives) – will follow through a similar approach as the aforementioned category. As documents dealing with particular geographical regions and areas of action, this section will further narrow the focus of this analysis adding a second level of evaluation in normative terms. This will provide more specified insight into the employment of the critical frames and identify their pertinence within this thesis. Additionally, they provide a link between the broader EU intents in the area of CSDP and those expressly presented for Somalia (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, this section will demonstrate how the EU’s general strategic concerns are operationalised in the context of its relations with Africa as well as more narrowly with reference to its military initiatives, particularly those of a maritime nature.

To allow a more comprehensive account of the strategies’ and sub-strategies’ normative interpretation, factsheets, institutional reports and press releases will also be incorporated in the content and critical frame analyses (see Appendix 4 – Primary sources index). These will support the conclusions drawn with reference to the EU’s actorness. Departing from the formats of strategic and operational documents which are mostly formed by the Council, the frames will be identified in the rhetoric of the European Commission and the European Parliament, amongst others, thereby also demonstrating the shared normative underpinnings
on an EU-wide level. Therefore, the actorness stemming from the use of the frames in this occasion is demonstrative of the EU’s normative nature as an actor in itself, rather than one that could be restricted to the EEAS. Additionally, for the purposes of thoroughness, supplementary coding concerning the EU’s global actorness (which is also added in Appendix 3), reference to the EEAS and attribution of credit (described in Chapters 3 and 4) will be referred to, to highlight the nuances within the frames, most importantly the partnership-ownership binary.

In bringing together the components outlined in the previous chapters, both of a theoretical as well as an empirical nature, the analysis of the coding conducted on the collected material will enable a nuanced analysis and discussion to emerge (both in this Chapter as well as more broadly in Chapter 8). Building on the basis of a normative understanding, the observations in the ensuing elaboration will demonstrate the evolution of the EU’s normative actorness through a structured analysis of the coded frames in accordance with the codebook (see Appendix 1). Within this process, the role of the EEAS will be identified, thus engaging with the argument put forth in this thesis concerning its catalytic role in the EU’s external action from an NPE point of view. Additionally, the compatibility of military means with normative diffusion will be addressed, thereby speaking to the main theoretical question underpinning this research.

6.2 EU Strategies: setting the normative ground

Within this section the coding of EU strategic documentation will be presented as well as the subsequent analysis which emerges from the employment of the critical frames. Following the discussion in Chapter 4 concerning the importance of the ESS in terms of its contribution to the structure of CSDP, this Chapter will focus on its conceptual impact which informed the launch of the EU’s military operations in Somalia, EUNAVFOR and EUTM (see
Chapter 7. This will be presented through the lens of the critical frames, highlighting their role in the operationalisation of the EU’s initiatives. The shortcomings of the ESS (2003) will lead to its Implementation Report (2008) and ultimately to the most recent EU strategic document, the EUGS (2016), thereby showing how the Union responded to its previous critiques. Therefore, the strategic trajectory of the EU as an external actor will be accounted for both before and after the creation of the EEAS. With Manners’ (2013:316) forms of normative diffusion in mind, particularly ‘informational diffusion’ (see Textbox 1), the ESS and EUGS emerge as particularly important. Within this category Manners (2013) places strategic communications and explicitly refers to the ESS as important in promoting ideas, such as the ‘complex causes’ of terrorism and this becomes more apparent, particularly within the presentation of the ESS Implementation Report (S407/08, 11 December 2008).

Through the elaboration of this strategic trajectory, the development of the EU’s external action in normative terms will be demonstrated, thereby addressing the main research question. By identifying the changes within this process prompted by the EEAS’ establishment, what will also be indicated is its role in the overall evolution of the EU as a normative actor, thereby speaking to the second point of inquiry within this project. In order to inform the analysis of the critical frames, Council Conclusions and EU Parliament Reports, interim initiatives within CSDP (European Defence Action Plan – EDAP), progress reports and press releases will be included in the content analysis. Thus, a broader understanding of the EU’s intents will be set out, laying the ground for the ensuing presentation of the EU sub-strategies’ coding.

6.2.1 The ESS (2003) and ESS Implementation Plan (2008)

In 2003 the EU set out its strategic vision in the ESS (2003), which it later refined with an Implementation Report (2008). Adapting to the complex nature of threats a comprehensive, all-encompassing approach which would employ the whole array of EU resources ranging from
diplomatic and trade to development and crisis management instruments (Quille 2010:56) was introduced. This ‘comprehensive security’ (Hynek, 2011: 82) bears several similarities to what later was named the ‘comprehensive approach’. Although the ESS remained the most complete attempt to formulate a comprehensive European foreign policy until the recent EUGS (2016), it remained an indication of a strategic approach which did not explicitly specify the importance of UN mandates nor did it require the existence of a mandate for military force deployment (Matlary, 2006:115). Therefore, it presented a broad level of guidance without an explicit or comprehensive series of positions on important issues including goals, practices and means. It introduced recommendations, therefore leaving implementation processes and measurement of success in a vacuum. Thus, at this stage, the ESS can only be seen as providing a guideline.

Nevertheless, the main contributions of this document can be identified on two points. The first was introducing a nascent version of a ‘comprehensive’ approach to external action while the second concerned the ways with which it would cooperate with its international partners (ESS, 2003:11) in dealing with “complex problems” (ESS, 2003:1) and “global threats” (ESS, 2003:9). The ESS therefore referred to a notion of ‘comprehensive security’, underlining the direct connection between peace, development and political stability. It explicitly stressed the need for civilian and military instruments to be used together, promoting the development of “operations involving both military and civilian capabilities” (ESS, 2003:13). This understanding was succinctly portrayed in the assertion that “Security is a precondition of development” (ESS, 2003:2). Therefore, although an explicit ‘comprehensive approach’ did not appear as such until 2013, elements of this concept were included in the ESS. This frame is particularly important in normative terms, as it foresees the employment of all the means at the EU’s disposal to tackle the challenges it would face. The emphasis of NPE on non-coercion – rather than non-coercive means - is the point which separates it conceptually from ‘civilian power’. Therefore, drawing on the critiques of normative power (Zwolski, 2012),
this thesis supports the notion that any means –including military- can be employed in normative diffusion, as long as they are not used in a forceful manner. It is within this conceptualisation that the ‘comprehensive approach’ becomes relevant to this research as a notion and illuminating as a critical frame. Following this logic, it is important to point out that even ten years prior to the Comprehensive Approach (COM, JOIN (2013) 30 final, 11.12.2013), the idea of combining both military and civilian means in external action existed within the EU’s intents. What is also interesting is the fact that the element of coordination in the ESS was also related to the creation of horizontal coherence, both between institutions as well as their respective policy areas (ESS, 2003:11). The vision created by the Lisbon Treaty and reflected in the establishment of the EEAS was precisely to achieve this continuity in terms of cohesion internally as well as complementarity externally (see Chapter 4). Therefore, a continuum of intent can be identified, culminating in the establishment of the EEAS institutionally and the Comprehensive Approach conventionally.

**Chart 6.1 European Security Strategy (ESS): Content Analysis Distribution (%)**

![European Security Strategy (ESS) (2003)](image)

*% of the coded segments

Therefore, it is no coincidence that the content analysis of the ESS illustrates the dominance of effective multilateralism (51.9%) followed by an implied reference to a
comprehensive approach (29.6%) (Chart 6.1). The codification of the latter as ‘implied’ is because the term itself is not used within the document, but the elements of the concept are present.

In the delineation of specific strategic provisions, the ESS lacked focus both on geographic areas as well as areas of military engagement, namely maritime. Even though concerns in some neighbouring regions (Middle East, Balkans) as well as other locations (Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula) were raised, the eastern and southern neighbourhood, Central Asia, the Gulf and sub-Saharan Africa were not explicitly provided for despite their importance with relation to the EU’s international role. Furthermore, growing concern in the area of maritime piracy was also identified as a “new dimension to organised crime which will merit further attention” (ESS, 2003:5). Until the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS, 2014), no comprehensive strategic provisions were made in this domain. Although this threat was highly visible in certain geographic areas (i.e. Horn of Africa), it raised global concerns, thus demanding coordinated efforts on the same scale. An opportunity to address this issue appropriately appeared through the Lisbon Treaty’s provision for multilateralism and more specifically as supporting the UN, especially in scenarios considered to involve the responsibility to protect.

From this, the pertinence of the comprehensive approach as a critical frame becomes apparent. The ESS, as a first step in the conventional organisation of this concept, introduces the combination of military and civilian means as the way forward in CSDP. Furthermore, the ESS highlights a parallel between internal and external security. The notion of interconnectivity between these two elements is pivotal within the Comprehensive Approach (2013) as well as the relevant Action Plan (2015). Additionally, emphasis is put on the centrality of multilateralism in the effective operationalisation of the concept. This element is further expanded within the sub-strategies focusing on geographic areas (Horn of Africa, 2011) as well
as areas of operational engagement (EU Maritime Security Strategy, 2014). Therefore, post-
EEAS, the EU’s effort to compensate for the shortcomings of the ESS is more visible, thereby
further illustrating the argument set forth in this thesis concerning the catalytic role of the
EEAS’ establishment in the EU’s normative actorness. Following from the above, the creation
of the EEAS appeared to be the institutional attempt to coordinate action taken within the
internal-external security nexus as well as that relating to internal coherence. Although that
may have been the vision of the Lisbon Treaty (2007) and ensuing Council Decision
establishing the EEAS (2010/427/EU), the case of its effective function is a debatable issue,
both internally as well as externally (see section 4.5).

The 2008 Implementation Report of the ESS (S407/08, 11 December 2008) adds some
new security challenges, beyond traditional threats, related to climate change, information
systems and energy resources (ESS Implementation Report, 2008: 1). It also expands on the
security-development nexus particularly with reference to terrorism and non-proliferation.
Furthermore, it explicitly addresses the effect of state failure on the EU “security through
crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy” (ESS Implementation Report, 2008:1)
thereby clearly stating its interest in tackling the previously untouched issues related to
maritime security. Within the aforementioned phrase, the case of Somalia is essentially
illustrated. What makes this reference to Somalia even more interesting is the fact that the EU’s
first maritime operation, EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, 10
November 2008), was launched a month before the publication of the Implementation Report.
Therefore, the importance of the case itself, is raised to a level of strategic importance through
its incorporation in this document. Additionally, the link presented between state failure and
criminal behaviour, underlines the interconnected nature of deeply rooted causes with arising
security threats, and it is this issue which lies at the crux of the Somalian situation.
What the Implementation Report contributes to this discussion is the interest of the EU to address both levels of the problem. When seen within the context of the ESS’ call for a comprehensive approach, one cannot fail to notice the similarities with the current operational setting in Somalia, whereby the military initiatives (EUNAVFOR and EUTM) are complemented by civilian missions (EUCAP Somalia) in an effort to accomplish both short-term (security focused) as well as long-term (developmental) results. Further to the elaboration on the security-development nexus in Chapter 4 (section 4.5.2), the normative underpinnings of this conceptualisation emerge. The ESS and its Implementation Report would clearly fall under Manners’ (2013:316) ‘informational diffusion’ (see Textbox 1), but the provision of humanitarian assistance, engagement and support related to the long-term goals would also relate to ‘transference diffusion’ within the framework of NPE. Therefore, the contribution of the Implementation Report is not restricted merely to covering the gaps left by the ESS, but also compliments its normative significance through the expansion of the EU’s aims as well as the links it introduces between them.

Table 6.1 ESS - ESS Implementation Report: Content Analysis Comparative Distribution(%)
As demonstrated in Table 6.1 the frame of ‘effective multilateralism’ is dominant in both the ESS (51.9% implied, 3.7% explicit) and its Implementation Report (38.6% implied, 6.8% explicit). Interestingly, in both documents the prevalent category is ‘implied multilateralism’. This denotes the fact that the term ‘multilateralism’ is not mentioned explicitly in the coded segments but rather the concept of it is presented. With due consideration of the ESS’ shortcomings, the Implementation Report explicitly addressed the need to “strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood” and added that “the EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the UN” (ESS Implementation Report: 4). Within the Implementation Report the pivotal role of regional actors is underlined while the EU is appointed a leading role in “a renewal of the multilateral order”, “working with the United States” and its “partners around the world” whilst recognising the position of the UN “at the apex of the international system” (Implementation Report, 2008:2). Furthermore, the need to deepen the “strategic partnership for better cooperation in crisis management” between EU and NATO is underlined.

These statements echo NPE on multiple levels and provide interesting insight not only to the EU’s identity but also how it is reflected within its action. Particularly with reference to ‘procedural diffusion’ (see Textbox 1) which relies on mechanisms such as partnership and cooperation, the links to normative power are apparent. Additionally, this form foresees the use of possible prestige and status of associating with the EU and other international organisations as further apparatuses falling within it. Therefore, the importance of multilateralism and its employment within this document increases the pertinence of a normative evaluation, particularly seeing that it is combined with the denunciation of coercion: “It is important that countries abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial
integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable. *Threat or use of military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues – anywhere.*” (Implementation Report, 2008: 2, emphasis added). The element of coercion is pivotal in the understanding of normative power (see section 2.4.2). It is not only a cornerstone of NPE but also relates to the discussion concerning the compatibility of military means for its operationalisation. Direct reference to the centrality of the normative element further enhances the presence of this approach in the analysis of the ESS as well as the Implementation Report: “The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests based on our core values.” (Implementation Report, 2008:2).

**Chart 6.2 ESS Implementation Report (2008): Content Analysis Distribution (%)**

![Chart 6.2](chart6.2.png)

*% of the coded segments

When examining the Implementation Report, the frame of ‘partnership’ is also more visible (20.5% explicit partnership, 2.3% explicit ownership) (Chart 6.2) as opposed to the ESS (14.8% explicit partnership) (Chart 6.1). Initially, what is striking is the fact that the frame of ‘ownership’ is included within the former and, even more so, explicitly. It appears under title II ‘Building Stability in Europe and Beyond’ and states that the EU’s security efforts beyond
its immediate neighbourhood “will not succeed without full Afghan ownership, and support from neighbouring countries” (Implementation Report, 2008: 7). This statement is interesting on two accounts. Firstly, the EU’s intent to expand its involvement further than regions in its immediate proximity is explicitly stipulated, thereby demonstrating its self-perception as a global actor rather than a regional one. This is also demonstrated in the supplementary coding (Appendix 3), which indicate a 6% recurrence of global actoriness as a theme amongst the coded segments. Secondly, the fact that it underlines ‘ownership’ is telling of the way with which it sees itself in relation to the ‘other’, thus speaking to Diez’ (2005) argument regarding the formative affect of rhetoric on the EU’s identity construction (see section 2.6).

To establish the continuity on a strategic level between the Implementation Report (2008) and the EUGS (2016), three supplementary documents have been coded to demonstrate the evolution of the frames: the 3183rd Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on common security and defence policy (FAC) (Brussels, 23 July 2012), the Interim Report by the HR: Preparing the December 2013 European Council on Security and Defence (Brussels, 24 July 2013) and the European Parliament Report on the EU in a changing global environment-a more connected, contested and complex world (EUPR)(A8-0069/2016, 29.3.2016). These documents have been selected on the grounds that they comprehensively encapsulate the concerns and views of the EU’s institutional framework on CSDP, whilst representing both its intergovernmental and supranational facets. This is particularly important in illustrating the level of internal EU convergence of CSDP priorities, particularly in a post-Lisbon Treaty context. Furthermore, the report of the HR/VP under her newly-allocated double-hatted position is crucial in understanding the orientation of the EEAS in its initial stages. Table 6.2 presents the percentage of coded segments covered by each frame within each document.
From an overview of the percentages (Table 6.2), what becomes visible is a relatively stable presence of the comprehensive approach and effective multilateralism overall through time. Conversely, the partnership-ownership binary demonstrates a consistent increase, almost tripling between the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions (2012) and the EU Parliament Report (2016). With the increasing employment of this frame between the ESS (2003) (Chart 6.1) and its Implementation Report (2008) (Chart 6.2), but also the significant rise in its appearance within the EUGS (2016) (Chart 6.3), a pattern seems to emerge with reference to its importance. When looking into the co-occurrence of the frames, a more detailed account emerges, particularly with reference to partnership and its use with effective multilateralism (Table 6.3). What this demonstrates about the use of these frames within the strategic documents, is the reliance of the EU on the concept of partnership in its international cooperation. Echoing Diez (2005), this is indicative of the EU’s perception of ‘self’ as well as the ‘other’, thereby indicating its commitment to mutual collaboration rather than imposition of its self-serving intents.
Table 6.3 ESS and Implementation Report, EUGS and Implementation Report: co-occurrence of partnership with multilateralism (number of coded segments)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code System</th>
<th>Multilateralism implied</th>
<th>Multilateralism explicit</th>
<th>Ownership implied</th>
<th>Ownership explicit</th>
<th>Partnership implied</th>
<th>Partnership explicit</th>
<th>Explicit Ownership</th>
<th>Explicit partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateralism explicit</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership implied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership implied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit Ownership</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explicit partnership</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Furthermore, the comprehensive approach demonstrates a decrease in its use between 2012 and 2016 whilst it continued to drop even further within the EUGS (2016). Nevertheless, within the three documents, it is particularly telling in terms of the connection between the EU’s intents and how they are reflected within operations, the role of the EEAS as well as the normative underpinnings of this frame within the context of the military operations in Somalia.

Through the lens of the comprehensive approach, the three documents demonstrate a common focus on the coherence of the ‘internal-external’ security nexus. In 2010, the EU adopted the Internal Security Strategy (Council, 6870/10, Brussels, 25 February 2010), identifying threats and defining internal security policies as well as instruments to address them. In addition to external and internal security strategies, the EU has also adopted policy-specific strategies, including fighting terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Both the internal and the external security strategies promote a comprehensive approach to security, putting strong emphasis on horizontal coherence (Zwolski, 2012:994).

Within this theme the HR Interim Report states: “The Union must be able to protect its interests by contributing to international security, help resolving crises and projecting power. The EU’s call for an international order based on the rule of law needs to be backed up by...
credible civilian and military capabilities of the right type, when required” (HR Interim Report, 2013: 2, emphasis added). As outlined by Manners (2008:46) this statement encapsulates elements of normative significance seeing that the normative principles promoted by the EU, in this case the rule of law, are generally acknowledged as universally acceptable, thus acquiring increased significance. Therefore, the need for their examination is reinforced in order to avoid following common critiques concerning the EU as an actor promoting cultural imperialism (see section 2.5.1). Not only does the EU reaffirm its commitment to its core values – the rule of law, but it also underlines the need for the development of means, both of civilian as well as a military nature, required to support its intents. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, the employment of military means does not exclude the existence of normative power, as long as they are not used in a coercive manner (Cooper 2003). Through symbolic manifestation, their presence can actually facilitate the process of normative diffusion, thus reinforcing Manners’ (2006) argument concerning symbolic manifestation (see section 2.4). On this point, the projection of power highlighted in this statement bears particular normative importance. This is because the shift from capabilities to the image of the EU, in NPE terms, indicates that the focus in external action may pivot away from ‘procedural diffusion’ seen in the ESS and leans towards ‘overt diffusion’ (seeTextbox 1). This change is amplified and transformed within the EUGS (2016) under the guise of autonomy. With symbolic manifestation (see Chapter 2) in mind, the emphasis on presence hints to the need for recognition. This is also significant within a normative understanding, especially with reference to the dynamic diffusion of normative power (Kavalski, 2013). This thesis therefore argues that it becomes more pertinent when explored through the lens of identity where the recognition as a ‘normative power’ is an essential element of being one.

Building on this, when examined within the frame of the comprehensive approach, additional themes concerning the impact of CSDP missions and the importance of strategic
coordination emerge. The Council underlines the significance of operational engagement as a “tangible expression of the EU’s commitment to promote and preserve peace and stability” (FAC Conclusions, 2012:1). It emphasises amongst others the role of the HR in “mobilising the different tools at the EU’s disposal….in close cooperation with other international actors” (FAC Conclusions, 2012:2) whilst welcoming the “activation of the EU Operations Centre in support of the CSDP missions and operations in the Horn of Africa, namely Operation Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor, with a view to increasing efficiency, coherence and synergies” (FAC Conclusions, 2012:2). On this matter, the HR in her Report reiterates the need for a more strategic approach to maritime security and adds that the EU can “build on the successes of EUNAVFOR Atalanta” (HR Interim Report, 2013:7) amongst other initiatives.

The aforementioned summarize the pivotal role of the HR and the EEAS within the normative context supported in this thesis but also justify the choice of the military operations in Somalia as a case study in this research. On an identity level, the actorness of the EU – operational engagement- is hereby presented as proof of the EU’s dedication to supporting its core norms – peace and stability. Given the normative importance of the comprehensive approach as a concept, the role of the HR and the EEAS are recognised as the main actors responsible for its achievement. Additionally, the combination of initiatives carried out in Somalia under the coordination of the EU Operations Centre (which is part of the EEAS) is presented as a positive move towards the achievement of the EU’s ambition in the area of operations. Therefore, what is indicated from the above is the pertinence of the military operations in Somalia for the examination of the EU’s actorness within a normative power context.

Within the frame of effective multilateralism, the three documents demonstrate several elements which go beyond the previous illustration of the frame in the ESS and its Implementation Report. Most obviously, the EEAS is referred to on many occasions
particularly with reference to “inclusive multilateral diplomacy” in initiatives “both in the
neighbourhood and globally” and “positive synergies...between increasingly interlinked
external action policies and internal policies at EU level” (EU Parliament Report, 2016: 10).
The Service is therefore recognised as a reference point of coherence within the EU as well as
between its internal and external security, thus referring to the EEAS’ within the context of the
comprehensive approach. Within the common segments between ‘effective multilateralism’
and ‘partnership-ownership’, the texts underline once more the importance of the EU’s
partnership with the UN and NATO, whilst adding the AU (FAC Conclusions 2012:3, HR
Interim Report 2013:2). This therefore demonstrates the new commitment of the Union in
creating tighter bonds with the African continent, thereby also recognising the change from the
donor-recipient relations that characterised their interactions previously (see Chapters 4 and 5).

Additionally, the frame of multilateralism is directly linked to the normative foundation
of the EU. The EU Parliament Report (2016) is particularly explicit on this link when stating
that the aim of an efficient multilateral governance should be “strengthening democracy, good
governance, the rule of law and human rights” (EU Parliament Report, 2016:10) while
safeguarding “the EU’s values and societal model” (EU Parliament Report, 2016:5) parallel to
reiterating its role as a global actor. This final point becomes one of the focal elements of the
EUGS, as demonstrated in the following section. Additionally, the HR Report (2013:2)
includes the need for civilian as well as military means –thereby implying the comprehensive
approach- to be employed for the EU’s “call for an international order based on the rule of law”
(HR Report, 2013:2). Subsequently, what becomes apparent, is the consistent promotion of the
Union’s normative foundation within CSDP, thereby also indicating its prominence in the way
it perceives itself within external action.

By repeating its vision of becoming a global actor based on the comprehensive use of
its means in order to achieve normative goals, the EU demonstrates a consistent intent of
promoting its normative identity and incorporating elements of it within its strategic documentation. This trajectory begins before the Lisbon Treaty within the ESS and is further refined and emphasised by the Implementation Report as well as its initiatives in the area of CSDP leading to the EUGS. Although the basis of its promoted multilateralism remains relatively unchanged, in the period following the establishment of the EEAS new partners have been added to the cornerstones of its strategic endeavours – the UN and NATO. Focus is clearly shifting towards an EU global actorness while regions relatively neglected within the ESS - predominantly in Africa – are brought to the fore. The evolution of the EU’s normative intents, culminating in its aim of becoming more autonomous as an international actor, while simultaneously maintaining its commitment to effective multilateralism, are also demonstrated by the EUGS.

6.2.2 The European Union Global Strategy (2016) and Implementation Plan (2016)

The EUGS explicitly sets out a new trajectory for the EU as a global presence in the area of external action. With the majority of its action officially organised under the remit of the EEAS, it sets a very particular set of goals which demonstrate a new direction, separate from that of a conventional civilian actor and point towards what is argued in this thesis as a normative actorness. Echoing the contributions of Stivachtis (2007) and Sjursen (2006), the explicit reference to the values and principles (particularly democracy and good governance) of the EU as well as its commitment to international law (particularly international humanitarian and human rights law) in both the EUGS as well as its Implementation Plan further support the relevance of NPE as well as the pertinence of normative power in the examination of external action (see section 2.4.2).

From the outset of the document, the HR puts an emphasis on what she calls the EU’s “principles”, “interests” and “priorities” (EUGS 2016:3). Importance is set on the “diplomatic
network” of the EU (EUGS 2016:4) and the role undertaken by the EU in the areas of the finance and trading primarily, but also within a context of responsibility in the world as a whole. The latter point become more visible in the supplementary coding of ‘global actorness’, indicating a recurrence of five time over 56 pages (see Appendix 3). What is further stressed is the “major role, including as a security provider” and the importance of partnerships as the aims of the Global Strategy. A broader meaning is attributed to the term “Global” which transcends the geographical sense and includes the “the wide array of policies and instruments” promoted in the Strategy (EUGS 2016:4). What this actually refers to, is the importance of effective multilateralism which is identified as a cornerstone of the EU’s actorness throughout its strategic documents. The EUGS further explicitly demonstrates the importance of norms within its provisions, consistently promoting a “rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle” (EUGS 2016: 8) as a priority.

In the document’s foreword, the HR stresses the EU’s intent to separate itself from the ‘civilian power’ it is commonly related with. She more explicitly expands upon this comment by underlining the importance of the military operations parallel to the civilian missions while underlining the benefit of both to the EU’s “own security” and its “partners” (EUGS 2016:4). In the scope of normative power, this statement is crucial. The main argument of this thesis concerns the potential of normative power coexisting with the use of military means as well as the identity it constructs which makes it separate from that of a ‘civilian power’. This intent which, in this thesis, has been seen to be evolving in the military operations in Somalia, now becomes an explicitly stated direction the EU is operationalising through the Global Strategy.
Expanding on this, the comprehensive approach as a critical frame also becomes prominent in this document (33% implied, 4.2% explicit, Chart 6.3) because the combination of civilian as well as military means are once again referred to within the context of an effective EU actorness. The competencies to align the two now lie within the remit of the EEAS, given that the relevant instruments which are tasked with the formulation of the strategic planning of CSDP -mainly PSC, EUMS and CPCC and CMPD- changed after the Lisbon Treaty (2007) (see Chapter 4). When seen in conjunction with the vague long-term goals set by the ESS, the EUGS provides a more concrete framework within which the aims of external action are promoted, geared towards an explicit operationalisation of the comprehensive approach while utilising international partners under the oversight of the EEAS.

With reference to this frame the EUGS makes another interesting conceptual contribution by including a commitment to expanding “the meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’” (EUGS 2016:10). According to the document, what will be included is the involvement of the EU in a manner that prevents conflict, investing in stabilisation while remaining focused on assuring a long-term resolution. This expansion will
again be supported by effective multilateralism and “deep and durable regional and international partnerships” (EUGS 2016:10). The Implementation Plan (2016) further details the steps that have to be taken both in aligning the civilian and military tools within CSDP as well as the need to provide assistance to strengthen the EU’s partners in order to overcome “hybrid threats” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:3). Therefore, a link is provided between the comprehensive approach, effective multilateralism and partnership, thus underlining the centrality of the frames in the operationalisation of the EU’s external action. The pertinence of this link is also important in normative terms given the explicit reference to values within the EUGS (2016:14): “‘Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests.’” This speaks to Tocci’s (2008) definition of normative power as one incorporating the elements of intent, action and impact, thereby also reinforcing the relevance of the analytical framework of this thesis.

Table 6.4 From ESS to EUGS Implementation Plan: Content Analysis Distribution (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive approach \ CA implied</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive approach \ CA explicit</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>comprehensive approach \ TOTAL</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism \ TOTAL</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism \ explicit</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism \ TOTAL</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Ownership implied</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Partnership implied</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Explicit Ownership</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Explicit partnership</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ TOTAL</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*% of the coded segments
Unlike the ESS (2003) and its Implementation Report (2008), the EUGS (2016) demonstrates a more balanced employment of the critical frames (Chart 6.3). The comprehensive approach (33% implied, 4.2% explicit) together with effective multilateralism (29.2% implied, 16.7% explicit) still comprise the majority of the coded segments. Nevertheless, they are not disproportionately overwhelming. When looking at the number of occurrences though, this impression changes. The comparative table is quite helpful on this point (Table 6.4). Although the frequency of the partnership-ownership frame usage is identical in the ESS and EUGS documents (4 times), in the context of the texts’ sizes (ESS 14 pages, EUGS 57 pages) it becomes apparent that this frame has been underemployed. In terms of content, the EUGS attributes similar importance to the EU’s ‘partnership’ with NATO as the ESS (“We will keep deepening the transatlantic bond and our partnership with NATO”, EUGS, 2016: 7) while most references are directed towards the EU’s global actoriness. On these occasions, the document states that the “EU will be a responsible global stakeholder, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility goes hand in hand with revamping our external partnerships” (EUGS, 2016: 11) and that it “will engage in a practical and principled way, sharing global responsibilities” with its “partners and contributing to their strengths” (EUGS, 2016:7). Therefore, contrary to the ESS wherein partnership was linked to a concept of ‘othering’ (Diez, 2005), partnership in the EUGS is employed in a fashion more akin to effective multilateralism or in conjunction with it, therefore echoing Tocci’s (2008) argument that normative powers are substantively ‘other empowering’ (see section 2.6).

When examining the supplementary coding carried out with reference to ‘global actoriness’ (See Chapter 3), this impression is verified (see also Appendix 3). Table 6.5 shows the code relations between effective multilateralism and partnership-ownership demonstrate
that all the segments under the first frame also appear in the second. Furthermore, an overlap is also present between ‘global actorness’ with the two frames. This convergence of frames denotes the orientation of the EU to constructing an identity of shared responsibility with its international counterparts. This framing of its multilateral engagement speaks to several elements within the normative power understanding. Initially, echoing Diez’ (2005) argument that representation is an important precondition for other actors to agree to the norms set out, in this case, by the EU. Additionally, with the overlapping frame of partnership, Tocci’s (2008) other-empowering thesis is also manifest. Therefore, within this conceptualisation, the EU appears to be demonstrating a normative actorness sequence that underpins an intent to become recognised as a global actor amongst equals, thereby also disqualifying the potential to be engaging in a self-serving *mission civilisatrice* (see Manners 2006; section 2.5.1)

**Table 6.5 EUGS: Co-occurrence of partnership – multilateralism – global actorness code relations (number of coded segments)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code System</th>
<th>effective multilateralism \ SUM</th>
<th>Multilateralism implied</th>
<th>Multilateralism explicit</th>
<th>partnership ownership \ SUM</th>
<th>Ownership implied</th>
<th>Partnership implied</th>
<th>Explicit Ownership</th>
<th>Explicit partnership</th>
<th>Global actorness</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism \ Multilateralism implied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism \ Multilateralism explicit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism \ TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Ownership implied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Partnership implied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Explicit Ownership</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>partnership-ownership \ Explicit partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ TOTAL</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

193
What the EUGS also validates is the argument put forth in this research concerning the intent of the EU to forge an autonomous yet cooperative actorness on the basis of the critical frames of effective multilateralism and the comprehensive approach. According to the HR “The Strategy nurture the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union” in order to “promote the common interests of our citizens, as well as our principles and values” which are “best served in an international system based on rules and on multilateralism” (EUGS 2016:4). Within this statement the link between effective multilateralism on the basis of the EU’s normative standing is underlined. Furthermore, the intent of the EU to assert itself as a separate identifiable presence in external action is also important within the scope of normative actorness. The fact that the foundation for the actions to follow within the document are set upon a normative foundation is telling of the new trajectory that is intended to be paved through this Strategy. In the closing remarks of the foreword, the HR stresses once more the importance of the “unity in action across our policies” (EUGS 2016: 5) while also underlining the need for tighter cooperation between Members States. This is also important in supporting the argument that the EU is promoting a separate even more coherent external actorness which transcends the aggregate of individual states ones (Nunes 2011; Kratochvil 2011; see section 1.3).

Echoing Kavalski (2013:250) emphasis on the importance of a normative power appearing to be one rather than being one, the element of ‘presence’ becomes of critical importance at this point. As far as presence and actorness are concerned, two key elements emerge; willingness and tighter cooperation. Firstly, the document outlines and explicitly introduces the willingness of the EU to act in a more autonomous fashion while still remaining committed to its international partners. This stronger autonomous presence is now introduced as “an aspiration to transform rather than to simply preserve the existing system” (EUGS 2016:10). The balance between forming and sustaining an autonomous presence is repeated in the Implementation Plan whereby the “EU’s strategic autonomy entails the ability to act and
cooperate with international and regional partners wherever possible, while being able to operate autonomously when and where necessary” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:4). According to the EUGS, it will be accomplished through enhanced cooperation as well as a broader involvement of the EU within an expanded “comprehensive approach”, with an overwhelming emphasis on the role of the EEAS in the success of the endeavour. What is interesting to note about the language which is employed for the presentation of the EU’s role in the multilateral efforts is that it is centred around “partnership” rather than “cooperation”. This becomes more apparent in the Implementation plan where in one sentence the term is used three times: “In carrying forward its actions, the EU will work with partners and actively enhance its partnerships, while strengthening its own ability to take responsibility and share the burden with our partners in security and defence.” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:4)

Tighter cooperation is the second interesting point of this document. In view of the more potent role which is being sought within this Strategy, the external action will also be made more cohesive. This is explicitly stated in the “Vision to Action” section which underlines the pivotal importance of the EEAS and the HR in the successful operationalisation of this Strategy. More specifically: “A strong EEAS working together with other EU institutions lies at the heart of a coherent EU role in the world. Efforts at coherence also include policy innovation such as the ‘comprehensive approach to conflicts and crises’ and joint programming in development, which must be further enhanced” (EUGS 2016: 49). The Implementation Plan reiterates this increased importance of the EEAS in the “Implementing the Level of Ambition” section where the Service is explicitly referred to almost all the provisions within it (Implementation Plan, 2016:4). The tasks it will undertake are stressed and presented in detail with particular emphasis being put on the role of the EDA, PSC and EUMC. What becomes apparent in this Strategy is that the EEAS is recognised explicitly as the part of the EU framework which will essentially lead it into the new era which it foresees in external
action. This not only demonstrates the increasing importance of the Service but also its clear connection to the three frames (effective multilateralism, the comprehensive approach and partnership) as well as to the highly normative character of CSDP initiatives to follow.

**6.3 EU sub-strategies: refining the scope of the EU’s normative intents**

Building on the examination of the EU strategic documentation, this section will concentrate on the EU sub-strategies, namely – EU Strategy for Africa (2005), Joint Africa-EU Strategy (2007), Comprehensive Approach (CA) (2013) and EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) (2014). Following the same structure as the previous section, the key documents will be presented and discussed through the analysis of the critical frames. Given their narrower thematic scope concerning the EU’s strategic interests in particular geographic areas as well as areas of practice within external action, these documents will allow a more specific account of the EU’s strategic concerns. Still dealing with the element of ‘intent’, the analysis in this section will emanate from the previous discussions on the EU strategic documents and further depict the employment of the critical frames in a narrower scope. Whilst expanding on the insight they provide, these documents are also thematically specific, thereby allowing a more detailed account of the critical frames’ employment as well as their examination through an NPE lens. In view of emerging conceptual trajectories within the vision of the EU towards becoming an effective international actor, the sub-strategies will advance the understanding and add a second level to the evaluation of the EU’s actorness in normative terms. More specifically, the Comprehensive Approach (CA) (2013) will demonstrate the effects of the frame’s codification as well as to how it incorporates the concepts of ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘partnership-ownership’. Furthermore, JAES and the Gulf of Aden Strategy will draw on the EU’s general strategic concerns and demonstrate how they are specifically operationalised in the context of its relations with Africa as well as more narrowly
with reference to its military initiatives, particularly those of a maritime nature. This final point will be also be examined through the EUMSS and its focus on the maritime security domain. In order to conceptually complete the exploration of the frames, relevant Action Plans, Roadmaps as well as institutional conclusions and press releases will be included in the coding. Furthermore, the supplementary themes identified in Chapter 3 will be introduced wherever pertinent, to complete the illustration of the emerging intricacies within the critical frames. Throughout this section, the role of the EEAS’ establishment will also be evaluated in terms of its contribution to the evolution of the EU’s normative identity.

The exploration of ‘intent’ as presented in the proposed analytical framework (see Chapter 3) will thereafter be complete, thus having demonstrated its importance in the evaluation of the EU’s normative actorness. Following the more niche insight provided within this section, the Chapter will proceed with the EU documents relating to Somalia specifically as well as with the pivotal Somali Compact (2013).


Following the discussion on the changes occurring within the bilateral relation between the EU and Africa in Chapter 5, this section will present the coding carried out on the key documents. Starting from the European Strategy for Africa (2005), the evolution of the EU’s intents will be demonstrated, particularly with reference to partnership and the dynamics of ‘othering’ within it. Drawing from the theoretical elaboration in section 2.6 concerning the perception of normative power by ‘others’ as well as the importance of reflection by the normative power itself, this section will illustrate how it has been incorporated within the selected texts as well as how it has evolved over time. Another link that will be drawn will be the connection between the frame of partnership-ownership with effective multilateralism.
Table 6.6 From EU Strategy for Africa (2005) to 4th EU-Africa Summit Roadmap 2014-2017: Content analysis distribution (%)  

<table>
<thead>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.88</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism \ TOTAL</td>
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<td>46.5</td>
<td>38.23</td>
<td>67.86</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Ownership implied</td>
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<td>2.94</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Partnership implied</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.57</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Explicit partnership</td>
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<td>31.0</td>
<td>38.24</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ TOTAL</td>
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<td>44.12</td>
<td>17.86</td>
<td>33.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*% of the coded segments

From an overview of Table 6.6, multilateralism has been the dominant frame in most texts followed by partnership from JAES (2007) onwards. What this indicates is that after introducing the new type of relations between the EU and Africa, departing from the previous donor-recipient dynamic (see section 5.3.3), the EU followed a more practical path establishing partnership within multilateral obligations. By doing so, it shared the responsibility of action with the international community but also with the African partners themselves. This latter point was achieved through the promotion of ownership. This diplomatic tight-rope walking in normative terms will be further expanded in Chapter 8. Ultimately, this section will set the ground for the ensuing sections which will focus on the thematic sub-strategy related to maritime security, the EU Maritime Security Strategy, thereby completing the examination of intent both on a regional as well as thematic-security level.
Despite criticisms on the EU Strategy for Africa (2005) centring around the fact that it had retained a unilateral donor-client approach (see for example Lomé 1975-1995; and Cotonou 2000) and that it reflected a too biased European priority agenda, which would not be conducive to forging African ownership, it presents some interesting insight on the frame of partnership. The language employed in this document is overtly of a normative nature, particularly echoing the other-empowerment (Tocci 2008). Furthermore, it provides the first definitions for ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’. Within the definition of partnership, the donor-recipient past of the EU-Africa is rejected and “equality, partnership and ownership” (EU Strategy for Africa, 2005:3) are presented as shared basic principles. Nevertheless, within its definition of ownership the document states that “to turn the principle of ownership into policy, budget support should increasingly become the main aid delivery mechanism” (EU Strategy for Africa, 2005:19). Additionally, direct use of ‘contagion diffusion’ (see Textbox 1) is visible in the following statement: “The EU can offer Africa lessons learned from its experience of continental integration, regional and social cohesion, institution-building and policy development” (EU Strategy for Africa, 2005:19). Furthermore, the EU appears to engage in this conventional expression of partnership by “assuming its leading responsibility in partnership with other international players and with the UN” (EU Strategy for Africa, 2005:20), thus supporting the critiques of Haastrup (2013) and Rutazibwa (2010) on the role of the EU as mentor on the basis of othering. Basing its importance on the common values (democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance), mutual recognition and accountability (EU Strategy for Africa, 2005:2) of the two continents, the EU Strategy for Africa ultimately presents some common themes with the more recent documents examined in this section but only with reference to their normative foundation.

The determination of central objectives within JAES (2007) (see Chapter 5) indicate an intent on behalf of the EU to evolve its relationship with Africa into a political partnership that
goes beyond the issues that have traditionally dominated their relations (trade and development cooperation) and embraces a number of global concerns. Two fundamental dynamics which appearing within it concern deepening the relationship and jointly engaging the world community. JAES (2007) solidifies the relations between EU and Africa based on the principle of ‘a partnership of equals’. This phrase later changes in the 4th EU Summit Declaration (2014:1) to “shared principles of equal partnership and joint ownership” (emphasis added), further highlighting the bond between the two continents both in shared benefits as well as in responsibilities. By treating Africa as a single entity, the JAES focuses on eight thematic partnerships which include peace and security and democratic governance. The focus on the latter two is overtly influenced by the normative foundation of the EU seeing that, according to NPE, they are concerned with three (democracy, sustainable peace and good governance) of its nine substantive normative values (Manners, 2002). Their introduction within a regional agreement is also pertinent in normative terms, particularly with reference to the diffusion of normative power. According to Manners’ (2013:315) six forms of diffusion (seeTextbox 1), the institutionalisation of relationships between the EU and third parties, including inter-regional cooperation agreements and political partnerships, fall within the category of procedural diffusion. Arguably, the main form of diffusion in the EU Strategy for Africa (2005) was transference diffusion, seeing that the previous engagement of the EU with Africa was based on the provision of aid and assistance, rather than being a political partnership of equals. This change in diffusional form can be explained when seen through the broader strategic initiatives of the EU in the same period, namely the ESS (2003) and its Implementation Report (2008). A similar shift also occurred from informational diffusion in the ESS to procedural diffusion in its Implementation Report (section 6.2.1). Therefore, an argument can be made that these alterations in preferred forms of action are not a coincidence but rather the result of shifts within the EU’s identity, still within a normative understanding. Although in the strategic
document it appears that this shift coincided with a higher resort to the frame of partnership, the same is not the case on the level of strategies, at least not the ones in this section.

Section III entitled “NEW APPROACHES” of the JAES (2007) sets the new direction upon which the relations between the EU and Africa were going to be based upon. It is this section that emphasises the acknowledgment and reaffirmation of the partnership-ownership binary. Emphasis is put on the reinforcement of local leadership (regional and continental) whilst simultaneously repeating the essential role of "partnership” within a context of multilateralism, highlighting the ‘self’ with relation to the "other". On this point, it is also interesting that as the first document to set the grounds for the political cooperation between the two continents, JAES demonstrates the EU’s reflexive ability as an actor in the way it constructs its conventional obligations whilst setting the framework for future cooperation. This also demonstrates the influence of the ‘other’ (in this case Africa) thus in proposing in essence a dynamic rapport in the decision and operationalisation of the action to be taken in the continent. In normative terms, this is not only demonstrative of the EU-self’s role in this partnership, but also of the reacting ‘other’ in the sense that past differences are explicitly acknowledged, nevertheless their bridging is suggested in a context of a conventional agreement.

The partnership was concluded to guide important transformations, such as conflict prevention, good governance and food protection. Within the EU’s “Africa EU Strategic Partnership 2 Unions, 1 Vision, Summit Edition” (2014) report, the Somali conflict was explicitly referred to and the commitment to bringing it to an end reasserted. The presented goals for the this were “to stabilise the internal situation and to promote timely post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts. To these ends, we will continue working together in support of a strengthened AMISOM, as well as of the Somali Security Forces, extending support to the TFG in the framework of a reinvigorated comprehensive political strategy”
The importance of an “effective multilateralism” within multilateral institutions as the main fora for international cooperation is highlighted, particularly with the goal of maintaining “peace and security, human rights and democracy and on global governance” (Africa EU Strategic Partnership 2 Unions, 1 Vision, Summit Edition 2014:13).

Elements that inform the context of partnership in JAES appear to be the ever tighter institutional cooperation of the two parties on a political level, the need to address “common challenges”, the treatment of Africa as one, the promotion of “holistic approaches” to development processes (see De Zutter 2010) and make the Joint Strategy a permanent platform for information sharing, participation and mobilisation of civil society actors both with the EU and Africa (JAES, 2007:3). Ownership therefore, or onus of the action that will ensue, therefore also depends on the contribution of sub-state actors that will inform the outcome. This is important within the understanding of effective multilateralism. Although this term is assumed to imply the cooperation of the EU, AU, UN as well as state actors, in this case it includes explicitly civil society: “Ongoing dialogue with civil society, the private sector and local stakeholders on issues covered by this Joint Strategy will be a key component to ensure its implementation”. (JAES, 2007:3). In the footnote of this section “the context of this Joint Strategy, the term non-state actors is understood as comprising: (i) private sector, (ii) economic and social partners including trade union organisations and (iii) civil society in all its forms according to national characteristics” (JAES, 2007:3). The incorporation of non-state entities demonstrates the expansion of the ‘effective multilateralism’ frame whilst attempting to broaden the spectrum of normative ‘receivers’. Drawing on Ruggie (1998), norms are justified on the grounds of their underlying socially constructed interests. Therefore, by engaging with the broadest possible pool of parties, the EU could potentially achieve social reform from the base in redefining interests and preferences (Elgström 2011) whilst advocating the inclusion of
social stakeholders in decision-making. In turn this could echo the EU’s commitment to promoting democracy and social solidarity, two of its core normative principles (Manners 2002).

Within the Strategic Priorities, particularly on the subject of peace and security, JAES underlines the foundation on the promotion of “holistic approaches” to security that cover all the stages of conflict, from prevention to long-term peace building and sustainable development in order to eradicate the root causes of the conflicts (JAES, 2007:4); this element is particularly pertinent to the case-study of Somalia. Within this section the element of partnership is once again prominent, this time though complemented by ownership. The leadership of the AU, particularly through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), is stressed while the EU appears as the key partner in supporting the creation of appropriate conditions for the maintenance of lasting peace and stability (JAES, 2007:5). The support of the EU and its member states is identified in in their “expertise, financial and human resources”, while the AU and the instruments it has set up are the key coordinators or enactors of the relevant initiatives (JAES, 2007:5).

The JAES Action Plan 2011-2013 introduces the role to be undertaken by the EEAS, within the frame of the EU’s partnership with Africa. The first initiative within the Political Dialogue subsection allocates the “Completion and implementation of the political dialogue framework by establishing systematic and structural linkages...between the new EU (EEAS) structures, the AUC and RECs peace and Security Departments. The objective is to increase the involvement at this political level in reviewing actions already undertaken, and on providing increased political guidance for the future” (JAES Action Plan 2011-2013:7). The creation of the EEAS is also recognised as a contributing factor to the strengthening of the EU Delegations’ role in African capitals (JAES Action Plan 2011-2013:10), thereby supporting the argument put forth in this thesis concerning the Service’s catalytic role in the evolution of the
EU’s actorness. Furthermore, the role of these delegations is set within “ensuring effective EU coordination and in promoting awareness and ownership among Member States” (but is also considered key for the Action Plan’s implementation JAES, Action Plan 2011-2013: 10). This therefore situates the EEAS in a crucial position, tessellating between the frames of multilateralism and ownership. In turn, this links to the importance of the Service in normative terms, given the importance of the frames’ concepts in the same terms.

In the “Sub-Partnership on Peace and Security - Political dialogue” Section of the text, recognition of the limited operational support provided with respect to the security and crisis management initiatives is reaffirmed. Referring to the Horn of Africa and Sahel the text states, that increasingly the "neighbours of the neighbours" are being affected. By incorporating the Horn of Africa into the "neighbourhood" paradigm and the extended normative foundation underlining neighbourhood policy set by the EU, the African region is brought closer to the interests of the EU thereby further extending its commitments to the broader geographical area. The 4th EU Summit Declaration retains the normative tone but also adds the ways with which the EU will contribute predominantly through its missions: “Within the framework of the EU's comprehensive approach to tackling conflicts and its causes, and building on experiences of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations, such as….Somalia….work in close collaboration with Africa, in the framework of the APSA, in support of African led peace operations and, more generally, African efforts…through the provision of advice, mentoring and training. Additionally, the supply of equipment is an option, either as a complement to CSDP missions and operations or as part of stand-alone measures.” (2014:3). This statement succinctly encapsulates the relationship of the EU with Africa, particularly in operational cooperation. The ‘comprehensive approach’ is presented as the basis for the EU’s involvement instead of any normative reference to its core values. The comprehensive approach has thus evolved to encompass not only the employment of all means
at the EU’s disposal but also indicated the connection of internal with external security (see De Zutter 2010; section 2.5.1). Consequently, this statement departs from previous highly normative pronouncements and implies the EU’s concern of being affected rather than demonstrating solidarity and support. Set within a CSDP context, the statement highlights the non-coercive means of the EU’s involvement and downplays its operational contribution by suggesting the supply of equipment. Therefore, once again the provisions that are considered for the operational level, although not explicitly normative, remain appropriate for a normative actor/power. This observation is further corroborated by the EU Summit Declaration (2014:3) which states “We agree to support these efforts to enhance African capacities in the field of peace and security through the range of means at our disposal, with a particular focus on capacity - building.”

The sub-strategies with Africa therefore enable a better understanding of the EU’s actorness within a continent to continent basis. Following the broader strategic endeavours which were presented previously, this section has identified the prominence of ‘partnership’ as pivotal in understanding the EU’s actorness in normative terms. The EEAS has emerged as the linking agent in the operationalisation of the Union’s intents but also the carrier of the ‘comprehensive approach’. Most importantly, the frame of ‘partnership’ has appeared crucial throughout the two continents’ relations, whilst the language the EU employs and the means of support it foresees are largely oriented to financial support or training. Combined with the extensive employment of normative rhetoric, this demonstrates the commitment of the Union to the use of non-coercive means of support, thus speaking to the main question of this thesis. The EU appears to be a consistent normative actor both in its intents as well as in the framing of its actions. Within the frames it employs, the EU has always reflected its normative foundation as well as echoed it in its subsequent presentation of intents. With reference to its relations with Africa, this element has been dominantly manifesting through ‘partnership’.
6.3.2 The EU fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa and the EU Maritime Security Strategy (2014)

Pursuant to the previous elaboration on the scope of EU relations with Africa, the focus now narrows to that of maritime security, more generally, as well as the EU’s fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa more specifically. For this reason, the coding conducted on the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) (2014) and its subsequent Action Plan (17002/14, 2014) will be presented through the lens of the critical frames employed in this thesis. To further the insight provided by the analysis of those frames, Council Conclusions concerning counter piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa as well as relevant press releases and factsheets will be coded to demonstrate in more detail the normative underpinnings of the EU’s actorness within maritime security in the region. This section will therefore narrow the analysis, further completing the illustration of the EU’s actorness in normative terms as well as pinpointing the significance of the EEAS’ establishment within its evolution. Ultimately, the examination of the military operations will complete the normative landscape of this research by incorporating ‘action’, thus responding to the second question of this thesis which concerns the compatibility of military means with the NPE framework.

In order to contextualise EUMSS provisions regarding EUNAVFOR Atalanta, the regional policy for the Horn of Africa (2010) will be explored prior to the analysis of the EU’s strategic vision for maritime security, codified in the EUMSS (2014). Initially focused on development, the Commission Recommendation on measures for self-protection and the prevention of piracy and armed robbery against ships, (2010/159/EU, 11.3.2010) set the basis for the ensuing Council Conclusions in November 2011 (EU strategic framework for the Horn of Africa) tackling more political problems in the wake of piracy attacks off the Coast of Somalia. The latter aimed at aligning various external policy programmes and instruments
towards five objectives: good governance and human rights; peace-building; preventing the insecurity spilling over from the Horn onto other regions and, in its latest version, vice versa; economic development and poverty reduction; and cross-border political and economic cooperation, especially through the role of the African Regional Economic Communities.

The highly normative nature of the aims becomes apparent, seeing that the aforementioned objectives echo the substantive normative principles of the EU (Manners, 2002). The same applies for the foreseen areas of engagement in support of regional and country level environments: conducive to peace, security and justice, good governance based on democratic principles of inclusion, rule of law and respect for human rights and equality (Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:4). What is thereby also demonstrated is the basis of its multilateralism in the Horn on two levels, regional and country- specific (Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:5). Amongst the international partners mentioned in this document, the most prominent are the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU) and the UN.

EU engagement in Somalia is also outlined in this document, whereby the focus is set on the financial support of the local-regional authorities rather than the military operations it carries out in the country. More specifically, the EU emphasises its humanitarian support from ECHO and the funding it provides for the Transitional Federal Institutions through “cooperative activities in the governance sector managed by the UN and civil society, for the African Union (AU) mission (AMISOM) through the African Peace Facility” (Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:11) and frames EUNAVFOR as its contribution “to containing piracy” and EUTM as supporting the “training of Somali National Security Forces in partnership with Uganda and the US” (Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:11). This is a stark contradiction with the most recent vision presented in the EUGS, aiming at the establishment of autonomous presence in its external action (see section 6.2.2). Nevertheless, the emphasis on ownership and
fair burden sharing within the region itself has remained the same. What is thus demonstrated is the continuing commitment of the EU in the support for what JAES (2007) phrase “equal partnership and joint ownership”. Therefore, the dominance of effective multilateralism in this document (52.63% of coded segments) is not coincidental (see Table 6.7).

Table 6.7 The EU’s fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa and EUMSS (2014): Content Analysis Distribution (%)
The EU’s efforts in Somalia are further outlined within the context of the comprehensive approach: “The EU will seek to make its engagement in the Horn more effective through consistent, coherent and complementary use of its instruments, reinforcement of its political coordination, and by focusing clearly on the underlying challenges of the region.” (Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:13). The inclusion of tackling the underlying causes of conflict is increasingly important within a normative understanding and relates to the long-term effect of the developmental efforts of the EU parallel to short-term security initiatives (see section 4.5). The role of the EEAS comes across prominently in this frame as well seeing that of the EUSR, who is tasked to contribute to “developing and implementing a coherent, effective and balanced EU approach to piracy encompassing all strands of EU action” (FAC Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 2011: 2) as well as the “coherence, quality, impact and visibility of the EU’s action in the region” (Council of the EU, 16858/11, 2011:13). This last provision touches upon two different forms of normative diffusion whilst, simultaneously, applying to the comprehensive approach. The contribution of the EUSR – as the main EU interlocutor with the AU and IGAD, does not only concern the maintenance of cohesion between the different aspects of the EU’s involvement in the region but also requires that these efforts are visible. Therefore, the normative significance of the EUSR’s mandate is not only a matter of procedural diffusion but also overt diffusion (see Textbox 1). This element is particularly importance seeing that this vision is one of the main endeavours of the EUGS (see section 6.2.2), thereby demonstrating a continuum of intent on a strategic level. Furthermore, the fact that the EEAS is indirectly involved in the accomplishment of the EU’s visibility, demonstrates the actual inclusion of the Service as a normative agent rather than a presence that enables the normative process.
A very telling portrayal of the EU’s operationalised normative intents underpinning the launch of a capacity building maritime mission in the Horn of Africa can be found within Council PRESSE (18321/2/11, 12/12/2011:1): “The new mission has two main tasks: strengthening the sea-going maritime capacities in the countries in the region (with the exception of Somalia) and, in Somalia, the training of a coastal police force as well as the training and protection of judges. Specific activities to execute those tasks are to give expert advice on legal, policy and operational matters concerning maritime security; coast guard training to develop the ability to enforce laws on the sea; and procurement of the necessary equipment.” This mandate encapsulates and operationalises the normative principles the EU has been promoting throughout its strategic initiatives more broadly, as well as those more specifically in the region. What is also highlighted by the incorporation of this mission within “the EU’s comprehensive approach to fight piracy and instability in this region” (Council PRESSE, 18321/2/11, 12/12/2011:1), is the intricate connection between the frame and the operationalisation of normative intents through it.

The HR in her Joint Communication to the Parliament and the Council (JOIN (2014) 9 final, 6.2.2014) summarises the role and importance of EUNAVFOR Atalanta whilst highlighting the pertinence of the frames employed in this thesis: “The Gulf of Aden has become an important area for cooperation, due to the presence of international partners protecting vulnerable shipping and fighting piracy. The EU’s presence in the Gulf of Aden through EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta, combined with the extensive support provided by other EU cooperation instruments, has a positive effect on other policy areas and fosters better civil-military cooperation. The success of Operation Atalanta combined with the longer-term cooperation actions should be preserved to ensure that any future resurgence of piracy is avoided.” (JOIN (2014) 9 final:2). Concerning multilateralism, the importance of international partners is stressed from the outset whilst underlining the mandate of the operation, primarily
in providing security for aid and secondarily in combatting piracy. Simultaneously, emphasis is put on the comprehensive approach in terms of EU internal instruments as well as in terms of combined civil-military means. Lastly, the importance of providing long-term impact by countering the root causes of piracy is stipulated, thus speaking to Stavridis (2001) and Mitzen (2006) concerning the relevance of a normative understanding in the combination of military and civilian initiatives.

Table 6.8 EUMSS and EUMSS Action Plan: Content Analysis Distribution (%)

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<th>EUMSS Action Plan (17002/14) CSDP/PSDC 744 (16/12/2014)</th>
<th>EUMSS Responding together to global challenges - A guide to stakeholders (17/08/2016)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>20.59</td>
<td>26.32</td>
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<td>10.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ TOTAL</td>
<td>8.34</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*% of the coded segments

The EUMSS is presented as a policy framework, intended to provide continuity between the internal maritime order and the global one but also to effectively coordinate the means at the EU’s disposal in serving this purpose. Therefore, as demonstrated in Table 6.8, the comprehensive approach appears as the dominant frame within the Strategy itself. The Action Plan provides a different image. Focusing more on the cooperation of the EU with its international partners while asserting an intent to act autonomously, it comes as no surprise that the most employed frame in this case is effective multilateralism (70.59% of coded segments). Unlike most of the post-EEAS era documents which have been coded in this
research, the Maritime Strategy underutilises the frame of partnership. Nevertheless, this Strategy is expressly meant to be complementary to broader initiatives, wherein the relations with partners will be covered. Therefore, the “principles enshrined and the objectives identified in this Strategy should be embedded in the implementation of existing and future regional EU strategies, such as those for the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Guinea” (EUMSS, 2014: 4)

From the outset, the EUMSS (2014) situates its importance within the context of the comprehensive approach. Demonstrating its relevance to the ESS’ conceptualisation of the frame (see section 6.2.1) which connects internal and external security, the EUMS is also presented as a means of projecting the internal maritime security order of the EU onto a global domain (EUMSS, 2014:2). Simultaneously, the Strategy underlines its importance as a political framework so as to “comprehensively address maritime security challenges through the employment of all relevant instruments…across civilian and military authorities and actors” (EUMSS, 2014:3), thus echoing the importance of the comprehensive approach in the coordination of all means at the EU’s disposal. The Action Plan reiterates the EUMSS’ foundation on a “cross sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for rules and principles, and maritime multilateralism - including the decision-making autonomy of the EU” (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014:2) thereby demonstrating an interconnection of the two frames -the comprehensive approach and effective multilateralism. What is interesting in this instance is the explicit demonstration of an intent to retain separate actorness parallel to international engagements. The same attempt to mitigate the two elements of external action is also seen in the most recent strategic endeavour, the EUGS (see section 6.2.2). Additionally, seen in conjunction with the explicit intent to “secure the maritime security interests of the EU and its Member States against a plethora of risks and threats in the global maritime domain” (EUMSS, 2014: 3) one cannot fail but reflect upon whether the EU’s international endeavours stem from
a genuine commitment to its core norms or whether it utilises its normative standing to promote its own interests (Manners 2008).

Within the section devoted to External Action (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014:3), the document further specifies the initiatives that will be undertaken in a coordinated approach on maritime security issues in international fora and with third countries. What is further clarified in this part of the text are the immediate, medium and long term goals, depending on their intended delivery. This not only demonstrates the perceived urgency of the challenges faced but also the hierarchy of the focus it sets for their resolution. Within this same ‘Workstrand’ the goals that are included also identify the ‘Lead Actors’ responsible for their achievement, of course with respect to their competences and legal mandates. The EEAS is identified as responsible for the majority of the initiatives identified (5/7) thus demonstrating the gradual increase in its importance as part of the EU framework.

The frame of effective multilateralism is expanded upon in the immediate and medium term goals, wherein the roles of the EEAS as well as the cooperative relations in maritime security between the EU and other actors are identified. The exclusive competence for the development of “strategic dialogue with relevant regional and international stakeholders and third countries on maritime security to sustain and further develop the promotion of rules-based governance at sea” is hereby foreseen for the EEAS (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014, ANNEX, para 1.1.1:3). The overall delineation is therefore undertaken by the EEAS but complemented in the identifying “the areas of commonality and complementarity between the EU and the UN in its bodies to develop an improved partnership in the field of maritime security, with a view to the development of joint regional maritime capacity-building activities” (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014, ANNEX, para 1.1.2:3) with the Member States. Therefore, as far as the overall operationalisation is concerned the EU holds the primary responsibility, but within the framework of a multilateral engagement with the UN, Member States are also involved to
determine the elements of military capabilities. This is not only indicative of the role to the EEAS’ overall normative character, but also its dependence from the Member States when it comes to carrying out the mandates that have been set up for maritime security.

What is also interesting in this provision is the employment of the ‘partnership’ frame. Throughout the policy concerning relations with Africa (see EU Strategy for Africa 2005, JAES 2007 and subsequent EU-Africa Summit Roadmaps) and initiatives that are carried out in the region (either broadly or more case-specifically), the partnership frame is always used to underline the relationship between the EU and the local powers. As mentioned previously, this is directly linked on a normative level with the empowerment of the African contribution to the resolution of the challenges at hand, thereby not following the usual “superior self” – “inferior other” paradigm (see Diez, 2005). In this case, the incorporation of partnership can be read as hinting to the parallel and equal involvement of the EU and the UN in maritime security. This becomes even more interesting as a rhetoric choice seeing the autonomous involvement of the EU in operations, such as Somalia and the Horn of Africa. In turn, the interpretation of this particular choice can be seen as a reaffirmation of the EU’s own presence in the maritime security sector. Lastly, the EUMSS introduces another element that supports the normative power thesis. Section 1.2 (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014, ANNEX, para 1.2:4), focuses on the enhancement of the EU’s visibility in the maritime domain. This is not foreseen in this document as a long-term goal, which would in turn indicate the secondary nature of this concern, but as one of immediate-medium term. Within this research the issue of the EU’s visibility has been highlighted throughout as relevant to its actorness via the EEAS.

In the ensuing paragraphs of this section the relations between the EU and other international actors is identified. Stress is put on the efforts for coordinating EU and NATO initiatives in the area of maritime security, identifying complementarity as well as developing enhanced cooperative relations. This is particularly telling of the direction the EU was taking
at the time, especially in view of the more recent policy (see section 6.2.2 on the EUGS). Within the framework of effective multilateralism, the EU appears to be strengthening its cooperation with NATO from its western partners, although not neglecting the importance of the local regional powers. The ties with NATO do, however, indicate a further concern of the EU with its military capabilities despite its highly normative nature as an actor.

According to the EUMSS: “Taking into account the EU’s comprehensive approach, plan and conduct regular maritime security exercises with third countries and international/regional organisations, in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations and missions or EU exercises in adjacent sea basins and to other areas of interest, in accordance with the EU exercise policy” (EUMSS Action Plan, 2014, ANNEX, para 1.2.1:4). The ensuing paragraphs of this section reiterate the EU’s concern in conducting workshops, seminars and conferences as well as a communication campaign with an aim of sharing its regional strategies and initiatives but also facilitating their implementation. What becomes apparent is the commitment of the EU in maintaining a highly civilian actorness, not only with reference to the means it employs, but also with the role it undertakes within the frame of multilateral cooperation. Emphasis on the EU being mostly involved in the strategic planning and dissemination of relevant knowledge indicates its highly normative self-portrayal. In the sections to follow, this normative identity becomes more apparent with particular reference to ownership. In paragraph 1.4.1 the document states: “Whilst ensuring local ownership, priority should be given to countries and regions where the lack of maritime security capacity has a direct impact on the security and economic prosperity of the EU and its citizens including on ports/regions with major trade flows to the EU and on countries/regions of transit and origin of migration flows”. These provisions essentially point to the case of Somalia although it is not explicitly mentioned until the following paragraph on effective
multilateralism, which unequivocally targeted the Horn of Africa (EUMSS Action Plan 2014, ANNEX, para 1.4.2:5).

The EUMSS Action Plan can be seen as a key text that has defined the EU’s military action internationally but most importantly its overall actorness. Although the scope of this text is defined to a narrow area of application, the rhetoric frames employed are indicative of the EU’s intents as well as its evolving identity through military operations. The three frames selected for this thesis appear throughout the document. As far as the operationalisation of these intents is concerned, the EU appears to be concerned with pursuing them in a complementary fashion through its operations. The main point of reference remains effective multilateralism (see Table 6.4). Nevertheless, the comprehensive approach as well as the establishment of a partnership-ownership relation with third countries complete the full image of the EU’s actorness, which comes across distinctly normative. Moreover, the outline of its future ventures further reinforces this research’s argument that the EEAS becomes more pivotal in the relations of the EU as a global actor, thus paving the way for a new type of actorness in the post-Lisbon era.

This section thus completes the examination of sub-strategies which focus on the intents of the EU with respect to its relationship with Africa more broadly, as well as its particular engagement with countering piracy in the Horn of Africa more specifically. The strategic vision constructed through this analysis on maritime security, specifically its codification in the EUMSS, demonstrates an increased interest in the area of maritime security but also contributes to the illustration of the normative landscape for the naval operation in Somalia – EUNAVFOR Atalanta.
6.3.3 The Comprehensive Approach (2013) and Action Plan (2015)

Within this section, the coding and frame analysis of The Comprehensive Approach (CA) (2013) and its implementation Plan (2015) will be presented. The approach taken with this document will be different from that with the other sub-strategies. Seeing that the comprehensive approach has been examined as a frame throughout this research, within this section the elaboration will focus on the conceptual contribution of the document to the frame itself as well as how it incorporates the concepts of ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘partnership-ownership’. It will thus be approached within the scope of the case studies of Somalia and the broader Horn of Africa. Furthermore, links will be draw with its normative significance, thereby demonstrating its pertinence in the examination of the EU’s normative power as well as the role of the EEAS’ establishment in its evolution.

### Table 6.9 The Comprehensive Approach (2013) and its Implementation Plan: Content Analysis

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive approach\CA implied</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive approach\CA explicit</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive approach\TOTAL</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>42.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism\Multilateralism implied</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td>47.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism\Multilateralism explicit</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism\TOTAL</td>
<td>26.66</td>
<td>47.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership\Ownership implied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership\Partnership implied</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership\Explicit Ownership</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership\Explicit partnership</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>10.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership\TOTAL</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>10.53</td>
</tr>
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*% of the coded segments
From an overview of the coded segments (see Table 6.9), the dominance of effective multilateralism becomes apparent, second of course to the comprehensive approach. Nevertheless, what can also be observed is the limited use of the partnership-ownership frame. This could be justified by the fact that partnership itself is dependent on the niche relationships outlined in strategic documents, or documents of strategic significance. Therefore, an overarching provision on this frame would demonstrate the disregard of the EU for the nature of the challenges it is facing as well as the underlying complexities that could be entailed. Furthermore, as observed in the analyses presented in this chapter, the frame of comprehensive approach deals with the coordination of internal with external practices. It further regards the full use of tools at the disposal of the EU in a coherent manner for the purposes of achieving a specific goal. According to De Zutter (2010), a normative power is a political entity whose norms guide both those practices. Additionally, Zwolski (2012:994) observes that the EU supports its security environment internationally through the advancement of effective multilateralism and good governance through a comprehensive approach. Therefore, from the aforementioned, what can be deduced is that the EU is in fact a normative actor simply through the comprehensive approach it follows in its external action. This is important theoretically for the purposes of this thesis’ main research question but also in the identification of the EEAS within the trajectory of the EU’s evolving normative actorness. The CA and its Action Plan respond to this precise point of enquiry and therefore addresses the theoretical questions that underpin this thesis.

The CA from the outset identifies in the Lisbon Treaty the “principles, aims and objectives of the external action of the European Union” (CA, 2013:2). The consistency between the different areas of EU external action are reflected institutionally in the HR and the establishment of the EEAS. Within this context, the CA (2013:2) stipulates that “the EU has both the increased potential and the ambition – by drawing on the full range of its instruments
and resources- to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic”.

In this dense statement, the document eludes to the conceptualisation of normative power argued within this thesis; this includes the employment of all the tools at the EU’s disposal, both military and civilian in nature, in external action with the caveat of the former not being employed in a coercive fashion. The document goes on to acknowledge that the notion of the comprehensive approach is not a new one and that it had already been operationalised in many cases, including that of the Horn of Africa (see section 6.3.2). It nevertheless, underlines that the principles governing this approach have yet to become “systematically, the guiding principles for EU external action across all areas, in particular in relation to conflict prevention and crisis resolution” (CA, 2013: 2). The inclusion of all stages of the conflict cycle or external crisis, from prevention to the support of sustainable long-term development, are required in this approach. The emphasis put on the long-term impact as well as on sustainability directly refer to the relevant core normative principles identified by Manners (2002). Another important element is included in this initial presentation of the concept, regarding the identification of the HR commitment in applying the concept of comprehensive approach both in the EU’s external policy as well as its action. This point directly reflects the analytical approach taken within this thesis, concerning the continuity of intent and action (see Chapter 3).

The following section underlines the importance of the EU’s visibility and global role within the context of the comprehensive approach. More specifically, the document states that comprehensiveness “refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States” (CA, 2013: 3) within which the potential of the EEAS is explicitly mentioned. According to the document, this is the way by which the EU can better “define and defend its fundamental interests and values” as well as “promote its key political objectives” (CA, 2013: 3), thus
directly referring to the importance of norms as well as the arguments of Kavalski (2013) and Manners (2006) concerning presence and normative actorness (see section 3.4).

An important conceptual connection is demonstrated further in the text, that between security and development. As the document stipulates this nexus is “a key underlying principle in the application of an EU comprehensive approach” and therefore “responses must be context-specific and driven by reality and logic of real life situations encountered” (CA, 2013:4). This point is reiterated in the Action Plan (2015:2) which states that “EU policy and action should always take into account the country or regional context and the political realities and needs on the ground”. What is therefore underlined is the needed coherence between the two areas of responsibility which, as discussed in section 4.5.2, are extensively critiqued within the EEAS context as dysfunctional. This is due to the complexity of the issues the EU has to face in its external action, seeing that the majority of challenges it is called to encounter are within developing countries. Therefore, the comprehensive approach serves another purpose with regards to the timeframe set for the operationalisation of initiatives which also indicates the urgency for tackling the issues that arise. Seeing its pertinence to the security-development nexus, this approach attempts to link short-term crisis management/conflict resolution efforts with longer-term security sector reform and state-building efforts in order to ensure the sustainability of its results wherever the EU conducts its operations (Smith, 2013:38). Within this, the role of the comprehensive approach is to a large extent an issue of bridging and coordinating the EU’s development cooperation agenda, which is mostly by civilian instruments and the Commission, with its foreign security policy agenda, which is dominated by EU Member States with reference to military/policing capabilities and the EEAS regarding strategic design and oversight. As Smith (2013:38) asserts “the comprehensive approach is largely about linking the EU’s new CSDP policing/military capabilities to its longstanding expertise in using civilian and economic foreign policy tools”. The cooperation of the two
instruments is further emphasised in the document (CA, 2013: 10): “Close cooperation, in particular between the High Representative and the Commission, is also vital on the various global issues where the external aspects of internal EU policies have a growing foreign and security policy dimension”, whereby the coherence between the internal and external practices is again critical.

The solution to the aforementioned tension, according to the CA (2013:6) is the adoption whenever possible of overarching strategic document with a regional focus, such as that of the Horn of Africa (see section 6.3.2). Within these initiatives another interpretation of the comprehensive approach is served, that which connects the internal practices with the external ones (CA, 2013:9), thus speaking to De Zutter’s (2010) definition of a normative power. What becomes apparent, therefore, is the connection of NPE characteristics of normative powers with the comprehensive approach. This observation is reinforced within the CA (2013:8), which reiterates the centrality of core normative principles (Manners 2002) – namely sustainable peace and development- within the EU’s responses.

The Implementation Plan reiterates all of the aforementioned points raised within the CA. An interesting addition with reference to effective multilateralism appears in the third section of the document under “Cases” wherein Somalia is explicitly addressed. Within this section focus is on the Somali Compact (2013) as a text defining the areas of coordination between the FGS, the EU and the international partners. Interestingly enough, the local stakeholders are not included, although in the text itself they hold a prominent part. As a crucial addition to the Somali Compact, this group was added to demonstrate the incorporation of the population in the decision-making process at the time. Naturally, their incorporation was an important contribution to the frame of multilateralism, seeing that they were represented in the meetings with the international partners (see section 6.3.2).
Furthermore, the three CSDP missions in the area are mentioned, within the context of the EU’s development cooperation framework. An interesting element in this section concerns the visibility of the Union’s actions both in a regional as well as in a state level. Particularly the EUSR for the Horn of Africa is presented as key in enhancing “the coherence, impact and visibility of the EU regional approach” (CA Action Plan 2015: 8). This speaks to Kavalski’s (2013) argument on the increased importance of a normative power being perceived as such rather than being one.

As witnessed in the Horn of Africa, and especially in Somalia, it has become increasingly apparent that piracy can be effectively dealt with only when maritime operations are complemented by parallel efforts at land. As Overhaus (2013:512) contends, the Treaty of Lisbon created “the prospect for better dealing with conflicts at the intersection of security and development” particularly through the creation of the EEAS. This research identifies this particular potential of the EU’s external action within NPE in theory and within the military operations in Somalia in practice. Normative power’s ability to combine military means with non-coercive use (see Chapter 2) for the operationalisation of the EU’s intents largely in the area of development (see Chapter 4) demonstrates the pertinence of NPE when exploring external action and echoes this thesis’ argument that the creation of the EEAS is a catalyst in the establishment of the EU’s normative power.

The need for a combination of means at the disposal of the EU is required to attain the effectiveness of its short-term (security) and long-term (development) goals – thus operationalising its “comprehensive approach”. As an international actor, it is required to cooperate with the other actors in the areas of interest as well as the recipient countries of its aid, hence demanding “multilateralism” in its action in order to achieve effective coordination. Theoretically, normative power provides the opportunity for a long-term solution to be put in place through the diffusion of its intents. On a practical basis, the EU is demonstrating
continuity through the implementation of its military means within the context of its operations in Somalia (see sections 7.3). The creation of the EEAS establishes a basis for a coherent operationalisation of the EU’s normative ambitions seeing that it is tasked with the oversight of the strategic planning as well as the operational practice on the ground, but also bears the weight of representation –presence- especially through the role of the EUSR. Therefore, the EEAS in theory as well as in practice is the institutional reflection of the comprehensive approach. Echoing De Zutter (2010) as well as Kavalski (2013), the emphasis in the CA as well as in the Action Plan demonstrate conceptual overlaps with normative power. Therefore, what can be argued, is that the EEAS in this logic is a normative actor and thereby infuses this element in the external action of which it is responsible for.

6.4 Conclusion

Within this chapter the coding and subsequent analysis of the strategic documents and sub-strategies demonstrating the EU’s ‘intent’ with regard to the operationalisation of the critical frames within the EU’s military initiatives was presented. Following the discussion in Chapter 4 concerning the role of the EEAS and its contribution to the structure of CSDP on a conceptual basis, and Chapter 5 which provided an overview of the political changes in Somalia, including the EU’s broader initiatives in Africa, this Chapter focused on the conceptual impact which informed the launch of the EU’s military operations in Somalia, EUNAVFOR and EUTM. This was presented through the lens of the critical frames, highlighting their role in the operationalisation of the EU’s initiatives.

The strategic trajectory of the EU as an external actor was accounted for, both before and after the creation of the EEAS, highlighting its impact on the critical frames as well as the overall actorness of the EU in external action. With Manners’ (2013:316) forms of normative diffusion in mind (see Textbox 1), the ESS and EUGS emerge as particularly important. Within
this section, the strategic communications proved essential in the promotion of ideas which informed the development of the EU’s external action in normative terms.

Starting with the ESS (2003), arguably the most important guideline for external action the EU had for more than a decade, one can identify the beginning of a normative strain being created. This ultimately culminated in the latest grand-strategic document, the EUGS (2016). Whilst both documents appear to overall promote ‘effective multilateralism’ as a frame, they include significant divergence in relation to ‘partnership-ownership’. Introducing a nascent version of a ‘comprehensive’ approach to external action, the ESS also focused on the ways with which it would cooperate with its international partners (ESS, 2003:11) in dealing with “complex problems” (ESS, 2003:1) and “global threats” (ESS, 2003:9). The ESS therefore referred to a notion of ‘comprehensive security’ even though it was lacking focus both on geographic areas as well as areas of military engagement.

As demonstrated in Table 6.1 the frame of ‘effective multilateralism’ is dominant in both the ESS (51.9% implied, 3.7% explicit) and its Implementation Report (38.6% implied, 6.8% explicit). With the increasing employment of this frame between the ESS (2003) (Chart 6.1) and its Implementation Report (2008) (Chart 6.2), but also the significant rise in its appearance within the EUGS (2016) (Chart 6.3), a pattern seems to emerge with reference to its importance. When looking into the co-occurrence of the frames, a more detailed account emerges, particularly with reference to partnership and its use with effective multilateralism (Table 6.3). What this demonstrates about the use of these frames within the strategic documents, is the reliance of the EU on the concept of partnership in its international cooperation. Echoing Diez (2005), this is indicative of the EU’s perception of ‘self’ as well as the ‘other’, thereby indicating its commitment to mutual collaboration rather than imposition of its self-serving intents. Interestingly, in both documents the prevalent category is ‘implied multilateralism’. This denotes the fact that the term ‘multilateralism’ is not mentioned
explicitly in the coded segments but rather the concept of it is presented. With due consideration of the ESS’ shortcomings, the Implementation Report explicitly addressed the need to “strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood” and added that “the EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the UN” (ESS Implementation Report: 4). The 2008 Implementation Report of the ESS (S407/08, 11 December 2008) also explicitly addresses the effect of state failure on the EU “security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy” (ESS Implementation Report, 2008:1) thereby clearly stating its interest in tackling the previously untouched issues related to maritime security.

With reference to the comprehensive approach, the EUGS makes another interesting conceptual contribution by including a commitment to expanding “the meaning and scope of the ‘comprehensive approach’” (EUGS 2016:10). According to the document, what will be included is the involvement of the EU in a manner that prevents conflict, investing in stabilisation while remaining focused on assuring a long-term resolution. This expansion will again be supported by effective multilateralism and “deep and durable regional and international partnerships” (EUGS 2016:10). What the EUGS also validates is the argument put forth in this research concerning the intent of the EU to forge an autonomous yet cooperative actorness on the basis of the critical frames of effective multilateralism and the comprehensive approach. Echoing Kavalski (2013:250) emphasis on the importance of a normative power appearing to be one rather than being one, ‘presence’ becomes of critical importance at this point. As far as presence and actorness are concerned, two key elements emerge: willingness and tighter cooperation. Firstly, the document outlines and explicitly introduces the willingness of the EU to act in a more autonomous fashion while still remaining committed to its international partners. This stronger autonomous presence is now introduced as “an aspiration to transform rather than to simply preserve the existing system” (EUGS
The balance between forming and sustaining an autonomous presence is repeated in the Implementation Plan whereby the “EU’s strategic autonomy entails the ability to act and cooperate with international and regional partners wherever possible, while being able to operate autonomously when and where necessary” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:4). According to the EUGS, it will be accomplished through enhanced cooperation as well as a broader involvement of the EU within an expanded “comprehensive approach”, with an overwhelming emphasis on the role of the EEAS in the success of the endeavour. What is interesting to note about the language which is employed for the presentation of the EU’s role in the multilateral efforts is that it is centred around “partnership” rather than “cooperation”. This becomes more apparent in the Implementation plan where in one sentence the term is used three times: “In carrying forward its actions, the EU will work with partners and actively enhance its partnerships, while strengthening its own ability to take responsibility and share the burden with our partners in security and defence.” (EU Implementation Plan, 2016:4)

The EUGS, therefore, explicitly sets out a new trajectory for the EU as a global presence in the area of external action. With the majority of its action officially organised under the remit of the EEAS, it sets a very particular set of goals which demonstrate a new direction, separate from that of a conventional civilian actor and point towards what is argued in this thesis as a normative actorness. Echoing the contributions of Stivachtis (2007) and Sjursen (2006), the explicit reference to the values and principles (particularly democracy and good governance) of the EU as well as its commitment to international law (particularly international humanitarian and human rights law) in both the EUGS as well as its Implementation Plan further support the relevance of NPE as well as the pertinence of normative power in the examination of external action (see section 2.4.2).
The EU sub-strategies – Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES 2007), EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa – dealing with particular geographical regions and areas of action, further narrow the focus of this analysis adding to the evaluation in normative terms, providing more specified insight into the employment of the critical frames and identifying their pertinence within this thesis. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrated how the EU’s general strategic concerns are operationalised in the context of its relations with Africa as well as more narrowly with reference to its military initiatives, particularly those of a maritime nature.

The EUMSS Action Plan can be seen as a key text that has shaped the EU’s military action internationally but most importantly its overall actorness. Although the scope of this text is defined to a narrow area of application, the rhetoric frames employed are indicative of the EU’s intents as well as its evolving identity through military operations. The three frames selected for this thesis appear throughout the document. As far as the operationalisation of intents is concerned, the EU appears to be concerned with pursuing them in a complementary fashion through its operations. The main point of reference remains effective multilateralism (see Table 6.4). Nevertheless, the comprehensive approach as well as the establishment of a partnership-ownership relation with third countries complete the full image of the EU’s actorness, which comes across distinctly normative. Moreover, the outline of its future ventures further reinforces this research’s argument that the EEAS becomes more pivotal in the relations of the EU as a global actor, thus paving the way for a new type of actorness in the post-Lisbon era. By identifying the changes prompted by the EEAS’ establishment, its role was indicated in the overall evolution of the EU as a normative actor, thereby speaking to the second point of inquiry within this project.
Chapter 7

Somalia, EUNAVFOR and EUTM: case-specific dimension

7.1 Introduction

This chapter will proceed with the EU’s documentation relating to Somalia. Although they may not be strategies as such or deal with the elaboration of related concepts, these documents have elements of these within them. Thus, the scope of the analysis will be further honed down to the use of the critical frames within the case of Somalia. Most importantly, building on its introduction in Chapter 5, the examination of the Somali Compact (2013) will add the perspective of the Somali side (‘impact’) in the dialectic diffusion of normative power (see Chapter 2). Therefore, both sides to the normative process will be accounted for thus completing the conceptualisation of NPE and, more specifically, how it is reflected in the impact of the EU’s relations with Somalia.

Finally, the documentation related to the two military operations, EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM, will conclude this chapter, thereby completing the illustration of the EU’s normative actorness within a normative setting. This section will focus on the fluctuations (or lack thereof) of the critical frames’ employment within the renewed versions of the mandates, highlighting the changes in their subsequent normative underpinnings. Furthermore, the emerging comparison between the two operations will contribute to the construction of a more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia as well as its overall actorness in normative terms. Thereby, the element of ‘action’ will complete the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3. The role of the military operations themselves will be presented as part of the normative actorness of the EU, as well as how this is situated within the operationalisation of the frames. The mandates as well as the multilateral distribution of power will be highlighted, thereby setting the foundation for the ensuing discussion in Chapter
8. The function of the regional and country forces allocated by the international conventional relations will also inform understandings of the adopted critical frames. Therefore, wherever pertinent to the current research, the role of AMISOM and the Somali state authorities will be introduced to further demonstrate the operationalisation of multilateralism as well as the partnership-ownership binary.

7.2 EU documents relating to Somalia and the Somali Compact (2013): case-specific normative diffusion and impact

Building on the context provided through the content and frame analyses of the EU strategies and EU sub-strategies, this section will draw on the elaboration carried out in the previous chapter regarding EU-Africa policy and the Somali Compact and present the coding carried out on Council Conclusions relating to Somalia. Their purpose is twofold: on the one hand they are adopted under the Foreign Affairs Council formation, therefore focus on the EU’s external action, which includes foreign policy, defence and security, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. They therefore complement the elaboration of the concepts dealt with in the EU’s strategic documents and sub-strategies. Furthermore, these documents span chronologically from the year of the EEAS’ establishment (2010) and go up to one year after the conclusion of the Somali Compact (2013). The selected documents also include the Somalia New Deal Conference Communiqué (2013) as well as the HR’s statement in order to encapsulate the views of the EEAS within the selected timeframe.

The period between 2010 and 2013 encompasses key moments in the EU’s evolution as an international actor, particularly with reference to its engagement in Somalia. From an institutional standpoint, 2010 marks the establishment of the EEAS, argued by this thesis to be a catalyst in the evolution of the EU’s normative identity. From an operational standpoint, this timeframe encapsulates the parallel activities of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the launching of
EUTM in 2010, thus provisions for both can be found in the selected Council Conclusions. Lastly, the timeframe of the selected documents will allow the examination of the dynamic norm diffusion between the EU and Somalia, thus demonstrating the former’s reception as a ‘normative actor’.

Consequently, this elaboration will demonstrate how the frames have been employed in EU documents relating to Somalia to inform the operationalisation of its normative identity. Additionally, through their application on the Somali Compact (2013), the areas within which the EU has been recognised as a normative actor will be identified. Echoing the theoretical arguments of Diez (2005) and Kavalski (2013) (see section 2.6), this section will explore the EU’s promoted normative aims and illustrate their convergence with those reflected by the Somali side, thereby addressing the element of ‘impact’ within the proposed analytical framework for this thesis (see section 3.3). In doing so, an evaluation of the EU’s norm diffusion in Somalia will occur, thus highlighting successes and failures.

7.2.1 EU documents relating to Somalia: critical frames in norm diffusion

The Council Conclusions on Somalia demonstrate an irregular employment of the frames, demonstrated in Table 7.1. Although effective multilateralism appears to be used in equal proportion to the comprehensive approach in 2010, it becomes the dominant frame employed in 2012 and 2014. This is not only the case in the FAC Conclusions but also in the EEAS’ Communiqué as well as the HR’s statement in 2013. Furthermore, the frames of ownership appear to be consistently employed by both the EEAS and FAC with the exception of the HR and 2014 conclusions. Therefore, although not conclusively, effective multilateralism seems to be the central frame in all documents while ownership also appears to be consistently applied. In view of the dynamics created by the employment of partnership and ownership within the relations of the EU with Africa, more broadly (see section 6.3.1), and the
Horn of Africa region (see section 6.3.2), more specifically, what can be concluded is that this binary will provide interesting insight in the country specific case of Somalia too.

Table 7.1 EU documents relating to Somalia: Content Analysis Distribution (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code System</th>
<th>3023\textsuperscript{rd} FAC Conclusion on piracy off the coast of Somalia 14 June 2010</th>
<th>FAC conclusions on Somalia 3166, 14 May 2012</th>
<th>Statement by the EUHR Catherine Ashton, A436/13, 28 Aug 2013</th>
<th>Somalia New Deal Conference Communiqué, 16/9/2013</th>
<th>FAC Council conclusions on Somalia 20 October 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive approach \ CA implied</td>
<td>18.18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive approach \ CA explicit</td>
<td>27.27</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total comprehensive approach \ CA</td>
<td>45.45</td>
<td>14.29</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism \ Multilateralism implied</td>
<td>45.45</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53.33</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>effective multilateralism \ Multilateralism explicit</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total effective multilateralism \ CA</td>
<td>45.45</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53.33</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Ownership implied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Partnership implied</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Explicit Ownership</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>21.43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partnership-ownership \ Explicit partnership</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total partnership-ownership \ CA</td>
<td>9.09</td>
<td>42.86</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26.67</td>
<td>6.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*% of the coded segments

In June 2010 the Foreign Affairs Council (3023 FAC /14 June 2010) acknowledged the multi-faceted nature of piracy and identified the root causes of piracy. It therefore called upon the High Representative to propose a comprehensive EU strategy for the Horn of Africa in an effort to reinforce the stability of Somalia which required a comprehensive approach in the region linking security policy with development. This arguably more strategic approach accentuated the importance of regional multilateralism within the Horn of Africa and underlined the importance of “building on Somali ownership and addressing the underlying security and developmental challenges in Somalia” (3023 FAC /14 June 2010:1). Simultaneously it invited the HR and the Commission to make a proposal in order to achieve better cooperation with the regional partners. What becomes apparent is that the scale of the
case of Somalia and the Horn of Africa calls for substantial multilateral as well as EU coordination. The HR/VP is given a substantial mandate to prepare proposals and coordinate European action, thereby setting her and the EEAS at the epicentre of operationalising the comprehensive approach. What also becomes apparent is the interconnectivity of the frames employed, geared to towards achieving a long-term goal. As far as the actorness of the EU is concerned, in this document it appears that the EU takes a back seat in dealing with the resolution of the challenges in the area. Therefore, the invocation of ownership on this occasion can be perceived as reluctance to act, rather than ‘other’-empowering support (Tocci, 2008).

In the 3166th Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Somalia (2012) (FAC 9596/12, 14 May 2012) the EU indirectly positions itself once again in a supporting role rather than a leading one. From the very beginning of the text responsibility “for the design and delivery of a political solution lies with Somalis themselves” (FAC 9596/12, 14 May 2012:1). This can be considered as an indirect reference to ownership. The transference of responsibility on the local community of course has implications on effective multilateralism together with partnership-ownership. On the one hand the EU demonstrates its commitment to the normative underpinnings of the binary whilst on the other hand demonstrates reticence to implicate itself in any action. This is to say that by remaining true to establishing its involvement on ownership, which it has reaffirmed on multiple occasions, it almost exempts itself form direct engagement on the ground. This simultaneously sets the premise for the ownership of the political solution and execution of the intended mandate while detaching the EU from the responsibility of the endeavour's outcome. The question of whether this reticence demonstrated by the EU is an indication of adherence to its core normative basis or a diplomatic guise that excuses it from utilising military power will be further expanded upon in the following Chapter.

In paragraph 4 the involvement of the EU is explicitly set out, confirming the aforementioned concerns: “The EU will continue its significant support to AMISOM consistent
with a Somali-led strategy to stabilise the country and encourages AMISOM to continue developing its capacity to protect civilians and their human rights. The EU calls upon other donors to contribute to sustainable funding for AMISOM and to provide force enablers that will allow the mission to operate effectively.” (FAC 9596/12, 14 May 2012:2). What is therefore underlined is the financial support of the EU without determining its contribution in military means or its active engagement in supporting the forces during conflict. What is also reiterated is the dominant and primary role of AMISOM as well as its leadership in the operations on the ground. The EU thus remains a civilian actor when supporting the efforts in Somalia while at the same time providing capacities in order to justify its role and establish a resonating credibility of its involvement. In the following paragraph the EU underlines the importance of ultimately handing security responsibilities to Somali authorities, thereby supporting its claims to advancing local ownership, to enhance the international support to the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) “in cooperation with AMISOM, Uganda, the US and other relevant actors.” Therefore, an overlap between the frames of multilateralism and ownership is constructed. Although remaining normatively consistent, the EU demonstrates a lack of pro-active engagement, thereby allowing the interpretation of its military missions to be compatible with the character of NPE (see section 2.4.1)

In Article 5, the FAC (Luxembourg 20 October 2014) reiterates the role and work undertaken by the EUTM: “which undertakes advisory, mentoring and training activities, with the aim to developing the Somali national Armed Forces’ structures and their training capacity in Somalia itself”. The supporting role played by the EUTM in this instance is emphasized, thereby seceding primacy and acknowledging local initiative. Therefore, the pertinence of ownership is thus emphasised. Furthermore, within the same frame, the EU “underlines the importance of the Federal Government taking on an increased responsibility and ownership of the security sector” (FAC Conclusions, 2014: 2). By recognising the contribution of its
partners, mostly that of the FGS, the EU manages to retain its normative commitment to effective multilateralism intact. Nevertheless, it also demonstrates its secondary role on the operational front, even though it self-identifies as having a leading role in the fight against piracy within its effort in the Horn of Africa (see section 6.3.2).

The statement by the HR (6/9/2013) and the Communiqué following the adoption of A New Deal for Somalia provide no further insight into the pertinence of the frames than the FAC Conclusions. On both occasions, the ownership of the local forces as well as the commitment of the EU to providing comprehensive support to AMISOM and the FGS are repeated. Therefore, the EEAS and Council appear to exhibit the same level of reticence in this occasion. Nevertheless, this insistence on ownership can be seen on a theoretical basis as supporting the case for the EU’s normative power based on Tocci’s (2008:9-13) assertion that normative powers are other-empowering. Although this might appear as a very convenient excuse for the EU’s demonstrated lack of initiative, it nevertheless is justifiable on a theoretical level.

7.2.2 The Somali Compact (2013): norm diffusion from the receptive side

Following the discussion in section 5.1.3, the coding of the Somali Compact will be presented to demonstrate how the frames were employed within the document to reflect “a new political, security and development architecture framing the future relations between Somalia, its people, and the international community” (The Somali Compact, 2013:3). From this initial statement, the centrality of multilateralism and the comprehensive approach are visible. This is corroborated by the content analysis (see Chart 7) which further illustrates the extensive employment of ownership (20% of the coded segments) and partnership (24% of coded segments). The objective of this document was to align the international assistance to the country’s own peace and state-building priorities. The election of the new President as well as the increasing prospects of donor countries contributing peacebuilding affected this initiative.
The innovations introduced by JAES (2007) with respect to the relations between the EU and Africa, as well as the broadening of the partnership spectrum to include non-state actors in consultations (see section 6.3.1), influenced the needs within Somalia and thus impacted on the spectrum of instruments covered by the comprehensive approach as well as the scope of effective multilateralism to include non-state actors.

**Chart 7 The Somali Compact (2013)**

The expanded scope of multilateralism to include citizens, civil society and multi-stakeholders (The Somali Compact, 2013:3) within the consultation period, demonstrates the shift in the documents focus away from a government/developmental orientation. The Compact reinforces the role of the Somali people and introduces them as part of the multilateral process together with the government and the international community (Somali Compact, 2013:4). This enhancement of the societal level is followed by provisions within the frame of ownership, which can be summarized in the phrase of “Development is Somali-owned and Somali led” (Somali Compact, 2013: 13).
Although the provisions within this text concern the internal structure of the Somali state and include the Constitutional reforms which will lead to a “greater alignment of international aid, reduction of fragmentation and increased Somali ownership” (Somali Compact, 2013:4), the question of whether EU normative impact can be detected remains. Although arguably the principles that underpin these changes to reflect good governance can be attributed to EU influence on the basis of “Africa and Europe are bound together by a community of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy as enshrined in the relevant international agreements and in the constitutive texts of our respective Unions” (JAES, 2007:1), the element of recognition is still lacking to be considered an indication of normative diffusion.

Nevertheless, this recognition of the EU’s influence can be seen in the Annex of the Compact. Within this section the milestones for both the FGS and Somaliland are outlined, stating strategic objectives, governmental responsibilities and whether there is support from international partners. Therein, the UN and AMISOM are explicitly mentioned as supporting the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) concerning security (Somali Compact 2013:32) and justice (Somali Compact 2013:33). Although coordination with other international partners is foreseen in these sections, therefore including the EU, it is interesting that it is only explicitly mentioned in the areas of justice and inclusive politics (Somali Compact 2013:39), the environment (Somali Compact 2013:42) and health, education and civil service and public finance sectors (Somali Compact 2013:43). Taking into consideration the nature of these areas, one can speculate that the EU is recognised as a normative actor.

In view of the FAC Conclusions presented in the previous section and the reticence the EU demonstrated in the way it framed its involvement within Somalia, it is not surprising to see that its influence is not recognised within the Somali Compact. Nevertheless, this does not detract from the normative power of the EU overall, but is merely indicative of its shortcomings.
in being a visible international actor within areas such as security and defence. Therefore, this justifies the sequence of recent occasions –most prominently within the EUGS (see section 6.2.2) - in which the need for an autonomous EU presence is called for.

This section thus concludes the examination of the EU’s ‘intents’ within the proposed analytical framework as well as the perceived ‘impact’ (see section 3.3). The coding of the documents relating to the military operations in Somalia – EUNAVFOR and EUTM- will be presented next, thereby completing the analytical framework proposed with the element of action.

7.3 Documentation relating to EU military operations in Somalia: EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM

Drawing from the normative landscape structured throughout the EU strategies, sub-strategies and EU documents relating to Somalia, the focus of this analysis now turns to EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM. This will complete the illustration of the EU’s normative actorness within a normative setting by contributing the element of ‘action’ to the proposed framework from section 3.3. It is here that the fluctuations (or lack thereof) of the critical frames’ presence throughout the versions of the mandates emerges, highlighting the changes in their subsequent normative underpinnings. Furthermore, the evolving comparison between the two operations will contribute to the construction of a more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia as well as its overall actorness in normative terms.

7.3.1 EUNAVFOR Atalanta

The naval component of the EU ‘s involvement in Somalia was set up in 2008 (EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008), when the phenomenon of piracy off its coast appeared in the EU’s agenda. It was at that time that the Council decided to launch
its first naval military mission EU Naval Force Somalia- Operation Atalanta (EUNAVFOR). The mandate of this operation is based on the direct request by the TFG for support from the international community to deal with piracy. The objectives of the missions were thus determined as follows: a) the protection of vessels from the WFP delivering humanitarian food aid and further the protection of AMISOM shipping, b) the deterrence, prevention and repression of actors of piracy and armed robbery, c) the protection of merchant vessels in danger cruising off the Somali coast and d) the monitoring over areas off the coast of Somalia, in which dangers to maritime activities could arise (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008). Therefore, the political objective of the operation was ‘to improve maritime security in the region’ while its military objective ‘to deter piracy and to strengthen the security of main maritime routes.

According to Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, two levels are identified within which coordination would be sought. These levels also inform the frame of multilateralism within the operation itself. At a strategic level, close cooperation with the UN, the African Union (AU), the TFG and neighbouring countries. At an operational level, ship-owners’ organisations, the relevant UN departments and the WFP are identified. Furthermore, the mandate explicitly mentions the US-led Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) and NATO as privileged partners in the fight against piracy (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP). Together with nine other countries with similar operations in the area such as China, India and Russia, this endeavour is a prime example of operational coordination. With reference to multilateralism, the operation mandate also provides that Atalanta would “liaise with organisations and entities, as well as States Working in the region to combat piracy and armed robbery” (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP). This particular responsibility could be perceived as normatively important given its connection with the preservation of the international legal order. EUNAVFOR Atalanta has, therefore, been able to align itself with
the aforementioned actors, of course within the remit decided upon by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which is responsible for the political and strategic direction of the EU military operation.

The content analysis for the mandates and documentation regarding EUNAVFOR Atalanta did not prove to be illustrative of the frames’ use within them (see Table 7.2). The structured analysis carried out throughout this chapter, starting from the EU strategic documents and resulting in the operational mandates, has proven to be essential in the contextualisation of the operational provisions. According to Zwolski (2012:994), the EU endeavours to support its security environment internationally through the promotion of effective multilateralism and good governance via a comprehensive approach. This became more apparent in the JAES (2007) and later reflected in its FAC Conclusions (3023 FAC / 13 June 2014) wherein the EU reiterated its commitment to local ownership and combatting the root causes of the challenges faced. The employment of the partnership frame thereby assumes a key role and highlights an emergent pattern throughout the levels of EU documentation, whether in providing broader guidance on CSDP or focusing on particular regions (JAES, Horn of Africa). Continuously presenting itself as other-empowering (Tocci 2008), the Union arguably can be considered to accumulate characteristics of a ‘normative power’, at least on a theoretical level. The EEAS has been allocated a central role in assuring the harmonisation between the internal and external trajectories of its initiatives, thus always allowing the EU to achieve a level of coherence between the internal and external trajectories of its action, echoing De Zutter (2010).
The internal division of responsibilities regarding the conduct and planning of the operation can be considered important within the concept of the comprehensive approach. In the initial mandate of 2008 –before the Lisbon era and the establishment of the EEAS- the framework of interacting EU bodies which undertook the responsibility of different organisational aspects of the operation, were required to function in a coherent manner, thereby assuring the smooth function of the operation. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) was
responsible for sending reports to the PSC “regarding the conduct of the EU military operation” (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Art 6. Para 3) which would in turn receive reports from the EU Operation Commander. This demonstrates a mechanism demanding the coordinated effort of internal means, therefore could fall within the comprehensive approach concept introduced by the ESS (2003) and its Implementation Report (2008) (see section 6.1.1).

An interesting provision in the first mandate regards the authorisation by the UNSC, of course with due respect of the conditions set by international law, allowing Atalanta to “take the necessary measures, including the use of force” (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Article 2 Para d, emphasis added) in the execution of its duties. This explicit permission to utilise force has been questioned by Germond and Smith (2009:583) underline: “the advocates of an ESDP naval mission framed this option as not just a measured response to a known threat, but also as an opportunity to increase the EU’s scope of action and spread European/EU values”. This emphasis is important on a normative level seeing that although the intents by member states could have been self-serving, the inclusion of this threat in the only strategic document at the time which would guide the action of the EU’s external action, identified the importance of the underlying norms that would be diffused through its operationalisation. Furthermore, the recognition of the importance of norms in carrying out military operations also indicates the coexistence of the two elements despite the theoretical contradiction (as elaborated upon in Chapter 2). As they go on to emphasise: “the operation goes well beyond the traditional Petersberg-type ESDP tasks” since Atalanta “exercises the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence on the high seas and within another state’s territorial waters in order to protect the EU’s and its Member State’s interests in addition to protecting the population of the state in question through the delivery of humanitarian aid” (Germond and Smith, 2009:573). This demonstrates a further departure from the previous practice that has been witnessed in the other military operations in which the EU has been involved.
The Council Decision (2012/174/CFSP) of 23 March 2012 amended the original mandate of Atalanta by extending the area of operations to include Somali internal waters and land territory but also underlined the need to set conditions under which “persons suspected of intending...to commit, committing or having committed acts of piracy” (Council Decision 2012/174/CFSP, Art 12 Para 1) shall be transferred to the competent authorities. These changes bear significance to effective multilateralism as well as the range of the comprehensive approach. As far as the first is concerned, the extension of Atalanta’s jurisdiction into the sovereign Somali territorial waters and part of the mainland denotes the closer cooperation and coordination that would have to be achieved with the country’s judicial and police forces. Another important element with concern to multilateralism lies within the question of jurisdiction over the suspected pirates/armed robbers, which in turn would determine the avenues of cooperation needed for the transfer of said offender. An observation can be made at this point regarding the absence of partnership and ownership, both implied or explicit. Although reference to those frames or the concepts that underpin them is not identified within the mandates themselves, it can be surmised from the broader context within which they are situated. Drawing from the provisions in the “Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa” (16858/11, 14/11/2011) as well as more broadly from the JAES (2007), the cooperation with regional authorities mentioned above would still imply respect to the principles of “equal partnership and shared ownership” (4th EU Summit Declaration, 2014:1, see section 6.3.1).

Most importantly, this change is significant with reference to the comprehensive approach. In extending the jurisdiction of Atalanta to seizing vessels on shore adds to the element of prevention foreseen in the mandate. It also shows the even tighter relationship provided for the naval operation with the other operational activity of the EU in Somalia. The Factsheet on EUNAVFOR (16 October 2012) is particularly illustrating in this respect “The EU’s objective in Somalia is to contribute to the establishment of a peaceful, stable and
democratic country, trigger sustainable development and eradicate the root causes of piracy” (EUNAVFOR Factsheet, 2012:4) especially seeing that the normative underpinnings of the EU’s endeavours are once again underlined. Commitment to the normative core principles (see section 2.1) is emphasised within the comprehensive approach, thus demonstrating their intricate link. In the same section, the fit of EUNAVFOR with the EU’s other initiatives comprising this approach (EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor) is highlighted, as well as its relation to external actors (AMISOM) within the same concept. In turn this links to the conceptual definition of the comprehensive approach within the ESS (2007) and the Implementation Report (2008), regarding the interconnectedness of the internal and external trajectories of coordination (see section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). This argument is further reinforced by the explicit reference to “an integrated and complementary manner with EU humanitarian and development aid” (EUNAVFOR Factsheet, 2012:4) as well as the situation of the naval efforts within a regional context, thereby pointing to the relevance of the provisions presented in the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (16858/11, 14/ November 2011) as well as the JAES (2007) (see sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.1 respectively).

The role of the EEAS also becomes prominent in the amendment of the Council Decision (2012/174/CFSP) amending EUNAVFOR’s mandate. In view of the Service’s establishment in 2010 and the restructuring of the EU’s institutional framework as a result of that, the previously mentioned PSC and EUMC now fall within the remit of the EEAS’ authority (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the appointment of and EUSR to the Horn of Africa in 2011, again under the oversight of the Service, to best coordinate the components of the comprehensive approach in Somalia “thus supporting regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security and development” (EUNAVFOR Factsheet, 2012:4), underlines the central role allocated to the EEAS. These changes would entail the inclusion both of a strategic as well as a political nature, in defining the direction of the EU military operation with
respect to the former, and situating Atalanta within the broader regional needs and initiatives, with respect to the latter.

The next amendment to EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s mandate (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 21 November 2014) foresaw the extension of the operation’s activities until 12 December 2016. Most importantly, for the first time in the Council Decisions delineating its role, the document explicitly recognises Somali ownership as the basis for the operation within an “integrated approach to improving security and the rule of law in Somalia” (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014). According to the document: “the EU will take forward its integrated approach to improving security and the rule of law in Somalia, on the basis of Somali ownership and responsibility, close coordination with other actors and coherence and synergies between EU instruments, in particular between its Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations” (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014, preamble para. 5). This excerpt summarises the further incorporation of the operation within the frames, but also demonstrates their interconnected nature. The document also focuses on the need to tackle the root causes of piracy whilst expanding on Atalanta’s mandated tasks. Both of these changes carry normative significance. The alleviation of the root causes, rather than the eradication of the symptoms – security threats, implies the aim of tackling the conditions that create the threat itself. As presented in Chapter 5, the underlying causes of piracy stem from the chronic state instability as well as the internal fragmentation of Somalia. Furthermore, the corruption of government and subsequent lack of trust by the population, also spilling into the international donors, have exacerbated illegal activity. Therefore, the EU’s engagement with changing the root causes implies the promotion of social solidarity, rule of law and good governance, three of nine principle norms according to NPE (Manners 2002). Thus, the link of addressing the root causes is inextricably linked to the diffusion of normative power.
To this end the document adds secondary tasks to Atalanta which contribute to “anti-piracy law enforcement while improving the efficiency of its intelligence-led counter-piracy operations” (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, preamble para. 8). More specifically it includes responsibility of personal data collection of persons under suspicion for piracy and armed robbery to assist their identification (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014, Article 1, par 2(g)). Subsequent to collection, this data is shared with EUROPOL and with Somali entities as well as private companies operating on their behalf, ultimately leading to “better understanding their activities and capacities and de-conflict operations at sea” (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014, Article 1, para 2 (k)). Lastly, Atalanta is called to contribute to the “logistical support, provision of expertise or training at sea” (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014, Article 1 para 2 (l)), assisting EUCAP NESTOR, EUTM Somalia and the EUSR for the Horn of Africa, thereby informing the frames of comprehensive approach by enhancing the coordination of the EU’s efforts as well as effective multilateralism between the concerned parties.

Subsequently, what becomes apparent is the extension of Atalanta’s responsibilities into tasks of a non-forceful nature. Although formally a military operation, EUNAVFOR contributes more to the efforts against piracy within a civilian-mission resembling capacity than one associated with the use of coercion. It’s role in the repression of piracy is diminished to the benefit of its actions in the prevention of the phenomenon. With the normative foundation and justification of these alterations in mind, EUNAVFOR is presented more as a diffuser of said norms rather than a military force with a narrowly defined securitizing mandate. Therefore, this conceptualisation of a military operation can be seen as compatible with the NPE structure (see section 2.4.2) and echoes Manner’s and Diez’ (Diez and Manners, 2007:178; Diez 2005) assertion that military power can be also be beneficial for spreading civilian values. Further speaking to Larsen’s (2002) argument, irrespective of the presence of military capabilities –
EUNAVFOR in this case- the EU continues to portray itself as a civilian power, thereby rendering Atalanta an example of the EU’s normative identity manifesting in its actorness.

Within the scope of operations carried out in Somalia, the comprehensive approach as well as effective multilateralism are found at the core of the EU’s efforts to eradicate the threats faced within the country. Furthermore, the fact that the Strategies which directly affect and guide the operationalisation of the EU’s initiatives were constructed in the light of the EEAS’s appearance within the framework of external action, underline the importance of the aforementioned frames not only in understanding the EU’s actorness but also subsequently the character attributed to the EEAS in which appears at the crux of internal and external multilateralism. As illustrated in Chapter 2 and supported throughout this thesis, normative power is seen as a separate type of power which can also include military presence if that is not complemented by coercive action. In the ensuing section, the critical frames will be elaborated upon within the context of EUNAVFOR Atalanta.

The EU’s response to piracy off the coast of Somalia is confirmation that the security instruments within the policy framework are located within CSDP in the post-Lisbon period but also branch out to other areas (Zwolski, 2012:69). According to Ehrhart and Petretto (2013:185) the kingpins of piracy may have strategically withdrawn from their naval activities, nevertheless the possibilities of a future resurgence of criminal activity is not impossible. The UN Security Council supported this view (S/2013/413: 22) by stating that once international naval actors withdraw and ship owners feel secure in reducing the private protection on board their vessels, there is an expectation that piracy will pick up once more.

The most important contribution of the Comprehensive Approach was the inclusion of a long-term plan which would ensure the alleviation of the security threats in the area. The subsequent reorientation and increased focus on the role of the EEAS demonstrated its importance within the current guise of CSDP. This becomes even more apparent when
reviewing the evolution of EUNAVFOR and EUTM. Given their particular combination within the comprehensive approach as well as effective multilateralism, it becomes apparent that engagement in Somalia will continue to be a case that will act as a test for the efficiency of CSDP as well as the EEAS in bringing together the elements which will ultimately lead the EU to becoming a recognised global normative actor. In turn this case will also act as a proof of concept concerning the EU’s normative power, given that this element is underlined within the EUGS as well as its Implementation Plan (see section 6.2.2). The fact that its mandate has been extended until December 2018 (Council Decision 13274/16, 25 October 2016) is testament to the continuing relevance of the case made.

The evolution of EUNAVFOR’s role appearing through the consecutive amendments to its mandate illustrate the parallel increase in its civilian responsibilities under the strategic and political oversight of the Service. It can be argued that the establishment of the EEAS, an important change to CSDP’s evolution, affected these alterations to Atalanta’s tasks and thus acted catalytically towards the its emergence as a norm-diffusing agent rather than a traditional military operation. In turn, this realisation speaks to the research questions of this thesis. Firstly, the EU becomes more visibly a normative actor judging from its external action efforts in Somalia. This argument is further supported by the analysis of frames presented throughout this chapter. Secondly, through the examination of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, military means can arguably be compatible with the NPE framework and act in a conducive manner to normative diffusion. This has been demonstrated on the level of ‘intent’ through the critical frame analysis of the EU strategic documents and sub-strategies, as well as on the level of ‘action’, through the examination of EUNAVFOR’s mandate.

The following section will add the last piece of this puzzle by examining the second military operation in Somalia, EUTM. This will add a second point of exploration thereby allowing the comparison between the EU’s military endeavours in Somalia together with
determining their significance within a normative context. Through the examination of the frames as well as their normative underpinnings, this final piece of analysis will complete the operational exploration of the EU’s military operations in Somalia and ultimately, lead to the conclusion of remarks with reference to their pertinence in the examination of the Union’s actoriness as a constitutive element of the Union’s overall ‘normative power’ identity.

7.3.2 EUTM Somalia

Within the scope of its comprehensive approach to supporting the Somali Security sector, the EU launched a military training operation in 2010 – EUTM. The aim of this mission was to act in parallel to the naval component of its military efforts (EUNAVFOR) and contribute to the training of Somali security forces. According to the document which set up this operation (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP), the EU’s decision to increase its engagement for the promotion of peace and development in the country resulted from UNSC Resolution 1872 (2009) which stressed the importance of the “re-establishment, equipping and retention of Somali security forces”. This initiative would be “part of a larger and coherent framework involving close EU cooperation” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para 3) as well as coordination with international partners, most prominently the AU, the UN and US. The importance of AMISOM’s role was also underlined in the same section. Together with Atalanta and the EUSR, EUTM is part of another goal of the EU to enhance its visibility in Africa (3124 FAC Conclusions 2011: 8). The mission operated from its headquarter in the Ugandan capital of Kampala until the first months of 2014, while training was carried out in the western part of the country. The mission also served as a liaison office in Nairobi (Kenya). In the first months of 2014, the headquarters of EUTM were relocated to the Somali capital Mogadishu, together with all advisory, monitoring and training. In time it focused further on self-training capacities of the SNSF and transferring EU training to local actors (Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP).
What becomes apparent from the outset is the foundation of this operation on the comprehensive approach –through its complementarity with EUNAVFOR- and effective multilateralism –within the framework of its coordinated efforts with international partner. This will be demonstrated in the ensuing critical analysis of the frames as well as the examination of their normative significance. This section will act as the final piece of elaboration concerning the EU’s military engagement in Somalia, thus concluding the presentation of ‘action’ within the analytical framework of this thesis. Together with EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM will demonstrate the operationalisation of the frames within the particular context of its mandate. Furthermore, it will allow the comparison between the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia, thus allowing for a more comprehensive illustration of this facet of external action. In turn, through the normative evaluation of the EU’s actions, a conclusion will be reached with regard to the main research question concerning the EU’s normative actorness as well as to whether military means can be compatible with the diffusion of norms.

Conversely to the document portrait of EUNAVFOR (see Table 7.2), EUTM is more diverse in the depiction of the critical frames (see Table 7.3). Most importantly, it highlights the appearance of ownership as well as the consistent use of ‘partnership’ within its mandates together with a dominant recurrence of effective multilateralism. Given the number of international stakeholders engaged within this mission, it doesn’t come as a surprise that the coordination of their efforts is a central element of the mandates. What also emerges from the first mandate is the prior involvement of regional state actors (Uganda) in an effort to change the security sector landscape of Somalia.
Table 7.3 EUTM Somalia: Content Analysis Distribution (%)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Council Decision</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUTM 2010/96/CFSP, 15/2/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011/483/CFSP, 28/07/2011</td>
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<tr>
<th>Press Release:</th>
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<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia Information Brief 8/5/2012</td>
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<tr>
<th>Council Decision</th>
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<tr>
<td>2012/835/CFSP, 21/12/2012</td>
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<tr>
<th>Council Decision</th>
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<tr>
<td>2013/44/CFS, 22/1/2013</td>
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<tr>
<th>Factsheet EUTM Somalia, December 2013</th>
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<th>Council Decision</th>
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<tr>
<td>(CFSP) 2015/441, 16/3/2015</td>
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<th>Factsheet: CSDP-EUTM Somalia April 2016</th>
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<th>Council Decision</th>
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<tr>
<td>(CFSP), 2016/2239, 12/12/2016</td>
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<th>comprehensive approach \ CA implied</th>
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<th>effective multilateralism \ Multilateralism explicit</th>
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<th>partnership-ownership \ Ownership implied</th>
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<th>partnership-ownership \ Explicit Ownership</th>
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<th>partnership-ownership \ Explicit partnership</th>
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Within the foreword of the initial mandate of EUTM (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP), the role of the mission is broadly outlined as covering the need “to support the training of the Somali security forces” and emphasised that when “the EU planning for the delivery of training would be implemented, the EU trainers would be expected to follow harmonised and approved curricula” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para. 8). The
context of this harmonisation becomes clearer in paragraph 11 of the same document which indicates the fit of the mission within a pre-existing framework of activities at that time. The military mission would “contribute to the training of Somali security forces in Uganda where Somali forces are already being trained” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para. 11). In the same paragraph, the role of this mission would also allow for the better coordination of EU action with AMISOM. Therefore, what immediately emerges from the very beginning, is the centrality of effective multilateralism. The mission becomes the actual medium of coordination rather than part of the effort itself. Furthermore, traces of the comprehensive approach are also visible. In facilitating coordination between the two international parties, EUTM also contributed to internal coordination being harmonised with its external trajectory. This element was highlighted as part of the concept within ESS (see section 6.2.1) and, within the current context, is being effectively operationalised whilst interwoven with the frame of effective multilateralism. The importance of multilateralism is further enhanced in this paragraph wherein the Council explicitly provided for the training to be “part of a wider international effort” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para. 11).

In this mandate the delineation of tasks is highly indicative of EUTM’s nature, which appears to be a stark departure from that of a traditional military operation. Within this allocation of responsibilities, the EU’s identity emerges as distinctly normative in nature when viewed through the forms of diffusion it employs (see Textbox 1). According to Article 1 (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP): “The Union shall conduct a military training mission, hereinafter called ‘EUTM Somalia’, in order to contribute to strengthening the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) as a functioning government serving the Somali citizens. In particular, the EU military mission shall be to contribute to a comprehensive and sustainable perspective for the development of the Somali security sector by strengthening the Somali security forces through the provision of specific military training, and support to the training
provided by Uganda, of 2 000 Somali recruits up to and including platoon level, including appropriate modular and specialised training for officers and non-commissioned officers.’’ This provision is very dense in the way it illustrates the role of the operation as well as the subsequent identity of the EU that is reflected within it. From a preliminary observation, the aim of the military training is different from that in the foreword. In this occasion, the goal is to strengthen the TFG –provide long-term political change- rather than contribute to the Somali Security Sector –potentially short-term security support. This implies the EU’s priority in safeguarding the functioning of government demonstrates its perception of self within this operation as an actor promoting core normative principles of good governance and sustainable development (Manners 2002) rather than one participating in a security endeavour. Therefore, the EU portrays itself as a civilian actor despite the military nature of the initiative (Larsen 2002). This point is reinforced by the invocation of UNSC Resolution 1897 (2009) from which the EU initiative stemmed, which underlines its “respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia” (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, preamble para 1). Through a normative lens, Manners’ (2008:46) submission that the EU promotes normative principles that are generally acknowledged with the UN system to be universally acceptable becomes pertinent. In promoting such normative justification (via reference) the EU increases the value of the norms it promotes thus further reinforcing the procedural diffusion which is employed in this instance (see Textbox 1). The emphasis put on the wellbeing of the people is also important in this assessment, in view of its thematic resemblance to the focus that is prevalent in the Somali Compact three years later (see section 6.4.2). In turn this highlights the continuity of intents the EU promotes, thus indicating their origin stemming from the EU’s identity rather than being temporary rhetoric devices of ad hoc diplomatic utility.
Additionally, the troops receiving specialised training as well as the financial commitments of the EU towards them are also indicative of its civilian-oriented actorness within this operation. As mentioned in the foreword, the EU’s plan to support the trained forces would extend to after they returned to Mogadishu (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, preamble para 11), thereby demonstrating its long-term commitment rather than a short-term contribution. What is striking in the same paragraph is the EU’s undertaking of the “funding and payment of the salaries of the soldiers” (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, preamble para 11). This point is not only important in terms of its support to the security reform support, but also indicative of the Union’s nature and self-perception. The transference diffusion employed in this instance (seeTextbox 1), reaffirms Larsen’s (2002) submission that the EU continues to portray itself as a civilian power, despite the presence of military means. Moreover, Article 1 (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP) specifies the ranks receiving the mandated training, but also the higher ranks receiving specialised training. This further underlines the EU’s intent to achieve a long-term effect, which it explicitly identifies as “comprehensive and sustainable” (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, Article 1), in that alongside the troops –responsible for security provision- the officers -providing strategic direction on the ground- will be trained as well.

Lastly, Article 5 (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP) addresses the EUTM’s political control and strategic direction. The PSC, under the responsibility of the Council and the HR, will be providing this direction and report to the EUMC at regular intervals. The latter is responsible for the proper execution of the mission (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, Article 6, para 1). In view of EUTM commencing in the post-Lisbon era, yet before the start of the EEAS’ activities, the element of internal cohesion also becomes apparent with the same contextual importance as in the case of EUNAVFOR (see section 4.5.1).
This contribution towards training within the higher ranks of the forces is expanded in Article 1 of the operation’s first amending and extending Council Decision (2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011), which stated that “Training will focus on developing Command and Control and specialised capabilities and on self-training capacities of the Somali NSF, with a view to transferring EU training expertise to local actors”. This echoes Elgström (2011:459) in the ability of actors to “redefine interests and preferences”, only in a the more specified social microcosm of the military. In this capacity, the EU would have the ability to indirectly influence the activities within the security sector, whilst simultaneously remaining non-coercive in practice. An important addition in this amendment is the incorporation of an intent to “integrate different militias and clan forces into the NSF” (2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011, preamble para. 6). This further underlines the pertinence of Elgström’s (2011) view and speaks to the particular problems of the country’s internal fragmentation (see Chapter 5).

The objective of EUTM is, therefore, aimed at ultimately providing the Somali state with the ability to train their armed forces, so they can protect their own state and people as well as to provide a long-term sustainable result which would withstand potential resurgence of the threats. From a normative power standpoint, this long-term result goes beyond the security concerns usually undertaken by military operations and sets the ground for the transference of skills. In turn, it extends into the frame of “ownership”. Although this frame does not explicitly appear within the original mandate, the role of the EU as well as that of the other international actors is framed as a “partnership” in the first amending mandate (2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011, preamble para. 9), therefore implying a relationship of equals rather than one of a superior-intervener with a weaker-host (Diez 2005). The main goal is stated as “transferring EU training expertise to local actors…in line with agreed TFG requirements” (Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011: Art 1 par 1). Therefore, essentially, the intent, the action as well as the impact of EUTM is of a non-coercive nature whilst
simultaneously accomplishing to contribute substantially in a military fashion to the elimination of the threats in Somalia. Although the efforts of the EU were aimed at providing assistance and addressing the root causes of the security threats (namely piracy and terrorism), EUTM provided an impetus of resolving internal fragmentation by integrating militias and clan forces into SNSF (Council Decision 2011/483/CFSP, preamble paragraph 6). This initiative was further expanded in the Somali Compact (2013) which added a level of internal cooperation between the TFG and Somaliland (see Chapter 5). Even though the EU has promoted its commitment to the protection of the Somali people as the reason for the military training mission, it can be argued that other concerns might lie behind the objective of the mission, such as the risk of Somalia developing into a base for Somali extremists and terror organizations (see Ehrhart and Petretto 2013:184-185). Such a development would surely have an impact on the government and citizens of Somalia, but would also impact the EU in the form of a possible terrorist attack, as well as an increase in the piracy and boarding of European merchant vessels.

Within the remit of the comprehensive approach, the EU managed to integrate the initiatives of diverse actors which aimed at training the Somali security forces within EUTM. Somali soldiers’ first-hand training has been taking place only at the EUTM camp (initially in Uganda and more since 2013 in Mogadishu) with coordinated activities of the Ugandan Government, the UN, the USA and the AU. Nevertheless, according to Ehrhart and Petretto (2013:184-185), the security governance in Somalia demands a more radical change in security structures rather than the training of the soldiers. The fact that the soldiers are selected from within and trained for the Somali Government is highly problematic, seeing that their role will be serving the political leadership in Mogadishu rather than the general population. As mentioned previously in Chapter 6, the fact that the distrust of the people in the government combined with the general distrust in the function of the elites in higher levels of government,
would only diminish security for the people. This also affects the population’s impression of the EU, seeing that the government has been perceived as extensively corrupt and Western supported (see Chapter 5).

The third Council Decision (2013/4/CFSP, 22/1/2013) amending and extending EUTM’s mandate, introduces new insight to the analysis of the frames, following a completely basic second amending Council Decision (2012/835/CFSP, 21/12/2012). Article 1 para. 2 (2013/4/CFSP) foresees the operation relocating all its advisory, mentoring and training activities to Mogadishu whilst taking out the clause explicitly mentioning the Somali citizens. Instead, the new mandate refers to the military operation’s contribution to “the building up and strengthening of the Somali National armed Forces (‘SNAF’) accountable to the Somali National Government, consistent with Somali needs and priorities” (2013/4/CFSP, Article 1, para 1). What becomes apparent is the shift of scope from the needs of the population to those of the state. This is a particularly interesting alteration seeing that the Somalia Compact, which was adopted, later that year demonstrated the reverse course (see section 6.3.2). In view of the Somali election in 2012, the governmental structure had relatively stabilised thereby allowing it to undertake its responsibilities. In turn this signals the end of the period calling for the increased support of the international partners, as outlined in the initial EUTM mandate (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP). Nevertheless, the CSDP EUTM factsheet of December 2013, still makes reference to the EU’s support “towards improving the living conditions of the population” (Factsheet, EUTM Somalia 2013: 2). It is worth noting that this phrase appears under the title of “The European Union’s Comprehensive Approach to Somalia”, thereby linking this matter directly to the relevant frame.

Within the same section of this document the role of the EU is explicitly mentioned as that of “major sponsor of AMISOM…both financially and on planning and capacity building” (EUTM Factsheet 2013: 2). This leads to the conclusion that the EU remains a civilian actor
when supporting the efforts in Somalia, even though its military operations, while at the same
time providing capacities in order to justify its role and establish a resonating credibility for its
involvement. Therefore, the focus of its self-presentation is on the benefits and support through
its military training mission while completely avoiding actual engagement of military
capacities on the ground, thus establishing itself as a facilitating power that is founded on
training and financial support rather than hard power. This indicates the EU’s resolution to
upholding its normative non-coercive practices, whilst demonstrating the symbolic importance
of a military operation which engages in a civilian power strategic function, thus echoing the
views of Whitman (2002), concerning the civilian character of the EU remaining irreducible to
its military power, as well as Larsen (2002) on the EU’s self-portrayal as a civilian power.

The final issue that is called for at this point concerns the role of the HR, and the EEAS
subsequently, in the three most recent EUTM mandates. Although the 4th and 5th mandates -
Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/441, 16/3/2015 and Council Decision (CFSP), 2016/2239,
12/12/2016- provide no further insight to the operation, they reiterate the EU’s commitment to
the comprehensive approach as well as to effective multilateralism. From the 3rd mandate
(2013/44/CFSP, 22/1/2013) and henceforth the structure of strategic and political guidance
outlined in the launch of EUTM was incorporated into the structure of the HR. Therefore, in
terms of internal coherence between the concerned instruments as well as representation within
coordinated efforts with international partners, the HR and EEAS assume a key position.
Echoing to De Zutter’s (2010:1111) definition of a normative power as a “political entity whose
norms guide its internal and external practices” while emphasising the element of coherence
between the two, it appears that the HR is that normative actor within EUTM. Furthermore,
with Kavalski’s (2013) emphasis on the appearance of an actor as a normative power in mind,
the HR has been identified by the Somali Republic as central to the EU’s efforts in the country.
This is evidenced within the 3rd EUTM mandate (2013/44/CFSP, preamble para 6) whereby
the Somali Government requested the “HR to continue the Union’s engagement in support of Somalia”. Therefore, one can argue that the HR and subsequently the EEAS can be considered as the source of the EU’s normative diffusion, at least when referring to the case of the military operations in Somalia.

7.4 Conclusion

Building on the basis of the strategic documents and sub-strategies, this chapter focused on: a) the niche exploration of ‘intent’ through the EU documents relating to Somalia specifically as well as with the pivotal Somali Compact (2013), and b) the element of ‘action’ through the documentation relating to the EU’s two military operations in Somalia – EUNAVFOR and EUTM.

The period between 2010 and 2013 covered by the documentation encompasses key moments in the EU’s evolution as an international actor, particularly with reference to its engagement with Somalia. From an institutional standpoint, 2010 marks the establishment of the EEAS, argued by this thesis to be a catalyst in the evolution of the EU’s normative identity. From an operational standpoint, this timeframe encapsulates the parallel activities of EUNAVFOR Atalanta and the launching of EUTM in 2010, thus provisions for both can be found in the selected Council Conclusions. Lastly, the timeframe suits the examination of the dynamic norm diffusion between the EU and Somalia, thus demonstrating the former’s reception as a ‘normative actor’. Echoing the theoretical arguments of Diez (2005) and Kavalski (2013) (see section 2.6), this section also reflected the Somali side (through the Somali Compact), thereby addressing the element of ‘impact’ within the proposed analytical framework for this thesis (see section 3.3).

The Council Conclusions on Somalia demonstrate an irregular employment of the frames, demonstrated in Table 7.1. Although effective multilateralism appears to be used in
equal proportion to the comprehensive approach in 2010, it becomes the dominant frame employed in 2012 and 2014. Therefore, although not conclusively, effective multilateralism appears to be the central frame in all documents while ownership also appears to be consistently applied. Similarly to the conclusions drawn from the previous chapter, what can be surmised is that the binary of effective multilateralism with partnership-ownership is crucial in the country specific case of Somalia too.

In June 2010 the Foreign Affairs Council (3023 FAC /14 June 2010) acknowledged the multi-faceted nature of piracy and identified the root causes of piracy. It therefore called upon the High Representative to propose a comprehensive EU strategy for the Horn of Africa in an effort to reinforce the stability of Somalia which required a comprehensive approach in the region linking security policy with development. This arguably more strategic approach accentuated the importance of regional multilateralism within the Horn of Africa and underlined the importance of “building on Somali ownership and addressing the underlying security and developmental challenges in Somalia” (3023 FAC /14 June 2010:1).

The HR/VP was thereby given a substantial mandate to prepare proposals and coordinate European action, setting her and the EEAS at the epicentre of operationalising the comprehensive approach. What also becomes apparent is the interconnectivity of the frames employed, geared towards achieving a long-term goal. As far as the actorness of the EU is concerned, in this document it appears that the EU takes a back seat in dealing with the resolution of the challenges in the area. Therefore, the invocation of ownership on this occasion can be perceived as reluctance to act, rather than ‘other’-empowering support (Tocci, 2008).

What is subsequently underlined is the financial support of the EU without determining its contribution in military means or its active engagement in supporting the forces during conflict. What is also reiterated is the dominant and primary role of AMISOM as well as its leadership in the operations on the ground. The EU thus remains a civilian actor when
supporting the efforts in Somalia while at the same time providing capacities in order to justify its role and establish a resonating credibility of its involvement.

In the statement by the HR (6/9/2013) and the Communiqué following the adoption of *A New Deal for Somalia*, ownership of the local forces as well as the commitment of the EU to providing comprehensive support to AMISOM and the FGS are repeated. Therefore, the EEAS and Council appear to exhibit the same level of reticence in this occasion. Nevertheless, this insistence on ownership can be seen on a theoretical basis as supporting the case for the EU’s normative power based on Tocci’s (2008:9-13) assertion that normative powers are other-empowering. Although this might appear as a very convenient excuse for the EU’s demonstrated lack of initiative, it nevertheless is justifiable on a theoretical level.

The Somali Compact (2013) from its initial statement, highlights the centrality of the partnership-ownership binary. This is corroborated by the content analysis (see Chart 7) which further illustrates the extensive employment of ownership (20% of the coded segments) and partnership (24% of coded segments). The objective of this document was to align the international assistance to the country’s own peace and state-building priorities, therefore creating a connection between the binary and effective multilateralism. The innovations introduced by JAES (2007) with respect to the relations between the EU and Africa, as well as the broadening of the partnership spectrum to include non-state actors in consultations (see section 6.3.1), influenced the needs within Somalia and thus impacted on the spectrum of instruments covered by the comprehensive approach as well as the scope of effective multilateralism to include non-state actors.

In view of the FAC Conclusions presented in the preceding section and the reticence the EU demonstrated in the way it framed its involvement within Somalia, it is not surprising to see that its influence is not recognised as a visible international actor within areas such as security and defence. Therefore, this justifies the sequence of recent occasions –most
prominently within the EUGS (see section 6.2.2) - in which the need for an autonomous EU presence is called for.

The evolution of EUNAVFOR’s role appearing through the consecutive amendments to its mandate illustrate the parallel increase in its civilian responsibilities under the strategic and political oversight of the Service. It can be argued that the establishment of the EEAS, an important change to CSDP’s evolution, affected these alterations to Atalanta’s tasks and thus acted catalytically towards the its emergence as a norm-diffusing agent rather than a traditional military operation. In turn, this realisation speaks to the research questions of this thesis. Firstly, the EU becomes more visibly a normative actor judging from its external action efforts in Somalia. This argument is further supported by the analysis of frames presented throughout this chapter. Secondly, through the examination of EUNAVFOR Atalanta, military means can arguably be compatible with the NPE framework and act in a conducive manner to normative diffusion. This has been demonstrated on the level of ‘intent’ through the critical frame analysis of the EU strategic documents and sub-strategies, as well as on the level of ‘action’, through the examination of EUNAVFOR’s mandate.

The naval component of the EU’s involvement in Somalia was set up in 2008 (EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008), when the phenomenon of piracy off its coast appeared in the EU’s agenda. The objectives of the operation under the initial mandate (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008) were: a) a political objective, geared towards the improvement of maritime security in the region and b) a military objective to deter piracy and to strengthen the security of main maritime routes. With reference to multilateralism, the operation mandate provides that Atalanta would “liaise with organisations and entities, as well as States Working in the region to combat piracy and armed robbery” (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP).
The content analysis for the mandates and documentation regarding EUNAVFOR Atalanta did not prove to be illustrative of the frames’ use within them (see Table 7.2). In the context of the EU’s evolution as an external actor though (as outlined in Chapter 4) the internal division of responsibilities regarding the conduct and planning of the operation can be considered important within the concept of the comprehensive approach. In the initial mandate of 2008 –before the Lisbon era and the establishment of the EEAS- the framework of interacting EU bodies which undertook the responsibility of different organisational aspects of the operation were required to function in a coherent manner, thereby assuring the smooth function of the operation.

An interesting provision in the first mandate regards the authorisation by the UNSC, of course with due respect of the conditions set by international law, allowing Atalanta to “take the necessary measures, including the use of force” (Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, Article 2 Para d, emphasis added) in fulfilling its duties. This explicit permission to utilise force has been questioned by Germond and Smith (2009:583) who underline: “the advocates of an ESDP naval mission framed this option as not just a measured response to a known threat, but also as an opportunity to increase the EU’s scope of action and spread European/EU values”. This demonstrates a further departure from the previous practice that has been witnessed in the other military operations in which the EU has been involved.

The Council Decision (2012/174/CFSP) of 23 March 2012 amended the original mandate of Atalanta by extending the area of operations to include Somali internal waters and land territory but also underlined the need to set conditions under which the extension of Atalanta’s jurisdiction into the sovereign Somali territorial waters and part of the mainland denotes the closer cooperation and coordination that would have to be achieved with the country’s judicial and police forces. Another important element with concern to multilateralism lies within the question of jurisdiction over the suspected pirates/armed robbers, which in turn
would determine the avenues of cooperation needed for the transfer of said offender. An observation can be made at this point regarding the absence of partnership and ownership, both implied and explicit. Most importantly, this change is significant with reference to the comprehensive approach but also shows the even tighter relationship provided for the naval operation with the other operational activity of the EU in Somalia (EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor), as well as its relation to external actors (AMISOM) within the same concept.

The role of the EEAS also becomes prominent in Council Decision (2012/174/CFSP) amending EUNAVFOR’s mandate. In view of the Service’s establishment in 2010 and the restructuring of the EU’s institutional framework as a result of that, the previously mentioned PSC and EUMC now fall within the remit of the EEAS’ authority (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the appointment of and EUSR to the Horn of Africa in 2011, again under the oversight of the Service, to best coordinate the components of the comprehensive approach in Somalia “thus supporting regional and international efforts to achieve lasting peace, security and development” (EUNAVFOR Factsheet, 2012:4), underlines the central role allocated to the EEAS.

The next amendment to EUNAVFOR Atalanta’s mandate (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 21 November 2014), for the first time in the Council Decisions delineating its role, the document explicitly recognises Somali ownership as the basis for the operation within an “integrated approach to improving security and the rule of law in Somalia” (Council Decision 2014/827/CFSP, 2014). Subsequently, what becomes apparent is the extension of Atalanta’s responsibilities into tasks of a non-forceful nature. Although formally a military operation, EUNAVFOR contributes more to the efforts against piracy within a civilian-mission resembling capacity than one associated with the use of coercion.

EUNAVFOR is therefore presented more as a diffuser of said norms rather than a military force with a narrowly defined securitizing mandate. Therefore, this conceptualisation
of a military operation can be seen as compatible with the NPE structure (see section 2.4.2) and echoes Manners’ and Diez’ (Diez and Manners, 2007:178; Diez 2005) assertion that military power can be also be beneficial for spreading civilian values. Further speaking to Larsen’s (2002) argument, irrespective of the presence of military capabilities –EUNAVFOR in this case- the EU continues to portray itself as a civilian power, thereby rendering Atalanta an example of the EU’s normative identity manifesting in its actorness.

Within the scope of its comprehensive approach to supporting the Somali Security sector, the EU launched a military training operation in 2010 – EUTM. The aim of this mission was to act in parallel to the naval component of its military efforts (EUNAVFOR) and contribute to the training of Somali security forces. The importance of AMISOM’s role was also underlined in the same section. Together with Atalanta and the EUSR, EUTM is part of another goal of the EU to enhance its visibility in Africa (3124 FAC Conclusions 2011: 8). What becomes apparent from the outset is the foundation of this operation on the comprehensive approach –through its complementarity with EUNAVFOR- and effective multilateralism –within the framework of its coordinated efforts with international partner.

Conversely to the document portrait of EUNAVFOR (see Table 7.2), EUTM is more diverse in the depiction of the critical frames (see Table 7.3). Most importantly, it highlights the appearance of ownership as well as the consistent use of ‘partnership’ within its mandates together with a dominant recurrence of effective multilateralism. Given the number of international stakeholders engaged within this mission, it does not come as a surprise that the coordination of their efforts is a central element of the mandates. What also emerges from the first mandate is the prior involvement of regional state actors (Uganda) in an effort to change the security sector landscape of Somalia.

Within the foreword of the initial mandate of EUTM (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP), the role of the mission is broadly outlined as covering the need “to support the
training of the Somali security forces” and emphasised that when “the EU planning for the delivery of training would be implemented, the EU trainers would be expected to follow harmonised and approved curricula” (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, preamble para. 8). Therefore, what immediately emerges from the very beginning, is the centrality of effective multilateralism. The mission becomes the actual medium of coordination rather than part of the effort itself. Furthermore, traces of the comprehensive approach are also visible. In facilitating coordination between the two international parties, EUTM also contributed to internal coordination being harmonised with its external trajectory. Lastly, Article 5 (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP) addresses the EUTM’s political control and strategic direction. The PSC, under the responsibility of the Council and the HR, will be providing this direction and report to the EUMC at regular intervals. The latter is responsible for the proper execution of the mission (Council Decision 2010/97/CFSP, Article 6, para 1). In view of EUTM commencing in the post-Lisbon era, yet before the start of the EEAS’ activities, the element of internal cohesion also becomes apparent with the same contextual importance as in the case of EUNAVFOR (see section 4.5.1).

The objective of EUTM is, therefore, aimed at ultimately providing the Somali state with the ability to train their armed forces, so they can protect their own state and people as well as to provide a long-term sustainable result which would withstand potential resurgence of the threats. From a normative power standpoint, this long-term result goes beyond the security concerns usually undertaken by military operations and sets the ground for the transference of skills. In turn, it extends into the frame of “ownership”. Although this frame does not explicitly appear within the original mandate, the role of the EU as well as that of the other international actors is framed as a “partnership” in the first amending mandate (2011/483/CFSP of 28 July 2011, preamble para. 9), therefore implying a relationship of equals rather than one of a superior-intervener with a weaker-host (Diez 2005).
What becomes apparent in the third Council Decision (2013/4/CFSP, 22/1/2013) amending EUTM’s mandate is the shift of scope from the needs of the population to those of the state. This is a particularly interesting alteration seeing that the Somalia Compact, which was adopted, later that year demonstrated the reverse course (see section 6.3.2). Although the 4th and 5th mandates - Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/441, 16/3/2015 and Council Decision (CFSP), 2016/2239, 12/12/2016- provide no further insight to the operation, they reiterate the EU’s commitment to the comprehensive approach as well as to effective multilateralism. From the 3rd mandate (2013/44/CFSP, 22/1/2013) and henceforth the structure of strategic and political guidance outlined in the launch of EUTM was incorporated into the structure of the HR. Therefore, in terms of internal coherence between the concerned instruments as well as representation within coordinated efforts with international partners, the HR and EEAS assume a key position.
Chapter 8

Discussion: EU Normativity through critical frames

8.1 Introduction

This thesis has sought to understand the role of the EEAS’ establishment in the evolution of the EU as a normative power within its external action. In examining the operationalisation of the EU’s normative actoriness through the critical frames of the “comprehensive approach”, “effective multilateralism” and the “partnership-ownership binary” in its military operations in Somalia –EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM Somalia- this research also addressed the compatibility of military means with the NPE framework on a theoretical level. The documents dealt with in Chapters 6 demonstrate the centrality of norms within the operational intent as well as the actions of the EU. What becomes apparent is that the military nature of the engagement in Africa, the Horn of Africa and more specifically in Somalia, hinges on the symbolic presence of the means employed rather than the nature of the action on the ground. On one hand this is demonstrated by the principle actors that are mandated for the preparation as well as delivery of the foreseen initiatives. The EU, especially through the EUGS, has explicitly identified the EEAS as the main actor when it comes to the undertaking of its engagement beyond its borders, particularly in actions related to CSDP. Although this may seem the case for the entirety of external action (as outlined in the Lisbon Treaty), when looking into the rhetoric surrounding military operations in Somalia and more specifically the critical frames that are employed in the operationalisation of the initiatives, the following elements become prominent: a) the unwillingness of the EU to resort to military force, b) the pivotal role of operational cooperation with international regional and state actors, c) the intent to engage in a more essential long-term fashion in resolving the challenges faced rather than eradicating the immediate problems (comprehensive approach), d) the interlinked
nature of military operations with civilian tasks (particularly in EUNAVFOR) as well as the
infusion of military means with civilian goals, e) the apparent hesitation of the EU to come
forth as the primary responsible for the action on the ground together with the establishment of
local ownership, f) the increasingly multifaceted role of the EEAS, in mitigating the gap
between the operationalisation of military initiatives with the highly non-coercive nature of the
practice in Somalia.

As can be seen from the strategic texts between the EU and Africa, the frames assume
a central position. Within the military initiatives of the EU, military means are employed
nevertheless, that occurs in a non-coercive way resembling more to a civilian nature. This
trajectory, conceptualised within the “comprehensive approach”, proves the pertinence of the
holistic nature of the EU’s external action, as argued by Zwolski (2012) and discussed in
Chapter 2. The second frame of effective multilateralism appears regularly, if not always,
beside the comprehensive approach. This can be interpreted in two ways: either the need for
the EU to draw its normative power from the increased legitimisation of its partners, particularly
the UN and NATO, or the foundation of its normative power on precisely its engagement in
cooperation with other actors.

In the first explanation, the EU does not possess a normative power of its own in its
external actorness or it is in the process of creating one, whereby it is utilising existing
normative appeal from more established -or normatively potent- actors in the area until it is
able to promote its own. From the second interpretation, the conclusions that can be drawn can
follow multiple routes: i) the EU appreciates the importance of cooperation in itself when
dealing with challenges of a global nature while not focusing on the element of employed
means within this cooperation, ii) the EU seeks to share responsibility of its actions and their
impact. The second stream of understanding bodes well with the third frame of ownership-
partnership in the sense that the EU, by employing this frame, comes across simultaneously as
underlining the importance of local primacy over its own. Nevertheless, this would also create a subsequent challenge towards the normative intents, that is to say, whether the EU actually values the importance of local ownership or is it acting in this way to avoid responsibility and potential blame for its ineffective actions.

Partnership-ownership is more unclear in its normative importance particularly when viewing the delicate nature of the dynamics it implies between international engagement and the inclusion of local powers in the operationalisation of initiatives in Africa. As outlined in Chapter 5, the political setting of Somalia is mainly characterised by three challenges: internal fragmentation between the areas of the FGS, Somaliland and Puntland; the perennial corrupt behaviour of consecutive government, usually accompanied by distrust in the international actors as supporters of the incumbents; the overwhelming security concerns linked to the Al-Shabaab, piracy and clan-based militias.

The focus of this examination has been the case of Somalia, as particularly representative of the way the three proposed critical frames appear in the official documentation concerning operational engagement. What has been highlighted is the nature of the EEAS’ role in mitigating the gap between the normative intents outlined in the strategic documentation and the non-coercive actions mandated to the military means employed, together with the ways it employs forms of normative diffusion (Manners 2013). The argument presented throughout is that the dominant character of the EU in its engagement in Somalia is that of a normative power which employs military means as its primary way of asserting presence which is of a civilian nature (Larsen 2002). Following this, the increasing importance of the EEAS in this endeavour has been highlighted whilst focusing on the way it manages to combine intent-action-impact in the area of external action thus reinforcing the EU’s normative global actorness.
8.2 Sources of normative power: critical frames

The EU appears to base its normative projection on the back of UN Resolution provisions, its own strategic texts (predominantly the ESS, the CA and the EUGS) as well as its cooperation with NATO. While maintaining the intents that have been incorporated in the strategic documents, the EU promotes its presence in the field via proxy in the case of Somalia through the empowerment of the SNSF and AMISOM. It remains mainly a civilian power in essence, while making sure it enhances its visibility through the better combined use of the means at its disposal, thus engaging in a comprehensive approach (3124 FAC Conclusions on the Horn of Africa, 2011: 8). This balance is facilitated by the vague nature of the prescriptions in its strategic documents which is usually open to interpretation in as much as the ultimate practicalities on the ground are concerned. Subsequent minor decisions therefore which refer to the larger strategic documents (such as the ESS) reflect the unclear language concerning the operationalisation of its involvement. Nevertheless, the gaps in the operational responsibility are covered within the regional sub-strategies (in this case the Horn of Africa Strategy, the EUMSS, JAES and the Roadmaps which ensued) and further defined in the case of Somalia with bilateral arrangements with the EU (A New Deal for Somalia Communiqué, Brussels Conference, 16 September 2013) as well as internal policy documents such as the Somali Compact (see Chapters 5 and 6). The idea of a normative actor is therefore reinforced by the fact that it retains its non-coercive nature while employing military means thus allowing it to appear highly engaged with the norm-recipient, Somalia. This is accomplished through the rhetoric which it maintains, combining the comprehensive approach, effective multilateralism and the binary of ownership-partnership. The latter is pivotal in bringing the rhetoric of the EU together in its relations with Africa as well as Somalia more specifically. The dual interpretation of this binary is essential in the way the EU formulates its overall diplomatic
conduct with Somalia as it simultaneously demonstrates engagement while allowing for it to separate itself from the ultimate repercussions the operations have in the country.

As Olsen (2011:252) argues, the establishment of the Peace Facility was the result of the desire on behalf of the EU to avoid direct military involvement in Africa. Instead the AU would have to take responsibility for African security. Two main concerns of the EU towards Africa were specified to avoid deploying European troops on the continent, yet it provided financial assistant to African peace and conflict management operations (JAES 2007 and Somali Compact 2013 Addendum:32-33, 38-40) and contributed to capacity building with the African partners through training of African troops to perform peace and security operations (EUTM).

AMISOM’s activity is simultaneously empowered through the attribution of ownership over the actions on the ground whilst the role of the EU is restricted to support (FAC Council conclusions on Somalia 20 October 2014: 3 para. 8) as well as training of the officers through EUTM. On the other hand, the relinquishing of ownership over the mission is also explicitly mentioned within the operational mandates. This in turn works on two conceptual levels with reference to normativity: it empowers AMISOM -therefore the EU is other-empowering- while simultaneously remaining committed to its actions in a normative fashion. On the other hand the EU disempowers itself as an actor with adequate hard power (based on the critiques provided by the more realist contributors to the argument) which nevertheless can support its actions as a civilian actor particularly when considering Hyde-Price’s (2008:29) suggestion that it should act more as a ‘calculator rather than a crusader’. Therefore, depending on the reading of the initiatives both sides of the argument can be supported. It is interesting that the EU claims its increased interest in resolving the threats in the Horn of Africa whilst relying on the legitimacy of UNSCR decisions concerning multilateral action and simultaneously urges the further involvement of AMISOM (based on ‘ownership’). This demonstrates the unclear
long-term plans of the EU as far as its international actoriness is concerned. The EUGS (2016:28) presents an interest towards increasing the EU’s presence in the region, while absolving itself of the potentially unwanted repercussions that may come with the use of force. What also appears to be the case is that the EU is attempting to increase its global visibility, thus reinforcing Kavalski’s (2013) argument concerning the importance of being perceived as a normative actor rather than being one, while juggling with the notion of a comprehensive/holistic approach, resembling to the normative actorness (Chapter 2). Given its apparent resolution to maintain a diplomatic identity rather than that of a military or even purely civilian power (EUGS 2016: 4), the EU is attempting to take advantage of the symbolic presence of its military power without the unwanted potential impact it may have as a force of coercion, thus speaking to the conceptualisation of the symbolic manifestation of military power (Manners 2006).

According to Scheipers and Sicurelli (2008:607), in relation to Sub-Saharan Africa, the EU demonstrates its intent to empower African countries by referring to them in a framework of solidarity – the partnership-ownership binary. At the same time, though, this attempt to empower Africa displays crucial limits concerning the effectiveness of the EU’s attempts to promote norms and the international image of the EU itself. What Scheipers and Sicurelli (2008:607) argue, which is an observation also upheld in this thesis, is that these limits might constrain the process of EU identity construction as a normative power. This hindrance in identity construction is hinged upon the pivotal dynamics of ‘othering’ that are essential in the empowering process of the EU (Diez, 2005) but is also further linked to the EU’s failure in comprehensively accounting for all the mechanisms of normative diffusion, more specifically cultural filter (see section 7.4).

The introduction of the partnership-ownership binary appeared prominently in JAES and has since been employed consistently in the EU’s CSDP mandates for Africa. This frame
is uniquely important to the EU relations with Africa and constitutes one of the major sources of contention when analysing its normative power through its military operations. As illustrated by the examples within Chapter 6, othering has a strong connotation of dis-empowering the other while at the same time empowering the self – the EU - inasmuch as the other is depicted as inferior (Diez, 2005). The concept of empowering has a strong link with social relations and constitution. It is related to the idea of ‘power to’ rather than ‘power over’, and thus considers ‘how social relations define who the actors are and what capacities and practices they are socially empowered to undertake’ (Barnett and Duvall 2005:46)

As with othering in general, empowering is identity-based, but in contrast to disempowering the ‘other’, it aims at increasing the recognition and the status of an actor by, for instance, depicting it as equal or even similar to the ‘self’. As Barnett and Duvall (2005:47) explain, the practice of empowering is not restricted to discourses of identity construction. Rather, it involves a variety of practices and power resources, such as the transfer of knowledge and expertise, the provision of enhanced development chances and/or trade opportunities and the transfer of material resources. Empowering others can also be pursued for strategic reasons; for instance, an actor A can aim at increasing the stability of a country or a region B, the instability of which would be detrimental to A’s interests. This self-portrayal echoes the ‘emphasis on the normative power of non-material exemplification found in the contagion of norms through imitation and attraction’ (Manners 2006b:176). It indicates, however, that the EU is at times merely ‘miming’ normative power, since self-portrayal and action differ. It is also a sign of a specific paradox within the mechanism of empowering: whilst empowering aims at treating the other on an equal basis, it actually emerges from a relationship of inequality. The ‘empowerer’ has both the initiative and superior (symbolic and material) resources – without the latter, empowering would not work. In order for it to work, however, this inequality has to be concealed as far as possible.
8.3 Forms of diffusion and the EEAS

As outlined in the Chapter Three, Manners structures the normative power of the EU around six main forms of diffusion (Manners 2002: 244-246). One of the founding normative bases of the EU has also been rule of law (Manners 2002:240) and sustainable development and good governance as “minor norms” (Manners 2002: 242). From these avenues of norm communication, the EU appears to be resorting heavily – if not exclusively- on contagion, informational diffusion, transference and overt diffusion (see Textbox 1) in its relationship with Africa and particularly with Somalia (see section 6.4.1). In line with these modes of diffusion it presumes its own existence as a virtuous example stemming from its history (Manners 2001), operationalises its normative intents through policy documents (Manners 2006), engages in extensive inter-regional cooperation, provides EU development aid and organises official meetings with its counterparts respectively. It is within this line of action that the three examined critical frames manifest and organise the whole array of its involvement in the case of Somalia. Although the aforementioned norms are prominent in the rhetoric promoted within the EU’s external action, this thesis has focused on their operationalisation through the critical frames, thus demonstrating their normative significance rather than the extent to which the norms themselves are referred to. In seeking to evaluate the actoriness of the EU through a normative lens, the coding of the frames is more suited for the purposes of this research than indicating the extent to which norms are deployed. Within this understanding, and following the analysis is Chapter 6, effective multilateralism is not only testament to the EU’s belief in the international society and building cooperative bridges with its international counterparts, but also the way it manages its own action on the ground with reference to military operations. The comprehensive approach, although extensively relied on and unequally formulated, provides the bridge between the ‘substantive’ nature of the military operations and the ‘symbolic’ diffusion of the mandates’ normative basis which, aside from the organisational
elements of each operation, refer to the overall direction prescribed within the strategies. Lastly, the partnership-ownership binary as a diplomatic apparatus, introduced within the inter-regional relationship between the EU and Africa, allows the EU to promote and establish itself as a partner with the other international powers but also leaves space for the empowerment of the local forces. This latter point can be either seen as a strategic move to dismiss the potential rise of accusations of neo-imperialism, whilst demonstrating the virtuous intent of the EU to aid local government in creating a long-term result prosperity (Manners, 2008).

Supporting Langan’s (2011:265) call for a critical reformulation of Europe’s ‘normative power’, this thesis confirms his findings. The actual normative power of the EU does not rest in its ability to shape non-Europeans’ “hearts and minds” and “redirect their policy agendas towards humanitarian goals” (Langan 2011:265) but is rather understood as its ability to mask and entrench policy agendas that promote EU interests under the guise of it values. The ultimate goals of the EU seem to be to “publicly legitimise, and to self-rationalise” (Langan 2011:265) by promoting its military policy within a framework of development aid and ‘other-empowerment’ (see JAES section 6.3.1 and EUTM section 6.5.2).

Since the establishment of the EEAS, the EU has been undertaking a series of actions which it perceives as pertinent in order to cover the gaps of its internal incoherence and self-reflexive failure. The creation of the Service acted as a twofold attempt to bring together its institutional structure, mainly between the Commission and the Council (see section 4.5.2). At the same time, the Lisbon Treaty elevated the role of the High Representative to provide an outward coherent head of what it named ‘external action’ which brought together the previously separated areas of CFSP and CSDP. In its particular relations with Africa, the JAES (2007) provided the basis for the creation of a bond between the individual countries which were of particular concern for the EU’s own benefit, including Somalia. The EUMSS, drawing most of its importance and direction from the vague ESS (2003) and its Implementation Report
(2008), delineated in fairly convenient terms the security concerns of the EU by expanding the scope of its engagement with piracy from Somalia to the entire region of the Horn of Africa (EUMSS, 2014:4). The relevant strategy that was operationalised, identified the particular interest the EU had in the region while demonstrating the convergence of its development initiatives within a framework of security provision. This overlapping, yet not completely fitting, combination was manifested through the two military operations in Somalia as well as a civilian mission – EUCAP NESTOR- although the latter obviously acted as symbolism of the EU’s broader civilian role as opposed to the very explicit military-security concern in Somalia. The fact that the promoted intent coordinated the sundry efforts in the region to provide a comprehensive response which included all types of available means – both civilian and military- whilst calling for a concerted effort including the affected countries is indicated by the prominence of the comprehensive approach. What must also be underlined is the increased reference to the EEAS within the pursuant Action plan, thus signifying the increasing responsibility of the Service to coordinate the different elements of operationalisation as presented within the frames of the EUMSS. The Somali Compact which broadened the range of perceived by the EU critical partners in its engagement, led to its good-governance driven support for a democratically elected government.

Throughout this line of operationalised norms, the EU failed to account for what could be considered the most essential element in a ‘normative power’ evaluation: the recognition of its influence by the local community which can only be accomplished by a successful account of ‘cultural filter’. The fact that the strategies of the EU still remain quite vague in their prescriptive elements, although admittedly become more specific in the allocation of duties to its own instruments (culminating with the EUGS), demonstrates the blind eye the EU has taken in what should be considered the aim of its actions: longstanding ownership of successful local
initiatives. It is this exact point which proves the inefficiency of the EU in its external action, whilst not detracting from the overall weight it has set on its normative foundation.

Recognising its superiority as a civilian power, the EU has attempted to project its involvement and power through the assignment of military means. Nevertheless, the fact that this line of action is proof of emulation rather than initiative stemming from self-awareness, is reflected in its rhetoric with partners that tessellates between respect to cooperation yet establishing its own presence. Within the EUGS Implementation Plan (2016:4) and the recent reaffirmation of its close cooperation with NATO (Council Conclusions, 15283/16, CSDP/PSDC 699, 6/12/2016), the particular balance between retaining close cooperation with international partners yet maintaining “strategic autonomy” and “being able to operate autonomously when and where necessary” (EUGS Implementation Plan 2016:4) becomes prominent.

Understandably, successful socialisation of its norms within the Somali Government is a very long-term goal which demands continuous and effective engagement. Nevertheless, the fact that local governance is essentially divided between three zones of administration (with the EU interacting officially with one directly –FGS) and the subsequent separate identity of the populations of these areas, demonstrates the complexity of the case. Although the EU is playing according to its strengths- norm promotion- it fails to effectively encapsulate the complexity that derives from the path of norm diffusion in its quest to assert itself as a global normative power. Even though steps have been made to effectively structure a hybrid polity which combines a civilian identity with the use of military means, the EU has failed to yet formulate a potent external action aside from the creation of the EEAS.
8.4 Mechanisms of diffusion and multilateral engagement

The rhetoric acknowledging primacy of African institutions (particularly the AU) on the subject of continent-to-continent cooperation with the EU began in 2007. Although this may be perceived as a move on behalf of the EU signalling its commitment to the partnership-ownership binary it has also been questioned on its actual depth with regards to African regionalism (Khadiagala 2012). The issue can again be identified in the asymmetric use of diffusion forms and the absence of a realistic plan with long-term sustainable effect. Even though the EU has been engaging on multiple occasions in continent-to-continent dialogue, between the AU Commission and EU Commission, it commenced the process of JAES with regular revisiting and incorporated the RECs in the consultation. Simultaneously, it funded their coordination with the EU, thus showing that the EU has failed to acknowledge the impact on the ground, which can be attributed to the EEAS.

As demonstrated in Chapter 6, this disjunction stems from the divided responsibility of promoting development aid as intent (primarily within the purview of the Commission) while operationalising said intent with security-military means which are coordinated and overseen by the EEAS (see section 4.5.2). This is mainly due to the absence of the ‘cultural filter’, which has been highlighted in this analysis. Even though particular reference to the needs of the Somali population is made in the EUTM mandates (see section 6.5.2), it appears to have fallen short in reflecting them within its collaboration with the TFG and subsequently FGS. Furthermore, on a broader level, the JAES has been deemed as overambitious, both in its scope as well as its method of ‘institutional isomorphism’ (Sicurelli, 2010: 174) resulting in its “hibernation” (Open Society Briefing Paper, 2010: 20). Although the EU appears to cover the bases of informational, procedural, transference and overt diffusion (see Textbox 1) within the aforementioned initiatives, it has also ignored the reality of the AU and its member states (Open Society Briefing Paper, 2010: 20). This becomes more apparent when viewing the case of
Somalia which adds the multiple administrative and cultural elements that are related to its internal division. Therefore, the result has been seen as an augmentation of the tensions between the AU framework and African member states, together with regional organisations such as the RECs (Helly, 2013:145). This leads to challenging the depth of the EU’s commitment. Therefore, the mode of governance set by the JAES appears to have failed in its efficiency since it has mostly been managed by EU and AU bureaucracy, ultimately leaving the relationship of the two continents stagnant (Helly, 2013:145).

With respect to the multilateral collaboration of the EU with Africa on the issue of peace and security, the subject can be seen as one of ‘pragmatic multilateralism’. Within the agenda set out since 2007 the element of crisis prevention and management has featured dominantly, particularly in view of the persistent security concerns in the Horn of Africa. This is demonstrated explicitly in the JAES initiative and throughout the Roadmaps in subsequent years. Particularly the first partnership was based on peace and security and provided the framework for funding through the APF predominantly as well as intense working relations (Pirozzi 2010, 2010b; Vines and Middleton 2008; Haastrup 2013, 2013b). Although the partnership on this level has been characterised as successful, it has been stipulated that there have been discrepancies between allocated and actually transferred paid funds (Helly, 2013:149). Nevertheless, the substantial objectives that genuinely corresponded to African needs were attributed to the partnership from the outset, particularly with reference to political dialogue, support to regional peacekeeping operations, support to the African Peace and Security Architecture and sustainable funding to peace and security in action. The partnership was broadly supported internally in the EU especially in the need to move from the ‘C2C’ level bilaterally to the multilateral level. Furthermore, the encouragement for ownership of African authorities to provide solutions and undertake the mass of the action on the ground, has met the inability or unwillingness of the African states and institutions themselves. Therefore,
although the intent to create a transfer of power from the EU unto the local actors (in essence the promotion of ‘ownership’) has been operationalised in theory, in fact this creates a further vacuum between the action itself and the impact it accomplishes, as opposed to the one it aspires.

What can be concluded from the aforementioned fragmented approach to the progression of the partnership-ownership binary is that the EU has progressed in promoting its own aspirations without in fact taking into consideration the need for the interventions it has carried out (see EUTM section 6.5.2). From a formal point of view, the EU has adequately kept the avenues of cooperation open but only pertaining to the overt and institutional forms of normative diffusion (see Textbox 1). The increased reference to normative rhetoric is apparent. Nevertheless, when it comes to accomplishing the intended impact and long-term result of its engagement with Africa as a whole, two issues stand out as highly problematic. Firstly, it has not taken into consideration the actual abilities of the organisations it has constructed a partnership with (most prominently the AU) and secondly, the EU has not tailored its provisions according to the diverse needs on the ground. This indicate that the political issues it claims to be concerned with in Africa cannot be addressed within a vague overarching strategic framework but only on a focused case-by-case basis. This failure becomes even more apparent when dealing with countries such as Somalia that not only face security concerns but are also characterised by internal division. On the one hand the EU as an institutional actor can formally enter binding cooperation with state actors it acknowledges, in this case the FGS. On the other hand, this commitment does not go as far as the intents it promotes if it does not account for the particular needs of the population on the ground which are excluded in the negotiations or the effective provisions, in this case Puntland and Somaliland.

Therefore, the EU, as a normative actor, can be held accountable for not effectively reflecting the complexity of the political situations it is engaging in and the particular needs
entailed from the normative assertions it is promoting. In the case of Somalia, the most basic disparity lies between the prognosis and diagnosis of the issues it is dealing with on the ground. Although presenting the security of development aid as the intent which triggered the need for its engagement, it is addressing the case on the ground as one of direct security threat – piracy- as well as a more longstanding situation stemming from the democratic deficit in the selection of government. Both operations appear to be functioning on two different timeframes with respect to security while the core issue that has been dealt with goes beyond its operations and relates to the election of the government of Somalia. The EU launched EUNAVFOR Atalanta to tackle the phenomenon of piracy which, although admittedly the most apparent symptom of the political failure in the country, is not the root of the problem the international community is focusing on. Securing the WFP vessels in their transfer of development aid has been the nexus for the international community’s efforts in the region. The mandate of Atalanta after its multiple amendments, has resulted in including elements that would justify it being characterised as resembling to a policing mission which safeguards international law rather than a military operation (see section 6.5.1). After the successful advent of the multilateral effort in addressing piracy, the state instability is still visible. It could be argued that the democratic deficit and clan-based structure of the government has been the root cause of this symptom (Cordano, 2015:3). Even though the EU has supported the electoral process which came to fruition only in the beginning of 2017 and resulted in the democratic choice of the current Federal Government, the humanitarian challenges -which were also core issues that contributed to the illegal practice of piracy- such as famine are reappearing.

What appears to be the case is that the EU is attempting to eradicate the political problems in Somalia from a western-centric approach. The fact that beyond the efforts it made to provide security, both short-term (EUNAVFOR) as well as long-term (EUTM- training local authorities), have failed due to the forms of intervention it has been engaging in. The military
operations were created to address the perennial criticism the EU has been facing as a soft-
power oriented actor (see section 2.4). The fact that its military operations have been infused
with civilian powers are testament to that. Therefore, in an attempt to bridge these two tangents
into a newly formulated hybrid polity within external action, the EU has resorted to a highly
normative, yet quite vague set of strategic intents within CSDP, thus transforming it into an
international normative power, at least in appearance. Nevertheless, although managing to
establish its presence and remain consistent with its promoted intents, it has failed to account
for the particular needs on the ground. The result is the creation of a very visible yet ineffective
global actor.

8.5 Cultural filter: the missing link

The case of Somalia is also important in identifying the shortcomings of normative
diffusion in the EU’s attempts to promote itself as such. As mentioned in section 7.2.3, on
certain levels the EU has to a relatively large extent accomplished to operationalise
informational and institutional diffusion within the strategic frameworks it has agreed upon in
Africa. Within Manners’ (2013) (see Textbox 1) typology of norm diffusion, ‘cultural filter’
becomes particularly challenging in its identification as well as its practical employment. In
the case of Somalia, this filter is multifaceted not only given the disparity of internal identities
between the three administrative areas – FGS, Somaliland and Puntland- but also in their
representation as international actors itself. While the central FGS is the recognised state entity
which cooperates and contracts international agreements, Somaliland and Puntland still make
up an extensive part of the country’s territory, represent a significant amount of its population
and self-identify as separate administrations but also as cultures. Therefore, the frameworks
within which the international actors function is quite limited in the scope of engaging the
counterparts they are supposedly trying to aid. Furthermore, the concerns of what defines a
normative power argued by Diez (2009, 2010) and Kavalski (2013) resurge as pivotal in this discussion. According to the two academics one of the most important elements in evaluating the success of an actor as a normative one is the receptive side of the diffusion, which is whether this actor is also recognised as a power by the recipients of the norms. In the case of Somalia this element cannot be accomplished given the disparity of the people on the ground, which the EU itself does not take into account within the delineation of its engagement in Somalia. Therefore, the unsuccessful normative impact the EU seeks to accomplish in this case is hindered by the cultural filter-blind approach it takes.

The aforementioned omission of the EU is indirectly highlighted within Hills’ (2013) research concerning governance in Somalia regarding development-related challenges. As she asserts, the incorporation of development-oriented governance -which was the main focal point of the aid provided by the international community since the very beginning of its engagement in the Horn of Africa (see section 6.3.1) - is hindered by the inability of international actors “to influence local power brokers or mitigate the distrust and insecurity affecting daily life in a city such as Mogadishu” (Hills, 317:2013). In normative terms, this indicates successful normative diffusion through ‘cultural filter’. As she goes on to support, the issue with the international partners’ provision of aid is based on a Western policy promotion of the overall transfer of procedural and normative goals developed in particular cultural fields which are in tune with liberal democracies without taking into account the context provided by the particular nature of the interventions at hand (Hills, 2013: 319). This in turn points towards the existing disparity of the norm diffuser and the norm receiver. Due to the lack of adequate understanding of the cultural particularity on the ground, norm diffusion cannot accomplish the final stage of its incorporation, namely socialisation.

As confirmed by academics (Menkhaus 2006-2007, Lund 2006, Hagmann and Höhne 2009) Somalia is not actually the ground upon which only one recognised entity – the FGS-
acts singularly. It is rather an arena which is managed by a number of security and administrative actors that are linked ethnically and economically but simultaneously characterised by different levels of stability and style of governance. While the regions of Somaliland and Puntland have a more longstanding independence (the former declared itself an independent republic in 1991 while the later claimed autonomy in 1998), the recognised – now federal- government has survived mainly due to the support of the international community (Hills, 2013: 321). Its existence is predicated on the presence of AU troops and the humanitarian as well as financial support of the international actors, mainly the UN and the EU. Direct initiatives range from humanitarian activities to support for conflict resolution initiatives and institutional reforms, while indirect initiatives refer to the mainstreaming of conflict prevention objectives into sector programmes in the areas of development and trade (Bagayoko, 2010:233). It is therefore unsurprising that the local communities have created an attitude of disbelief towards the international donors in view of the perennial issue of corruption of consecutive governments which are predicated on traditional clan construction and personal militias (see Chapter 5).

Therefore, the element of cultural filter when coming to international norm diffusion, and even more so EU, would become pivotal in accomplishing a longstanding effect on the recipient country. The issue on behalf of the EU was falsely identified on the democratic deficit surrounding the selection of government while it should have been in taking heed to the regional needs within the country and tailoring its provisions to mitigating the disparity of means distributed throughout the fragmented territory. In turn this may have assured a level of understanding of the popular needs and potentially created a shared sense of interest that would have translated into fairly distributed humanitarian aid, rather than witnessing a disproportionate distribution of aid towards the FGS while witnessing the bulk of casualties from the 2010 and 2017 droughts in Puntland. Therefore, the issue is identified in the
international contributors’ information on the needed variables that would in turn translate into establishing trustworthy officials in Mogadishu. This shortcoming is not restricted to the western actors but also includes regional ones, such as AMISOM, which act as executives of the international community’s engagement in the country due to “ownership” over the actions on the ground. As Hills (2013: 329) asserts: “International organisations and donors wish to transform the SPF into a national force capable of supporting a government that is staffed by inexperienced newcomers intent on securing foreign support. But Mogadishu’s governance is built on clan calculations, manoeuvre and entrepreneurial skills, and international advisers lack the contextual knowledge needed to map this, let alone change it”.

8.6 Conclusion

The “Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa” is one of the main texts that provides a clear view of the contextual support delivered for the operationalisation of the military operations. As previously mentioned, the elements of development policy and humanitarian aid have been fundamental in the initiatives undertaken in Somalia. Not only has the initial intent been focused and guided around these two pillars, but also the deployment of particular stages of the operations has been ensured to keep them as a “compass” in their delineation. Nevertheless, the intervention itself, as well as the underlying normative justification, appear to be oriented towards the provision of security, which ultimately renders the link between intent, action and impact quite blurred. Ultimately this hinders the ability to draw definitive conclusions on the overall normative actoriness of the EU. While the humanitarian intent sets the field for civilian intervention, the choice of following a military operation highlights the instrumentality of respective means even though they are not employed in a coercive fashion. Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn is that the EU retains a civilian guise and remains
true to it even though it employs military means. With a NPE-based evaluation, this can be explained on the basis of symbolic manifestation.

The creation of the EEAS was the outcome of a long search to provide a unified and comprehensive actor in the provision and delineation of external action. Nevertheless, the division of areas of responsibility namely, DEVCO – humanitarian aid and development policy and EEAS – security and defence, perpetuates the pre-existing inconsistency and vague borders between intent and action. Although the intents of EUNAVFOR are purely in the realm of the former, the action is undertaken and prescribed by the latter. What makes things more interesting is that the eventual response combines the normative intent of development and transcribes it into the action taking place through the lens of security. Thereby security and defence abide by the rules that are set in a highly normative understanding and approach to the operations, while the deployment of the operation takes place only on the normative level of the initiative, while the action remains highly civilian/normative.

The conflagration that is already existent in the function of the EU and the way it operationalises its intents, was attempted to be overcome with the creation of the EEAS. The initial idea behind the establishment of the Service was the centralisation and unification of the sundry components/concerns the EU had with concern to the initiatives it was setting up. This confusion appears to be repeated with the competences as well as the internal composition of the Service itself. On the one hand, continuity was not successful given a) the development-humanitarian aid intents taken up by the Commission (DEVCO) with the actions security-defence of the EEAS, whilst the latter refer to the intents themselves instead of following their own line that would accord more with military action; b) the presence of the EEAS and the apparent attachment of its role not clearly separate from the pre-existing structure; c) the aforementioned disjointed relationship between the intents and action was also replicated within the bureaucracy of the EEAS thus creating a potential re-emergence of the division
between the actors and roles. This is to say that without a uniform esprit de corps (Juncos and Pomorska, 2014), the unification under the EEAS of the Commission and Council employees as well as the seconded diplomats only leaves the root of a potential problem re-emerging between the importance of the institutions to come.

The argument that was presented in the theoretical chapter of this thesis and that was examined throughout the elaboration of the two operations, is that the normativity of the EU is not a matter of its identity but rather a dynamic element constructed on the basis of its actions. In order to structure this, the three-part route, from intent to action and ultimately reception (impact) will demonstrate the ability of the EU to have normative power, whether it desires to do so or not (this will be seen in the intents it puts forth), by looking at the way it carries out its military operations.

It appears that the normative underpinnings of the EU are incompatible, or even conflictual. Although what it seeks to do is highly based on informational, procedural and, through military operations, overt diffusion of power, the key element of cultural filter hinders their full evolution. This thesis focuses on the procedural explanation of the EU’s normative diffusion by examining its military operations. Of course, this presupposes an acknowledgment and understanding of the informational elements that are based within the mandates, agreements and ‘strategies’. When attempting to combine the two areas, the same conclusion is reached.

Even though the EU itself is enacting upon its intents, thus highly demonstrating a focus on the normative elements of its actorness, it fails to account for the cultural filter. Especially in the case of Somalia, this is seen in the shortcomings of the EU in accomplishing long-term resolution even after attempting to increase its impact through the comprehensive approach and effective multilateralism. The fact the EUNAVFOR has been successful in tackling the initial intent presented in its mandate, that is the phenomenon of piracy, it still is unable to
foresee and account for the future resurgence of the criminality which created this issue to begin with. The understanding of the interconnectedness of issues was apparent since the very first mandate in 2008 which underlined the primary goal of securing WFP and AMISOM vessels transporting humanitarian aid. Tackling famine with an international concerted effort, would result in the alleviation of the root causes which would result in criminal activities (see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, the lack of efficiency on behalf of the EU became apparent once again in 2011 and 2013 with famine and drought striking again. This time, the corruption of the local powers in the distribution of the aid was highlighted. In turn, now with the added concern of Al Shabaab in reclaiming areas, interest now pivoted to the resolution of the democratic deficit within the country. Therefore, a goal for elections was initiated.

Meanwhile, the distrust of the population was overlooked (Cordano 2015; Menkhaus 2011). Having been subjected to corrupt governments which retained an elitist clan-based administration, the already divided population of Somalia considered the Western powers as bedfellows/supporters of the regimes, thereby reducing the credibility and trust in the EU initiatives (see Chapter 5). What this demonstrates is the importance of cultural filter but also of the key role of the receiving end in norm diffusion. While the EU attempted to address these concerns on an institutional level, such as instating an EUSR for the Horn of Africa who would account for the particular conditions on the case, as well as on a policy level -establishing a new rhetoric framework on partnership-ownership, it failed to change the impact on its efforts.
Chapter 9

Concluding thoughts

9.1 Hesitant Power Europe

The indecision of the EU in the way it is willing to progress as a global actor still remains quite apparent. On the one hand its purported engagement in issues that have been presented as international concerns is quite vague in the means it is employing as well as the long-term plans it has in resolving them. The increased resort to normative commitment is evidence of the track the EU is on with concern to its own identity. While not progressing as a military actor, aside from its reliance on cooperation with NATO (EDA report 2016), it continues to construct long-term (strategic as it calls them) plans to demonstrate its ability to address in a more constructive way the challenges that it faces. Although the civilian nature of the actor is quite obvious, the means it employs still lack coherence, both internally as well as externally.

Although steps have been taken towards establishing a democratically elected government (only to be accomplished in the beginning of 2017) the insecurity and fragmented nature of the territory remains. The main issue that was highlighted as the source of the 2010 famine was not the lack of international interest but the distribution of that aid internally due to the corrupt nature of the government at the time (see Chapter 5). This concern was attempted to be tackled by the support for a TFG and then the FGS. Although it is still too soon to make a valid assessment at the time, this initiative appears to remain dysfunctional. Furthermore, the element of piracy which has remained the focus of the mandates for maritime security is currently considered as diminishing and presented as one of the successes of the EU and its effective multilateralism. To keep up with the international security trends at the time, the element of terrorism was introduced in the security aspect of the EU involvement in the case.
The incidents of attacks by Al Shabaab reduced for a few years only to resurface in late 2016-2017. This demonstrates a connection of the core issue—humanitarian need—and the reappearance of security concerns—piracy and Al Shabaab.

The aforementioned leads us to the following conclusions: a) the unsuccessful engagement of the EU in Somalia with reference to its long-term goals, b) the subsequent problematic diffusion of its normative assertions— which as demonstrated in this thesis are intrinsically linked to its long-term “strategy”. The former is the result of the gap between the humanitarian nature of the intents it has put forth and the security driven measures it has promoted. This is also reflected in the disconnection within the EEAS, particularly with concern to the security-development nexus (see section 4.4). The normative importance of this lies in the incoherence of the intents with its actions which subsequently affect the EU’s efficiency and impact. This can be attributed to either the alignment of the three dominant frames which have been examined in this thesis together with the inconsistency of the types of normative diffusion which the EU appears to employ.

9.2 Incoherence and the military means-civilian mandates gap

Blair and Gya (2010:105) identify the disparity between the military and civilian missions carried out by the EU within their research of civilian crisis management (CCM). Their findings and insight within the ‘civilian’ element of the EU’s international interventions are particularly pertinent to the current research and verified by the findings of the critical framework analysis it is based on. As the two academics point out, the EU appears not to have an actual strategic plan for engagement with the local communities in implementing its initiatives, aside from the widespread rhetoric of local ownership and “consultations”, without in fact assessing the impact on the ground (Blair and Gya, 2010:105).
The disjuncture which is at the core of the EU’s fragmented intervention in Somalia, and of course lie at the epicentre of the tension which is the combination of military means and civilian power into a hybrid actorness, is that between the provision of humanitarian aid and the engagement in military operations. As asserted by Kobi and Ben-Ari (2011:658), military intervention is perceived as necessary to ensure stability in the operational arena and allow the civilian components to operate. According to Szayna et al (2009:16), a civilian mission that is introduced within a violent environment is doomed without the support of a professional military force. It is thus understandable that the two types of intervention have to be complementary in their operationalisation in order to maintain a short-term effect that will also yield a long-term effect. In the case of Somalia, the initial mandate justified the engagement of the EU for the following reasons: securing the vessels providing aid from piracy. Therefore, the elements of humanitarianism as well militarisation were incorporated within the same logic that make up the basis for the continuing military presence, autonomous and multilateral, in the Horn of Africa.

9.3 Transposition of responsibility

What can be seen throughout the EU’s engagement in Africa and even more vividly in the case of Somalia is the prevalence of a detachment-transposition of responsibility with purported intent. The transposition of action seems to underscore the new normative approach to external action that has been established since 2007 and further institutionalised after the Lisbon Treaty. This in turn can be seen as either a substantiation of the EU’s commitment to non-coercive actorness or the appearance of a new gap between the means at its disposal and its expectations. On the one hand, the promoted normative foundation of the EU’s involvement in Somalia can be supported by its non-coercive use of military means in both operations it is carrying out. The mandates that have been put forth call on AMISOM to effectively carry out
the EU’s demonstrated security-oriented actions in the region. This also agrees with the partnership-ownership binary it has set out within the JAES. It further underlines an even deeper commitment it this new frame it champions.

Although the aforementioned understanding could be seen as a positive move towards arguing that the EU is evolving as a normative power, the fact that the prognoses and diagnoses of the issues it is tackling are incoherent poses more concerns. Throughout the mandates concerning Atalanta (as well as the EUMSS and the Strategy for the Horn of Africa) the EU presents humanitarian aid as the reason for its involvement while promoting action that is more akin to provision of security. On the one hand, this could be a demonstration of the comprehensive approach whereby the humanitarian aid is the long-term solution to the root causes while the short-term provision of security concerns the temporary eradication of the symptoms, thus allowing the strategy to be effective. On the other hand, it is quite confusing from a normative perspective when the EU employs military means and allocates them civilian tasks based on normative grounds. This complicated link between the intents and actions of the EU justify the concerns that have been raised around the overall actorness of the EU as well as the actual intents of the EU.

Within a normative examination of the aforementioned inconsistencies the EU can either be seen as a comprehensive normative actor that maintains its normative commitments and non-coercive intervention, even though it employs military means. Conversely, the question becomes what the aim is for this choice and how it can be understood from a symbolic standpoint. The most persuasive explanation can be found in the concept of symbolic manifestation by Manners (2006), as it has been elaborated upon in Chapter 3. The EU is attempting to establish a potent normative actorness within its aspirations on a global scale. Stemming from its own identity, it promotes its normative power while assuring that it creates a visible presence within its interventions. EUNAVFOR quite effectively indicates the EU’s
ability to deploy in military operations on its own while being a part of a multilateral effort. This in turn proves that it is able to deploy military means while maintaining its soft-power core. It is also diplomatically significant in reasserting its commitment to its partners and maintaining a civilian actorness simultaneously. Therefore, it can be perceived as consistent with its normative assertions as well as dependable as a peacekeeper and partner. On the other hand, the impact it manages is evaluated as a failure, in view of the recurring issues that appear in Somalia. Therefore, this indicates a problem in the operationalisation of the EU’s strategy and highlights the problematic impact it has achieved. From a normative understanding, the mechanism of normative diffusion via cultural filter appears to be the weak point in its endeavours (see section 7.4).

9.4 Limitations of research and suggestions for future projects

The EEAS is itself relatively newly-established and its work in Somalia is ongoing. This offers plenty of scope for original findings, especially within the areas of the EU’s external relations and foreign policy. Subsequently, the contributions of this thesis into a new area of enquiry, whether and how the EU can act as a normative power/norm diffuser, can generate useful material for policy makers and hypotheses to guide future research. In terms of the EU’s external actorness, and given the continuous international interest raised in the particular case Somalia, an examination of the civilian operations in the African continent can be explored through the lens of NPE to provide a more comprehensive account.

Additionally, the internal dynamics which have not been explored in this research could open other avenues in deciphering the provenance of the EU’s normative standing. More specifically, an exploration of the most prominent Member States in the formulation of the EU’s external action initiatives with the employment of a principle actor approach could shed light on the mechanisms of normative identity formation and diffusion. Through process
tracing, either solely or in conjunction with critical frame analysis, a more nuanced account of the normative standing of the EU as an actor can be examined.

In expanding the exploration of normative power as well as military operations, additional research on gender could provide interesting insights. Such an approach is needed to further feminist perspectives in EU scholarship and investigate the representation of gender on the basis of the EU’s normative standing as a security and defence actor. Continuing from the normative focal point of this thesis, such a project would engage with the concept of symbolic manifestation, as presented in the NPE literature, to demonstrate the impact of the provisions set within EUNAVFOR MED (operation Sophia) as well as their repercussions in the representation of particular migrant groups within the policy framing itself. Specifically, it would emphasize the representation of women as well as the silences which further support the biased gendered nature of CSDP as a whole and military operations even more so. It would therefore illustrate a feminist contribution to normative power theory within CSDP (particularly the EEAS) where the EU is perceived in accordance with gender regimes at multiple levels. The gender regime concept is not reserved for states but is also highly useful in a multi-level context. Therefore, the strength of feminist analysis lies in its understanding of how power hierarchies rooted in gender are operationalized in political practices, organized and embedded in institutions.

Understandings of gender are thus constructed through EU relations to other states in the global context and in EU policy-making and institution-building. Simultaneously, whilst women appear to be central in the debate of peace, they are attributed an ambiguous position with reference to security (both as actors of providing it as well as targeted/referent objects). Although there is literature on migration and CSDP, research interweaving these issues remains nascent. My proposed research links to my thesis via the normative core, dominant in both projects. Feminist theory belongs to a critical theory tradition with theories that share an interest
in power, change and emancipation (Manners, 2007). The gender viewpoint provides the critical position, while it is normative in the sense that feminism seeks to eliminate gender inequalities.

Despite the EU CSDP masculinity being considered a civil-minded military one, a dominant EU hierarchical military masculinity is institutionalized, thereby leading to the CSDP embodying different types of military masculinities. The aforementioned is exemplified in the explicit articulation of the role of protector on behalf of the EU “to pay special attention to the needs of vulnerable groups, in particular to the rights of the child and violence against women” (Council of the European Union, 2008:13). Since 2008 the EU has committed to protect these rights through the UN Women Peace and Security agenda (EU Security and Defence, 2009:292). The only form in which femininity is explicitly referred to as relevant in the CSDP is with references to women and children in places outside and away from the EU.

For the aforementioned reasons, the examination of the gender journey in CSDP through the example of the refugee crisis (operation Sophia) is not only a multifaceted subject theoretically, but also one with extensive political, social and normative impact.

9.5 Conclusions

This thesis explored issues of normative power, from a theoretical and empirical perspective. Specifically, the normative underpinnings of the NPE framework and the use of military means as a way of norm diffusion were examined in order to determine the importance of actorness as a constructive element of the EU’s normative identity in its external action.

In response to the main research question underpinning this project, the establishment of the EEAS in the context of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) appears to have contributed to the evolution of the Union as a ‘normative power’. Judging from its external action overall, and the military operations carried out in Somalia more specifically, the EU exhibits the characteristics of a normative power according to NPE (Manners 2002). Departing from the
initial inception of the theory by Manners (2002), this thesis incorporates the main critiques suggesting what the defining element of ‘normative power’ is (see Chapter 2). Namely, it considers ‘normative interests’ together with ‘normative action/behaviour’ (Diez 2005, Merlingen 2007, Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007) and ‘normative impact’ (De Zutter 2010, Diez 2005, Manners 2006, Youngs 2004) and combines them in accordance with De Zutter’s (2010) position, which claims that a normative power demonstrates continuity in its behaviour internally and externally.

Simultaneously, the research tackles the inherent tension between military and normative power by exploring the military operations in Somalia. With due consideration of Stivachtis (2007) and Diez (2005), a separation is made between military means and the use of coercion. With this distinction, military means can act as ‘symbolic manifestation’ (Manners 2006), thereby becoming compatible and even beneficial to normative diffusion. This last point responds directly to the second theoretical question underpinning this research.

Therefore, this thesis’ theoretical contribution is two-fold: it provides theoretical innovation by expanding on the debate regarding the operationalization of normative power as well as empirical originality via the selected case study. The theoretical contribution lies in the examination of the compatibility between military means and normative power, thereby addressing one of the main theoretical tensions of NPE (see Chapter 2). This theoretical question is illustrated empirically within the case of Somalia (see Chapter 5, 6 and 7), more specifically, through the two military operations carried out by the EU. Therefore, the contribution to theory is incorporated within a case study that has not previously been explored through a normative lens whilst contributing to the literature on the case study itself. By identifying whether and how the EU has acted as a normative power/norm diffuser in the difficult case of Somalia, this thesis generates both useful material for policy makers and creates new routes of enquiry for future research.
The empirical element upon which the theoretical premise is explored is the EU’s normative actorness within CSDP. Most importantly, the establishment of the EEAS is argued to be a catalytic moment in the evolution of the EU as a normative actor. Following the theoretical elaboration in Chapter 2, the discussion of the changes that occurred as a result of the EEAS’ establishment as well as the unresolved issues that have been identified in the literature as far as its role and function are concerned are portrayed in Chapter 4. The operationalisation of the EU’s normative standing within its military operations is achieved through a content analysis of EU primary documentation (see Appendix 1) and a subsequent critical frame analysis (see Chapters 3), thus completing the portrait of its normative identity and ‘power’. The critical frames of the ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘partnership-ownership’ are employed to allow the interpretation of the EU’s initiatives from a normative perspective.

To provide a more comprehensive and detailed account of EUNAVFOR and EUTM’s normative importance emerging from the content and critical frame analyses, the following structure is followed throughout Chapters 6 and 7. Initially the content analysis of the critical frames appearing in the key EU strategic documents – European Security Strategy (ESS 2003), EU Global Strategy (EUGS 2016) and their respective Implementation plans as well as the Comprehensive Approach (CA 2013) and its Action Plan (2015) - are presented in the light of the employed analytical apparatuses to provide a broader context to the EU’s actions within CSDP. Building on discussions concerning the EEAS’ importance as well as shortcomings (see Chapter 4), what becomes apparent is how the vision of the Lisbon Treaty is echoed by the intents the EU puts forth in its strategic documents. The EUGS and its Implementation Plan demonstrate the most recent conceptualisation of the EU’s normative basis with reference to the three critical frames, but also indicate the evolution of the EEAS into a pivotal actor bearing most of this normative actorness.
The EU sub-strategies – Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES 2007), EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and the fight against piracy in the Horn of Africa – dealing with particular geographical regions and areas of action, further narrow the focus of this analysis adding to the evaluation in normative terms, providing more specified insight into the employment of the critical frames and identifying their pertinence within this thesis (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, the relevant chapter demonstrated how the EU’s general strategic concerns are operationalised in the context of its relations with Africa as well as more narrowly with reference to its military initiatives, particularly those of a maritime nature.

The EU’s documents relating to Somalia follow (see Chapter 7). Although they may not be strategies as such or deal with the elaboration of related concepts, these documents have elements of these within them. Thus, the scope of the analysis further honed down to the use of the critical frames within the case of Somalia. Most importantly, building on its introduction in Chapter 5, the examination of the Somali Compact (2013) adds the perspective of the Somali side in the dynamic diffusion of normative power (see Chapter 2). Therefore, both sides to the normative process are accounted for thus completing the conceptualisation of NPE and, more specifically, how it is reflected in the impact of the EU’s relations with Somalia.

Finally, the documentation relating to the two military operations, EUNAVFOR Atalanta and EUTM, conclude this chapter (Chapter 7), thereby completing the illustration of the EU’s actoriness within a normative setting. This section focuses on the fluctuations (or lack thereof) of the critical frames’ employment within the renewed versions of the operations’ mandates, highlighting the changes in their subsequent normative underpinnings. Furthermore, the emerging comparison between the two operations contributes to the construction of a more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s military initiatives in Somalia as well as its overall actoriness in normative terms. Thereby the element of ‘action’ completes the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3.
The conclusions drawn from the coding indicates the continuity of the EU’s normative commitments within the design and execution of its initiatives in the area of external action. The comprehensive approach, as the linking element between military and civilian means but also between the internal and external practices of the EU, has consistently been employed and evolved throughout the levels of EU engagement. In this respect, the EU can be characterised as a normative actor according to De Zutter’s (2010) definition, given that the Union has demonstrated the centrality of norms both in its internal as well as its external practices. With reference to the means employed, the critical frame analysis supported Whitman’s (2002) view of the Union’s military power as a residual tool whilst also reflecting Larsen (2002) in that the EU did not resort to military force to the detriment of non-coercive means but also that it relies more on its rhetoric rather than its action. The military operations in Somalia are testament to these last points, seeing that they both rely on the use of non-forceful means and are rather concerned with the diffusion of core normative principles (see Manners 2002). As illustrated in Chapter 2 and supported throughout this thesis, normative power is seen as a separate type of power which can also include military presence if that is not complemented by coercive action.

In promoting its norms within a framework of generally accepted values (through referral to international law or to generally acknowledged systems such as the UN) the EU has increased the value of its norms whilst highlighting them in its external action (see Manners 2008). Lastly, with reference to the symbolic element of military power (Manners 2006), within its initiatives, particularly EUNAVFOR, the EU has capitalised on Kavalski’s (2013) emphasis on the recognition of presence of a normative power, by focusing on it on a strategic (EUGS), institutional (EEAS) as well as an operational level (EUNAVFOR). Although remaining committed to its promotion of effective multilateralism, the Union has also focused in its most recent strategic documents (EUGS and Implementation Plan) on the construction of autonomy,
or representation of self. What the frame analysis has demonstrated, particularly in the sub-strategies prescribing its relations with Africa as well as Somalia, is that again it fulfils, theoretically, the requirements of being characterised as a normative power. Speaking to Tocci’s (2008) definition of a normative power as ‘other empowering’, the EU has resorted heavily to the employment of the partnership and ownership frames, thus engaging with the procedural diffusion of its norms (see Textbox 1) throughout its engagement in Africa and even more so in Somalia.

Within the scope of operations carried out in Somalia, the comprehensive approach as well as effective multilateralism are found at the core of the EU’s efforts to eradicate the threats faced within the country. Furthermore, the fact that the Strategies which directly affect and guide the operationalisation of the EU’s initiatives were constructed in the light of the EEAS’s appearance within the framework of external action, underline the importance of the aforementioned frames not only in understanding the EU’s actorness but also subsequently the character attributed to the EEAS which appears at the crux of internal and external multilateralism.
# Appendix 1

## Codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Codes/Frames</th>
<th>Sub-codes</th>
<th>How it appears within the document</th>
<th>Extent of unit</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Example</th>
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<td>Concerns the employment of “the full range of its instruments and resources to make its external action more consistent, more effective and more strategic” (CA, 2013:2) but also “refers not only to the joined-up deployment of EU instruments and resources, but also to the shared responsibility of EU-level actors and Member States” (CA, 2013:2)</td>
<td>“Using all EU instruments within the comprehensive approach enables the EU to effectively address maritime security threats at and from the sea, tackle the root causes and restore good governance.” (EUMSS, 2014:9)</td>
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<td>The comprehensive approach “refers to the EU’s more pro-active, and more coordinated, integration of its various external policy tools to address specific international security problems” (Smith, M.E., 2013:25)</td>
<td>“More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities.” (ESS, 2003:11)</td>
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<td>Effective multilateralism</td>
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<td>“We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the United States and with our partners around the world.” (ESS Implementation Report, S407/08, 2008:2)</td>
<td>“Essential for success is close cooperation between ourselves, with the relevant regional and sub-regional organisations, the UN and its agencies, and with other international coordination mechanisms such as the G8++ clearing house for Africa.” (4th EU-Africa Summit Declaration, 2-3/4/2014)</td>
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### Appendix 1

**Codebook - continued**

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<th>Partnership Definition</th>
<th>Ownership Definition</th>
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<td>The terms 'partnership' or 'partner/s' are employed in accordance with the definition.</td>
<td>The term is mainstreamed after JAES as a stark opposition to the previous relationship of the EU with Africa (on a continent to continent basis) wherein the former was appears as donor and the latter as recipient.</td>
<td>&quot;The promotion of democratic governance and human rights constitutes a central objective of the Africa-EU partnership.&quot; (JAES, Action Plan 2011-13, 2007:2)</td>
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<td>&quot;This dialogue should help both parties to define the issues at stake, agree on common positions on issues of common concern and jointly undertake specific initiatives and actions.&quot; (JAES, 2007:8)</td>
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<td>&quot;On 22 July 2013, the Council further agreed that the EU will take forward its integrated approach to improving security and the rule of law in Somalia, on the basis of Somali ownership and responsibility, close coordination with other actors and coherence and synergies between EU instruments, in particular between its Common Security and Defence Policy missions and operations.&quot; (Council Decision 2014/825/CFSP, 2014, preamble para. 5)</td>
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<td>Usually included in a framework of partnership, yet recognising primacy or responsibility within an initiative to one of the actors (when referring to the EU usually meant in a 'mentoring' capacity, wherein the EU is recognised as a supporter of the initiative).</td>
<td>&quot;In order to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 1, the EU military mission shall be deployed in Somalia and in Uganda in order to mentor, advise and support the Somali authorities with regard to the build-up of SNAF, the implementation of the Somali National Security and Stabilisation Plan and SNAF training activities.&quot; (Council Decision 2013/443/CFSP, 2013: Art.1 para. 8)</td>
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## Appendix 2

### Comprehensive Content Analysis (%)

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