AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN
THE EDUCATION OF HANDICAPPED PEOPLE
IN THE LIGHT OF THE WARNOCK REPORT "SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS"
AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

A thesis submitted for the degree of
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ABSTRACT

This thesis employs the Aristotelian concept of equity in acknowledging differences between individuals, which continue despite apparent increases in social uniformity. Differences affecting education are considered in the light of the Warnock Report 'Special Educational Needs', subsequent constructions of educational policy on integration, and polarisation of opinion between those holding the Report to be too radical, and potentially damaging to the education system, and those holding it not radical enough.

Part One, 'Introduction', places the Report in an historical context, and in the context of contemporary thought. The Report is not revolutionary, but represents a stage in the evolution of educational theory and practice.

Part Two, 'The Handicapped Person in Society', studies related concepts, differentiation and categorisation, with reference to relativistic notions of normality and deviance. Particular attention is given to the relativistic theory that 'handicap' is socially conditioned and hence avoidable, which is criticised and replaced by the thesis that serious handicaps, whilst possibly affected by social conditioning, are not socially created, but objectively real. The concept of a person is examined, and compared to that of an adult.

Part Three, 'The Handicapped Person in Education', examines the philosophical debate over the contested concept of education, and then focusses on special education, leading to a review of the special methods and contents used with severely handicapped children, and of the Report's title 'Special Educational Needs'. Part Three closes by exploring the philosophies of integration and comprehensivisation.

Part Four, 'Conclusion', links analysis of the principal philosophical issues raised by this study with the putative end of Special Education following the Warnock Report. This contains little that is revolutionary, yet some interpretations, made for non-educational reasons, are held to be potentially damaging to the education of handicapped people. Such interpretations largely arise from the ambiguities of the Report's use of emotive concepts.
## CONTENTS

### PRELIMINARIES

- Title page 1
- Abstract 2
- Contents 3
- List of Figures 4
- Frontispiece 5
- Acknowledgements 6

### PART I   INTRODUCTION

- Chapter 1  Aims and Methods 7
- Chapter 2  Background 18

### PART II   THE HANDICAPPED PERSON IN SOCIETY

- Chapter 3  The Description of a Person 48
- Chapter 4  The Value of a Person 63
- Chapter 5  The Concept of a Person 99

### PART III   THE HANDICAPPED PERSON IN EDUCATION

- Chapter 6  Education - a Contested Concept 130
- Chapter 7  Special Educational Content 152
- Chapter 8  Special Educational Methods 170
- Chapter 9  Special Educational Needs 190
- Chapter 10  Integration 211

### PART IV   CONCLUSION

- Chapter 11  Principal Philosophical Issues 244
- Chapter 12  The End of Special Education ? 272

### BIBLIOGRAPHIES

- Bibliography 1  Works Referenced in the Text 283
- Bibliography 2  Other Selected Works 289
List of Figures

Frontispiece

Figure 1  Special Education prior to 1889  26
Figure 2  Special Education 1889 to 1944  27
Figure 3  Special Education 1944 to 1970  30
Figure 4  Special Education 1971 to 1980  32
Figure 5  Special Education since 1981  32
Figure 6  Difference and individuation  106
Figure 7  Venn diagram of the three educations  138
Figure 8  The communications system  159
Figure 9  Comparison of scripts  163
Figure 10  The interrelationships of the subject  244
Figure 11  Sub-sets of moral rights  255
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PART I

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

Aims and Methods
"We hold that education has certain long-term goals, that it has a general point or purpose, which can be definitely, though generally, stated. The goals are twofold, different from each other, but by no means incompatible. They are, first, to enlarge a child's knowledge, experience, and imaginative understanding, and thus his awareness of moral values and capacity for enjoyment; and secondly, to enable him to enter the world after formal education is over as an active participant in society and a responsible contributor to it, capable of achieving as much independence as possible. The educational needs of every child are determined in relation to these goals. We are fully aware that for some children the first of these goals can be approached only by minute, though for them highly significant steps, while the second may never be achieved. But this does not entail that for these children the goals are different. The purpose of education for all children is the same; the goals are the same. But the help that individual children need in progressing towards them will be different. Whereas for some the road they have to travel towards the goals is smooth and easy, for others it is fraught with obstacles. For some the obstacles are so daunting that, even with the greatest possible help, they will not get very far. Nevertheless, for them too, progress will be possible, and their educational needs will be fulfilled, as they gradually overcome one obstacle after another on the way."


"Our concept of special education is thus broader than the traditional one of education by special methods appropriate for particular categories of children. It extends beyond the idea of education provided in special schools, special classes or units for children with particular types of disability, and embraces the notion of any form of additional help, wherever it is provided and whenever it is provided, from birth to maturity, to overcome educational difficulty. It also embodies the idea that, although the difficulties which some children
may dictate WHAT they have to be taught and the disabilities of some HOW they have to be taught, the point of their education is the same."

(ibid., s. 1.10, p. 6)
The aim of this thesis is to give a philosophical analysis of the 1978 Warnock Report on Special Education (1), thereby integrating it with current educational and social thought. Additionally, the attempt is made to put these current ideas on the nature of proper educational differences into a historical framework. This review of the past demonstrates how opinion of the proper educational treatment for handicapped children has developed to the present position. It also shows how the concept of handicap, rather than poverty, stupidity, or moral fault, has developed.

The whole thesis is placed within an Aristotelian framework of equity (2), a concept which indicates the way differences between people can be relevant in certain situations. Handicapped people can be regarded as a special group, comparable to women, or racial minorities. Kant is acknowledged as the second major philosophical influence, since an integral concern developed in the thesis is the importance of all individuals being treated as ends rather than means (3).

The salient points of the Warnock Report on which this thesis focusses are :-

a) there should not be a formal distinction made between handicapped and non-handicapped children;

b) formal distinctions between different groups of children previously called handicapped are not only useless, but educationally and socially damaging;

c) a completely new and much wider view of handicap can be expressed in terms of special educational needs;

d) therefore, a certain view of education, which is very different from many conventional views, is appropriate.

The conflict that arises from differing interpretations of these four points, and from inner inconsistencies of the Report itself, is assessed.

In Part One of the thesis, Chapter 2, The Background, follows the present chapter and analyses the historical and contemporary scene. Since the 1960s, there has been a movement on both sides of the Atlantic towards 'equal opportunities' for social minorities. These minorities vary from country to country, but include, inter alia, blacks, women, the unemployed, the poor, and the elderly. 'Affirmative Action' and 'Positive Discrimination' are terms
representing this ethos, which holds that extra help in terms of money or employment opportunities should be made specially available to certain groups. International Year of Disabled People, in 1981, which was also the year of the Education Act which encapsulated the Warnock Report (4), was an example of this development. The whole tenor of both official and unofficial statements during the year was that handicapped or disabled people should be regarded as part of the community, as fellow citizens of equal value to everyone else.

This theme is linked with the similar educational argument that all children, whatever their intellectual or physical capacities, should be accepted as fellow pupils in their local school, rather than being segregated in special schools.

In the historical section of Chapter 2, proof is offered that the Report is not the new and revolutionary document that it was often hailed to be. On the contrary, it was an obvious stage in the long term trend. It is best seen as a culmination and distillation of ideas. The history is approached from two directions. Initially, the Report's own assessment of historical trends is discussed. Warnock's contention is that whilst, from very early in the development of the state education system, theory and governmental policy on special education have advocated integration, with most handicapped children being educated in the mainstream, the actual practice has been one of segregation (5). Secondly, the Warnock Report is shown to have close links with the Plowden Report (6), from which it can be seen to have developed.

The second Part of the thesis, entitled 'The Handicapped Person in Society' examines closely the wording of sections of the Report. Two quotations, of paramount importance for any criticism of the Report, are assessed in terms of contemporary sociology and anthropology. The relativistic view that handicap is socially conditioned, and is thus a matter of subjective, even irrational, decision by any particular society is often stated. The main purpose of this section is to refute this idea, and to replace it with the firm conviction that whereas some minor handicaps may be socially made, and hence in principle avoidable, serious conditions are objectively real for all.

Both Chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with the likelihood of stigma
affecting the handicapped person. Chapter 3 examines this topic through 'The Description of a Person'. This assesses the method used by Warnock to lessen stigma, which is to widen the concept of Special Educational Need to such an extent that it includes almost anyone. The intention seems to be that the smaller group of severely handicapped children will not be distinguishable within the larger group. In this thesis it is suggested that the smaller group may continue to present such serious difficulties to their educators that a new concept could be needed, namely 'children with special, special needs'. This, in turn, could produce its own stigma.

Chapter 3 therefore opens the debate on differentiation by examining differences within the group of children described as having special educational needs. Stigma is approached through categorization. It is shown that it is important to be recognised as the sort of person one really is, and not to be mistaken for something else or someone else. Thus while some allowance should be made for blindness, a blind person need not also be treated as if deaf or mentally handicapped. A deaf person would not wish to be appointed as an orchestral conductor or a piano tuner, but would object if refused employment where deafness is irrelevant. Warnock's insistence on recording, rather than categorization, which ignores this, is unlikely to lessen stigma. Indeed the new groupings of need that Warnock suggests to replace statutory categorization are shown to be very little different from the pre-1978 arrangements. However, the wider concept of special needs should improve the provision for those children with multiple handicaps who do not fit into the categories established in 1944.

Chapter 4 examines 'The Value of a Person' as a further discussion of stigma. The concept of normality held by relativistic sociologists is assessed. It is concluded that there is a norm for society in late twentieth-century Britain, against which an individual's educational progress and abilities can be measured. Whilst all may be of equal value in moral terms, not all are the same. The paradox of the Warnock Report is demonstrated: to avoid stigma it is necessary to prove that all pupils are the same, yet their differences must be emphasised to assure fulfillment of their special educational needs.

'The Concept of a Person', Chapter 5, puts questions of entitlement to both special education and extra financial support into a Kantian
context by reference to personal worth and need. A review of the
philosopher's concept of a person leads to the conclusion that it is
the concepts of an adult and of a human being that are used in most
current arguments. The consequences of this in terms of rights are
explored.

Part Three relates the previous analysis of the acceptance of
handicapped people in society to the narrower concern of the proper
place and provision for handicapped pupils in the education system,
from nursery school to university and beyond. These Parts are
obviously related in that the education system can hardly be
considered in isolation from society. Though not the social system,
education is a social system, as child relates to child, teacher to
teacher and child, and all with parents, friends and neighbours. The
Part opens with the statement by Gribble that special education may
not be education, and ends with the idea that it may not be special.

Chapter 6 opens Part Three by reviewing the contested concept of
education as it has been raised in recent years in the philosophy of
education. This discussion is inevitably coloured by the dominance of
the 'Peters school'. The difficulty in discussing the teaching or
schooling of the handicapped, and particularly of the mentally
handicapped, is that Peters' definition seems to eliminate the
possibility of calling such intervention education (7). This
demonstrates the impossibility of fixing a meaning for such an emotive
concept. A distinction between education and schooling is used to
show the differing roles of teachers and parents. The number of
external influences on all children, especially television, is
emphasised. Thus the chapter investigates the need for, and
approaches to, the reconciliation of the philosophy of the Peters
school and the reality of the educational system. This is achieved
through the adoption of the concept of an educational activity. This
is an activity which is not necessarily academic, but which expands
either an individual's ability, or his understanding, or indeed, both.
A further distinction, between educational and non-educational is
made. By approaching the problem in this way, rather than by asking
the philosopher's traditional question 'What is education ?', it can
be shown that the activities dismissed by Gribble do have an
educational value.
Chapters 7 and 8 consider the special contents found in, and the special methods used in, special education, since it is the nature of these contents and methods and their difference from those of the mainstream which may permit this area to be denied the title of education. Using the concept of educational activity established in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 develops the theme of the previous chapter, explaining the special content of the education needed by certain groups of severely handicapped pupils, those with 'special, special needs'. These contents are related to those of mainstream education in that they are extensions of them. The need for a severely disabled child is the specific and planned teaching of skills, such as speech or language, which other children will pick up incidentally. A profoundly deaf child, for example, needs, initially, to be taught every word. His hearing peer will have an automatically widening vocabulary.

Chapter 8 continues from the previous two chapters by discussing the special methods used for these special contents. Because of some of the methods used, the special education of the severely mentally handicapped, for example, often looks very different from mainstream teaching. However, there are links and similarities in both practice and purpose which are sufficient for the special methods to be termed education. On a wider theoretical front, methods such as the behaviour modification techniques which have developed from the theory of B F Skinner and the experience of many teachers, are assessed. The initial premise that these cannot be called education is replaced by the conclusion that they can be, if the methods are properly conducted. Once more, a Kantian distinction is drawn between using people as ends rather than means.

In Chapter 9 it is argued that Warnock's central tenet on education, the concept of special needs, although introduced to lessen formal distinctions between children, can actually be used to support even greater distinctions. The Warnock Committee were specifically instructed to ignore the topic of academically gifted children, except in cases where such pupils were also maladjusted (8). It is argued here that the education of this group should also be placed in the context of special needs. For, once the idea of special needs is introduced, special groups other than the conventionally handicapped can logically be included. Special educational needs is thus explored.
to clarify the distinction between educational and non-educational needs. Musical talent, and the ability to perform successfully in sport or ballet are used as examples, since they are subjects of current interest. The belief that women and girls have special needs for separate provision in schooling, is placed in the same context. Allied to this is an analysis of the concept of needs per se. It is shown to be a word with such highly emotive associations that the practical meaning may be absent in some cases.

In Chapter 10, the history of selection is reviewed to show how, in recent years, this has become the history of integration. This topic, which is ostensibly about the education of different groups of non-handicapped children is here considered in terms of the education of children with special educational needs in the light of Warnock's statement that it is only since 1965, and the subsequent 1976 Education Act, that true attempts at integration have been made (9). The comprehensive school, with the allied concept of a core curriculum for all children is discussed. It is demonstrated that the integration of children with 'special, special needs' will probably alter the nature of any particular school, and have implications for the whole education system.

The implications for mainstream philosophy are elaborated in Chapter 11, which begins with a demonstration of the interrelationships of the philosophy of special education with philosophy itself, and with other, allied, subjects. Distinguishing between exploratory and culminative sections in the thesis, the chapter traces the various philosophical themes encountered in discussion of special education and in particular in this thesis. It is shown that a study of the educational, social, and moral position of handicapped people can provide useful examples for traditional philosophical arguments. Three broad groups of disabilities are delineated. These are intellectual handicaps, physical and sensory handicaps, and socio-economic handicaps. Each of these broad groups is shown to illuminate a different issue in contemporary philosophy. Thus intellectual handicap is linked to 'human rights' and 'animal rights', physical and sensory handicap to 'equality' and 'compensation', and socio-economic handicap to 'relativism' and 'deficit theories'. Consideration of deficit theory, particularly as exemplified by those learning English as a second language, demonstrates the tension
between integration and cultural integrity, a tension which is at the heart of post-Warnock arguments about special education.

Indeed, it is possible that special education no longer exists, and this proposition is examined in Chapter 12. Since all children are different, all education must be individual and 'special' once the concept of 'needs' is granted. That could mean that either all education is special, or none is. Because of the educationally relevant differences between children, educational segregation may assure higher and more appropriate educational success, without necessarily leading to social segregation and stigma. A separate provision could even enhance academic progress and thus improve an individual's potential for integration as an adult. It may look as if some kind of 'Good Life' is achieved when there are no segregated schools. The utopia is less desirable if there are then children in the mainstream for whom there is no adequate provision, or who impede the progress of others. Warnock frequently acknowledges this. It is the interpretations of the Report which ignore it.

Thus it is shown how changes have taken place between the Warnock Report and its current implementation through the various consultative and legislative documents. Two specific changes are outlined as examples.

The use of the various emotive concepts essential to educational discourse are shown to leave the Warnock Report open to a number of conflicting interpretations. In discussion of these, this thesis emphasises the need to adopt the concept of equity, as fairness, rather than that of numerical equality, showing that all cannot be the same.
References to Chapter 1.


4 Education Act, 1981.

5 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., ss.2.79, 2.80, pp.32-3.


9 ibid, s.2.82, p.34.
Chapter 2

Background
Chapter arrangement

2.1 Contemporary Backcloth

2.2 Historical Background

2.2.1 Historical Overview

2.2.2 History of Special Education since 1870

2.2.3 History of Special Groups in Mainstream Education

2.3 Philosophical Background
2.1 Contemporary Backcloth.

The International Year of Disabled People, 1981, was also the year of the Education Act implementing the Warnock proposals. Both Act and Year can be seen as social phenomena in a tradition of concern with equal opportunities for all, and the desire to normalize life for previously stigmatized minorities. Since the 1960's, there has been a steady growth in the use of terms such as 'mainstreaming' (in the U.S.A.), 'integration', 'positive discrimination', and 'affirmative action'. A positive effect has been the extended provision of work and educational opportunities, and for a few people, for example through 'group homes' for former mental hospital patients, better living conditions.

Related to the general trend are attempts to provide community rather than institutional care for people who are mentally ill, elderly, or chronically sick and disabled. There have also been demands for foster parents, rather than 'homes' for children separated from their natural parents. Sometimes this has succeeded, in that care has been provided in the community and by the community. In other instances, community care has meant no care at all.

Paralleling the change in social concern, the ethos of the state education system has evolved from the position of the 1944 Act, when differences in 'age, ability and aptitude' were considered relevant for varied types of school placement to the present position where the comprehensive school is expected to cater for every child in its catchment area; the few special schools being reserved for pupils with extreme educational or social difficulties.

The case for this extreme comprehensive system, and that for the educational integration of handicapped children, has been presented on social and political grounds. Indeed, it may be that some groups of children may perform less well intellectually in a co-educational comprehensive school than in an academically selective or single sex school. Similarly, it is possible that severely handicapped children will receive an education in the units of ordinary schools, which is the placement generally offered on the closure of a special school,
that is insufficiently adapted to their very specific needs. Social ideals of uniformity put forward in the guise of equal opportunity are now being discussed with reference to the education of the 16-19 age group. Here there is a wide variety of provision, from unemployment to a life long career, from the Youth Training Scheme to university. The arguments formerly marshalled by the proponents and opponents of the 11-plus have faced the educationalists and politicians considering the 16-plus examinations. Not only have the merits and demerits of preserving the distinction between Ordinary or Advanced level and the Certificate of Secondary Education received attention, but also the value of introducing a school leaver's certificate of competence has been questioned. Such a certificate may be regarded as either a qualification for all, or no true qualification at all, since every pupil will have it.

As school based education has changed, so has adult education. There has been the liberalising effect of the adult literacy campaign. The expansion of the Open University, and the increasing willingness of conventional higher education to accept mature students without formal academic qualifications, has begun to further popular acceptance of education continuing beyond adolescence, possibly as a life-long process. However, for the handicapped, and in particular the mentally handicapped, the opportunities are slower to develop. Many such young people are just reaching their optimum educational potential at the point when they leave school. Some manage to go to 'bridging' courses, but others move to training centres, where education ceases and is replaced by a menial job.

The rationale behind demands for equal opportunities is that every person should be considered part of the local and national community. All minorities are accepted as of equal social value. There is some confusion over whether such acceptance implies the disappearance of the minority, or that the difference is accepted, valued, and not stigmatized. Certainly, one may wish to preserve cultural differences. The play 'Children of a lesser god' (1) shows that a handicap can become a matter of pride in one's independence and individuality. It may be hoped that handicapped people can be accepted as adults and friends with an active contribution to make to society, rather than as dependent patients or pupils. Handicapped children may similarly be regarded as equal members of the school
The Warnock Report must be viewed in its context, following on the past, reflecting the present, and hoping to influence the future. It is not a revolutionary document suggesting great change, and indeed it has been criticised for changing only the terminology and leaving the situation untouched (2). What is new, and problematical, in the Report, is the attempt to widen the concept of a handicapped child to the concept of the child with special educational needs. Consequently, the arguments on integration must be altered. Almost any child may have special needs, which removes any meaning from the term, and confuses the issue.

The Warnock Report aims to achieve three ends:

1) to lessen the stigma for children with severe difficulties;
2) to advise on the educational and employment opportunities for such children;
3) to improve the education of other children for whom the school has, as yet, not been a success.

The Report admits that the need for different placement for those children with what are, in this thesis, called 'special, special needs' will continue. Yet the Report is not clear as to which type of special need is being discussed at any one point.
2.2 Historical Background

Much popular reaction to the Warnock Report has assumed that its recommendations are revolutionary. Few are, beyond the suggestion that the remedial service be discontinued. Most of the recommendations represent what has come to be seen as good practice in education; the Report merely advocates their wider adoption.

The Report does, however, represent the culmination of various strands of historical development. The first and most obvious is the history of the education of handicapped children within the state system. The Report was intended by its authors to be a high point in this development, and a whole chapter is devoted to tracing the historical growth of the special educational system. The second and third strands, although alluded to in the Report, must be understood as an important ground of a changing ethos, not only in education, but also in society and political thought.

The second strand is the appearance of the idea of special groups within the mainstream education system which need special help. This links Warnock with the Plowden Report on primary schools. Plowden looked at whole schools and residential areas, whereas Warnock concentrates on individuals, yet they share a belief in educational handicap as a wider concept than purely conventional physical, sensory or intellectual disabilities.

The third strand, concerning the proper nature of secondary schooling, illustrated by the growth in selection for different forms of education, is elaborated in this thesis in the discussion on the comprehensive school in Chapter 10. It can be said here that this history can be traced from the 1901 Education Act, which brought secondary schooling within the sphere of state interest, through the selection of children on the basis of the recommendations of the 1944 Act and the earlier Haddow Report, to the current theory that there should be a truly comprehensive school which provides for all children in a catchment area, be they handicapped or not.

The Warnock Report can be seen in this historical context by recalling
the reports, papers, and Education Acts in the century of state education since 1870. Although this section of the thesis concentrates on developments up to the submission of the Report in 1978, more recent developments must also be reviewed. The Education Act of 1981, which implemented the Report, was not fully operative until April 1983, and the situation is changing continuously.
2.2.1 A History of Special Education since 1870.

"Mental disability was for many children no substantial handicap in coping with the simple demands of every day life in a largely uneducated and relatively uncomplicated world...after 1870 (when) large numbers of children of below average or poor intellectual ability entered public elementary schooling. Many of them made scarcely any progress, and their presence hindered normal teaching." (3)

The history of special education since the Forster Act represents a developing elaboration of provision aimed at giving a suitable education to the children described above, and additionally to those others whom improving health care has kept alive despite serious disability. Time has uncovered a great variety of conditions initially subsumed in 'below average intelligence or poor intellectual ability', and also different educational methods for their compensation. The current concern of the special educators, and of their pupils' parents, is the adequate maintenance of educational standards, while absorbing the social advantages of integration. That there may be social advantages to integration needs to be balanced against the possible educational disadvantages. Ironically, the call for integration is occurring concurrently with the desire of some parents to acquire special provision for further groups of children who were not previously recognised as special, for example 'gifted' or 'dyslexic', and the desire of some schools to shed some especially disruptive pupils into 'sin bins'.

The situation is complicated by the fact that while larger numbers of handicapped children are able to live at home because of improved support systems, more children with complex handicaps have appeared to fill their places. In the past, these children would either not have survived the first few months of life, or would have been considered ineducable. Furthermore, the current drop in school aged children has naturally affected the Special Schools, and many have closed, transferring their pupils to units within ordinary schools. Whether this has been encouraged on educational grounds as a result of the Warnock Report, or whether the reasons are purely economic, is not
Warnock comments on the historical situation that despite the early placement of some handicapped children, particularly the blind and deaf, in ordinary schools, special education has developed as a separate system, linked only in theory to the mainstream (4). Warnock believes that even at a very early stage in this history, official statements indicated an intention that as many children as possible should be integrated, and explains why this did not happen (5).

Particular criticism is levelled at the wording of the 1944 Act (6), although some allowance is made for the economic conditions prevailing at the end of the Second World War. The real beginning of integration is held to occur with the establishment of comprehensive schools (8), was consolidated by the 1976 Act, and finally made compulsory by the 1981 Act. Warnock does not acknowledge the contribution of many individuals and their writings to the theoretical basis of this development.

Viewed simplistically, the early history of special education might be represented as in Figure 1. (It must be noted that the term special education is used anachronistically here, as it was not employed officially until 1944).

![Figure 1. Special Education prior to 1889.](image)

Even before the 1870 Act, there had been many individual efforts to help both deaf and blind children, but it was not until 1889 that the
first official pronouncements were made, in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Blind, Deaf and Others (mainly the mentally handicapped) (8). Since that time, special education has developed many forms of programmes for many different pupils. Early developments followed the Reports of the Royal Commissions on Delicate and Defective Children (1896) (9) and into the Care and Control of the Feeble Minded (1908) (10), producing the pattern illustrated in Figure 2.

![Figure 2. Special Education 1889 to 1944.](image)

From the Act of 1921 which established them in law, these categories remained the only official handicaps until the 1944 Act. However, other forms of handicap were being recognised, and in 1944, it was found necessary to increase the number of recognised handicaps to eleven, although this total was reduced by one nine years later. One of Warnock's chief aims was to reclassify these handicapping conditions in much broader terms, thus replacing categorisation, particularly because of the difficulties in interpreting the existing statutory wording for the many children with a combination of handicaps or for those newly isolated conditions which did not fit into the existing system.

The powers given to Local Authorities in 1902 to provide for handicapped children were made duties by the 1914 Act. Four years later the definition of the categories was extended, while the separation of ineducable and ineducable children had been defined in
1913 by the Mental Deficiency Act. By this Act,

"Only those who were judged by the authorities to be incapable of being taught in special schools were to pass into the care of the local mental deficiency committee." (11)

As this led eventually to a large population of children in mental deficiency hospitals, from whence many never emerged, Warnock may be a little unjustified in stating

"...the statutory foundation of special education provision which had been laid in the last decade of the nineteenth century, though consolidated in the Education Act of 1921, continued in broadly the same form until 1944." (12)

The 1929 Report of the Mental Deficiency Committee is quoted by Warnock as an example of an early advocation of integration.

"We do not however contemplate that these (special) schools would exist with a different legal sanction, under a different system of nomenclature and under different administrative provisions. If the majority of children for whom these schools...are intended are, ex hypothesi, to lead the lives of ordinary citizens, with no shadow of a 'certificate' and all that that implies to handicap their careers, the schools must be brought into closer relation with the Public Elementary School System and presented to parents not as something both distinct and humiliating, but as a helpful variation of the ordinary school." (13)

This was in contradiction to the 1921 Act, which in Part V

"...provided for handicapped children to be educated in special schools and special classes..." (13)

that is, as a separate category of provision.

Although maladjustment was early recognised as an educational problem, the child guidance clinics established after 1927 to help schools with pupils' behavioural problems were considered part of the medical
service. The term was not used as a category for which schooling needed to be provided until the 1944 Act.

Of the Reports presaging the 1944 Act, Warnock considers that the Green Paper 'Education after the War' which suggested that most mentally defective and delicate children should be in ordinary schools (15), and the White Paper 'Educational Reconstruction' which promised 'substantial modification' of the 1921 Act (16), laid the foundations for reform. Warnock suggests that the 1944 Act itself was important for two contrasting reasons. Firstly, it officially brought the education of the handicapped into the mainstream. Secondly, it extended

"...the range of children's special needs for which the authorities would be obliged to make specific provision either in special schools or in ordinary schools." (17)

The practical result was that most such children were provided for in isolated special schools. Handicapped pupils were described as those 'who suffer from any disability of mind or body', and this was incorporated in the overall plan of the Act that all children should have different education commensurate with their 'age, ability, and aptitude'. 'Ineducable' children were unaffected by the changes. The new category of 'educationally sub-normal' was so named as a reminder, repeated by Warnock, that it is only on specifically academic educational grounds that many can be considered different. For these people, an independent life after school was assumed. Educationally sub-normal, a term coined to avoid the stigma attached to 'mentally deficient', has since attracted its own stigma. The other categories of handicap listed in the 1945 Regulations were blind, partially sighted, deaf, partially deaf, delicate, diabetic, epileptic, maladjusted, physically handicapped, and those with a speech defect. From 1953, diabetics were included with the delicate, while the partially deaf were renamed partially hearing in 1954 to indicate 'a more positive approach to the use of residual hearing' (18). This period of development is illustrated in Figure 3 (p.30).

Warnock's chief criticism of the 1944 Act was that by hardening the categories, it prevented the development of proper education both for those whose type of disability had not been recognised by 1944, for
Table 3. Special Education 1944-1970.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ineducable</th>
<th>Educationally Sub-normal</th>
<th>Blind</th>
<th>Blind</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blind</td>
<td>Partially Sighted</td>
<td>Defective</td>
<td>Deaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially Deaf</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Partially Hearing</td>
<td>Delicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaf</td>
<td>Epileptic</td>
<td>Maladjusted</td>
<td>Physically handicapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Those with a speech defect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainstream</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. Special Education 1944-1970.

example the autistic, and for those whose combination of handicaps made no school wholly appropriate. This was because the special schools were established for the specified categories. A school for the deaf could not cope with a deaf child who was also spastic or educationally sub-normal.

Portley House School for the Deaf, now closed, at Caterham in Surrey, illustrates another of Warnock's criticisms; that the demands of the Act together with demographic and economic conditions forced 'separatism' on the Local Education Authorities (19). Like many other special schools, Portley House was founded after the 1939-1945 war, in fulfillment of the County Council's duties. Since the number of children sufficiently deaf to warrant such placement was small, the school was required to serve an extensive catchment area, resulting in a need for many children to board. Furthermore, the only readily available low cost accommodation at the time of the school's establishment was a large house in its own grounds on the edge of a town, a position which necessarily produced isolation from the mainstream until 'ordinary' primary schools were relocated on adjacent sites in the 1970s and a measure of integration occurred.
Warnock's third criticism of the 1944 Act was that it divided handicapped pupils into those less seriously handicapped, to receive their education in ordinary schools, and those with 'serious disabilities', to be educated in special schools (20). Despite this, the Warnock Report preserves this distinction under a different terminology, although it recommends that the distinction be made on educational grounds rather than of the severity of the handicap per se (21). The distinction is now between the children with special needs, who can continue in the ordinary school, and those who need to be recorded. The overall indictment made against the 1944 Act by Warnock is that it emphasised provision and treatment rather than needs.

In 'The first ten years' (22), Warnock elaborates the changes made in the immediate post-war years. These required a rapid expansion in the numbers of teachers and of places in special education, as first the losses of the war were made good, and then the increase in the birth rate was catered for. However,

"...if special provision for most categories of handicaps appeared to be nearing sufficiency in amount (as distinct from quality), the needs of EDUCATIONALLY SUB-NORMAL pupils remained obstinately unsatisfied in spite of continuous expansion since 1945" (23).

The Report is here stressing the number of children in ordinary schools awaiting special placement and not receiving a satisfactory education.

The final part of the Report's historical section reviews events to 'the present day' (i.e. 1977), charting among other matters, the gradual ending of the separation from education of the severely mentally handicapped. This was achieved by the Mental Health Act (1959), and the Education (Handicapped Children) Act (1970) (24). The former gave parents more rights, enforcing co-operation between health and education authorities. The latter, implemented in 1971, brought the teaching of children formerly called ineducable into the special education system. To mark this change, these 'mentally deficient' and 'ineducable' children were renamed 'severely educationally sub-normal', and their training centres became special schools (Figure 4) (p.32).
Since that time, the pattern seen by Warnock is the closing of the gap between special and ordinary education, to the point where they merge, in fact and theory, both streams needing to change direction as they converge (Figure 5).

The aim expressed by Warnock was already expressed in the 1976 Act. This was that

"...special education of all handicapped pupils (should) be
given in county and voluntary schools, except where this is improbable, incompatible with the efficient instruction in the schools, or involved unreasonable public expenditure." (25)

The Warnock Report attempts to come to terms with these exceptions in Chapter 7, and draws the conclusion that there will always be some children for whom special school placement will be necessary, despite the loss in terms of social isolation. Such isolation, it may be noted, is increased as the number of children so treated is reduced, and thus fewer, more centralised schools are required. The Report uses its concept of special educational need to emphasise the individual, and hence allows schooling to be fitted to the individual rather than the reverse.

"Our view of special education is much broader and more positive... It encompasses the whole range and variety of additional help, wherever it is provided and whether on a full or part-time basis." (26)

Following the generally favourable reception of the Warnock Report, most of its recommendations were incorporated in the 1981 Education Act. In the wake of this Act, which was fully operational from 1983, other bodies have tended to review their policies concerning the handicapped (27).

At the same time, the Report and the Act have been criticised. In particular, the time lapse between enactment and operation of the Act, and the varied response of Local Education Authorities because of open-ended and ambiguous statements in this period, have provoked dissatisfaction. Furthermore, research studies published by the Advisory Centre for Education and the Centre for Studies on Integration in Education, among others, have begun to question the nature and value of the resulting integration (28).

Warnock refused to be drawn on integration. Accepting that it was the stated purpose of the 1976 Act, the Report merely explores ways of achieving this. Many parents have interpreted the Report and subsequent legislation as a chance for their handicapped child to attend an ordinary school, even though the amount of functional unity may vary widely from case to case. The concern of some educators, on
the other hand, has been that local authorities may regard the closure of special schools as a valuable financial economy, without realising the true costs, in financial terms, of even a limited integration.
2.2.2 History of Special Groups in Mainstream Education.

The Warnock Report is linked with the Plowden Report on Primary Education, and with the Newsom Report on Secondary Education. All three emphasise the existence of special groups within the 'normal' school population, and press for additional resources for these groups. Here again there is a history of ideas to be followed; it is possible to demonstrate the trends in earlier Acts and Reports, particularly those concerned with Primary Schools, where an understanding of such problems emerges. Paradoxically, although the trend has been to isolate special groups needing different types of attention, this has led to integration, just as the history of selection has become the history of integration.

Primary education developed from the Elementary education that began in 1870. The early history of the elementary system is confused by religious dissentions, and state intervention occurred in 1870 to harmonise the different denominational provisions. The purpose of the education was limited; it was stated that schooling was provided so that a better educated populace would make a more efficient workforce, and also be able to make wiser decisions when the political franchise was extended. Financial limitations, leading to the system of payment by results, limited the teaching to drill, basic literacy, and numeracy. The 1904 Elementary Code (29) was an attempt to 'liberalise the Elementary School'. However, it was still providing a set pattern of education. Pupils had to fit into the scheme, and not have a scheme fitted to their individual needs.

Fisher's statement in Parliament in 1917 when introducing the Education Bill, shows the first understanding that there were children whose schooling was marred by their health.

"...the value of our educational system is impaired by the low physical conditions of a large number of our children, and how imperative is the necessity of raising the general standard of physical health among the children of the poor, if a great part of the money spent on our education system is not to be wasted." (30)
This led to the consolidation of links between education and health through the school medical service founded in 1907. The problem indicated by Fisher was regarded purely as one of health, which could be eradicated by adequate funding, rather than an educational one.

The Committee which reported on the primary school, in 1931, produced a document which can be compared with the Hadow Report, which itself influenced the course of secondary education up to, and even beyond, the 1944 Act. This Committee

"...did much to shape development of primary education in the years immediately before and after the Second World War." (31)

In addition to claiming that

"...the outlook of the primary school has been broadened and humanised..." (32)

in fulfillment of the then fashionable ideas on 'child-centred' education, the Committee's Report also bemoaned the 'squalid environment' in which many pupils lived and worked. The changes advocated were necessarily practical ones of health and hygiene; the recommendation being that elementary schools should be as similar as possible to the 'open air' schools for delicate children.

The 1944 Act widened the duties of the local authorities by requiring them to provide 'education', rather than 'elementary training', and thus prepare the way for the further development of the secondary sector. It also represented an important landmark in the history of the education of conventionally handicapped children, by bringing their education within the authorities' duty to provide for primary and secondary schools. It is in the discussion of 'educationally sub-normal' children that the recognition of the wider special group first occurs. The category of educationally sub-normal children consisted of children of limited ability and children handicapped by other conditions such as irregular attendance, ill health, lack of continuity in their education, or unsatisfactory school conditions.

These were thought to comprise 10% of the school population, with 1-2% needing special schools, and the remaining 8-9% being capable of
attending ordinary schools (33). The 'problems' of such children here start to be regarded as educational, rather than medical. However, the distinction between 'more' and 'less' severely handicapped, as elaborated by the 1944 Act, does not start to approach the educational difficulties of the larger group in ordinary schools suffering from social problems.

This area was first investigated in the Report on Early Leaving (1954) (34), which studied the cases of those who left school early, having failed to live up to their early promise as assessed by their selection for a grammar school education. The special factor about these pupils was that they had come from poor homes. The Newsom Report (1963) elaborates on the educational problems for the secondary schools of children living in the 'slums'. The schools

"...require special consideration if they are to have a fair chance of making the best of their pupils." (35)

The Report is interesting in its stress of the need to approach the educational improvement of such children by means of 'other social agencies' than the school system.

"In the slums the need for reform is not confined to the schools." (36)

The Plowden Report (1967) followed logically as an overview of the similar plight of younger children in the schools that were by then described as serving 'deprived areas' (37). The Warnock Report is an obvious heir to the three earlier documents in that it covers the whole educational system, yet it is closest to Plowden in its practical and theoretical recommendations. Warnock and Newsom both had 'catchy' titles, 'Half our Future' and 'Special Educational Needs': Plowden did not, but it could aptly have been called 'Educational Priorities'.

Whether Warnock will have the long-term practical impact of Plowden, which led to improved financial provision, has yet to be seen. Certainly, the Warnock Report is already influential from nursery provision even up to Further Education, where Colleges are being
required to provide 'Bridging Courses' for quite severely mentally handicapped school leavers.

Much of the connection between Plowden and Warnock is in ethos. Some of the pronouncements of the former, particularly in the section on the education of the handicapped child in the ordinary school, could have been printed and bound into the latter with no loss of coherence. Warnock specifically states that the detailed social factors involved in educational problems would not be discussed (38), presumably because they had been so forcibly set out in Plowden, and were accepted by most teachers and educational administrators. However the Warnock Report does enumerate the occasions when such social factors are relevant. Particularly emphasised in this respect are the educational problems for children with moderate learning difficulties (39), for those whose first language is not English (40), and in the discussion of the proper terms to be used to describe pupils who are 'maladjusted' (41).

In connection with this last topic, Warnock outlines ways in which a school may provoke its own disciplinary problems, leading to pupil maladjustment through inappropriate treatment. Critics have attacked the Report for not developing this topic, and for retaining a model of children failing in schools rather than schools failing pupils. This could be refuted by asserting that the emphasis in Warnock is on the case of individual need, rather than of set provision by the school.

The extent of Warnock's inheritance from Plowden can be seen in such phrases as 'special need calls for special help' (42), and the emphasis on positive discrimination to redress the balance of deprivation. The idea of positive discrimination is developed in Warnock to cover extra help for an even larger number of children than that envisaged by Plowden. It is thus with Warnock's wider concept of children with special educational needs, who for any reason do not give of their best and need extra or special help at some time in their school career, that the link with the 1967 Report comes. Indeed, the 'Plowden' children of the 1960's and 1970's may well be the parents of the 'special needs' pupils in the 1980's and 1990's.

Warnock expresses dissatisfaction with the remedial system that had developed since Newsom and Plowden for inadequately compensating for
lost educational opportunities. Very little is said about the educational content of schooling, in contrast to Plowden, but both Reports stress the role of education in reducing inequalities; both can be regarded as being as much about social engineering as about learning.

Plowden shares three further preoccupations with its own historical past, and with the Warnock Report that is its future. Firstly, it advocates a form of child-centred education that was first promoted in the 1920's as a revolt against the rigid elementary school tradition of training children in certain set and limited paths. Thus

"At the heart of the educational process is the child." (43)

and

"We wish to see a more positive approach and we have adopted the concept of Special Educational Need, seen not in terms of a particular disability which a child may be judged to have, but in relation to everything about him, his ability as well as his disability - indeed all the factors which have a bearing on his educational progress." (44)

Allied to this is the belief implicitly shared by the two Reports on the facts of child development. Indeed Plowden has been criticised for holding a 'growth metaphor' idea of child development, as if a child were a plant for which adequate soil provision is enough to ensure a perfect flowering (45). Warnock's equivalent is special needs being left unfulfilled, preventing the adequate development of a child's intellectual and social persona. Both Reports use the concept of needs throughout, and of particular interest in this context is the comment of the former on the education of gifted children:

"In any group, gifted children are bound to have particular needs." (46)

The consecutive placing of the two chapters on handicapped children and gifted children in Plowden is significant. By contrast, the consideration of gifted children was specifically excluded from the Warnock committee's remit.
Secondly, Warnock follows Plowden in stressing that handicap is a term that can cover wider numbers of children than had formerly been assessed as suitable for the special school. Plowden's statement that social deprivation can amount to a handicap is more clearly shown by Warnock to extend the forms of educational need beyond conventional ideas of physical, sensory or intellectual disability. Warnock widens the role of special needs for two reasons. The first of these is the educational desire to improve the learning of all children whether or not handicapped, and the second is the social desire to end the stigma of differentiation between children, all of whom should eventually attend the same school even if they are in different streams or units within it.

Thirdly, Warnock follows Plowden in the emphasis placed on nursery education, with the importance of starting any compensatory programme very early in life.

"Education in the first five years of life is of critical importance." (47)

and

"Nursery education...is of immense value." (48)

may be compared with

"There should be a large expansion of nursery education." (49)

Plowden's most obvious and specific link with the Warnock Report is, as has been said, the chapter entitled 'Handicapped children in ordinary schools'.

"If handicapped children, either as individuals or as a group, are looked upon as a nuisance, or with pity, they will not flourish. It follows that a school such as we have described ... is not only right for the normal but right for the handicapped, for their fundamental educational needs are similar though there may be differences in the way they are satisfied. The school must provide for and cherish all its members." (50)
It may be noted in passing that the last sentence is reminiscent of the statements in Circular 10/65 quoted above. The chapter anticipates all the later criticisms of the special education system, and ends

"We recommend a study of the needs of the handicapped child."

(51)

This recommendation was fulfilled by the appointment of the Warnock committee.
2.3 Philosophical Background.

Paralleling the changes in popular thought since the 1960's, there has been a similar liberalisation in academic philosophy in terms of a development from the rigidly intensive linguistic analysis inherited from Wittgenstein and Austin towards forms of 'Applied Philosophy'. Wittgenstein's approach has lost its dominating position in English philosophy, but analysis has found a place as a method of wide application. The question may occur whether academic philosophy has any proper comment to make on a specific professional area like special education.

Few 'special' teachers have the time to spare for formal ethical and analytical deliberation, whereas few philosophers have the practical knowledge. Yet there are close links of interest, through ethics, social philosophy, and philosophy of mind, in addition to the more obvious link through educational philosophy. Practical problems from the classroom give examples for philosophy; similarly, thinking philosophically can clarify ideas, both theoretical and practical. Moreover, many famous special educators, for example Van Uden, the Dutch teacher of the deaf, with his analysis of contemporary linguistics, have very strong philosophical presuppositions especially in terms of ethics and psychology.

Social philosophy should be seen as a blend of ethics and politics, as well as a comment on contemporary sociology. As such it holds a key position in this thesis, since the education of severely handicapped children raises questions on the relationships between groups of people. Thus, in this thesis, concepts from Aristotle, Kant, classical utilitarianism, and the new rationally-based ethics derivable from the work of John Rawls, are all applied to contemporary situations.

From Aristotle comes a preoccupation with justice as 'equity' and the need to treat people differently in order to achieve something like a fair outcome. Kant suggests the moral stance discussed in the chapter devoted to the 'Concept of a Person', where it is held that individuals be taken as ends in themselves rather than as means to
another's gratification. The implication for this in special education is outlined in the section on Skinner and conditioning. Behaviour modification is a wide-spread and successful method for teaching children with severe mental handicaps and those with extreme behaviour problems, yet it appears to ignore the possible autonomy of the subject.

Classical utilitarian arguments are broached in the section on entitlement to special treatment, which can be held to be either an advantage, or a disadvantage. It can be argued that more money spent on special education in an individual's childhood and youth can lead to more personal independence in adulthood, with a lesser financial dependence on the state. Such an approach can be contrasted with the ideas of Aspin on what will here be called 'altruism' (52) and Mary Warnock on compassion (53). This may be compared with the more recent work of John Rawls with his concept of a fair society based on rational decision and the principle of 'Maximin', whereby the only advantages allowed to the better-off are those which tend to improve the position of the least well-off (54). This latter philosophy is one of the few where the interdependence of social classes is acknowledged.

In 'philosophy of mind', attention is drawn to the concepts of thought, intelligence, mind, and persons. Faced by strong, healthy and able members of the community, there is no reason to contemplate the concept of a person. Yet when faced by some very severely disabled members of the subnormality hospital's population, or the tiny handicapped babies who are possible subjects for euthanasia, it becomes necessary to explore such concepts.

More specifically, old philosophical debates are re-opened in a new manner. Thus the differences between rationalism and empiricism, resumed by the work of Chomsky on the one hand and by Skinner as an extreme proponent of the other, are examined in Van Uden's work. Writing on the education of deaf children, Van Uden approaches linguistics through the difficulties of 'natural' language acquisition (54). He shows that too close an adherence to either type of philosophical method can lead to a faulty educational model. Hence he attempts to devise a via media. Many other psychologists have taken a similar approach to language acquisition of both deaf and 'language
disordered' children, in order to clarify the understanding of the
modes of language acquisition in children without such difficulties.

'Philosophy of Education' has only recently become concerned with
special education as such, with, for example, the article by Aspin in
'Educational Review' referred to above. Since the 1981 Act, with the
attendant publicity given to the Warnock Report, however, there has
been other relevant literature, particularly that written for the
National Foundation for Educational Research by Hegarty and
Pocklington (56). Much of this has concentrated on the advocacy of
total integration, which appears publicly as the most important
aspect of the Warnock Report. As is shown below, even a superficial
reading of the Report demonstrates that this interpretation is
incorrect.

The exploration of concepts in special education provides material for
philosophy in a wider sense. It is impossible to define special
education in isolation from education itself, any more than it is
possible to assess special needs when divorced from needs in general.
An analysis is thus begun which leads to many other educational
concepts. Special education, nursery education, adult education, and
continuing education all fall into place as part of a continuum
dealing with the acculturisation of the individual.

The particular method of implementing the Warnock Report that has been
followed by most Local Education Authorities, that of closing special
schools and advocating integration, has a probable future effect on
the development of the comprehensive school. Decisions have to be
made on the extent to which a school can afford to be comprehensive,
and on the distinctions which may have to be made between people of
very different intellectual ability and need.

Not all severely handicapped people are so from birth. The neonate
with no functional brain is an extreme case of disability. The adult
accident victim, a 'cabbage' attached to a life support machine, and
the severely psychotic or schizophrenic adolescent who becomes
mentally ill after a 'normal' childhood both present society with
ethical and medical decisions. These are exacerbated by advances in
medical science and by changes in the law. A foetus with a suspected
'fault' can be aborted without legal penalty, but the position on
euthanasia after birth is more complicated. Whereas people formerly
died of serious accidents, they can now be kept alive bodily despite
being formally 'brain-dead'. This new term reminds philosophers that
there is no clearly defined concept for many terms such as life,
death, rights, or persons. There are moral questions for practical
behaviour, and terminological ones for theory. These topics are
discussed below as part of an assessment of the possible value of
persons as individuals in a Kantian sense.

Even in traditional terms, there are ethical considerations, as well
as new topics, to pursue. Linguistic analysis undertakes the role of
criticising the often misleading and naive language used by
sociologists and psychologists, educationalists and politicians. This
thesis is written within the context of developments in both
philosophy and education. There is no attempt to develop a
philosophy of special education. Philosophy for special education is proferred.
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Chapter 3

The Description of a Person
Chapter arrangement

3.1 'Stigma' introduced

3.2 Stigma, integration, and segregation

3.2.1 What is stigma?

3.2.2 Does he take sugar? Stigma and incorrect descriptions

3.3 Stigma - The Warnock Report's new terms for handicaps assessed
3.1 'Stigma' introduced

One of the main aims of the Warnock Report is to eradicate the 'stigma' attached to being described as a handicapped child. The Report thus develops the existing concept of 'children with special educational needs', and attempts to rename various disabilities to be more appropriate to the new general nomenclature. 'Categorization' of children and aspects of differentiation between between people are thus discussed in terms of the elimination of social differences, rather than in terms of assuring the appropriate educational provision.

In this chapter it is held that the term handicapped, although having some disadvantages in use, should be retained. This is not least because there are children who are not handicapped, but who have what the Warnock Report terms 'special educational need'. There are also children who are handicapped, but whose educational needs are not special in any sense, although they may have non-educational needs which are special.

It is emphasised that categories and labels, though not necessarily of a statutory nature, have both practical and theoretical roles to play beyond those envisaged by Warnock. Indeed, whilst there may not be 'two types of children', there may be very many different groups of children. Medical science is constantly refining diagnoses, and clarifying the description of differences between syndromes. Such differences are often educationally relevant. The proper description of a person may be vital to teachers and parents. It is also necessary for an individual to know himself.

Thus the present chapter closes by assessing Warnock's attempt to banish stigma by renaming some disabilities in a way that could look euphemistic, and by so enlarging the group of people considered to have 'special educational need' that the severely handicapped person who could have been the subject of stigma disappears into the crowd. This leads to the approach assessed in the next chapter. This is a sociological perspective, expressed in the work of Booth (1), which considers an even wider group, namely everyone. In such a view, simply to exist is to be normal, and stigma becomes wrong because it
is unnecessary. This view is not expounded by Warnock, but it can be taken as the background to some of the interpretations and criticisms of the Report.

There is a fear expressed by some teachers and parents that governmental acceptance of the Report may be a political manoeuvre, since it is possible to interpret the Report as advocating the total abolition of the special school system, particularly because of the importance of integration for social reasons. Many education authorities can be accused of adopting this interpretation in order to run down and then close their special schools as a budgetary saving. This interpretation is not, however, true to the spirit of the Report, which acknowledges that there will always be children for whom such extra special placement will be necessary, even if this implies boarding schools (2). Most analyses of the Report have concentrated on this topic of integration, ignoring the aspect which is more important in numerical terms, and is likely to effect the education of all pupils: this is the widening of the 'special needs' application.

That the interpretation leading to the abolition of special schools is possible indicates one of the many paradoxes in the Report. Another seemingly inevitable paradox is that whilst statutory categorisation of handicapped pupils is to cease, yet the replacement term 'children with special needs' is to be used to differentiate an even larger group of children. It could be asked whether it is wise to classify even more children as different from their peers if such differentiation is not a good thing. Might it not lead to stigma? Warnock is, of course, trying to marry two quite different aims, namely that of improving educational provision and that of lessening social distinctions. The Report assumes that these form a single task, but the present thesis maintains the essential separation.

One method of achieving better educational provision within the mainstream could have been to improve the remedial schemes that are the heritage of the Plowden Report. More money for equipment; more staff with appropriate training; more periods timetabled for such work and general assessment of progress in the basic subjects of literacy and numeracy; all of these could have had the desired effect. Yet one of the recommendations of the Warnock Report is that remedial schemes be abandoned, or incorporated into the wider special needs plan.
3.2 Stigma, integration and segregation.

To Warnock it appears that the children with greater educational difficulties will disappear into the large group as far as those likely to stigmatize them are concerned, whilst remaining obvious to the teachers and educationalists monitoring their progress. It may be however, that stigma is harder to eradicate. Either a sub-group of people with 'special, special needs' could be discriminated against, or the whole group could be deprecated. Another possibility is that the sub-group with 'special, special needs' may be lost sight of by the teachers. The loss of special school facilities is liable to minimize rather than to enhance social and educational provision, with the result that the gap between the quality of individual attainments widens.

Warnock suggests that decisions about a child's need for special teaching should be an automatic, internal school-based procedure rather than a ritual of formal interviews where certification or labelling leads to the stigma of being declared a handicapped pupil (3). However, when examined, Warnock's scheme of recording for children with 'special, special needs', i.e. those for whom mainstream provision is not practicable, is very little different from the previous arrangements for categorization. Furthermore, it appears that recording will single out exactly the same small number of children as categorization.

"I noticed too that some people gained a different impression than I did from the reading of official pronouncements and reports. Thus plans for integration were said to be 'in line with Warnock'. Yet when I read the Warnock Report myself, I was unable to derive any clear implication for a shift in educational policy to a position where fewer handicapped children would be educated in segregated forms of provision." (4).

In opposition to the Warnock approach of dismissing stigma by refusing to describe handicaps exactly, it could be said that a better popular understanding of more closely detailed descriptions of handicapping
conditions might be more likely to achieve the desired result. In other words, if people understood more about a particular child's ability and disability, they would be more eager to accept him.

This chapter shows that it is incorrect labelling, rather than description or labelling per se, that results in distress for individuals. The handicapped person's desire is to be seen as 'the kind of person I am'. That is, to be recognized as deaf or blind rather than stupid, or as depressed rather than insane. The second desire behind the slogan 'the handicapped are people' is that disabled people above the age of 18 are adults, and should be treated as such, rather than as children. The implications of this are developed in Chapter 5.
3.2.1 What is 'stigma'.

Stigma has been exhaustively discussed in the work of Goffman (5). From a sociological position, he shows how many of the differences between people can lead to an individual feeling unworthy whilst other people stigmatize him. Stigma involves feelings of isolation, guilt, and unworthiness on one side, matched by avoidance, fear, and distaste on the other. To Goffman, all differences and all handicaps lead to stigma. The model of deviation from the norm is given the title of 'deviance'. Goffman uses concepts and results derived from the study of criminals since he considers that handicapped people are treated by their neighbours in the same way that released prisoners would be (6).

Signs of deviance for Goffman are both the obvious physical characteristics, for example the facial structure of a Down's syndrome child, and the labels given to individuals by teachers, doctors, and social workers. The point of stigma, Goffman believes, is that the feelings of fear by the able-bodied and of separateness by the disabled are linked. It resembles the relationship described by Buber as 'I-It' (7). Rather than an understanding and acceptance of the other person with his own career and expectations, there is incomprehension.

Tracing the possible genesis of such sentiments is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, some pointers may be noted. There are proven medical links, which have been known for a long time, between syphilis and some forms of blindness and dementia. Such a reason for some forms of handicap is likely to have coloured opinion on all forms of disability. Insanity has always been frightening, whatever its cause, especially when it involves violence or incoherence. Thus attempts are made to distinguish clearly between various forms of 'mental illness', and to differentiate between these and true dementia. Another historical clue is that in the past many conditions were thought to be contagious or infectious, the two conflated as 'catching'. Primitive hygiene and lack of medical knowledge made many conditions more serious than they are now. Religious prejudice has had a part in the genesis of stigma, with the idea that certain afflictions could be sent as divine punishment. Even today, illnesses which should provoke
sympathy rather than stigma can cause the latter. Thus the extreme fear of cancer evinced by many people seems to stem from the fear of it being transmitted to, or from, others, as much as from the illness itself.

It can be seen that the fear of handicapped people, which is the base of much stigma, comes largely from misunderstanding. Parents still fear that their child might 'catch something' from the child in a wheelchair. It is, furthermore, not generally comprehended that most handicaps arise as a totally unexpected result of an apparently normal pregnancy, and there is assuredly no basis for suggesting they are the 'moral fault' of the parents. Many handicaps are not even genetically transmitted, and hence will not pass to future generations, an important consideration for a prospective spouse or his family. The handicapped person is unlikely to be harmful in any way, and thus stigma is an irrational reaction.

The Warnock Report alerts its readers to the possibility of regarding a handicapped child simply as one of a body of pupils, so conditioned by disability as to be exactly like all others with the same condition. Warnock considers that individuals are adventitiously affected in a number of possible ways, rather than as essentially damaged in a set fashion. However, the device of hiding the 'special, special' population may not reach the core of the problem. Stigma arises in groups too large to possess the advantages of individual friendship and knowledge. Sometimes, the education of the public and the expectation of individuals will require more detailed explanatory labels rather than fewer.
3.2.2 'Does he take sugar?' - Incorrect descriptions.

As has been mentioned, the history of both medicine and special education has been the story of differentiation and diagnosis. Various handicaps, with a variety of needs and potential have gradually been isolated. However confusions arise in popular thought, and these are the basis of stigma.

The major confusions arise between mental handicap and other disabilities, and between insanity and other mental illness. Thus the spastic child with near normal or even superior intelligence may be treated by others as mentally incapable. His speech and uncontrollable movements confuse those unfamiliar with the condition. The pre-lingually deaf person will suffer from a similar opinion expressed by those who cannot understand his speech. An episode of a television programme on lip-reading capitalized on this with the title 'Deaf not daft' (8). The term dyslexia is used to indicate an allegedly specific type of perceptual problem which affects literacy skills only, and to differentiate from the global incapacity of the slow learner, which is due to a lack of intellectual ability. Similarly, attempts are made to show that some maladjusted children are actually highly intelligent or even gifted.

To clarify this, the title of a long-running radio programme can be used as an example. The title 'Does he take sugar?' (9) demonstrates a common misunderstanding of the handicap of visual impairment. A blind person can himself answer the question, as could most physically and mentally handicapped people. A deaf person would not hear the question, but could lip-read or understand sign language. The use of Blissymbols for those too severely handicapped to use sign language (10), and of Makaton for people who are severely speech impaired but have the manual dexterity to make simplified gestures (11), has enlarged the group of people who can be put in the position of answering for themselves the questions they fully understand.

In some ways it has always been an advantage to be labelled, provided the label was neither 'insane' nor 'subnormal'. This particular form of stigma, which is so much harder to eradicate, has necessitated the
almost that the advocates of all other groups of handicapped people have been campaigning not to be called 'daft'. This increases the problem of acceptance for those who are not as intelligent as their neighbours. Historically, part of the problem may rest in memories of the work-house and the asylum. However, careful and selective teaching can start to lessen this form of stigma. For example, some Down's syndrome children have been taught to read and follow the early part of the primary school curriculum. Social and educational progress has also been achieved using methods of behaviour modification. Similarly, until modern methods revealed the intelligence of many spastics, it was not realised that they had any capacity for learning. Thus many of the inhabitants of 'subnormality hospitals' have been wrongly placed. Many other mentally handicapped people are equally able to learn and could take a place in open society if given considerable practical and financial support.

Knowledge of the exact nature of a handicap enables judgement of the parameters of useful treatment. It is, for example, often difficult to judge whether a child be deaf or autistic (12). The presenting symptoms of non-communication and lack of reaction to sound, which bring the child to the attention of the general practitioner, are common to both. Autistic children have been placed in schools designated 'for the deaf', and yet it is useless and indeed harmful to subject the autistic child to the selectively high amplification that aids speech teaching for the profoundly deaf. Other methods used in speech training for the 'hearing impaired' are also of no help here. The discussion of personal needs must rest on a full understanding of the child's condition. Van Uden has even distinguished different types of speech impairment among deaf children, finding such differentiation useful since the children respond to different methods of instruction (13).

Parents also need some easily comprehensible name for their child's disability to come to terms with the situation, to make plans for the future, and to keep sensible estimates of their child's ability. Warnock acknowledges that contact with parents of similar children is usually found helpful (14). A number of Societies, devoted to the cause of welfare promotion for various handicaps, fulfil this function, and also carry out or fund specific research, publicity, and
Teachers also may need to be labelled or recorded as experts in a special field. Although all teachers in training can now be given an introduction to 'special needs', even the most radical forms of integration deriving from the Warnock Report involve the use of some teachers with special qualifications, training and experience, either as visiting advisers, or based within static units to which children go for extra tuition (15).

Thus more specific labels can be a useful guide, and possibly can even lessen stigma if they lead to understanding rather than increase the intolerance born of ignorance. Warnock's two-fold task of assuring adequate educational provision for all and eradicating stigma can thus be considered, as demonstrated here, to be a double issue. More specific labelling, if linked to specific and intensive teaching programmes, may lead to greater academic attainments by individuals. This in turn might lead to greater acceptance in adult life, with less stigma.
Warnock's new names for handicaps assessed.

Warnock's solution can be seen to leave matters very much as they have been since the 1944 Education Act, merely substituting different labels. The most important feature of this maintenance of the status quo is that, despite Warnock's assertions, there will still be 'two types of children', namely those with 'special needs', and those without. Among the 'special needs' group there are to be ten types of handicap. This is the same number as there has been since the diabetic category was combined with the delicate category in 1953. Warnock achieves this same number by combining two pairs of groups, whose members educationalists have been at pains to keep separate since the needs involved are so different. The two newly combined groups are 'children with visual disabilities' and 'children with hearing disabilities'. The first was previously composed of 'blind' and 'partially sighted'; the second of 'deaf' and 'partially hearing'. The second term of each pair was so phrased to emphasize a positive approach towards the use of residual senses, and entailed the use of quite different educational programmes. To make up the number, two new terms are introduced. These are 'children with specific learning difficulties' and 'children with mild learning difficulties'. The former are those previously called dyslexic, who were often not recognised as handicapped by Local Education Authorities. The latter were previously either members of remedial classes, or children from the ordinary classes now held to be 'in need' because of lack of progress. This is likely to be the largest group among the 20% of children said to have special needs at some time in their school career. For many of them the needs will be permanently episodic because of health or domestic problems. For others the need will be temporary.

Of the other terms, 'physically handicapped children' and 'children with epilepsy' are virtually the same as they have been since 1944. Stress is now placed on the phrasing 'children with...' rather than, for example, 'epileptic', presumably to emphasise the fact that these are children first, which is more important for teachers and parents than the nature of the disability. The category of delicate and diabetic children has no parallel in the Warnock scheme, since better
function normally, attending their local school. Presumably some of these children will be subsumed in other terms.

Another term, 'children with speech and language disorders', widens the earlier category of 'children with speech defects' in a logical way. However the use of the term 'disorders' is unexpected, as is the term 'disabilities', given the contemporary fear of pejorative terms leading to stigma. The same can be said of 'children with emotional and behavioural disorders', a term which also should be compared with Warnock's statements on the advisability of retaining the term 'maladjusted' (16). Warnock advocates retention of this relativistic term, to stress that maladjustment is frequently nothing to do with the physical or mental state of the child himself, but caused by factors of the environment, such as unsuitable schooling, or cruel and irregular upbringing (17). The new description, like some of the others in both the new and the old systems, may not be intelligible to the general public or even the parents, and thus have little effect in reducing stigma.

The two new terms for the children previously categorised as 'educationally subnormal' demonstrate the difficulty that arises in any attempt at describing people with intellectual handicaps. The new terms 'children with moderate learning difficulties' and 'children with severe learning difficulties' replace the 'moderate' and 'severe' sections of the former category 'subnormal', which has become a pejorative term. It was originally qualified by 'educational' to show that the category was an administrative term relevant to schooling, and not to be used descriptively outside the educational system. However, although the term was introduced as an improvement on 'mentally handicapped' or 'ineducable', 'E.S.N.' has attracted its own stigma. The emphasis in popular thought has rested on 'subnormal' rather than 'educationally'. As in the change from describing countries as 'undeveloped' to describing them as 'developing', changing the label once more will not necessarily banish the stigma, especially as the new terminology is so similar to the old.

Warnock's hope is that in the very large group of children with 'learning difficulties', which should actually encompass all the 'special needs' children, the severely affected will not be publicly

60
obvious. Most critics and interpreters have failed to notice that 'special schooling' and 'recording' is advocated as a necessity for the 2% that are severely affected, and this is very little different from the 'categorization' and 'placement' that is to be superceded. Warnock specifically acknowledges the need for official recognition of serious handicaps, to ensure that these children's needs are catered for through the different stages of their education, and particularly in a move from the area of one education authority to that of another. (18).

In contrast to Warnock's approach, another method is discussed in the next chapter. This is based on the perceived value of individuals.
References to Chapter 3.


2 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., ch.8, p.121 et seq.

3 ibid., s.3.23, p.42.


8 B.B.C.1 Television, 1975.


13 Van Uden, W., 1970: op.cit.

14 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., s.5.19, p.78.

15 ibid., s.6.13, p.97.

16 ibid., s.3.27, p.44.


18 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., s.3.31, p.45.
Chapter 4

The value of a person
Chapter arrangement

4.1 Introduction

4.2 What is handicap?

4.2.1 Illness, handicap, and normality

4.3 Models of handicap and normality

4.3.1 Social relativism revisited

4.4 Normality - the three senses

4.4.1 Normality and special education
4.1 Introduction.

The concept of normality is logically central to any analysis of the nature and meaning of special education. Examination of terms such as 'handicapped', 'impaired', or 'disabled', and educational assessments such as 'partially hearing', 'with impaired vision', or 'educationally subnormal', indicates an ambivalence in their presupposed antonyms 'normality' and 'normal'. Yet there is a sociological position which seeks to prove that there is here a clue to the banishment of stigma. This position holds that all our descriptions and assessments of both handicap and normality are essentially relative to a particular social milieu, and thus illegitimate (1). 'Handicapped people' should not be stigmatized with that label when in other societies they are unlikely to be so described. The response propounded in this thesis is that the argument holds true for a few of the less serious handicaps, particularly those affecting literacy, which is a requirement of a certain type of society. For the serious handicaps, on the contrary, it is possible to demonstrate an objectively real condition obvious in any society. The thesis further poses the question, to which no satisfactory answer is found, why some differences are seen as advantageous in one society and disadvantageous in another. Stigma is shown to affect the public value of an individual, as he views himself, and as he is seen by others.

In this chapter, three models of handicap and normality are outlined to introduce the differences between the positions. The traditional medical model takes handicapping conditions as objectively real. The sociological model sees them as socially conditioned, that is socially created. The educational model, as evinced in the Warnock Report, attempts a via media. The intention here is to assess and reconcile the different elements by an analysis of the term 'handicap' and other related concepts. This is followed by a section devoted to unravelling the complications of the term normality, which is shown to be an evaluative concept, sharing the logical complexities of other evaluative words like 'good', 'right', and 'beautiful'.

The position reached by the end of the chapter is that whilst some slight handicapping conditions may be socially conditioned, meaning
Socially created, either because they are socially caused by society, for example maladjustment, or because they are only made obvious in a certain type of society, which is the case of dyslexia, yet the more serious conditions cannot be argued away in this manner. There are statistical norms for a particular society. Other societies can be assessed either on their approximation to the level of care and encouragement towards handicapped people that are normal in this country, or on their approach to an ideal which would also be preferable in late twentieth-century Britain. The paradox of making handicap socially invisible whilst ensuring adequate special education still remains.
4.2 What is handicap? Normality and handicap - definitions.

As has been explained, the Warnock Committee sought to replace the term 'handicapped pupils' by the term 'children with special educational needs' for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the term 'pupils' is to be replaced by the term 'children with...' to endow the phrase with humanity. The replacement is effected through the complete list of 'descriptions' which are to replace the 'categories' of the 1944 Education Act, for example in 'children with behavioural disorders' instead of 'maladjusted'. Secondly, the committee hoped that far more children could be given special help than under the existing legal concept of special education, which includes only the formally handicapped pupils. Thirdly, there was the hope that the education system could be rationalised to make it relevant to more pupils. Finally, there is the underlying rationale for all this; that is the hope of removing the stigma of being formally categorized as a handicapped pupil, and therefore as different.

Much of the impetus for renaming the categories has stemmed from the difficulty of describing educationally subnormal children. As was shown in the last chapter, this term, which was introduced to replace earlier descriptions held to be too pejorative, has attracted its own stigma. The label has caused distress to parents, and its effects on children last into adulthood. Although used originally to emphasise the educational rather than the comprehensive nature of the difficulty, the term has come to exceed this narrow definition. It is the 'subnormal' rather than the 'educationally' that is retained in the public mind. It may be, indeed, that the addition of the category ESN(S) at the time when the previously-named ineducable children were finally admitted to the school system, rather than lessening the stigma for these more severely handicapped children, actually increased the stigma for those with milder educational problems.

For those who have been assessed as subnormal because of cultural differences between the home conception of the school and that held by the school, or because of language difficulties, as is the case for many West Indian children, the label is inappropriate even in the strictly academic context. This, however, implies that the children
Even for those with a slightly restricted intellectual capacity, the category is probably only relevant within the academic context itself, for many pupils learn very little at school, yet successfully find employment and raise families in adult life. In adulthood, the relevance of categories is limited to those who attempt to extend their education, for example, through evening classes. In such cases, it is necessary for the teacher to know which pupils have not previously succeeded under normal teaching methods, and which of those pupils have not succeeded because of lack of interest rather than lack of opportunity. Different teaching methods are needed both for those adults with intellectual disabilities, and for those for whom English is a second language. However, in the more general social context of employment, family, or friendship, a category such as educationally subnormal (M), or 'with mild learning difficulties', is unlikely to be relevant. Other, more serious, educational handicaps like dyslexia similarly need not necessarily affect the person as an adult if he can find a method of replacing the need for literacy, for example by the use of tape recorders.

Despite the apparent relativistic tone of the approach thus far, it must be emphasised that for many children and adults, learning problems are so severe that they extend beyond the special educational needs of schooling to encompass their whole lives. For such people, the term special educational needs may put too much stress on schooling, and mask the wider social implications of disability. Although the Warnock Report noted the need to retain some special schools to cater for these pupils, this recommendation has largely been neglected in the interpretation of the Report by central and local government.

At first, the term handicapped appears inappropriate as a group name, since the population of special schools has never been homogenous. Unlike the pairs physically handicapped/able bodied, deaf/hearing, blind/sighted, handicapped has no proper antonym, although the term normal is often used as one.
"...that a school such as we have described...is not only right for the normal but right for the handicapped,..." (2)

Although the word handicapped has been useful to indicate a large, if disparate, group of people, modern educational thought, which stresses the importance of each child progressing at his own pace along his own path, deprecates the overtones of the word for it suggests competition, where there are winners and losers. However, handicap remains a useful term in that it shows that people can be held back by external forces, as in the case of the maladjusted child. This is similar to the racehorse being handicapped by carrying extra weights to impede its speed.

Of two related sets of descriptive terms, one has been introduced in the previous chapter. This set is the terms 'deviance,' 'stigma', and 'disadvantage'. The second set is the terms 'impairment', 'disability', 'illness', and 'handicap'. This is an integral group with associated roles and although often used interchangeably in common speech, they can be distinguished. An impairment is an unwanted departure from the norm in some form or function of the body, mind, or behaviour. Thus birthmarks, extreme short stature, or a heart murmur are all impairments. An impairment becomes a disability when it cannot be remedied or when it effects other functions. Thus short sight is not, in general, a disability, since accurately prescribed glasses can compensate for the impairment. Birth marks, although not disabilities per se, may lead to psychological problems if the marks are very noticeable, and hence become disabling. A heart murmur may reflect serious and incapacitating heart disease, or it may occur in a child who functions normally with no disability.

An impairment or a disability can become a handicap in certain contexts. Thus short statured children are handicapped in a running race, but not in gymnastics where they may indeed be at an advantage. Short sighted child will similarly be handicapped in certain situations where they cannot wear their glasses. Loss of a hand or arm affects different individuals differently, depending on whether it was the one previously used for writing. Loss of a leg is more important for its effect on personal mobility and causes little educational loss. A facial disfigurement, for example a cleft palate, can be a disabling impairment which handicaps the development of speech.
Baldness and albinism are impairments, but not disabilities. Like birthmarks, they can become a handicap in cases where the resultant embarrassment leads to depression.

Thus it can be seen that some impairments are disabilities which lead to handicaps; others are not handicaps at all; yet others are not true disabilities, but still lead to handicapping conditions. A child with no legs is obviously disabled, yet the successful early fitting of artificial legs should enable him to function normally, with no need of educational handicap ensuing, unless frequent hospitalisation leading to irregular schooling should become necessary. A severely disabled spastic, whatever his intelligence level, has an impairment which will be a disability and a handicap in all aspects of his life. This is particularly an educational handicap. The problems of oral communication and writing present an educational need. Special teaching and the use of electronic aids can mitigate the handicap to allow the individual to work and live socially, although there remains a severe handicap in terms of lack of mobility and independence. By contrast, a gifted child has no impairment or disability. His intelligence or musical ability do, however, present a difference from other children. Such a child can become handicapped if boredom with an inappropriate curriculum leads to underachievement and hence to maladjustment.

Deafness is an obvious impairment of function, which is also a disabling handicap in most contexts. Even in a non-literate society, the profoundly deaf person is obvious from his speech and lack of communication. There is so much that deaf people cannot do that they have often been treated as idiots. There are very few occasions when deafness would be an advantage; perhaps it would be so for anyone working in a very noisy environment where everyone depended on signs or lipreading, for example in a foundry. It is not just the effect on language acquisition that is important. A deaf person is unable to gather general information from casual conversation. Thus the handicap is both social and educational. Hearing aids are unable to compensate in the way that glasses help the short-sighted, for aids generally distort the sounds as they amplify them to high levels. Speech is thus not always clarified, and it is often impossible to mask a constant tinnitus. Different kinds of deafness result from damage at different points of the hearing mechanism, at the ossicles,
Initially, it appears that the child who is called dyslexic or supposed to have specific difficulties with reading and writing has a relative handicap. The handicap seems to be created by the literate society around the child in which there is a constant need to decipher the printed word. If so, it could not occur in non-literate societies. However the condition involves less of a relativistic view when it is, as frequently, combined with extreme clumsiness and difficulty with the discrimination of left and right. In a developed society, people like this can find safe driving, cooking, dressing, and working difficult. In a third world context, where personal survival skills are even more important, the individual could be more severely handicapped than his 'western' counterpart.

Educational handicaps have been distinguished from what might be called life handicaps, yet the two are generally connected, in that educational failure affects the type of job, and social position, and hence the lifestyle, available to the adult. Conversely, the basic handicaps also affect educational progress.
4.2.2 Illness - handicap and normality.

Although handicap, disability, and impairment have been distinguished in the previous section, it is also necessary, though sometimes difficult, to distinguish between these and illness. Disabled children are generally healthy, although certain illnesses may affect them unusually seriously when they do occur. All children are sometimes ill, but not all children are sometimes disabled. An illness can best be viewed as having a possible cure, in that either time or medical skill will end it. Thus there is a search for some cure for cancer. Spina bifida, on the other hand, is operable, but not cureable. The operation deals with the build-up of fluid in the brain, not with the actual spina bifida. A third category of condition is illustrated by Down's Syndrome. In this instance, it may be possible to prevent the occurrence of the syndrome by the use of mineral additives in the pregnant woman's diet. However, once the condition has developed there is no sense in talking of a cure, any more than there is a cure for an amputated arm.

An illness can result in a permanent handicap, as when a limb has to be amputated because of tuberculosis, or when joints are incapacitated by rheumatism or sickle-cell anaemia. Some illnesses lead to a temporary disablement and educational handicaps, for example, if a child cannot learn through free movement, or loses schooling from an extended stay in hospital.

It is further arguable whether some conditions are illnesses at all, or merely part of the normal expectation of life. For example, period pains and pre-menstrual tension are held by many doctors to be a normal accompaniment to a woman's cycle. To other medical practitioners, however, the condition appears avoidable and undesirable, and is thus to be treated rather than endured. There are wider considerations than mere comfort however. Severe pre-menstrual tension has successfully been used as an exculpating factor in a murder case. That the defendant was found temporarily insane is only an extension of the notion that hormonal imbalance, as after childbirth, can lead to suicidal and homicidal tendencies. If such acts are considered to be the result of illness, unwilled and hence
not part of the woman's moral career, she is not to be held responsible, any more than the schizophrenic person is held responsible for his deeds.

The term mental illness was introduced as a euphemism in an attempt to demonstrate that depressives and others were neither malingerers nor insane. It was intended that 'illness' would invoke sympathy and understanding rather than stigma or disapproval. 'Bad nerves', or 'nerve trouble' occurred for similar reasons. However, psychologists like Laing (4), and Szasz (5), are now attempting to remove the term mental illness from the vocabulary. They point to the greater likelihood of being diagnosed as schizophrenic in the United States than in Britain, and suggest that mental illness is not illness at all, but only a product of living conditions. Mental illness has acquired its own stigma. As a result, blame is now to be laid on the environment rather than on the individual, in the same way that 'social deprivation', 'disadvantaged' and 'educational priority areas' have replaced 'poverty', 'poor', and 'slums'. Laing believes that schizophrenia is the result of poor family care of children and not of chemical imbalance, which is the alternative diagnosis.

Laing regards schizophrenia as a sane reaction to an insane world, an escape. Indeed, many cases of depressive illness may well be provoked by external circumstances which may thus be seen as the 'cause'. However, the notion of 'cause' poses difficulties in this application, for the person must be of the temperamental type which reacts to the particular circumstances, the Aristotelian form, the body being the material. Some people can withstand a considerable amount of stress, even emerging enriched from the experience, while others manage to manufacture their own crises from the most ordinary circumstances. Laing's ideas do not take sufficient account of this.

The terminology of illness is thus criticised for employing an incorrect model, leading to what Szasz holds to be excessive power in the hands of doctors. Sympathy is now evoked by the terminology of deprivation and the environment rather than by concern for the sick person. This may be, at least in part, because social deprivation and disadvantage can be remedied, and also because their existence removes the responsibility from the individual.
The traditional remedy is the provision of greater financial resources to provide extra equipment, or more teachers with specific training in special schools for the handicapped. The remedy was extended to schools in educational priority areas in the post-Plowden era (14). In adult education, the term disadvantaged has been used to indicate a range of classes where lower fees were charged or payment waived totally. These classes include lipreading, braille, and basic adult education (literacy and numeracy). The rationale for applying the 'financial remedy' in this instance has always caused some confusion. Some students believe it to be a right, since their condition, for example illiteracy, is a handicap. The teaching is held to be a quasi-medical service, and therefore should be free, like other treatment under the National Health Service. Other students hold that the handicap affects their earning capacity. Therefore the student concerned is unable to afford the full fee, and the reduction is a form of hardship remission, due to them as it is due to students who are unemployed or single parents. The confusion extends to the local authorities providing the classes. Thus, for example, Surrey charges a reduced fee, and tends towards the second rationale, while Sutton provides for some free classes from social services funding, thereby tending towards the first rationale.
There are several contrasting attitudes to both knowledge and society, three of which will be considered in this section. The first is the medical model. This assumes that there is such a thing as objective or scientific knowledge, specifically in medicine. Thus a qualified doctor will know more about disease, illness, prevention, aetiology and cure than will his tribal counterpart, the priest, witch doctor or shaman. When a 'scientific' doctor does adopt folk medicine, or practices from other cultures such as acupuncture, it will be on 'scientific' grounds. New drugs from traditional herbal remedies will be used after chemical and pharmacological analysis of their components, and trial examination of their effects on both animals and humans. Similarly, as acupuncture is scientifically investigated to discover whether the needles activate known neural pathways, it is drawn into western medicine. In this model, new ideas are incorporated into the existing framework of knowledge and technique in ways consistent with the idea of scientific control and experiment.

The second model is the sociological approach. This represents a form of cultural relativism, emphasising the belief that there are no objective grounds for knowledge, but only a variety of equally valid opinions held by members of different social groups. These opinions are in some way true for for them, but not necessarily so for others. Just as different social groups have their own moral codes, it is argued, so to do they also have their own forms of knowledge. These may conflict, but they are all valid. Individuals adopt a particular world view because it is that of their society, not because it is intrinsically superior, more efficient, or even correct.

Related to this model are certain attitudes to health, illness, handicap and disability. It is held that illness and handicap are social phenomena. The argument states that since what is considered illness in one society is not in another, it is not really illness at all. Some sociologists hold that all handicaps are socially conditioned, that is created by the social group into which the so-called disabled person is born. Normality is purely relative to a particular social group, and hence such appellations as partially
hearing are made on wholly subjective grounds.

The example can be used of the quasi-psychotic behaviour of some of the South Sea Islanders whose interaction was reported by Margaret Mead (7). Another example is the elevated social position of the epileptic shaman or visionary priest in North American Indian society. As such behaviour is considered normal in those societies, it should not be marked out as unusual or undesirable in Western Europe. For such a relativistic approach, western or 'scientific' observers can offer no 'knowledge' that is of possible assistance to another people if it is not part of, or assimilable to, their belief system. Western medicine has, for example, assimilated the use of hallucinatory drugs, but not the methods used by the Azande (8). In contrast to objective attitudes, which could bring, as evidence to support the case, the world-wide eradication of smallpox, cultural relativism states that there can be no valid objective knowledge, as a matter of definition. Knowledge is only thought to be so: it is really opinion. In the medical model, it is acknowledged that it is only when ideas are assimilable that they are accepted, but also that some ideas about medicine are true, and some are false. Even in cases where there are several methods of curing an illness, all will have a common characteristic, whereas other methods will not result in a cure or may even be harmful, but a patient treated by them may still recover despite the intervention.

In terms of relativism, it is unclear whether the individual is denied the illness or handicap because his society does not recognise it, or whether it should be said that although he manifests all the symptoms as defined by a western trained doctor, his social group does not recognise this. Only the former can be truly termed relativism, while the latter shows a widely accepted, but debateable, opinion that some societies have more medical knowledge than others.

A proponent of the scientific approach could suggest that the discrepancies in belief resulted from ignorance of immunology, and that, furthermore, Western medicine has a norm of well fed and well cared for healthy babies, with a larger proportion surviving birth and then childhood than most developing countries. Therefore, judgements can be made against this norm.
Here it will be maintained that there is such a norm for late twentieth century Britain, particularly in the educational context, where overall provision has to be made for the major part of the child population. Despite the so-called multi-cultural society, there are certain universal expectations. All prospective parents are aware of the ideal of the healthy child they wish to produce. To achieve this, pregnant women are advised to avoid alcohol, cigarettes, and other drugs, certain foods and certain medical procedures (e.g. x-rays). Health tests and genetic counselling are encouraged even before any attempts are made to conceive a child. Nobody wants to bear a handicapped child, however much such a child can be loved once born.

Moreover, there are certain forms of behaviour not accepted as normal in this society, because of the effect of the individual on those around him. The truth that some people are labelled eccentric and are left alone, while others are labelled mad or criminal and are incarcerated, does not blur an overall distinction. Borderlines are always difficult to demarcate, but that does not imply that there are no norms against which behaviour can be measured. The sociological model takes normality to mean every variation that survives. By existing, any child is normal. The subsequent analysis of normality in this thesis is intended to shed light on the meaning of such pronouncements. Warnock's model of handicap borrows from both approaches, and attempts to describe 'educational handicap'.

"...we called attention to the wide range of things which a child needs to know as part of his education. Besides his academic studies he must learn, for example, to accommodate himself to other people. He must also learn what will be expected of him as an adult. Any child whose disabilities or difficulties prevent him from learning these things may be regarded as educationally handicapped..." (9).

As an illustration of the distinction between such an educational model and the medical model, it is useful to explain the difference between deaf and partially hearing. The distinction is not based on hearing loss as measured on the child's audiogram per se. Rather, the child is assessed according to his personal functioning and the extent of his language development. Some 'partials' are much deafer, in medical terms, than profoundly deaf children. The distinction is made
by reference to the way residual hearing is used by the individual, as judged by his natural language development. The partially hearing child is one who can learn by oral methods supplemented by amplification, often in a mainstream school. The profoundly deaf child needs specific language teaching very different from that offered in mainstream classes. The same type of educational distinction can be made between the functionally blind, who need non-visual teaching methods, and the partially-sighted, who can use high powered visual aids. It is thus possible to be judged educationally blind.

Warnock named the Report 'Special educational needs', and delineated very wide groups of handicap rather than specific ones. Both these actions were taken so that the options for any particular child were not circumscribed by his being put into a category, but were rather designed to suit the individual. The emphasis is on individual needs rather than the uniformity of a category as in traditional forms of treatment or provision. This is particularly intended to help the many multiply-handicapped children for whom there has been no proper placement under the system of single handicap schools.

It is intended, by this emphasis, that the child be viewed as a whole person, with needs based on both abilities and disabilities, rather than as identical with others in his category. It could be argued that assessments for placement in the past were based on perceived need, and indeed, for most children with a single handicap, the future experience will be very little different from the past. However, it must be acknowledged that there were children who were denied places in schools for the deaf, for example, because an additional handicap such as poor mobility complicated a child's progress in such a school, which also could not provide the regular physiotherapy, or extra care for toileting because of insufficient numbers or training of staff. In these cases, decisions on placement were apparently made according to the facilities a particular school could provide, rather than the needs of the pupil. Such decisions can look realistic or unimaginative depending on the circumstances of the case and the viewpoint of the critic.

Each of the three models of handicap has a useful contribution to make to the discussion. The sociological model indicates the possibility
can be caused by aspects of the society in question. This may well be true for maladjusted children, or those with mild learning difficulties. The sociological model performs the function of alerting teachers to cultural and linguistic features of handicap.

The medical model acts as a reminder that despite sociological and educational jargon, there are certain serious conditions which will always cause difficulty. Medical research eradicates some handicaps, while also allowing more multiply handicapped children to survive. By differentiating certain conditions, for example autism from deafness, the medical model can indicate the proper teaching methods.

The educational model recognises the sociological and medical approaches, while seeking to optimise the potential of each individual. Thus it can be extended to cover educationally gifted children, for example, who can certainly be regarded as having special needs.

Each of the different models of handicap involves a different definition of normality. The sociological model defines the word to mean all that there is existing. The medical model draws sharp distinctions between normal and abnormal. The educational model derived from Warnock deprecates this distinction, yet still refers to children having special needs, which are distinct from those of their peers, and does not acknowledge, with the sociologist, that all children's needs are special. These differences of definition stem, in part, from the ambiguity of the word normality, which seems to have scant meaning in common between its definitions (see pp.88 et seq.).
4.3.1 Social relativism revisited.

As a further comment on the sociological model, and as an initial stage in the clarification of what can be meant by normality, it is useful to distinguish between actually being ill, or diseased, or handicapped, or injured, and being considered sick, or disabled, by one's social group. To preserve a status for knowledge in the face of the attack by relativism, it can be argued that it is generally possible to recognise that a person 'has something wrong' with them. This is a matter of informed observation of symptoms and causes. Whether a person is termed sick, and allowed a role which involves dependence and behaviour different from his fellows, will probably depend partly on the resources of food for the community. It will also depend on the community's need for his labour, upon the complexities of social interaction, and on the tasks needed for survival. However, the most important aspect of the decision whether or not an individual will be considered handicapped is the severity of the disability or illness, and this will be the severity as related to the local situation. Thus existence is much harsher in most primitive societies than in Western Europe. Common childhood ailments here become killer diseases in Africa, while handicaps like poor eyesight, which although causing the sufferer here some difficulty, can, in the third world, mean complete helplessness. A whole settlement area on the Volta, in West Africa, for example, has had to be abandoned because of endemic eye conditions leading to blindness and hence to the economic dependence of the sufferers on the healthy remainder of the community, a diminishing proportion (10).

By contrast, people with slight disabilities can be handicapped in one society in a way that would not occur in another. Thus a tribe where accuracy of shooting arrows was integral to an adult male's survival, because of the need to catch food, would regard impaired eyesight as a serious matter. Even slight astigmatism could seriously affect a man's aim, and hence his diet and health, as well as his possibilities for marriage and parenthood. For a European man, a variety of roles and jobs would be available, and the opportunity of obtaining glasses to correct the vision. Both societies have a norm for the adult male. In this instance, the European norm allows more variety, rather than
less, but it is of scant comfort to an individual to be told that he
would have no problem in another society. Moreover, whatever the
relevant society's estimation of him is, any individual has a certain
physical and intellectual ability which can be seen from outside, and
within the limits of which he will grow. Social relativism is
appropriate in some cases, but not all.

A general relativistic theory of knowledge presents a radical threat
to all logical discussion, and denies the possibility of any objective
analysis. It even undermines its own integral presuppositions. It is
impossible for the relativist to claim that relativism be true. It is
also impossible to decide that it is false, since the answer to this,
as to all claims, is that it is relative to person, time and place.
The outcome of this is shown by Midgley:

"We are rightly angry with those who despise, oppress, or
steamroll other cultures, and we think that doing these things
is actually wrong, but this is itself a moral judgement. We
are condemning oppression and so forth. We cannot condemn if
we think that all our condemnations are just a trivial local
quirk of our own culture, still less if we try to stop judging
altogether." (11)

Relativism disallows moral judgements by making them nonsensical. The
essence of moral discourse is that it assumes a form of universality
by use of such words as right, ought, and good. Otherwise it cannot
be dissociated from prudential or economic judgement. This is
applicable to social relativism, since social groups differ in their
moral assumptions. However, it is still possible to study different
life styles and judge between them as to which is more desirable, or
which is more appropriate to a given set of circumstances.
Preferences, and the logical reasons for them, can be admitted, but a
completely attitudeless life is not possible, as has been shown by
existentialism.

Even attempts to dismiss conventional morality imply a moral
standpoint, albeit of a different nature to the conventional one.
The sociologists of the relativistic school write as though there were
such a plethora of easily accessible social systems that somewhere or
another all behaviour that we term ill, mad, wicked, or criminal, and
all impairments that we term disability or handicap, would immediately be accepted as normal. Even if this were the case, which it does not seem to be, such a belief has no relevance for the family of a child with severe epilepsy, for a schizophrenic adolescent, or a young man limbless because of his mother's consumption of thalidomide during pregnancy. In practical terms, it would be impossible to transport each to the relevant society, while in moral terms it would also be undesirable, since the child's need is to fit within his own family. Furthermore, the epileptic might not be accepted as a shaman, and he might be stigmatized for being white, or from a different 'tribe'. Similarly, the schizophrenic might evince quite different behaviour when confronted by people whose own behaviour differs from that which he has been used to.

Changing attitudes, not geographical placement, must be what is to be sought, and in particular the overall change in attitude towards the handicapped of accepting the individual's right to a chosen lifestyle, to sustenance, and to maturation. This will not result in the disappearance of handicap, but rather the minimization of its consequences in terms of stigma. Too close adherence to the tenet that social acceptance has priority should be avoided, for from this comes the idea that disability is socially conditioned. There are other priorities, however, since differences in need mean also differences in provision.

Social relativism's prime argument against stigma is that it is meaningless, since all are normal. However, the differences, and the stigma, do not disappear. There seem to be outsiders in all societies who are in some way stigmatized for being different. It might have to be accepted that there will always be some people who are sufficiently different from the rest of the society, whose presence causes ambivalent feelings, just as there will always be people who are 'below average' in any comparison. Those who are different may also need different treatment for their own sake. Blind and paralysed people are obviously handicapped, and their handicap, in practical terms, needs greater parental care in childhood, and restricts the ability to take the adult role of working and caring for others. Many handicapped children who are educated in Western Europe would not have survived in a primitive society, some of which, like the Nuer, practise infant euthanasia (12), while others have to let children die
because they lack the medical skill to prevent this.

Recent critical studies of the concepts of health, illness, and normality have approached their subject by way of mental illness, which has always seemed more problematical than physical ill-health. Szasz, for example, takes it as axiomatic what constitutes bodily health (13). In psychiatry, relativism has affected methods of treatment, as doctors like Laing have presented theses which have undermined the accepted views of normality and mental health. Schizophrenia is thus regarded by some not as an illness, but as a form of maladjustment arising from faulty upbringing. This is to replace the idea that it results from chemical imbalance in the brain. In treatment of schizophrenia, the latter belief recommends drug therapy, the former requires behavioural change. For Szasz and Laing, decisions on a person's sanity or madness are political acts rather than medical ones. The resultant argument is that everyone is to some extent mad or could be thought so, which is a form of relativism.

Here, normality is equated with health, but it is thus actually the idea of perfect health which is to be understood.

"The ultimate goal of analysis as Freud saw it, was to secure the best possible psychological equilibrium for the functioning of the ego." (14)

This may not be the same as physical or mental good health, or even as health which is normal in the statistical sense. There is a paradox about normality, that it can be normal not to be normal. This paradox starts to disappear when the different connotations of the word are disclosed. Thus, presuppositions of good, or normal, mental health can be distinguished from each other. Similarly, a particular life style may be shown to be preferred, given certain moral presuppositions, because it is more healthy.

It is possible for a Western trained doctor to assess the general health of a person not of his own culture or society. Taking the example of a still widespread disease, it would be odd to argue that although an American Indian had tuberculosis as shown by a sputum test, he did not suffer from the disease because his tribe did not recognize the illness. A moral dilemma would arise for the doctor who
was also a social anthropologist. He would need to determine, when faced by the tubercular Indian, the priorities of his belief. His choice is between two principles of behaviour, either to attempt to cure illness whenever it is evident and amenable to treatment, or to avoid interfering in another peoples' life style. This resembles the dilemma faced by Turnbull during his residence with the Ik, an African tribe gradually dying from starvation. In this case he could only act as an observer of the situation, although at first Turnbull shared some of his food because he felt impelled to do so, being unable to eat while surrounded by starving people he knew as individuals. (15).

In the case of the tubercular Indian, there is the added complication that the rest of the family, and then the whole tribe could become infected by the 'non-existant' disease. Tuberculosis is initially painless, but becomes more serious with time. It is possible that at some later point in time, the tribe might come to acknowledge the illness, without understanding the exact nature of the condition. The difference in diagnosis might thus be no more than a difference in the stage at which the person is recognized as ill. It is possible, even in Western cultures, to be ill without knowing it. For example, many forms of cancer are not evident until the tumour has grown to an inoperable size. As in the case of the tubercular Indian, a western trained doctor faced by the epileptic shaman might also be in the dilemma of whether or not to give him drugs to ease his condition, for loss of the fits might mean loss of social position.

It is possible to recognise that other people are ill, injured, or diseased, however alien their life style, and whatever the opinion of their community. For example, many people in the past, thought by their contemporaries to have been poisoned, are now believed to have died from peritonitis. This condition was not then known, but can now be diagnosed from contemporary accounts of the symptoms. Similarly, the so-called Witches of Salem in eighteenth century Massachusetts may have experienced hallucinations brought on by eating contaminated grain. This, it is supposed, had been stored in damp conditions, leading to the formation of ergot, a fungus which produces hallucinations. Twentieth century chemistry can say that the neighbours who hounded the Witches to death, because they were possessed of the devil, were in the wrong.
It is also possible to recognise that an animal is ill, even though there is no common language. A veterinary surgeon can diagnose, and treat successfully, the illnesses of various beasts, such as dogs, cows, guinea-pigs, fish, and birds. Mammals suffer arthritis, cancer, mange, and irritations caused by mites. Fish have fungus on their scales. None can express any opinion as to the exact nature of their discomfort, although sometimes the animal can show that it is in pain, either by overt behaviour, or simply by not eating. Whilst the historical examples above show cases of the wrong explanations of illness, the veterinary examples show that there is sometimes no need for explanation.

The crux of this is biological similarity. Even very alien human societies are in most ways mutually comprehensible because of the physical resemblance. There are two opposing views on this expressed in the work of Wittgenstein. Firstly,

"If a lion could talk we could not understand him." (16)

This passage occurs after a reference to the problems of interpretation and linguistic translation and has influenced relativism. It is suggested that the lion's life is so different from that of a twentieth century Austrian that a mutually comprehensible language could not exist. There would be no method of expressing the concepts of one to the other.

A second passage contradicts this:

"...and now look at the wriggling fly, and at once all these difficulties vanish, and pain seems able to get a foothold here..." (17)

Even the fly resembles man in terms of suffering pain, and man can understand this, pity the fly, and even squash it to prevent further suffering. If this is an intelligible action, and we are sensible to stop boys pulling the wings off a fly, how much more intelligible to man should be a lion that is old, hungry, and cancerous. As a mammal, the lion is subject to illness, injury, and deprivation in a way known to man. The Manus, the North American Indian, or the Esquimaux then look even more familiar and intelligible.
A real problem would only occur if attempts were made to define health and normality for intelligent beings which were very different to man in anatomy, physiology, or biochemistry. Human norms are of injury and death, recovery and life. The parameters of social intercourse would be modified in the face of beings who could infinitely use spare parts to remedy injury, manage self-reduplication like a starfish, or split like an amoeba. Indeed the very meaning of self would need redefinition, just as it does when discussing the human case of cloning. The waging of war, and the keeping of peace, would present difficulties, since the concept of harm would not apply. To be able to harm another, common ground must exist. Such a common ground is present with even those human tribes whose life style seems most different from that of Western Europe. All men eat, need water, suffer pain, and die.

Consequently, it is possible to make the imaginative step to understand why the Esquimaux have numerous names for different types of snow. Anyone living and travelling in such terrain would need such concepts. One can 'put oneself in their shoes'. Presumably, the Esquimau could understand, at least in principle, why Western technology has the need for a variety of names for metal alloys. Each has a different strength and application, just as the different types of snow have their own implications for a safe passage, or for value in the construction of an igloo.
4.4 Towards a solution: Normality - the three senses.

What are the facets of normal and normality that lead commentators towards cultural relativism? The answer is their ambiguity, which these words share with all evaluative words. 'Education', 'musical', 'artistic', 'right', and 'good', from cultural and aesthetic as well as moral contexts, can be shown to play at least two roles. Their main use is in an evaluative sense, with a constantly changing descriptive content, which is often virtually non-existent. Such emotive terms can be used freely in argument, to mislead, and to persuade. Thus approval can be gained for what is termed normal in an evaluative sense while the tenor of the actual details is not elaborated. This is a similar use to that frequently experienced with political concepts, for example, justice.

The complexity of the present issue is deepened by the use of the word normal in the phrases 'its quite normal', or 'normal development', and in the compounds 'abnormal', or 'subnormal'. The word has, we find, three main roles. First is the basic meaning of normal in the statistical sense. This meaning of usual, or 'found in most cases', is logically prior. Dependant on this is the purely evaluative sense, which means something like ideal or proper. Third is a mixed sense, which keeps the evaluative nuance, but masquerades as descriptive. These will be called normality^s (statistical), normality^e (evaluative), and normality^m (mixed).

Normality^s.

To find the normal^s height of seven year old girls, in any society, it would be necessary to undertake an empirical study. No moral presuppositions, apart from those common to all research, for example honesty in presenting the results, are needed. The children in the survey population would be measured, and the results tabulated. The mode, or most frequently occurring value, could then be found. This mode would be the normals height.

This statistical sense of normal defines the norm as the most usual.
Thus a statistical curve of intelligence as judged by the conventional Intelligence Quotient test will show that most children of the same age and experience score approximately the same, with a few members of the population scoring very low or very high. The central, and largest group on the distribution curve are the population with normal$^S$ intelligence.

It is normality$^S$ which varies from culture to culture, and even from class to class within a culture with a stratified society, and also from one geographical area to another. Thus health visitors may find different norms in the middle class and working class districts of a town in Britain, while the normal$^S$ height of army recruits from the Scottish Highlands is several inches more than for that of those from the South Wales Valleys. On a wider scale, climate and the availability of food affect normal$^S$ health, activity, and disease. In most developing countries, it is quite normal$^S$ for children to suffer intestinal parasites, rare in Western Europe. Normal$^S$ child development, in terms of behaviour, language, and understanding, varies from society to society, as will be found by anyone attempting to repeat Piaget's experiments, on the conservation of number, or assessing children in terms of the norms$^S$ established for American children by Gesell (18).

Granted this, relativism appears feasible, yet this is not a necessary conclusion, since while it can be said that for one society, a certain form of behaviour is normal$^S$, this behaviour might not be normal$^S$ for humans in general. In this case, the particular society's behaviour is not normal$^S$, but different. The same argument holds for illness, disease, and handicap. The global view, which has been gained through the knowledge of a number of different cultures, can judge that certain things are unusual, or even abnormal$^S$. For example, a trait such as the shaman's epilepsy is not considered normal$^S$ even in his own society. There he is differentiated in a special way, which elevates his social position. Neither is he normal$^S$, at least as far as his being epileptic is concerned, when compared to the members of other societies. It is interesting to consider why some forms of difference, when compared to other societies, lead to a socially favourable position, while others do not.
A typically relativistic argument is introduced by Alexander:

"Examples can be found, in the very scanty anthropological work on this question. One anthropologist reports that in some South American tribes, a certain skin disease was so common that the few men who did not suffer from it were regarded as pathological to the degree of being excluded from marriage..." (19).

Unlike the position in the tubercular Indian argument, in this instance, nearly all the tribe has the skin disease. They recognise the condition, and yet it is not seen as harmful. Presumably it is neither painful nor incapacitating, for if it were, acceptance might not be so likely. Adopting the global frame of reference, it can be stated that as most people in the world do not have the disease in question, it is neither normal nor necessary. There would, however, be a moral dilemma for a doctor in deciding whether or not to offer medication. Any tribesman who was cured would be put into an invidious position vis-à-vis the rest of the tribe, for whom the concept is not one of normality, but of normality.

Attempted attitudinal changes in such a case are only acceptable to the person who has decided that intervention in other cultures is morally permissible, or, as for a Victorian missionary, morally required. An effective change of opinion may even be virtually impossible, as the proponents of birth control have found in areas where children represent either the outward sign of their fathers' masculinity, or the future means of support for ageing parents. The argument that other people do not suffer from skin disease might not convince Alexander's tribe, since for many such primitive tribes, anyone outside their own close group is considered so different as to be effectively non-human, and the absence of the skin disease would confirm this view.

Another formulation of the relativist's argument is offered by MacClachlan:

"A single disease, to exist in a cultural group, as such, must come within the purview of contemporary diagnostics. Otherwise it can exist only as a part of the general malaise known as
'feeling bad', or, alternatively may even be considered a desirable departure from normality." (20)

The word in (my emphasis), is, for MacClachlan's conclusion, not the correct word. Disease can exist in a culture without any recognition of its existence, or even of a 'general malaise'. MacClachlan means 'to exist for a culture', a more complex notion, but one for which his claim is unquestionably correct.

Various options are open to those who are dissatisfied with the statistical concept of normality. To be normal, it could be said, is not enough. To be normal is to be inferior to those who are special, even if the society does not discriminate against those people. Paradoxically, it can be normal to be abnormal, that is it can be normal to be ill. The paradox is dissolved by the differentiation of the two forms of normal, as shown here. The idea of normal health comes not from that which is, but from that which might be, or perhaps which should be. The normal health of a society can be established, and then perhaps improved. Statistical norms do not of themselves involve stigmatisation, but they are the basis for the evaluative uses for normal, which can lead to some differences being deprecated, and thence stigmatized.

The proper use of an evaluative term presupposes a form of commitment to some ethos. Thus to say that something is normal, in an evaluative sense, is to express approval, within a certain moral system. Relativists would argue that it is normal to be a cannibal in certain tribes, and hence unobjectionable. This needs to be clarified as follows: it is normal to be a cannibal in these societies, and therefore it is normal, that is to say, unobjectionable.

The third use of the word, normal is demonstrated in the title of a book by Valentine: The normal child and his abnormalities (21). This should be construed as 'the normal child and some of his
This title shows how normal can mean proper, that which is approved of, as an extension of the idea that what is most usual is right. Valentine's normal child is statistically like his peers in that he exhibits many abnormal traits of which his parents disapprove. The title also demonstrates the difficulty of extricating the factual, or statistical, meanings from the evaluative ones.

The abnormalities, or undesirable forms of behaviour, can be shown, objectively, to be normal in developmental terms over a longer time-scale. Thus Valentine can quote features of abnormal, even neurotic, behaviour in the childhoods of people who subsequently become what he defines as paradigms of normal adulthood, for example, W.A.A.F. officers, teachers, and medical students (22). This begs the question whether such people are actually normal in any of the three senses. That is, would Valentine's normal adults represent a common adult type (normal), or would their behaviour have been evaluated as desirable by other people at the time the book was written (normal). Valentine makes a point out of the same difference, between desired and desirable, that misled Mill in the formation of his utilitarian principle (23).

Normal, normal, and normal

Alexander's argument can be resolved in the same way as Valentine's. However it is not immediately clear whether the definition wanted is what is to be normal in any society, what is thought to be normal, or what is to be recommended as normal. If medication be accepted by the tribe with the skin disease, the result would be that over time, fewer people would evince the symptoms, which would thus cease to be normal. Yet it might be that conservative opinion would continue to consider the condition normal. Consequently, if the society held only those members having the disease to be normal, it might continue to penalise the deviants, whether those deviants were different from their own choice or not, and whether the deviants were normals or not.

Furthermore, it is not clear whether the normal, that is proper, is what is actually desired, or what is morally desirable; whether it is
that which is approved of, or that which ought to be approved. The likelihood of misunderstanding, on which the unscrupulous can capitalise, is evident. The evaluative uses of normal tacitly assume a consensus of understanding the statistical use. Valentine parodies this misuse of words in his title, yet he proceeds to make the same mistake by suggesting which adults are normal. Many people might consider such individuals to be far from normal. They are certainly not normal, as they represent only a small proportion of the total population. Yet they may be called normal if the speaker so desires.

The conflation of statistical and evaluative ignores the fact that people differ in a variety of ways from the norms of their society. Some differences are valued, some are stigmatized. A priest might not be a normal man, since he might be more spiritual, or is required to be celibate, while a doctor may be more compassionate or skilled at healing than the normal. However, except in peculiar circumstances, like Revolutionary France, or Pol Pot's Khmer Republic, priests and doctors are considered normal. A blind man is not normal in respect of his lack of sight, since this is unusual. However, he is normal in respect of his hearing, and his desire for employment and social intercourse. Should he be considered normal?

The Aristotelian principle of equity, that is treating like people alike, and different people differently in respect of their particular difference, is perhaps appropriate. If some differences are relevant to varying behaviour patterns, some are not. Many societies recognise approximately the same groups of people as being different, although not all societies may have names or categories as specific as we do. Just as while most societies suffer the same types of ills, although the severity may vary, and the terms of description may vary, 'being ill' does not. Where societies do differ is in considering some groups of different people as worthy of respect, and others worthy of stigma. Not all differences are treated in the same way by all societies.

The response to the relativist argument of the normality of cannibalism is that such behaviour is not normal, since most societies do not condone it. It is not possible either to allow that it is normal, since this use of the word as a wholly moral term
presupposes a universality of judgement not available to the relativist. Purely evaluative terms must be universalisable to be used at all, for it is the strength of moral discourse that it is self-explanatory and consistent. There is no need to ask 'why not do that which is wrong?'. Either decisions are universalisable, or the use of evaluative terms must cease. Even if cannibalism can be held normal\textsuperscript{m} in a primitive society, it cannot be in ours, and the relativist cannot pre-empt the use of normal\textsuperscript{s}.

Justice can be used by comparison here, as it works in a similar manner when another society is being described. It is possible to say that 'this society's justice is not really justice; they think it is, but we can see that it is not'. The observer can claim a higher order sense of justice as of any evaluative term. He can do the same with normal\textsuperscript{s}, and normal\textsuperscript{e}. But if normal\textsuperscript{m} is used, it is rather a personal comment on the value of certain life styles.
4.4.1 Normality and special education.

The discussion of different meanings of normality can be integrated into the analysis of special education by showing which normality is being used at any given point. In most discussion of the physical and sensory handicaps, the concept is normality. That is, such people have a statistical difference from their fellows. Most people have hearing and eyesight within a certain range, most people can walk, are continent, and can use their arms. This is a normal which is valid throughout the world, and not just in twentieth-century Europe.

Many specifically educational handicaps do, however, seem to be man-made. Not man-made in the sense that thalidomide damage is the result of human error, but in the sense that they are conceptually defined by a certain social system. Of these, dyslexia is a prime example. The child with a specific learning disability will be noticed as such, and hence categorized, only in a literate society. Moreover, it could be that the dyslexic will only exist as such if he happens to be born in a society where spoken and written language have an extreme mismatch. There should be fewer problems in a language like Chinese, where the plethora of characters ensures less likelihood of confusion than in English, where for example, 'gh' has at least two sounds, or in Gaelic with its complicated system of mutation. In a society where there was no written language, dyslexia would seem impossible, although an individual with a poor oral memory would suffer in a culture where long sagas needed memorization. The dyslexic would be normal in a non-literate society, as he would be like all his peers in being unable to read or write. Equally, in a literate society with logical and consistent spelling rules, he might well be normal also, in that his spelling could be as good as anyone else's.

It is possible to show that there might be an objective rather than a relativist basis for dyslexia. An anthropological survey might discover awkward people unable to fire arrows straight, or blow pipes correctly. Clumsiness, inability to choose a leading hand, problems with focussing, all of which are symptoms of dyslexia, could lead the anthropologist to postulate a cross-cultural basis, and some
underlying brain malfunction which is manifested in different ways in
different societies, depending on the practical demands made on the
individual. Hence, it could be that there is, in this sense,
something 'wrong'. If this is the case, the person is abnormal in
this aspect of his functioning.

The maladjusted also fit the relativist argument. Certain forms of
child behaviour which are commonly termed maladjusted in this society
at present, may be quite acceptable in other societies or in this
society at other periods of history. These behavioural forms are
normal for such societies, although not for this one. It should be
possible to discover whether these forms are the global norm. If
they are, then it is this society which is abnormal.

However, many children are maladjusted because of paternal cruelty.
They have tried to adjust to an impossible situation: perhaps the
term should be 'maladministered'. In such situations, responses
differ. One child, well-behaved at school, may run away from home
because of conflict with parents; another child, unexceptionable at
home, may behave in ways unacceptable to a particular school regime.
This evidence supports the relativist case that given changed
circumstances, the child will not behave differently from his fellows
This would make the child normal, and his behaviour normal, as a
reaction to the abnormal circumstances.

Other types of handicap or special need fit the relativist pattern
less easily, thus illustrating the fallacy of generalising from one
handicap, that is maladjustment, to others. Thus the autistic child
has a behaviour problem which would be obvious in any society. The
severe difficulties in communication and formation of relationships of
the autistic child need only to be compared with mild cases of
maladjustment and educational subnormality to demonstrate the dangers
of such generalisation. The autistic child is nowhere normal, and
it would also be odd to call him normal, or normal.

It must be remembered that many autistic, and severely mentally
handicapped, children now survive who would formerly have died soon
after birth. Thus despite educational advances, many teaching
problems are now more acute than previously. The notion that past, or
more primitive, societies must be kinder to their deviants does not
bear examination. An English lunatic asylum held John Clare, who was not seen as normal$^e$ or normal$^m$, although his depression now looks normal$^s$ in relation to his circumstances. In some societies, handicapped babies are exposed, or simply die without treatment. They are not normal$^s$, and are not considered normal$^e$ or normal$^m$.

Some people are abnormal$^s$ in their society. The dyslexic cannot read easily, the blind cannot see, nor the deaf hear. These people are not normal$^s$ in these respects, and it would be wrong to make certain normal$^m$ demands on them, such as asking a profoundly deaf man to sing in a choir, or a blind man to paint the wall. However, because there are aspects of statistical normality which they share with others, the extent to which they are to be called normal$^e$ or normal$^m$ becomes a moral question.

Adopting the principle of equity, it can be shown that there are considerable differences between people, and that it is as wrong to treat all the same as it is to discriminate on the wrong grounds. Regional accents or ethnic origin may be relevant differences to a casting director when choosing actors, but are not so in most occupations. Discrimination means firstly an informed and justified choice, to which the negative aspects are secondary.

It must be admitted that what is taken as a relevant difference can vary. A philosophically inclined Nazi, for example, could have claimed to follow Aristotle, since being a Jew, a gipsy, a handicapped person, or a homosexual, was seen as a relevant difference in the 'Final Solution'. These may be relevant differences for some contexts, but not for the kind of treatment given by the Nazis. The aspects by which such people differed from normality$^s$ were taken as having such overriding importance that they were classed as non-human. Such an approach has to be repudiated. The acknowledgement that all are human persons condemns this approach, and also allows people to be called normal$^e$ or normal$^m$, even though they are, by certain criteria, not normal$^s$.
References to Chapter 4.

9 Warnock, H.M., 1978, op.cit., s.3.2, p.36.
17 ibid., p.98e.
22 ibid.
Chapter 5

The Concept of a person
Chapter arrangement

5.1 Concept of a person - Introduction

5.1.1 Philosophical approaches to 'a person' and 'rationality'

5.1.2 Treating as a person

5.2 The Concept of an adult - Introduction

5.2.1 Adulthood and citizenship

5.2.2 Entitlement, citizenship, and rights

5.3 Rights - human and legal

5.3.1 Ensuring and protecting rights

5.4 Conclusion
The concept of a person, a traditional topic in philosophy of mind, has assumed an integral position in twentieth century analytical thought as developments in computing and robotics have led to a reassessment of the nature of intelligence, thought, and the self (1). The developments in medicine and surgery, of cloning, spare-part surgery, and abortion, have brought a resurgence of interest in ethics. This is currently extended by the evaluation of research on the early development of the human embryo, involving artificial conception and development in a test tube (2). All these topics seem to demand a re-evaluation of what it means to be a person or an individual. This has resulted in the coining of terms such as 'potential persons' for embryos, 'former persons' for accident victims on life-support machines, and 'non-persons' for those born without mental capability.

There are two main areas where such arguments assume importance when assessing the possible status of handicapped people, who may often be seen as, and treated as, something inferior to others, perhaps as 'near persons'. Firstly the challenge has to be met that a major traditional definition of 'a person', if taken at face value, implies that many severely mentally handicapped people are not persons. This point has been made by Singer (3), in his arguments for animal rights, to prove that many people are not persons, whereas many non-people, i.e. animals, are persons. This argument affects both the status allowed and the treatment given to handicapped people, as well as to animals. By introducing the concept of the human being as special, rather than people/persons, the argument avoided.

Secondly, there is discussion on the likelihood and advisability of a handicapped person being allowed the status of adulthood when he reaches the appropriate chronological age. Many handicapped people complain that they are treated as children throughout their life. Adulthood is considered, in the main, to confer rights and freedoms: the obligations of adulthood are recognised less frequently.

With these two areas in mind, the first section of the Chapter
evaluates the relationship between the concepts of persons and rationality in philosophical terms. The ethical problems involved in abortion, euthanasia, and other pertinent surgical interventions, are alluded to. In the second section, the idea of adulthood is expanded to show that, despite apparent differences, it is the same concept as citizenship. The concept is then used to show the possible role and status of both the handicapped child in school, and the handicapped adult in the wider community.

In conclusion, the three concepts of a person, a human, and an adult are used to evaluate the various, conflicting, arguments for differential treatment of handicapped people. The preferential claims of rights, in the sense of human rights, is compared to two other types of justifications, utilitarianism, and the need for compassion, altruism and charity. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach are assessed. It is shown that each has a part to play in contemporary thought, and, furthermore, that certain aspects of each may be reconciled.

The tenor of the conclusion reached in the chapter is that the concept of a human being is more important than that of a person. It is obvious that all conceived by human parents are also human, whether or not they should be classified as persons. As humans, they demand a certain respect and status.
5.1.1 Philosophical approaches to 'a person' and 'rationality'.

There have been many philosophical attempts to define the concept of a person, and attempts have continued to be made even since Wittgenstein issued his warning about looking for characteristic properties, essences, or necessary applications of a word,

"...its meaning lies in its use..." (4)

Most recent writing in the philosophy of mind has followed one of two approaches. That deriving from Descartes has given rise to a continuing speculation about the possible forms and manner of the relationship between mind and body (5). A trend resulting from this approach has been to attempt the reconciliation of the two, regarding persons as being special since they are both acting and thinking beings. This argument is evident in the work of Strawson, who analyses certain predicates as applicable to persons only, while others are applicable to all physical bodies.

"What we have to acknowledge....is the primitiveness of the concept of a person. What I mean by a concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type." (6)

A second approach, deriving from Hume's attempt to eliminate the mind/body problem, has concentrated on what it means to describe an individual as the same person continuing through bodily and psychological change, with questions of memory, survival, personal identity, and hence personal moral responsibility, being paramount.

The two approaches are merged by contemporary discussion of the relationship between intelligence and human personality in the two aspects of our relationship with animals and our relationship or possible relationship with complicated machines which may be 'intelligent' (7).
Because of the history of the philosophy of mind, the important contemporary approach to 'intelligence' is linked to traditional arguments about 'rationality'. Wittgenstein's strictures on not looking for essences derives specifically from his criticism of Aristotle's search for functions.

"Have the carpenter then, and the tanner, certain functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without a function? Or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts, evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What then can this be? ... Now if the function of man is an activity of soul which follows or implies a rational principle..." (8)

This has been paraphrased as 'man is a rational animal'. The reasoning abilities are held to be sufficient to separate man from the animals, with which man might be confused by the use of such descriptors as 'long-lived', 'self-movement', or 'tool-using'. Furthermore, any attempt to define rationality and hence 'being a person' in terms of evaluating, inferring, and communicating ideas, runs into the question whether man is the only rational animal in any of these senses. Many of the higher animals have an ability to reason, and to work out quite abstract problems in ways far more intelligent than the conditioning which is available for rats or pigeons and which has been applied to humans by Skinner and his followers (9).

Dolphins have the ability to communicate with each other and teach each other simple concepts. Singer bases some of his argument for animal liberation on the extreme intelligence and complex social life of pigs (10). Singer holds that we are guilty of the crime of speciesism, which is comparable to racism, when we treat only other humans as people. This goes far beyond veganism, the refusal to use animal products, to discuss the detailed rights of animals as persons, to be treated far beyond the boundaries of our convenience.

Dr. Johnson criticised bear-baiting for the effect it had on the human spectator. Singer would be concerned with the individual worth of the bear, which he would equate with any human. Singer regards not all humans as persons, and not all persons as humans. Thus research on animal psychology and behaviour can be used to show that rationality,
meaning intelligence, is insufficient to identify man, or the human being, and that the meaning of 'the rational being' may not be concomitant with the meaning of 'the person'. Language, another possible candidate for a special function of man is discussed in Chapter 7. Suffice it to say here that there are animals with well developed forms of communications. Chimpanzees have ostensibly learnt American Sign Language, but the conclusions to be drawn from this are both varied and variable.

In discussing the differences between objects, species, and persons, there are various distinctions to be made. The first is between a sentient being, and a non-sentient object. That is of being alive or being incapable of life. A living thing grows, changes, reproduces, and develops. A non-living thing only decays, and can only be altered by the actions of other bodies around it, for example by erosion or oxidation, or by the interference of a living thing, particularly by human interference. The next distinction is between those living things which can feel pain, and those which can not. Here man is in a similar category to the rest of the animal kingdom. Plants are living things, but do not feel pain as we understand it. We should probably behave differently in our gardens if it were true, that plants give out electrical impulses comparable to our pains, when pruned or otherwise cut or mutilated. We should certainly behave differently if they displayed obvious signs of pain, moving or making a noise. Commonly, some very severely handicapped people are thought of as 'vegetables', in that they are incapable of self-movement. This is not an appropriate term, however, if they feel pain.

These ideas of difference and individuation can be represented diagrammatically (Figure 6a)(p.108). Preserving the term rational for man suggests the final distinction shown in Figure 6b, while by contrast, Singer's work suggests an alternative final stage shown in Figure 6c, for he conflates persons with rationality.

This raises several difficulties, the first of which is the meaning of rationality or intelligence. One might ask how rational or intelligent does a being have to be before being counted as a person. Perhaps the ability to perform calculations in formal logic or mathematics should be the criterion, or the possession of basic reasoning powers, or the conducting of one's life in a 'more or less'
Figure 6a.

alive  
(beings)  

not alive  
(objects)  

feeling pain  
(animals)  

not feeling pain  
(plants)

Figure 6b.

feeling pain  
(animals)  

rational  
(man)  

not rational  
(others)

Figure 6c.

feeling pain  
(animals)  

persons  
(most humans, pigs,  
dolphins, etc.)  

non-persons  
(some humans,  
worms, etc.)

Figure 6. Differentiation and individuation
logical and sensible manner. By any of these definitions, many adults are irrational for much of the time, frequently acting on impulse or whim, while most children, all babies, and some mentally handicapped adults are also disqualified by such definitions, as Singer claims. Although these definitions do not allow these classes to be called persons, they obviously are such.

Even if babies and children are allowed as potentially rational, and hence potentially people, confusion results. For what if the child should later suffer some form of brain damage, so that the potential is never fulfilled? This is not the same as, for example, a glass bottle being broken, that is fulfilling its potential to break, since the broken glass can be melted down for re-use. The child's potential is of a kind that must be realised to be said to exist. Childhood is, by definition, only a stage in a person's life.

A more radical criticism would be presented by the consideration of different criteria of rationality, as suggested by anthropological literature (11). There are the different ways of reasoning envisaged by Aristotle, the many-valued logics of the west which challenge his true/false dichotomy, and the different types of proof in Africa, which while dismissible as irrational, can be shown to have their own internal logic (12).

One answer to Singer is that speciesism is necessary, a logical approach to individual differences. Speciesism is not like sexism or racism in being wrongly discriminatory or irrational. Rather, it marks an essential difference, namely that some beings are human and some are not, and is therefore highly rational. This is irrespective of their intelligence or language skills. This means, for example, that a human baby has a greater moral value than an adult pig, or a baby calf. We react differently to a horse with a broken leg and a child with a broken leg. A dog with cancer is destroyed, but an adult helped to live with his illness, and then face death through the 'hospice' movement. When an anacephalic baby is dying in hospital, it is given care and attention, not just to placate the parents, but because it is a human child.

It might appear that there is a moral choice here. This is to take all and only those born of women, and decide which to treat as
persons. The real decision is, however, forced upon us. All are humans just from their human conception. The moral choice is how to treat those so conceived, and what status to allow them. It is a central point of the 1984 Warnock Report that the human foetus is special (13). Is it better to help each individual survive, even if severely handicapped, or should some be allowed to die? All are humans, however handicapped, although it must be recognised that not all may become full citizens and adults.

Following from this initial definition, the leading question is about appropriate treatment and ideals. It is possible to ignore or deny personhood, as the Nazis did, and to dispose of the handicapped on the grounds of the expense of maintaining a burden. This is to treat persons as ciphers, or as equipment for the operation of the state. Similarly, it could be decided that the adequate education of handicapped people was too costly in view of other priorities.

By comparison, the English state education system has been developed since 1944 on the basis of education of each as is

"...suitable to his age, ability and aptitude..." (14)

This has been interpreted in very different ways, the 1981 Act adding statements about 'special needs', but the ideal is left intact. In recent years, the aim has been that education or schooling should deal with the individual as he is, to help him develop along his chosen lines in the best possible way. This approach opposes that of education as a given body of knowledge and doctrines to be passively imbibed whatever the pupil's interests or abilities. Thus the modern system tries to ensure that, as a matter of respect and concern, each shall count for one, and none shall count for more than one.

However some may need to count for more than one in terms of the necessary financial provision. The philosophy of special education has of necessity been a quasi-Aristotelian notion of relevant differences between children, allied to a respect for personal worth.
5.1.2 Treating 'as a person'.

The recommendation to treat someone as a person has its own problems. It is a difficult plea to understand, since all people are treated differently. The necessary parameters differ from those used in the understanding of a person's role, where it is unreasonable to expect the plumber to rewire the house, or the electrician to deliver milk in the morning. The doctor is not expected to direct traffic, nor the constable to prescribe pills.

Yet even for people with specific roles towards an individual, there are further difficulties. What does it mean to treat someone as one's father? Presumably there are certain expectations in any society. The father may be someone who is respected, or treated as an authority figure, or looked after when ill. Similarly, there are many ways of being a mother. Central to twentieth-century English culture is the belief that the mother has charge of her children unless the process of law has decided otherwise. Thus the mother may call her children in from the street, choose their food, and guide their actions in a way that she has no right to do for others' children unless in loco parentis as a nanny, minder, or baby-sitter. There is little which is vital to the idea of motherhood, apart from the biological fact of bearing the child, and even that does not apply in the case of adoptive parents.

Accepting this, there are two misconceptions which elicit the response 'the disabled are people'. Firstly, the individual is a case, an interesting specimen.

"Anyone who works with an articulatory case soon recognizes that the case seems to have difficulty in detecting, locating, or understanding the nature of his errors. This seems to be true even when the case has completely normal hearing. Like some aphasics, the case seems to find it hard to realize that his utterance includes deviant sounds." (15)

This is an inappropriate attitude rather than a misconception, and is most frequently encountered amongst those professionals dealing with
the handicapped, or even with those able-bodied persons temporarily in their care, as anyone who has been in hospital will aver. This is treating the disabled person as a non-person, whereas, secondly, and more commonly among the general public, is the misconception of not treating the disabled person as responsible, of treating him as a child rather than an adult, or of treating him as possessing some handicap other than that which is actually relevant.

These two misconceptions are deleterious. When an individual is seen as a case, his needs may be subordinated to the analysis of his handicap or disability. This is one reason for Warnock's insistence on jettisoning the system of formal categorization, although it may be considered that the professional attitude, although inappropriate, is less damaging, because it occurs less frequently, and is applied indiscriminately, than the misconceptions of the general public, which may well in addition become stigmatising. When a responsible adult is treated as a child, his freedom is restricted, leading to frustration, and the feeling that he is being stigmatised.

Yet, in some cases, such treatment may seem to be appropriate, as when someone of adult years has a child's lack of understanding of cause and effect. However, even in these cases, there are those who claim that even the most severely handicapped adults have the right to make their mistakes and decisions, and to learn or not from their errors. Paternalism and 'ends and means' will be discussed more fully in Chapter 8. Suffice it to say here that assigning responsibility in deciding what is best for an individual, and deciding whether there is more value in the individual making his own, perhaps unfortunate, decision or having that decision made for him, can both cause difficulties.

Treating someone as possessing a different handicap leads to other problems, as has been discussed above (pp.57 et seq.), since social, educational, and medical treatment must all be appropriate if any real meaning is to be given to the concept of needs.
In extreme cases, handicapping conditions, by their very nature, can preclude a meaningful exercise of civil liberties and affect personal relationships. For many of these, comparison with a child, a non-responsible being with certain rights and obvious limitations, may be acceptable. For others, a more appropriate comparison is with young people, with more rights and fewer limitations. Thus, at the summit of the comparison is the adult, rather than the person.

Schrag has satirised the treatment of children in his fable of the Namuh and the Nerdlihc, in which a dominant tribe mistreats a dependent one (16). This demonstrates that childhood can be defined by two different approaches. The adult, considering the legal position of children, regards the laws as a protection for the innocence, physical weakness, and inexperience of minors. Alternatively, the same laws can be regarded as restrictive, and overdue for reform. Proponents of children's rights seek powers for children which may result in damaging that which others believe defends the children's well-being.

For an able-bodied person, childhood is a stage in development, leading to the freedom of adulthood. The handicapped person may wish to be able to enjoy the same development from childhood through adolescence or youth, to adulthood; a development which is sometimes denied him. This development encompasses the chance of further education or employment in late adolescence, the possibility of relationships with the opposite sex, and the independence of choice in spending one's leisure time. The institutional life of the severely handicapped militates against this development. For those in such institutions, there is not only the wish for rights and civil liberties of voting, marriage, procreation, and independent living, but also the desire for control of the petty decisions of diet, clothing and friendship which mean freedom more than the major items, which even for the able-bodied are so often governed by circumstance. Indicatively, they are also commonly referred to by the staff as 'boys' and 'girls', although this is now occasionally replaced by 'clients'.
the child possesses certain rights, principally to protection by those adults who have duties towards him. Restrictions on earnings, the hours and types of employment, sexual intercourse, and access to pornography, were all designed to protect the exploitation of children, and reduce the psychological and physiological damage to them.

It might appear that childhood and adulthood are definable only in terms of each other or of citizenship, that a child is someone who is not an adult, or that an adult is a full citizen and a child is not. However this simplification covers the fact that children are allowed to develop gradually, and are given more responsibility as they mature. The youth of fifteen is permitted greater freedoms by his parents and his school than his brother of seven. Despite much criticism of the legalities of the age of majority in Britain, the different ages at which marriage, consumption of alcohol, or the power to vote, are permitted do mark, albeit in an illogical fashion, the fact that the process of maturation is a gradual one. Furthermore, it suggests that there is a need for a concept of an adolescent or a young person, who can be given some responsibility such as withdrawal of funds from a personal account, which lies between the child and the adult.

Discounting the minor differences between men and women in the field of employment, which, like the restrictions on child employment, reflect a protection against the exploitation of the past, the adult in our society is allowed freedom within the law in choice of spouse, employment, and leisure activities, although being allowed these freedoms is not the same as being ensured such freedoms. Indeed what appears to a child as a freedom is in reality restricted by financial and social pressure rather than by the directive of the law as is the case under the anti-miscegenation laws of South Africa. Furthermore, all freedoms and legal rights carry consequent duties.
It may be argued that adulthood and citizenship are the same thing. Certainly, in our society, they are for most of the time, and although citizenship may be a dated concept, it has no real replacement. In many primitive societies, where adulthood is linked to puberty, the ceremonies making the adolescent a full member of the tribe are inextricably linked with the sexual maturation of the individual. This closeness is not reflected in our society, where citizenship is based on certain legal rights and duties, which are granted when the individual reaches a given age, irrespective of his maturity, either physical or emotional. Indeed, sexual maturation normally occurs rather earlier than the attainment of any of the rights of a citizen. The mismatch which this produces may be exacerbated in cross-cultural situations by differences in the approximation between maturation and attainment of citizenship.

Even if it could be established that adulthood and citizenship were related to maturation, they would still not be the same thing, since there are those who, although adult, are denied their citizenship. Prisoners have forfeited their citizenship by their offence against society. Their rights are circumscribed by their imprisonment, although other special rights are bestowed on them. Long-stay patients in psychiatric hospitals are, to a certain extent, in a similar position. Certainly, Laing and Szasz both describe such illnesses as a social problem, rather than a medical one, requiring punishment rather than cure. Both prisoners and patients can thus be non-citizens, if the period of their imprisonment or hospitalisation is temporary, or former citizens, if it is permanent. Additionally, some immigrants may be future citizens, although, despite being adults, they are not at present citizens of the country they are entering.

Furthermore, citizenship can, in some measure, be granted by one citizen to another. Just as a parent acts for his child, so the possessor of a power of attorney acts for, and as, the person who has made the grant. Power of attorney is normally adopted in cases of senility, but 'Advocacy Alliance' (17) has a more general application.
never obtain their citizenship in its entirety. The adoption of some rights of citizenship by another enables the patient to progress towards full citizenship.
5.2.2 Entitlement, citizenship and rights.

There are a number of possible attitudes to entitlement, that is towards the grounds on which special treatment should be given to handicapped people, or indeed any group held to be in need. Those discussed here, with one exception, are based on the acceptance of the common humanity of the other person, and of his fellow membership of the society.

The exception is utilitarianism, which can hold that on prudential grounds, resources expended on the initial education for the independence of an individual will reduce the final cost of his support by the state. The individual may even become economically productive, and hence cease to be a drain on the state. Such a bald statement of the argument may be qualified by the assertion that this attitude will also be to the individual's best interest, allowing him to develop as an individual. This goes well beyond utilitarianism.

On more humanitarian grounds, Mary Warnock, in her own writings, argues for compassion as the correct attitude (18). This is similar to the type of altruism described by Aspin (19). Mary Warnock criticises a third attitude, that is the provision of special treatment on the grounds of equality, since differences between people are often too great to allow for compensation. The argument for compensation to achieve equality is, however, frequently given as a reason for expending additional resources on the education of deprived or handicapped groups (20). It is sometimes separate from, and sometimes linked to a fourth attitude. This holds that there are certain definite and circumscribed rights which exist for all, whether handicapped or able-bodied.

The utilitarian attitude seems valid, although inadequate. That is, it does seem prudential to lessen final dependence. However, the view of individuals merely as numbers, either currently productive or not, is not a view of society which many would wish to hold, since it ignores all notions of the possible worth of the individuals themselves. When extended beyond economics to educational or social discussion, the argument is that independence, both financial and
It involves self-satisfaction. Since the independence and freedom of choice to be achieved by utilitarianism are often regarded as rights by those holding the fourth attitude, it can be seen that the four attitudes involve a considerable degree of interdependence. Utilitarianism, on its own, is not enough, but allied to one or more of the other attitudes, it provides a valuable perspective on entitlement.

Aspin bases his attitude of altruism on the understanding of the handicapped individual as being like oneself (21), a possible member of one's own family, a view also held by Segal:

"Those of us who find it hard to identify ourselves with unfortunate children or their parents, might like to conjecture that in the history of each of our families, some children have been handicapped. Similarly, if future history emulates the past, each of us will be ancestor at some time to a handicapped child." (22)

This is like the older meaning of compassion and humanity, used by Mary Warnock, of not just being externally sorry for the individual, but suffering with that person, and sharing their pain and sorrow. The two ideas are linked in that they both arise from the concept of an ill or handicapped person as a fellow human being with needs and difficulties, rather than as an abstract 'case'. Mary Warnock also links her attitude to the notion of justice, since all human persons are of equal worth and have an equal need of consideration for themselves.

"If we are humane, we will recognise a duty to improve the lot of all human beings, and particularly those who are most helpless." (23)

In discussion on this matter, Mary Warnock offers a critique of those who adopt the attitude of numerical equality. Her argument is that although attempts at compensation are well meant, and are often helpful in the case of children with minor disabilities, no amount of additional education can make a mentally handicapped child equal in attainment to an academically gifted child. However, the approach
Mary Warnock quotes Tawney with approval as the 'voice of paternalism', to show that

"...it is these needs which a nation ought to satisfy, as a good parent will seek to satisfy them for his family." (24)

One of the reasons given by those holding the rights attitude is dissatisfaction with the previous arguments. These appear to be founded on a form of social discrimination between the dependent and those who help them, which persists however good the latter's motives are. Compassion and altruism are thus to be denigrated, as are paternalism and charity, as involving an outmoded social relationship of subservience for the handicapped and inflation of importance for the able-bodied. Charity is seen as the 'normal' condescending to the 'abnormal', who are intrinsically less valuable. Moreover, charity is seen as personal, and thus subject to whim. Rights, by contrast, are held to be timeless, despite the possibility of legal rights being lost, or altered, by a change in government or a change in economic circumstances. Rights confer the status of a full citizen, an adult with a positive role to play in society. Rights are not only held by all citizens, irrespective of personal circumstance, but themselves confer status. It is held that these claims of rights should thus be paraphrased as demands for treatment as a full citizen of the particular society. The Warnock Report thus claims, as a culmination to its first chapter,

"Those who work with children with special educational needs should regard themselves as having a crucial and developing role in a society which is now committed, not merely to tending and caring for its handicapped members, as a matter of charity, but of educating them, as a matter of right, and to develop their potential to the full." (25)

Any extensions to the legal rights and duties of such citizenship can henceforward be made through the due process of law.

However, a life based on entitlement through rights might prove to be very much harsher for a handicapped person than one based on altruism.
There is also the problem of persons being ends rather than means, and the problem of making one's own mistakes, particularly if others can see a better choice, when there may be a conflict between a person's needs and his freedom if he believes his needs to be other than that they really are. Given the claim for treatment as a full citizen, it is difficult to preserve good arguments for the need for preferential treatment. Indeed, if parity of esteem is only to be achieved by full citizenship, it may be impossible, since the rights of citizenship bring also obligations. These obligations may be unfulfillable by a severely handicapped person.
Popular discussion of rights often confuses what are called human rights with the particular legal rights of any particular society. Looking at other countries where there are fewer freedoms than in Britain, it is declared that the rights of the people are abused by their legal system. A distinction is thereby drawn between the legal rights that are actually allowed to the citizens of those countries, and those rights which, being part of the legal system here, are believed so desirable that they should be allowed everywhere. These last are human rights.

Most arguments about rights in this country, with the notable exception of animal rights, are about legal rights and the interpretation of the statutes. Attempts have been made, for example, to prove that there is a right to both nursery and adult education. These are based on variant readings of the 1944 Education Act. Since the 1981 Act, parents have had extended their legal rights in respect of handicapped children, although the children have no such rights themselves.

Human rights are held by their proponents to override legal rights, and the existence of the European Court of Justice has enabled suitors to reverse the argument given above to state that given legal rights in other European countries are so desirable that they should be allowed here. Thus corporal punishment, regarded by many British schools and local authorities as a necessary sanction, is held in other countries to be an infringement of both the parents' human rights and the child's. This view is supported by the European Court, and thus a legal right in another country, claimed by some as a human right here, becomes a legal right in this country.

It could be argued that the concept of human rights should be conflated with the concept of legal rights. However, it is an extremely important concept and particularly for the treatment of handicapped people, since it has been claimed that handicapped people, as humans, have human rights to better treatment, even where this is not currently accepted under the law. Thus legal rights are
That there are differences between human and legal rights may be shown by a consideration of the situation after a total nuclear war. This would bring an end to all legal rights and systems, leaving a desperate fight for personal survival. The outcome might be the gradual evolution of a very different set of legal rights from those of present day Britain.

Some of the legal rights in this country are built upon a lack of legal rights in other countries. Thus the British housewife has the legal right to buy any coffee on the market, even though by buying the cheapest, she may be acquiescing in the exploitation of the producers. The housewife may feel morally bound not to use her right, or the government may feel bound to restrict her right, to bring pressure on the other country to provide the legal right for reasonable working conditions or pay, since the plantation workers are held to have a human right to a decent standard of life. This also shows the interrelation of human and legal rights.

There are occasions when legal rights conflict with other perceived needs of the society. Thus, in time of war, press freedom and the legal right to information may need to be restricted on operational grounds. Thus, even the most simplistic view of history shows that human rights cannot be, as their proponents would have them be, set ideals which are necessary for all time.

Any discussion of rights presumes a desired form of society. Thus discussion of rights for the handicapped should mean the extension of the legal rights to those who have not previously been allowed to act as citizens. However, rights for a person involve him in duties or obligations. First among these is the duty to live so as to preserve the similar rights of fellow men, and to help them to enjoy their rights. Rights, like freedom, are limited by the necessity of social
intercourse. Thus "animal rights" is an illogical concept, since animals cannot live a social life with us, and cannot be described as possessing rights which must be respected by men, since they have no conceivable obligation towards men. Man does have duties and obligations in his treatment of animals, which arise from his right to keep animals. Thus if the animals are pets, man has assumed the responsibility of caring, in return for the pleasure of their company; if the animals are to be used in laboratory experiments, since man benefits from the experiments, he has a duty to cause as little pain as possible, and not to research on frivolous or unimportant topics; if the animals are bred for food, the benefit to man and the fact that they would not exist were it not for human intervention, again gives man the responsibility to treat them sensibly and without cruelty; if the animals are wild, man still has a responsibility not to be cruel or prodigal with resources shared by man and animals. It is not always clear whether conservationists' arguments are given as being about survival for the animals' own sake, or because such survival ensures a richer or more varied world for mankind.

Similarly, the foetus has no rights enshrined in a legal sense, yet adults have certain obligations towards any particular foetus whether as parents or doctors. However, it does not follow that, if the foetus has no rights, abortion is permissible; other arguments must be considered. The mother herself has legal rights to an acceptable level of care by the doctor, midwife, and other medical staff which protects the developing foetus and neonate. Both parents share a special position towards the unborn child.

Once born, a child is a legal person with certain legal entitlements, having a name, an address, and a National Health Number long before he is a full citizen. A baby has rights, although only his parents, or those in loco parentis, can defend them for him. Developing into adulthood, he assumes the obligations inherent in those legal rights. Part of the process of maturation is learning the parameters of one's own freedom, and that other people have needs and hurts like one's own. Becoming an adult is a gradual process. There are various official landmarks, as particular rights and duties are assumed, and for most people, general understanding and development also progress with age. A full citizen is the result, but there is no reason why some people should not take longer to reach a level of understanding
citizenship were to be based on maturity rather than age, the problem of who should decide when a person is 'ready' would arise.
5.3.1 Protecting and ensuring rights.

It is useful to examine a list of rights typically claimed for the disabled or handicapped. The list below is compiled from various sources to give the fullest possible range.

The handicapped person has a right to:

1. Prevention of disability
2. Health service and medical care
3. Education to the fullest extent of which intellectually capable provided in the regular channels of education
4. Training - vocational and avocational
5. Work
6. An income
7. Live how and where chosen
8. Barrier free public transport
9. Function independently
10. Petition social institutions as a citizen
11. A sex-life, marriage, and children
12. Privacy

Some of these rights are already allowed as specific legal rights to all in Great Britain, whether handicapped or not. Some are part of the normal expectation of the able-bodied, although are not legal rights. All have been claimed as human rights for which legislative provision should be made so that they become legal rights, although this might appear utopian in many cases.

Any discussion of such a list must show the difference between allowing someone the right to something, and ensuring that he gets it. The 'right to work' provides one example of this difference, while another is the 'right' to a sex-life. In one sense, all members of society in this country over the age of sixteen have a right to a sex-life, since there is no law against it as there is for those under the age of consent. However, this is an odd sort of right. Nothing in the law can ensure that an individual finds a partner, nor having found one that he or she will provide a satisfactory sex-life beyond the limited demands of conjugal rights. This argument is also valid
for marriage and bearing children. No-one actually has a right to these things, they only have the right that no-one may prevent them from marriage (assuming it is not bigamous, or within the bounds of consanguinity), or having sexually intercourse (again within certain legally prescribed limits), or children, if they can find a suitable partner. The right to non-interference by the state may be considered to be a human right, which is allowed as a legal right, within certain limits, in Great Britain. In other countries the limitations that the legal right makes on the human right are different, so that for example, 'miscegenation' is not permitted in South Africa.

As to the encouragement of such relationships among the mentally handicapped or psychiatrically ill, there are valid arguments on both sides. Many mentally handicapped people are regarded as less than adult in this respect, or even as a threat to the community. There are obvious difficulties over contraception and sterilisation, and whether these should be arranged without the consent of the patient, even when the patient is unable to give, or understand, such consent. There are few eugenic reasons for refusing the 'right' of handicapped people to bear children, since the correlation between handicapped parents and handicapped children is very low (26). Furthermore, it may be argued that since many able-bodied parents prove quite incapable of bringing up children, the grounds of unsuitability for the responsibilities of parenthood cannot be used either. The contrary arguments can easily be appreciated, and although it is true that the children of unsuitable (whether handicapped or able-bodied) parents are often taken into care, the argument that this leads to more children being available for fostering or adoption hardly seems adequate.

There are however some illnesses and handicaps which are genetically transmitted. Genetic counselling is normally available, but the decision usually has still to be faced whether or not to attempt to conceive, knowing that the outcome may well be a handicapped child. The gene may be recessive in the prospective parents, for example in muscular dystrophy, cystic fibrosis, or haemophilia. In these instances there may be eugenic reasons for certain people not to produce, and it can be argued that they should not be allowed to do so on the grounds of preventing the birth of a handicapped child. This seems unthinkable in a society that is less than totalitarian, but
may well be the outcome of promoting abortion and euthanasia.

Discussion of rights, whether general or particular, tends to founder on this difference between ensuring and protecting. This is certainly so for legal rights. Indeed, although there is, in this country, the right to a fair trial, there is no right to be found innocent. It may be that a claim for a human right is really a claim that a particular protected legal right should also be ensured. Even in practical terms it can be seen that for most of the cases listed on p.123, this would be impossible.
5.4 Conclusion.

There are elements from the various approaches to the 'concept of a person' which are reconcilable in the light of the idea of a human being per se deserving special care and respect, whatever his abilities or failings. The utilitarian view that the course of action be chosen for its financial soundness may be helpful if it is interpreted as spending on education to ensure an increased future independence. If, however, the choice were interpreted as being between minding the handicapped and compulsory euthanasia, which might well cost less, the utilitarian view would find less ready acceptance. Utilitarianism is only acceptable when it comes to certain conclusions. In this example that conclusion is to provide independence, which is seen as a good desired by all.

Dependence, when wanted or needed, is also desirable. Indeed, the desired end for all is to have as normal a life as possible, and as a matter of altruism for other humans to have this too. The difficulty for the handicapped is that they may not be regarded as completely human, and thus not having interests, hobbies, the desire for fun and friendship, and responsibilities. The handicapped may be regarded as pets, in the same way that some children are treated as appendages, rather than as individuals in their own right. The approaches of altruism and compassion emphasise the need to look beyond mere rights to the needs of the person, which may be extraordinary rather than normal. Furthermore, regarding people as humans with a moral career links these approaches to the idea of a moral view of rights.

This chapter has sought to establish that all those who are conceived of human parents demand special care and attention, just because they are human. This form of speciesism is both physiologically and psychologically necessary, and also morally right. Only in some rather extended senses is it possible to regard animals as people; they are certainly not human. Humans are special, and this is why proposals for cross-breeding people and animals to provide workers would be viewed with horror. Being a human demands that the individual is treated as an end in himself, rather than as a means to another's ends.
With this in mind, it is taken that human rights and legal rights are interdependent, and that arguments for human rights are actually moral statements about the sort of society desired by their proponent. In this chapter it is held that all humans have a right to a basic decency of treatment, purely because they are humans, and human rights for the handicapped are those rights which they ought to possess as human beings, as should all.

Part of this decency of treatment to be given to all humans should be to ensure that they develop their abilities as far as is possible, even if this demands extra provision. Most handicapped people should be enabled to live the normal life of a citizen, with full legal rights and obligations, and not as second-class citizens or non-humans. (Conversely, animals cannot fulfil the legal rights and obligations of citizenship, and cannot be considered as persons.) There is a limited number of people, however, who will never be able to fully achieve this status. These will largely be either severely mentally ill, or severely mentally handicapped. They should be assisted, through education, to take on the dignity of advancing as far as possible towards citizenship, and to accept those legal rights which they are able to use. Through their families, or through Advocacy Alliance, they may gain their full legal rights.

The possession of legal rights shows that a person is a full member of a particular society, whereas the possession of human rights shows that the person is a full member of the human race. The availability of human rights, however, is determined by practical considerations which are applicable to the whole of humankind, rather than to the ability of a particular human being to use or understand them.
References to Chapter 5.

13 Warnock, Dame M.,1984 : op.cit.
14 The Education Act, 1944 : Section 36.
24 ibid., p.54.
PART III

THE HANDICAPPED PERSON IN EDUCATION

Chapter 6

Education - a contested concept
Chapter arrangement

6.1 Education - a contested concept: Introduction

6.2 What is education? - the traditional approach

6.3 What is education? - the emotive approach

6.4 What is educational? - a new approach
"While there are good grounds for devoting a larger proportion of a nation's resources to the rehabilitation of a mentally, or a physically handicapped child, this is not, properly speaking, education." (1)

This statement is made by Gribble, who takes a particular view of education as essentially academic because of the influence of Peters. Gribble goes on to assert that the teaching of literacy skills, basic reading, and writing, are not truly educational activities, since the skills have no intrinsic value. This may be contrasted with the following quotation from Segal:

"It is increasingly recognised that some handicapped children - including some who have been left out of our school system - could be educated if given special facilities, special methods, more teacher time, and a special curriculum." (2)

Segal and Gribble hold clearly opposing views as to the nature and value of education for the handicapped. Gribble's view contradicts that of most teachers, particularly those in the primary sector. They see the teaching of even such basic skills as recognising letter sounds as a very important educational activity, and would similarly view the many comparable tasks in special education, such as speech or language training for the deaf, or braille instruction for the blind. All teachers would acknowledge that time is spent on peripheral, non-educational tasks, like taking registers, but Gribble must be shown to reject too much. Sharpening pencils and hearing reading practice are different in essence. Indeed, it is also arguable how much administration is integral to Gribble's concept of education.

As has been said, Gribble's attitude is based on his interpretation of Peters' work, that to be educational, activities must be intrinsically worthwhile or valuable and involve knowledge. Since literacy skills, runs Gribble's argument, have an instrumental value in leading to information or pleasure and in furthering knowledge and academic ability, they cannot be intrinsically worthwhile. Thus, in addition
to assessing Gribble's work, it is also necessary to discuss that of Peters, to establish whether the interpretation is fair, and to discover how apparently extreme statements, such as the first quotation on p. 132, came to be made. This is important, since similar dismissive statements could presumably be made about the teaching of basic mathematics, or logical skills.

The influential analyses made by the Peters school can be contrasted with Segal's work, and with the wider view taken by the Warnock Report, which has developed from Segal. It is here concluded that the educational theory underpinning the Warnock Report best represents the contemporary attitude to the school's place in a child's upbringing, although the theory is not as different from that of Peters as it first appears, since both Warnock and Segal value academic success, and hope to extend it to the many children who could achieve more.

Gribble offers a far too simplistic interpretation of Peters, and his use of the term rehabilitation for work with handicapped children can be speedily rejected, as this is plainly an incorrect use of the term. Habilitation, although unusual in English usage, is the more appropriate term. Rehabilitation refers to the giving back, or restoration, of skills that have been lost for some reason. Thus it would be possible to rehabilitate a child who had lost a hand in an accident by teaching him to write with the other. Similarly, a stroke victim could be partially rehabilitated by being taught to speak, read, or dress himself again. Attempts are made to rehabilitate ex-convicts or former psychiatric patients on their return to the community. They are helped to readjust to the demands of freedom and responsibility.

Children who are physically handicapped because they have been damaged in an accident subsequent to their acquiring a particular skill, and those who have been brain-damaged, with this damage affecting a skill, may be rehabilitated in respect of that particular skill. However, for a mentally or physically handicapped child who has never acquired that particular skill, the difficulties and the description must be different. Gribble uses the term rehabilitate because he needs to reserve the term education for something he regards as more important, namely academic education.
It is not certain whether habilitation, which Gribble calls rehabilitation, includes all school-based tasks with handicapped children, or only the specifically non-academic. That is, is Gribble defining all work with the handicapped as non-educational? If he is, then he is plainly in error, since many handicapped children, even in the traditional classification, manage to achieve high academic levels. This is particularly true of physically handicapped children. In Warnock's wider notion of special educational needs, many of the children will have some strictly academic achievements, even though they may be from the small group requiring special placement.

If, on the other hand, Gribble is rejecting only that part of the schooling that is not academic, his position is still debateable. Many would consider that this non-academic part of schooling should be dignified by the term education, and that Gribble's and Peter's concepts are far too narrow.

Bridging this gap may be achieved by different approaches. The first of these is to ask - What then is the teaching of the handicapped, if it is not education? There are three alternative answers to be considered. Firstly, it is not education, but health care. In organisational terms, at least some of it was until 1971, when responsibility for the education of children in mental hospitals was transferred from the Department of Health to that of Education. At the time, this was thought to be appropriate because of advances in teaching techniques as well as greater understanding of the potentials of individuals, and consequently, of enhanced expectations of the value of teaching for the handicapped individual. Secondly, the teaching of the handicapped can be held to be minding. This supposes no real intervention, and is seen as having a lower value than education, and a lower value even than the third possible answer, that the intervention is training. It has to be admitted that some of the work done with the 2% of children who are to be recorded, in Warnock's terms, and particularly with those who have mental handicaps, will be training within the terms of Skinner's operant conditioning (3). The overall approach may, however, still need to be viewed as education, that is, part of a more prestigious, and valuable, system.

The second approach is outlined at the end of the chapter, and is to ignore the noun education, and look rather at the adjective
educational. An activity can be educational, that is developing a person's knowledge or understanding, abilities or skills, experience and interests; it can be anti-educational that is stunting the person's knowledge, experience, abilities, or interests; or it can be non-educational, that is irrelevant to these. Illustrating this in terms of television programmes, 'Blue Peter' could be classified as educational, for it tells of foreign countries, of children's lives there, and it inculcates certain positive attitudes towards others. Advertisements could be classified as anti-educational, although they can be discussed in an educational manner to demonstrate how they suppress thought and evaluation and press for conformity. Very little can be classified as truly non-educational, that is irrelevant to education, as the viewer is constantly being shown what different people take to be worthwhile, and how people react in differing circumstances. Such influences may, or may not, coincide with those that, in the case of a child, the parents or the school are trying to inculcate.

It is also possible to approach the debate by asking whether there is anything special about a school that separates it from any other place where children are cared for. Segal suggests that it is important to call a place a school to allow the possibility of calling the teaching of even the severely handicapped schooling. He still wishes to keep the term schooling distinct from education, reserving the latter, more prestigious, word for that teaching of children which retains at least some academic aspirations. Illich, by contrast, describes schools merely as a large child-minding service, part of an unnecessarily institutionalised society, education taking place outside in the real world (4). It is more usual to concede that something more than child minding is being undertaken. In traditional terms, which were recognised by the 1971 transfer of responsibility for hospital schools, the school is distinguished from the children's hospital by having educational aims and conditions, rather than aims revolving round the child's health.

Hospitals, although having as their primary role the physical welfare of their clients, who are patients rather than pupils or students, do take on an educational role. This is particularly evident in the treatment of mental and metabolic disorders, but also in the work of the physiotherapist, who with the occupational therapist and the
dietician teach the patients how to move, live, and eat. The behaviour and understanding of the patients are changed.

Furthermore, as well as other institutions which share enough of a school's procedures to begin to look like one, there are schools which look like something else. Summerhill, under A S Neill, was a school in name, yet from contemporary descriptions it sounds more like a childrens' psychiatric clinic (5). Neill specifically deprecated all academic aims as unimportant, and was particularly critical of examinations.

It is possible in Britain for a child not to attend school at all. Home teaching is permitted if the parents are considered responsible and capable. Such action is usually taken by parents who do not want the specifically examination-based and academic elements of schooling for their child. These parents advocate a wider sense of education, deprecating formalism, competition, and institutionalism. However the same decision can result from the opposing philosophy, that academic achievement is paramount, and that the standards in the available schools are not high enough (6). In either case, part of the benefits of schooling have been ignored. Such conflicts over the relative importance of different parts of education are perhaps inevitable. There are conflicts over the relative value of different subjects, and over which subjects should be properly the concern of the school rather than of the home.

Home is generally contrasted with school, and yet parental involvement in formal education is increasing. Moreover, parents are increasingly encouraged to take more positive steps with children of all ages in the development of their learning powers. The relationship between teacher and parent is becoming one of partnership, rather than one of professional and client. It is necessary to distinguish here between the role of a parent as an extension of the teacher, for example in supervising homework, listening to reading, or insisting on music practice, and his role as an addition to the teacher, for example in outings to castles or zoos, or using the home computer. With the very young children, the latter function, albeit it at a simpler level, is an important preliminary to school-based learning. With handicapped children, some of these preliminaries have to be undertaken in school, but the location of the activity is less important than its nature, as
will be shown below in the discussion of educational activities. It must also be argued that much of any child's education, in any sense, can take place outside the influence of both school and parents. Three important influences are television, private reading, and the non-school-based lessons, clubs and societies attended by children at evenings and weekends. These influences are greatly underestimated by the school-based professionals, just as much as by the volunteer coaches, instructors, and leaders involved. Peters, as a former youth leader, stresses the importance of moral education in this context (7), but some strictly academic education can also be gained.

These external influences are especially important to the handicapped child, where they can provide a 'normal' childhood, with hobbies and interests. For physically handicapped children, 'Riding for the Disabled', or swimming, both provide opportunities for the handicap to be overcome. Additionally, the contact with other people, the helpers and coaches, and the responsibilities given to the child help to make him more like 'other children'. Similarly, the opportunities offered by the Scout and Guide Movements, whether in specialised units or in integrated ones allow the handicapped child a similar social life to that which is available to the normal child.

The concepts of schooling, education, and upbringing are thus interrelated, and shared by teachers, parents, other adults, and peers. While it is hard to attempt to separate these concepts, it is clear that they can be linked through the idea of an educational activity, which is one implying change and advance of knowledge, experience, skills and interests, at any level. This relates to Segal's demonstration that all children are capable of some advancement, and that none are ineducable (8).

Thus it is necessary to distinguish, in discussion, between the three useages of the word education. The widest of these involves all kinds of upbringing of children, and may be called education1. A sub-class of this is the education envisaged by the Warnock Report, which is mainly concerned with school-based activities, but which contains enough discussion of work with parents, health visitors, and others, for the inclusion of the notion of upbringing to be essential. This is educationw. A more limited concept is the academic definition of education developed by Peters (educationa). The
elements of education\textsuperscript{a} are found in education\textsuperscript{w}, as the Warnock Report acknowledges the importance of academic learning and the knowledge component, but the Report also asserts that education is more than this, especially for handicapped children (9). The interrelationship of the three educations is shown in the Venn diagram in Figure 9.

Figure 9. Venn diagram of the three educations.

The distinction between the three senses of education might at first appear simplistic, since even those who restrict education to the academic sense would probably include some wider teaching of what might be called good manners or proper behaviour. There can also be considerable argument over the constitution of education\textsuperscript{a}. Peters' work, as elaborated by Hirst, suggests the need for a wide curriculum (10), whereas it could be argued that science or arts alone could suffice.

The definition is particularly important in the context of the upbringing of handicapped children, because of the arguments, notably, as has been seen, by Gribble, that this is not education at all. In the case of children with special educational needs, the wider group suggested by the Warnock Report, much of their education will be education\textsuperscript{a}. Warnock however, adopts the wider education\textsuperscript{w} to include more than education\textsuperscript{a}, because of the prestige of the term education, and because of the expectation of social gains under the prevailing social system as well as 'educational' gain.

The argument of the present thesis is in direct contrast to the works of Barrow, who states that schooling includes education (11). Here, as has been shown, education includes schooling, as well as socialisation, and many other processes. For Peters, education is that which leads to the formation of an educated man (12). It is argued here that more than academic lessons are needed to form such a man, and that a process can still be called educational, even if it
does not lead to this result, or even if it is not intended to.
6.2. What is education? - the traditional approach.

The previous section has demonstrated that there are many different philosophical approaches to the role of the school, and to the education of children. Of these, Peters concept of education will be examined first. This has been gradually evolving over a number of years since its first appearance. It has generally been understood to be defined as initiation into worthwhile forms of life by morally acceptable means.

Most of the subsequent discussion has focussed on the meanings of initiation, worthwhile, and morally acceptable. Peters himself specifically ruled out torture as a morally acceptable means, but it is still necessary to discuss whether conditioning is either logically or morally permissible. This is done in Chapter 9. Peters also stresses a knowledge content to education, and it is this above all which seems to disqualify much basic teaching of particularly the mentally handicapped as education, since it is thought that although they do things, they do not understand what they are doing.

Peters stated that he had not tied education to any specific content (13), although Hirst subsequently defined the forms of knowledge (14). Nevertheless, the concept as stated above is still an evaluative one. In 'Education and the educated man', Peters acknowledges the possibility of the accusation of elitism (15). The ideal of the educated man is that to which all education is meant to be leading. Peters does not seem to accept, however, that this in itself is a moral or evaluative judgement, and that what is valuable or worthwhile, like the very concept of the educated man, is wholly questionable. The attributes are not necessarily universally valued, nor is the product necessarily an educated man. Such doubts are increased when Peters states that the educated man would have certain moral qualities. We presume that such a man would not be involved in burglary, as a matter of definition, yet this ignores the possibility that the two are not mutually exclusive. The question of Peters' reaction on finding a person previously categorised as educated subsequently engaging in burglary remains: would Peters say that he has ceased to be educated? Or would he say that the man never was,
and that the previous categorisation was inaccurate? Or can a man only be described as being educated in his obituary? If this last is so, what is education?

Perhaps the type of education which would produce the educated man should be determined by empirical study rather than by the logical definition given by Hirst and Peters in their discussion of liberal education and forms of knowledge (16). It may be that different people require different forms of teaching to reach the same end.

Peters does, at least at one point, accept an extended use of the word education as referring to all aspects of child rearing (i.e. education^u), but this is discarded in favour of his own concept (education^g) (17).

"The more recent and more specific concept links such processes with the development of states of a person that involve knowledge and understanding in depth and breadth..." (18)

The logic of the words education and educated is not always clear. Firstly, it is not until 'Education and the educated man' that the possible separation of education from the educated man is acknowledged, and the admission that the terms can be used in a more general sense occurs. Peters' earlier statement that a Nazi or a Spartan could not be an educated man demonstrates a moral impossibility not a logical one. That is, it is a matter of opinion.

Secondly, as Peters acknowledges (19), the logic of education and educated is not the same as that of reform and reformed. It is nearer to civilisation and civilised in the way that it can be said that the Aztecs had quite a well-developed civilisation, but they were not really civilised because they practised human sacrifice. The logic of culture and cultured is the same.

When discussing education and civilisation, it cannot be assumed that there is a consensus of opinion on what constitutes either a civilised man or an educated man, although there may well be features which would generally find agreement. A definition of either term may be no more than what is held to be valuable or desirable in a civilisation
or in education. Certainly, both concepts are wider than reform. If a man is said to be reformed, that statement must be qualified by a statement of the respect in which the man is said to be reformed; for example, before he stole, or was constantly in prison, or beat his wife, - and now does not. The word reform cannot be used in what Peters calls the external sense; he is reformed alright, but he still beats his wife. This sounds merely like a flippant joke.

Thirdly, education or educated can be taken as achievement words, that is following Ryle, who in 'Concept of mind' shows the difference between running a race and winning as a task and an achievement (20). There are not two separate activities of running and winning. It would be novel, though permissible, to use teaching as a task word, that is trying to teach, even if it has been unsuccessful, and the pupil has learnt nothing. It is not proper, however, to do this with education, which is thus an achievement word. This analysis is not wholly satisfactory, since with caught, won, or finished, one can point to the clock and say 'he has done it'. With teaching, conditioning, or indoctrinating, it is more difficult, but it is still possible to lay down criteria for success. Thus, 'I will have conditioned that rat when it has run through the maze x times', or 'I have taught him to add when he gets all the sums right'. With educated, it cannot be said that 'When he can resolve this problem, he will be educated', or 'I have educated him now'. There is not a specifiable act. It can be said 'There is an educated person', but it cannot be said when he became one. The recognition can only be afterwards, in perspective. Thus, if it is an achievement word, it is an achievement word with a difference.

Gribble's own work adds a further complication, since he discusses what is intrinsically valuable. This arises as it is not certain whether the intended meaning of the definition on p.140 is 'initiation into what a particular group calls worthwhile' or 'initiation into what is really worthwhile'. The terms intrinsically valuable, from Peters, and intrinsically worthwhile, even if synonyms, are not satisfactorily defined. Some things can be justified in terms of benefit accruing, but in other cases, talk of justification is quite out of place. The same sort of end-stop is reached as where it is inappropriate to ask 'Why do you enjoy what you enjoy ?', or 'Why do you obey God ?'.
It is not clear whether the statement that something has intrinsic value can mean any more than that it cannot be justified. It is also difficult to see how intrinsic value can be applied in any particular case of curriculum choice. It certainly seems to be out of place in a discussion of reading or writing. By contrast, it is quite clear what it means to have instrumental value or usefulness.

There are various possible meanings for 'it has intrinsic value'. Firstly, 'it has no practical use, but I think it is important, and so should you'; secondly, 'it has no practical use, but it has its own special value'; which could be the same as thirdly, 'it has no value at all'. With no criteria to form a judgement, the last two are indistinguishable, which suggests that the first meaning is the operative one. This is a persuasive definition.

As Peters shows, it is possible to establish an instrumental value even for such pursuits as philosophy, which may be said to develop powers of reasoning. It could be that this type of value, that is instrumental value, is what those who claim intrinsic value are looking for. As it leads to different ends, this is just another form of instrumentalism.
6.3 Education - an emotive concept.

It does appear that the statement that somebody is educated is very much like the statement that somebody is a painter rather than a dauber, or a poet rather than a versifier. That is, it is an evaluative term which is applied within quite a wide field of relevant human behaviour, but for the application of which, no logically necessary criteria can be given, an example of Wittgenstein's 'family resemblances' (21). These words all work in the same way as good, although more specifically. Peters believes that he has not made a value judgement, as he has not specified exactly what the content of initiation is to make the man educated. He does however assume an academic preference, and he accepts Hirst's elaboration of this.

What Peters does demonstrate is the impossibility, or the illogicality of attempting to allow other people's views equal weight to one's own. In the present case, one cannot honestly say 'I mean one thing by an educated man, but you can believe something quite different'. A Spartan would claim that another Spartan was educated. It is, however, possible to say, as does Barrow, that there are various routes to being educated in Peters' sense.

This analysis of educated can also be given to the word education, itself equally an evaluative concept. Education is, in fact, what O'Connor calls a prestige word, and

"Like most such words, it is used more often for its prestige value than for its strict descriptive sense." (22)

That is, it is a positive emotive word. O'Connor's own example is 'theory', which would presumably be contrasted with 'hunch' or 'guess'. Education can be contrasted with the pejorative term indoctrination. The word training has come to share this pejorative nature, as have caring and minding. These were all originally prestige words. When Physical Training Colleges were renamed Colleges of Physical Education, the change was made for two main reasons. Firstly, the type of teaching advocated by the Colleges has changed. Physical training involved the copying of drill, whereas physical
education requires the pupils to decide their own movements. Secondly, there was the reason of prestige. What the students learnt was to be part of their own education, as well as that of their pupils. Furthermore, entry standards were upgraded, with a concomitant theoretical increase in the status of the institutions.

Segal demonstrates a similar ambivalent use of a prestige word, in this instance 'educable', stating 'no child is ineducable' for two reasons (23). Firstly, in the 1960's, there were many children in training centres who were not receiving the teaching that would have enabled them to progress, and Segal believed that progress was possible with all children. He also believed that it was wrong to use the term ineducable since this implied that the teaching of such children was less important than that of children in the mainstream or in special education. This had been partly acknowledged in 1959, when the 'ineducable' children, had been renamed 'unsuitable for school', and their 'occupation centres' were renamed 'training centres' (24). Segal was among those influencing the changes which occurred in 1971, when the children were renamed severely subnormal, and the centres became schools. The series of name changes was continued in 1981, when on the advice of the Warnock Report, the severely subnormal became 'children with severe learning difficulties'.

Segal's intentions in advocating the transfer of the children from the health service to the education service were twofold. Firstly, the actual quality of the teaching should be found to improve if more care was taken over teacher training, provision of equipment, and the flow of ideas and techniques. Secondly, the pupils would gain in dignity from the renaming. In this, Segal is a clear ancestor of Warnock, in its emphasis on the need to eliminate stigma.

Education is thus seen to be one of a family of emotive or highly charged evaluative terms which are found too frequently in the Warnock Report and in discussion of the 'educational debate'. Inter alia, the list of these words includes normal, education, stigma, discrimination, handicap, categorisation, integration, needs, and development. Peters uses 'education' in the same way, for he states that education is itself intrinsically worthwhile, that is to say that he includes as education only those facets of which he approves.
The last two sections have shown how important the academic sense of education can be, and that any discussion of the term must acknowledge this and also recognise the emotive nature of the term. However as Barrow states, too much discussion of the word education

"...has lead much philosophy of education quite unnecessarily astray." (25)

Equally, seeking approval, or funding for an activity by calling it and absolutely everything education has its own dangers, not the least of which is the trivialisation of the concept. Warnock, rather than trivialising the concept, attempts to extend it, so that aspects of some children's schooling may properly be called education, although these aspects will not be education for every child. Basic skills are hard won for some, and involve considerable effort in learning and teaching.

One escape route from the education debate is taken by Barrow. He entitles his book 'Philosophy of Schooling', because he wishes to acknowledge the many important things undertaken in schools which are excluded from his, and from Peters', definition of education. He also wishes to emphasise his acceptance of schools, rather than to support the 'de-schoolers', agreeing with Segal that school is the proper place for all children.

The route taken in this thesis, however, is to discuss instead the word educational, not least because of the title of the Warnock Report 'Special educational needs', and because this permits the notion that not all needs are educational. It may be argued that there is very little in special education that is not education even in Peters' terms. Most learning in special education, which is largely language and concept teaching and involves Peters' knowledge component, is far from training. Even those aspects which resemble training most closely are, while acknowledging the possibility of the use of a prestige word, educational. That is, they expand the individual, his experience, skills, and eventually his understanding, albeit in a
limited way. This is the first part of the Warnock Report's 'two-fold' concept of education (see p.9). It can be compared with the idea of an activity being 'pre-education'. Barrow adheres to this view, considering that,

"By and large primary school teachers do not educate as much as lay necessary foundations for education or contribute elements of education." (26)

rather than to Gribble's view of basic literacy skills, and special education contents, being not education at all. These skills and contents can be recognised, together with initial number work, as a necessary part of any person's academic education, without which no further progress can be achieved. Learning to read and write is very different from learning to type, since it is an absolute necessity for any academic success. It is inconceivable to think of an 'educated man' who could not read or write. Barking at print could be regarded as anti-educational, but learning the letter sounds is only one of the many aspects of learning to read, and the child will generally be learning reading and writing simultaneously, not as separate activities. Both will be part of a wider curriculum, even in the first class of a primary school, and together these methods of learning are educational. Indeed the Bullock Report emphasised their importance, insisting that every teacher should be a teacher of reading (27).

One advantage of adopting the pre-education notion is that a pre-reading stage is already recognised by many teachers. Children are given shapes and colours to match and differentiate. The activities of a good play-group are in this pre-reading stage; school starts with actual letters. The nursery school, intermediate between play-group and primary school, will probably teach the early steps in actual reading, in a way that the play-group will not, and both would see this as a difference between them. They have different methods and concentrate on different aspects of a child's development, but both aim to prepare the child for school at the age of five. Insofar as both expand the child, his experience, skills, and understanding, both can be educational.

Thus if it is accepted that pre-education can be educational, the
the former term could usefully describe the activities of the teachers of severely mentally handicapped children, which are a vital part of the learning progression for those children. Particular tasks among children with any special educational need, such as language training for the deaf, braille learning for the blind, and even the prior tasks of walking or dressing oneself, which may be the limit of some children's potential, can all be included. For the child with no special educational need, much pre-education may be accomplished at home, before entering the school system. This will also be true, to a greater or lesser extent, for many of those with special educational needs. However, there will always be some children for whom this is not possible, and for whom

"...continuous support from specialist services, including an intensive educational programme in a special school..." (28)

may be necessary, and just as important as the achievement of the status of an 'educated man'.

The connection between the skills teaching and the rest of the curriculum, and its methods and contents, all ensure that it is educational, that is expanding the individual, his experience, skills and understanding, even if it is not education in conventional terms. This is appropriate to mainstream teaching, since all children need to develop a modicum of personal independence before they can participate in school life. It is also appropriate to a consideration of which matters are the proper job of parents, and which should be undertaken by teachers.

One limitation is that a subject is not academically rigorous enough, for example, 'film studies'. Many social skills could be dismissed on this criterion. Such subjects can be made academic, and hence part of 'education' by being given a literary basis, a logical and ethical approach, a historical perspective, and a link to other subjects in a form of knowledge approach. However, even without these accretions, the use of films may be educational. The difference between a film being entertainment and being educational is that in the former case it is merely watched, whereas in the latter case, the watching will be followed by reading, writing, making judgements. The use made of the raw material is more important than the nature of the raw material.
- a cartoon of 'Tom and Jerry' can be used educationally, and a film of a Shakespeare play can be used anti-educationally. Indeed, such educational use of the media is held by its practitioners as corresponding directly to official objectives for English teaching, which are defined as

"...comprehending ideas orally, following a line of argument, selecting, interpreting, and collating evidence, distinguishing fact from opinion, writing persuasively, reading with effect." (29)
References to Chapter 6.

6 e.g. in the case of Ruth Lawrence, who won a scholarship to Oxford at the age of 12.
14 Hirst, P.H., 1968: op.cit.
16 see n.6 and n.11.
24 ibid., p.6.
26 ibid., p.60.


Chapter 7

Special Educational Contents
Chapter arrangement

7.1 Four areas of difficulty.

7.2 Speech and Language.

7.3 Reading and Writing.

7.4 Mobility training.

7.5 Social Skills.
7.1 Four areas of difficulty

"Terry at 16 had little or no means of communicating. He couldn't hear, couldn't speak intelligibly, knew no sign language and couldn't write." (1)

"He still can't write his own name - but the shy, withdrawn boy has disappeared. Terry 'talks' easily in sign language now. He is confident and cheerful and his prospects are much improved." (2)

The content of a particular child's special education may differ in a number of ways from that of his peers. For a child with special, special needs, the differences will be greater. As Warnock explains,

"In very broad terms special educational need is likely to take the form of the need for one or more of the following:

(i) the provision of special means of access to the curriculum through special equipment, facilities or resources, modification of the physical environment or specialist teaching techniques;
(ii) the provision of a special or modified curriculum;
(iii) particular attention to the social structure or emotional climate in which education takes place.

These are by no means exclusive and a child may very often have more than one of these forms of special educational need." (3)

Thus in the first category of child with special educational needs, the contents will probably be as for mainstream children, the same ground being covered, albeit more slowly, with some specific instruction being given in areas of need. For such a child, the special teaching is a preliminary to, or concomitant with, the mainstream academic curriculum, whatever the level finally reached. However, it is the extra special contents which mark out the special, special needs of those severely handicapped children that Warnock suggests should be 'recorded'. Specific instruction in skills, which other children learn before school and refine in late childhood, may
well constitute the complete extent of a special, special schooling, although recent experience suggests that many more children are able to approach the academic curriculum although provided only with the basic literary skills, at a later stage than their peers. Chapter 8 discusses the special educational methods for such an education, while this Chapter examines the special contents.

Four separable, but related, areas are discussed below. These are speech and language, writing and reading, mobility, and social skills. All form part of a mainstream education, with a continuous interaction, varying from child to child, between home and school influences, particularly as to the relative extent of the formal and the informal setting of different experiences. For the child with special, special educational needs, the amount of formal instruction and schooling will be greater.

Given their interrelationship, it is arguable which skill can be given priority. Reading and writing are not possible for all, and all could be classified as social skills, valuable for a community life, and independence. Certainly, it might appear that mobility should be subsumed into social skills, yet with the modern methods of instruction used in teaching mobility, it is equally part of speech and language, and is an important background for meaningful literacy. The special aspects of mobility which make it a vital part of a visually impaired child's education, can be used as a paradigm case on a par with the paramount place of speech and language acquisition for a deaf child. Alternatively, language may be regarded as the most important of the four, since, academically, so little can be achieved without understanding and expression of ideas. Moreover, in personal development, the absence of communication in some form can lead to mental illness or the lack of understanding of the world found in autistic children. Reading and writing are secondary skills, dependent on language acquisition, although they themselves increase the vocabulary of all children. The true interdependence of skills is emphasised by the development of speech and language as a result of a growing social awareness and ability, and as a result of academic achievement. Not all four of these special contents will be relevant in the case of any individual child in special, special education. The relative importance of each will vary. Children with multiple handicaps, as may be caused by rubella will need a very complex and
specific teaching involving more than one aspect. Other children may just need additional help with language and literacy. In all cases, the need for language development appears of paramount importance.

For a number of reasons, it has been argued that the training of handicapped children, when restricted to these special contents, may not properly be called education. Even reading and writing have been called non-educational (4), although often because of the methods used, notably 'barking at print', rather than for their content. It is somewhat difficult to comprehend why the teaching of a first language should be denied the prestige of being called education, when that of a second language never is.

The nature of basic skills teaching is more open to argument, yet this chapter demonstrates that all the pursuits termed special contents here can be placed in a continuum of child development through which all children must pass. That this is an educational development is demonstrated by use of the distinction between educational and non-educational and anti-educational developed in the previous chapter. It can also be illustrated by using the distinction between teaching or education and care which is given by Warnock (see p.7), and suggested by the Royal National Institute for the Deaf:

"Often our residential centres are a last resort before deaf people are sent to long-stay institutions or psychiatric care..." (5).

In Warnock, as in Plowden, education is concerned with the whole child; it is also for the child. When methods and contents are not for the child, but for the convenience of others, they could cease to be educational, and become anti-educational. It is necessary to distinguish here between teaching methods, and the media employed. Thus Braille or lipreading are media, and like the information conveyed by these media, are part of the content. The skills of brailling or lipreading can be taught in a variety of methods, for example by drill, or by a more liberal, though structured, approach.

It may further be argued that nearly all such teaching can be regarded as education even in Peters' sense, since it involves a knowledge component in the understanding of language and concepts. In the small
area of social skills development which has no definite knowledge component, still shares an element from Peters' education if it can be considered intrinsically valuable. To Peters, these skills may not seem intrinsically valuable, and may even appear trivial to those who have attained them easily, but to those who do not possess them, the position is rather different. Thus it cannot be fairly asked 'Why do you want to be able to talk ?', or 'Why do you want to look after yourself ?'. To those who either do not possess them, or to those who have had to work very hard to achieve them, the social skills have a great intrinsic value. The importance of developing an individual is such that it can merit the prestige of the term education. By calling it educational, and not limiting the use of this term beyond the definition already given, the commentator affords the individual the possibility of further development.
As has been asserted (p. 155), there are reasons why basic communication may be seen as the paramount need. It is not possible here to assess in detail the range of modern theories of the mechanics of the early acquisition of a first language by a young child. However, following Chomsky, it can be said that in a sense, children have an innate ability to develop language skills, since most do (6), while following Skinner, it can be shown that experience is very important (7). A common-sense combination of both theories is that experience provides the material which is used by the innate ability of the individual. A child with the ability will develop some language, whatever the linguistic experience he has. The non-development of language is explicable by either the child not having the experience of spoken language, because he is deaf or not spoken to, or the child having the experience of spoken language, but being seemingly unable to process, understand, or reproduce, his experience.

A communications network is described by Robinson and Petchenik who enlarge upon Singh's work (8)

"... a typical communications network consists fundamentally of a source (or transmitter), a channel which conveys the message, and a receiver. In everyday terms a speaking person may be the source, the air which carries the sound waves of his voice would be the channel, and a listener the receiver. A more detailed analysis of the basic system will usually include the insertion of an encoder between the source and the channel, and a decoder between the channel and the receiver... The function of the encoder is to improve the efficiency of the system. In our original illustration, the voice mechanism of the speaker constitutes the encoder, taking the thoughts of the source and transforming them into sound waves, while the hearing mechanism of the listener is the decoder, transforming the sound waves back into thoughts." (7)

Robinson and Petchenik are concerned with adapting this model to the
processes of map-reading, but here it may be used more readily (Figure 8).

![Diagram of the communications system]

**Figure 8. The communications system**

Speech is only one form of language, albeit the most usual and widespread medium, which takes many forms, but all can be understood in terms of Figure 8. In addition to speech, gestures, formal sign language (e.g. BSL - British Sign Language, or Makaton), mime, finger-spelling, the use of Blissymbols, computer screens, and even writing in the absence of other forms, are all channels of communication. Their formation is to be considered as encoding, while at their reception, their meaning has to be decoded through the mechanisms of hearing, touch, or sight, and is followed by the understanding of the message. In this thesis, the term speech is reserved for talking audibly with the mouth.

Not only the profoundly deaf are affected by the lack of speech and language. In the case of the child unable to process the experience of language, the difficulty may be caused by an interruption at any point in the communications system. Thus the signal may be failing to reach the ears - that is the person has a hearing impairment; or it may fail to be decoded and unable to reach their brain; or the person may be unable to react to the received signal. These last are termed language-disordered people. Sometimes both features are present, and also brain damage, particularly amongst the multiply-handicapped.

Thus there are deaf children who can learn standard language patterns when these are presented through high amplification and specialised teaching. They may even be able to attend ordinary schools despite a profound hearing loss. However, other children can make no sense of such teaching, suffering pain at the high levels of amplification,
and yet still be unable to receive the message.

Work with adults recovering from serious head injury as a result of war or accidents, and with stroke patients, has demonstrated similar difficulties in receiving messages. These patients are said to have suffered brain damage. However except by analogy, or in cases of pre- or peri-natal trauma causing damage to the brain by a temporary loss of oxygen it is usually inappropriate to use the epithet for children, while the term language-disordered is too unspecific. The behaviour of autistic children, for example, is very different to that of conventionally mentally-handicapped children. Even so, recent research suggests that autism is indeed a form of mental handicap, and not a psychosis as was previously believed (11). In autistic children, the linguistic inability is part of a global inability in all forms of communication and social intercourse.

It is argued that spoken language is given undue priority over other forms of language by, in particular, trained teachers of the deaf. The history of the controversy between oral and non-oral teaching is complex, and varies in different countries. The traditional rationale for teaching deaf children in this country has been oralism. This is based on the teacher training of the Ewings at Manchester (12). The ideal is to give the child a spoken language, with which they can communicate to most other people. However, there is, increasingly, a feeling that this is insufficient for two reasons. Firstly, profoundly deaf children very rarely learn to speak well enough to be generally understood; and secondly, the heavy investment of time on specific oral and aural training results in a neglect of other aspects of the curriculum, for which the relatively low reading levels achieved by most deaf children are cited as evidence. In contrast, the students of Gallaudet College in the United States reach high academic levels in a programme based on non-oral methods.

A more radical approach holds that sign language itself is acceptably regarded as a first language, comparable with any other as a valid form of communication. It is hence as much of an insult to a deaf child not to acknowledge sign-language as an acceptable 'mother-tongue' and a proper vehicle for teaching, as it is to a member of any other linguistic minority to disregard their mother-tongue. Such arguments counter those for integration, unless
it were possible for all children to learn sign language. There tends to be a polarisation of those who emphasise social acceptability, and those who emphasise the importance of the individual's development.

Even the confirmed oralist must accept that speech is not the only means of communication, nor even the most important, even for those whose use of it is not limited by handicap. The existence of 'body-language', the influence of smell and touch on personal mood, the facial expression of speaker or listener, are all important to the hearing person, as is the use of gesture to a greater or lesser extent. Within families, or similar close groups, there is a considerable range of non-verbal communication by grunts, shrugs, and sighs. Thus proponents of 'total communication', the use of all possible means of conveying information, can claim to be building upon, and extending, the natural experience of the child.
7.3 Reading and Writing.

Reading and writing are developed from forms of language, and indeed can themselves be classified as forms of language, as seen in the previous section. Respectively, they are receptive and expressive or transmissive. The usual adult mode of reading is swift scanning for comprehension, that practised in the reading of novels or newspapers. This can be extended into a more profound form of comprehension practised for study, using indices, reviewing, and note-taking.

Reading is frequently more valuable to the handicapped person than to his peers, and yet it is usually more difficult to succeed. For example, although there are subtitles on some television news bulletins, and although viewdata systems are advertised as ideal for the deaf, a certain reading level is necessary for their comprehension. That which may be helpful for the hard-of-hearing with naturally acquired language is less so for the profoundly deaf, who as was stated on p.160, frequently have rather low reading levels. Perhaps surprisingly, this low relative capability is true even when the deaf are compared with the blind.

Reading, and writing, here defined as any method of producing language in a permanent or semi-permanent form are obviously potent forces both in and for education, and are often also held to be important political weapons as Freire's work in Latin America has demonstrated (10). Peers commented about Africa in 1958;

"...the new political awakening in a number of colonies, accompanied by a rising sense of nationhood and the growth of democratic forms of government, both local and national, are stimulating the desire for literacy and a knowledge of the issues involved in elections. Illiteracy in this situation is felt more and more to be a mark of inferiority." (11)

Even if some of the political hopes expressed may have proved illusory, the conclusion remains valid. In the developed world, adult illiteracy carries even more stigma, as it implies failure at school, and hence stupidity. It is remarkable that ineptitude with numbers
Reading is more useful to handicapped children than to their friends.

Shorthand (Pitman 2000)

Reading is more useful to handicapped children than to their friends.

Moon (Grade 1)

READING IS MORE USEFUL TO HANDICAPPED CHILDREN THAN TO THEIR FRIENDS

Braille (Grade 2)

READING IS MORE USEFUL TO HANDICAPPED CHILDREN THAN TO THEIR FRIENDS

Blisssymbols

reading is more helpful to children not to speak not more to their friends

Chinese

Reading to handicapped children than to their friends is more useful

Figure 9. Comparisons of scripts.
For both reading and writing, discussion can take place about three aspects. Firstly, there is the actual script that is written or read. This can be in traditional orthography, that is as used on this page, in ita (International Teaching Alphabet), Braille, Moon, or symbols like Bliss or Rebus (Fig.9). Secondly there is the medium by which the script is produced, by hand, or by machine, whether typewriter, word-processor, brailer, or type-setter. Thirdly, there is the method of instruction, mentioned above, and expanded in Chapter 8.

Word-processors, and other computer hardware and software, are now widely designed for, and used by, the severely handicapped, many of whom can now exhibit intelligence which had previously been unrecognised. For a severe case of lack of movement, an especially adapted individual 'Possum' machine can permit the use of, for example, a typewriter by controls in the form of the strength or number of directed breaths.

The recently devised symbol systems Bliss and Rebus are forms of language. They are also forms of writing, which since they are designed to match spoken language, with standard grammatical forms, can also be read, just as a ideographic script like Chinese although their vocabulary is much more limited, and hence complete sentences are difficult to render neatly. Moon and Braille retain not only standard grammar, but also, to a great extent, standard spelling, although there are contractions in long and in commonly-used words which result in a similarity with shorthand. In ita, the grammar is retained, but the spelling is rationalised, while in Chinese, the grammar is as different as the orthography (Fig.9).
7.4 Mobility training.

Until recently, mobility was taught as a separate subject in a blind child's education, an important part, but one that could be added on at the end. Mobility training for the visually handicapped is now much more than just learning to move safely about one's environment. The change has occurred as it was realised that blind people were not able to learn to move sensibly, without learning a number of relevant concepts. These mobility or spatial concepts are now integrated into the child's general curriculum. In a sense, every teacher is a teacher of mobility, just as every mainstream teacher is a teacher of English, and every teacher of the deaf is a teacher of speech. The concepts are, moreover, an important tool in academic development, since they permeate all books and texts, and not only at the simplistic level of 'see above'.

Mobility training for the blinded adult is quite different from that for a child that has never seen. For the former, it is a matter of capitalising on skills and concepts already developed; the retraining involves learning a different deployment of skills, and is thus more akin to the older methods of mobility training. For the latter, the specific tasks of learning to cook, to organise one's belongings, to choose clothes, wash and dress, to go to the shops, and to use public transport, may be the same, yet the understanding of what is happening and where it is happening has to be learnt alongside the task itself.

Like speech training, mobility is both part of every lesson, and is a separately timetabled feature of the curriculum. Gymnastics, dancing, music and movement are all used as an adjunct to formal mobility training, conveying concepts and ideas of the individual's body in relation to his immediate environment. The learning process can be conceived as a three-stage progression. Firstly, there are the general language lessons in the classroom, which include mobility concepts; secondly, there are movement sessions in the gymnasium or 'soft-room'; and finally, there are specific mobility lessons on foot in the wider environment. All are leading towards the same end, of providing the range of spatial and directional concepts familiar to the sighted child, for example, up, down, over, under, left, right.
That this must be integrated with, and is essential to, the curriculum is evident from even a superficial view of any syllabus in mathematics, geography, or history, to name but three subjects.

"It is a common enough experience in any branch of education for children to be talking and learning about things of which they have limited experience and understanding and this could happen in extreme form in blind children with the danger of using 'empty' words and language forms." (12)

Accepting this with reference to spatial and mobility concepts enables it to be understood why Cassirer said:

"...a vast number of the most diverse relations, particularly qualitative and modal relations, come within the scope of language only indirectly, by way of spatial determinations." (13)

Teaching spatial and mobility concepts can thus truly be regarded as applied language instruction.
7.5 Social Skills.

All skills may be classified as social skills, since all contribute towards the individual's social life as a member of some community. Learning to drive, for example, extends the individual's employment prospects; learning to play chess his circle of friends; learning to read his knowledge and his topics of conversation. The skills highlighted here as social skills are those particularly necessary as a basis for independence in community and family living. Social skills are taught both to the young mentally handicapped and to older 'disadvantaged' students, for example on Youth Training Scheme (YTS) courses, where they are a preparation for work and adulthood.

There are two groups of skills for the young to learn. Firstly, there are those which involve social independence, such as dressing, eating, and toileting, and secondly there are those which involve social acceptability and the lessening of stigma. An example of the latter is the perceived need to curb the exuberance and demonstrativeness of many Down's Syndrome children. There may also be types of behaviour to be unlearnt, for example self-stimulating and self-destructive behaviour.

The independence skills can also be part of social acceptability; even among similarly handicapped people, for example, the additional problem of incontinence, or rather the resultant unpleasant odour, will commonly produce stigma. For the adolescent, much of the emphasis in social skills will be in this area of social acceptability. The two groups of skills are allied through their importance as a means to end dependence.

The work with adolescents and young people is called training to differentiate it from their schooling, at which they have failed, or against which they have rebelled, and because it has a vocational bias. However, much of both is educational, as Gulliford recognises, using almost identical terms to the definition of educational employed in this thesis:

"These social competence skills are valuable first of all
because they benefit the child - they put him increasingly in situations where he has to think for himself; they enable him to widen his experience and increase his skills. They are basic to the process of developing as a person." (21)
References to Chapter 7.

1 Sydenham, R., 1984: Pers. comm.
2 ibid.
5 Sydenham, R., 1984: op.cit.
Chapter 8

Special Educational Methods
Chapter arrangement

8.1 Behaviour modification: A special educational method?

8.2 Logic of behaviour modification

8.2.1 Operant conditioning

8.2.2 Training and drill

8.3 Ethics of behaviour modification

8.3.1 Autonomy and free will

8.3.2 Paternalism, means and ends
8.1 Behaviour modification: A special educational method?

"Skinner's teaching methods, however, may well often be appropriate as a last resort in an attempt to train handicapped people where all else has failed or seems inevitably unsuccessful. Only in such a desperate position could such a means be justified by its end result, since the method does seem to treat pupils as somehow less than human." (1)

This widely held view of operant conditioning as a form of behaviour modification expresses a moral and a logical concern about the treatment of pupils in classrooms. Blackman discusses these philosophical issues at length, going further than the above quotation, and he questions whether for even the most severely handicapped and institutionalsied person, it is a proper method.

"However, for many patients there may be no prospect of discharge from the hospital to the 'normal' world, and questions concerning the ethics of behaviour modification in such cases may be more difficult to resolve. Is it better to encourage in such people more varied behavioural repertoires, or should we leave them to their own disturbed and limited horizons?" (2)

Blackman concludes that 'Opinions are clearly divided'.

Behaviour modification does not constitute the sole method used in special education, nor even in special, special education. Indeed it is possible to argue that there are no special educational methods in the sense that there are no methods confined to special education. All the methods may, like the activities, be found in the mainstream classroom, although the special equipment used, for example the electronic 'loop' system, is not. Despite this, behaviour modification is given extended treatment here, for three reasons. Firstly, it is controversial, and thus the arguments tend to stand out more starkly. Secondly, the discussion follows logically from the elaboration of the meanings of education in Chapter 6, since behaviour modification is a form of teaching. Thirdly, the ethical questions
which arise concerning free will and autonomy, paternalism, ends and means, relate both to the earlier discussion of the nature and value of a person (Chapters 4 and 5), and to the next chapter 'Special Educational Needs'.

Before looking at operant conditioning and its place in behaviour modification theory, a distinction must be drawn between the individual techniques, the overall methods, and the presuppositions inherent in the rationales of teaching. In the first instance, there are many techniques of teaching, many of which are not specific to an individual subject. Thus the teacher of speech needs to know how different sounds are made, by varying the mouth shape and the use of air (i.e. inhaled or exhaled). To this has been added a requirement to operate various electronic aids to help, for example, a child make his voice pattern approximate to the correct pattern shown on an oscilloscope.

Secondly, there are different methods which can be used to encourage the child to try the techniques. Some of these will be intrinsic to the task, some, such as rewarding the pupil by giving sweets, are extrinsic. Some can combine both. It can thus be argued that it is quite logical in using different techniques to reward or punish children in ways that Skinner advocates, while yet not accepting the view of man and teaching that Skinner propounds (3). Thirdly, the teacher possesses an underlying rationale for attempting to teach the matter in hand. These rationales may vary, and may imply a variety of techniques and methods.

The techniques themselves are relatively value-free; it is the discussion of their application that is not. Thus this Chapter is in two sections, the first dealing with the logical questions arising from the methods, discussing the nature of behaviour modification as a teaching method, and the second with the moral concepts arising from the rationales, attempting to answer the two further questions, 'Is man as Skinner supposes ?', and 'Is it right to treat people as Skinner suggests ?'. The relationship between these two questions is also explored, to see whether they can both be true together, or both false, or whether either can stand alone.
8.2 Logic of behaviour modification.

In some senses it is true to say, that all teaching is behaviour modification. All teachers expect their pupils to be able to perform tasks following instruction, of whatever form, that they could not perform before. 'Knowledge' is tested through behaviour, that is a test or examination is taken, a map is drawn, an essay written, or a conversation in a foreign language takes place. For the behaviourist who accepts the arguments of Skinner, this comprises the whole of education. 'Knowing how' is behaviour, and there is no 'knowing that' beyond these expressions of behaviour. For most teachers, both education and training mean more than this.

A discussion of 'true' behaviour modification, that is operant conditioning, is complicated by the fact that it comprises many sorts of activity. There are several different techniques, for example, punishment, differential schedules of reinforcement, timeout, and over correction, but all are based on systems of reward or punishment.

Behaviour modification can be contrasted with other approaches, to establish the differences between it and what may be seen as the norm in the classroom. This is explored fully by Cohen (4), and it may be said that since such modification is concerned primarily with behaviour and the learning of skills, it can be contrasted with the opposing rationale that knowledge and understanding represent more than behaviour, that is what Cohen terms the 'liberal tradition'. Furthermore, as mastery of the skills is paramount to the behaviourist, the approach can also be contrasted with the 'child centred' emphasis on individual development. Cohen believes that in the child-centered approach, insufficient attention is paid to the content of what is being learnt, and behaviour modification places too much emphasis on this aspect, while the liberal tradition holds a balanced view. Mary Warnock, in 'Schools of thought' (5), shows herself to be a member of this liberal tradition. The Warnock Report itself, with its emphasis on needs and on an individual's approach to education, follows the Plowden Report in being child-centred. Unlike Plowden, however, it can be criticised for not dwelling deeply enough on practical teaching methods or contents.
8.2.1 Operant conditioning.

The form of behaviour modification devised firstly for work with rats and pigeons, and then applied to humans, is operant conditioning. It must be differentiated from the classical conditioning of Pavlov, which involved the triggering of reflexes. Salivation, in Pavlov's experiments, happens to the dog. It does not occur by the dog's action. Operant conditioning involves action by the individual.

Put simply, 'teaching' for Skinner, involves developing new behaviour patterns. Forms of behaviour are either rewarded, or reinforced in Skinner's terminology, or punished by negative reinforcement. Behaviour can also be ignored, which seems to be a form of negative reinforcement. Reinforced actions tend to be repeated by the subject, be they pigeons or humans, while those which are ignored or punished tend to die out. Rats in cages can learn to press levers, since by doing so, they obtain a food pellet, and hence they tend to repeat the action. This has long been a piece of commonsense knowledge for parents and teachers, who praise and reward good behaviour and actions they wish to encourage, and punish bad behaviour and actions they wish to eradicate. Many toys for very young children are designed to this principle. The Jack-in-a-box jumps out when a lever is pressed, so the child keeps pressing the lever. Thus it is not controversial that behaviour can be modified by Skinner's methods. Operant conditioning may even help to solve the problem of motivation that besets the teacher of a large or recalcitrant classes. However, it may be questioned whether Skinner's methods actually succeed in teaching anything. The teacher may have to use conventional techniques for teaching reading, but employ reinforcement of some kind to keep the children interested and compliant.

It has been demonstrated how patterns of behaviour can be built up in rats or pigeons

"...most of his pigeons developed stereotyped patterns of behaviour between the five-second periods of access to food. Thus one of the birds was seen to turn round and round in the box, always in an anti-clockwise direction." (6)
As a teaching method, operant conditioning can be used similarly to build up patterns of behaviour in a very young or handicapped child.

The principle advantage claimed for this method is that it works. Traditional education is criticised by the proponents of operant condition because it is not efficient. It has, it is suggested, neither a properly planned schedule, nor a clearly conceptualised outcome. Efficiency is held to be the most important aspect of education. Furthermore, traditional education uses concepts like knowledge and understanding, which Skinner considers to be otiose. Similarly, provided the skills are performed, a commitment to learning is unnecessary.

Skinner's critics regard operant conditioning as limited and possibly stultifying. It is close, they argue, to indoctrination or manipulation, and is non-educational, since it may be restricted to specific tasks and hence does not allow for transfer of techniques or knowledge in the way aimed at by most teachers.

However, the very point of criticism, that operant conditioning does not involve commitment or understanding, has led it to be seized as a revolutionary method in the teaching of profoundly mentally handicapped people and for those who suffer from such severe mental illness that they need long term hospital treatment. Indeed, Skinner showed at quite an early stage in his corpus of writing that the methods could be used to extend the behaviour of what he termed a microcephalic 'idiot' whose

"...intellectual accomplishments ... in the forty-first year of his life have exceeded all those of his first forty years. They were possible only because he has lived a few hours of each week of that year in a well-programmed environment." (7).

In practical terms, any task can be broken down into very small steps. Each step is taught successively by reinforcement of each movement that approximates to that desired. As each movement becomes more like the desired step, and as each step is performed, the next step is taught as a follow-on. Then reinforcement is given for the completion of the two in order, and the process is continued until the whole task can be completed. This is called chaining.
Practical problems with the method are legion. Additionally, considerable controversy surrounds the practice of reinforcement. As Furneaux indicates, there are children, particularly amongst the autistic, for whom it is difficult to find a reinforcement (8), since they are not interested in the sweets or potato crisps suggested by Gulliford (9). A more radical difficulty is that it is not always possible to decide what is a punishment and what is a reward. This problem may be more evident to the child than to the teacher, to whom the matter seems clear-cut. Thus a teacher may ignore a child for most of the time. When the child does something wrong, the teacher punishes him. However, since this punishment means being given attention, which is itself a reward in the child's mind, the negative reinforcement becomes a positive reinforcement, and the 'naughty' behaviour is repeated.

A different problem arises when meals are used as reinforcement. As a meal is expected to occur as a matter of course, deprivation is regarded as a punishment, rather than simply as a lack of a reinforcement. In due course, such deprivation may actually harm the child, making the logical dilemma an ethical one. It is noticeable, that although Skinner demonstrates that positive reinforcement is more efficient than negative reinforcement, he does not consider the moral implications of either.

The logic of 'time out' as a punishment also merits evaluation. 'Time out' is the removal of children from, for example, the meal table, and is used as a negative reinforcement for bad behaviour both at the meal table and elsewhere. The rationale is that at the next meal the child will not evince the same unwanted behaviour, so that he may remain at the table and enjoy the meal. This rationale is frequently ineffective, as the child does not make the connection between the unwanted behaviour, for example, head-banging or rocking, and the negative reinforcement. Indeed, the time away from the table may provide the opportunity for the undesirable form of behaviour to occur, and is thus a positive, rather than a negative, reinforcement, and the behaviour is maintained rather than extinguished.

The concepts of Skinner's theory form a family of terms which are defined only by reference to each other. This circularity is explored by the present author, in a treatment of Skinner as a philosopher.
rather than as a technician (10). Briefly, however, it has been demonstrated that most applications of behaviour modification by operant conditioning go well beyond Skinner's original ideas since they involve learning and understanding on the part of the pupil. Except in a few very limited tasks, it is also too time consuming and unnecessary to wait for the appropriate piece of behaviour to appear 'naturally'. Thus a child is usually shown, guided, or forced, through a pattern of behaviour, which is then rewarded to maintain the behaviour and to make it part of the child's repertoire. The teacher normally undertakes an active role, not only shaping the environment in an appropriate way, but also acting as a model for the behaviour of her class. The resultant copying of behaviour goes beyond operant conditioning. Thus it can be said that most attempts at operant conditioning require an element of understanding, which brings them closer to traditional education, even though the child may not be able to verbalise what he has seen.

True operant conditioning is very useful at the commencement of learning, but is soon discarded as it can only be applied in limited areas. Thus a young deaf child can, at first, be reinforced by a teddy bear whose eyes light up when a noise is made. As a result, the child vocalises frequently. However, in order to teach the child to discriminate between the different sounds produced either by himself or others, the teaching must progress beyond this simplistic level. Once the child understands the process, different teaching methods are adopted. Thus once the association of the approximation of speech pattern to those of the teacher as recorded in an oscilloscope is made, guidance can be given in the placing of the mouth, tongue, and lips to improve the correspondence, and henceforward, success is its own reward as the child's speech pattern matches that on the screen.
8.2.2 Training, drill, and computer assisted learning.

Training, drill, and computer assisted learning are all considered here as methods which, although appearing to be similar to operant conditioning, are not.

Training, in philosophy of education, is a derogatory term, and yet in many respects it is used as a prestige term. Thus, for example, 'she is a trained teacher', or 'it is important for a woman to get some kind of training before she gets married'. In these usages, the term indicates someone following a course with practical, and sometimes academic, contents. The person is generally regarded as committed, and knowledgeable. The concept is only differentiated from the academic notion of education by its specific nature, rather than its generality. The proportion of academic content varies, for example, between the training of a doctor and the training of a dancer; in some cases, the training may amount to an education in Peters' sense. Despite this, in the philosophy of education, training has been opposed to education, as noted above. Generally this is because 'training' is vocational and specific, but also because it uses more limited methods. Consequently, it seems to be much closer to the training of animals, which is achieved by operant conditioning, than an important part of education. Thus, children are trained in ways resembling operant conditioning; they are, for example, 'potty trained'. Yet in most normal children this occurs as a matter of maturation as much as a matter of reinforcement or punishment.

Drill may be viewed as an earlier, undeveloped form of behaviour modification. It has as its main aspect, the constant repetition of an action until a pattern of behaviour is built up. An individual follows this pattern so automatically that if he is interrupted, he may be unable to continue the pattern, but will need to recommence the pattern from the beginning. The pattern is a whole, not the sum of its individual parts. However, unlike the method in true operant conditioning, the instructor will not wait for the desired behaviour to appear, but will demonstrate the specific skills. These are then either performed correctly or incorrectly. However, drill does share with operant conditioning the method of breaking down a task into its
component parts which can be strung together as, in a different
category, a dance routine is learnt.

Both in training and drill, operant conditioning is seen as a way of
motivating, ensuring, and maintaining learning, rather than a way of
actually teaching.

With adults, there appear to be appropriate methods for teaching
specific skills, such as learning to use three dimensional maps, or
learning to discriminate between different colour changes in a
chemistry laboratory. For children, similar skills, for example
learning tables or letter sounds are a necessary part of their
schooling. However, these may well be regarded as only part of the
child's schooling. As well as learning, in a mechanical sense, the
repetition of his tables, the child needs to learn and understand the
what the tables mean. Similarly, although an older child can learn to
speak a foreign language through the pronunciation of the words in a
language laboratory, even this demands far more than operant
conditioning can provide, as reading skills and an understanding of
the task are required.

Computer assisted learning can combine facets of operant conditioning,
training, and drill. For a handicapped child, the computer represents
a reinforcement more potent than any teacher, since it never gets
tired, bored, or irritable. On the other hand, it cannot show
sympathy or provide human comfort, and except for those cases which
have already been programmed into it, cannot allow for individuality.
Furthermore, most programmes can permit progress well beyond the
limits of operant conditioning, especially those which are branched,
rather than the original simple linear programmes prepared by Skinner
himself. The computer itself is not a teacher. That is the person
who devised the programme. The computer is merely a reinforcing and
presenting instrument, albeit a very 'efficient' one in Skinner's
terms.
8.3 The ethics of behaviour modification.

As a prolegomena to a detailed analysis of the ethical terms used in descriptions and criticisms of behaviour modification, it will be useful to indicate the nature of the practical moral problems involved. As in all moral argument, there is a conflict over the primacy of different moral principles. This the teacher may be torn between two aspects of her ethos; firstly, should she help the children learn all they can, or secondly, should she treat these children as individuals. The basic moral dilemma is whether anybody be treated in the way behaviour modification demands, or if they are so treated, whether they do not become objects rather than pupils. More subtly, can it be argued that while it is not right to treat most people like this, may it still not be permissable to use the method for severely handicapped people, since there appears to be no alternative?

Two answers can be given. The affirmative answer is given on the grounds that any action which is successful is better than no action. By contrast, the negative answer holds that this is social discrimination, and that operant conditioning is wrong as is any approach which treats anyone as less than human. An extension of this view is that all teaching of children by adults is discriminatory, paternalistic, and wrong, since it imposes standards. Skinner capitalises on this argument to say that, given that this aspect must exist as a matter of definition, teaching should at least be specific and directed, rather than irrational and random.

Turning from the ethics of the situation to what has been termed meta-ethics, it is necessary to demonstrate the inter-relationship of a family of emotive concepts which are used in such moral debates. These terms are autonomy, free will, paternalism, means, and ends. Of these, the central concept is autonomy. An autonomous person is one for whom

"...what he thinks and does, at least in important areas of his life, are determined by himself. That is to say, it cannot be explained why these are his beliefs and actions, without
Such an individual has free will. Treating people as non-autonomous, in the sense imputed to operant conditioning, both overrides free-will in a practical sense, and in a theoretical sense denies that there is such a thing as free-will. Thus to Skinner, the autonomous man is a fiction. Those who value autonomy, and believe in free-will, allow that people can act to influence, educate, or help others, but emphasise the importance of treating each individual as an end in, and for, himself; not as a means to another's end. Treating a person as a means overrides his autonomy. This is the argument against paternalism, which by implication overrides autonomy by deciding for an individual what his ends should be. Clearly this discussion is closely linked with the traditional rational ethics of Kant, and with the rationally based ethics of Rawls.
8.3.1 Autonomy and free-will.

The concept of free-will is central to much of the ethical thought of the Western world. Philosophers as disparate as Sartre and Kant have held it at the centre of their ethics. Skinner intentionally sought controversy by entitling one of his works 'Beyond freedom and dignity'. Anticipating the criticism that his methods do not allow students the dignity of being treated as autonomous, he argues that no-one is autonomous. Free-will is an illusion, and since free-will and autonomy stand together, both concepts should be ignored. Skinner is able to argue in this way because he polarises random and determined behaviour. In answer, it can be said that freedom does not involve randomness, but is compatible with a certain form of determinism, although not predestination. Thus the person who is autonomous has free-will, not in an absolute sense, but in the sense that any actions are not wholly predictable. Each individual makes choices on a number of bases, including his own nature as well as the influence of others. Thus this limited autonomy can be misused, abused, or ignored as a contrast to being fostered, developed, and encouraged. The autonomous man is thus different to Kant's heterogeneous being (12). However, 'free-will' displayed in the form of random, unpredictable behaviour is not the sign of an autonomous person, but of one who is not 'in control'.

This approach to free-will and autonomy provides the following view of behaviour modification. Operant conditioning, based on the rationale of behaviour modification, does not seem to respect sufficiently an individual's free-will or autonomy, because it treats the subject as an object, as an organism whose behaviour is to be 'shaped' in Skinner's terms, but 'manipulated' in the eyes of others. The total path of behaviour is to be chosen, either by a teacher, or an administrator, or a programmer. It is noteworthy that in some contexts, the teachers are called 'instructors' or 'supervisors'. Both the path to be followed, and the method, as well as the outcome, are chosen by the organiser of the learning. The student's own interests are ignored, except in so far as they may be exploited as reinforcement, although the programme may be considered to be 'in the student's best interest'.
One response to this is that all education necessarily follows such a pattern. Only at a very advanced stage does a student ever choose his area of study. In this country, choices of 'options' are made at fourteen, but these are clearly circumscribed, and are, at best, choices within groups of subjects. The syllabus is determined. Even with the 'Mode 3' examinations, the work has to be approved.

Originality of thought is rarely rewarded as much as is logical analysis of the material. The same holds of first degree work, and even, in some senses, of research. However, there is a difference, as Peters points out (13), in following the advice of an authority as a rational procedure from a respect of his knowledge rather than of him as an individual. Even quite young children can enjoy an academic task, become involved and want to learn, for the sake of the task rather than for any external reward.

As far as handicapped children are concerned, any approach must be varied and tailored to the individual. Much depends on the extent of the handicap. It seems obviously wrong to say that in the case of mentally handicapped people, free-will can be ignored since such people have no rational way of acting, and therefore cannot be said to possess free-will. This represents a simplistic view of what constitutes mental handicap, and of the variations that are subsumed in the term (14).

However, the situation may appear to be different when considering those individuals so profoundly handicapped that they can do nothing. The functions of their bodies continue, to a greater or lesser extent, but there is no medical hope of improvement. Thus, it is clear that the work of enrichment programmes cannot be judged in utilitarian terms. For these people, the enrichment of their environment through the use of textures, tastes, and lights is performed by devoted teachers and nurses from a conviction that they are doing the right thing. For these very special, special pupils, behaviour modification has no place. It becomes no longer sensible to ask 'What is education ?', but rather 'What should we do ?' It is compassion that dictates such action, with a belief that there is something special about the human individual. In a sense, each is autonomous, as each is an individual unlike any other.
Paternalism is a term of either praise or criticism which has long been used in the social and political considerations of education, which often replace the methodological considerations in a debate. Paternalism involves the making of choices for other people, choices which they are supposed to be unable to make, or are prevented from making, for themselves. This inability occurs for several reasons, of which the prime reason is that the individual is too young. Good parents are paternalistic since they take care to make decisions for their children's future, as well as protecting them from present harm. Matches are hidden, and gates are placed on stairs. As the child develops, the gates are removed, to be replaced by other precautions. Pills are hidden from the child and the proper use of, and respect for, medicines is taught. This is paternalism in its appropriate context, although some extreme proponents of freedom hold that children should not be guided in any way. More generally, paternalism is opposed when it is seen as inappropriate, either because the individuals should be able to choose for themselves, or because the very choices are defined for them.

It is felt by many handicapped people that charity is degrading as it is a form of paternalism. The recipient has a lesser status than the donor. Moreover the recipient has no role in decisions over the distribution of the charity. Thus this form of paternalism is believed to involve an unequal relationship, together with a lack of dignity, which leads to stigma.

Such criticisms take on an added force when they are viewed in the light of behaviour modification programmes. These define the socially acceptable behaviour sought by the paternalist, without reference to the students, or even to outside norms, and thus both the treatment and the standards are imposed on the student. It must be accepted that what is 'socially acceptable behaviour' is open to debate, and in the treatment of maladjusted or mentally ill people there are real moral problems, since both these terms are as emotive in their nature as is 'socially acceptable behaviour'.

185
Two examples can demonstrate the differences between individual cases. Firstly, if an adult should wish to rid himself of a phobia such as the fear of flying, or of an undesired habit like smoking, he may voluntarily agree to a programme of behaviour modification. In this case the subject remains the subject, even when he submits himself to the 'treatment'. This is to be compared to the acceptance of a surgical operation or of a course of prescribed pills. All these offer a solution to a condition which the adult considers to be unwanted. A second, and more dubious, example is that of the person convicted of homosexual offences who may yet not wish to change, or may believe that paedophilia should not be punishable. He may still be forced to undergo operant conditioning or drug therapy to change what others regard as errant. Moreover, in a case of a homosexual who has a stable relationship which he likens to the heterosexual's marriage and also not wishing to change, it might be considered that operant conditioning is an unwarranted assault, while still holding it to be necessary for the former case.

In these examples, not only is there the question of what constitutes socially acceptable behaviour, particularly in a time of changing mores, but also there is the question of the morality of making choices for another, against his will. The counter-argument that the paternalistic psychologist can see what will be in the patient's best interest may be regarded as no more than a mask for the political control of that person, as in Russia, and is connected to Rousseau's contention that a man can be 'forced to be free', which is true only under Rousseau's definition of freedom.

Paternalism does not allow people to make their own mistakes. The parent eventually recognises when a child can be allowed to do this, and indeed learn from his mistakes. This change occurs because the parent recognises that the child is an end, not a means. The concept of paternalism is closely interwoven with that of ends and means, because of the need to ask who should make the choices. Kant advises that all actions should be performed so as to respect another's autonomy, to treat him as an end, not as a means to one's own end. There is the concomitant hope that others will act in the same way towards others. This kind of rational approach is taken up by Rawls in his advocacy of the 'maximin' principle, whereby the natural choice for a person not knowing his own position in a society is shown to
be an arrangement which only allowed improvements for the better-off if these involved an improvement for the least well-off. This, of course, supposes that all people want the same sorts of things. Both Kant and Rawls presume that to be rational means to choose in the same way (as Kant and Rawls). It is when people do not choose, or are unlikely to choose, what is held to be rational, that others feel the need to choose for them.

A further implication of the difference between using someone as a means to one's own end, rather than to his own end, may be illustrated by the difference between what is in the individual's best interest and what is in the best interest of the staff of the school or hospital. Thus, a patient in a psychiatric ward who continuously calls the nurses may be ignored, so that losing the reinforcement of the nurses' responses, she ceases to bother them. While this clearly makes life easier for the nurses working in an understaffed psychiatric ward, it also suggests that the purpose of sending the patient to their care has been forgotten (18). The patient's best interest might well be served by an entirely different course of action, for example by providing the patient with an activity such as helping the staff, which absorbed her to the extent that she did not need to call the nurses and which would have a positive advantage to the running of the ward.

Similarly, the use of behaviour modification with a child may change his behaviour so that life is made easier for his family or teacher. While this may be an important and necessary aim for such treatment, it cannot be the only one. It would, for example, make life 'easier' for the family if the child was in a permanent drug-induced coma, but this cannot be said to allow for the quality of life or the concern for the individual that has been defined as his right as a person.

It may appear acceptable to use operant conditioning to teach the mentally handicapped the basic skills like communication, rather than the social skills or behaviour, since these, it can be argued, are clearly beneficial to the child. However, the 'basic skills' in this context are the social skills. Evaluative decisions must be made about what is acceptable, and what is not.

It is not appropriate, in this thesis, to provide answers to the moral
questions which have been posed. For the profoundly handicapped, decisions have to be made as to what is in their best interest. In certain limited cases, operant conditioning may be used if it develops skills and even understanding, for then it can be regarded as educational. It can never be considered to be a total education, even though it may occupy the whole of a person's schooling in Barrow's terms. Operant conditioning appears to be a useful tool with which certain limited aspects of a wider education can be covered. Thus, for example, it could be used in an emotion-free atmosphere to teach the discrimination of similar letter shapes to a dyslexic child.

A moral dilemma has to be faced, and this is that although Skinner's 'efficiency' may not be enough, it must still not be ignored. Although teaching methods which do not work, however laudable their rationale, may not harm a child who has other means of learning - from his parents, his peers, or his environment, for a child with profound handicaps, there may be no other route. Efficiency may have to be the criterion, albeit mitigated by an appreciation of the necessity of not indulging in cruelty.
References to Chapter 8.

13 Peters, R.S., 1966: op.cit., p.240; p.259 et seq.
Chapter 9

Special Educational Needs
Chapter arrangement

9.1 Special Educational Needs: a useful concept?

9.2 Special Educational Needs: the Warnock approach

9.3 Needs

9.3.1 Educational Needs and Special Needs

9.4 Special Needs: a wider approach

9.4.1 The Special Needs of gifted children

9.4.2 The Special Needs of girls
"...we wish to see a more positive approach and we have adopted the concept of Special Educational Needs, not in terms of a particular disability which a child may be judged to have, but in relation to everything about him, his abilities as well as his disabilities,—indeed all the factors which have a bearing on his educational progress." (1)

The title 'Special Educational Needs' was given to the Warnock Report as an explicit contrast to the title of a 1946 pamphlet 'Special Educational Treatment' (2). 'Needs' was thus substituted for 'treatment' on the grounds that the former indicated an personal approach to a person as a subject, the latter an impersonal approach to a person as an object. It must also be admitted that the Warnock Report was following a trend, rather than creating one, for the concept of special educational needs was currently fashionable. The endorsement of the use of the term by the Report promoted this fashion for the use of the word needs, although not always in appropriate contexts.

The term special education has been current since the 1944 Act, while the first official use of the term special school was in 1926, when it was introduced to replace earlier labels, for example 'defective', which were seen as derogatory. The term special education was adopted to foster a popular acceptance of the idea that the teaching of handicapped children was at one with the teaching of the mainstream, that it is education, different, but not inferior to any other. In practical terms, because the exigencies of the post-war financial climate demanded that the new schools be established in isolated country houses, special education became socially and educationally isolated as well as geographically so.

In the U.S.A., the term exceptional has come into use instead of handicapped. Like special, this is a prestige word, used in a rather unusual context, to enact a form of persuasive definition. If people see such education as special, and such children as exceptional, it is thought that there will be less stigma. The usage of the term is
thus seen as facilitating acceptance and integration, although as the
analysis of the word normal in Chapter 4 shows, this need not be so.

The effect of the concept of special educational needs permeates the
Warnock Report, and makes it a logical whole. However, the concept
presents certain difficulties, since it is never adequately defined.
The meaning is only given in relation to special education and special
educational provision, which are themselves defined in terms of
special educational need. There is no analysis of what might
constitute a 'need'. Thus children with special educational needs are
defined as those who need special educational provision. This is no
explanation.

Chapter 3 of the Warnock Report, which purports to discuss the
concept, does not in fact do so. Reasons for adopting the term are
given; it replaces stigmatizing words like handicapped and disabled,
it strengthens the individual emphasis, it allows for children with a
multiplicity of handicaps to be catered for, and the Chapter also
discusses the proportion of children likely to be in such need.

"...about one in six children at any time and up to one in five
children at some time in their school career..." (3)

This seems to imply no more than that the members of the Committee
believe that finance should be provided for special provision for up
to 20% of the population, including 2% who need to be recorded,
figures which appear to remain constant.

Although special educational need is such an important concept that it
provides the title of the Report, and represents the crux of the
proffered argument, it will be argued in this Chapter that the term
needs is otiose. Needs is shown to be a word with little practical
meaning, but which is overlain with strong emotive tones. It is,
indeed, another prestige word, similar to those discussed in
Chapter 6. Special educational needs could be said to mean no more
than 'we approve of special education with an individual approach'.
'Needs' is here providing an assurance of approval, and acts as a
contrast to the words formerly used, just as have 'normal',
'education', and 'special'.
In Chapter 7, it was deemed necessary to add the concept of special, special needs to describe the position of children with profound handicaps for whom educational integration is an impracticality, although one might hope for some measure of social integration to be possible. It must be emphasised that for some children, the 'needs' are so different and complex, when compared with those of children 'with special educational needs', that special is an inadequate description. If mildly handicapped children, such as those with mild learning difficulties, who may only 'need' a sympathetic teacher, have special needs, then the prelingually deaf, the profoundly mentally handicapped, and many physically handicapped children must have a special, special need. Something extra has to be added, to acknowledge the severity of the educational problem facing these children, their teachers and their parents.

It is also possible to use Warnock's concept of special educational need and to extend it logically to cover areas not considered by the Committee. If by having a special educational need is meant that a child cannot develop to his full educational potential within the mainstream classroom without some extra help, then gifted children and girls must also be considered. It is argued here that these groups do have an educational need, which by this definition is a special educational need, and thus statutory provision should be made for them despite their omission from the current legislation. This conclusion is reached through an analysis of needs, special needs, and special educational needs, three areas which cannot be taken to be coincident.

If it were to be agreed that gifted children could be officially recognised as having such a special need, local education authorities would have to make a greater financial provision for these children than, through the current programmes of enrichment, bursaries to music colleges, and the assisted places scheme, they presently do. In the present climate, this would imply that other children were receiving less in these areas. At present, entitlement is not claimed on the basis of special need, although it can be argued that, logically, it should be.

Thus Warnock limits the concept of special educational need, using it only to describe differences of approach within a limited context.
'Special' is an euphemism, and 'Needs' is almost a tautology. Interestingly, when taken to its logical conclusion in the case of special provision for gifted children or girls, it can be used to support arguments for educational divisiveness, rather than the type of integration that most followers of Warnock have adhered to.

It is, of course, an empirical question whether there will be any less social divisiveness or stigma as a result of the adoption of the term 'Special Educational Needs' and the new descriptions of educationally handicapping conditions. It must also be, at least in part, an economic question whether the new system will be allowed to work, since it will clearly require more finance than can be saved by closing special schools.

As has been shown, Warnock, within the terms of reference, gives such a wide application to the concept special educational needs that it begins to lose its meaning. The concept could be taken to an even wider context by the claim that, in fact, the educational needs of all children are special, in the sense that each should be treated individually, with a personally designed educational work programme. Yet, if all are special, none are. There is no meaning if there is no contrast. Warnock seems to believe that, by widening the group so covered, as well as by ensuring a more appropriate treatment for these children, stigma will be eradicated. One does not stigmatise those who cannot spell perfectly, or who have difficulty with arithmetic, so, Warnock would argue, why should children with greater problems be penalised for their disability. Such an approach is very laudable, although it must be said to fly in the face of human nature.

The approach in this thesis has been to accept that Warnock's wider group have special needs, but to acknowledge that amongst this group, there are a relatively small number of children, those that Warnock suggests will be 'recorded', the nature of whose special educational problem is so great that they can be regarded as having special, special needs. The children in this group require either to be taught extra special contents, or to be taught by extra special methods. They are, by definition, those who cannot be integrated without a considerable educational loss to both themselves and to their 'host' classmates. Warnock says that it is unnecessary to argue the issue of integration, since most of the relevant children are already in the mainstream, and the Report's aim is merely to improve the quality of their learning. The controversy over integration for those with special, special needs is dismissed. Warnock does not emphasise the distinction between 'disabilities' and 'significant difficulties', that is between the 'special' and the 'special, special', because it does not match the Report's arguments for social cohesion and the lessening of stigma. Furthermore, although Warnock does admit that some children will always need special school provision, this aspect of the Report has been ignored by the local education authorities whose duty it is to carry out the provisions of the 1981 Act which
have been distilled from the recommendations of the report. The variations between the report, the Act, and the resultant provision, are discussed below.
9.3 Needs.

"Saying what children need is a cloaked way of saying what we judge they ought to have." (4)

In their philosophical analysis of the Plowden Report (5), both Dearden and Peters single out the concept of needs as used therein for specific attention. The close relationship between the ethos of Plowden and that of Warnock means that much of this analysis holds as much for the latter as it did for the former. Writing in the same tradition, Hirst also discusses needs, in relation to the curriculum, in terms which are highly pertinent to a consideration of the Warnock Report. His conclusion, quoted above, briefly outlines the approach upheld earlier in this Chapter, and corresponds to that of Peters:

"...talk of children's needs, is too much a way of dressing up our value judgements in semi-scientific clothes." (6)

Dearden, Hirst, and Peters all connect the concept of needs to the type of individualistic approach advocated by those who support the 'growth' theory of education. This lies behind both Warnock and Plowden, and suggests that it is possible to talk of a child's potential. If allowed to 'grow', he will develop to his full potential through an adequate and apposite education. Some educationalists imply that 'growth' means leaving the child to develop as he will. This is not only impossible, since a child will die without adult intervention and care, but it also seems unethical, since not all tendencies exhibited by a child ought to be fostered: a child could 'grow' into a sadist. However, by this approach, it is acknowledged that a child has needs to be fulfilled, rather than themselves needing to fit into the mould of a set educational system. Amongst these needs, Warnock, while not accepting Peters' picture of the child as a 'barbarian at the gate', does acknowledge that there is a need to learn one's place in society and to be prepared for work (7).

The terms 'need', 'needs', and 'necessary' have a variety of applications. Thus, for example, in a thesis or book, it could be
written 'it is necessary to consider ...'. This capitalises on the shared, but not explicit, understanding that both the reader and the writer wish to understand the matter under consideration. If the reader wishes to follow the writer's argument, he will acquiesce with the 'it is necessary...'. To clarify the point, it can be said that 'it is necessary...' is really a shorthand for 'if one wishes to clarify this exegesis, the following arguments can be applied ...'. Similarly, a discussion of needs presupposes both a context, and a shared aim of a certain decided outcome, although, as in the case of a thesis, these are seldom made explicit.

The term needs presupposes something lacking, a lack which can moreover be rectified externally, rather than by any action on the part of the child. Needs can only logically be discussed in relation to something else so that 'x' is needed in order to achieve 'y'. Thus, children need certain foods to grow to healthy adults, they need parental love to grow to mentally healthy adults, they need certain forms of education to develop into full members of society. Because of the dependant nature of the achievement, it is always pertinent to question the reasons for the need, although it must be admitted that this is seldom done.

In this context, the reasons for the special educational needs are the needs for special help to learn as much as possible, or to develop the individual's full potential along certain lines. In other societies, these educational needs may not seem so important as they do in our own. Even if needs statements are 'cloaked' value judgements, there should be no difficulty when the aims of education are clear. For the Warnock Committee, the desired outcome was clear, and that was that children should be helped as much as possible; to develop the different facets of their characters; to be helped to understand moral, practical, and aesthetic values; and to be prepared for work and leisure. These features should be available to all children, although the progress of some will inevitably be slower or carried less far than others.

Thus, if this and only this is said to be the desired end for all children, they can readily be said to have a variety of needs to enable them to achieve it.
Children with handicaps may have a special need for a certain amount of extra help, or a special, special need for even more aid, depending on the severity of their handicap, and the possible extent of its educational palliation. Warnock is clear as to exactly what the schools are to achieve for their pupils, a clarity which is not possessed by all other writers, who do not realise that even though claimed, needs cannot be asserted if the desired outcome is not clearly delineated.

Warnock's (1978) emphasis on needs entailing individualisation is contrasted to the then extant (i.e. post 1944) system of large and impersonal categories. A table of treatment published in 1946 (8), suggested to Warnock set forms of teaching, with as it were, 'one handicap, one solution'. Children who did not fit into a category were excluded from the system. The concept of needs acknowledges both the shortcomings and the strengths both of this approach, and of the individual. Individual programmes can be devised for the individuals, rather than individuals being expected to fit into existing schema.

This criticism of the then existing educational provision is, however, simplistic. Most schools for handicapped children, with classes, and indeed catchment populations much smaller than those of the mainstream have endeavoured to allow for individual differences between their pupils' development to be accounted for by a balance of group and solo work. However, there have been borderline cases for admissions, when children have been refused places because they could not fit into the school regime. Thus allowance for need is in relation to particular situations, and often hinged on the availability of particular facilities. A school for the deaf, would not for example, have, a hydro-therapy swimming pool, or the staff necessary for a physically handicapped non-ambulant child, and vice versa.

The term treatment, with its medical overtones is, like remedial, banished by the Warnock Report. Both terms are seen therein as emotive, and negatively critical, terms which suggest that there is something wrong with the child. In many cases, there is indeed something wrong. In others, it is the school or home which is wrong, but the term is to be replaced in every case. The approach of the individual's needs is intended to be positive, although, it is hard to see how much more positive it may be than remedial, a term which does suggest that despite deficiencies, there may exist some remedy.
It is clear that some 'needs' are educational, and some are not, being emotional needs or financial needs, psychological needs or nutritional needs. Indeed, by attempting to assess which needs are educational, and which are not, it might be possible to arrive at a definition of education. Difficulties with any of the non-educational needs may very well lead to an educational need, and because of this they need to be solved before education can take place. They have a moral priority. There might well be criticism of a developing country that boasted a heavily-funded educational system, whilst allowing its people to starve. Furthermore, in addition to educational needs, there are educational needs which are special, and other special needs which are not educational. A pregnant woman, for example, is held to have a special need for a nutritionally balanced diet, beyond that needed by her non-pregnant sister. The distinction is important, since there are people who are handicapped in a conventional sense, but not in an educational sense, and others, not conventionally handicapped, who have an educational handicap. The former may have a special need for transport or domestic help in order to permit them to function outside an institution, but not for any educational assistance. For the latter, for example, those previously categorised as educationally sub-normal, the need existed purely in an educational sense, and yet there was a continuing struggle to ensure acceptance of this by the public, who tended to regard the handicap as a global one.

Children with special, special educational needs, on the other hand may often have other special, special needs. That is their diets, play facilities, social acceptance, parents, and teachers may all need to be special. However, Warnock's emphasis, and that of this thesis, rests on the educational needs, to indicate that these are the proper areas for school wherein growth and development can be expected to occur, rather than the purely 'care' approach of hospitals, where a child in the past could have lain in bed all day.

Special educational needs are those which in themselves are extra or different, or need a special type of teaching for their solution.
Thus it is logical to argue that a gifted child has a need for music lessons to develop his special talents, as much as a handicapped child has a need for a wheelchair. Both needs are different from those of the children's peers.
9.4 Special needs - a wider approach.

The discussion of needs and special educational needs evokes a particular view of education and the part schooling should play in an individual's life. It implies that education is a matter of upbringing, described in terms of the development of the individual, and of growth towards his full potential. However, the terms 'growth' and 'potential' have their own difficulties, and furthermore, not all needs are for things that society is ready to grant; not all growth is to be encouraged. A tree or bush can grow wild; it can be stunted; or it can be trained, and grow well. Growth metaphors of education ignore the pruning, transplanting, uprooting, and cutting down that happens in most gardens; such metaphors also frequently ignore the role of the gardener.

However, given that the concept of special educational needs should be adopted, even if only because it represents an approach which emphasises the care of the individual, it is odd that the Warnock Report ignored two groups of children whose potential is evidently not being tapped, or fulfilled, in our society. One group, that of gifted children, is mentioned, but dismissed as 'not in our remit' (9). The other group, that is women and girls, is not even mentioned. Yet both fulfil all the Report's criteria for inclusion. Both have special, and in some cases, special, special needs in terms of completely separate placement from the norm of a co-educational, mixed-ability classroom.

Here it is argued that many gifted children, and many girls have special needs, in that they are unlikely to achieve as much as they are capable of unless given special help. Of Warnock's three forms of provision for special need (10), gifted children are likely to require the second, 'a special or modified curriculum', and girls the third, 'particular attention to the social structure'. Either group may need 'specialist teaching techniques'. They would do better given such special provision, and at least some gifted children and girls do have a need for special, special education.
To be clever may appear an advantage rather than a handicap. That unrecognised giftedness, however, can lead to maladjustment is acknowledged by the Warnock Report, and thus it is in terms of maladjustment that such children are discussed. Furthermore, special provision will now only be made for a gifted child by the Local Education Authority, that is by the state, if he is maladjusted. The special provision, whether in a state school or a private one, is made because of the maladjustment as a 'special need', rather than because of the frustrated intelligence that has been wrongly treated. Those working with either gifted or maladjusted children would concur that it is too late to wait until maladjustment has occurred. A positive effort is required to spot and provide for such children before the harm has been done.

Many studies also consider gifted children in terms of maladjustment, since these cases are interesting (11), and there is the potential for a solution. The gifted child can indeed be defined as handicapped if by this it is meant that he is unable to fulfill his full potential. His schooling may handicap him by provoking boredom, leading to a lack of interest, and frustration, and hence to behaviour problems such as attention seeking or tantrums in the younger child.

It is however, quite possible to discuss the needs of gifted children without mentioning maladjustment. Many gifted children have rewarding hobbies and interests outside school, are perfectly happy and well-behaved, yet are capable of much more. It is still possible to indicate the educational need in terms of an unfulfilled academic or musical potential.

One of the major difficulties in discussing gifted children is the classification of 'a gifted child'. In some studies the classification seems to include the fairly large number that would previously have attended a grammar school, yet gifted cannot mean very much if all academically inclined children are included. A more rigorous definition restricts the classification to those with 'genius' levels of intelligence, although it is widely recognised that
IQ scores cannot be taken as reliable guides of this threshold. The recognition is easier amongst musically gifted children, some of whom reach very high grades in music examinations at an extremely young age, which provides an external check on their ability. Those gifted in mathematics and science will be regarded as more useful in a pragmatically oriented society, despite the possibility that such children may well develop into pure, rather than applied, researchers. However, it is the musical children, and dancers, who have been given special recognition, even at a time when the comprehensive ideal held almost unquestioned sway. This is presumably because it is easier to judge musical and dance potential at an early age, and because not to differentiate on these grounds still brings a charge of philistinism.

The assisted places scheme provides special placement for older able, though not necessarily gifted, children, in the same way that there has been the special placement for handicapped children, albeit in this case with no age limits. The scheme is criticised on a number of grounds, very few of which can be called educational. Of the criticisms, the most important is that the scheme provides a very high level of financial aid to a small number of children at a time when the level of finance available for education is declining. It is also criticised because the beneficiaries are believed to be 'middle-class', who already possess advantages over their peers, particularly that of parents who believe in the value of academic education. It is suggested that many such children would go to the schools whether or not the scheme existed. Furthermore, critics of the scheme hold that it opposes the comprehensive ideal and makes the system of mixed ability teaching inoperable by 'creaming off' the most able, thus depriving the less able of contact with the more able and vice-versa. A final criticism is that the beneficiaries, unlike the handicapped children, for whom all the above criticisms are also true, are sent to prestigious private schools, which will not only provide a better education, but also a type of social upbringing and status which is deprecated by the critics.

A brief study of education systems in other countries soon makes it necessary to face the question of which special needs must be catered for, and which gifted children must be encouraged. In the Soviet Union, for example, children who are gifted gymnasts or potentially so attend, from a very early age, special schools. Here, a large part of
the time is spent in gymnastic training. Being gifted as a gymnast is seen as an educational difference and as a special need, because the U.S.S.R. wants to produce highly skilled gymnasts who will enhance the nation's prestige. In this country, would-be gymnasts have to complete their training in voluntary clubs, out of school hours, with but limited financial support in terms of central or local government grants. Much of the coaches' time, and that of the parents, is spent on fund-raising rather than training. Much of the child's time is spent practising in the early morning or late at night. The same is true for skaters and athletes or footballers. By contrast, if the same children wished to become ballet dancers, or have a musical gift, a number of limited opportunities for special treatment are available. In such schools, the need for musical practice, for example, is balanced against the needs of the wider curriculum and the examination system, which is not a feature of the Soviet system. Although in Britain these specialist schools are private, state scholarships do exist, and they thus correspond to the assisted places scheme. The schools are, however, like those in the assisted places scheme, only at secondary level, and even if younger children can have their needs served by, for example, a choir school, there is no local or national governmental assistance.

This points to another contrast between Britain and countries with centrally-planned economies in their approach to educational needs. This is emphasised in the English language by the classification of ballet and music as 'arts', while skating, athletics, or football are 'sports'. One 'trains' for football, athletics, or skating, but one 'practises' or 'learns' ballet and music. This is despite the fact that present-day ballet and gymnastics have few differences in either training or performance, and the same child will probably achieve as well in either. Can it still be supported as a logical proposition that a child choosing ballet has a special educational need, while one choosing gymnastics does not?

In the examples given above, it is tempting to say that the decision to differentiate is made because of the state's needs rather than for the child's. Whichever is the morally correct approach must also be applied to the academically gifted child. That is, should differentiation occur for the child's own sake, or because of the state's need to avoid the expenses of maladjustment? Or should
utilitarian considerations of the country's needs take precedence?
9.4.2 The special needs of women and girls.

It has been suggested that post-war developments in women's education, employment opportunities and social expectations has led not to an improvement of relationships between men and women, but to an increase in divorce rates. One reason for this, it is suggested, is that men, and particularly husbands, are made to feel inadequate, threatened, or insecure by the success of, and demands made by, their womenfolk. This brings out the possibility of another moral dilemma, which is found at the point where different needs coincide, and may not be reconcilable. Both men and women may need to change. Here again, discussion centres on roles, relationships, and the relevance of certain differences. Which differences are the relevant ones is open to argument, as Lucas has shown (12).

It can reasonably be argued that in an educational sense, sex is a relevant difference. It was once believed that girls were less rational than their brothers, and hence could not cope with an academic curriculum; art, music and embroidery being their proper concern. Those few girls who managed to obtain an academic education disproved this notion, but while it was considered unladylike to want to learn academic matters, this attitude, with the lack of opportunity, rather than the inability of girls to learn, ensured that the numbers of girls taking advantage of an educational opportunity remained small.

More recent arguments for differentiation by sex suggest that the attitude that educational success is unfeminine still has some influence among girls. To counteract this, the federation of schools run under the Girl's Public Day School Trust, epitomises the emphasis on a single sex environment. The schools give their pupils the opportunity of seeing women in all the positions of authority, responsibility, trust, and achievement. The girls are also freed from the need to 'fight' boys for their teacher's attention - a fight they would be bound to loose if they were not prepared to become extremely aggressive. This last problem has become noticeable in mixed schools, and in some of these, classes in certain subjects like computing or mathematics, where the girls lack the confidence of their boisterous
male peers, are now taught in sex-segregated groups.

The arguments for a special, that is a single-sex, education for girls imply that boys also receive a special, single-sex, education. Yet if boys were found to benefit in both their attitude to work, and their social behaviour, from co-education, this would be a further coincidence of opposing needs.

It is important not to confuse these arguments with those which advocate parental choice, or those of religious beliefs. However, girls from ethnic minorities may have a particularly strong need for single-sex schooling, since their early upbringing is likely to have left them not only lacking confidence when faced by the male, but also a wholly subservient approach to the male. At the same time, the ethos of the successful girl is so completely alien to their parents' culture, that the education may cause considerable family conflict.

Whether the schools are independent, as are those of the Girls' Public Day School Trust, or are funded by the local authority, as single-sex comprehensive schools, the question of differentiation to provide for a need has obvious moral, as well as practical, implications. If resources are limited, should they be devoted to duplicating facilities for sex-segregation, or on special music schemes and peripatetic teachers, or on special education for the more able, or on special equipment and training for teachers of the handicapped, or should they be devoted to improving the comprehensive school?

In our society, we have decided that the child who is blind, musical, female, or mathematically gifted, has a special educational need. The gymnast or the footballer has a need, but his is not educational. Which of these gifts we regard as special enough to demand special treatment in terms of allowing them additional resources depends on our own moral and political ideals.
References to Chapter 9.

1 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., s.3.6, p.37.
2 Ministry of Education, 1946: Special educational treatment, Pamphlet No.5, London, H.M.S.O.
6 ibid., p.8.
7 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., s.1.4, p.5.
8 ibid., s.1.4, p.5.
9 ibid., s.1.2, p.4.
10 ibid., s.3.19, p.41.
Chapter 10

Integration
Chapter arrangement

10.1 Development of integration

10.2 Integration now

10.2.1 The comprehensive school

10.2.2 Integrating children with special needs

10.2.3 Integrating children with special, special needs

10.3 Integration beyond school

10.3.1 Out-of-school activities

10.3.2 Further education and training
10.1 Development of integration.

"We have...judged it more fruitful to concentrate on the practical requirements for the future than to continue to debate the advantages and disadvantages of integration." (1)

In 1976, an Education Act was passed by Parliament, although it was never implemented (2). Amongst sections to end selection for different kinds of education, was Section 10 which stated that handicapped children should be taught in maintained (i.e. Local Authority) mainstream schools 'in preference to' special schools. As the Warnock Committee had been sitting since 1974, it was decided not to implement the Act until their Report had been received and debated. The Report followed the arguments of this Section of the 1976 Act with some amendments, but regarded the provisions for integration as immutable.

The enactment of the subsequent 1981 Education Act brought both Section 10 of the 1976 Act, and most of the proposals of the Warnock Report, to the Statute Book (3). Consequently, it has influenced the education of children with special needs. However, the view of integration which has become commonly accepted represents a simplification of the provisions of both the Acts and the Report.

Following the historical development, it may be said that what was previously the story of selection for different types of schooling has become the story of integration. In the process of this change, the word selection has changed its meaning from the making of choices about a normal child's education taking place in one of a range of placements, from technical school, through secondary modern school to grammar school. 'Selection' now means the making of choices about different aspects of integration within the preferred setting of the comprehensive school. The picture is complicated by the existence of independent schools on the one hand and of children too handicapped for the mainstream on the other. In particular, for those who support the notion of a unitary state education system, it is proving as difficult to destroy the former as to ignore the latter.
Originally, the arguments about selection were concerned only with the secondary age range. However, they have come to permeate the whole system. Thus the primary schools, or first and middle schools depending on the arrangements of the Local Education Authority, are to be as comprehensive as the secondary schools. Warnock pinpoints the change of emphasis from selection to integration:

"In particular, completion of the re-organisation of all-age schools in the 1960s, and the progressive ending of selection for secondary education which followed the issue of Circular 10/65 enabled ordinary primary and secondary schools to broaden their educational programmes and to take greater account of individual children's needs." (4).

However, Circular 10/65 represented a position which would have seemed very alien to the educationalists of the earlier decades of the century. The 'right' to secondary education for all children was first mooted in the Hadow Report (5). Before this, secondary education meant education in grammar and public schools, most children leaving their elementary schools at 13. In 1901, free places had been made available at grammar schools, and when the state secondary schools were established after 1904, these were modelled on traditional grammar and public school lines. The developing 'top level' of the elementary school was not considered as secondary education at all, although catering for the older children. Even in the 1918 Act, with its abortive plan for 'continuation schools', there was no suggestion of a different pattern for secondary schooling.

Official arguments changed with the Hadow Report, and according to Maclure

"Reorganisation of schools on what became known as Hadow lines began in the 1930s, and the 1944 Act formalized the changes." (6).

The Hadow Report represents a step towards the comprehensive school in advocating a new form of secondary school for all. The choice of three quite different types of institution, Grammar School, Technical School, and the new Secondary Modern School demonstrates a belief in the necessity of educational selection of quite different groups of
pupils suited to different strata in life. This belief continued to be the received opinion until well after the passing of the 1944 Act.

The Spens Report of 1938 (7) draws surprisingly close to the concept of the comprehensive school in its advocacy of a 'multilateral' system, in which all types of school should have 'parity'. The Report develops advice on the achievement of this parity, studying the feasibility of multilateral schools, which sound very like the streamed comprehensive schools which developed after 1965. Such schools were rejected in 1938 because of their inevitably large size, and the difficulty of finding a head teacher sufficiently knowledgeable over the whole range of pupil ability. Ironically, the large size of the proposed comprehensive schools was held to be an argument in their favour a quarter of a century later, since it allowed an adequate sixth form.

Of further interest in the Spens Report is the emphasis on intelligence testing, with no doubts being expressed as to the accuracy of such tests, or their appropriateness for placing children in the developing multilateral system of grammar, technical and secondary modern school. As in Hadow, selection is the aim, integration not being considered as the groups appeared all the time to be quite separate, and easily delineated.

The subsequent Norwood Report (1943), continues this theme :

"The evolution of education has in fact thrown up certain groups, each of which can and must be treated in a way appropriate to itself" (8),

and goes on to detail different approaches to life and learning for these types of pupil. The first is 'interested in learning for its own sake'; the second has 'interests and abilities markedly in the field of applied science and applied art'; and the third deals 'more easily with concrete things and ideas'.

The Norwood Report shows a lessening of confidence in the accuracy of intelligence testing :

"However carefully devised and sympathetically carried out,
Differentiation at 10 or 11+ cannot be considered as final. Opportunity must be given for the rectifying of mistakes or for dealing with cases of late development or failure to fulfill promise." (9).

A Lower School is suggested, with 13+ as the final age for definite placement; free movement of pupils between different types of school was envisaged. The confidence evinced earlier in the automatic 'parity' between schools is demonstrated to be over optimistic:

"Parity of esteem, in our view, cannot be conferred by administrative decree nor by equality of cost per pupil. It can only be one by the school itself." (10)

The 1943 White Paper on Educational Reconstruction has three main features: firstly, it recommended a form of classification for children (the 11+ test); secondly, it recognised that the grammar school still held the most prestige; and thirdly, it acknowledged that the three-fold form of educational provision, which was still adhered to, could be provided in one building, or on one site (11).

The early aspirations for what became the 11+ test bore very little relation to the system that actually developed. It was hoped that selection could occur:

"...not on the result of a competitive test, but in an assessment of their individual aptitudes largely by such means as school records, implemented, if necessary, by intelligence tests, due regard being had to their parents' wishes and the careers they had in mind." (12)

It was obviously not envisaged that, as in fact happened, these intelligence tests themselves could become a competitive examination, for which pupils were coached, and which had 'an effect on the curriculum'.

Although revolutionary in officially offering 'efficient full time education' rather than 'elementary instruction', the 1944 Act, with its emphasis on different types of school and education being offered
'according to age, ability, and aptitude' of the pupil, encapsulates the beliefs about psychology and learning held over the previous twenty years. Despite the fact that it can be seen as leading to the development of poor secondary modern schools and the problems of the 11+, the Act is still another step towards comprehensive schools and the rejection of selection on educational grounds. This is because during the period from Hadow to 1944, selection on the basis of parents' financial standing was rejected in favour of selection on educational grounds. The grammar school remained the desired place for those who could benefit from it. Furthermore, as Warnock explains, the 1944 Act declared that:

"...special educational treatment would be required for up to 17% of the school population...(and)...ordinary schools would have the major share in providing it." (13)

The next twenty years, leading to Circular 10/65 on comprehensive re-organisation, saw a complete change of ideas, comparable to that marked by the Hadow Report in 1926. It was gradually realised that the secondary modern schools were not achieving 'parity of esteem'. Reports suggested that selection at 11+ seemed to be picking the wrong pupils. This led to the more radical consideration that selection in any form was inadvisable.

The 1954 Report 'Early Leaving' (14) first introduced the possibility of social factors complicating the 11+ selection procedure. This was in response to the finding that numbers of pupils left the grammar schools early with no examination passes. The 1959 Crowther (15), and 1963 Newsom Reports (16), respectively on the more and less able pupils, followed the same ground. The latter was particularly critical of the physical conditions and staffing problems of the Secondary Modern Schools, and showed how these factors, combined with residence 'in the slums', held back the education of many children (17). The term 'priority' is introduced by the Newsom Committee, and there is a statement very reminiscent of the Warnock Committee's views:

"...the idea of 'below average ability' easily suggests 'below average pupils' as though the boys and girls so described were..."
The Newsom Report can be seen as leading to a backwater, since it made no assessment of the best form of organisation for secondary schooling, being concerned to make improvements in one limited area, and by no means to change the status quo. The change of Government in 1964 led to the decision that comprehensive schools be adopted as the best means of assuring adequate secondary schooling for all pupils. Local authorities were asked to submit plans for their areas with the understanding that

"It is the Government's declared objective to end selection at 11+ and to eliminate separatism in secondary education." (19)

Six main forms of comprehensive organisation were outlined, but no guidance was given on the streaming or setting which could lead to separatism within a school. It was the separation of children into different schools that was seen as socially divisive.

"...the separation of children of differing aims and aptitudes in to different schools at the age of 13 or 14 ... is acceptable ... only as an interim stage." (20)

It is accepted in the Circular that children do vary.

"The more able children must not be held back or denied the range of subjects and qualities of teaching which they would have enjoyed in a grammar school. Equally, their needs must not be met at the expense of other children." (21)

The Circular advises the need to balance 'educational disadvantages' against the 'benefits that will flow from the adoption of comprehensive schooling'.

The change of Government in 1970 prevented the passing of the Education Bill formalising the changes of the late 1960s. However, the reorganisation was well under way in most local authority areas, and the comprehensive school became the norm for state secondary education in England and Wales. The comprehensive ethos has changed,
however, from the early slogan 'grammar schools for all' to a form of mixed ability teaching, especially in the lower part of the schools.

Under the Labour Government of 1974-9, the next step was to examine the relationship between the state and the private sector. The Newsom Report (1968) had deprecated the existence of the private sector as a more radical form of separatism (22), and for the 'socially divisive effect', which produced

"...an arbitrarily selected membership which already starts with an advantageous position in life." (23)

The aim was to integrate such schools into the comprehensive system, and although this continues to be the aim of some political factions, it remains remote, as both legal problems, and the prevailing political realities are at present overwhelming. The Conservative Government, indeed, introduced the Assisted Places Scheme to widen the availability of private schooling.

After the failure of the 'anti-selection lobby' in the case of independent schools, the attack was turned to other selective schools with the 1970 Report on the Direct Grant Schools. Following another change of Government (back to Labour), the Secretary of State announced in 1975 that financial support would be withdrawn from any such schools which refused to join the maintained sector. By the due date, some 35 schools had agreed to join, while many more 'went independent'. Paradoxically, therefore, the attempt at ending selection resulted in selectivity on a much wider scale, with greater educational distinctiveness and a greater emphasis on parents' financial capability as an entrance requirement, although it must be noted that many schools offer bursaries, for example

"...(to) enable financial assistance to be available for girls who qualify on merit for entry but whose parents could not afford full fees". (24)

Thus these schools, many of which were previously regarded as, and often founded specifically for, poorer children to obtain an 'academic' education, have had to become more 'elitist'. Not only is it harder to get in on academic grounds, but also the financial
consideration has become all important. This last consideration now also has become important for children with special needs. There have always been those parents who have been prepared to pay fees so that their child should not be in a 'special school', thus acknowledging the stigma that that term was intended to circumvent, but this willingness has increased as the private sector has risen to meet the need for the education of dyslexic children, a condition only recently recognised by the local education authorities.
To some people, the integration of all handicapped children into the 'ordinary schools' of their neighbourhood has been an important aim of intrinsic value to the extent that it has become the aim, paramount above all other considerations. Integration was not held by either the Warnock Report or Section 10 of the 1976 Education Act to be possible for all children, and nor, therefore, subject to certain provisos, as the only aim. These provisos were that integration was preferable if certain conditions could also obtain, namely that the integrated provision must be 'practicable', 'compatible with the provision of efficient instruction', and ensured 'the avoidance of unreasonable expenditure' (25). This difference makes it necessary to examine the concept further.

As has been stated (26), the Warnock Report was hailed as revolutionary on the grounds of its espousal of the integration principle, although the Report did not argue the case. It merely followed the 1976 Act, in which the proposal was stated, and then elaborated ways of reconciling the overall recommendations with the necessary provisos mentioned above. In particular, nowhere does the Report state that all handicapped children should be in ordinary schools, sitting alongside their able-bodied peers. On the contrary, detailed explanations are given of the type of special school provision needed by the minority. Most children with Warnock's widened kind of special need are integrated already, or at least attend their local school. This is why

"...the well-worn arguments for and against integration, being framed in terms of the 2% of children at present ascertained as having special education, do not fit our wider concept of special education." (27)

A typical 'revolutionary' comment on the 1981 Act and the Warnock Report is provided by the 'ACE Special Education Handbook'. This states

"For many people, the most exciting and significant duties in
the Act are those which promote (for the first time in implemented legislation) the education of children with special needs in ordinary schools alongside children without such needs, rather than in separate and segregated special schools and units. The duties to integrate into ordinary schools and, once in the school, within its normal activities, apply to ALL children, whatever their disability and however severe it may be." (28)

The conditions which might make this impossible are outlined in the Handbook, and are shown to be in accord with previous legislation, but they are then largely ignored in the discussion, although they are written in to the 1981 Act. The latter states that integration is 'preferable' if the child can still receive the relevant special educational provision, and if this provision is compatible with the 'efficient education' of his classmates, and with an 'efficient use of resources (29)."

The Warnock Report had examined what these provisos might mean in practical terms, and, while acknowledging that the views of parents were important, came to the conclusion that not all children could learn with their peers (30). The ACE Handbook emphasises the duty of the Local Education Authority to take parents' views into consideration, and shows how parents can take legal proceedings to assure this 'right' (31). It does not, however, acknowledge, as does Warnock, that there are occasions where the child's need may be for separate education, even if the parents disagree, although it does perceive that some parents may claim a special need for which the Local Education Authority will not make provision.

From the Warnock Report it can be seen that there are a few children for whom integration, meaning sitting next to their able-bodied neighbour in the local school, is neither practicable nor desirable, either because of the handicapped child's own needs being unfulfillable in this situation, or because of the effect his presence might have on the education of others. Thus the teacher might be insufficiently equipped, in time, in training, in ability, or in resources, to attend to the needs of all her pupils. However, the Warnock Report also demonstrates that 'integration' can mean more than 'sitting next to their able-bodied neighbour in the local school',

222
that it can indeed mean many things, almost to the point where it begins to mean almost nothing at all. Integration is yet another emotive concept.

The American term 'mainstreaming', preferred by many, misses this strong emotive connotation of 'integration'. Furthermore, the latter term, with two possible antonyms in 'segregation' and 'differentiation', allows for too wide a variety of actual meanings. Thus most proponents of integration are against the segregation of handicapped children in special schools, whilst wishing to retain a form of differentiation of treatment, and greater financial commitment, better pupil-teacher ratios, and special equipment, all seen as the 'advantages of special education'. A prescient few fear that emphasis on integration as an intrinsic good will mean loss of special service and special expertise.

Discussion of integration or mainstreaming cannot, furthermore, refer to the school experience alone, any more than any educational system can afford to ignore the world in which pupils now live as children, and which they will inhabit as adults. Increased social interaction outside the school will not necessarily stem from closer educational contact, and even may itself be necessary before the latter is achieved. Furthermore, the nature of a meritocratic society is likely to affect the possible extent of integration (32).

Hegarty and Pocklington have a view of integration as the way an ordinary school and a special school can merge to form a new sort of educational body, in the way that salt mixed with water gives brine (33). Our physical environment has been gradually changed as ramps, wide lifts, and specially adapted toilet facilities become the norm. These changes, made for the physically handicapped, may also benefit the able-bodied, and it may be that similar changes need to occur in the social and educational environment. As Hegarty and Pocklington remind us, too often integration has been seen as a simple total assimilation of an alien group into an existing environment without any effect on that environment.

The similar problem of ethnic minorities is a useful example, since many handicapped people have compared their situation with the victims of apartheid. With a group of immigrants, the desire is rarely simply
to melt into the background. West Indians would not deny that there are differences between themselves and others; it is just that skin colour and hair texture are not relevant differences for most purposes. This does not indicate a wish to forget customs, religions and dietary observances, for it is felt that there is room for differences within a community or society without stigma being attached. It is possible to wish for a society which is not stratified by colour, without wishing for everyone to be the same colour. If the British diet has been affected by the adoption of many dishes, from curry to zabaglione, can not also the customs and way of life be affected?

Three main aspects of integration emerge. These are:

a) social integration;
b) educational integration;
c) integration in employment.

The third is clearly dependent on the first two. These three aspects mirror three concerns of the parents of a handicapped child, social acceptability, schooling, and financial independence.

A difference needs to be made between the requirements of integration within the school, and those of integration as an adult. As noted above, the mere physical presence of a child in a classroom with his peers does not constitute integration, and cannot be taken as a good in itself. The extent of integration that is possible for any particular child depends not only on his handicap, the nature of his family life, and his determination, but also on the nature of the school, and the quality of the teachers. There is the danger of thinking of 'host' school, and 'guest' pupil, rather than in the desired terms of a family with various members, each of whom has to accommodate the others.

Physical integration at too early an age might prevent special teaching, or might exacerbate the handicapping condition. For example, the noise of an ordinary classroom may make a language impaired child's position even worse. The child may be unable to develop his full potential to mix socially as an adult, through a lack of either social or educational development.

The social differentiation in our society is caused, it is argued, by
the differentiation in schooling, between independent and state school, or between grammar and secondary modern, and yet it is not immediately clear whether educational differences exacerbate social differences, or merely mirror them. These social distinctions might remain whatever happened to the educational system: even if all children were taken away from their parents and reared together, social distinctions might develop as the children grew older. The social differences between handicapped and able-bodied people might need another solution beyond common schooling.

If social aims are not held to be paramount, but educational aims are given precedence, the individual's personal development through education might gradually facilitate the social integration of the growing child. There is an obvious conflict here between the ideals of the teacher and of the parent. A prelingually deaf child will need, particularly in the early stages of his education, such an intense concentration on language development that education with his peers is precluded. The social losses of the present have to be balanced against the possible gains of the future.

A similar conflict occurs, as has been noted, in the debate over co-education. If it is true that abler girls do better educationally, measured by examination passes, in single sex schools, then we may better achieve an aim of full social integration, as measured by an equivalence of academic success, of male and female adults by separating them as children. If girls learn to underachieve whilst studying alongside boys, and so are conditioned to perpetuate the place of the female as a second class citizen, social integration on more equal terms might be achieved by an amount of educational differentiation. The analogy with the handicapped is clear.

A representative problem occurs with the profoundly deaf. Traditionally, in this country, the social aim has been held paramount, and oralism has been the main focus of teaching to enable children to mix with their peers and to be understood by their own families. Yet now, as noted in Chapter 7, teachers and parents are tending to the view that too much concentration on articulation per se is causing too great a neglect of ordinary education. Use of some form of sign language or cued speech would enable more intellectual growth and development, and this would compensate for the social
consequences of isolation in communication.

Integration, or mainstreaming, as the Warnock Report demonstrates, can be affected by a variety of methods of educational organization. The two ends of this spectrum are complete educational segregation in a special boarding school, followed by a training centre, work for Remploy, or the mental hospital, and placement in a neighbourhood school, with no allowances made for the handicap. The placement needed, and the alternatives available, will vary not only with the handicap, but also with the individual's reaction to his handicap.

The isolation of the special boarding school is rarely necessary, although the alternatives may be a considerably greater drain on local authority resources, but there are children, mentally ill or violent, who do need isolation, just as there are adults who, despite all the claims for community health care for the mentally ill, do need to be kept apart to prevent them from harming themselves or other people. Discussion of integration frequently ignores the very severely handicapped, whose cases assert that there can be no single solution for the whole of the spectrum.

One of the alternatives given in the Warnock Report to true or 'functional' integration is the special school sharing a campus with other schools, with joint sports and dining facilities (34). Such a school could be independent, or it could be no more than a unit of the ordinary school, where all the children are part of a year group, despite receiving their lessons in the special unit. A further restriction could be for the special unit being a 'resource unit', where certain children go for extra help. Other alternatives are for the handicapped child to be wholly within an ordinary class, with a visiting 'special' tutor giving occasional help, or having a 'special' programme of learning devised by the class teacher. While all these variations do exist, it is not clear at which point 'integration' is achieved, even though Warnock dignifies them all with this title (35).

The Warnock Report compares 'locational' integration, 'social' integration, and 'functional' integration. Many children in ordinary classrooms who are not handicapped are not integrated with their peers, while many special units attached to ordinary schools function,
in effect, as isolated special schools, with little social contact for either staff or pupils in the host school. They are indeed 'attached to' rather than 'part of' the main school.
Another way of viewing integration is to regard it as an extension of the comprehensive ideal.

"The comprehensive school must be seen as the place where integration is to take place". (36)

Although recent discussion about the comprehensive school has been largely concerned with the secondary age range, there has always also been selection in the primary age range also. Most obviously, different areas are chosen as places to live by different categories of parents, resulting in parental selection of schools by the operation of 'catchment areas', and thus restricting the social mix of the school. This trend is especially marked in local authority areas that include neighbourhoods of inner-city deprivation, and to overcome the educational imbalance thus caused, the policy of 'bussing' has been resorted to by some American states, and by some English local authorities. Additionally, parents may cite religious preferences, either from conviction, or from a desire for a particular form of schooling, for example, in a single-sex school for Muslims, or in one which is particularly formal for Anglicans or Roman Catholics.

Within the primary school there has also been selection in streams, although this has been less prevalent since the general abolition of the 11+ examination. However, there are likely to be more mildly handicapped children in primary schools, whose need for special education will manifest itself in the secondary school. Thus, although it might be argued that special primary schools could facilitate a child's entry into an integrated secondary school, in the present system, the younger the child, the less likely he is to be isolated educationally, despite the pressures noted above, which continue unabated at secondary level.

Indeed, it appears that comprehensive schools, which were designed to eliminate selection, have encouraged the increase of separatism on other than strictly academic grounds. It has proved impossible to
"...schools...(that) are as socially and intellectually comprehensive as is practicable." (37)

Yet it is into this, apparently flawed, system that the handicapped child is to be integrated.

The arguments now given in support of comprehensive schools are actually arguments against differentiation, and are quite different from those of the comprehensive schools' early proponents, who saw them as 'grammar schools for all'. The original proponents, seeing the faults of the secondary modern schools, were eager to extend to all the advantages of the grammar school, whereas the present proponents of 'comprehensivisation' are against the grammar school for being selective and divisive. Yet selection continues between different residential areas, continuing the distinction between the secondary modern and the grammar school in a different, and perhaps more arbitrary, guise. The panacea, mixed ability teaching, is complicated by the demands of the examination system. Even the adoption of a common examination at 16+ will not dissolve the necessity for selection after that age, or those who should go on to sit A-levels at 18. This is followed by selection for College or University, for employment or unemployment.

The contemporary comprehensive school is likely to be organised in one of three ways. It may practise an internal selection, leading to a rigid distinction between streams, comparable to that between the secondary modern and the grammar schools. While ostensibly providing for all children, these schools give a very different educational and social experience to each stream. The second method of organisation is to practise not a global selectivity, but a more fluid system of 'sets', where the child's teaching in each subject is with a group of children of similar ability in that subject. The third method, adopted in what might be termed 'true' comprehensive schools, is to practise mixed ability teaching throughout the whole age band. Even these latter schools have generally needed some form of remedial scheme, acknowledging that some children cannot 'cope', and have required other children to leave the school because the school cannot 'cope' with them. The ability of the school to integrate children
with special educational needs, or special, special educational needs will depend, in part, on its present organisation, as well as on the calibre of its staff.
Most of the children to be assessed as having a special educational need and whose education is to be integrated into the mainstream comprehensive school, are not those traditionally thought of as being handicapped. The Warnock Report challenges schools to provide more carefully for such children, rather than advocating a more revolutionary approach. If schools are to practise mixed-ability teaching, in some, if not all, subjects, at the lower end of the school, the presence of these children may affect the quality of teaching that is possible. Because of this, the Report makes detailed recommendations on the training and support of staff (38).

A few children with special educational needs who find themselves integrated having previously been in special schools will need merely adaptations to the physical environment to make the integrated placement feasible.

For both these groups of children, there are possible drawbacks to being assessed as having special educational needs. For the former group, there is still the chance that they will be stigmatised, perhaps where they were formerly not, by association, in name at least, with the more severely handicapped children. Being singled out as different in a mixed ability class may be very little different from the miseries of the remedial scheme, and be without the compensation of hope that remedial implies. Moreover, individual difficulties may become more obvious by comparison with the abler children in such a mixed ability environment. If a core curriculum is adopted, this will exacerbate this problem, as there will be children who are unable to achieve the core.
10.2.3 Integrating children with special, special needs.

Children with some types of severe handicap are easier to place than others. It is not mere expense that is the criterion, as is shown by the case of the profoundly deaf. Their educational needs go far beyond special microphones and other electronic equipment. Such aids are cheaper and easier to provide than the large-scale adaptations to a building needed for a child in a wheel-chair to be enabled to enter, yet the educational problems of the profoundly deaf child are far greater than those of the limbless child.

The delicate child has a different problem. A child who is frequently ill from chest complaints, or who needs frequent surgery for a heart complaint, or who needs regular physiotherapy, may find it very hard to manage even any semblance of 'keeping up' with his peers, even when endowed with superior intelligence, or when working on an independent programme in the basic subjects of mathematics or English. Frequent absences, furthermore, may militate against the child being familiar enough with anyone to be truly part of the school.

The physically handicapped child of normal intelligence may be more easily integrated in the educational sense, yet he cannot join in sports lessons. A very young spastic child may have problems with the 'learning by experience' method used for early mathematics. He cannot necessarily gain the concepts from sand and water play. Indeed, any two children will always be getting a completely different experience in the same class-room.

These examples show that integration, even if considered a good, in that it may lead to other desired aims, may in some cases be counter productive, and actually harmful to a particular child.

In the past, there have been many reasons why individual children have been placed in special schools. The Warnock Report claims to represent and advocate the 'good practise' already prevalent in the country, rather than suggesting a revolution of treatment. Some handicapped children have always been placed in ordinary schools if it has seemed appropriate and possible.
However, what is accepted as appropriate and possible is now changing. As a result of the Warnock Report and the 1981 Act, Local Education Authorities are reconsidering the education of children with statements, to establish whether they can be 'mainstreamed'. Parents are now more concerned that the likely closure of special schools will lead to one of a number of possibilities not in the best interest of their children. The few remaining schools are likely to have to cater for a mixture of children with a wide range of incompatible serious problems. There will be no role models for the less able to copy, and the children will tend to 'pick up' the various less desirable manifestations from each other. Furthermore, the distances the parents and children will have to travel will increase. Thus for those children kept in special schools, educational and social isolation will only increase, as it lessens for their former peers who are now integrated. For these latter, however, there remains the concern that the education offered in the mainstream can neither be as individual nor specific in a mixed ability class of 25 children as it could have been in a special class of 10.
Integration beyond school can mean both the integration of an individual's social life contemporaneously with his schooling, that is 'out of hours' activities and hobbies, and also the integration in youth and adulthood after leaving school. This includes both further education and training, and subsequent employment and community life.

The kind of integration envisaged by Hegerty, which goes well beyond Warnock's functional integration, is associated with a certain sort of homogeneous society which is contrasted with the existing society, described as stratified and meritocratic. It is believed that the integration of handicapped children in school will lead towards this, and also that the existence of such a society would facilitate the same integration.

It is possible to regard the late twentieth century, and the 'developed' world as an environment alien to handicapped people, even if only because of those things which are ostensibly valued and held up as role models for all. Beauty, health, sexual and financial success are explicitly the prime concern of many television programmes, films, and advertisements. Writers such as Germaine Greer (39), and Suzy Orbach (40), have shown how many women have been made to feel devalued by the media's emphasis on the rich, the beautiful, and the slim.

Whilst it is obvious that all pregnant women would wish their expected baby to be as healthy and perfect as possible, and that all parents would wish to keep their children that way, it could be argued that too great an emphasis on this produces feelings of guilt in those whose children fall short of this ideal, and of rejection of society by the children themselves. There is a clear paradox here for the medical profession, who must emphasise the importance of pre-natal care, and yet publicise the fact that handicap is not caused by neglect. Similarly, the teaching profession have to hold both that academic success is of importance, and that it is not.

Attempts at making a change in social views are inherently long-term,
and prone to failure, although it is possible that there is now, for example, a better understanding of mental illness, or at least depression, than formerly. However, the same cannot be said of other forms of insanity. Depression is now regarded as common, unfortunate, and acceptable; insanity is not. In an attempt to change social views of racial integration, attempts are made to introduce people of other races into ordinary television programmes, primarily as news readers, and also special programmes are prepared in minority languages and with a special content. The disabled too, have special programmes, although none have achieved the widespread success or prime viewing time of 'Vision On' (41).

Even if this form of public integration is successful, it is sometimes held to be even more insulting than the previous neglect, either to the individual who is 'integrated', or to the group of handicapped people. As Munro says

"Just as a woman may well feel insulted at being given some position just because she is a woman, not because she is the particular woman she is, so a cripple might feel insulted at being treated merely as a cripple." (42)

The token 'black', 'woman', or 'person with special needs' begins to be treated as a case rather than as an individual. That which might have had the propaganda value of showing that disabled people can be, for example, good employees or reliable workmates may thereby be wasted.

Another aspect unfavourable to integration or acceptance is that selection is very much a part of adult life, which is neither 'fair' nor 'equal'. Thus, as Warnock acknowledges, a child who has been sympathetically treated as having special needs at school may find adult life, without comparable support, especially difficult. Indeed, it can be argued that it is impossible to end this selection in our complex society. Certainly, attempts to describe utopian societies, where everyone does the pleasant as well as the unpleasant tasks, for example, Skinner's Walden Two (43), based as the title shows, on Thoreau (44), all use small communities, where this might be possible. Furthermore, where revolutionary attempts have been made to change society, meritocracies or oligarchies have generally arisen.
It can thus be argued that it is wrong not to prepare children for the selection they will face in adulthood. Warnock certainly acknowledges that some people will have to face an adulthood in an institution, and discusses how they may be helped to achieve 'significant living without work' (45).
10.3.1 Out of school activities.

"I just want to do what the other boys do." (46).

The Scout Movement is an example of a body which has, like many others, attempted to enhance the range of social activities provided for children with special needs, and even for children with special, special needs. In its recent publications, the Movement's planners have acknowledged, and have tried to adapt to, the changes due to the new vocabulary and approach to the handicapped, even adopting a concept of the 'Scouting needs' of the young person. Prior to the publication of the Warnock Report and the passage of the 1981 Act, much of the Scouting 'for and with' the handicapped took place in Extension Groups, although there have always been a few handicapped children who have been members of local Scout Groups. The term 'Extension' was adopted in 1967, as part of a wide-ranging review of the Movement, and like the word 'special' in the educational context was intended to emphasise that the Movement was an entity, but that the provision of Scouting, or education, has to be to some degree different for these children.

The basic requirement of membership of the Scout Movement is the ability to make and understand (47), in terms appropriate to the person's age, the Scout Promise. The Extension Groups were enabled to modify this requirement, to some degree, and offer the fun and excitement of Scouting to disabled children in an amended form. This possibility remains, although the emphasis is now rather that the challenge and the out-door life envisaged by Lord Baden-Powell should be offered to many more, even those having severe handicaps, alongside their able-bodied contemporaries. This may happen either by an individual joining the local Group, or occasionally by putting a number of able-bodied and handicapped young people into a common situation, such as a camp, together. The rationale for this is

"Is it not bad enough to be born with no use in your legs, or blind, or deaf, or slow of mind ? Why should the handicapped have to suffer the additional disability of social activities apart from the rest of us ?" (48).
Thus the emphasis is on social mixing, although the Scout Movement also considers itself to have an educational role, outside that of the schools. Indeed the Movement has existed, ever since the first experimental camp on Brownsea Island in 1907, as a place where young people of very different social backgrounds can meet on equal terms. The concern to involve the handicapped is but a re-affirmation of this rationale.

Emphasis is frequently laid on young people undertaking strenuous activities, despite physical or mental disability, and helping other people, in the role of 'giver' when they perhaps are more normally 'receivers'. Thus a description is given of a limbless Venture Scout who carried out a survey in rough country for the laying of a water pipe to a Kenyan village.

"When not otherwise occupied, he worked as a labourer transporting piles of bricks on the front of his wheelchair and pushing himself along with his crutches." (49)

Thus the Movement is challenging received ideas of what are practicable activities for handicapped people. However, it is also made clear that the question 'If I push him - will he break?' needs careful thought and attention, since not all boys can join in all the activities offered.

The effect of the new approach is being felt by the whole Movement, as an increasing number of able-bodied young people are brought into contact with handicapped Scouts. The importance of being an equal member is emphasised. In this context, it can be seen that social integration does not require educational integration at school as a precondition.
10.3.2 Further education and training.

"The transition from school to adult life can be difficult for many young people." (50)

Following its initial impact on schools, the Warnock Report is now having implications for further educational establishments. There is an increased need for provision for young people with special educational needs who have left school, especially in the 16 - 19 age range. There is also the need to integrate the provision to a greater extent than in the past.

To meet these demands, Colleges have devised special 'bridging' courses, and have attempted to facilitate the entry of handicapped students into existing courses, both by the adaption of the physical environment, and by alterations to the curricula. The Warnock Report recommended an improvement in the accessibility of further education courses, citing the Open University as a model to be followed (51). However, it may be argued that this is merely a problem of environmental access, rather than of special educational provision. Adaption of the environment, or the provision of hearing aids does not affect the nature of the education itself, in the way that integration of students with the special educational need of having learning difficulties into a technical college course would surely do.

In fact, as in the schools, there have always been a few such students, although in the past, many may not have completed the course because an inability to cope with the academic demands. Courses in English have often been given to, for example, plumbing students, albeit disguised as Liberal and General Studies.

The Warnock Report emphasises the value of a continuation of education beyond school, particularly for children with severe learning difficulties, for whom a slow maturation means that they are just reaching their learning peak at the time they should leave school (52). Further education, for these students, has two advantages. Firstly, it provides the purely educational advantage of enabling them to use their abilities at the time they are ready to be used, and
secondly, it has the social advantage of enabling them to attend college as do their peers. (53)

The individuals' educational needs may be lessened at this further educational stage, to the extent that the need has disappeared by the end of their course. However, others may have dropped further behind their peers, and have found that their needs are exacerbated. Indeed, some aspects of special educational need may not even be apparent until the young person has left school and even further education, and is attempting to find employment.

"It is not always recognised that even if a pupil with a disability or significant difficulty is successfully integrated into an ordinary school, he may still need special help with decisions about further or higher education, training and a career." (54)

It has been suggested that an integrated schooling, might not be the best preparation for an integrated adulthood, nor necessarily lead to it. The Warnock Committee considered, however, that not only the educational system, but also the world of employment would need to change.

"We recommend that the public service and nationalised industries should urgently review their policies with a view to opening their doors more widely to and providing more imaginative opportunities for work for people with disabilities." (55)

In specific jobs, for example the teaching profession, where certain forms of handicap have traditionally been a debarring condition, it is shown that handicapped people may not only work, but also provide their pupils with a broader view of life from their own experience and personal knowledge of a handicapping situation.

It may seem that the Warnock Report devotes more space than is necessary to the difficulties of handicapped people in employment. However, this is a highly pertinent matter for the handicapped person whose chances of employment and social life are at stake. This is especially true for those whose social life and employment are
combined in an institutional life. Education, for Warnock, is the preparation for adulthood in the realms of work, social life, and spare-time hobbies and interests. These three lead to personal fulfillment.
References to Chapter 10.

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2 Education Act, 1976.
3 Education Act, 1981.
4 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., s.2.80, p.34.
6 ibid., p.180.
7 ibid., p.193.
8 ibid., p.201.
9 ibid., p.204.
10 ibid., p.203.
12 ibid., p.208.
15 ibid., p.245.
16 ibid., p.278.
17 ibid., p.281.
18 ibid., p.280.
19 ibid., p.301.
20 ibid., pp.302-3.
21 ibid., p.304.
22 ibid., p.332.
23 ibid., p.338.
26 see ch.2.
27 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., s.7.4, p.100.
29 ibid., p.3.
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46 May. R., 1985: op.cit., p.11.
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49 ibid.
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52 ibid., s.10.27, p.170.
55 ibid., s.10.77, p.186.
PART IV

CONCLUSION

Chapter 11

Principal philosophical issues
Chapter arrangement

11.1 Philosophy from special education

11.2 Philosophy in special education

11.2.1 Philosophy and intellectual handicaps

11.2.2 Philosophy and physical and sensory handicaps

11.2.3 Philosophy and socio-economic handicaps
11.1 Philosophy from special education

Throughout this thesis it has been presupposed, not only that philosophical analysis aids in the elucidation of conceptual problems in special education, but also that special education has a role to play in the wider consideration of philosophy per se. Thus it is possible to discuss the philosophy from, or in, special education, as well as that of, or for, special education, particularly as issues from special education can be used as examples in a whole network of traditional philosophical problems. With this presupposition as a basis, a detailed study of the Warnock Report, its rationale and historical position within a constantly changing educational system, has been conducted with the aim of showing that the study of special education has a direct relationship with philosophy, as well as an indirect one through its obvious connection with the mainstream of philosophy of education. The study of special education also has practical and theoretical links with the study of education. These interrelationships can be depicted by Figure 10.

![Diagram of interrelationships of the subject]

Figure 10. The interrelationships of the subject.

The two main areas of pure philosophical interest, reached either directly, or as mediated through philosophy of education, are moral and social philosophy, and philosophy of mind (epistemology). The latter has not been extensively developed in this thesis, but is
Aspects of moral and social philosophy as forms of ethics have here been taken as pre-eminently relevant. Students with the severe educational and personal problems that cause them to be termed 'with special, special needs' present to their teachers, as well as to educationalists and politicians, those borderline cases which cause moral dilemmas. These occur when there is a clash of principle as, for example, between the commitment to furthering a pupil's educational development as far as possible, and preserving, or even fostering, his freedom or autonomy. Such decisions are present in the mainstream, but are not so clear cut, since the methods of remediation are neither so extreme, nor so demonstrably efficient.

The concerns of groups of students in relation to other groups, are moreover also linked in the way that moral philosophy is linked to social philosophy, particularly as it can be debated whether there is such an entity as the group 'the handicapped'.

Dependent on this, certain themes have run through the thesis. Paramount among these has been an analysis of a group of concepts which, while being ostensibly factual, have been shown to carry a strong evaluative content. Since all of these are positive rather than negative, or derogatory, the concept of 'prestige terms' has been borrowed from the work of O'Connor (2). The positive normative concepts thus indicated, have been highlighted to show the real possibility of arguments arising which are totally dependent for their persuasiveness on an ambiguity which threatens to render them vacuous.

The third and fourth chapters of the thesis, together with the ninth and tenth, illustrate this point, as what have been called 'cloaked value judgements' (3) are brought to light in a way common to both contemporary and traditional philosophy.

Chapter four may be seen as one of the points where the argument culminates, bringing together the previous ideas. It shows finally the shortcomings of a widespread approach to philosophy and sociology
known as relativism. This is conducted through an analysis of the prestige concept of normality, which is shown to have strong normative connotations, allied to at least three possible changing and quasi-factual practical meanings.

Chapter 10 shows how much recent discussion of educational integration has been vitiated for the same reasons. So many different meanings of the word integration have been used that it is never quite clear, in Warnock, or in other writings, which is the one being discussed. This argument is also relevant to mainstream education through the agency of the comprehensive school, as it can be asked what the meaning of 'comprehensive' is in any particular argument.

Chapter 5 is again a culminative, rather than an exploratory chapter, with its analysis of persons, dependant on the idea of normality. An attempt is made to show how the idea of a person is central to moral philosophy, as well as to epistemology. More specific current philosophical ideas, particularly those about animal rights are introduced to show how the existence of severely mentally impaired people is used by, for example, Singer to further the idea that a new definition of a person which may exclude many humans and include some animals is needed. Arguments criticising speciesism developed from this compare the claimed intelligence of animals such as pigs with that of many disable persons. Intellectually handicapped people are not the only individuals that can be used as an example. Midgley has shown that we should hesitate to call a 'morally defective' person, or an insensitive person, totally human (4). However the existence of mentally-handicapped people does counter the 'animal rights' arguments, which are based on the similarity of animals with the rational part of man.

The study of 'persons' moreover, in the terms of the moral arguments over euthanasia or abortion, gives prominence to people handicapped either before birth, or through an accident or old age. Furthermore, social and political, as well as moral, arguments about the nature of society generally include discussion about the procedure for dealing with the weak, the ill, and the handicapped.

Chapters 6 and 7 elaborate the theme that the 1971 Education Act, designed to further the teaching of the severely mentally handicapped
to the point when it could be called education, has affected the current view of education elaborated in the 1981 Act which followed the Warnock Report. The term education is analysed in these chapters as a further example of a prestige word.

Behaviour modification as developed from the work of Skinner has attracted wide interest, both for itself and for its relationships with other approaches to learning. In chapter eight, behaviour modification is shown to be relevant to epistemology, which itself has links with moral philosophy. Special education has an important place in this philosophical discussion, since as a purely practical consideration, it is most likely to be severely handicapped children who are taught in this specific way. Mainstream children receive this form of instruction only in the much modified sense of the use of reward and punishment. The associated moral arguments about autonomy, rationality, and freedom are also relevant here. If the concept of autonomy is seen as necessary to indicate the presence of a person, the existence of a mentally handicapped person causes a difficulty. Changes must be made, either to the idea of a person, or to the notion of autonomy, or to our behaviour.

Chapter nine considers another prestige word, needs, which has received very little attention outside the volume 'Perspectives on Plowden', but which demands analysis, as it is currently used so extensively in persuasive debate. It has long been understood by parents that the boy who says 'I need a new cricket bat' really means 'I want a new cricket bat'. Such an analysis can be given to many other cases of so-called need. Although Warnock is shown to be innocent of this ambiguity, subsequent use of the term cannot be so easily vindicated. The Warnock Report gave the existing concept of needs respectability, but the concept can be used, or abused, in ways logically derived from, but alien to, the Warnock Report.
11.2 Philosophy in special education

Another way of approaching the philosophical issues highlighted by the present analysis of the Warnock Report is to distinguish three very broad groups of handicap and to discuss the philosophical issues relevant to each group. These handicaps are considered mainly in relation to those with 'special, special needs', that is those with severe forms of the handicap that seem to demand the extra forms of remediation not currently available in the mainstream classes.

Although the very many forms of disability present widely different practical manifestations, three broad groups can logically be described. These are intellectual handicap, physical, including sensory, handicap, and socio-economic handicap. Although the use of such broad groups seems to be diametrically opposed to the greater specificity suggested in this thesis to be a mark of good educational practice, it is philosophically helpful for the following reason. In the consideration of the suitable educational placement of any individual, three questions need to be asked, in addition to the satisfaction of his general needs. These questions concern firstly his present intelligence, secondly the state of his body, which includes the sense organs the eyes and ears as well as the working of his limbs, and thirdly the socio-economic status of the child, of his family, and of his position in that family.

There are various other ways of considering an individual which this approach does not take into consideration, and also it must be admitted that in most meanings of the word, 'intelligence' is in part dependant on physical factors, the state of the brain as a bodily organ, and in part also on socio-economic factors, such as the child's general life-experience. Indeed, all three aspects of intellectual, physical, and socio-economic handicap in practice often occur together, overlapping and exacerbating, or sometimes ameliorating, each other.

The use of such broad groups also ignores the possibility of there being disagreement over the status of any particular handicap. Is 'dyslexia', for example, to be understood as a socio-economic and hence relative handicap where a literate society makes extra demands
on an individual, or is it, as it often appears to be, an intellectually specific handicap?

However, in principle at least, the three groups are separable, and this has again to be shown to have a practical as well as a theoretical impact. For example, two young children, with the same type of hearing loss as measured by an audiogram, may have very different intellectual levels, as measured by performance, and different levels of support and understanding by their families, with the practical result that one speaks, and the other does not.

Given the overall value of this three-fold distinction, three logically separate, although overlapping, types of philosophical issue arise. Their own interrelationship is based as much on the interrelationship of moral concepts, as on the interrelationship of the different types of handicap. Thus 'equality' is linked to 'fairness', 'deficit' to 'normality', and 'rights' to 'persons'.

The existence of people who can be called severely intellectually handicapped, who cannot speak, or even in some cases cannot act at all independently, brings into focus the conventional arguments about rights, as related to personhood, individuality and status. The real differences between such individuals and the non-handicapped have traditionally seemed relevant to both a different position and determined value in and for society, and also a segregated education and training. Modern arguments are generally in favour of eradicating such differences, which are now held to be irrelevant. Also to be considered at this point are the arguments for so-called animal rights, and accusations of forms of speciesism, both rampant and moderate (5). Links can further be drawn to the moral presuppositions of the members of the committee which produced the second Warnock Report looking at the research into artificial conception and embryology.

The related group of concepts of 'needs', 'equality', and 'compensation' come into focus with consideration of the status of students with physical and sensory handicaps. For, in many cases, it can be seen to make sense to talk in terms of financial input, either for specialised education or for special aids, which provide a basic level of compensation since some aspects of 'normal life' can thereby
be assured along the 'normal opportunity range' (6). Thus a job can be kept if money is spent on adapting the office; independent living is also possible in a house that is similarly adapted, with lifts and hoists, for example; there are further possibilities for friendships, marriage, and hobbies. Total compensation can never be achieved, but on this basis, it is sensible to use the concept in terms of relevant need.

When turning to socio-economic handicaps, the relativistic arguments, which have been shown to have no role with other handicaps, come into play. It is here held that such arguments, and the sociological approach to disability are generally too facile and ignore real problems. Associated ideas of 'normality' as a normative concept are also relevant here, with the link back to conceptions of status and stigma that occur with intellectual handicap.

Each of the three approaches possesses its own moral justification for intervention or not, for preferential treatment, for acceptance, and for specialised education. Thus in the treatment of the severely intellectually handicapped, ideas of 'compassion' and 'altruism' are more common and relevant than those of 'rights' which generally appear unsustainable. For physically handicapped people, it is possible to argue sensibly in terms of 'justice', 'fairness', and 'equality'. For many people with socio-economic handicaps, the important moral issues are 'cultural integration' or 'cultural isolation'. Indeed it is as true for the philosophy of special education as it is for the philosophy of education that,

"... the problems of the philosophy of education, if pressed far enough, become the traditional problems of philosophy." (7).
11.2.2 Philosophical issues and intellectual handicaps

As has been demonstrated earlier in this thesis, the position of handicapped people is relevant in a discussion of the topic of rights, both in respect of the claims for the extension of legal or civil rights, and in respect of the existence of moral or human rights.

For intellectually handicapped people, such arguments assume a major importance. Thus it can be argued that the moderately intellectually handicapped are more like the rest of the community than is often assumed. Although unable to perform many intellectual or academic tasks, in social tasks, for example, marrying or voting, their ability need not be impaired significantly. Thus, for this group, claims for legal rights are not unreasonable. Indeed, even those who are so intellectually retarded as not to be able to use legal rights in any way can be, and are, still claimed to possess moral rights to treatment and care.

In philosophy, the distinctions between moral and legal rights cannot be so easily justified, and indeed some philosophers, have denied the existence of the former. In recent philosophical literature, two approaches to rights can be distinguished. The first, represented by Frey, denies the existence of moral rights (8). The second, represented by Peter Singer, extends moral rights to previously unforeseen areas(9). Singer and Frey eventually reach very similar conclusions about the appropriate treatment of animals, but it is not certain whether this unanimity would extend to handicapped people.

The existence of severely intellectually handicapped people has been used in discussions about rights to illustrate this variety of philosophical arguments. In particular, as shown in Chapter 5, the proponents of animal rights, as represented by Singer, have argued that on a common definition of what it is to be a person, that is being in possession of a certain intelligence or rationality, some humans are not persons, and some non-humans are persons. Singer holds that since pigs, for example, are more intelligent than many intellectually handicapped humans and have a well developed social life, it is not only cruel to keep them as we do, but also an
infringement of their rights, since they are treated as an ends to our means, not as persons having their own ends.

The practice of culling provides a very different view of the status of the individual, and involves strong means and ends arguments. Culling is advocated for the same reasons as thinning seedlings in the garden. The weak or the excess are thinned out or culled for the good of the species as a whole. In this process, the individual animal is ignored, being the means to the end of the survival of the whole species, or certain individuals, that is those chosen to survive are the ends, and the others are the means. In either case, the cull is only to the good of those who survive, but in some cases, the good of another species is also considered, as when seals are culled to reduce their depredations on fish stocks.

The Nazis rationalised their 'cull' as the purification of the species, as well as the provision of 'Lebensraum'. This is certainly an extreme form of treating people as means, not ends, and hence of denying the importance of individuals, which runs counter to the arguments for human rights. To animal rights proponents, the culling of humans is no worse than the culling of animals, and the culling of animals is as morally wrong as the culling of humans.

Singer concludes that we should definitely treat some animals better than we do, and possibly that we need not treat some humans as well as we do. However, many would dispute the latter part of the conclusion, believing that this showed something wrong with Singer's argument rather than with our treatment of handicapped humans. It could even be argued that the treatment of other humans ought to be improved before discussing the treatment of non-humans.

Frey counters the approach of Singer by denying the existence of all forms of moral rights, whether for humans, animals, or non-sentient beings. He argues that moral rights which are debateable and can be shown to depend on equally debateable moral principles cannot have the same force as those rights which have a clear legal basis (legal rights).

Conventionally, moral rights have been restricted to those rights claimed for human beings as persons. As human rights, they have been
contrasted with legal rights (which Frey terms civil rights), to emphasise a difference between particular existing or desired legislative provisions. Thus only humans could have moral rights, and arguments for moral, that is human, rights were designed to show that other humans in different countries, or with different coloured skins, or with different customs or religions, had certain entitlements. Proponents of human rights assume that there is one society, that of humans.

"What...is the legacy of the quarter century? ...in one word, it is globalism. Forced into our unwilling minds has been a view that presents humanity as a single entity." (10).

The conventional line of argument is used in Chapter 5 to show that handicapped people can be said to have rights, because they are members of the human race. While the differences between those with varying handicaps, and between all handicapped persons and those not so handicapped encourage the latter to discount the former, the 'rights lobby' serves to redress the balance. However, this argument, based on the existence of a common humanity, despite appearing to be a moral advance, leads to accusations of speciesism.

Frey shows what happens when moral rights are extended from being the preserve of humans, to being claimed to be possessed by animals also. Thus animal rights and human rights are subsections of moral rights, and are equally valid on a utilitarian basis (see Figure 11). There may be other forms of moral rights. In some senses of the word, plants, especially trees and forests, and even listed buildings can be said to have moral rights. They have 'interests' as well as 'rights' consequent on the duty of humans towards them on utilitarian grounds.

![Figure 11 Sub-sets of moral rights](image)

Figure 11 Sub-sets of moral rights
Frey's criticism is that these interests are based on beliefs, intellectual capacity, and language, which are not possessed by even the 'higher' animals. He then argues that there are no moral rights for any being, only 'civil' (i.e. legal) rights, although there are other reasons for treating animals well and for accepting the practical consequences of the many other claims for 'rights'.

Singer's argument for the extension of moral rights to some 'higher' animals is on the grounds that they are persons, with intelligence, and are therefore properly treated as ends rather than means. He would presumably restrict this extension to the intelligent individuals, for if a 'dim' pig were found it would presumably not be categorised as a person because of its intellectual handicap.

Legal rights for handicapped people, and indeed for animals, can exist without the interpolation of moral rights, as Frey argues. However, it may be more appropriate to refer to the legal protection afforded to the foetus, the child, or the handicapped person, and to the duty of others to ensure this protection, rather than to the possession of a right by these groups. This is because 'legal right' implies the bearer performing his actions for himself, while 'legal protection' acknowledges that some humans cannot do this, but that they should not be penalised, or harmed, because of this inability.

Both Frey and Singer can be accused of a new form of the old discrimination of 'intellectualism' or 'rationalism', as both value intelligence above everything else. This discrimination is not central to Frey's argument, but it is to that of Singer. It gives rise to two criticisms of Singer's work. Firstly, why should possession of intelligence be valued if being human is not. This is in direct contradiction to that current political argument which denigrates intellectual ability in favour of individual worth as a member of society. Especially in educational circles, meritocracy is not the fashion. The choice of intelligence level as being a relevant difference for treatment is as arbitrary as is the choice of species. Secondly, the result of adopting this intellectualism is a clash with Singer's own utilitarianism. Singer holds that all suffering is wrong and human suffering should not be valued as worse than animal suffering; they are in principle of equal moral worth. However his argument about the quality and depth of the suffering of intelligent
beings goes beyond basic utilitarianism. That is, when he discusses intelligent animals like pigs, he shows that they suffer not only physical pain, but also a form of mental or intellectual pain because of the mismatch between the rearing conditions imposed by modern farming methods, and the pigs' own social preferences for piglet rearing.

It is not certain whether he regards mental anguish as worse than physical anguish, or whether the two are equivalent, but the occurrence of both together is worse than either on its own. Singer seems to have interposed qualitative arguments, as he needs to do, while his espousal of utilitarianism demands the use only of quantitative ones. If qualitative arguments are ever to be allowed, are not humanity or species relevant qualities?

It is possible to question whether speciesism and a belief in animal rights are so opposed, or whether belief in animal rights is necessarily opposed to a belief in special treatment for handicapped people. It ought to be possible to decry sexism, racism, speciesism, and 'handicappism', as all equally involve baseless discrimination. But the anti-speciesist proponents of animal rights can be accused of handicappism, that is taking mental handicap as relevant to a denial or an assertion of an individual being a person and hence having rights.

There are two irreconcileable viewpoints. Either being a human is highly relevant to all moral treatment and relationships, or it is not. This thesis is therefore open to the accusation of speciesism, because it adopts altruism and because it accepts Mary Warnock's argument that it is necessary to be humane towards those who are humans, and to ensure the best possible education and treatment for them, on the grounds of compassion (11). However, all moral arguments have ultimate and unprovable basic assumptions, whether these be utilitarian or principle-based. Such arguments need to be pressed far enough to reveal these assumptions. Thus it cannot be proved that being human is a crucial, morally-relevant factor. Equally, the absence of such proof does not deny the assertion. Similarly, while the 'anti-rights' proponents can argue that the term 'rights' is merely used to make respectable the argument in defence of a better treatment of animals, the 'pro-rights' proponents can only reiterate that rights they indeed are.
11.2.3 Philosophy and physical and sensory handicaps

Much recent educational debate in the political sphere has centred on the ideas of 'equality' and 'compensation'. Although Mary Warnock has argued that these two concepts lose their meaning when applied to severely handicapped children (12), they are useful in analysing the rationale behind providing extra resources for the education of children with physical and sensory handicaps. However, in consideration of this group of children, the words equality and compensation are indeed pushed to the limits of their meanings.

'Equality', which was a concept of political philosophy, has become important for education since the politicising of the educational system, ostensibly from the 1944 Education Act, but actually traceable long before this (13). 'Philosophy of education', as a subject, has developed during the period when discussion about comprehensive schools have been couched in terms of 'equality'. The contribution of philosophy of education has been to elucidate what might be the meaning of this word in any particular context or argument.

The meanings of 'equality', 'equals' and 'equivalence' are very different in social or political discourse from those in either mathematics or formal logic. In these latter disciplines, 'equivalence' involves the possibility of substitution. Thus in algebra, mathematical equivalence means that in 'a = b', the figure from the left can be used to replace that from the right. Similarly, in formal logic, the idea of material equivalence is contained in truth-tables. Thus p=q means that the truth values of p and q are the same (14). This does not concern the meaning of the statements, only their form and truth values.

In respect of people however, it is not possible to say Peter = John meaning that one can be substituted for the other. In this sense, 'All men are equal' can only mean that 'All men have a right to vote' or 'All men have right to .....' However, as can be seen, stated equality for people must be in a particular respect. Substitution of roles replaces substitution of people. Equality can mean very little out of context.
As has been shown, equality has become a prestige word, and has a variety of possible meanings, many of which capitalise on the generally accepted understanding that what is equal is fair. An understanding of the term fairness, that is Aristotle's 'equity', is fundamental to the argument presented in this thesis concerning the position of handicapped school pupils. This might be called 'equitarianism' as it subordinates equality to fairness.

Although Barrow states that

"Nobody in their right mind believes that everybody should be treated exactly the same in all circumstances without qualification" (15),

Cohen shows that there are those for whom equality is itself a basic principle (16). This type of strict egalitarianism can oppose arguments for justice or equity on the grounds that the proffered views for relevant differentiation of treatment are varied, contestable, and could in principle lead to paradoxically unjust outcomes, for example the treatment of the Jews by the Nazis. However, strict egalitarian ideas themselves conflict with other important principles, those of liberty, worth, or just desserts.

In education, three aspects of equality are used in particular. In addition to these is 'equality of status' which has been discussed in the previous section. The claims for human rights are claims that all humans have an equal status as people, and hence have certain rights, especially to be treated as means not ends. In educational terms, equality of status has been applied to the desired 'parity of esteem' between secondary modern and grammar schools. Special schools for handicapped children have frequently been assumed to have a lesser status than schools in the mainstream.

The remaining three aspects of equality are 'equality of treatment', 'equal opportunity', and 'equality of outcome'. The former assumes a common ground for all children, and leads to the mixed ability comprehensive school. This route could lead to educational loss for handicapped children. The position of the handicapped child in such a system forces consideration of the question whether or not there can be equality of treatment, since the handicapped child, even if sitting
next to his able-bodied peer, will receive an entirely different classroom experience. The deaf child, for example, will not hear the same details, nor gather the same information from the teacher's speech, no matter how well amplified the latter is as he does not possess the same concepts of language as his hearing neighbour. Similarly, the severely physically handicapped child, or the spastic child, will have difficulty in manipulating the equipment with which his neighbour has no trouble.

Equality of opportunity appears to be very similar to equality of treatment. However the emphasis is now placed on what is available, rather than on what is provided. Thus all children have an equal opportunity to attend a comprehensive school, regardless of the financial or social status of their parents. However, since not all children, nor indeed all schools, are identical, the existence of the equality of opportunity predicates nothing of the outcome, although equality of outcome is taken to be the desired end of equality of opportunity. For this reason, in his discussion of equality of opportunity, Gribble, quoting Williams, distinguishes between 'formal' and 'operative' or 'actual' equality of opportunity to show that differences between children's abilities, and the attitude of adults to these differences, are just as important as the attitude to equality per se (17).

The Equal Opportunities Commission attempts to limit discrimination on the grounds of sex or handicap. In the case of handicapped people, discrimination can be overcome by establishing that the handicapped person can perform the task as well as any other, even if to achieve this, special facilities or equipment must be installed.

Equality of outcome may well appear to be unobtainable in the face of serious handicaps. However, for special education it is the most relevant of the four, and arguably the most just. Even though most severely deaf children will not go to university, any more than will most children in a non-selective school, the ideal of achieving such an outcome can be present. As has been stated, Aristotle's idea is of equality, as valued because it is part of justice or fairness (equity). He claims that although like has to be treated as like, those who are different should be treated differently.
Two difficulties arise from this argument. Firstly, a decision has to be made as to which are the relevant differences for planning the variety of treatment, and secondly, it has to be accepted that some differences cannot be overcome. Thus if one child has three sweets, and another one, a third person also having three sweets could give two and a half to the second child and a half to the first so that both had three and a half sweets. This would produce equality, although whether it was fair or not would be argued by the children. However, such a simplistic solution cannot be pursued in the case of ears, legs or healthy bodies. It is thus inappropriate to talk of equality of outcome as an aim, if mathematical equality is intended. It does become possible to use the term if equality in principle is intended by the action being considered.

A similar argument can be made for 'compensation'. No child could have been fully compensated for the fact that he had no limbs because of thalidomide damage. Yet the damages awarded by the court would help to ameliorate some problems. Similarly, an ordinary child in good health can, for example, run about, play football, go for long walks; to achieve at least some suppleness in his limbs, a suppleness which will always be limited, the child with cerebral palsy needs physiotherapy, a special hydrotherapy pool, and possibly surgery. Special schools, physiotherapy pools, resource units, trained teachers, and other aids can compensate, to some extent, albeit at considerable expense, for the child's handicap. Compensation, and hence equality of outcome is one of the rationales offered for this greater expenditure on handicapped children. The greater expenditure can help the children achieve an outcome which approaches, to a greater or lesser degree, the outcome that is desired from the education for all children. In this way, the idea of compensation is related to that of equality.

"... positive discrimination to remove and compensate for 'natural' handicaps might be argued to be a matter of justice through its fostering equality." (18)

A second rationale is that of 'need'. The provision of extra resources helps the child achieve more, and he therefore 'needs' these extra resources to achieve more. Thus a deaf child needs extra help in speech, and language, and with a longer time allowed for the
learning process, to achieve an 'O-level' pass. In the longer term, the satisfaction of this need leads to an equality or near-equality of outcome, that is, the possession of a pass in that particular examination.

Clearly, the two rationales are linked, since compensation has to be related to relevant need to have any educational value. Providing handicapped children with holidays abroad, or other 'treats' does not compensate for the child's needs in the classroom. Indeed, it may be argued that an activity cannot be properly termed compensation if it is not consequent on the need. This then poses the question of what forms the relevant need, the answer to which depends on the desired outcome for education, and the answer to the continuing question in the philosophy of education, "What is education?".

The political philosopher must address the moral dilemma, since the educational needs will differ depending on whether the desired outcome is a trained population, an educated population, a re-trainable population, or a population which is prepared to accept un- or under-employment. The position of the child with physical or sensory handicaps helps clarify the issues in such a moral discussion.
11.2.4 Philosophy and Socio-economic handicaps

"Special educational needs are an artefact of the expectation of a dominant culture." (19)

This quotation from Kyle indicates how the analysis of special education gives a new or further perspective to certain sociological arguments which have become philosophically and politically important. The sociological arguments are based on the 'Knowledge and Control' type of analysis, typified by the volume of that name (edited by M F D Young)(20), and emphasise that knowledge is relative to society, and that there is no such thing as absolute knowledge; any view is as valid as any other. From this it follows that what is seen as knowledge, and hence important, in any society is relative to that society; possession of such knowledge brings possession of power and 'social control'. Thus society is defined in terms of dominant and submissive (minority) cultures. Certain classes of society decide (define) what is knowledge, impose this decision on those less powerful, and hence define themselves as knowledgeable, while the other classes are 'deficient' or 'disadvantaged' because they cannot achieve the imposed standards of knowledge. The result in Western society is that those so-called disadvantaged children who do not do well in school in academic terms, are actually being made into failures by the school. The 'Knowledge and control' argument is that the schools fail their pupils rather than vice versa. There is nothing inherently 'wrong' with the children, only with the schools that fail them.

This argument is expanded in the work of Labov (21), who discusses the theory of 'verbal deficit' in children. He holds that an analysis such as that given by Bernstein in his work on elaborative and restrictive codes in language use (22), depends on a faulty view of language and gives class-biassed or racist, model. Labov is particularly critical of the Head-start programmes of education for disadvantaged children in the U.S.A., which he believed to be based on a mistaken idea of socio-linguistics. In Britain, the work of Swann and others (23), especially in the texts prepared for the Open University, have extended this analysis to the education and socialization of conventionally handicapped children.
With the publication of the Warnock Report in 1978 and the subsequent Education Act of 1981, arguments about conventionally handicapped children have become confused with those about the new types of special educational need, some of which may well be socially conditioned. It is one of the points of this thesis to disentangle these strands of the argument, and also to question the relativism which, in some senses, poses a threat to special education. As explained in Chapter 4, the relativist approach is comparable to that outlined above, in that handicaps are held to be relative to the expectations of that society. Handicaps are not only caused by socio-economic factors, as was the blinding of people in Bhopal in 1985 (where those handicapped were affected because their poverty necessitated their living close to the factory and because the economic conditions lead to insufficient safety controls), but also because the society defines what is meant by a handicap and what is meant by normality. Since this definition is sociologically relevant, no society should single out particular individuals as handicapped, but rather accept all as normal.

The first difficulty with this argument is that while it may be morally acceptable to accept handicapped people as normal as far as respect or esteem is concerned, it is probably not morally acceptable to many people that the handicapped should be prevented from receiving special care and attention, and it is entirely impracticable to accept the riposte to this that all should be treated with as much care and attention as each other.

In the article quoted at the head of this section, Kyle takes this relativist argument to its logical conclusion in the case of deaf children. He gives the methods of a psychologist involved in assessing the special needs of certain children, and he correctly demonstrates that this assessment is far more complicated than that formerly needed to assess handicap. This leads to a criticism of the Warnock Report, since he holds that deaf children are not really 'communication handicapped', as they have traditionally been considered, but have only become so because of their treatment by parents and teachers. Specifically, deaf people have a perfectly 'accredited language' in sign language (24), which is as effective, Kyle argues, as spoken English for communication (25). Deaf people thus represent a cultural minority who have been forced to learn a
majority language. Since they are unlikely to learn it very well, they are bound to be failures, just as are Labov's black children. Teachers are thus not only misguided in teaching oral speech in this context, they are also actually abusing deaf childrens' rights to the acceptance of their first language, that is sign language, as a proper language. Like any other cultural or linguistic minority, they are being oppressed, and should be permitted, or even encouraged, to use their language with dignity.

Apart from questioning whether sign language is 'as effective as spoken English', Kyle's argument is open to much criticism. In this thesis, it has been argued that the relativistic case only holds for a few handicaps, of which maladjustment and possibly dyslexia are the principal examples, which have a demonstrable social or economic basis. The 1981 Act specifically omits children for whom English is a second language, yet paradoxically, these children would seem to have a prima facie case for according them 'special needs' status on a relativistic basis.

Kyle's attempt to prove that deafness is a social category, rather than a sensory handicap is interesting. What he actually proves is that some deaf children, namely those with deaf parents who use sign language and whose parents have taught them to use this sign language fluently before they go to school and are prepared to continue to do this, are in a similar position to those for whom English is a second language. It may be noted that the group for whom this is so is a very small proportion of even the deaf population. The import of this is that sign language, as such, should be respected, as should its users. However, Kyle does not answer the question of the content of the deaf child's teaching, any more than Labov does for his black children, and neither is the remainder of the deaf population affected by this argument.

It is true that the signing deaf child may be communication handicapped in the sense that there are few people who can understand them, (despite the project in Leeds to teach sign language to all children)(26), and they may be handicapped in the sense that access to the large body of books is denied them, and hence to a wider education. Neither BSL (British Sign Language), the system advocated by Kyle, nor ASL (American Sign Language), nor indeed NNE
(Non-standard Negro English) used by Labov's children, conform to written English or American structure, despite the fact that the basic vocabulary is the same as can be seen from this quotation from the play 'Children of a lesser god',


"I have nothing; no hearing, no speech, no intelligence, no language. I have only you. I don't need you. I have me alone." (Standard English) (27).

A number of questions of definition need to be asked of Kyle, and of Labov. Firstly, what is to be understood by the term 'a properly accredited language'? Labov defines a language as having a grammar that can be written down and explained. However, this implies that any statement can be grammatical if it, or its type, occurs more than once, and if this is so, can there be any criteria for correcting speech or language as ungrammatical? Indeed, can there not be as many languages as there are speakers? Or, put another way, this argument implies that everything spoken is a language in itself, and if this is so, can the term 'language' have any real meaning or value?

Secondly, Labov and Kyle must define 'culture'. Kyle's discussion of minority and dominant cultures presupposes some generally accepted meaning for the term 'culture' or cultural group'. This notion is readily associated with, for example, the Jews, who have identifiable different religious and social practices, but is much less easily applied to deaf people, who tend to be part of the English, or the Jewish, or the American cultures, but also happen to be deaf.

One of the factors at stake here, in educational terms, is the nature of the curriculum. For black children, being taught in black language 'ghettoese' or non-standard negro English, may be restricted in their access to material not in 'ghettoese'. Similarly, a concentration on black literature or black history, restricts their wider education to an unnecessarily narrow spectrum, to an even greater extent than the restriction on English speakers who do not learn French or German.
In the case of deaf children, while it may be easier to learn in sign language, and more can be learnt in the time that would otherwise have to be spent on the tedious acquisition of a probably not very high standard of speech, there are very severe limitations. In particular, there is the limitation imposed by the small size of the deaf population, and the smaller size of the signing deaf population, which makes it uneconomical to produce textbooks. This limits the curriculum. Furthermore, the available linguistic structures are themselves limited, or at least different, as the quotation above demonstrates.

Furthermore, ninety per cent of deaf children come from homes where the parents are not themselves deaf or signing, a point which Kyle admits but glosses over (28). In such families, speech is the normal method of communication, and an early decision has to be made as to which shall be the deaf child's first language, since small deaf children have, in effect, no language. Speech can best be learnt at an early age, and possession of speech is the key to integration, but the success of the instruction cannot be measured until later in life. This must always pose a moral dilemma for parents and teachers, but it is not a dilemma which can be resolved by philosophical discourse.

The conclusion reached by the 'Knowledge and control' school, and by Labov and Kyle, is that there is no such thing as being deficient, but that this is an artificial description. However, even in a multi-cultural society, the different groups have an ideal to which they aspire, albeit an ideal which differs from one culture to another. To discount this is to attempt to change society in a fundamental and draconian way. The education of handicapped children thus illustrates the core of the arguments for and against integration of cultures into a society, an integration which can be held to be an ironing out of differences, or an accepting and valuing of these differences. As can be seen in many parts of the world, for example Sri Lanka, or Canada, on the national scale this can lead to separatist movements, of Tamils, or Québécois. On a smaller scale, promotion of cultural identity leads to the cultural isolation of the ghetto.

It must be wondered whether even the most ardent proponent of sign language and deaf rights would really endorse this prospect,
particular since, although the black children described in Labov's study can understand and use standard American speech as well as NNE, such are the common features of the two, this ability is not available to those 'signing' deaf children who can only understand BSL. Thus their isolation is the greater.

In response to the question heading this section, it must be admitted that Kyle is partially correct, for some special needs are indeed 'artefacts' of a certain culture. However, it makes little sense to say that all are. Kyle has not sufficiently separated three aspects. Firstly, it is not very important whether or not BSL is an 'accredited' language. It is important that decisions need to be taken about second language learners, and even which language should be the first language. Secondly, having or lacking respect for the language or its speakers may put them in an invidious position of outsiders vis à vis their status as citizens and employees. Thirdly, there is an alternative sign language, 'signed English', which does attempt to follow the structure of English. This does not have the appeal of the second language arguments, and has not been developed by deaf adults, but it was developed by hearing teachers from BSL, attempting to modify the signs into the standard English structure. This allows the deaf their normal means of communication, but also permits them access to reading material in standard English.

Adoption of sign language for deaf children, as Kyle suggests, would make the special education of deaf children more special, and more different. Similarly, education in black studies and in black language following Labov, makes this education more different. The desire for the acceptance of different cultures must be balanced against the desire for their integration.

The large group of children for whom English is a second language would, as noted above, seem to have a very good case for special needs designation. Paradoxically, they are not included by either the Warnock Report nor the 1981 Education Act. Given the emphasis on integration, and hence the omission of the gifted child or girls from its brief of the former, this is surprising. Conversely, Kyle, in emphasising the special linguistic needs of the deaf, and by association other children for whom English is a second language, strengthens the case of the gifted child and of girls to be allowed
special needs treatment. This argument follows the spirit of the Warnock Report, but is contrary to the apparently general interpretation of it both by the 1981 Act, and by the Local Education Authorities and educationalists.
References to Chapter 11.

12. ibid.


Chapter 12

The End of Special Education?
Chapter arrangement

12.1 Warnock: vision to reality

12.2 Warnock: emotion and philosophy
"To those whose expectations were roused by the deliberations of the Warnock Committee and its generally welcome report, the 1981 Education Act and subsequent regulations have produced dismay and disappointment." (1)

When looking at the practical results in Special Education consequent upon the Warnock Report, it is necessary to distinguish between several different publications. Thus the 1978 Report was followed by the 1981 Act, and by Circular 1/83, which gave Local Education Authorities guidance on the fulfillment of the requirements of the Act, and also by those Authorities own subsequent interpretation and use of the Act since it became fully in operation in April 1984. Between Report and Act, there were consultation documents, a special standing committee, a White Paper (2), and an educational debate. Indeed, it is no wonder that some aspects of the Report were altered or lost.

Whether the final results in classroom practice do produce 'dismay and disappointment' depends partly on attitude, and partly on personal interpretation of the Report. The Report has certainly been diluted by all the subsequent writings as it passed through the consultative stages. This is as a result of the wording of the Report itself, which has as we have seen can be given at least two differences in interpretation.

Thus some are 'disappointed' because they regard Warnock as propounding integration for the severely handicapped; an integration which has not occurred widely. Some are 'dismayed' because their interpretation of the Warnock Report pointed to a better quality of education for all children with learning difficulties, and a possible change in the teaching of all children, which again does not seem to have happened generally. The practical reason for as piecemeal and varied interpretation of the both the Warnock Report and the 1981 Act is the nature of the education system, and in particular, the power of the educational authorities in a scheme where, until sufficient case-law has been established, there is only guidance and advice.
guidance and advice rather than reinforcement.

Furthermore, the existing Local Authority provision (i.e. pre-1981) was already very varied. Not only were some more open to the suggestion, or the need, for integration, but also their social and physical environments, and their budgetary constraints varied enormously. These differences, coupled with the discretion given to Local Education Authorities has produced a situation which ranges between two extremes:

"...there is disquieting evidence that some Local Education Authorities have seized upon the integration principle to make placements in ordinary schools without due regard to their preparedness." (3)

"...slowness on the part of many Local Education Authorities to accept the integration principle..." (4)

Two examples of the changes between the Warnock Report and the present situation can be given here. Firstly, the Report gave prominence to the concept of the 'Named Person',

"...who will provide a single point of professional contact..." (5)

and

"...to whom the parents of children with disability or special needs can turn for advice on the different services available to meet their child's needs." (6)

This provision has been seen as lasting up to and beyond school leaving age for the severely handicapped person, for whom it could have been connected with an organisation like 'Advocacy Alliance' (7). This suggestion has entirely disappeared from the subsequent legislation.

Secondly, a change of nomenclature has meant that those children whom the Warnock Report recommended should be
"...recorded...as in need of special educational provision..." (9),

are now given

"...statements of special educational need." (9).

As Philips suggests, it is not always clear whether 'recorded' and 'not recorded' are to

"...correspond to the categories of special school and ordinary school." (10)

In Warnock's terms, it appears that the two terms are the same, as recording is for children who require

"...special educational provision not generally available in ordinary schools." (11)

Philips' argument is that there are children, for example, those who are dyslexic or have special learning difficulties, who do not need special school placement, but who should have the advantages of a statement, since this protects their right to be accorded a special educational need even if they move to a Local Education Authority where the nature of the need is not recognised to the same degree. This position was maintained by the White Paper (12), but is now less clear.

A current extension of this discussion is caused by unease over the nature and quality of the statements themselves. Statements have been made for all children in special schools, including recommendations on the proper placement in the future for each individual. At least some parents are indeed filled with 'dismay' at the thought of their child being transferred to an ordinary classroom, since they are convinced they will not receive the specialist and individual help currently given in the special school. Indeed, the local education authority, the teacher, the parents, the child, and ultimately the lawyers may each have a different view of what is the proper, or the appropriate placement for the individual.
The very statement that the Warnock Report may herald the end of special education can be greeted with dismay or enthusiasm. Such a statement arises from the central paradoxes of the Warnock Report. These are, as noted above, that

"...they have recourse to such a wide ranging definition of special educational need that it can readily be seen to refer to the whole school population," (13)

and secondly, that the Warnock Report has had to try to preserve the advantages of 'being special' and those of being treated as the same. From these two stems the third, that an adequate special educational system could lead, on some interpretations, to an end of special education.

This statement clearly depends on two meanings of special education. Special Education¹ is that which is given to children with special educational needs in Warnock's terminology. Special Education² is the individuated education given to every child according to his needs. One 'end' for Special Education¹ could be for there to be no more handicapped children. This apparent precondition of the 'Good Life', that all children should be healthy, intelligent, and well-cared for, loses some of its appeal if it is taken to mean 'no handicapped child is to be born' rather than 'no child is to be born handicapped', or if it is to mean that children who become handicapped during childhood are to be eliminated. The most that it can mean is that the utmost should be done to prevent disability, although this cannot, by itself, mean the 'end' of special educational need. By contrast, adoption of Special Education² would lead to no child being classified as handicapped as far as their education was concerned, since all would be provided for as normal, and hence none would be special.

The Warnock Report has been criticised for adhering to Special Education¹, and not pursuing the argument to its conclusion, that is to say, Special Education², a criticism which the extensions of the Report's arguments to cover gifted children and girls (see Chapter 9) illustrates.

In one sense, all education is special education. It has a special
importance to the individual who has only one childhood and youth, and it is increasingly individuated in the way that the Special Education\textsuperscript{2} approach recommends. However, some needs are always going to be greater and more complex than others, and the scale of this variety requires that such greater, or more complex, needs be differentiated. The extent to which society can cater for such greater needs depends on its resources, and the priorities it places upon these resources as much as on interpretations of Acts and Reports.
"It is not mere superstition and prejudice to suppose that the crippled and the blind are to some extent set apart from the rest of us: there are real and important differences here which it is just as cruel to ignore altogether as to exaggerate." (14)

This thesis has sought to establish that there are considerable differences between individuals, some of which are relevant to education, whatever is considered to be educational. An Aristotelian approach, that the acknowledgement of relevant differences leads to equity and fairness has been propounded in the face of sociological arguments. This emphasises the contention of the Warnock Report that some children will continue to need special school placement, despite current interpretations of the Report which press for total integration.

Munro states that it is 'cruel' to ignore the differences, as he is arguing, in the quotation given at the head of this page, on humanitarian grounds. It can also be said that on rational grounds it is 'illogical' to deny the differences, which are, in some cases, so externally evident. It may also be 'injudicious', on utilitarian grounds, if such people are said to have rights. The arguments for retaining some form of special treatment can thus be held together, with none taking priority, save in cases of very severe handicap, where notions of compassion and altruism must necessarily predominate.

The types of difference in the educational sphere, offered by Warnock, refer to the content, approach, and atmosphere of the learning. A sociological approach to educational differences suggests that it is just as cruel to exaggerate the wrong difference. The Warnock Report itself is a long, detailed, and well-written document, which might have been more coherent if it had concentrated on its specific task of being 'An enquiry into the education of handicapped children and young people'. Widening the category by redefining handicap in terms of special educational need has provided the arguments for this thesis,
but it has made the concept itself unsustainable. For, as has been demonstrated in this thesis, there is a family of emotive concepts, which are drawn upon in most educational contexts. The use of this family of concepts involves what might be called 'the three 'P's' - paradox, prestige, and pejorative. These concepts are 'education' itself, 'normal' and its compounds, 'needs', 'handicapped', and 'special', and many more. A reader might be warned

"...note first of all the deceptive combination of factual data and appreciation. Because one cannot dispute the information, one may be lead to think that one cannot disagree with the value-judgement." (15)

The Warnock Report itself, cannot, at first sight, be accused of hiding value-judgements in this way, since it defines what it means by 'education' and 'special needs', though not by 'needs'. By contrast, the criticism of hiding value-judgements can be levelled at the many critics whose arguments are less clear, or who use the concepts of the Warnock Report in a way alien to it. However, because special, special needs are subsumed in special needs by the Report, arguments are given, which although they may hold for one, may not be relevant for the other.

The attempt to adopt prestige, or even non-emotive, terms to replace pejorative ones can lead to the paradox that the intended non-emotive or prestige term itself becomes pejorative, in the way that educationally subnormal has done. The greater paradox is that it appears impossible to combine the two main aims of the Warnock Report. These aims, which have been maintained by most special educationalists, whatever their philosophy, are:

a) to enable the children to be as normal as possible with their peers and without stigma;

b) and to offer them the best possible and most appropriate teaching.

The need to be considered to be the same may not be compatible with the need to be treated differently. Equity, as fairness, not equality, is the proper social aim of education.
Relativistic arguments, whilst providing a timely reminder that some handicaps are purely educational, and are both socially created and maintained, do not adequately explain the position of severe, and profoundly debilitating, conditions, which may be rare, but whose rarity makes them even more difficult to deal with. One result of the developments following the submission of the Warnock Report is that the few special boarding schools that do remain are likely to be even more isolated, in terms of distance from their pupils' homes than before, although it is to be hoped that the Report will encourage some forms of integration locally to the school for the children. At the secondary level, boarding schools may well be an advantage for many children, as they provide them with an increasing independence from their parents, which is a normal development of adolescence, and which is not always allowed to the severely handicapped. In some cases, such separation may provide a better academic and specific education than could be available in the bigger, and less specialised, classes of the comprehensive school, and, furthermore may encourage the individual who may be better able to have some success in a small way rather than be a failure in a large institution.

It is never easy to change attitudes, or teaching methods, by statute. Indeed the criticisms that the Warnock Committee should have been more far-reaching in its recommendations could not hope to be met, for it already had too great a task. The Committee hoped to remove stigma in favour of a proper educational distinction of difference made on grounds relevant to both the teaching and placement of children, and the expectations from them. However, this cannot be achieved merely by renaming of groups, syndromes, or individuals.

An almost total integration of handicapped children and adults may indeed be the eventual result of the Warnock Committee's deliberations, but it was not a feature of their Report. If it does occur, in the long term, it will be costly in terms of time, resources, and personal commitment of all those involved in the education of children, both with and without 'special educational needs'.
References to Chapter 12.


4 ibid.

5 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., s.4.61, p.67.

6 ibid., s.5.13, p.76.

7 Advocacy Alliance, 1985: op.cit.

8 Warnock, H.M., 1978: op.cit., s.3.31, p.45.

9 Newell, P., 1983: op.cit., p.6 et seq.


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285


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