ALIGNMENT IN PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY 1954-1977

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The main aim of this study is to examine and analyse the element of alignment in Pakistan's foreign policy.

The study demonstrates that the various bilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements with which Pakistan became involved proved to be counter-productive, and detrimental to the territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan.

The study further analyses the divergent interests of the signatories, and the differences implied therein. Pakistan basically joined these arrangements to safeguard its territorial integrity and political independence, especially against India.

The study further reveals that these military pacts proved to be useless and Pakistan's allies refused to help Pakistan in its hour of need in 1965 and 1971, and Pakistan was allowed to be dismembered in 1971. Pakistan, as a result reappraised its international commitments, and as a matter of principle opted out of these military pacts which had lost their significance. Fundamental misconceptions of the purpose of alliances were the cause of failure; for the
United States the pacts were part of the policy of containing the Communist powers, while for Pakistan they implied a guarantee of territorial integrity.

Pakistan decided to follow a more realistic foreign policy, and as a result, started to draw closer to the non-aligned movement, and eventually joined the movement as a full member.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The term international relations, in its broadest traditional sense, denotes relations among the autonomous politico-territorial organisations or states, or among individual members of such units. On the collective level, such relations may be political, economic, cultural or military; they can comprise many kinds of individual relations involving members of different nations. Thus international relations, within this context, denote political relationships and embrace, all collective and individual relations which impinge upon the political position of a state vis-a-vis other states. The term in this sense is synonymous with foreign policy, "Most studies in 'world politics' or international politics have, in fact, been studies of foreign policy, where policy is defined as the decision that defines goals, set procedures, or lay down course of action, and the actions taken to implement those decisions ... As distinct from international politics and foreign policy, the term international relations may refer to all forms of interaction between the members of separate societies, whether government-sponsored or not. International relations would include the analysis of foreign policies or political processes between nations, but with its interests in all facets of relations between distinct societies ...." ¹

¹ Holsti, K.J. International Politics: A Framework For Analysis, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1972, p.21
Pakistan and its Neighbours.
The concept of international relations is as old as political history itself, and has shown throughout the ages constant patterns of relationships and policies, whether devised and practised by monarchies, aristocracies, or democracies, cities or nation states, continental empires or tiny principalities. The consistency of patterns beneath the variety of historic manifestations makes both historic understanding and theoretical analysis of international relations possible. As a result one is in a position to understand and appreciate the development of the Greek city-states, the Indian political philosophy or the Islamic ideology. By detecting in the international relations of different cultures and historic periods identical responses to identical challenges, one is able to develop certain theoretical assumptions about international relations regardless of time and place.

The dynamic force that moulds international relations is to be found in the aspirations for power of independent political entities. These aspirations crystallize into three basic patterns, (i) to keep power, (ii) to increase power, and (iii) to demonstrate power. In the context of this classification three distinct policy patterns emerge: the policy of status quo, the policy of imperialism and the policy of prestige. The clash of these policy patterns leads to an unending struggle for power which characterizes all international relations. As such the concept of power and the struggle for power unquestionably leads to the balance of

power through which nations endeavour to maintain the status quo individually or collectively. Independent political entities strive to pursue their respective goals in conjunction with other nations, and as a result embark upon a policy of alignment (the participation of Pakistan in the bilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements is a classical case in point). If and when states have taken a decision in principle, to use force or the threat of force to pursue their ends then there ensues a race which often can lead to an open and violent conflict. Moreover, nations endeavour to justify and rationalise their policies, position and actions, in struggle for power by reference to universal values typically of a moral nature, and nations as such develop political ideologies.

Pakistan emerged, in 1947, as an independent state at the time when British and European Imperialism was crumbling, and the United States had emerged as one of the two most powerful states in the world claiming its respective sphere of influence. The era of Cold War had started and the world was basically divided into two power-blocks, and as such Bipolarism had been established. This Bipolar system dominated from 1944 to 1958, and encouraged the Domino Theory.

According to Karl Deutsch governments that must continually prove their will and capacity to fight probably do not have enough prestige for the policies they are engaged in. An insufficiency of prestige, like a lack of credit in the
bank, is no trifling matter.\(^3\)

The sum of government's commitments is often much larger than the sum of its resources, and if government promises more than it can deliver, the result is something like a run on a bank, which is a ready recipe for unrest or revolution. Something similar can happen in foreign policy, too. Even an awesomely mighty and wealthy nation's government may enter into so many commitments to defend, develop, or control so many different colonies, satellites or weak allies, that it may simply not have the wherewithal to do so if its power in more than a few of them should be challenged by local uprisings, outside attacks, infiltrations, or combinations of all these. Here again nations or governments may find themselves over-committed, vulnerable to any real serious crisis in their prestige that might precipitate a run by their client countries on all their commitments and promises.

To some of the rulers of that great power, their allies and clients may then come to take on the aspect of a row of dominoes, which may fall concurrently or consecutively; and if any one of these smaller states or regimes should fall because it lacks trust in its great protector, they fear, all the others will fall with it. In this way, the "row of dominoes" image often has its roots in a preceding over-extension and over-commitment of resources and prestige on the part of some metropolitan power. It is axiomatic to state

that the beginning of an empire is the very beginning of its end.

There is no denying the fact that the former Colonial Empires did keep contact with their former colonies or territories (the Commonwealth of Nations is a case in point) but it would also be correct to suggest that their influence has been diminishing and their hold waning with the passage of time. Some of the former Colonial Empires met humiliating defeat e.g., France at Dien Bien Phu; and their successors who went into Vietnam in the name of democracy and freedom had to sign a peace treaty with North Vietnam whose forces then swept southwards and conquered South Vietnam and created a united Vietnam. The massive military machine of the Vietnamese was later used against Kampuchea (Cambodia) and to hold sway over Laos. Could Thailand be the next domino?

The emergence of General Charles de Gaulle in France in 1958, and the assertion by the newly emergent states of their existence set in motion the concept of Multipolarity. The emergence of the People's Republic of China, as a potential super-power, has given credence to the new concept; the concept has been further strengthened by the ever increasing influence of the non-aligned states.

Political subdivisions may itself contain, therefore, impediments to self-fulfilment and may interact unfavourably with other components of the variable character of places and areas, and thus augment the adverse or beneficial effects that these other components may have upon human material welfare.
A man's lot depends to a certain extent upon the environments in which he lives, the environmental effect being the total impact upon him at any time and through time of the variable character of places near or far.

One cannot over-emphasise the importance of distance as an important element in the field of international relations or geopolitics. It is important to note that distance has shrunk in this day and age; in this sense technology has made distance meaningless. But at the same time one cannot ignore the fact that the Americans were at a disadvantage in Vietnam, and on the other hand both Chinese and Russians enjoyed the benefits of proximity to the actual theatre of war. In the Cuban crisis distance must have played an important role when the decision making process was taking place in the Kremlin. Again proximity or otherwise played a vital role in the context of the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979. It may not be out of place to suggest here that in the light of discussion in the preceding pages, Pakistan might well be the next domino; one must not rule out Iran from the "row of dominoes".

Geopolitics is the science of the relation of politics to geography. Richard Hartshorne has defined it "as the study of areal differences and similarities in political character as an interrelated part of the total complex of areal differences and similarities. The interpretation of area differences
in political features involves the study of this inter-
relation with all other relevant areal variations...." 4

The subject matter of geopolitics is derived from pol-
itical geography, history and military strategy. In the op-
inion of geopoliticians the strength or weakness of a state
depends to a large extent on geographical factors e.g., location,
size, shape, topography, natural resources, manpower, industrial
potential and political organization. Geopoliticians, I be-
lieve, can very effectively speculate and chalk out the course
of events in the life history of a given politico-territorial
organization; and some of these conclusions have been auth-
enticated in the annals of history. The threat and use of
naked power have enjoyed a significant position in international
politics, and it would not be inappropriate to suggest here
that power rests securely upon geographical foundations.

The position and power of a given state very much depends
upon (a) what that state is in relation to people and national
consciousness, (b) what does it possess in the shape of terri-
tory and natural resources, and (c) its position vis-a-vis
other nation-states and their wealth.

In estimating the power potential of a given state or of
a region one must examine its location, size, shape and bound-
aries, and learn as to how its natural resources rank in re-
lation to those of other political areas of the world.

4. Hartshorne, Richard, Politics and Geographic Relationships,
W.A.D. Jackson, London, 1964, p.60
Human resources include not only manpower but also those characteristics required to make manpower effective e.g., technical know-how, national cohesion, sources of energy resourcefulness, national traits and characteristics and the effectiveness of the government. The power and position of a state is measured by the degree to which it is able to achieve that which it desires. The sum total of these desires and objectives may be termed as its national interests. The means that a territorial society pursues to secure these objectives is known as national policy; domestic policy so far as it relates to internal affairs, and foreign policy as it relates to external relationships. The soundness, or lack of it, of a national policy may be effectively measured by the success with which it uses the national resources and energies to provide prosperity, amicability in foreign relations, and the means to safeguard its territorial integrity and political independence.

Almost all geopolitical concepts, however repugnant or untenable one may judge them to be, can contribute a measure of understanding of past and present trends in the behaviour and relations of states. The underlying premise of these postulates is that configuration of land and seas provides and sets limits within which the political relations of nations have evolved and will continue to evolve.

To appreciate, properly, the emergence of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947, it should be noted here that "A state is an area organized politically in an effective manner by an indigenous, or resident, people with a government in
effective control of the area. It is modern history's re-
pository of legitimate authority.\(^5\) The term state implies
the mechanism of government through which the will of the
state is formulated, expressed and exercised. In most modern
states the people themselves have some bonds of union e.g.,
common objectives, common language, common heritage, common
culture and common religion. These are some of the unifying
elements within the state structure, and separate those people
who possess different bonds of unity.

If and when the disparate elements within the state fail
to achieve a semblance of national unity and cohesion then
the very structure of the state-idea may be demolished, and
the superstructure is bound to disappear and the state dis-
integrates. If the unifying bonds are allowed to flourish
then national cohesion and unity would be achieved. Otherwise
the polarisation of forces is likely to damage the fabric of
the society, and as such the state itself is likely to be
dismembered.

The basic centripetal force must be some concept or idea
which seeks justification for the existence of a given state
must have a raison d'être. The forces of inertia, vested
interests, and fear of the consequences of change may keep it
going more or less effectively for some time, but if a state-
structure has lost its original reason for existence then the
state is likely to collapse. Those states are strongest in
which the basic state-idea encompasses the entire body-politic.

\(^5\) Buehring, E.H. "Role of New States in International Politics"
Pakistan emerged as an independent political entity on the basis that the Muslims of India were a separate nation and as such entitled to a separate homeland. Jinnah expressed his views on the subject in the following manner: "It has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Musalams are a minority. The Musalams are a nation by any definition.... The problem in India is not of inter-communal character but manifestly of international one, and it must be treated as such.... The Hindus and Muslims belong... to two different civilisations which are based on conflicting ideas and conceptions...."  

The partition of the Sub-continent and the political boundaries of Pakistan were established on the basis of the Radcliffe Awards. Each of the two Commissions was "instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab/Bengal on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will also take into account other factors."  

This was in conformity with the Lahore Resolution which is popularly known as the Pakistan Resolution, passed on 23rd March, 1940, and asserted that "no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principle, namely that geographically contiguous units... be so constituted... that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in north-western...

6. M.A.Jinnah, Address to the All India Muslim League Session, Lahore, 1940

and north-eastern zones of India should be... autonomous and sovereign."\(^8\) In this manner religion formed the raison d'etre of Pakistan's territoriality as an independent state.

However, the present territorial limits of Pakistan are very much in conformity with the ideas of the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal when he wrote in 1930, "I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of North-West India."\(^9\)

Religion was the main unifying force of the state-idea as it emerged in 1947, and appeared to hold very tenuous bonds between the distant, dislocated and distinct parts of Pakistan. In addition to religion as the reason for existence one may as well include the desire of the Muslims, in the North-east and North-west of British India, to achieve economic independence, and the right to order their life free from economic suppression and exploitation, internally or externally. The objective, therefore, was to establish a state in which the Muslims could forge their socio-economic and political development without the prospects of Hindu domination, and as such the newly emergent state had to be organised and administered with a view "...to establish

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8. Iqbal, Muhammad, Presidential Address to the All India Muslim League Session, Allahabad, 1930

9. The Lahore Resolution which was passed on 23.3.1940 (The All India Muslim League)
complete and exclusive control over internal political relations... the creation and maintenance of law and order. Local political institutions must conform with the concepts and institutions of the central, overall, political organization... a state may tolerate considerable variation in its different regions... there is a tendency... to exert unifying control even over the institutions... every state must strive to secure the supreme loyalty of the people in all its regions, in competition with any local or provincial loyalties and in definite opposition to any outside state-unit."

If a state fails to achieve these ends and allows fissiparous tendencies to flourish or does not effectively nip the evil of parochialism and sub-nationalism in the bud, then internal and external vested interests are bound to exploit these weaknesses within the state structure, and the secondary political groups i.e. political parties (such as the Awami League in the former East Pakistan, and now the defunct National Awami Party in West Pakistan) are likely to be used as vehicles of disruption and influence by the internal and external political groups. Most of the secondary groups operate largely in the advancement of interests of various non-political groups e.g. linguistic, religious, industrial, commercial and agricultural.

A state should formulate a policy of direction, and a framework of operation which is consonant with the state-idea,

and must lead towards cohesion and away from disharmony and
disunity. The overriding priority of the state should be
that "all the regions of a state are clearly included under
the state-idea, and have complete loyalty to the overall
concepts of the national unit, regional differences inevitably
cause some differences in interpretation and implementation
of these concepts....If the differences are great, the attempt
to impose such a uniform system may provoke opposition en-
dangering the national unity."11

The Concept of State-Government in Islam

It is imperative to discuss in detail the concept of
State-Government in Islam since religion formed the very
raison d'etre of Pakistan as an independent state. It may
be argued at the very outset that no form of state-government
is prescribed in the Holy Quran. For obvious reasons Allah
(God), having declared Himself to be the absolute Ruler and
Sovereign of the entire universe, could not have appointed
man as a ruler on the planet earth. Man could only be desig-
nated as His deputy.

In the universe God's government which is based on Adl
justice is carried out by His angels but on the planet earth,
this task has been entrusted to man, and for his guidance
His Apostle has laid down the pattern. God sent Adam on this
earth as His Khalifa or vicegerent (Al-Quran 11:30), and

11. ibid. p. 95
directed him to follow His guidance (11:38). Allah promised to confer Khilafat (vicegerency) on the successors of Adam if they became believers, and followed the righteous path. "God has promised to those among you who believe and do righteous deeds that He will of a surety grant them in the Law, inheritance (of power) as He granted to those before them." (XXXIV:55)

As such there can be no doubt that the Holy Prophet, besides proclaiming His message had, in fact, established a government for administering the affairs of the state. According to the Holy Quran, legislative, executive and judicial powers were all vested in him; and as such he became the Khalifa-tullah (God's deputy) to proclaim and enforce the Laws of Allah on earth. Thus he was the first Head of the Islamic state; and he established the Kingdom of God (Hakumat-i-Illahia) on earth and acted merely as a Khalifa (deputy) of God, as the Holy Quran says, "It is He who hath made you His Khalifa, inheritor of the earth." (VI:165). Allah had commanded him, however, to work for a common consensus, while dealing with the affairs of the state. The Holy Quran says, "and consult them in the affairs of the moment. Then when thou hast taken a decision put thy trust in God". (III:159).

The argument above has been the cardinal feature of the various constitutions of Pakistan since 1947, and the preamble of each of those constitutions emphasised, "Whereas

** There are 30 Paras (parts), 114 Surahs and 6236 Verses (Ayats) in the Koran (Quran).
sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust....Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah...."12

The Prophet of Islam did consult men of knowledge and learning, but did not establish a regular Majlis-i-Shura (the consultative and advisory body) for this purpose. The state had a unitary form of government, and the emphasis was on centralism. The Prophet of Islam, however, never considered himself to be the ruler of the state; and he could not have done so, because the sovereignty of the heavens and earth belongs to Allah. The virtual ruler of the Islamic state was only a servant of God and had no superior rights than any other citizen of the state. The rule and exploitation of man by man is repugnant to the very spirit of Islam. A man is considered superior not because of his wealth, high status or ancestry, but on the basis of "Taqwa"*** alone, "Verily, the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who is) the most righteous of you" (XLIX:13)

The Khalifa, therefore, is the central figure in the Islamic scheme of government. Just as Allah is the centre

*** Taqwa-Abstinence-piety-fear of God.
of the universe. Tauheed (unity) is the pivotal point of Islam, and the Khalifa is the shaft around which the edifice of the Islamic state revolves and is built. This is the pattern of government laid down by the Prophet of Islam, and this pattern of government was strictly adhered to by Khulafa-i-Rashdeen (the first four Caliphs) after the death of the Prophet.

There is a school of thought in Islam which argues that only the Prophets were the Khalifas of Allah and that the Khilafat (Caliphate) came to an end with the last of the Prophets. They also argue that there was one Amir-ul-Momineen (leader of the believers) and the remaining successors were only administrative heads; and that these successors to the Prophet of Islam were merely Khalifa-tur-Rasul (deputies to the Prophet) or as "Ulul-Amre-Minkum" (those who simply carried out the orders as laid out by the Prophet in "Sunnah" (practices) and the "Hadith" (sayings) of the Prophet in strict obedience of the Quranic injunctions). It is further argued that a head of the state should simply be called Amir-i-Mumlakat, and head of all the Amirs should be called as Amir-ul-Umara (Head of all the heads of states) or Khalifa. Since there are more than 45 states where Muslims reside in a considerable number, therefore, it is neither prudent nor possible to have such a person; especially after the indignities suffered by the Khalifa and the Sultan in the aftermath of the First World War.

The Holy Quran also confirms such a system and suggests that these Amirs will be the Ulul-Amre-Minkum, for whom
obedience is prescribed, along with God and the Apostles, "Ye who believe, obey God and obey the Apostle, and those charged with authority among you" (IV:59). The Holy Quran has clearly stated that if at any time, the elected Khalifa were to transgress the limits of the Quran and Sunnah, the believers were empowered to remove and replace him.

It may be argued that the Islamic form of government is indeed unique and cannot be identified with any other form of government. It is neither monarchy nor dictatorship. It is also not theocracy. One cannot really call it democracy either parliamentary or presidential, but it would not be wrong to suggest that it is a mixture.

It is the government of Allah through the Divine Law, based upon "Adl" for the welfare of humanity, run by those Muslims who are worthy of being entrusted with administration, and who delegate their power to the Khalifa or the Amir who, in turn acts as the vicegerent of Allah and His trustee. Only those persons are acceptable as Khalifas or Amirs who are well versed in the Quranic injunctions, Sunnah and the Hadith, and who are prepared to establish an Islamic form of government for the purpose of enforcing Nizam-i-Islam (Islamic System), on the pattern set up by the Holy Prophet.

It was imperative to discuss the Islamic system and to emphasise its importance to a Muslim society, especially with reference to Pakistan since Islam was the very raison d'être of Pakistan's territoriality. Pakistan was created
on the basis of contiguous/majority areas in 1947, and precisely for this reason the two wings of Pakistan emerged as one single state in 1947; and religion, no matter how tenuous, was the most important link between the Former East Pakistan and West Pakistan.

Invariably all the constitutions of Pakistan emphasised the point that Pakistan would be an Islamic state; and that the people of Pakistan would be encouraged to lead their lives in accordance with the Quranic injunctions, Sunnah and the Hadith. Although only lip-service was paid to that effect by the various governments; and it was never given real importance regarding the enactment of various laws.
The external relations of Pakistan need to be studied in their proper context, and as such an analysis of its geo-political problems is highly desirable. Such a critical analysis would help a great deal in explaining the desire, on the part of Pakistan, to align itself with the West. Pakistan did not enter into the East/West ideological conflict until 1954, and on the whole adopted and pursued an independent foreign policy, especially with regard to the cold war. Pakistan's economic and geopolitical problems, however, forced it to seek friendship with the United States and its allies. Pakistan was deeply disturbed by the negative attitude that India seemed to have adopted towards Pakistan since the very inception of this nascent state.

Pakistan's geographic position was its worst enemy. The two wings of Pakistan were totally dislocated, and were advocating different socio-economic and political policies; and the parts were too distant to achieve a meaningful and harmonious relationship. These geopolitical drawbacks, disadvantages and weaknesses were very effectively exploited by the internal and external vested interests, and eventually proved disastrous for the territorial integrity and political independence of Pakistan as it emerged in 1947.

A critical analysis of the geopolitical distinctiveness of the two wings of Pakistan would clearly demonstrate the inherent weaknesses of Pakistan, and establish the fact that the links between the two parts were very tenuous, and this
link was unable to withstand the pressures from within. The fissiparous tendencies and the dissidents, with help from without, were successful in dismembering Pakistan in December, 1971.

Pakistan emerged a unique state in the terms of modern history because of her geographic discontiguity. The population of Pakistan in 1970-71 was approximately 130.28 million (the present population of Pakistan is in the region of 74 million). Pakistan occupied an area of 364,737 square miles. The two wings of Pakistan were approximately 1230 miles apart (Islamabad-Dacca). It is imperative, therefore, to treat these two wings separately so as to have a better understanding of their geopolitical location and socio-economic problems.

West Pakistan (present Pakistan) is situated between the longitudes 61°E and 75°E and the latitudes 24°N and 37°N. This wing touches the Himalayas' foothills and the Hindu Kush mountains in the north and is separated from the Soviet Union by a narrow stretch of mountain ranges, and extends from the Pamirs down to the Arabian Sea. Afghanistan and Iran are in the north-west, while in the east and the south-east it is bounded by India. West Pakistan comprises the former areas of the North Western Frontier Province, the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the former States of Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat, Mekran, Lasbela (these are now practically part of Baluchistan, whereas Khairpur is within the sway of Sind and Bahawalpur was incorporated in the Punjab), Dir, Swat, Buner, Chitral, Hunza and Nagar (these
have been brought within the administrative control of the NWFP.

West Pakistan experiences an arid climate. The rainfall is very scant, with most of the rain falling in the hilly north and the fertile plains of the Punjab, especially during the monsoons. The scarcity of rainfall is amply remedied by the waters of the Indus, Jhelum and the Chenab. These rivers flow into Pakistan from the disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir (the Indus originates in the Chinese region of Tibet). The three eastern rivers such as the Sutlej, have also made a substantial contribution towards the agricultural and economic development of this wing. These eastern rivers the Sutlej, the Ravi and the Beas, flow from India into Pakistan, and are now fully used by India in accordance with the terms and conditions as stipulated in The Indus Water Treaty which was fully implemented in 1970. The treaty gave Pakistan the right to utilise the three western rivers excepting a limited use of water by India in the disputed Kashmir, eastern Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. The Aid Pakistan Consortium along with India helped Pakistan financially and in the technical fields in the replacement programme under the Indus Water Treaty.

Some political geographers accepted the socio-economic and political viability and validity of the western wing (Pakistan) and have strongly argued in support of its economic prosperity, "West Pakistan is fundamentally better-found than East, and it has the makings of a decent if not spectacular agrarian prosperity, if only the Kashmir crisis can
be settled by genuine agreement and relations of real co-
operation between the two Republics established. ¹

The former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) lies between the
longitudes 88°E and 92.30°E and the latitudes 21°N and 27°N.
It borders the Union of Burma in the south-east, India in
the east, north and west, and the Bay of Bengal in the south.
The total area is 54,501 square miles, supporting a popu-
lation of approximately 81 million. The region has a sub-
tropical climate, and the area has heavy rainfall; and is
ribboned with thousands of streams providing very rich silt
and alluvium for growing jute and rice. This region was
visualised "as a very vast piece of flooded land - a gigantic
delta stretching from the sea upwards, and we will find that
in this gigantic delta the rivers have also been shifting
from West to East thereby creating numerous lakes all along
the delta." ² There are no wide contrasts of scenery. Heavy
rainfall and intensive developed river system had made the
former East Pakistan a green land, rich in sub-tropical prod-
ucts.

While no one would contend that shape alone would pro-
duce a federal structure in a given state, it is correct to
assume that the shape characteristics of some states have
contributed largely to that choice of politico- territorial
organisation. It is argued that Pakistan would not have
become a federal state were it not fragmented into two major
units: other states (Islamic) are highly centralised and
unitary in character. The erstwhile sceptics now expressed
their hope and confidence that Pakistan had come to stay and

   of Asia: A Political Geography, Methuen, London, 1971, p.180
2. Ahmad, Kazi S. "Introducing Pakistan" A N.I.P.A. Publication,
could not be dismembered short of war and aggression, "That Pakistan will survive appears certain: it could not now be destroyed short of war, and although in that event the dice would be very heavily loaded against Pakistan (owing to the negligible war potential vis-a-vis India, and almost impossible strategic lay out) .... But it would not be very surprising if East Pakistan, by way of ad hoc regional agreements to meet local interests...were gradually to slip into a special position such that there would eventually be an abrupt confrontation....At that point the evolution could hardly be consummated without a major crisis in the sub-continent." 3

In the case of Pakistan, cultural and economic centripetal forces consolidated the divisive nature of the state's fragmentation, "The bisection of Pakistan raised serious administrative problems. East Pakistan is notoriously unmilitary; except for the short frontier with Burma it is entirely surrounded by India, and a veritable hostage to fortune. West Pakistan consists effectively of an attenuated oecumene of good (where irrigated) land, 750 miles from Karachi to Rawalpindi but only 80 miles wide in the constricted wastesouth of Multan. The inheritance of the North West Frontier is not an unmixed gain." 4

West Pakistan (Pakistan) is almost six times as large as the former East Pakistan (Bangladesh), but its population was only two thirds of the eastern wing (1970-1971, figures). While the population gravity point thus appeared to lie in the former East Pakistan, the effective administrative capital


remained in the western wing (Dacca was the seat of the Federal Legislature).

Political decision making remained in the western wing and often, according to the East Pakistanis, did not sufficiently take into account the legitimate interests of the eastern wing. There were two national languages i.e. Bengali and Urdu while English enjoyed the status as the official language for a limited period. West Pakistan truly remained a Muslim country, with over 95% of the population adherent to the Muslim faith, but in the former East Pakistan only two thirds of the people were Muslims. Here the Hindu minority found itself in the similar situation as the Muslim minority in India.

The most serious disparities, however, between the two wings were economic. Living standards were lower in the eastern wing, where the land was overcrowded, and subsistence modes of life prevailed. There were serious charges levelled against the Federal Government that its economic policies invariably favoured the western wing and ignored the socio-economic needs of the eastern wing. They further accused the central government that it was treating the eastern half as a colony and not as an equal partner in the federation. There is no denying the fact that some of these charges and accusations were well founded but others were wholly fallacious. The relations between the two parts were strained not only by the government's pricing and export policies towards the two competitive cash crops of the country i.e. jute and cotton but also by a resentment in the eastern-half against a
government that was proceeding too slowly in agrarian reforms, because more than half of the population in the east, under the British, had fallen into the hands of the landlords; whereas the western-half enjoyed, on the average, larger land-holdings.

There can be no question that geographic discontiguity of the state had been a major factor in every issue of disagreement facing the two wings. It is also not hard to imagine why the East Pakistanis were not so enthusiastic towards the Kashmir question, while in West Pakistan there has been a virtual unanimity of views on this thorny issue. There is no denying the fact that a greater proximity of East and West Pakistan would have created a more harmonious relationship, and certainly improved communications and the absence of the real psychological barrier of the Indian landmass would have engendered and invigorated the state idea in this divided and fragmented country, and enhanced the chances of Pakistan surviving as a unified entity.

The idea of Pakistan was opposed by many, and at the time of its independence serious doubts were cast on the socio-economic and political viability of Pakistan as an independent sovereign state: "The greater the weight we attach to the geographical factors, however, the more difficult does it become to accept the racial and ideological aspects of the Two Nations Theory." Carlson remarked, "Perhaps not wisely constituted as a sovereign state, Pakistan is beset with the economic difficulties that its restricted and divided domain imposes upon it." Weigert similarly expressed a belief

that "the soundness of the Pakistan solution has still to stand the test of history." Brown aired his thoughts: "Pakistan would come into existence in chaos without a well-ordered governmental organisation and would have severe handicaps threatening its very existence... disadvantages were so certain, so clearly pointed, so much calculated to affect Muslims as well as Hindus, that they forbid the creation of Pakistan." 

These comments, express, rather typically, the common belief that the discontiguous political pattern of the nascent state was both illogical and impractical, and pointed towards the very tenuous nature of its continued existence. This was a feeling which differed radically from that of the Pakistanis, who viewed the obstacles to nationhood as a test of Muslim nationalism and resurgence in which they were bound to succeed. "All observers are impressed with the depth of national feeling which is displayed by the Pakistanis. It was the intensity of this feeling which was responsible in the initial days for the survival of Pakistan." Spate had since stated, "The setting up of a state in the appalling confusion of Partition was a tremendous achievement in itself, but the gains of Jinnah and Liaquat Khan seemed in danger of dissipation during ten years of factionalism; a new stability seems to have been attained but there remain critical difficulties, internal and external." 

These remarks clearly demonstrate the level and direction of discussion with regard to the political validity of this

fragmented and culturally divided Pakistan. Once the decision to partition the sub-continent had been made, however, there was no argument as to which part of the newly emergent state constituted its heart - its raison d'etre. The Punjab was the vital core of Pakistan. This part of Pakistan had established strong Islamic traditions, and contemporary economic conditions were highly favourable as compared with those in the rest of the country - "From the point of view of political geography, the Punjab must be considered the raison d'etre of Pakistan, although the province contained only 18,814,000 persons in 1951, less than 25% of the total population."\textsuperscript{11}

The dominant cultural position of the Punjab was based on its close affinity with Islamic South-west Asia; for the north-west is largely a product of the Islamic way of life found in the lands to the west. A series of invaders traversed the Khyber and Bolan Passes, bringing with them a conservative, agricultural economy imbued with Islamic values and concepts that had their base and origin in Arabia. This drive continued eastward until its fervour and energy were sapped in the Ganges valley, where Hindu culture and values were strong, and had survived in good shape after having assimilated the invading alien ideologies and philosophies. The Islamic faith, however, had gained a strong foothold several hundred miles down the Ganges, at its very mouth, and in this area the Islamic values and concepts remained intact and entrenched. But it was in the Punjab that Islamic ideas

took form in comparative isolation from contemporary influences in British India.

Lahore is the most important centre of Muslim culture in Pakistan. A key city in the Punjab, it has played the role of strategic control point between the Khyber Pass and Delhi. The Muslim conquerors from Central Asia or the Hindu Kush used Lahore as their regional capital, the British as their provincial capital, and from 1947 to 1955 it served as the provincial capital of Pakistani Punjab. In 1955 the One Unit was created incorporating the four provinces of the western wing along with Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Kalat, Mekran and Lasbela; and Lahore was again made the capital city of the new province. Since the partition left Lahore well exposed geopolitically and militarily, the new state selected Karachi as its capital. In 1959, however, most of the functions of the capital were being conducted from Rawalpindi as a prelude to the eventual shift to Islamabad, the new capital, which is only fifteen miles away from Rawalpindi, "The two cities... form a nucleus exercising both civil and military authority", and it would not be out of place to state here that the Rawalpindi-Lahore-Lyallpur axis constitutes the core area.

A cultural, economic, social and historical analysis of the former East Pakistan would immediately reveal that it is too distant from the focal point of Islamic culture, and that

13. No one, however, denies the fact that the Muslims of Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines constitute a very important part of the Islamic world, but the contention remains that the Muslims of this region have been under the effective influence of the regional culture e.g., dance and music are part of the cultural rituals of the region but anathema to the basic concepts of an Islamic society. This does not mean, however, that the rich Muslims of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan or for that matter Pakistan have jealously guarded the basic principles of Islam.
its people belong to a different ethnic unit. It would not be wrong to argue that the East and West Pakistan were more distant from each other than Poland and Spain, and in many instances their life styles depict greater dissimilarities than those of the two European states.

The cultural development and diffusion in West Pakistan produced a people that can be characterised as tall, bigboned and often fair skinned (mostly wheatish in complexion), whereas the people of the former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) are generally small, slender and have darker complexion. These physical contrasts only represent a small proportion of the inherent ethnic differences between the two peoples; food and manner of living are also different. The people of the former East Pakistan are much more artistic than their erstwhile compatriots in the western wing.

The people who considered the Punjab to be the raison d'être of Pakistan were not only convinced about the cultural dominance of the region but of its economic contribution to the state, "The Punjab alone was really sound fiscally...it seems that this one province, with less than a quarter of the population of Pakistan must be the stay and foundation of the East." 

The Punjab, as a result, assumed economic leadership and the former East Pakistan was pushed back and considered a poor relation, a land with negligible resources, having an agrarian society and the added burden of over-population.

14. East Pakistani (Bangladeshis) generally prefer Dhoti, Lungi and Saree. People in West Pakistan prefer Shalwar, trouser suits and turbans. The staple diet of the Bangladeshis is rice and fish whereas in Pakistan people generally prefer wheat-flour and Chappati.

There was a great optimism in the Punjab which was over-spilling in the rest of West Pakistan, and this optimism was largely based on the possibilities of extending large-scale and systematic irrigation and for a tremendous expansion of hydro-electric power for the manufacturing potential of the region and its agricultural surplus.

The concentration of political power and the predominance in the cultural and economic fields of the raison d'être is not sui generis in geopolitics. There are very few states which are homogeneous and free from regional disparities or differences. One has to study some basic statistical data regarding the United Kingdom to ascertain as to which part or region of the country is predominant. But regional differences and frictions can be easily exaggerated, exploited, intensified and consolidated in a politico-territorial organisation which is physically divided, especially when the raison d'être region appears to hold such a commanding position in spite of the fact that it enjoys a minority population status: the Punjab in particular and West Pakistan in general may be cited as cases in point.

During the initial stages of nation building some of these fundamentals were ignored and the major attention was concentrated in West Pakistan, which in turn created further frictions and suspicions between the two parts of Pakistan. Richard Hartshorne has very succinctly put the picture in its true perspective underlying dangers which are inherent and affect the situation as such, "In much older states, we may expect to find that an indigenous raison d'être has evolved
that may have little or no relation to the original genesis.... In the well developed modern state, politically minded people in all regions of the state area are conscious of their loyalty to the state, and have some common understanding even though not clearly phrased, of what that state means to them. In such a case we may recognise, I think, the existence of a nation as something distinct from the state itself.... Whatever is found to be the raison d'etre, the underlying idea of the state, it is with this concept, I submit, that the geographer should start in his analysis of the state area.... On this basis, we may approach the most elementary problem... that of the distinguishing within the legal confines of its territory, those regions that form integral parts of the state-area in terms of its basic idea, and those parts that must be recognised as held under control, in the face of either indifference or of opposition on the part of the regional population."16 To demonstrate his point of view that a certain area in a given political entity may be treated as a subject area: "Thus during the centuries in which all of Ireland was recognised in international law as part of the United Kingdom, its greater part was certainly operated in fact, as a subject area, distinct from the controlling state. Much the same may be true today of certain portions of the Soviet Union, notably the so called republics of Central Asia.... On the other hand, we have in the United States clear cut though tiny relics of internal colonialism in the Indian reservations."17

17. ibid. p.94
West Pakistan is near to the heartland Islamic environment whereas in former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) a form of Southeast Asian culture predominates. This contrast as well as the obvious factor of spatial separation affected the integration of East and West Pakistan into a whole and well-knit political entity: "And there is always the fundamental difficulty arising from the unique division of East and West, entities so different that to build one state of them is like trying to harness a camel and a water-buffalo to one plough." 18

If Pakistan continued to make visible progress in redressing genuine grievances of the majority, and in evolving a national culture flexible enough to allow a maximum amount of variations between the two regions, then its geographical dislocation, although unique as a political phenomenon, should not have unduly affected the solution of the problems that were strongly polarising the socio-economic and political differences; a veritable host to separatism and secession. The government of Pakistan could not effectively plug the widening gulf between the two halves of the country, and as a result, the original territoriality of the state-idea could not be held together.

The gradual but definite alienation of the public in former East Pakistan which eventually ended the legal bonds between the two wings of Pakistan, a Muslim homeland, as it emerged in 1947, could be explained by the interplay of centrifugal forces, which effectively outmatched the centripetal forces, and as such the balance of power was seriously jeopardised, and both the internal and external vested interests

were effectively allowed to exploit these inherent weaknesses to the disadvantage of a United Pakistan. The Central Government, as a result, was unable to hold the country as it had emerged in 1947, and the territoriality of the raison d'être was severed.

The effective operation of the centrifugal forces in Pakistan could be ascribed to a) the economic disparities, b) the linguistic and cultural distinctiveness, c) the administrative and bureaucratic elitism, d) the pre-eminence of the military machine and e) the gradual spread of parochialism, regionalism, provincialism and sub-nationalism.

Until 1970, when the first general elections were held on the basis of universal adult franchise, and the people of Pakistan were denied their inherent political rights under the guise of "Basic Democracies, indirect democracy" and a system of government which suited the "genius of the people".¹⁹ Most of the time the national political scene was dominated by a Punjabi or Pathan, and the Bengalis were relegated to a secondary position, especially in the area of decision-making in spite of the fact that they were in majority. This gradually led to the alienation of Bengali political opinion, urban educated class and the farming community (who resented the attitudes and the remote decision-making operation of the military and civil bureaucracy). The quasi-unitary political system worked against the very interests of a united Pakistan and the state-idea was irreparably damaged.

The criticism and resentment was particularly directed towards the army for failing in their supreme duty, and there-

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fore, the Bengalis particularly emphasised the futility of allocating the lion's share of the Central Budget (50-65 per cent) for the maintainance of a large army which had apparently left them defenceless (there were approximately 8,000 men and officers in East Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965). The criticism was directly or indirectly meant either to highlight or undermine the "Punjabi hegemony", especially since the army was overwhelmingly Punjabi in origin, "The Pakistan army has been almost entirely recruited from four districts of northern Punjab (Rawalpindi, Campbellpur, Jhelum and Gujrat) and two districts of the Frontier Province (Peshawar and Kohat). Sixty per cent of the army is Punjabi and thirty five per cent is Pathan."20

The development of political institutions was painstakingly supervised by the elitist group comprising the Civil and Military Services who tended to act as masters and not as public servants. This was particularly true of the Civil Service of Pakistan (now reorganised and merged with other services within the Administrative Services but without losing their real hold and prestige in spite of the fact that such appletons as C.S.P. and P.S.P. have been dropped) who were posted in the Eastern Wing; and their dealings with the Bengalis were very officious and they tended to stay aloof. A small minority only ventured to learn the Bengali language which further alienated the indigenous people. Both the Civil Service and the military establishment used the democratic

20. Sayad,K.B.,"The Role of the Military in Pakistan" in Jaques Van Doorn ed; Armed Forces and Society, the Hague, 1968, p.276
institutions for their self-aggrandisement instead of act-
ing as the instruments of democracy in the service of the
interests of the people at large. The devastation of the
1970 cyclone in East Pakistan generated further hatred for
the Central Government, and the masses in East Pakistan voci-
ferously criticised the apathy and the failure of the Federal
Government in their care of the millions who were devastated
by the ravages of the huge tidal waves. The remoteness of
the Federal Government and the Capital in addition to the
decision-making machinery, were identified as the real vill-
ains of the tragedy. The cyclone might be construed as the
real catalyst. The Awami League led by Sheikh Mujib-Ur-Rahman
exploited, in full, this human tragedy and pin-pointed various
other drawbacks of the relationship that existed, at that point
in time, and as such pursued, with added vigour, the implement-
ation of the Six Points, which in effect, meant the establish-
ment of a confederal structure.

It needs to be stated here that the more the Central
Government endeavoured to impose a unitary cultural-religious
concept, the more difficult it became for the state-idea to
hold sway over the territoriality of a United Pakistan.
The more the politico-military leaders struggled to strengthen
the unity of the state, the more certain its eventual sever-
ence became.

The tenuous nature of the Islamic link between the two
wings of Pakistan was not capable of withstanding the pressures
from within, especially the parochial approach of the dissi-
dents who encouraged fissiparous and secessionist elements
on the grounds that Hindu economic domination must not be allowed to emerge in the shape of Punjabi or West Pakistani socio-economic and politico-military pre-eminence. Especially in view of the fact that Islam had constituted the most important link between East and West Pakistan, and that the Muslims of East Pakistan were only too happy to align themselves with the Muslims of West Pakistan because they were keen to get rid of the Hindu economic domination (especially the Marwari economic predominance). This fact was very effectively exploited by the internal and external vested interests especially the Indians who proved to be the decisive factor in 1971.

This was a good example of the failure and incompetence of the framers of Pakistan's foreign policy, and those who failed to correctly calculate or evaluate the significance of the internal forces and as to how and to what extent these internal forces were able to merge their interests with the external vested interests with a view to achieve their collective objectives.

Pakistan's allies did not come to the aid of Pakistan when Pakistan needed them in 1971. Pakistan's forces in its Eastern wing were seen as the "forces of occupation" or "foreign army of occupation" and its allies within SEATO were content to see the Eastern wing amputated from the main body, and with the help of a foreign power. The events were allowed to take their natural course and Pakistan was made to realise the realities of the situation.
Economic Factors

Political potentials and foreign policy options of a given state are clearly related to its economic system. Natural resources, military power, industrial base, lines of communication and transportation, effective administrative structure and sound financial institutions are important instruments of statecraft. A state's ability to back up its demands on other political entities, to attract and support its friends and allies, to bring pressure to bear upon adversaries, requires the ability and power to manipulate various goods and services, qualities and quantities. The intangible called national prestige may to a greater or lesser extent very much depend upon the economic structure of that state.

Strategy and national policy are often subject to the economic power potential and strength of that political entity. Ideas and concepts which are advanced by various national leaders are directly or indirectly associated with the economic potentials of their state.

The magnitude and comparison of a state's economic output depend upon a complex of variables: natural and mineral resources, manpower and the socio-economic system, and the pattern of its institutions; and it has a direct bearing on the external relations of that particular state. This may impose limitations on its foreign policy options.
or on the other hand remove such inhibiting constraints from the area of its international activities and relations.

The Disruption of the Existing Pattern

For a geopolitical analysis of Pakistan it is important to analyse the circumstances under which it achieved its independence, and therefore, an examination of its economic background and potential is necessary for a better understanding of Pakistan's geopolitical problems.

The partition of the sub-continent in 1947, created a number of very intricate socio-economic, political and territorial problems which practically eliminated any chances of good neighbourliness between the two nations. The Chairman of the Award Commissions, Sir (later Lord) Cyril Radcliffe envisaged that after the chaos of the partition had died down, the two states would develop very friendly and harmonious relations, and that there would be a political reconciliation and any outstanding boundary problems would be settled in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and co-operation, "I have done what I can in drawing the line to eliminate any avoidable cutting of railway communications and of river systems, which are important to the life of the Province; but it is quite impossible to draw a boundary under our terms of reference without causing some interruption of this sort, and I can only express the hope that arrangements can be made and maintained between the two states that will minimize the consequence of the interruption as far as possible."¹ This

¹. The Radcliffe Awards, 12 August, 1947
was a very simplistic opinion and a forlorne hope in view of the hostility between the two states.

The partition disrupted the water system, and the irrigation complex in the Pakistani Punjab became dependent upon India as a result of the Radcliffe Award, especially in view of his thoughts that this kind of situation was precisely what he had in mind when he expressed his opinion. Some of the most important headworks and embankments were awarded to India though they controlled the water to Pakistan, "of the 48 million acres of cultivable land in the Indus Basin (32 million in Pakistan and 16 million in India), only 26 million acres (21 million in Pakistan and 5 million in India) receive irrigation..."\(^2\)

The partition also severed some of the most important links (rail and road), and some of the river channels in the former East Pakistan were also badly affected; the political division also disrupted the social and cultural bonds, and as such seriously uprooted the existing economic system.

A number of important market towns gained their socioeconomic and cultural importance because these were sites of some of the most revered religious shrines (mazaars), temples and religious centres, one must not, however, minimize the importance of some of these cities which are also the centres of economic and commercial activities, and which have played a significant part in the industrial and economic development of their respective regions e.g., Lyallpur is famous for its textile industry and is called the "Manchester of Pakistan", Multan is a very important financial, economic

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and commercial city. Again Gujrat (Pakistani Punjab) is
known for its pottery, in addition to the Shah Dowllah
Shrine. Ajmer (India) is highly respected by the Muslims,
Hindus and Sikhs. A number of Pakistanis still travel to
Ajmer, annually. Thousands of Sikhs have been allowed to
visit Nankana Sahib and Panja Sahib in Pakistan. The Ahmadis
(Mirzais) had their religious centre in Batala (India), and
large parties have been permitted to visit their holy places.
Lahore is a very important socio-economic, political and
cultural centre, and its added attraction to the Muslims
is the shrine of Datta Ganj Baksh. Thousands of people
visit the shrine every day to pay their respect and homage
to this Muslim saint and teacher.

In addition, a number of urban centres had achieved
their significance because of the fact that annual horse
and cattle shows were held there e.g., Lyallpur, Pakistan.
This city was and still is very famous livestock market
for the whole of the Punjab. But as a result of the par-
tition its links with the Indian Punjab and Haryana have
been severed in this respect.

The above examples clearly demonstrate the fact that
the partition of the South Asian sub-continent resulted in
the emergence of a new geopolitical structure, and this
effectively disrupted the existing economic system. As a
result the political division of the sub-continent, East
Bengal (the former East Pakistan) received three quarters
of the jute growing area but only negligible manufacturing
capacity. India on the other hand received one quarter
of the jute growing land but all of the manufacturing facil-

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India duplicated the jute production of Pakistan, which in turn was obliged to look for distant markets which were more expensive in economic terms. In addition, Pakistan launched a comprehensive programme to achieve self-sufficiency in the manufacture of jute. There was a tremendous growth of interprovincial trade between the two wings of Pakistan (approximately 800 million Rupees per annum); this was obviously expanded at the expense of trading and commercial links between India and the former East Pakistan. Moreover, the Indians were forced to reroute the transportation of their tea from Assam which proved to be quite an expensive venture since the traditional channels of transportation through the former East Pakistan were denied to India. Again, for political reasons, Pakistan preferred to import coal from the People's Republic of China, at comparatively very heavy costs than the natural source of supply i.e. India.

The Agrarian Base

Pakistan is predominantly an agrarian country, and more than seventy per cent of the civilian labour is engaged in agricultural pursuits. This figure amounted to 85.25 per cent in the former East Pakistan. In Pakistan the man/land ratio was 0.66 cultivated acres per person, with a distinct disparity between the two wings (0.53 in the former East Pakistan, and 0.8 acres in West Pakistan). In spite of this ratio the dependence on land is considerable and the existing

3. Pakistan Times, 4.4.1975
situations is not likely to change in the near future, "... Pakistan will remain predominantly an agrarian... for many years or decades,"\(^5\) Since the very inception of Pakistan the various agrarian reforms in Pakistan have endeavoured to eradicate sub-division and fragmentation, achieve a reasonable standard of land holdings and to better the lot of the peasants and haris or cultivators.

It is not easy to give a correct assessment or an accurate critical analysis of the various land reforms which have been announced from time to time simply because of the fact that it is difficult to ascertain how far these reforms were actually implemented to the very letter and spirit of these reforms. There have been persistent reports that the limits imposed by The Ayub Reforms in 1959, 500 acres of irrigated and 1000 acres of unirrigated acres were not implemented in good faith and the big landlords or landowners were in a position to twist the actual requirements, and the consolidation of land holdings was not fully carried out.

The Bhutto Reforms of 1972, further reduced the land holdings and fixed at 150 irrigated or 300 unirrigated acres or the equivalent to 15,000 produce index units. It is believed that these reforms were not fully implemented and the influential landlords or big Zamindars (landowners) were allowed to flout the letter and the spirit of these reforms. It is, therefore, too premature to make any judgement as to whether the land reforms were effective and whether these

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were instrumental in improving the lot of the ordinary peasant or Zamindar. It is generally believed that the absentee landlordism still thrived in spite of these reforms, but one has to accept that there may be few exceptions.  

The partition in 1947 resulted in the disappearance of non-Muslim moneylenders. Some Pathans who practised usury in towns were limited in their resources and were unable to advance any considerable loans to the village cultivators. The situation in the former East Pakistan was particularly serious because the Baniya (the Hindu money-lender) migrated to West Bengal and Assam. The Village Agricultural and Industrial Development programme, the Basic Democracies and the Agricultural Development Cooperation were responsible for procuring and distributing fertilisers, implements, improved seeds, pesticides and agricultural extension activities.

Pakistan has had a serious foodgrain problem, especially in the former East Pakistan until 1971. The problem had been particularly serious because of the recurrent floods, water-logging and salinity. Water-logging and salinity were widespread in the western wing whereas floods were more severe in the eastern wing. These seriously affected agricultural production, reducing yield per acre. While the population was growing at the rate of three per cent per annum, the growth of food production was two per cent per annum. This necessitated the import of foodgrains in large quantities.

During the 1950's Pakistan imported around 500,000 tons of foodgrain annually which had grown to 1,000,000 tons during the 1960's. The gap between the domestic supply and demand was widening, and the import requirements in 1971 had reached approximately 2.5 million tons. This placed Pakistan in a very difficult situation since the import of foodgrains very heavily burdened the foreign exchange earnings and seriously affected its development planning.

The main source of supply was the United States, and the Americans were very willing to meet Pakistan's food requirements, especially since 1954, the year Pakistan signed the Manila Treaty and joined SEATO. The foodgrain requirements of Pakistan were met under the Public Law 480. The whole programme was carried out as follows:

1. The aid was provided on local currency items i.e. the sale of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities against payment of Pakistani Rupees in cash which was deposited in U.S. Account of the State Bank of Pakistan. The bulk of this amount was given back to Pakistan in the shape of loans and grants.

2. The Americans provided the assistance on convertible local currency terms. The surplus U.S. agricultural commodities were supplied and Pakistan was required to pay back in U.S. dollars within a period of 40 years.

3. The U.S. Government made a gift and donations of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities to meet relief requirements, and to combat hunger and malnutrition.

7. Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 1972
There were, however, far-reaching conditions which very clearly affected, and in fact, limited Pakistan's relations with other states especially those which were considered unfriendly states by the Americans e.g., Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam and for a considerable time China. There was a definite clause of the agreements that if and when Pakistan accepted aid and assistance under P.L.480** then it must not have trade relations with Cuba, North Korea and North Vietnam.

In addition to these limitations on Pakistan's foreign policy options, the Americans obliged Pakistan to purchase a certain amount of its agricultural requirements from American markets with cash payments. This stipulation was within the scope of P.L.480, and was known as Usual Marketing Requirements (UMR), and as a result Pakistan had to import 100,000 to 160,000 tons annually at comparatively higher costs.

Moreover, the recipient was required to pay the freight charges for all the aid and assistance so received. Pakistan was not allowed to export the same or the like commodity either domestic or of foreign origin without first having received U.S. clearance.

The total aid received under P.L.480 was U.S.$ 1,196m up to 1965, and in 1974 the total had reached U.S.$ 1.303m. 8 The fact that the total aid received by Pakistan under P.L.480, from 1965 to 1974 amounted to U.S.$ 107million, demonstrates the kind of relationship Pakistan enjoyed with the United States, and which definitely affected Pakistan's imports from the United States for the period in question.

8. All these figures have been taken from the Pakistan Times, Lahore, 4.4.1975.

** P.L. stands for Public Laws

** P.L. stands for Public Laws
This point is further substantiated by the trade figures of Pakistan, especially 1971-1972 with regard to its imports from the United States. The reason being that the United States was the chief donor within the Aid Pakistan Consortium and that practically influenced the decisions of the Aid Consortium to Pakistan during the East Pakistan crisis in 1971, and the fact that the aid was not fully rehabilitated till Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in February, 1974. This is proof enough of the political limitations and constraints which Pakistan has been obliged to recognise, at times, because of its economic requirements.

The Industrial Base

In 1974 the total U.S. deposits in Pakistan stood at Rs. 6,620,000,000, as a result of its aid and assistance programme under P.L. 480. The Americans have used this massive fund for the maintainence of its Embassy personnel, propaganda publications, the award of scholarships and the various exchange programmes. This huge fund has been a source of considerable embarrassment to Pakistan.

Pakistan's economy at the time of its independence was predominantly agricultural and it had no major industrial centres, and was without capacity for processing indigenous raw material. At the time of independence, there were only 34 factories in Pakistan with a total daily employment of 26,400 persons. Although Pakistan inherited twenty per cent of the sub-continent's population, its industry was less than 7 per cent and even this consisted of small scale and minor

9. ibid.
industrial units. Thus for instance, Pakistan was the home of jute but without a jute factory of its own.  

Jute:  

As stated previously the growth of the domestic manufacturing industry in Pakistan, especially jute, stemmed from the partition of the subcontinent which split the world's main jute growing area in Bengal between the former East Pakistan and Indian West Bengal. In 1947, Calcutta was the jute capital since it had the largest terminal market for jute from East Bengal (East Pakistan - Bangladesh). But this facility was disrupted in 1949 as a result of the dispute concerning the exchange rate between Pakistan and India. The government of Pakistan was obliged to take measures aimed at reducing the impending hardships of the jute growing farmers and issued the Jute Ordinance 1949 (which was replaced by the act in 1956) to establish the minimum support prices, to administer the purchase, sale and storing facilities on behalf of the government. Since the entire output of raw jute was exported and domestic requirements were met by imports, Pakistan found it imperative to set up its own jute industry so as to eliminate dependence on foreign manufactured jute i.e. Indian. The jute manufacturing capacity increased from a negligible level in 1947 to 8070 looms in 1961, and to

(Pakistan Basic Facts, 1967-68, an official publication indicated that at the time of the partition there were 14,569 industrial establishments in the undivided India and only 1406 units were located in the area that formed Pakistan. Pakistan had 10 per cent of the industrial units but these mainly were flour mills, rice mills and cotton ginning factories.)

- 55 -
The Third Five Year Plan of Pakistan estimated a total installed capacity of 24,619 looms by 1970. The development of jute manufacturing industry in Pakistan and the diversification of its raw jute exports was a good example of the characteristics of Pakistan's geopolitical problems, and a reflection on its foreign policy options with particular reference to Pakistan's unhappy relations with India.

A study of jute production and manufacture in Pakistan indicates that until 1952 Pakistan imported jute manufactured goods to the tune of 22.9 million rupees and its exports of jute manufacture amounted to only 0.2 million rupees. In 1967-68 the exports in raw jute amounted to 758.9 million rupees, and the jute manufactured goods exported from Pakistan earned 619.6 million rupees. This picture of the jute production and manufacture in Pakistan materialised as a result of the realigned geopolitical priorities of Pakistan.

Raw jute and jute manufactures constituted the largest single source of foreign exchange earnings for Pakistan. In 1967-68 the exports earned a total of 1379 million rupees. After the Partition in 1947, the jute exports trade passed through some major vicissitudes. India was at the outset by far the most important consumer, taking 5.3 million bales as against 0.8 million by the rest of the world in 1947-48. In 1948-49 Indian purchases were at the more normal level of

11. The total looms installed were located as follows: 18,928 in the former East Pakistan, and 500 in West Pakistan at Jaranwala in the Punjab. There were 40 jute mills in Pakistan in 1968 and the jute consumption of raw jute amounted to 2.88 million bales and the production of jute goods was 490,535 tons. In March, 1970 according to the Financial Times, London (17.8.1970), there were 21,700 looms in Pakistan.

3.9 million bales, exports of other countries increasing to 1.8 million bales. By 1950-51 two-thirds of Pakistan's exports of jute were absorbed by countries other than India, chiefly the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and Belgium, "...as Indian domestic production of raw jute rose from 1.7 million bales in 1947-48 to about 6.3 million bales in 1961-62, and Indian imports of raw jute from Pakistan were under 0.4 million bales in the latter year. India has thus achieved its goal of virtual self-sufficiency in raw jute...loss to Pakistan's exports is being absorbed by increasing manufacturing capacity (at home)...."  

The changed pattern of Pakistan's jute industry since 1947 was indicative of the eventualities of the division of the subcontinent and its inherent geopolitical problems. The old and established channels of inter-Dominion trade were gradually being eroded and new but expensive trade connections were established. Pakistan was exporting its raw jute and manufactured jute goods to distant markets. This involved extra and unnecessary freight and insurance charges which were endangering the competitiveness of the Pakistani jute and jute manufactured goods in the world market.  

India was the closest and the most natural customer in the field but the political considerations of the parties concerned outweighed the economic benefits, and which should be construed as a serious error of judgement. By 1960-61 Pakistan was exporting


14. These were expensive in the sense that had there been a continuous exchange of goods between India and Pakistan. The two countries would have been spared of the unnecessary and extra costs.
only 5 per cent of its commodities to India and was importing only 5 per cent from India. Since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, and until recently the trading relations between the two countries were at a standstill.

**Cotton:**

Cotton is both the chief cash crop and the main Kharif*** crop in Pakistan (formerly West Pakistan), and is grown mainly on the doabs** (canal irrigated areas) of the Indus Valley.

Since 1914 good quality seeds have been imported from the United States to improve the production and quality of cotton known as the Punjab-American; it has taken well to the indigenous soil and climate and now 87 per cent of the area in Pakistan is under these improved varieties producing 90 per cent of Pakistan's cotton production. These varieties of cotton are grown in well-defined zones north to south along the Indus Basin of Pakistan. Approximately three million acres were under cotton cultivation in 1947, but the acreage has been increasing gradually over the years and in 1967-68 there were 4.3 million acres under cotton cultivation in Pakistan (West Pakistan). In the former East Pakistan cotton was mainly grown on the slopes in Chittagong Hill Tracts (approximately 35,000 acres) and is generally known as "Comilla Cotton". This area produced between 10 to 55,000 bales of harsh short-staple cotton, "The cotton is mainly used for mixing with wool and its acreage fluctuates widely because it depends on shifting cultivation (jhuming) by primitive tribes, predominantly Buddhist."\(^{15}\)

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15. Ahmad, K.S. op.cit. p.96  
*** Kharif crop-Autumn Crop  
Rabih crop-Spring Crop  
** Doab-Land between two waters - rivers
As a result of improved qualities of cotton and increased consumption at home and abroad, the production of cotton has increased considerably in the last few years. The average production of cotton from 1955-56 to 1959-60 was 1.68 million bales (392 lbs. each bale) which increased to 2.92 million bales (450,000 tons) in 1966-67 and 2.92 million bales (511,000 tons) in 1967-68.\(^{16}\)

In 1952-53 the crop reached a peak of 1.8 million bales. The food shortages that emerged in 1953-54 led to an official discouragement of cotton growing in favour of summer grains. Because of the increase of cotton consumption at home, which resulted from industrial expansion in this sector, a campaign was launched to grow more cotton in 1955-56 but it did not prove very effective. Yields remained stationary at 189 lbs. per acre from 1955 to 1960 and the failure of measures to increase the yield was ascribed to several factors, "Recurring weather difficulties, insect damage and water shortages in the canals were held responsible in earlier years. Later, there was increasing recognition that the causes of stagnation lay deeper. Low applications of irrigation waters, the accumulation of salts in soil, unreliable seeds, inadequate plant production and uneven cover of plants have combined to keep the yields low. Market incentives have also worked against cotton. Sugar-cane proved profitable, encouraging the diversion from cotton not of land as such, but of precious irrigation supplies and peasant energy."\(^{17}\) To improve the cultivation,

\(^{16}\) Pakistan Basic Facts, 1969
\(^{17}\) Andrus, Mohammed, op.cit. p.29
marketing and manufacture of cotton centres of research and technology had been established especially at Karachi and Lyallpur.

At the time of the Partition in 1947 the bulk of the cotton crop was exported and the industry was underdeveloped. This state of affairs was maintained during the first five years of independence. The need for development, however, was realised and this sector of the industry was gradually being given importance. The figures of 1947 (29.7 million lbs. and 881 million yards of cloth) and those of 1967-68 (569.7 million lbs. and 782.5 million yards of cloth) highlight rapid development of the industry since 1947.\(^{18}\)

The Federal Government, with a view to safeguarding the interests of the cotton growers, decided on 19th April, 1979 to continue providing necessary facilities i.e. improved seed, fertiliser, irrigation, water, credit and plant protection. A production target of 3.65 million bales of cotton was fixed for 1979-80 crop; the government further decided to continue with its scheme of support prices, and the purchase of the crop was done directly from the growers and strict quality control was maintained. But there was an element of bad economics since the government decided to continue with the concept of support prices in spite of the fact that the cotton prices in the world market were declining because of the decreasing demand for the commodity.

In 1972 there was the record production of four million bales which declined to 2.446 million bales in 1976-77, and increased to 3.233 million bales in 1977-78. The production

\(^{18}\) ibid.
declined in 1978-79 to 2.662 million bales due to heavy rains in Sind and severe pest attack in the Punjab.\textsuperscript{19}

With various incentives the government succeeded in encouraging the growers to increase the area under the cotton crop from 1.843 million hectares in 1977-78 to 2.038 million hectares; the yield per hectare rose by 33.9 per cent to 312 kgs in 1978 as compared to 1976-77, but declined by 25.6 per cent to 232 kgs in 1978-79 mainly because of adverse weather conditions and inadequate pest control measures.\textsuperscript{20}

The prices of cotton in the international market increased significantly and commensurate with its demand. The prices ranged between 74 cents and 80 cents per pound. The government, therefore, decided to withdraw the subsidy of Rs.45 per 37.324 kgs. The international prices, however, started to decline in January, 1979 because the buyers had more than covered their short-term demands and the crop was good.\textsuperscript{21}

The domestic consumption of cotton is estimated to have been 2.4 million bales. Till March 31, 1979 the Cotton Export Corporation had exported 0.31 million bales valued at 61.7 million dollars, with 0.111 million bales in the stock.\textsuperscript{22}

It must be stated, at this point in time, that cotton enjoyed the position of cash crop in West Pakistan whereas jute enjoyed the position of cash crop in East Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{19} Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 1979
\textsuperscript{20} ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} ibid. Also see the Lloyds Economic Report "Pakistan"
\textsuperscript{22} These figures have been taken from Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 1979, pp.273-274
Cotton was earning a good percentage of the foreign ex-
change which was badly needed by Pakistan to meet its bal-
ance of payments requirements. But it must also be stated
in categoric terms that cotton did not earn as much as did
the predominant cash crop of East Pakistan i.e. jute, which
remained the chief foreign exchange earner for the united
Pakistan until December, 1971.

It should also be noted here that the remittances by
Pakistanis overseas have enjoyed the leading position for
some years now. Jute and cotton as such played an import-
ant role in Pakistan's foreign policy since the two cash
crops provided it with very substantial incomes from their
export. Most of the income, however, was allocated to the
military sector and a substantial amount was spent on devel-
opment projects in West Pakistan. Thus the Eastern wing
was largely ignored in spite of the fact that jute was East
Pakistan's main foreign exchange earner.

Both India and Pakistan chose to ignore the socio-
economic and geographical imperatives in view of their en-
trenched political priorities; since Pakistan's jute and
cotton were sent to distant markets whereas these commodit-
ies could very well have been exported across the border
to India. Its foreign trade policy, especially concerning
its exports, was economically not only irrational but
counter-productive since Pakistan's economic interests were
intertwined with its political objectives within the frame-
work of Pakistan's foreign policy. This irrationality created
more difficulties for Pakistan and undermined the conduct
of its foreign policy.

Pakistan was obliged to accept the restrictions and limitations as prescribed by the Public Law 480. It had also to accept very stringent rules and conditions of the donor countries as prescribed either by the Aid Pakistan Consortium collectively or the member states individually.

This limited, undermined and circumscribed Pakistan's conduct of its foreign policy since the stringent conditions proscribed Pakistan's trading links with certain states e.g. Cuba, North Korea, North Vietnam. The increasing pressure on Pakistan's nuclear energy development programme and the conditional flow of economic and military assistance is yet another example of the manner in which Pakistan's conduct of its foreign policy has been limited and undermined.

Realignment in Pakistan's International Trade

International economic and political relations are very closely interrelated. The volume of aid and trade closely approximates to the degree of political cordiality that exists between states. Both aid and trade have, at times, been used as the instruments of political pressure, for example, the ban on Pakistan's military aid during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965; the ban on American military supplies to both India and Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. i) The suspension of economic aid to Pakistan by the Aid Pakistan Consortium during the East Pakistan crisis; and during and after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, which was not lifted
until 1974. ii) The suspension of military aid and the economic assistance to Pakistan over the nuclear reprocessing plant which Pakistan had negotiated to purchase from France. The enormous pressure by the Ford Administration and the Carter Administration, on the French, not to sell the reprocessing plant to Pakistan. The eventual refusal by the French to honour the original agreement, which had, incidentally been confirmed by the International Atomic Agency after having accepted Pakistan's assurances that the plant was to be used for peaceful purposes. iii) The offer of military and economic aid to Pakistan, by the Americans, after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979.

Since Pakistan is predominantly an agricultural country its main exports consisted of primary products, though industrialisation provided considerable opportunities for the export of manufactured goods, especially textiles. The main imports of Pakistan consisted of industrial raw materials, food and live animals, machinery and transport equipment, animal and vegetable oils etc. Pakistan generally has had an unfavourable balance of trade since 1947.

Jute and cotton formed the basis of Pakistan's exports (approximately 75 per cent), though a relative decline in the importance of export of raw jute and cotton was registered. During the period of 1964-65 raw jute and cotton constituted 46 per cent of total exports, in 1967-68 these shared 39 per cent of total exports. Jute still occupied the traditional role in exports, but cotton exports dwindled for a period, because of increased domestic consumption, and wide fluctuations
in prices coupled with tough competition in the world market. Jute and cotton manufactured goods were promising exports; and textile manufactures increased from 25 per cent in 1964-65 to 29 per cent in 1967-68. In spite of the increase in the export of manufactured goods, Pakistan still depended upon a limited number of agricultural products, which are affected by weather conditions and their fluctuating prices in the world market. In addition, Pakistan earned valuable foreign exchange by exporting, on a small scale, sports goods, carpets, rugs, oil cakes and tea. The real foreign exchange earner in addition to cotton, for some years, has been rice. The Pakistani working overseas have been remitting home substantial amounts of foreign exchange, and in fact, constitute the single most important source of foreign exchange earnings.

The structural modifications in the economy of Pakistan necessitated substantial changes in the composition of its trade. The expansion of industry relegated the importance of consumer goods, and the import of machinery, raw materials, fuels and spare parts took precedence. Moreover, the fast growth of population and relatively slow rise in agricultural production compelled Pakistan to import food grains to meet its increasing requirements. In 1947-48 the total imports amounted to Rs.359.2 million, and since then there has been a steady trend towards rising imports which stood at Rs.5,374.2 million in 1966-67. During the fiscal year 1965-66 Pakistan's imports fell considerably because of the undeclared India-Pakistan war of 1965, tighter import restrictions and the
temporary stop in the flow of the American economic assistance. Imports, however, in the financial year 1966-67 recorded an increase of 23 per cent which was basically necessitated by the increased import of food stuffs, coupled with the relaxations in the import policy. Imports fell by 10 per cent in 1967-68 as compared with the previous financial year owing to the decreased import of food stuffs and the delay in the import of iron, steel and non-ferrous metals, caused by the pending negotiations of loans and credits.  

Pakistan's trade relations with other countries have been largely determined by the following considerations: a) The inherited pre-partition trade relations, b) The source of foreign aid and the conditions thereof, c) The structural changes in the economy of Pakistan and the development of markets for the newly manufactured products, d) Commonwealth Preferences and e) The development of barter trade.

At the time of the Partition in 1947, the U.K. was the main source of imports and destination for Pakistani exports (U.K. imported 17 per cent of Pakistan's total exports in 1948, and 25 per cent of Pakistan's total imports for the same period originated in U.K.). The U.K. maintained its top position as the chief importer of Pakistani exports, which amounted to Rs.396 million in 1967-68, and the United States maintained its position as the chief exporter to Pakistan, and in 1967-68 it exported goods worth Rs.1436

Pakistan has been diversifying its trade ever since it became aware of the United Kingdom's interest in joining the European Economic Community. The United Kingdom is still a very important customer of Pakistani goods although the relative importance of the British Markets has diminished. Pakistan's exports to U.K. constituted about 14 per cent of the total in 1963-64, but only 12 per cent in 1967-68.

Pakistan has mounted export drives in the African, Asian, Communist Block countries, and especially the Arab countries with whom Pakistan enjoys common affinities in a number of fields.

The increasing trade with the communist countries, whose trade is state controlled, prompted Pakistan in 1967 to set up the Trade Corporation of Pakistan. The commodities that the Trading Corporation of Pakistan imported included pig iron, rubber, sugar, betel, nuts, aluminium ingots, copper rods and copper ingots. The Government of Pakistan intended to authorise the T.C.P. to import bulk commodities as the sole importer. Pakistan's trade with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China provided a good example of the changing pattern and the realignment in Pakistan's international trade. In 1960-61 Pakistan imported from the Soviet Union, goods worth Rs.25,025,000, and its exports to the Soviet Union for the same period amounted to Rs.14,201,000. In 1966-67 the imports from Russia totalled Rs.179 million, and the exports for the same period to the Soviet Union amounted to Rs.137 million.  

These figures clearly demonstrate that the trading relations with the Soviet Union were in favour of the Russians, and Pakistan, on the whole, had an unfavourable balance of trade with regard to the Soviet Union.

Since Pakistan's economic sources are limited, Pakistan, as a result, has been obliged to rely heavily on foreign economic assistance in the shape of grants and aid in 1950, and by December, 1978, it had received assistance worth 14.68 billion dollars of which 3.95 billion dollars were in the shape of grants, including The Indus Basin Replacement Programme and the Tarbela Project, and grant-like assistance (repayable in non-convertible rupees), and the balance of 10.73 billion dollars in the shape of repayable loans and credits. This amounted to 9.2 billion dollars, of which 1.8 billion dollars has been repaid leaving the outstanding debt at 7.4 billion dollars on December 31, 1978.27

There was an interesting change, during the sixties, in the shape and form of foreign assistance; the grants and grant-assistance were transformed to loans and credits to be repaid in foreign currency. "During 1950-55, grant and grant-like-assistance was to the tune of 70 per cent...in 1955-60 this percentage rose to 79. However, it declined to 43 per cent in 1960-65 and 26 per cent during 1965-70...during 1970-75 it constituted only 9 per cent of the total aid received, whereas in the following years it has ranged between 11 to 19 per cent."28 This demonstrates quite a remarkable transformation in the foreign economic assistance which was extended

27. Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 1979
28. Pakistan Year Book, Karachi, 1979, p.361
to Pakistan, and there is an obvious conclusion, that is to state that Pakistan did not receive many gifts, grants or grant-assisted foreign economic assistance but credits and loans, and at very high rate of interests at that, to say the least, "Pakistan received credits totalling dollar 122.2 million for five development projects from...International Development Association (IDA), during 1978...70 million for salinity control and reclamation project in the Punjab; dollar 35 million for Tarbela; dollar 12.5 million for the Punjab extension and agricultural development project, dollar 3 million credit for hill farming...1.7 million for the Hazara forestry technical assistance project. 29

With the inflow of aid in 1950, the trend of development moved fast towards creating an infra-structure e.g., irrigation, power and transport, fertilisers, cement, steel and capital goods manufacturing units. The public sector development expenditure of Rs. 2,636.42 million in 1971-72, rose to Rs.19,000 million in 1978-79. Reliance on foreign economic assistance, as a result, was increased, especially from the Islamic countries. This put added burden on Pakistan's economic difficulties and further complicated the balance of payment situation. The balance of payments deficit on current account rose to 992 million dollars in 1978-79 as against 489 million dollars in 1977-78. In spite of the fact that the dollar volume of external assistance has increased during the last few years, its value in real terms has declined as a result of persistent

29. ibid.
inflation both at home and abroad. According to the World Bank, Pakistan will require three dollars by 1980 to match what one dollar could buy in 1965; and more than two dollars to equal one dollar in 1970.

The aid pledge by the Consortium for 1978-79 was 845 million dollars in 1977-78. In addition another amount of 104 million dollars was provided by the Consortium but outside the Consortium arrangements in 1978-79, as against 79 million dollars in 1977-78.

Aid pledge from all sources:

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Outside Consortium Arrangements</td>
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<tr>
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<td>IMF Trust Fund</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,134</td>
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The Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, which concluded its two-day session on June 6, 1979, decided to give aid of 700 million dollars for 1979-80 fiscal year, which was 100 million dollars less than Pakistan had asked for. In addition, the Carter Administration decided to take economic measures against Pakistan because of its belief that Pakistan was in the process of making a nuclear weapon, in spite of repeated denials by Pakistan. As stated earlier the Americans, however, offered Pakistan military and economic assistance

30. ibid. p.364
worth 400 million dollars, over a period of two years, as a sequel to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, but Pakistan declined to accept the offer and described it as "peanuts".

As a result of Pakistan's economic difficulties, especially with regard to debt servicing and the recurring charges, Pakistan has, at times, requested debt relief arrangements. According to Pakistan Year Book 1979, the Memorandum of Understanding of June 28, 1974, the Consortium members agreed to provide debt relief of 650 million dollars spread over a period of four years from 1974-75 to 1977-78 in annual instalments of 175 million dollars for the first three years, and 125 for the fourth year; and the relief amount carried interest rate of 2.5 per cent and repaid over a period of thirty years including the grace period of ten years. Agreements were signed with France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, U.K. and U.S.A.

Pakistan also signed similar agreements with Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Poland, Switzerland, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. 31

According to the Pakistan Year Book, 1979, the British Government has written off Pakistan's debt liability amounting to 76.421 million pound sterlings (162.3 million dollars), on account of principal and interest payable during the period up to the end of this century. In an agreement (June 26, 1979) the British Government agreed to the retrospective terms of adjustment of past British loans with effect from July 31, 1978, and the cancellation of debt liability.

According to an agreement signed in Islamabad on 22.3.1979,

31. ibid. 365.
Japan will also provide debt relief to the tune of 3.653 million dollars. The grant and its accrued interest will be used by Pakistan purchasing synthetic rubber, chemicals, newsprint, steel and steel materials, machinery, scientific instruments and services from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Pakistan has developed special relations with the Islamic countries which have since been greatly expanded, especially since the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and the oil embargo after the Arab-Israeli war of October, 1973. Pakistan has received valuable assistance from these countries, especially to meet its balance of payments requirements as well as loans for the implementation of the country's priority development projects. Pakistan was able to get total commitments of 982.5 million dollars from Iran, Libya, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and OPEC during the period 1973-74 to 1978-79. The rupees generated by this assistance were utilised to finance development projects and other programmes.

With the collaboration of Abu Dhabi, Iran, Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia joint ventures in the field of fertilizers, cement, textile industries and education have been set up.

These developments clearly demonstrate the direction and the realignment in Pakistan's international trade in conformity with the geopolitical structure in the region.

It is quite clear that Pakistan managed to cope with the new geopolitical structure in spite of the immense and
overwhelming difficulties, especially since the state was dismembered in December, 1971. The direction of its socio-economic and political development is a response to the prophets of doom who were predicting an early demise of Pakistan after the Eastern half had been amputated, and to those who had condemned Pakistan for exploiting the riches of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and asserted that Pakistan was economically not a viable entity; and because of its enormous problems could not survive as an independent state.
The Pakhtunistan Issue

In 1947, Pakistan assumed the international rights and obligations of the Crown in India, and it naturally accepted the legality and established validity of the Durand Line. But Afghanistan questioned the established frontiers because it was its view that Pakistan as a newly emergent state did not automatically succeed to the rights of the Crown in India since these, the Afghans believed, had lapsed with the transfer of powers on 15th August, 1947. In the wake of its claims Afghanistan voted against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations, thus casting the only negative vote; a Muslim negative vote.

At the same time the Afghan government demanded the creation of Pakhtunistan (Land of Pakhtuns-Pushtoons-Pathans). Pakistan rejected the demand and pledged to defend its territorial integrity. In this Pakistan had been fully supported by the United Kingdom and the overwhelming majority of other countries. Mr. Noel-Baker, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, on 30th June, 1949 stated: "It is His Majesty's Government's view that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India...in these territories, and that Durand Line is the international frontier." ¹ This view was further affirmed by the British Prime Minister on March 1, 1956 "In 1947, Pakistan came into existence as a new, sovereign

¹ Parliamentary Papers, Commons, 1948-49, Vol 466, pp.1491-92
independent member of the Commonwealth. Her Majesty's Government regard her as having, with the full consent of the overwhelming majority of the Pushtu speaking peoples concerned...succeeded to the exercise of the powers formerly exercised by the Crown in India on the North West Frontier of the subcontinent. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully support the Government of Pakistan in maintaining their sovereignty over the areas east of the Durand Line and in regarding this Line as the international frontier with Afghanistan...."  

The validity of the Pakistani claim was also endorsed by the members of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation: "The members of the Council severally declared that their Governments recognised that the sovereignty of Pakistan extends up to the Durand Line, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan."  

The statement "deplored statements and interventions by Soviet leaders". It is true that SEATO joint statement in effect rejected Afghanistan's claim to Pakhtunistan; and this was the first time that the United States of America had openly and officially recognised the Durand Line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

During the budget discussions in the National Assembly (March 1956) various members criticised the foreign policy; and in an effort to placate the Assembly the then Foreign Minister Hamid-ul-Choudhry stated, "as far as Pakistan is concerned the most notable achievement of the SEATO  

4. ibid.
Fig. 4
The Durand Line And
Location of Tribes
is the joint affirmation by the members of our stand on Kashmir and the Durand Line. The Assembly was not fully satisfied with the statement and posed serious questions regarding the visits to New Delhi by Selwyn Lloyd and John Foster Dulles before and after the meeting respectively. Both the visits were considered as a part of the appeasement policy being pursued by the allies of Pakistan. The members further inquired as to why the British and the Americans had not stated in categoric terms that Kashmir was an integral part of Pakistan since the Russians had stated that Kashmir belonged to India. The Foreign Ministry's demands for grants and budgetary requirements were passed by 22 to 16 votes; the highest proportion of votes cast against the Governments' foreign policy.

From the Pakistani point of view successive Afghan Governments have tried, at times, to elicit support in Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province or the Sarhad (frontier) region. Some elements in these provinces, who are at odds with Pakistan and sympathise with the Afghan claims, clearly draw their support from without and as such, hope that these two provinces might secede from Pakistan. It is an indication, not of the weakness of the idea, but of the incoherence and inconsistency of the advocates of the scheme since there was no viable definition or definite approach to explain the extent or validity of their claim. Some speak of "Greater Baluchistan" and others of "Pukhtunistan" and, except in rare cases, they have avoided defining the

5. National Assembly of Pakistan Debates, 26th March, 1956, p.96
territories of "Pukhtunistan" (Pakhtunistan is also spelt as Pukhtunistan and is also known as Pushtoonistan or Pashtunistan and Punjab is also spelt as Panjab). It has been defined at various times as a state stretching from River Jhelum to the Oxus; Margalla to the Oxus. North West Frontier Province to be renamed Pakhtunistan, within Pakistan, or a new country comprising both the Frontier Province and Baluchistan, or indeed, a greater Afghan state going down to the Arabian Sea with the Indus as its eastern border. Pakhtunistan as such remained an ill-defined area which would seem to include the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province. Afghanistan, with some help from dissident Pushtoon tribesmen and leaders, argued that this vast territory should not form part of Pakistan and that it should be recognised as the national territory of the Pushtoons. The Afghans are still unclear on the details, although the proposed Pushtoonistan would in some way be united with Afghanistan. This would entail the new and expanded Afghanistan which would not only incorporate a solid Pushtoon majority to match its Pushtoon ruling class, but also give the proposed state a direct access to the Arabian Sea (via non-Pushtoon Baluchistan) instead of depending on Pakistani, or indeed, Soviet facilities. 6

To the most vociferous group "Greater Baluchistan" means the incorporation of Pakistani Baluchistan, the Jacobabad-Kashmore areas of Sind, the Dera Ghazi Khan area of Pakistani Punjab, a slice of the Frontier Province and all

of Baluchistan's Pathan majority areas in pockets adjoining the Sarhad region. The territory demanded from Pakistan constituted less than half the area claimed. The remaining area would draw the Afghan territory of Farah and parts of Helmand Valley and a good part of Iran, especially the entire length and breadth of Iranian Baluchistan. Its western boundary would run from Lingeh on the Gulf Coast to Turkmenistan (U.S.S.R.) covering Kerman, Zarind and Turbat-i-Haideri. Its southern extremities would encompass approximately one thousand miles from Lingeh along the Gulf Coast to Sonmiani near Karachi, Pakistan. As stated earlier there is no precise territorial definition of Pakhtunistan and no coherent lines of demarcation. A postage stamp issued by the Afghan-istan Government shows this map covering the territory of Baluchistan, blotting out its name and calling the whole area Pakhtunistan.7

The inconsistencies do not end with territory. These extend to arguments, supposedly on ethnic grounds, advanced in favour of the claims made by Afghanistan on Pakistan territories. Mr. Abdul Wali Khan, leader of National Awami Party (now defunct) and his colleagues vehemently supported the idea of four nationalities. But the father of Mr. Abdul Wali Khan, Khan Abdul Ghaffer Khan, in his 'Pukhtunistan Day' speech in 1967 and in his autobiography (written for him by Kanwar Bhan Narang) has stated that all Tajiks, Turkmen

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Uzbeks, Baluchis and Pathans, whether they speak Pushto or not, should in effect forget their separate identities and call themselves Pukhtuns, living in a state extending from Amu Darya, to the west as far as Herat, and to the south as far as the Jhelum River.\(^8\)

Surprising enough, whereas Ghaffar Khan advocated unity amongst different nationalities inhabiting different territories, he openly supported the concept of four nationalities as advocated by Wali Khan and supported their right to self-determination. This was and still is construed by Pakistan as preaching secession of the Frontier and Baluchistan from the federation of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan believed that Afghanistan with the help of dissidents in the Frontier Province and Baluchistan was sowing the seeds of secession over a wider area and endeavoured to attract support and sympathy for secessionists in the areas, hoping that the process might engender a process of simultaneous secessions and the eventual dismemberment of Pakistan. The strategy seemed to have been geared, according to the Pakistani point of view, towards concurrent and not consecutive action, so as to establish the fall of "Dominoes" at once rather than in broken successions, "Kabul's position has never been clearly stated, but it appears to be a straightforward irredentist claim to the Pathan-inhabited areas of the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan though usually cloaked in the more respectable guise of a plea for 'self-determination for the

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Pathans'...India has not publicly supported Kabul's position on Pakhtunistan as the Pathan areas of Pakistan are sometimes called - but Delhi has made it abundantly clear that its sympathies lie with Afghanistan."\(^9\)

It must be noted here that the Embassy of Iraq played an undiplomatic role in Pakistan in February, 1973 when large scale arms were discovered in Islamabad after the Pakistani authorities had forced their way into the Iraqi Embassy. The Pakistanis "...accused Iraq of being party to an anti-Pakistan conspiracy following the recovery yesterday of large stocks of arms and ammunition, mostly of Soviet origin, from the Iraq Chancellery here. The Iraq Ambassador, Mr. Hikmat Suleiman, has been declared persona non grata and the Pakistani Ambassador in Baghdad has been recalled...what was described as a veritable arsenal was discovered in the Iraq Embassy. It included 300 submachine guns and carbines, 40,000 rounds of ammunition, 40 incendiary bombs and equipment for training in guerilla warfare."\(^10\) According to the Pakistan point of view the arms were destined for Baluchistan where dissidents were engaged in sabotage and as such "...arms and ammunition imported by the Iraq Embassy under diplomatic cover were meant for distribution among elements 'within and without' Pakistan who sought to subvert the security and tranquility of the country...authorities here have been concerned for some time about the Iraq-based movement for Free Baluchistan which, according to informed sources, sought to establish an independent state comprising the adjoining Baluch-inhabited areas of Pakistan and Iran."\(^11\) A careful analysis of the

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11. The Times, February 12, 1973
Pakistani point of view would reveal that only a part of their argument deserved some credibility since some of the arms were meant for Pakistani Baluchi dissidents but the rest were destined for the Iranian Baluchistan especially the areas of Sistan, Kuhiri, Konarak and Chah Bahar (a military and naval base). This seemed to be in line with the Iraqi thinking, at that point in time, since they were annoyed with the Iranians because of their attitude towards the Kurdish problem.

The Iraqi arms were meant to support the idea of "Greater Baluchistan" and were especially meant to subvert peace and security in Iranian Baluchistan that would naturally involve Pakistan. The Economist emphasised, "...arms might have been meant to end upon the hand of guerillas not in Pakistan but in the Arab Emirates of the Gulf, or in Iranian Baluchistan. The Iraqis have undoubtably been striving to foment revolution in the Emirates and to make as much trouble as they can for the Shah. They have financed, and provided guerilla training and an office in Baghdad for, a Baluchi 'liberation movement' in Iran."\(^{12}\)

The hopes of Afghanistan succeeding in its designs against Pakistan were influenced by Indian propaganda suggesting that Pakistan's life as an independent state was likely to be short; and the Afghans were convinced that Pakistan was a weak state, which could hardly survive the social, cultural, economic and military strains of the immediate future. Therefore, the Afghans advanced their claims with the hope of reaping a rich harvest after the eventual demise of Pakistan.

12. The Economist, February 17, 1973
Fig. 5
Pakhtunistan As Claimed by Afghanistan
The Indian propaganda and the Afghan claims against Pakistan must have given added incentive to Pakistan to align itself with the West in the interest of its security and political independence.

The Afghans laid claims to an integral part of Pakistan in spite of the fact that people had declared their allegiance, in overwhelming majority, to Pakistan in a free and democratic manner: "On 15th August, 1947, after a plebiscite, the Frontier Province, with every sign of enthusiasm, became a part of Pakistan. And in November of the same year this lead was followed by all the tribes up to Durand Line and the Chiefs of the Four Frontier States of Dir, Swat, Chitral and Amb, the former signifying their loyalty in open jirgas, the latter by means of Instruments of Accession."13

Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have not followed the fraternal patterns which should have been expected between the two neighbouring Muslim States. In fact, these have been blurred and confused because of the Afghan attitude and outside interference. In December, 1955 the Soviet Union entered the scene openly by sympathising with the Afghan claims on Pakistani territory and the Pakhtunistan issue, the Soviet Premier Marshal Bulganin declared: "We think the demands of Afghanistan to give the population of Pushtunistan an opportunity of freely expressing their will are justified and well grounded."14 This statement apparently indicated the Soviet displeasure at the Pakistani membership of the American sponsored military pacts. Again in

14. Keesings Contemporary Archives, p.14654
March, 1960, the Soviet Union repeated its support for the Afghan claims on Pakistani territory. The Government and people of Pakistan resented the Soviet interference in the internal affairs of Pakistan and declared in unequivocal terms the inviolability of its territories. The then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Manzur Qadir stated that it was "regrettable that the Soviet Union deemed it fit to interfere in this country's internal affairs." He further challenged the validity of the Pakhtunistan issue and invited the Afghans to hold referendum on its side of the Durand Line, "It is reasonable to assume that Pakhtoons (Pathans) whether they live in Pakistan or Afghanistan, want to be together and under the same flag. The flag can be either the flag of Pakistan or of Afghanistan...a referendum has already been held among the Pakhtoons of Pakistan, it is only logical that we should now ask the Pakhtoons in Afghanistan what their wishes are..."

The Soviet Union had hoped to gain concessions in the area which had been considered American sphere of influence after the British withdrawal. But the immediate reason for the Soviet support in 1960, of the Afghan claim, was the shooting down of the American spy plane U2 over Sverdlovsk, about 1100 miles inside the Russian territory. The plane had flown from Peshawar in the north west of Pakistan (West Pakistan), and was said to have landing facilities at Bade Ber. It may not be wrong to suggest that the Russians had

15. ibid., p.17323
16. ibid., p.17321
no other immediate objectives in the region, at that point in time, and that they were not seeking a confrontation in a region which is so close to their borders, and that their long term interests could well be served by a policy of equal treatment.

This point is clearly substantiated by the policy which the Soviet Union pursued after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. The Tashkent Declaration of January, 1966 was a feather in the Soviet cap, and Prime Minister Kosygin earned the praise of both parties for his untiring efforts. The Soviet Union seemed to be the only participant to emerge with unqualified success and satisfaction. Underlining the difficult nature of the task facing Premier Kosygin, The Times had observed that the Russians were trying "to open a lock that has no key." The fact that both India and Pakistan agreed to meet on neutral territory was an achievement in itself, and the fact, that the two agreed on a joint Declaration was an achievement that no other country could match. Soviet diplomacy made a dramatic breakthrough and proved that it was a major factor in the power politics of South Asia. A peacemaker at the time when the Americans were waging war in Vietnam. And after the Tashkent Declaration the Soviet economic assistance to Pakistan increased; in

17. The Times, 3.1.1966
addition, the Soviet Union agreed to supply military hardware. The Russians also quietly dropped their support of Afghanistan on the issue of Pakhtunistan.

The Brezhnev plans of organising some kind of collective security demonstrated the Soviet Union's increasing interest in the region; a very important element in the geopolitical developments of South Asia. The Soviet interests in Afghanistan could either be looked at from its preoccupation with security arrangements or as a culmination of the Czarist dreams of expansionism or both (the overt Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December, 1979 is a case in point).

The attitude of successive Afghan governments caused innumerable hardships to the people of this landlocked country, and at times, jeopardised peace and tranquility of the region. Various unfriendly moves of Afghanistan eventually resulted in tough Pakistani retaliation in the Bajaur area (1960-61) of the North West Frontier Province after the Afghans had committed repeated raids into Pakistan territories. Pakistan also closed the Torkham border thus denying the Afghans access to their traditional natural and most transit route.
Pakistan also banned the entry of Fußland (seasonal migrant) who normally entered Pakistan for various jobs over the winter, and it is estimated that their number sometimes passed the two hundred thousand mark.

The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were normalised as a result of the efforts of the late Shahinshah of Iran. The Torkham route was reopened on July 20th, 1963 and the Afghan trade was allowed to operate once again. These relations were further strengthened after the exit of Premier Daud Khan, a cousin of King Zahir Shah, who had ruled Afghanistan with iron hand for nearly ten years and made the demand for Pakhtunistan one of the main planks of his policy. A transit trade agreement was signed on 9th March, 1964.

Significance of Tashkent, 1966

The Tashkent Agreement which was signed under the aegis of the Soviet Union on 10th January, 1966 could be construed as the watershed regarding Pakistan's policy of alignment, and as a definite shift towards non-alignment. Pakistan was beginning to assert itself in view of the disillusionment the Pakistani nation experienced before, during and after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. The Tashkent Declaration was seen as a substantial gain for Pakistan because it was perceived as a further erosion of India's special relationship with the Russians. This enabled Pakistan to practise its policy of friendly relations with all the three foremost world powers, the USA, the USSR, and China, on a bilateral basis. International relations and developments thereof directly affecting Pakistan between 1960-66 must be considered in their proper perspective. For a time, especially in 1963-64 and up to the war in 1965, Pakistan sought to regain its capacity to respond to the dynamics of power-politics, and remove itself from a narrow, one-dimensional, all-or-nothing basis of relations with the great
powers, especially in view of the change in American attitude and policy vis-a-vis alignment and non-alignment. The Kennedy Administration was not as keen on alliances as the Eisenhower Administration had been. Non-alignment was not considered. 'immoral' and neutralist policy was accorded recognition and respectability. Alliances were termed as 'pactitis' and allies were being ignored. Pakistan decided to realign its national personality on the assumption that signals and friendship from one source alone could be an asset neither to itself nor to its allies. In the national interest, and in the larger interest of restoring balance in the region, Pakistan decided to activate its diplomatic ties with both the Soviet Union and China. This progress was, however, halted by two sets of developments. One was the considerable pressure put on Pakistan by the America's hostility towards China, and the pressures it exerted to force a change in Pakistan's policy. The United States was expressing great anxiety and suspected every friendly move towards China. In August 1963, it suspended a $4.3 million loan for the Dacca airport because Pakistan had signed a civil aviation agreement with China. The cancellation in April 1965 of an invitation to the late President Ayub Khan to visit the United States, and the postponement in July, 1965 of the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium meeting. A further evidence was the suspension of both the economic and military aid to Pakistan and India in 1965 within the confines of American policy of 'evenhandedness'. This was meant to hurt Pakistan in every sense of the word since India continued to receive a considerable quantity of armaments from the Soviet Union, and in addition, India had
developed its own armaments industry.

The other set of developments parallel to the first was the Soviet attitude in the Indo-Pakistan war of September 1965, and the signing of the Tashkent Declaration under the aegis of the Soviet Union, and an apparent change in the Soviet policy towards Pakistan and their willingness to quietly drop their support of Afgahn claims regarding Pakhtunistan. Neither of these events would have confused Pakistan's foreign policy, had Pakistan been blessed with a leadership which was capable of understanding the sophisticated nature and complexity of international relations and capable of maintaining serenity, dignity and steadfastness in the face of temporary setbacks; and had it correctly understood and analysed the true nature of the U.S. friendship and its foreign policy interests.

Pakistan could not antagonise China in the face of Indian and Afghan hostility; and in this the two had received both tacit and open support from the Soviet Union. The Indians on Kashmir and the Afghans on the Pakhtunistan issue. The Americans had shown a kind of ambivalence regarding Pakistani interests e.g. Kashmir, India and Pakhtunistan. It is ironical, however, that the correctness of Pakistan's policy towards China was vindicated for the United States by subsequent developments in the world situation, but at a colossal expense to Pakistan. As far back as 1965-66 Pakistan had conveyed to the United States that Pakistan could serve as a bridge between China and the United States, but it was not until 1971 that the United States took up this offer when Dr. Kissinger's trip to Peking was facilitated by Yahya Khan's regime; and the event
itself, the inception of a direct dialogue between China and the United States, could not have been more felicitous for Pakistan.

Pakistanis believed, rightly or wrongly, that the signing of the Indo-Soviet Treaty in August 1971, the draft of which had remained under consideration for three years, was the sequel to this journey, and in fact, paved the way for India to move against Pakistan in a decisive manner; and dismember Pakistan by force.

The Americans not only put stringent conditions on the use of their military aid to Pakistan, they did not hesitate to express their displeasure when Pakistan used these weapons against the Afghan intruders, for defensive purpose, in the Bajaur area in 1960-61, against the Indian forces in the Rann of Kutch in 1965 and during the crisis in East Pakistan in 1971.

The North-West Frontier

Coming back to the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan one can safely state that the Afghan Government maintained its sympathetic attitude towards the dissidents in North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, in an effort to influence Pakistan's domestic policies in the two provinces.

The importance of the north-western entry where the mountain core of Asia narrows approximately 250 miles between the Oxus and the Indus and the Hindu Kush has impracticable passes through which both the religious zealots and soldiers have travelled. The first Muslim landing on the subcontinent, however, was in the Mekran coastal area when Mohammad Bin Qasim landed in Sind in 711. Although during this day and age the Chinese domination of Tibet revitalised
along-dormant frontier, the North-West Frontier Province or the Sarhad remains the major geostrategic area which would increasingly come under pressure from the interested parties, and the Frontier of the old Indian Empire was simply on the northwest and more specifically with Afghanistan; all of which was inherited by Pakistan.

The boundary with Iran posed no problems, but an extension of Soviet influence into the erstwhile British/U.S. sphere of influence in southern Iran is bound to pose serious problems especially if and when the Soviet union embarked upon a policy to project and demonstrate its interests there as a "Continental and Oceanic Superpower". The Durand Line and the Pakhtunistan issue would become very relevant in the context of power politics and the very survival of Pakistan as an independent sovereign entity. And so would be the concept of alignment and the principles of collective security as enshrined in the U.N. Charter.

Pakistani Baluchistan marches along southern Afghanistan and south eastern Iran, and is open to tribal movement across the border, and therefore, open to subversion; and an effective control of the Quetta-Peshawar-Kabul-Kandahar quadrilateral could only be effected by one single political administration and therefore, an open temptation to the parties concerned. This frontier is, therefore, very much alive and a potential zone of hostility.

Financial hardships and the preoccupation with the Indian and Kashmir borders have in a sense added to Pakistan's difficulties in dealing with these thorny and complex problems of this region, especially in Baluchistan. A concerted effort has been made to develop the social and economic
potentials of this region, and the discovery of iron ore and copper deposits has further strengthened the possibilities of greater activity in this region. The Government of Pakistan has been actively working to extend the supply of Sui Natural Gas for domestic purposes which had previously been denied to the region. Moreover, added efforts have been made to improve the supply of fresh water in the area.

The Pakhtunistan issue backed by the Afghans, the Soviet-American rivalry and the inter-tribal feuds in the region may very well play into the hands of either the Soviet Union or the United States, who would hesitate very little in capitalising on the situation to their particular advantage, and embark upon adventurous moves in the region.

The Soviet Union might still be attracted to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the oil rich region of the Persian Gulf. The Americans and their allies are not going to take things lightly and would in all probability move swiftly to counter any Soviet advance in this region.

Pakistan has important trading links with South-West and South-East Asia, but Islamic ideology and cultural affinities are the real bonds. But Pakistan must guard against possible subversion from across the Durand Line, and this subversion is likely to be directed at the Baluchi and Pathan tribesmen who straddle across this boundary which was agreed upon in 1892 but has since been seriously questioned by the Afghans who, at times, have received overt and covert support from the Soviet leaders; and in addition, have sympathetic ears in Delhi.
Chapter 5

The Indian Factor

The attitude of Pakistan and India to each other has largely been negative, although friction arising directly from the Partition itself waned through time mainly because India seemed to have accepted the existence of Pakistan as an independent Sovereign entity.

The Kashmir Dispute

The Kashmir dispute is more specific locationally than the general attitude of India towards Pakistan, and it is complex in detail.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir has an area of 84,571 square miles which is only slightly smaller in area than the U.K. According to the Census Report of 1941, the population of the State was 4,021,616 i.e. four fifths of Lancashire. The following figures give a comparative percentage of the various communities in the State:
State:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Non-Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jammu</td>
<td>1,981,433</td>
<td>1,215,676</td>
<td>765,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmir</td>
<td>1,728,705</td>
<td>1,615,478</td>
<td>113,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frontier Districts</td>
<td>311,478</td>
<td>270,093</td>
<td>41,385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures clearly indicate Muslim majorities in all three major divisions of the State though the Indians now claim a clear-cut non-Muslim majority in Jammu (according to the 1961 figures published in India, Muslims constitute 38 per cent of the population and Hindus 59 per cent of the population). This change can be explained first by the continuing emigration of Muslims to Pakistan and, secondly, by planned settlement of Hindus and Sikhs by the Indian authorities in order to strengthen their claims.

"The State occupies a strategic position in the extreme north-western corner of the Indian subcontinent. Not only does it have common borders with India and Pakistan, but also with the Chinese controlled regions of Tibet and Sinkiang, and for a shorter stretch, with Afghanistan as well. Less than fifty miles of unpopulated mountains separates the extreme north-western tip of the State from the territory of the Soviet Union." ¹

The Kashmir dispute seems to have been engendered, in the absence of a precise understanding among the devisers of the partition plan of 1947, in the Hindu obduracy which has failed to accept the "two nations theory" and in the Hindu refusal to recognise

the full implications of Pakistan. Had the Radcliffe Award been pronounced on the majority/contiguous basis and had the District of Gurdaspur (a Muslim majority area) been transferred to Pakistan, the Kashmir dispute would have been nipped in the bud.

The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 ended the British Paramountcy over the Princely States, which were given the choice to accede either to Pakistan or India. The Maharaja of Kashmir failed to reach a positive decision to this effect though he signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan on 12-15 August, 1947, but no such agreement was exchanged with India. The massacre of Muslims in the State and the District of Poonch by the Hindus and the Dogra Forces resulted in a popular uprising. The tribal Pathans from the North Western Frontiers of Pakistan entered the State on 24th and 25th October, 1947, with the hope of saving their brethren from genocide. On 25th October, 1947, Lord Mountbatten presided over a meeting of the Indian Defence Committee in which it was decided to send V.P. Menon to Srinagar to negotiate the accession of Kashmir to India. Menon flew back and forth, and during his second trip to the State capital he succeeded in obtaining the Instrument of Accession on 26th October 1947 and on 27th October a Sikh Battalion was flown into Srinagar; thus began the Indian occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

The entry of the Indian forces in spite of the Instrument of Accession is difficult to justify since the Standstill
Agreement had entrusted the defence, foreign affairs and communications to Pakistan. More important still the letter accepting the Instrument of Accession on behalf of the Indian Government clearly established the right of the people to self-determination... in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute ... it is my Government's wish that ... the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.²

Pandit Nehru emphasised the same point in a telegram sent to Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, on October 28, 1947..."In regard to accession it has also been made clear that this is subject to reference to people of the State and their decision...."³ The promise was repeated in Nehru's radio broadcast of November 2nd, 1947. "We have decided that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not, and cannot back out of it. We are prepared ... to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nation...."⁴ These promises and pledges abundantly establish the interim nature of the Indian occupation of the State, and the right of its people to decide their future is a fair and free plebiscite. The Indian leaders committed themselves unequivocally to the right of the Kashmiris

2. Lakhanpal, P., Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute, New Delhi, 1965, p.57
4. Ibid., pp. 52-5
to self determination. This was further endorsed by the Security Council of the United Nations in a resolution passed on April 21st, 1948.

The preceding population figures establish beyond the shadow of a doubt that the vast majority of Kashmiris was Muslim, and that it was contiguous to West Pakistan. Pakistan's Western rivers either originated in Kashmir or traversed its territories before entering Pakistan and giving them much needed waters. Pakistan is very much dependent upon these waters; and so long as India maintains its occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan would continue to feel insecure and apprehensive of India's intentions. India as such continues to hold the trump card which could prove to be the decisive strangle-hold regarding Pakistan's economic development.

Kashmir is extremely important from the strategic point of view since it has common borders with China, Afghanistan and is separated from the Soviet Union by the barren mountains of Afghanistan.

The Indus Waters dispute dragged on for years before it was settled in 1960, mainly due to efforts of the World Bank. The United States of America and Pakistan's other allies played a major role in this respect. In addition, these allies made a major contribution towards the Indus Waters Replacement Programme.
The United States and Pakistan's other allies took an added interest in the settlement of this dispute after Pakistan had joined the various unilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements.

There is no denying the fact that considerable economic progress had been achieved in Pakistan and although the socio-economic problems facing Pakistan had scarcely been so vast and complex as those of India, it is perhaps not surprising that Pakistan should have sought to strengthen its position in the 1950's by securing economic assistance from the United States.

To India this seemed to threaten the delicate structure of its version of non-alignment which India was endeavouring to build, and as such its immediate reaction was to wriggle out of its international commitment vis-a-vis a fair and free plebiscite in Kashmir.

As stated earlier, Kashmir is of greater economic value to Pakistan than to India since much of the irrigation of the Punjab and the Lower Indus Plains depends on the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab; the Pir Panjal foot hills supplied much timber to the Punjab, and there are enormous resources of hydro-electric power (Mangla Dam and Terbella Dam), anthracite, bauxite, iron ore - marginal to India's needs but perhaps sufficient to make much difference to Pakistan's future industrial development.
The natural economic and socio-cultural links of Kashmir are decidedly with Pakistan.

The Indus Waters

"The Indus gave India its name. Now it is to give India a large portion of the waters of its eastern tributaries. This is provided for in the recent Indus Waters Treaty which took twelve years to negotiate and will take ten years to implement." 6

The Indus Waters Dispute originated in the partition of the Punjab (land of five rivers) in 1947, and quickly became critical when, on April 1st, 1948, the flow of canal water from East-Punjab (India) to West-Punjab (Pakistan) was cut off.

The Indus Water Treaty was signed on September 19th, 1960, between Pakistan, India and the World Bank. The treaty provided that the three western rivers the Indus, Jhelum and the Chenab were to be used exclusively by Pakistan, and India was to be allowed their use only for domestic, non-consumptive and agricultural purposes and for the generation of hydro-electric power. India was given the exclusive right over the three eastern rivers the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. Pakistan was authorised to use the eastern rivers for "domestic and non-consumptive" purposes. In addition Pakistan was given the right, for agricultural development, to use the waters of Basantar, Bein, Tarnah and Ujh tributaries of the Ravi. Pakistan is

authorized to withdraw from the Basantar' such waters as may be available and necessary to irrigate not more than 100 acres annually...may also withdraw...for SAILAB cultivation of as much area on each of the four tributaries Basantar, Bein, Tarnah and Ujh, as was cultivated on 1st April, 1960, and which cannot be so cultivated after that date, to maximum of 14,000 acres on Basantar, 26,600 acres of Bein, 1,800 acres on Tarnah and 3,000 on Ujh annually. If, however, there are extraordinary floods during any year then SAILAB cultivation may be extended beyond these limits. The treaty does not give Pakistan any rights to any releases by India in the tributaries of the Ravi or Sutlej...7

Both Pakistan and India agreed to cooperate in the effective implementation of the treaty and accepted their responsibilities in the setting up of "hydrological and meteorological observation stations within the drainage basins", and to give early warnings on the flood levels of the rivers. The two countries also agreed to set up a commission of experts to deal with any disputes; and further agreed to refer any such dispute to a "Neutral Expert" in case there was a difference of opinion between the two.

The Indus Waters Treaty was accompanied by other agreements regarding the replacement works and the financial requirements. Although India was required under the financial arrangements to provide £62 million, she was not allowed to participate in the decision-making that affected the replacement works. The

7. Ibid., p.9
treaty provided that in case of request from Pakistan for the extension of the interim period the Bank will pay the following money to India:

i) One Year £3,125,000
ii) Two Years £6,406,250
iii) Three Years £9,850,000

The Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement was put into effect on October 1st, 1960, and accordingly the signatories agreed to make the following contributions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grants</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>6,965,000 Australian Pounds</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>126,000,000 Marks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>22,100,000 Canadian Dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1,000,000 New Zealand Pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>20,860,000 Pounds Sterling</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>177,000,000 U.S. Dollars</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Loans       | U.S.A.               | 70,000,000 U.S. Dollars    |
|            | World Bank           | 80,000,000 U.S. Dollars   |

Pakistan also agreed to make contributions in foreign currency (£440,000) and in Pakistani currency equal to £9,850,000. The Indus Waters Treaty provided broad terms for future cooperation between Pakistan and India, and it was hoped that the two countries would sincerely initiate concerted efforts towards a peaceful settlement of their disputes, but the hope has yet to materialise.

8. Ibid. p.16
These financial commitments on the part of the United States and her allies won Pakistan's gratitude, and helped to provide the United States with an opportunity to enhance its standing and influence in Pakistan. Pakistan as such was increasingly drawn within the American sphere of influence, and its alignment with the West was further entrenched. Pakistan's affiliation with the West projected predominantly by India, and carefully exploited to her advantage. India increasingly utilized Pakistan and her alignment with the West.

Considerable economic progress was achieved in Pakistan, although the socio-economic problems facing Pakistan have scarcely been so vast and complex as those of India, it is perhaps not surprising that Pakistan should have sought to strengthen its position in the 1950's by securing economic assistance from the United States.

To India this seemed to threaten the delicate structure of her version of non-alignment which India was endeavouring to build and as such its immediate reaction was to wriggle out of its international commitment vis-a-vis a fair and free plebiscite in Kashmir.

India endeavoured to maintain a balanced foreign policy between the Soviet Union, the United States and China. But this was interpreted by the United States as being contrary to its global interests but in line with the foreign policy
objectives of China and the Soviet Union.

On 17th October, 1949, the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawahar Nehru stated: "Inevitably she had to consider her foreign policy in terms of enlightened self-interest, but at the same time she brought to it a touch of her idealism.... The main objectives of that policy are: the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major powers, but through an independent approach to each controversial or disputed issue." 10

India was determined to pursue an independent neutralist policy, but the United States continued to look for opportunity to extend its influence in India. The 'Point Four' agreement was signed with India in December 1950. Mr. Chester Bowles was sent in October 1951, to appraise the Indian situation and to offer generous assistance for India's First Five Year Plan.

In 1951 a mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed between India and the United States, which enabled India to receive some military assistance from the United States without any of the corresponding obligations that devolved on aligned States. In the beginning of 1952, another Agreement was signed for the establishment of an Indo-American Technical

Co-operation Fund, with further advances over a period of five years, totalling $250 million.

In the middle 1950's increasing influence was being exerted by the United States on the countries along the 'defensive perimeter'.

India, however, resolutely resisted the overtures from the United States, and firmly rejected all the allurements and refused to join the United States in its scheme of defensive arrangements. The United States became weary of Indian tactics and doubted its neutralist stance. Thus in August 1953, the United States openly opposed the inclusion of India in the proposed political conference on Korea. Secretary of State John Foster Duller made no secret of his displeasure and termed non-alignment as 'immoral'. According to the United States News World Report of 24th January 1954, Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, tended to favour military aid to Pakistan as a counter to the confirmed neutralism of India under Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru.

The United States took some time before it realised that India was not prepared to get involved with the U.S. in its Asian strategy; and just as, after the Communist victory in China, Japan had replaced China as one of the pillars of its Asian policy, so Pakistan was to replace an India unprepared
to give its allegiance to the United States' global objectives.

This throws some very interesting light on the Indian version of a neutralist foreign policy, its posture on non-alignment and the pursuit of its idealism complied with its national interest within the field of international relations. Some critics termed it as alignment with both the Super-Powers.

"Post-war nationalism and anti-colonialism, and the pressing problems of economic under-development, are the background circumstances in which non-alignment has flourished. These are, however, features shared by all Afro-Asian countries, including those which are aligned. While each has a strong influence toward non-alignment, clearly each can be more than offset by strong pressures in the direction of alignment". 

According to Burton in the broadest terms, non-alignment is encouraged by whatever factors contribute to the widespread if not universal desire of nations for independence, and by whatever current advantages there happen to be in non-involvement in the conflicts of others; and alignment occurs when defence and related national interests that require foreign assistance are sufficient to more than offset these non-alignment influences. Defence pacts, alliances and non-alignment are resultant of these two sets of forces simultaneously.


12. Ibid., pp.169-206
President Sukarno in Belgrade in 1961 stated: "Every nation, without exception, basically desires such a policy, knows that it could help preserve world peace by the adoption of such a policy. But the possibility of conducting a policy on non-alignment depends not upon desires alone. It may be because of historical background, because of the immediate national interest, because of the geographical positions, many countries do not have the opportunity, or even the capacity, to conduct a policy of non-alignment." 13

More powerful countries can impose alignment on weaker ones by the forced installation of a particular government e.g., Germany, Korea were divided, and that it was more than a mere coincidence that the Western sectors supported the Western policies and Eastern sector governments favoured the Eastern Block policies. They did not choose and they did not favour alignment. In addition, the occupying power ensures alignment by creating institutions and governments which are likely to favour alignment. * Alignment is neither imposed nor is it a consequence of imposition; it is a deliberate response by a nation to a set of circumstances which, in the view of its leaders, compel it to seek the protection and active diplomatic, economic and military support of another Power. But in the case of Eastern Europe, Afghanistan and El Salvador alignment seems to have been imposed. Pakistan is an interesting example of a Cold War alliance which had little to do with the

* According to Burton

Cold War. As a matter of fact the forces operating in the direction of non-alignment have been as strong upon Pakistan as on any other nation. Pakistan has always been regarded as intensely anti-colonial, nationalistic, and unconvinced regarding the merits of the conflict between the Great Powers.

The socio-economic, historical, cultural and religious affinities with the Middle Eastern countries, and relations with China and the Soviet Union on the one hand and with the West on the other, would seem to make Pakistan a classical case for non-alignment. But in 1954 and 1955 Pakistan went out of its way to align itself with the United States and its allies. This was done in spite of the opposition in the Constituent Assembly and in certain parts of Pakistan. The reason for this alignment could be ascribed to Pakistan's general defence problems, especially in view of the Indian hostility to Pakistan which led to Pakistan having common borders with Afghanistan, China, Iran, India and Burma, but left the defence industries with India. In addition the nature of Pakistan created more problems for the nascent state. Initially no nation was prepared to offer support, especially in view of their vested interests in India. But in 1953 John Foster Dulles and the Eisenhower Administration were looking for clients for their scheme of alliances against communist subversion and expansionist designs. Pakistan was considered an ideal bulwark against communism, especially in view of its Islamic identity. Pakistan's leaders were led to believe that
such an alignment would not only provide them with much needed economic and military aid but full moral and diplomatic support for their case regarding the disputed territories of Jammu and Kashmir.

The alignment of Pakistan as such had very little to do with the Cold War; Pakistan wanted to involve other countries in its defence against a non-aligned nation, as a means of obtaining economic aid and badly needed military equipment, and as a remedy to the isolation from which its leaders were suffering after the assassination of Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951.

Pakistan's alignment proved unstable and untenable even counter-productive since the non-aligned nations could obtain similar, if not better, benefits without in any way having to sacrifice their freedom of action vis-a-vis the Cold War. The causes of alignment are multifarious and do not necessarily relate to the struggle for power being waged in the leading nations; and one should not associate ideological conflicts with that struggle. Alliances and alignments emanate out of pre-conceived ideas regarding the attitude and behaviour of nations, out of subjective expectations, long-standing disputes and enmities coupled with traditional fears or out of internal unrest which cannot be contained by the people who are at the helm of the affairs.

Most, if not all, of these reasons could very well explain
Pakistan's urge to align itself with the West during the 1950's, and once the realities of the situation had been realised and Pakistan had been rebuffed by her allies then the Pakistani leadership began to reassess and re-evaluate its foreign policy. Pakistan also realised that non-alignment in the prevailing power-politics had a wider significance than its relations to the Cold War. The non-aligned nations were of the opinion that as such their own security was not threatened; and that they were fully capable of defending themselves without external help or intervention. This supposition, however, has, at times, been invalidated in the light of events which have taken place since the end of the Second World War. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1956, 1967 and 1973 are cases in point.

Pakistan's relations with India have been marred by the crucial problems inherent in the basic conception of the partition of the sub-continent. The Hindu leadership clearly deemed the Pakistan scheme and the partition to be a vivisection of 'Mother India' to which they would never be a party. Mr. Acharya Kriplani, as President of the Indian National Congress in 1947, declared: "Neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a united India." 14 Congress asserted that if Pakistan ever became a reality they would do their best to make it economically unworkable and exert every effort towards its total


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collapse and ultimate end"....in effect they said, "Well if the Muslims want Pakistan, let them damned well have it and with a vengeance. We shall shear every possible inch of her territory so as to make it look silly and to ensure that it is a viable country and when they have got what's left we'll ensure that it can't be worked economically," Hindus preached "Akhard Bharat" and the Congress had accepted partition in anguish and in anger. They were frustrated in their designs of a united India and were shocked at having failed to rejuvenate the Maurayan or Ashoka Empire. They were bitterly disappointed at the non-fulfilment of their dreams of being a great power of the future: "...India will inevitably exercise an important influence ... also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in South East Asia and right up to the Middle East. Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part of the world which is going to develop rapidly in the future.... The small national state is doomed. It may survive as a culturally autonomous area but not as independent political unit."

These principles seemed to be entrenched in the foreign policy of India as an independent state, especially when one reviews its attitude towards smaller neighbouring states such as Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. India seems to have nursed the same designs regarding Pakistan and, therefore, has never hesitated totally to reject policies, and it appears, from the preceding pages, as

if the Congress had calculated to this effect immediately before
the partition and no wonder that only 72 days were earmarked
for the partition. "I agreed to partition as a last resort,
when we should have lost all....Mr. Jinnah did not want a
Pakistan but he had to swallow it. I made a further condition
that in two months time power should be transferred." Indians,
form the very beginning, had thought of dominating the Policies
of Pakistan. "There had been a fair indication of Patel's policy
on this subject in the leading article of today's Hindustan Times.
Ismay drew attention to the relevent extract, which runs as follows:
If there is a settlement between the Congress and the League as a
result of which the Muslim majority areas are allowed to constitute
themselves into separate sovereign States, we have no doubt that
Union will not stand in the way of British establishing contact
with those States. It must be clearly understood, however, that
the Indian Union will consider it a hostile act if there is any
attempt by Britain to conclude any Treaty or alliance involving
military or political clauses." These words clearly indicate
that the Hindu leadership was bent upon treating Pakistan as the
secessionist part of "Mother India" which must be treated as the
Indian sphere of influence. India prided herself as the only
successor to the British Crown in India and has tried hard to
realise this claim. Foreign observers noted this element of
Indian foreign policy at the time of the acceptance of the U.S.
military aid by Pakistan in 1954. "Every conceivable argument

17. Quoted in Kewal L. Painjabi, The Indomitable Sardar, Bombay
1962, p.124 (Quoting Sirdar Patel)
18. Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, p.72
against the offer and Pakistan's acceptance of it was adduced, every device of organized propaganda applied... But what it all amounted to, at the higher levels of the Indian Foreign Office, it can have hardly remained subconscious, was that, in the average Hindu heart even now, years after mutually-accepted partition, Pakistan as an independent state had no real right to exist; she must not devise a foreign policy of her own; her destiny was to be an Indian satellite."^{19}

The former President of Pakistan has stated similar views in his autobiography while discussing the essential features of the Indian foreign policy "At the back of it all was India's ambition to absorb Pakistan or turn her into a satellite". This is further vindicated by India's ready acceptance of the U.S. and Commonwealth military aid (including an "air umbrella") in 1962, when she suffered setback on the disputed McMahon Line. India was not ashamed to have accepted so graciously the very aid for which she had so ruthlessly criticised Pakistan on the pretext that Pakistan had brought the cold war and tension in the area. The irony of it was that India had entered into a "Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement" with U.S.A. in 1951. The agreement was reached through an exchange of letters between Mr. James E. Webb, the Acting Secretary of State, and Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian Ambassador in Washington. On March 7th, 1951, Mr. Webb wrote "The Government of the United States of America understands that the Government of India is prepared..."

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* Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, p.115
to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defence... to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other state." To this Mrs. Pandit replied: "I have now the honour to inform you that the Government of India are in agreement with the terms, conditions and assurances proposed." Pakistan entered into the mutual assistance agreement openly, India satisfied her wishes in a more subtle manner to further shroud her posture of non-alignment. It would not be wrong to suggest here that India took the initiative in stirring up the trouble with the Chinese, "General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated in a secret Congressional testimony made public here today that India might have started the border fight with Communist China."22

The Nehru move against the Chinese in 196223 was calculated to secure massive military and economic assistance from all sides; and as a result India reaped a rich harvest in the shape of western military aid of which the emergency aid alone is reported to have amounted to approximately $120 million. But Nehru also succeeded in creating bigger gulfs between his countrymen and the Chinese who had once been acclaimed as brothers (the Indian slogan: Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai). In essence

21. Ibid., p.874
23. It would not be out of place to suggest here that the Indians were confident at the time that the Chinese would not retaliate in an overwhelming fashion to counter the Indian moves in the area.
his China policy failed him and his non-aligned posture, which had already been described as "alignment with both the super-blocks" and "immoral." G.W. Chaudhury has given a good analysis of Nehru's ambition in South Asia: "Nehru seemed to be sensitive to anything in South Asia of which he was not the architect. India wants to establish a "sphere of influence" in South Asia." For achieving his ambitions to be the inspired and undisputed leader of South Asia, Nehru had set his eyes on Pakistan with a view either to total re-annexation or to re-incorporation in an Indian dominated confederal structure. "As late as 1963, Nehru regarded Pakistan as an area which should be re-incorporated into an Indian dominated confederation." In spite of the Indian Foreign Office's declaration that "Pakistan has come to stay as a viable political and economic entity," it is very difficult to envisage a real change of heart on the part of Hindus and the Indian hierarchy. The former President Ayub of Pakistan explained the Indian concept of "Akhand Bharat" and "Bharat Varsha" in the following lines: "The Indian theoreticians were claiming boundaries from the Oxus to the Mekong.... India was not content with her present sphere of influence and she knew Pakistan had the will.... to frustrate her.... designs. She wanted to browbeat us into subservience. All we wanted was to live as equal and honourable

24. Chaudhury, G.W. Pakistan Relations with India, London, 1968, p.4
26. The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 27.8.1967
neighbours, but to that India would never agree. It was Brahmin...arrogance that forced us to seek a homeland of our own where we could order our life according to our thinking and faith....There was fundamental opposition between the ideologies of India and Pakistan. The whole Indian society was based on class distinction in which even the shadow of a low-caste man was enough to pollute a member of the high caste."\(^{27}\)

The former Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger\(^{28}\) has very lucidly explained and analysed the Indian attitude vis-a-vis the creation of Pakistan. According to him Pakistan's very existence was an affront to Indian nationalists who had, like other leaders of independence movements, dreamed of claiming all the territory ruled by the former colonial power. A Muslim Pakistan was considered by India as a potential threat to its own national cohesion, and the presence of more than fifty million Muslims in India sooner or later could pose serious threat to Indian unity by claiming their own national existence.

In the 1950's and 1960's, the United States, oblivious to the newly emergent countries' absorption with themselves, sought to fit them into its own preconceptions; and accepted Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru's claim to be the neutral moral arbiter of world affairs. The United States failed to perceive that this was precisely the policy by which a weak nation seeks influence out of all proportion to its strength, or that India rarely matched its international pretensions with a willingness to assume risks, except on the sub-continent where it saw itself

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27. Khan, M. Ayub, Friends not Masters p.172
destined for pre-eminence. The United States treated Pakistan merely as an ally with military potential to counter communist subversion or aggression. The United States never realized or, in fact, recognized the fact that the vast majority of Pakistanis considered India to be the real threat, the very country that the United States had enshrined in the pantheon of abstract morality and that in turn the arming of Pakistan was viewed with suspicion and apprehension; and as such was undermining the United States' attempts to find favour with India.

This is the clearest possible exposition of the American aims and objectives within the concept of their global objectives which, unfortunately, the Pakistani leaders failed to perceive; and in a state of fantasy continued to legitimise their policy of alignment till 1965 when they were crudely shaken by the so called 'even-handedness' policy of the United States and its allies. This was deceptive in nature and content, and the practical consequence was to injure and cripple Pakistan, since India received most of its arms either from the Communist nations or from its own well established armouries. The United States seemed to consider the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War as a pretext to disentangle itself to some degree.

Pakistan should have realized the shift in the American policy which was initiated by the Kennedy Administration in 1961. Washington's interest in Pakistan cooled noticeably; verbal assurances of American protection came increasingly to be sub-
-stituted for military hardware.

The United States showered its generosity over non-aligned India, especially after the Sino-Indian border conflict. Pakistan's normalisation of relations with China were suspect in the American eyes; and the Border Agreement in 1963 was received with considerable distaste in Washington. India had not yet disillusioned Americans by its nuclear test and the assumption of authoritarian rule. Emotional ties with the World's most populous democracy remained intact. Large annual aid proportions were proposed by the Administration and passed by the Congress with little opposition.

If India basked in Congressional warmth and was subject to Presidential indifference, Pakistan's situation was exactly the reverse. The irony of it all was the fact that the 'most allied ally' was being crudely rebuffed with a view to nurturing closer ties with non-aligned India.
The Arab countries have generally been sympathetic and friendly towards Pakistan, and its relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan have been particularly good. Pakistan has always supported the Arabs especially with regard to Palestine. However, these relations have been clouded and marred since Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact on September 23, 1955, because the Arab countries especially Egypt considered the Pact contrary to their interests, "Egypt was opposed to joining military alliances sponsored by the west which were contrary to her interests, and was pursuing a policy of neutrality between world blocks ... what was good for Pakistan was not necessarily good for Egypt, and that both countries had their own problems which necessitated a different approach to various problems." The Arabs criticised the Baghdad Pact and expressed concern that it was designed to disrupt and divide the Arab World. These fears may not have been totally unfounded since Pakistan's attitude, as a member of the Pact, during the Suez Crisis in 1956, was confused and illogical; and it would not be wrong to suggest that considerable damage was done to Pakistan's image in the Arab World by the statement of her Prime Minister, Mr. Suhrawardy, on 23rd November, 1956, "The Suez Canal must be cleared as soon as possible and the U.N. must see to it that all hindrances and obstructions are removed. We are beginning to feel the results of its closure, and our economy will be seriously disturbed if the Canal is not cleared soon. Our entire economic policy may well have

Fig. 7
CENTO
Communication Links
to be reorientated to meet the situation. Indeed, there are many countries who, with us, wonder what requirements of military strategy or tactics necessitated the sinking of so many ships in the Canal, thereby adversely affecting the lifeline of so many countries who depend upon it for their trade and their essential supplies." ²

President Nasser viewed this as anti-Egypt and anti-Arab, and rejected Pakistan's earlier offer of a contingent for the United Nations Emergency Forces.

The Arabs were led to believe that Pakistan could not be a genuine friend of the Arabs so long as it remained a partner of both Britain and France, who had committed aggression against Egypt in collusion with Israel. Pakistan managed to salvage some of its lost prestige when Turkey announced on November 29, 1956, that she had recalled her minister Mr. Istinyeli from Israel "Until the Palestine question has been finally settled with Justice." ³ This move was reported to have been successfully initiated by Pakistan intending to recover its position and to strengthen the Baghdad Pact.

On July 14, 1958, the military coup led by General Abdul Karim Qassem ousted Premier Nuri-as-Saeed and his pro-western government in Iraq, and consequently on March 24, 1959, Iraq decided to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact. The withdrawal of Iraq changed the whole complexion of the western oriented defensive arrangements along the

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² Ibid., p. 15231.
³ Ibid.
The Military Revolution (October 27, 1958) in Pakistan was instrumental in changing its attitude towards the defensive pacts, and it was further helped by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, which had labelled these military pacts as "pactitis". As a result a new relationship was initiated between Pakistan and Egypt. The visit of President Ayub to Egypt in 1960, considerably helped to remove the unfortunate misunderstandings between the two countries, and relations have been improving ever since.

The change of government in Pakistan in 1958 was responsible for re-aligning Pakistan's foreign policy. The process of change was gradual and painful. The 'most allied ally' was finding out for itself the cost of alignment and as a result started the process of disentanglement. A considered and authoritative exposition of Pakistan's policy of 'bilateralism' is contained in Ayub's book Friends Not Masters, and in his successor President General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan's address to the Iranian Parliament on 30th October, 1969. Pakistan's prescription of 'Bilateralism' of course
is primarily meant to save itself from getting scorched by the friction between the big powers. It has never been uncommitted in respect of Muslim countries and, as far as can be foreseen, never will be.

Regarding 'Bilateralism' Ayub's argument was very succinct and potent: "I know of no other small country which has the somewhat dubious distinction of having three such mighty neighbours. Now, this location is a source of weakness in physical terms but it could be converted into a source of strength if we could establish normal and mutually acceptable relations with the countries hemming us in. With one of them, India, the prospects of establishing normal relations do not appear to be in sight. We must, therefore, accept the situation of implacable Indian hostility and learn to live with it. Then there is the Soviet Union ... it should be possible to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union by removing her doubts and misgivings. And then there was the People's Republic of China fast emerging as a power to be reckoned with... All we had to do was to convince it of our sincerity and friendly intent." The whole pattern of Pakistan's relations with others required fundamental re-thinking.

Some of the essentials in Pakistan's geographical situation had not been recognised, nor was there a clear concept of the nature of the political compulsions to which Pakistan was being subjected. Therefore, Pakistan was forced by the chain of events to re-assess
and realign its foreign policy, and take appropriate measures with a view to protecting its national interests. Experience had demonstrated that over-commitment to any one power was not in the best interest of Pakistan; and that the interests of great powers were constantly changing and as a result small but over-committed powers found it increasingly difficult to adjust to these changes. Pakistan, therefore, tried to hold a balance in its relations with the major powers on its borders and with the United States. Pakistan did not try to play off one power against another and most certainly did not play on 'both sides of the street'. The small and medium powers can 'best satisfy their legitimate and laudable urge' for making a contribution to the world order by cultivating their small neighbours and by extending co-operation with like-minded nations with a view to lessening their dependence on outside powers.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister Arshad Hussain while commenting on Pakistan's membership of SEATO AND CENTO in the National Assembly on 28th June 1968, stated that Pakistan no longer took any part in the military side of these pacts and attended the Ministerial Council meetings as an observer only. Pakistan had not denounced her connection formally and preferred to let the pacts 'wither on the vine'.

In addition to these defensive arrangements Pakistan's relations with the Arabs, led by Egypt, were being hampered by the existence of very close and friendly understanding and ties between Saudi Arabia

and Pakistan. The two Arab states had basic ideological differences, Saudi Arabia leading the conservatives and Egypt the progressives. In this delicate situation Pakistan had a limited room to manoeuvre between the two feuding factions. Arabia always supported Pakistan in its endeavours to win the Kashmiris their right to self-determination, but Egypt on the other hand followed a neutralist policy; and cultivated very friendly relations with India. Egypt objected to the supply of Pakistani arms to Saudi Arabia, because some of these had found their way to the Yemeni Civil War, in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia were backing the progressives and conservatives respectively.

Consistent with its policy, Pakistan continued to establish closer relations with the Arabs. It signed the Defence Training Agreement with Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1967, under which Pakistan agreed to render technical advice to the Saudi armed forces, and provide training facilities. Relations between Pakistan and Jordan have been very friendly, and Pakistan has extended every possible moral and material help to the Kingdom.

The Islamic Conference at Rabat in 1969, proved that Pakistan enjoyed the status of a friend in the Arab world in spite of the Indian overtures towards the Arabs to weaken pro-Pakistani feelings: "India's foreign policy suffered a humiliating setback today as a consequence of the reports that the Arab world had sided with Pakistan and had excluded India from the Islamic summit conference
Pakistan's relations with Arab countries have been improving considerably since the Indo-Pakistan crisis of 1971. These friendly relations have assumed greater significance, since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, and the consequent use of the oil boycott of the West by the Arabs and the dramatic rise in oil prices. Pakistan imports approximately 90 percent of the oil from the Persian Gulf area including Iran; and the prohibitive rise in oil prices adversely affected Pakistan's balance of payment situation. It could not meet these requirements on its own and in addition it was finding it difficult to finance its development programme since the rising oil and commodity prices resulted in the exaggerated worldwide inflation. During 1974/75 Pakistan received $450 millions from Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms. These countries promised Pakistan further financial assistance and there were reports in the press that the Arab countries were helping Pakistan to buy badly needed armaments (since her major source of supply (U.S.A.) had not given a positive response to repeated Pakistan requests for lifting the arms embargo which was imposed after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan hostilities. Pakistan tried in vain to remind the United States of its treaty obligations especially under the Central Treaty Organization.

The Second Islamic Conference which was held at Lahore provided Pakistan with a splendid opportunity to cement its close relations

with the countries of West Asia and it seems to have succeeded in its endeavours to forge closer collaboration with the World of Islam.

One minor disadvantage of sponsoring the Second Islamic Summit was the lukewarm relations between Iran and Pakistan. It is believed that the late Iranian Ruler wanted Pakistan to ignore Libya and withdraw its invitation to Colonel Qaddafi, the Libyan leader. But Pakistan refused to oblige and as a result the late Shahinshah declined the request to attend the conference personally. Ever since the relations between Pakistan and Iran have remained somewhat cool. Moreover, the Pakistani overtures toward the Arabs, especially the Persian Gulf States, have been suspect in the Iranian eyes, because Iran considered these States and the Persian Gulf as her sphere of influence. From a close study of Pakistan's foreign policy it can be safely deduced that Pakistan intended to seek closer relations with the Arabs and at the same time assure Iran that its intentions were friendly. This was the main purpose behind the late Mr. Bhutto's personal exchanges and visits to Iran. It should further be stressed that Iran cannot feel safe from all the sides, especially when Iran faced difficulties in the Persian Gulf, and an air of mutual distrust prevailed with the Soviet Union in spite of the increased co-operation in the economic fields. Pakistan was trying very hard to keep the delicate balance between its increasing relations with the Arabs and Iran, but this balancing act could come under severe strains if Iran adopted an adventurous policy in the Persian Gulf; or if Iran endeavoured to woo India
over and above Pakistan's interests.

Pakistan's relations with Iran were very good, and both the countries have refrained from interfering in each other's internal affairs, and have shown a good deal of understanding in matters of foreign affairs. Both Pakistan and Iran gained considerably in the socio-economic fields from their common membership of CENTO. The western nations helped the three Muslim participants in developing transportation and communications. A microwave telecommunications network was completed linking Ankara, Tehran and Karachi.

In addition, the CENTO members started work on an all weather road and rail link between the three Asian members. This would have supplemented the already existing rail and road link between Zahidan (the main Iranian town bordering Pakistani Baluchistan) Quetta and Karachi, thus facilitating their mutual cooperation.

Pakistan, Iran and Turkey organised the Regional Cooperation for Development, on July 3-4, 1964, a group "parallel to but outside CENTO". This was intended to promote industrial, cultural and socio-economic cooperation between the three countries. The member countries reached a number of agreements in promoting the development of the organisation. These included a Regional Cultural Institute, a Tripartite Shipping Conference, a Joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and an R.C.D. commercial bank. Pakistan, Iran and Turkey

7. This was never completed.
agreed on joint industrial ventures, and among the products to be produced exclusively in Pakistan were Kraft paper, textile machinery, diesel engines, electrical equipment, aluminium sheets, machine tools, polyester fibres and wires and cables. A joint Iran-Pakistan oil company was to be set up and under the plan "Iran would place a newly discovered oilfield at Pakistan's disposal in return for guarantees that Pakistan would consider Iranian oil as a "domestic" product ... Iran and Pakistan ... hope to reduce - or even eliminate - their dependence on the western countries through a joint venture in exploiting and marketing oil ... The oil field is probably in Baluchistan, the desert province bordering Pakistan, where surveys have been made with very promising results."\(^8\)

The member countries agreed to abolish visas for tourists at the first meeting of the Ministerial Council held in October 1964. The conception of mutual understanding and cooperation between the three Muslim neighbours ushered a new era of political stability into the region. Bearing in mind their enshrined objectives the R.C.D. members kept the organisations' doors ajar for other countries of the West and Southern Asia and also those of South East Asia irrespective of their political alignments. Pakistan is reported to have sounded Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia about participation as equal members in achieving the ends of the organization, in the collective interests of their peoples; but their response had been rather lukewarm because of their political compulsions.

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Iranian policy however changed ever since Iran discovered her economic power which geology has bestowed upon her, and the change in Iranian attitude has special significance for Pakistan which is already being pressed hard by India, Afghanistan and, by proxy, the Soviet Union. During the 1971 war Iran urgently warned India of the consequences if she sought to occupy West Pakistan. Reflecting its fear of a further disintegration of Pakistan, whether due to external subversion or internal fragility, Iran moved quickly to intensify her ties with Pakistan in the wake of the 1971 crisis. The late Shah visited Pakistan on 8th January 1972, and the late Shah paid another visit on 16th-18th January 1973. Iran reacted sharply to the Baluchi insurgency in Baluchistan and cooperated militarily with Pakistan and issued strong warnings. In April 1973 both Iran's late Prime Minister Hoveyda, and her Ambassador in Pakistan Mr. Zelli, affirmed the importance attached by Iran to Pakistan's territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{9} During the late President Bhutto's visit to Iran the following month the late Shah warned that Iran would not remain indifferent to, or oblivious of, any separatist movement in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{10}

Iran was totally dismayed at the event in East Pakistan in 1971 and is reported to have voiced its strong opposition to military action there, but this did not detract her from viewing the fact that India invaded and dismembered Pakistan, and considered it a very dangerous precedent, and which convinced Iran that she had to rely on herself alone and so should other regional states.


\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, 19 May 1973.
A chain of events made Iran come to that conclusion, first the Iranian point of view that America could not act, with any effectiveness, as the world's policeman, second, the withdrawal of British forces from the East of Suez, third the dismemberment of Pakistan and finally the inherent dangers of external and internal subversion in the Persian Gulf and Baluchistan.

It was generally felt in America that the Soviet Union sought to cause trouble in the area - using Iraq as her chosen client and instrument. It was also reported, but strongly denied by both the Russians and Iraqis, that Russia had a sprawling naval facility at Umm Qasr in Iraq and maintains an enlarged and active Indian ocean fleet. As such the Soviet Union seemed to go for the jugular vein, and the Persian Gulf is the oil jugular for America, the West and Japan. Iran was keenly aware of this fact and to dissuade the Russians from any adventurous move, signed a $600 million contract to supply much needed natural gas to the Soviet Union.

To counter any Soviet sponsored subversive move and to protect their independence and territorial integrity the littoral states in the Persian Gulf spent a good deal of their petrodollars on the large scale purchase of arms, and an arms race was in full swing all over the gulf. Saudi Arabia signed contracts worth $600 with the British for the supply of air defence equipment, and was also taking delivery of 50 F.5E's and $350 million worth of French tanks. The Saudi defence bill amounted to one billion dollars annually. Abu Dhabi ordered a squadron of Hawker Hunters and Twelve Mirages, and Oman spent more
than half of her total oil revenues on fighting the insurgent in Dhofar, where Iranian troops were also engaged. Kuwait and United Arab Emirates were also spending millions of dollars on armaments.

It was estimated that by 1980, America, the World's largest oil consumer, would be buying approximately 3.6 billion barrels every year (compared with 2.2 billion barrels in 1972), and other industrial nations would be increasing their oil consumption and as such higher oil imports. The Persian Gulf is the only oil rich region which can meet these requirements, and yet the lifeline that connects the Gulf to the world - the route through the strait of Hormuz, seems very precarious, and can easily be sabotaged by an unfriendly action, and a line of oil tankers can be effectively put out of action. American options would severely be limited so long as it continued to support Israel against the collective Arab World, hence the need for an alternative policeman and the ready appearance of Iran for such a role in the Gulf was an understandable phenomenon. Iran's economy was improving rapidly and the late Shah seemed to be a strong, dependable and a willing ally. Iran's military hardware and muscles seemed to guarantee the free flow of oil to the industrialised world. This in turn would greatly depend on how Saudi Arabia and the other littoral states react to such ambitions, and as to how the Soviet Union views the American and Iranian intentions and interests in the region.

Pakistan's wooing of the Arabs was viewed with some concern by
Iran. Since the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, Pakistan intensified its contacts with the Arabs and the late Mr. Bhutto organised and hosted a large gathering of Islamic Heads of State in Lahore in February 1974, where the status of Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli question figured prominently. The conference was a clear indication that Pakistan intended to pursue its contacts with the Arab States. In particular Pakistan's relations with Libya annoyed the late Shah of Iran, especially the extension of Muammar Qaddafi's stay after the Islamic Summit in Lahore. However, Pakistan and Libya have much in common, apart from the religious ties, each has what other needs: Pakistan has an abundance of human resources and negligible hard currency, while Libya is wealthy from oil revenues and deficient in trained personnel. If Iran, however, continued to distrust some of the Arab States, and latent, and occasionally open, rivalry continued to exist between Iran and some of the Gulf States, the Iranians are likely to frown on any entente between Pakistan and the States of the Persian Gulf. Although Pakistan's cultivation of the Arabs both in the Gulf and to the West should not necessarily damage its close relations with Iran, insofar as this leads to dilution of Pakistani support for Iranian interests in the region, it may be expected to diminish Iran's enthusiasm for ties between Pakistan and Iran.

Iran, however, was not convinced that the region's stability would be enhanced by a weak and dependent Pakistan and as such Iran

tried, for a time to bolster Pakistan's defence needs, which the Indians totally disagreed with. It seemed highly unlikely that Iran had accepted the rationale that India required an overwhelming margin of superiority over Pakistan as a contingency against two pronged war i.e. from Pakistan and China. In addition, Iran deeply distrusted India's intentions in providing trained personnel to Baghdad; and indeed, Iran very much suspected the Soviet links both with Iraq and India.

There were widespread reports that Pakistani pilots and military personnel had begun to replace Egyptians in Libya and that these military advisers were authorised to fly combat missions within the Libyan air space to counter foreign intrusions. This development was logical militarily for both Pakistan and Libya: had similar French made aircraft. Moreover, since the Islamic Summit at Lahore, Libya and Pakistan had established a joint ministerial commission which held its sessions at Tripoli and Islamabad. During their deliberations the Commission agreed to establish a joint bank, a shipping company, an Islamic centre and a publishing house. The two governments also agreed to facilitate the transfer of capital and a mutual exchange of commercial and technical knowhow. Libya also agreed to finance the installation of a fertilizer plant, paper and textile mills in Pakistan. This cooperation between Libya and Pakistan in the socio-economic and political fields is bound to

benefit the peoples of the two countries and strengthen Pakistan's close ties with West Asia and help to neutralise India's preponderance in the region.

As stated earlier Iran was not convinced as yet to the real purpose of the links between India and Iraq; and was worried about the larger strategic implications of close "... politico-military relations between India, Iraq and the Soviet Union. So entangled had the issues of relations between Iran and Iraq and India and Pakistan become that mutual anxiety gave way to mutual recriminations." 13

Recognising the importance of stressing the Islamic dimensions in Pakistan's external relations, the late Mr. Bhutto undertook an extended whirlwind trip of the Islamic Middle East from May 28 to June 1972. Since then Pakistan has been successful in cultivating the Gulf Sheikhdoms, by emphasising the common Muslim heritage, and by providing trained personnel. As a result Pakistan has had a considerable success in consolidating its commercial, political and military relations with West Asia.

Another important development was taking place in the context of the Middle East and Pakistani interests in the region. Libya and Turkey seemed to be drawing nearer to each other after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. Both the countries agreed to a number of joint

industrial projects and to strengthen socio-economic and cultural relations. "Turkey and Libya signed wide-ranging agreements in Ankara that will bring Turkey three million tons of Libyan crude oil this year and initiate joint military and economic projects between the two Moslem countries."¹⁴ Turkey declared her support, for the first time, and demanded the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories. Libya in turn fully supported the Turkish position on Cyprus. This alignment could be of immense significance both to Libya and Pakistan. Libya has a large number of Pakistanis working in the country including military personnel, and according to the Jang International, Turkey had agreed to supply about ¹⁵ six hundred thousand labourers, doctors, engineers etc. Pakistan and Turkey have no points of dissension and both have been cooperating in a number of fields since 1954, and both were engaged in bilateral and multilateral alliances and economic arrangements.


Pakistan recognised the People's Republic of China on 4th January, 1950, and as such became the first Muslim country which chose to establish relations with this newly emergent Communist state; and the two countries exchanged Ambassadors in 1951.

In addition, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Chaudhry Muhammed Zafrullah Khan, in a plenary meeting of the General Assembly held on 25th September 1950, supported the People's Republic of China's claim to its rightful place in the United Nations. This was a logical step in pursuit of Pakistan's foreign policy which was based on national self-interest coupled with its geographical compulsions. Pakistan's proclaimed guidelines of foreign policy were to establish friendly relations with all the countries irrespective of their socio-economic and political ideologies. Pakistan, however, stressed that it would strive to establish closest possible relations with the Muslim countries consonant with its Islamic ideology.

The preservation of territorial integrity and political independence has been an obsession with Pakistan; and its anxieties regarding Indian intentions concerning "Akhard Bharat" have not diminished since the Partition.

Economically, Pakistan found it impossible either to establish
Pakistan and its Northern Neighbours
or maintain a defence machinery which could provide adequate safeguard or effective protection against subversion or external aggression.

Pakistan, therefore, looked for friends who were able, and in fact, ready to bolster Pakistan's economy and capabilities. The United States of America along with its friends and allies wasted no time in enlisting Pakistan and involved it in a number of bilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements e.g. Baghdad Pact (Cento) Seato. Thus Pakistan was actively drawn into the Western system of Alliances against Communist subversion or aggression. But Pakistan joined these defensive arrangements with a view to defending its territorial integrity and political independence against a possible Indian aggression. These divergent interests presented a fundamental clash of aims and objectives amongst the signatories of these defensive arrangements or organisations.

Pakistan's involvement in these pacts drew a sharp criticism from India, displeasure from the Soviet Union, critical statements from Egypt and understandable objections from the People's Republic of China.

According to S.M. Burke China's policy towards Pakistan, in particular, is an object-lesson in how to attain long-term national goals by calm calculation, forbearance, and diplomatic skill. In her durable Prime Minister Chou En-Lai, China enjoyed
the leadership of a "past master of diplomatic finesse." ¹

There is no denying the fact that initially Pakistan, a zealous Muslim country openly expressed its dislike for communism and opted to support the policies of the West which was anathema to the People's Republic of China. But China showed a great deal of patience.

One could also argue that Power politics were involved, and that Pakistan was justified in exploiting the Sino-Indian differences.

At the same time we must not forget that from April 1954, when India signed a treaty with China recognising Tibet as a region of China till the escape of Dalai Lama at the end of March 1959, Sino-Indian friendship was at its apex. Chinese and Indians prided themselves as 'Bhai Bhai' (brothers).

In spite of very close Sino-Indian relations China still succeeded in maintaining the delicate balance, and successfully avoided straining relations with Pakistan, and continued to follow a positive attitude towards Pakistan, although Pakistan was rapidly becoming more and more involved with the West through the various defensive arrangements.

The West considered both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as potentially dangerous countries but China

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¹ Burke S.M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy : An Historical Analysis, O.U.P. London, 1973, p. 213
succeeded in convincing Pakistanis that it was different from the Soviet Union; and when Pakistan decided to accept the American military aid, William Clarke of the Observer reported from Karachi that it was 'most noticeable that Communist China is not regarded as a grave menace, but rather a fellow Asian country dealing with common Asian problems of population, growth, food resources and land reforms.'

The then Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-Lai criticised the formation of Seato but emphasised that the principles of co-existence should apply to China's relations with all Asian countries including Pakistan.

In a farewell message to Ambassador A.M. Raza the Prime Minister Chou En-Lai expressed his sadness and the fact that he felt personally hurt over Pakistan's membership of Seato since he regarded Pakistan as a friend, but added that he fully understood its peculiar circumstances and hoped that it would continue to play a decisive part in bringing peace to the World.

Under the able leadership of Prime Minister Chou En-Lai, China had embarked upon a path which was to end up in further strengthening of socio-economic and political ties with Pakistan in spite of their ideological differences; and China decided to initiate

2. The Observer, 14 March 1954
3. As reported in People's China, 16 October 1954
4. Hindu, 27 November 1954
an era of increased understanding with Pakistan in view of the developing relations between India and the Soviet Union: "If Moscow is trying to tighten its links with India, it is natural that China should examine the possibility of a link with Pakistan."  

Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy made a ten day visit to China in October 1956 and was warmly received by the Chinese leadership including Mao Tse Tung. Chou En-Lai told Pakistani newsmen that, "although Pakistan was a member of Seato, there was no reason why China could not be friendly with it. China and Pakistan had many points in common and, though they differed in some ways the two countries had no conflict of interest." This was a very constructive statement which clearly established the fact that China fully appreciated Pakistan's peculiar disposition within its geopolitical compulsions. China's constructive attitude under Chou En-Lai had made "new history in international relations by giving so broad-minded a lead."  

This point is fully substantiated by the various statements made by the Chinese leadership, especially Chou-En-Lai, who visited Pakistan in December 1956. His views were clearly defined and expressed in a joint communique: "The two Prime

5. Manchester Guardian, 18 December 1955  
6. Dawn, 24 October 1956  
Ministers are of the view that the difference between the political systems of Pakistan and China and the divergence of views on many problems should not prevent the strengthening of friendship between their two countries....they are happy to place on record that there is no real conflict of interests between the two countries."^8

Pakistan was very much impressed by the sincerity of purpose and the constructive attitude of China. Pakistan urged the Government of the United States of America to recognise the realities of the situation and allow China to take its rightful place in the Comity of Nations, but unfortunately the Eisenhower Administration did not see eye to eye with the Pakistani viewpoint and as such rejected Pakistan's plea that China should be recognised. The Americans were not convinced that China had no expansionist or aggressive designs. Their attitude towards China was seriously coloured as a result of Chinese involvement in the Korean War and the fact that China was a Communist country.

Pakistan projected a mature and realistic understanding of international relations which was fully substantiated by subsequent events.

Pakistan's Prime Minister made a remarkable prediction while addressing the National Assembly: "I feel perfectly certain that when the crucial time comes China will come to

The events of 1965 are the living testimony, and proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that China expressed sincere thoughts regarding Pakistan, and in fact, stood by its promises.

This point is fully borne out by Air Marshal (Retired) Asghar Khan in his book "The First Round: Indo-Pakistan War 1965," he made a very pertinent statement: "... we were in a difficult position and needed assistance. I informed the Prime Minister that our immediate requirements were some fighter aircraft and some anti-aircraft guns and ammunition. Ayub Khan was keen that this assistance should be channelled through Indonesia ... Chou En-Lai appeared surprised at the suggestion and said ... would cause unnecessary complications and delay....I then explained the military situation as we saw it and said that we felt that Chinese moves on India's northern borders would help to reduce the pressure against us in West Pakistan... any move by China against India would have certain international implications. It was for them to weigh these... extent to which China could move and the nature of her action was, therefore, a matter for them to determine ....we would, for the present, be satisfied if China concentrated forces on India's borders without any overt military action. Further action could be determined in the light of future military developments. He said that any action that China took would indeed have serious international implications.

implications. China however, was vitally interested in Pakistan's security and could not stand idle whilst we were being attacked....my proposal had such serious implications as to make it necessary for them to discuss things with Ayub Khan.....Chou En-Lai's response had been more positive than we had a right to expect.....I was back in Rawalpindi ... and I briefed Ayub Khan on my visit.....He was not prepared to do this and said that he did not see what useful purpose this would serve.....Ayub Khan.....did not.....for fear of annoying our western allies, meet them until well after the war had ended."  

This was not the first or only instance when the Pakistani leadership seemed to have acted in a feeble and ambivalent manner towards China; the representation of People's Republic of China at the United Nations, the juridical position of Taiwan and the 'Danger from the North' are cases in point.

In 1950 Pakistan voted in favour of China in the General Assembly vote. Consequently on the Korean War, the United States sponsored a draft resolution in 1951 seeking to have China branded as an aggressor in Korea. Pakistan abstained on this resolution. Pakistan again abstained in 1952, when the United States called for the postponement of the considerations of Chinese representations. In 1953 Pakistan voted for the postponement of this question. In 1954 Pakistan joined Seato

and from then on its attitude on the question of China's representation showed scant regard to the real position in China in spite of the fact that Pakistan had itself recognised China in 1950.

In 1957, Pakistan at first abstained from voting on the resolution due to procedural considerations arising from a slight change in the U.S. resolutions, but changed its vote next day in favour of the resolutions blocking China's representation by its legitimate government. It informed the U.N. Secretary General that the previous vote had been incorrectly recorded.

On 22nd September 1958, the Chinese Foreign Office addressed a note to the Pakistan Government which in effect stated that both the Governments had identity of views as Asians on most international issues and yet Pakistan had sided with the United States, and therefore, China would like to know the attitude of Pakistan, as an Asian nation, on the status of Taiwan. Pakistan replied on 1st October 1958 emphasising the point that it had given neither de facto nor de jure recognition to the government in Taiwan and urged that the parties should desist from upsetting the status quo and as such the world peace. By 1959, the policy of supporting the United States on the question of the legitimate rights of People's Republic of China was well established. In 1960, however, Pakistan chose to abstain, and the then Minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources ignored
In 1961, Pakistan voted in favour of the draft resolution to seat the representative of the People's Republic at the United Nations; and a decade later, the representatives of the Chiang Kai-Shek regime were ousted from the world organisation.

In 1958 Pakistan's relations with China were put under great strain; and these deteriorated further in 1959. President Ayub Khan criticised both the Soviet Union and China for having aggressive designs towards the sub-continent, and as such offered joint defence with India against any internal subversion or external invasion. According to President Ayub Khan's thinking, China could move south through Burma and the Soviet
Union could move through Afghanistan and Iran. These moves need not necessarily be military; ideological penetration or installation of Communist backed regimes could achieve the desired objectives. He, therefore, expressed his preparedness to collaborate with India against the possible "aggression from a third party" which meant China and the Soviet Union: "The President, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, yesterday warned that in five years the Pakistan-Bharat sub-continent would become militarily vulnerable to major invasion from the north.... General Ayub Khan said that the invasions would not probably be directed against the bigger segment of the sub-continent Bharat, but Pakistan was also in the way. The President was last evening giving his impressions as a military man of the recent developments in Tibet and Afghanistan, flanking the sub-continent.....the position could be defended if both Pakistan and Bharat dissolved their differences and ceased to face each other with loaded rifles. Pakistan, he said, would very much like to defend Bharat in such an event."^11

President Ayub Khan expressed similar views on November 9th 1959, ".....That Chinese occupation of Tibet and road-building activities in Afghanistan posed a serious threat from the north....."^12

^11. Morning News, Karachi, 24th October 1959
^12. Morning News, Karachi, 9th November 1959
The Boundary Agreement

The dispute concerning the north-eastern boundary of Pakistan was complicated since the final status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is yet to be determined. This sector involved "China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan". The boundary alignment commences in the north-western extremity at Height 5630 metres (a peak, Longitude 74° 34/'E and Latitude 37° 03/'N), generally running towards eastward and then south-eastward along the main watershed between the tributaries of the Tashkurgan and Hunza rivers, and passes through the Kilik, Mintaka, Kharchanai, Mutsjilga and Parpik passes, before reaching the Khunjerab Pass. Then the boundary generally follows southward along the above mentioned watershed up to a mountain-top south of the Khunjerab Pass, leaving the main watershed to follow the Akjilga River, the Taghdumbash (Oprang) River and the Keliman Su (Oprang Jilga). The boundary line then runs up the Kelechin River (Shaksgam or Muztagh) along the middle line of its bed to its confluence with the Shorbulak Daria (Shimshal or Braldu). From the confluence of the Kelechin and Shorbulak rivers, the boundary, according to the Chinese, ascends the crest of a spur and runs along it to join the Karakoram Range main watershed, belonging to the Shorbulak Mountain. According to Pakistan the boundary line from the confluence of Kelechin and Shorbulak rivers, ascends the crest of a corresponding spur and runs along it, passing through Height 6520 meters till it joins the Karakoram Range main watershed. From this
point the boundary runs southward and then eastward following the Karakoram Range main watershed which separates the Tarim and Indus drainage systems, passing through the East Muztagh Pass, Chogri Peak \( (K^2) \), the tops of the Broad Peak, the Gasherbrum Mountain, the Indirakoli Pass and the top of the Teram Kangri Peak, and then reaches its southern extremity at the Karakoram Pass.\(^\dagger\)

The two sides had widely varying claims of territory in the area. According to Pakistan the dispute related to a total area of 3400 square miles. According to the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 2, 1963, Pakistan gained 1350 square miles including 750 square miles which were under the actual control of the Chinese (such as Kuz and Sokh-Bulak). Pakistan also received the Oprang Valley and the salt-mining areas east of the Shimshal Pass. China, according to the Agreement, gained 2050 square miles, especially from the point where the agreed border met the Muztagh River, picking up another crest line and running through the Aghill Pass. However, the Indians claim that Pakistan gave up a total of 13000 square miles but Pakistan firmly rejects the contention. The boundary has since been demarcated on the basis that where there are rivers the boundary runs in the middle of the river beds, and where there are passes or dabans the watershed forms the boundary.

The agreement on border demarcation was considered as

\(^\dagger\) The details of the boundary alignment are based on the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of March 2, 1963.
the first significant step in the evolution of relations between China and Pakistan. Its real purpose was to eliminate a possible cause of conflict in the future. This agreement was followed by the establishment of air communications between Pakistan and China when an air transport agreement was signed in Karachi on 29th August, 1963. It strengthened relations between the two neighbouring countries. Sino-Pakistan trade received further encouragement when a barter agreement was concluded in September 1963.

Pakistan's allies expressed their serious concern and apprehension vis-a-vis its dealings with China and Pakistan's increased interest in Afro-Asian affairs which were basically economic in nature and directed towards the exchange of ideas and experiences.

During this period of time relations between Pakistan and India had deteriorated because of the Indian plans to integrate Kashmir into the Union and because of the communal riots which broke out after the sacred hair of Prophet Muhammed was stolen from Hazratbal shrine near Srinagar on 26th December 1963. During his visit to Pakistan in February 1964 the late Chou-En-Lai declared China's support for the rights of the Kashmiris to decide their own future. A very welcome change in the Chinese attitude within the context of triangular relationship, especially since the Americans had been very lukewarm towards the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.

President Ayub Khan, however, was not that concerned
regarding the Sino-Indian clash in Ladakh; and according to Dawn, Karachi 4th November 1959, he described it as India's problem. According to Morning News, Karachi, 4th November 1959, Ayub Khan simply described it as India's concern, and yet a few days later Ayub Khan talked, in emphatic terms, of the danger from the north and was offering joint defence with India.

There is no denying the fact that there was some truth and foresight in Ayub Khan's utterances as the later events unfolded themselves. How far one can apportion the blame is a matter for conjecture and serious debate. It would not be wrong to suggest that the parties concerned felt genuinely that they were taking measured steps with a view to protecting their interests in the region.

As far as Sino-Pakistan relations were concerned China showed a sense of magnanimity, generosity and astute sense of propriety within the context of international relations in the face of positively negative statements and assertions from the Pakistani leadership.

The relationship between Pakistan and China has withstood the vagaries of time. Its strength lies in their common interest i.e. India. Although it has been suggested that the ideologies of Pakistan and China were incompatible, and that a
friendly working arrangement cannot, therefore, be sustained between them. It was further argued that Pakistan's relations with China, being of a subjective nature, will be unable to withstand the stress and strains of time since the predominant reason of their relationship was based upon the maxim 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'; a relationship based upon tenuous and feeble arguments. And as such could be described as untenable assumptions. States deal with states, as such, and not with their social systems and ideologies. There is no denying the fact that since the very inception of Pakistan the various Governments have stressed the need and desire to establish closer links with the Islamic World but at the same time all the Governments have emphasised the need to develop and foster friendly relations with all states, especially its neighbours.

If the preceding argument were to be pursued to its logical conclusion, Pakistan should have friendly relations only with Muslim states and as such isolate itself from the rest of the world, knowing full well that Islam, as a political force suffered more at the hands of Christendom than any other ideology. It was the Christian nations which held almost all Muslim states under imperial bondage for centuries, destroying their socio-economic and cultural fabric to such an extent the world of Islam is still in the process of recovering from the damage inflicted.

Pakistan's relations with China were put under some strains
during the crisis in its former province East Pakistan (Bangladesh), during 1971. China did not talk in terms of safeguarding Pakistan's territorial integrity and political independence but was content with emphasising the need for preserving Pakistan's sovereignty and political independence; and this practically meant that China was only interested in the unity of West Pakistan (present boundaries of Pakistan). China could not support a repressive military regime against a revolutionary movement. China, however, emphatically condemned the Indian military intervention which eventually led to the dismemberment of Pakistan in December 1971.

The emergency military aid for India was agreed upon between Kennedy and MacMillan on 29th December, 1962, at Nassau. Pakistan expressed its serious concern and protested that the Americans had resiled from their understanding to consult Pakistan before initiating any military assistance to India. Pakistan received a bigger shock on 30th June, 1963 when Kennedy and MacMillan agreed to extend long-term military aid to India, during their meeting at Birch Grove, Sussex.

The Sino-Soviet split in 1958 opened various avenues for China to improve relations with Pakistan. These overtures received further boost when India and China clashed in the Ladakh Region, and later during the Sino-Indian border conflict in October 1962.

India continued to receive military hardware from the
Soviet Union during this conflict. In addition, India received substantial military aid from Pakistan's main ally i.e. the United States. The "most allied ally" was left out in the cold.

The Indo-Soviet Treaty of August 1971 was very crucial in this pentangular equation and world power-politics. This enabled the Indians to dismember Pakistan in December 1971, and established the fact that the Indo-Soviet relations had deeper roots than the foreign policy makers in Islamabad had either envisaged or calculated. Pakistan's allies had once again reneged on their treaty obligations. China was obliged to stay out of the hostilities and its support was visible only in the political, moral and diplomatic fields. China was unable to help Pakistan militarily for the fear of Russian retaliation in the Aksai-Chin border region. Whereas the Indo-Soviet cooperation established its credibility and reinforced the logicality of balance of power in terms of regional power-politics.

The triangular relationship between China, India and Pakistan as such ought to be studied, examined and analysed within the context of regional alignment than cold war alignment or in the context of global balance of power. This relationship, in the future, is likely to be determined by the logic of local and regional geopolitical compulsions than cold war power-politics.
Boundary Agreement

U.S.S.R. - China

JAMMU & KASHMIR (Disputed Territory)

Pakistan - India

AFGHANISTAN - Durand Line

INDIA
Since 1971 a modified policy of alignment has emerged in Sino-Pakistan relations, impressed partially by the logic of great-power relationships. India's close ties with the U.S.S.R. and the Sino-Soviet rift have created a situation where Pakistan and China are logically close in terms of a regional balance of power. It is this, given the previous history of Sino-Indian differences and the foundations laid by Chou-En-Lai, which has enabled the relationship to survive various changes of leadership both in Islamabad and Peking, as well as the strengthening of China's ties with the United States.

Pakistan's relations with China, it could be argued, should be understood as an essential part of power-politics as practised by the five nations involved in this pentangular balancing act; from the global point of view, it could also be described as a triangular balance of power from the regional point of view. The Soviet Union is very much tied to the Indians because of the size, resources and geographic position of India. Soviet union has very serious ideological and boundary differences with China.
Pakistan and The Soviet Union

Pakistan's relations with its mighty neighbour the Soviet Union were bedevilled by its membership of the Western sponsored military pacts. The Soviet Union very severely criticised and resented Pakistan's participation in these pacts, and went as far as to question the very existence of Pakistan. Mr. Nikita Khruschev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on December 10, 1955, at Srinagar, Kashmir, stated: "It made us very sad when imperialistic powers succeeded in bringing about the division of India into two parts ... we are absolutely convinced that, when passions have calmed down and people realise the significance of such an artificial division of India, they will regret it ... The present Government of Pakistan openly profess its close ties with American monopolistic circles. They were among the first to initiate the notorious Baghdad Pact. We do not like the Baghdad Pact at all, but we are patient and confident that it will burst like a soap-bubble ... we should very much like to have friendly relations with Pakistan, it is no fault of ours if such relations have not developed."¹

The Baghdad Pact (Central Treaty organisation) was essentially a defensive arrangement of non-aggressive nature designed to forestall any internal subversion or external aggression, especially from the Soviet Union.

¹. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Bristol, p. 14604.
But the pro-Western stance of Pakistan proved very expensive for it since the Soviet Union ignored Pakistan's geopolitical compulsions, in supporting Afghanistan over Pakhtumistan (since Pakistan joined the former Baghdad Pact) and India (over Kashmir and East Pakistan - 1955, 1965 and 1971) with whom Pakistan had territorial frictions and politico-ideological differences. The acceptance of the 'gospel of coexistence' by the United States and the Soviet Union ushered in a new era of relative understanding between Pakistan and the Soviet Union; and as a result the two countries signed the oil exploration agreement in October 1961, under which the Soviet Union advanced a loan of $3 million for a period of 12 years, at 3½ per cent interest. The loan was to be utilised for the purchase of machinery for oil exploration by Pakistan. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to utilise the repayments for the purchase of textile/farm products from Pakistan. Unfortunately this development took place after a lot of water had passed under the bridge since June 2, 1949 when the U.S.S.R. invited the then Prime Minister of Pakistan to visit Moscow. (Liaquat Ali Khan had accepted the invitation but the whole matter fizzled out when Pakistan declined the exchange of Ambassadors on the pretence that Pakistan had a 'shortage of personnel' (Dawn, Karachi, 9-6-1949.). While Moscow's invitation was spurned, a later invitation from Washington was promptly accepted. This fence was not mended for quite some time, and by the time the relations between the two states seemed to be on the mend the international scene had undergone a considerable transformation, and Pakistan had experienced many changes.
of government during that period of time.

These contradictions\(^2\) in Pakistan's foreign policy surfaced not only vis-a-vis great powers but also the Islamic states. On the one side, with Pakistan's leadership campaigning against the dismemberment of Palestine in 1947, and undying support for the Arab cause; on the other, Pakistan adopted a policy of dither and equivocation over the Suez Canal in 1956.

These are but a few outstanding examples of the kind of thinking that governed Pakistan's foreign policy, and none could be ascribed to an objective concern with security.

The Pakistan-India War of 1965, provided the Soviet Union with a good opportunity to exert influence on the two neighbours, which resulted in the signing of the Tashhent Declaration of 1966. "Mr. Kosygin expressed the Soviet Government's profound satisfaction that the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India were meeting in order to establish direct contact with a view to improving relations and eliminating the conflict between India and Pakistan ... We regard this ... a turning point in the relations between India and Pakistan ... to strengthen friendship between India and the Soviet Union, between India and Pakistan, and between Pakistan and the Soviet Union."\(^3\)

\(^2\) These contradictions were basically due to the everchanging complexion of Pakistani leadership and their understanding, or the lack of it, of the international political scene.

\(^3\) Keesings Contemporary Archives, Bristol, pp. 21187-89.
For a better understanding of the Soviet position it is desirable to study in some detail the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union in South Asia and South-West Asia. The Soviet boundaries in Asia for a time were relatively calm and stable as compared with its European boundaries. The relative success of Soviet policy in Central Asia has mainly been due to (a) the Nationalities policy of the Soviet Union and (b) the methodical application of modern technology to Soviet Middle Asia and Southern Siberia.

The Asian U.S.S.R. borders on Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and China (Pakistan and the U.S.S.R. have no common borders). Soviet policy towards Turkey embodied elements of hostility, and as such it was considered as a stumbling block in the path of Soviet approaches to the Mediterranean and a possible enemy base (Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the subsequent refusal of the United States to supply arms to Turkey did bring a measure of understanding between the Soviet Union and Turkey; and the tension between Turkey and Greece seemed to have enabled this understanding to flourish apparently to the detriment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation).

Iran also poses the same problems to the Soviet geostrategic interests in the area since it is interposed between the U.S.S.R. and the Indian Ocean by way of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.
The Soviet Union borders Iran both in South Caucasus and in Central Asia, and shares with it the navigation of the Caspian Sea. Iran has as such survived as a buffer state in spite of her weak defences, merely because of the fact that the situation suited both the Soviet Union and the British interest, at a point in time, in the area (American interests have largely replaced purely British interests). Moreover, this constituted a major element in the Soviet concept of realism as against Utopian precepts. Whenever and wherever the two came into clash, it seems, the forces of nationalism triumphed and prevailed. With a view to safeguarding their special interests in the area both the Soviet Union and Britain carved their respective 'spheres of influence' and in 1941 the two Powers occupied their respective zones when German intervention in Iran was threatened. In fact, Iran served as a good supply route to the Soviet Union during the Second World War and the Allied Powers very effectively used this route to fight the Germans who had penetrated the Soviet heartland. At the end of the war the Soviet Union was very reluctant to vacate the occupied zone in northern Iran by the agreed date of March 2, 1946, because she had her eyes set on the oil wealth of Iran. Iranian (Azerbaijanz) Azerbaijan is an important centre geostrategically and commands roads into Turkey and Iraq, and is linked by a line to Jolfa. Tabriz is also a vital link in the communications complex.

The Soviet Union tried to establish more cordial relations with Iran, in spite of the Iranian connections with the Central Treaty
Organisation; and their endeavours seemed to have met with a certain amount of success, although the basic suspicions were never removed and the atmosphere of mutual distrust still prevailed.

Three of the Soviet Central Asian Republics e.g. Turkmen, Uzbek and Tadzhik adjoin Afghanistan, which, as a semi independent state, acquired international prominence in the late 19th century. This landlocked country commanded chief landward approach to the subcontinent. Since there are no ports in Afghanistan, the usual port for consignments destined for Afghanistan is Karachi, Pakistan. The trading highway runs via Herat, Kabul and Nandahar, to the gateways of the subcontinent and still possesses its geostrategic significance. In 1893 the Durand Line was agreed upon as the line of demarcation, and Russia accepted this region as the 'British Sphere of Influence'.

A close study of the north western frontier of Pakistan would clearly establish that its significance lies in the fact that it contains the important Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, Gomal and Bolan Passes (Peshawar, Bannu and Quetta have served as effective and useful military encampments for the defence of these strategic points), and these passes provide the only viable overland link between Pakistan and the rest of Asia. Almost all past invasions of the Indus Valley and the plains of India beyond have come through these passes; the strategic points the defence of which now devolves on Pakistan. To the east of the Indus there is no physical barrier of any significance to check the advance of the invading armies.
until the Burmese frontier is reached. The control and defence of these passes is, therefore, of absolute importance to the security of Pakistan.

Even more important than these frontier passes of Pakistan are the passes of the Hindu Kush in Afghanistan and as such the Hindu Kush is a much stronger proposition and an effective barrier against any hostile force from the north than are the frontier foothills of the Pak-Afghan border. The undemarcated frontier between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in the Wakhan region does not pose much problem simply because of the mountainous and difficult terrain of the forbidding Pamirs and the lofty Hindu Kush. However, the control of the passes in the Hindu Kush range can give a hostile power a strong offensive advantage (this point has clearly been vindicated by the Chinese offensive in the North East Frontier Agency in 1962). Therefore, it has been the aim of both the defenders and invaders of the subcontinent to control the Hindu Kush and as such the routes which connect Afghanistan with the Soviet Union or Central Asia on the one hand and with Pakistan on the other.

After the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 the defence of the north-western marches became the primary concern of Pakistan. In spite of the fact that the Pakistan - Soviet territories are only 25 miles apart in this area, their proximity cannot be given importance similar to Soviet Tadzhikistan, Kirghizia and Kazakhstan bordering Chinese Sinkiang (Aksai-Chin) which in turn
borders Pakistani held Kashmir and controls the new all weather road (the old silk route), linking China and Pakistan.

It must be emphasized here that the Soviet interests in this borderland have not diminished, and in fact, since the Tashkent Declaration of January 1966, these interests have manifestly increased. These interests have been projected in a variety of ways, and as the first link in the chain of policy manoeuvres the idea of Brezhnev's so-called 'collective security' was floated. Pakistan had no hesitation in rejecting the idea because it viewed it as an anti-China campaign, and as a friend of the Chinese Pakistan could not possibly enter into such an arrangement.

The Indo-Soviet "Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation" was the second most important link in the chain and it further demonstrated the Soviet interests in the area, "Russia will back India with force if necessary in the event of War with Pakistan under a 20 year treaty, signed in New Delhi yesterday, that put India firmly in the Russian camp after years of non-alignment . . . If India were attacked, there would be immediate consultation with the Russians to remove the threat and "to take appropriate effective measures" to counter it. Clearly, then, in the event of an Indo-Pakistan war, Russia might wage war on Pakistan . . ." The Treaty was signed in a very hurried manner, "After several blunt statements by . . . Pakistan threatening to go to war with India,

Delhi sent the former Ambassador Mr. Dhar back to Moscow. Mr. Gromyko forthwith flew to Delhi and signed the treaty within a few hours.\textsuperscript{5} Article 9 of the Treaty stipulates, ".... In the event of either party being subjected to attack or threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations with a view to eliminate this threat and taking appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and security of their countries."\textsuperscript{6}

Immediately after the entry of Indian forces in East Pakistan both the Soviet Union and India had made direct contact with each other, and as soon as the Indian forces were engaged in war on 3rd December 1971, in West Pakistan, India despatched Mr. D.P. Dhar to Moscow and the Soviet Union sent a senior representative (Mr. Kuznetsov) to Delhi to coordinate action against Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. These two diplomats remained at their respective posts during the whole duration of the war. This was an active Soviet participation in coordinating her anti-Pakistan policy with India. The Western press had already forecast this policy. The Guardian correspondent Inder Malhotra wrote, "India and the Soviet Union today signed a treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation under which Russia has virtually underwritten Indian defence in the event of an attack by Pakistan with or without connivance, support, or encouragement by China."\textsuperscript{7}

The contents of the Treaty also shed light on the Indian concept of non-alignment and foreign observers were of the view that "Taking

\textsuperscript{5} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{6} Keesings Contemporary Archives, p. 24773.

\textsuperscript{7} The Guardian, August 10, 1971.
the world by surprise, India today discarded her policy of non-alignment and entered into a formal alliance with the Soviet Union."\textsuperscript{8} However, India rejected these interpretations and firmly stated her position to the contrary, "Mrs. Gandhi similarly emphasized on August 9 that the Indo-Soviet treaty did not represent a reversal of India's policy of non-alignment."\textsuperscript{9} These denials and firm rejections by India that she had entered into a formal defence alliance with the Soviet Union were not taken seriously by Pakistan, and the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971 substantiated Pakistani point of view.

The Soviet Union as a 'continental' and 'oceanic superpower' is bound to avail itself of any opportunity which might strengthen her hold in South Asia and her eyes are specially trained on the south-western coast of Pakistan.

This would be of greater temptation to the Soviet Union in the event of further dismemberment of Pakistan, "Russia's plans to isolate Pakistan continue to prosper. As a result of her alliances with Iraq and India she is both increasing her pressure on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and also tightening the encirclement of China. It was the pact with India in 1971 that gave Mrs. Gandhi the green light to intervene in East Pakistan ... Pakistan was cut down to half its former size, and pro-Indian,

\textsuperscript{8} The Times, August 10, 1971.

\textsuperscript{9} Keesings Contemporary Archives p. 24773.
pro-Russian Bangladesh was created...problems in residual Pakistan have been exacerbated by subversion from Afghanistan with full Russian support. The aim here was the familiar one of trying to detach much of the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan to form a separate state of Pakhtoonestan...This is the background against which America, after much heart-searching, decided to lift the ten year old embargo on arms for both Pakistan and India."  

Security and development have been the principal objectives of Pakistan's foreign policy, and the requirements of defence were further complicated because of the truncated nature of the state as it emerged in 1947.

Pakistan's resources were limited and for the preservation of its territorial integrity and political independence Pakistan readily accepted the hand of friendship and the bond of alignment as offered by the United States and its allies.

This alignment annoyed the Soviet Union and its friends in India. China was not very happy regarding Pakistan's membership of either Cento or Seato but expressed its understanding in view of Pakistan's geopolitical compulsions.

Pakistan made it abundantly clear that its alignment with the West was dictated by its security requirements especially against a possible Indian aggression. In this Pakistan failed to convince either its western allies or the Soviet Union. The Americans never committed themselves to helping Pakistan against Indian attack, and the events since 1954 have

validated the main line of argument.

In this pentangular equation the objectives of the Soviet Union have been vague and dubious especially with regard to Pakistan. And on the whole Soviet policy has been barren of ideas, and the notion that the collapse of Pakistan would open the door to the Persian Gulf seem to be fanciful. But one cannot deny the fact that Russia has always fancied a direct access to the Arabian Sea, and their advance through Afghanistan and Pakistani Baluchistan would not only realise their age old dream of direct access to the Warm Waters and protect their soft under-belly but at the same time give them the strategic advantage regarding the Persian Gulf.

But how the Americans are likely to react to such a Russian advance in this strategic area is the real imponderable.

The Soviet policy towards Pakistan has largely been dictated by its relations with India, and it seems that in this the Russians are tied hand and foot to India. The Soviet Union has no real policy towards Pakistan and has tended to react within the context of its relations with India and China.
The emergence of Pakistan warranted adequate economic and
defence requirements to withstand the imperatives of independ­ence. Pakistan, therefore, looked for external assistance to
build up the social overheads and provide initial outlay; to
this the United States responded generously. The foundations of
friendly relations between the two countries were laid by
Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, during
his three and a half weeks State visit to the United States in
1950. These relations were further cemented in 1954 when the
two countries signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement
under which the United States agreed to supply Pakistan with
military assistance to maintain its territorial integrity and
political independence. Pakistan and the United States were also
signatories of the Manila pact, which stabilised the South East
Treaty Organisations in 1954. Pakistan also signed the Baghdad
Pact (Central Treaty Organisation) in 1955, but the United
States was not a member of this and only attended the various
meetings as an observer. These close ties were further strengthened
and consolidated in 1959, with the signing of the Unilateral
Agreement of Co-operation, which was designed to reinforce the
defensive of the Central Treaty Organisation (seriously questioned
by the late President John F. Kennedy. As a Senator, Kennedy had
already shown his unhappiness over what he considered to be the
neglect of India, which, in his estimation, occupied a pivotal
importance in the American strategy of containing Communism in Asia).
Before the Sino-Indian clash in Ladakli in 1959, however, Kennedy was not prepared to support India at the expense of alienating Pakistan, "... our special and valued treaty relationships and military pacts with Pakistan do not make possible such an international effort for India... I have regretfully concluded that the current political cleavages between India and Pakistan do not allow such a programme .... "¹ Regarding military pacts Kennedy reiterated on 9th February, 1959, that they: "... provide no long term solutions. On the contrary they tend dangerously to polarize the Middle East, to attach us to specific regimes, to isolate us very often from the significant nationalist movements. Little is accomplished by forcing the uncommitted nations to choose rigidly between alliance with the West or submission to international Communism .... "² These words were fully justified and validated regarding Pakistan's alignment with the West. This is the end proved to be counter-productive, especially in view of the fact that when Kennedy assumed Presidency of the United States he was in a position to implement his ideas, and put his plan into practice. The value of military bases and alliances was greatly reduced by the sophisticated and advanced military technology. These developments, among others, were largely responsible for the shift in emphasis from military support to enhanced economic co-operation.

It would not be inappropriate to suggest, that the Military

   (The speech was originally delivered before the Senate on 25.3.1958
   ². Ibid., p.122
Coup in Pakistan in 1958 marked the end of one era and the beginning of another. There is no denying the fact that the Ayub Regime made some confusing and often contradictory statements, but Pakistan's foreign policy was gradually being forged on a neutralist basis. Ayub's well known statement: "Also, I think the United States did not quite realize the extent to which the people of Pakistan would be prepared to accept economic distress and hardship for the sake of honour and integrity of their country. People in developing countries seek assistance, but on the basis of mutual respect; they want to have friends and masters. We knew of the U.S. relationship with China but the U.S., too, must recognize our political and geographical compulsions." ³

It was only after Pakistan's compulsions were appreciated and understood by the United States that relationship was re-established on the basis of new understanding i.e. Pakistan's relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union did not mean that Pakistan was going into the Communist fold or orbit with all its concomitants of military alliances or arrangements: "People in Pakistan were becoming disillusioned; a relationship which had been built up after a great deal of hard work during the fifties was ceasing to command respect....." ⁴ The late President Ayub analysed the international scene in a very succinct manner: "The shock of the conflict and the Indian defeat had altered India's

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4. Ibid., p.158
The shift in India's orientation was, for the United States, one of major importance. India had been forced to review her political philosophy in the realm of international affairs. Also, there were indications that the Soviets and the Chinese had had profound differences. There was a definite shift in international relations and foreign policies were re-shaped and re-aligned.

The late President Ayub stated in his Autobiography "Friends not Masters" that from Pakistan's point of view the rational and pragmatic approach in its foreign policy made it imperative on Pakistan to establish normal relations with the four major powers involved in Asia without antagonizing any one of them. Pakistan endeavoured to set up bilateral equations with each one of them, with the clear understanding that the nature and complexim of the equation should be such as to promote mutual interests without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of third parties. The relations between the two countries took a sharp turn in September-October 1962, when the United States supplied India with massive military aid as a result of the Sino-Indian conflict along the NEFA borders and the Ladakh-Aksai Chin areas. Pakistan "a friend of immediacy and constancy" was deeply disturbed and felt ignored; a relationship which had been developed after a good deal of hard work during the fifties was losing respect. The United States had agreed that Pakistan would be informed and

5. ibid; pp. 159-160
and consulted before any such assistance was extended to India "the assurance given by President Kennedy to me that Pakistan would be consulted before any decision was taken on the question of giving arms to India".* More important still, Pakistan argued that these arms would be used against her rather than China; a point which was vindicated in September 1965, when India crossed the international boundary in the Lahore sector, threatening the very existence of Pakistan. The United States had publicly assured Pakistan that "The Government of the United States ... has similarly assured the Government of Pakistan that if our assistance to India should be misused and directed against another in aggression the United States would undertake immediately ... appropriate action both within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression." 6 These assurances public and private were of no consequence as far as India was concerned since it used these weapons against Pakistan. During the undeclared war of September 1965, between Pakistan and India, the United States assumed a neutral position and immediately stopped the military aid to both the belligerents. Pakistan vehemently resented the American policy of "equal treatment" since it was aligned with the United States through various pacts. The Americans argued that they were under obligations to help Pakistan only in the case of communist aggression. This argument may be accepted as half-truth since there is such

* ibid.

6. State Department Release, 17.11.1962. ibid., p. 145
a stipulation in the Manila Treaty of 1954, as the "understanding" of U.S.A. "The United States in executing the present Treaty does so with the understanding of its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack.... apply only to communist aggression....". But no such reservations can be detected in the American commitments under the bilateral Agreement of Cooperation in 1959,"...the members...affirmed their determination to maintain their collective security and to resist aggression direct or indirect.... The U.S. Government, in accordance with the Mutual Security Act of 1954... reaffirms that it will continue to furnish... military and economic assistance as may be mutually agreed upon... in order to assist... in the preservation of its national independence and integrity and in the effective formation of its economic development."  

American policy towards Pakistan may be described as a curious mixture of sympathies and antipathies. She cultivated extremely friendly relations with Pakistan during the fifties which resulted in the complete political identification of Pakistan with the west; and virtually alienated Pakistan from the Soviet Union. With the thaw setting in U.S.-Soviet relations, the enunciation of the principles of co-existence by Kruschev and the exchange of Sino-Soviet polemics, America largely overlooked Pakistan's friendly overtures towards the Soviet Union.

7. Story of Seato, Seato Publications, Bangkok. p.44  
8. Treaties and Alliances of the World, Keesings, Bristol, 1968, p.140
But Pakistan's "courtship" with China seemed to have been rebuffed by the Americans, who communicated strong displeasure in 1963, when Pakistan signed the Boundary Agreement with China. The relations between Pakistan and China remained suspect in American eyes, and the American policy seemed to have been hardened on this question by the Indian propaganda of "Sino-Pakistan collusion". The relations between the United States and Pakistan have never been the same though a marked improvement was noticeable with the inauguration of the Nixon Administration.\(^9\)

American policy was very much linked with its investment and oil interests in the Middle East and this region gained further eminence as a result of the Arab-Israel war of October 1973, and the Arab oil embargo. There were suggestions in various Western quarters that America should take military action against the Arabs, especially the Persian Gulf States and occupy the oil fields. Direct intervention at that point in time, seemed out of the question. This appears to be a very tempting proposition but fraught with dangers and such an action might lead to global conflagration because the Soviet Union might be tempted to protect her interests in the region, where she is so heavily committed.

Since December 1971, Pakistan gradually tilted towards the Arab world especially the Persian Gulf states and Libya. This

\(^9\) During the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war President Nixon showed a marked tilt towards Pakistan and reminded India of U.S.A. treaty obligations towards Pakistan, and this seemed to have warded off larger Indian invasion of West Pakistan.
largely annoyed the Iranians especially the late Shahinshah who considered this area as one of his "spheres of influence". The Iranian policy tended to be adventurous and aggressive in the area since the Iranians occupied the tiny islands (the Tumbs) in the Persian Gulf and agreed to help militarily the Sultan of Muscat and Oman against the insurgents (the Front for the Liberation of the occupied Arab Gulf) "Iranian Forces are still fighting alongside Omani forces in the south of the Sultanate... A military communique this week reported that nine Iranians were killed and one was missing after an ambush in the south western mountains, where Government forces launched a new campaign against Leftist guerrillas on December 2.... The communique was not only the first to reveal the Iranians continued presence in southern Dhofar, it was also the first time the army had ever mentioned Iranians in a public statement since a "task force" was sent in at the request of Sultan Qaboos Bin Said, the ruler, about two years ago."\textsuperscript{10} The Iranians were actively mending their fences with India and a number of joint projects were agreed.

The Iranian posture towards the subcontinent eminently suited the American and Soviet thinking, which was geared to keeping Pakistan very much involved in subcontinental matters; subsequent political developments have shown that this policy met with success. Pakistan and India agreed in November 1974 to renew trade links which were severed in 1965, and the postal

\textsuperscript{10} The Financial Times, 13.12.1974
and communication links had already been established. The Americans did not want Pakistan to be linked with the Persian Gulf or the Middle East and they wanted to see India, Pakistan and Bangladesh as one economic unit, obviously under Indian preponderence. Precisely for these reasons the Americans for quite some time refused to restart the supply of armaments to Pakistan which were suspended after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. There was a general understanding amongst the American leadership that Pakistan's close relationship with the Arabs might draw it out of its sphere of influence and that could jeopardize its political standing in the area. The Iranians were armed to the teeth and they were supplied with sophisticated weapons, and the Iranians believed that they would emerge as the most powerful nation in the region, and possibly serve U.S. interests. However, there seemed to be a contradiction in Iranian policy towards the Arabs in the sense that they were directly concerned and involved with the Kurdish movement in the northeast of Iraq, which was struggling hard to win some kind of independence from Iraq, and on the other hand Iran wished to align itself with the Arabs, "The Shah of Iran said in an interview published today that another Arab-Israeli war would involve all Moslem countries and not just the Arab States.... " Certainly it will be our war this time. None of us has a choice".... We will never accept any change in the identity of Jerusalem."12

11. These restrictions were lifted both against India and Pakistan. But it should be stressed here that America did not lift the arms ban on Pakistan to bolster Pakistan's defence capabilities but to support American geopolitical interests in the area, especially with regard to the oil rich Persian Gulf, and Pakistan enjoys a very desirable geostrategic location to that effect.

This policy would have to be further streamlined if Iran has any idea of establishing closer links with the Arab World as such. In this field Iran would have to reconcile with the Pakistani efforts in developing close socio-economic, political and military links with the Arabs, especially in the Persian Gulf. Pakistan has already signed agreements with United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Libya and as such joint ministerial boards have been set up to coordinate socio-economic and cultural development. Such cooperation already existed between Iran and Pakistan and some joint ventures were either under study or were being implemented. The Regional Cooperation for Development offered opportunities to both Iran and Pakistan to coordinate policies in various fields but the progress was really slow and never achieved its desired objectives. This was especially true of Pakistan-Iran cooperation with Turkey, the third member of R.C.D. Turkish trade with Iran and Pakistan amounted to one per cent of her total foreign trade. The total imports from Iran and Pakistan during the first nine months of 1974 amounted to 0.11 per cent of total Turkish imports, and the total amount of exports to Pakistan and Iran during this period were to the tune of 0.98 per cent of the total Turkish exports. This is a clearcut indication

13. "Iran is to close its northern borders to Kurdish rebels from Iraq, ending a long-standing over the path of an international boundary line through a river estuary on the Arabian Gulf. Iraq has agreed in principle to make concessions on its territorial claims in the Shatál Arab estuary, which provides river access to the Iranian's largest refinery at Abadan, in return for closing of all the borders to infiltration of a subversive character"

The Times, London, 7.3.1975

that mutual trade amongst the R.C.D. countries was very negligible in spite of the fact that the member countries could benefit tremendously during the high inflation period which was specially caused by the soaring oil prices. This would have eminently suited Pakistan because the mutual trade and trade concessions would have benefited the member states in the sense that new markets would have been discovered closer at home, and the damaging effects of inflation and highly exaggerated oil prices would have been effectively met. Cooperation between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan could have been based on the principles of regional economic community but such coordination did not seem to meet the growing demands of increasing Iranian interests in the Indian Ocean area. Iran visualised greater interests and its ambitions were formidable because of the flow of petrodollars, and it envisaged itself as "big power" in the geopolitical complexion of the region. Iran seemed to be interested in controlling lines of communications and transportations between the Nile and the Straits of Malacca and beyond, and Pakistan's growing friendship and involvement with the Arabs, especially in the Persian Gulf seemed to lay bare the roots of expansionist designs of Iran and its posture of aggrandisement.

The Americans tended to support the Iranian designs and they supplied the Shah with an ever increasing quantity of sophisticated weapons. In spite of the widely publicised pro-Pakistan "tilt" during the Pakistan-India crisis of 1971, it seems that America would not help Pakistan to such a position where it could
effectively challenge the Indian preponderance, although the
American policy would tend to support the continued territorial
integrity and political independence of Pakistan. America
would increasingly endeavour to improve her relations with India
and her policy would be geared towards establishing a politico-
economic structure under which a weak but defensible Pakistan
would be allowed to exist, and Indian hegemony would prevail.
Unfortunately for Pakistan, this also seems to suit the Soviet
cynical realism and the close Soviet cooperation with India,
This understanding and cooperation also eminently suited the
growing Iranian interests in the region. But the situation would
not appear so desperate for Pakistan so long as it succeeded in
unifying the forces at home and possessed the kind of technical
knowhow the Arabs wanted and with the help of the Arab petro-
dollar it could effectively neutralise the tripartite or quadri-
partite stranglehold on Pakistan's foreign policy options; and
in this Chinese reactions might hold the key to Pakistan's survival
as an independent and sovereign state. It is important to observe
here that China's policy towards Pakistan, for some years has
been to adduce her support for Pakistan's "independence and state
sovereignty", this was ambiguous in relation to East Pakistan,
although it certainly represented a firm commitment to the sur-
vival of the nucleus of Pakistan in the West, and this position
of course defined very precisely the character of the Chinese
stake in Pakistan; deeply committed to the maintenance of a strong
and independent West Pakistan. What Pakistan required of China
and the United States was a firm commitment to the "national unity

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and territorial integrity" of Pakistan - a formula which implied the defence of Pakistan and as such of East Pakistan against the possibilities of invasion from India. In the event both China and America decided not to adopt such a policy and their commitments towards Pakistan remained dubious. The U.S. Government probably shared the Pakistani assessment that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to the peace of Asia, which partially accounted for the American "tilt" in favour of Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, and President Nixon was quick enough to remind Mrs. Gandhi that the United States had treaty obligations towards Pakistan.

The refusal of Pakistan to participate in Soviet schemes for "collective security" and regional cooperation in the sub-continent prevented the Soviet Union from deepening her influence in India, and by engaging India in regional preoccupations Pakistan's hostility also reduced India's capacity to support the Soviet Union in its rivalry with China. If Pakistan were to agree to come to the "good-neighbourly" terms with India which the Soviet Union has been impressing upon it for more than a decade. India's regional preponderance would have been decisively confirmed and it would be more able to compete for regional influence with China, especially in the Himalayan States including Chinese Tibet, and as such India would be able to command a position of strength and respect in the area with or without the help from the Soviet Union.
Chapter 10

Alignment in Pakistan's Foreign Policy

The inception of Pakistan as an independent sovereign political entity with discontiguous territorial regions presented it with considerable economic, political and security difficulties and problems. With a view to ensuring its socio-economic development and safeguarding its territorial integrity and independence, Pakistan decided to align itself with the West and some of the Asian countries e.g., Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Thailand and the Philippines. To re-emphasise the point these defensive arrangements and groupings projected the divergent requirements of the participants in the context of international relations and the prevalent power-politics. The West led by the United States was primarily concerned with the containment of the rising tide of communist influence and its threatened inroads amongst the emerging nations of the world, especially in Asia and Africa. The West offered friendly co-operation and assistance in the economic, defence, cultural, social and technical fields, and in addition offered protection and security guarantees, in the guise of multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements, against communist threat and subversion. The newly emergent nations on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China were considered suitable and effective points of deterrence against communist infiltration or subversion.
The United States and its allies held the view that by injecting massive aid coupled with security guarantees, the communist advance in South and Southeast Asia could effectively be deterred, and in fact, stemmed; and the "Dominoes" consolidated.

Pakistan was identified as one of the prospective participants whose economic base and defensive potential required to be bolstered and strengthened. From this point of view Pakistan with its Islamic ideology and zeal looked an ideal candidate in the western scheme of global interests and strategy aimed at curtailing the communist advance, and precisely for this reason Pakistan was invited to join the anti-communist alliances. The reason for Pakistan's participation, however, in these military pacts with the West and other allies was not dictated by its hatred or contempt for communist ideology or actions but by the instinct for survival and self-preservation, in particular, against a possible Indian action aimed at undoing the partition "...there were several important parties and personages in India who had made it very plain that they will unite Pakistan and India and undo partition...India, for some reason, which it considered to be justifiable, massed her troops on the borders of Pakistan in March 1950, poised for attack... again in July 1951 India considered it necessary... to mass its troops on our borders... to overawe us and to invade us."¹

Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, told the Pakistan National Assembly: "The main driving force behind a nation's foreign policy is its urge to maintain its independence and territorial integrity

¹  H.S. Suhrawardy, Dawn, Karachi, 23.2.1957
... to preserve its distinct ideological personality."²

This important clash of ideas within the multilateral defence alliances very clearly manifested the paradoxical attitudes of the participants and their divergent interests. There were sharp and different views amongst the signatories of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation; the Manila Treaty of 1954 was a vivid example of their respective positions and their interpretation of the various clauses of the Treaty. Whereas Pakistan considered the provisions to be effectively applied against any external aggression or internal subversion, the United States understood the provisions to be applicable only against communist aggression or subversion. The American interpretation was very accurate and correct. It was a gross misjudgement on the part of the Pakistanis to have given such a naive interpretation in spite of the clear-cut reservations incorporated into the provisions of the Treaty at the insistence of the United States. The Pakistani policy makers, and the Foreign Office, to my mind, were misleading the people of Pakistan and duping public opinion. Pakistan, in fact, invoked the provisions of the Treaty during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 but the United States refused to oblige, and the other signatories acquiesced with the American position.

Pakistan's membership of SEATO, the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and its friendship with the United States were dictated by its economic requirements and the need to preserve its territorial integrity and political independence.

² Bhutto, Z.A. Foreign Policy of Pakistan, Karachi, 1964, p.27
Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) to safeguard West Pakistan and to foster closer relations with the countries of the Near East with whom it had common affinities i.e. history, culture and religion. Mr. Hamidul Haq Chaudhary, the then Foreign Minister, addressing the National Assembly stated: "the development of the closest friendship with the Middle Eastern countries has been the cornerstone of our policy... pursuant to our policy to strengthen the fabric of peace in this vital region and to ensure its stability, Pakistan acceded to the Turko-Iraqi** pact along with Iran and the United Kingdom." Arab opinion, however, was sharply split over the viability the validity and the purpose of such a defensive arrangement. The Egyptians considered it as a manoeuvre to split the Arabs; the Saudi Arabians were also displeased, especially at the inclusion of Pakistan with whom they had very friendly ties and were particularly concerned at the inclusion of the United Kingdom since the British were considered to be the friends of Israel.

The Egyptian opposition to the pact may be attributed to i) deep rooted hatred for Turkey, ii) Nasser's friendship with non-aligned India and iii) the prospective challenge to Nasser's leadership in the region.

The Suez crisis of 1956 brought some of the underlying fears to the surface and Pakistan's relations with Egypt were put under severe strains. In November, 1956 at a meeting of the former Baghdad Pact, held without the presence of the United Kingdom, the three Muslim members of the Pact

**Iraq withdrew from the Pact after the July Coup in 1958
3. Foreign Relations (O.P.), Karachi, 1956, p.35
condemned Israel for invading Egypt, and demanded that the United Kingdom's forces should be immediately withdrawn from Egyptian territory (It is now openly admitted that there was a clear-cut collusion with Israel on the part of France and the United Kingdom: the United Kingdom was allied to Pakistan through the former Baghdad Pact and SEATO. France was allied to Pakistan through SEATO.)

The meeting also admitted the sovereign rights of Egypt in its nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company. Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, however, criticised Egypt for blockading the Suez Canal. He issued this statement on 23rd November, 1956, and this was considered to be extremely hostile by Egypt, and in order to show his indignation President Nasser rejected Pakistan's offer to participate in the United Nations Emergency Force while at the same time he accepted an Indian military contingent to be included in such a force. Mr. H.S. Suhrawardy, referring to the Muslim countries, delivered the celebrated verdict: "Zero plus zero still equals zero." His full verdict was as follows: "The question is asked: Why don't we (the Muslim countries) get together rather than be tied to a big power like the U.K. or America? My answer to that zero plus zero plus zero after all equal zero. We have, therefore, to go farther afield rather than get all zeros together because they will never be able to produce anything which is substantial."  

4. Dawn, Karachi, 12 December, 1956
At the time of the historic Suez crisis of 1956, Prime Minister Suhrawardy addressed the National Assembly and, in the course of his statement, said "Today we see no reason why the United Kingdom, having obeyed the mandate...should not sit with us in order to promote the security of the Middle East and also ourselves...and as I said elsewhere, any number of zeros cannot make more than zero, whereas if you add one to it, the larger the number of possible zeros the greater will be the ultimate result, whether they are put in front or put in the rear, they are more than zero." 5

Mr. Suhrawady's statement could only be considered in the light of Egyptian attitude towards Pakistan and its dispute with India over the status of the disputed territory of Kashmir since President Nasser had stated, "Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India." 6

President Nasser's views seemed to follow the Russian way of thinking on Kashmir since he openly criticised Pakistan's membership of the defensive arrangements and seemed to side with India over the issue of Kashmir. President Nasser was annoyed with Pakistan since Pakistan had aligned itself with France and the United Kingdom, and these two states in collusion with Israel had invaded Egypt, therefore, the Egyptian leader doubted Pakistan's credentials as a true friend of the Arabs. This whole episode obliged Pakistan to reappraise its policy vis-a-vis the Arabs and the Pan-Islamic movement. Pakistan initiated a more realistic

policy towards the Muslim countries and its emotive attitude towards Pan-Islamism seemed to dissipate. President Nasser's actions thus caused Pakistan "to be guided more by facts and less by theories and sentiments." 7

Pakistan signed the Manila Treaty of 1954 largely with a view to safeguarding its truncated eastern half against a possible Indian action because Pakistan believed Indian policy to be based on the view "that the creation of Pakistan was a tragic mistake which might still be corrected, at least as far as East Bengal is concerned." 8 Thus Pakistan became fully aligned with the West, and for a time, acted as a pawn in the global strategy of the Americans. Pakistan had offered communication facilities to the Americans in the vicinity of Peshawar (Bade Ber) in the North West of the then West Pakistan, and the United States had been using Pakistan territory for U-2 spying missions over the Soviet Union.

There is no denying the fact that Pakistan enjoyed great technological and economic benefits from its membership of SEATO and CENTO, but at the same time it suffered a great deal in its relations with the Soviet Union, Egypt and some of the other Middle Eastern countries. It also, to some extent, suffered initially, in its relations with the People's Republic of China but Pakistan was good enough to have realised that it had to mend its fences with that great country, and in this a notable achievement was recorded during the Bandung Conference in 1955.

7. Round Table, 1956-57, p.174
8. Callard, Keith, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, New York, 1957, p.11

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Various states of Africa and Asia were not only suspicious of the military arrangements that Pakistan had opted to join but were openly critical of these defensive arrangements and very much doubted the motives behind such bilateral or multilateral arrangements, and denounced these pacts as merely the instruments of American or Soviet "imperialism" directed against the emerging nations of Africa and Asia. Pakistan found it difficult, and at times impossible, to further strengthen its ties with African countries, especially the Arabs of Africa, Nigeria, Guinea, and Ethiopia.

Pakistan achieved a considerable success during the first Asian-African Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia from 18 to 24 April 1955. This conference was sponsored by Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan, and was attended by 24 Asian-African countries in addition to the sponsors. The Pakistan Prime Minister Mr. Mohammad Ali Bogra was successful in allaying the misapprehensions of the leaders of the People's Republic of China with regard to Pakistan's membership of the military pacts. Mr. Chou En-Lai the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, while addressing the Political Committee of the Badung Conference on 23 April, 1955 said, "...I paid a visit to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear China would commit aggression against her. As a result of that, we achieved a mutual understanding....The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured me that if the United States should take
aggressive action under the military treaty or if the
United States launched a global war, Pakistan would not
be involved in it... just as it was not involved in the
Korean war... through these explanations we achieved a
mutual understanding. This creates agreement and harmony
amongst us in understanding each other on collective peace
and cooperation...." 9 The Bandung Conference provided
Pakistan with a good opportunity for a dialogue with the
People's Republic of China and the perusal of the initiative
resulted in the establishment of friendly and good neigh­
bourly relations between Pakistan and China in spite of
their ideological differences, "... the differences between
the political systems of China and Pakistan and the diver­
gence of views on many problems should not prevent the
strengthening of friendship... due importance should be
given to commercial and cultural relations between the
two countries...." 10

These friendly ties have further been strengthened
between China and Pakistan, because the absence of any
"real conflict of interests".

Pakistan achieved another diplomatic success during
the Bandung Conference when it very effectively challenged
the proclaimed Five Principles of "Panch Sheel" of Indian
Foreign Policy. These Five Principles had been agreed upon
between China and India during the period when it was voc­
erously being claimed, "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai" (Indians
and Chinese are brothers); and in the course of discussion
on "Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region

9. Hassan, K.S. Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan,
Karachi, 1966, pp. 361-62
10. ibid. p. 363
of China, 29 April, 1954, and the principles were as follows i) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, ii) mutual non-aggression, iii) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, iv) equality and mutual benefit, and v) peaceful co-existence.\(^{11}\) It may be deemed surprising that agreement failed to incorporate the right to self-determination, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the admissibility of collective security. All of these principles had a direct bearing on the Indo-Pakistan relations, especially with regard to Kashmir and the military pacts of which Pakistan was a member. Incidentally the important principles are very much a part and parcel of international law and in conformity with the enshrined principles of the United Nations.

As a substitute for "Panch Steel" the Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Bogra presented his "Seven Principles" to the Conference. These were 1) sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, 2) equality of all independent nations, 3) non-interference in the internal affairs of one country by another, 4) non-aggression, 5) rights of self-defence of each country to be exercised singly or collectively, 6) self-determination for all peoples and abhorrence of colonial exploitation in every shape, and 7) settlement of disputes through peaceful means, that is, by negotiations, mediation and arbitration.\(^{12}\)

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11. ibid. p.40
12. Chaudhury, Pakistan Relations with India, 1947-66, p.248
These principles specifically include self-determination, peaceful solution of disputes and individual or collective security, all three of which are accepted standards of international conduct.

The Bandung Conference modified the "Five Principles" and in its final communique enumerated "Ten Principles" for the conduct of relations among independent political entities, and emphasised the need for the recognition of "the equality of all nations large and small" and urged the Afro-Asian countries to abstain "from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force." These principles are very much in line with the basic concepts and the valued principles of the U.N. Charter, which upheld "the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively."

India's Prime Minister Pandit Nehru was unhappy at the inclusion of these principles, especially at the endorsement of collective security. The Times special correspondent to the Conference reported in a dispatch: "It has been Mr. Chou En-Lai's week....From Turkey to Philippines, Mr. Chou En-Lai spread reason and tolerance," and in its editorial the Times observed: "Indian diplomacy displayed all its customary adroitness but could not have succeeded in overcoming the distrust which Delhi's neutralism implies in such powers as Turkey, Iran, and Thailand...."

As a result Pakistan appeared to have partly succeeded in breaking the Indian policy of containment against it in Asia and Africa.

13. Hassan op.cit. p.60
14. ibid.
15. ibid.
16. The Times, London, 23.4.55
17. ibid.
The Sino-Indian border conflict in the NEFA area in 1962 seriously affected the political and military thinking of the regional and world powers. The border conflict underlined the vested interests of both India and China, and projected a serious rupture between the two countries which has yet to be effectively mended. The conflict provided the Americans with a chance of bringing India to their fold, and the United States showed its eagerness in rushing military aid to India in a massive way with a view to containing the communist giant or dragon, which was projected as an expansionist and aggressive power.

The Kennedy administration believed that India had the ideal size and adequate potential to serve as a bulwark in its policy of containing China. It, therefore, was considered expedient to give large scale military hardware to India so as to strengthen India's economic base and military preparedness against communism "... in Kennedy's view, the long range struggle with communism in Asia depended on how India solved its economic problems. His goal was described as an attempt to turn India into a 'showplace' for his ideas on what the Western world should do for an Asian country." 18 Mr. Kennedy was never enthusiastic towards Pakistan and the direction of American policy to the subcontinent after the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 was very succinctly analysed by an American columnist in the following words: "Washington recognises Pakistan's loyalty to the two Asian alliances... rather less enthusiastically endorsed by Kennedy. But we also recognise that Pakistan

18. Hindu, Madras, November 16, 1960
represents only 20 per cent of the subcontinent and is divided...the sole hope of establishing a viable competitor to China is India...affection for an ally is tempered by geographic reality."\(^{19}\)

The changed tone of the American administration and their support for "non-aligned" India gave Pakistan further opportunity to establish closer relations with the other great power, the Soviet Union, and as such a golden opportunity to adopt a positive policy of positive neutralism and Pakistan should have picked a leaf from the Kennedy Administration's book on power-politics, which very clearly demonstrated that the Americans had no time for their ally and that America was fully prepared to sacrifice Pakistan's interests at the altar of Indian understanding.

Pakistan was not prepared to accept hegemony from any quarters especially India, and therefore it condemned the American endeavours to treat India as the regional power, "At President Kennedy's request, I had urged Mr. Nehru to extend his leadership to other areas in South-East Asia."\(^{20}\)

Mr. Johnson seemed to have worked on these lines after having succeeded Kennedy in November, 1963, and after his re-election in 1964. The U.S. attitude during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 seemed to have confirmed the changed direction of American policy towards Pakistan, and in fact, towards "non-alignment" and the alliances which the Americans now described as "pactitis" and not as pacts or alliances were fundamentally eroded. To my mind, both the aligned

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   Dawn, 29.5.1961 (quoted Vice President Johnson's statement in Washington 26.5.1961)
and non-aligned were treated equally, and therefore, the non-aligned states were in a better position since they had given no cause to complain as far as the Soviet Union was concerned.

Pakistan also started to demonstrate some indifference to these pacts, and in fact helped to render both SEATO and CENTO as ineffective instruments vis-a-vis American interests. In Vietnam various countries helped the Americans on their own.

Pakistan manifested increasing desire to develop relations with the Third World, and to be linked with the non-aligned movement, and endeavoured to adopt a more open and realistic approach in its foreign policy. The "most allied ally" was beginning to find an independent identity and positive direction in its foreign policy.

As stated earlier there was a divergence of opinion and interests vis-a-vis the military pacts or defensive arrangements. Pakistan's adherence to the Manila Treaty or Cento was primarily due to its security needs, especially against Indian aggression. Precisely for this reason Pakistan reacted sharply when America and its other Western allies did not come to its aid either in 1965 or 1971. The United States of America had expressed its clearest possible intentions with regard to its position as a signatory of the Manila Treaty which America considered to be a defensive arrangement against a possible communist subversion or aggression. The Americans were at pains to explain their position, as they understood it to be, and indicated that
they were not committed to help Pakistan against a non-communist aggression, in particular, Indian aggression. The United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand were not prepared to help Pakistan against India simply because these member states were not prepared to assist one member against another within the Commonwealth. Ralph Braibanti expressed a similar point of view and asserted that both Australia and New Zealand had publicly declared that they were in no way bound, by the Manila Treaty, to take military action against any member of the Commonwealth. But it also is true that the Treaty did not prevent them from helping Pakistan in a positive manner, and in defence of its territorial integrity and political independence.

In the case of Pakistan the signatories to the Manila Treaty were not willing to accept their obligations. Once a state has indicated its willingness to be bound by a treaty then this willingness should be unequivocal; a reasonable effect should be given to the treaty rather than unreasonable excuses. The basic principle involved herein is an attempt not to defeat but to fulfil the intention.

Australia and New Zealand joined the Pact to safeguard their interests against communist threats, a possible Japanese military resurgence and because of their treaty relations with the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The Americans expressed concern regarding the communist threat in the region and Australia was concerned with the Indonesian policy vis-a-vis New Guinea.

All these multifarious interests clearly cancelled out any advantage that Pakistan might have in joining the South

East Treaty Organisation. Pakistan was as such duped by design when it became a signatory to the Manila Pact; and the American reservation was not in conformity with the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter since no distinction is made between a communist and a non-communist aggression whatsoever. In fact, the United Nations had not agreed upon, at that point in time, a definition of the term aggression. The Americans, therefore, were ethically and morally wrong in insisting on the insertion of such a reservation in the Manila Pact. This established a fundamental and a crucial point of divergence between Pakistan and the United States. It protested at the American attitude and the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan Sir Muhammad Zafarullah Khan asserted that all aggression was evil and that the Americans should have no reservations to that effect.

In view of these clearout differences Pakistan was at a disadvantage, to begin with, and as such should not have joined SEATO since it was obvious to its political leaders that the fellow signatories would not help Pakistan against an Indian attack.

For the reasons outlined above Pakistan failed to receive any help from the signatories to the Manila Pact either in 1965 or 1971. It may be pointed out that the United States and its western allies were not prepared to give preference to Pakistan over India because of India's size, its political record, institutions and because of the importance of India to the West.
In the ultimate analysis the West was invariably prepared to forget and forgive India for its anti-American posture, pro-Russian stance, direct or indirect alignment with the West or the Soviet Union or, in fact, India's alignment with both the super-powers. Both the Russians and the Americans were prepared to supply India with arms and extended economic assistance in spite of India's disregard for the U.N. Charter, and in spite of the fact that India did cross the International Border on 6th September, 1965, along the Lahore-Sialkot Sector, and in 1971 along the Jessore Sector in the former East Pakistan.

It would not be out of place to state here that India entered into Treaty obligations with the Soviet Union in August 1971, and that it paved the way for India to take decisive action against Pakistan and dismember it by force. Pakistan's allies within SEATO were content with the situation and allowed the events to take their natural course in spite of the fact that the Treaty and its Articles I,III and IV clearly asked for common action "to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without" (Article II). It was morally wrong for Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom to sign the Manila Treaty, in good faith, and then to renege on their obligations, under the Treaty, irrespective of their position vis-a-vis the Commonwealth.

These countries along with France, Philippines and Thailand were bound by the Treaty to come to the aid of Pakistan both in 1965 and in 1971 since no reservations or
"understanding" had been included in the Treaty. Treaties entered into voluntarily are bound to be upheld, respected and honoured since such treaties are signed in good faith (pacta sunt servanda) and the signatories should not try to wriggle out of their politico-moral and legal obligations under the pretext that a vital change of circumstances has occurred. The clausula rebus sic stantibus has invariably been brandished implying that the treaty is to be binding only so long as things stand as they are. This principle has been used, merely to excuse the breach of a treaty obligation that a state finds it inconvenient to fulfil.

One might excuse Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, albeit reluctantly, for wriggling out of his commitment to hold a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir after Pakistan had joined the military Pacts SEATO and CENTO. But one would find it difficult, if not well nigh impossible, to accept the pretences under which Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, France and Thailand failed to fulfil their treaty obligations both in 1965 and 1971. All these signatories were fully aware of the facts, and therefore, their excuses or arguments were immaterial and untenable.

It could be argued that Pakistan should not have signed its rights away by becoming the "most allied ally" but unfortunately Pakistan had taken certain decisions since 1950 which put it in a most unenviable position where Pakistan could not trust or find another World Power to champion its cause or protect its territorial integrity and political independence.
Pakistan's increasing affinity with America, such as Pakistan's attitude towards the Korean War and the Japanese Peace Treaty were receiving ready approval, "...in contrast to India's aloofness from the struggle between communism and democracy, Pakistan has been almost aggressive in her moral commitment to the Western Powers."\(^{22}\)

The first Prime Minister of Pakistan Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was reported to have told the New York Herald Tribune that America wrongly equated Pakistan's foreign policy with that of India; and stressed that Pakistan was opposed to an isolationist policy and was prepared to make sacrifices for the collective security system being chalked out by the free world.\(^{23}\)

Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din who succeeded Liaquat Ali Khan, after Liaquat Ali's assassination in October, 1951, was obliged to ask the United States in 1953 for free help and obtained a gift of approximately one million tons of wheat since Pakistan did not have foreign exchange to meet such a requirement. The need for economic assistance, indeed, added much urgency towards greater affinity with the United States.

After the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan on 16th October 1951, Pakistan experienced internal instability and early in 1952 prices of both jute and cotton fibres, upon which its foreign trade solely depended, began to drop fast. While the general commodity price index dropped

\(^{23}\) The Pakistan Times, 3.10. 1951
from 162 to 123 between June 1951 and December 1952, fibres fell from 193 to 98, and Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings dropped from 288 crore Rupees to Rs.192 crores during 1952. Gold and Sterling reserves which stood at Rs.148.7 crores on 1.1.1952 slumped drastically to Rs. 60.61 crores by the beginning of 1953.  

This picture of Pakistan's economic plight is a vivid exposition as to why it endeavoured to strengthen relations with the United States, and as to why Pakistan entered into bilateral and multilateral military arrangements involving the Americans and their allies.

The Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement signed between the United States and Pakistan on 19.5.1954 was as irksome to India as the arms assistance to India, following the Sino-Indian border conflict of October 1962, was to Pakistan. But the suggestion or the implication that, apart from the question of military supplies to Pakistan, all was in good shape between India and the United States is a misleading concept. Basic differences existed between the United States and India long before the Americans started their arms supplies to Pakistan, and it has been suggested that the United States turned to Pakistan after they had been rebuffed by India. Chester Bowles emphasised that it was bad arithmetic to alienate 360 million Indians in order to aid 80 million Pakistanis. India was acting contrary to U.S. interests. Richard Nixon's biographer stated that the Vice-President's recommendations of military

** Rs. Denotes Pakistani Rupees  

24. One Crore is equal to 10 millions  

25. The Pakistan Times, 15.3.1953 (Choudhri Muhammad Ali's Budget Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 14.3.1953)  

to Pakistan "was entirely carried through as a counterpiece to the confirmed neutralism of Jawahar Lal Nehru's India." 27

Both in India and the United States persons like Sunderlal Poplai and Phillips Talbot wrote that "American military help and political alliance have gone to Pakistan only and not also to India because India has declined such help and association." 28 Richard P. Stebbins expressed his views: "Had the United States been less firmly committed to its worldwide strategic programme, or had India been somewhat less sympathetic to American views on the 'cold war', this country might have hesitated to take a step which threatened to complete the breach of confidence which had been developing with the largest democracy in Asia. As things stood, however, Indian-American relations were already in a condition that made many Americans doubtful whether it was really possible to continue taking Indian susceptibilities into account." 29

There were sharp differences between India and the United States regarding communist states and the possible threat that they posed to the free world. Economic colonialism, according to the Indian point of view, posed a bigger threat. Krishna Menon believed that a major objective of American foreign policy was to create an economic political and military vacuum in India which would in itself be filled by the Americans. 30 The late Clement Attlee asserted that in the eyes of Asians, the "number one

27. See Ralph de Toledano, Nixon, p.164
28. Talbot, P. and Poplai, S.L. India and America, A Study of Their Relations, Harper and Brothers, N.Y. 1958, p.70
exploiter, even more imperialist than Britain,'" was now the United States of America. During the eighth Session of the General Assembly the Indian delegate, alleging that the United States was establishing and perpetuating a new form of colonialism in Puerto Rico, sought to have the whole Puerto Rican matter investigated.

There were other differences regarding capitalism, socialism and the preservation of peace. India held the view that capitalism was more dangerous than socialism and that peace could be effectively preserved by creating a zone of peace than a system of collective defence. All this was in sharp contradistinction with the American foreign policy objectives.

Since the Americans failed to enlist the Indian support in search of their objectives they opted for the secondary option i.e. Pakistan which, at that point in time, was considered to be the second largest non-communist state on the face of the Asian Landmass. A Muslim state which was fervently opposed to Godless ideology, and which needed economic and large military assistance which enjoyed a strategic position and had an important role to play in the fight against communism.

Pakistan continued to express its enthusiasm for the defensive arrangements, especially the Central Treaty Organisation because of its religious and cultural affinities with Turkey, Iran and Iraq; and because of its

31. Twilight of Empire, Memoirs of Prime Minister Clement Attlee, as set down by Francis Williams, p.238
proximity to these three Muslim members of the Pact.

The United States never joined the Pact because it did not want to alienate or estrange any further the Egyptians. Moreover, the United States did not want to enter, at that point in time, into a mutual defence alliance with Israel because that would have totally alienated Iraq and other Arab States, and possibly driven them into the Soviet fold.

Nasser's objections to these arrangements and his pronounced adherence to the non-aligned movement were hypocritical, to say the least. Like Nehru, Nasser claimed the leadership of the non-aligned movement, but it would be well nigh impossible to establish that Egypt under Nasser was non-aligned in the true sense of the word. Egypt was either aligned with the United States or the Soviet Union, at a point in time, during the last thirty years. It was more a question of changing partners according to the changed circumstances, and criticising the various military pacts was deemed necessary with a view to performing a ritual act. It was only after Egypt had been spurned by John Foster Dulles and the United States when Nasser's request for financial assistance and military hardware had been rejected that Egypt turned to the Soviet Union in 1954-55. Nasser's successor the late President Anwar Sadat followed the same policies and invited thousands of Russian personnel and military advisers to train the Egyptians in various fields; and when Sadat found their presence unpalatable he had no qualms in ordering the Russians out unceremoniously during 1971-72. The events since the Arab-Israeli
War of 1973 are the living proof of increasing co-operation between Egypt and the United States of America.

Alignment and non-alignment seem to have been synonymous in Nehru's approach to international relations, and it could be argued that India under Nehru behaved in almost identical manner after the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 when Nehru quickly accepted the American and Commonwealth help with much gratitude.

The late President Ayub wrote in his autobiography that Pakistan learnt on October 2, 1962, that Pakistan Ambassador to India, J.K. Galbraith, and that the Ambassador had, on the authority of the U.S. Government, told Jawahar Lal Nehru that America would supply arms to India and it was for the Indian Prime Minister to indicate the requirements. Jawahar Lal Nehru also addressed a general appeal for support and help against China for "the elimination of deceit, dissimulation and farce in international relations." British military supplies arrived in India on 29.10.1962, in two Royal Air Force Britannias; and on 3rd November, 1962 the first U.S. arms shipments arrived in four planes which landed at Calcutta.

By 16th November, 1962 the Indians under Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru were not only asking the Americans for transport planes but were also asking for pilots and crews to fly the aircraft. Galbraith has gone further and stated that the

37. ibid. p.481
Indians, at that time, yearned for the sight of American uniforms, and shortly afterwards the Indians began to plead for military association with the United States, and they wanted the U.S. Air Force to back them up so that their own pilots could fly tactically without leaving the cities unprotected.

According to New York Times, a squadron of U.S. c-130 transport planes, having arrived during November 1962, threw a crucial air bridge across the Himalayas from Central India to Leh and flew fifteen to seventeen runs a day to the front, moving 150 to 180 tons of desperately needed equipment daily.

In addition to military hardware, a high powered team headed by Averell Harriman arrived in India, from the United States, on 22nd November, 1962, and another from the United Kingdom led by Duncan Sandys, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations arrived on 24th November, 1962. After the emergency aid had been agreed at Nassau in December 1962, the two leaders i.e. President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacMillan met again at the end of June 1963, at Birch Grove house in Sussex and declared that they were agreed on their policy of continuing to help India by providing further military aid to strengthen its defences against the threat of renewed Chinese Communist attack.

The U.S. Engineers helped to build an all-weather highway from Srinagar to Leh (from the Capital of Indian held Kashmir to the Capital of Ladakh) and in addition, the airport at Leh was improved. Indian Air Force held

38. ibid. p.489
39. ibid, p.486
41. See Pakistan Horizon, 3rd Quarter, 1963.
joint defence training with the U.S. Air Force and the Royal Air Force and made arrangements for the U.S. Air Force to come to India's rescue in case of renewed hostilities. The U.S. Ambassador designate Chester Bowles stated in a radio interview that the United States was "very anxious to help India and the only question was the amount of military aid the Indians can absorb." 42

The Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan announced on 8.4.1963 that India proposed to double the strength of the army. 43 Early in 1964 a five year defence plan was chalked out which was expected to cost Rs.5,000 crore including foreign exchange worth Rs.680 crore. 44

The Economist reported that by May 1964, India had secured an offer of £200 million from the United States for a period of five years, and in addition, had secured large scale military hardware from the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom which would enable India to assume the role of a major power in the region. 45

In essence the United States had given economic aid to India to the tune of $6 billions but Pakistan received only $3 billions in economic assistance. Pakistan, however, received by September 1965 a total of $1.5 billion while India had received military hardware to the tune of $84.5 million. Thus, while Pakistan had received more arms from the United States, India having received massive

42. Christian Science Monitor, 28.5.63
43. Asian Recorder, 1963, p.5207
44. Kavic,L.J. India's Quest for Security, p.193
economic aid was able to divert its economic resources to its military machine, and in addition, received increased military supplies from the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{46}

Pakistan made repeated representations and protested that the arms will be used against it, and not against China, especially in view of the fact that the dispute over Kashmir had not been resolved.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister stated that "Kruschev did not say that India will be annihilated. He said Peshawar would be annihilated."\textsuperscript{47} Pakistani leaders seemed to have acted in a positive manner and adopted a correct approach in emphasising the fact that they did not ask for a total ban on arms for India but wished that they should have been properly consulted before the supply of arms, and that there should have been some guarantees and that there should have been some restraint on the use of these arms. They further argued that the Sino-Indian border conflict provided India, Pakistan and the West with a golden opportunity for a peaceful solution of the Kashmir dispute: "only a speedy and just Kashmir settlement can give us any assurance that the contemplated increase of India's military power is not likely to be deployed against Pakistan in future."\textsuperscript{48}

The Americans also started to question the very validity and relevance of these Pacts; and this criticism

\textsuperscript{47} Nikita Kruschev threatened the Pakistani Charge d'affaires on 9.5.60. (New York Times, 10.5.1960)
\textsuperscript{48} Khan,M.A. Friends Not Masters, O.U.P. p.150
became more severe with the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration in January, 1961. After assuming office President Kennedy took a number of decisions which soon began to affect American relations with Pakistan. In his address to the joint session of Congress, Kennedy declared: "I can vividly recall sitting where you sit now...the undimmed eloquence of Churchill, the soaring idealism of Nehru, the steadfast words of de Gaulle." 49

And at the same time there were visible changes in India's attitude especially in the United Nations, where India supported the United States over Congo and did not support the Soviet campaign against the Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.

The American grievances against India's past activities were beginning to erode and disappear, and India was encouraged to take a more active role in Afro-Asian affairs. At the same time America, under the direction of President Kennedy was negotiating to provide India with substantial economic assistance and to help India in its Five Year Plan. The bulk of the economic assistance was to be provided in the form of Long Term Development Fund Loans at very low interest rates and repayable over a forty to fifty year period.

Vice President Lyndon Johnson was sent on a mission to Asia with a view to establish a new equilibrium between the United States and other non-aligned states. During his visit to India Johnson declared: "I am

49. Dawn, Editorial, 24.2.1961
confident without reservation that India and the United States will continue to build a friendly and a wholesome relationship. This I can assure you is very much welcome on the part of America. Our President John F. Kennedy's high regard for India and India's leadership needs no reiteration beyond the presence here of Ambassador Galbraith. 50

Z.A. Bhutto stated that Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had invited India and other nearby countries to play a more active military and economic role in the defence of the region; and according to Bhutto, the U.S. roving Ambassador Averell Harriman, was reported to have made a statement, on 6th May 1961, in which he asked Nehru that it was the view of the Americans that certain neutral countries of Asia should underwrite the neutrality of Laos. 51 Bhutto agreed further that India was gradually being won over by the United States through increased economic assistance and through an elevated Indian position in international affairs; and Premier Nehru was considered a top favourite of the Kennedy Administration among world statesmen.

Nehru, it was suggested, was also responding in a positive manner since he agreed to send Indian troops to Congo at a time when the United Nations Force was about to collapse; and supported the British moves for a ceasefire and urged Kruschev to accept them.


51. ibid.
On May 18th 1961 Krishna Menon attending the 14 Nation Conference on Laos in Geneva, objected to the Soviet demand that it should have the right to veto the 'peace plan'. 52

Only the previous month, twenty four hours after having attacked American intervention in Cuba, Nehru had no qualms in changing his tune - calling President Kennedy "dynamic" and suggesting that "there might be two sides to the Cuban story." 53

There was an exchange of pleasantries between American and Indian leadership which could be construed as a further demonstration of growing confidence between the two countries. The Indian Ambassador to the United States was reported to have said: "When I came here neutralism was distrusted and suspected. Today it has become respected ... the switch in American policy is so great that America now wants neutral states in Africa and Southeast Asia... and take economic aid...." 54 The change in policy was so abrupt and far reaching that it left the Pakistani leaders isolated. It rekindled not only all the old passions for India but also the known prejudices against partition. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru's irksome policies were forgotten, as was the fidelity with which Pakistan attached itself to the American interest. Pakistan, however, did receive substantial economic and military assistance but not without a price. Pakistan had undertaken defence commitments

52. ibid.
53. ibid. p.57
54. Dawn (Karachi), 4.6.1961
against Communist Powers without a categoric assurance with regard to its security against India. Pakistan incurred the hostility of the Russians, who openly supported Afghanistan and India against Pakistan. Pakistan's image was also tarnished, due to its policy of alignment, in the United Nations. It strained Pakistan's relations with neighbouring Islamic Arab countries and drove Pakistan towards isolation in the community of Asia and Africa. The changes in the subcontinent and on the Himalayan frontiers erased with a single stroke both the services of Pakistan and the antagonism against India. The "most allied ally" was left without a dependable ally.

The American policy towards India and Pakistan has undergone numerous changes but the basic policy objectives have remained the same. Broadly speaking these objectives could be summarised as follows:

i) Both India and Pakistan must remain within their reach.

ii) India has priority over Pakistan

iii) Pakistan to be brought in the limelight only as a counterweight to overt Indian hostility and antagonism.

iv) The containment of communist influence in the region.

v) The protection of American global interests.

Pakistan's alignment or non-alignment is bound to be viewed, reviewed and scrutinised, by the United States and its allies, according to the vested interests of the Americans; and the United States would help or ignore Pakistan accordingly.
Conclusion

The preceding pages establish the fact that Pakistan emerged as a dislocated state with a number of problems, in the socio-economic, administrative, military and political fields; and this goes without saying that the "possession of an uninterrupted territory is one of the principle requirements for the smooth functioning of a political entity."¹ The birth of Pakistan, however, was subjected to the tremendous disadvantage that the state would find itself burdened with great economic pressures, and that its vulnerability in the economic field would be sufficient to lead Pakistan towards its eventual disintegration or demise.

The two distant and distinct parts of Pakistan were bound by their Islamic faith and an inborn desire to free themselves from socio-economic and political exploitation. The people believed that the creation of Pakistan would enable them to achieve their ends, and this would help them to throw off the yoke of economic exploitation and to rehabilitate their position through an acceptable democratic process.

The fragmented nature, however, of the state caused serious problems and in spite of the fact that "Pakistan's two Wings... were united by a common religious faith - but divided by numerous cultural contrasts. As happens frequently with fragmented States, one part of the State, in this case the East, felt itself the victim of political discrimination. Charges of 'domestic colonialism' abounded and in the end the State broke up as East Pakistan - now Bangladesh - fought for independence, aided by neighbouring India."²

². de Blij, H. Systematic Political Geography, London, 1972, p. 40
These were some of the high ideals which the people cherished within the concept of a strong and prosperous Pakistan, but their hopes of achieving these objectives were blunted by the entrenched position of internal and external vested interests. "In every state there are forces tending to reduce its cohesion. In extreme cases they break the state into two or more parts, as Czechoslovakia was broken up in 1939....In other cases, it may serve merely to make administration more difficult and to weaken the political power of the State....The division of a state area into two or more parts by the territory of another, as Pakistan... is a matter of serious importance." 

Externally the very existence of Pakistan as an independent state was challenged by India who never gave up the idea of the eventual reunification of "Bharat Mata". India used various economic, political and military means to demonstrate its dominance as the arbiter of the future political patterns on the sub-continent, and in the pursuit of its policy it received useful help from within and without, especially the Soviet Union. To counterbalance this inherent threat to its security and independence, Pakistan opted to align itself with America since Pakistani leaders held the view that the Americans with their world-wide influence would help Pakistan to strengthen its defences and assist its economic development. The Americans were more than keen, at the time, to aid Pakistan in both the fields since they thought that a strong Muslim Pakistan would serve a useful purpose in their global strategy of containing communist influence especially in the Middle East and South Asia.

Consequently Pakistan proved more than a willing ally, and joined with the United States, in signing a number of bilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements e.g. S.E.A.T.O. CENTO (the old Baghdad Pact). These pacts gave Pakistan a sense of security and considerable amount of military, economic and technical assistance. The membership of these pacts, however, made Pakistan the convenient target of criticism, and marked it out as the active pawn in the game of powerpolitics and the dreaded cold war.

The Soviet Union openly and vehemently criticised Pakistan for allowing itself to be drawn into powerpolitics. Pandit Nehru (the then Indian Prime Minister) showed his indignation and criticised Pakistan for bringing the cold war to the South Asian subcontinent (while he conveniently ignored the agreement signed between the United States and India in 1951), and employed this as an excuse to wriggle out of his international commitments (as if Pakistan had violated the U.N. Charter or the basic principles of collective security within the precepts of International Law) over Kashmir, and accused Pakistan of having "destroyed the entire basis for a plebiscite in Kashmir." President Nasser of Egypt accused Pakistan of subverting the Arab world and collusion with the friends of Israel.

These were some of the formidable obstacles that Pakistan had to face as a result of its close association with the Americans, and which consequently proved to be more damaging than the help Pakistan received from the Americans and their allies.

4. Keesings, op.cit., p.14895
Had India accepted the emergence of Pakistan as a sovereign and independent state, and showed some shrewd diplomacy and a degree of magnanimity towards it at the very outset, Pakistan's fears could have been allayed and an atmosphere of cordiality generated. A logical requisite for the two developing nations who shared a variety of common interests. Instead, an atmosphere of suspicion and mutual hostility was nurtured on both sides much to the detriment of the two peoples, and as such provided opportunity for outside powers to influence the chain of events in South Asia.

Due to the fact that a large Hindu minority (20 to 25 per cent) remained in the former East Pakistan after the partition, the process of national integration was undermined since this large minority had never opted for Pakistan and had openly rejected the very idea of Two Nations and the concept of Pakistan. There is no denying the fact that a Muslim minority remained in India (about 10 per cent), especially in the former United Province and the former Central Province, and many Indians considered them Pakistanis in disguise. But their position was comparatively weaker than the Hindus in the former East Pakistan or Sind. The Muslim minority in India was not in a position to influence the fissiparous tendencies in India and were not effective in terms of their geopolitical location. Had this minority been located within the outer fringes of India, especially in the North-West of post-partition India then their position would have been much stronger and they might have played a more active role in the Indian Politics, particularly in the area of Indo-Pakistan relations.
Moreover the division of Indian Panjab into Harayana and the Panjab clearly demonstrated that the large Sikh population was not pleased with the state of affairs within the Indian Union, and were clamouring for more autonomy, and possibly desiring the establishment of Khalistan, independent of the Union.

Had the Muslims not migrated to Pakistan from Gurdaspur, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepur and Amritsar the position of the Indian government would have been considerably weakened vis-à-vis the Sikh demand for Khalistan, and instead of dividing the Panjab into Haryana and the Panjab, the Sikhs could have been encouraged towards the establishment of their own homeland or at least a fully autonomous state within the Union; which in turn would have given valid grounds to the people in Tamilnad, Mizoland and Nagaland for greater autonomy, if not outright independence. As a result India would have been deprived of her geopolitical competence to assimilate or annex Bhutan and Sikkim into the Union.

The position of the Indian Muslims weakened further since the Indians advanced their argument that if they allowed the promised plebiscite in Kashmir the potentials of communal bloodshed would seriously jeopardise the lives and property of the Indian Muslims, and their interests could be seriously damaged (as if there had been no communal riots in India).

In fact, the argument was advanced to nullify the concept of Two Nations which the Indians never really accepted. There have been more than two thousand communal riots in India since 1947, resulting in bloodshed and widescale loss of property,
and the Muslims have been the main victim. This has also belied the Indian claims of secularism and democratic socialism. "Despite the assertion in the Indian Constitution that the State has no official religion, it is difficult to deny that in fact, it has been established around the Hindu Faith." Therefore, the Indian argument holds no water.

The separatist tendencies in the former East Pakistan could be explained in the socio-economic and political dissatisfaction of the people in the eastern wing; the total lack of enthusiasm for the concept of Pakistan amongst the Hindus, who always looked favourably towards Calcutta rather than Dacca, and the politically disenchanted dissidents whose only interest vested in the possibility of wielding political power. One of the foremost duties of the political parties and their leadership in Pakistan should have been to forge national unity and cohesion through tolerance and political compromise so as to effectively check the growth of parochialism and regionalism, and stem the tide of fissiparous tendencies, especially in the former East Pakistan, which would ultimately prove fatal for the territorial integrity and the very existence of Pakistan.

It would not be out of place to emphasise here that such a goal could very well have been achieved through some degree of democratic processes and by a sustained effort towards interregional understanding and co-operation. Unfortunately the political leadership in Pakistan failed to fully appreciate the geopolitical compulsions of a dislocated Pakistan, and the gradual drift towards authoritarianism generated a strong feeling of mistrust, fear and hatred for the Central

government; which the regional political leadership exploited in full. The gradual disintegration of the Pakistan Muslim League (the political party which was largely responsible for the creation of Pakistan) provided the regional political parties with an opportunity to voice their demands with added confidence, and with a definite parochial flavour and on regional lines, which proved so damaging, and consequently led to the disintegration of Pakistan with active military help and support from India.

Keeping in view the geopolitical limitations of Pakistan a true federal structure with a bicameral legislature would have safeguarded the legitimate rights of the federating units, eliminating the parochial tendencies, and the vicious circle of suspicion, hate and fear among the people of Pakistan as a whole. Instead a quasi-federal or more appropriately a quasi-unitary state was established under the constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973. This brought the centrifugal and centripetal forces into a direct clash, and as such the fissiparous elements were allowed to work fast and effectively in destroying the unity of Pakistan. This process had been amply demonstrated in the failure of the United Arab Federation (Iraq and Jordan dissolved in 1958), United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria dissolved in 1961) and the Malaysian Federation (Malaya and Singapore dissolved in 1965).

In the case of Pakistan the need for national cohesion and integration was very crucial because of its specific geographic location, "The extreme case in the division of Pakistan into West and East Pakistan....The two are accessible to one another by ship, but the difference between the ports of Karachi and Chittagong is about 3000 miles. This fact alone has necessitated a federal constitution; it has increased..."
innumerably the defence problems, and weakened seriously the homogeneity of the state...."^6

A close study of the geopolitical factors of Pakistan would reveal that there are a number of inherent problems in the very method of partitioning the sub-continent which adversely affected the geopolitical and economic life of the nascent state, "....few modern states started their existence... under such severe initial difficulties as Pakistan... the east wing lost its principle port, the pivot of its railway system, and the industrial complex that had processed its jute, while west wing's frontier with India cut across the extensive... irrigation network, leaving vital headworks in Kashmir and India... the country's mere survival as a political unit was remarkable."^7

Edwardes also expressed similar views, "Radcliffe had great difficulty in drawing his lines on the map. Indeed he found it impossible to get hold of a large-scale map on which to draw them... and Radcliffe had been forced to work with inadequate data. His problem in the Punjab was not just that of dividing areas of community as it mainly had in Bengal. In the Punjab it was a matter of water."^8

The Radcliffe Award in the Punjab left its irrigation system in jeopardy and the Pakistani Punjab was made dependent upon Ferozepur and Hussainiwala Headworks which were carved out to India though India had less irrigated areas dependent on these headworks. Furthermore, the award of Ferozepur Tehsils to India left Pakistan very much vulnerable

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6. ibid. p.57
to Indian interests geographically and economically since Ferozepur was a very important rail and road junction and a military centre of considerable significance. There is a general belief in Pakistan that the award of Ferozepur Tehsils (sub-districts) was not based on contiguous majority areas principle but on "other factors".

Again the award of Gurdaspur to India facilitated the Indian occupation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which negated the contiguous majority areas principles but unfortunately the "other Factors" were employed and favoured India. In fact, the Indian Independence Act of 1947, had provisionally included the whole of Gurdaspur District in the new province of West Punjab, "Districts provisionally included in the New Province of West Punjab. In the Lahore Division, the District of Gujranwala, Gurdaspur, Lahore, Sheikhupura and Sialkot.... "

It is important to emphasise that had Lord Mountbatten given the same advice to the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir which he is said to have given to the Maharajah of Jodhpur, the people of India, Pakistan and Kashmir would have been spared the misery that followed the questionable decision of the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir. Lord Mountbatten at the time is reported to have impressed upon the Maharajah of Jodhpur, ".... that the Maharajah had every legal right to accede to Pakistan if he wished, but did he really realise what the consequence might be? As a Hindu ruler of a largely Hindu state, he was surely going against the principle

that India was being divided into a Muslim and non-Muslim Dominion. His decision to accede to Pakistan might cause considerable communal disturbance in Jodhpur.... The Maharajah was quickly reduced to bluster...."10

The division of Gurdaspur becomes more questionable when one learns about the reported statement made by the late Lord Mountbatten regarding the partition of the Punjab, "I put that in for the simple reason that the district of Gurdaspur in the Punjab the population 50.4 per cent Muslim, I think, and 49.6 per cent non-Muslim. With a difference of 0.8 per cent you will see at once that it is unlikely that the Boundary Commission will throw the whole of the district into the Muslim majority areas."11 Small wonder that Radcliffe eventually awarded the large majority of the said district to India against the very principle on the basis of which India was to be partitioned, and of which the Maharajah of Jodhpur was so emphatically made aware.

These observations to an impartial mind, seemed to be improper and highly prejudicial, and were bound to affect the State of Jammu and Kashmir and its position vis-a-vis India and Pakistan.

The failure to reach an amicable settlement of the outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan is bound to encourage outside interference; a potential threat to the stability and security in the region, "That Pakistan will survive appears certain; it could not be destroyed short of war, and although in that event the dice would be heavily

loaded against Pakistan....India would be very unlikely to add to already numerous internal problems that of holding down a hostile population in the granary of the sub-continent; Kashmir may alone prove a quite sufficient strain."\(^{12}\)

If and when India decided to take a major military invasion of Pakistan aimed at the total dismemberment of Pakistan then India would have done irreparable damage to her own unity which to many observers seems tenuous and full of fissiparous and divisive elements. "In spite of the geographic Kaleidoscopic appearance of India and the resulting chain of Indian geographic unity... the history of India regurgitates innumerable instances of cultural, economic, political and social disunity, and the emergence of Pakistan... is the latest and the most comprehensive rebuttal to the claimants of such illusionary unity."\(^{13}\)

The continued Indian occupation of Kashmir could very well jeopardise the very existence of Pakistan, especially if the policy of confrontation is pursued by the two neighbours, "West Pakistan is fundamentally better-found... and it has the makings of a decent if not spectacular agrarian prosperity, if only the Kashmir crisis can be settled....Otherwise the prospect is bleak indeed...."\(^{14}\)

If and when the troubled relations between the two are put on a friendly basis then Afghanistan could be persuaded to realise that its safety would be strengthened by a strong and stable Pakistan.

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13. Tayyeb, A. op.cit. pp.24-25
14. East and Spate, op.cit. p.170
A detente between India and Pakistan, and Pakistan and Afghanistan would greatly help in lessening the tension in the region, and remove the possible seeds of instability in South Asia. Such an atmosphere is bound to help and benefit the peoples of this region. This would be directly in line with the basic principles of the Bandung Conference.

The outside powers such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, Japan and the United States would be obliged to seek open and fair competition rather than sow the seeds of dissension and as such would be obliged to seek cooperation and understanding as against exploitation, and carving out their respective spheres of influence.

Developing nations such as Pakistan cannot afford to be pawns in power-politics and as such serve the entrenched interests of great powers. The regional powers must look around for economic, commercial and cultural ventures instead of looking towards distant corners for friends and protection. For Pakistan, these objectives can very well be served best by seeking closer relations with India, Sri-Lanka, Iran, Afghanistan, Russia, Bangladesh, China and Japan, and the other countries of South, East and West Asia. This would be very much in conformity with the geopolitical compulsions of Pakistan, especially after the recent events in Afghanistan. The emphasis should be towards reconciliation and understanding; and away from confrontation and acrimony.

Pakistan has succeeded, at times, in establishing useful relations with the Soviet Union which has taken increasingly greater interest in the region, especially after the signing
of the Tashkent Declaration in 1966. The Soviet Union, however, seems to have done more damage to the Pakistani interests than brought constructive help to Pakistan in socio-economic and cultural fields.

In addition the Soviet Union has taken considerable diplomatic steps to further strengthen its position in the region. It has succeeded in securing useful naval facilities from the littoral states in return for socio-economic and military assistance e.g., South Yemen, Iraq, Ethiopia. In order to bolster its position and to widen the area of Soviet influence and presence Moscow concluded a number of treaties with the littoral states since 1970, including India.

The attitude of India towards the increased Russian naval activities in the Indian Ocean seems paradoxical in nature and content; whereas it is totally unfriendly towards American efforts to securing naval facilities, especially Diego Garcia, in the region, "the Indian attitude tends to be soft towards the Soviet Union."  

If India really desires to have a "Zone of Peace" then it must endeavour to keep both the super-powers out of the Indian Ocean area to avoid any possibility of direct confrontation between the two.

India has at times, tried to minimise the Soviet presence in the area and grossly exaggerated the American intentions, "Moreover, there is a lurking fear... that India indirectly promotes Russian naval activities in the Indian Ocean."  

The Soviet Union would endeavour to dominate the entire region especially the Persian Gulf to ensure a reasonable share

15. ibid. p.62.
of the wealth of the area, and would very much want to have
ports or port facilities in the warm waters of the region.
The Soviet union which arms and trains the Afghan military
forces has never given up its dreams of access to a warm water
port on the Arabian Sea. If "Pakhtunistan were ever to emerge...
it would probably provide the Russians with the corridor...
to the coast."  

This does not augur well for Pakistan, especially in view
of the Afghan interests in NWFP and Baluchistan, and in this
respect the Soviet interests direct or indirect cannot be
ignored or dismissed,"only if Afghanistan, as a Soviet sat­
elite, were able to further the cause of Pakhtunistan inciting
the Pathans to open revolt against Pakistan," then the Soviet
Union would be willing to lend help in this direction and seek
the total dismemberment of Pakistan. The position has not
remained so simple since a number of very important events
have taken place, especially the creation of Bangladesh, and
the Indo-Soviet involvement in the whole affair after the

Mr. Bhutto expressed his thoughts on the subject, "It
was to a large extent Soviet Union's involvement in the sub­
continent which made possible India's invasion of East Pakistan...
whatever motivated the U.S.S.R. to enter into this pact, it
certainly gave India the backing...to embark upon her armed
aggression."  

The increased Soviet involvement and activities in the
region, the close Soviet-Afghan co-operation and the increasing
Indo-Soviet collaboration is bound to adversely affect

18. Cohen, S.B. Geography and Politics in a Divided World,
Methuen, 1964, p.202
19. Foreign Affairs, April, 1973, p.550
Pakistan's geopolitical interests directly clashed with those of the Soviet Union then there would be a concerted effort to subdue and even subjugate Pakistan. To counter any such move Pakistan would be obliged to seek greater and closer co-operation and understanding with China, Iran and other states of West Asia and the Persian Gulf. In addition, Pakistan might be forced to have greater economic links with the United States, Japan and the Common Market. Pakistan would have to chalk out a very delicate balance without losing its self-respect or independence.

It ought to be made clear that in this day and age a small incident might become an international problem and threaten peace and security as such; and it would not be wrong to suggest that either America or Russia or both might be directly involved in such a situation. It is also clear here that the Indian Ocean is slowly but surely becoming a theatre of cold war and that both the Soviet and American interests are bound to clash. This dreaded thought is likely to occupy the American mind for quite some time, and therefore, persuade the Pentagon to stay its hand with regard to taking some kind of military action against the Arabs to secure the supply of oil.

In case of an Arab-Israeli detente the Russians would find it very difficult to secure any further inroads in the Arab world; the reverse of this scenario could also take place.

With this background in mind the strategic location of Pakistan cannot be underestimated and Pakistan can play an effective role in the geopolitical affairs of the region, "Pakistan's destiny is inevitably intertwined with that of
the subcontinent... her geopolitical position is not circumscribed by the subcontinent. There is a 371-mile-long border between Chinese Sinkiang and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir with its ancient silk route, and only Afghanistan's Wahkan Corridor... divides the Soviet Union and Pakistan along 180 miles. Situated at the head of the Arabian Sea, Pakistan flanks the entrance to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and is, therefore, of strategic importance to many countries of the Middle East.... Moreover, Pakistan provides an overland passage from Europe to the Indian Ocean, an area on which international attention is being increasingly centred."^{20}

The Dismemberment of Pakistan

At the time of the inception of Pakistan as an independent state, Islam was one of the most powerful elements in the composition of its people. The national leadership, however, failed to establish a stable political edifice, based upon consent and capable of reconciling the disparate tendencies. The internal divisions, the geographical separation, and the cultural-linguistic distinctiveness accentuated the sense of relative socio-economic deprivation felt by the former East Pakistanis with respect to their compatriots in West Pakistan. The East Bengalis identified these inadequacies with the state-structure itself, whose tenuous unity was increasingly undermined by the constant tendency in Pakistan to centralise authority, especially since 1958, in the shape of military

\[20\] Bhutto, Z.A. Foreign Affairs, April, 1973, p.553
dictatorship. In 1969, the Ayub Regime was dissolved, and his successor General Yahya Khan (incidentally both the gentlemen have died) attempted to rehabilitate the principle of consent but by that time the situation had entirely changed and the political concession was considered too little and too late.

The emergence of sub-nationalism (East Bengali nationalism) had gathered momentum in 1970, particularly after the devastations of the cyclone in the former East Pakistan. The break between the two wings could yet have been averted, had there evolved a constitutional system guaranteeing the East Bengalis access to power, and the reward of economic expansion and communal self-expression within the framework of a united Pakistan. Such a system could have attracted sympathy and support of the moderates right across the social and political spectrum in both the wings of the country, and the polarisation of forces could have been averted. This would also have discouraged the external vested interests from precipitating the events in the former East Pakistan.

The divergent interests, however, of the two main parties, at the time, especially after the 1970 General Elections, left very little room to manoeuvre, and as such the two were heading towards a collision, undermining the unity of Pakistan as it emerged in 1947. The flight of the refugees to India from the former East Pakistan furnished India with a golden opportunity to justify its unwarranted intervention and subsequent invasion with a view to dismembering Pakistan.

The hostility between the two neighbours was a well established fact, and their antagonism was expressed in the mutually incompatible principles upon which the two nations based themselves in 1947. The instinctive Indian attitude to the events in the former East Pakistan was discernible in its deep rooted hostility to the very existence of Pakistan as an independent political
The international reaction represented a fair description of the international power-politics, and the fundamental reconstruction of the system as envisaged by the great powers, especially with regard to South Asia. The Soviet Union sympathised with the Indian point of view; France, United Kingdom and the United States refrained from condemning Pakistan; People's Republic of China condemned the Indian motives and activities and fully supported Pakistan's position.

A kind of rapprochment had been established between China and the United States which seemed to have opened new vistas for the international balance of power, and naturally, involved South Asia. Geopolitically the South Asian landmass represents an area in which both China and Russia have shown their increased interest, in particular, since the Sino-Soviet rift and the subsequent border clashes along the Ussuri River. According to J.R.V. Prescott (Boundaries and Frontiers, 1978, p.114), positional dispute between China and Russia over the location of the boundary at the junction of Amur and the Ussuri, arose. The treaty in 1860 defined the boundary as following the Amur River to its junction with the River Ussuri, and then turning south along the Ussuri River. The crux of the problem is to decide the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. The Russians place it at Kazakevichevo (K'o-tsa-K'ai-wei-ch'ai-wo Shui-tao) while the Chinese put it at Khabarovsk. In short the Russians put it between two arms of the River Amur while the Chinese claim it between the two arms of the Ussuri River.
The rapid development of nuclear technology and its inherent dangers have obviously convinced these mighty neighbours of the necessity to defuse the situation along their common borders, and to shift the area of their activities to the regions where the risk of direct confrontation is not so acute; South Asian sub-continent is an obvious choice. The chances of involving this region have been tremendously increased since the Russians sent their forces into Afghanistan.

Until recently the Soviet Union has been very carefully excluded from the sub-continent, basically as a direct result of the deliberate policy followed by the British Empire, in creating the buffer zones, during the last quarter of the 19th century; the Wakhan region is a good example. This is a very narrow strip (at one point only seven miles wide) occupied by the Kirghiz of Afghanistan separating Pakistani held Kashmir and the Soviet Union; and as such there does not exist a direct overland link, to the annoyance of both the Indians and the Russians, between India and the Soviet Union. China, on the other hand, is geopolitically better placed since it has common borders with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

The geopolitical characteristics of the northwestern region of the sub-continent have largely influenced the pattern of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the area. There is no denying the fact that the Soviet Union has enjoyed the Indian diplomatic support against China, but this has equally been neutralised by the close ties between China and Pakistan. To the annoyance of its neighbours Pakistan has not allowed the
transit trade either between Russia and India or between Afghanistan and India; and Pakistan at the same time dis-associated itself from Brezhnev's concept of "Collective Security". This refusal, on the part of Pakistan, has compelled the Soviet Union to rely on the distant sea routes to maintain its links with India.

The Indian pre-eminence would decisively be confirmed if and when Pakistan accepted the Brezhnev concept. Without Pakistan's co-operation, however, direct or indirect, the Indo-Soviet attempts to dominate the region, and to isolate China are likely to end in failure.

It would not be wrong to argue that if Pakistan represented Soviet Union's gateway to India, is is also the central point in the Chinese security system, for the reverse of the same argument. Pakistan as such is the crucial gap in what otherwise would be a ring of hostile powers encircling China's most vulnerable salient. Pakistan has also provided China with useful outlets to vital geostrategic regions of West Asia, and the Karakoram Highway is the most vital link. This clearly establishes the fact that China is very actively interested in the preservation of Pakistan's present territorial limits since China's security system is directly involved.

The opponents of Pakistan, in the past, have rejected the concept of "TWO NATIONS" on the basis of their paradoxical contention that the sub-continent was inhabited by one people but with different social, cultural, linguistic and religious values and affinities. These elements argued that the economic and political viability and validity of Pakistan was suspect
and highly questionable, and therefore, it was bound to disintegrate. They apparently rejoiced at the dismemberment of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971, and contended that the "Two Nations Theory" had been totally negated and demolished.

The break between East and West Pakistan did not, however, mean that Bangladesh was willing to be absorbed into India. The nascent state very vociferously proclaims its independence, an independence which can only be predicted upon its distinctive Muslim character; the Bangladeshi secularism was very short-lived, indeed. Secularism in the sense of tolerance and the rejection of theocracy is very much a part and parcel of the Islamic political culture.

The Chinese Premier, the late Chou En-Lai, stated in December 1971, "The fall of Dacca had laid completely bare the Indian expansionist's wild ambitions to annex Pakistan... the fall of Dacca is definitely not a so-called"milestone" towards victory for the Indian aggressors, but the starting point for endless strife on the South Asian sub-continent..."

The events in Bangladesh have largely substantiated the main point of the argument, and the Soviet backed victory of India over Pakistan, now looks hollow. Indian Hegemony in South Asia is once again threatened by the emerging Muslim unity. In fact, right from the outset, many Bangladeshis have accused India of exploiting their country and treating it as an Indian colony. 22

From the preceding argument it may be concluded that the raison d’etre of Pakistan has not been demolished, and

the present geopolitical disposition and the territorial limits of Pakistan have further strengthened its chances to survive as an independent political entity. Pakistan cannot be further dismembered without a massive covert or overt subversion or aggression. The present geostrategic location, size and compact territoriality of Pakistan have enhanced its chances to emerge as an important regional power.

Pakistan must make every effort to avoid taking sides in the field of power-politics, and should pursue a foreign policy which is consistent with its territorial integrity and political independence. Pakistan must not side with one great power to the detriment of its opponent. It is very heartening to note that Pakistan has eventually taken its legitimate position amongst the non-aligned nations. It is desirable to discuss in some detail, at this point in time, that India's own security and interests are very much intertwined with a strong and stable Pakistan, "India's security and interests are bound up with the issue of strong and stable neighbours; if Pakistan, Ceylon, and Nepal are weak they will not be able to withstand outside pressure."  

India was in 1947, and is today, the strongest local power; ignoring the Soviet Union and China, India could be classified as the most powerful state in the region. India is large and militarily strong, and by comparison Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal are small and weak, and there is no local balance, only India's military dominance. Precisely for this reason Pakistan, has from the beginning looked outside

23. Mrs Indira Gandhi, addressing a conference of Indian envoys from 28 Asian countries (New Delhi April, 1972)
the South Asian sub-continent for equilibrium, "In 1972 as
in 1947, tussle between centripetal and centrifugal forces,
tension about political fission and fusion, dominate the
international and internal politics of the countries of
South Asia. Politics and strategy are, closely entwined....
The geographically separated Pakistan of 1947 finally split
in 1971, and the governments of the two separate states of
Pakistan and Bangladesh are now both subject to severe tests
of their capacity to survive...."24

Peter Lyon (Strategy and South Asia: twenty five years on,
International Journal 1972) states that the end of the British
Imperial authority throughout South Asia in 1947-48 brought
in its train the dismantling of a strategic system and new
political divisions and amalgamations. In the wake of India's
dominant position he practised a strategic frontier-zone policy
based on control of the "reverse slopes" of the land frontiers.
This was simply a frontier, or zonal, much more than it was
a boundary, or linear, strategy; this policy, however, was
expressed in the term of buffer states in the areas off the
"reverse slopes" with military cantonments to their rear such
as Quetta, Peshawar and Bannu-Kohat.

He further argues that the strategic calculus of the
Himalayan region has changed so much since 1947, and India
considers the central sector as the most vulnerable section
of the Himalayan boundary and does not attach similar import-
ance to the northwest boundary whereas Pakistan regards its
common border with China in Sinkiang as a major strategic

24. Lyon, P. "Strategy and South Asia: Twenty five years on,"
International Journal, 1972, pp.334-335
and political asset. It is this area where the all important Karakoram Highway has been completed to the mutual benefit of China and Pakistan. Three empires met in the Pamirs i.e. China, India and Russia. Afghanistan was created as a buffer and the Wakhan region formed the panhandle that separated the Russian and the British Indian territory. Russia as such was regarded as the real threat.

It would be interesting to know the real Indian reaction and the degree of interest that India shows to the Russian invasion of and presence in Afghanistan. So far India has been reluctant to either condemn or criticise the Russians, on the contrary, the Indians seemed to have sympathised with the Russian position over Afghanistan. In addition, the Indians believe that the Russians are in Afghanistan at the invitation of the Afghan government and that their stay is going to be temporary, but according to the Daily Telegraph, London (28.8.1980), "Soviet forces in Afghanistan have begun a wide-ranging military construction programme, indicating an occupation lasting several years, informed sources in New Delhi reported last night....The implication of the construction program is that the Russians believe they are in for a long stay in Afghanistan....One high level analysis in New Delhi is that the Russians may eventually find that they need as many as 400,000 men in Afghanistan, almost as many as the Americans had in Vietnam when fighting there was at its peak." It would be interesting to know as to how the Indians are going to react in such a situation.

The Sino-Indian border war of October 1962, and its immediate aftermath, confirmed and polarized the trends in
great-power relations in South Asia which confirmed the developments of the late 1950's. Sino-Indian relations became deeply affected and the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai slogan was lost and forgotten. The Soviet Union chose to side with India, and in the wake of these developments the late President Ayub Khan unfolded his foreign policy objectives, "to establish normal relations with the four major powers involved in Asia without antagonising any one of them." This opened the way towards ripening friendship between Pakistan and China.

Peter Lyon clearly states that the very considerable flow of armaments both from the West and the Soviet Union after the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, was most probably the major precipitating factor in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. India used the weapons against Pakistan, although these weapons were meant to bolster its defences in the North Eastern Frontier Agency; once again these well equipped forces were used against Pakistan, especially against its eastern half, and all Pakistan's protestations fell on deaf ears, in spite of the fact that Pakistan had been given repeated assurances that no arms would be supplied to India without first consulting Pakistan (no such consultations took place), and then Pakistan was repeatedly assured that these weapons will not be used, but the fact of the matter is that India used these weapons against Pakistan, and Pakistan's allies did nothing to give any useful practical assistance.

History has taught very useful lessons to the leaders of Pakistan. All those bilateral and multilateral defensive arrangements were counter-productive, in fact, detrimental to the very interests of Pakistan. Pakistan must have strong

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