AN ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGICAL DEMARCATION

IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, WITH PARTICULAR

RESPECT TO THE PERIOD 1970-1973

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Summary

Dodd, P. C. E. (1978) An analysis of Ideological demarcation in the German Democratic Republic, with particular respect to the period 1970-1973, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Surrey. The leadership of the German Democratic Republic (DDR) has been faced with the problem of legitimising its rule. It is argued that legitimacy depends on the level of support for the ideology of the leadership, Marxism-Leninism. The acceptance of this ideology by East Germans has been hindered by affect for the liberal democracy of the Federal Republic of Germany. The concept of ideological demarcation, defined as a defence mechanism for the protection of ideological socialisation within the DDR, is the central element of the thesis. It is suggested that ideological demarcation has been principally concerned with countering the demand from East German citizens for the national unity of the two German states. The DDR leadership initially claimed that it alone represented the German nation, and, when this policy failed, proclaimed a separate East German nation. Between 1970 and 1973 the DDR emerged from its relative isolation from the Federal Republic. The function of ideological demarcation at this time is evaluated.
I am indebted to Professor Otto Pick and to Professor Roger Tilford for their supervision of this thesis, for their many valuable suggestions and comments and for their help and guidance throughout.
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Bibliography
An analysis of ideological demarcation in the German Democratic Republic, with particular respect to the period 1970-1973

Introduction

This thesis examined the role of ideological demarcation in the DDR. It is argued that a policy of ideological demarcation has been consistently pursued by the East German leadership, with the aim of countering ideological pressures, which, in the leadership's view, were likely to have a potentially destabilising effect upon the East German state.

In the case of the DDR, ideological demarcation is related to the leadership's task of nation building, which is understood in Carl J. Friedrich's terms as 'a matter of building group cohesion and group loyalty for international representation and domestic planning'. Here two factors are significant: firstly, the East German leadership has introduced and developed a Marxist-Leninist revolution within the territory under its control, based on the Soviet model. Secondly, the DDR is one of two German states established after the defeat of Nazi Germany. The citizens of the DDR and of the Federal Republic of Germany

had formerly lived within a united Germany, although time has caused the percentages of the populations of the two successor states born after these states were established to increase. The two states diverged, the one following a liberal democratic and the other a Marxist-Leninist path. However, because of continuing affect for a united Germany, and because of cross-frontier family ties, the East German leadership has found it difficult to obtain support from East German citizens. This led to what has been described as a 'Legitimationsdefizit' for the East German régime.²

The consolidation of the structural changes introduced within the DDR depended on popular support for the leadership, which in turn required the internalisation by the general population of the leadership's belief system. In Marxist-Leninist terms, a cultural revolution was required to complement these structural changes.³ Whereas in the other Eastern European states which underwent a Marxist-Leninist revolution it has been possible for each leadership to allude to patriotism and national unity to support its claims to legitimacy, this has not been so simple a matter in the DDR, since the German national question has hindered legitimation. Accordingly, official East German ideological demarcation has been directed principally and progressively against the concept of all-German unity.

² Peter Christian Ludz: Deutschlands doppelte Zukunft, Munich, 1974.

(except on terms which would have meant the establishment of an all-German Marxist-Leninist state). The ideological demarcation of the DDR leadership is understood as a defence mechanism protecting the legitimation of the leadership from the attraction of all-German unity.

The thesis suggests a general definition of demarcation, before considering specifically its East German variant. I have attempted to demonstrate that East German ideological demarcation, although not initially formulated as a conscious policy, originated in 1945 after the defeat of the Nazis, when an administration headed by German communists was set up in the Soviet zone of occupation.

The Abgrenzung campaign which was introduced in the DDR in 1970 is taken as a case study. It is argued that the causes of this campaign were to be found in the events of the previous year, when the East German leadership came under pressure to regularise its relations with the Federal Republic. Pressures for normalisation of relations between the two German states came both from the USSR, which desired this as part of its aim of legitimising the post war status quo in Europe through a European security conference, and from the Federal Republic, which wished to stop the divergence of the two states. The first high-

level governmental contacts between the two German states followed in 1970. The discussions which took place at this time made clear the opposed aims of the two states: whereas the Federal Republic wanted rapprochement with the DDR, the latter sought West German acceptance of the fact that the two states were diverging. For the DDR leadership, Abgrenzung was the opposite of Annäherung.\

There had been no diplomatic relations between the two states, and their relative isolation from each other had facilitated their growing-apart. Nevertheless, the desire for some links between the two states remained strong, if declining, among their respective populations. It is suggested that the principal purpose of the Abgrenzung campaign of 1970 was to counter any reactivated desires for all-German rapprochement among East German citizens, to persuade them that the establishment of relations with the Federal Republic did not mean any change in the leadership's German policy. After a period of intense diplomatic activity which include a four power agreement on Berlin in 1971, relations were regularised, short of full diplomatic recognition, between the two German states, in the Basic Treaty which came into force in 1973. In the same year the DDR leadership signalled the end of the Abgrenzung.

5. This opposition was stressed by Willi Stoph in Neues Deutschland on October 7th, 1970.

6. Some evidence of the desires by East and West German citizens for intra-German links may be gathered from the surveys presented by Gebhard Schweigler in Nationalbewusstsein in der BRD und in der DDR, Düsseldorf, 1973.
campaign and repeated that the German question was no longer open.7

This study concentrates on examining the nature of official East German demarcation and the pressures against which the policy was directed, in the period 1970-1973. The measures undertaken to counteract these perceived pressures will be considered. Finally, the relative success or failure of the policy will be assessed.

1. The Concept of Demarcation

i. A general definition

In initially considering demarcation in general terms, a number of types will be suggested which may serve to clarify the specific East German case. Demarcation is interpreted as an aspect of inter-group relationships. As part of his or her wider socialisation, the individual commonly identifies with one or more positive referents; the individual may, for instance, develop a sense of belonging to a tribe, city, region or nation, or to some specific interest or attitude group which forms only part of the population of a given community, but which may have adherents throughout the world. In addition, individuals may belong simultaneously to one or more groupings. However, in learning to belong, the individual also learns to differentiate, and to exclude. Thus the members of a given group may believe that the group represents their shared interests, which differ from the interests of other groups.

Here, a form of group prejudice may arise, if a group believes that its essential interests are being threatened, and, under conditions of strain, a sense of hostility towards outside groups may develop. The outward-directed hostility of the in-group may be defined as a function of its insecurity. Where the nation state is defined as a

1. For an examination of group theory, and of reference groups, see the International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Crowell Collier and Macmillan Inc., 1968.
group, and under conditions of relative security, such prejudice may be satisfied by, say, support for the national football team. On the other hand, extreme group prejudice at the level of the state may lead to war. Accordingly, demarcation is understood as the means of expressing the prejudice of the in-group; it is an attempt to set limits to the levels of cooperation with other groups, in order to protect the perceived interests of the in-group.

The various factors influencing the demarcation of one group from another may be found singly or in combinations. The forms in which demarcation expresses itself may be mainly racial (South Africa), linguistic (Belgium), religious (Northern Ireland), or, in the case of the differing interests of associations of employers and employees, economic. These examples do not exhaust the list of apparent causes of group prejudice.

The apartheid policy of the government of the Republic of South Africa is an overt form of demarcation, which is aimed at a wide-ranging differentiation between the minority groups of European origin holding power and the majority groups of non-European origin. Formerly, when there had been less fear of the non-Europeans, demarcation had existed between Afrikaners and Anglo-Saxons; the former had expressed their group prejudice through a 'laager mentality'. Today, these formerly mutually hostile European groups have combined,
without completely abandoning their mutual prejudice, in the face of what the believe to be a greater common threat from the African majority. From this example it may be concluded that the size and combination of groups may change, and that for a given subject the object may become a relatively positive rather than a relatively negative referent, and vice-versa.

What is common to most of the examples of demarcation given above is that each group wishes to preserve what it believes to be its particular culture or sub-culture. In these cases it would be possible to describe the group hostility as cultural demarcation. However, this term will be avoided because of its ambiguity. I will use the concept of ideological demarcation, defining ideology broadly in Edward Shils' terms as a 'pattern of beliefs', in the first place because the group is seen to defend what it

2. East German cultural demarcation was suggested by Linde-mann and Müller in the restricted sense of the arts. Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der DDR. Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1974. Again, in the DDR culture is either defined widely ... 'die Kultur entsteht sowohl in der ökonomischen Basis als auch im ideologischen Überbau (Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch, p. 472) - or narrowly, where it forms a section of 1978 editions of Neues Deutschland largely related to the arts. I am defining culture in the wider sense as ... 'die Gesamtheit der typischen Lebensformen einer Bevölkerung, einschließlich der sie tragenden Geistesverfassung...' (Wörterbuch der Soziologie, Stuttgart, 1969, p. 568) - interpreting 'Geistesverfassung' as the sum of values, norms and beliefs.

3. International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 7, p. 66. Alternatively, East German sources define ideology as a system of ideas. (Kleines Politisches Wörterbuch, p. 343.)
believes to be its interests, and, secondly, because the dominant ideology, Marxism-Leninism, claims to be comprehensive, and to permeate the socialist culture of the DDR.

In examining any example of demarcation two main questions may be posed: (i) Which group believes its interests to be threatened, and from where does it believe the threat comes? and (ii) How does the group define its own interests and the nature of the threat to those interests? To answer these questions briefly with respect to the DDR, the East German leadership is identified as the group which believes its interests to be threatened, and this group further claims to be threatened by pressures from the West, particularly from the Federal Republic of Germany. Secondly, the DDR leadership claims that the ideological expression of its interests is threatened by Western, and particularly West German liberal democratic ideas, which it defines in its own ideological terms as the bourgeois ideology of capitalism (or imperialism). These answers must be qualified as follows:

1. East German ideological demarcation has to be considered within the framework of a European cleavage between the Eastern and Western power blocs, led by the USSR and the USA respectively. The former similarly views the East-

4. For an East German definition of socialist culture see Kulturpolitisches Wörterbuch, Berlin (East), 1970, pp. 320-324.
West opposition in ideological terms as a contest between socialism and imperialism. In formulating its policies the DDR recognises Soviet ideological preeminence.

2. As within other states, the DDR leadership claims to represent and act on behalf of the whole population. The state represents a peculiar form of grouping, in that its leadership claims a monopoly of force within the area it administers. With the founding of the DDR its rulers, although possessing the capability to enforce their will, had to gain the support of the general population for their policies, and ultimately for the ideology motivating these policies, if they wished to achieve legitimacy.

3. Legitimation was hindered by the feeling of belonging together (Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl) which was widely shared by the populations of the two German states. This expressed itself in the form of a demand for the unity of the German nation. Both states claimed to be the sole representative of the German nation, and each denied the legitimacy of the other. In the early 1970s the DDR integrated the national question within its ideological system by developing a class-based two nation theory.
The international framework within which East German demarcation operates was originally determined by factors outside the control of either German state. After the second world war, Soviet power had extended physically into the middle of Germany. The USSR was and remains greatly concerned with the security of its Western frontiers, and with the stabilisation and legitimisation of its enlarged sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe. In its desire for security the USSR demarcated this area from the West through an iron curtain. Initially, the USA did not accept the post-war expansion of Soviet influence in Europe. The Cold War developed, and the two parts of Germany found themselves divided by a general East-West demarcation. Given the ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, it might be argued that the pattern of future demarcation was set before the end of hostilities, when the frontiers of the American, British and Soviet zones of occupation were agreed.

The territories which came under Soviet military occupation were subjected to a policy of coordination. Among the Eastern European allies of the USSR, the extent of their adoption of Soviet models and of policy coordination may be judged from the communiqués issued at the
international meetings of the Moscow-oriented Marxist-Leninist ruling parties, from the proceedings of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the Political-Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and other regional bodies, and also by noting the similarities of constitutions, party programmes and party statutes of the Eastern European states to those of the Soviet Union.

Coordination on the Soviet pattern was imposed within the Soviet Zone of Germany. In April 1945 a ready-made elite of German communists, the 'Ulbricht Group', was flown in from Moscow to direct the preparations for the civilian administration of the Soviet Zone. Demarcation developed soon after the Nazi capitulation, when the four zones of occupation 'came to resemble independant countries, with frontiers almost impassible for men and materials alike'. The division and divergence of the Western and Eastern parts of Germany continued with the currency reform introduced in 1948 in the three Western zones, to which the USSR responded by stopping interzonal traffic and starting the Berlin blockade, with the founding of the two German states in the following year, with their subsequent remilitarisation and integration into the Western or Eastern power bloc, and with the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

In view of the manner in which the DDR is ruled, the DDR leadership may be considered to be practically identical with the SED leadership. Decision-making within the higher party organs was regulated according to the principles of inner-party democracy and democratic centralism. Party control of the state was based on the Soviet model, with the lines of authority extending downward from the central to the regional and local levels, and, at each level, control was extended horizontally over the equivalent representative and executive bodies. Party control at all levels was strengthened through the Nomenklatur system, again borrowed from Soviet experience, through which party cadres were placed in key positions. From 1949 the mechanisms of control were further perfected by the introduction of the Soviet-type system of voting for a single list of approved candidates for representative bodies.6

The DDR differs from the Soviet Union in that, although perhaps de facto, it is not de jure a one party state. From 1945 the policy was to colonise rather than to prohibit non-communist parties, which were however forced to join in an 'anti-fascist bloc', under communist domination. Moreover, those leaders of the non-communist

6. A detailed exposition of the methods of control in the DDR is given in the fourth section of a book by Georg Brunner: Kontrolle in Deutschland, Cologne, 1972, pp. 359-506.
parties whose behaviour displeased the Soviet military administration were removed. The anti-fascist bloc became an umbrella organisation, a 'transmission belt' for mobilising support for the DDR leadership, and came to include not only all political parties, but all mass organisations, such as the trade unions (FDGB) and the SED youth movement (FDJ). Within the bloc, the KPD merged with the East German SPD to form the SED, which, at its first congress in January 1949, overtly became a Marxist-Leninist 'Partei Neuen Types'. In the same year the bloc was renamed 'Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland'. It was the Nationale Front, rather than the SED, which became responsible for the mobilisation of support at house and street level. The name of this organisation was significant; one DDR source described it as the 'Sprecher der patriotischen Kräfte in ganz Deutschland'. However, its function of mobilising support within the DDR was more effective than its effect upon the West German population. The organisation's role was defined by the same source as follows:

The Nationale Front '...stützte sich auf das Zusammenwirken der Parteien, bezog jetzt aber auch viele politisch nicht organisierte Bürger, darunter bisher abseits stehende Kreise aus dem Bürgertum, der Intelligenz sowie ehemalige Mitglieder der NSDAP und frühere Offiziere der Hitlerwehrmacht, die keine Kriegsverbrechen begangen hatten, ein.'


It might also be noted that it was the Nationale Front, rather than the SED, which was responsible for the preparation of election manifestos and the organisation of a single list of candidates for representative bodies.  

Having consolidated its control, the leadership sought legitimacy from the East German population. The formal but dubious legitimacy conferred by electoral participation and Volkskammer majorities in favour of the Nationale Front of almost 100% was not enough.  

An East German source of 1973 claimed that the founding of the DDR had been legitimised in law by putting into effect the provisions of the Potsdam agreement, and had been historically legitimised by making the goals for which progressive forces in Germany had long fought the law of the land (Staatsgesetz).

However, these claims to legitimacy had to be substantiated. The legitimization of state power implied the replacement of coercion by persuasion, and the general acceptance of the authority of the leadership. In Etzioni's terms, the need was to move from coercive to

9. Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschland, pp. 130-146.

10. See, for example the results of the 1971 Volkskammer elections, where 98.48% of the electorate voted, and the Nationale Front gained 99.85% of the votes cast. Die Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 6. Wahlperiode, Berlin (East), 1972, pp. 765-785.

remunerative power, and then to normative power, with the predominance of the latter indication the general achievement of legitimacy. Coercive power alone might become self-defeating, and hinder legitimation.

From the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, legitimation might be interpreted as a progression from the dictatorship of the proletariat to the state of all the people, where public self-administration would eventually lead to the withering away of the state. In other terms, legitimacy would be achieved when the belief system of the leadership was internalised by the majority of the population, with coercive power remaining in the background as an ultimate sanction against deviant minorities.

Public self-administration might be defined in non-Marxist-Leninist terms as a situation where the citizens of a state follow without direct supervision the policies of the leadership. To return to Etzioni's matrix, three levels of involvement might be seen: (i) alienative involvement, through fear of sanctions, (ii) calculative involvement, and (iii) moral involvement through identification with the


13. Programma kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soyuza, Moscow, 1961, pp. 100-102. Klaus and Buhr categorise three periods in the development of the socialist state. Philosophisches Wörterbuch, pp. 1164-1165. A further source described the third period as the state of all the people which, it was claimed, had only been reached by the USSR. Wörterbuch zum sozialistischen Staat, Berlin (East), 1974, p. 301.
leadership's policies, as a result of the internalisation of the belief system which motivates these policies. The third level would represent the highest degree of legitimacy. With the internalisation of the leadership's ideology, support for the leadership might become self-regulating. The internalisation of the official ideology by the individual might also imply a form of self-censorship, in that the selection and classification of information might also become self-regulating. In the case of Marxist-Leninist ideology, this would suggest that both processes might be influenced by the theory of antagonistic classes, the socialist/bourgeois cleavage. Given that Marxism-Leninism views socialism and capitalism as opposites, it may be understood how this would tend to facilitate a self-regulating ideological demarcation among committed supporters of DDR official ideology.

Within those states where the leadership enjoys a high and stable level of diffuse support, the dominant ideology tends to be considered uncontroversial, and to be taken as given. Under such conditions ideology may come to be considered unimportant, or irrelevant, because of its implicit nature. This I would consider to be the main reason for the mistaken claim of the 'end of ideology' in the Western world.14

Conversely, continual explicit references to the role of ideology are characteristic of Marxist-Leninist states, including the DDR, as a motivation for the planned transformation of the state; it is argued that the revolution only begins when power is assumed, being accompanied by a cultural revolution. Ideological demarcation expresses itself in the constant reference to the perceived threat from the ideology of capitalism. The concern for ideological rectitude was explained by Rüdiger Thomas as follows:

'Da die SED als die bestimmnde gesellschaftliche Instanz ihre Politik durch die Prinzipien des als 'wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung' begriffenen Marxismus-Leninismus legitamiert, ist sie permanent benötigt, ihr eigenes Handeln als konsequente Verwirklichung einer vorgegebenen ideologischen Programmatik Einsichtig werden zu lassen, die ihrerseits in veränderten realgeschichtlichen Situationen jeweils neu zu definieren ist'. 15

In this was the DDR leadership is a prisoner of its own ideology, since an attack on the ideology is an attack on the leadership. Again, reversals of policy have caused problems, since both the old and new policies have to be ideologically justified. This has often been done not by argument, but by the use of a convenient quotation from Marx or Lenin. The danger was that these authors would become treated as infallible deities, rather than thinkers, leading to what Ludz described as the 'Leerformelhaftigkeit' of official ideology.

Since the leadership's claim to legitimacy was derived from Marxism-Leninism, legitimation depended on the successful socialisation of the general population into that ideology. This was facilitated by the leadership's control of the education system and of the internal mass media. The importance of the education system for the leadership was shown by the dismissal of all teachers who had been associated with the Nazis, whether actively or passively, and their replacement by ideologically reliable but pedagogically untrained Neulehrer. The strict selection and control of teachers\(^ {17} \) might be contrasted with the wide appeal for cooperation with the government made by the Nationale Front to all former Nazis who were not war criminals.

The main hindrance to the legitimation of the DDR leadership was the question of the German nation. In the DDR national sentiment was dysfunctional, since it was shared by the citizens of both German states. East Germans tended to take the Federal Republic as a reference point, and compare it with the DDR, to the latter's disadvantage. In an attempt to check the attraction of the Federal Republic, the DDR leadership had felt obliged to follow a more intense demarcation policy that was the case with its Eastern European allies.

\(^ {17} \) Note the strict control of East German teachers shown by the section: Aufgaben, Pflichten und Rechte of the current conditions of employment for teachers in the DDR. Arbeitsordnung für pädagogische Kräfte. Sozialistisches Bildungsrecht. Volksbildung. Berlin, 1973, pp. 168-170.
The difficulties caused by West German attraction were increased by the fact that the DDR leadership, to a far greater extent than its Eastern European neighbours, did not enjoy a monopoly of information. With the exception of the Dresden area and the extreme North-East, most parts of the DDR can receive West German television transmissions, and all areas can receive radio broadcasts from the Federal Republic. Television has been used by West German politicians to appeal directly to DDR citizens. Moreover, the two West German radio stations which broadcast internationally, Deutsche Welle and Deutschlandfunk, have the statutory duty of broadcasting to the DDR. It was generally not possible for the DDR to jam programmes which were intended to be heard or seen within the Federal Republic.

18. Lothar Loewe: Abends kommt der Klassenfeind, Frankfurt/M, 1977, p. 47. The title was taken from an official DDR slogan: 'Abends um 19 Uhr kommt der Klassenfeind ins Wohnzimmer'.

19. See, for example, Kiesinger's speech on German unity of September 1967, which began: 'Meine lieben Landsleute in beiden Teilen Deutschlands!' Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 1, pp. 158-159. In addition, Loewe (p. 102) mentioned that the West German television channel ARD had arranged to broadcast Wolf Biermann's Cologne concert on November 19th, 1976, at 10.25 in the evening, the best time for reception in the DDR. On January 24th, 1978, the presenter of the ARD programme, Report, which reviewed the anti-leadership manifesto published in Der Spiegel in January, declared that, if what he was doing was interference in the internal affairs of the DDR, he accepted the charge.

The result of the influence of the West German electronic media has been to cause the official East German interpretation of events to be argued more convincingly than elsewhere in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{21} The suppression of internal news has become almost impossible since West German newsmen were permitted to be stationed in the DDR.

A distinction might be made between ideological demarcation in the restricted sense - as a defense mechanism against dysfunctional ideas and beliefs - and the physical demarcation, the control over persons and goods, which is represented in an extreme form by the Berlin Wall. However, it is argued that these defence measures are ultimately expressions of ideological demarcation, since they were ideologically motivated.

\textsuperscript{21} Note, for example, Karl-Eduard von Schnitzler's programme on DDR television, which shows and then comments on extracts from West German television.
2. East German ideological demarcation in the wider East-West context

The demarcation policy followed by the DDR leadership against external pressures which are believed to hinder the international and domestic legitimation of the DDR operates on two levels: firstly, there is a specific demarcation directed against real or imaginary dysfunctional influences from the Federal Republic, and, secondly, a more general demarcation may be identified, against the West. Here the DDR forms part of the Eastern European power bloc, led by the USSR, which has put into practice a collective demarcation policy against Western pressures which are believed to threaten the stability of the socialist camp. These two levels of East German demarcation are linked, since the rivalry between the two German states has lain at the centre of the conflict of interest between the two super powers, supported by their respective allies, in Europe. This chapter examines East German ideological demarcation at the wider, international level.

This view of the relations between the two power blocs in Europe is somewhat over-simplified, since it ignores the possibilities of intra-bloc disagreements. However, the DDR leadership had particular interest in bloc cohesion, in view of its instability, which had largely
resulted from its cultural proximity to the Federal Republic, and by the general withholding of international recognition, outside of the Eastern bloc, before the Basic Treaty between the two German states was signed in 1972.

For the greater part of the post war period Soviet policy towards the Federal Republic had appeared to accord with that of the DDR, but the DDR leadership nevertheless had to face the possibility that the interests of the USSR and of the other people's democracies might diverge from those of the DDR. Two examples are given which may have served to justify the insecurity of the DDR leadership; there were the unsubstantiated rumours current in the 1950s that the Soviet Union may have been prepared to consider an 'Austrian solution' for Germany1 - i.e., to sacrifice the East German Marxist-Leninist state in exchange for all-German neutrality. Secondly, in the second half of the 1960s, when the Federal Republic introduced its new policy towards Eastern Europe, the DDR feared that its allies might enter into agreements with the Federal Republic, without insisting on concessions favourable to the DDR as a prerequisite for such agreements.2 The weakness of the DDR leadership's internal control was made clear by the internal disturbances of 1953, where

1. This claim was made by Isaac Deutscher. Russia, China and the West, 1953-1966, Oxford, 1970.
Soviet armed support was required to restore order.\textsuperscript{3}

The USSR was responsible for the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist state in its zone of occupation in Germany. Further, as the dominant member of the Eastern bloc, it has exercised the greatest influence upon the wider demarcation policy of the DDR. Accordingly, the nature of Soviet ideological demarcation will be considered briefly before examining its influence upon the DDR policy. At the strategic, aspirational level, the Soviet Union has claimed that its actions have been governed by Marxist-Leninist principles, from which the Soviet leadership, like that of the DDR, derives its legitimacy.

In accord with the historical determinism of Marx's Communist Manifesto, the Soviet leadership claims that the whole world will inevitably come to live under a communist system. However, at the tactical, operational level, this world view may be modified by the short term needs of state security. In early Soviet history, examples of this phenomenon may be seen in the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the New Economic Policy. Similarly, there was a certain ambivalence in Soviet policy towards the belligerents on both sides. The USSR was ideologically consistent in categorising both Nazi Germany, on the one

hand, and the USA and the United Kingdom, on the other, as capitalist states, and in distinguishing between the bourgeois leaderships of these states and their working class general populations. For short term reasons of state the Soviet Union cooperated with the Third Reich, in order to avoid or delay a possible Nazi invasion, and, when the Nazis had invaded the USSR, the latter joined the Western allies in an anti-Hitler coalition. But for ideological reasons Soviet cooperation with the Western powers was conditional, and ceased after the Nazi capitulation.

The conflict of interests between the Soviet Union and the Western powers after the second world war resulted from the Soviet desire to secure the frontiers of the European territories it had occupied, which conflicted with the American aim of removing Soviet influence from these territories. Super power conflict first manifested itself in Europe in the series of Berlin crisis which began in 1948. Perhaps, as shown by its ambivalent attitude towards its Western allies during the war, the USSR was more aware of potential ideological disagreement than were the Western powers. The differing interpretations of the democratisation of Nazi Germany, as laid down at Potsdam in 1945, would suggest that the conflict of interests between the two sides was ultimately ideological in nature.
The Soviet Union viewed its security problem in Central Europe in ideological terms, as a contest between capitalism and socialism. In accord with the dialectical method of reasoning characteristic of Marxism-Leninism, they were considered mutually exclusive. The dangers of nuclear war were recognised in the Soviet party programme of 1961, which claimed that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the USSR had contributed to the maintenance of peace, since it could no longer be attacked with impunity. The programme declared that the fundamental question of the time was the question of war and peace, and that imperialism was the sole source of the danger of war.

i. Peaceful coexistence

Having emerged from its pre-war relative isolation, the USSR found itself with the responsibilities of a global power, as the leader of the Eastern European states which it had caused to be established on Marxist-Leninist principles after the war. The interests of the USSR came into conflict with those of the USA and its allies in Europe. In order to avoid the danger of war through the opposed interests of the two super powers, to avoid moving from cold war to hot war, some level of understanding between the two powers was necessary.


5. Ibid, p. 57.
It might be argued that it was easier for the Soviet Union to stabilise its relations with the USA than was the case in the opposite direction. Here the dialectical training of the Soviet Union was heuristically advantageous. Marxism-Leninism tended to regard conflict between opposites as the norm, and, as shown by Soviet behaviour towards the belligerents in the second world war, it was possible for the leadership to make a clear distinction between military and ideological conflict. Conversely, as Brzezinski and Huntington have pointed out, the American political system operated on compromise, and fundamental cleavages tended to produce crises. Thus, after the USA came to realise that the behaviour of its former ally was not subject to compromise, the reaction of some American statesmen, particularly John Foster Dulles, was to view the USSR in fundamentalist religious terms, as the embodiment of evil.

For the Soviet Union, the attempt to avoid a fight situation in its relations with the United States and its allies was justified in ideological terms by the 'Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems'. In the post war period this policy has been consistently quoted and elaborated by the Soviet Union and its allies, including the DDR.


The 1961 CPSU programme declared that peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states was an objective necessity in the development of human society, and that war could not and must not serve as a means of solving international disputes. It was further claimed that history had posed the question of peaceful coexistence or a catastrophic war. However, if the West were to start another war, the peoples of the world would sweep away and bury imperialism.

The Soviet view of international conflict resolution was explained in the party programme as follows:

'Peaceful coexistence proposes: the rejection of war as a means of solving questions in dispute between states, and their settlement by negotiations; equality of rights, mutual understanding and trust between states, taking each other's interests into account; non-interference in the internal affairs (of other states - P.D.), the recognition that each person has the exclusive right to decide all questions affecting its country; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; the development of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage.'

On the face of it, the above quotation appears to advocate a form of conflict resolution similar to Rapoport's concept of a debate situation. However, since the early history of the USSR, when a dual foreign policy was conducted by Narkomindel and the Comintern, Soviet policy towards capitalist states has simultaneously aimed at day to day cooperation with the governments of those


states, while supporting some groups within those states which wished to achieve internal socialist revolutions. The rejection of war and the offers of economic and cultural cooperation contained in the policy of peaceful coexistence did not mean 'a weakening of the ideological struggle', in the words of the programme, where it was further declared:

'Peaceful coexistence serves as a basis for peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism on an international scale and is a specific form of the class struggle between them... Under conditions of peaceful coexistence more favourable possibilities are created for the struggle of the working class in capitalist countries...' 9

I would view peaceful coexistence as the generalised form of ideological demarcation practised by the Soviet Union and its allies against the West. It was made clear that cooperation between East and West does not affect the ideological conflict between the two world systems, a conflict whose outcome is believed by the Marxist-Leninist states to be historically determined in their favour. On the contrary, it is argued that peaceful coexistence is the means of facilitating the ideological struggle, by allowing it to proceed under conditions of relatively stable relations between the two blocs. It is in this light that Soviet proposals for normalising relations in Europe, and, more specifically, East German proposals for

the normalisation of relations between the two German states, must be considered. Peaceful coexistence is an expression of ideological demarcation because it claims that the ideological differences between East and West are irreconcilable.

The SED programme of 1963 repeated the definition of peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism, and continued that '... dieser Kampf wird als ökonomischer, politischer und geistig-kultureller Wettstreit zwischen den beiden entgegengesetzten Systemen ausgetragen, auch in Deutschland.'10 From this it appeared that peaceful coexistence offered both conflict and cooperation, particularly in the economic and cultural spheres. It was to be conditional cooperation, carefully regulated in order not to exercise a negative influence upon the competition between the two systems. Because of the thinking of the leaderships of the Marxist-Leninist states, all areas of life are claimed to be influenced by the dominant ideology. Again, as Picaper has suggested,11 there may be a tendency for these leaderships to assume that there is a similar centralised control, which is consciously ideologically motivated, in the Western states. This may explain why the leaderships

of the Eastern European people's democracies sometimes appear to infer pressures upon the ideological stability of their states from economic and cultural exchanges which are apparently neutral. Such inferences may be justified by the suggestion that the citizens of the Western states have successfully internalised the dominant ideologies of their states, that they are unconscious bearers of liberal democratic ideology.

The need for ideological demarcation was of more immediate importance for the DDR than for the Soviet Union. In the latter case the problem was rather one of stabilising Soviet control in the newly occupied territories, which formed a buffer zone between the USSR and the West. The ideological demarcation to which Soviet citizens were subjected in some ways resembled the operation of the 'official ideology' of Nicholas I in the early 19th century; in both cases the introduction of dysfunctional information from the West was hindered by physical distance and by differences in culture and language. Moreover, Marxist-Leninists had controlled Russia since 1917. Here it was a question of maintaining an ideological status quo, whereas in the DDR the ideological socialisation of the population, on which the leadership's legitimacy depended, had been practised for a much shorter time, and had been accepted by a relatively lower percentage of the population.
The apparent contradiction between cooperation and conflict contained in peaceful coexistence was resolved by the DDR leadership in the cultural sphere through a policy of cultural demarcation, where cultural exchanges, both in the Federal Republic and in other Western states, were used for political ends.\textsuperscript{12} The DDR also appeared to have been relatively successful in separating economic cooperation with the West from any ideological contamination. In particular, the trade links beneficial to the DDR were expressly excluded from the area of ideological conflict.\textsuperscript{13}

The economic reforms introduced by Ulbricht from 1963 appeared to place efficiency before ideology, by giving greater importance to monetary controls.\textsuperscript{14} On the other hand, Philip Windsor noted that the DDR had reproached Czechoslovakia and Hungary for permitting the development of pluralism within their societies, as a consequence of economic reforms based on the theories of the Soviet economist Liberman.\textsuperscript{15}

\begin{itemize}
\item[12.] Hans Lindemann/Kurt Müller: \textit{Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der DDR}, Bonn-Bad Godesberg, 1974
\item[13.] Note Stoph's neutral comment on intra-German trade at the 13th SED plenum of June 1970. \textit{Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik}, Vol. 5, p. 308.
\end{itemize}
It is argued that the ideological demarcation of the Warsaw Treaty member states was directed against the introduction of dysfunctional information from the West. This process was described by the USSR and its allies as 'ideological sabotage', leading to 'ideological subversion'. Greater stress began to be placed on this factor in the early 1960s, with the move from cold war to détente, when nuclear confrontation began to be increasingly modified by the mutual desire of the two super powers to control the growth of thermo-nuclear weapons.

An East German article of 1973, which was typical of the collective Eastern European viewpoint, claimed to explain the reasons why the United States had begun its policy of détente. It was argued that the USA had been obliged to abandon its doctrine of strategic superiority as a result of changes in the international balance of power 'zugunsten des Sozialismus'. The article analysed the concept of national interest as allegedly perceived by the American dominant élite, and suggested that the national interest of the USA was divided into three elements; the protection of territorial frontiers, the protection of the socio-political status quo in the USA and the maintenance and creation of international relations which were favourable to the development of American capitalism. It was argued

further that the role played by military power in the safeguarding of the American national interest was becoming less effective, that the second inaugural speech of President Nixon, delivered on January 20th, 1973, had represented a change in the American leadership's perception of the national interest, by suggesting competition through the force of ideas rather than of arms - i.e., that he was proposing arrangements somewhat similar to peaceful coexistence.

A further East German source of 1969 had suggested that American policy was being pursued by ideological rather than military means, under the changed conditions of détente. It was declared:


The suggestion might be raised here that ideological sabotage is the Western contribution to the 'geistig-kultureller Wettstreit', which the 1963 SED programme claimed was a part of peaceful coexistence. However, the ideological filters which conditioned the thought

ii. Convergence and allied theories

The Moscow oriented people's democracies maintained that socialism and capitalism were irreconcilable. Moreover, for reasons of legitimacy they claimed that only their own brand of Marxism-Leninism was valid, categorising other forms of socialism as left or right opportunism, and firmly declaring that social democracy - or social democratism, as DDR sources called it - was a form of bourgeois ideology. Accordingly, the theories of the industrial society, which was claimed to show common traits in both its socialist and capitalist form, and of the convergence of the two systems, associated with the names of such writers as Galbraith, Sorokin and Tinbergen, which began to gain currency in the West from the end of the 1950s, were viewed in Eastern Europe as a particularly dangerous form of ideological subversion, since they appeared to reject the Marxist-Leninist class-based differentiation between the two systems. In its original form convergence theory claimed that the industrialised countries in both East and West would, in the course of technological development, be obliged to follow similar patterns of economic

19. For a detailed East German analysis of the development of convergence theory and its relationship to the theory of the industrial society see Günther Rose: "Industriegesellschaft" und Konvergenztheorie, Berlin (East), 1974. Rose examined the development of these theories both in the international and the intra-German context.
processes of the official commentators of the Eastern bloc did not permit this conclusion to be drawn. It is possible to argue a good/bad distinction between the propaganda of the two sides, the one being 'gesetzmäßig' and 'parteilich', and the other 'counter-revolutionary', provided that one accepts the value-loaded terminology in which the Eastern European case is presented. If a distinction which is not expressed in value-loaded terms is attempted, it is perhaps that the former is largely defensive, and the latter largely offensive, and that both have the aim of influencing the citizens of the people's democracies.

The preservation of the official ideology is of vital importance for the stability of the Eastern European people's democracies. Since the leaderships of these states claim that the 'scientific' principles of Marxism-Leninism, as interpreted by themselves, offer them the sole correct guide to action and interpretation of events, then any attack on their belief system and any alternative ideology will tend to be interpreted by the rulers and ruled as a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the former. This is one reason why the reactions in the Eastern bloc to Western propaganda have been greater than any Western reactions to Marxism-Leninism, and this ideology is generally freely and legally propagated in the West.
and social organisation, which might eventually produce a convergence of their political systems. In some versions of the theory it was argued that these political systems would converge towards a type of liberal democracy. Convergence theory has been applied particularly to comparative studies of the United States and the Soviet Union. The theory would appear to be based on principles similar to the Marxist concept of base and superstructure, if the organisation of the economy were equated with the base and the political system with the superstructure, for both Marxist and convergence theory suggested that the one influenced the other. This might explain why Brzezinski and Huntington described convergence theory as 'anti-Soviet Marxism'.

Convergence theory further suggested that industrialisation would result in growing pluralism and diversity within a given society, so that within the people's democracies each ruling party would lose its power of direction, and would be obliged to assume the role of a mediator between competing interests. It might be argued that differing views between party theorists, military and economic specialists are as inevitable in the East as in the West, but in precise signs of disagreement tend to be excluded from the official media of the Marxist-Leninist states, as if disagreement meant weakness, the leading role of the

ruling party is constantly stressed, and pluralism is con-
demned as 'eine Klasse idealistischer Weltanschauung',
which denies 'das Wirken allegemeingültiger Gesetzmäßig-
keiten'.

In addition, convergence theory claimed that the increa-
sing affluence produced by industrialisation would lead to
a decline in the importance of ideology (Entideologisierung),
within both camps. This appeared to suggest that the prin-
ciples upon which the Eastern European ruling elites
based their legitimacy would cease to be important. And
worse still, Brzezinski and Huntington declared that the
Chinese communists, who also claimed to be the leaders
of Marxism-Leninism, were accusing the USSR of convergence
with the West.

One way in which economic convergence between East and
West might be argued is by comparing Eastern European
command economies with the growth of the state sector
of the economy in most Western countries - state monopoly
capitalism, in Marxist-Leninist terms. In a East German
definition of state monopoly capitalism it was declared

p. 652ff.

22. Political power: USA/USSR, p. 9. See also an East
German critique of Maoism as a 'kleinbürgerlich ver-
wurzelte politisch-ideologische Strömung'in Philo-
sophisches Wörterbuch, ed. Georg Klaus/Manfred Buhr,

that, as the privately owned economies of the capitalist states became more complicated through the application of advanced technology and the growth of monopolies, enormous investments in science, research and education were required, which the private owners were unable to provide. These investments, it was argued, were found through taxation by the state in the interests of monopoly capitalism. State monopoly capitalism meant the end of free competition and the replacement of liberal democracy by a form of totalitarian domination.

But was not the expropriation of private industry during the initial phase of the revolution in Marxist-Leninist states, the dictatorship of the proletariat, also a form of totalitarian domination? Did not each ruling party aspire to total control of all areas of society? Here the Marxist-Leninist answer would be that it was a dictatorship of the proletariat rather than of the bourgeoisie.

This distinction - in whose interests? - was one of the main arguments used in the attempt to refute convergence theory. An article by Kurt Zeisler declared that there was a 'cardinal theoretical error' in the Western concept of the industrial society and of the early forms of convergence theory, because, '... while on the one hand they

(Western theorists - P.D.) construe a causality between the development of the productive forces and the superstructure of society, they on the other hand largely ignore the significance of the social and economic basis for the character of the social system, i.e. the relations of production and the basic question of who owns the decisive means of production'.

In defining a 'theory of current imperialist strategy', which had allegedly resulted from a change in the world balance of power to the benefit of the socialist countries, Zeisler had noted that early convergence theory had been found wanting in the West by Brzezinski and Huntington. Zeisler argued that they had only condemned its most obvious illusions, and thereby propounded 'a more flexible but also more aggressive variation of the convergence theory'. Brzezinski and Huntington had predicted evolution (or erosion), rather than convergence, having declared that '... in reality, most convergence theories postulate not a convergence of the systems, but the downfall of the other system...' Such thinking would appear especially relevant to the relations between the two German states, and throw some light on East German suspicions of rapprochement and 'bridge-building' with the Federal Republic, seeing this as an attempt to annex the DDR.
According to Zeisler, imperialist strategy was clearly based on a counter-revolutionary model of evolution, and had tried to avoid the previous error of underestimating questions of political power and the role of production relationships, when investigating social developments in the people's democracies. He claimed that there was the possibility of a cultural lag in the social consciousness of the producer in a socialist society under conditions of rapid change, with the danger of the reactivation of 'petit bourgeois' modes of thinking on account of the upheavals caused by change. The aims of current imperialist strategy further included the 'de-ideologisation' of the people's democracies, the elimination of the leading role of the ruling party, Zeisler argued, with the growth of pluralism, the destruction of democratic centralism and the end of centralised planning. He declared that the counter-revolutionary process would begin in the super-structure and then extend to the production relationships at the base.

A further East German writer, Herbert Meißner, linked convergence theory with ideological sabotage, declared that, after the rethinking which had led to the new Ostpolitik, Western Soviet and Eastern European specialists had come to accept the socialist system as historically

25. Herbert Meißner, Konvergenztheorie und Realität.
legitimate, and that the main tactical thrust of their argument was now aimed at improving socialism. This was to be seen in the proposals for 'market socialism', 'humane (menschlich) socialism', 'democratic socialism', 'liberal socialism' and so on.

While appearing to understand the concern of some Western specialists as well-meaning, but misguided, such developments were condemned by Meißner:

'Bei manchen progressiven bürgerlichen Intellektuellen mögen solche Überlegungen über die Weiterentwicklung des sozialistischen Systems sogar durchaus ehrlich gemeint sein. Gesellschaftlich relevant wird aber nicht ihre gute Absicht, sondern ihre im Prinzip antisozialistische Tendenz. Hier wird das Gesetz der ideologischen Integration wirksam, nach welchem Auffassungen progressive Autoren, die nicht völlig den Interessen der Monopolbourgeoisie entsprechen, aber auf der Grundlage bürgerlicher Ideologie und Weltanschauung aufbauen, in das reaktionäre Gesamtsystem des Imperialismus integriert werden. Grundsatzzlich sind all die theoretischen Bemühungen um eine Verbesserung des Sozialismus ein Ausdruck jener neuen Methoden des ideologischen Kampfes, die als ideologische Diversion zu bezeichnen sind.' 26

When condemning these attempts to modify socialism, it is likely than Meißner had in mind not only 'progressive bourgeois intellectuals', but also the proposals for reform from within the socialist camp, and especially the Czechoslovak experiment which was stopped in 1968. In this connection it would seem useful to examine the views of Ota Šik, an economist who had formerly been a member of

the Dubček administration, and who now lives in Switzerland. Šik suggested a 'third way' between socialism and capitalism. In his book, 'der Dritte Weg', he called for a democratic, humane socialism which rejected the fundamental principles of communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the one-party system, state ownership of industry and dirigiste central planning. The workers who had suffered under capitalism became even less free after the revolution; socialist ownership of property was defined as a 'staatsmonopolistische Aneignungsweise'.

Šik saw conservative forces on both sides. The black-and-white positions of the dogmatists of capitalism and communism were claimed to be on the same methodological plane:

'Die konservativen Ideologen beider Seiten ... werden vor allem den Theoretiker verfolgen, der versucht, diese Kluft innerhalb einer Wissenschaft zu überbrücken. Wie den konservativen Politikern beider Seiten geht es ihnen vor allem um die Erhaltung ihres Reiches - diesen um ihr geistiges, den anderen um ihr sehr materielles politisches Reich. Trotz heftiger gegenseitiger Bekämpfung werden sich die Vertreter der entgegengesetzten Systeme jeweils mit der Existenz der Ideologie des anderen so weit abfinden, als ihr eigenes Reich dabei unangetastet bleibt. In diesen Sinn werden daher konservative Ideologen beider Systeme einander in einer Hinsicht sehr gut verstehen: in ihrer Verteufelung aller Reformer und aller Konvergenz-Ideen. Solche Ideen untergraben ihre Machtpositionen und sind viel gefährlicher als die alten gegnerischen Ideen, die man schließlich recht zuverlässig unterdrückt und totgeschwiegen hat.'


29. Der Dritte Weg, p. 15.
Whereas Šik had his long experience as a member of a ruling communist party on which to base his judgement of the attitudes of party theorists towards convergence theory and proposals for reform, the extent to which it could be claimed that this situation was paralleled in the West was doubtful. Party theorists do not have the same standing and influence in the West, convergence theory was the creation of Western political theorists, and may now be discredited by some writers, but it is not officially condemned as anathema. However, Šik could argue that some radical critics and would-be reformers have been persecuted in the West, if one includes not only the liberal democracies but also the dictatorships included under the heading of capitalist states. But within the liberal democracies leading the Western bloc radicals are more likely to be valued as original thinkers, as happened to the socialist Šik in capitalist Switzerland. No radical thinker in the liberal democracies was ever subjected to the treatment which Rudolf Bahro received in 1977 from the East German authorities.

Although the leaderships of the people's democracies have been hostile to internal or external attempts to challenge the ideological bases of their legitimacy, some ideological evolution, under party control, has taken place since Stalin's death. The stagnation and emptiness of Stalinist official ideology has to some extent been
complemented by new theories which have taken account of the growth of the social sciences, especially systems and information theory.

These developments in the social sciences would appear to offer both potential advantages and disadvantages to the party leaderships; it was therefore important that the introduction of social science-based theories should be under party control. The economic reforms associated with Liberman, which were first introduced in the DDR in 1963 in the New Economic System of Planning and Control (NÖS), might be viewed as a means of attaining greater economic efficiency - or as a step towards the reintroduction of a capitalist market economy. Events in Czechoslovakia, where economic and political reform went hand in hand, might be seen by the party leaderships as a warning.

I would suggest that Ulbricht, often wrongly portrayed as the most Stalinist of the Eastern European party leaders, had been remarkably successful in controlling and furthering the process of ideological adaptation within the DDR, sometimes himself formulating concepts which differed from those of his allies.30 On the one

hand contacts with the West were more strictly limited after 1961 than was the case with the other Eastern European states, and a close ideological uniformity had been maintained in the media and education system; on the other hand, the concept of inner-party democracy had been interpreted to permit some freedom of discussion on fundamental issues among restricted and trusted groups. An example of this was seen in a 1964 symposium on the effects of technological change upon the official ideology, where differing viewpoints were presented.\(^31\)

Ernst Richert suggested that the permitting of some expression of differing views followed Kádár's dictum: 'wer nicht wider uns ist, ist für uns'.\(^32\) Again, Peter Christian Ludz has written of DDR 'institutionalised revisionism',\(^33\) under which a new generation of Marxist-Leninist theoreticians were permitted to reinterpret the official ideology in terms of cybernetics, provided that they remained within bounds acceptable to the SED leadership. The leadership's acceptance of the interesting theories of Georg Klaus\(^34\) may be contrasted with its


\(^{33}\) The changing party elite in East Germany, Cambridge, Mass, 1972.

\(^{34}\) See, for example, Sprache der Politik, Berlin (East), 1972, and Kybernetik und Gesellschaft, Berlin (East), 1973.
treatment of Robert Havemann. Havemann relates in his autobiography how, after the XX CPSU congress, he had called for greater freedom and an end to dogmatism at a hostile party meeting, but had received the support of Ulbricht himself. However, Havemann would not play the part of an 'institutionalised revisionist', despite his good connections with the SED leadership, and suffered exclusion from the party, loss of job and police supervision.

In the case of Klaus it might be argued that the leadership saw his theories as a means of attaining greater administrative efficiency and more effective social control - in the words of Ludz, the offered the possibility of a refunctionalisation, rather than the annihilation of the prevailing ideology. At present the main source of dysfunctional ideologies appears to be the DDR itself, with the anti-Leninist theories of Havemann and Bahro, which is complemented by the growth of eurocommunism, itself arguably anti-Leninist, within Western communist parties. It remains to be seen how the DDR and the other people's democracies will cope with this challenge.

3. The development of East German ideological demarcation from the Federal Republic, in the period up to 1969

i. Early signs of ideological demarcation

The divergence of the Eastern and Western zones of occupation in Germany began with the Nazi capitulation, with the establishment in the Soviet zone of an 'anti-fascist - democratic' administration led by German communists, headed by Ulbricht, who had been flown in from the Soviet Union. This period was characterised by the 'democratic land reform', the division of large estates among the peasantry, and by the expropriation of large-scale industry.¹ These measures were accompanied by the beginnings of a cultural revolution, the most important being the 'democratic school reform' of 1945, which placed the education system under Marxist-Leninist control. The cultural policy of the time was described by an East German source of 1974 as follows:

'Ein energischer Kampf wurde für die geistig-kulturelle Erneuerung, zur Ausrottung des faschistischen und militärischen Ungeistes, gegen den tiefverwurzelten Antikommunismus geführt... Nach dem Jahrzehnte währenden Feldzug der Reaktion gegen den wissenschaftlichen Kommunismus konnten die Ideen von Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels und Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin ungehindert verbreitet werden'.²

1. For a West German account of these events, with the systematic elimination of all opposition, see Die Deutsche Frage, Würzburg, 1964. See also Part I of the SED programme of 1963. A popular description is given in DDR. Werden und Wachsen. Berlin (East), 1974.

With the establishment of the DDR in 1949, the building of a Marxist-Leninist society, based on the Soviet model, became the overt policy of the new régime. This goal had been expressed in the manifesto addressed to the German people on the occasion of the founding of the Socialist Unity Party in 1946, where it was declared:

'Die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands will aber bei dem Aufbau einer antifaschistisch-demokratischen Republik nicht stehenbleiben. Ihr Ziel ist die sozialistische Gesellschaftsordnung...' 3

The aim was a socialist society in the whole of Germany, since the manifesto was meant for all Germans.

However, the SED only controlled part of Germany, and only within the Soviet zone could it begin to propagate effectively the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and to suppress all counter-ideologies. The party leadership had to deal with the problem of socialising the rank-and-file members of the SED, as opinion leaders, before it had the capacity to concentrate on the political education of the general population. Some of the difficulties faced by the leadership were to be seen in a commentary of 1949:

'... das sehr niedrige theoretische Niveau der Mehrzahl unserer Parteimitglieder und die in den Jahren 1946/47 noch sehr mangelhafte Orientierung der Partei auf die Betriebsarbeit und die schwache organisatorische und ideologische Arbeit der Parteileitungen in den Betrieben sind eine weitere wichtige Ursache für die qualvoll langsame Befreiung aus der Ideologie des Kapitalismus und die ideologische Umstellung der Arbeiterklasse und

große Teile unserer Mitgliedschaft. Hinzu kam eine Überlastung der relativ kleinen Zahl von Parteifunktionären mit rein praktischer Arbeit, die sie hinderte, ihr theoretisches Wissen zu vertiefen.' 4

Officially promoted socialisation was hindered, both from within the DDR, and from the West, especially from the Federal Republic, with whose citizens the majority of East Germans retained strong affective ties. The problem of possible ideological subversion from these sources was posed in the SED programme of 1963:

'Der Mensch der sozialistischen Gesellschaft entwickelt sich in dem konfliktreichen Prozeß der Auseinandersetzung mit den ideologischen Nachwirkungen der kapitalistischen Vergangenheit und mit den Einflüssen feindlicher Ideologien, die vor allem aus Westdeutschland in die Deutsche Demokratische Republik getragen werden. Die Zerschlagung der imperialistischen Ideologien ist ein entscheidender Teil der geschichtlichen Aufgabe der deutschen Arbeiterklasse und ihrer Vorhut in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.' 5

Among the negative Western influences condemned by the SED, particular hostility was directed towards West German social democracy. The programme continued:

'Die Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands bekämpft die antisozialistische Ideologie jener rechten sozialdemokratischen Führer, die aufs engste mit den westdeutschen Imperialisten und Militaristen zusammenarbeiten. Sie setzt sich mit dem modernen Revisionismus und Reformismus auseinander, der die Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung entstellt und die Arbeiterklasse vom konsequenten Kampf um die Erfüllung ihrer geschichtlichen Aufgabe abzuhalten versucht.'


It was perhaps important for the DDR leadership to make a sharp distinction between West German social democracy and Marxism-Leninism - and the controversy may be traced back through the inter-war years to the revisionism of Eduard Bernstein - since the two movements had shared common roots, and it might therefore be argued that there were historical grounds for the West German SPD to claim to offer an alternative socialist path. In the contemporary East German view two trends had developed in the German SPD in the first half of the 20th century; it was claimed that there was a bourgeois side to the party, whose leaders had postulated a non-Marxist 'third way' to socialism, and a proletarian side, the members of which in the Eastern zone of occupation had joined the German communists to form the SED. It was argued that contemporary social democracy (usually described by DDR sources as 'social democratism' - P.D.) '... propagiert einen "demokratischen Sozialismus", als angebliche "Alternative zum Kommunismus"', with the function of 'Diversion gegen die sozialistische Staaten­gemeinschaft durch "modernisierten" Antikommunismus und Schürung des Nationalismus' and 'ideologische "Aufweichung" der sozialistischen Staaten...' The post war history of the West German SPD and the behaviour of SPD ministers in the Federal government from 1966 would appear to justify some part of the East German claims. In particular, since

the Godesberg Programme of 1959, in which the SPD finally abandoned the Marxist variant of socialism, there would appear to be little in common between West German social democracy and East German Marxism-Leninism.

An example of early anti-SPD propaganda is found in an Einheit article of 1949, where an SED group in Thuringia was accused of nationalistic deviations and anti-Soviet behaviour, denying the fact that the Soviet army had freed Germany from fascism, and had given great assistance in the development of a new democratic order in the Soviet zone. The party secretariat for Thuringia, it was declared:

'...zeigte eine ungenügende Wachsamkeit in ideologischen Fragen und hat die propagandistische und organisatorische Tätigkeit der Schumacher-Agenten und anderer feindlicher Kräfte nicht genügend zum Anlaß genommen zu einem entschlossenen ideologischen Kampf in den Betrieben und demokratischen Massenorganisationen.'

Organisational measures were not enough to combat these deviations, it was argued. What was required was fundamental and systematic ideological work, to raise the ideological level of the whole party membership. There were several articles published at this time attacking the West German SPD, which possibly was associated with DDR and Soviet hostility to the events leading up to the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany.

7. Über die Gefahr nationalisticher Abweichungen. Einheit, 1949/6, p. 484.
ii. The national question

The early forms of East German ideological demarcation were not directed against the West German population, but against its leadership, including the leaders of the SPD opposition. The East German leadership claimed that it alone represented the interests of the whole German nation, that the solution of national questions was to be found in socialism. Within each German state, a shared sense of national unity found its expression in a general desire for unification, and this was recognised by both governments. The goal of 'staatliche Einheit' was included in both the West German Basic Law of 1949 and the SED programme of 1963. Article 1 of the first DDR constitution of 1949 had declared that Germany was an 'unteilbare Republik' and that there was only one German nationality (Staatsangehörigkeit).

National consciousness was potentially both advantageous and disadvantageous for the legitimation of the two German governments. This was shown by an apparent contradiction in the policies of the two states. Both professed a desire for unification, but on the other hand both were following diverging paths, which appeared to make the realisation of this goal more difficult. This contradiction might be

explained by the fact that the legitimation of the two governments would have been greatly impeded if unification had not been presented as a basic aim of their policies. However, both states placed the stabilisation of their rule before unification. Both sides considered that stabilisation would best be served by adapting the social systems of their respective states to those of their allies, by integration within the international organisations of the two power blocs.

Each side had to feel sufficiently sure of internal support before it would consider engaging in negotiations for unification. With both states placing stabilisation and bloc cohesion above the question of national unity, where both claimed the sole right to represent the interests of the German nation, and each state further declared that the government of the other was illegal. Both states attempted to force unification on their own terms; for instance, Article 146 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic demanded the 'free decision' of the German people on this question - i.e., according to a liberal democratic voting system - whereas the East German Prime Minister, Otto Grotewohl, had declared at the time the DDR was founded:

'Die Bildung dieser Regierung ist der Ausdruck der Tat­sache, daß die demokratischen Kräfte unseres Volkes nicht gewillt sind, sich mit der Spaltung unseres Vaterlandes und der Versklavung seiner westlichen Teile abzufinden, sondern daß sie von dem eisernen Willen beseelt sind,
Some months before the founding of the two German states, an article in Einheit posed the question whether for the DDR national policy was inopportune, concluding that it was not. It was declared that the German people had to solve the elementary tasks of restoring national unity and national sovereignty. In the Eastern zone the Soviet occupying forces had placed no obstacles in the way of a national policy. The article continued:

'Durch die Bodenreform und die Enteignung der Kriegs- und Nazi­verbrecher wurden die Voraussetzungen der nationalen Katastrophe in der Ostzone beseitigt... So ist die Ost­zone heute die Keimzelle einer künftigen deutschen Ein­heit, die Basis des Kampfes für die deutsche Einheit und Souveränität.'

The Western parts of Germany, it was argued, were dominated by the imperialist powers. Anti-national German politicians had the upper hand in the Western parts of Germany, agreeing to everything the imperialists desired. In an attempt to link the national question with a class-based Marxist-Leninist analysis, it was declared that the German working class was leading the struggle for German unity, although at this time a social, rather than socialist revolution was envisaged in Germany:


"Der nationale Befreiungskampf gegen die imperialistische Unterdrückung der westlichen Teile Deutschlands muß zugleich ein sozialer Befreiungskampf sein. Denn er muß sich gegen die deutschen Monopolkapitalisten richten und sich die Durchführung der demokratischen Reformen zum Ziele setzen. Das Banner der sozialen Revolution und des antiimperialistischen Kampfes führt uns zur Einheit Deutschlands, und das nationale Banner zur sozialen Revolution. Die deutsche Arbeiterklasse, die an der Spitze der nationalen Befreiung steht, dient gleichzeitig der internationalen Aufgabe der Arbeiterklasse." 13

However, at this time the goal of national unity was also being questioned in the DDR. In 1949 Alexander Abusch claimed that there was a cultural split between the two German states. He declared:

"Obwohl starke Kräfte auch in Westdeutschland traditionell und aktuell für die Einheit der deutschen Kultur wirksam sind, muß eine lange Zeit der kulturellen Spaltung zu einer immer fühleraren Entfremdung, zur Entwicklung von zwei unterschiedlichen Kulturen führen. Bei längerer Dauer wird dies zu einer tödlichen Gefahr für den Bestand der Nation." 14

It appeared that Abusch was deploring, rather than approving of his prediction. Nevertheless, the DDR leadership came to consider national unification more and more unlikely, and in January 1970 Ulbricht denied the existence of a single German nation.

The two German states, while following diverging policies, continued to appeal to each others' citizens over the heads of their rulers, with the claim made by each state that it represented the German nation. For each state the demand for national unity became a powerful means of gaining sup-

port for its own legitimacy and for the destabilisation of the other state, since, if the unification proposals of the one side were to prevail, it would mean the extinction of the other state.

This trial of strength was won by the Federal Republic, whose liberal democratic polity was legitimised through free elections, which also showed a decisive rejection of the KPD, before it was declared unconstitutional and banned in 1956. The stabilisation of the Federal Republic was assisted by American aid and by the rapid economic growth which followed the currency reform of 1948. Indicators of the relative success or failure of the DDR leadership's claims to legitimacy are limited; DDR election results ceased to show this after the introduction of the Soviet pattern of voting for a single list of candidates in 1949. The data assembled by Gebhard Schweigler, based on polls conducted among DDR citizens in West Berlin before 1961, have suggested that the level of support was increasing, although it was far lower than West German support for the Federal government.  

The Federal government had acquired legitimacy more rapidly than the DDR leadership. I would agree with Philip Windsor that Adenauer's chancellorship corresponded with 'a

15 Nationalbewuβtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, Düsseldorf, 1973. Chapter III, p. 66ff, considers the attitudes of East German citizens to the nation and national consciousness.
period in the post-war history of the Federal Republic when all its interests - economic, political and military - combined in a general national interest'. The citizens of the Federal Republic had legitimised a political system which developed from the traditions which had been unsuccessfully applied in the Weimar Republic; the Basic Law might be viewed as an improved version of the Weimar constitution. Furthermore, the widely believed possibility of Soviet expansion westwards acted both as a force for integration within the Western bloc, and as a source of hostility towards the DDR régime. There is little evidence that a parallel fear of the Federal Republic and of the USA existed among East Germans, although the officially controlled media in the DDR tried to create such an impression. The legitimation of the DDR leadership was faced with difficulties caused by the need for the East German population to adapt to the rapid structural changes of the continuing Marxist-Leninist revolution. Here the imposition of a single belief system invited comparisons with the coercion and coordination (Gleichschaltung) of the discredited Nazi past.

The government of Dr Adenauer had been in a stronger position to use the national question as a means of destabilising the East German state. With the support of

its allies, the Federal government had brought about the diplomatic isolation of the DDR outside of the Eastern bloc. The DDR was to be ignored; the anavoidable contacts between the two German states were conducted at sub-ministerial level, and the arrangements governing these contacts were often kept secret.\textsuperscript{17} The DDR reacted to its isolation by continually demanding international recognition (völkerrechtliche Anerkennung), and this was made a prerequisite for any negotiations on unification, such as Ulbricht's proposals for a confederation, which appeared in the 1963 SED programme. These overtures had been ignored by Adenauer; there seemed to be no need to pay the price of recognition, when it was believed that the policy of non-recognition was impeding the legitimation of the DDR leadership. The Federal Republic had established diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1955. However, after this Ulbricht succeeded in blocking further diplomatic links between the Federal Republic and its Eastern European allies — with the exception of Romania — until the early 1970s, when the diplomatic isolation of the DDR came to an end.

During Adenauer's period of office a stalemate had been reached between the two German states on the national question. East German demands for recognition in international

\textsuperscript{17} Verträge Bundesrepublik Deutschland-DDR, ed. Rolf Ehlers, Berlin (West), 1973, p. 5.
law, which represented the denial of international legitimacy, had been frustrated. On the other hand, the DDR had made this a precondition for any movement towards a negotiated rather than an enforced unification. Adenauer's policies had not led to the collapse of the DDR; given the existing super power relationships, this could only have had any chance of success of the Federal Republic had been able to exercise sufficient pressure on the USSR. Similarly, DDR proposals for a united 'democratic' Germany could not but fail, since the USA would not have permitted the Federal Republic to enter the Soviet sphere of influence.

It might be argued that Adenauer's policy of non-recognition represented a form of demarcation in reverse - and the 1948 currency reform was clearly a form of economic demarcation. However, the strategic position of the DDR made its survival important for the Soviet Union. The Berlin Wall, which had to be built in 1961 because West German attraction was so successful, causing mass flight from the DDR, represented a defeat for the Federal Republic, which was powerless to intervene. The latter's dependence on the United States was also demonstrated; the USA, although prepared to defend West Berlin, was not prepared to risk war by attempting to stop the closure of the DDR's last frontier with the West.
The Berlin Wall facilitated economic stabilisation in the DDR, and brought further advantages for the DDR leadership which were less easily quantified. It had the psychological effect of making it clear to those East German citizens who were opposed to the political system of the DDR that the option of Republikflucht no longer existed. With the elimination of the direct economic pressures on the DDR through West Berlin, particularly the losses of highly qualified personnel, West German ideological attraction through radio and television remained as the principal external influence upon East German citizens. Again, after the wall had been built, East Germans were not permitted to visit the Federal Republic or West Berlin until 1964, when pensioners were allowed to visit their relatives in the West.

For the East German leadership, the problem raised by West German ideological attraction lay not so much in the orientation of East Germans towards the Federal Republic, as in the fact that the Federal Republic was for them a relatively positive referent. This was so, despite the attempts by the DDR media to argue the contrary. Schweigler

18. In 1968 the East German commentator Stefan Dörnberg described the Berlin Wall as 'eine Schocktherapie für alle diejenigen, die den Sinn unserer Epoche und das wahre Kräfteverhältnis in der Welt und in Deutschland nicht begriffen hatten oder nicht begreifen wollen'. Quoted from Nationalbewusstsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 72.

quoted a question addressed to East Germans between 1956 and 1960: "Welche Seite halten Sie in der gegenwärtigen geistigen Auseinandersetzung für erfolgreicher: den Osten oder den Westen?" Although the effectiveness of official DDR socialisation might be shown from the fact that the highest number of East Germans who thought the West was more successful than the East was 87% in 1956, but steadily declined to 52% in 1960, with the lowest number of East Germans who were of the opinion that the East was more successful being 10% in 1956 and rising to 17% in 1960, it was clear that the East was at a disadvantage, since over this period those who thought the West more successful varied between 87-45%, while those claiming that the East was more successful varied between 5-22%. This would suggest that at least half the population were not convinced by the policy statements of the DDR leadership in the field of ideology. In rejecting the DDR, they were also rejecting the Soviet Union, which was presented in the East German media as a positive model to be copied by the DDR. Again, the flight of those DDR citizens who had been attracted by the way of life of the Federal Republic meant that they had chosen to reject the socialist system of the DDR and of the other people's democracies. This however had the advantage of reducing the internal opposition to the régime.

After 1961 a series of documents and policy statements published in the DDR demonstrated the leadership's desire to further the divergence between the two German states. The first of these was the 'Nationales Dokument', of March 25th, 1962, which was concerned with the future of Germany. The document proposed a confederation between the two states. However, it also declared that the DDR '... kann mit der Vollendung des Aufbaus des Sozialismus, mit der Erfüllung dieser ihrer historischen Mission nicht warten, bis die friedliebenden Kräfte in Westdeutschland unter Führung der Arbeiterklasse den Sieg errungen haben'. It was argued that the Federal Republic had abandoned all claims to '... eine nationalstaatliche, souveräne und friedliche Existenz des deutschen Volkes...', and that accordingly the future of Germany was a matter for the SED. Eberhard Schneider declared that the National Document served as a basis for the definitive demarcation between the two German states. It had spoken of the 'in zwei Staaten gespaltene Nation', and represented the final rejection of reunification.

21. For the history of DDR proposals for joint Federal Republic-DDR governmental institution, which may be traced back at least to 1950, see Die Deutsche Frage, 1964, p. 101ff. Here it was argued that the purpose of these proposals was to demonstrate the existence of two German states.

22. Die geschichtliche Aufgabe der DDR und die Zukunft Deutschlands, Berlin (East), 1962.

The National Document was followed by the first SED programme of 1963, and in 1964 by a new DDR constitution, which declared that the DDR was a 'sozialistischer Staat deutscher nation'. The SED programme advocated a 'sozialistisches deutsches Vaterland', a 'sozialistisches Nationalbewusstsein' and a 'sozialistische Nationalkultur'. In the promotion of a separate DDR national consciousness, an important role had been assigned to the East German education system. The programme declared with reference to the education system:

'Sie hat die Aufgabe, das sozialistische Nationalbewusstsein der Jugend zu entwickeln, die Jugend zur Liebe der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, zu bewußten Erbauern des Sozialismus im Geiste der sozialistischen Moral, des proletarischen Internationalismus und zur festen Freundschaft zur Sowjetunion zu erziehen.'

This quotation contained a series of positive referents which might serve to counter West German attraction. Formerly, no specific references to socialism and the limitation of affect to one part of Germany had been contained in the law on the democraticatisation of German schools, introduced in the Soviet Zone in 1946, or in Article 27 of the first DDR constitution. Both these documents had limited themselves to humanistic, peace-loving aims. To take account of the increasing stress on socialism, the DDR education system was completely reorganised in 1965.

25. See the section: Ziel und Aufgaben der deutschen Schule in the Gesetz zur Demokratisierung der deutschen Schulen vom. 31.5.1946, Berlin (East), 1946.
27. Gesetz über das einheitliche sozialistische Bildungssystem der DDR, Berlin (East), 1965. Note that socialist aims were also stressed in the law of December 2nd, 1959.
iii. Ideological demarcation in the sphere of economics

Initially, most DDR citizens did not perceive the relations between the two German states in terms of a cleavage between socialism and imperialism; the main ideological threat to the stability of the East German régime was indirect, and resulted from the attraction of the Federal Republic for the East German population. This attraction was national, rather than ideological, and expressed itself in the desire for national unity which neither German state could ignore. In their orientation towards the Federal Republic, East Germans were able to draw comparisons unfavourable to all aspects of life in the DDR, since the Federal Republic had manifestly provided its citizens with a widening freedom of choice, as could be seen by any DDR citizens who watched West German television. West German citizens had also been provided with a rapidly rising standard of living. Such successful consumerism, which reflected positively on the West German political system, could not be matched in the DDR, particularly before the Berlin Wall was built. The following quotation from the period following the West German currency reform showed the concern of the DDR leadership for the effects of the higher West German standard of living upon the East German population, and the attempt to compensate for this through political education:
'Die ungenügende Rolle, welche die antifaschistisch-demokratische Ostzone bisher noch im Bewusstsein des deutschen Volkes in den vom ausländischen Imperialismus beherrschten Zonen spielt, hat ihre Ursache nicht nur in der dort betriebenen Verleumdungskampagne und reaktionären Unterdrückungspolitik, nicht nur darin, daß die Schaufenster in Westdeutschland und Westberlin zur Zeit einen gepumpten Wohlstand vorzubewirken, nicht nur in den tatsächlichen materiellen Schwierigkeiten, die es in unserer Zone noch zu überwinden gilt, sondern in dem zurückgebliebenen ideologischen Zustand großer Teile der Bevölkerung unserer Zone, in dem noch ungenügend entwickelten Klassenbewusstsein des Proletariats.' 28

The economic difficulties in the Eastern Zone were made worse not only by the lack of American assistance, but also by the relative severity with which the dismantling policy was carried out, and Soviet exploitation of the East German economy. 29

The need for economic growth to permit the raising of living standards in the DDR was a further long-term factor which was required to support the legitimation of the régime. Economic demands of the population of a given state upon its government are of considerable importance, and the legitimacy of the government may be called into question if it is widely believed that it is failing to satisfy the population's material expectations. Under certain conditions, economic dissatisfaction may lead to demands for political change. The DDR leadership had had experience of this problem, as a result of the disorders


29. For the early economic situation in the Soviet Zone see Die Deutsche Frage, p. 116ff. Note also the suicide of Erich Apel, chairman of the State Planning Commission of the DDR, in December 1965, allegedly because of unfavourable terms of trade forced on the DDR by the USSR.
which began in East Berlin in June 1953. Again, the serious economic difficulties of the time had been one of the reasons why the Berlin Wall was built, to stop the losses of skilled personnel.\textsuperscript{30} The economic difficulties did not begin to lessen until after 1963, when the reforms of the New Economic System were introduced.

In a liberal democratic state, there generally exist institutionalised arrangements for the accommodation of economic discontent, by offering the possibility of replacing one administration by another in a general election. Here there is usually no threat to the polity, since a distinction is made between the legitimacy of the government (which must continually face opposition from alternative contenders for power) and the legitimacy of the existing constitutional arrangements. Conversely, in a Marxist-Leninist state where the ruling party is identified with the state system, an attack on the one is seen as an attack on the other, and represents a demand for structural change.

For the DDR leadership, this potential danger was increased by the orientation of East Germans, not towards past performance in the DDR or the living standards in the other Eastern European people's democracies, but towards the Federal Republic. Walter Ulbricht showed that

\textsuperscript{30} For the economic difficulties caused by the failure of the 'Seven Year Plan introduced in 1959 see DDR-Wirtschaft: eine Bestandsaufnahme, Frankfurt/M, 1971, p. 56ff.
he was aware of a link between ideology and the satisfaction, with his reference to the 'principle of material self-interest' (materielle Interessiertheit). On the occasion of the VI SED congress of 1963 he declared:

'Man soll nicht glauben, daß es angängig wäre, die aus einer falschen Behandlung der materiellen Interessiertheit der Menschen bestehenden Mängel durch Appelle an die Moral und das ideologische Bewußtsein zu überbrücken. In der sozialistischen Gesellschaft bilden die materiellen Interessen und die ideellen Faktoren eine untrennbare Einheit, aus der eben die große Kraft des bewußten Handelns für das materielle Wohl unserer Menschen entspringt. Fehler auf dem Gebiet der materiellen Interessiertheit untergraben daher auch die Rolle des moralisch-ideellen Faktors.' 31

Rüdiger Thomas also claimed that East Germans tended to compare their living standards with the Federal Republic rather than with the socialist states.32 The V SED congress of 1958 had attempted to counter this by engaging in economic competition with the Federal Republic:

'Die ökonomische Hauptaufgabe besteht darin, die Volkswirtschaft innerhalb weniger Jahren so zu entwickeln, daß die Überlegenheit der sozialistischen Gesellschaftsordnung gegenüber der kapitalistischen Herrschaft umfassend bewiesen wird. Deshalb muß erreicht werden, daß der Pro-Kopf-Verbrauch der werktätigen Bevölkerung in allen wichtigen Lebensmitteln und Konsumgütern höher liegt als der Pro-Kopf-Verbrauch der Gesamtbevölkerung in Westdeutschland.' 33

31. Das Programm des Sozialismus und die geschichtliche Aufgabe der SED, Berlin (East), 1963, p. 88. See also Klaus Dyhrenfurth/Gerhard Jannermann: Die Verwirklichung des Prinzips der materiellen Interessiertheit in unseren landwirtschaftlichen Produktionsgenossenschaften, Einheit, 1961/2.


These promises were followed by the serious economic difficulties connected with the failure of the 1959 Seven Year Plan. However, by the end of the 1960s the standard of living of DDR citizens, although well below that of the West Germans, had dramatically improved, as a result of the economic reforms introduced from 1963. With a manifest rise in living standards measured by the DDR's own past performance, the DDR leadership now felt confident enough to compare the living standards of the two German states from a position of moderate success. The alleged social and economic difficulties of the Federal Republic were seen as interrelated. It was claimed that West Germany was an insecure society with no future, which suffered from economic inequality, crime and unemployment. This tendency of attacking the Federal Republic in socio-economic rather than in ideological terms became more pronounced after Honecker became party secretary in 1971. Internally, he expanded Ulbricht's achievement oriented policy of payment by results; both men had interpreted socialism, in the terms of the 1963 party rules, as 'jeder nach seinen Fähigkeiten, jedem nach seiner Leistung'.

34. "DDR living standards are further examined in Chapter 8.

35. See a standard East German work, Imperialismus heute, Berlin (East), first published in 1965. In 1971 it was retitled more specifically 'Der Imperialismus der BRD'

iv. East German reactions to the new Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic

In the period of the Cold War, faced with the negative policies of Adenauer and John Foster Dulles, the DDR had developed the mentality of a state under siege. The DDR leadership had been able to gain at least one benefit from its relative weakness; ideological demarcation had developed in a black-and-white situation where the issues which divided the two German states appeared to be clearly defined, with no possibility of compromise, which fitted in well with the official DDR claim that there was an irreconcilable cleavage between socialism and imperialism. Moreover, the leadership had been able to suggest proposals for unification in the knowledge that they would be ignored by Adenauer. The advantage of this was that the leadership could claim before East German public opinion that it was actively pursuing the goal of unification, and that this was being blocked by the Federal government. In support of this it was constantly argued that the Federal Republic, together with its Western allies, had been responsible for engineering and continuing the division of Germany, by violating the Potsdam agreement on the democratisation of Germany, destroying monetary unity through the currency reform, by being the first to establish a separate German state, to rearm and join the common defence organisation of its allies. This argument might be countered
by the suggestion that the behaviour of the Federal Republic and its allies was the result of Soviet and East German intransigence.

Nevertheless, Ulbricht's scheme for a confederation, contained in the 1963 SED programme,\textsuperscript{37} whether sincere or not, was realistic in taking account of the differences between the two states; this scheme recognised that unification could not be achieved in one stage - it would at least have provided institutional arrangements for the regular exchange of opinions between the two states. But the Western policy of non-recognition had a further consequence; it relieved the DDR of the necessity of reconsidering its own German policy. If negotiations with the Federal Republic had taken place, it is possible that the DDR leadership would have been exposed to internal pressures to compromise, and modify its position. Negotiations might have raised hopes on unification which had been lowered by the building of the Berlin Wall.

In the early 1960s the international situation was changed by the moves towards super-power détente. This would affect the DDR because the settlement of the German question would be at the centre of détente in Europe. There was a further change at this time, of more direct relevance to the DDR.

\textsuperscript{37} Programm der SED, p. 58ff.
There was a change in West German attitudes towards Eastern Europe, including the DDR. Within the Federal government, Adenauer's Ostpolitik had been declared a failure by the then secretary of state Carstens and foreign minister Schröder in 1963-4. On the part of the SPD, Egon Bahr, at that time press-secretary of the West Berlin senate, who was closely associated with Willy Brandt, suggested a policy towards the DDR aimed at producing change through rapprochement (Wandel durch Annäherung). Although at the time Bahr's proposals were considered controversial, they became important after the SPD-FDP coalition came to power in 1969. On the same occasion Brandt declared that the time had come to settle the status quo militarily, in order to overcome it militarily, and that this was the only way to achieve reunification. He continued:

'Gerade weil das Deutschlandpolitik so sehr in das Verhältnis zwischen Ost und West eingebettet ist, gibt es für uns keine Hoffnung, wenn es keinen Wandel gibt.'

The formation of the West German Grand Coalition in 1966 marked a further stage in the revision of the Federal government's Eastern and German policies. In his first policy speech as Federal chancellor, Kiesinger repeated the

40. Ibid, p. 16.
desire for improved relations with Eastern Europe expressed in Dr Erhard's peace note of March 1966, and extended it to the DDR. While rejecting recognition of a second German state, Kiesinger declared:

"Wir wollen entkrampfen und nicht verhärten, Gräben überwinden und nicht vertiefen. Deshalb wollen wir die menschlichen, wirtschaftlichen und geistigen Beziehungen mit unseren Landsleuten im anderen Teil Deutschlands mit allen Kräften fördern." 41

In the following month, in January 1967, the then foreign minister Willy Brandt suggested that the East-West split could only be overcome with the aid of the super-powers. He claimed that the DDR leadership had opposed détente, either by making excuses, or by presenting unacceptable demands. 42

A reaction to these statements came in February 1967 from the DDR state secretary for West German questions, Joachim Herrmann, who replied that peaceful coexistence and cooperation (friedliches Neben- und Miteinander) between the two states was possible without the prior recognition of the DDR. He continued:

"Seit dem Amtsantritt dieser Regierung hat die eingefahrene Bonner Politik der Sabotage jeder Verständigung, der Blockade gleichberechtigter Verhandlungen eine außerordentliche Zuspitzung erfahren. Diese Regierung hält nicht nur an der

im höchsten Grade abenteuerlichen und friedensgefährdenden Alleinvertretungsansprüchen fest, sie weigert sich nicht nur, die Existenz von zwei deutschen Staaten anzuerkennen. Sie konzentriert vielmehr in völliger Verkennung der realen Lage ihre gesamte Politik darauf, mit Hilfe neuer raffi- nierterer Methoden der Täuschung, Spaltung und Erpressung um jeden Preis doch noch ihr wichtigstes Etappenziel zur Revision der Ergebnisse des zweiten Weltkrieges und zur Erringung der Vorherrschaft in Europa zu erreichen: die Annexion der DDR.' 43

The statement claimed that the West German government had rejected DDR proposals for understanding and détente between the two states. The establishment of diplomatic relations with Romania was interpreted as a new form of 'annexionistischer Alleinvertretungsanspruch' directed against the Eastern bloc, and above all against the DDR. It was further declared that the true nature of the new Ostpolitik could be evaluated from the utterances of Franz-Josef Strauß, who had proposed a 'free Europe' extending from the Atlantic to the Bug and the Black Sea, and from the 'Grauer Plan' of the then Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs, which had allegedly planned down to the last detail 'die Beseitigung der sozialistischen Gesellschaftsordnung und die Ausplünderung der Bevölkerung der DDR', and, thirdly, from a quotation from the CDU politician Rainer Barzel that 'unsere Positionen bleiben unverändert, nur unsere Methoden können wechseln'. It was significantly stated that, as a result of the behaviour of the West German government, including its social democrat ministers, the term 'gesamtdeutsch' had become meaningless,

and, accordingly, the East German Staatssekretariat für gesamtdeutsche Fragen had been renamed 'Staatssekretariat für westdeutsche Fragen'.

These manoeuvres continued with an exchange of correspondence between Kiesinger and the president of the DDR Council of Ministers, Willi Stoph, which appeared to take the declamatory form of a direct appeal by each side to the citizens of the other state. Concrete but irreconcilable proposals were put forward by Kiesinger and Stoph, the former suggesting practical measures for lessening the division of Germany, and the latter suggesting a treaty to establish 'normal relations' between the two states, which would require the diplomatic recognition of the DDR.

The negative reaction of the DDR leadership to the new Ostpolitik of the Federal government was hardly surprising. The latter had claimed a desire for closer relations with the citizens of the DDR, while at the same time continuing to refuse to recognise their government. The DDR leadership's suspicions that the Federal government's goal remained destabilisation and annexation would have been heightened by Kiesinger's statement that the Federal budget

was to be used as an instrument of German policy, and by his statement that '... wir alle wissen, daß die Spaltung unseres Volkes ... in der Tat nur durch ein Arrangement mit Moskau möglich sein wird...',\(^4\)\(^6\) seemed to justify Stoph's claim that the Grand Coalition's policies had the aim '... die DDR zunächst international zu isolieren, ihre Beziehungen zu den sozialistischen Bruderländern und zu anderen Befreundeten Staaten zu untergraben und durch eine massive politische und ideologische Einwirkung auf die Bevölkerung der DDR Unruhe und Unsicherheit zu stiften.'\(^4\)\(^8\)

The East German claim that the term 'gesamtdeutsch' had lost all meaning, quoted above from Herrmann's statement of February 1967, was considered by Schweigler to be the start of the DDR leadership's demarcation policy.\(^4\)\(^9\) I would argue that the statement represented a further stage in a process which had begun before the establishment of the DDR, that the fact that the two German states were diverging had led to an objective ideological differentiation between them. Such factors as the dropping of 'gesamtdeutsch, the abandoning of the proposals for confederation

\(^4\)\(^8\). Ibid, Vol. 1, p. 139.
\(^4\)\(^9\). Nationalbewußtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 76.
by Ulbricht in his New Year's Message at the beginning of 1967, the law of February 1967 which claimed a specific East German citizenship (Staatsbürgerschaft), and the new constitution of April 1968, which declared the DDR to be a 'sozialistischer Staat deutscher Nation', would suggest an intensified ideological demarcation in the area of the national question, as a reaction to West German attempts at rapprochement. Ideological demarcation was now increasingly stressing the differences between the DDR and the Federal Republic as a whole, and not just its leaders. Unification remained in the constitution as a long-term goal, but was out of the question in the existing circumstances.

50. On this occasion Ulbricht declared: 'Eine Vereinigung zwischen einem imperialistischen und militaristischen Westdeutschland und dem sozialistischen deutschen Friedensstaat ... ist undenkbar.' Nevertheless, the 1963 SED programme containing proposals for a confederation remained formally valid until the new programme of 1976.
4. East German ideological demarcation after the coming to power of the SPD-FDP coalition

i. The implications of rapprochement with the Federal Republic

In 1969 the movement towards European détente, which had been interrupted by the Czechoslovak crisis of the previous year, was resumed. In the Federal Republic the Grand Coalition was replaced by an SPD-FDP administration in the autumn of 1969. Both these events resulted in proposals which seemed likely to affect the interests of the DDR. Firstly, the Western desire for a satisfactory resolution of the Berlin question, which was stressed by President Nixon in West Berlin in February, and in the April communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, was met before the end of the year by Soviet willingness to begin discussions.1 Secondly, in October of the same year, the new Federal Chancellor, Willy Brandt, laid down the policies of the SPD-FDP coalition for Germany as a whole, and for Eastern Europe.2 In his speech Brandt announced that the Federal government would conduct discussions with Poland, in response to the invitation to consider the question of the Oder-Neisse line, which the Polish party leader, Władysław Gomułka, had extended to the Federal Republic in May 1969.3

On the same occasion Brandt replied to a Soviet aide-mémoire on renouncing the use of force by agreeing to propose a date for talks with the USSR to be held in Moscow.

However, the offer of negotiations between the two German states contained in the policy speech was of most direct concern to the DDR. Here Brandt had declared:

'Die Bundesregierung setzt die im Dezember 1966 durch Bundeskanzler Kiesinger und seine Regierung eingeleitete Politik fort und bietet dem Ministerrat der DDR erneut Verhandlungen beiderseits ohne Diskriminierung auf der Ebene der Regierungen an, die zu vertraglich vereinbarter Zusammenarbeit führen sollen.'

This offer was qualified by the refusal to consider full diplomatic recognition, because of the special relationships between the two states. Brandt continued:

'Eine völkerrechtliche Anerkennung der DDR durch die Bundesregierung kann nicht in Betracht kommen. Auch wenn zwei Staaten in Deutschland existieren, sind sie doch für einander nicht Ausland; ihre Beziehungen zueinander können nur von besonderer Art sein.'

Although admitting for the first time the existence of two German states, Brandt declared that his aim was to avoid a further growing-apart (Auseinanderleben) of the German nation, to move by way of a regulated working alongside the DDR (geregeltes Nebeneinander) to cooperation with the DDR (Miteinander).

It has been argued that affect for the concept of a united Germany among DDR citizens was the main hindrance to the legitimation of the SED-led régime, and that legitimation
required the creation of a separate East German national consciousness and the transforming of the Federal Republic into a negative referent. Under conditions of relative isolation after 1961, some progress towards the former goal had been claimed by Gebhard Schweigler.\textsuperscript{4} However, if isolation had facilitated differentiation, rapprochement might hinder or reverse this process. The West German policy of reversing the growing-apart of the two German states, of achieving 'menschliche Erleichterungen' for East German citizens, seemed likely to run counter to the goal of differentiation; the DDR leadership argued in turn that this policy was directed towards the destruction of its rule by means of 'ideologische Aufweichung' and 'Wandel durch Annäherung'.

Nevertheless, there were good reasons why relations with the Federal Republic should be normalised, if normalisation were to include the recognition of the DDR. The latter had long desired to end its diplomatic isolation from the non-communist world, and here the negative effect of non-recognition upon domestic legitimation had been an important consideration, and the arguments presented by the Federal Republic to justify non-recognition were freely accessible to DDR citizens through West German radio and television. Like its eastern allies, the DDR leadership hoped to check any infiltration of dysfunctional ideological pressures which normalisation of relations with the West might bring, in accord...

\textsuperscript{4} Gebhard Schweigler. Nationalbewusstsein in der BRD und der DDR. Düsseldorf, 1973, p. 104. Peter Bender quoted an undated survey among DDR schoolchildren between 14 and 16, where less than 5\% boys and 2.5\% girls thought reunification important. 6X Sicherheit, Cologne-Berlin, 1971, p. 89.
with its interpretation of peaceful coexistence. However, the main difficulty for the DDR leadership was raised by the possibility of rapprochement with the Federal Republic. Yet the normalisation of relations with the Federal Republic was a prerequisite for wider international recognition, since the Federal Republic had gained the support of its allies for the policy of non-recognition, and had sought to achieve the same goal among uncommitted states through the application of the Hallstein Doctrine. The DDR, from a weaker position, had tried to persuade its own allies that Western, and particularly West German recognition of the East German state should be linked with any further moves by the Warsaw Treaty member states towards rapprochement with the Federal Republic. This policy had been generally successful up to 1969, since, apart from the USSR, only Romania had established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, in 1967.

A further reason why the DDR leadership should consider normalising relations with the Federal Republic was that failure to do so might cause its policy to diverge from that of its allies. The DDR needed the Soviet Union to guard its interests in the proposed discussions on the future of Berlin; in the event a Berlin agreement was concluded in 1971, and some of the provisions of the agreement required a level of cooperation between the two German states which would have been difficult to achieve, if the

5. The policies of the two German states on recognition were examined by Philip Windsor in Germany and the Management of Détente. London, 1971, pp. 36-38.
DDR had maintained its policy of isolation from the Federal Republic. Moreover, both the USSR and Poland were to begin discussions with the Federal Republic. In the latter case Gomułka's initiative of May 1969 was not accompanied by a demand for West German recognition of the DDR, which may have revived apprehensions among the DDR leadership to justify the earlier claim that the Federal Republic's new Ostpolitik was aimed at the isolation of the DDR from its allies. 6 With the improvement in East-West relations, isolation from the Federal Republic now held for the DDR the danger of isolation from its own allies.

Closer links with the Federal Republic might hinder ideological demarcation and consequently the stability of the régime. Here, in Birnbaum's words, the DDR leadership was faced by a choice between isolation or infiltration. 7 For years the leadership had claimed a desire for normalisation (as defined by itself), but in practice, whenever contacts had seemed likely, as in the case of the proposed Redneraustausch of 1966, it had drawn back, thus casting doubt on the sincerity of its intentions. 8 There was now less room for the DDR leadership to make apparent concessions

6. In 1967 Ulbricht had claimed that West German policy was aimed at the 'flexible Isolierung' of the DDR. Neues Deutschland, 18th October, 1967. (Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 2, p. 54).
8. In January 1967 Brandt had declared that the DDR was evading détente, either with excuses, or with demands which could not be fulfilled. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol 1, p.33.
for internal consumption, to give the impression that the leadership was actively attempting to promote unification. On the other hand the 1968 constitution had made it clear that only a socialist Germany could be united, and Ulbricht had declared at the VII SED congress that under the existing conditions unification was impossible. 9

In theory, peaceful coexistence appeared to show how relations might be normalised while avoiding ideological contamination, but in practice it was not possible to draw a clear line between permissible and impermissible contacts, and DDR sources have argued that most contacts were potentially dangerous. 10 Again, the officially promoted Feindbild of the Federal Republic might lose its usefulness if normalisation were to come about. However, if it could be demonstrated that the development of a separate East German national consciousness had not been stopped or reversed by rapprochement with the Federal Republic, then this might in turn increase the stability of the régime. It could not be assumed that those East German citizens who wanted closer links with the Federal Republic were also hostile to the East German state, not that those hostile to the state also wished to destroy it through fusion with the Federal Republic, rather than to reform it,


but still within a Marxist-Leninist framework. By facing openly the question of national identity, by showing greater trust in the population it controlled, a highly-politicised population which had been incessantly lectured on the dangers of ideological subversion, the leadership might gain more support, and also lose some of its sense of insecurity in this area.¹¹

ii. The initial effects of rapprochement upon DDR citizens

The DDR leadership accepted Brandt's invitation, and discussions were held between Brandt and the chairman of the DDR council of ministers, Willi Stoph, at Erfurt in March 1970, and at Kassel in May of the same year. These were the first high-level discussions between the two states, and at least served the purpose of clarifying the negotiating positions of the two sides. In a case study which attempted a reconstruction of East German decision-making between Brandt's speech of October 1969 and the Erfurt meeting between Brandt and Stoph, Anita Dasbach-Mallincrodt has suggested that the reactions to Brandt's initiative which appeared in the DDR media were slow and hesitant, and that they were accompanied by a display of increased hostility towards the Federal Republic.¹²

¹¹. Schweigler claimed that if the DDR frontiers were opened, the Nationalstaatsbewuβtsein of its citizens could be strengthened if they became aware that they were different from West German citizens. Nationalbewuβtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 104.

Increased hostility towards the Federal Republic was also noted by the federal minister for intra-German affairs, Egon Franke. In May 1970 he had suggested that the possibility of rapprochement between the two states was causing the DDR leadership to devote greater attention to the ideological security of the régime. He declared:

'Wir müssen ganz nüchtern sehen, daß die Fortsetzung des in Erfurt begonnenen Weges für die Ostberliner Führung mit einem gewissen Risiko, mit bestimmten Unwägbarkeiten verbunden ist. Es wäre töricht zu verkennen, daß die Frage, wie die Bevölkerung in der DDR auf eine zunehmende Normalisierung der innerdeutschen Beziehungen reagieren würde, nicht nur für Ostberlin von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung ist. Wir haben deshalb allen Anlaß, diese Propagandawelle als eine aus der Sicht Ostberlins verständlichen Versuch zu werten, die weitere Entwicklung der innerdeutschen Beziehungen ... ideologisch abzusichern.' 13

Franke saw a paradox in the behaviour of the DDR leadership, claiming that the greater the level of hostility towards the Federal Republic, the more determined was the leadership to continue the Erfurt and Kassel talks.

The need for greater ideological demarcation would appear to have been justified by the events connected with Brandt's visit to Erfurt. West German observers have described the enthusiastic reception he received in Erfurt, and the placards with a large letter 'Y' displayed along the railway line between Erfurt and the border with West Germany, which made it clear that support was being given to Willy Brandt rather than to Willi Stoph. 14

The data assembled by Schweigler appeared to indicate in 1970 a temporary reversal in the trend for domestic support for the DDR leadership to increase. On two occasions in 1970 West Germans who had visited the DDR were questioned on the opinions of DDR citizens they had met. The following question was asked:

' Ist Person X der Ansicht, daß die Bundesregierung die DDR auf jeden Fall anerkennen sollte oder nur dann, wenn damit Erleichterungen für die Menschen hüben und drüben verbunden sind oder ist X der Ansicht, daß die Bundesrepublik die DDR auf gar keinen Fall anerkennen soll?' 15

There was a slight decline from 28% in Survey I to 26% in Survey II of those for unconditional recognition (auf jeden Fall anerkennen), and an increase in those wanting conditional recognition (anerkennen nur mit Erleichterungen) from 47% to 50%. If this indirect data were to approximate to reality, then half the DDR citizens were for improvements in their situation, and if these improvements were to be equated with 'menschliche Erleichterungen' - and it is possible that this would have come to mind to the politically sensitive East Germans, then this seemed to be a demand for closer contacts with the Federal Republic. It would be even worse if conditional recognition were to mean support for special intra-German relations.16

15. Nationalbewußtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 99. The claim that Brandt's Ostpolitik had led to a slight decline in domestic support for the DDR leadership might also be supported by Table 13 on page 98.

16. Ilse Spittmann saw a link between 'menschliche Erleichterungen' and 'innerdeutsche Beziehungen' in a quotation reproduced on the following page.
The DDR leadership could be encouraged by the fact that apparently three quarters of DDR citizens supported recognition, the difficulty lay with the half of those interviewed who wanted conditional recognition, since it was not known how far these conditions would agree with official policy towards the Federal Republic. The subsequent use of Brandt’s formula of moving to Miteinander through Nebeneinander by Honecker - although differently interpreted - suggested that at least lip service was paid to these aspirations.17

iii. Ideological demarcation and the national question

It is argued that the overt Abgrenzung campaign which began in September 1970 resulted from the German policy of the SPD-FDP coalition. This led the DDR leadership to take measures to make it clear that high level negotiations with the Federal Republic would not mean Wandel durch Annäherung. In this connection Ilse Spittmann commented as follows:

'Um die unerwünschte Stimmung der Bevölkerung aufzufangen und klarzumachen, daß Verhandlungen zwischen Bonn und Ost-Berlin weder ideologische noch machtpolitische Veränderungen zur Folge haben würden, konzentrierte die SED ihre Agitation auf drei Punkte: die Sozialdemokratie und ihre neue Ostpolitik, die Brandtsche Formel von den innerdeutschen oder zwischendeutschen Beziehungen, die menschliche Erleichterungen zum Ziel haben sollten, sowie die These von den zwei deutschen Staaten im Rahmen einer einheitlichen deutschen Nation.' 18

17. These words were used by Honecker in April 1972 in Sofia. Neues Deutschland, 19th April, 1972.

The repeated declarations in the DDR media from the spring of 1970 that social democracy was a form of imperialist (or bourgeois) ideology represented an intensification of existing policy, which had earlier been found, for example, in the SED programme of 1963. The intensification may be explained as a reaction to the fear that social democracy might come to be considered as a democratic alternative to Marxism-Leninism; it was an exercise in popularisation aimed at suggesting that a social democratic chancellor would follow basically the same policies as his CDU predecessors, that, while the form might have changed, the content of his policy was the same. 19

However, the greatest threat to the DDR leadership's demar- cation was the renewed stress placed by Brandt on the unity of the nation. In his report on the state of the nation of January 1970, he declared:

'25 Jahre nach der bedingungslosen Kapitulation des Hitler­ Reiches bildet der Begriff der Nation das Band um das ge­ spaltene Deutschland. Im Begriff der Nation sind geschicht­ liche Wirklichkeit und politischer Wille vereint. Nation umfaßt und bedeutet mehr als gemeinsame Sprache und Kultur, als Staat und Gesellschaftsordnung. Die Nation gründet sich auf das fortdauernde Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl der Menschen eines Volkes.' 20

Brandt continued that no one could deny that in this sense a German nation existed and would continue to exist, as far as could been seen, and added that the DDR declared itself part of this German nation in its constitution.

19. This was the view of Norden on June 9th, and of Ulbricht on June 10th. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 5, p. 287ff and p. 333-334.

He repeated that since the two German states were not foreign countries (Ausland) for each other, there was no question of the international recognition of the DDR by the Federal Republic. This did not mean, he argued, that the Federal Republic wanted the DDR as a West German colony. The two states were not foreign countries for each other for the realistic and practical reason that there were closer family ties between the inhabitants of Leipzig and Hamburg, than between the inhabitants of Leipzig and Milan or Warsaw. Similarly, East Berliners were closer to West Berliners than to Parisians.

Convergence theory was wrong in suggesting that the two German states would automatically grow closer, but correct in claiming that the necessities of the modern industrial society in East and West would force measures, developments and reforms, independant of the political and social conditions. Here Brandt himself declared a demarcation between the two states:

'In den beiden staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen, die es nun schon seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten auf deutschem Boden gibt, drücken sich völlig verschiedene und nicht zu vereinbarende Vorstellungen darüber aus, wie die Einheit Deutschlands, wie eine gemeinsame Zukunft aussehen soll und wie sie zu erreichen sein könnte. Niemand darf sich der trügerischen Hoffnung hingen, den Auseinandersetzungen entgehen zu können, die unausweichlich sind, weil Deutschland eben nicht nur staatlich gespalten ist, sondern weil sich auf seinem Boden völlig unterschiedliche Gesellschaftssysteme gegenüberstehen. In diesem Punkt sind wir uns mit Ulbricht einig: zwischen unserem System und dem, was drüben Ordnung geworden ist, kann es keine Mischung, keinen faulen Kompromiß geben.' 21

In his demand that DDR citizens should be allowed to decide their own future, and that contacts should be encouraged between East and West Germans, Brandt appeared to be appealing to the former over the heads of the DDR leadership. The question might be asked whether a single German nation would continue to exist, if the social, political and economic systems of the two states continued to diverge. Schweigler argued that the consciousness that the DDR was a separate nation state (Nationalstaatsbewußtsein) would increase among DDR citizens, and that this would increasingly call into question the unity of the German nation as a concept within the consciousness of DDR citizens (Bewußtseinsnation). The reaction of the DDR leadership was the overt rejection of the unity of the German nation. It opened the way for the policy of total demarcation, since it was an attempt to resolve the national question by destroying the Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl which was so important for Brandt, and which was the main surviving point of common interest to the citizens of the two states.

The DDR leadership's changing attitude to the national question may be seen in a comparison with earlier policy statements. It had long been argued ideologically that the DDR formed the nucleus of a future all-German state, which would be socialist. However, since the Federal Republic was a capitalist state, unification was, at least in the short

22. Nationalbewußtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 100.
term, not possible, as could be seen from the conditions laid down in Article 8 of the DDR constitution. The SED programme of 1963 had stated that the DDR was the German state which embodied the national future of Germany:

'Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist auf allen Gebieten der Politik und des gesellschaftlichen Lebens die nationale und soziale Alternative gegenüber dem in Westdeutschland herrschenden Imperialismus. Ihre historische Mission besteht darin, durch die umfassende Verwirklichung des Sozialismus in dem ersten deutschen Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Staat die feste Grundlage dafür zu schaffen, daß in ganz Deutschland die Arbeiterklasse die Führung übernimmt, die Monopolbourgeoisie auch in Westdeutschland entmachtet und die nationale Frage im Sinne des Friedens gelöst wird.'

It would seem useful to compare Ulbricht's view of the nation expressed at the 10th plenum in May 1969, which was still close to that of the 1963 programme, with his changed policy statements after Brandt had become Federal Chancellor. At the 10th plenum he had declared:

'Unsere Partei, die nationale Front, unser werktätiges Volk arbeiten nicht nur an der Lösung der Probleme der DDR. Wir haben darüber hinaus auch die geschichtliche Aufgabe, die Probleme der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung und des Lebens des Volkes im Namen der Lebensinteressen der ganzen deutschen Nation zu lösen. Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist - ihrer Verfassung gemäß - ein sozialistischer Staat deutscher Nation. Daraus ergibt sich der Verfassungsauftrag, daß unsere Werktätigen beweisen, daß es möglich ist, unter Führung der Arbeiterklasse im Bündnis mit den Bauern, der Intelligenz und anderen werktätigen Schichten die Grundprobleme der Entwicklung des sozialistischen Staates, der Entwicklung des ökonomischen Systems des Sozialismus und der sozialistischen Nationalkultur als Beispiel für die ganze deutsche Nation zu lösen.'


Here the SED was still claiming leadership of the German people
and of the German nation in an all-German context. However,
on that occasion Ulbricht also declared that the West German
workers, in view of the different historical circumstances
and level of development, would have to work out their own
path to socialism, and could not simply follow the East German
model.

Ulbricht maintained that the DDR was a sovereign state, and
possessed the right to negotiate on the German question. The
Federal Republic was also a sovereign state. He argued that
the relations between sovereign states could only be conducted
on the basis of international law, and gave the example of the
international relations between Arab states, which had differing
social orders, but which were all part of the Arab nation. He
continued:

'Der Begriff der Anerkennung eines Staates ist völkerrecht-
llicher Natur und beinhaltet die Bereitschaft, auf der Grundlage
soveräner Gleichheit mit diesem Staat eine bestimmte Art von
zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen. Das gilt auch, wenn es sich
um verschiedene Staaten ein und derselben Nation handelt....
Das heißt, mit der Anerkennung nimmt ein Staat lediglich offi-
ziell von der Existenz des anderen Staates Kenntnis und bekun-
det seine Bereitschaft zur gleichberechtigtem Gestaltung der
völkerrechtlichen Beziehungen. Eine staatsrechtliche Anerken-
nung gibt es gar nicht. Der vom Gegner häufig gebrauchte
Begriff ist eine reine Zweckkonstruktion, die darauf hinaus-
läuft, die DDR zu einer Art westdeutschen Bundeslandes zu
degradieren. Das heißt, die geplante Annexion der DDR soll
juristisch vorbereitet werden....' 25

The process of rejecting the concept of a single German nation,
which was the reason given by Brandt for blocking the recognition

of the DDR in international law, was begun by Ulbricht in a
speech delivered at the 12th SED plenum on December 12th, 1969.\textsuperscript{26} This was the considered reaction to Brandt's speech of October 28th. Dettmar Cramer noted that since the coming to power of the SPD-FDP coalition the terms 'ganze deutsche Nation' and 'sozialistischer Staat deutscher Nation' (which Ulbricht had used in his speech at the 10th plenum) had been dropped.\textsuperscript{27} Cramer further viewed the draft treaty between the two states, which was published by the DDR on December 17th, as the start of the policy of total demarcation. However, I would suggest that the first signs of total demarcation, in the sense of an attempt to attack the unity of the nation as the embodiment of the remaining points of common interest between the citizens of the two states, were to be found in Ulbricht's 12th plenum speech which predated the draft treaty, and that the draft treaty had only conformed passively to the new policy by ignoring completely the national question.\textsuperscript{28}

At the 12th plenum Ulbricht claimed that the CDU/CSU had been responsible for splitting and betraying the interests of the German nation. The schism began with the establishment of the Federal Republic, he argued, and was confirmed in 1952 when Adenauer rejected the Soviet proposals for an all-German peace

\textsuperscript{26} Neues Deutschland, 14th December, 1969.
\textsuperscript{27} Deutschland Archiv, 1971/2, p. 114.
\textsuperscript{28} Neues Deutschland, 21st December, 1969.
treaty. Whereas at the 10th plenum Ulbricht had accepted the formula of two states within a single nation, he now appeared to argue that if there were two states, it followed that the nation was split:

'Herr Willy Brandt hat selbst von der Existenz zweier deutscher Staaten gesprochen und muß schließlich auch in seiner Außenpolitik von dieser Tatsache ausgehen. Das heißt, auch Herr Brandt weiß genau, daß die deutsche Nation gespalten ist.' 29

Ulbricht then examined the term 'Germany' which, he argued, was a variable political and geographical concept. 'Germany' was often used as if a unified state organisation still existed. But two sovereign, fully independent and internationally (völkerrechtlich) recognised states had been in existence for twenty years. In view of their progressive differentiation (Auseinanderentwicklung), it was an illusion to wish to construct an artificial common roof over the two states. Ulbricht claimed that the solution of the German question meant only 'die Herstellung eines geregelten friedlichen Nebeneinander zwischen der DDR und der BRD auf der Grundlage ihrer völligen Gleichberechtigung und gegenseitigen völkerrechtlichen Anerkennung...' Although he repeated Brandt's term 'geregeltes Nebeneinander', there was no mention of 'Miteinander'. Ulbricht claimed that the unification of the socialist German state with the West German state, which was still dominated by monopoly capitalism, was impossible. Nevertheless he declared that the aspirations of unification contained in Article 8 of the DDR constitution of 1968 remained valid.

Ulbricht returned to the theme of relations between the two German states at an international press conference held on January 19th, 1970. The occasion was used to reply to Brandt’s report on the state of the nation of January 14th. Once again Ulbricht claimed that the existence of two German states meant that there could be no united German nation, which had been split as a result of a coup d'état (Staatsstreich) carried out by Adenauer in agreement with the USA. Since Adenauer had become Federal Chancellor as a result of the elections of August 1949 in which the West German KPD had participated with little success, perhaps Ulbricht’s reasoning might be compared with that of the Bolsheviks in 1918 who dissolved the elected Russian Constituent Assembly, in view of its ‘counter-revolutionary majority’, despite the fact that they had participated in these elections.

On the national question Ulbricht declared at the press conference:

'Die Deklamation des westdeutschen Bundeskanzlers über die Einheit der Nation wurde übrigens von ihm selbst widerlegt, indem er feststellte, daß es zwei deutsche Staaten gibt, mit gegensätzlicher Gesellschaftsordnung, und indem er das Bekenntnis zur Integration in das westliche imperialistische Bündnissystem begründete und einen deutschen Nationalstaat ausdrücklich ablehnte. Das ist die historische Realität: Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist ein sozialistischer deutscher Nationalstaat, die westdeutsche Bundesrepublik ist ein kapitalistischer NATO-Staat, dessen ehemalige Adenauer-Regierung sogar solche Grundrechte wie die Regelung der Beziehungen zur DDR den imperialistischen Westmächten übertragen hat. Es ist ein Staat mit beschränkter nationaler Souveränität.'


The argument that the DDR was free to decide its relations with the Federal Republic, in accord with Article 1 of the Soviet-DDR treaty of 1955, whereas the Federal Republic enjoyed limited sovereignty, having surrendered its rights of decision-making in the area of relations between the two states, was somewhat dubious. It was true that the sovereignty of the Federal Republic was limited by the four powers, but so was the sovereignty of the DDR, and this was confirmed in 1972 in Article 9 of the Basic Treaty between the two German states. On the same day the Federal Government contented itself with referring to Ulbricht's remarks as a 'merkwürdiger historisch-politischer Exkurs'.

The purpose of Ulbricht's arguments would seem to be to suggest that the Federal Republic was controlled by the Western powers. For the first time the DDR was described as a 'socialist German nation state'. In failing here to describe the Federal Republic as either 'deutsch' or 'national', Ulbricht appeared to be arguing that the DDR was the sole German nation state, in claiming that Brandt had 'expressly rejected' a German nation state. He continued:

'Wenn gegenwärtig Herr Brandt in mystischer Weise von einer Einheit der Nation spricht, so braucht er diese unrealistische Behauptung, um die Herstellung normaler gleichberechtiger völkerrechtlicher Beziehungen mit der DDR aus dem Wege zu gehen. Herr Brandt sollte sich übrigens darüber klar werden, daß auch in der westdeutschen Bundesrepublik von der Einheit der Nation nicht die Rede sein kann. Zwischen den Krupps und den Krauses, zwischen den Milliardären und Multimilliardären und dem werk-tätigen Volk gibt es keine nationale Einheit.'

This might be understood as a reply to Brandt's claim that special intra-German relationships were justified by the close family links between the citizens if the two states. Ulbricht argued, from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint, that there could be no national unity between capitalists and members of the working class. However, it was not clear whether there could be national unity between the West German Krauses and the citizens of the DDR.

The 13th plenum of June 1970 was characterised by intensified hostility towards the Federal Republic. On this occasion Albert Norden argued that the SPD-FDP coalition was continuing the militaristic and revenge-seeking policies of the CDU/CSU, that, despite the change of government, political and economic power still remained in the hands of the capitalists. Norden argued that the West German insistence on intra-German relationships was a variation of the Hallstein Doctrine, an 'arrogant interference in the affairs of third states', which contradicted the West German declaration that relations with the DDR should be conducted on the basis of equality. He further condemned the Federal Republic's refusal to recognise the DDR in international law, and concluded that this meant that the Federal Republic was allowing itself a free hand for 'aggressive Absichten' against the DDR.

In his speech at the 13th plenum, Norden developed the theme that the German nation was split. A link was seen between Brandt's affirmation of the unity of the nation and of special intra-German relationships:

'Typisch für das Auftreten auch der gegenwärtigen Bonner Regierung unter Bundeskanzler Brandt ist die ständige Wiederholung der nationalistischen Demagogie von der angeblichen "Einheit der Nation". Mit dieser der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit widersprechenden These wird versucht, die revanchistische Formel von „innerdeutschen Beziehungen“ zu begründen.'

Norden continued that the 'reactionary forces' in West Germany, in alliance with American imperialism, had consciously destroyed the unity of Germany after 1945, and made the split permanent through the Paris Treaties of 1954. The Federal Republic was calling for the unity of the nation, Norden argued, despite having been responsible for splitting Germany. When West German sources had noted that the DDR constitution supported unification, they had not added that this was qualified unification, on the basis of democracy and socialism.

Norden had carefully declared that the unity of Germany, rather than the unity of the nation had been destroyed. He argued that the Germans had been divided by the irreconcilable class opposition between proletariat and bourgeoisie, even when they had lived within a single area; there had never been unity between the ruling class and the workers, whose brothers were not the German capitalists, but their class.

34. The Paris Treaties guaranteed the Federal Republic equal rights within NATO and the West European Union. See Die Deutsche Frage, Würzburg, 1964, pp. 64-76, for West German defence policy between 1949 and 1963.
comrades throughout the world. This irreconcilable class opposition had assumed state form (staatliche Gestalt) in the socialist DDR and the monopoly capitalist Federal Republic. It was claimed that imperialism was the negation of all national interests, which today could only be represented by socialism, the revolutionary working class and the national liberation movement. Norden defined the DDR as 'der sozialistische deutsche Nationalstaat', and the Federal Republic as 'ein monopolkapitalistischer NATO-Staat', repeating Ulbricht's terminology of January 19th, 1970.

On the following day at the 13th SED plenum, Ulbricht countered the Federal Government's' German policy point by point:

1. It was argued that recognition of the DDR would seal the schism between the two states - but this had come about 20 years ago, and had been caused by the Federal Republic.
2. Recognition of the DDR by third states was claimed to be an unfriendly act, and to hinder the growth of intra-German relationships - but these did not exist.
3. Membership of the United Nations Organisation by the two states would be a 'juristische Verewigung' of the split - but the split had become legally permanent through the setting up of the Federal Republic and its adherence to the Paris Treaties.
4. Why could there not be relations between the two German states similar to those between the Federal Republic and Austria?
Ulbricht's reply was that the Federal Republic was an imperialist state which exploited Austria, and that a similar arrangement was unacceptable to the DDR. He also stressed the cultural and linguistic differences between the two German states. The DDR, it was argued, was encouraging the development of a 'humanistische sozialistische Nationalkultur', which had inherited the classical German language, whereas there existed in the Federal Republic a language which was contaminated by imperialism and manipulated by the capitalist monopoly publishing houses.

5. The constant West German demand for self-determination could only refer to self-determination within the Federal Republic, and the attempt to apply this principle to the East German population represented the camouflaged aim of annexing the DDR. East German citizens had the inalienable right of self-determination, and had made use of this right in a plebiscite on the constitution of the socialist DDR.

Ulbricht then considered the question of all-German Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl. It may be noted that here he did not stress the differences between monopoly capital and the working class, between the Krupps and the Krauses, but between the citizens of the Federal Republic and the 'Staatsvolk des sozialistischen deutschen Nationalstaates':

'Sprechen wir also über einige Gefühle. Klar, es gibt zwischen Verwandten gute oder schlechte Gefühle und manchmal auch gewisse Gemeinsamkeiten. Aber die Deutsche Demokratische Republik und die westdeutsche Bundesrepublik und ihre Gesellschaftsordnungen sind nicht miteinander verwandt. Die Bürger

When taken with Ulbricht's remark at the 10th plenum that the West German working class would have to find its own way to socialism, the differentiation between East German citizens and the whole population of West Germany represented a further move towards total, or at least maximum demarcation from the Federal Republic. It had been declared that ideology was thicker than blood. Not only Nation but also Volk had become a concept subject to demarcation. The statement at the 10th plenum that 'der Weg der sozialistischen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik nicht schematisch auf Westdeutschland übertragen werden kann' implied that West German communists would follow a different policy from the SED. Accordingly, besides demarcation between the populations of the two states, it might be argued that Ulbricht was sacrificing the unity of the German working class in the cause of total demarcation. Aspirational total demarcation, balanced by affect for the USSR, was perhaps best presented by Günter Mittag at the 13th plenum:

'Alles verbindet uns mit der DDR, unserem sozialistischen Vaterland, mit der mächtigen Sowjetunion und den anderen sozialistischen Staaten. Nichts verbindet uns mit dem imperialistischen System in Westdeutschland und seinem Hauptverbündeten, dem aggressiven USA-Imperialismus.'

iv. The Moscow Treaty

Ultricht's draft treaty of December 1969 and the Erfurt and Kassel meetings had made it clear that the DDR saw the normalisation of relations between the two German states not as an opportunity for rapprochement, but as a means of consolidating and extending its demarcation from the Federal Republic. At the 13th SED plenum Ulbricht had claimed that the Kassel meeting had clearly demonstrated to the world the irreconcilability of the social systems of the two states. However, the claim that normalisation would confirm differentiation remained an aspiration; it could not become an effective claim unless it was supported by the rank and file SED membership, by the general population of the DDR, and by the allies of the DDR leadership. It has been argued above that the first effects of the Brandt-Stoph meetings upon DDR citizens had tended to hinder rather than promote demarcation: the Soviet-West German treaty concluded on August 12th, 1970, (the Moscow Treaty) was to show the level of Soviet support for the German policy of the DDR leadership.

In the treaty the Federal Government accepted that the frontiers of the DDR were inviolable. At the end of Article 3 of the treaty it was declared that the USSR and the Federal Republic

37. Neues Deutschland, 16th June, 1970.
... betrachten heute und künftig die Grenzen aller Staaten in Europa als unverletzlich ... einschließlich der Oder-Neiße-Linie, die die Westgrenze der Volksrepublik Polen bildet, und der Grenze zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik.' However, the Moscow Treaty did not include any reference to Western or West German recognition of the DDR. It was ironic that Ulbricht's earlier claim that the Federal Republic had not been permitted by the three Western powers to negotiate on the German question was used by Bahr as an argument to justify the non-recognition of the DDR. The sovereignty of the DDR was shown to be similarly limited by the all-German interests of the Soviet Union, when the DDR news agency referred to Soviet forces in the DDR, which was immediately corrected to Soviet forces in Germany.

It was in the interests of neither the USSR nor the DDR to publicise their differences, but Birnbaum noted that the attempt by the DDR Ministerrrat to argue that '... die im Vertrag zwischen der UdSSR und der BRD eingegangenen Verpflichtungen machen es folgerichtig erforderlich, nunmehr

38. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 94.
diplomatische Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der BRD herzustellen..." 41 was omitted from the translation of this declaration which appeared in Pravda. 42 It was also significant that the West German affirmation of the unity of the nation, which was expressed in the Brief zur Deutschen Einheit 43 presented to the Soviet Union on the same day that the treaty was signed, was not rejected by the latter.

The DDR's interests in the Berlin question - and this applied to East as well as to West Berlin - had been put at risk by the USSR's restatement of four-power responsibilities for the city during the negotiations with the Federal Republic, 44 which had been highlighted by West German insistence on a political link (Junktim) between the ratification of the Moscow Treaty and a satisfactory Berlin agreement. 45 Certainly, West German demands for securing a close relationship between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, and for unhindered access to West Berlin, 46 raised potential problems for the DDR, particularly

41. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 108.
43. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 96.
44. Gromyko had declared that the rights of the four powers with regard to Germany as a whole and to Berlin would not be affected by the Moscow Treaty. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 84.
45. This was stated by the Federal government on June 6th, 1970. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 120.
46. See, for example, Brandt's remarks on December 1st, 1970. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 222.
in the latter case, if this were to mean that not only Western military traffic but also civilian West German traffic between the Federal Republic and West Berlin could cross DDR territory without being subject to DDR control. This would represent a loss of formal sovereignty to the DDR, and the loss of the opportunity to interfere with civilian transit traffic as a reprisal against any alleged 'provocations' by the Federal Government or by West German political parties in West Berlin.

The reiteration by the Federal Republic in the Moscow Treaty that it had renounced the use of force worked against the Feindbild promoted by the DDR. It was admitted in the declaration of the DDR Council of Ministers of August 14th that the Federal Republic's 'friedensbedrohende Revanchepolitik' was now at an end, if the Federal Republic kept strictly to the letter and spirit of the treaty. This might be contrasted with Norden's statement at the 13th plenum two months earlier that non-recognition meant that the Federal Republic was harbouring 'aggressive Absichten' towards the DDR. In this respect a comment in Pravda, which, in the view of one West German observer, was addressed to the DDR, stated that '...those who were accustomed for decades to regard the Federal Republic as the tool of aggressive blocs find it difficult to accept the fact that West Germany, like any other sovereign state, has its own state interests, and wishes to pursue a

policy which takes into account the real situation and the real possibilities." 48

However, whatever the outcome of the Moscow Treaty, the DDR had decided to resume contacts with the Federal Republic. In his closing remarks at Kassel Stoph had declared that the Federal Republic required a pause for thought (Denkpause), to rethink its position, to realise that the DDR proposals offered the best way of achieving peaceful coexistence between the two states. 49 In July 1970 Ulbricht had added that 'die Dauer der Denkpause hängt aber nur von der Frist ab, die die Bundesrepublik für die Unterzeichnung des Gewaltverzichtsabkommens mit der Sowjetunion braucht.' 50 Clearly, the only concession made by the Federal Republic in the treaty had been to guarantee the inviolability of the frontiers of the DDR, and, after the treaty had been signed, Brandt had claimed that the 20 point programm he had proposed at Kassel remained the constructive basis for a treaty (vertragliche Regelung) between the two German states. 51

It was possible that this willingness to resume contacts with the Federal Republic resulted from a desire not to appear

48. Pravda, 18th August, 1970
inflexible in the face of domestic and international public opinion; the experience of the statements in the DDR media at the time of the Erfurt and Kassel meetings suggested however that further discussions with the Federal Government would be used to stress the ideological differences between the two states. A similar view had been taken by Egon Franke, who declared, in a West German declaration of ideological demarcation:

'Bei der Fortführung der Gespräche bleiben die ideologischen Gegensätze unberührt. Wir sind auch nicht bereit, unsere Vorstellungen von Demokratie, sozialem Rechtsstaat und freiheitlicher Gesellschaftsordnung aufzugeben. Darüber gibt es keine Diskussion.' 52

This raised the question whether it was possible to conceive of a united nation between two states with differing dominant ideologies, or whether, as the DDR leadership claimed, unity could only be achieved by the elimination of one of the two states, which implied the elimination of the dominant ideology of that state. A unified nation further implied a unified national culture. The DDR had long attempted to develop a separate socialist national culture. The rejection of the unity of the nation was an extension of this process.

The policy of the DDR leadership suffered a setback in the Moscow Treaty, not only through the absence of Soviet support, but also because the DDR population, through its access to both Eastern and Western information, became aware of this failure.

52. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 119.
5. Overt demarcation - from Ulbricht to Honecker

1. The beginnings of the Abgrenzung campaign

The relative decline in anti-West German statements in the East German media before the signing of the Moscow Treaty, which had been noted by Ilse Spittmann, continued for a month. This quiescence may possibly be explained by the need of the DDR leadership to reconsider its German policy in the light of the lack of Soviet support for this policy associated with the Moscow Treaty. The DDR media continued to stand by the interpretation of the treaty contained in the declaration of the Council of Ministers of August 14th, and presented the view that the German and European policies of the DDR were fully supported by and completely in line with those of the USSR and of the other Warsaw Treaty member states. However, signs of irritation might be noted in reference to a Chinese allegation that the Moscow Treaty was a betrayal of the sovereignty of the DDR; this was condemned as an attempt to drive a wedge between the DDR and the Soviet Union.

A return to the slogans of ideological warfare was signalled by a speech delivered by Hermann Axen, a member of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the SED, on September 13th,


1970. While stressing the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist nature of the DDR, Axen argued that unpunished Nazis were to be found in the Federal Republic, which was the home of neo-nazism, revenge-seeking and militarism. He continued:


Here hostility towards the Federal Republic was more pronounced than in Ulbricht's speech in Rostock on July 16th, delivered before the Moscow Treaty was signed, where at least a distinction had been made between the Brandt-Scheel coalition and 'progressive democratic forces' on the one hand, and the 'extreme right wing forces' gathered around Franz-Josef Strauß on the other. Despite the clear rejection of the use of force by the USSR and the Federal Republic in Article 2 of the Moscow Treaty, the old claims of militarism and revenge-seeking had been applied in undifferentiated form to the Federal Republic,

4. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 129.
from which now total demarcation, 'Abgrenzung auf allen Gebieten', was overtly advocated.

Subsequent speeches by a number of East German leaders suggested that 'Abgrenzung' was the key word in a renewed anti-West German campaign. On October 6th Willi Stoph again attacked the concept of the unity of the nation, and repeated the standard ideological distinction between the two states:

'Angesichts der Gegensätzlichkeit der Staats- und Gesellschaftssysteme vollzog und vollzieht sich unvermeidlich ein objektiver Prozeß der Abgrenzung und nicht der Annäherung. Worum es zwischen der BRD und der DDR geht - das ist die Herstellung von völkerrechtlichen Beziehungen, wie es zwischen Staaten mit unterschiedlicher Gesellschaftsordnung im Interesse der Erhaltung des Friedens notwendig ist.' 6

The detailed coverage of this speech in the Soviet press noted by Spittmann, 7 suggested that its anti-West German content was acceptable to the USSR. A similar opposition of demarcation and rapprochement, the former making the latter impossible, was argued by Kurt Hager in the following month:

'Angesichts der Gegensätzlichkeit der zwei Staats und Gesellschaftssysteme - des Sozialismus und des Imperialismus - vollzog und vollzieht sich gesetzmäßig ein Prozeß der politischen, ökonomischen und ideologischen Abgrenzung zwischen der DDR und der BRD. Eine Annäherung oder gar ein "inneres" Verhältnis ist objektiv überhaupt nicht möglich.' 8

In a speech reported in Neues Deutschland on October 24th Honecker declared that the logic of the Moscow Treaty was

that the Federal Republic should establish diplomatic relations with the DDR. The division of Germany had been made permanent by the entry of the Federal Republic into NATO. There could never be 'innere Beziehungen between socialism and imperialism."

Honecker continued:

'Der Antagonismus zwischen den beiden Systemen ist objektiv. Und so vollzieht sich auch zwischen der sozialistischen DDR, die fest und unverrückbar zur sozialistischen Staatengemeinschaft gehört, und der imperialistischen Bundesrepublik, die mit den USA verbündet und fest in die NATO integriert ist, ein objektiver Prozeß der Abgrenzung.'

Honecker stated that West German politicians, who did not deny the irreconcilability of the two systems, should draw the necessary conclusions. Relations with the Federal Republic had to be based on peaceful coexistence, which 'beruht auf dem unerschütterlichen Bündnis mit der Sowjetunion, auf der Macht und der Solidarität aller sozialistischen Staaten.' But peaceful relations had to be accompanied by ideological watchfulness, he argued, since the socialist states were to be strengthened not only by economic development, but also by the ideological struggle against imperialism. Echoing Mittag at the 13th plenum, he concluded:

'Nichts verbindet uns mit dem imperialistischen System - alles verbindet uns mit unserem sozialistischen Vaterland, der DDR, mit unseren Freunden und Verbündeten in der sozialistischen Gemeinschaft...'

Although Honecker had identified economic development and ideological security as two means of strengthening the social-

ist states, including the DDR, there was a third factor, which was peculiar to the DDR, the need for Western recognition to support legitimation. The realisation of diplomatic recognition did not lie directly within the power of the DDR leadership; as has been argued above, this depended ultimately on the Federal government. But the latter was not prepared to recognise the DDR in international law, which explains the attacks on the unity of the nation and intra-German relationships, since these concepts were used by the Federal Government to justify non-recognition. It would perhaps have seemed a logical step for the DDR leadership to have incorporated the denial of national unity into the Abgrenzung theory; this was done indirectly with the slogan of demarcation in all areas, yet there was no mention of 'nationale Abgrenzung', possibly because any attempt to formulate such a concept would have been counter-productive, in view of the level of affect for Brandt - and by implication, for the German policy of his administration - which had been demonstrated at Erfurt.

There was a further difficulty of a constitutional nature. Despite the declaration that the DDR was the socialist German nation state, the term 'Nationalstaat' had carefully not been applied to the Federal Republic. It was claimed that the leaders of the Federal Republic had destroyed the unity of the German nation. But in denying the unity of the German nation the DDR leadership did not go as far as saying that there were now two
nations, which nationale Abgrenzung would have implied. The furthest that Ulbricht went was to declare a 'staatliche Abgrenzung' between the two states.

In a speech reported on November 6th Albert Norden linked Abgrenzung with peaceful coexistence:

'Das große historische Ringen zwischen Sozialismus und Imperialismus beflügelt den Kampf der Völker um ihre Befreiung... Zwischen den Systemen findet vielmehr ein objektiver Prozeß der immer deutlicheren politischen, ideologischen und ökonomischen Abgrenzung statt. Mit jedem Erfolg des Sozialismus tritt der reaktionäre Charakter des Imperialismus und seine historische Überlebtheit immer scharfer hervor. Staaten, die diese entgegengesetzte Systeme repräsentieren, heben sich daher in ihrem Wesen mehr und mehr voneinander ab. Genauso verhält es sich mit der Stellung der sozialistischen DDR zur imperialistischen BRD. Das schließt Beziehungen der friedlichen Koexistenz zwischen solchen Staaten nicht nur nicht aus, sondern macht sie geradezu notwendig, eben weil es um Staaten mit unterschiedlicher, ja gegensätzlicher Ordnung geht. Darum bilden die klare Erkenntnis der Unversöhnllichkeit von Sozialismus und Imperialismus und unsere Politik der aktiven friedlichen Koexistenz eine untrennbare Einheit.'

The argument that peaceful coexistence was essential under conditions of demarcation was repeated two days later. Here peaceful coexistence was defined as follows:

'Sie zielt gerade darauf ab, daß Beziehungen des Völkerrechts zwischen allem Staaten und die Zurückdrängung der aggressiven Kräfte des Imperialismus heute den Frieden zusichern, ohne daß damit der grundlegende gesellschaftliche Antagonismus und der Gegensatz von bürgerlicher und sozialistischer Ideologie aufgehoben werden könnte.'

Once again the refusal by the Federal Republic to establish relations with the DDR based on international law was the point

at issue, since apart from this it could be argued that the Federal Republic had already complied with the main tenets of peaceful coexistence. It had long been prepared to exchange declarations of non-aggression with the Eastern bloc, and to include the unsolved problems of the division of Germany in these declarations. Furthermore Brandt, who had directly offered the DDR an agreement on the mutual renouncing of the use of force in October 1969, had combined this with his declaration in January 1970 that there could be no ideological compromise between the two states. The difference between the official viewpoints of the two states was that the DDR claimed that demarcation and rapprochement were opposites; on the other hand, Brandt wanted both ideological demarcation and rapprochement.

Some light may be thrown on this apparent inconsistency by Picaper's statement that Western culture is decentralised, but is seen by the East as a coordinated conspiracy. Brandt appeared to limit his conception of ideological demarcation to a rejection of the belief system of the DDR leadership. Conversely, in accord with the Marxist-Leninist base/superstructure theory, the DDR leadership viewed all activity as

ultimately related to ideology. Thus the East German concept of total demarcation was ideological in this wider sense. It followed from this that rapprochement was the negation of demarcation, since rapprochement was understood by the Federal Republic in terms of menschliche Erleichterungen, which would have the effect of facilitating increased contacts between the citizens of the two states, contacts which would expose DDR citizens to Western ideology. It was not possible to describe the desire for increased contacts with the DDR as a coordinated conspiracy, because the Federal Republic, as a liberal democratic state, did not aspire to exercise ideological control over all sectors of West German life, but the effect was the same, since the ballot box had shown that the majority of West German citizens shared the liberal democratic ideology of the politicians in the Bundestag.

17. On the question of basis and superstructure a modern East German source has declared:

'Die Gesellschaft stellt auf jeder Entwicklungsstufe eine Gesamtheit gesellschaftlicher Verhältnisse zwischen den Menschen dar, die in materielle und ideologische einge-teilt werden können. Die ersteren bilden die Grundlage, die reale Basis einer Gesellschaft; die letzteren stellen den Überbau über dieser Basis dar.'

ii The strengthening of the leadership's control

The Abgrenzung campaign was accompanied by intensified measures to promote greater effectiveness within three key areas of East German society, the education system, the rank and file SED membership and the armed forces. In January 1970 an agreement was signed to develop the cooperation between the DDR and the USSR in the field of education.18 In May 1970 the VII pedagogic congress of the DDR took place, on which occasion the minister of education, Margot Honecker, called for higher research standards, the revision of curricula, and for higher levels of achievement by schoolchildren.19 On September 15th, 1970, an academy of pedagogic sciences of the DDR was founded, and simultaneously a plan for scientific cooperation with the Soviet academy of pedagogic sciences was announced.20 Fifteen institutes and sections were established for specialised tasks in the field of education.21 Their work, particularly through the rewriting of textbooks, became important for the socialisation of schoolchildren into the concept of demarcation.22

The following example of how demarcation was to be taught in the schools balanced the negative referent of West German imperialism by positive reference to the USSR and the other socialist states. At this time, July 1970, the central conviction of the friend-foe relationship was still declared to be that the West German working class would one day achieve socialism.

Anforderungen an das ideologische Freund-Feind-Bild

1. Politisch-ideologisches Engagement für die Partei der Arbeiterklasse und alle Werkähigen in der sozialistischen Menschengemeinschaft.


7. Übereinstimmung der persönlichen Interessen mit den Interessen des sozialistischen Vaterlandes sowie mit allen um Frieden, Demokratie und Sozialismus kämpfenden Menschen und Staaten.

In October 1970 joint manoeuvres of the Warsaw Treaty armed forces, codenamed Waffenbrüderschaft, took place within the DDR. The manoeuvres were given massive coverage in Neues Deutschland, with fulsome expressions of the unbreakable bonds of friendship between the DDR, the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty member states, and the standard condemnations of alleged Western aggression. In the same month Walter Ulbricht called for increased political-ideological work among the armed forces in a speech before newly commissioned officers of the Nationale Volksarmee. He returned to the language of the cold war. The old bogey of the Hitler generals of the Bundeswehr, who were allegedly planning to use chemical and nuclear weapons against the socialist states, was revived. It was claimed that Waffenbrüderschaft had demonstrated the invincibility of the socialist community of states, and had strengthened the international reputation of the DDR. Here the DDR statement of August 14th, which had suggested that West German revenge seeking was at an end after the Moscow Treaty had been signed, seemed to have been forgotten.

Ulbricht then turned to ideological questions. He declared that the newly qualified officers were starting their careers at a time when the DDR was building the developed socialist society, which was indivisibly connected with the

mastering of the scientific-technical revolution in all areas of society, including defence. He continued:

'Entscheidende Voraussetzung für die effektive Lösung aller Hauptaufgaben ist die ideologische Geschlossenheit der Bevölkerung, die Stabilität des Bewußtseins jedes einzelnen Bürgers und demzufolge auch jedes Armeeangehörigen. Lenin lehrt uns: "... je tiefer die Umgestaltung, die wir vollbringen wollen, desto mehr muß man Interesse und bewußte Einstellung zu ihr wecken, muß man ... von dieser Notwendigkeit überzeugen."

The world struggle between socialism and imperialism was intensifying, he argued. The economic struggle was accompanied by a struggle for the consciousness of all peace-loving people, where ideology was the decisive area of conflict between the two systems. Lenin's statement that there was no middle way between bourgeois and socialist ideology remained true. This made the political-ideological work in the NVA increasingly important.

'Vor jedem militärischen Kampfkollektiv, vor jeder Parteiorganisation steht die unabdingbare Forderung, zu erreichen, daß sich jeder Armeeangehörige vorbehaltlos mit den Zielen und Aufgaben des Sozialismus identifiziert. Nicht zuletzt wächst die Bedeutung der politisch-ideologischen Arbeit, weil das sozialistische Denken und Handeln aller Bevölkerungsschichten unserer Republik nur durch die Auseinandersetzung mit der bürgerlichen Ideologie entwickelt werden kann.'

It was argued that ideological work should be linked more closely with military duties, that the greatest military successes were achieved where communist consciousness was most highly developed. Ulbricht declared that the young officers occupied a key position in political-ideological work, as the immediate superiors of the ordinary soldiers, and advised the newly qualified officers on the methods of political education; they should make use of the experience
of their superiors, study the contemporary Marxist-Leninist social sciences and set a good example through their personal behaviour.

This speech suggested that a widespread tightening-up of ideological discipline was in progress in the NVA. What was interesting was the assertion that socialist thought and behaviour could be developed only through conflict with bourgeois ideology. However, Ulbricht did not relate ideological controversy specifically to the Federal Republic, and there was no mention of Abgrenzung. Jörg Lolland claimed that Ulbricht had taken measures to try to raise the political consciousness of the NVA, because its morale had been shattered. Lolland argued that this had been caused firstly by the defeat of the Egyptians in the 1967 six day war in the Middle East. The fact that the Egyptians had been trained by Soviet instructors had lessened the NVA's trust in Soviet military science. The second reason suggested by Lolland was the unpopularity of the intervention of the DDR armed forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968, where in the first days DDR military reporters had thoughtlessly described the NVA as an army which was full of élan and intoxicated with victory.25

Between September 1st and October 31st, 1970, all full and candidate members of the SED had their membership documents renewed. This subject was mentioned in November in a television interview between Ulbricht and two party secretaries. It was clear from the interview that an attempt had been made to explain the DDR leadership's German policy to the ordinary party members.26 The significance of the exchange of party documents was discussed in Neuer Weg, the periodical for SED officials. Horst Dohlus, the central committee member in charge of party organs had declared in July 1970:

'Der Dokumentenumtausch ist so gesehen keine rein inner- innerparteiliche Angelegenheit, seine Durchführung hat große gesellschaftliche Bedeutung und steht in Zusammen-hang mit der Lösung aller anderen Aufgaben. Der Umtausch der Mitgliedsbücher und Kandidatenkarten ist ein Bestand- teil der Anstrengungen unserer Partei, den Blick der Ge-nossen und aller Werktätigen für die nächste Zukunft zu weiten und alle Kräfte unserer sozialistischen Gesellschaft noch bewusster und gründlicher auf die Lösung der gegenwär-tigen Hauptaufgaben zu orientieren, sie zu mobilisieren und zu führen.' 27

However, while alerting the party, Dohlus did not elaborate on the tasks which had to be tackled. A further article in September declared that some comrades had expressed the view that too much fuss had been made about the exchange of documents. But it was necessary to raise the level of activity of every member, and to prepare the party for the coming tasks.28

iii. West German interpretations of demarcation

At the beginning of December 1970, on the eve of the 14th plenum, a meeting of the Political-Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was held in East Berlin. The concluding declaration, quoted by Ulbricht at the 14th plenum, appeared to give considerable support to the DDR's Western policy. It was stated that the establishment of relations based on international law between the DDR and other states, including the Federal Republic, and the entry of the DDR into the United Nations Organisation and other international organisations were important contemporary demands.29

However, this support could not disguise the fact that the DDR had suffered a further setback with the conclusion of the treaty on the normalisation of relations between the Federal Republic and Poland (the Warsaw Treaty), on December 7th, 1970.30 The DDR had failed to stop Poland normalising relations with the Federal Republic, without the latter having recognised the DDR. It was again shown that the DDR's allies were not prepared to insist on West German recognition of the DDR. Despite this failure Ulbricht

29. It was stated in the declaration: 'Die Teilnehmer der Beratung erklärten sich einmütig mit der Friedenspolitik der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik solidarisch.' Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, pp. 224-227.

commented at the 14th plenum:

'Die Regierung Brandt wird also zur Kenntnis nehmen müssen, daß es keinen sozialistischen Staat gibt, bei dem sie Verständnis für die nebulöse Forderung nach „innerdeutschen Beziehungen" finden könnte.' 31

The uncertainties connected with the Berlin and Warsaw treaties for the DDR leadership may be viewed as one explanation for the Abgrenzung campaign and the associated measures for intensified political education in the NVA and SED. A further source of anxiety might be found in the continuing quadripartite negotiations on the future of Berlin. In November 1970 Neues Deutschland had attacked the West German government's insistence that its ratification of the Moscow Treaty would be made dependent on a satisfactory outcome of the Berlin negotiations. 32 Here, if the demands of the Federal government were realised, 33 they would represent a serious limitation of East German claims to sovereignty in this area. A contemporary West German observer claimed that the DDR was using the Berlin negotiations for a 'deutschlandpolitische Gegenoffensive', by attempting to make concessions on Berlin dependent on the Federal Republic accepting the DDR's German policy. 34 But the realisation of the DDR leadership's policy depended on Soviet support,

31. Neues Deutschland, 10th December, 1970
32. Ibid, 5th November, 1970
33. West German demands were explained by Egon Franke on August 11th. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, pp. 87-88.
34. Deutschland Archiv, 1970/12, pp. 1259-1260.
and the USSR had shown in the Moscow and Warsaw treaties that it was prepared to sacrifice DDR interests when they conflicted with Soviet policies in the field of European security.

It is argued that one immediate factor behind the DDR leadership's decision to introduce the Abgrenzung campaign was connected with its agreement with the Federal Republic on October 29th, 1970, to resume discussions with Bonn on matters of common interest. This was the view of the parliamentary state secretary in the Federal ministry for intra-German relations, Karl Herold, which he expressed during question time in the Bundestag on May 12th, 1971. At that time he was asked how the Federal government judged one of the SED May Day slogans - 'Vollständige Abgrenzung von der imperialistischen BRD - für die Herstellung normaler diplomatischer Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der BRD entsprechend den Regeln des Völkerrechts!' - with respect to the Erfurt and Kassel meetings and the discussions between the two states which began in November 1970. Herold replied by sketching the course of the campaign which began, he claimed, with Stoph's speech of October 7th, 1970, and was developed by Honecker at the 14th plenum. He noted the relationship between demarcation and peaceful coexistence and continued:

35. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 6, p. 166

This reaction resembled Egon Franke's comment of May 1970, that increased hostility towards the Federal Republic after the Erfurt meeting was evidence of the leadership's desire for ideological security within the DDR, to counteract any euphoric hopes for closer contacts with the Federal Republic among DDR citizens. Herold added that the Federal administration could not remain indifferent to the 'ideologische Aggressivität' of the SED. He reinforced his assertion that a settlement with the DDR in no way implied approval of the political-ideological or social relationships in the DDR, and quoted Brandt's similar views in the latter's state of the nation speech of January 1971, that there could be no amalgamation of the opposed ideological and political conditions within the two states.

The federal government could afford to take a more relaxed view of the ideological controversy between the two German states, because the dominant ideology of the Federal Republic, liberal democracy, was shared by both the government and the overwhelming majority of the population of West Germany.

Thus the Federal government, unlike the DDR leadership, did not suffer from a lack of legitimacy. A few days after Herold's statement, Willy Brandt was asked in an interview whether total demarcation had worsened the chances for Nebeneinander with the DDR. He replied:


This view was subsequently supported by Gerhard Wettig, who claimed that a survey conducted in the DDR in early 1972 had concluded that four fifths of the East German population disapproved of the official demarcation policy. 38


iv. The 14th SED plenum

The 14th plenum, which was held between December 9th and 11th, 1970, formalised the Abgrenzung campaign. Its significance may be judged by the frequent references back in the following months to the statements on Abgrenzung which were developed during the plenum. In the report of the Politbüro to the 14th plenum, delivered by Paul Verner, stress was laid on the role of demarcation in the field of ideology. It was argued the aggressive nature of imperialism had increased, that accordingly greater watchfulness was required against the new forms of counter-revolutionary struggle against socialism. Peaceful coexistence could never mean ideological coexistence, in this area there was neither room for neutrality nor compromise. Verner claimed that the differences between the West German social democratic leaders and the CDU/CSU were tactical rather than fundamental, the former finding the conservatism of the latter unsuitable in the fight against socialism. Brandt’s formula of intra-German special relationships was viewed not as a nationalistic propaganda slogan, but as the contemporary principal strategic line of nationalism against the DDR. This was an expression of revenge-seeking, which had the purpose of preparing the way for the annexation of the DDR.

39. Neues Deutschland, 10th December, 1970.
Verner continued that the intra-German concept was derived from the allegedly continuing unity of the German nation. This unity had been destroyed, he argued, as a result of the second World War, and especially by the subsequent split for which the American and West German imperialists were responsible.


Honecker also repeated at the 14th plenum\(^{40}\) that there could be no rapprochement between socialism and imperialism, and declared that the fact that an objective process of demarcation, and not of rapprochement, was taking place between the two German states, was of great importance for the ideological work of the SED. He claimed that the exchange of party documents had been more than a purely

\(^{40}\) Neues Deutschland, 14th December, 1970.
organisational matter. Its aim had been to increase the leading role of the party in all areas of social life, and to intensify the development of socialist consciousness among the workers, in order to fulfill the great task of building a socialist society on the DDR. For this purpose the exchange of documents had been the opportunity to conduct a personal, comradely discussion with each party member and candidate. In this connection he declared:

'...unsere Genossen – und dies haben die Versammlungen und Aussprachen bewiesen – durchdenken die Frage der Abgrenzung zwischen der sozialistischen DDR und der imperialistischen BRD bis zu Ende...'

Further reference to Abgrenzung at the 14th plenum was made by Friedrich Ebert, whose attack was directed particularly against social democracy as a form of bourgeois ideology. He declared that objective demarcation represented permanent conflict with the policy and ideology of social democracy. The all-round strengthening of the DDR and the unshakeable links with the USSR and other socialist states were decisive in this conflict.\textsuperscript{41}

The hostility towards the Federal Republic seen at the 14th plenum was reflected in the columns of Neues Deutschland, taking the form of constant references to past Nazi atrocities, and the alleged claims that West Germans were assisting the Portuguese colonialists in Guinea, and operating as mercenaries in the Sudan.\textsuperscript{42} This running

\textsuperscript{41} Neues Deutschland, 13th December, 1970

\textsuperscript{42} This was especially noticeable around the new year.
criticism may be explained as a deliberate policy decision to provide material to justify the Abgrenzung campaign. A change was noted in Neues Deutschland after Honecker's accession to power, when criticism of the Federal Republic tended to be aimed at the latter's alleged social and economic deficiencies.

At the end of December an article appeared in Neues Deutschland, entitled: Abgrenzung der Kultur: Ein aktuelles Problem des ideologischen Klassenkampfes. The article repeated that an objective process of demarcation, and not of rapprochement, was taking place, and continued that party members were interested in the role of demarcation against imperialism in the field of culture. Stoph's remarks at the 14th plenum that art and culture were playing an outstanding part in the conscious creative activity of the workers were recalled. It was declared:

'Diese Vorgänge sind dialektisch unauflösbar verknüpft mit der Abgrenzung und Wegwendung von den kulturellen Verfallsmerkmalen, welch den überholten Ausbeuterordnungen anhaften. Jeder Schritt auf dem Weg zur sozialistischen Kultur ist zugleich ein Schritt weg von der imperialistischen Unkultur.'

It was claimed that in the socialist countries a revolution had been completed in the field of ideology and culture, that the demarcation against imperialism was not a superficial phenomenon, as Western propagandists had maintained, in their efforts to make rapprochement palatable and to propagate.

43. Neues Deutschland, December 29th, 1970.
the notion of cultural disarmament. Abgrenzung against imperialism was an essential part of all socialist progress, and accordingly of cultural progress. An example of this was the democratic school reform which had ended privilege in education. This was indubitably a distinct and permanent form of demarcation, it was argued. There could be no rapprochement between humanists and barbarians.

v. Ulbricht's final months of control

In his 1971 new year message, Ulbricht had argued that the Federal Republic, by concluding the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, had bound itself to promote relations with the DDR on the basis of full equality, and the entry of the two states into the United Nations. Ulbricht claimed he was surprised that the Federal Republic had declared that it could not conclude an agreement with the DDR on the transit traffic between West Berlin and West Germany, because this lay within the competence of the four powers. He appeared to have forgotten his earlier position of one year before, when he had argued that the sovereignty of the Federal Republic was limited in this area by the three Western powers, whilst conversely the sovereignty of the DDR was not limited by the USSR. He made no reference to Abgrenzung in his comparison of the two German states.

Ulbricht had indeed referred to demarcation on December 17th, 1970, several weeks after other prominent DDR leaders, but his speech was not published until four weeks later.

On the national question he had declared:


Die Integration der BRD in die NATO und die imperialistische Globalstrategie der USA einerseits und die Entwicklung der souveränen sozialistischen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik andererseits hat eine immer schärfere staatliche Abgrenzung zwischen den beiden Staaten und Gesellschaftssystemen bewirkt. Im Prozeß der Entwicklung der Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Macht und des sozialistischen Aufbaus hat sich die DDR als sozialistischer deutscher Nationalstaat herausgebildet.

Ulbricht continued that the old bourgeois German nation had ceased to exist after 1945. The DDR was the socialist German nation state, within which a socialist nation was developing. These were irrevocable facts. The Federal Republic was an imperialist NATO state, which embodied the remaining part of the old bourgeois German nation.

'Während der Gegner Beziehungen zur DDR nutzen will, um im Zeichen einer fiktiven "nationalen Gemeinsamkeit" die DDR der BRD anzunähern und mit der sozialdemokratischen Gesellschaftstheorie in der DDR Fuß zu fassen, ist unsere Politik darauf gerichtet, solche Beziehungen zur BRD herzustellen, die uneingeschränkt dem Völkerrecht entsprechen, der objektiven und unvermeidlichen Abgrenzung zwischen den Systemen Rechnung tragen und damit alle Pläne für irgendwie geartete "innerdeutsche Beziehungen" durchkreuzen. Wenn die Politik des Gegners auf Verklammerung mit der DDR hinausläuft, kann es uns nur um entschiedene Abgrenzung gehen. Das ist die Voraussetzung für eine offensive Politik der friedlichen Koexistenz gegenüber der BRD.'

Ulbricht repeated his assertion that the Moscow Treaty represented the obligation to establish 'normale staatliche Beziehungen' between the two German states, and that both should join the United Nations. The anti-West German tone of the speech was notably sharper than was found in his new year message.

Ulbricht then examined the development of the DDR during the 25 years' existence of the SED. Since a socialist
programme had been introduced at the VI SED congress of 1963, the principal characteristics of the national structure of the DDR had been formed. This process had continued after the VII congress, with the establishment of the guidelines for 'die allseitige Gestaltung des entwickelten gesellschaftlichen Systems des Sozialismus und die Durchführung der wissenschaftlich-technischen Revolution.' Imperialism had been eradicated, an end had been put to the exploitation of man by man, and the socialist national culture had further developed.

What was decisive in these successes, he argued, was that the historic achievement of the SED could be seen, that the SED had been able to convince people, to win them over for the solution of these great historical tasks. The matter was as Engels had said; there could be no social progress without it first passing through the heads of people. The SED had to mobilise the whole population. All DDR citizens had to be filled with socialist consciousness, all workers had to become good specialists, for without this the scientific-technical revolution could not be realised. This would also contribute to the further development of the socialist community (Menschengemeinschaft).

Here Ulbricht's aspirations could be clearly seen. He wished to build socialism through an achievement-oriented society. However, he did not refer in this passage to the necessity of following Soviet experience.
The 15th SED plenum took place at the end of January. On that occasion it was announced that the VIII party congress was to be held in June, and the congress agenda was published. At the plenum Ulbricht declared that the VIII congress would raise the important tasks for the party, the working class and people of the DDR. These tasks arose 'aus der Entwicklung der DDR zum sozialistischen deutschen Nationalstaat, der untrennbar mit der Sowjetunion und der sozialistischen Staaten-gemeinschaft verbunden ist, und seiner prinzipiellen Abgrenzung vom imperialistischen NATO-Staat BRD.'

The phrase underlined in the original was repeated twice in Ulbricht's speech. He then appealed to the citizens of the DDR in emotional, non-material terms:

'Die Bürger der DDR bauen unter Führung der revolutionären Partei der Arbeiterklasse ihr sozialistisches Gesellschaftssystem aus und entwickeln sich dabei selbst zu sozialistischen Persönlichkeiten mit sozialistischem Bewusstsein. Das heißt, sie sind erfüllt von dem Gefühl hoher Verantwortung, sie erwerben hohe Bildung und Moral, sie entwickeln Internationalismus und besonders feste Freundschaft mit der Sowjetunion, sozialistisches Nationalbewusstsein und sozialistischen Patriotismus für ihren sozialistischen deutschen Nationalstaat. Möge so die Weltanschauung unseres Volkes entwickeln und festigen...''

Adressing himself to Deutschlandpolitik, Ulbricht declared that the only rational path for the Federal Republic was the path of peaceful coexistence. More favourable conditions now existed for the establishment of relations regulated by treaties based on international law (vertragliche völkerrechtliche Beziehungen) between the two German states.

47. Neues Deutschland, 30th January, 1971.
Ulbricht stressed the importance of literature and art in the development of socialist national culture. Literature and art were to develop as an essential part of socialism; they were important for the development of socialist consciousness, if writers and artists created truly socialist works and deepened their relationships with the working class, and if the artistic presentation of social relationships, of the socialist community and the socialist personality was associated with the struggle against anti-communism and imperialist ideologies in this field. He continued:

'Wir sind uns bewuβt, daß die Stabilität der DDR als sozialistischer deutscher Nationalstaat von der richtigen ideologischen Erziehung der Mitglieder der SED und aller Werktätigen und von der ständigen systematischen Aufklärungsarbeit unter allen Bürgern der Republik abhängig ist.'

The theme of stability had also appeared in Neues Deutschland one month earlier in an article which evaluated the work of the 14th plenum.48

At the 15th plenum Honecker stressed the importance of ideological work, of 'parteiliche Überzeugung':

'Höhere Menschen handeln mit großem Verständnis bei der Lösung der Aufgaben, gehen schöpferisch an die Verwirklichung, entfalten eine große persönliche Initiative zur weiteren Entwicklung der sozialistischen Gesellschaft. Dabei haben wir stets vor Augen, daß wir die neue Gesellschaft des Sozialismus unter den Bedingungen unversönlicher Klassenauseinandersetzung mit dem Imperialismus in der BRD und seiner verschärften geistigen Diversionsversuche aufbauen. So ist es auch weiterhin notwendig, alle Spielarten der bürgerlichen Ideologie, vor allem Nationalismus und Sozialdemokratismus, konsequent zurückzuweisen...

Honecker claimed that the exchange of party documents in the previous year had been concerned with the goal of increasing the fighting strength of the SED, and of deepening the relations based on trust with the workers, collective farm workers and intelligentsia. The principal aim was the all-round strengthening of the DDR and its firm and irrevocable integration into the socialist community of states. The latter offered the sole guarantee for a successful policy of peaceful coexistence with states of differing social order, including the Federal Republic.

He continued:

'Die weitere Abgrenzung der sozialistischen DDR von der imperialistischen BRD ist die wirksamste Antwort auf die reaktionäre nationalistiche, antikommunistische Politik der herrschenden Kreise der BRD.'

With reference to the decisions of the 14th plenum, Honecker declared that they had evoked great agreement and

satisfaction among the whole population of the DDR. This proved the party's links with the people.

The question arises why Ulbricht himself did not refer to Abgrenzung until December 17th, 1970 - and this speech was not published until January 14th of the following year, some four months after Axen had proclaimed 'Abgrenzung auf allen Gebieten'. This would seem all the more remarkable, since Ulbricht had tended to lead the way in stressing the differences between the two states, particularly with his claim that the DDR was as 'sozialistischer deutscher Nationalstaat'. There were occasions after Axen's speech which would have given him the opportunity to join the Abgrenzung campaign, but, even at the 14th plenum of December 9th-11th, where Abgrenzung appeared to become accepted as general party policy, he remained silent on this point.

This might be explained as evidence of disagreement on German policy not only with the Soviet Union (which was suggested by the failure of the Soviet ambassador to the DDR, P. A. Abrassimov, to make any reference to Ulbricht when congratulating Honecker on becoming party secretary)\(^5\) - but also with his colleagues in the party leadership.

It is argued that Ulbricht was opposed to any but the minimum necessary contacts with the Federal Republic, yet improved contacts would have to come about, since this was part of the price the USSR had to pay, in order to further its European policy. I would suggest that Ulbricht's colleagues accepted that closer contacts between the two German states were inevitable, and they, rather than Ulbricht had introduced the Abgrenzung campaign, in order to maintain control under conditions where static relations with the Federal Republic were to be replaced by developing relationships. Such a view might be supported by the link between demarcation and peaceful coexistence made by Norden (November 6th) and Stoph (November 8th), which appeared to make demarcation part of the process of the normalisation of relations between the two German states. Such a link was subsequently elaborated by Honecker after he had become party secretary. Again, early signs of similar thinking by the USSR and Ulbricht's colleagues may be inferred from the printing in Pravda of Stoph's claim in his speech of October 6th that demarcation was the opposite of rapprochement, a claim repeated by Verner and Honecker at the 14th plenum. Thus Ulbricht's belated acceptance of the demarcation policy is viewed as a defeat for his views within the DDR leadership.
6. Ideological demarcation under Honecker

i. Closer alignment with the Soviet Union

At the VIII SED congress of 15th-19th June, 1971, the demarcation policy against the Federal Republic, formulated under Ulbricht, was restated:

'Der Parteitag erklärt: Zwischen der DDR und der BRD, zwei voneinander unabhängigen Staaten mit entgegengesetzter Gesellschaftsordnung, vollzieht sich gesetzmäßig ein Prozeß der Abgrenzung. Zwischen ihnen kann es daher nur Beziehungen der friedlichen Koexistenz auf der Grundlage des Völkerrechts geben.' 1

However, some changes in emphasis became apparent after the replacement of Ulbricht, the most notable being a closer identification of the DDR with the Soviet Union. This view was supported by an increased number of references to the USSR in the East German media, and, in particular, by Honecker's speech at the 16th plenum of May 1971, the first plenum which he addressed as party leader. Here there were constant uncritical references to the Soviet example, as a model for the development of the DDR. Honecker's speech was largely a detailed description of the recently held XXIV congress of the CPSU, whose decisions were declared to be 'von grundlegender Bedeutung für alle kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien...' The leading role of the CPSU was stressed with an even greater intensity than had been found for years in SED declarations:

Deutschlandpolitik was now more explicitly claimed to be backed up by Soviet support. Whereas Ulbricht had also declared that DDR policy was in line with that of its allies, as, for example, after the meeting of the political-consultative committee held in East Berlin in early December 1970, the impression was now given not only that DDR policy enjoyed Soviet approval, but that the DDR was faithfully carrying out policy which had been initiated by the USSR.

On this point Honecker declared:

'In Übereinstimmung mit der KPdSU und den anderen Bruderparteien - das zeigte der XXIV Parteitag erneut - gehen wir in unserer Politik davon aus, daß sich am reaktionären, aggressiven Charakter des Imperialismus der BRD nichts geändert hat.'

The claim that the Deutschlandpolitik of the DDR was being initiated by the Soviet Union at this time was later to be supported by the tone of the Soviet declarations in Annex I and Annex III of the Quadripartite Agreement.

There was an apparent contradiction here, since Soviet and DDR interests were not identical, as was shown in the outcome of the Moscow Treaty, where the wider concerns of the USSR caused the DDR's claim for West German recognition


to be frustrated, and by the signs of disagreement between Ulbricht and the USSR in the four power negotiations on Berlin.\textsuperscript{4} I would argue that Honecker found advisable to appear to support Soviet policy totally at this time, in order to secure his position during the leadership change in the SED.\textsuperscript{5} Perhaps realistically, if unwillingly, he had to accept that Soviet policy would run counter to some DDR interests in the German question. But if Soviet policy were to permit the realisation of some of the aims of the Federal government's German policy, the desired 'menschliche Erleichterungen', then this would put the demarcation policy to the test. It was also possible that a closer Soviet orientation was not unwelcome to Honecker, since the Soviet Union was required as a positive referent to balance the official Feindbild of the Federal Republic.

At the 16th plenum Honecker also referred to the Soviet example in the field of political socialisation; he spoke of the new face (Antlitz) of Soviet man, of the role of Soviet writers in supporting the ideological position of the CPSU, and reported with approval the demand made at the XXIV CPSU congress for more effective ideological work, for a contribution from each individual communist to the raising of the moral reputation of the party through exemplary personal conduct. It is likely that the SED membership

\textsuperscript{4} The tensions between Ulbricht and the Soviet leadership were examined by Ilse Spittmann in Deutschland Archiv, 1971/6, pp. 568-569.

clearly understood that these demands also applied to themselves. After the 16th plenum the adulation of the Soviet example began to abate, but in one respect closer ideological cooperation with the Soviet Union appeared to be permanent. Evidence of such change was to be found in the following year, with the establishment in East Berlin of two joint DDR-USSR commissions, on April 4th and 6th, 1972, respectively, the one for research in the field of philosophy, and the other for research on the history and theory of the international labour movement.6

ii. The national question

At the VIII congress the SED's view of the national question was developed by Honecker. He repeated that there was no unity of the German nation, and that relations between the two states could only be based on peaceful coexistence:

'Die prinzipielle Linie unserer Partei geht davon aus, daß der gesamte Verlauf der Entwicklung und die Festigung unseres sozialistischen Staates objektiv dahin führt und führen muß, daß die Gegensätzlichkeit zwischen uns und der BRD, die den kapitalistischen Weg geht, sich verstärkt und daß darum der Prozeß der Abgrenzung zwischen beiden Staaten in allen Bereichen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens immer tiefgehender wird.'7

Such was the situation, Honecker argued, as long as the Federal Republic remained an imperialist state. He reminded those in the West who allegedly wished to swallow

up the DDR that it was a stable socialist state, behind which stood the whole power of the Soviet Union and the united socialist countries, and in this claim he was supported by Brezhnev's speech at the congress.

The DDR's contribution to European security was enumerated under five headings. It was declared that the SED and the government of the DDR would react positively to measures taken by the Bonn government which took into account the true state of affairs. The five points were:

1. Support for a European security conference, at which the DDR would be an equal participant.

2. DDR membership of UNO would assist European détente.

3. The DDR was ready to establish diplomatic relations with all states, with full mutual respect of sovereignty.

4. The West German formula of special intra-German relations was torpedoing the normalisation of relations between the two states, and also European security.

5. Normalisation of relations between the DDR and West Berlin would contribute to détente in the centre of Europe. Thus the DDR wished for a successful outcome to the four power discussions on Berlin. Here it had to be recognised that West Berlin had a special political status, did not belong and never would belong to the Federal Republic.

So far Honecker's position did not differ greatly from that of his predecessor. However, Honecker declared not only that there was no unity of the German nation, but also that the national question had been answered:
Honecker sketched the development of the German nation from 1871. It was claimed that at that time German Großkapital in alliance with the Junker class had welded together a unitary German nation state by blood and iron through the suppression of the German people themselves and the subjugation of foreign peoples. From the beginning the bourgeoisie was the worst enemy of the nation, having plunged the German people into national catastrophes through two world wars, for which the bourgeoisie was to blame. With the end of the Third Reich the bourgeoisie had lost the right to lead the nation. Only the working class, Honecker argued, could renew the nation on a democratic basis and guarantee its unity within an anti-fascist and democratic state. German monopoly capital had completed its national treachery by splitting Germany and the German people in the interests of preserving its class rule.

Honecker continued:


Im Gegensatz zur BRD, wo die bürgerliche Nation fortbesteht und wo die nationale Frage durch den unversöhnlichen Klassenwiderspruch zwischen der Bourgeoisie und den werk­tätigen Massen bestimmt wird, der – davon sind wir überzeugt – im Verlauf des welthistorischen Prozesses des Übergangs vom Kapitalismus zum Sozialismus seine Lösung finden wird, entwickelt sich bei uns in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, im sozialistischen deutschen Staat, die sozialistische Nation. 9

Honecker then explained how the socialist nation was developing:

'Das findet seinen Ausdruck darin, daß die Macht der Arbeiter und Bauern errichtet wurde und souverän über ihr eigenes Territorium herrscht, dessen Grenzen zuverlässig geschützt sind. Durch die Vergesellschaftlichung der entscheidenden Produktionsmittel, durch den Sieg der sozialistischen Produktionsverhältnisse ist eine völlig neue, die sozialistische ökonomische Basis der Gesellschaft entstanden. An die Stelle der kapitalistischen Anarchie und Konkurrenz ist die sozialistische Planwirtschaft getreten. Die sozialistische Gesellschaft in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik besitzt eine grundlegend neue Klassenstruktur. Hier existieren unter Führung der Arbeiterklasse freundschaftlich miteinander verbundene Klassen und Schichten der Bevölkerung, die von sozialistischen Characterzügen geprägt werden. Im Verlauf der sozialistischen Entwicklung in unserer Republik sind die sozialistische Ideologie und die neue sozialistische Nationalkultur, die alle humanistischen Traditionen der deutschen Vergangenheit in sich aufgenommen hat, vorherrschend geworden. Für alle Zeiten ist die Deutsche Demokratische Republik fest im sozialistischen Weltsystem verankert und ihre Integration in die sozialistische Staatengemeinschaft vertieft sich gesetzmäßig.' 10

This statement was significant, because it was delivered by the party leader at the party congress, and had the effect of laying down official policy on the national question for the next five years. However, in the following

10. Ibid, p. 32.
months there was a decline in references both to the national question and to demarcation, although Honecker declared at the 2nd plenum of September 1971 that a 'völlige und entgültige Abgrenzung' was being achieved between the two states, on the basis of peaceful coexistence. The further development in the DDR leadership's German policy, the proposals made by Honecker in his speech in Sofia on 18th April, 1972, repeated at the 5th plenum in the same month, that the two states should discuss the normalisation of their relations, ignored the national question, as had Ulbricht's draft treaty of December 1969.

In a contemporary review of the SED policy on the national question, Ludz noted that Ulbricht and Honecker had introduced revised concepts of the nation in an imprecise manner, the former by including both the old 'sozialistischer Staat deutscher Nation' and the new 'sozialistischer deutscher Nationalstaat' in his statement of January 19th, 1970, and the latter by not specifying whether the socialist nation had been achieved, or whether it was still developing. The continuation of older definitions was seen in the DDR constitution, which was not changed until 1974, and the party programme and rules, which were replaced at the IX

SED congress of 1976. Connected with these developments was the apparent tendency from 1970/1971 to limit the use of the word 'deutsch'. Ludz explained the coexistence of old and new definitions as a sign of 'Unsicherheit im Selbstverständnis der SED-Führung bezüglich der Nation'.

I would suggest that the DDR leadership was likely to experience uncertainty for the following reason: by denying the unity of the German nation it was putting the legitimation of the régime at risk. The concept of a single German nation, which had been employed by Ulbricht as late as 1969, had been the main obstacle to legitimation. It was of symbolic significance, because it implied the unification of the two German states, and the principle of unification, although more and more heavily qualified, remained in the DDR constitution until 1974. Consequently, unification hindered the legitimation of the DDR leadership, by implying that the East German state was provisional, until unification had been achieved.

Since 1945 the two parts of the former Reich had increasingly diverged, and Schweigler had suggested that all-German national consciousness, although widespread, was tending to decline. At the same time the DDR leadership was slowly

undermining beliefs of all-German significance, finally rejecting the unity of the nation in 1970. The question was how far the rates of change in (a) the decline in affect for a united Germany and (b) the leadership's moves towards a rejection of a nation common to both German states were in step. A decline in the leadership's support would ensue if the SED's policy on the national question were to develop faster than the decline in all-German national consciousness among the general population.

Ludz declared on the leadership's national policy:

'...daß die... politische Konsolidierung der DDR - bei weitreichender sozio-ökonomischer Stabilität - einer tieferen Begründung, einer Legitimation dringend bedarf. Vor allem die Betonung der sozialistischen Nation nach außen (gegenüber der Bundesrepublik) ist deshalb als Funktion der Innenpolitik der SED anzusehen.' 15

The East German view of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy was presented in the May-June edition of Deutsche Außenpolitik.16 The international factor, in the form of the Soviet Army, it was argued, had contributed to the establishment of the DDR, and had guaranteed its protection from imperialist attacks. However, the international factor was especially important through the fact that the DDR was in direct confrontation with West German imperialism. This caused a particular responsibility for the peace and security of all European peoples


to develop in the DDR. The article continued:

'Als wesentliche Aufgabe der ständigen Auseinandersetzung mit dem westdeutschen Imperialismus entstand für die Strategie und Taktik der DDR die Notwendigkeit, einen hartnäckigen Kampf um die volle Gleichberechtigung und die völkerrechtliche Anerkennung der DDR als souveräner Staat im System der internationalen Beziehungen zu führen. Die Ergebnisse dieses Kampfes festigten die Sicherheit der DDR weiter. Sie sind zugleich von zentraler Bedeutung für den Frieden und die Sicherheit aller europäischen Völker.'

It was argued that the building of socialism within the DDR and a successful foreign policy for the DDR were interdependent. However, the article did not go as far as advocating the international recognition of the DDR as an independent sovereign nation. The two-nation theory was aimed principally at the populations of the two German states. It has been ignored, not only in the West, but also among the DDR's allies. Brezhnev stressed the growing international authority of the DDR in his speech at the VIII SED congress, but made no reference to the socialist nation in the DDR. The attempt has however been made to project the claim to a specific DDR national culture internationally, as Lindemann and Müller have suggested.

The proclamation of the DDR as a socialist nation was determined by domestic considerations, and was used, as Ludz wrote, to support the attempts to legitimise the

régime. Hartmut Zimmermann argued that two possible strategies on the German question existed for the leadership motivated by a desire for self-preservation. Both proceeded from the historical fact of national division, but had drawn contrasting conclusions from this. Zimmermann postulated an 'offensive' attitude aimed at overcoming this division, and a 'defensive' attitude, where the unified German nation was rejected. He saw Ulbricht's speech of January 19th, 1970, as a switch from an offensive to a defensive strategy on the national question.

I would argue that the strategy change was completed by Honecker at the VIII congress, that Honecker's opposition of the West German 'bürgerliche Nation' to the East German 'sozialistische Nation' was a logical consequence of 'Abgrenzung auf allen Gebieten', and, although this was not stated in the DDR media, it represented a call for national demarcation. This view was supported by a West German source of 1974:

'Der VIII Parteitag der SED ... wurde von dem neuen 1. Sekretär des Zentralkomitees der SED, Erich Honecker, dazu benutzt, um die Politik der nationalen Abgrenzung verbindlich zu formulieren, nachdem die entsprechenden Vorarbeiten bereits vom 12. und 13. Plenum des ZK der SED der VII Legislaturperiode und von Ulbricht in seiner letzten Rede ... geleistet worden waren. 21


iii. Ideological demarcation within the education system after the VIII congress

The demands for more effective teaching at the VII Pedagogic Congress of May 1970 continued in the following year. Pressure upon the teaching staff to raise their political consciousness was to be noted. The claimed antagonism between socialism and imperialism, with particular condemnation of West German social democracy as a disguised form of anti-socialist nationalism and revenge-seeking, was stressed in the educational press. More specifically, in connection with research into the development of teaching methods in the socialist schools, an article was published attacking the West German educational system:

"In der Didaktik der sozialistischen Schule wurde es stets als eine prinzipielle Aufgabe betrachtet, Auseinandersetzungen mit der imperialistischen Didaktik zu führen und eindeutigen Abgrenzungen zu den gesellschaftlichen Grundlagen, den Zielen und Positionen aus vorzunehmen. Die Verschärfung des ideologischen Klassenkampfes zwischen Sozialismus und Imperialismus, die Notwendigkeit, einen kompromißlosen Kampf gegen die imperialistischen Ideologie zu führen, erfordert jedoch, die offensive Auseinandersetzung noch im weitaus stärkerem Maße zu einem Prinzip unserer gesamten Arbeit werden zu lassen." 23

It was argued that West German didactic theories had to be subjected to thorough analysis and criticism, in order


to strengthen the positions of DDR educationalists in the controversy between the two ideologies, and in order to carry out resolutely the demarcation process in the field of education. It was argued that it was necessary to uncover the social bases of the approach towards didactics under state monopoly capitalism, as well as its anti-communist nature. It was also necessary to fight against the philosophical roots of West German didactics, and to show its position and function within the whole framework of West German educational theory.

Policy changes introduced at the VIII congress were reflected in the school curricula. These changes were presented in the form of detailed directives to the teaching force, effective from the beginning of the 1971-2 academic year. The emphasis was to be increased on the links between the DDR and the socialist community, especially the USSR, and on the demarcation of the DDR from the Federal Republic, as part of the world-wide opposition between socialism and imperialism. For instance, the 10th class of the polytechnic secondary school was required to study the whole of the SED central committee report to the VIII congress.

The greatest number of changes introduced by the directives concerned civics (Staatsbürgerkunde), and the time devoted to that subject was increased. Of all subjects taught in DDR schools, civics is perhaps the one most closely related to ideological demarcation. The key role of civics was presented in the teachers' guide to the 7th class civics course:

'Die Koordinierung mit anderen Fächern, ein vielfach begründetes objektives Erfordernis sozialistischer Bildung und Erziehung, gewinnt im Staatsbürgerkundeunterricht der Klasse 7 besondere Bedeutung...'  

Civics is introduced in the seventh class of the polytechnic secondary school, when the pupils are aged 12. East German educationalists have claimed that at this age the pupils have developed positive attitudes to socialism and to the DDR, that their interests in politics is growing and that they have an open mind towards the new subject. This might be the reason why the directives specifically called for changes of emphasis in the 7th class civics course. Since for this age-group the material has to be presented in a relatively simple form, it most clearly shows the function of ideology in relation to everyday life. The directives stated that section four of the 7th class course, which examined the question 'why are there today two German states?' should be taught with reference to Part 1 of

25. Direktive, pp. 3-5.
27. Ibid, p. 11.
the central committee report to the VIII congress. Part I was entitled 'the main tendencies of international development and the foreign policy line of the SED', and included both relations with the Federal Republic and with the states of the socialist community.\(^{28}\) Section four of the 7th class civics course, together with section three 'the DDR - our socialist fatherland', presented the friend - foe relationship which was the basis of ideological demarcation.

The principal aims of sections three and four of the 7th class course were as follows: The 1972 teachers' syllabus for section three declared that the main purpose of the section was to teach the pupils to be proud of the DDR and to love their socialist fatherland.\(^{29}\) The notes to section four recommended that the conflict between the two great contemporary class forces (Klassenkräfte) should be stressed in the relations between the two German states:

'Der Unterricht soll den Schülern helfen, die Klassenfronten auf deutschen Boden zu erkennen, Freund und Feind zu unterscheiden und so einen klaren politischen Standpunkt zu gewinnen. Sie sollen die Einsicht gewinnen, daß die Abgrenzung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik von der imperialistischen BRD ein objektiver Prozeß ist und unsere Republik als untrennbare Bestandteil der sozialistischen Staatengemeinschaft eine feste Bastion des Friedens und des Sozialismus in Europa ist.\(^{30}\)


30. Ibid, p. 21
In 1972 the 7th class civics syllabus was basically the same as when it had been introduced in 1968. However, in 1974 it was completely revised, in accord with the proposals made at the VII Pedagogic Congress. The greater effectiveness of the new course, especially the skill with which the material was presented, showed evidence of the work of the Academy of Pedagogic Sciences. The title of section four, 'why are there today two German states?' now became 'the socialist DDR and the imperialist BRD - two states with opposed social orders'. There was a tendency to replace the expressions 'deutsch', 'Deutschland' and 'Westdeutschland' noted in the 1968 edition with a clear (socialist) DDR - (imperialist) BRD demarcation. Even in the 1968 edition there had been no mention of nation or unification in the pupils' textbook. This was perhaps understandable, since the national question would have less relevance for those who had lived all their lives in the DDR.

The 1974 teachers' guide to section four repeated the simplified emotional demarcation to be internalised by the schoolchildren - love for socialism, the DDR and the USSR, and 'Gefühle des Hasses ... gegenüber den imperialistischen Kräften in der BRD...'


32. Staatsbürgerkunde Klasse 7, Berlin (East), 1968.

The desired aim of unit four was described as follows:

'Die Konfrontation der sozialistischen DDR mit der imperialistischen BRD in der Stoffeinheit 4 verdeutlicht den Schülern den weltweiten Prozeß der Abgrenzung zwischen den beiden gegensätzlichen gesellschaftlichen Systemen und festigt ihre sozialistische Grundposition zur DDR als ihrem sozialistischen Vaterland.' 34

Section four was to be concluded by a simplified diagram, 35 which presented demarcation as an accomplished fact.

![Diagram](image)

The attempt to make the East German teaching force more aware of a demarcation from the Federal Republic in the field of education continued with the holding of a joint conference of the Academies of Pedagogic Sciences of the USSR and DDR, which took place in East Berlin on November 16th-18th, 1971. The theme of the conference was 'the struggle against anti-communism in the schools policy and pedagogics of imperialism' - a fundamental task of Marxist-Leninist pedagogics'. The conference was opened by the DDR minister of education, Margot Honecker, who claimed that anti-communism was trying to destroy Marxist-Leninist theory and socialist education, and to educate young people in the spirit of imperialism. She continued:

'Es entspricht zutiefst dem humanistischen Anliegen der sozialistischen Pädagogik, alles zu tun, um die Jugend vor dem Gift des Antikommunismus zu schützen. Die Verwirklichung der höchsten Ziele der Menschheit, den Kommunismus zum Siege zu führen, den Frieden zu erhalten und zu sichern, macht den konsequenten, kompromisslosen Kampf gegen den Antikommunismus, den Feind der Völker und ihrer Jugend, zu einer unabdingbaren Aufgabe aller Pädagogen, die es mit ihrem humanistischen Auftrag ernst meinen.'

Although Margot Honecker was condemning anti-communist educational theory in general, most of the East German participants specifically attacked the West German education system.


After the VIII congress a series of demarcation measures were introduced against the Federal Republic which appeared to have two aims; (a) to make communications between the two German states more difficult and (b) to abolish all institutions which had an all-German dimension.

In the first respect, on July 1st, 1971, the letter postal rates 'nach den kapitalistischen europäischen Ländern, einschließlich der Bundesrepublik, nach Westberlin und den Ländern in Übersee' were raised to the same level, thus equating the Federal Republic and West Berlin with 'Ausland'. At the same time the foreign tariff was introduced for telegrams and parcels to the Federal Republic, and telephone charges were also raised, so that a telephone call from East Berlin to West Berlin now became approximately eight times more expensive. 38 Again, the border between the two German states was strengthened by the DDR authorities, with new minefields, weapons which were automatically triggered (Selbstschussanlagen), and with new chain fences and observation towers. 39

Secondly, on July 7th the East German Sekretariat für westdeutsche Fragen (formerly gesamtdeutsche Fragen) was

39. The strengthening of the border was described in some detail by Rainer Barzel. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, p. 148.
abolished. Further, on August 16th the 'ständiger Ausschuss der deutschen Arbeiterkonferenzen zur Förderung der Aktionseinheit der Arbeiterklasse', another body claiming to be of all-German significance, ceased to function. The DDR anthem, with the words 'Deutschland, einig Vaterland', was no longer sung. Again, on October 1st, the 'Deutscher Freiheitssender 904', broadcasting 'an alle Deutschen, um sie für Frieden und Freiheit zu gewinnen', was replaced by the 'Stimme der DDR', intended for DDR citizens. On September 28th the leader of the KPD, which had maintained a shadowy existence in the Federal Republic as an allegedly all-German party, joined the West German DKP, thus signalling the end of the KPD, and the DDR-based 'Stimme der KPD' ceased broadcasting. A significant change occurred at the end of 1971, when the 'Nationale Front des demokratischen Deutschlands' was renamed 'Nationale Front der DDR'.

These measures were balanced by the introduction of visa-free travel between the DDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, from the beginning of 1972, which indirectly was to aid demarcation from the West by encouraging the closer identification of East Germans with their Eastern neighbours.

v. The Quadripartite Agreement

At the same time as the DDR leadership was introducing these demarcation measures, it was being obliged to accept a further international agreement connected with the developing policies of détente of the two super-powers, and with the Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic. A new situation was introduced with the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, on September 3rd, 1971. It provided for a series of subsidiary agreements between the Federal Republic, West Berlin and the DDR, which appeared to contain the possibility of rapprochement, rather than demarcation, between the two German states.

The Quadripartite Agreement was a practical contribution to the normalisation of the situation in Berlin, and carefully attempted to avoid the extraordinary legal and semantic difficulties associated with the Berlin question, by agreeing that the individual and joint rights of the four powers would remain unchanged, and that, irrespective of the differences in legal views, the situation which had developed in the area should not be changed unilaterally.45

For instance, the English text was entitled simply 'Quadripartite Agreement', leaving unclear whether it referred to Berlin as a whole or solely to West Berlin, and the Senate in West Berlin, which called itself 'Berliner Senat', but which the DDR called 'Westberliner Senat', was referred to simply as 'the senate'. Nevertheless, since the choice of terminology was considered to be of great importance by the two German states, a sharp disagreement broke out between them over the German translation of the text, which led to a temporary interruption of discussions between their two negotiators, Egon Bahr and Michael Kohl.\footnote{Deutschland Archiv, 1971/10, p. 1117.}

The DDR leadership expressed satisfaction that the agreement had declared that West Berlin was not a constituent part of the Federal Republic, and claimed that the DDR's international position had been strengthened, since its correct title had been used in the agreement. However, the Quadripartite Agreement had limited the freedom of action of the DDR, since it was required to negotiate with the Federal Republic and West Berlin on a range of matters, where the outcome of the negotiations had already been agreed in outline by the four powers, and where the outcome seemed likely to contradict the aims of the DDR's demarcation policy. This could be understood from Annex I and...
Annex III of the agreement, where it was declared:

'The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics... has the honour to inform the Governments of the
French Republic, the United Kingdom and the United States
of America that:

...transit traffic by road, rail and waterways through the
territory of the German Democratic Republic of civilian
persons and goods between the Western Sectors of Berlin
and the Federal Republic will be facilitated and unimpeded...

...communications between the Western Sectors of Berlin
and areas bordering on these Sectors and those areas of
the German Democratic Republic which do not border on
these sectors will be improved...

...permanent residents of the Western Sectors of Berlin
will be able to travel to and visit such areas for com-
passionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial
reasons, or as tourists...

...arrangements implementing and supplementing the pro-
visions... will be agreed by the competent German author-
ities.' 47

Here it was the DDR's main ally which was laying down the
terms on which the negotiations to be entered on by the DDR
were to be concluded.

The first result of the provisions of Annex I and Annex
III came quickly on September 30th, 1971, when a post and
telecommunications agreement (Protokoll über den Post- und
Fernmeldeverkehr) was signed.48 This was followed on
December 17th, 1971, by an agreement between the two German
states on transit traffic between West Berlin and the Fed-
eral Republic (Transitabkommen),49 and on December 20th,

47. Die Berlin-Regelung, pp. 333-337.
1971, arrangements for visits by West Berliners to the DDR were agreed by the DDR and the Senate. The latter two agreements officially came into force together with the Quadripartite Agreement on June 3rd, 1972. The delay was caused by the link with the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties (Ostverträge), which were not ratified by the Bundestag until May 17th, 1972.

The protocol on post and telecommunications traffic seemed likely to run counter to the demarcation policy and to hinder officially promoted political socialisation by facilitating the exchange of information between individuals in the two German states. The relevant points of the agreement were a shortening of delivery times for letters and parcels, and an improvement in telephone, telegraph and telex links. In the case of telephones, the number of lines was to be doubled. A colour television link was to be set up between the two states, which was available for the exchange of programmes, not only between the two states, but also between the Eurovision and Intervision networks. Point 6.5 of the protocol declared:

'Der Fernsprechverkehr wird vollautomatisiert. Die dafür notwendigen Leitungen und Kabelverbindungen werden bis zum 31. Dezember 1974 bereitgestellt'.

This meant that, gradually over the next two years, the DDR

leadership would lose the capability to stop the immediate exchange of information by telephone between individuals of the two German states. This in turn seemed likely to cause some insecurity among the leadership, and possible justification for their often publicly expressed concern for the dangers of subversion and espionage from the Federal Republic.

It was suggested above that the provisions in the Quadrupartite Agreement for civilian transit traffic between West Berlin and the Federal Republic, and for visits by West Berliners to the DDR, would tend to limit the freedom of action of the DDR leadership. This meant that the leadership would lose the capability of interfering with these traffics (except under limited and clearly defined conditions). The DDR had formerly used such interference as a means of exerting political pressure upon the Federal Republic and the three Western powers, subject to Soviet constraints. An official West German view of the provisions for transit traffic claimed that formerly West Berliners had suffered a sense of insecurity, since they did not know whether their links with the West would be maintained. Especially after June 1968, with the demand for passports and special endorsements (Sichtvermerke), it was declared that the DDR had attempted to hinder the transit traffic 'durch verzörgerte Abfertigung, schikanöse Kontrollen, Rotschalten der Ampeln u. a.'.
It was claimed that:

'Diese Vereinbarung über den Berlinverkehr ist der größte Fortschritt, den die Vier Mächte seit der Beendigung der Blockade hinsichtlich des Berlin-Zugangs erzielt haben... Die Westmächte haben dadurch zugunsten Berlins etwas erreicht, worum sie seit den ersten Schwierigkeiten auf den Zugangswegen vergeblich bemüht hatten: eine prinzipielle sowjetische Verpflichtung, einen unbehinderten Verkehr zu gewährleisten.' 51

Secondly, the improved travel arrangements into and across the territory of the DDR posed a potential security problem for the DDR leadership. If the numbers of West Germans and West Berliners travelling were to increase (as was subsequently the case), then it was likely that East Germans would increasingly come into contact with them. This would run counter to the demarcation policy, since increased face-to-face contacts might contradict the official Feindbild of the Federal Republic. There might also be an increased demand from DDR citizens for the corresponding right to visit West Berlin or the Federal Republic. Restricted permission was later granted, to DDR citizens below retirement age for pressing family reasons, in a regulation published on October 17th, 1972,52 on the same day that the Verkehrsvertrag between the two German states came into force.


Honecker, Ulbricht and Stoph commented on the Quadripartite Agreement in interviews published on September 5th, 7th and 8th September, respectively. As the titles which headed the interviews given by Ulbricht and Stoph indicated, the agreement was claimed to be a success for peace. In his interview Honecker maintained that the agreement had strengthened the position of the DDR in international law:

"In den Viermächte-Abkommen haben sich die drei Westmächte... zum erstenmal über die Deutsche Demokratische Republik als einen souveränen Staat, über seine Grenzen und seine Beziehungen zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zu Westberlin verbindlich geäußert. Diese Tatsache schätzen wir sehr hoch ein. Es handelt sich ja um ein internationales Abkommen, in dem die Deutsche Demokratische Republik, ihr Territorium und ihre Grenzen genannt werden. Dieses Abkommen trägt die Unterschriften der USA, Großbritanniens und Frankreichs. Die Äußerung der drei Westmächte über die Deutsche Demokratische Republik hat also völkerrechtlich verbindlichen Charakter."

Without mentioning the Federal government's demand for a satisfactory outcome to the Berlin negotiations before the ratification of the Ostverträge, Honecker continued that the Quadripartite Agreement had created favourable conditions for the ratification of the treaties. He expressed satisfaction for the statement contained in the agreement that Berlin was not a constituent part of the Federal Republic, and argued that the agreement referred solely to West Berlin:

"In dem Abkommen der vier Mächte wird klar gesagt... Verhandelt wurde über den westlichen Sektoren Berlins, über deren Einwohner, über den Transit zwischen den..."

westlichen Sektoren Berlins und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und über die Vertretung dieser Sektoren im Ausland. Das demokratische Berlin ist seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten die Hauptstadt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Sie ist kein Gegenstand des Viermächte-Abkommens.

Honecker further declared that the sovereign rights and legitimate interests of the DDR were not affected by the Quadripartite Agreement. He later claimed that they had been confirmed by the agreement. 55  

Stoph also welcomed the agreement, and declared:


The constant reiteration by the DDR leadership that the sovereign rights of the DDR had not been affected by the Quadripartite Agreement might be explained by reasons of domestic legitimation. It might be seen as an attempt to present a situation dictated by external circumstances as a success for the policies of the leadership. This was an example of how the DDR leadership was a prisoner of its own policy statements. The leadership's claims to legitimacy were related to its further claim to be the sole

56. Neues Deutschland, 8th September, 1971.
bearers of Marxism-Leninism, the only ideology which permitted the taking of correct decisions. Accordingly, to claim that its foreign policy was unsuccessful would go against the leadership's justification of its own legitimacy; any failures had to be explained as the fault of the other side. Because the SED claimed that there was an interaction between domestic and foreign policy, the one dependent on the other, to suggest that foreign policy had failed would question the success of domestic policy.

The Quadripartite Agreement had confirmed the rights of the four powers in Berlin, as point 3 of the general provisions of the agreement had made clear.\(^5\) Four power rights in the whole of Germany, to be confirmed in the Basic Treaty of 1973, contradicted the DDR's claim to be an independent, sovereign state.\(^5\) But the immediate limitation was the proposed loss of control over transit traffic. Honecker's assertion which was made three times in his interview of September 5th, that the international position of the DDR had been strengthened by the fact that for the first time it had been officially named in an international treaty, might be defended. However, in the agreement the DDR had not been directly named by the three Western powers; the DDR had been officially mentioned in the sections which

58. The rights and responsibilities of the four powers were confirmed by Article 9 of the Basic Treaty. See Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, pp. 288-289.
contained the statements of the Soviet Union, which were not rejected by the Western powers. Mention of the DDR was still a long way from Ulbricht's goal of recognition in international law by the non-Marxist-Leninist world.

The official DDR position that the Quadripartite Agreement had been a success for DDR policies was contradicted by the claim of the United States representative at the quadripartite negotiations, Kenneth Rush, that the Soviet representative, P. A. Abrassimov, had initially refused to consider the question of access to West Berlin as part of the negotiations. Rush declared in an interview on September 9th:


This statement would seem to support the view that the DDR leadership had perceived that its sovereignty would be limited by the Quadripartite Agreement, and also the claim that Ulbricht's retirement from the party leadership had been influenced by disagreement between the USSR and the DDR in the area of German policy. 60

59. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, p. 72.

60. See Ilse Spittmann: Warum Ulbricht stürzte, Deutschland Archiv, 1971/6, p. 568.
vi. Honecker's economic and social policies

Both Ulbricht and Honecker had been aware of the need for material incentives as a means of gaining support for the régime. Since DDR citizens tended to perceive their standard of living in relation to that of the Federal Republic, the growth of DDR incomes might assist demarcation, if this caused DDR citizens to become less dissatisfied with the fact that they were lower than West German incomes. At the VIII congress Honecker related DDR living standards with their level five years before. Since that time he claimed that a one third increase in production and a 20% increase in living standards had been achieved. The continuity of economic policy was implied by reference to the analysis of economic development conducted at the 14th plenum. With regard to planned economic development in the period 1971-1975, Honecker predicted a 21-23% increase in real income, higher old age pensions, and improved supplies of consumer goods. The key word was stability, which had been stressed at the 14th plenum, in the section of the Politbüro report headed 'Kontinuität und Stabilität des volkswirtschaftlichen Reproduktionsprozeß', and in a commentary of December 13th, 1970, that the decisions of the 14th plenum formed the basis

61. The role of planned national economic development as an aid to political mobilisation was discussed by J. P. Nettl: Political Mobilisation, London, 1967, pp. 232-244.

for the further stabilisation of social development in the DDR. On this question Honecker declared at the congress:


In the section of his speech which dealt with the ideological-theoretical work of the SED, and the role of agitation and propaganda, Honecker drew back from the impression created by Ulbricht at the 15th plenum that the DDR had been following a unique path of socialist development. Honecker recognised the existence of 'allgemeingültige Gesetzmäßigkeiten der sozialistischen Revolution und des sozialistischen Aufbaus', which had been confirmed by the experiences of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. In contradistinction to Ulbricht, he argued that there was no fixed boundary between socialism and communism; the former was gradually growing into the latter. Although stressing continuity in economic policy, a note of caution and realism was to be found. Honecker declared:

63. Neues Deutschland, 13th December, 1970

64. Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII Parteitag der SED, p. 56.
'Manche haben in dieser Zeit die Frage nach dem ökonomischen System des Sozialismus gestellt. Genossen, das ökonomische System des Sozialismus entwickelt sich gut, nur allzuviel ‚äußerplanmäßige Wunder' kann es nicht verkraften. Es braucht den bilanzierten Plan als sicheres Fundament.' 65

In a comment on Honecker's more realistic and sober approach to economic policy, Hartmut Zimmermann concluded that the SED could no longer legitimise its policy by reference to future benefits, but only by demonstrating here and now what it could offer DDR citizens.66 Instead of promising, the new leadership acted, as shown by its decision to freeze consumer prices in the period 1971-1975.67 Honecker stressed the 'dialectical connection' between economics and politics:

'Ökonomie und Politik voneinander zu trennen ist ebenso falsch, wie das ökonomische System des Sozialismus im Sinne eines bloßen Steuerungs- und Regelmechanismus zu handhaben oder auszulegen' 68

In this connection Honecker argued that it was necessary to increase the moral factor as the principle of material self-interest (materielle Interessiertheit) was developed.

Besides offering improved economic benefits, Honecker also called for greater attention to be paid to popular participation (under the guidance of the party) in the

66. The GDR in the 1970s, p. 21
68. Bericht des ZK an den VIII Parteitag der SED, p. 94.
affairs of state at all levels. He also promised the strengthen­ing of socialist legality:

'Von allen Staats- und Wirtschaftsfunktionären muß gefor­dert werden, daß sie vorbehaltlos die Gesetzlichkeit acht­en und die Gewährleistung von Ordnung, Diziplin und Sicherheit zum festen Bestandteil ihrer Leitungstätigkeit machen. Selbstverständlich schließt das auch - im großen wie im kleinen - die strikte Wahrung der Rechte der Bürger ein. Die Rechtssicherheit ist ein wichtiger Faktor, der das Vertrauen der Bürger zu ihrem sozialistischen Staat festigt. Angriffe gegen unsere sozialistische Ordnung, gegen das sozialistische Eigentum, gegen Gesundheit und Leben der Bürger werden konsequent geahndet.' 69

In an apparent attempt to gain the support of all citizens, the frequent use of the word 'Bürger' was significant. This had to be seen in relation to the reaffirmation of the lead­ing role of the working class by Honecker:

'Die theoretisch-ideologische Arbeit wurde besonders darauf konzentriert, die führende Rolle der Arbeiterklasse und ihrer revolutionären Partei weiter auszuarbeiten und darzu­legen.' 70

Although the term 'Bürger' applied to all DDR citizens, whereas 'Arbeiterklasse' applied to part of the citizens, the latter term included all those who in the Federal Republic would be classified as Arbeiter/Angestellte/Beamte, excluding the collectivised peasantry, the intelligentsia and the remaining self-employed. In the DDR the majority of the population is classified as working class, including many, who in common British usage, would be classified as

70. Ibid, p. 92.
middle class. Indeed, as evidenced by the attempts to break down the barriers between manual and non-manual work, and the promotion of the skilled worker in the MMM (Messe der Meister von morgen), and by the stress on achievement orientation (Leistungsprinzip, sozialistischer Wettbewerb), it could be argued that the whole ethos of DDR society was middle class in the sense commonly understood in Britain. However, Honecker found it necessary to declare that:

'Die objektiv begründete Führung der sozialistischen Gesellschaft durch die Arbeiterklasse mindert die Stellung und Leistung der anderen werktätigen Klassen und Schichten unseres Volkes in keiner Weise...'

Kurt Hager later expanded on the difference between the working class and the intelligentsia, and stressed that the socialist intelligentsia enjoyed great respect, as the VIII congress had very clearly declared; its position had not been devalued in relation to the working class.

The SED's goal of ideological demarcation from the Federal Republic could only be internalised by the majority of DDR citizens after a long process of political education. The acceptance of (DDR) socialism implied the rejection of (West

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72. Bericht des ZK an den VIII Tagung der SED, p. 60. Note also Honecker's call for a relationship based on trust between the party and the 'parteiloser Bürger' (Ibid, p. 60).

German) imperialism. At the VIII congress Honecker argued that a principal task of the party in the building of the socialist social order in the DDR was the development of the 'allseitig entwickelte Persönlichkeit'. He declared that the arts had their part to play in the development of socialism, and stressed the continuing development of a specific socialist national culture in the DDR. The term 'sozialistische Nationalkultur' was found in the SED programme of 1963. This expression, like so many others connected with the national question, was ambiguous. In 1963 it was primarily interpreted as the socialist (as opposed to the bourgeois) culture of the single German nation. However, with the proclamation of the two nation theory at the VIII congress, it was to be understood rather as the culture of the socialist German nation, in opposition to the culture of the bourgeois German nation. Honecker saw the function of the artist in the DDR as counteracting the influence of bourgeois ideology through the development of specific socialist forms of expression:

'In wachsender Verbundenheit mit den Werktätigen unserer Republik und ihrer Kollektive und mit der Aufgabe vor Augen, die Bürger unserer Republik auch mit den Mitteln der Kunst für die Auseinandersetzung mit der bürgerlichen Ideologie, mit dem Imperialismus auszurüsten, werden die Künstler dabei ihre schöpferische Phantasie einsetzen können, um beeindruckende, unserer sozialistischen Gesellschaft eigene Ausdrucksweisen zu finden, die sich nicht aus dem Modernismus einer uns fremden, ja feindlichen Welt nähern... Die Kulturschaffenden unserer Republik leisten einen wichtigen Beitrag im Kampf gegen die ideologischen Diversionsversuche des Imperialismus gerade auf kulturellem Gebiet. Den menschenfeindlichen Produkten des westlichen Kulturzerfalls setzen sie den lebensspendenden Atem unserer neuen sozialistischen Epoche entgegen.
Without mentioning the Federal Republic, the same elements of bourgeois ideology were condemned, as had been the case under Ulbricht. These were anti-communism, anti-sovietism, social democracy, revisionism, convergence theory and the theory of the industrial society.

vii. Changing West German attitudes to the national question

One factor which indirectly facilitated the demarcation policy of the SED was the increasing awareness by most West Germans that the two German states were following divergent paths, not only economically and politically, but also socially. This view was supported by Schwiegler's claim that growing awareness of divergence was leading to a diminution of all-German national consciousness among West German citizens. Again, the notion of West German ideological demarcation from the DDR, implicit in some West German publications concerned with political education, and explicit in the declarations of some political leaders, might be noted.

One West German observer, Manfred Ackermann, writing in 1971, shared Schweigler's view that the concept of the all-

74. Bericht des ZK an den VIII. Parteitag der SED, p. 77.
75. Nationalbewuβtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 65.
76. Note, for example, the SPD's demarcation between socialism and communism. "Sozialdemokratie und Kommunismus". Beschlußvorlage des Parteirates der SPD vom 14.10.1970 in Tatsachen und Argumente, Bonn, No. 301.
German nation was becoming increasingly difficult to defend:

'Die Deutschen haben keine gemeinsame Geschichte mehr, keine gemeinsame Kultur. Sie haben eine gemeinsame Sprache (auch mit den Österreicichern und Bewohnern der Schweiz), sie leben in einem geographischen Raum (Mitteleuropa), es bestehen gewisse verwandtschaftliche Beziehungen (die abnehmen), man weiß, daß es früher einmal anders war, und die Mehrzahl meint, daß es auch heute anders sein sollte, als es ist. Dies ist kaum ein ausreichendes Fundament für die Konstituierung als Nation. Deshalb lautet folgerichtig die Devise des Tages 'Abgrenzung', mal bewusst forciert - mal praktisch gelebt, in jedem Fall eine Tatsache.' 77

The arguments employed by Ackermann to support his claim that there was an inadequate basis for a single German nation were remarkably similar to those of Ulbricht and Honecker, apart from the lack of a class-based analysis. However, his questioning of the nation was untypical of West German opinion; the government's view was restated by Brandt in his state of the nation speech of January 28th, 1971, where he repeated what he had said in his previous report on the state of the nation that:

'Die Nation gründet sich auf das fortdauernde Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl der Menschen eines Volkes. Niemand kann leugnen, daß es in diesem Sinne eine deutsche Nation gibt und geben wird, soweit wir vorauszudenken vermögen.' 78

Brandt declared that he agreed with Ulbricht when the latter spoke of demarcation, since the ideological and social conditions of the two states were incompatible. 79

77. Deutschland Archiv, 1971/9, p. 910.
78. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 7, p. 11.
79. Ibid, Vol. 4, p. 205
Whereas Ulbricht and Honecker had derived their rejection of a single German nation from the opposed ideologies of the two states, Brandt was arguing the opposite - that ideological demarcation was compatible with the unity of the German nation. Brandt maintained that 'Nation ist eine Frage von Bewusstsein und Willen'. The existence of such a perception of the nation in the DDR had been perhaps confirmed by the continual polemic of the DDR leadership against the unity of the nation. Brandt was suggesting that the leadership’s rejection of the single nation was opposed by wide sectors of the DDR population. By advocating a single nation, a single nationality and the right of self-determination for all Germans, Brandt was directly challenging the legitimacy of the leadership, whose apparatus of political socialisation had the goal of convincing DDR citizens to the contrary.

The question was whether two states which were socially, economically and ideologically diverging could form part of a single nation. Ulbricht had once appeared to believe this, since, before he rejected the unity of the nation, he had proposed a confederation. In January 1972 the Federal Minister for Food, Agriculture and Forestry, Josef Ertl, had similarly suggested a 'deutsche Föderation', but '...unter Bedingungen, die allen Deutschen eine freie

80. The offer of a German confederation appeared in the 1963 programme of the SED, which remained formally in existence until a new programme appeared in 1976.
Willensbildung und ein freies Entscheidungsrecht ermöglichen', that was to say, on terms totally unacceptable to the DDR leadership. Ulbricht had at least realistically proposed, with regard to the two German states, that his confederation 'erfordert keine Veränderung ihrer Gesellschaftsordnung'. Ulbricht's and Ertl's proposals had been made in response to popular demands. One difference between the two proposals was that they had been made at different times. Ulbricht had suggested his confederation when Adenauer had been Federal Chancellor, and had refused all official contacts with the DDR, which was not recognised by the Federal Republic. Here it could be argued that Adenauer had followed a policy aimed at total demarcation from the DDR leadership, though not from East German citizens. Again, Ertl had proposed a federation when the situation had changed, when the DDR had rejected confederation and proposed a total demarcation from the Federal Republic and from West German citizens. A second difference was that Ulbricht had made his proposal with the suggestion that it was a step towards possible unification, while in fact his policies were promoting divergence, whereas Ertl was attempting to create the impression for West German public opinion that the goal of unification remained, while preparing West German citizens for concessions which

81. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, p. 519.
were to be interpreted by the CDU/CSU opposition, particularly during the Bundestag debate on the ratification of the Ostverträge of 23rd-25th February, 1972, as a widening of the division of Germany. As with Ertl's proposed German federation, Brandt's definition of the German nation had no chance of being considered by the DDR leadership, since the latter had placed the national question within an ideological framework where it was subordinated to the claim that socialism and capitalism were irreconcilable.

The DDR leadership's argument that the two systems were mutually exclusive was accompanied by all attempts at synthesis, such as through convergence theory or the 'democratic socialism' of the SPD. These were categorised as expressions of ideological sabotage. The alleged mutual exclusiveness of the systems now appeared to be confirmed by Brandt and the other West German leaders who in their turn were declaring that the dominant ideologies and social orders of the two states were irreconcilable. Both sides had proposed a 'friedliches Nebeneinander', although interpreted differently, and, given the mutual ideological demarcation between the two states, this appeared to be as far as they could go if they wished negotiations to succeed. The DDR leadership had long considered the implications of this limited goal, by relating it to the principle of peaceful coexistence. Here I would argue that it was becoming clear to the West German side that peaceful coex-
istence was applicable to the German policy of the Brandt-Scheel administration, that it was only in such terms that the Federal government's German policy could be expected to achieve results.

The rejection of ideological convergence, not only by Ulbricht and Honecker, but also by Brandt would make this fact clear to politically conscious East Germans, and would tend to force them to choose between Marxism-Leninism and liberal democracy. Given a situation where time was working for the DDR leadership, where an increasing percentage of East Germans consisted of those who had been socialised solely within the DDR, with no direct experience of the Federal Republic, it would seem likely that the latter would accept the dominant ideology of the society in which they lived as the norm, and that of the West German state as alien to their experience. As will be considered in Chapter 8, this did occur up to a point, since even most of the East German critics of the DDR leadership, such as Havemann and Bahro, claimed to be communists, and to reject West German liberal democracy. But Honecker had related national demarcation to ideological demarcation; the former would appear to be supported by the evidence of Schweigler and others that all-German national consciousness was declining, not only in the DDR, but also in the Federal Republic. If two forms of national consciousness specific to the DDR and the Federal Republic were to arise, then the choice of a national consciousness related to only one
German state would imply the decline of affect for an all-German nation.

As direct negotiations between the two German states continued, increased signs of strain were to be observed within the Federal Republic, as shown by the controversy over whether the word 'deutsch' could only apply to all Germans, or whether it should or should not be used to mean solely the citizens of the Federal Republic, which arose at the beginning of 1972. At that time Josef Ertl posed the question whether a separate West German consciousness existed:

'Vor einiger Zeit ist mir die Frage gestellt worden, ob es nicht mit der Dauer der staatlichen Teilung so etwas wie ein bundesrepublikanisches Bewußtsein gebe und wie ich es definieren würde. Ich glaube in der Tat, daß sich, so sehr man dies auch aus gesamtdeutscher Sicht bedauern mag, bei uns zulande so etwas wie eine Art Staatsbewußtsein allmählich aus sich selbst heraus entwickelt hat. Es liegt ihm die tiefer greifende Motivation zugrunde, daß unsere Bürger in der Bundesrepublik den freien Teil Deutschlands repräsentieren sehen, in welchem sie über ihr politisches Schicksal und alle Fragen des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens frei entscheiden können. Eine zweite Ursache ist in der nachternen äußerlichen Tatsache zu sehen, daß sich auf dem Boden des Deutschen Reiches durch Teilung und Demarkationslinie eine Entwicklung zu zwei deutschen Staaten hin vollzogen hat und immer weiter vollzieht. Die Folge ist, daß sich der Deutsche westlich der Demarkationslinie tagtäglich, nicht zuletzt z. B. im Auslandsreiseverkehr oder im Sport, der Bundesrepublik zugeordnet sieht. Wen wundert es, wenn er sich dann letztlich selbst mit diesem seinen Staat, der Bundesrepublik, identifiziert?'

83. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 9, pp. 537-539.

84. Ibid, Vol. 9, p. 520.
In relating ideological demarcation to group theory, I have suggested that the DDR leadership had rejected the unity of the German nation, because it hindered the aim of persuading East German citizens to develop affect for the state system within which they lived. If, as Ertl suggested, West Germans were increasingly identifying with the familiar surroundings of the Federal Republic rather than with the receding abstraction of an all-German consciousness, then, by choosing the Federal Republic, they were demarcating themselves from the population of the DDR. This might not be national demarcation; whether or not it was depended on how the nation was defined. But, if social, economic and ideological demarcation existed between the two states, and if family links were declining, then there was little left in common on which to base an all-German national consciousness. Ertl's reference to demarcation in sport was significant, since sport is a powerful generator of specific affect. His suggestion that a West German Staatsbewußtsein was emerging might be supported by the recorded cases of disorientation among DDR citizens who had fled to the Federal Republic, who had found it difficult to integrate themselves into West German society. Such evidence also supported the claim that a DDR state consciousness was developing.

85. The problems faced by East Germans who have settled in the Federal Republic are regularly examined in the feature 'Barbara bittet', in Die Zeit.
However, while doubts about national identity began to appear in the statements of the Federal government, the CDU/CSU opposition continued to condemn any moves away from the West German national policy which had developed under Adenauer. In the Bundestag debate on the state of the nation report in January 1971 Brandt's national policy was bitterly attacked by the former Federal Chancellor, Kurt Kiesinger:

'Die deutsche Nation bleibe auch eine Realität, wenn sie in unterschiedliche staatliche und gesellschaftliche Ordnungen aufgeteilt sei. Welch melancholische Fest­ Feststellung! Es ist ein schlimmer Trost, eine Nation zu sein und in zwei Staaten geteilt zu bleiben.' 86

An example of thinking which had remained fixed in the Adenauer era was found in a 1971 speech by the President of the Bundestag, Kai Uwe von Hassel, where he referred to the DDR at one point as 'die sowjetische Besatzungszone.' 87

For electoral reasons, the unity of the nation remained an article of faith for West German politicians. In his 1972 state of the nation speech, which opened the debate on the ratification of the Ostverträge, Brandt claimed - despite Honecker's remarks at the VIII congress - that there was no reason to expect change in the DDR's national policy:

86. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 7, p. 635.
'Es wird zu berücksichtigen sein... daß beide Staaten, bei all ihrer Unterschiedenheit und Gegensätzlichkeit, doch zur Nation in Beziehung stehen. Wir sind unserem Grundgesetz verpflichtet, und uns ist nichts davon bekannt, daß die Ausrichtung der DDR-Verfassung auf die Nation geändert werden soll. "Deutschland" und "deutsch" - das sind Begriffe, zu denen wir stehen und von denen andere auch kaum weglauen können. Es hat nichts mit Juristerei zu tun und steht jedenfalls über der Kategorie des Völkerrechts, daß die Menschen in diesen beiden Staaten sich im Verhältnis zueinander nicht als Ausländer empfinden. Und die Regierungen in Deutschland sind gewiß gut beraten, auch diese Realität weder zu leugnen noch zu übersehen.' 88

Brandt had defined the nation as being independent of social, economic and ideological differences. He now appeared to go one step further by divorcing the nation from international law. Conversely, the DDR leadership had argued the 'dialectical unity of domestic and foreign policy', that the international recognition of the DDR would strengthen the development of the socialist revolution within the DDR. Honecker had argued at the VIII congress that the East German working class, having taken political power, became a national class, and themselves constituted a nation. Brandt's definition would seem to support Ackermann's view that there was little in common between the two German states on which to base the concept of an all-German nation.

It might be argued that the West German view of the nation had been influenced by history. The example of the

Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation might be given, within which ideological demarcation existed in the form of religious cleavage, and economic demarcation through the customs barriers between the component states. Here a form of national consciousness was kept alive by the free movement of intellectuals and administrators, but it was a different national consciousness from that of the Second and Third Reich, which followed the rise of pan-German nationalism and the 'kleindeutsche Lösung' of the German question in the nineteenth century. But such conditions did not exist between the Federal Republic and the DDR, and the latter's concept of the nation was based on different principles. It was possible that Adenauer and others had in mind a Holy Roman Empire type of solution in their support for the European Community. However, the success of Adenauer's policy of Western integration was an important reason for the failure of his German policy, since West German identification with the European Community has contributed more to the division of Germany than corresponding East German identification with the joint institutions of the socialist community. Perhaps unwittingly, Adenauer's policies have contributed to a West German demarcation from the DDR by increasing the West European orientation of West German citizens.

The controversy within the Federal Republic on future German policy came to a head in February 1972 in a heated
Bundestag debate on the ratification of the Ostverträge, which reflected a parallel debate within West German society. This debate, which nearly led to the defeat of the coalition, was televised live and followed by millions of Germans.

The main speeches for and against ratification occurred between February 23rd and 25th, and the vote was not taken until May 17th, 1972. Ratification of the two treaties was accompanied by a joint declaration (Entschließungsantrag) of coalition and opposition, which stressed that ratification did not conflict with West German policy on the national question. Brandt declared at this time that the idea of the German nation would not and did not need to be abandoned.

On introducing the treaties before the Bundestag, the then Federal Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, argued that the debate had both external and internal significance:

'... wenn wir in fairer Grundeinstellung an die vor uns liegende Debatte herangehen, werden wir diesem Staat nach außen und nach innen einen großen, vielleicht einen entscheidenden Dienst erweisen. Nach außen, weil die Welt in diesen Tagen auf den Deutschen Bundestag blickt. Sie will nicht nur wissen, was für und was gegen die Verträge gesagt wird. Die Welt wird vor allem auf die Halbtöne hören, die ihr vielleicht Rückschlüsse auf das innere, das tiefere Denken unseres Volkes ermöglichen. Noch

89. Point 3 of the declaration. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 10, p. 427,

wichtiger als die Frage, mit welcher Mehrheit die Verträge verabschiedet werden, wird sein, ob wir uns den Frieden nicht nur als Ziel gewählt haben, sondern ob wir auch eine Sprache des Friedens führen... Die Art und Weise, wie wir diese Debatte führen, wird aber auch für die Zukunft unseres Landes von Bedeutung sein. Wollen wir sie so führen, daß der nationalen Teilung ein innerer Graben in der Bundesrepublik hinzugefügt wird? 91

It was significant that when Scheel spoke of 'die Zukunft unseres Landes' he meant the Federal Republic, and not the whole of Germany. The importance of the debate for the Federal Republic's German policy was also noted by the leader of the CDU/CSU Fraktion, Rainer Barzel:

'Die Entscheidung, die wir hier zu treffen haben werden, gehört zu den ersttesten und zu den folgenschwersten, die je im Deutschen Bundestag zu treffen waren. Ich scheue mich nicht, von einer geschichtlichen Entscheidung zu sprechen. Zur Entscheidung steht hier eine Politik. Es geht auch, aber nicht nur um Vertragstexte.' 92

In the debate the government claimed that the unity of the nation would not be affected by ratification, while the CDU/CSU had argued that this would deepen the division of Germany. 93 But the CDU/CSU was mistaken: It was likely that the division of Germany would deepen, not because of ratification, but because of the chain of events which the second world war had started. As Ulbricht might have said, ratification meant the acceptance of reality. On the other hand, ratification offered at least the chance of slowing down the rate of divergence, if the promised 'menschliche


Erleichterungen', whose introduction depended on ratification, were to be implemented. Ratification meant the acceptance of peaceful coexistence, which had become apposite after Brandt had declared that there could be no ideological convergence with the DDR. The debate, which some East Germans would have followed on their television screens, formalised the failure of Adenauer's German policy, through which he had hoped to force unification by destabilising the DDR by ignoring its existence.

Scheel had maintained that the outcome of the debate was of interest to the whole world. This applied especially to the DDR, since the Moscow Treaty guaranteed its frontier with the Federal Republic, and supported its claim to be a sovereign state. At the VIII congress Honecker declared:

'Das besondere Interesse der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik an diesen Verträgen steht außer Frage, weil die territoriale Integrität der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik auf diese Weise erneut bekräftigt wurde.' 94

He argued that ratification was opposed by ultra right wing circles in the Federal Republic, who openly continued to support the old goal of revenge-seeking. The importance of ratification for the DDR leadership was demonstrated by the apparent attempts to assist the coalition in its difficult task of gaining a majority for ratification in the Bundestag. It was significant that the DDR, as a

94. Bericht des ZK an den VIII. Parteitag der SED, p. 27.
'Geste des guten Willens', introduced the agreement on visits by West Berliners to the DDR, on the day before the report on the state of the nation, an action noted with approval by Brandt in his report. This agreement had not been due to come into force until after ratification.

On March 10th, 1972, Honecker claimed that the decision to put into effect the agreement on travel between West Berlin and the DDR before ratification underlined the positive attitude of the SED and the East German government to all questions of peace and security. In an attack on the CDU/CSU opposition, Honecker declared:

'Wer von Frieden redet, aber den Weg zu sicherem Frieden blockiert, macht sich nicht nur unglaubwürdig, sondern schadet den Völkern. Schließlich wird es nur die Ratifizierung der zu Erörterung stehenden Verträge ermöglichen, die Abkommen zwischen der DDR und der BRD sowie zwischen der DDR und WestBerlin in Kraft zu setzen und eine Entwicklung einzuleiten, die zu einem friedlichen Nebeneinander zwischen der DDR und der BRD führt...

This was seen as an expression of peaceful coexistence.

He continued:


Given the apparent difficulties for the DDR leadership of explaining the relationship between peaceful coexistence to SED members, it was not surprising that West Germans found it difficult to accept the argument. But it seemed that at least the leader of the SPD Fraktion in the Bundestag, Herbert Wehner, who had long maintained semi-official contacts with the DDR leadership, understood this view of demarcation, when he declared during the ratification debate in the Bundestag:


On the following day of the debate a further interpretation of demarcation was given by Egon Franke. He claimed that the Federal government had done everything possible to maintain the unity of the nation, as the Grundgesetz required. However, the German question could only be kept open if the West German position remained credible:


Here Franke was referring to the introduction of visa-free travel between the DDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. While these measures could be seen as 'menschliche Erleichterungen', their effect would appear to facilitate demarcation by turning the attention of DDR citizens eastwards.100

Franke argued that the German nation continued to exist:


100. On December 31st, 1971, the Sächsische Zeitung, Dresden, described these measures as 'eine neue Etappe des Zusammenlebens der Bürger sozialistischer Staaten' and there could be 'gegenüber dem Imperialismus keine Politik der offenen Grenzen'. Quoted from Deutschland Archiv, 1972/4, p. 402.

The view that the two nation theory was not accepted outside of Germany might be supported by Brezhnev's speeches at the VIII congress and on March 20th, 1972. 102 Brezhnev had spoke of the growing international authority of the DDR, and had supported ratification, not only for Soviet reasons of state, but to confirm the DDR as an independent sovereign socialist state, but on neither occasion had he referred to the DDR as a socialist nation. Later, Honecker admitted that most DDR citizens were of German nationality, but an attempt was made to distinguish between nationality, citizenship, and nation. 103

Honecker undertook a further initiative before the Bundestag voted on ratification, in a speech delivered in Sofia


103. Neues Deutschland, December 13th, 1974. See also Alfred Kosing: Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Berlin (East), 1976.
on April 18th, 1972. His advocacy of ratification appeared to contain a mixture of promises and threats:


There then followed the promise of improved relations between the two states after ratification:

Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist bereit, nach der Ratifizierung der Verträge zwischen der UdSSR und der VR Polen mit der BRD in einen Meinungsaustausch über die Herstellung normaler Beziehungen zwischen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland einzutreten und die hierfür erforderlichen völkerrechtlichen Vereinbarungen zu treffen. Es könnte eine Entwicklung eingeleitet werden - das möchte ich hier ausdrücklich wiederholen - , die zu einem friedlichen Nebeneinander zwischen der DDR und der BRD führt, zu normalen gutachtlichen Beziehungen mit dem Ausblick zu einem Miteinander im Interesse des Friedens, im Interesse der Bürger beider Staaten.'

The ratification of the treaties on May 17th, 1972 had the cathartic effect of confirming Brandt's German policy. It also facilitated demarcation by making it clear to the citizens of both German states that their governments accepted, the one totally and the other partly, that there were irreconcilable features within the two societies.
7. From the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties to the Basic Treaty.

i. The aftermath of ratification.

The Moscow and Warsaw treaties, ratified by the Bundestag on May 17th, 1972, was followed by further agreements, in accord with Honecker's claim that ratification was a prerequisite for improved relations between the two German states.¹ The treaty on traffic (Verkehrsvertrag) between the two states, initialled on May 12th, was signed on May 26th. At this time the representatives of the two sides agreed to begin negotiations on the normalisation of relations between the two states.² The preamble to the Verkehrsvertrag went some way towards supporting the DDR's claim to be an independent sovereign state, and the DDR representative, Dr Kohl, claimed that this was the first state treaty between the two states.³ On June 3rd the final protocol of the Quadripartite Agreement was signed, and the transit agreement between the two states and the agreement between the DDR and the Senate of West Berlin on visits by West Berliners to the DDR came into force.

On the day following the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties Honecker declared that these treaties had legitimised the results of the second world war, and that they signified the recognition, binding in international law, of the frontiers of Europe, including the frontier between the two German states. With the coming into force of the treaties, he argued, peace and security in Europe had been advanced. He repeated the offer made in Sofia in April that there should be an exchange of opinions between the two states on the normalisation of relations and the creation of the necessary agreements based on international law. However, any sense of euphoria among DDR citizens was tempered by his statement that it was all the more necessary to stress that there could be no calm (Windstille) in the ideological struggle, at a time when peaceful coexistence was making progress. The irreconcilable struggle against anticommunism, anti-sovietism, nationalism and against all other forms of reactionary bourgeois ideology remained the constant task of all party organisations.

In subsequent weeks it was constantly repeated that the ratification of the Ostverträge was a success which had contributed to the international recognition of the DDR, which was an attempt to gain the international, and through this the domestic legitimisation of the territorial and state

demarcation of the DDR from the Federal Republic. What was more difficult to persuade the population of the DDR to accept was the ideological justification for this demarcation, based on the irreconcilability of the dominant ideologies of the two states, the premise that peaceful coexistence did not mean rapprochement, but an intensification of the ideological struggle as peaceful coexistence gained in success. The frequent repetition of these claims would suggest that the DDR leadership was dissatisfied with their level of general acceptance. Honecker's speech of May 18th was delivered to an audience of local (Kreis) party secretaries, from which it might be inferred that it was still believed to be necessary to persuade the ordinary SED membership of the validity of these claims.

On the occasion of the signing of the final protocol of the Quadripartite Agreement the official DDR view was expressed in a joint party-state declaration. The declaration noted the constructive policy of the USSR, and argued that the ratification of the Ostverträge by the Federal government had made it possible for the Quadripartite Agreement to come into force. It was further claimed that the agreement had strengthened the legitimate interests and sovereign rights of the DDR in a form which was binding in international law, and it was repeated that the three

5. Neues Deutschland, 4th June, 1972
Western powers had recognised the DDR for the first time as a sovereign state, as well as the DDR's sovereign rights within its frontiers.

A few days later, on June 6th, Honecker gave an interview on the question of Deutschlandpolitik. He claimed that the Western powers had recognised the sovereignty of the DDR, and had recognised that West Berlin was not a constituent part of the Federal Republic. It was declared that, by ratifying the Ostverträge, the Federal Republic had recognised the sovereignty of the DDR in a form binding in international law. Honecker claimed that the DDR's action of introducing prematurely some of the agreements provided for in the Quadripartite Agreement, as 'Gesten des guten Willens' had assisted the ratification of the Ostverträge by the Bundestag. In commenting on the Verkehrsvertrag, he repeated that it was the first state treaty between the two states, and continued that it had the same international binding force as other treaties concluded by the DDR and the Federal Republic with third states.

On the question of improvements in travel between the two states, Honecker remarked that the DDR was the country with the greatest tourist traffic in the centre of Europe. When the Verkehrsvertrag had been signed the DDR had announced

its intention of introducing further improvements in travel
after the treaty had come into force. He continued:

'Diese Maßnahmen — so verstehen das die Bürger der DDR zu
Recht — sind Teil unserer Politik der friedlichen Koexistenz
zwischen sozialistischen und kapitalistischen Staaten... Was die DDR angeht, so hat die Regierung bereits ihr Wort
gesprochen und den Verkehrsvertrag der Volkskammer zur Be-
handlung zugeleitet. Ein entsprechender Schritt in Bonn
steht noch aus... Das Tempo der Verwirklichung hängt jetzt
also von der anderen Seite ab.'

Although Honecker could claim credit for the arrangements on
visa-free travel between the DDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia,
the opportunities for DDR citizens, who were not pensioners,
to visit the Federal Republic and West Berlin, remained
severely restricted.

Honecker regretted that the Federal Republic had replied
to the DDR's goodwill gestures by blocking its interna-
tional recognition. He noted that 31 states had already
recognised the DDR, and claimed that the Federal Republic
would not be able to stop this trend. He then repeated
that relations with the Federal Republic could only be
based on peaceful coexistence; intra-German relations were
impossible, and related to the pan-German nationalism of
Hitler Germany.

Honecker was then asked how he thought that relations
with the Federal Republic would develop. He replied that
the process of normalisation had already started and should
be continued. He declared that he had already suggested
this in his Sofia speech, and that the Federal Republic
had bound itself by its declaration of intent in the Moscow
treaty to establish relations with the DDR based on uni­
versally valid international norms, and to renounce totally
any attempt to discriminate against the DDR internationally.
Furthermore, the entry of the two German states into the
United Nations Organisation had been declared an urgent
matter, and the Federal Republic had pledged itself with
the USSR to work for a European security conference, a
move which was supported by the DDR.

Honecker was then asked whether it were possible for the
two states to work peacefully alongside each other, and he
replied that both working alongside each other (Nebeneinan-
der) and with each other (Miteinander) were possible.
There were sufficient areas of cooperation, and this was
what was understood by a policy of active peaceful coexist-
ence. However, he added that peaceful coexistence did not
do away with the unbridgeable contradictions between soc-
ialism and capitalism.

On June 19th Honecker repeated that there could be no
ideological coexistence between the two German states. 7

'Nur unter Beachtung der unbestrittenen Tatsache, daß es
sich bei der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der
Bundesrepublik um zwei Staaten unterschiedlicher sozialer
Ordnung handelt, um zwei Gesellschaftsordnungen mit einander
ausschließenden Ideologien, nur auf der Grundlage der all-
gemein anerkannten Normen des Völkerrechts kann es zu einer
spürbaren Normalisierung der Beziehungen zwischen der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der BRD und damit
zu einem friedlichen Nebeneinander kommen.'

This quotation was repeated at the 6th plenum. Honecker again conceived of eventual Miteinander in a speech delivered at the end of June, but on condition that the Federal Republic gave up all interference in the internal and external policies of the DDR. However, Honecker's interpretation of Miteinander differed from Brandt's. It was not viewed as a step towards unification, but as the formalisation of the split between the two states. It meant cooperation, but within the framework of peaceful coexistence as defined by Honecker.

ii. The 6th SE D plenum

At the 6th plenum the report of the Politbüro reviewed the German policy of the DDR. It was claimed that the effectiveness of the coordinated foreign policy of the USSR and its allies could be measured by the international agreements which had been recently concluded, and that these agreements had unequivocally made clear the position of the two German states in international law. Despite these alleged successes of DDR foreign policy, the report appeared to express dissatisfaction with the continuing negotiations between the two German states:

Wie aus den Massenmedien der BRD entnommen werden kann, versucht die Bonner Regierung ungeachtet der Tatsache der souveränen Gleichheit der Staaten, Probleme in den Mei-

nungsaustausch zwischen DDR und BRD einzuführen, die nichts mit dem Abschluß eines Vertrages über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der BRD zu tun haben. Ganz zu schweigen von der bekannten Tatsache, daß die weitere Normalisierung der Beziehungen zwischen DDR und BRD nichts mit der Aufnahme der DDR und der BRD in die UNO zu tun hat. Das in Kraft getretene Vertragswerk hat hierzu bereits entsprechende Grundlagen geschaffen.\textsuperscript{10}

Some evidence of the policy differences on the question of the normalisation of relations between the two states subsequently came to light on August 31st, 1972, when the West German and DDR negotiators, Egon Bahr and Michael Kohl, presented in television interviews the aims of their respective governments.\textsuperscript{10} Kohl declared that it was a question of establishing normal relations based on international law between the two states, which had differing, totally opposed social arrangements. The exchange of ambassadors, rather than plenipotentiaries, was a prerequisite for the establishment of normal relations. Kohl further rejected any kind of special relationships with the Federal Republic as illusory. Relations based on international law, he argued, required that each state should respect the sovereignty and independence of the other, should not interfere in the affairs of the other state, should maintain the principle of territorial integrity and, above all, avoid any kind of discrimination, for example in foreign relations, against the other state. In this last respect the Federal

\textsuperscript{10}. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, pp. 130-132.
Republic had given much cause for complaint.

Conversely, Bahr maintained that the Federal government had no intention of abandoning its claim to special relations with the DDR, and this had to find expression in the proposed treaty. The Federal Republic and the DDR had recognised that they were linked together (aufeinander bezogen) in their constitutions. In Bahr's opinion the demand for an exchange of plenipotentiaries, and not ambassadors, remained the unchanged position of the Federal government. Thus the stumbling block remained the unity of the German nation, insisted on by the Federal Republic, and rejected by the DDR.

Although the word Abgrenzung continued to be little used, the 6th plenum was characterised by its concern for ideological demarcation from the Federal Republic. The main contribution was made by Kurt Hager, who stressed the irreconcilability of socialist and Western culture. At the same time, but not at the plenum, Albert Norden examined the relationship between ideology and peaceful coexistence. In a further contribution Norden expanded the two nation theory presented by Honecker at the VIII congress. These detailed policy statements, in accord with the claim for total demarcation, may have been inspired by a desire to maximise ideological security before the Basic Treaty was signed, since the treaty provisions would increase the opportunities for contacts between the citizens of the two states.
In the communique of the 6th plenum it was announced that a commission had been elected under the chairmanship of Honecker to revise the SED programme which dated from the VI congress of 1963. Paul Verne was to chair a further commission to revise the party rules (Statut).\(^\text{11}\) Such revision was long overdue, especially in view of the change in policy on the national question.\(^\text{12}\)

Hager's speech at the plenum on questions of the cultural policy of the SED was notable for the renewed references to socialist realism, a term which had tended not to be used since the 4th plenum.\(^\text{13}\) H.-D. Sander saw this as an ideological restoration, as a return to a defensive position in literature and art.\(^\text{14}\) Hager stressed the role of cultural policy in the development of socialism and the combatting of Western counter-ideology. Socialist realist art, he argued, enriched the spiritual world of the workers through its representation of the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint (Parteileich-keit), its links with the people (Volksverbundenheit) and with real life, and through its socialist intellectual content (sozialistischer Ideengehalt). He claimed that the humanism of socialist culture and the anti-humanist culture of imperialism, infested with decay, were sharply opposed to

12. The need for revision was considered by Fred Oldenburg in Deutschland Archiv, 1972/8, pp. 788-789.
each other. The cultural power of socialism, which found its highest expression in the achievements of Soviet culture, was playing an ever increasing role in the struggle between socialism and imperialism. Accordingly, he argued, the cultural policy of the SED had the task of supporting with all cultural means the political and ideological offensive of socialism. Socialist culture also had a role to play in the development of all-round socialist personalities, in the overcoming of the remains of the former capitalist society and against the ideological influence of the imperialist class enemy.


Hager continued that under conditions of capitalism, which were driving the workers to physical and mental exhaustion, and in view of the growing social insecurity and fears for the future (Existenzangst), these slogans were being used by the bourgeoisie and right wing social democrats to lead the workers astray and to disguise the imperialist system of domination.

Examples were given of the alleged reality in the West: These included references to the level of child abuse and to the high crime rate in the Federal Republic. Hager claimed that this was a decaying society which was doomed to destruction, a society in which man was the enemy of man. Only socialist society, he declared, could guarantee the all-round development of the personality, and in this respect cultural progress was a natural (gesetzmäßig) and necessary element in the development of socialism.

With regard to the artist's portrayal of the individual and his personal life, Hager declared:


He further suggested that laughter and ridicule should be used to attack Western ideology, and to show up any defects in socialist society, but, he warned, self-criticism should not be used to become ammunition for the enemies of the DDR. More attention should be paid to modern popular music, but in

16. Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitik der SED, p. 44.
this area there were 'complicated problems'. DDR dance music could never develop within the chains of Western fashions, but, on the other hand, neither could it develop within a locked greenhouse.

These remarks might be interpreted as an attempt to discipline the East German artist. The frequent references to SPD policies on the freedom of the individual would suggest that they had been widely approved of by DDR citizens. The remarks might also be viewed as further evidence of official insecurity caused by the matters which the West German side was raising in the discussions on the normalisation of relations between the two states.

In accord with earlier DDR policy statements, Hager claimed that socialist society had the exclusive right to inherit the progressive cultural traditions of the past. He declared:

'Die imperialistischen Ideologen in der BRD sehen sich auf Grund unserer Erfolge in der Pflege und Aneignung des kulturellen und künstlerischen Erbes zunehmend gezwungen, ihr bisheriges Verhältnis zum kulturellen Erbe zu ändern. Sie versuchen, sich dem Kampf um die besten Traditionen des deutschen Volkes zu stellen und - natürlich mit allen erdenklichen Verfälschungen - Besitzansprüche auf diese Traditionen anzumelden. 17

Particular attention was devoted to the Federal Republic in the section of Hager's speech entitled: The struggle against socialism and imperialism in the field of culture.

17. Zu Fragen der Kulturpolitik der SED, p. 55. In their book: Die auswärtige Kulturpolitik der DDR, Lindemann and Müller described how the DDR attempted to maintain the claim to have inherited German cultural traditions internationally.
Hager claimed that the growing strength of socialism had forced imperialism to take up the challenge of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between opposed social orders. Imperialism had modified its anti-communist strategy and tactics, and was intent on using the new opportunities for international cooperation for the deliberate undermining of the socialist states. These intentions extended from attempted annexation of the DDR to the crude denigration of the artistic achievements of the DDR and of the other socialist countries. Hager argued that ideological sabotage had become one of the main forms of contemporary anti-communism.

Western popular culture was condemned as 'imperialist mass culture'. It was viewed as being closely related to the anti-humanistic way of life which arose from capitalist relationships based on exploitation. It resulted from the dominant political, educational and cultural concepts of imperialism, he argued, and from the extensive subjection of cultural productions in the mass media to the class interests of the monopoly which were hostile to the people. The glorification of brutality and crime as phenomena which

were 'normal', 'everyday' and 'part of life' was the main content of this so-called mass culture. Hager further condemned the various forms of revisionism and reformism in the cultural sphere, which were allegedly attacking the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism.

With regard to the Federal Republic, Hager declared:

'Die herrschenden Kreise in der BRD verfolgen gegenüber der DDR die nationalistische Linie des "Fortbestandes der Einheit der deutschen Nation". Eine wesentliche Rolle spielt dabei die bürgerliche These von der einheitlichen "Kulturnation". Dass die Existenz zweier Staaten von niemandem mehr zu leugnen ist, wird die längst widerlegte Behauptung von einer angeblich geschichtlich begründeten und weiter fortbestehenden "Einheit der deutschen Kultur" aufrechterhalten.' 19

Here Hager claimed from the Marxist-Leninist class-based viewpoint that history had shown that there had never been a unified German culture. After 1945 the East Germans began to construct an anti-fascist-democratic culture, but in the three Western zones, under the demagogic slogan of freedom and democracy, the newly founded parties of reviving German imperialism, with the support and participation of the right-wing leadership of the SPD, had persecuted all democratic and socialist initiatives. He continued, giving perhaps the clearest expression of SED cultural demarcation so far:

'Mit dem Entstehen zweier Staaten und ihren entgegengesetzten gesellschaftlichen Systemen hat sich auch der grundsätzliche Charakter der Kultur in der DDR und in der BRD voll herausgebildet. Die sozialistische Kultur in der DDR entfaltet sich als die Kultur der Arbeiterklasse und der mit ihr verbündeten Klassen und Schichten des Volkes.

Demgegenüber herrscht in der BRD die imperialistische volksfeindliche Verfallskultur. Somit stehen sich heute zwei Kulturen gegenüber, die ihrem Inhalt und Klassencharakter nach unvereinbar sind.'

On July 5th, 1972, in an article published in Pravda, Albert Norden developed the theme of ideological conflict between East and West under conditions of peaceful coexistence. The article aligned DDR foreign policy with that of the USSR, and its publication in Pravda would indicate Soviet approval of its contents. It was not published in Neues Deutschland until 3 days after the 6th plenum had ended. Norden declared that peaceful coexistence had been difficult to achieve, since it had had to be wrested from the aggressive Western powers. Nevertheless, it offered the chance of checking their aggression. As a result of the increasing strength of the socialist states, they had been forced to support détente, and were even claiming to have invented the policy.

It was argued that at the present time the task of socialist foreign policy was to create the most favourable external conditions for the building of socialism-communism. The socialist states had allegedly led the way in promoting peace and détente in Europe, as evidenced by the ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties. The DDR, it was claimed, had made a concrete contribution to this end through the

transit agreement with the Federal Republic, and through the agreements with the West Berlin senate which had been provided for in the Quadripartite Agreement.

Norden remarked that the imperialists had been forced by the new situation to change their tactics, but they remained imperialists. They were increasingly militarising their economies and engaging in an arms race. In an apparent reference to the border with the Federal Republic, he declared that the imperialists were especially dangerous where they directly opposed the defensive Warsaw Pact (Warschauer Verteidigungspakt), and where every military action was connected with the risk of an immediate world war. They were attempting to achieve old goals by new means, and here politics, economics and ideology were now playing a greater part than formerly.

Norden then posed the question why the West was making intensified efforts in the ideological class struggle. His answer was that the West had resorted to non-military means internally (nach innen), in order to secure domestic support within the crisis-ridden Western societies, and externally (nach außen), to subvert the citizens of the socialist countries. In the West, he argued, overt and clumsy anti-communism was becoming less effective, and the citizens of Western states were beginning to doubt the bourgeois 'free democratic order', as a result of the sharpening
contradictions within the capitalist states. Imperialist and reformist ideology had therefore been given the task of securing the existing power relationships internally. At the same time the imperialists saw an opportunity for intensified ideological sabotage externally, through the manifold political, economic and cultural relations with the socialist countries.

In the conflict between the two ideologies, he continued, a sharp struggle had begun for the hearts and minds of men. For the Marxist-Leninist parties, the dialectic of the struggle for peaceful coexistence consisted in uncompromisingly attacking bourgeois ideology in step with every further move towards détente. Anti-communism remained the main characteristic of bourgeois ideology. Under present conditions it had changed its form; now the anti-communist propagandists were acting in a pseudo-scientific and flexible manner, employing political and economic means, and the methods of ideological sabotage, to undermine socialism.

Norden viewed the cultural policy of the imperialists as an example of the contemporary elastic and cautious form of anti-communism. It was claimed that some West German politicians were attempting to win trust and prepare the ground for bourgeois ideology in the socialist countries. They were camouflaging their aims under such headings as 'objective factual analysis' and the 'scientific comparison of systems'. So-called 'DDR-ology', 'sovietology'
and 'Eastern research (Ostforschung) had the task of developing new strategic and tactical concepts for the Federal government's new Ostpolitik, of producing the theoretical basis for the struggle against the USSR and the DDR, against the socialist community and Marxism-Leninism. Norden argued that the imperialist ideologists had been forced to change from a policy of ignoring and isolating the DDR to one of 'preparation' (Präparierung). Here they had revived the old poison of national socialism. They no longer condemned the DDR totally, even praising its achievements, but suggested that these had come about despite the party and state. Norden claimed they were attempting to drive a wedge between leadership and general population in the DDR, and to destroy the alliance with the USSR.

The right wing of international social democracy was playing an important role in anti-communism. It saw itself as an alternative to communism, and was becoming increasingly active. But their anti-communist attacks had to be made from apparently socialist positions. Although within their own states they were supporters of monopoly capitalism, as the West German example proved, externally the formula of 'democratic socialism' served as an anti-communist key concept. Right-wing social democrats in the Federal Republic saw that they had greater opportunities in the ideological struggle against the socialist countries than had
the overtly bourgeois parties. They wanted to get their foot in the door of the DDR; for years they had supported the introduction of so-called 'reform communism' into the socialist countries, where in reality the reforms meant the restoration of capitalism. They were at present attempting to oppose the natural development of demarcation (gesetz-mäßige Abgrenzung) between the two states in all areas of social life.

If it were true, as Brandt and Wettig had suggested above, that the majority of East German citizens was opposed to demarcation from the Federal Republic, then Norden's claim would be counter-productive. If DDR citizens agreed with Norden that the SPD was hindering demarcation, it was likely that this would increase the support for the SPD's policy, within the DDR. Again, assuming widespread support for the SPD - which Brandt's visit to Erfurt on 1970 had demonstrated - then Norden's claim that the SPD was in favour of reform communism would encourage those within the DDR who supported this movement. However, the claim that reform communism would lead to a restoration of capitalism was of doubtful validity. The DDR leadership condemned reform communism because - at least in its Czechoslovak version - it questioned the leading role of the party, and thus the legitimacy of the SED.
Norden turned to the national question in a speech delivered in July 1972, which was not published until several months later. The delay in publication was significant, in view of the party control of the media. It was possible that the DDR leadership believed that publication in July might interfere with the Bahr-Kohl negotiations, where differing views on the national question played a major role.

Ilse Spittman saw Norden's speech as evidence of disagreement within the DDR leadership, which would represent a more likely reason for withholding publication.

Norden declared that the West German claim of the unity of the nation, which had been reaffirmed during the ratification debate in the Bundestag and subsequently, was the excuse for an international campaign against the recognition of the DDR. He referred to the VIII congress statement that history had long decided the national question, and to Honecker's claim in his speech of July 19th, 1972, that the united (einheitlich) Nation was a fiction.

"Heute ist die Lage doch so, daß in der DDR die neue, die sozialistische Nation wächst, während in der BRD die alte kapitalistische Nation fortbesteht. Zwischen ihnen gibt es keine Klammer, weil eine vom Gesetz der Ausbeutung des Menschen beherrschte Nation und eine ausbeutungsfreie Nation von keiner sogenannten nationalen Klammer zusammengehalten werden können. Die eine Nation entwickelt sich als Bestandteil des sozialistischen Weltsystems, während die BRD zur imperialistischen Welt gehört, mit der uns überhaupt keine Gemeinsamkeit verbindet und verbinden kann. Es gibt nicht zwei Staaten einer Nation, sondern zwei Nationen in Staaten verschiedener Gesellschaftsordnung."

Norden then listed the criteria which in his view characterised a nation. The nation should share the same territory, and the same economy, which was not the case with the two German states. He claimed that further national characteristics not shared by the two German states were psychic and moral qualities, culture, and a common history. He rejected the criterion of language, arguing that German was also spoken elsewhere in Europe.

It was argued that Honecker's remarks on the national question at the VIII congress represented a claim for national demarcation, although that term was not used. Norden's statement of 'two nations with differing social orders' was an unequivocal expression of national demarcation, which I would view as the logical extension and culmination of the policy of total demarcation. If the list of criteria which Norden considered to be characteristic of a nation is examined, it may be seen that each element represents an area of possible demarcation. When aggregated under the general heading of the nation, these elements complement each other.

The two German states occupy different territories and have different economic systems; it is also true that different nations may speak the same language, although Norden might have mentioned the lexical differences in the German language used in the two states, which reflect
their differing forms of social organisation, and their different dominant ideologies. The remaining criteria used by Norden was more controversial, since it could equally be argued that the two states did share common psychic and moral qualities, culture and a common history. The distinguishing factor used by the SED to justify its claims that the two states differed in these areas was ideological; it was argued that under socialism the feelings of the working class were fundamentally different from those of the private capitalists in the Federal Republic, socialist culture was the opposite of West German imperialist culture, as Hager had argued at the 6th plenum, and the history of the working class differed from that of the capitalists. To support the latter argument Norden referred to Disraeli's concept of two nations within the same country, the nation of the rich and the nation of the poor. He continued:

'Indem das Proletariat - wie Marx und Engels im „Kommu­nistischen Manifest“ begründeten - die politische Herr­schaft erobert, erhebt es sich zur nationalen Klasse, konstituiert es sich selbst zur Nation. Mit der Errichtung der Arbeiter-und-Bauern-Macht und dem Aufbau der sozialis­tischen Gesellschaft entwickelt sich ein neuer Typus der Nation, die sozialistische Nation. So ist es in der Deut­schen Demokratischen Republik im Gegensatz zur BRD. Dort besteht die bürgerliche Nation fort, dort wird die nationale Frage weiterhin durch den unversönlichen Klassen­widerspruch zwischen der Bourgeoisie und den werktätigen Massen bestimmt, der im Verlauf des welthistorischen Prozesses beim Übergang vom Kapitalismus zum Sozialismus seine Lösung finden wird.'

Here a demarcation between the working classes of the two states was implied, which would seem to follow the
earlier abolition of institutions of all-German significance, after Honecker's assumption of power. The working class in the Federal Republic was to be treated the same as the working class of any other capitalist state; the impression was given that the citizens of the DDR were to demarcate themselves from the whole population of the Federal Republic. The decisive importance of ideological demarcation could now be seen; the two nation theory derived its justification from the acceptance of the socialist/capitalist dichotomy, which might explain the attempts to convince DDR citizens that the dominant ideologies of the two states were irreconcilable, and, even if the Federal Republic was unable to use military force, its ideology had the aim of subverting the DDR.

Norden then considered the West German claim of the unity of the German nation:

'Der eigentliche Charakter der nationalistischen Bonner Konzeption und der daraus abgeleiteten politischen Taktik wird völlig klar, wenn man ihr Ziel ins Auge faßt. Es geht den herrschenden Kreisen in der BRD darum, mit der Parole von der angeblichen »Einheit der Nation« das vom proletarischen Internationalismus und vom sozialistischen Patriotismus geprägte Bewußtsein der Bürger der DDR zu stören, den Prozeß der Integration der DDR in die sozialistische Staatengemeinschaft aufzuhalten, um eines Tages die DDR im Zeichen einer solch angeblichen »Gemeinsamkeit« doch noch in den Machtbereich des Imperialismus zurückführen zu können.'

The demand for special intra-German relations was viewed by Norden as a modern version of Adenauer's reunification policy; he claimed that 'intra-German' meant interference
in the internal affairs of the DDR. He added that the national question had nothing to do with the DDR's desire to join the United Nations, since this was not an organisation of nations, but of states. These remarks clarified the reverse side of Norden's definition of national demarcation; the rejection of all common national characteristics between the two German states was countered by the promotion of socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism, where the Russian speaking workers of Moscow, the English speaking miners of Scotland, the French speaking Renault workers and the Italian peasants were claimed to be a thousand times closer to the citizens of the DDR than the German speaking capitalists of the Federal Republic. No mention was made of the German speaking workers of the Federal Republic.

iii. The further development of ideological demarcation before the signing of the Basic Treaty.

The question of ideological conflict under conditions of peaceful coexistence was the main feature of the August 1972 edition of Einheit, under the heading 'Coexistence and class struggle'. An article published on this theme, entitled 'Fight ideologically with conviction', dealt with the perceived dangers of Western ideology. Reference was made

to Honecker's statement at the VIII congress that 'the development of socialist consciousness must be constantly bound up with the struggle against bourgeois ideology, which shuns no means of damaging the creation of a socialist society in our republic', and to Norden's above mentioned claim that in the struggle between socialism and imperialism a sharp struggle had begun for the hearts and minds of men.

The article claimed that, in order to counter bourgeois ideology, its class function had to be revealed. This was all the more necessary today, since imperialism had reacted to the growing strength of the socialist camp and the deepening general crisis of capitalism by producing a more refined form of ideology. This was to be seen in the growth of convergence theory and futurology. Class contradictions had been falsely redefined, it was argued, as 'development problems of the scientific-technical revolution', and the working masses had been deceived by the illusion that imperialism could be modified, that the class struggle was superfluous and a hindrance to progress. The article continued that refined, camouflaged anti-communism was the main political-ideological weapon of bourgeois ideology, that social democracy and revisionism were especially useful forms of ideological sabotage, since they gave the impression that socialists, rather than imperialists, were calling real socialism into question.
It was declared that anti-sovietism was at the centre of anti-communism, but an attack on the Soviet Union and the CPSU was an attack on all communists. The spreading of proletarian internationalism and above all the strengthening of the alliance with the Soviet Union were among the central tasks of the ideological work of the SED. This had two topical aspects: Firstly, the further extension of the developed socialist society depended on the success of socialist integration in the economic and scientific-technical spheres. However, it was argued that this was primarily an ideological task. This fact had also be noted by the class enemy, particularly by social democrat and revisionist ideologists, who had concentrated on reviving bourgeois nationalism in the socialist countries and on discrediting the internationalism of the communist parties. They had become the advocates of economic 'national autonomy' in the individual socialist states. It was claimed that the monopoly bourgeoisie was justifiably afraid of every step towards socialist integration, for in that way socialism grew stronger and destroyed the plans of the reactionaries to weaken socialism through the atomisation (Vereinzelung) of its states. For this reason it was necessary to promote socialist integration, particularly through ideological means, in the class struggle between socialism and imperialism.
There was a second aspect which was especially applicable to the East German communists. Imperialists in the Federal Republic, with their dreams of so-called intra-German relations, represented a form of bourgeois nationalism. But nothing connected the citizens of the DDR with the monopoly social and state order of the Federal Republic, but everything bound them to the socialist DDR, their socialist fatherland, which was firmly part of the socialist community. There was only one answer to the enemy's attempts to separate the DDR from the other socialist states; this was to integrate the DDR even more firmly into the socialist community, and to make the internationalism of the SED into the world-view and behavioural norm of all citizens of the DDR.

The next section stressed the primacy of the party and the role of its membership. The article declared that, in order to combat bourgeois ideology and spread Marxism-Leninism successfully, knowledge of the truth was not enough. The mass effectiveness of ideological work would be measured by how far it enabled the workers to strengthen their socialist consciousness:

'The representation of our scientific world-view and of the struggle against imperialist ideological sabotage was never and will never be the preserve of scientists and propagandists. They are the duty of every comrade, every basic party organisation, and of every party executive committee (Parteileitung).
iv. The November conference on agitation and propaganda

The Basic Treaty (Grundlagenvertrag) between the two German states was initialled on November 8th and signed on December 21st, 1972. Between these two events the negative influence of Western ideology upon the DDR was further considered in a Politbüro statement of November 7th, entitled 'The tasks of agitation and propaganda in the further realisation of the decisions of the VIII congress of the SED'. The declared aim was to influence and involve all sections of the community in the building of the developed socialist society. It was argued that the conflict with imperialism and with all forms of its ideology ran like a red thread through the whole of the agitation and propaganda of the party, which had the task of fighting anti-communism, bourgeois nationalism, social democracy, revisionism and left wing opportunism. The unity and purity of Marxism-Leninism had to be defended and it was repeated that there could be no ideological coexistence. There were further condemnations of 'democratic' and 'human' socialism, of the 'industrial society' and convergence theory. A further task was claimed to be the unmasking of Maoism, which was considered anti-leninist, anti-soviet, and an expression of great power chauvinism.


Later in the same month the Politbüro statement led to a conference of the SED central committee on agitation and propaganda, on November 16th and 17th. The conference was opened by Honecker, who, although optimistic about the Basic Treaty, warned that there should be no illusions on the nature of the relations between a socialist and a capitalist state. Ideological work was of great importance, and had to be more flexible and effective.26

The main speech was delivered by Werner Lamberz. He echoed Honecker's satisfaction at the initialling of the Basic Treaty. Supporting his conclusions with quotations from the Western press, he argued that West German imperialism had been forced to recognise the independence and sovereignty of the DDR, not only de facto, but also de jure. Some grounds for satisfaction may be understood if one considers the years of constant East German propaganda demanding recognition, and calling on the Federal Republic to recognise reality and cease to block this goal. Satisfaction was also claimed by Lamberz from the alleged discomfort of some West German sources at having to give up their illusions and abandon their aims of first isolating and then incorporating the DDR into the Federal Republic. Lamberz maintained that the 'notorious' West German newspaper, die Welt, had calculated 'full of anger' that -

26. The speeches of Honecker and Lamberz appeared in: Agitation und Propaganda nach dem VIII. Parteitag der SED.
Lamberz continued that it should not be forgotten that the treaty had been concluded between states with opposed social orders. He noted that the treaty had left open certain fundamental questions, including the national question, on which the two sides could not agree.27

Lamberz quoted the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera as declaring that attempts by the West German government to save the theoretical principle of the continuing existence of the nation were pitiful fictions, that the two German states were sharply divided from each other, two separate sources of sovereign authority, and as such they would now and in the future be regarded by other states without exception. The Western press was also quoted on the subject

27. This was expressed in the preamble to the treaty. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, p. 268.

of demarcation. An Austrian newspaper had declared 'that
the DDR, with the conclusion of this treaty, had been able
to demarcate itself further, and in this case decisively
from the Federal Republic, and its sovereignty was streng-
thened'. Lamberz commented that the party's ideological
work should stress that this was indubitably true; it
corresponded to the historical fact that an objective
process of demarcation, and not of rapprochement, was
taking place between the two German states, as Honecker
had declared at the 14th plenum of December 1970.

The significance of demarcation was then explained, and,
from Lamberz' remarks, it appeared that some SED members
found it difficult to accept the official argument:

'Manchem scheinen Vertragsabschlüsse mit der BRD und
vor allem die damit erweiterten Besuchs- und andere Re-
gelungen als ein Widerspruch zur Abgrenzung. Genossen,
hiervor muß ganz klar geantwortet werden. Ohne die Politik
der Abgrenzung von der BRD wäre der jetzt sich vollzie-
hende Prozeß der weltweiten völkerrechtlichen Anerkennung
der DDR nicht erreicht worden. Das ist die Wahrheit.
Das Verhältnis von zwei Staaten zueinander ist bekannt-
lich nicht bestimmt vom Verwandtschaftsgrad des einzel-
nen Bürgers und der Dauer von Besuchen, sondern von den
herrschenden Gesellschaftsordnungen. Nicht, weil wir
etwas von unserer Souveränität oder dem Charakter unserer
Gesellschaftsordnung zugunsten irgendwelcher Gemeinsam-
keit abgestritten hätten, gibt es Verwandten- oder tou-
ristische Besuche sowie andere Regelungen, sondern weil
sie, die BRD, unsere Souveränität und eigenständige
Entwicklung als sozialistischer Staat anerkennen mußte.
Ob Hans aus den Heckert-Werken in Karl-Marx-Stadt und
Fritz von Conti in Hannover sich besuchen oder nicht,
das ändert keine Machtverhältnisse. Hans arbeitet im
und für den Sozialismus, und Fritz bleibt ausgebeutet
bis zum Tage, da sich die westdeutsche Arbeiterklasse
befreit. Wir haben nicht die Absicht, die Revolution zu
exportieren, aber die Einfuhr von Konterrevolution wird
schon gar nicht zugelassen. Deshalb hat der Kommentator
von SFB schon in etwa richtig den Beschuß des Politbüros
tu Agitation und Propaganda interpretiert, wenn er nach
This was a further step towards total demarcation from the Federal Republic. Lamberz was proposing a demarcation between the East and West German working classes, and the latter would have to free itself alone from capitalism, since the DDR would not export its socialist revolution. 30

Lamberz repeated that peaceful coexistence did not mean ideological demarcation, but, on the contrary, a period of intensified conflict between socialist and bourgeois ideology. Three points had to be understood:

(a) Peaceful coexistence was the only alternative to nuclear war. It did not conflict with the revolutionary movement. Peaceful coexistence was a revolutionary policy, a class struggle, the scientifically based utilisation of the objective laws of social development. The party was convinced that peaceful development would lead to further changes in international power relationships beneficial to socialism.

(b) The reactionary and inhuman character of imperialism

29. Agitation und Propaganda nach dem VIII. Parteitag der SED, p. 49

30. The abolition of the KPD one year earlier symbolised the differentiation between the working classes of the two German states.
Western visitors had come to the DDR in the first nine months of 1972, most of them West Germans or West Berliners. Many of them had visited the DDR for the first time, or after a period of several years. After DDR citizens had shown them, with self-confidence and pride, what had been achieved there, West German periodicals had been forced to change their reporting, since the old anti-communist line was no longer believed. The visitors were categorised as progressive supporters of the DDR, interested sceptics, prejudiced persons, those using visits as an excuse for anti-DDR activities, and the great mass of allegedly 'apolitical' visitors.

Lamberz then considered how this increased number of Western visitors was to be dealt with:

'Von unserer Propaganda und Agitation ist dabei vor allem guter Kontakt zu den Menschen, Fingerspitzengefühl und parteiliche Konsequenz verlangt, vor allem noch mehr Fähigkeit, die Grundprobleme unserer Zeit im Alltag der Menschen sichtbar zu machen oder, wie Karl Marx es formulierte, unsere Theorie am Menschen selbst zu demonstrieren. Es verlangt von jedem Bürger der DDR ein ausgeprägtes Staatsbewußtsein, immer und in jeder Frage den Standpunkt seines Staates, seiner Gesellschaft klar und unmissverständlich zu vertreten.'

Besides stressing the need for every party member to raise the quality of his ideological work, Lamberz further followed the Politbüro of November 7th in stressing the importance of the DDR mass media in popularising the work.

of party propaganda; it was demanded of the mass media that their presentation should become more skilful. The Politbüro declaration and the conference on propaganda and agitation appeared to have the aim of alerting the SED to the ideological dangers believed to be presented by the increased numbers of West Germans who were likely to visit the DDR after the implementation of the Basic Treaty. The significance of the SED's concern with agitation and propaganda was summed up by Gerhard Wettig as follows:

'Unmittelbar vor der Paraphiering des Vertrages über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten im November 1972 faßte das Zentralkomitee der SED Beschlüsse, welche die Leitlinien der Abgrenzungspolitik festlegten und die zu ihrer Durchsetzung erforderlichen Maßnahmen dekretierten. Alle denkbaren Apparate des Staates und der Parteien wurden eingesetzt.'

Among further measures described by Wettig which were undertaken from 1972 was the forbidding of party and state officials and others with access to classified information to maintain contacts with West Germans.32

v. The Basic Treaty

Article 7 of the Basic Treaty provided for a series of subsidiary agreements including improvements in border traffic,33 to allow West Germans living close to the DDR frontier to make one day visits within the border areas of the DDR, up to a maximum of 30 one day visits each

had to be laid bare through the scientific policy of the SED, through the evidence of contemporary imperialism, and through the SED's own bitter experience of the past.

(c) Increased conflict with bourgeois ideology was taking place, under conditions peculiar to the DDR, and bourgeois ideology was attempting to gain influence in the DDR.

It had to be quite soberly seen, Lamberz argued, that the class enemy would use all means, including détente and the successes of the DDR's struggle for coexistence and security in Europe, in order to extract new and direct opportunities from the international recognition of the DDR. He claimed that the enemy up to now had attempted to gain influence in the DDR by seizing on the old outlook, customs and behaviour patterns which still existed in DDR society, and attempting to reactivate them. Here the enemy used the West German media to try to carry bourgeois ideology into the DDR. Lamberz told his audience that they would have to fight more decisively and with better ideas against the hostile mass media, and they would have to demarcate themselves even more energetically from its utterances and falsehoods.

A further manner in which the DDR might be subjected to negative influences was through the increased numbers of Western visitors. Lamberz noted that over five million
year; for this purpose four additional road frontier crossings were to be opened. The agreement on local border traffic came into force on the same day as the Basic Treaty, on June 21st, 1973. It was to contribute to the increase in opportunities for personal contacts between the citizens of the two states; together with the Verkehrsvertrag, the number of West Germans visiting the DDR increased by 4.8% between 1972 and 1973, from 1.54 to 2.27 millions.

Of more immediate significance was the exchange of letters on 8th November between the two governements permitting the journalists of each state to work within the other; this agreement became effective on the same day. In connection with the exchange of letters the DDR declared:


35. Die Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, p. 55.
38. Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, p. 298.
This declaration was expanded by the DDR in a decree of February 21st, 1973, which regulated the activities of foreign media and their correspondants in the DDR. Some of the difficulties experienced when these agreements were put into practise were subsequently described by the West German television reporter, Lothar Loewe. Such difficulties arose from the interpretation of the decree of February 21st, which included the following requirements, that the journalist should not slander the DDR, its state organs and leading personages, or states allied with the DDR, and that the reports should be truthful and correct, with no malicious falsification of the facts. They tended to support Brandt's claim of 18th January, 1973, that the long years of hostility and non-relations (Nicht-Beziehung) between the two German states would initially be followed by difficulties and friction.

Both sides expressed satisfaction with the provisions of the Basic Treaty. In an interview with an American journalist on November 22nd, 1972, Honecker repeated that they could be no confederation and no ideological convergence between the two German states. Both sides claimed that their policies had been confirmed in the treaty. Thus

Brandt argued that his 20 point programme presented to Stoph at Kassel in May 1970 had been largely realised in the Basic Treaty.\(^{43}\) Again, Honecker declared at the 8th SED plenum on December 7th, 1972, that the Basic Treaty had confirmed the five point peace plan put forward at the VIII congress. He also claimed the success of the demarcation policy:

'Es hat sich als richtig erwiesen, die Frage der Abgrenzung zwischen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland so entschieden aufzuwerfen. Dies entspricht voll und ganz den Tatsachen. Bei der DDR und der BRD handelt es sich um zwei Staaten mit unterschiedlichen sozialen Systemen. Die Verdeutlichung dieser Tatsache, die Ablehnung jeden Mischmaschs zwischen den nicht zu verein­enden Gesellschaftsordnungen, die allseitige Stärkung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ihre weitere Profilie­rung als sozialistischer Staat - das war die Grundbedingung für die Einleitung des Prozesses der weltweiten Annerken­nung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, für ihre gleichberechtigte Teilnahme am internationalen Leben,'\(^{44}\)

Honecker continued that the extent and intensity of the ideological struggle was increasing, and the SED had clearly taken up its position on this question through the Politbüro declaration on propaganda and agitation of November 7th.

vi. The end of the overt demarcation policy

As had been the case with the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties, the Basic Treaty was opposed by the CDU/CSU opposition, being rejected by the Bundesrat, and delayed by the Bavarian

\(^{43}\). Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 11, pp. 320-324.

claim before the Federal Constitutional Court that it was unconstitutional. As a result of these delays the Basic Treaty did not come into force until July 21st, 1973. However, after the Basic Treaty had been passed by the Bundestag on May 11th it was followed by the 9th SED plenum, which took place on May 28th-29th, 1973. The significance of this plenum may be inferred from Ilse Spittmann’s comment that for the first time since the VIII congress the Politbüro report had been delivered by Honecker, and that he had dealt with the period from the VIII congress, instead of just the period from the preceding plenum, as was usual.

Honecker declared that the Basic Treaty had opened a new chapter in the relations between the two German states. He stressed that it was a normal treaty, based on international law, between two independent sovereign states with differing social orders. Once again he warned that there could be no special relationship with the Federal Republic, and that the national question was no longer open:

‘Klar und eindeutig besagen die Bestimmungen des Berliner Vertrages über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der BRD: Die DDR ist kein Inland der BRD und die BRD kein Inland der DDR. Als definitive völkerrechtliche Regelung der Beziehungen zwischen zwei souveranen Staaten ist der Berliner Vertrag kein „Modus Vivendi“, und nach der Logik der Dinge gibt es darum auch keine „offene deutsche Frage“. Wer sich ständig darauf versteift, das Gegen teil zu behaupten, verschwendet nur Zeit.’

45. These events are described in Texte zur Deutshclandpolitik, Vol. 12.


47. Erich Honecker: Zügig voran bei der weiteren Verwirklichung der Beschlüsse des VIII. Parteitages der SED, Berlin (East), 1973, p. 13. Note that the Basic Treaty was described as the Berlin Treaty in DDR parlance.
It was argued that the normalisation of relations between the two states had confirmed the principles of peaceful coexistence, yet the Federal Republic still represented a danger to the DDR.

'Natürlich müssen wir berücksichtigen, daß die regierenden Kreise in Bonn versuchen, das Vertragswerk, insbesondere den Vertrag über die Grundlagen der Beziehungen zwischen der DDR und der BRD, in einer für sie vorteilhaften Weise auszulegen. Die westlichen Massenmedien, vor allem der Rundfunk und das Fernsehen der BRD, die ja bei uns jeder nach Belieben ein- oder ausschalten kann, machen daraus gar kein Geheimnis. Zugleich wird mit ökonomischen Vorteilen gewinkt; obwohl jeder wissen sollte, daß jeglicher Versuch, die Souveränität der DDR einzuschränken, der Ausweitung unserer wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen mit den kapitalistischen Ländern nur entgegenwirkt.' 48

Honecker's admission for the first time that East Germans were not forbidden to switch on radio and television programmes from the Federal Republic was noted by Ilse Spittmann.49 She related this statement to the demands for more effective political work among the DDR population, as demanded by the party declaration of November 7th, quoting from a speaker at the plenum who wished to create an open atmosphere of trust as the best immunisation against imperialist influences. The atmosphere of trust would also have been facilitated by the amnesty granted to prisoners on October 6th, which for the first time had mentioned the existence of political prisoners.50 Honecker had commented


49. Deutschland Archiv, 1973/6, p. 570.

that the DDR leadership had been encouraged to take this step in view of the favourable internal development of the DDR after the VIII congress and its growing international recognition.  

Honecker argued that a new picture of the DDR was developing in the Federal Republic. The reality of two German states with differing social orders had been confirmed by opinion polls in the Federal Republic. He appeared to be modifying the strict cultural demarcation maintained by Hager at the 6th plenum, by suggesting that cultural and linguistic differences resulted from differing social structures.

'...wer die Entwicklung der DDR und ihre Perspektiven einigermaßen übersieht und begreift, der wird eingestehen müssen, daß nicht Sprache und Kultur die Grenze zwischen der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland gezogen haben, sondern die unterschiedliche, ja gegensätzliche soziale Struktur... Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik ist sozialistisch; in ihr ist das Privateigentum an Produktionsmitteln abgeschafft. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist kapitalistisch; in ihr dominiert das Privateigentum an Produktionsmitteln und gibt es nach wie vor die Ausbeutung des Menschen durch den Menschen. In dieser Frage sind wir bekanntlich einer Meinung mit Herrn Brandt, der mehrfach betonte, daß es hinsichtlich der Gesellschaftsordnungen in den beiden deutschen Staaten keinerlei Mischmasch geben könne.'

As Norden in July 1972, he repeated that those speaking the same language often belonged to different states and different nations. It was claimed that the DDR was the state embodiment of the best traditions of German history.


52. Zügig voran bei der weiteren Verwirklichung der Beschüsse des VIII Parteitages der SED, p. 19
'In der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik entwickelt sich
die sozialistische Nation unter Führung der Arbeiterklasse. In der sozialistischen Nationalkultur unserer Republik
lebt all das fort und erfährt eine neue Blüte, was in früherer Zeit an kulturellen Schätzen geschaffen wurde. Von der Geschichte, der Kultur und der Sprache werden wir nichts preisgeben, was es an Positivem zu erhalten und zu pflegen gibt, was den humanistischen und den revolutionären Traditionen entspricht.' 53

Honecker continued that in the era of nuclear weapons
relations between socialist and capitalist states could only be based on peaceful coexistence, which was more than non-war, but the way of sensible cooperation. However, peaceful coexistence did not abolish the social and ideological differences between socialist and capitalist states. He appeared to mention demarcation almost as an afterthought, not as a continuing process, but as something which had long since been completed:

'Im übrigen wurde die klassenmäßige Abgrenzung zwischen der sozialistischen DDR und der kapitalistischen BRD bereits zu Zeiten Adenauers vollzogen. Das Rad der Geschichte läßt sich nicht zurückdrehen. Die DDR hat jetzt, da bereits 82 Staaten diplomatische Beziehungen zu ihr unterhalten, die ihren nationalen Interessen entsprechende Politik fortzuführen.' 54

I would regard this statement as a signal to end the overt campaign of ideological demarcation from the Federal Republic, which began in September 1970, reaching its high point at the beginning of 1971, and being used less often from the time of the VIII congress. Spittmann had commented

54. Ibid, p. 23.
on the lack of references at the 9th plenum to both demarcation and social democracy.\textsuperscript{55} Wettig commented that from 1973 'entdämonisierte sich das Image der SPD in gewissem Umfang', when the main agreements with the Federal Republic had been concluded, and the DDR leadership began to see the advantages of the new relationship.\textsuperscript{56} The ratification debate had to some extent contradicted the SED's claim that the German policies of government and opposition were the same. One reason for the end of the Abgrenzung campaign might have been its unpopularity, even among party members, suggested by Wettig.\textsuperscript{57} On November 1st, 1973, Honecker presented the relationship between recognition and demarcation: 

"Friedlich geregelt wurde eine der wichtigsten Fragen der Nachkriegsentwicklung, die völkerrechtliche Anerkennung des Bestehens zweier voneinander unabhängiger, souveräner deutscher Staaten. Völkerrechtlich ist durch die Aufnahme in die UNO und die Festlegung der Verträge von Moskau, Warschau und Berlin über die Anerkennung der Grenzen... der Prozeß der Abgrenzung zwischen der DDR und der BRD ein für allemal vollzogen..." \textsuperscript{58} 

Thus Abgrenzung was presented as a completed process. Although Honecker's claims that class (klassenmäßig) and diplomatic (völkerrechtlich) demarcation had been completed between the two states,\textsuperscript{59} there seemed no chance of achieving total demarcation, particularly in view of the increasing contacts between the citizens of the two states.

\textsuperscript{55} Deutschland Archiv, 1973/6, p. 569. 
\textsuperscript{56} Dilemmas der SED-Abgrenzungspolitik, p. 3. 
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, p. 4. 
\textsuperscript{59} Honecker at the 9th plenum of May 1973 and 13th plenum of December 1974, respectively.
vii. The consolidation of ideological demarcation from the Federal Republic

The DDR constitution of 1968 was extensively revised and replaced by a new constitution in October 1974. By the time of the IX SED congress of May 1976, the new versions of the party programme and rules appeared, the work of the commissions appointed at the 6th plenum of July 1972. All three documents were characterised by the breaking of all links with the Federal Republic, and by aspirations of closer relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist community. Dietrich Müller-Römer commented on the new constitution as follows:

'Mit der Streichung aller Verfassungsbestimmungen in der Präambel und den ersten Artikeln, die auf Deutschland als Ganzes und die einheitliche deutsche Nation Bezug nahmen, hat die SED-Führung auch verfassungsrechtlich dokumentiert, daß sie keinerlei Beziehungen besonderer Art zwischen beiden Teilen Deutschlands mehr gelten lassen will und die Existenz des deutschen Volkes für die Zukunft negiert. Dieser starren Abgrenzung nach Westen entspricht eine verfassungsrechtliche Aufwertung der Beziehungen zur sowjetischen Hegemonialmacht. Artikel 6 spricht jetzt nicht mehr bloß von Zusammenarbeit und Freundschaft mit der Sowjetunion, sondern statuiert darüber hinaus, daß die DDR für immer und unwiderruflich mit der UdSSR verbündet sei.'

Deutschland was replaced by DDR, the description of the DDR as a 'sozialistischer Staat deutscher Nation', and the aspiration of eventual unification, contained in Articles 1 and 8 of the old constitution, disappeared. Article 1 of 60. Die neue Verfassung der DDR, Cologne, 1974, p. 10.
of the 1974 constitution defined the DDR as a 'sozialis-tischer Staat', and the adjective 'national' now applied only to the DDR. Similar changes were noted in the new party programme and rules. Fred Oldenburg commented that 'die hervorstechendste Neuerung ist die peinliche Lösung aller gesamtdeutsche Bezüge sowohl im Programm als auch im Statut'. At the IX congress Honecker claimed that the new programme and rules had increasingly stressed and more precisely defined the leading role of the SED. The main task was said to be the more effective spreading of Marxism-Leninism and the uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology. Karl Wilhelm Fricke noted that the new programme did not contain a chapter devoted to the relations between the two German states, and that references to the Federal Republic were ostentatiously unostentatiously spread throughout the document. He continued:

'Im zweiten Programm der SED nun ist von einer Annäherung beider deutscher Staaten nicht mehr die Rede. Der deutsch-deutsche Grundlagenvertrag wird nicht einmal auch nur erwähnt. In ihren zweiten Programm bekräftigt die SED anders gesagt unmissverständlich schroff die radikale Wendung in ihrer Deutschlandpolitik. Das Verhältnis zwischen beiden deutschen Staaten soll ausschließlich durch Abgrenzung bestimmt werden - durch die bewusste, mit äußerster Entschlossenheit betriebene Abgrenzung der DDR von der Bundesrepublik.'

However, the section of the programme devoted to foreign relations did mention the Federal Republic, to stress that

relations between the two German states were to be based on peaceful coexistence and the norms of international law, with no mention of Abgrenzung. 64

At the 9th plenum of May 1973 Honecker had argued that a class-based (klassenmäßig) demarcation had been completed when Adenauer was in power; at the IX congress he claimed that this had been complemented by a diplomatic (völkerrechtlich) demarcation between the two states in the period between the VIII and the IX congresses. The German question was closed, he declared, the socialist German nation was developing within the DDR, and the DDR as a socialist nation state belonged inseparably to the socialist community. 65

In June 1973 Hermann Axen spoke on the subject of the socialist nation in the DDR, which was claimed to be developing under the conditions of the developing socialist society. It was argued that social and class factors determined the character of a nation. It was only possible to speak of a genuine unity of the nation, that was to say the unity of the socialist nation, under conditions of socialist production relationships. 66 Axen continued:

64. Programm der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Berlin (East), 1976, p. 62.


'Auf dem Territorium der DDR herrscht die sozialistische Produktionsweise. Dieser entscheidende Faktor bedingt die Abgrenzung von der Gesellschaftsordnung, vom Staat und vom Territorium der kapitalistischen BRD. Die sozialistische Nation in der DDR unterscheidet sich grundsätzlich von jeder kapitalistischen Nation durch ihr geistiges Antlitz. In der kapitalistischen Nation herrscht die bürgerliche Nation in den verschiedensten Formen.' 67

Axen declared that ethnic factors, such as language, geographic milieu and customs were not characteristics which determined the existence of a nation. It was not a thousand years of German history, but the class struggle under capitalism which led to the development of the German nation. He argued that the German national question had long been decided by history. For more than 25 years the DDR had participated in a qualitatively new historical movement, in common with the other socialist countries. West German claims to the unity of the nation were condemned.

'Die ebenso unwissenschaftliche wie scheinhelle Argumentation über eine angeblich „nationale Gemeinsamkeit“ zwischen BRD und DDR kann nicht den politischen Zweck, die Klassenziele der imperialistischen Kräfte in der BRD verdecken... Die Phraseologie vom angeblichen Fortbestand einer einheitlichen „deutschen Nation“ bezweckt nichts anderes, als den Anspruch auf eine Eingliederung der DDR in den Machtbereich des Imperialismus aufrechtzuerhalten.' 68

Here the placing of 'deutsche Nation' between commas was significant, since in SED literature any concept placed between commas is automatically to be rejected. The use of the adjective 'deutsch' was also avoided in the formula of 'die sozialistische Nation in der DDR'.

68. Ibid, p. 25.
Fred Oldenburg argued that Honecker and a majority of Politbüro members had felt that the demarcation strategy had gone to far with the apparent rejection of 'deutsch' by Axen. Oldenburg quoted a speech by Honecker delivered at the 13th plenum of December 1974, and noted that Honecker had referred to the two German states, using their full titles and not the abbreviations, and that he had stated for the first time since the VIII congress that the DDR represented 'socialist Germany'. Honecker had declared that the overwhelming majority of DDR citizens were of German nationality.

'Es gibt also keinen Platz für irgendwelche Unklarheiten beim Ausfüllen von Fragebogen, die hier und da benötigt werden. Die Antwort auf diesbezügliche Fragen lautet schlicht und klar und ohne jede Zweideutigkeiten: Staatsbürgerschaft - DDR, Nationalität - deutsch. So liegen die Dinge.' 70

This question was pursued in a book by Alfred Kosing, which appeared in 1976 as a definitive exposition of the SED's view of the national question. He addressed himself to distinguishing between nation and nationality.

'Die Unterscheidung von Nation und Nationalität ist von großer theoretischer Bedeutung und hilft, einige Probleme der Nationsentwicklung im früheren Deutschland und in der DDR und der BRD besser zu verstehen. Gerade im Hinblick

69. Deutschland Archiv, 1975/1, p. 2.
70. Ibid, pp. 93-94
71. Nation in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Berlin (East), 1976.
auf das Verhältnis von Nation und Nationalität bestehen viele Mißverständnisse und erschweren die Einsicht in die gesetzmaßige Entwicklung der sozialistischen Nation in der DDR. Häufig werden Nation und Nationalität miteinander identifiziert. Von diesem falschen Ausgangspunkt ist natürlich nicht einzusehen, daß sich in der DDR und der BRD Nationen unterschiedlichen Typus entwickeln.' 72

The reference to 'former Germany', as though Germany no longer existed, illustrated one of the difficulties faced by the two nation theory. The replacement of 'Deutschland' and 'deutsch' by 'DDR' has been noted above; Fred Oldenburg had thought it likely that the SED would have dropped the 'Deutschland' from its name.73 However, the terms 'German' and 'Germany' have remained, and are shared with the Federal Republic. Since the DDR leadership could hardly claim that the citizens of the Federal Republic were not German, some way had to be found of reconciling this characteristic held in common by the two states with the policy of total demarcation. Kosing argued that nationality, which he defined as shared ethnic factors, could not justify the unity of a socialist and a capitalist nation.

'Die sozialistische Nation in der DDR und die kapitalistische Nation in der BRD unterscheiden sich nicht ihrer ethnischen Charakteristik, ihrer Nationalität nach, sondern ihren sozialen Grundlagen und Inhalten nach, weil es sich um zwei qualitativ verschiedene historische Typen der Nation handelt. Die Nation in der DDR ist die sozialistische deutsche Nation und die Nation in der BRD ist die kapitalistische deutsche Nation. Da sie als Resultat der früheren Geschichte des deutschen Volkes und der deutschen

72. Kosing, p. 176

Kosing then considered the question of national feeling. He claimed that in the capitalist nation the national feeling of the bourgeoisie, composed of national egoism, antipathies and hostility was taken over by the working class and was used by the bourgeoisie as a means of oppressing and manipulating the workers both ideologically and psychologically. An important part of the ideological educational work of the party in the socialist society consisted in bringing the national feeling of the workers in line with their class consciousness and with socialist internationalism, and in overcoming all national prejudices and other remaining elements of petit-bourgeois-nationalistic mentality.

A further important task was the creation of a new socialist national consciousness in the DDR.

'Die gesellschaftliche Grundlage des sozialistischen Nationalbewusstseins in der DDR ist die Formierung und weitere Entwicklung der sozialistischen deutschen Nation in der DDR, die damit verbundene Abgrenzung von der weiter-bestehenden kapitalistischen deutschen Nation in der BRD, die Existenz und Entwicklung der DDR als sozialistischer Nationalstaat sowie die wachsende Zusammenarbeit und Annäherung der sozialistischen Nationen in der sozialistischen Staatengemeinschaft mit der Sowjetunion als Zentrum.' 75

74. Kosing, p. 179.
Kosing continued that these processes would not automatically produce a socialist national consciousness. This required the ideological work of the party, state, education system and mass media. Socialist national consciousness was viewed as an important factor in the ideological strengthening of the DDR society, and in the immunisation of DDR citizens against ideological infiltration. Kosing quoted Western observers, among them Schweigler, who had concluded that an independent national consciousness had developed in the DDR.  

An East German article published in July/August 1978 quoted from a hearing of the intra-German committee of the Bundestag, where it was claimed that more than half of West Germans aged between 19 and 28 regarded the DDR and the Federal Republic as two states and two nations, and, if nothing else occurred, the German question, at least in the Federal Republic, would solve itself. The article claimed that the slogan of the unity of the German nation was being used by the rulers of the Federal Republic to give a pseudo-scientific justification for the attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of the DDR. It was declared that two German nations existed, which were opposed to each other, and that any attempt to revive the national question to sabotage the DDR would be doomed to failure.

76. Schweigler had claimed a 'Meinungstrend in Richtung auf ein eigenstaatliches Nationalbewuβtsein der DDR-Bevölkerung'. Nationalbewuβtsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 104.
The short- and longer-term effectiveness of East German ideological demarcation from the Federal Republic

After the Basic Treaty the DDR leadership was able to record two successes for the demarcation policy, which had strengthened its claims to legitimacy. There was firstly the 'völkerrechtliche Abgrenzung' claimed by Honecker at the IX congress, so important for the SED with its formula of the dialectical unity between domestic and foreign policy. The DDR had become a full member of the international community, having joined the United Nations and having received diplomatic recognition from most Western states. This included de facto diplomatic recognition from the Federal Republic. Although relations between the two states were conducted through permanent representatives rather than through ambassadors, to satisfy West German reservations on the national question, the representatives functioned as ambassadors, as do the high commissioners exchanged between members of the Commonwealth.

Secondly, there was the evidence of a growing national consciousness - Nationalbewußtsein or Nationalstaatsbewußtsein - specific to the DDR. During the Bundestag debate on the Basic Treaty in May 1973, Brandt had declared:

'Nichts spricht zur Zeit dafür, daß der zerbrochen deutsche Nationalstaat in alter form wieder erstehen könnte' 1

This statement might be construed as an admission of nationalstaatliche Abgrenzung. In his speech Brandt referred to Volk and Nation in an all-German context, but it might be argued that the claim that they were united was justified by nothing more than Kosing's definition of nationality, 'die Gemeinsamkeit ethnischer Faktoren'.

Further, from the data quoted by Schweigler and the July/August 1978 edition of Einheit, there were signs that West Germans were beginning to conceive of a separate Federal German nation and state. By doing so, they would demarcate these concepts from the nation and state of the DDR.

However, it remained to be seen what effect upon these changes might be produced by the provisions of the Basic Treaty, which offered greater opportunities for personal contacts between the citizens of the two states. It was possible that increased contacts might check or reverse the growing-apart of the two states. On the other hand, the opposite result might be achieved; East and West Germans meeting after long separation might be alienated by the differing social conditions of the two states. Schweigler argued that support by DDR citizens for their nation state might be increased by contacts which demonstrated that they were different from the West Germans.

2. Kosing, p. 179.
1. Increased contacts between the citizens of the two states

The annual number of West Germans visiting the DDR rose from 1.25 million in 1970 to 3.12 million in 1975, 3.12 million in 1976, and 2.9 million in 1977. Annual totals for West Berliners visiting East Berlin and the DDR were 3.2 million in 1975 and 3.4 million in 1977. For one day visits by West Germans in the border areas of the DDR, the estimated totals were 463,190 in 1975 and 443,000 in 1977. In the reverse direction, the annual figures in millions for DDR pensioners visiting the Federal Republic and West Berlin were 1.04 (1971), 1.25 (1973), 1.33 (1975) and 1.3 (1977). Other than pensioners, the total number of DDR citizens visiting the Federal Republic and West Berlin, chiefly for pressing family reasons, had reached 131,600 by the end of 1975 and 215,000 by the end of 1977.

The annual totals in millions of West Germans and West Berliners who were in transit through the DDR were 7.25 (1969), 7.63 (1971), 10.48 (1972), 13.67 (1973), 14.79 (1975) and 18.0 (1977). Further, the number of East-West telephone calls had reached 12 million annually by 1977, and the number of areas within the DDR which could

5. The data on personal travel and telephone calls between the Federal Republic, West Berlin and the DDR is taken from various editions of the Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung, Bonn. 1977 figures are provisional.
be reached by direct dialling increased steadily. In this respect the official West German view that the telephone and postal traffic played an important role in maintaining and developing the contacts between the populations of the two German states might be noted.  

The DDR appears to have coped fairly efficiently with the large increase in the number of West Germans and West Berliners visiting and passing through East German territory. The effect of this traffic was examined by Honecker at the 13th plenum of December 1974. He argued that the socialist consciousness of DDR citizens had been strengthened under conditions peculiar to the DDR. Every day, every hour bourgeois ideology entered the DDR from West Germany and West Berlin. In connection with the world-wide recognition of the DDR in international law, its frontiers had been opened wide to Western visitors. Honecker did not try to play down the size of the numbers; he appeared to magnify their significance by quoting the total number of visitors since the treaties came into force. He also quoted aggregate totals for DDR visitors to the West, without mentioning that most of them were pensioners.

Honecker continued that these facts had made and would continue to make heavy demands on the political-ideological
work of the party and of the mass organisations. The mass media had an important role to play in stressing the ideas and achievements of the DDR and in fighting bourgeois ideology, by raising the quality of their broadcasts to a high level, in order to strengthen the bonds between the citizens and their socialist state.

The increased numbers of Western visitors to the DDR were accompanied by a rise in the number of East Germans travelling abroad, and by an increase in visitors to the DDR from Eastern Europe, principally as a result of the introduction of visa-free traffic between the DDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Honecker had approved of the growth of tourist traffic as a benefit from the success of peaceful coexistence, and had claimed that the DDR was the country with the greatest traffic in the centre of Europe. Honecker's claim appeared to be justified: The number of visitors to the DDR had reached 16.1 million in 1975, and this did not include the total transit traffic of 14.7 millions for that year. East Germans had been given greater opportunities to travel abroad as part of this traffic growth; the average annual number of visits abroad for the years 1973-1975 was nearly 13 million, with slightly more than five million East Germans visiting Poland annually, with an equivalent figure of about four million visits to Czechoslovakia.

8. This information is quoted from the relevant editions of the Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR, Berlin (East).
10. For traffic data see also Handbuch DDR-Wirtschaft, 1977.
East Germans had been given greater freedom to travel abroad - but mainly to the other socialist countries. From the DDR leadership's viewpoint, this served to further the integration of the DDR into the Eastern bloc. Honecker had declared at the 13th plenum:

'Das hat dazu beigetragen, ein neues, tief im Volk der DDR verwurzeltes Verhältnis der freundschaftlichen Verbundenheit zwischen unseren Völkern zu schaffen. Diese Begegnungen haben für alle Beteiligten große Räume erschlossen und die Annäherung der Völker und ihrer Kulturen gefördert. Für die weitere Entwicklung unserer sozialistischen Gemeinschaft ist dieser Prozeß heute und noch mehr in der Zukunft von wirklich historischer Bedeutung.'

In 1975, out of 16.1 million journeys abroad by East Germans, 10.7 million were to the socialist countries. This left approximately 2.7 million visits to the rest of the world, of which about half were to the Federal Republic or to West Berlin. When it is considered that all but a small percentage of these visits were made by pensioners or those travelling for special family reasons - and the latter group was small enough - the extent to which travel to these destinations was restricted may be understood.

With respect to the first two above-mentioned groups, it might be argued that time was working for the DDR leadership. It was possible that cross-frontier family links might be progressively weakened by separation. Moreover, the percentage of the population born in the DDR with no personal experience of Western Germany was...

increasing. However, the strength of family links was shown by the fact that both Ulbricht and Honecker had kept in touch with relatives in the Federal Republic.

The policy of restricting the numbers of East Germans travelling to the Federal Republic and West Berlin was illustrated by Lindemann and Müller in their history of the cultural exchanges between the two German states.\textsuperscript{12} The example was given for 1970 of 9,300 concerts performed abroad by DDR artists in non-socialist countries, but not a single one in the Federal Republic. Since the Basic Treaty a cautious increase in mutual visits has been noted. These were not regulated by treaty, since agreement in the field of culture, provided for in the Basic Treaty, had still not been achieved by the end of 1977.\textsuperscript{13} Lindemann and Müller concluded from their examination of cultural exchanges between the DDR and non-socialist states, other than the Federal Republic, that the DDR was pursuing a policy of international cultural demarcation, with the aim of presenting a specific East German national culture which differed from that of the Federal Republic.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der DDR, pp. 26-29.

\textsuperscript{13} An annual review of the cultural exchanges between the two German states is given in each edition of the Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung.

\textsuperscript{14} Auswärtige Kulturpolitik der DDR, p. 115.
It is difficult to estimate the effects of increased contacts between the citizens of the two states on the opinions of East Germans, since the results of official surveys conducted within the DDR are not published. Some information was however collected by Gerhard Wettig. He quoted an official survey of spring 1974, which found that most young people in the DDR would emigrate to the Federal Republic given the opportunity. He found dissatisfaction with the régime among younger rather than older citizens, among workers and those close to the SED rather than among members of the former bourgeoisie. These claims would seem to contradict the view that the DDR youth would be less oriented towards the Federal Republic.

Dissatisfaction among party supporters was explained by the prohibition of contacts between DDR officials and West Germans, which was strictly enforced. The prohibition applied to those undergoing or having recently completed military service, and to the personnel of large enterprises. Wettig claimed that these measures produced bitter resentment among those affected. His remarks shed doubt on Honecker's optimistic evaluation at the 13th plenum of the effects on DDR citizens of increased contacts with West Germans and West Berliners.

Wettig could not reveal the sources of his information, since such a move would put his informants at risk. His claims appeared to contradict the data presented by Schweigler and other West German researchers of increasing identification of East Germans with their own state. Wettig had further quoted an official survey of spring 1972 which concluded that four fifths of the DDR population were opposed to the demarcation campaign.\textsuperscript{16} It is argued that both sets of conclusions were accurate, that growing national consciousness - Nationalstaatsbewusstsein rather than Nationalbewusstsein, to use Schweigler's words - was accompanied by demands for closer links with the Federal Republic. This would tend to support the conclusions drawn from Schweigler's data collected at the time of the Erfurt and Kassel meetings, that half the population of the DDR agreed with the proposition that the Federal Republic should recognise the DDR, but only on condition that recognition was accompanied by improvements for the citizens of the two states.\textsuperscript{17} The reluctance of Ulbricht to use the word demarcation, and then only a qualified 'staatliche Abgrenzung' rather than Axen's 'Abgrenzung auf allen Gebieten', and Honecker's retreat from his goal of 'vollständige Abgrenzung', his disavowal of the uncompromising positions of Axen and Norden with his acceptance of a common German nationality

\textsuperscript{16} Dilemmas der SED-Abgrenzungspolitik, p. 4. Hermann Weber claimed difficulties for the DDR leadership in attempting to gain support both for demarcation, and its complement, integration into the socialist camp. Die SED nach Ulbricht, Hannover, 1974, pp. 23-24

\textsuperscript{17} Nationalbewusstsein in der BRD und in der DDR, p. 99.
and of ethnic similarities between East and West Germans, may possibly be considered as realistic reactions to the finding of these surveys. The suggestion of dissent among young people and party supporters must have been particularly worrying for the DDR leadership, and was to pose a problem for the future.

Nevertheless, the immediate problem of increased contacts with West Germans did no appear to have affected the physical security of the state. Perhaps more significant today is that, after the initial increase, the traffic appears to have stabilised, with the exception of transit traffic. This meant that the ideological problems caused by the exposure of East Germans to Western visitors, which Lamberz had raised at the SED conference on agitation of November 1972, had become more manageable; a once and for all effort was required to achieve ideological stabilisation, to accept the higher level of contacts as normal, which was at least an easier task than having to deal with continuously rising numbers. Again, during the period of rapid growth, the DDR leadership had been able to influence the rate of increase by raising or lowering the amount of West German currency which had to be exchanged daily (Mindestumtausch) by the Western visitors.18

18. Official West German sources have claimed that the lowering of the Mindestumtausch in November 1974 had contributed to a rise in the number of West German citizens visiting the DDR. Jahresbericht der Bundesregierung, 1975, p. 447.
ii. Economic pressures on the stability of the DDR

Economic factors played an important role in the ideological demarcation of the DDR from the Federal Republic, since East Germans tended to compare their standard of living unfavourably with that of the Federal Republic. There then existed the danger that they might translate economic dissatisfaction into a questioning of the DDR leadership and its legitimising ideology. Under Honecker, political propaganda in the field of economics had been closely associated with demarcation. Two main themes had been followed, the condemnation of socio-economic developments in the Federal Republic, and the promise of improved living standards. An examination of Neues Deutschland in 1971 shows that before Honecker assumed the leadership of the SED the Federal Republic was condemned for its militarism and revenge-seeking, but after this time the criticisms changed notably to describe the Federal Republic as a society with no future. Ulbricht had stressed the importance of economic rewards - to further remunerative power as a support for legitimation - with his 'Prinzip der materiellen Interessiertheit'. Honecker had used the slogan 'alles zum Wohle des Menschen'. The phrase 'leistungsorientierte Lohnpolitik was used at the IX congress, and, as though

placing economic efficiency before ideology, the contribution of private tradesmen in the provision of services was spoken of with approval. Joachim Navrocki quoted from a Neues Deutschland article of June 1971 which appeared to confirm this tendency:

'Die Bedürfnisse des Menschen, das sind erstens materielle Bedürfnisse; ...es sind zweitens geistig-kulturelle Bedürfnisse.' 21

The DDR leadership was successful in maintaining relative economic stability through the changes of 1970-1973; despite difficulties through increased prices for raw materials and an uncertain long-term economic future, the increase in gross national product over the years 1963-1974 remained steady within the 4%-6% band. The improvements in living standards promised at the VIII congress led to a considerable rise in purchasing power, especially in the years 1974 and 1975. However, between 1967 and 1974 the DDR did not succeed in noticeably closing the gap between its own per capita gross national product and that of the Federal Republic, although a more favourable result was obtained in 1975 due to a temporary slump in the Federal Republic. 23

Furthermore, it remained to be seen whether the rising living standards of East German citizens could be maintained, in view of external factors. In the 1970s the international terms of trade worsened for the DDR. It has been estimated that by 1976 the DDR had an unfavourable balance of trade with the Federal Republic of DM2.6 billions. For mid-1976, the total foreign currency debt, including the debt with the Federal Republic was estimated to be US$3.5 billions. It is not possible to give accurate figures, since the DDR does not publish data on its foreign currency balance. Complications have arisen because de facto the DDR uses three currencies. The Mark der DDR circulates only within the country: At the tourist rate of exchange it it has the same value as the West German Mark, but unofficially (and as quoted in West German banks) its rate fluctuated at about 3–4 East German Marks for 1 West German Mark. Although the exchange rate was not necessarily an accurate reflection of the respective purchasing power of the two currencies, being based on supply and demand in the free market, it had the propaganda value of suggesting that the one Mark was 'good' and the other 'bad'. Trade with the Federal Republic was conducted in units of account (Verrechnungseinheiten), and the unit of account was for all practical purposes the same as the West German Mark. For other international trade the Valuta-Mark was employed, which in 1976 equalled DM0.72.24

The DDR leadership appeared to have sacrificed ideological for economic considerations in the area of trade between the two German states. This has expanded, whereas one possible interpretation of total demarcation would have suggested that it should be minimised. However, the economic advantages it brought to the DDR were considerable. The tariff benefits gained by de facto membership of the European Economic Community have been mentioned above. In addition, trade with the Federal Republic permitted the DDR to take advantage of advanced Western technology. Again, the DDR, which was short of foreign currency, enjoyed interest-free credit from the Federal government to cover its deficit in intra-German trade. It was notable that the DDR leadership had always appeared to keep trade between the two German states out of the area of political controversy. In 1970 at the 13th plenum Stoph had condemned the Federal Republic for allegedly following policies which had damaged the DDR economically, but he continued:

Wenn nun mitunter durch gezielte Veröffentlichungen und Äußerungen der Eindruck erweckt werden soll, die DDR ziehe aus der Lage im Außenhandel mit der BRD irgendwelche besonderen Vorteile, so hat das mit den Tatsachen nichts zu tun.

However, Ludz claimed that the special nature of intra-German trade had been recognised in the Basic Treaty - where article 10 had declared that existing treaties and

25. Peter Christian Ludz considered the advantages and disadvantages of intra-German trade for the DDR. Die DDR zwischen Ost und West, Munich, 1977, pp. 314-316.

agreements were not affected by the Basic Treaty - and that Honecker had openly admitted the special status of the trade in an interview of November 22nd, 1972. On that occasion Honecker had said that trade would continue as before, but that this was at the wish of the Federal Republic.

Certain difficulties were caused by the relationship between the West German Mark and the Mark der DDR. On the one hand the DDR claimed that the two currencies were equal in value, but on the other hand the free market rate mentioned above and the black market rate within the DDR suggested that this was not so. The DDR could not ban the use of West German marks within its territory. It demanded payment for certain services in West German currency, which was a useful source of much-needed foreign exchange. Der Spiegel estimated that the DDR made an annual gain of DM1.5 billion in such areas as the sale of visas and road usage fees. The situation under which certain services within the DDR could only be paid for in West German Marks was a limitation of the purchasing power of the Mark der DDR, and led to what Hartmut Zimmermann called 'serious socio-Psychological consequences'. Because of its need for freely-convertable

27. Die DDR zwischen Ost und West, p. 313.
currency, Intershops were introduced in the DDR, selling high-quality goods only in exchange for hard currency. In 1973 the East German government passed a law permitting DDR citizens to accept gifts of up to DM500, which could be spent in the Intershops. In the following year a further law was passed in an attempt to protect the Mark der DDR by stopping the illegal movement of foreign currency into the DDR.31

Two particular problems arose: Zimmermann claimed the growth of friction between those DDR citizens with access to West German currency and those without, especially party and state functionaries for whom contact with West Germans was forbidden. The second problem was potentially more serious: The West German Mark has begun to circulate generally as a second currency, as a means of obtaining services and goods in short supply in the DDR.

Some echoes of this problem appeared in a Neues Deutschland article of August 1978.32 The article quoted Bild-Zeitung, which had claimed that West Berliners crossing over to East Berlin for the day found large numbers of East Berlin women who were prepared to engage in prostitution for West German currency, which they could then spend in the


Intershops. It was further claimed in Bild-Zeitung that West Berliners recrossing the border after the permitted time could escape with a fine, which naturally had to be paid in West German marks. Neues Deutschland did not attempt to refute these claims, but declared that they were an insult to the women of East Berlin, and continued that it ought to be considered whether stricter control over freely-convertible currency should not be introduced, and whether only foreigners should be allowed to use the Intershops. It was true that Western goods could also be bought in East German currency. In 1975 I saw scotch whisky on sale in an ordinary East German supermarket - at 80 East German marks a bottle. The difference between Intershop and ordinary prices for the same article underlined the difference which the government itself saw in the real value of the two currencies. Der Spiegel claimed that the rumours that East German citizens would no longer be permitted to hold Western currency and to use the Intershops had led to a 20% increase in turnover in the Intershops. However, as with the case of personal contacts with West Germans, it appeared that the DDR would be powerless to stop the circulation of West German marks within the DDR - the best it could do was to introduce strict controls and to attempt to divert as much of this money as possible into the state treasury.

iii. The growth of internal opposition to the DDR leadership

An examination of the view of perhaps the three most well-known recent critics of the régime, Havemann, Biermann and Bahro, would suggest at least the partial success of officially-promoted ideological socialistation, since all three claim to be communists, and to criticise the leadership's policies from a Marxist viewpoint. Their opinions might also be taken as evidence of the success of ideological demarcation from the Federal Republic, since none of them has suggested an alternative social democratic of capitalist model; they do not recommend that West German experience should be followed.

All three wished for greater personal freedom within a socialist society, and they had supported the Dubček experiment of 1968. However, since these demands could only be satisfied by dismantling the centralised party control, they represented a direct threat to the SED apparatus and leadership. They remained uncompromising, and refused to accept the role of institutionalised revisionists. Having replaced Stalinist terror by socialist legality, the DDR leadership found it impossible to contain the crisis, and responded by depriving Havemann of party membership and employment, and subjecting him to close surveillance, by expelling Biermann from the DDR and depriving him of DDR citizenship, and by arresting Bahro on the charge of espionage.
In his autobiography Havemann attacked what he called the modern Stalinism of DDR society, with its centralised structure through which everything was decreed from above. To replace this system, he demanded four freedoms, (1) freedom of speech, to include freedom of access to the media, (2) freedom of information, (3) freedom to decide where to live, the right to decide whether to work and what work to do, and (4) freedom to form organisations and parties. He also condemned what he viewed as the empty consumerism of 'stalinistischer Gulaschkommunismus', and thereby attacked the policies of both Ulbricht and especially Honecker, which aimed to gain support through the achievement of rising standards of living for DDR citizens.

From this it is argued that Havemann was advocating the abandonment of the leading role of the party. It was perhaps significant that he described himself as a German Marxist, rather than Marxist-Leninist, in the secondary title of his autobiography. In declaring that the DDR after the XX congress of the CPSU was a neo-Stalinist party, he was in fact attacking Leninism, since the model of the centrally organised, strictly disciplined elite party had been developed by Lenin under the peculiar conditions of the final decades of Tsarist Russia. Given the insecurity

of the DDR leadership, and its memories of what happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the sanctions taken against Havemann would seem relatively mild under East German conditions, since he still finds it possible to give interviews to Western journalists. He may have been spared imprisonment as a life-long communist with an unquestionable anti-Nazi record — he was held in the same prison of Brandenburg-Görden as Honecker — and because of his close acquaintance with some of the present Politbüro members.

In this respect Ludz had noted the importance of Havemann in the KPD and subsequent SED, and compared his fate with that of another critic of official ideology, Rudolf Harich, who was imprisoned by Ulbricht.37 Lutz declared that the difference between Harich and Havemann was that the former had tried to influence the party line with the help of forces standing outside the party, such as the SPD, whereas Havemann sought to revitalise the party, dialectical materialism and the policies of the SED from the inside.38

Radical changes were also advocated by Rudof Bahro — but in a much sharper and more precise form. Whereas Havemann had attacked the generalised target of Stalinism, which had already been partly discredited at the XX congress of the

CPSU, Bahro's critique was aimed at 'real existierender Sozialismus', which was the secondary title of his book. It was also the key term used by Honecker to describe the contemporary society of the DDR. Bahro described the SED leadership as a 'politbürokratische Diktatur'. Echoing Kautsky, he declared:


Bahro saw a rapid decay in the significance of ideology, 'seit der militärischen Polizeiaktion vom August 1968'. He argued that the party apparatus, as the nucleus of state power, was a 'säkularisierter Gottesstaat'. The party had to regain ideological hegemony, to replace the 'Überstaatsapparat' by a 'kollektiver Intellektueller'.

Like Havemann, he condemned consumerist communism, but he went further. The growth-oriented economy of the DDR was declared to possess a 'kapitalismustypische Dynamik', which in a historically short period would become econom-


ically, politically and psychologically untenable. Bahro condemned consumerism, not only for its ideological emptiness, but also for ecological reasons - he was against the principle of growth.

Bahro defined his alternative as 'allgemeine Emanzipation':

'Die allgemeine Emanzipation ist ... die Befreiung der Individuen von allen sozial bedingten Entwicklungsschranken, die ihren Ausschluß von der Mitbestimmung über die allgemeinen Angelegenheiten, von der bewußten Verursachung gesellschaftlicher Veränderungen zu Folge haben mußten.'

Here it was clear that the conditions of general emancipation went far beyond the provision of material means in the narrower sense. The whole system of rapid growth (erweiterte Reproduktion) would become untenable. Resources were being consumed, Bahro claimed, which other peoples and future generations would need to maintain life. He called for a new cultural revolution:

'Die sogenannte, wissenschaftlich-technische Revolution, die jetzt noch überwiegend in dieser gefährlichen Perspektive vorantreibt, muß von einer neuen gesellschaftlichen Umwälzung her umprogrammiert werden. Die Idee des Fortschritts überhaupt muß radikal anders interpretiert werden, als wir es gewöhnt sind.'

Bahro continued that the overcoming of subjection (Subalternität) was the only alternative to the unbounded expansion of material needs. This required a redistribution of work, the end of piece work, the education of everyone to


43. Ibid, p. 311
the same level, and personal communication within small groups.

Bahro went even further by directly condemning the USSR:

"Mein Buch ist eine Kritik des real existierenden Sozialismus. Und dessen Wurzeln, dessen Geschichte, dessen Struktur kann man nur begreifen, wenn man über die Sowjetunion geht, wenn man den Weg Rußlands - ich nenne das von der agrarischen zur industriellen Despotie - versteht, das heißt also: nicht einfach denunziert, sondern in seinem Wesen, in seiner Notwendigkeit auch begreift und von dort dann neue Perspektiven aufzeichnet."

This heresy was delivered on West German television for most of the citizens of the DDR to see and hear. The interviewer had suggested to Bahro that he was a heretic. Bahro replied:

"Ketzer - wir können ja diesen Begriff ruhig einmal beim Wort nehmen. Die Reformation, wenn man so will, also im ausgehenden Mittelalter, hat ja ihre Adressaten längst, bevor sie dann mit Luther endgültig zum Durchbruch kam, schon in den Kreisen gerade, die der Kirche durchaus nahe standen, in Theologiekreisen, in Mönchskreisen, in Kreisen engagierter christlicher Laie, gehabt. Und wenn ich an unsere Verhältnisse hier denke: Wir haben in der Tschechoslowakei doch 1968 gesehen, wie viele Kommunisten, die in der KPC organisiert waren, in Wirklichkeit auf ganz anderen Positionen standen, als sie partei-offiziell zum Ausdruck bringen mußten. Ich würde ganz entschieden sagen: es denkt in der DDR. Hier sind zahllose Leute, die mit dem Marxismus einigermaßen vertraut sind, natürlich längst auf ähnliche Gedanken gekommen wie ich. ...die Problemstellungen, die ich aufwerfe, die stehen in zahllosen Köpfen in der DDR auf der Tagesordnung."


45. Ibid, p. 98.
iv. The emergence of mass dissent in the DDR

When dealing with critics of the régime the DDR leadership could use sanctions against individuals, as long as such activity was confined to a small minority of intellectuals. This would however no longer be possible if such ideas were to gain mass support, and Bahro's phrase 'es denkt in der DDR' had raised such a possibility.

A foretaste of such problems for the leadership was shown by the widespread objection in the DDR and elsewhere to the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia. Further difficulties appeared likely with the section dealing with human rights contained in Basket III of the Helsinki Agreement of 1975, which had been fully supported by the DDR as part of its campaign for international recognition. The official East German interpretation of human rights was subsequently developed:

'Menschenrechte werden erst dort zur vollen Wirklichkeit, wo die werktätigen Menschen in der Tat die Macht haben, ihr Recht selbst zu bestimmen und wahr zu nehmen. Es gibt kein anderes Beispiel dafür, daß all diese Voraussetzungen von der Theorie zur Praxis wurden, als den

46. Havemann claimed 'leidenschaftliche Empörung' in the socialist countries after the intervention. Fragen Antworten Fragen, pp. 256-271. Havemann's son was imprisoned for 18 months for painting pro-Dubček slogans in East Berlin.

47. The text was printed in full in Neues Deutschland, 2/3 August, 1975. See particularly pp. 8-10, headed 'Zusammenarbeit in humanitären und anderen Bereichen.'
realen Sozialismus. Und es ist unumstößlich historische Wahrheit, daß die Geburtsstunde dieses realen Sozialismus im Oktober 1917 in Rußland geschlagen hat.' 48

Just as classic socialist theoreticians, from Babeuf, Marx, Lenin onwards had argued that true democracy depended on economic equality, so it was claimed that true human rights could only exist under socialism.

East German sensitivity on the human rights issue could be seen from a statement made by Honecker:

'Verleumdung unserer Bürger und ihrer Regierung, Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der DDR, deren sich bestimmte Korrespondenten schuldig gemacht haben, werden wir auch künftig nicht hinnehmen. Wir sind für eine normale, objektive und sachliche Berichterstattung und lehnen selbstverständlich Kritik nicht ab. Wir erwarten von journalistischen Vertretern des Kapitalismus gewiß nicht, daß sie sich auf den sozialistischen Standpunkt stellen. Unterschiedliche Auffassungen sind also vorausgesetzt. Aber die Schlußakte von Helsinki, die den Interessen des Friedens Ausdruck gibt, muß geachtet werden. Dort heißt es, daß die Zusammenarbeit unter voller Achtung der die Beziehungen zwischen den Teilnehmerstaaten leitenden Prinzipien durchgeführt werden sollte. Eines dieser Prinzipien ist unabdingbar die Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten eines anderen Staates.' 49

Here Honecker had raised the question of West German journalists in the DDR. They represented a danger to the official ideology not only for what they reported, but also because their reports - such as the ARD interview with Bahro - could be received by East Germans. In connection


49. Honecker in interview with Saarbrücker Zeitung on 19/20 February, 1977. Quoted from Bürgerrechte '77, pp. 53-54.
with the Basic Treaty, the two German states had agreed to exchange correspondants, and West German reporters were granted wide facilities to work in the DDR.\textsuperscript{50} Lothar Loewe, in a somewhat over-dramatised account of his experiences as the first reporter for the West German television service ARD, declared that the agreement sounded like a Magna Charta for journalistic activity in the DDR.\textsuperscript{51} Given the excessive preoccupation with internal security characteristic of all Marxist-Leninist states, it was perhaps inevitable that difficulties arose in the interpretation of these rights. Loewe described these as the tight supervision of his activities by the DDR foreign ministry, and the DDR Journalistenverordnung of February 1973, particularly paragraph 5, which required the correspondants 'wahrheitsgetreu, sachbezogen und korrekt zu berichten sowie keine böswillige Verfälschung von Tatsachen zuzulassen.'\textsuperscript{52} Loewe was expelled from the DDR on December 22nd, 1976:

'...wegen gröbster Diffamierung des Volkes und der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, wegen schweren Verstoßes gegen die Rechtsordnung der DDR, gegen die »Verordnung über die Tätigkeit von Publikationsorganen anderer Staaten und deren Korrespondenten in der DDR« vom 21.2.1973 und wegen grober Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten der DDR...'\textsuperscript{53}

This was to be the first of several expulsions of West German journalists from the DDR.

\textsuperscript{50} Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol.11, pp. 294-300.

\textsuperscript{51} Abends kommt der Klassenfeind, p. 22

\textsuperscript{52} Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik, Vol. 12, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{53} Loewe reproduced the text of his expulsion order on page 137 of his book.
It might be argued that Loewe should have proceeded more cautiously, that he should have been more aware of the fact that he would have been carefully observed as the first accredited West German television reporter in the DDR. But, as Loewe himself wrote, he was not a diplomat, it was his duty to ask questions. His activities fulfilled the useful function of testing the system to its limits. I find the fact that he was able to accomplish so much more significant than the restrictions and harassment to which he was subjected. His dinner table conversations with Erich Honecker and Werner Lamberz, and the latter giving him his telephone number at the central committee building, his impromptu interviews with Margot Honecker and other delegates in the capacity of an invited Western reporter to the IX congress of May 1976 would have appeared unbelievable a few years earlier.

Loewe's account of his work within the DDR shown that the introduction of accredited West German journalists into the DDR had broken the SED's monopoly of the internal media. East Germans had always been able to learn of not only international events but also of events within their own state from West German television. Now West German camera teams could film actual events within the DDR, transmit the film unhindered to the Federal Republic, where it could be very rapidly shown on television programmes which could be seen by 80% of East German citizens.
In this way it is suggested that the West German television services had become of truly all-German significance. Loewe recounted how he had received all kinds of anonymous detailed information, and this had only become possible because he was stationed in East Berlin. This meant that if the internal censorship were to suppress reports of, say, an influenza epidemic, such action would increase the tendency of East Germans to watch West German television. However, internal ideological security could now be broken by West German television reports on such sensitive subjects as human rights. It is suggested that these reports played an important role in the development of mass opposition by offering an alternative communications network within the DDR, by demonstrating to the individual or individual group opposed to the leadership's policy on any given issue that they were not alone, but part of a wider movement.

The undesirable effects of this change, from the viewpoint of the DDR leadership, was illustrated by Loewe's experience, when a planned interview with Havemann was stopped by the Volkspolizei blocking the street where Havemann lived - and the altercation with the police was filmed and shown on television for most East Germans to see.54

A further example related by Loewe, perhaps even more

unwelcome, was the case of a doctor in Riesa, Bezirk Dresden, who accused the DDR authorities of violating his human rights by not answering 52 official requests he had made to settle in the Federal Republic. 66 East German citizens had joined with him in signing a petition requesting permission to emigrate, citing the general declaration on human rights, the final act of the Helsinki conference, and the DDR constitution. He was arrested, and his wife was forbidden to give any television interviews to Western journalists. However, in accord with the regulations covering foreign journalists in the DDR, Loewe was permitted to film in Riesa. On September 11th, 1976, 13 policemen and women stood in front of the doctor's wife's house, but hid when Loewe's team began filming. He explained to the doctor's wife why he had decided not to interview her. Then the neighbours appeared and offered to be interviewed, explaining why they were dissatisfied with life in the DDR and why they wished to go to the Federal Republic. When this report was shown on West German television, it produced many requests about the doctor and his case from DDR citizens. This incident showed that East Germans were no longer afraid to speak their mind to Western correspondants, and it demonstrated this fact to most of the population of the DDR.

Evidence of widespread disapproval of some of the policies of the DDR leadership, both among intellectuals and the rest of the population, was shown by the reactions to the Biermann affair. Biermann suffered expulsion from the DDR and loss of DDR citizenship (Ausbürgerung), after he had performed at a concert in Cologne, singing songs which the leadership considered defamatory. The expulsion order was published on November 16th, 1976 in Neues Deutschland. In an accompanying article signed Dr. K. ( Günther Kerzscher), it was declared of Biermann:

'Er befindet sich in der Front derer, die ihre Hetzkampagne, ihre psychologische Kriegführung gegen die DDR wieder auf eine Höhe getrieben haben, die hinter der Zeit des kalten Krieges kaum noch zurücksteht. In dieser Front ist er einer unter vielen, ganz konform und kaum zu unterscheiden. Er verschwindet in der dunklen Masse der antikommunistischen Krakeeler.'

Kerzscher justified the expulsion by claiming that citizenship required loyalty (Treuepflicht) to the state. Coming from the Federal Republic, Biermann had been granted DDR citizenship, but through his own fault, through his hostility to the DDR, had lost it again. Here Kerzscher appeared to be implying a demarcation between DDR and West German citizenship, although the latter applies to all Germans, so that most DDR citizens would automatically enjoy full civil rights on entering the Federal Republic.

56. The Biermann case was documented in Deutschland Archiv, 1977/1, pp. 69-105. See also Manfred Jäger: Das Ende einer Kulturpolitik. Die Falle Kunze und Biermann, Deutschland Archiv, 1976/12, pp. 1233-1239.


58. See the preamble and Article 116 of the Basic Law.
The news of Biermann's expulsion and deprivation of DDR citizenship provoked an open letter from within the DDR dated November 17th, which, while not agreeing with all of Biermann's behaviour, and disassociating itself from the attempts to misuse the affair against the DDR, protested against the expulsion order and requested the case to be reconsidered. The expulsion was criticised in unequivocal terms:

'Unser sozialistischer Staat, eingedenk des Wortes aus Marxens »18 Brumaire«, demzufolge die proletarische Revolution sich unablässig ständig kritisiert, müßte im Gegensatz zu anachronistischen Gesellschaftsformen eine solche Unbequemlichkeit gelassen nachdenken ertragen können.'

The letter was signed by 12 prominent DDR artists, five of whom were executive members of the DDR writers' union. The letter was supported by nearly one hundred DDR artists between November 17th and 21st. Furthermore, the Biermann concert was publicised throughout the DDR when it was broadcast on West German television on November 19th.

In accord with the principles of socialist realism and the 'Bitterfelder Weg', the artist had always been considered to play an important role in supporting the policies of the leadership. A greater percentage of the population than would have been the case in the West had been officially

59. The letter was published in the West German newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau on 23rd November, 1976.

60. For an East German interpretation of socialist realism and the 'Bitterfelder Weg' see Kulturpolitisches Wörterbuch, Berlin (East), 1970.
encouraged to take an interest in the arts. Moreover, in a society where the internal media were censored, the arts were a means of transmitting ideas, often allegorically, and were regarded in that light by the general population. Never before had such a high level of dissent been found among DDR artists, who were supposed to function as an extension of the party. The significance of this protest was considered unique by Havemann, who declared:

'Bisher haben wir niemals solch eine Solidarität mit einem Menschen, dem Unrecht getan worden ist, erlebt in einem solchen Umfang. Es ist ein Politikum ersten Ranges... Entscheidend ist, daß die SED von der Methode der Einschüchterung nun absehen muß und versuchen muß, gewissermaßen sich mit den gleichen Waffen zu verteidigen, mit denen sie angegriffen wurde.'

The West German commentator Erik Nohara described the reaction to Biermann's Ausbürgung as a new development which was all the more threatening to the DDR leadership, since the artists who had signed the letter of protest were almost exclusively well known outside of the DDR, and in the past had enjoyed official approval and reward as representatives of DDR culture. The DDR leadership reacted to the protest by mobilising other writers in support of the expulsion, by obtaining the partial retraction of some of the signatories, and through sanctions, which included a number of arrests, but still published some of the works

61. Zimmermann: The GDR in the 1970s, p. 30
of the signatories. The uncertain reaction of the leadership to the protesters was described by Harald Keinschmid as a 'Kulturpolitik der Widersprüche'.

At the beginning of 1978 Der Spiegel published a document entitled 'Manifest der Opposition', which condemned the single-party dictatorship, the dictatorship of the proletariat, democratic centralism, advocating party pluralism, an independent parliament and cooperation with non-Marxist-Leninist parties, including the West German social democrats. The document approved of some aspects of Maoism and euro-communism. The DDR authorities reacted sharply by closing the Spiegel offices in East Berlin. However, the authenticity of the document is questionable, partly because of the terminology in which it was written. It differs from the style of Havemann or Bahro, but this may be the result of compromise caused by the presence of non-Marxists among the group. Secondly, the authors of the document are unnamed, and there is a long tradition of Marxist polemics in which one or two persons have claimed to represent a non-existent opposition movement. Thus there is no way of knowing how large the organisation of the protesters may be. Nevertheless, such an organisation could come into being as a result of publicity through the West German media, and

64. Deutschland Archiv, 1977/6, p. 566ff.
67. Peter Bender considered the authenticity of the document in Deutschland Archiv, 1978/2, pp. 113-116.
this was perhaps the main reason for the closure of the Spiegel offices.

I would suggest that the original aim of ideological demarcation as a defence mechanism has been relatively successful, in view of the evidence that East and West Germans are increasingly identifying with their respective states. For the DDR leadership demarcation is still necessary, but in a form similar to that practised by the leaderships of the other Warsaw Treaty member states, against negative ideological influences which affect them all. For the DDR leadership the main threat is no longer affect for a united Germany, but the ideas of the Czech experiment of 1968 and of eurocommunism, which call the leading role of the party into question. The SED must accept the unwelcome fact that internal criticism cannot be silenced by intimidation; Bahro's example may be followed, and most of the artists who supported Biermann have not retracted their views. Again, the extent to which the DDR leadership can condemn eurocommunism is limited, since this is the policy of Western communist parties with which the SED is theoretically allied. I would claim that the only possibility for the SED is to accept the need for greater tolerance towards dissident groups; the possibility for compromise already exists, for the Biermann supporters declared that they did not wish to damage the DDR, and Bahro had expressed the hope that his actions would not be taken advantage of
by such West German politicians as Franz-Josef Strauß. It is to be hoped that the DDR leadership has learned from recent Eastern European history. Severe persecution of internal opposition might prove dysfunctional, and lead to a situation similar to that of contemporary Czechoslovakia, where ten years after the intervention a war is being waged between the party and the majority of the population. On the other hand, Kádár and Gierek, who came to power after upheavals in Hungary and Poland, have succeeded in regaining the support lost by their predecessors. The sophistication and skill of the DDR leadership would suggest that they would prefer this alternative. There remain two factors against this: Firstly, the Soviet Union would be nervous of any so-called liberalisation, in view of the strategic position of the DDR. Secondly, one measure undertaken by Kádár and Gierek, the granting of permission to visit the West, would cause difficulties for the DDR leadership, since the attraction of West Germany still remains, and the 1974 survey suggested that 80% of East German youth would like to emigrate to the Federal Republic. But the general permission to travel to the Federal Republic is the ultimate test of ideological demarcation; a situation must be created through improved living standards and greater personal liberties where any emigration loss could be tolerated, and might even be balanced by immigration from the Federal Republic.

68. Rudolf Bahro: Eine Dokumentation, pp. 98-99
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In attempting to construct a bibliography of the literature of a Marxist-Leninist state, it is difficult to draw the line between primary and secondary material, since, where the media are state-controlled, commentators tend to function as civil servants given the task of explaining and popularising the official viewpoint. This problem has been considered by Brian Hunter in the introduction to his book: Soviet-Jugoslav relations, 1948-1972: a Bibliography, London-New York, 1976. The bibliography is divided into Eastern and Western sources, according to place of publication. Thus internal critics of the East German régime, if published in the West, appear under Western sources. A further difficulty arises from the tendency in Eastern Europe for books to be written by a team, and here the books are referred to by title. Where an author is named, his works are presented chronologically.

The following abbreviations for frequently quoted sources are employed:

da. - Deutschland Archiv
dauß. - Deutsche Außenpolitik
ein. - Einheit
nd. - Neues Deutschland
n.w. - Neuer Weg
päd. - Pädagogik
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