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Evolutionary Games and Matching Rules

Jensen, Martin Kaae and Rigos, Alexandros (2018) Evolutionary Games and Matching Rules International Journal of Game Theory, 47 (3). pp. 707-735.

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This study considers evolutionary games with non-uniformly random matching when interaction occurs in groups of n ≥ 2 individuals using pure strategies from a finite strategy set. In such models, groups with different compositions of individuals generally co-exist and the reproductive success (fitness) of a specific strategy varies with the frequencies of different group types. These frequencies crucially depend on the matching process. For arbitrary matching processes (called matching rules), we study Nash equilibrium and ESS in the associated population game and show that several results that are known to hold for population games under uniform random matching carry through to our setting. In our most novel contribution, we derive results on the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of population games and show that for any (fixed) payoff structure, there always exists some matching rule leading to average fitness maximization. Finally, we provide a series of applications to commonly studied normal-form games.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
Jensen, Martin
Rigos, Alexandros
Date : 11 June 2018
DOI : 10.1007/s00182-018-0630-1
Copyright Disclaimer : This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Depositing User : Clive Harris
Date Deposited : 04 May 2018 07:42
Last Modified : 31 Oct 2018 16:57

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