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Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism and Interpretation

Patterson, Dennis (2018) Theoretical Disagreement, Legal Positivism and Interpretation Ratio Juris, 31 (3). pp. 260-275.

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Ronald Dworkin famously argued that legal positivism is a defective account of law because it has no account of Theoretical Disagreement. In this article I argue that legal positivism—as advanced by H.L.A. Hart—does not need an account of Theoretical Disagreement. Legal positivism does, however, need a plausible account of interpretation in law. I provide such an account in this article.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Law
Authors :
Date : September 2018
DOI : 10.1111/raju.12216
Copyright Disclaimer : © 2018 The Authors Ratio Juris published by University of Bologna and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Depositing User : Melanie Hughes
Date Deposited : 06 Apr 2018 08:34
Last Modified : 08 Aug 2019 15:02

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