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A contest success function for networks

Bozbay, Irem and Vesperoni, A (2018) A contest success function for networks Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 150. pp. 404-422.

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Abstract

This paper models conflict as a contest within a network of friendships and enmities. We assume that each player is either in a friendly or in an antagonistic relation with every other player and players compete for winning by exerting costly efforts. We axiomatically characterize a success function which determines the win probability of each player given the efforts and the network of relations. In an extension, we allow for varying intensities of friendships and enmities. This framework allows for the study of strategic incentives and friendship formation under conflict as well as the application of stability concepts of network theory to contests.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Bozbay, Iremi.bozbay@surrey.ac.uk
Vesperoni, A
Date : 31 January 2018
Identification Number : 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.01.022
Copyright Disclaimer : © 2018. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Uncontrolled Keywords : con ict, contest, success function, network, pairwise stability
Depositing User : Melanie Hughes
Date Deposited : 26 Jan 2018 10:36
Last Modified : 24 May 2018 12:53
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/845697

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