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Online/Offline Public-Index Predicate Encryption for Fine-Grained Mobile Access Control

Liu, Weiran, Liu, Jianwei, Wu, Qianhong, Qin, Bo, Liang, Kaitai and Meadows, C. (2016) Online/Offline Public-Index Predicate Encryption for Fine-Grained Mobile Access Control In: European Symposium on Research in Computer Security ESORICS 2016: Computer Security – ESORICS 2016, September 26-30, 2016,, Heraklion, Greece.

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Abstract

Public-Index Predicate Encryption (PIPE) allows users to encrypt according to boolean predicates defined on arbitrary attributes. The expensive algebraic operations are the major efficiency obstacle for PIPE to be applied to mobile clouds. This paper proposes a general Online/Offline PIPE (OO-PIPE) framework to address this issue. First, we propose a generic transformation from a Large Universe PIPE (LU-PIPE) secure against chosen plaintext attack (CPA) to OO-PIPE in the same security model. The challenge is to generate ciphertext without the knowledge of the associated ciphertext attributes in the offline phase. We address the challenge by identifying an interesting attribute-malleability property in many LU-PIPE schemes. The property allows an encryptor to efficiently malleate a ciphertext associated with one ciphertext attribute to any assigned ciphertext attribute. Second, we design a generic transformation from CPA-secure LU-PIPE to OO-PIPE secure against adaptively chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2), assuming the underlying LU-PIPE has attribute-malleability and public-verifiability properties. The main obstacle here is that the online/offline mechanism endogenously implies forgery in the sense that a pre-computed ciphertext must be able to be efficiently malleated to the resulting ciphertext associated with a different ciphertext attribute and a plaintext, while any efficient valid ciphertext forgery is forbidden in CCA2 security. We circumvent this obstacle by employing a universally collision resistant Chameleon hash, namely, only the original encryptor can malleate the ciphertext to associate with different attributes and provide a hash collision of the ciphertext components.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Conference Paper)
Divisions : Faculty of Engineering and Physical Sciences > Computing Science
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Liu, WeiranUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Liu, JianweiUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Wu, QianhongUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Qin, BoUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Liang, Kaitaik.liang@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Meadows, C.UNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : 15 September 2016
Identification Number : 10.1007/978-3-319-45741-3_30
Copyright Disclaimer : © 2017 Springer International Publishing AG. Part of Springer Nature.
Additional Information : Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series
Depositing User : Karen Garland
Date Deposited : 09 Nov 2017 11:59
Last Modified : 09 Nov 2017 11:59
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/844870

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