Quality of Service and the Policing Function: A view from the top

Ian Waters

Thesis submitted for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Surrey

1996
Summary

This thesis focuses on the origins and development of the Quality of Service (QOS) initiative in the Police Service of England and Wales. Interlinked with the analysis of that initiative is an assessment of the police reforms which were introduced by government from 1993 onward. It is argued that the QOS initiative has become increasingly embroiled in the politics of police reform, and that the 'consumerist' dimension of quality has taken precedence over what might be termed a public sector 'professional' model. It is concluded that the centralisation of policing continues apace, and that this is inevitable given the need for the central state to augment its monitoring and surveillance capabilities. The empirical research itself entailed well over 100 interviews with senior staff in the policing environment, as well as a survey of Chief Inspectors and Superintendents in three participating forces.

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Acknowledgements

Naturally, a PhD cannot be completed in the absence of assistance and encouragement of others, and I shall take this opportunity to thank those who have helped me in this current venture.

Firstly, warmest thanks are extended to my family (especially my wife Deborah) who have had to endure the lengthy retreats to my study since 1992. Phoebe and Amelia have passed through their earliest years understanding that I would need to lock myself away in splendid isolation. Weekend after weekend, Deborah has risen valiantly to the challenge of entertaining and caring for two young children.

Naturally, I wish to thank Nigel Fielding for agreeing in the first place to be my PhD supervisor, and for all his academic acumen and painstaking reading of the thesis. It would be very difficult to secure a more astute and competent supervisor. Similarly, it would be an unrealistic task to obtain a more worthy external examiner than Robert Reiner, and I would like to express my gratitude to him.

I must, of course, thank all the respondents who so willingly and generously agreed to take part in the research, as well as John Hoddinott and Mike Mylod who, respectively, were Chief Constable and Deputy Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary at the time of the research. It was Jennifer Brown who allowed me so much time during my post with Hampshire Constabulary to successfully conduct the data collection, and once again I extend my sincerest thanks to such a supportive manager and close colleague.

Finally, I wish to thank all those in Hampshire Constabulary and Nottingham Trent University who have stoically typed up the innumerable versions of the thesis, and in this respect I am most indebted to Sandra Odell, whose speed and accuracy has made the difficult task of editing and re-editing more bearable!
## Contents

1. **History, theory and analysis**  
   1.1 Introduction  
   1.2 The theoretical landscape  
   1.3 Methodological summary  
   1.4 Outline of the thesis

2. **The Agenda of Reform**  
   2.1 Introduction  
   2.2 The New Right imperative and the public sector reform agenda  
   2.3 Responding to the reform agenda: the drive for Quality  
   2.4 The path to change  
   2.5 The storm of reform  
   2.6 Concluding comments

3. **Quality of Service in the Police**  
   3.1 Introduction  
   3.2 Early Quality of Service in the Police  
   3.3 The genesis of the Quality of Service sub-committee and the role of the Home Office  
   3.4 The launch of the Quality of Service initiative  
   3.5 Other elements of the QOS programme  
   3.6 Impressions of the early initiative  
   3.7 The status of the QOS programme

4. **The impact and meaning of Quality**  
   4.1 The definition of Quality policing  
   4.2 The coherence of the QOS programme  
   4.3 The impact and success of the QOS programme  
   4.4 Quality of Service: Professionalism or New Managerialism?

5. **Power, Politics and Quality**  
   5.1 The concept of power  
   5.2 The state  
   5.3 The Politics of Quality
5.4 Conclusions.

6. Visions of the future
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The pessimistic vision
6.3 The optimistic vision
6.4 The Police Department
6.5 The HMIC and the Audit Commission
6.6 Some Conclusions

7. Concluding Comments

8. List of Appendices

9. Bibliography
1. History, theory and analysis

1.1 Introduction

"We have created a Police Service second to none in the world, more professional, more efficient, more technically advanced, less politically influenced, less corrupt, and less racial and we have neglected to sell it to the public or excused ourselves on the grounds that we have been too busy...

How can we better meet community expectation? Well, in keeping with our professional accountability to the public, we can begin by determining corporate strategy for the Police Service, identify what the public wants from the police in terms of service and style of policing, what the community sees as the priorities and how individual Police Forces can best respond to those community needs and then monitor public satisfaction. The Service is committed to defining a corporate strategy and setting a new contract for police service delivery to the community...

The Police Service has never been more efficient or effective in the areas we have prioritised but we accept that we have to be more responsive to community priorities and more imaginative in their resolution. We are in the process of putting our house in order. The OPR, the first major public opinion survey commissioned by the Police Service, set out to identify the differences between service delivery and public expectation. This was the beginning of our commitment to close that gap."

(Hirst, 1990)

These are fine words from the speech of the then Chief Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary to the ACPO Summer Conference of 1990. But to what extent have the principles espoused been adopted by the Service? To what extent have the police set a new 'contract' for service delivery to the community? Does the philosophy set out at that conference represent a significant paradigm shift in policing - a radical departure from the past in terms of policing ideals and objectives? Why did Michael Hirst need to stress that the Police Service was putting its house in order?

These are just some of the questions which have underpinned this thesis. One major aim of the research has been to analyse the genesis, development and impact of the Quality of Service (QOS) programme. The collection of empirical data has centred on senior officers within the Service, members of the Home Office Police Department, and Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC). A summary of methodology appears in section 1.4, while a full account of sample and methodology is included in the appendix. An outline of the thesis structure is presented in section 1.5.

The study commenced in 1992, at a time when the police reforms were soon to be unleashed. When, in
1993, the Service was exposed to the potentially radical changes pinpointed in the results of the Sheehy Inquiry and the White Paper on Police Reform (Home Office, 1993), the research became rather more complicated. It became necessary to take into account the effects, or possible effects, of the police reforms on the policing function generally, and the QOS programme more specifically.

I wondered, for example, if the effort of responding to the police reforms would divert the focus of senior police leaders away from the concept of quality. Would the whole QOS programme grind to a halt under the weight of centralised performance indicators? To some extent, these are still open questions as the 'dust' has not yet fully settled. What was clear at the end of the research was that while the Quality of Service programme continued, it had a significantly different focus from that of the original initiative at the beginning of the decade.

Given that the police is an apparatus of the state, and given the onset of centrally-driven police reforms during the research period, it was essential to couch much of the analysis within a broad 'political sociology' framework. This framework was dominated by considerations of the state, state power and the concept of statism. As Uglow (1988, p.17) suggests, it is imperative to consider the relationship between the police and the state in any discussion of the former. During the evolution of the research it became natural to focus more closely on the concept of the state, and the implications that the police reforms would have for the central state/police relationship. Given the growing importance of this aspect of the research, the analytic attention became increasingly 'external'. That is, rather than focus predominantly on the internal or organisational ramifications of the QOS programme, more attention was paid to the service-wide symbolism of QOS, and how this was juxtaposed against the policing vision of the government (and other elements of the central state such as the Home Office Police Department).

Similarly, the research was bound to consider the historical developments of the police/central state relationship, as well as some of the key analyses of that relationship (such as Reiner, 1992; Fielding, 1991; P.A.J. Waddington, 1994; Green, 1990; and Northam, 1988). Thus, rather than an intra-organisational focus, the momentum of the analysis led to an inter-organisational and agency level dimension. This is not to suggest, however, that the implications of the QOS programme for the development of a quasi-militaristic, and highly bureaucratic, organisation have been totally ignored. Nevertheless, the ultimate direction of the thesis has been to develop (or at least contribute to) theory at an increasingly macro-sociological level. This level of analytic attention is commensurate with the type of attention paid to quality; this has eschewed detailing the elements of localised policing activities, and has explored more widely the meaning and political significance of the QOS programme.

In the most general sociological terms, the research was conducted from a conflict perspective, but not in a formal Marxist sense. I would suggest here that 'conflict' between individuals and groups in society is
inevitable. To some extent conflict is fortuitous, in that it is indicative of a level of debate and political activity which is desirable within our current social system. It would be unrealistic, and naive, to assume a homogenisation of interests and ideologies amongst different social strata and groups. Diversity of interest must inevitably lead to the politicisation of issues (such as the provision of policing), and thereby tension (or conflict) between one set of interests (for example ACPO objectives) and the interests of another group (say the Home Office).

Ultimately, the research findings and analysis have acted inductively to support Weberian notions of power and the state. These concepts, however, did not structure (in a hypothetico-deductive sense) the collection of data nor the testing of hypotheses. This is discussed under 'Methodological Reflections' in the Methods section of the appendices. What are especially important are the following ideas stemming from Weberian theory: firstly, that the state is an arena of conflict between different 'status groups' (Orum, 1978, p.53); secondly, that the relationship between social groups is fundamentally one of constant conflict (Orum, ibid, p.49); thirdly, the fact that modern capitalist society is characterised by the 'iron cage' of bureaucracy and bureaucratic surveillance (Dandeker, 1990, chapter 1); fourthly, the pre-eminence of 'legal-rational' domination and the embodiment of this domination in the form of the modern state bureaucracy (Orum, ibid, p.57).

In discussing the limits of power and conflict Carson (in Rock and McIntosh, 1974, p.81) rejects the concept of a homogeneous power-elite exercising power:

“*For me the process may be more accurately portrayed as one in which many powerful groups compete and from time to time coalesce, giving rise to legislation frequently distinguished by compromise rather than by outright victory.*”

This would typify the recent political straggles in the police reform process: such ideas are explored further in chapter 5.

My conception of society, and indeed the 'human condition' is one marked by conflict and power struggle, whether at a micro or macro level. I believe Weber is correct in his apparently pessimistic, and realistic, vision of the social order. Dandeker writes:

"*For instance, bureaucracy is always a component in a structure of domination, serving the interests of leaders involved in the struggle for power.... Weber's discussion of bureaucracy in the context of social conflict and the struggle for power is a far more realistic one than the perspective of consensus adopted by functionalist views of modern organization.*" (ibid, p.22).

The police reforms have signified a continuation of rationalisation in the modern world, and another stage
in the erosion of freedom and the "dominance of instrumental reason" which Layder (1994, p.189) identifies. The central state is critical in this process; discussion of the state, and the centralisation of social control, forms a crucial aspect of the thesis.

Williams (1991) presents lucid accounts of the work of Dahrendorf (1959), Turk (1969) and Vold (1958), aspects of which reflect some of the findings and assertions of the current research; that is, they can form part of the inductively-derived 'picture' which has been built up from the interplay between empirical investigation and theoretical reading. Williams (ibid, p.291) defines the work of Vold:

"Central is the idea that different groups have different and often incompatible interests which give rise to conflicts. Where groups are of a similar strength, then often these conflicts are resolved by compromise, lending stability to a society. Where they are of differing strength, one may win by using the full power of the State to enforce their interest."

The work of Vold is focussed mainly on crime and criminology, but the notion that different groups will have varying, and conflicting, interests is nevertheless useful for the current analysis. Williams contrasts the theoretical approach of Marx and Dahrendorf:

"Marx located conflict in an unjust economic system and saw it as something which could be eradicated. Dahrendorf, in contrast, saw it as located in the power differences, and especially in the distribution of authority, in a State, and as being necessary to a healthy society. All healthy societies need a difference in the levels of power or authority of the individuals, so that the cultural norms or rules can be enforced. If one is to have rules, one needs sanctions to enforce them, and to ensure that the sanctions are effective someone has to have the power to use them. This is bound to lead to conflict." (ibid, p.292).

Although I would agree that there are bound to be differences in levels of power between social groups and individuals, I would be more hesitant to suggest that this is 'healthy'. I believe that there has to be a countervailing balance between powerful status groups, so that the power of one group is not excessive; ultimately, however, there will be conflict.

The work of Turk is summarised:

"Turk (1969) also recognised that social conflict was a real and inescapable part of social life, and that someone had to be in authority. For Turk, if there was no conflict in a social order it was unhealthy. It might indicate either that there was too great a consensus in the community, or that individuals were being excessively controlled or coerced by those in power. Too much conflict would also be undesirable,
as no society can be healthy without a fairly high level of consensus. Turk therefore saw social order as being based on a coercion-consensus model, and the authorities must ensure that the balance between the two is not lost." (ibid, p.292)

This extract fits neatly with my own emergent theoretical framework. Where there is an absence of conflict between groups, particularly elite groups (I suggest), this would indicate an excessively homogenised set of beliefs and objectives. Admittedly this conflict perspective has stemmed very much from the thesis focus on elite groups. Conflict between the lower and upper echelons of society or organisations has not been explored. However, conflict is also inevitable between upper and lower strata, and within the police this is often evidenced by the tensions between the Police Federation and Chief Officers.

Given the complexity of our society, it is inevitable that conflicts of interests will become manifest. This conflict does not merely stem from the capitalist political economy, as orthodox Marxists would argue, but from a whole host of cultural, ideological and economic factors. I do not subscribe to economic determinism or the arguments of 'radical' writers such as Bonger (1969) or Hester and Eglin (1992) who couch their theorisation in Marxian 'structural-conflict' terms. The Left Idealism of Taylor, Walton and Young (1973) is deemed to be overly simplistic and naive. The complexities of conflict, crime and the requirement for policing are inadequately accounted for in such work. In contrast, I support many sentiments of the Left Realists, as typified by the extensive writing of Jock Young. Menzies (in Lowman and MacLean, 1992) says of this new realist trend:

"Realism draws in the critical lens, shedding peripheral utopian diversions, and localizing its fields within familiar contours of time and space.... As a rationalist system, realism exudes a conviction in the stability and practicality of empirical knowledge.... pragmatism must prevail. Criminal justice, law, order, and punishment can all be resurrected and converted into instruments of empowerment." (p.142)

Menzies, however, is ultimately critical of the left realist stance, and argues that "philosophically, politically, and pragmatically realism is far more ambiguous" (p.144). Matthews and Young (in "Rethinking Criminology", [1992]) present a robust case for the adoption of a left-realist approach:

"It is a criminology which expresses a commitment to detailed empirical investigation, recognizes the objectivity of crime, faces up to the damaging and disorganizing effects of crime, and emphasizes the possibility of engaging in progressive reform." (p.4)

I too am committed to empirical investigation, and recognise the 'objectivity' and destructive effect of crime. Crime should not be regarded as proto-revolution against the evils of capitalism, nor should the police be regarded simply as the Darth Vader (to pick up on Reiner's colourful description) of social control. The
police do assist in preventing or soothing the misery of crime and disorder and apprehend offenders bent on damaging the lives of other citizens. On the other hand, the police, and the function of social control, should not be accepted uncritically. This is particularly crucial when considering the development of the state and the centralisation of control over the police.

Without 'social control' there would be anarchy. Social control can take many forms, whether this is based in the family, local community or through state agencies (such as social services departments or the police). We need a degree of social control, in the same way that there needs to be some conflict in society. Social control is often required to contain this conflict, and the police is one of the key agents in this respect (for example in the policing of demonstrations). Matthews and Young (ibid, p.7) discuss the decline of orthodox Marxist theories of the state and power in the 1980s. They add:

"Theoretically and politically, the forms shifted towards developing more pluralistic and democratic forms of control. 'Social control' ceased to be a negative concept and an undesirable process. Instead, the problem increasingly became one of trying to make control more social."

I think this should be at the crux of the argument. Control needs to be made more 'social' and accountable; it is illusory to believe that social conflict and control will somehow become redundant. If power and control can be made more pluralistic, then one can hope to safeguard the liberty of groups and individuals. This thesis raises and analyzes concern about the threat to the dispersion of control and power. It is argued later that the police reforms symbolise a further step in the undesirable centralisation of social control.

As with social conflict and control I suggest that power does not have to be viewed as exclusively negative. In a rather Parsonian sense, power can be used to achieve or to do. Power is often (usually?) abused by 'power elites' such as the government, but power held by one social group can be used to countervail the power of another. If one social group (like the central government elite) attains and wields excessive power, then the social system becomes imbalanced. As a result, more social conflict will arise as a result of the single-minded pursuit of ideological and political dogma. Brake and Hale (1992) identify the tenets of Conservative policy and criminology and suggest that these have created the social conditions under which more conflict arises. They also argue:

"We believe that the Conservatives' desire to use the forces of law and order to defeat opposition to their economic, industrial and social programmes has accelerated and reinforced the trend to paramilitary-style policing". (p.34)

The 'hardening' of police style will be discussed further in chapter 2. It will also be argued that the central state is acquiring more and more power (and therefore social control). Much of the research has focused on
the issue of power and the way in which the QOS programme became enmeshed in the power struggle between the central state elite and the police elite.

As is outlined in chapter 5, the conceptual structure built up inductively from the empirical observations reflected a hybrid of elite theory and pluralism, following the model presented by Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987). In very simple terms, I have aimed to demonstrate that the QOS programme and the police reforms signify the pluralistic conflict between elite groups (such as ACPO and HMIC). The concept of power has lain at the heart of the thesis, with particular attention paid to the centralisation, or otherwise, of state power. The power struggle between central government and leaders of the Service constituted a fascinating part of the research and there is no doubt that the QOS programme became embroiled in this battle.

The dynamics of the tripartite structure (the chief officers, the Police Authorities, and the Home Office) are still in a formative period and will probably take some time to solidify. Of particular significance is the whole area of performance management: the suite of police performance indicators which has been developing since the early 1990s is now accompanied by the Home Secretary’s key objectives which were first outlined in the White Paper of June 1993. These objectives caused considerable disquiet for senior police leaders, many of whom claimed that striving to meet such centrally imposed objectives would be detrimental to other ‘service’ aspects of policing which are less amenable to performance measurement. Stephens and Becker (1994, p.228) raise concern that the government’s focus on setting key objectives in crime-related areas will undermine the care or service dimension of policing.

While it could be claimed that the Police Service, and indeed the policing function, is in a period of epochal reform it is important not to lose sight of the past. The police has been subject to external pressure for change on numerous occasions, and attempted internal reform prior to the QOS initiative. There have also been historical periods which are generally deemed to be significant signposts to change. For example, depending on one’s viewpoint, the 1960s are often regarded as a watershed in modern history. Morris (1989, p.163) highlights that that decade is often regarded as one of "progressive liberalism", but others dismiss the destructuring impetus of that decade as illusory (Cohen, 1985, chapter 1). Cohen (ibid) argues that the ‘master patterns’ of the Great Transformation of social control and criminal justice march on inexorably. Cohen’s thesis tends to be supported by the emergence of the police reforms of the 1990s. A church report from 1967 also lends weight to the argument that there is growing formalisation and monitoring of social life. "Police: a social study" (p.33) talks of changing social structures and moral emphases:

"The increase in the size of the unit of government, whether this be industrial or political, has removed a large number of its administrators and executive officers further and further away from most of the people on whose behalf they function. The more social organisation is centralised, in the interests of its own efficiency, and of necessity, the more relationships are embodied in rules, regulations and laws
The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the blossoming of rules, laws and regulations. That earlier decade saw the increased regulation of policing with PACE (1984), for example, and the 1986 Public Order Act tightened up on the laws surrounding public assembly and riot. The central state has certainly become more authoritarian on the 'law-and-order' dimension identified by Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987, p.8).

Brake and Hale (1992, chapter 3) discuss the development of a “control culture”, and the shift towards the authoritarian state. They note (p.37-38) that many of the current law-and-order policies develop trends which had their origins prior to the current Tory administration. It would be unfair, then, to locate all blame for the trends of “repressive legislation” and centralisation of policing with the current administration (p.38). I tend to agree with this, but I do believe that since 1979 the Conservatives have markedly acted as potent catalysts in the inexorable growth of state power and social control. The conservative administration since 1979 has abused its position of authority and created the acute imbalance in the power relations suggested earlier in this chapter. It is now clear that Margaret Thatcher and the ‘New Right’ were set to engage in a brand of politics which rested on a model of heightened conflict rather than emphasising the need for consensus and compromise. Brake and Hale present the work of Hall et al (1978) and conclude (p.40):

“Thatcherism can be read, then, as a form of populist anti-statism, as a move towards a control culture, which alongside of its individualism, its privatisation of collectivist welfare provision, from health and education through to water supplies and transport, and its aggressive law and order policies justifies its increased collective surveillance with an appeal to values of self-reliance and individual responsibility.”

Not all writers, however, agree with the ‘authoritarian state’ or ‘tooling up’ arguments which centre on developments in the 1980s. P.A.J. Waddington (1994) dismisses the idea that the alleged shift towards authoritarianism (p.28) is encapsulated in PACE 1984 and the Public Order Act 1986. Waddington (ibid, p.37) argues that Britain was no more authoritarian after the 1986 Act than it might have been before.

Nevertheless, Cotterrell (1992, p.288-289) argues:

“.... state law seems to extend into an increasing range of fields.... As it does so it supplements or perhaps replaces other mechanism of control (mores, informal understandings governing social relations, community or neighbourhood networks and institutions, family responsibilities).... Law intrudes increasingly into social life, but it does so as an alien force; a contingency to be taken into account; an imposition and control upon, rather than an expression of, spontaneous social relations.”
It is interesting that Cotterrell’s comments reflect what was stated three decades earlier in the Church sponsored report.

The central state tightened up on financial accountability from the early 1980s (with the Financial Management Initiative), and the ‘Citizen’s Charter’ movement of the early 1990s introduced another raft of rules and guidelines which increasingly penetrate public life. The public services (including the police) are subject to increasing levels of monitoring and formalisation of action which is manifest very clearly in the recent police reforms.

Recognising historical trends with admirable lucidity, the writer of the 1967 Church report wrote:

"The trend is towards a more formalised institutional social life... It is clearly necessary, in these new circumstances, that police actions be better known to the public. The policeman becomes professional and detached. This is forced upon him by changes in society, and until its new forms of integration become clear he has little choice but to lean towards impersonal enforcement of law and away from that complex of personal relationships which enabled him at one time to behave informally as well as formally in the keeping of the peace. To retain public confidence in the police, however, it is essential that what the police do be as visible in the new circumstances as it was in the past."

('Police: a social study', 1967 p 35-36)

As Burrell (1992) points out, if one adopts a notion of cyclical time then it is hardly surprising if the types of concern (such as centralisation of power) which lie at the heart of police reform and 'progress' in the first half of this decade have emerged in previous decades, with similar epochal overtones. Burrell suggests the extent to which organisation, ideology and programme can recur in history, and hints at the danger in ignoring the lessons of the past. Burrell summarises three models of time:

"Time may be conceived to be a straight line, or circular or spiral in form, and human events and artefacts which necessarily take place in time come to take a form and shape which reflect this temporal shape. In other words, organisational forms may be thought to be progressive, linear, thoroughly new and innovative or repetitive, cyclical and historically rooted or both or neither.

Within spiral time, perhaps, progress and reversals would be common occurrences acting in one direction at one moment and in another at the next... Our view of time needs to reflect the complexity of the real world and its multiple histories."

(Burrell [p 180] in Reed and Hughes [1992])
The concepts of cyclical and spiral time sensitise us to the possibility that the events of history do not always follow a logical and pre-determined sequence and that contradiction forms part of the fabric of the real world. In addition, the actions undertaken by social actors (such as government ministers or leaders of the Police Service) may not always follow a pattern which is clearly identifiable or readily explainable. Often irrational, hidden and spontaneous actions of individuals or groups can defy meticulous theoretical and causal re-construction of events. As with any regression equation, there will always be an element of variance which cannot be explained by analysis. Heidensohn (1989, p.63) warns us that predicted events may not occur and that key historical pointers can be ignored, and asserts:

"Hindsight is at once a useful tool and a dangerous weapon. It is easy to look back on an era.... It is easy because we have after-knowledge; yet we may be imposing a pattern on unplanned and potentially inconsequential events, which at best distorts and at worst does them real injustice."

Despite her reservations about interpreting history, Heidensohn nevertheless concludes that the 1960s were distinctive years. While acknowledging the warning that it is easy to impose a coherent analysis which makes sense of inchoate social phenomena and actions in the real world, it is nevertheless concluded here that clear patterns of change in the 1980s and 1990s have been identified for the purposes of this thesis. It is useful here to combine the concepts of spiral time and linear time. For example, internally-driven and externally imposed police reform might be visualised as spirals within a ‘tube’ of linear time. The tube of linear time represents the inexorable thrust or direction of historical forces, while the intricacies and contradictions of individual or group actions are represented by the spiral within that constraining tube. The tube can be seen to represent what Cohen (1985) calls the "master patterns". The spiralling developments might seem to confound rational or over-arching explanation (in a post-modernist sense), but the broader historical patterns provide a theoretical container which facilitates explanation and understanding. Ultimately, then, apparently unplanned and inconsequential events do form part of the engine of history whose course remains fixed on an overwhelmingly linear vector. The events and phenomena of one decade follow on logically and inevitably (at least with the benefit of hindsight!) from those of the preceding decade. The destructuring impulse of postmodernism is thereby rejected in this thesis.

Matthews and Young (ibid, p.10) record that radical (or left) realism involves a “qualified reaffirmation of modernism”. I too support calls for the reaffirmation of modernism. I object to the nullification of any attempt to construct general theories about the social world. Matthews and Young (ibid, p.11) note how postmodernist thinkers question the concept of ‘progress’ in criminology and totalizing theories. They provide a wounding attack on post-modernism (p.13) to which I subscribe:

"Its scepticism about ‘progress’, its deconstructing of the concept of crime, its antipathy towards grand theory, mean that it can too easily lead towards nihilism, cynicism and conservatism.... .... Challenging
existing values and categories has a long and distinguished history, but if these values are simply rejected and not replaced with alternative visions then we become stranded and helpless. Postmodernism at this point turns into a pseudo-radicalism and becomes thoroughly depoliticized. It becomes ultimately a conservative stance, which is unable to offer any directives for social change and in which the concept of emancipation has no place.”

These authors argue (p.15) that modernism has not yet been fully implemented, and that postmodernism can at best only be regarded as the “dark side” of the modernist project. I would agree with Matthews and Young that there has been, and can be, progress and reform. It is too depressingly pessimistic to accept a deconstructionist position of relativism, and a concomitant rejection of the concept of ‘progress’. The fashionable adoption of this intellectual paradigm should remain in the realm of the arts, rather than be falsely imposed on the harsh realities of crime, policing and social control. The niceties of such academic discourse become fatuous in the face of (for example) violent crime, politicised control of policing and the often brutal realities of public disorder.

Amongst other things, this thesis deals with the increase, or potential increase, in political control over the policing function. One must retain a pragmatic, realist, modernist grip to analyse the pragmatic, realist and modernist action of those at the centre of power; without such a grip, one becomes powerless to comment on potentially dangerous developments in social control.
1.2 The theoretical landscape

There are a variety of concepts and concerns which have formed the theoretical landscape, and these will be outlined briefly before they are discussed in greater depth (and in juxtaposition to the empirical data) later in the thesis.

i) The New Agenda

The ideology and policies of 'neo-liberalism' represent powerful themes in the study, and form part of the analysis of the 'New Agenda' which has markedly altered the environment in which public sector organisations have had to operate since the 1980s (Lawton and Rose, 1991). As shall be argued later, the Police Service has responded to the varied elements of the New Agenda, but possibly in ways which may prove detrimental to the professionalism and professionalisation of the police. The New Agenda revolves around the issues of organisational change, performance measurement, privatisation, managerialism, neo-liberalist economics and ideology, and quality of service itself. All of these issues have affected the development of the Service in recent years, and indeed some have been at the heart of unprecedented conflict between the government and leaders of the Service. The so-called 'Posen Enquiry', for example, which commenced in early 1994 and which was concerned with the identification of core and ancillary policing tasks, and the extent to which policing functions could be hived off, fuelled considerable animosity between the police and central state.

Police leaders have embraced key aspects of the 'new agenda' and new managerialism. However, there has been a logical impasse between certain aspects of QOS (such as the growth of the consumerist ethos) and the attempts at professionalisation (such as the development of shared values and 'ethics'). This tension will be discussed further in chapter 4.

ii) Power and Politics

As numerous writers have suggested (including Lukes, 1986 and Wrong, 1979) the concept of power has been one of the most problematic within social science. Nevertheless, it has been crucial to wrestle with the ideas of power and authority, for these have lain at the core of dialogue and interaction between the Service and the government, not only in the volatile years of the early 1990s, but one might say throughout the history of the 'new' police.

Power is not just critical for the analysis of the relationship between the Service and central government. It is necessary for the interpretation of the role of the state more generally, and indeed has its place in understanding the consequences and implications of the QOS philosophy.
Of course, the very act of policing has at its core the phenomenon of power. Fielding (1991, p.11) draws attention to the work of Bittner (1980), and concludes that the latter’s “analysis of the capacity to use force as the core of the police role is dominant”. In the case of the police, the use of force (as a form of power) is legitimized, if constrained. P.A.J. Waddington (1991, p.4) notes that the wielding of “naked power” involves the power-holder inducing, threatening and forcing; however, the power of the police rests in legitimate authority. Waddington suggests (p.5) that this form of power is both robust and delicate, but that nevertheless ‘policing by consent’ is still a distinctive feature of British policing.

The concept of power cannot be separated from the study of politics. Alderson stated in 1979:

"Police are part of the politics of social control.... Superior police are the creation of liberal democratic states. They stand in the way of revolution and on the side of orderly evolution in allowing a tolerable degree of constructive violence and protest.... Although there is a whole field of policing which has nothing to do with the law at all, the police themselves are very much the servants of the law and instruments of its authority.” (1979, p.57)

As Reiner (1992) reminds us, the police are "inescapably" political:

"This notion of the political neutrality or independence of the police cannot withstand any serious consideration... In a broader sense all relationships which have a power dimension are political.... Their specific role in the enforcement of laws and the maintenance of order is as specialists in coercion... The craft of successful policing is to be able to minimise the use of force, but it remains the specialist resource of the police, their distinctive role in the political order. In this sense the police are actually at the heart of the state's functioning, and political analysis in general tends to underplay the significance of policing as both source and symbol of the quality of a political civilisation." (Reiner, 1992, p.2)

iii) The State

Having research access to chief officers, senior civil servants and members of the HMIC and Audit Commission has been invaluable in dissecting the concept of the state.

It has become clear that the apparatus of the state has not acted as a unified and homogeneous entity in the early 1990s, and the recent conflict between the central state (the Home Office, central government, the HMIC and the Audit Commission) and the Police Service has reached unprecedented levels, especially when this is placed against the close relationship between Thatcher’s government and the police in the early 1980s (see Scraton, 1985). The research has also highlighted the political 'in-fighting' between the
Audit Commission and the HMIC, so it would be incorrect to assume that the agents of the state have necessarily been marching under the same banner in the 1990s.

Of particular value has been the work of Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) who provide an incisive analysis of the definition and influence of the state. They develop three images of the state (cipher, guardian and partisan) and juxtapose these against five theories of the state (Pluralism, New Right, Elite Theory, Marxism and Neo-pluralism).

The police reforms have brought on an avalanche of debate about the centralisation, or decentralisation, of power, and the extent to which the central state apparatus has tightened or loosened its grip on the policing function in the 43 forces.

The New Right claim that the frontiers of the state have been ‘rolled back’ comes under critical assessment. It should become clear that in fact the state is becoming more ‘statist’, particularly on the dimension of law, order and social control. The police reforms of the early 1990s have permitted an illuminating case study of the extent to which central state power has increased, and this is a recurring theme in later chapters of the thesis. Cotterrell (1992, p.130) notes that:

"Many of the most perceptive social theorists recognised early that a thoroughgoing individualism in law and ideology, despite its proclamation of liberty, paved the way directly for the massive concentration of state power characteristic of modern Western societies.... The development of this power was, thus, not an aberration from individualism but its authoritarian face."

The extent to which this ‘authoritarian face’ has become more overt in recent years forms one of the principal questions of the thesis. Analysis of the QOS programme provided a vehicle with which the police/state relationship could be explored. Along with the concept of power, treatment of the state has been a fundamental focal point of the research.

iv) Organization Theory

Although explored to a far lesser extent than the concepts of power and state, it has been necessary to consider theories of organisation. This is particularly pertinent in relation to the 'internal' dimension of quality within the police; that is, the dimension concerned with change in organisational culture and objectives. From the outset, the QOS initiative was concerned with affecting the style and philosophy of policing provided to the public. Later elements of the QOS programme (most specifically the 'Getting Things Right' initiative) focussed on internal quality, with emphases on radically altering the policing culture, improving the quality of 'people management', and moving toward shared strategic aims.
The discussion of organisation can be approached in numerous ways. For example, Scott (1981) has defined organisations in terms of rational, natural and open systems; Pheysey (1993) devotes attention to various organizational cultures (that is 'role cultures', 'power cultures', 'achievement cultures' and 'support cultures').

Alderson (1979, p.65) argued that police cultures are most discernible where officers feel most threatened:

"The greater the feeling of threat from a hostile environment the greater the cultural cohesion and group solidarity."

Alderson adds (p.66) that ideally police and public cultures are in a "sympathetic relationship". The organisational changes undertaken (or mooted) under the banner of quality have aimed to change the police culture, and to emphasise the importance of being more 'in tune' with the public and its expectations. 'Getting Things Right' (1993) stressed the need to move away from a quasi-militaristic organisation, with an overbearing obsession with rules. Some senior officers in the research considered that there was still much to be done in countering the 'canteen culture' in the police; others felt that QOS had focussed too much on organisational/cultural issues, and that there had been little concern with public service/operational matters. Within the police, there has been a thoroughly modernist assumption that cultural and organisational reform can take place. This will be developed further in chapter 3.

v) The Quality movement

Somewhat related to the corpus of knowledge about organisation, and organisational culture, is the literature devoted to the 'quality movement' and the concept of total quality management. As will be demonstrated later, the quality literature has been dominated by the standpoint of the business sector (see for example Wille, 1992 and Macdonald and Piggott, 1990), and many writers on business quality outline models of organisational culture which yield the best results in terms of quality, organisational survivability and, of course, profitability. The quality movement will be discussed in chapter 2 so that we might understand better the language and concepts which the Police Service has adopted to meet its own objectives. The tenets of quality management as laid down by 'gurus' such as Deming (1986), and Juran (1988) will be outlined, as many senior officers have been exposed to their teachings.
1.3 Methodological summary

The research entailed both quantitative and qualitative methodology, as well as the use of documentary materials.

In late 1993, a questionnaire-based survey of Chief Inspectors and Superintendents was conducted in three police forces. 207 questionnaires were sent to 91 Superintendents and 116 Chief Inspectors. 154 officers returned questionnaires, yielding a satisfactory response rate of 74%. Completed questionnaires were returned directly to Hampshire Police Headquarters in addressed return envelopes. Survey data were analysed using SPSS. Interviews with chief officers and chief superintendents were also conducted within the three participating forces. These interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed, and included questions on the perception and experience of the QOS initiative, opinions on the police reforms, and the perceived priorities for contemporary policing.

Semi-structured interviews were also held with Home Office Police Department, HMIC, Audit Commission and Bramshill Police Staff College personnel. Certain key respondents were contacted on more than one occasion. Overall, qualitative data was gathered in well over 100 interviews.

Observation at seminars and meetings also contributed to the collection of empirical data. Such observation included the 1994 QOS conference at Bramshill Police Staff College, and the 1996 QOS conference held at the Henry Fielding Centre in Manchester.

The details of methodology, plus an example of the survey questionnaire are included in the appendix.
1.4 Outline of this thesis

The thesis will follow a logical sequence which begins with Chapter 2 'The Agenda of Reform'. This will provide an historical and thematic backcloth against which the Quality of Service programme in the police can be sensibly placed. The public sector reform agenda in the 1980s and 1990s has provided an impetus and lexicon of language and concepts which have been influential in the quality movement especially, and on policing more generally. Chapter 2 will also outline the rudiments of the quality movement, and provide an overview of the business origins of quality, and identify its main tenets. The chapter will also focus on the events and developments which have threatened the legitimacy of the police in recent years.

Chapter 3 will outline the elements of the QOS programme in the police, and pinpoint the specific catalysts of quality in the police.

Chapter 4 will focus more closely on the meaning of quality, and quality policing, as ascertained in the empirical research. In addition, an assessment of the impact and success of the Quality of Service programme will form a vital part of this chapter.

Chapter 5 will broaden the analytic perspective and encompass the thrust of the wider police and public sector reforms. It will be necessary to ask whether QOS in the police has been predominantly a matter of political expediency, and how quality is implicated in the politics of police reform. The chapter will also include an analysis of the shift, or potential shift, in power and influence between the police and the central state. Theories of the state, and of power will be particularly pertinent in this chapter.

Chapter 6 will continue some of the themes of Chapter 5, and include much reference to the perception of senior police department officials. 'Visions of the future' include the perceived trends in the relations between elements of the central state (such as the police department, HMIC and the Audit Commission).

The concluding Chapter 7 will draw together the central themes presented in the thesis and providing commentary on the policing function, the state, and power. Particular attention is paid to the increasing centralisation of social control and growth of bureaucratic surveillance.

Throughout most of the thesis, the thoughts and words of respondents will be interspersed with more theoretical discussion. The bulk of survey results will be presented in Chapter 4 ('The meaning and impact of Quality').
2. The Agenda of Reform

2.1 Introduction

The quality movement in the Police Service has emerged against a backdrop of radical, and often turbulent, change in the organisation and management of the public sector. Moreover, 'quality' has formed part of the response to the agenda of public sector reform which blossomed in the early 1980s. It is one aim of this chapter to review the 'New Right' philosophy of the Conservative government which has provided the ideological hothouse in which 'new managerialism', 'marketisation' and 'consumerism' have flourished. As McKevitt and Lawton (1994) suggest, the assumed superiority of the private sector model has had a profound impact on the public sector: many philosophies and strategies rooted in the business world have been transplanted into public sector organisation, and the Police Service is no exception.

Inextricably tied up with the 'New Right' philosophies of the conservative government (particularly during the Thatcher era) is the concept of 'rolling back the state'. It will be argued that this shibboleth of the Tory party does not withstand close scrutiny, particularly when considering the impact of recent reforms to the police. It will be vital in this current chapter to provide a historical backdrop, and identify the key elements of the police reform programme. In addition to the dramatic reform of the 1990s, the 1980s witnessed a clear drive to make the police more accountable to central government in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

The 1980s were also punctuated with serious civil disorder, the policing of which raised considerable debate about the politics and public accountability of the police. Several senior officers in the present research pinpointed the miners' strike as a watershed in the development of policing style and the image of the police: some suggested that damage to the 'traditional' image of the service during the miners' dispute helped to usher in a concerted effort to instil a quality approach. In order to pursue such development, the police have drawn upon the teachings of the quality 'gurus' from the business world, and this chapter will present a brief overview of key tenets of this brand of quality philosophy.
2.2 The New Right imperative and the public sector reform agenda.

With the ascendancy of New Right thinking in the 1970s one of the principal aims of Thatcherism as a 'political project' (Gamble, 1994, p4) was to reinstate market liberalism as the predominant philosophy. This neo-liberalist stance of the Conservative government has had a profound impact on the organisation of, and service delivery in, the public sector. Lawton and Rose (1991) provide a detailed analysis of the 'New Agenda' which has markedly altered the environment in which public sector organisations have had to operate since the 1980s. This new agenda includes organisational change, performance measurement, managerialism, and privatisation.

Farnham and Horton (1993, p239) note that the economic crisis of British capitalism, and the burden on the resources of the welfare state "gave rise to theorists of the New Right challenging the orthodoxies associated with Keynesian economic policy". Coxall and Robins (1994, p29) assert that the consensus on the management of the economy became increasingly strained during the 1970s, which was paralleled by the ascendancy of the New Right.

Farnham and Horton add (p240) that the perceived value of the private sector and the rejection of immoderate public expenditure was most clearly espoused in the work of the New Right. They posit (p.241) that the "contours" of the state have extended into the private sphere, thereby blurring the division between the public and private sectors; importantly they imply that the supposed contraction of the state is somewhat chimeral. Gamble (1994, p34) argues that all followers of the New Right have sought to challenge many concepts of the post-war social democratic regimes in Europe, and believe that the authority of the state has needed restoration:

"The key doctrine of the New Right and the political project it has inspired is therefore the doctrine of the free economy and the strong state... The idea of a free economy and a strong state involves a paradox. The state is to be simultaneously rolled back and rolled forward. Non - interventionist and decentralised in some areas the state is to be highly interventionist and centralised in others". (ibid, p 35-36)

Jessop (in Abercrombie and Warde 1992, p15) sets out how the Thatcher administration broke with the "post war settlement" which was underpinned by Keynesianism and the welfare state. He documents (p25) that the crisis of flawed Fordist economic management in the 1970s engendered major dispute about political and economic strategy, and that this set the scene for the rise of 'Thatcherism' which involved:
"rolling back the frontiers of the Fordist state.... And second, Thatcherism is trying to 'roll forward' new forms of state intervention favouring the emergence of a post-Fordist economy in Britain".

( Ibid, p28)

Dearlove and Saunders (1991, p372) note the government's attack on public sector bureaucracies which were regarded as inefficient and overpaid: it was perceived that a "burgeoning public sector had overburdened the private sector" (p372). Public ownership was criticised as "inefficient and monopolistic" (p373). Gamble (1994, p57) indicates that the achievement of the New Right was to force the supporters of public sector provision on the defensive.

Radical changes to the public sector became manifest in Thatcher's third term of office. Gamble (p135) states that proposals to transform education, health, social security and the financing of local government were underscored by the philosophy of "new public management", with its emphasis on tendering, contracting out, and financial incentives. Horton (1990, p184-185) records how a new model of local government was unveiled by Nicholas Ridley in 1988, with the aim of creating a customer-focused local council, and contracting-out services to the private sector. Horton (p185) notes too the emphasis on competition, customer choice, and reducing the power of professional groups.

Dunn and Smith (1990, p38) recall that the move to privatize the large public utilities began apace in 1989. Famham and Horton (1993, p20) state that by 1992, 60 companies (including the major public utilities of electricity, water and gas) had been sold off to the private sector. These authors (p18) also define the "micro objectives" of the conservative government as "optimising consumer choice and consumer sovereignty in the market-place", and liberating individuals from dependency on the state. Importantly (and this will be explored further in chapter 5), they note (p21) that there has been a proliferation of legislative initiatives which have strengthened central government, and made local authorities and other public bodies the agents of central government policies. The centralisation (or otherwise) of control over the police service has formed a central analytic theme of this thesis, and was an issue which clearly permeated the policing agenda during the research period. Dunn and Smith (1990, p42) reflect on the consequences of Thatcherism:

"The policy of privatisation has introduced more competition into the provision of public services (possibly at the expense of quality), and has led to the replacement of certain powerful public sector monopolies by private sector ones, making necessary the establishment of regulatory agencies".

They suggest also (p42) that such developments indicate that growth in modern industrial economies is still
dependent on a powerful government sector. Gray (in McKevitt and Lawton, 1994) robustly attacks the fallacy of laissez-faire (which of course is a critical element of New Right theory) and dismisses the concept of the minimum state:

"The result in contemporary Britain of the erosion of civil society by an expansionist state has been the eruption of a political struggle for resources. From being an umpire which enforces the rules of the game of civil association, the British state has become the most powerful weapon in an incessant competition for resources. Its power is sought by every interest and enterprise, partly because of the huge assets it already owns or controls, but also because no private or corporate asset is safe from invasion or confiscatory taxation". (ibid, pp 26 - 33)

Gray describes the state as an "instrument of predation" (p33) and claims that individuals and enterprises are obliged to "organize collusively" so as to "capture or colonize" the interventionist state. He argues (p33) that, despite its claims, the Conservative government has abandoned the aim of a limited state and continues to expropriate discretionary powers. I would support this view, given the evidence of the police reforms and research data.

Quinney (1974, p.95) argues that the ruling class is not in direct control of the legal system, but needs to operate through the mechanisms of the state. In a sense we could argue that the state is a 'prize' to be commandeered; it becomes a tool with which positions of dominance (whether ideological, economic or political) can be maintained. Quinney (ibid, p.96) identifies the elements of the state system, such as the police and judiciary, and adds:

"It is in these institutions that state power lies, and it is in these institutions that power is wielded by the persons who occupy leading positions.... these are the people who constitute the state elite...."

Members of ACPO are, of course, part of the state elite. Drawing on the work of Poulantzas (1978), Cotterrell (1992, p.296) notes the degree of "dissent and conflict" within the state structure. As will be developed further in chapter 5, it is incorrect to assume a necessarily unified state apparatus. There is conflict and competition between elite groups. Cotterrell (ibid, p.132) rightly notes that competition between elements of the state apparatus can lead to the expansion of state intervention in social life. The state structure embodies power, and that power is desired.

Lawton and Rose (1991) discuss at length the 'New Agenda' which has significantly affected the environment
within which the public sector must operate. They list (p133) some of the characteristics of this environment, including the drive to transform the culture of the public sector into one that is more business-like. The measurement of performance has been an important element of both the Police QOS programme, and externally imposed reform (such as the Audit Commission performance indicators). Lawton and Rose (p137) note that assessing performance forms a key aspect of the "managerialist ethos" which has penetrated the public sector.

The thrust of recommodification, or commercialization, of the public sector is critical for our current purposes, considering the 'customer' emphases within the police QOS programme and the transposition of commercial concepts. Consumerism, and the use of the term 'customer' has also penetrated other areas of the Criminal Justice System, as Goode (in Ward and Lacey, 1995) points out in relation to the probation service. Stewart and Ranson (in McKevitt and Lawton 1994) tend to be cautious about the overly simplistic transference of private management concepts to the public sector, but acknowledge that the former can yield benefits for public management (p54). On the consumerisation of public services they warn:

"However, there are customers, clients, consumers and there are citizens. The public sector organization can and should be concerned with a particular customer, but has also other concerns. Consumerism is by itself no guarantee of the public interest". (ibid, p55)

I tend to agree with the last assertion. These authors conclude (p69) that the 'customer' of a public service does not (and indeed should not) behave like the customer of a private sector organization, and the private sector model is inadequate to meet the demands of "public domain".

Potter (in McKevitt and Lawton, 1994) assesses at length the application of consumerism in the public sector, and catalogues five key factors which constitute the "structural underpinning of consumerism" (p250), including choice of product or services and representation of consumer interests. Potter questions, however (p256), whether consumerism is sufficient to radically alter the relationship between the public and providers of service. She suggests (p257) that consumerist principles stop at representation, rather than encompass participation, and maintains that "consumerism is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough to effect a radical shift in the distribution of power" (p257). She questions too whether the current interest in consumerism is genuine or "fanned by the prevailing climate"; authorities are not adopting a consumerist approach just to provide a better service or to re-kindle public support, but also because there are "votes to be won as well, at a time when local government needs all the support it can get if it is to maintain its franchises" (p262). As ever, the imperative of political survival cannot be underestimated. Cynically, it
could be argued that QOS in the police has merely been fanned by the prevailing wind of ideology and policy imperatives. Less cynically, it would be naive to expect senior officers to ignore the political context in which they have to secure resources and legitimacy. Importantly, Potter highlights (p260) an "undercurrent of defensiveness" and hostility about the implantation of consumerism, especially from professional groups.

Farnham and Horton (1993 p238) provide a clear and concise analysis of 'new managerialism' within the public services, some of the main rudiments of which include a rational approach to management (including objective setting), changing organisational structures to shorten hierarchies and devolve responsibility, measuring organisational achievement in term of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, developing performance indicators, creating flexible and responsive organisations, and developing a 'service' orientation, (with concomitant emphasis on the concept of customers and demand-led services).

These authors identify (p241) the cultural shift from the traditional public service ethos (based on "need, equity, fairness and altruism") to that of "public business":

"The private sector model of management involves the use of economistic, rationalist and generic frames of reference. All public services are now perceived as businesses with mission statements identifying their goals and objectives, which can either be quantified or measured. They identify the markets that they are seeking to satisfy and the customers and clients that they serve. This is not always easy to do, for example, in areas like the police and prison services". (ibid, p242)

They remind us (p242) that up until 1987 there was greater managerial emphasis on reducing costs of services and controlling 'inputs', but that since 1987 the emphasis on 'quality' and 'consumer' demands has come to the fore. The way in which some police forces have started to market their services is also noted (p251).

Prior to the brand of 'consumerisation' and 'marketization' of the late 1980s, the police service had already been subject to the pursuit of the three 'Es'. Lawton and Rose (1994, p.157) record that the early 1980s were dominated by the efficiency strategy of the government. Leishman and Savage (in Farnham and Horton, 1993, p.213-215) observe that critical attention on police management tended to accumulate in the early 1980s, and that the police were subject to the Financial Management Initiative (FMI).

Butler (1992, p.23) recalls that the FMI was launched in 1982 and was said to be aimed at "promoting improved management of the civil service" by the setting of objectives, the measurement of performance and
seeking value-for-money (VFM). Butler adds that the aims of the FMI became known as ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness’ (or the three Es). Home Office Circular 114/1983 entitled ‘Manpower, Effectiveness and Efficiency in the Police Service’ encapsulated the essence of the FMI, as is noted by Reiner and Cross (1991, p.6). The introduction of the circular itself (dated 30 November 1983) noted that the purpose was to “invite” Chief Officers and Police Authorities to keep objectives, resources and priorities under review. It was stressed (paragraph 2) that a period of consolidation was required after a phase of increased expenditure on the police.

Leishman and Savage (in Farnham and Horton 1993, p.217) posit that the release of circular 114/83 has been the “cornerstone” of change in police management since the early 1980s, and also conclude that it clearly embodied the principles of the FMI. They note (p.217) that the circular had particular ‘clout’ given the onus on forces to prove economic, efficient and effective use of resources prior to Home Office ratification of establishment bids. Leishman and Savage add (p.218) that some forces responded to 114 of 1983 by adopting ‘Policing by Objectives’ (PBO), which in effect became a diluted version of ‘Management by Objectives’.

Butler (currently Chief of Gloucestershire and an advocate of PBO in the 1980s) also highlights (p.24) that PBO was the origin of much management development which became manifest in response to 114/83. Butler himself produced a book in 1984 entitled ‘Police Management’ which addressed the concept of PBO and its application within British forces. Not all police leaders, however, were keen on adopting the PBO approach. David Phillips, who at the time was an ACC in Greater Manchester Police, wrote in 1987:

“The bulk of what is really important is ignored. Instead we go for some statistical indicator at the marginal levels. We are required to establish the success or failure of a police force according to marginal movements in statistics, particularly the crime figures. That seems to me to be a very misleading way of trying to assess a police force.” (p.10)

Phillips suggested (p.10) that “business as usual” was the “gist” and “bedrock” of policing.

In 1989, Sir Peter Imbert (then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police) rejected the idea that VFM could be judged solely on quantifiable indicators, and that all aspects of policing are amenable to numerical measurement of results (1989, p.264). Imbert added, nevertheless, that the police had done much to pursue VFM during the 1980s and stated:
"For several years now, our management structure has placed responsibility on local managers to set targets after consultation with the community, to monitor progress and to evaluate those results". (p265)

In looking to the 1990s, however, Imbert warned (p266) that the balance between VFM and the quality of policing would need to be retained.

The Audit Commission has played a significant part in the public sector reform process. Butler (1992a, p29) recalls that the Audit Commission was founded in 1983 in order to promote economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the public services, and that they were significant in shaping police management development. Lawton and Rose (1991, p121) note that the creation of the Audit Commission (AC) increased accountability in the public sector, ensured "probity" and promoted improvements in the three Es. The main AC respondent (interview 085 25.4.94) defined the task of the organisation:

"To secure improvements in the quality of management of local authority services. Improvements in terms of getting better value for money, being more economical in the use of resources, a better understanding of the needs of the consumers, and helping local authorities devise management systems and procedures which make the best use of their resources and meet the needs of their local communities." (TC 107-112)

Leishman and Savage (in Famham and Horton, 1993, p215) argue that the "close scrutiny" of the AC helped to put the managerial framework of the Police Service under great pressure after the instigation of the FMI. A steady stream of AC papers has ensured that their influence vis-a-vis the police has remained high profile, and indeed augmented. Love (1991), who was then an Inspector attached to HMIC at the Cambridge Office, considered the impact of the AC police papers:

"This programme of papers has moved progressively from the periphery of police activity and organisation... towards more central issues such as training and communications, and is now reaching out to fundamental issues such as force reorganisation and management style." (p89)

The progression to operational matters was heralded by the 1993 work on crime management entitled 'Helping with Enquiries : Tackling Crime Effectively'. While the majority of officers interviewed during the research welcomed the work of the AC, a small minority felt that their influence (especially in matters related to criminal investigation) was disproportionately high.
The final report of the Independent Inquiry into the role and responsibilities of the police (Police Foundation/PSI 1996) concluded that:

"We have been impressed by the quality and practical usefulness of the work of the Audit Commission in its studies of police operations and we would like to see this exploited still further in future." (p.45)

In the survey questionnaire, Chief Inspectors and Superintendents were asked to say whether or not the AC had 'too much' or 'too little' influence over the police service. A mean score of 4.86 was obtained for the sample as a whole, with a standard deviation of 1.34 (respondents could give a score of 1 for 'too little' influence through to 7 for 'too much'). Generally, then, the Audit Commission was not regarded on excessively influential.

The Audit Commission respondent cited above acknowledged, however (TC 536), that in becoming more involved in operational areas (such as command structures and crime) there was a risk of "trampling on the toes" of those who felt that this was not the role of an auditor. It was added, nevertheless (TC544) that the function of the AC was to act on behalf of the taxpayer:

".. there aren't many areas of policing that we feel are ones that we would necessarily have to shy away from. The difference is that we're looking at the process, not the outcomes.." (TC 548)

Without doubt, one of the most influential Audit Commission papers was No.6 "Footing the Bill: Financing Provincial Police Forces" (June 1990). The main AC respondent believed that this had been the most influential paper and stated:

".. we think we gave a very firm push to the Home Office and the Treasury about the way that forces are funded which has led to the proposals in the Police and Magistrates Courts Bill". (TC 719)

The thrust of consumerism achieved its apotheosis with the launch of the 'Citizen's Charter' in 1991, in which the AC has played a key role. A Times report of 22 September 1993 (entitled 'The triumph of the chartering classes' p38) acknowledged that John Major is widely regarded as the "father" of the Citizen's Charter, but recalled that since the mid 1980s conservative politicians and civil servants had been "assembling the guidelines to which every public service must work". The rather glowing Times article asserted that Citizen's Charter (CC) was a mainly successful initiative, although William Waldegrave (the minister responsible for Citizens Charter at the time) had admitted early in 1993 (see 'Independent' 18.2.93) that more
effort was required to educate the public, and the public sector providers, about the purpose and implication of the initiative.

The Audit Commission occasional paper No.18 ('Putting quality on the map: measuring and appraising quality in the public service', March 1993) noted:

"In the public sector .. there is increasing interest in quality. The principles of making public services answer better to the wishes of their users, and raising their quality overall are the foundations of the Citizens Charter ... The Audit Commission supports the improvement in the quality of the public services. The thrust of the commission's work over the past decade has been to identify services that combine efficiency with effectiveness and quality." (p1)

Dowding (in Dunleavy et al 1993, p177) recalls that the Citizen's Charter was John Major's "big idea" for the 1992 General Election, and notes (p178) that all government departments are expected to produce charters for their 'customers'. Dowding points out (p178) that such charters do not increase legal rights for citizens, but that the CC has generated a novel "consumer-oriented feel" to the public services crucially. It is also suggested (p178) that the CC allows the centre to apply more pressure in the policy making process. This is indicative of how central state intervention has increased.

As several senior officers were keen to point out, the police had of course already launched the QOS initiative prior to CC. Butler (1992a, p26) boldly reminds the reader that the police "can claim to have taken the initiative" by releasing the SCPV and SPD 10 months before CC. Butler tends to be critical of the Audit Commission approach to performance measurement (ibid, p26) and suggests that their approach is focused excessively on 'costs'. In another critique, Butler (1992b) laments the Audit Commission's emphasis on the three Es, and claims that the police is right to be wary of the CC, especially because of the central role of the AC (p49). Butler (ibid, p40) also documents the "legislative support" which the Local Government Bill would give to the CC, in that the AC would have the statutory power to monitor and publish performance indicators for public services.

The AC occasional paper No.18 (referred to above) also highlights the "statutory force" (p12) which the Local Government Act gives to aspects of CC, particularly with regard to performance information:

"The Audit Commission's new duty to prescribe performance indicators for local authorities, and the duty of local authorities to publish information about their performance, will contribute to improving
the quality of services... Overall, the Citizen’s Charter and the associated legislation will be a spur to all authorities..." (p12)

The police concern about the AC Citizen’s Charter performance indicators (PIs) has been manifest in a number of ways. For example a letter from Tony Butler (dated 26.7.94), who at the time was Chair of the QOS PI working group, was directed to all chief constables and invited comment on the AC’s proposals for CC indicators for the year 1995/1996.

As another example, Charles Pollard (in a letter dated 13.7.94 and directed to Paul Vevers of the AC) documented ACPO doubts about the CC indicators:

"we have regularly voiced our concerns that the Audit Commission’s Citizen’s Charter Indicators are quantitative in nature and do not address the qualitative element of policing. Without qualitative indicators the community will be unable to make judgements about police performance."

Comment was made about the likelihood of using simplistic and damaging performance 'league tables'. Pollard concluded his letter to the AC with the hope that the Commission would seek a "unified approach" vis-a-vis the CC performance indicators and the Home Secretary’s key objective indicators. The injection of certain 'new managerialist' principles, as dictated by government, has met with considerable resistance from key police leaders. The presentation given by the Audit Commission representative (Paul Vevers) at the 1994 QOS seminar at Bramshill met with some cynicism; Vevers had tried to 'sell' the idea of force comparisons by suggesting that histograms (and not league tables) would be used to compare forces. The then ACPO president (John Hoddinott) concluded the QOS conference with a 'joke': when is a league table not a league table? [Answer] When it's an Audit Commission histogram! (recorded in field notes, December 1994). This quip provoked much amusement in the Bramshill audience (apart from Paul Vevers).

Nevertheless not all within the police have responded to the Citizen's Charter with disdain: several forces have obtained the 'Charter Mark' which is awarded to those organisations that meet the qualifying criteria of the initiative. In sum, the role of the CC movement, and more specifically the Audit Commission, has formed a significant element of the public sector reform programme. The power of the Audit Commission to shape the policing agenda was already significant prior to the Local Government Act of 1992, and the latter has served to enhance that authority.

For the police, the policies and ideology of the Conservative government were brought to the fore in the early
1980s with circular 114/83. After the emphasis on the three Es, there was a shift toward the consumerization, privatization and marketization of public sector services in the late 1980s. Part of the response by both private and public sector organisations to this has been the adoption of 'Quality of Service', and this will be the topic of the next section. The first half of the 1990s have witnessed continued pressure on the police (and other public sector organisations) to focus on their performance, and of course, the police service has been subject to significant reform during the research period: this reform will be delineated in section 2.5 of this chapter.

And what of the immediate future? Leishman and Savage (in Farnham and Horton 1993, p231) reflect on the significant changes in the police within the last decade or so. They add:

"The continuing pressure from central government, the critical evaluation of many aspects of the police by the Audit Commission, public concern over policing methods and priorities, and the police service's own expressed determination to pursue top to bottom improvements in the organisation, will all ensure that change is very much on the agenda."
2.3 Responding to the reform agenda: the drive for Quality

As well as the growing attention to the three Es, part of the response by many organisations to the public sector reform agenda has been the adoption of a Quality of Service (QoS) or Total Quality Management (TQM) approach. As Lawton and Rose (1991, p155) indicate the quality approach is rooted in the private sector, and its origins can be traced back to the re-building of the Japanese economy after World War II. Some public sector organisations (including certain police forces) began utilising the concepts and discourse of quality in the late 1980s, and the approach has become more significant and widespread in the 1990s.

(i) The development of Quality and the Quality gurus

After the second World War the re-building of the Japanese economy was carried out with the help and guidance of the US authorities. MacDonald and Piggott (1990, p.91) identify the three main quality gurus as Philip Crosby, W Edwards Deming and Joseph Juran. As Peratac (1994, p66) point out, Deming transformed the Japanese approach to industry. Teboul (1991, p17) records that Deming became a "living legend" in Japan, and that 1950 is considered to be the year in which the quality movement was born. Wille (1992, p.17) notes that there is a philosophical, "almost spiritual" fervour attached to the Deming teachings, which aim to create a radically new way of perceiving business life:

"It is based upon a system of beliefs about people and aspirations for their well-being. The people are employees and everyone who may be called a customer. Happy people, delighted by what you have provided, become loyal customers. They will continue to demand what you supply and you will be on the pathway to profit and growth."(p17)

Kennedy (1991) recalls that Deming's 'fourteen points' of management lie at the core of his philosophy. Some of these points (as summarised by Kennedy, p39) are included here:

- Improve constantly (and forever) every process of planning, production and service.
- Adopt and institute leadership aimed at helping people to do a better job.
- Drive out fear, and facilitate effective two-way communication.
- Break down barriers between departments and staff.
- Encourage education and self-improvement for everybody in the organisation.
MacDonald and Piggott (1990, p108) refer to Joseph Juran as the other 'Samurai' and believe (ibid, p108) that Juran's work epitomises the "very essence" of quality, and assert (p109) that he was the first to amalgamate a variety of approaches into what is now termed 'Total Quality Management' (TQM). Wille (1992, p26) lists Juran's 'ten steps' in the quest for quality which include building awareness of the need and opportunity for improvement, and recognising people who produce good quality work.

Teboul (ibid, p18) records that during the 1960s, the quality philosophy swept through Japanese industry, and that the first 'quality circles' became operational in 1962. He adds (p18) that quality became a "formidable competitive weapon". Sashkin and Kiser (1992, p5) state that by 1980 there were 100,000 quality circles (or quality control circles) in operation in Japanese industry. A number of forces have attempted to use quality circles (including Hampshire Constabulary), but the generally autonomous work patterns of officers have often undermined the efficacy of such attempts. Sashkin and Kiser (p5) define the Japanese approach to quality circles:

"Workers who were part of a "team" would meet around a table at a regular time during the week, usually before or after working hours. The team members would discuss problems, usually problems that concerned the quality of production. Based on these discussions they would develop solutions and pass these ideas on to management."

Drummond (1992 p20) states that by the mid-1970s, Japanese industry was seriously undermining its US and other western competitors, and that only at that point did the west pay due attention to the type of philosophy as expressed by Deming. Teboul also posits (p19) that the brand of quality propounded by Deming and Juran only began to penetrate the western world in the 1970s and 1980s, and that Japanese success underscored the significance of the quality gurus. As Wille testifies (p27), the other principal quality guru, Philip Crosby, has been hugely influential in bringing quality to western companies.

The concept of the police 'customer', and consumerism within the public sector more generally, is resonant with the type of business philosophy of Deming, Juran and Crosby. Observation during interviews with senior officers, particularly those more directly involved with Quality, revealed that the bookshelves of these respondents often contained work by quality and management experts.

Wille (ibid, p.30) writes:

"All three of these gurus are really talking about management. That is what quality is about. The
purpose of a business is to create and keep a customer. There is only one way to do this, by giving the
customers what they want, and that is a definition of quality. Running a business, therefore, is all
about quality. In one way there is no other topic."

Dale and Oakland (1994), in their history of British national quality initiatives, highlight the significance
of the DTI 1982 White Paper 'Quality and International Competitiveness' which outlined the decline of
the UK's share of world trade, the intensity of global competition, and the importance of the reputation
for 'quality' (Dale and Oakland, 1994, p12). They recall that the 'National Quality Campaign' was
launched in 1983 and that BS5750 formed an integral element of this campaign. This series of standards
provides:

"the requirements for quality assurance and providing guidance on how to manage and achieve quality
... and were seen as a very positive step towards improving the UK's reputation for quality". (p13)

BS5750 accreditation is achieved through assessment by an authorised certifying body. Lawton and Rose
(1994, p189) suggest that BS5750 can be easily "applied to a repetitive manufacturing process or routine
activities such as the payment of benefits where there is an easily identifiable output": they add, however,
that the features of the public sector require careful consideration vis-a-vis the applicability of such quality
models.

The DTI, through the 'Enterprise Initiative', launched the 'Managing into the '90s' programme (see Dale
and Oakland, ibid, p13) which targeted the areas of design, purchasing and supply, manufacturing and
quality. Dale and Oakland (ibid, p13) describe how the TQM approach was promulgated through the DTI
programme (with the use of workshops, videos and consultancy) and conclude that the 'quality campaign'
successfully assisted many UK companies. Lawton and Rose (1994, p191) note that while few public
sector organisations have achieved the BSI 'kite mark', many other organisations have moved towards the
quality approach.

More recently, however, there has been evidence of scepticism or disappointment with quality and quality
experts. For example, a recent BBC2 broadcast of 'The Money Programme' (29.10.95) contained
criticism of the quality movement and the value of management experts. In the programme, Tom Peters,
one of the contemporary management gurus, defended the use of the quality concept, and suggested that
companies would need to strive harder in their efforts at corporate development.
The Common elements of a Quality approach

Lawton and Rose (1991, p.156) indicate that most approaches to quality incorporate an emphasis on cultural change in the organisation, the commitment of management, and the training and education of staff at every level. An important element of the police approach to quality has been 'Getting Things Right' (first launched in 1993), and this focused on the importance of changing culture within the organisation. Drummond (1992, p.129) highlights the impossibility of 'bolting on' a quality culture to a set of existing practices and systems.

Fielding (1988, p.2) notes the common conception that police occupational culture exercises a "monolithic authority", and that it can easily subvert managerial action. Given this assumption, one would indeed anticipate the impossibility of 'bolting on' a quality focus in the police. Fielding (p.9) adds, however, that there can be distinct cultural differences between (and within) police forces. It would be simplistic to assume that the 'culture' of junior ranks is necessarily the same as that of senior ranks. Nevertheless, the then Chief HMI, Sir John Woodcock, questioned in 1990 the cultural milieu of the police:

"... I sometimes wonder if the police mind, steeped in tradition and the organisational philosophy of the past, can make cuts into the fabric of policing deep enough to let the fresh blood of innovation and trust flow." (1990, p.19).

According to Drummond a quality organisation must jettison the tendency to de-skill its employees (p.140), and should involve employees in the management process itself (p.133). In discussing organisational culture, she emphasises (p.127) that building a 'quality culture' presents the Western world with an "opportunity to beat Japanese competition". One might propose more cynically that the remonstrations about improving employee potential and involvement are merely instrumental in achieving the 'hard core' of an organisation's objectives. Wilkinson et al (in 'Professional Manager' September 1993, p.18) state:

"The arguments for quality management are various, including customer demand, boosting staff morale and product differentiation. However, for many, the most compelling argument is that quality improvement promises to enhance long term business performance and profitability. Quality is seen not as an option but as a business requirement in the face of growing competition."

If the distinction between the public and private sectors has blurred given the impetus of 'new
managerialism' and government policy, it is not too surprising that QOS has been adopted as a means of organisational survival. For public sector organisations like the police, the adoption of a commercial model of development is perhaps inevitable given the ethos of competition and marketisation which has characterised the 'zeitgeist' of the 1980s and 1990s.

Peratec (1994, p11) note that successful organizations monitor performance in relation to "customer requirements". To some extent, this has been undertaken by the police via the ACPO customer surveys (which will be discussed further in the next chapter). The concept of 'customer' also incorporates the need to respond to the requirements of colleagues within the organisation, and once again this idea has been stressed by senior officers involved in the QOS initiative. The corporation striving for quality must consider the measurement of satisfaction of external customers, the identification of internal customer requirements (which some forces have done), and the comparison (or benchmarking) with competitors (Peratec, 1994, p12-13).

Morgan and Murgatroyd (1994, p3) define TQM as a "general philosophy and set of ideas which has paradigm wholeness", and identify the common assumptions which underpin this so-called paradigm, while acknowledging the variations between quality advocates. They list (p6) some assertions about TQM which include the following:

* The customer-supplier 'interface' lies at heart of TQM.
* TQM is predominantly concerned with changing attitudes and skills. The culture is imbued with the aim of doing the "right things, right first time, every time".
* There is a philosophy of never-ending improvement, which leads to "customer delight". (ibid, p6)

These aspects have certainly figured in police quality discourse. The above authors note (p8) that the definition of 'quality' varies according to different emphasis (such as a product-based, customer-based or value-based emphasis), but more interestingly highlight (p9) the distinction between manufacturing and service definitions of quality. The critical importance of the customer/user focus in the service industry is quite rightly pinpointed (p9).

Drummond (1992) also focuses on the 'interface' dimension of service organisations, and stresses (p94) that interaction between consumer and 'producer' will inevitably affect perceptions of quality. She lists (p97) the aspects of service which are commonly held to impact upon this perception, including reliability,
courtesy, responsiveness and communication. It is stressed (p99) that, as in manufacturing, the key to quality in service delivery is customer satisfaction, and that this rests on fulfilling expectations. There has been a recent emphasis within the police on the idea of managing customer expectations and 'educating' the public about what can be expected from the police.

Morgan and Murgatroyd (1994, p10) highlight some difficulties which must be confronted in the provision of service quality, including the heterogeneous needs of the customer, and the "inseparability" of the producer and consumer (in that quality occurs during the delivery of service). Nwankwo and Richardson (1994, p32) distinguish between those organisations which have a conception of customers based on "customer-specific" definition and those which have a more introverted definition of customers. They suggest (p33) that the latter treat their customers as "zombies" and fail to incorporate “a customer-driven mission, an effective system to measure customer satisfaction, customer input into decision processes, "customer-oriented value-driven behaviour". The police, of course, have particular difficulties with the concept of embracing customer values. Many of the police "customers" are in breach of the law and readily defined as "villains". Are these villains to be referred to as customers? This seems rather nonsensical given the coercive nature of the interaction between police and villain. Fielding (1991 p.115-116) writes of the enduring nature of police stereotypes such as the ‘decent citizen’ and ‘scumbag’. It is unlikely that the police will allow the value system of the scumbags to drive their customer-oriented behaviour; it is therefore necessary to be aware that the concept of ‘meeting community expectation’ is only likely to reflect the expectations of the decent citizen. Some critics might suggest that such ‘decent citizens’ are more likely to be white and middle or upper class. However, the police have in recent years shown greater sensitivity to groups such as ethnic minorities, so it is unfair to dismiss totally their efforts to bridge the gap between themselves and groups in less powerful positions.

Nwankwo and Richardson argue (p36) that customers are becoming more sophisticated in their demands for, and reaction to, service quality, and that adopting a "strategic customer service perspective" provides a new opportunity for public sector organisations. At this juncture it is beneficial to consider the actual application of 'quality' concepts in both the private and public sector.

(iii) The application of Quality

To what extent do the concepts of quality, and TQM, translate into practical application? A review of the
literature indicates evidence of problems in the implementation of a quality approach, some of which will be highlighted here. Sashkin and Kiser (1992 p9) argue that the introduction of Quality Circles (QCs) into some organisations is akin to the grafting of a fifth leg of a donkey onto an overweight cow to support its bulk (!). Although they feel that QCs can act to improve quality, they note (p10) that many simply fade away within two years of being set up; in their case study of an American University, QC failed because there was no sense of common purpose, no organisational commitment to quality improvement and no "social and cultural solidarity of the Japanese organisation". (ibid, p8). Cynically, one might suggest the concept of QCs was at fault rather than the organisation, or its personnel.

Drummond (1992, p127) posits that QCs have generally failed because they were "tools of development" used in the absence of any organisational infra-structure or strategic approach. Interestingly, she does not support the notion that Japanese workers are necessarily happy and motivated, is not overimpressed by Japanese quality development, and questions their application of quality circles. This assessment runs counter to many claims about the 'quality' approach in Japanese industry. Drummond (p128) argues that Japanese quality systems are beset by "conventional power structures", with a clear division between managers and workers.

With the quasi-militaristic structure and culture of the police, it could be argued that the imposition of quality by senior officers (and the measurement of customer satisfaction) represents a rather oppressive form of employee control. For example, if it becomes clear (via a customer questionnaire) that a particular officer or shift is not satisfying the customers, then management have a tool with which to penalise or rebuke the officer (or civilians) on the ground. Similarly, it is certainly true that the Police Federation have been very reluctant about ethical standards because of the disciplinary implications.

Dale and Oakland (1994, p52) reject the assumption that success stories about organisational reform and the drive for quality are "universally applicable". They note too (p53) the variety of staff in companies who are responsible for 'quality' and the diverse definition of TQM and quality management. Coulson-Thomas (in 'Managing Service Quality' November 1993) discusses the failure of quality programmes, and suggests (p29) that they often "run out of steam" after a while. He notes as well (p30) that the attitudes and behaviour of staff may not change as a result of the quality initiative, possibly because personnel are not "empowered, equipped and motivated" to meet the corporate aspirations (p30). The difficulties of 'customer service initiatives' are highlighted by Macauley and Cook (in 'Managing Service Quality' vol. 4 No.4 1994) which include:
Senior managers paying 'lip service' to the idea.

The initiative being regarded as 'flavour of the month'.

No criteria are set to measure the success of the initiative.

Middle managers are not involved or committed, creating a barrier to development.

(ibid, p32)

These type of issues have certainly emerged in discourse about the police's QOS programme, and were reflected in comments recorded during interviews and the research survey. Macauley and Cook emphasise (p32) the danger of senior management issuing service charters without there being any real impact on the way in which customers are treated; they suggest (p33) that middle management hold the key to radical changes required for a successful initiative. Like Coulson-Thomas (1993) they advocate (p34) regular reviews of any quality initiative.

The September 1993 issue of 'Professional Manager' carried an article by Wilkinson, Redman and Snape who in 1992 had conducted a major survey of nearly 900 managers in the UK. The survey results (published by the Institute of Management) indicated that the main impact of quality campaigns is to raise awareness about quality issues (but with limited impact on "bottom line performance" such as sales). Wilkinson, Redman and Snape (p18) report that:

"While most of those surveyed felt quality management programmes had achieved a reasonable degree of success, over ten per cent reported adverse effects, particularly on productivity, cost efficiency, profitability and employee morale. And a minority expressed some important criticisms of approaches to quality management, seeing it as a management fad, dominated by obscure jargon and a sales gimmick."

After listing the generally accepted advantages of a quality approach, Lawton and Rose (1994, p190) illuminate several difficulties which could accompany the adoption of such an approach in the public sector, including the absence of a profit motive which can weaken the incentive to improve quality, (as can the monopolistic provision of a service), the fact that high satisfaction of customers can conduce to increase demand, and that requisite culture change may not extend to 'front-line' service providers (p.191). Lawton and Rose concede, nevertheless, that the quality approach in the public sector can lead to improved complaints procedures, the assessment of customer needs and satisfaction, and enhanced staff development (p191).
Morgan and Murgatroyd (1994, chapter 8) provide a searching analysis of the problematic issues which the public sector must confront in implementing TQM. It is suggested (p169) that many public sector employees are resistant to change (as indeed are many in the private sector), and that the most common points of resistance to the introduction of TQM include a fear that it will reduce the number of jobs available or promotion opportunities, a fear that work will become more complex, and a reluctance to accept full responsibility for action (ibid p170-171). It is also argued that TQM is sometimes regarded as just another "management fad" (p171), too burdensome (p172), threatening to professional autonomy (p173) and too slow to produce immediate results (p173).

In conclusion, section 2.3 has focused on the history and key concepts of quality, and pinpointed some difficulties which may accompany the implementation of a quality programme. It is useful to end this section with an extract which emphasises the policy framework within which the public sector has, and will, be obliged to operate:

"Many public services must now compete for work in a way unimaginable 10 or 15 years ago. Quality has become an issue because standards are now contractually defined, whereas previously they were vague and unmonitored.... Rivalry focuses not on price but quality. Universities, for example, are ranked according to research output, with leading establishments being awarded a disproportionately high share of funds, while the future of those with poor ratings is bleak. Such is the economic and political climate that ever-higher standards are demanded in the face of diminished and diminishing resources." (Drummond 1992, p13)
Apart from the impact of the New Agenda in the 1980s the other major factor which foreshadowed the QOS initiative was the relative de-legitimation of the police.

It is impossible to catalogue here all of the events which contributed to the progressive de-legitimation of the Police Service from the 1960s onwards. However, in the 1980s the decline in public confidence, the threats to accountability, the cases of corruption and miscarriages of justice, and the 'hardening' of public disorder policing fell increasingly under critical scrutiny. In addition, the government became increasingly sensitised to the apparent failure of the police to combat crime.

Reiner (1985) argues that the closest the police ever came in modern times to a mythical 'golden age' of policing was in the 1950s. From the 1960s onwards the standing of the Police Service gradually diminished (as it did for most other parts of the Establishment). Hall and Jacques (1989, p.30-31) remind us of the significant change which occurred in the post-war period:

"The social upheavals of the late 1960s, centred on the first generation of the post war welfare state, the beneficiaries of higher living standards, better health and improved educational opportunities spawned new aspirations for social, individual and sexual liberation, which could not be contained within the mores of respectable postwar society."

Thus, it would be incorrect to assume that the police service has been the only state agency or institution to come under increasing scrutiny or criticism in recent decades. Hall and Jacques (ibid, p.31) talk of the 'crisis' of the 1970s and that decade's disenchantment with the post war settlement. Allum (1995, p.542-543) recalls the perceived social and state crises of the 1970s, and summarises the 'new politics' which mushroomed after the late 1960s "placing topics like 'quality of life', the environment, peace, gender on the political agenda" (p.543). He notes, nevertheless, (p.544) the survival of 'old politics' and traditional institutional arrangements and elites.

Reiner and Cross (1991, p.1) state that:

"During the late 1970s widespread anxieties about economic, social, cultural and moral change in British society came to be crystallised into one primary symbol: 'law and order'...."
In the 1970s, there was growing disquiet about police malpractice and the growing significance of reactive-type policing (Reiner 1985 p198). Miller (in Holdaway, 1979, p.14) asserted that police-public relations in London were undergoing a "serious crisis", and that the standards of the Metropolitan Police were in decline. The legitimacy of the police continued to decline in the 1980s, a decade which was punctuated with major public disorder and a concomitant strengthening of policing hardware and tactics to counter the social unrest with which the Service was confronted. Reiner and Cross (1991, p.4) outline the tumultuous events of the 1980s and the failure of the government's law-and-order policies. The causes, unfolding, and impact of the 1980, 1981, and 1985 riots are well documented by writers such as Joshua and Wallace (1983), Waddington (1992) and Brightmore (1992). The tactics and style of policing in Brixton was criticised by Lord Scarman in his report on the disturbances in 1981, and his findings acted as a major catalyst for an attempted redirection of policing in the early 1980s, although there was considerable police resistance to some of Scarman's recommendations (see Reiner 1985 chapter 7). Perhaps even more serious for the de-legitimation process was the Miners' Strike of 1984-1985. Some very senior officers in the research sample drew attention to the profound impact that this dispute had on the tactics and ethos of the police, and felt that the cultural 'fallout' from this period contaminated the Service for a considerable period.

P.A.J. Waddington (1991) discusses the eclipsing of the 'Dixon of Dock Green' image, and suggests (p13) that 1966 (for example) was a significant year in that it marked a clear development in the approach to armed police operations. The 1976 Notting Hill Carnival heralded a distinct change in the tenor of public disorder, and its policing (Waddington, p30). The Bristol riot of 1980 set the tone for a decade which traumatised both inner city and non-metropolitan areas of Britain, and which adumbrated the 'tooling up' of the police beyond all recognition. As Northam (1988, p30) asserts, since the formation of the SPG in 1965, the police had adopted an increasingly paramilitary stance in the maintenance of order, and adds:

"Since 1981, they have slipped towards the tactics of public order control which characterise the military... The paramilitary drift has been a piecemeal response to deep-seated perceptions of increased threat among police officers" (p31)

Northam (p41) also reminds us of the significance of ACPO's 'Public Order Manual of Tactical Options and Related Matters' whose genesis occurred in September 1981 (after the summer riots of that year), when ACPO set up a working group to review riot control methods. Within two years, the manual had been compiled, and according to Northam (p42):
"At one stroke, two central traditions of British policing were thrown into question: the selection of paramilitary tactics raised doubts about the doctrine of minimum force, and the strict code of secrecy surrounding the decision drove a coach and horses through the concept of policing by public consent."

Reiner (1992, p85) echoes such views in stating that the "militarisation of policing has proceeded apace in the 1980s in the wake of yet more serious disorder", and records that the intensification of policing tactics included the first use of CS gas in mainland Britain.

Levi (1989, p194) refers to the "tough approach to public order policing" in the 1980s which was encouraged by the government; he highlights also the considerable developments in police powers (p185). The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) of 1984, for example, augmented the powers of entry, stop-and-search, and arrest although (as Fielding, 1991, p189 indicates) the codes of practice under PACE are often regarded as cumbersome and obstructive by the police themselves.

The Public Order Act of 1986 increased police powers in relation to demonstrations and marches (Levi, ibid, p185, Savage, ibid p92), and the 1986 White Paper 'Criminal Justice: plans for legislation' paved the way to the Criminal Justice Acts of 1987 and 1988. Savage (ibid, p94) reminds us that the former was aimed at combatting serious commercial crime, while the latter included reforms to trial evidence, extradition and maximum sentences. Savage concludes (p97) that such reforms were "clear evidence of a continued attempt to strengthen the hand of the forces of law-enforcement".

The Police received considerable criticism in the 1980s about their policing style and relationship with the community, especially ethnic minorities, and as Joyce (1992 p233) points out, the significance of policing approach in the causation of the 1981 disorders was recognised in Lord Scarman's report. Joyce (p246) concludes that police reform must be one of the central planks in reducing the propensity for serious public disorder. Fielding (1991, p138) too notes that the adoption of certain policing techniques can "provoke or aggravate the anticipated response" in both order maintenance and crime control.

Reiner (1992, p88) documents that despite the "tougher methods" of policing and the post-Scarman emphasis on community consultation, the serious riots of 1985 could not be averted. He recalls also (p88) the serious disorder of 1986 to 1987 during picketing of the News International Plant at Wapping; complaints were made about the ferocity of policing style, and as Leishman and Savage (1993, p216) indicate, a report by Northamptonshire Police concluded that some Met Officers were "out of control". Leishman and Savage (ibid, p213-216) outline other events which damaged the standing of the Service,
and its management, including the Policy Studies Institute report of 1983, the RUC 'shoot to kill' controversy in 1986, the Hillsborough football disaster of 1989, and the disbandment of the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad:

"These events raised a host of questions about the police organisation, but one which ran throughout was to do with the capacity of police management to cope with the demands of, and policing in, contemporary Britain. It is within this context that the style, structure and processes of management have undergone change in recent years..." (ibid, p216)

These authors catalogue the other signposts and catalysts for change in the 1980s, such as Circular 114 of 1983, the "more assertive and demanding" approach of the HMIC, and the emphasis on the 'three Es'. It is stated that the Police have:

"begun to develop more comprehensive views of what police performance overall can be about. One notable expression of this has been in the shift in recent years toward concern for 'quality' in policing processes..." (p223)

One DCC (interview 067 13.12.93) suggested that Chief Officers had been insensitive to societal development, and that the police staff college had failed to prepare the future leaders of the service for a rapidly changing society (TC335). The immediate precursor to the 1990 QOS initiative was the Operational Policing Review (OPR), which was conducted when the Police:

"realised that we had to be seen to be addressing ourselves, were we in tune to police the 90s and beyond? ... it came about with a dawning or realisation that we had to be seen to be addressing our ethos and the way that we do things, and the quality of service that we were giving to the public." (TC 411-425)

An ACC from the same force (interview 079 28.2.94) was asked why the SPD had arisen when it did. He ruminated on the 'force' element of policing the early 1980s riots and the Miners' Strike, and added:

"I think there probably was a realisation that we had to, as well as financial management, the whole ethos of the Service had to be looked at under a microscope, and realised that we perhaps weren't doing all that we should be doing...."
Several police leaders reflected on the 'Transit Van Mentality' which typified public order policing in the 1980s, and which was antithetical to the idea of close co-operation with the public. The ACC cited above lamented the fact that there were still officers in his force who acted as though they were "under siege" (TC 190), and the fact that the "canteen culture" was still in evidence.

The use of the police in the mid-1980s to press home the political and ideological imperatives of the Conservative Government was an issue discussed in a substantial number of interviews. The 'repressive' policing function during the Miners' Strike is quite clearly an important historical precursor to the efforts of relegitimation (as Reiner, 1992 p97, phrases it) of the late 1980s/early 1990s. Gamble (1994 p126) recalls that during the second phase of the Thatcher administration, the government was prepared to "meet and defeat any strike in the public sector", and that the Miners' Strike was the principal test of this resolve.

Green (1990) delivers a stinging attack on the "repressive policing" (p79) of the Miners' Strike, and talks of the "coincidental interests" of ACPO, the NCB and the Conservative Government:

"*interests which ensured that the police discharged their duty with brutality, centralization and class partiality*" (p45).

Green also suggests (p45) that the policing of the Strike significantly "reorientated the attitudes of the policed", in that the police were consequently viewed with considerable hostility and suspicion.

There is no doubt that the Miners' Strike, and the police's archetypal role of 'repressive state apparatus' damaged the image of the police and markedly affected the policing style of those forces involved. Graef (1989, p10-11) likens the media coverage of the strike (and the urban riots) to that of the Vietnam War.

Some of the officers interviewed tended to agree that the police involvement in the Strike was somewhat unfortunate. One Chief Constable (interview 055 9.11.93) said:

"... the way in which certain politicians and some Senior Police Officers used opportunities in the Miners' Strike did us a great deal of harm. To get caught up in an overtly government versus left wing issue was not right for us. I mean, we had to do it, I have no qualms about that, and if it happened again, I'd do the same thing. But there were a few basic tenets of public order practice that were lost,
"I think. And I'd never have let Maggie Thatcher anywhere near addressing the troops." (TC 208-220)

This Chief noted that the excessive emphasis on 'enforcement' was one driving factor behind the QOS initiative (TC 444).

A Chief Superintendent in Force 1 (interview 041 25.8.93) who was particularly critical of the police role during the strike agreed that it had politicised the police, and was saddened that the service had been perceived as an "arm of the state" (TC 192). He talked also of the period of radical change within the police in the 1980s:

"... I think the watershed would probably be around about ... '86, '87, but probably traced back to the time of the Miners' strike when attitudes, both within and without the Service, to my mind, began to change... I think the Miners' Strike did two things. It actually showed us to be quite a potent force, and I think that scared some people... both inside and outside the organisation." (TC 083-102)

As this officer pointed out, during the Miners' Strike the police "started to win" (TC 490) and this very phenomenon undermined public empathy for the beleaguered 'thin, blue line'.

Fielding (1991, p101) states that during the dispute, Chief Constables "acquiesced to a partisan role" and were generally "insensitive to the repercussions". A highly controversial development had been the setting up of the National Reporting Centre (NRC) which achieved a high profile during the Miners' Strike (see Fielding, 1991 p95). The aim of the NRC, based at New Scotland Yard, has been to co-ordinate the deployment of officers during large scale disorder. P.A.J. Waddington (1991, p130) clarifies that the NRC is now known on the Mutual Aid Co-ordinating Centre, and adds that the gathering and use of intelligence by the NRC was at the root of much controversy during the strike. He notes too (p131) the significant role played by central government, and Fielding (ibid p95) recalls the concern of local authorities that they had lost contact with their local policing arrangements. Graef (ibid, p14) records that many officers resent being used as political pawns; this was certainly the impression gained during some interviews with senior officers. Despite the type of protestation raised by Green (1990), however, other officers did maintain the police were simply responding to the mandate of upholding law and order during the strike. Reiner (1985, p209) concludes that the "harsh consequences" of government policy were encapsulated by the Miners' Strike:

"The police operation is accentuating all the centralising and militaristic tendencies which the post-
Scarman initiatives were aimed at reversing. Those Chief Constables less wedded to the new-style developments have been given a wonderful chance to reverse gears."

P. A. J. Waddington (1991 p123) asserts that in recent years the appearance of officers (with shields and riot helmets) has accentuated fear that the methods of "alien policing systems" have been introduced into Britain:

"Symbolically, they represent a coercive, even oppressive, style of policing, designed to secure compliance by force rather than consent."

Fielding (1991, p12), however, notes the danger of focusing on "spectacular public order disturbances", and ignoring "dangerously partisan" government and policing policy, and more insidious forms of social conflict. Fielding also emphasises (p28) that the riots of the 1980s, and concomitant debates about policing, tend to obfuscate an awareness that policing has always been bound up with public disorder and social conflict:

"Public order has been at the heart of the sustained controversy over police power and actions in a way which crime control seldom has." (p30)

The QOS initiative in the police was most certainly adumbrated by debate and concern about the public order function, and represented a counter-balance to the 'enforcement' role which had figured so highly on the agenda of the 1980s. Some senior officers in force clearly indicated that efforts to inculcate the service ethos in the late 1980s were in direct response to the fallout from the Miners' dispute.

One Chief Constable (interview 046 14.9.93) was asked to identify the 'watershed' of the 1980s in terms of changing policing style. He nominated three factors which contributed to a sense of 'where are we going?' (TC 328):

"it's a mix of probably three things: the riots, and the Scarman Report were fundamental. The Miner's Strike is another second thing, and the third thing, I think, was just the general increase in crime, increase in demand for policing ... as a result of a whole range of reasons ..." (TC 320)

A DCC (interview 035 19.8.93) recalled the impact of circular 114:
"You started to come across the three Es on courses, more than you were actually aware of them in force. And people started to think that way. And I think also at the time the Thatcher Government were very much pushing departments and industry in that particular direction .... for devolved management, for devolved budgeting and all those sort of things which actually make people much more accountable .. and those sort of things were actually happening, to my mind, a couple of years after 114 of 83." (TC 131-150)

He felt too that the "Thatcherite years" had impacted upon the ethos in the police, with officers much more money-oriented, rather than service-oriented. Another DCC (Interview 035 19.8.93) believed that the 'force versus service' debate had ensued in the mid to late 1980s:

"... and I think was quite a watershed. It took place nationally, in some forces it took place locally and I believe it emanated from enlightened management looking at what is the nature of our business - what are we here to do? And they linked into many other initiatives outside the service." (TC 077-080)

This officer also stressed the influence of quality initiatives within commercial organisations. One HMIC Chief Superintendent based at the central office (interview 063 26.11.93) recalled the influence of the management 'gurus' and how the police service leaders looked to the experiences of organisations such as British Airways and the NHS (TC 288). The historical reasons for the launch of quality in the police were recounted:

"I think society was moving out of an era whereby the professionals knew best. A far more questioning society, as we moved through the 80s... We had limited resources, and continuing limited resources, to meet those demands. We'd had to respond in some way... And so you had this picture of a demanding customer base, critical customer base, slippage in the public's opinion of us... limited resources... and an acknowledgement that we were not going to be able to meet everybody's expectation of what the police service should be doing." (TC 244-270)

These last two data extracts tend to confirm the impact of 'new managerialism' and the more stringent emphasis on the three Es. Another top member of the central inspectorate (interview 024 15.6.93) reflected on the 'law and order' mandate of the Tory party (TC 433), and noted how politicians and the media judged that the fight against crime had failed:

"There is a temptation that all you need to do is change the structure of the Police Service... to blame
things on bad management... So you get the pressure for change, coming from the political aspect, but you also get it from people like me, who actually see the folly of too many police Forces, of too much duplication..." (TC 455/470)

Levi (1989 p196), in summing up the development of policing in the 1980s, acknowledges the "centralisation and concentration of power" by ACPO and the Home Office, as well as the conflictual nature of policing industrial disputes, but adds:

".. it would be an exaggeration to describe mainland Britain as a police state... There is more dissent among Senior police and within government than the generally authoritarian trend discussed here would suggest..."

As will be developed later, the centralising trends of policing have become even more pronounced in the 1990s, as have the divisions between senior police leaders and central government. Finally, one of the recurring elements of Reiner's analyses is the delegitimation of the police. Reiner (in 'Policing' Autumn 1991) states:

"The big story of the late 1980s in policing is the massive haemorrhage of public confidence - the evidence of serious decline in the public standing of the force."
2.5 The Storm of Reform

It is often pointed out that in comparison to other public sector organisations, the police service in the early 1980s fared well in resource provision terms (see Savage 1990, p.90). Having been elected in 1979, the Conservative Government rapidly implemented the recommendations of the Edmund Davies committee and significantly increased police pay. Savage (1990, p.91) claims that since 1979 general expenditure on 'law and order' had increased by more than 40%. This can be of little surprise, given the 'free economy, strong state' imperative of the Tory government, and its determination to confront those segments of society which would resist the power of the state (Gamble 1994, p.7). The legislative developments of the 1980s paralleled the increase in police pay and manpower, and by the mid-80s, the state machinery was clearly geared up to fulfil its toughened role (see also Farnham and Horton 1993 p.2-3). This was evidenced in the policing of the Miners' Strike. Gamble (1994, p.220) notes that apart from in "privileged spheres" such as the police and the military, the Conservative Government downgraded the public sector activities.

However, given the continuation of New Right philosophies (or the "political project" of Thatcherism, Gamble 1994 p.4), and the particular emphasis on economy and efficiency it was clear that the police service could no longer be treated as a special case. The 'law and order' requirements of the government had shielded the police from the ravages of public sector reform in the 1980s, but by the early 1990s the impulse of Tory policies (and criticism) cut through the 'special relationship' between the Conservatives and the government. Reiner (1992, p.93) talks of the "police-Tory symbiosis" of the late 1970s, and suggests that the zenith of police politicisation was reached in 1984-85 (ibid, p.95). After this, Reiner suggests:

"The love affair between the Tories and the police cooled as public expenditure cuts began to bite on the police, and they feared a hidden agenda of incipient privatisation".

A number of senior officers reinforced the view that after the Miners' Strike, the relationship with the government changed, and that there was an effort by senior officers to distance the service from the harsher enforcement function which it had so publicly fulfilled in the first half of the 1980s.

Of course, the end of that decade and the beginning of the 1990s was an unfortunate time for the police in terms of public relations. The cases of the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven and the Birmingham Six obviously caused embarrassment for a government aligned with the law and order mandate. In 1991 the Home Secretary announced the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, which was headed by Lord Runciman.

48
The apparent failure to control the growth in crime was significant in the continued cooling of the love affair, and some very senior respondents alluded to the murmurings of discontent in the 'corridors of power'. Reiner (1992, p.104) maintains that the police had lost the confidence of what he calls the articulate "talking classes", whom he suggests could be described as Guardian or Independent readers. Reiner omits to mention the 'Times' or 'Daily Telegraph' readers who might have more power in the ranks of the central state: there is some indication that the Establishment had lost faith in the police.

The mounting pressure on the police in the early 1990s is epitomised by a 'Sunday Times' article of 17 May 1992 (by Michael Prescott). The article reflected varied criticism of the police, and talked of the perception of "laziness, incompetence and rudeness" (p.12) Prescott also wrote:

"the men and women whom Margaret Thatcher cherished with millions of pounds in extra pay and resources during the past decade are now revealed as practitioners of all that is anathema to Thatcherism, and the police service is derided as the last great unreconstructed national industry".

It was added (p.12) that disillusionment with the police stretches deep into the middle classes, and that the police would be in for a "roasting" given the appointment of Kenneth Clarke as Home Secretary, who has "an appetite for assaulting bastions of complacency and obstructive self-interest".

In 1992, the director-general of the CBI (Howard Davies) argued that the Police Service was in need of significant reform. A Police Review article (11.9.92) focused on the views of the director-general (who incidentally had previously headed the Audit Commission) as set out in the report "Fighting Leviathan: building social markets that work ". The article highlighted Davies’ criticism of blurred accountability of police expenditure, reduced police effectiveness, and managerial accountability. Such criticism from one of the leading proponents of 'new managerialism' (and a key representative of the business elite) was bound to contribute to the inevitability of police reform.

Early in 1993, it became clear that Kenneth Clarke was set to challenge the traditional structure and financing of the police, and thereby continue the programme of public sector reform begun in the 1980s. It might be suggested that he was able to attack the police at this historical juncture given that the 'enemies within' had mostly been defeated: the police had successfully done the 'dirty work' for the central state in the 1980s, and there was much less of a risk in reforming the police (and invoking their wrath or disenchantment) in the early 1990s. It would have been impossible for the Conservative Government to alienate the police during the period of asserting strong state authority in the 1980s. The turbulent agenda of change has embraced
fundamental themes, including the centralisation of control over the police, the dynamics of the tripartite structure, the marketization/privatisation of policing services, and the "perennial chestnut of debate" (Reiner, 1992, p.139) which centres on the force/service dichotomy. It was against this broiling backdrop that the research was conducted.

The Daily Telegraph of 21 January 1993 noted that since his appointment 9 months previously Clarke had instigated work on police pay, conditions of service, command structure, discipline and dismissal. The Guardian of 23.1.93 (p.7), reported that Clarke "was overcoming opposition in the Cabinet to his radical plans to cut the number of police forces, make them directly funded by the Home Office and put elected police committees in the hands of appointed business people". It was confirmed that Clarke's proposals had sent "shock waves" through the police and local government (although ideas for reform are not new within the Home Office).

David Walker (in 'The Times' 29.2.93 p.14) cited Robert Reiner who suggested that the mooted reforms would produce a revolution in the provision of policing; Walker also recalled the concerns of David Shattock (then Chief of Avon and Somerset Police) that the ongoing inquiries and commissions might act to "distract" senior police officers. The possible amalgamation of forces was a high profile issue in the early part of 1993.

The Guardian of 24.3.93 (p.2) carried the story 'Shake-up for police biggest for 30 years', and reported on Clarke's announcement, the previous day, on the police reforms. His announcement covered the composition of Police Authorities, financial provision, the setting of national policing objectives and force amalgamations. There had been much speculation that the number of forces would be halved.

**The White Paper**

The centralisation or possible centralisation, of power over the Police has been a critical issue. The White Paper on Police Reform (Home Office, 1993b) made it clear that the government "will set the key objectives which it will expect the police to secure" (p.3), and that "Chief Constables can expect to be judged by results" (p9). Chapter 4 of the White Paper focussed on the strengthening of police authorities, which some might suggest is one way for the government to assert more central control, given that the costed policing plan of the PA must satisfy the key objectives of the government. Paragraph 4.14 states:

"There will also be an important new relationship between the police authority and the Home Office. The Home Office will monitor the performance of forces in terms of the key national performance
indicators. This will create a dialogue between the Home Office and police authorities who will be responsible for supplying the Home Office with information on performance, probably on a quarterly basis. This will help the Home Secretary to keep in touch with local performance, and will help police authorities to feed local policing concerns into central policy making at an early stage”.

In discussing the accountability of forces, Reiner (1991a) notes that most of his chief officer respondents perceived a good relationship with police authorities to be one based on ‘reasonable’ interaction, and a degree of deference to the professional judgement of the Chief Constable. Reiner (ibid, p.285) concludes:

"Overall, then it seems clear that the line of accountability for chief constables is tilted increasingly towards the centre. Whereas central government is recognized as a significant and legitimate influence over policy and operations, whose wishes can not be ignored with impunity, this is not true of local police authorities. They are regarded, at most, as junior partners in the process of decision-making."

It is safe to conclude that the role of the PAs has now been enhanced. A few respondents indicated that their new PAs were beginning to ‘flex their muscles’.

Paragraph 4.48 of the White Paper notes that the Home Secretary was due to appoint the Chairman of the PA; this government proposal was defeated, of course, and was one which caused considerable hostility and suspicion on the part of police leaders.

Chapter 5 of the White Paper indicated that the Home Secretary will give the police a “clear steer on priorities” through a number of key objectives for policing. Chapter 8 of the White Paper focussed on the strengthening of the HMIC, with its "key role as a watch-dog monitoring police performance", while chapter 10 criticised the current "patchwork quilt of forces":

"Value for money and efficiency are fundamental to the Government's proposals for the police service. It is questionable whether 43 separate organisations are now needed to run police operations and whether the maintenance of 43 parallel organisations makes the most effective use of the resources available for policing."

A conference was held at the LSE on 21 September 1993, organised by the ISTD and the Mannheim Centre, and eminent speakers included Paul Condon, Robert Reiner and Eric Caines. In the conference report (Martin, 1994), Loveday highlights the centralisation of decision-making in the police. Loveday concludes
that the future PA will be much less independent of the centre, and posits that the local policing plans could predominantly reflect the "objectives and interests of the centre rather more than the locality" (p.13).

The Audit Commission report 'Cheques and Balances' (1994) notes that the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 empowers the Home Secretary "to issue direction to police authorities on remedial measures to improve efficiency and effectiveness, and to specify a minimum budget for an authority." (p.2). The Audit Commission paper continues:

"This last feature enhances central control and illustrates the fact that the new framework also poses some threats. These and the other powers of intervention by the Home Office will require discretion in their application if they are not to counteract the Act's impetus to delegate power - from the Home Office to the police authority to the Chief Constable, and from the Chief Constable to local commanders." (p2)

It is suggested (p.9) that the Act is intended to disentangle the "various strands" of accountability, but that the common territory of PAs, chief constables and the Home Office could "either be the venue for effective co-operation or a battleground for power and influence."

The content of the Policing Plan, it was added, and the size and role of the PA, could "bring conflict to the surface early in the new arrangements" (p.9). It was stressed, however, that the local policing plans are intended to be of paramount importance in strengthening police accountability (p.13).

In 1993, much of the media reportage of, and police response to, the Sheehy report tended to obfuscate the implications of the White Paper. Bogdanor warned in the Guardian (10.11.93, p.20) that the constitutional implications of reform had been overlooked and dismissed the government’s rhetoric of devolution and local control. The Police Review editorial of 2nd July 1993 argued that the publication of the Sheehy report had distracted attention from the White Paper and stated:

"This White Paper is committed to devolving command to basic units while it creates a strong central control system. It could be re-named ‘The Home Office Rules’." (p.4)

In the same issue of Police Review the then President of ACPO (John Burrows) was cited as objecting to the unacceptable shift of power to the centre (p.13). The Guardian (29.6.93, p.2) reported on the joint statement released by the AMA, the ACC and the Association of District Councils which said:
"Greater autonomy for chief constables will be bought at the price of police authorities becoming the agents of central government."

In an editorial (29.6.93, p.21) the Guardian agreed that police reform was long overdue, but lamented the increased control of the Home Secretary over forces, the reduction in the numbers of Councillors on PAs, and the concomitant increase of "businessmen". It was suggested that similar reforms had made "district health authorities more secretive, less accountable, and less in touch." Richard Coyles (at the time chairman-elect of the Police Federation) attacked the White Paper, which he called a "frontal attack" on elected PAs (see Independent 26.8.93, p.2).

On the other side of the ideological fence, Eric Caines argued (in The Times, 9.9.93, p.20) that PAs were unable to handle their Chief Constables, and are held in contempt by their police forces. He added:

"The entire system of accountability must be tightened. The performance of chief constables and their forces needs to be measured and exposed to public gaze... There needs to be a strong national framework of objectives, which reshaped police authorities would adapt to their local situations...."

The Police Reforms, as originally championed by Kenneth Clarke, met with considerable resistance as the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act passed through the legislative process. January 1994 witnessed the dilution of some of the most controversial reform proposals. The 'Independent' (24.1.94, p.4) reported the expectation that Michael Howard would drop the proposal for government appointed PA chairman, and that Lord Whitelaw and Lord Carr had been in "the vanguard" of opposition within the House of Lords. It was added that the Home Secretary wished not to compromise on the issue of appointing members from outside the ranks of local councillors and magistrates.

One senior Police Department official (interview 091, 21.7.94) noted that the government did not "stand an earthly" with respect to the 'so-called' independent members of the PA (and chairman) being appointed by the Home Secretary, and added that when somebody like Willie Whitelaw stands against his own party, then the government is in trouble! (TC 139):

"Well it was a revolt in the sense that the government weren't defeated by the opposition, they were defeated by their own backbenchers essentially." (TC 135)

One DCC (interview 099, 23.2.95) reflected on the role of PAs in the past, and the greater influence they
would have with the passing of the Act:

"Now certainly in the 70s and 80s, in my view, Police Authorities became all but marginalised. It was a dialogue between the Home Office and Chief Constables.... I think there was a genuine attempt by the Home Office to re-emphasise the three-legged separation, and to bring the Police Authorities, the locally elected representatives more on-side." (TC 530)

Brogden (1982, p.94-95) notes the weakness of the PA in comparison to the chief constable. He notes, too, that an “essential ideological relation” (regarding the maintenance of social order) between the chief and Authority members contributed to such a consensual imbalance of power. There would now appear to be more of a ‘sharper edge’ in the relations between chief officer and PA.

The chief officer above questioned whether the ‘external’ members of the new PA would contribute anything to his own force. He felt that the concept of providing the PA with a clearer role was admirable, but that the ‘delivery’ by the government had been very poor (Side 2, TC 10).

A Times article of 5th February 1994 (p.4) noted that the Home Secretary had abandoned key sections of the Bill to defuse potential defeat in the House of Lords. The article also noted the attack by Sir John Smith (then president of ACPO) on government policy, and his criticism of the national objectives.

The Daily Telegraph of 2nd March 1994 carried the story ‘Howard backs down over Police authority reform’ (p.10), and noted that local councillors would be allowed a majority in the composition of PAs (with five ‘independent’ members). The Government climbdown, in the previous month, from the proposal to appoint PA chairmen centrally, was also noted.

In the first issue of ‘Policing Today’ (October 1994) Sir John Smith criticised the government’s reforms of the service, and implied that the combination of national objectives, performance-related pay and fixed-term contracts could threaten the “prized integrity of policing” (p.7). He criticised the Core and Ancillary Tasks review of the Home Office, and noted more generally the threat to “our traditional style of policing”:

“*The fact is that we do not just meet the public in confrontational situations unlike many foreign police forces, but adhere to a ‘service’ rather than ‘enforcement’ model*” (p.8).
The Sheehy Inquiry

If the White Paper, and the subsequent Act raised the spectre of centralisation of control over the Police, the Sheehy Inquiry acted as a focal point for concerns about the ethos, deprofessionalisation and ‘marketization’ of policing. Sheehy, as noted already, provoked a deluge of reportage, and a vociferous response from the Service. The research interviews and survey results certainly evinced the generally negative reactions to Sheehy, although there were some respondents who felt that Sheehy had positive elements. It is clear that many aspects of Sheehy certainly coloured visions of the future.

As would be expected, the Sheehy Inquiry precipitated anxiety and speculation from the outset, as noted by Reilly in ‘Police’ (February 1993), who discussed the implications of short-term contracts. An ‘Independent’ article of 24th April 1993 reported on the work of Ernst and Young and Towers Perrin, who were acting as consultants for the Sheehy team. The results of their research suggested that “management tiers should be reduced and more responsibility given to the remaining ranks to provide better value for money and greater overall efficiency”.

When the Sheehy Inquiry reported at the end of June 1993, it became apparent how far-reaching the proposals actually were.

The Guardian (1st July 1993) suggested that the Sheehy report would tackle the “deeply-embedded restrictive practices” in the police, but that many of the reforms would be difficult enough to introduce within the private sector, “let alone a public sector with powerful unions”.

Representatives of junior and senior ranks reacted defensively against the Sheehy proposals. Richard Wells, the Chief of South Yorkshire (as reported in the Guardian, 8.7.93) criticised the lack of reference to the philosophy of policing, and was critical of Sir Patrick Sheehy’s “aggressive and defensive” manner. John Hoddinott, the Chief of Hampshire (as cited in the same article) pointed out the incompatibility between certain proposals of the Sheehy report and the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice.

At the height of Sheehy-induced concern, the Federation warned its members with the following:
A HEALTH WARNING FROM THE POLICE FEDERATION

SHEEHY’S BUNCH OF 5’s

Here are just five of the ways in which Sheehy damages your pay and conditions.

1 Pay
Pay increments will be abolished, and replaced by a system of performance related pay. This will give different values to different jobs in the same rank, besides rating individuals on their performance. Annual pay reviews will be based on the median of non-manual private employees, not the present movement in the index for all employees.

2 Pensions
If you accept promotion or transfer, you will go on a “Fixed Term Engagement”. You won’t get a pension before 60 and your commutation will be cut by £10,000 or more.

3 Overtime
No compensation for incidental overtime, including “pre-planned” overtime on a duty day. Public holidays will be compensated at double time (paid or time off). Rest day working with six days’ notice or less paid at time and a half or time off at plain time, with more than six days payment or time off at plain time.

4 Contracts
If you want to be promoted, or transfer to another force, you will have to accept a “short service” contract, entailing the possibility of non-renewal, and you will have to serve 40 years, or until you are 60, before drawing your normal pension.

5 Rent/Housing Allowance
Your existing allowance will be frozen at its current rate for the rest of your service.

Alan Eastwood OBE FRSA
Chairman
Lyn Williams
General Secretary
The Guardian of 19th July 1993 (p.2) reported:

"Police chiefs have backed junior colleagues by rejecting the key recommendations of the Sheehy Inquiry into pay and conditions.... These include fixed-term contracts, performance-related pay, the scrapping of three ranks and changes to pension and retirement rights."

The article noted John Burrow’s objection that the Sheehy proposals would undermine the ethos of the service and the morale of officers. Paul Condon, whose criticism was noted in the Times (19.7.93), felt that the proposals for performance-related pay, reduced starting salaries and short-term contracts were unnecessarily harsh, particularly for junior ranks. The Independent (23.7.93) in its editorial held that Sheehy, in advocating fixed-term contracts, had “proposed a sledgehammer to crack a nut”. Not surprisingly, The Daily Telegraph (21.7.93) criticised the mass rally of officers at Wembley in July (held in protest at the Sheehy proposals) and asserted:

“If officers act like industrial militants rather than members of a respected and skilled professional, they cannot complain if Sheehy treats them that way. They will be put on the rack of cost-effectiveness where the screws are turned by accountants, and asked to justify the way they spend their every hour.... This is not to say that the Sheehy proposals deserve unqualified support. They seek to introduce market forces into a sensitive area of public service....”

David Rose (in the Observer, 25.7.93) documented the betrayal felt by officers and suggested that Sheehy was “stripping away” the traditional Conservative bias in the police.

Paul Condon’s well-publicised suggestion that he would be unable to continue as the Met Commissioner if the Sheehy recommendations were introduced in full (as reported in the Times, 26.7.93) symbolised the rancour. The Daily Telegraph (26.7.93, p.6) noted how 24 out of the 51 Chief Constables in Britain had sent letters of support to the Wembley protest rally, and that Condon’s attack was the “latest shot in an increasingly acrimonious campaign.” The Guardian ‘Comment’ of 28.7.93 drew attention to the unprecedented Wembley protest and added “Rarely since the service started have all three police unions.... been so united”.

Duncan Campbell (in the Guardian ‘Outlook’ 21.8.93, p.19) provided an analysis of the Sheehy proposals, and the vociferous police response, and maintained:
"Broadly, it is seen as a cost-cutting exercise designed to introduce a market economy into a public service and an attempt to shift the blame for the rise in crime from the Government to the police."

Fairly extensive media coverage continued through September 1993, and during this month both Sir Patrick Sheehy and Eric Caines made counter-attacks in response to the protestations of police leaders (see, for example, ‘The Sunday Times’, 12.9.93, p.3).

The International Police Exhibition and Conference (IPEC) in October witnessed Paul Condon and Patrick Sheehy engaged in debate (see ‘Independent’, 14.10.93); the Met Commissioner argued that the vocational nature of policing could not be subject to the “crude transfer of ideology or management fashion”, and that it could not be just another commercial enterprise.

On 28th October, the Home Secretary made his announcement on the Sheehy Inquiry and it became clear that he had rejected a number of key recommendations. He had, for example, spurned the introduction of fixed-term appointments for junior ranks, the proposals for performance-related pay, and the recommendation that officers of all ranks should be expected to serve for 40 years to qualify for a full pension at 60. Amongst the Sheehy recommendations accepted was the abolition of the ranks of DCC and Chief Superintendent, the introduction of fixed-term contracts for chief officers, the abolition of overtime pay for inspectors, and the curtailment of certain allowances (such as mortgage relief).

The Guardian ‘Comment’ of 29th October (entitled ‘Howard loses his bottle’) suggested that Michael Howard nearly fell over backwards with the speed of his retreat from Sheehy and added:

"Kenneth Clarke is no longer at the Home Office. His successor, a much weaker man, has already turned himself into a police hostage with his switch to a hard line law ‘n’ order strategy to raise his own - and his party’s - political prospects. How do you bang up more people in prison when you have alienated the police? You don’t. Hence yesterday’s big trim. Politics have superseded policy."

Eric Caines (in the ‘Guardian’ of 29.10.93, p.22) lamented the government retreat over many of the most significant Sheehy proposals.

In addition to the issues identified so far, there were other significant events or debates which fanned the winds of change. One of the most important of these was the HO ‘Review of Police Core and Ancillary tasks’. The White Paper had indicated that every policing task could not be given the same priority (see
The core review was initiated in December 1993, and as it progressed through 1994, caused considerable suspicion and hostility on the part of police leaders. Several officers in the research sample expressed grave concerns about the Review.

Many police leaders tended to dismiss the review as an ill-conceived attempt to privatise some policing services while at the same time attempting to cut costs for the state. One ACC (interview 082) felt, in March 1994, that the aim of the review was to:

"Promote the fiction that there are still very large efficiency gains to be achieved if only we would concentrate our resources properly on the things that ought to be our priorities because they're the public's priorities, and stop doing so many of those things that we're doing because we've always done them..." (TC 325).

This chief officer believed that the review was financially-driven, and that it heralded creeping privatisation.

One officer (interview 102, 7.4.95) who had been involved in the Posen Inquiry (as it became known, due to the fact that Ingrid Posen of F1 division in the police department was responsible for it) provided a useful insight into the 'politics' of the review debate. At the time of interview (April 1995) the final report was still with Ministers, and there had been some time slippage in its production. It was felt by this key respondent that there was little in the report in terms of cost savings (TC 220), and indeed that Ministers might wish to put off publication! (TC 225). As indeed transpired, this officer noted that the Posen Inquiry did not turn out to be the major "hiving off" review as originally intended (TC 227). It was added:

"We fought a very effective campaign, both in the media and in the meetings." (TC 237)

Apparently, the first HO review paper was "torn apart" by the police, because it was so poor, and the HO realised that they could not continue in the "absence of arguments" (TC 248). The impetus of the review was blunted also because 'Howard was losing his way in the Lords' (TC 259), and because careful ACPO briefings to the media ensured a collapse of support for the principles of the Inquiry (TC 260).

One Chief Constable (interview 093, 23.8.94) was quite scathing about the Review; he felt there had been no clarity of thought, and that it was "confused and confusing" (TC 406). He criticised the lack of consultation and research and dismissed Ingrid Posen as a low-grade civil servant who was "tinkering" (although she was a 'nice lady doing a difficult job') [TC 420-470]. He too stated that the review was largely
Treasury-driven, and that the aim was to move a ‘slice of the police cake to another plate’ (TC 426). ACPO was somewhat admonished:

“We won’t actually win much by actually crucifying the Home Office. Because at the end of the day, what the Police Service should be doing is providing the Home Office with a case to argue to Treasury. And that is where we need to be a little bit more subtle in our negotiations....” (TC 479-487).

Another chief (interview 098, 14.10.94) criticised the “amateurish” and “doctrinaire stupidity of the initial approach”, but thought that the Inquiry would produce useful results eventually (TC 380). He believed that some energy of police leaders at the national level was being deflected from the QOS programme (TC 409), but that in-force efforts were not being affected.

As one would expect, opinions expressed by HO officials were rather more supportive of the Review. One respondent involved in the exercise (interview 084, 25.4.94, not taped) acknowledged the influence of the Treasury, but stressed that the latter did not dictate the setting up of the review. It was noted that the concept of assessing core and ancillary tasks within the wider criminal justice system already existed; F1 division ‘picked up’ on this with the aim of analysing the police. This respondent also emphasised other points: firstly there was a sense that one ‘couldn’t just keep asking people to do more, without asking them to do less’; it is too early to say if the number of core functions will contract; some functions could be fulfilled by private organisations; the review is not just a cost-cutting exercise, but it is concerned with “cost-effectiveness”; the criticism that the review is aimed primarily at privatisation and the provision of jobs for ‘friends in private industry’ is “genuinely nonsense”; the national key policing objectives figured quite highly in the review; and lastly this “real and valuable exercise” was meeting a need for the service, which had been “carelessly overloaded” previously.

Another official (interview 090, 21.7.94) was also surprised at the strength of police reaction to the Review (TC 551), but then suggested that this was probably due to ‘displacement’ given that the Service had lost the argument on the national objectives (TC 562). It was stressed that there would only be a very small reduction in tasks for the police (TC 507), and that these would be peripheral (TC 450). This respondent felt that ACPO were not being “enormously straight” at the time (TC 447).

Ian Westwood (then vice-chairman of the Police Federation) was quoted in ‘Police’ of November 1994 (p.19), suggesting that the so-called Posen Inquiry had cost much money to undertake, but had yielded very little in return.
By January 1995 there was a clear indication that the Review had lost its impetus. Jason Bennetto (in the ‘Independent’ of 24 January 1995, p.2) described the Home Office “climbdown” over the proposals to privatise parts of the Service. As reflected in later interviews, it was indicated that plans had been “watered down”, and that police victory had been due to an “embattled” Home Secretary, successful lobbying by ACPO and a weakened government which was attempting to claw back the ‘law and order’ platform from the Labour Party.

The then president of ACPO (John Hoddinott) welcomed the findings of the review (see also ‘Times’ 28.6.95, p.6), which highlighted 26 areas ripe for the possible elimination or reduction of police involvement. A Home Office summary of the Review stated:

“The review team concluded that there was little scope for the police service, broadly defined, to withdraw completely from large areas of current police work. None of the changes recommended would alter the nature of the police service offered to the public. Many of them are about inter-agency relationships rather than with the police service’s relationships with the public.” (Home Office, 1995, p.3-8)

Two other developments are worthy of mention at this stage. The first is the Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Role and Responsibilities of the police. The committee was set up early in 1994, with the inquiry funded by the Policy Studies Institute and the Police Foundation. Members included Sir John Cassels (and thereby the Inquiry is known as the Cassels Inquiry), John Hoddinott, Mary Tuck (national chair of victim support), Rod Morgan and Pauline Clare. The committee published a discussion document in August 1994, which highlighted the recent reviews of policing:

“.... all these major inquiries have assumed that the role and responsibilities of the police are well-known and subject to overall consensus. Such a consensus does not in fact exist.... At present there is considerable muddle and concern about the role of the police, in public opinion as well as in official documents.... It is therefore of fundamental importance to establish what the major functions of the police are. It is in this context that the Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Role and Responsibilities of the police has been established” (p.1).

The report emphasised (p.6) the significance of Circular 114 of 1983 and the fact that since that period the government had sought to introduce market disciplines and private sector management methods into the public sector (including the police). The impact of the 1980s urban riots, the miners’ strike, and the major
miscarriages of justice was also pinpointed (p.7).

The report questioned how the "apparently insatiable" demands of the public for more policing could be met (p.17), but agreed that the public demand for uniformed police patrols should be acknowledged (p.18-19). As a solution, two-tier models of policing were proposed. In one example, local (private) patrolling forces would be accredited by the public police. The former would execute functions which would not require the efforts of sworn public police officers, such as aspects of traffic management, local licensing and immigration control (p.20). The second model was built on the idea that designated patrol officers would form part of the local constabulary, and have authorisation to exercise certain street powers (p.21). Such powers would include arrest for minor public order offences, stop and search for stolen goods, and arrest for defined and limited criminal offences (such as theft).

The Cassels committee concluded in 1994:

"... the British policing tradition is a national asset that must be preserved and strengthened.... It is vital, if sensible change is to take place, that serious consideration be given to the role and responsibilities of the police...." (P.23).

Not all reacted favourably to this report. For example, while the Association of County Councils (ACC) welcomed the broad debate engendered by the Cassels Committee, the Association was:

"... particularly concerned that patrolling duties should not be given to lesser trained officers, nor to the private security industry, who need themselves to be regulated through appropriate statutory controls."

(Extract from agenda documents for third meeting of Committee of Local Police Authorities [COLPA] held on 15th June 1995).

A 'Police' article of November 1994 criticised the Independent Committee of Inquiry for accepting the government's insistence that no further funds were available for policing (p.5). The Posen review was lambasted, as was ACPO who were failing to fight for the "proper resources that this service and the British public deserve" (p.6). Fairly low-key articles on the August 1994 interim report appeared in the newspapers (see Guardian, 3.8.94, p.3, and Independent, 3.8.94, p.5): John Hoddinott was cited as supporting the idea of local councils paying for extra patrol officers.
The final Inquiry report (Police Foundation/PSI 1996) commented on police performance and accountability in chapter 7. It was stressed (p.43) that there is no case for privatising the police service as a whole and noted strongly that:

"The degree of success in performing an individual police force’s mission cannot be adequately measured solely by reference to a series of quantitative objectives and performance indicators decreed from the centre." (p.44)

While acknowledging (p.44) the usefulness of PI's, it was argued that the relationship between the centre (that is, the Home Secretary and his department) and those responsible for local implementation (chief constables and police authorities) should be one of partnership, rather than one expressed in command or contractual terms.

The topic of police patrol not only figured in the Cassells Inquiry. The Audit Commission instigated a study into the patrol function in 1994, the final report was published in early 1996. In October 1995 a draft had been circulated to Chief Constables as part of the consultative stage (personal communication with AC member 20.10.95).

The executive briefing paper for ‘Streetwise: Effective Police Patrol’ (February 1996) contained a number of criticisms of forces in their management of patrol functions, including the lack of objective setting and debriefings (p.8). The AC acknowledged (p.2) that the “bobby on the beat” is regarded as the cornerstone of effective policing and a symbol of British policing. Public dissatisfaction with levels of foot patrol was highlighted (p.2-3), however, and argued that:

"Anything which threatens this much-valued tradition of policing by consent is therefore a cause for concern.... Many forces are at a crossroads: they can either adopt a community-based approach, which will strengthen the capacity of communities to maintain high standards of order and social conduct, or remain reactive and risk losing some public support." (p.2)

The other major study of patrol was set in motion by John Hoddinott (then president of ACPO and Chief of Hampshire) in November 1994. A working group headed by Keith Povey (then Chief of Leicestershire) was tasked with producing a position paper on the patrol function. An initial report was published in February 1995 which covered issues such as the funding, function and regulation of patrol. The report (p.3) identified the challenges to the police service monopolistic provision of patrol, including the marketisation of the public
sector in the current and previous decades. It was claimed (p.21) that while the ‘voluntary sector’ (such as Neighbourhood and Street Watch) posed little threat to the traditional police patrol duty, the greatest challenge stems from private organisations and local authorities providing patrol services. The report discussed the issue of ‘two-tier policing’, and noted (p.27) that the HO had already distanced itself from the options as set out in the August 1994 report of the Cassells committee. It was argued (p.28) that most patrol work could not be carried out with limited police powers, and that increasingly volatile situations encountered by patrol officers demand higher, not lower, levels of skill:

“The demand for new style batons, pepper sprays and protective clothing are indicative of that increasing need.”

‘Second-tier’ officers, it was added (p.28) could find themselves in situations which they could not deal with appropriately, which could adversely affect quality of service to the public.

The contrast between the public service and private sector ethic is highlighted in the discussion of the security industry:

“There are certainly incompatible interests between the police and the security industry. The police have a national responsibility to society and provide a service on the basis of a public good, based on need. By contrast, the private security industry is client-driven and regulated by market forces” (p.41).

The working group concluded that: the demand for police patrol exceeds the present capacity of the service (p.42); the new funding allocations could have the effect of reducing the patrol provision by some forces (p.42); unchecked growth of the private security industry could erode police-community relations, but police involvement in its regulation and control could lead to the transfer of functions to the private sector (p.43); there is little to recommend the idea of two-tier policing, and it would fail to satisfy public demands (p.44).

The ACPO position paper on police patrol project (ACPO, October 1995) accepted that the concept of two-tier policing “was neither financially nor practically viable”, and added:

“ACPO supports the belief that police patrol underpins the whole ethos of policing by consent and is the cornerstone of the British Police Service” (p.1).

The position paper raised doubt over the employment of other types of localised ‘police forces’ (such as the
Sedgefield Community Force, p.7) and argued (p.5) that voluntary sector alternatives (such as ‘Street Watch’ and community volunteers) could not satisfy the patrol demand gap. ACPO clearly defended the traditional territory of the police service by highlighting dangers in the use of private security:

"Unlike the police service, the private security industry has no responsibility for the maintenance of the Queen's peace nor for safeguarding society from criminal activity...."

"... it must be recognised that there are few effective sanctions against companies which fail to deliver a quality of service for employers or to members of the general public with whom they interact." (p.15)

The position paper adopts a high moralistic stance, and echoes the public service ethos discussed already in this chapter:

"The police service is a public good. Service provision is not based upon an individual’s ability to pay but is available to all, including the under-privileged and vulnerable within society." (p.15)

Such assertions reinforce my argument that the QOS programme aimed primarily to reinforce public service values, rather than embrace the tenets of a wholly consumerist, business-oriented model; this is developed further in chapter 4.

To summarise, this section of the chapter has outlined some of the major items on the contemporary agenda of change. There is no doubt that the spectres of centralisation and privatisation have punctuated the official discourse of the service. It is against such a turbulent backdrop of police reform that the research was conducted, and it was important to consider the impact of the reforms on the QOS programme, and the extent to which the pressures of centralisation and marketisation have undermined or transformed the quest for quality.
2.6 Concluding Comments

Predominantly, this chapter has constituted a broad sweep of the key factors which have preceded the emergence of the QOS programme in the police. Hopefully, it has shown that the New Right imperative of the 1980s has set in motion a series of radical reforms to the public sector. An early taste of change for the police is symbolised by Circular 114 of 1983, but this failed to seriously disrupt the "cosy relationship" between police leaders, the HO and the government identified by Uglow (1988, p.17). The relationship between the police and the central state reached its zenith in the miners' strike of 1984-85, as so forcefully argued by critics such as Scraton and Green. There can be no doubt that the militarised (and effective) struggle with the striking miners damaged the standing of the police, and had dire consequences for the style and culture of policing in certain forces.

Uglow (ibid, p.12) argues that the past decade had witnessed a reversal of the situation whereby the police were viewed as independent, neutral and predominantly unarmed. The 1980s riots and miners' strike did, of course, usher in a hardened response to public disorder which in itself contributed to the delegitimation of the police which Reiner regularly identifies as a key theme in the recent history of the police. Naturally, one must remember that this 'delegitimation' formed part of a broader societal development in which the public has been more willing and able to question established social institutions.

Although the launch of the QOS initiative in 1990 was preceded by a difficult, and sometimes violent decade, it is important to remember the "enduring character of social conflict" (Fielding, 1991, p.9), and that:

"Without a more informed historical perspective it is easy to exaggerate the extent of public disorder and crime compared with the past" (ibid, p.26).

Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that the public profile of the police did suffer in the 1980s, and this was an important ingredient in the decision to launch the quality initiative (as discussed further in the following chapter). The public profile was damaged by incidents such as the Hillsborough football disaster, and the infamous 'miscarriages of justice' cases which emerged toward the end of the decade. Reiner and Cross (1991, p.8) refer to 1989 as a "vintage one for scandals", and indicate (p.6) the rapidly deteriorating relationship between the police and the government at the end of the decade. One senior HO official (interview 090, 21.7.94), who had worked on the Guildford Four case, believed that the police had 'lost its ground' in the 1980s:
"The chattering classes had certainly lost faith in the police, and their reputation was not high in public esteem, certainly in the Metropolitan Police, and that must have affected what was going on outside. They didn’t treat people well..." (TC 339-345).

As the 1980s progressed senior police leaders (and indeed the Police Department) realised that declining confidence had to be addressed. As discussed in this chapter, the quality movement had already permeated both private and public sectors, and as such ‘quality’ provided a means with which the police could respond to the pressures for reform. Given the increasingly influential emphasis on consumerism in the late 1980s, it was perhaps probable that the police should adopt a quality approach to counter the decline in public and government confidence. In short, one could say that the quality approach has been a survival approach. It would seem evident that leaders of the service (and the HMIC) knew that the police would have to put its ‘own house in order’, before this was done for them.

It could, of course, be argued that without the catalyst of declining public (and governmental) confidence, the police would never have embarked upon the ‘quality’ reforms. I would suggest that this is actually the case, given the traditions of the service and the reluctance of any large organisation to embark on a programme of reform if this is unnecessary. One prominent Chief Officer emphasised:

“I think certainly the service needed to take a very clear line as to what sort of service it was going to be, or else somebody else would have written it for us.” (Interview 101, 24.4.95 TC 224)

Despite the internal quality reforms initiated by the police in the late 1980s and very early 1990s, the government was determined to apply its project of inexorably changing the public sector landscape. The police service was perhaps the last public sector giant which had not been exposed to the reconstitutive surgery of the government. I have suggested that the neo-liberalist Thatcherite revolution involves both the rolling back and rolling forward of the state. With the police reforms, it becomes clearer that rolling forward on law and order involves the greater centralisation of police control. The Home Secretary has become more overtly powerful in the tripartite structure, and this has rankled senior leaders of the service.

In addition to identifying fears about the ongoing migration of power to the central state, this chapter has given an overview of other themes which have featured highly on the contemporary policing agenda, such as the possible privatisation of policing functions and the provision of patrol. The roots of the quality movement, and its principal tenets, have also been discussed. The QOS programme (at least in the early stages) focussed more on re-emphasising the professional and public service ethos, rather than embracing
the full ambit of a business-based model of quality: this will be explored further in chapter 4.

In conducting the research, it became increasingly obvious that considering the police-state relationship is a “fundamental issue in any discussion of a police force” (Uglow, 1988, p.17), including our discussion of the significance of ‘quality’. Another key facet is the concept of power, and it should be clear from this chapter that power can lie at the heart of so many (if not all) sociological phenomena and analyses: power was a central issue in the public disorder of the last decade, and more recently in the police reform programme. In Chapter 5 I will analyse how the QOS programme, and the concept of quality, have become implicated in the theoretical domain of power.

In sum, the 1980s were punctuated with serious outbreaks of conflict between the police/state and the community. The 1990s have witnessed some conflict between the police and the community (such as the Poll Tax disturbances and the Brightlingsea protests), but more significant for the current analysis has been the unprecedented conflict and power struggle between the central state and the leaders of its most overt and potent institution of social control.
3. Quality of Service in the Police

3.1 Introduction

"Policing in Britain requires public consent and this will not be given unless the public has confidence in its police. The quality of the policing service provided underpins this confidence and the desire to provide quality policing to all customers in the community we serve lies at the heart of our quality programme.

Working through the Combined Quality of Service Committee with our partners from other bodies and agencies, the service has made tremendous progress on its journey towards quality, passing a number of significant milestones - including the ACPO Strategic Policy document, the Police Service Statement of Common Purpose and Values, the Police Service Performance Indicator Package and the 'Getting Things Right' initiative - along the way."

(Policing Today, p39, October 1994)

This extract from 'Policing Today' pinpoints some of the initiatives and philosophy which have formed a major focus of the study. This chapter will seek to describe and assess the 'significant milestones' on the journey towards quality, and to identify earlier concepts of quality and community policing.

3.2 Early Quality of Service in the Police

Many respondents felt that QOS was a logical necessity considering the social forces in operation during the 1980s. Apart from the broader context of the New Agenda, and the influence of the QOS philosophy in the private sector, there were factors more specific to the police which paved the way to the QOS initiative.

Several officers argued that quality in the police is not new, and that such issues were being debated as long ago as the 1970s. The historical precursors to the more recent emphasis on quality are outlined below, and we will see that the emphasis on 'community programmes' in policing is indeed not a recent invention.

Community-oriented Policing

One Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) interviewed stressed that the idea of 'community-oriented' policing was far from novel. He had personal experience of working with John Alderson who, during his post of
Chief Constable with Devon and Cornwall, was one of the most prominent police leaders in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The DCC interviewed felt that his own working life had been significantly affected by the ideas of Alderson, describing him as a "dynamo" and adding that it had been a "very exciting" time to work with Alderson. The ideas of Alderson were somewhat in advance of their time, compared with the general ethos of the service, and as this DCC suggested:

"... certainly John Alderson was panned when he talked of concepts of the village in the city, when he talked in terms of policemen being worker-priests, when he talked in concepts of policemen being de facto community leaders."

(Interview 066 13.12.93, TC 152)

Rawlings (1985) notes the unsurprising fact that Alderson's model of communal policing was rejected by his ACPO colleagues. Importantly, Alderson's ideas implied greater decentralisation and a closer identification by the police with the local community, which in turn would encourage demands for participation in policing decisions (p.81). Scraton (1985 p123-124) recalls the tenets of Alderson's philosophy, which bear some resemblance to the imperatives of the QOS initiative. These included greater direct involvement of the police in affairs of the community, and enhanced liaison with the public through meetings and consultation 'clinics'.

On a more critical note, Scraton (p126) suggests that the 'community' approach was never designed to replace "more forceful operational tactics", and that it was just another part of the policing repertoire. Friedman (1992, p.115) argues that Alderson's work represents an "idealist utopian view of society" and notes that Alderson's idealism was given another dimension when advocates of his model defined the equilibrium between police and community as a "quality of life" issue. He cites the work of Moore and Brown (1981), whose quality-of-life model rests on the balance between preventative and reactive measures: the police officer is both "preventer" and "enforcer" who co-operates successfully with the public and other agencies (p.116). The work of Schaffer (1980), Friedman reminds us (p.116) stresses the broader emphasis on quality-of-life, rather than inter-agency involvement being limited to crime fighting.

Alderson himself stated in 1982:

"The arrangements for policing somehow no longer seem to match the complexity of society... If the police become alienated from the public on any wide scale it is likely that the fundamental nature of policing will change from an essentially proactive to reactive force."

(1982, p 135)
During the Scarman enquiry into the Brixton riots (see Scarman 1981), Alderson gave evidence on the aggressive style of policing used in London. According to the DCC respondent quoted above, because Alderson's evidence to the Scarman Inquiry was highly critical, 'he took the centre stage from the Met', for which the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police never forgave him. As Alderson had been 'hurt by his peer rejection' over his community policing model, his "pique" and "frustration" led to his damning critique of the Met's tactics which in retrospect was "an error of judgement" on Alderson's part (according to this DCC) [TC 180].

Nevertheless, as Reiner (1985 p 205) points out, the Scarman report was the "trigger for a re-orientation of policing" in the early 1980s and as Vick (1990, p2) indicates, "the agenda for the political debate surrounding the riots was largely set by Scarman's concentration upon 'community policing'". One of the most significant outcomes of the Inquiry was the statutory requirements for 'S.106' community liaison committees.

Apart from the influence of Alderson, there are other significant milestones. One Assistant Chief Constable (ACC) drew attention to his involvement in the derivation of 'Neighbourhood Policing' in the period 1978-1981, which was re-emphasised as a result of the 1981 riots. He noted how a Neighbourhood Policing project was set up in Putney, London and that a large number of people were exposed to 'new concepts which challenged the traditional values of the Met'. (Interview 037 23.8.93, TC 088)

Brian Hayes (then Chief of Surrey) outlined the rudiments and history of Neighbourhood Policing in a 'Police' article (July 1987). He wrote that against a backdrop of "resources falling behind demand" (p.28) the style of policing had necessarily changed over the previous five or six years. It was noted that the police had become more interactive or proactive, and that initiatives included police/community consultancy groups, crime prevention panels and schools programmes:

"Little credit has been given for the considerable progress in these areas, which has undoubtedly enhanced our quality of service to the public." (p.28)

This Chief recalled that Surrey and the Met police had introduced 'geographic policing' at a selection of sites: the original concept was called 'Neighbourhood Policing', and was based on the work of Inspectors Hart (of Surrey) and Beckett (of the Met). Brian Hayes asserted:

"Demands must be carefully assessed, at sub-divisional level and placed in order of priority. A major concern must be with the quality of service. That is undoubtedly the public's expectation." (p.30)
A Police Review article (15.2.91, p.322) commented on Plus and Neighbourhood Policing:

"After a history of patchy attempts at community policing in London, Plus aims to make the style of policing the same all across the Met... The Neighbourhood Policing experiment of the 1980s ended in disarray and recriminations, with variants appearing in different forms all over the force area."

According to the ACC cited above, Kenneth Newman (then Commissioner of the Met from October 1982) "stole" the concepts of Neighbourhood Policing, and attempted to incorporate them into his 'plan of problem-based policing'. Some of the aims of Neighbourhood or geographic policing were to inculcate officer ownership of their area, ensure continuity of service in that area, and to align deployment of resources to policing demands (Hayes, ibid, p.30).

Reiner (1985, p206-207) describes Newman's plan for policing London which emphasised greater public involvement and multi-agency work. Part one of the Commissioner's report for 1985 was entitled 'A police for the People', and in the introduction to this Newman emphasised the need for public support to maintain a "traditional style of policing", (p.1). In this report, Newman went on to develop his arguments under headings such as: 'Public support'; 'Legitimacy of authority'; 'Identification with the police task'; 'Police factors in creating distance'; and 'Thinking openness'. Newman cited the evidence of the 1982 British Crime Survey which suggested:

"... that it is the quality of the contact, rather than the amount, which determines the public reaction... The sense of quality, and the process of identification, will almost certainly be established by the personality of the officer involved in any encounter." (Newman 1985, p 4)

Fielding (1996) presents a useful trilogy of functions, resting on enforcement, service and community models. It is noted that:

"The community model gives precedence to maintaining order and public tranquillity over crime control, with the police and the community sharing responsibility for dealing with crime and disorder."

(p.42)

Fielding (p.51) suggests that this community model mixes elements of the enforcement and service models, and adds that the concept of sector or geographic policing has "considerable affinity" to the community model. Fielding identifies various aspects of the community model and it is clear that the QOS programme has incorporated several of these. For example, there has been an emphasis on devolved authority and the
increased responsibility of junior officers (ibid, p.55), as well as a clear move to improve internal
communication and staff feedback (ibid, p.55). These aspects will be explored later in the thesis. It should
also become clear that the QOS programme has also incorporated (as one would expect) the service model
which Fielding outlines:

"Its daily routine is dominated by service-type relations with the public.... The service model features
a close responsiveness to what the community wants and is largely reactive.... public concerns could be
built into the priority setting process of the service model." (p.48-49)

Certainly the rhetoric of the QOS programme has been imbued with the notion of meeting community
expectations. During the turbulent period of police reform, police leaders have argued that the slavish
application of quantitative performance indicators has little to do with improving service quality; Fielding
notes (p.51) that the service model cannot "adhere to existing quantitative performance measures." In sum,
I suggest that the QOS programme has straddled both the service and community models as delineated by

A Question of Ethics

Concern about probity of police conduct goes back to at least the 1970s and re-emerged with a spate of
overturned convictions in the 1980s and 1990s. The mid to late 1970s saw claims of a growing relationship
between the Metropolitan Police and the criminal fraternity, and the Commissioner at the time, Sir Robert
Mark, was concerned with purging the CID. Miller (1979, p.22) notes the "problems and criticisms" of the
Met in the 1960s and 1970s and the corruption endemic in New Scotland yard's anti-pornography squad.
Scraton (1985, p.35-36) outlines the emergence of the internal investigations department (A10) and the ill-
fated 'Operation Countryman' launched in 1978. Although Operation Countryman did result in some
convictions in 1982, overall it was a failure. Investigating officers encountered obstructive attitudes and
behaviour within the Metropolitan Police, and there was reluctance on the part of the DPP to prosecute
suspect officers. The operation was closed down in 1981.

The early years of the decade also witnessed the publication of the 1983 Policy Studies Institute report,
which produced results which were highly critical of the attitudes and behaviour within the Metropolitan
Police. The study itself began in 1980, and as Scraton (ibid) indicates:

"The account of the Metropolitan Police given in the Report is one of white, male, aspiring middle-class
domination of blacks, women and the non-respectable working class... There is ample evidence that
racism is institutional, pervasive, and not confined to young, inexperienced officers." (p104).

As part of his reforms, in 1985 Newman published the so-called 'Blue Book", whose full title was "The Principles of Policing and Guidance for Professional Behaviour". This quite extensive booklet covered in depth the subject of policing and organisational implications, the role of the officer, the rights and values of society, human dignity and discriminatory behaviour, personal standards and group loyalty. The handbook is laden with the most stringent calls for exemplary behaviour and qualities. In discussing personal standards, it is stated:

"From the duties we have constructed out of our position as constables we find that as public servants we should be tolerant, careful, thoughtful, well-balanced, humane, prudent, practical, wise and incorruptible. From the duties which arise for us, as members of a force, we see that we must be public spirited, scrupulously fair, valiant defenders of public ideals, tough, alert, courteous, compassionate, and both resolute and restrained." (p53).

It is generally agreed that the handbook was received badly by the workforce. One senior member of the academic staff at Bramshill recalled how some officers (who were themselves now "carrying forward" ethics) had admitted to him that they subverted the promulgation of the Blue Book philosophy. This respondent agreed that the message of the Blue Book was not successfully promulgated to the officers:

"...all they saw was another rather irksome burden." (Interview 036 20.8.93 TC 338)  

This respondent described Newman as one of the first police leaders to recognise that police credibility and esteem had begun to decline. One DCC recalled (rather humorously) the "dreaded Blue Book", and felt that it had absolutely no impact (interview 038 23.8.93 TC 018). Another DCC felt that the current emphasis on quality was a natural progression:

"... to me the national declaration was a natural evolution, I'm just sorry that it took as long as it did. And if you're looking for other milestones along the way, Sir Kenneth Newman, when he was Commissioner of the Met produced what was known as the little blue book ... and that was the first time, you see, that any force had really attempted to set out an ethical code for police officers ... it was panned by many people, including many officers in the Met as gimmickry. I regretted that, I both regretted it and resented it because I thought that he was a very clever man, Kenneth Newman, and in many ways (like John Alderson) he was moving several years ahead of his time... and they're catching him up now. I mean, what they were talking of 20 years ago is actually happening now."
One Chief Inspector (interview 115 21.8.95) also attested to the degree of disdain which the Blue Book created amongst Met officers. Other respondents noted the advanced thinking of Newman, and also felt that he set the early tone in terms of 'quality' generally, and 'ethics' more specifically. Despite (or perhaps because of) the intellectualism and vision of the Commissioner most rank-and-file officers of the Met were not impressed by the contents of the Blue Book. A 'spoof' document (reproduced below) in circulation in 1985 is illustrative of the reaction; grammatical errors in the document have been retained for authenticity:

**Dear Colleague**

What did you think about the new book then? pearls on every page, it took me nearly seven moons to come up with this little lot. Of course those amongst you with degrees and stuff will have already sussed it out as being a literary "fire exit" for yours truly.

It must be apparent by now to those of you with brain cells in double figures (not the helmets) that the wheels about to come off at last, what with rising crime statistics (thieving and things) falling clear up rates (bodies) the old joe publics got the right hump. Well it don't need that famous World in Action prog to tell you that the old Bill's going to come in for some flak of some sort. Human rights is well high on the agenda I can tell you, what with stopping niggers and nicking poofs. What's worse is those of you that actually leave the nick have been tear-arsing about causing all sorts of aggravation that is bound to hit the fan sooner or later.

Well, the old pension is looming on the horizon and me and Betty could see a sour end to yours truly career, what with avoiding the nutters in Belfast for what seemed a life, I decided that you bastards weren't going to win where they had failed. So the book. This 61 pages of absolute bollocks is designed to assist with the mitigation in the box "I told them so your worship, but would they listen" I reckon now I have spent 1.25 million quid on setting the record straight, in a rough attempt in sorting you lot out, any recoil from impending riot and such should miss me by a mile.

As a final word I must apologise for the lack of pictures in my latest publication. I know that some smart arsed lefty will use this as a point that I have not made myself clear to the average woodentop, however those of you that woke up last year will know about Ken's disciples. A great team this who will spread the word whether have read this ere book or not.
'Quality is nothing new'

Friedman (1992, p.18) suggests that the perceived importance of police/community relations is nothing new, and that the maintenance of good ‘public relations’ is typical of many community-oriented policing programmes in the past. He adds that England would be the last country where ‘community policing’ could be regarded as a new strategy, but notes the impetus given by Alderson to the conscious association of ‘community’ and ‘policing’ (p.110):

“Community policing is now a common issue of professional and scholarly discourse regarding policing-related strategies and innovations.” (ibid, p.111).

Several respondents wanted to stress that quality was not a new concept in the police. However, the language and labels attached to this ‘new’ philosophy are more recent, and (as shown elsewhere) have been transferred from the private sector. One ACC said:

"I can recall going on command training courses in 1985 where we were actually talking about quality of service then, in the Police Staff College. And quite clearly ACPO recognised during the mid-80s that society was changing, and that things had to change in the service to match the needs and demands of society - so I think it goes back a long way." (Interview 052 2.11.93 TC 076)

This officer added that in the late 1970s the policing agenda featured debate about ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’ policing. It was recognised, according to this respondent, that the police had focussed excessively on reactive policing (‘when we jumped into cars’). Proactive policing was deemed necessary to counter the fact that the police had become ‘divorced from the public’. (TC 152).

Mawby (1990, p.168) suggests that the extent to which modern police systems are built on a community base is somewhat problematic, and recalls the “mythology” of such in relation to 19th century policing. He notes that while the impact of technology in this century shifted the emphasis “from police proximity to speedy response to an emergency” (ibid, p.169), there was nevertheless a fairly immediate reaction against ‘fire-brigade’ policing: by the early 1970s ‘community policing’ was firmly on the agenda (ibid, p.169).
Fielding et al (in Morgan and Smith, 1989, p.49) note the confusion over the term ‘community policing’ in the 1970s. They add that urban riots “fuelled debate about the way communities should be policed”, and that for some, community policing promised to be a panacea.

Critchley (1978, p.327) notes the “determination of the police to present a constructively benign image to the public”, and how this had underpinned recent developments such as the modernization of training programmes, and the development of neighbourhood and unit beat policing schemes. He highlights also the efforts of Chief Constables, during the preceding twenty years, to build up community relations schemes.

Cowell and Lea (1982 p150) comment on policing developments:

"Since the early 1960s policing philosophy has been moving away from the traditional idea of consensus policing towards a reactive style in which the police, armed with the latest technological devices and to a great extent isolated from the public in their patrol cars, simply respond to calls... By the early 1970s this reactive style of policing had become well established... The British notion of policing by consent was very nearly stone dead." (p.150)

I would suggest here that Cowell and Lea are too alarmist, and tend to exaggerate the changes between the 1960s and the 1970s. The extent to which the police re-emphasised the concept of community policing in the 1970s tends to be ignored by Cowell and Lea, as is the fact that one aim of the unit beat policing scheme introduced in the late 1960s was in fact to improve contact with the community (Mawby, ibid, p.170).

One could clearly claim, then, that the importance of police/public interaction and co-operation has a substantial tradition. This, to some extent, could account for some suspicion or resentment of some officers at yet another official statement on what they already were (or thought they were) concerned with. This might be referred to as the ‘flavour of the month’ syndrome.

One Chief Inspector was rather scathing and cynical about the recent emphasis on the QOS programme and dismissed the QOS program as a sop to political accountability:

"It's a gimmick. It's pointless to me, but it's not pointless to the political face of the police force.... You see all of a sudden what has occurred, we're now focussing on quality of service as if it's a new invention, and it isn't...”

(Interview 031 6.7.93 TC 250)
One Chief Superintendent agreed that ACPO had raised the profile of quality since 1990, and in that sense the SPD had some impact: however, he disagreed that the QOS programme had markedly affected daily policing:

"I don't think so, because I honestly don't see it as a new issue. I think it's a new high-profile issue, or the profile's been raised, but I honestly believe that... certainly for the last twenty, thirty years every officer's wanted to provide a quality of service. Never expressed it that way but, you know, to be efficient and to respond to demands to do a good job. I think they've always wanted to do that."

(Interview 049 27.10.93 TC 235)

It should be clear that several officers simply equated 'quality policing' with the community or service oriented policing which they believed had always been provided.

**Wolff Olins and Plus**

Another important development occurred in August 1988, when the corporate identity consultants, Wolff Olins, presented a report to the Metropolitan Police entitled *A Force for Change*. The research had been commissioned by the force in order to assess the Met's identity, and to explore the attitudes of staff within the organisation. Despite the organisational changes which had been taking place in the Met, Wolff Olins identified a number of problems within the force, many of which were concerned with appearance of police stations and the so-called 'sellotape culture' of the Met.

From the Wolff Olins report was born the massive programme of development entitled 'Plus' which was launched in 1989. According to the Commissioner's report for 1989, the Statement of Common Purpose and Values formed the bedrock of the Plus programme. Both Plus and the statement must be seen as hugely significant stages in the development of QOS. As was indicated in the Commissioner's report, Plus was designed:

"...to tackle and change, where necessary, the culture of the organisation; it is about changing the emphasis from a "force" to "Service" ethos; it is about ensuring that those police and civil staff who provide help and assistance to our public are well supported and thereby able to give the best service possible to those who need it..." (Foreword pxii).

As McLaughlin (1992, p478) states, Plus was the prototypical mission statement for policing in the 1990s. The programme was built around nine elements, including adopting the statement of purpose and values,
improving communication, and developing performance indicators.

Issue No.28 of the Met newsletter ‘Plus Points’ (November 1992) stressed that "The Plus team will continue to take forward a message of quality, leadership and corporacy", and that the team was tasked to plan the introduction of the code of ethics, take the lead on the production of a policing charter, and to address the area of service failure and recovery.

Walker (1994, p.55) notes the “major programme of change” undertaken under the banner of Plus, and King Taylor (1992) includes Plus as a case study in her analysis of ‘total quality’:

“Given the traditions of The Metropolitan Police, the climate in which it operates, and its culture, one can only be impressed that its service excellence programme, known as Plus, ever took off at all.” (p.106)

King Taylor describes the traditional “paramilitary” approach to management in the Met, and the way in which this could undermine service to the public (p.115).

One DCC respondent indicated that Alec Marnoch of the Met, who was a "street-wise" officer, got the "thankless" job of running Plus, and added:

"...They really had an uphill battle, they really did...they really had to battle, they took some tremendously hostile flak in police stations, but they persevered, and again I would say that overall it's been a success... they have taken on board the philosophy of policing standards..."

(Interview 066 13.12.93 TC 095)

One Chief Superintendent, who had had a placement with HMIC, felt that the message of Plus did not have an immediate impact on other forces:

"I don't think it had much apparent impact on provincial forces, because I don't think it was widely known about particularly, but I think it did have an impact in the Home Office... and I think it had some transference through the Inspectorate."

(Interview 065 10.12.93 TC 444)

This officer believed that Plus impacted on ACPO, and indeed this is evidenced by the emergence of Met-inspired elements of the QOS programme (such as the key operational service areas and the SCPV).
One very senior member of the HMIC based at Queen Anne’s Gate was more certain about the ‘powerful influence’ of the Metropolitan Police in terms of QOS, and placed considerable emphasis on the impact of the Wolff-Olins report. This respondent thought that Plus had been "brave", and successful, and that the series of staff seminars which were held throughout the Met to promulgate the programme had changed people from "abject cynicism" to having very positive attitudes. (Interview 010 8.3.93, not taped).

‘Police Review’ of 8.2.91 carried an article (p.262) in which it was suggested that many senior officers were ignoring Plus, thereby severely limiting its impact on the rank-and-file. Another report in Police Review (15.2.91, p.322-323) argued that “a significant proportion of mid-ranking officers are blocking its implementation”, and noted that only a minority of staff were being briefed before attending their one-day seminar (the seminar programme was designed to promulgate the message of Plus and the Statement of common purpose).

One ACC respondent, who had been in the Metropolitan Police, was not convinced that the Plus programme reflected a TQM approach:

"Plus was not a quality programme, I believe. Plus just talked about culture and attitudes. It did not talk about quality management. Again, this is where I think it was started, and I think because it was started by the same person who’s running the Quality of Service now the concept of it hasn’t made that leap... that extra leap, to me a pragmatic approach to management."

(Interview 076 3.2.94 TC 080)

Despite this last comment, however, it should be clear that Plus was a significant attempt at organisational reform, and a key development in policing policy. Alec Marnoch (in ‘Police’ October 1990) claimed that despite the initial cynicism and hostility, attitudes about the message of Plus had changed favourably since its launch (p.17).

The Operational Policing Review

In the official discourse about the QOS programme, it is generally accepted that the 1990 Operational Policing Review (OPR) lies at the root of the original initiative. The concerns which led to the OPR were stated as follows:

i) ‘Traditional’ policing is threatened.
ii) The traditional service role of the police is being undermined by the focus on economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

iii) The effect of balancing the competing needs of 'value-for-money' and maintaining high standards of policing service could be to adversely affect the quality of life for citizens. (OPR, 1990, p2)

More specifically, the terms of reference were: to examine to what extent a host of demands had undermined the provision of beat patrol duties since 1974; to show how efficiency and effectiveness had been improved by police initiatives; to consider effects of societal change on policing operations and style; to consider the implications of HO circulars 105/88 (Civilian staff in the police) and 106/88 (Applications for increases in police force establishments); and finally to produce recommendations and a review of resource implications to the Joint Consultative Committee. (ibid, p2)

It was also stated in the introduction:

"The Operational Policing Review came into being when each of the members of the Joint Consultative Committee agreed that the dull ache that the service had long experienced in relation to resources was changing into an acute pain...”

(OPR, 1990, p1)

In sum, perhaps the major aim of the OPR was to "add evidence to the police position in the competition for resources" (ibid, p2).

Having fulfilled the 'strong state' functions in the 1980s, one could argue that the police call for more resources emerged at a logical historical moment. Perhaps in a sense police leaders felt that the service deserved a 'reward' after the tumultuous and politically contentious events of the decade. Of course, after the imposition of financial restrictions, and the emphasis on the three Es, in the early 1980s, it was inevitable that any state agency would need to make a clear and overt call for resources from the centre. The police could not assume (quite correctly) that the central state would automatically 'produce the goods'. Butler (in Policing Today, April 1995) writes that the police raised the debate about the future of policing through the OPR.

The OPR provided a list of 36 wide-ranging recommendations, including the need to re-emphasise the service's commitment “to the highest values”, and to review the style of policing in all forces.
The OPR revealed that officers placed less value on the 'caring, preventative' style of crime prevention and community policing generally. Reiner (1992, p.266) recalls the OPR demonstrating “that the priorities of police and public were out of kilter. The public expressed a preference for a community-oriented, service-style of policing rather than an enforcement-based approach.” Brogden, Jefferson and Walklate (1988, p.33-34) outline the ‘working personality’ of officers as that centred on machismo, prejudice and pragmatism, and concerned with action and excitement. Given this state of affairs, it is not too surprising that the OPR demonstrated a lower commitment to the caring or preventative aspects of policing.

As the OPR phrases it, the public views were ‘quite divergent’ in relation to policing style. The public survey revealed different opinions on the ideal split on foot and mobile patrols, and indicated that the public attached importance to crime prevention (although the OPR suggests the definition of this could have differed between the public and the police respondents), the 'caring, community' style of policing, and the investigation of all crimes.

It was also generally perceived by the public that the bulk of police officers patrolled in vehicles, rather than on foot. The discrepancy between the ideal policing styles was a major element in precipitating the original QOS initiative, and has been a recurring theme since 1990. As Stephens and Becker (1994, p.224) note, the OPR:

"concluded that what was required in the light of the review's findings was the restoration of the idea of 'traditional policing' to counteract the decline in confidence and to move somewhat closer to public expectations".

One Chief suggested that the OPR had been conducted due to the "complete lack of appreciation" (interview 045 14.9.93 TC156) of the police function on the part of government and the public. One DCC echoed the view that the OPR had been the "main kick" for the quality movement in the police, and said:

"I suppose the Operational Policing Review was one big marker, that showed people where we were, what wasn't quite right, what the expectations were."
(interview 034 19.8.93 TC103)

In a diagrammatic representation of the QOS programme used by the QOS committee, the OPR is shown as the roots of a tree, with the fruits being elements such as the Statement of Common Purpose and Values (SCPV), the Key Operational Service Areas and the Quality of Service video:
One officer who was a key member of the QOS committee said:

"... the rationale for the Operational Policing Review was that there wasn't a clear idea of what the police should actually be about. I don't think there is now particularly... People, I think, were beginning to realise we didn't actually know what the customers wanted, because we'd never bothered to listen to them before. ... It was also about that time that the Home Office started to become a little more aggressive in terms of it wanting to be more directive about what the police did, and I mean that continues to this day. I mean, inarguably, you know the Home Office officials would like to have a more influential part than ever, so perhaps that was something to do with it."

(Interview 018 14.5.93, TC 326-350)

This extract suggests both the growing importance of 'consumerisation' and the escalating conflict between the police and the central state. This officer also believed that a new breed of chief officers in the latter half of the 1980s were prepared to take the lead on the policing agenda, rather than remain subject to central direction.

One Chief Superintendent in central HMIC noted how the 'quality' approach was discussed on senior command courses at Bramshill in the 1980s, and emphasised the significance of the OPR (Interview 061 26.11.93, TC 308). However, another (in operational command of a large town) felt that the OPR had little impact on day-to-day policing, and that officers on the ground would have seen it as "management playing their games". (Interview 073 25.1.94, TC 155) Another Chief Superintendent (also in charge of a large conurbation) felt that the OPR had some impact in the higher echelons of the police, but that it was poorly promulgated and ultimately was followed up with very little action. (Interview 074 25.1.94, TC 116/539).

Despite a few reservations, however, it was generally agreed by those interviewed that the OPR was a significant development which led to the national launch of QOS. Of the Chief Inspectors and Superintendents surveyed, 65% were 'quite well acquainted', and 26% 'very well acquainted' with the OPR. Around half (51%) thought the OPR had a positive impact on their force, around a quarter (23%) that it had no impact, and a quarter (25%) were 'not sure'.
In sum, there can be little doubt that the OPR is important as a 'political symbol'. In addition to the fine and worthy calls for the ongoing professionalism of the police, it is clear that it represents an element in the struggle between state elites. Given the cosy relationship between the police and the central government in the mid-1980s, it represented an unprecedented attack by the former on the latter.
3.3 The genesis of the Quality of Service sub-committee and the role of the Home Office

It became clear during the research that there was some discrepancy about the perceived role of the Home Office officials in launching 'quality' in the police. Several officials emphasised the importance of the Police Department role, while senior officers stressed the key influence of service leaders themselves.

Ian Oliver (then Chief of Central Scotland Police) drew attention in June 1990 (Police Review 15.6.90) to the tarnished image of the police, and concluded:

"Clearly, radical reform of a whole range of procedures and practices is necessary within British policing if it is to survive the onslaught of the 90s" (p.1198).

One HO official noted how the policy direction of F2 changed due to the appearance and development of QOS, but that it only really became:

"a policing objective when we started to think seriously about the lessons of the Operational Policing Review". (interview 019 27.5.93 TC 077)

At the same time, this respondent recalled, there was increasing media concern about confidence in the service, and a general feeling that policing was in the "doldrums" (TC 093).

This official felt that the BCS is the most important piece of research carried out by the HO and that the "full flavour" of results (which emerged at the beginning of 1990, he suggested) were too significant to leave alone (TC 103). QOS was a "classic response" in that something had to be seen to be done (TC 143). More generally, it was felt that things had moved forward on QOS because there were a variety of "disentangled" causal influences, including the media, ministers, "gut feeling", and research. It was felt that the initiative really 'took shape when ACPO agreed (at the end of the 1990 Spring seminar) to form a sub-committee (TC 356). The SCPV was itself high risk, in that it was felt generally the statement of the Metropolitan "wide-boys" could not be used; Hirst, however, "very robustly" and bravely pushed this through (TC 438).

Another senior official (interview 023 15.6.93) recalled that the early working group produced the SPD which was launched at Bramshill in October 1990. Interestingly, it was recalled that the label of TQM was deliberately avoided, although much of the work on the original initiative involved the concepts of
TQM 'stripped of the jargon' (TC 514). This official also stated that "there was quite a lot of ACPO politicking" (TC 367). It was presumed that there would be more chance of forces supporting the initiative if it was led by the service, but it was felt at times a disadvantage that the police department was not steering it (TC 388). It took considerable effort "behind the scenes" to keep the parties working together (TC 390).

One HMIC officer (interview 021 7.6.93) recalled that the QOS working group had studied the TQM approach in commercial organisations such as British Airways and British Telecom, and taken into account the work of TQM "gurus" such as Crosby. It was felt that the police had "lagged behind the times". (TC 185). In the latter half of 1990, there was some "divergence of opinion" within the group, with 'people fighting for their territory' (TC 381) There had been several drafts of the SPD (which was nearing completion) but there was still considerable debate, "nit-picking", and "tortuous battles", often pitched at an academic level, about the content and meaning of the SPD (TC 410).

Interviews with senior officers generally revealed rejection of the idea that the HO significantly (if at all) contributed to the QOS initiative. One DCC felt there was a "delicious irony" about such a suggestion:

"Every time the Home Office decides that the Police Service is in need of reform, or the Criminal Justice System is in need of reform, you can bet your life somebody else will have initiated it, and usually it has been the police service... There was no Home Office input into the declaration of common purpose... that was a police-led initiative..." (interview 099 23.2.95 TC 112/134)

This DCC stressed how a number of initiatives, such as Neighbourhood Watch, schools liaison and the use of Area Beat Officers were all police led. He concluded:

"I certainly wouldn't look to Queen Anne's Gate for any inspiration. I never have." (TC 162)

Likewise, one chief constable firmly rejected the notion that the Police Department helped promulgate quality:

"Nothing could be further from the truth.... I have a very clear view that they couldn't initiate anything, least of all that. That was entirely a Police Service, Police Service energy, as have been many of the initiatives... I mean, they come along and sit on the platform at the right time. I mean, most of them wouldn't understand what we're doing out there anyway." (interview 055 9.11.93 TC
In some contrast one DCC felt that he had not been 'close enough to the debate' to ascertain the role of the HO in the early days of the initiative, but said:

"I think the Home Office have, if they didn't originate it, have certainly supplemented it, given it tremendous weight, encouraged chief officers to go down that route, and are still continuing to do so... it's right that they should, if they're focusing on quality, if their Inspectorate is focusing on quality, if the government is clearly focusing on quality, which they are, then yes, it's right that they should put pressure on chief officers to focus on quality". (interview 039 23.8.93 TC 330)

This extract perhaps suggests a more harmonious and co-operative embrace of ideas predominant at the time. One ACC believed that the HO would have been loathe to lead the QOS initiative (and assume responsibility), and proposed that the HO:

"... perhaps breathed a sigh of relief that the Service actually come up with something to which the Service signed up, and which made sense as far as the Home Office were concerned." (interview 045 13.9.93 TC 231)

On the role of F2 in the development of the initiative, one official felt that this allowed the "vision" to be translated:

"I think they were very influential in giving it a shape which enabled it to be recognised and promulgated." (interview 086 26.4.94 TC 190)

Despite the importance of F2, this respondent still believed that ACPO were the "architects" of the initiative, and that Michael Hirst was the "focus of it" (TC 216).

In sum, while it appears that there was considerable collaboration between police leaders and the HO in the early stages of the QOS initiative, there is also some evidence of inter-agency tension or 'jockeying for position'. During interview, several officers dismissed the idea that the HO were significant actors - perhaps this is more indicative of political competition at the time of interview, or general dislike of the central state administrators.
3.4 The launch of the Quality of Service initiative

The QOS initiative was launched on 23rd October 1990 at a Service-wide Bramshill seminar. The seminar itself was attended by senior officers and representatives of the other major agencies or departments (such as the Police Department and HMIC). The cornerstone of the seminar, and indeed the initiative at that stage, was the ACPO 'Strategic Policy Document', which was subtitled 'Setting the Statement for Policing: Meeting Community Expectation'.

In the foreword of this key document the then President of ACPO (Sir John Dellow) stated:

"What is proposed is not something that can be imposed nor made to work by direction. It is a philosophy of policing in which we must all have ownership and it must be adopted individually, freely and willingly. From this should flow a policing style through which a proper service is delivered to the public both in regard to enforcement and other policing."

The SPD itself had three stated objectives which were, firstly, to provide the Service with a corporate statement of common purpose, secondly, to provide the means with which to identify, implement and monitor quality of service, and thirdly, to propose the further development of standards of service delivery by forces and the service as a whole. What is noteworthy in the words of Sir John Dellow is the clarification that a new philosophy of policing was required for the future development of the service. This assertion that Quality of Service in the police represents a philosophy was reflected in many of the research interviews, although as some senior officers stressed, there has been a growing need to pin down the concept of quality and focus more on concrete 'deliverables' which can be provided by the police.

The Statement of Common Purpose and Values

Perhaps the most identifiable aspect of the original QOS launch was the Statement of Common Purpose and Values, which was adopted by the bulk of forces:

The purpose of the Police Service is to uphold the law fairly and firmly: to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen's Peace; to protect, help and reassure the community: and to be seen to do all this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.
We must be compassionate, courteous and patient, acting without fear or favour or prejudice to the rights of others. We need to be professional, calm and restrained in the face of violence and apply only that force which is necessary to accomplish our lawful duty.

We must strive to reduce the fears of the public and, so far as we can, to reflect their priorities in the action we take. We must respond to well-founded criticism with a willingness to change.

ACPO (1990)

This statement is practically identical to the original Metropolitan Police version which formed the cornerstone of Plus. Even though the statement was generally embraced by the leaders of the service, some forces adapted the national version.

One Chief Constable suggested that it was a "very brave thing" to get provincial (and often parochial) chief officers to sign up to the Met-based statement, but agreed there was some uncertainty three years after the launch:

"If you take the statement of common purpose and values, and the commitment to the concept of quality of service all Chief Constables will say they are totally committed to it. If you come to look at the actions to support all that, I'll have to say there's a tremendous variation between some Chief Constables whose, who are developing constantly practice procedures... and others who... the forces which are not doing that, the Chief Officer just doesn't really have a vision of how it could work, and to be fair some of those Chief Constables are in forces which have very big operational problems."

(interview 045 14.9.93 TC190)

One senior HMIC respondent found it ironic, however, that some chief constables felt inclined to adapt the so-called 'common' statement (Interview 010 8.3.93, not taped). One senior civil servant (interview 020 27.9.93) involved in the launch of the QOS initiative felt that the symbolism of the SPD was more important than its content, and indeed that some of the language in the SPD is difficult to comprehend.

Overall the statement of common purpose has been generally well received within the service, and has certainly fared better than other strategic initiatives and statements, such as the Metropolitan 'Blue Book' and the code of ethical principles. However, one Chief Constable said of the launch of the SCPV:

88
"... I think it was the right thing to do, but I'm only sorry that a number of my colleagues didn't sign up to it... We had a period then where other Chief Constables were doing their own thing, or at least amending the statement."

(interview 032 2.8.93 TC 166)

In the research survey, 63% of respondents said they were 'very well' acquainted with the statement, with another 37% saying they were 'quite well' acquainted. Similarly, the majority (62%) of these chief inspectors and superintendents felt that the statement had impacted positively on their force, although 10% were 'not sure'. Around one-quarter (27%) stated that there had been no impact.

The development of quality of service

The SPD made clear that despite the "great strides" in developing and implementing policies aimed at cultivating a more "responsive, sensitive and impartial" service since the Scarman report of 1981, it was evident that the police was still: setting its own priorities and standards in terms of service delivery and measures of effectiveness; not verifying that the service provided meets the expectation of those who demand it; and not providing a consistently acceptable standard of fairness, courtesy and sensitivity in its service delivery to the public. (SPD, 1990, p6).

The SPD outlined the evidence which suggested that the service was failing to meet public expectations in terms of policing style. For example, the 1990 OPR had identified that public confidence in the police was deteriorating, and the 1988 British Crime Survey highlighted a decline in public satisfaction with policing services (see Police Foundation/PSI 1994 p6). The document also stressed the need to measure public satisfaction with qualitative aspects of policing and continued:

"A basic measurement of performance in police relations with the public at sub-divisional level will be the systematic feedback from the 'customer', by regularly issuing a short questionnaire to members of the public who have come into contact with the police..."  (Paragraph 26, p11)

This paragraph encapsulates two important elements of the QOS philosophy and programme - firstly, the use of the term 'customers' and secondly, the utilisation of 'customer surveys' to ascertain satisfaction with the service. The SPD also acknowledged the need to reflect public concern and priorities in policing action, and to conduct local opinion surveys (p.11-12).
Paragraph 33 (p12) of the SPD stressed that the improvement of standards of behaviour amongst officers, as well as the demonstration of "fairness, courtesy and sensitivity at all times in dealings with the public" would be a key to improving public confidence and relations with the community.

Some of the recommendations of the SPD are listed below:

* There should be a statement of common purpose and values for the police service nationally.

* Chief Officers should draw up a policy statement on quality of service, within a clearly identified policy framework.

* There should be clearly identified mechanisms for monitoring customer satisfaction with the quality of service delivered.

* There should be clearly identified and monitored standards of behaviour within the service, with particular reference to equal opportunities and in relation to members of the public.

* Monitoring of performance of quality of service should be reinforced centrally.

(SPD, 1990, p15)

What becomes clear from the recommendations is that the SPD was concerned to pursue the standardisation of policing services, and indeed the increased monitoring of such. Dandeker (1990) discusses the inexorable growth of organisational bureaucracy and surveillance, and it could be posited on a critical note that the SPD (and the ensuing QOS programme) has heralded an intensified march toward internal organisational discipline and surveillance. This perhaps echoes the Weberian vision of professional expertise becoming subordinated to bureaucratic discipline (Dandeker, ibid, p.213). However, the idea of increased, and centrally encouraged, monitoring of policing standards sits rather uncomfortably with the claim to professionalism which also typified important aspects of the SPD. It could, however, be suggested that the SPD represents a type of "managerial professionalism" which James (in Holdaway 1979, p.70) identifies as a response to the challenge of police power from other agencies:

"On the one hand, the professionalization of the British Police is a process of sustaining an image of competence and parity, on the other hand this image can be directly related to the retention of power and authority".
We must not lose sight of the political motivation of launching the SPD, and its importance in underlining the authority and competence of the police in the face of a hostile ideological and political environment. The SPD, and the QOS programme, also represent a rationalisation of service provision, which perhaps is not too far removed from the exigencies of 1980s and 1990s new managerialism and the deeper historical trends toward legal-rational domination. Common standards, procedures, rules, 'proper' ways of thinking and acting appear increasingly to be the milieu in which we (and the police) work; this is, of course, despite the rhetoric of devolution of authority and individual discretion.

In sum, the SPD represents certain dualisms: in one sense it reinforces the professional/public service model of policing, but in another it accepts the need to standardise and monitor within a somewhat consumerist framework. It is a gesture to defy the encroachment on police authority, and yet embraces the ethos of increasing centralised monitoring. Perhaps the SCPV represents a “mystification of professionalization” (James, ibid, p.70) to counter the centralising tendencies of the government, and yet ironically the police itself is involved in centralizing and standardizing its own functions.
3.5 Other Elements of the QOS programme

In a previous section, the early stages of the QOS initiative, and the main aims and content of the 1990 SPD, were outlined. The speed with which forces responded to the recommendations in the SPD varied significantly. In addition, the impact of the other elements of the QOS programme has been variable, and in some cases, difficult to judge. The purpose of this section is to identify the other elements of the national programme since 1990, and to present some respondent opinions on the aims and form of these elements.

The key operational service areas

In December 1991 the QOS sub-committee published its management guide on the key operational service areas (ACPO 1991). This guide was intended to provide designated officers with a strategic framework, a review of definitions of terms and a set of examples to enable further force development (Foreword, 1991). This is perhaps indicative of increased centralized monitoring and 'surveillance'.

Of fundamental significance for subsequent issues on the national policing agenda (such as the derivation of the national police funding formula) was the definition of the five key operational performance areas as follows:

* The handling and management of calls from the public.

* Crime management.

* Traffic management.

* Public reassurance and public order maintenance.

* Community relations and community problem solving.

In subsequent debates (such as those surrounding the national police funding formula) it became clear that these areas were not exhaustive.

Under the key area of 'Public reassurance' the core functions included promoting the image of the police as a community service and reflecting public concern in the setting of policing priorities. During interviews with senior officers, members of the police department, and the HMIC, considerable support for
these concepts was expressed. Superintendents and Chief Inspectors in the survey were also broadly supportive, particularly in relation to the aim of 'Reassuring the Community'.

In rating out of 7 the importance of 'reassuring the community', these officers gave a high score of 6.20 (with a low standard deviation of 1.05). Interestingly, however, when asked in an open question about the most important function of the police few cited 'reassurance' as the primary role. Some of the comments which included reference to reassurance are reproduced below:

"Reassurance of the public and prevention of crime, but with due regard for the need to respond to immediate requests for assistance."
(Force 1 Chief Inspector 012)

"The maintenance of order and reassuring the community by responding in a positive manner to areas of local concern."
(Force 1 Chief Inspector 013)

"To reassure the public and maintain peace and tranquility. We need to be seen to actually achieve that goal."
(Force 1 Superintendent 040)

The document also represented early attempts at outlining a suite of performance indicators for each of the key operational service areas. The debate about the use of PIs continues and has been a source of considerable friction between the leaders of the Service, the Audit Commission, HMIC and the government.

'Getting Things Right'

At the December 1992 QOS seminar at Bramshill, the 'Getting Things Right' element of the programme was first brought into the public arena (ACPO 1993a). This was designed to address the 'internal' quality of service dimension. It is repeatedly stated within policing circles that if the internal quality of an organisation is assured, then the service provided externally to the public will be of a higher standard. 'Meeting the needs of and expectations of the internal customers' was one of the six strategic objectives of the QOS sub-committee in 1992 and in response to this, six key internal service areas were identified, some of the sub-elements of which are listed below:
1) **Leading and Managing People:**

Visible, Committed and Supportive Leadership  
Teamwork  
Trust and Openness  
Consulting and giving authority to staff  
Valuing People  
Career Development  
Recognition and Reward  

2) **How we communicate:**

Development of internal and external strategies  
Suggested schemes  
Improvement of existing channels of communication  

3) **Internal Organisation:**

In-force re-organisation  
Rank structure  
Specialist units  

4) **Managing Resources:**

Devolution to lowest practical level  
Resource strategy  
Buildings  

5) **Systems and Procedures:**

Reduce paperwork to the minimum  
Give staff authority  
Prevent mistakes happening  
Training
6) Strategy for action:

Corporate plans
Shared vision
Management of change

One Chief echoed the view expressed in GTR that it was vital to address 'quality' within the organisation:

"My own view is that we have probably done enough of telling people how they ought to behave better towards others, or provide a better service. I think it's time we showed them that we're prepared to provide them a better service. So internal quality will probably be the next big issue."

(Interview 054 9.11.93, TC 130)

Another Chief was clear that GTR would be very beneficial, and that it was vital to treat staff with respect:

"...if you treat the staff as, like shit, they'll treat the public like shit. And there are still far too many police forces who are still in the dark ages, frankly, in the way they do that, and they haven't got a real vision of treating your junior staff as fellow professionals... and getting the best out of them..."

(Interview 045 14.9.93, TC 060)

In 1993 the QOS committee (it had become a fully-fledged ACPO committee early in 1993) released the 'Getting Things Right' documentation in three versions. There was a full document which in detail discussed the elements of internal quality, a summary version of this, as well as a leaflet.

Charles Pollard, (Chairman of the QOS committee at the time) was the major driver behind the 'Getting Things Right' initiative and stressed repeatedly the importance of organisational culture to meet the challenge of change. It is stated in the 'Getting Things Right' summary document (p.8):

"For many years past, our military-based police culture has been obsessed with doing things right. It is, of course, important to do things right. But, as demands increase and policing becomes more complex, so it becomes increasingly important to prioritise what we do and not just react to events. This obligation rests particularly on our leaders and managers, for it is they who set the standards for the whole service and an example to all our staff."

There is little doubt that the model of internal quality espoused in GTR owes much to the business school: it stresses, for example, the need for devolved authority, the management of cultural change and a corporate vision. Drummond (1992) discusses how a quality culture is built up within an organisation,
and in developing the potential of any workforce she stresses the need for managers to act as “enablers” and to avoid the traditional imposition of standards (p.137).

Hood (1992) addresses the concept of culture within the Police Service and draws on the work of Roger Harrison (1987) and the use of the 'Diagnosing Organisation Ideology Questionnaire' (DOIQ). Hood (p34) notes the four types of organisational culture defined by Harrison; namely role culture, power culture, achievement culture and support culture. Hood cites the work of Plumridge (1988), and reports that in the period 1982-1986 around 2000 senior officers were tested with the DOIQ. Hood says:

"Approximately 35% of officers felt they worked in an organisation characterised by autocratic use of power by individuals or small groups. Approximately 50% felt that the culture was one where bureaucratic characteristics of impersonality, rules, procedures and hierarchy predominated." (Hood, 1992, p35)

Pheysey (1993) picks up on the typology of organisational culture noted above, and describes (p.40) the characteristics of role and power cultures:

"Role cultures have regulations that can sometimes work like thermostats. There are purposes, plans, measurement and corrective action. Power cultures tend to rely on direct intervention by superiors when it comes to corrective action. Both cultures favour regulation, which applies restraint."

Pheysey also suggests that a "secondary culture" exists alongside the dominant one in an organisation (p170). In the case of the police it might be proposed that a role culture predominates, with a power culture a significant secondary culture. The apparent aim of GTR has been to shift the Police Service away from a role and power culture to an achievement and support culture, with the latter as the predominant model. A support culture rests on good communication (up and down the organisation), staff involvement and the sharing of achievements. In a thoroughly 'modernist' sense, Pheysey discusses organisational development:

"To develop is to reach a more advanced or evolved stage. Individual persons can develop, organisations can develop, nations can develop... Beliefs about what an ideal organisation is like affect the practice of organisational development. Many Western OD consultants seek to foster achievement and support cultures."

(Pheysey, 1993, p164-165)

Lawton and Rose (1991) describe the dimensions of organisational change (p133) and remind us how organisations exist in a changing environment which is affected by economic, political, social and legal
developments. They refer to the decline of bureaucracy, and contrast the closed organisation with the open organisation which:

"...stresses flexibility and is characterised by discretion and responsiveness to the environment. A closed system is often characteristic of bureaucracy. If this is the case then a bureaucracy may have difficulty in coping with unplanned organisational change."

(Lawton and Rose, 1991, p134)

I disagree, however, that bureaucracy (and legal-rational domination) is on the decline.

GTR states:

"We live in a world where change is becoming the norm, where the speed of change is accelerating, where customers rightly demand quality although their needs and expectations vary widely, and where resources are limited. Policing in such a world is a complex, dynamic activity which makes tremendous demands on all our staff, especially those who directly serve the community."

(ACPO, 1993a, p3)

GTR stresses the importance of meeting customer requirements, devolution of authority, continuous change and improvement, and seeking a "flat, flexible structure" (p22). It is stated in the document:

"The police service, in common with all other organisations, cannot afford to stand still. It must continually adapt and improve to keep pace, or its very existence - in the form we know it - may begin to be challenged.

There can be no doubt that the police service is changing. It is now better equipped to meet its customers' expectations. But even greater strides can be made by improving internal support, and changing our culture still more so that it promotes internal customer care and service."

(ACPO, 1993a, p16)

GTR (and elements of the wider reforms within the police) ostensibly reflect the aspects of the 'postbureaucratic' organisation which Thompson (1993) discusses. Thompson distinguishes between the ontological and epistemological strands of postmodernist study (p183) and notes that some authors "concentrate on the material changes in society and work organisation" rather than epistemological concerns. Thompson refers to Mulgan's (1989) account of the new organisational forms (in the sense of postmodernist epoch):
"...that manifest a shift from 'strong' to 'weak' power. The former are embodied in a Fordist, bureaucratic regime of rules, hierarchies, predictability and centralisation; to be replaced by decentralised, self-regulating, fluid and flexible structures... Modern organisations are in reverse thrust, with initiative, drive and energy coming from the parts, not the centre."

(Thompson, 1993, p185)

As organisations and managers are no longer concerned with "bureaucratic rationality", Thompson (p186) suggests, they shift their focus to the "management of culture" which "encompasses the well-trodden path of the corporate culture literature". Much of this literature has, of course, centred on the evolution of Japanese industry and 'quality'. GTR itself draws attention to the "happy, motivated" workforce of Japanese industry (p7). Thompson (p184) reminds us how Clegg (1990) identifies Japan (and Sweden) as "postmodern futures".

It becomes apparent, then, that to some extent GTR reflects a 'postmodern sensibility', and that key leaders of the service involved in its promulgation appear to favour a postbureaucratic organisation. One could wonder, of course, how rapidly this will be achieved (if at all) given the power of the 'quasi-military' (Stephens and Becker, 1994, p221) tradition of the police. Walker (1994) questions, for example, the extent of managerial reform in the police:

"A number of factors may underlie the relative impotence of the caring reforms of a normative culture to break the self-perpetuating cycle of instrumentalism. Having subscribed to them throughout their career, some officers may be unwilling to jettison the values implicit in the military-bureaucratic model... as beneficiaries of its impressive fund of instrumental resources, they may have a vested interest in maintaining intact the prevailing bureaucratic system..." (p56).

Walker (p61) also draws attention to the recent emphasis on external regulation of the police (as exemplified by the national key policing objectives) and concludes that these external pressures will inevitably affect the dimensions of 'care and control' within the police. If police managers are increasingly under pressure to conform to the imperatives of 'value for money' and performance indicators, one might suggest that the commitment to developing a support or achievement culture could be significantly weakened.

Given the centralisation of control over the police, and the enhancement of rational and bureaucratic surveillance by the central state, I conclude here that any attempt at promulgating a 'postmodernist sensibility' within the police is doomed to failure. Given the centrality of the police as a mechanism for social control, the vagaries of a post-bureaucratic organisation of policing are untenable to the state. Police leaders
were perhaps naive to believe that their attempts at cultural and managerial reform could resist the iron cage of centralising authority and the momentum of rationalisation.

**Quality of Service Video**

At a cost of around £60,000 (paid for by the Home Office) a video was produced by the Quality of Service video committee in 1993. This was designed to promulgate the message of 'quality' throughout the service, and the video centred on scenes of police personnel at work, espousing views about quality policing. The leaflet which accompanied the video stated:

"It is important to emphasise that quality of service is about looking forward, not backwards. No one is talking about ditching the past, but building on the best of the service for the future. Nearly every organisation is now turning to quality of service as a way of improving its performance. ...Quality of service is not a quick fix - it has to be carried forward throughout an organisation."

No national evaluation was conducted to assess the impact of the video, but my research survey revealed that out of the total sample of 154 Chief Inspectors and Superintendents, only 69 officers (45%) had seen the video, and that the bulk of these were only in one of the three subject forces. In scoring the video for overall usefulness (on a scale of 1 to 7) a fairly poor mean rating of 3.61 was obtained. In one force, only 3 out of 34 respondents had seen the video.

It is safe to say that there was some disappointment about the video amongst senior officers (one DCC described it as "sub-standard"), and indeed within the Police Department.

**The development of Performance Indicators**

The use of performance indicators (Pis), as pointed out already, forms part of the 'New Agenda' of public sector reform. Early on in its work the Quality of Service Committee was turning its attention to the derivation of Pis, but the views of ACPO on the most appropriate form of performance measurement have often clashed with those of the Audit Commission, the HMIC and the government. ACPO have been concerned that the indicators derived by the Audit Commission and the HMIC are excessively focused on mechanistic, quantitative measurements, and have wanted to stress the importance of the qualitative dimension of service. In addition, the leaders of the Service have been worried that the emphasis on performance measurement (particularly that centred on the Home Secretary's key policing objectives) will skew the activities of the police. That is, policing measured by Pis will be prioritised at the expense of 'service' which is not systematically monitored.
One Chief Constable talked of the relationship (and tension) between ACPO, the HMIC and the Audit Commission:

"In terms of objectives, they're not dissimilar, but there's enormous friction over the performance indicators. I mean, it was very, very political... basically because the Audit Commission start talking about PIs... the Inspectorate... it was a totally political reaction... they whopped straight in with a ridiculous, a massive number of PIs, not thought out... absolute farce... they were not thought out, and what's more they sat on the table there for almost a year or two... totally political..."

(interview 045 14.9.93, TC 595)

This respondent felt that some 'very superficial work' had been done by HMIC on PIs. For the leaders of the Service, the particularly irksome HMIC initiative was the publication of 45 quality indicators in September 1991. As one HMIC Chief Superintendent put it, this:

"Went down like a dose of AIDS... totally unwanted... not totally understood by other people in the Inspectorate, unwanted very much by a lot of Chief Officers."

(Interview 062 26.11.93, TC 296)

In 1993, the debate about PIs was settled to some extent, if only to a limited period. The Quality of Service Committee issued the first suite of PIs, and to parallel this Home Office circular 17 of 1993 was issued. Thirty of the indicators had been derived by the Audit Commission, 20 were those of the HMIC, and only 6 were determined by ACPO, (as indicated below):

1) Percentage of callers satisfied with police performance standards in response to 999 calls.

2) Percentage of customers satisfied with police performance standards at station enquiry counters.

3) Percentage of victims satisfied with police performance standards at the initial response to a report of violent crime.

4) Percentage of victims satisfied with police performance standards at the initial response to a report of domestic burglary.

5) Percentage of victims satisfied with police performance standards at the scene of a road traffic accident.

6) Percentage of public satisfied with perceived levels of foot and mobile patrols.
The Chief Constable quoted above said of these:

"... we've had a real battle to get those six ACPO indicators in there. They're not right, but we've got a foothold, a big foothold... the principle is in, and that's terribly important... What appals me frankly is that there's so many people talk about quality such as the Inspectorate... Audit Commission... and Home Office, and yet they don't seem to understand that when you translate those principles into reality... that means you've got to have decent performance indicators..." (TC 627)

Some of the Audit Commission indicators, for example, indicate:

* Recorded crimes per 1000 population
* Percentage of crimes detected by primary means
* Number of crimes detected by primary means per officer
* Number of officers available for ordinary duty per 1000 population
* Expenditure on policing per head of population

A letter (dated 6.4.95) distributed on behalf of Paul Whitehouse (then Chief of Sussex and Chair of the QOS Committee) signified the response of police leaders to the AC indicators when it was argued that: comparisons should not be made between forces, such information should not be used in isolation when judging success or failure, and that performance indicators are merely management tools rather than 'ends in themselves'. The ACPO press release accompanying the letter stated:

"The Service is concerned, however, that the Audit Commission’s Citizen’s Charter Indicators present only a limited glimpse of a number of aspects of policing. They are important aspects to the public, such as crime detection, call handling and responding to emergencies but the indicators cover only what is easily measurable. The qualitative element of policing is not addressed. Without this element local communities will not be able to assess the complete performance of their force objectively."

(ACPO April 1995)

The Quality of Service Committee issued guidance documents for the conduct of customer and public surveys to meet the indicators, but the implementation of these was not standardised nor strictly monitored by the police. This became clear while working in Hampshire Constabulary; it is difficult, therefore, to compare force results, although reported satisfaction rates have been high; for example, national data for 1993-1994 indicate a 90% satisfaction rate for front counter callers, and a 93% satisfaction rate for victims of domestic burglary (HMCIC, November 1994).
There is no doubt that the plethora of indicators to which the Service has been exposed has caused consternation and some confusion for many senior officers. One of the principal objectives of the Quality of Service Committee currently is to monitor the PI package. The development and application of PIs thus far is regarded by many as a "hotch-potch", and as the Chief Constable of Gloucestershire put it during the December 1994 QOS conference, the Service must avoid falling into a simplistic "bean-counting" philosophy. The debate about PIs rages on; it is clear that the Service is not content to sit back and accept unquestioningly the PIs by which it will be judged. This was still evident at a QOS conference held by the Henry Fielding Centre (University of Manchester), in October 1996. Denis O'Connor (deputy chief constable of Kent) made it clear that the satisfactory resolution of the performance indicator issue was a primary objective for the QOS committee.

In ‘Policing Today’ (April 1995) Tony Butler claimed (p.13) that a commitment to measurement has been an important element of taking forward QOS, but expressed alarm at the possible distortion of policing strategy given the raft of PIs to which the police was now exposed (p.15). He distinguished between performance measurement and performance management and concluded:

"Performance management can only be a matter for Chief Constables who have the exclusive responsibility for the direction and control of their police force."

There is no doubt that Tony Butler has been one of the foremost political players on the police stage.

Ethics and Values

Once again, the work on developing a code of ethical standards formed an early focus for the QOS committee. This area has, however, had a rather stormy ride, and was yet to be fully resolved at the time of completing the fieldwork.

At the December 1992 conference the draft Statement of Ethical Principles was released. Staff at the Bramshill Police Staff College had been key players in the debate, and in an introduction to the Statement (attributed to the College) it was stated:

"...A 'Statement of Ethical Principles' will bring the Statement of Common Purpose and Values alive for each and every member of the Police Service. It will be our personal commitment to the community as to the standards that each of us will seek to achieve in our service to the public."

(ACPO 1992)

The statement contained eleven ethical principles including the need to:
* Act with fairness, carrying out responsibilities with integrity and impartiality.

* Uphold fundamental human rights, treating every person as an individual and display respect and compassion towards them.

* Support all my colleagues in the performance of their lawful duties and in doing so, actively oppose and draw attention to any malpractice by any person.

* Exercise force only when justified and use only the minimum amount of force necessary to effect my lawful purpose and restore the peace.

* Accept my responsibility for self development, continually seeking to improve the way in which I serve the community.

The reaction to the idea of this statement was to put it mildly, mixed. Some research respondents felt it was unnecessary, while others felt it was an important step in the continuing professionalisation of the police.

One ACC in Force 1 accounted for the ethical statement in the following terms:

"I think it's partly to do with quality of service... partly to try and offset two things. The sort of hide-bound, regulation-bound [approach].... to provide reassurance to the public at a time when all these horrible cases from the 70s have come back to haunt us. Where we're being judged on the pre-Police and Criminal Evidence Act era... the Sweeney era..."

(Interview 044 13.9.93, TC 470-480)

This respondent thought that the Service was attempting to state clearly its standards (without these being imposed) and that the statement was not just "cosmetic" or a political ploy. He added that there had been "slack standards" in the 1970s, and that there had been a credibility problem for the police; the statement of ethical principles, however:

"...wasn't just reaction, but very much a move to try and re-establish our identity in the eyes of the public, and in the eyes of government as well." (TC 551)

In rating the importance of the Service having the Statement of Ethical Principles, the Chief Inspectors and Superintendents in the research survey gave a mean score of 5.33 out of 7. (A high standard deviation of 1.82 was obtained, indicating considerable variation in the ratings given.)
A period of consultation with forces (by the QOS committee) in 1993 revealed that there were serious and varied concerns with the idea of having such a statement. For example, it was felt that the issuing of such a statement could imply that police officers were currently behaving unethically and that some of the principles espoused in the statement were in fact not 'ethically' oriented. In addition, it was felt that the release of the statement would over-burden an already harangued service, and that the reforms to disciplinary procedures would have to be consolidated prior to any statement of ethical principles. As a result, the Quality of Service Committee decided to slow down the work on ethics, and the idea of issuing a statement of ethical standards was replaced by the work on 'shared values'.

An interview with a member of the ACPO secretariat in April 1995 confirmed that the 'shared values' working group were very close to deriving an agreed statement, but that the Police Federation were still concerned by the concept. This respondent said:

"The group is not going to meet again, until the discipline codes have been signed, sealed and delivered, at which point we will have to try and get the Police Federation back on board with a view to considering launching the statement of shared values..."

(Interview 095 19.4.95, TC 030)

Factsheets

Symbolic of the growing politicisation of the policing function has been the publication of 'factsheets' designed for distribution to 'opinion-formers' within the community. The first was published in May 1993, although there had been debate within ACPO as to whether or not such a factsheet should be released at that time (given the political profile of the police reforms). Although not strictly within the original remit of the Quality of Service Committee, the factsheets were grafted on to form part of the overall QOS programme. The first factsheet touched on issues such as policing duties, rising workload, and public confidence in the police, and stated:

"The Police Service is facing a period of unprecedented change.... The service has welcomed a lot of changes and indeed has initiated many of them. ...This pamphlet sets out facts about your police service and some of its achievements, and seeks to unravel some of the mythology about the role of police." (ACPO 1993b)

One Inspector, who had been closely involved in producing the first factsheet, accounted for its emergence in the following terms:

"The main reason was to inform opinion-formers in society, that being councillors, MPs, justices..."
of the peace etcetera, ... where we're at and where we're going, and to give them some facts and figures so that they could enter into the debate about the change in the Police Service... we all know the Sheehy report was about to be published and we didn't want key members of society thinking about Sheehy from a position of ignorance."
(Interview 042 13.9.93, TC 005-018)

Even though it was acknowledged that Sheehy provided the added impetus to the factsheet, this Inspector denied (perhaps in a somewhat contradictory manner) that it was meant to be a political move or an attack on government. In addition, it was claimed that when the factsheet was presented at the ACPO Spring Conference of 1993, chief officers were concerned that the factsheet should not be perceived as "political" or "defensive".

One Chief Constable stressed that the public do not appreciate the complexity of policing services, and that factsheets help inform the public and market the police (Interview 045 14.9.93, TC 456).

This officer added that the factsheet had been difficult to handle "politically" within ACPO, and that the fairly low-key release of the factsheet was necessary given the volatile environment of 1993:

"...it could have been very easily seen as the police service getting very anti... almost against the Conservative... So, what we were worried about was that this could at the time we were doing this, when the... government were looking at the police, it could have been seen early on as a total attack on a government, and a typical trade union response, as is now the perception, of course, over Sheehy..." (TC 500-520)

A rather more doubtful Chief Constable referred to the Factsheets as "useful gloss", but added:

"I'm sceptical. I think they come out of adversity. I think we actually were driven to that in ACPO because we had problems, and that's what all organisations do..."
(Interview 089 23.8.94, TC 330)

This comment would tend to suggest that the factsheets were predominantly 'political'. The second factsheet was issued in July 1994, and was more overtly directed at influencing opinion and the political scenario. It contributed to the debate on policing, and aimed to counter some of the misapprehensions about the effectiveness of the police, and its willingness to evolve. Very specifically, the factsheet countered the assumption that 'private' policing would be more effective and efficient than the current service. The factsheet concluded:
"British policing is the best in the world, and it is continuously adapting to meet the challenges of the 1990s. The Police Service can function only with the consent, confidence and support of the public it serves. As the rest of the world looks to us to provide a model for community policing, we must not turn our back on what has developed over the past 165 years."

(ACPO 1994b)

In deciding the way the Police Service operates and responds to the Government's drive for cost effectiveness, we must ensure we do not lose all the values and characteristics that lie at the heart of British policing."

One officer noted that feedback to him about the factsheets had been positive, but added:

"As for an official government response, no we haven't had an official government response... they would have seen it for what it was, you know, an attack..."

(Interview 091 7.9.94, TC 314)

This key respondent suggested that the factsheets were 'all part of the service getting its act together'. The third factsheet of 1995 focused more specifically on the wider Criminal Justice System.

In sum, I would maintain that the factsheets are a clear manifestation of growing politicisation of the police, and policing, which Reiner (1992) catalogues. They illustrate the way in which an elite group seeks to impact on the tide of opinion and thereby alter the balance of power between itself and other elite groups (in this case central government). Thus, they reinforce the view that segments of the state are far from being necessarily unified and homogeneous in ideology or objectives. This tends to contradict the view of 'radical' writers such as Phil Scraton (1985).

National Policing Standards and Objectives

The work on the development of national policing standards and objectives was closely allied to the assessment of performance measurement. The first formal report from the policing standards working party was issued in March 1994, and represented "the first set of standards which have been endorsed by the police service nationally" (p1). In reality, there were some pockets of resistance in a limited number of forces. From the outset, the standards working group utilised the framework of the five key service areas, and was concerned to define commonly accepted standards of service, and key performance indicators required to measure the service.

It was noted in the first report that 36 forces would have published service charter documents by April 1994, but concluded that the framework of performance measurement had evolved "in a piecemeal fashion
tending to be driven by what can be measured rather than what should be measured." It was felt that a national standards approach would help rationalise the approach to performance measurement, and that it was important to develop adequate qualitative measures in addition to quantitative indicators. There was no intention, however, that the work on policing standards should lead to a 'National Police Charter'.

One might say that this work has been undertaken to counter the efforts of the government to set the policing agenda and the concomitant indicators of performance. One member of the Quality of Service committee said of this work:

"...if we have something at a national level which actually we believe we can deliver, again will ensure that it's something which is going to reflect well on the police, we would imagine, rather than again others constantly setting the agenda and expecting us to do things which we know from the outset are unachievable."

(Interview 077 22.2.94, TC 305)

To summarise, as well as the imposition of centrally-derived measures, and government expectations about the policing function, there has clearly been a move by the police to standardise its own performance measurement and management. This clearly fulfils a 'political survival' function: if the police service leaders are united in their cause then they are better able to defend their position within the state machinery. On a different sociological note, the development of things such as national policing standards are perhaps typical of the growth of rationalisation and surveillance. Dandeker (1990, p.37) points out the argument that with the ascendancy of 'rational bureaucracy' the organizations of modern capitalist societies develop greater surveillance capacities. The police service has sought to rationalise itself, and in doing so enhances its capacity to monitor the service it provides. At the extreme it could be argued that the entire QOS programme is another stage in the growth of police organizational and analytic capabilities, which Dandeker discusses in the context of improved information storage and resource allocation (ibid, p.128). Ultimately, then, this could enhance bureaucratic surveillance by the state over the populace.
3.6 Impressions of the early initiative

A minority of respondents were present at the original launch of the SPD at Bramshill in October 1990. One DCC recalled being at the original launch, and believed that some chief officers present were less than keen on the quality drive:

"There's one or two out there that I think are still being dragged kicking and screaming to the quality trough. Yes, I think there was a lot of scepticism out there". (TC 410)

One Superintendent (interview 016 30.4.93) who had been present at the 1990 launch noted that there was much negative feeling in evidence, and "heated" discussions in the working groups during the day. "Parochial attitudes" were expressed about the statement of common purpose and values. An HMIC Chief Superintendent who had also been present said of the strategic document and the seminar:

"The SPD came out as today's gimmick, and nobody had really thought through the vision of it - 'where is it actually taking us?' ... People had turned up purely out of duty. A lot of them left that seminar not understanding really what it was about. A comment from one chief officer was, 'Well, at least it gives us a code which we can whip some of our PCs into shape... He didn't see quality of service as something that you've got to sign up to ... He didn't see it extending any further than the external dimensions of quality of service, he didn't see the internal side of it ..." (interview 021 7.6.93 TC 537-555/009)

One ACC made the interesting observation that force representatives at the launch generally had a personnel and administration background, rather than operational responsibility, and that this reflected how QOS was perceived (interview 059 11.11.93 TC 066). This ACC believed that the launch of the QOS initiative did suffer credibility problems, and that this would have been ameliorated if there had been a greater focus on operational functions and 'quality' (TC 091).

An ACC from force 3 suggested that the original QOS strategy should have had a longer term focus, and that there should have been more detailed objectives. He also stressed how forces began to develop QOS in rather disparate ways, but was nevertheless generally impressed with the initiative:

"I think it's been quite coherent really and quite well defined ... I think perhaps if it was flawed it would have been flawed really in the fact that it went to 43 police forces, and each one really picked
it up and ran with it as they saw fit. ACPO's come on a long way very quickly - now there's much more of a feeling of one when something's now decided at ACPO level ... forces are doing far more in common with each other, and this applies to all the ACPO committees, and equally as it does to the quality of service committee ...." (interview 053 2.11.93 TC 006-028)

This comment reinforces the observation that policing is becoming increasingly standardised and centralised under the influence of ACPO (see Reiner, 1992, p.243-244).

One DCC believed that the QOS program had "earned its status", and that the initiative was now well received in many quarters:

"I think it has now become very clear and identified, after what might have been seen as a rocky, rocky start ... there's certainly an absolute acceptance, to my view, in ACPO that this is something to look to. It's a guide, it's going the right way, it's doing the things that we wanted to do .... it has had from the beginning of this year, the right status, I think." (interview 035 19.8.93 TC 018-039)

Overall, then, it was apparent that the launch of QOS was rather halting, but that the concept gradually gathered momentum.
As the research interviews progressed through 1993 to 1995, there was increasing evidence to suggest that the importance and impact of the QOS programme was on the wane. This is perhaps inevitable given that any 'initiative' loses its novelty value, and given the upheavals of the police reforms. Several respondents suggested that quality was not so much dying away as an issue, but was rather being transformed into a more specific programme with a focus on performance management.

One senior HMIC officer felt in March 1993 that QOS was "moving fairly slowly" (interview 010 8.3.93, not taped), and that maintaining the momentum was difficult considering the degree of uncertainty in the police (with developments such as Sheehy and the Royal Commission).

An ACC commented in August 1993 that the "environment" had changed in the last three years, from a "can do" to a "can deliver" philosophy in the police. This perhaps indicates the growing level of scrutiny of the police and the ongoing pressure on resourcing. He felt that the original thrust of QOS had been too wide, and that the focus in 1993 had to be much more specific. On being asked if the QOS programme was coherent and clearly identifiable he replied:

"I think it was a rallying cry for its time.... it gave us a sense of direction probably in 1990, but in 1993, you know, its age is showing." (interview 032 2.8.93 TC 020-035)

In relation to the current "public agenda", and what the police are able to deliver, he added:

"... and we have got to moderate our strategy, the way we measure quality, the way we market ourselves to accommodate the new environment, just like a business outside would." (TC 063)

This comment reflects the ascendancy of managerialist emphasis within the police (see Leishman, Cope and Starie, 1996).

One police department official (interview 058 10.11.93) was clear that the quality initiative and sub-committee had 'made their mark' by 1992, and remarked on how rapidly the sub-committee became a major committee. When asked if the initiative was in danger of 'fading away', he replied:

"I think that's probably not the right sort of metaphor really, because I don't it is a kind of
blazing torch. I think it's a, it's a sort of point of view. And it is clearly a point of view that is now well taken, well established at certain levels in the Police Service. I mean, you know, it is now, as it were, what is recognised as being what is wanted of the police in a sort of broad sense." (TC 880-900)

The theme of 'quality' being absorbed into the culture and objectives of the police, and no longer being a specific initiative, emerged in a considerable number of interviews. I discussed in chapter 2 some evidence from the business world that such initiatives tend to fade after a certain period. One HMIC chief superintendent (interview 062 26.11.93) acknowledged the potential loss of impetus for the QOS initiative:

"I think there is a possibility of it doing so, much like anything. The service in the last year, in particular, has had an awful lot more thrown at it... people may not necessarily have lost sight of it, but it's not the priority of the day". (TC 342)

One operational Chief Superintendent (interviewed in October 1993) felt no sense of a national initiative, but believed that within his own force there was an excessive amount of "jargon" and "buzz words" (such as 'Quality Improvement Opportunities'), and too much focus on service charters and service level agreements, and too little on the provision of service to the public (interview 049 27.10.93 TC 051). He was very concerned at the amount of time spent commenting on documentation (sometimes "unintelligible").

One ACC (interviewed in November 1993) disagreed that the national initiative would fade:

"No, if anything, it will gain momentum, but that's due to in no small part to the people in ACPO... and the dynamism of the people themselves..." (Interview 059 11.11.93 TC 417)

My October 1993 research survey revealed (as shown below) reactions to the statement: 'The current quality of service emphasis in my force will eventually fade away'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reaction</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no opinion</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quite clearly, the majority of Chief Inspectors and Superintendents disagreed that the emphasis on QOS would fade.

Further analysis, however, revealed some statistically significant differences. For example, around one quarter (24%) of officers who indicated that the emphasis on QOS had 'little' or 'no impact' on their jobs (see question 6, section D of the questionnaire) did agree that the emphasis on QOS would fade away, compared to only 8% of those who noted considerable impact. In addition, nearly one quarter (23%) of respondents who indicated a low level of involvement in the strategic development of their force tended to agree that the current QOS emphasis would fade (compared to only 10% of the high 'strategic involvement' respondents).

In another question, respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed that 'My force is at the forefront of developing quality of service'.

This yielded the following results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/no opinion</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 100%

For the sample as a whole, it appears that officers rated their force quite highly in relation to the development of QOS. Once again, more officers (86%) who felt they were involved in the strategic development of their force tended to agree that their force was at the forefront of developing QOS compared to (a still high) 69% of 'low involvement' officers who felt the same.

Several police department civil servants were also interviewed in 1994 (including heads of some of the F divisions), and these interviews provided a valuable (and rather rare) insight into views of 'central state' staff. These HO officials were asked about the status of the QOS programme. One respondent noted in January 1994:
"I think it's still there, yes. I mean, in a sense, it's been taken for granted - everybody knows about quality of service now, it's sort of, almost a catchphrase, but it is much more than a catchphrase, I mean I think that people do take it very, do acknowledge it's importance. It's certainly something that people still refer to fairly constantly. It hasn't dropped out of memory."

(interview 071 20.1.94 TC 629/679)

Another 'top' official (interviewed in May 1994) had gained the impression from senior officers that quality was still a live issue within the Police, and that service to the public was at the forefront of officers' minds. Moreover this respondent disagreed that Sheehy and the impact of the White Paper had impeded the QOS program, and felt that these were regarded as separate issues by the Police Service (interview 089 3.5.94 TC 320 - 364).

However, another official (interviewed in April 1994) speculated that there was 'too much going on' at the time for the police to focus on the QOS program (interview 084 25.4.95, not taped). It was added that QOS should 'all be about' good value for money and management, and that QOS is successful when it ceases to be a specific program and becomes 'an ordinary part of the organisation'.

Another respondent was rather more cynical about the QOS program and "hard-nosed" about any possible impact; that is, although it was "nice" that policemen now looked less fierce and were smiling more, one still had to question whether police performance in crime detection would improve (interview 090 21.7.94 TC 300). This official felt that QOS should be seen as part of performance, and not just concerned with the "have a nice day" approach (TC 270). There was disagreement that Sheehy had undermined the thrust of 'quality' (but perhaps 'blunted' it) and it was added:

"I don't think quality of service would be the answer to all that the service needs to do to up its game to improve its performance ... it's not the master solution." (TC 324)

The main Audit Commission respondent felt that there had been too much emphases on being "polite and courteous", and that the public should expect that at the very least! (interview 085 25.4.94 TC 385). Annoyance was also expressed at chief officers' claims that it is not the speed of police response which is important, but rather the quality of treatment when the officer arrives at the scene of an incident. This respondent felt that speed and efficiency are indeed important elements of quality (TC 369). When asked if any 'ideal' forces could be identified, it was suggested that around 'half-a-dozen' aspire to and achieve relatively high standards, but there are others "who don't demonstrate that same commitment"
Some forces are more 'stuck in a rut' and protest that they do not need "fancy management techniques and jargon" (TC 526). It was stated, however:

"Every force has got a lot of good things going for it. Some forces are better at sort of, you know, picking up on good practice more quickly than others ... ... there's a small group out in front, a lot of bunching in the middle, and a small group lagging behind... I think ACPO is much better now, it seems to work more coherently in identifying the way the Service should be going and pulling people along with it, and I think that's partly because of the changes in the style of Chief Constables." (TC 514/550)

As well as officials in London, a number of senior officers were interviewed in 1994. One Chief Superintendent, in operational command of a large conurbation, was generally quite sceptical about the impact of QOS initiative at the national and local level, although acknowledged it was not all "doom and gloom" (interview 075 25.1.94 TC 211). It was felt that GTR had had little impact, and that usually such initiatives and documents remained at the level of discourse far removed from the bulk of the workforce.

In addition, there are still difficulties at the senior echelons:

"even ACPO level who just have no idea how to actually translate those words, those fine words, what does that actually mean in practice ..." (TC 365)

One ACC was similarly sceptical about the status and impact of the QOS programme. He rejected the idea that Plus had been about 'quality' and that the QOS programme was concerned with engendering a 'quality system'. As he phrased it, 'passion without systems will fail, and system without passion will fail' (interview 077 3.2.94 TC 069). Within the police, it was suspected, there is no sense of 'Kaizen' (which is Japanese for steady, never ending improvement, see Peratec, 1994, p.84), and no passionate ownership of the quality concept (TC 075/119). This ACC also suggested there were still some Chief Constables who dismissed the quality drive as 'rubbish' (TC 117). It was stated that 'culture is a vehicle for quality' (TC 238), but that within the police culture there is little or no "thirst for knowledge" (TC 510).

On a slightly more positive note, one Chief Superintendent (also an operational commander) said of the coherence of the national program:

"I think to this stage it probably hasn't, because of vested interests elsewhere. So the Audit Commission, have had their interests, Home Office have had their, ACPO have had theirs. So certainly
in the early stages of, in my understanding of the quality of service initiative, was a little bit, what's the word, disjointed I suppose is the right word to use... but they seem to have got it together." (interview 074 25.1.94 TC 010)

This extract tends to confirm the perception of conflicting interests between elite groups, which in turn impeded the clarity and direction of the QOS initiative.

One ACC (with particularly strident views) was 'angry and irritated' by the impact of Sheehy and said:

"... this sort of clumsiness has distracted us from improving the quality of the service in other ways, that would have been a much better investment of all the effort and energy that's had to go into damage limitation and so forth, in response to Sheehy and the Home Office proposals." (Interview 082 22.3.94 TC 055)

He disagreed, nevertheless, that the police reforms had undermined the drive for quality in the police. This ACC was "astonished" that the QOS program had had considerable impact in such a short time, and felt that the police reforms had reinforced the commitment to quality (TC 080).

"... and if you like having lost, having lost our confidence in government, we search for reassurance locally. It's strengthened the ties between local authorities, police authorities, and forces, in their common opposition to government proposals, and I don't think that it has undermined our progress to improve the quality of service actually ..." (TC 095)

I would argue that given the government's attack on the competence of the police, the latter has sought to improve its level of support and image by legitimising itself in the eyes of the public. The QOS programme is, of course, a useful vehicle for such legitimisation. In this sense, QOS becomes a politicised issue.

Late in 1994 one member of the QOS committee (interview 103 7.9.94) tended to agree that the national programme was losing some of its impact, but one Superintendent (responsible for corporate development within his force) felt in October 1994 that the QOS programme was still as 'vital':

"Very much so. It has to be there as sort of one of the principal motivating forces for the Police Service, and [Force 1] have simply taken the messages of the quality of service programme and said 'Alright, how are we going to translate these into action?'" (interview 097 14.10.94)
He acknowledged that one weakness of the Police was following through at a tactical level the 'grand statement about how wonderful the world should be' (TC 570). It was also felt that his own force needed to do more with GTR (TC 608). Hirst (1991) acknowledged the difficulty of moving from the conceptual level of QOS to the practical implications for policing:

"If it is seen as something cosmetic or peripheral to mainstream policing, it will fail." (p.9)

Another Chief believed that each year 'quality' was centred on different themes (interview 098 14.10.94 TC 265), and that the focus in 1994 had been on performance management.

In the late period of the fieldwork, there were clear signs that the status of the QOS programme had changed. One DCC (interviewed in February 1995) acknowledged the reduced impact of the quality drive, but nevertheless felt the ethos had been successfully implanted:

"There has been a loss of momentum, and I think like all initiatives you can't leave it to travel on its own... you have to give it another shove to keep it going, and in my view perhaps that time is here. I think the formation of new police authorities, the re-addressing of liaison with elected bodies, and police liaison committees, is a time. For many, many police officers 'policing standards' has become a way of life. They don't see it as flavour of the month. It's part and parcel of policing, both internally and externally." (interview 099 23.2.95 TC 180-195)

This DCC was convinced that QOS had had a "remarkable effect", but stressed that periodically it was still necessary to "bang the drum" (TC 205). He added that 'Equal Opportunities' was regarded as an integral element of his force's philosophy, and stressed the greater emphasis on liaison with public bodies and the importance of Area Beat Officers and Neighbourhood Watch. When asked what the QOS committee should focus on currently, the respondent thought there should be no new "flashy distraction":

"I would go for a consolidation, a reinforcement, an underscoring, call it what you will, of established things. It's all contained in that declaration, and I don't think you need to move outside the statement of common purpose. That encapsulates what we are about." (TC 233-244)

One respondent (involved with the QOS committee) reflected on reaction to the 1994 conference:

"I think the reactions of people to the December seminar, which I think is the last gasps of the 'Have
a nice day' school, the comments that I heard, which prompted the whole debate on whether there should be one in '95, was there a need for the combined Quality of Service Committee? I think the comments said 'Well, yeah, we've done all that'.” (Interview 100 19.4.95 TC 022-032)

One superintendent (interview 102 7.4.95) noted how much energy the police reforms had absorbed, and added that the QOS committee was "subsumed" with the work on performance management. He suggested that the 1994 Bramshill conference was much less significant than the previous QOS seminars. The image of the QOS programme as a tree was recalled:

"I would have said there is a danger of the tree dying from the top, from the leaves down. It's a change, I mean, it's a different climate ... ... we're moving on into a different era now and I suspect the interests and energies will be more focussed at performance management and hitting targets ... particularly if as a chief officer your own fixed-term appointment and performance related pay are geared into those targets, which they undoubtedly will be." (TC 640-663)

I would suggest that the changing emphasis has been driven more by political exigencies, rather than the belief by police leaders that 'quality' and public satisfaction had been achieved. The Police Service has been forced to focus more on performance measurement out of political expediency. Naturally, political expediency was always a motivating factor. Hirst (1991a, p.4) identified the context in which quality emerged as an issue:

"To provide a backcloth, we need to go back about 18 months and remind ourselves of the criticism the police were then receiving from the press.... There was a feeling in the mind of many that at that time we were moving towards a crisis of confidence in policing."

One Chief still believed (in April 1995) that QOS was coherent and powerful, although "performance culture has moved us on" (interview 101 24.4.95 TC 032). He disagreed however that performance management had replaced quality issues, but felt that the service was being pushed to "bean-counting measurement" by indicators such as those devised by the Audit Commission. He disagreed the QOS programme had passed its heyday:

"No... I don't think it has been displaced, I think it has become refined, we've moved on from just simply talking about quality, and are trying to understand what quality means, how you measure it, how you improve ..." (TC 078)
A member of the QOS committee (interviewed at the beginning of May 1995) stated that the performance management working group of the committee was "probably the busiest group". On the development of quality, it was added:

"I have a personal fear that if we're not very careful, you know, it'll start to stagnate. ... the only issues we're moving forward on are performance measurement ... the service isn't properly, in my view, addressing and moving forward on other fronts ... I think ACPO's got to be careful not to end up just doing what it's always done, just reacting to events, rather than actually driving them forward..." (Interview 103 1.5.95 TC 080-100)

The ACPO Annual Report of 1995 included a section devoted to the QOS committee, and noted:

"It has been a busy year. The continuing repercussions of the police reform programme meant that the Committee's work was dominated by performance management issues.... The main elements of the quality of service initiative will continue to be ethical conduct and performance management." (p.37-39)

The report added (p.39) that in relation to the "shared values" work, the year "has been a frustrating one": the shared values statement and guide had been re-drafted, and negotiations on the new disciplinary proceedings had hindered progress. Concern was also expressed (p.39) about the use of Audit Commission PIs to compare forces:

"An over-emphasis on such comparisons might subsequently skew police activity and improve performance in one area at the expense of another or the qualitative element of policing."

Amongst the tasks listed for 1995-96 were developing the QOS ethic in the police, monitoring the effectiveness of initiatives such as GTR, contributing to inquiries by other organisations on ethical issues, and identifying and disseminating good practice. It was intimated that police leaders were determined to defend their authority and legitimacy in describing the objectives of the National Standards Working Group, which should be to:

"Demonstrate that the police service is working towards common service standards; to prescribe the essence of policing... to protect the core activities, standards and values of policing...." (p.39)
The QOS committee held another seminar on 5th December 1995. Perhaps significantly this was not held at Bramshill, but at the Beaumont Conference Centre Old Windsor. The seminar itself was held in conjunction with ICL, suggesting a clear business orientation to the proceedings. The seminar programme included a presentation by ICL's director of quality and customer care, and an open discussion on the prospects of performance measurement. Quite clearly, the emphasis was on the identification of customer expectations and performance management. The seminar 'pack' (which was supplied to me by a member of the QOS committee) contained the presentation transcript of John Ward (head of consumer support, National Consumer Council) and it was noted:

"It is an interesting reflection on the way times are changing that four or five years ago I would have needed to spend some time persuading an audience of public service providers that it is not only right, but feasible, to consult the users of your service. Now, the discussions are almost solely about how to do it - in a cost effective way." (p.9)

In sum, the faltering elements of the QOS programme (such as shared values), and the burgeoning areas (performance management and PI's) indicate that quality is now concerned less with defining the higher ideals of the policing mission, and is more clearly underpinned by the tenets of consumerism. This is developed further in the following chapter.
4. The impact and meaning of Quality

4.1 The definition of Quality policing

One of the principal aims of the survey of Chief Inspectors and Superintendents was to ascertain their definition of 'quality' policing. This was approached through the use of both quantitative and qualitative questions. The former focussed on testing opinions about 'common' elements of the quality movement in the police (such as the running of customer surveys) while the latter permitted free response on the following:

* The most important function of the police.
* Most important aspects of quality policing.

Chief Inspector and Superintendent Survey

In December 1991 the QOS sub-committee published the document which outlined the Key Operational Service Areas. Performance Area No. 4 was 'Public Reassurance and Public Order Maintenance' and included the objectives of promoting the image of the police as a community service, reflecting public concern in the setting of policing priorities, and reassuring the community. Performance Area No. 5 (Community Relations and Community Problem Solving) focussed on creating opportunities for the public to be involved in the determination of policing priorities and standards, as well as implementing co-ordinated multi-agency response to social nuisance problems.

In an amalgamation of these specified objectives, a question was constructed (in Section B of the questionnaire) to measure their perceived importance. The question asked officers to rate (on a scale of 1 to 7) the importance of seven activities. The resulting mean scores, and standard deviations, for the total sample of respondents are shown below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community liaison</td>
<td>6.03</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School liaison</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting the image of the police as a community service</td>
<td>5.63</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassuring the community</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflecting public concern in the setting of policing priorities</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with other agencies to address the root causes of crime and social nuisance</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the seven objectives listed in the question, 'Reassuring the community' was regarded as the most important, while 'Schools liaison' was deemed to be the least important (although the comparatively high standard deviation of 1.42 indicated some variation in the answers). It is clear that as a whole, all of these functions were considered to be important, indicating a correspondence between policy-level and 'operational manager' definitions of desirable policing objectives.

It could, of course, be argued that 'reassuring the community' can mean several things, in much the same way that the term 'community policing' entails more than one concept (see Fielding et al, in Morgan and Smith, 1989, p.49). McLaughlin (1994, p.21) also discusses the problematic concept of 'community'. Fielding et al (ibid, p.54) suggest that most community policing schemes have been somewhat piecemeal; they also note (p.62) that once the support of a Chief Superintendent in one of their research sites had been removed (through retirement) the community constable role was undermined. The support of senior officers in this respect is vital.

In rating their own commitment to the current QOS philosophy, Superintendents and Chief Inspectors gave a high average score of 6.31 out of 7, with a low standard deviation of 0.86. The lower the personal commitment rating, the lower the perceived importance of community liaison, schools liaison, promoting the image of the police as a community service and working with other agencies to address the root causes of crime and social nuisance. In relation to 'promoting the image of the police as a community service', for example, the following mean scores out of 7 were obtained:
### Personal commitment to QOS philosophy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>4.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The score of 6.00 was significantly different from the score of 4.84.)

In order to provide some analytic contrast to the 'community-oriented' service functions discussed above, a question was constructed to reflect the 'enforcement' end of the policing spectrum. Officers were asked to agree or disagree with a series of statements which included those shown below:
### Table showing level of agreement on questions related to police enforcement functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Don't know or have no opinion</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The police should harden their policing style</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police should have greater powers in their daily duties</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing has become too 'liberal'</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police officers should be issued with more effective defensive equipment</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(such as side-handled batons)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police service should focus more on its 'enforcement' duties</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too much emphasis is now placed on the 'service' side of policing</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater emphasis should be placed on public order training</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A substantial proportion (43%) of officers felt that policing has become too 'liberal', and around one-third (32%) agreed that too much emphasis is now placed on the service side of policing. Nearly half (48%) also agreed that the police should focus more on its enforcement duties. In conjunction with the results...
of question 1 above, these results could indicate the complexity of the relationship between 'service' and 'force' elements of policing (perhaps their inter-dependence) rather than necessarily a contradiction of the apparent support for the 'service' functions. As some interview respondents said, 'force is part of the service', and without the service dimension, successful enforcement would be difficult (if not impossible) for the police.

These findings in a sense parallel those of Fielding (1984). Fielding notes (p.1) that the balance between more 'control' and more 'support' oriented work in the Probation Service has been a topic of considerable debate; he adds:

"The interview data provide little evidence that officers may be divided... into control-oriented and support-oriented. Responses suggest a consensual validation of the mixture of approaches." (p.62)

However, Stephens and Becker (1994, p.214) argue that it is still difficult to regard the police as fulfilling predominantly a "caring" role, despite our greater consciousness of the latter. They add (p.215) that it is often impossible to disentangle "the elements of care and control.... not only are the two delivered together, they are interdependent at the pragmatic level, or at the point of delivery of police services."

Naturally, the 'care' element of policing at the point of delivery is not likely to be appreciated as such by offenders or 'deviants' (such as M3 motorway protesters). These 'customers' will only perceive the control or enforcement element, which officers would argue is providing a service to others in society.

In discussing the legitimation of the 'new' police Reiner (1992, p.69) suggests that 19th century police reformers "deliberately cultivated the service role in order to secure legitimacy for more coercive policing functions."

There were some significantly different variations in response to the statements shown above. For example, the CID officers were the most likely to agree that the police should 'harden' their policing style (with 54% doing so), as were those who had the lowest commitment rating to the QOS philosophy (with 65% agreeing). The 'low' commitment group of officers were also the most likely to agree that policing has become too liberal, that there should be more focus on enforcement duties, and that too much emphasis is placed on the service side of policing.

Another question focussed specifically on aspects which have figured prominently in the QOS programme
and/or the way in which some forces have responded to the 'Quality' movement. Respondents were asked to rate (on a scale of 1 to 7) the value for 'quality policing' of the items listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal staff opinion surveys</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External public attitude surveys</td>
<td>5.66</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Customer' satisfaction surveys (excluding offenders)</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offender satisfaction surveys</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal service charters</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking the Citizen's Charter 'Charter Mark'</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was greatest support for one of the key elements of the QOS programme, that is customer satisfaction surveys. Interestingly, there was least support for seeking the Charter Mark, and internal service charters only received a score (4.20) which was not far beyond the mid-point of the scale. Generally, then this demonstrates limited enthusiasm for the consumerist 'charterism' which has figured highly in public sector New Managerialism (as discussed by Farnham and Horton, 1993, pp 250-252).

Once again, there were some significant relationships with other variables. For example, those with the shortest length of service (11 to 21 years) were the most supportive of staff, public attitude and customer surveys. The higher the personal commitment rating to the QOS philosophy, the higher the perceived value of staff opinion surveys, customer satisfaction surveys, internal service charters and the Citizen's Charter Charter Mark.

In relation to the whole sample, only 11% agreed that their force currently places too much emphasis on the idea of 'serving the public'; 72% of respondents were in agreement that the main aim of their force should be meeting the expectations of the community. The latter was an important idea to explore considering the thrust (and sub-title) of the 1990 SPD - 'Meeting Community Expectation'. However, nearly a quarter (23%) did not feel that this should be the main aim of their force.

At the time of the October 1993 survey, two of the forces had public service charters. Respondents were asked to rate (on a scale of 1 to 7) their own charter on four dimensions:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Usefulness for your job</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity of aims</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating a strategic direction</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of policing service</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is clear that generally respondents were not overly impressed with force charters and their contribution to improving service.

With a clearer operational focus, respondents were asked for their opinion on sector or area policing. This is similar to the concept of Total Geographical Policing, and one which emphasises the 'ownership' of a police area by a particular set of officers who, in theory at least, are obliged to address the social and criminal problems within that area. This approach contrasts with the traditional shift-based system in which officers are far less wedded to a 'community' approach, and whose primary concern is to provide a reactive service with little regard to the longer-term effects of policing activity and inter-agency work. Fielding (1996, p.51) notes that the "geographic responsibility policing" has considerable affinity to the community model he presents. Nearly half (47%) of the sample felt that this type of policing provides a higher quality service than shift-based systems, although 29% expressed no particular opinion.

Out of the three forces, Force 2 was the most advanced in terms of adopting a sector policing approach, and indeed one of the most advanced nationally: 27% of the respondents 'strongly agreed' with the statement on sector policing, compared with 17% of Force 1 officers and only 4% of Force 3 respondents.

From a similar stable as that of sector policing, 'problem-oriented' policing rests on identifying and tackling particular problems within the community, entailing a more pro-active stance from the police point of view. Hunt and Magenau (1993) cite Goldstein (1990), and state that problem-oriented policing (POP) is an "explicit move against the traditional law-enforcement mission. It undertakes to redefine both the operational role of the police and the relationship between the police and the community" (p126). They suggest that POP is, at the same time, a theory, philosophy and a plan for policing (p126). The principal tenets of POP (as set out by Goldstein) include the following:
* The policing function entails dealing with a wide range of social problems (not just crime).

* Each type of problem requires a particular response, not a generic one.

* The police can work to prevent problems, rather than merely react to incidents which are manifestations of problems.

* The police role should approximate that of 'facilitator', encouraging the community to govern its own norms and behaviour. (ibid p126)

Hunt and Magenau (p127) highlight the distinction made between community-oriented policing (COP) and POP, but suggest that both are related to the ethos of TQM, and write:

"POP-COP is thus of a piece with a modern managerial current, the essential precepts of which correspond closely with the ones advanced by Goldstein."

42% of officers believed that this brand of policing is the best way to provide a high quality service, while 30% expressed no particular opinion.

In sum, it became clear that generally chief inspectors and superintendents were committed to the aim of reassuring the community, and responding to community expectations. It was also evident, nevertheless, that the 'enforcement' functions of the police were not to be rejected; nearly half of the sample felt that the police should focus more on its enforcement duties, and around one-third believed that too much emphasis was placed on the service dimension of policing. As Fielding (1984) determined in relation to the Probation Service, there is an inextricable meshing of care and control objectives and attitudes to the job. The topic of perceived important functions is explored further in the following section.

Most important function of the Police

In 1979, Holdaway noted the dominant crime-fighting image held by police officers (1979, p.9): the perceived importance of this role contrasts with the more socially-oriented types of duty. Holdaway added (p.9):

"...if the myth of the public image of policing shields a private world of practice then the myth of crime..."
work shields the reality of a vast range of social work/peace-keeping tasks."

In a free-response question, officers were asked what they regarded as the most important function of the police. The data from each force were analysed in turn, and officers' comments grouped in relation to themes, which emerged from the data. The frequency of themes for the sample overall are shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>No. of times theme emerged</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime-related</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Traditional'</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public tranquillity and stability</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public requirements and demands</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing safe communities</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation with the community and other agencies</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer service/QOS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with offences/offenders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassurance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Moral mission'</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting the public</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overt presence</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc/Mixed</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>151</strong></td>
<td><strong>101%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The single themes cited most frequently were 'Crime-related', 'Traditional' and 'Public tranquillity/stability'.

Cotterell (1992, p280) notes that the police regard "crime control" as lying at the core of the policing function; he cites the work of Manning (1977) however, in stressing how little impact the police have in actually affecting levels of crime. Reiner (1992, p144) asserts that "order maintenance is the core of the police mandate", and notes that uniquely the British police incorporate the law enforcement and order maintenance functions within the same organisation. Importantly, he adds:
"To regard the primary task of the police as crime control is dangerous for the police themselves, for there is now an impressive body of evidence which suggests not only that this is not being accomplished effectively, but that it could not be." (ibid, p146)

Fielding (1991, p219) points out that the 1960 Royal Commission regarded the core policing role as the maintenance of the Queen's Peace, and reminds us of Lord Scarman's prioritisation of order and public tranquility over law enforcement (p220). Reiner (1992, p255) notes that this prioritisation angered many within the Police. Scarman (1981, para 4.76) criticised the Met's Operation 'Swamp 81' and stressed (para 4.77) how the police should have questioned its appropriateness in tackling street crime given the social conditions in Brixton at the time. He stated that it was "necessary to assess the risk to public order" (para 4.77).

The 1991 report of HMCIC drew attention to the policing task (section 3, p21), and while it was acknowledged that "the provision of quality service is the major challenge facing the Police Service in the coming years", it was stressed that its fundamental policing tasks must be fulfilled; importantly, the first task highlighted and discussed was "maintaining the peace". Sir John Woodcock (p22) highlighted that during an eight hour period between 7th and 8th February 1992, there were 20,932 separate incidents recorded by the English and Welsh forces. 9,380 (47%) of these incidents were miscellaneous in that they concerned matters 'not specifically identified'; the next largest category (public disorder) involved 4,458 incidents, representing 21.29% of the total, compared to 4,421 (21.12%) property crime incidents. 28% of the 2,750 arrests during the eight hour period involved public disorder, compared to 30% for property crime, perhaps indicating that it is overly simplistic to discount 'crime control' as a secondary policing function. However, Loveday (in Leishman et al, 1996, p.89) raises doubt about the police's ability to control, detect or combat crime successfully. He notes too (p.96) that a very limited proportion of police time is spent dealing directly with crimes against the person or property.

Reiner (1994, p.754) suggests that the Conservative government's law-and-order strategy is fundamentally flawed by the misconception that policing can have a significant impact on levels of crime. He notes too (p.755) the apparent decline in police clear-up rates, and comments on the heterogeneity of policing functions in Britain:

"The British police have always been unique on a comparative scale for concentrating in the same organization a variety of policing functions - crime prevention, detection, peace-keeping, public order maintenance, and the preservation of state security...." (p.755)
The Audit Commission document 'Cheques and Balances' (October 1994) indicated the following breakdown of resources being expended on the five main policing functions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime management</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public order/reassurance</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call management</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community policing</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic management</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Audit Commission, 1994, p15)

Reiner (1991b, p227) acknowledges that:

"More recent research suggests, however, that most policing is crime work after all, although the extent varies. Crime and disorder accounts for the majority of public-initiated contacts in inner cities, although not in rural areas... Crime and reported crime have risen as a result of complex social changes..."

Of course, the government has now emphasised more clearly the crime-fighting role of the police as Loveday (ibid) outlines. The 'White Paper' (June 1993) stated in the introduction:

"Well under half of police time and money is devoted to fighting crime against persons and property. All the duties that police officers are expected to carry out are important, but they need clear priorities for their work. The Government is clear that fighting crime should be the priority for police officers - a priority that local communities should share and support." (Home Office, 1993b, para 1.5)

As well as 'crime' and 'public tranquility', responses in my data were categorised as 'traditional', which tended to encompass all of the policing functions in Rowan and Mayne's original formulation (spanning, of course, the crime management and public order functions).

Reference to QOS and customer service by Chief Inspectors and Superintendents was relatively infrequent. A small selection of comments will be presented below to illustrate the data. Around one-quarter of the comments were difficult to categorise under one theme, and therefore were grouped under the heading of 'mixed/miscellaneous'. The importance of public tranquility was reflected in the words of one Chief Inspector:
"In the most simplistic terms it must be:

i) The preservation of order (without this you have nothing).

ii) Protection of life and property.

iii) Prosecution of offenders.

Very "old hat" but nevertheless fundamental."

(Force 3 Uniform Chief Inspector 210)

Some suggested that other aspects of policing were detracting from the crime management function:

"I believe putting more emphasis on the 'service' side of policing is a soft option because we are failing in other areas. There are too many 'gimmicks' and 'political initiatives' designed to hide our inability at times to deal with the habitual criminals. Enforcement and reassurance i.e. fear of crime is our most important role because if the police do not catch criminals who does!"

(Force 1 Detective Chief Inspector 018)

Loveday (ibid, p.88) infers that the government’s position is one of abandoning service functions in order to enhance the crime fighting role. One officer was clear that criminal investigation had suffered:

"Surveys in the past have indicated public nuisance offences have caused priority concern to the public. We the police therefore tailored our response to those somewhat minor issues to the detriment of crime investigation. We must take the initiative on crime investigation and take active steps to improve the quality of life of those persons who feel they are vulnerable because of the yob element within our society."

(Force 1 Support/Admin Chief Inspector 025)

Brogden et al (1988, p.94) argue that public order legislation has been, and is, used to police “what national and local elites regarded as the disorderly edges of society”, particularly the working class edges. Some officers reflected on public order and tranquility:

"The establishment of a tranquil society by concentrating their efforts against the minority who prevent this by their anti-social activities be that public disorder, crime against people and property or drug related offences."

(Force 1 Detective Chief Inspector 005)
"To allow the market to operate under orderly conditions."
(Force 3 Uniform Superintendent 248)

This last extract tends to support the somewhat Marxist perception that the ‘New Police’ emerged because the:

“new social relations of emergent capitalism required novel devices for regulating social behaviour, for keeping the lower classes in their place once the former mechanisms of control associated with feudalism had broken down in the urban centres.” (Brogden et al, 1988, p62)

Some officers were apparently more concerned about what the public wanted:

"Service and enforcement, the two are not a contradiction of each other. Both should be measured to the public perception of the fear of crime, particularly violent crime and the police should respond to those justifiable concerns, rather than follow "fashion fads" created by minority intellectuals who feel that they know what is "good" for society. We serve the public and we should measure our response to their fears and needs. This will not however happen in isolation. The police cannot deliver that which central government emasculates them from so doing."
(Force 3 Support/Admin Chief Inspector 217)

This last comment reinforces the notion that both care and control functions are perceived to fall acceptably within the remit of an officer’s job (see Fielding, 1984 in relation to the Probation Service). The multiplicity of functions which Reiner (1994, p.755) illuminates is reflected in the words of a chief inspector:

"In today's modern society we are required to provide a service which enhances a number of areas such as crime prevention, law enforcement, maintenance of public order etc., etc. Our most important function is "getting the balance" right in all these activities/functions - this may be "being all things to all people," an impossible task."
(Force 1 Support/Admin Chief Inspector 027)

Another officer astutely noted the different functional emphases at different historical points, including the enthusiasm for crime prevention which Savage (in Savage and Robins, 1990, p.98) notes:
"No one function can be permanently placed as the number one function. At present, it is clear that public concern has pushed 'Crime-fighting' high on the priorities. But order maintenance (during 1984-5) and Reassurance/Crime Prevention (1990-2) have had their turn. Police managers need to balance short and long term priorities, in conjunction with local/national priorities."

(Force 3 'Other' Superintendent 256)

**Force comparison**

There were some differences between the three forces with regard to the 'free-response' answers. While around 2 out of 10 officers from Forces 1 and 3 stressed the more traditionally defined functions of the police, only 2 officers (6%) from Force 2 did so. A third of officers from Force 2 placed emphasis on crime management, compared to 16% of officers from Force 1 and 9% from Force 3. It was generally agreed by Force 2 officers that they had a particular problem with low detection rates in their forces, hence the emphasis on crime management. Force 1 and 3 officers (around 14%) mentioned 'public tranquillity and stability', while there was little mention of this in Force 2. I would speculate that Force 2 had been penetrated more clearly by new public management and business philosophies.

**Interviews with senior officers**

The 1990s have been punctuated with quite heated debate about the policing function, and the boundaries of responsibility. The Independent Inquiry into the roles and responsibilities of the police (Police Foundation/PSI 1996) has figured highly in the deliberations. While endorsing the statement of common purpose and values (SCPV), the Inquiry report (p.4) noted the degree of latitude surrounding the concept of upholding the law “firmly”. It was added that enforcement of the law is not always compatible with maintaining order, and that the latter should take priority (p.4). The Inquiry report also stressed (p.6) the importance of the relationship with the public, and the growing emphasis on identifying public priorities. It was stated:

"The British policing tradition is widely admired at home and abroad. We must strive to preserve the tradition of 'policing by consent' which has been and remains the hallmark of British policing" (p.8)

Thus, while acknowledging the need to develop as a “learning organisation” (see page 46) it was clear that the police should retain its traditional functions and public service ethos; as suggested already in this chapter, the ‘traditional’ policing role entails both care and control (or service and force) functions. Such issues were
explored during interview, and it became clear that several senior officers were unable to disassociate from one another the 'enforcement' and 'service' functions of the police, and that to achieve the former it was necessary (and desirable) to fulfil the latter. One DCC disagreed with the assertion that there is an irreconcilable role conflict between 'force' and 'service':

"The police has always been an amalgam of both, hasn't it? When you look at how multifunctional it is, it's very difficult to talk of a cuddly police service when a chap's all tooled up in riot kit and he's in the baton charge. And it's very difficult to think of a police force when you're doing Tufty Club on the playground with 5-year olds. The truth is we're both."

(Interview 099 23.2.95 TC 327)

In his first interview (067 13.12.93), this same officer had rejected the idea that the new 'service' emphasis was at the expense of the enforcement function, however. The basic functions are still to fight crime and maintain the peace, but with Quality:

"... I think the emphasis changes in the way that you deliver that, and the way you promulgate it and sell it, that's the difference. I don't think the functions changed... that sounds cynical, but it isn't." (TC 578)

The Independent Inquiry (ibid, p.26) stresses the need to secure and maintain high levels of public confidence to ensure police effectiveness. It might be argued that the ulterior motive for the QOS programme has been to enhance the effectiveness of the enforcement functions (include crime-fighting), rather than a concern primarily with community satisfaction. As the DCC above suggested, the 'bottom-line' of policing is maintaining order and crime management - perhaps QOS is merely a lubricant for these more authoritarian functions.

On being asked if the police should focus more on its enforcement duties, one Chief Constable replied:

"Well, define enforcement, and then define service, draw a line if you can between the two, list the pros and cons of both sets of arguments, and it's a much more confused picture... I happen to think that you can't provide the enforcement function in a sort of constitutional framework that we work in, without the service function."

(Interview 055 9.11.93 TC 187)
Paralleling this last comment, Reiner (1992, p141) identifies that the force/service debate "rests on a false dichotomy". He continues:

"In so far as the two roles are distinguishable, they are interdependent, and derive from a more fundamental mandate of first-aid order maintenance."

During the follow-up interview of the Chief Constable cited above, it was stated:

"If you ask the question what is policing about, it is probably not ultimately about the detection of crime. Policing is actually about order maintenance, it's about responding to crises, the authoritative intervention argument. And if it is about that... it is very important that you do fulfil high standards of customer service." (interview 101 24.4.95 TC 140-160)

Becker and Stephens (1994, p4) refer to the concept of 'care through control', and suggest that indeed "force is part of the service". They cite Reiner (1992) in stating that "to see care and control as polar extremes is too simplistic" (p4). The use of force and control can thereby provide a service which is expected by members of society, which was a point made by several senior officers.

One Chief Superintendent emphasised the maintenance of good order:

"I think the most important thing is public order, public disorder, and controlling... and allied with that some of the forms of crime, the violent forms of crime, that are associated with disorder... public peace and tranquillity, if you, like..." (interview 044 13.9.93 TC 410)

One Chief Superintendent agreed that there could be a danger of the "pendulum" swinging too far toward the service dimension of policing, and that the service police could "lose sight of the squirrel" (interview 070 14.12.93 TC455). It is now well documented that the government has placed increasing emphasis on fighting crime (Independent Inquiry, ibid, p.3): by doing so, the pendulum has been swung away from the service dimension by the impact of police reforms. When another Chief Superintendent (interview 054 8.11.93) was questioned about the common understanding of QOS amongst senior officers, he replied:

"There are some who are very dedicated to it, almost to the point of abandoning active, more proactive policing, in order to pursue what they see as policing standards, rather than the actual pursuit..."
of wickedness out on the streets, and locking up villains, which is what the public actually want us to do, and expect us to do." (TC 700-717)

This extract tends to contradict a common perception, clearly linked to findings of the 1990 Operational Policing Review, that the public are more concerned about being treated with ‘tender, loving care’, rather than the successful pursuit of villains.

A Detective Chief Superintendent in Force 1 believed that his force was aiming to emphasising 'service' rather than 'force', but admitted that the enforcement element would not be left too far behind. As he put it, the police 'still needs to win', and has to 'have a bigger gang than they have' (whether this be miners or drunks on the street). One of the basic principles of the job is that the police must win. (Interview 016 25.1.94, TC 366). This tends to underline the fact that ultimately the police is used to enforce (violently if necessary) dominant ideologies.

There was also some suggestion from respondents that there was a clear North/South divide amongst forces in the adoption of QOS. Perhaps the southern forces, dominated more by the middle classes, and dealing with more affluent 'customers', were better able to embrace the consumerist model of quality (and the ethos of public sector reform). It might be proposed that greater social or structural problems in certain areas (such as Moss Side) would predispose the police less to a 'service' or 'community' model (see Fielding, 1996). However, police forces such as Kent have considerably fewer social problems to deal with, and are more able to embrace 'quality' and have less need to embrace an enforcement model. It is highly probable that such factors would account for the varied responses to the original QOS initiative. McLaughlin (1994) analyses the turbulent history of policing and accountability in the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) area: although GMP developed community policing approaches (ibid, p.39), the force, as McLaughlin indicates, has a history of "a formidable and highly controversial presence in its dealings with certain sections of the community" (p.39). Unsurprisingly, GMP has not been exemplary in terms of developing or contributing to the QOS programme.

An ACC in Force 3 valued "welfare" functions such as schools-liaison, community-based projects and caring for victims, and suggested that these reflected 'pure quality of service'. He questioned, however, whether these functions could be sustained given their resource implication and current demands upon the police:

"I do pose the question, should we continue to escalate that form of policing, or should we actually
withdraw so that we concentrate on what government is now throwing at us, and saying 'Look you're not producing the goods, crime is going up, detections going down.'"

(Interview 053 2.11.93, TC 842)

This extract reflects Stephens and Becker’s observation (1994, p.228) that the thrust of reforms have been in the direction of control rather than care.

Another ACC (in charge of operations) said of the policing function:

"Well, I think the old Rowan and Mayne has never changed. I think there's some alleged new thinkers in policing that would have us believe otherwise... So it is about the protection of life and property, the protection of the peace and the prosecution of offenders - I see that as being the major role. And I just have a fear that we've been side-tracked." (interview 034 17.8.93 TC 310)

Although the Cassells Inquiry (1994) suggested that a “radical reappraisal” of policing was required (p.vi), it was nevertheless concluded that:

“... the British policing tradition is a national asset that must be preserved and strengthened....” (p.23)

The 1994/5 report of the Chief HMI noted (p.23-24) the increased emphasis on fighting crime, but clearly stated “there remain many other essential policing duties” (p.23). Trefor Morris emphasised (p.6-7) the broad range of minor and major incidents to which the police respond, “to contain, to protect, to provide reassurance, to resolve”.

In sum, it was clear from the interviews that this ‘tradition’ of policing should be valued, and accepted that policing encompasses the very great range of force and service related duties. It also became apparent that QOS was not itself representative of a new paradigm in policing, but re-affirmed the service dimension of the job, and in no way displaced enforcement or control.

The most important aspects of quality policing

To some extent definitions of ‘quality’ policing have been explored. To shed further light on this, the analysis of qualitative data collected in question 13 of section D of the questionnaire will be presented. Respondents were asked: 'What do you personally think are the most important aspects of quality policing?'
The main themes which emerged from analysis are listed below (for the sample as a whole):

What do you personally think are the most important aspects of quality policing?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>No. of times theme emerged</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public/community focus</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional excellence</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer-orientation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Policing with integrity'</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responding to demands and expectations</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate/Strategic vision</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal skills and care</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working to standards</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taking into account other demands</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Right first time'</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actually doing the job</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on the individual</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delivering as promised</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solving problems</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High personal standards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed/Miscellaneous</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>146</strong></td>
<td><strong>99%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was a considerable range of views about what constitutes quality policing. The single theme which emerged most frequently from the Chief Inspector and Superintendent survey was 'Public/community Focus'. One major theme of the QOS programme has been to acknowledge and respond to community requirements.

In the open comments, there was very much a sense that the views of the public should be heeded:

"To attract the confidence of the community that we can be effective in our role, or rather, in the community's expectation of our role. Confidence in the police does not arise if we are not seen as a component of the community, "locally appointed" and "owned" by the local people." (Force 3 Traffic Chief Inspector 226)

Once again, given the diversity of community, such admirable aims could be problematic. As Kettle (in Hain, Kettle, Campbell and Rollo, 1980, p.58) remonstrates, the police claim, “their authority on behalf of
the whole of society but they use that authority on behalf of a part of society”. The hostile sections of society such as demonstrators, blacks, gays and feminists (ibid, p.59) are perhaps less likely to ‘own’ the local police.

The tenets of consumerism are evident in some comments, for example:

"High quality delivery in a service environment. Measurable standards and customer surveying as routine. A charter detailing targets and prescribing predictable standards so the customer knows what to expect." (Force 2 Uniform Superintendent 123)

Critchley (1978, p.xvii-xviii) refers to the police as a “priceless national heritage” which sustains civilisation and freedom. Some comments paralleled this type of high moral tone:

"Policing with integrity and being fair but firm. Explaining our priorities effectively - Admitting mistakes." (Force 3 Det. Ch. Insp 229)

"That individuals are dealt with fairly, politely and if necessary firmly. That the police service is as efficient as possible within our current restraints." (Force 3 Traffic Ch. Insp 219)

"It must be honest, ethical, impartial and open." (Force 3 Support/Admin Supt 250)

These comments echo the assertions in Kenneth Newman’s Blue Book of 1985, which was seen by several respondents as a precursor to the QOS initiative. ‘Mixed’ observations included the following:

"1. Demonstrate that the organisation cares for its staff. 2. Set management standards and encourage teams. 3. Improve communication and measure effectiveness. 4. Consult effectively with the public with openness and honesty to establish priorities and goals. 5. Establish 'ownership' of decisions - problem solving." (Force 3 Training Ch. Insp 227)

"Having sufficient time to provide a quality of service. Currently we are under resourced, over stretched, lack guidance and are only just meeting the quantity of demands made upon us. Quality doesn't actually come into the frame." (Force 3 Uniform Supt. 246)

There was a considerable variation in definition of quality policing. This is perhaps unsurprising given the breadth of policing functions. Cotterrell (1992) comments on the processes of professionalisation,
which he defines (p278) as an occupational group's successful claim (resting on specialist skills or knowledge) to a monopolisation of practice in a given area. He adds (p278) that professional status provides a justification of self-regulation, rather than regulation being imposed by others. It is suggested, however, that:

"the claim to special police expertise is undermined by the sheer range and diversity of tasks that police are required to undertake. Many studies emphasise that crime related work constitutes a minor part of police activity." (Cotterrell, 1992 p280)

I tend to agree with Cotterrell's point, although within the discourse of police leaders the concept (and goal) of professionalism is usually identified as paramount. However, it has become clear that the government has sought to undermine the autonomy of professions and semi-professions. Jessop (in Abercrombie and Warde, 1992, p.31) and Coxall and Robins (1994, p.157) discuss the government's tendency to de-privilege influential groups in society. Farnham and Horton (1993) highlight the impact of managerialism and consumerism. I agree with their assertion (ibid, p.241) that the contraction of the state could be more apparent than real. By stressing the consumerisation of public services, the autonomy of the professions and semi-professions is undermined, including that of the police. Services become subject to the dominance of a centrally led managerialism, and the central state can enhance its control and surveillance by externally imposed performance indicators. Cotterrell (ibid, p.278) correctly argues that the enhancement of police status and influence is one of the general aims of police organisation. It is evident from my research that the QOS programme has been used to seek these aims, and to counter the de-professionalising centralism of the government.

A number of interviewees defined what they regarded as the most important aspects of quality policing.

One DCC (interview 035 19.8.93) said:

"I think the concept of quality is trying to instil quality in the individual, and getting that over... quality can only be successful if it is adopted by an individual. We have to think and practise quality as an example, as an ambassador, but it's never going to work unless it is actually accepted and practised by the individual." (TC 343-348)

It was agreed that the concept of 'meeting community expectation' is fundamental.
"Oh, absolutely, that's the whole raison d'être. If you like, the end product. But for me, you know getting it over, that it is instilled in the individual." (TC 355)

One training Superintendent was very concerned about the growing emphasis on the 'law enforcement' function (and the introduction of side handled batons, quick-cuffs and more double-crewing) and thought that quality policing should incorporate other aspects:

"You cannot simply improve those things by having bigger and more powerful battalions of police shock troops. There has to be a better way, working with other agencies, improving the education service... giving people a sense of worth, a sense of pride, and a sense of belonging. All these things are fundamental..." (interview 094 6.9.94 TC 220-228)

This officer also felt it important that the Police should mitigate the effects of the government's socially divisive policies (TC 206). The current "war footing" in the police is inclining officers to a "macho, law enforcement role" (TC 200). One Chief Superintendent (interview 041 25.8.93) also found abhorrent the "Robocop" law enforcement image of the police (TC 420) and said that the British Police had been so successful because "we have really pushed the social dimension of our activities" (TC 404). He felt that contact with the public is fundamental to quality policing; in his early service he found it important to talk to people and have cups of tea with them (TC 370).

A Detective Chief Superintendent (interview 073 24.1.94) defined as "cancerous growths" some officers who undermined the quality service provided by other colleagues (TC 235). The officer continued:

"If you convince me that I've got to provide quality service throughout the organisation I will say to you the number one priority is quality staff. No amount of management initiative or management thinking is going to change that as a priority. If you want to provide a quality service, then you must have a quality member of staff at the beginning. It's very difficult, with the likes of some of these sergeants, to change their ways. They will still continue to treat people badly..." (TC 346-360)

This extract is perhaps indicative of the tension between the aims and implementation of management initiatives and the type of street cop culture which Brogden et al (1988) outline. These authors (p.33), drawing on the work of Skolnick (1966) and Reiner (1985), identify the working personality of officers as one permeated by suspicion, cynicism, machismo and pragmatism. However, while Reiner (1992) highlights the resilience of "cop culture", he does acknowledge the possibility of organisational reform (p.135): an
important ingredient of this reform is commitment and support of management (p.136), which was a point made by a large number of my respondents.

4.2 The Coherence of the QOS program

One aim of this research was to ascertain the perceptions of the coherence of the QOS programme. Did respondents regard QOS as an interrelated system? There would appear to be a very limited number of forces (if any) who have really embraced a fully integrated business model of TQM. During interview, there were two or three respondents who were relatively familiar with the elements of TQM, and 'business quality', but there was quite a range of opinion on the coherence of the QOS program in the Police. As will be developed later in the chapter, perhaps the incoherence of the QOS program reflects the mix of 'professional' and 'consumerist' approaches to quality. It would seem that most forces have adopted a more generic 'customer care' approach which Warcup (1992) refers to, rather than a comprehensive embrace of 'total quality'.

Interview respondents talked both of perceived coherence of QOS from senior officers' point of view, and from the junior officers' perspective. In relation to the latter, one Chief Superintendent said:

"I think some of them consider it, to be perfectly honest, as a bit of a gimmick, because they tend to be very cynical people. I think when you sit down, though, and you talk to officers they are fully aware, of the necessity of Policing Standards." (interview 022 8.6.93 TC 466-475)

One member of the QOS committee thought that there still were some forces whose culture would not facilitate the introduction of quality initiatives such as Getting Things Right (interview 078 22.2.94). One Chief Superintendent thought that the perception of a coherent national program would be limited to ACPO ranks (interview 040 25.8.93 TC 065), while another (interview 044 13.9.93 TC 007) agreed that 'quality' was more coherent at his own force level. Yet another Chief Superintendent in Force 1 disagreed that there was a clear, coherent program at a national level (interview 047 14.9.93 TC 063).

When asked if the QOS program was coherent and well-defined, one chief said:

"I think it's been powerful... it's clearly defined in the sense you can identify the words, in that sense it's clearly defined. Whether it's clearly defined in terms of what it means is probably in the eye of the beholder.... I think one area of difficulty with it is that it tends, it tends to snowball from issue
to issue, so you go quality of service, ethics in the Police Service, national policing standards, but the concept I think is understood. I think one of the interesting things is that the concept has gone across better than the words.” (interview 055 9.11.93 TC 012-020)

One DCC suggested (interview 039 23.8.93 TC 013) that local initiatives primarily drove his force, but was content that his force paralleled national guidelines. Rather unusually for police respondents, he noted the important influence of the Home Office and HMIC (TC 030). One Force 3 ACC said that the QOS initiative is:

"probably fairly coherent and fairly clearly defined at the higher level of the police service, but that changes dramatically the further down the line you go..." (interview 059 11.11.93 TC 018)

Not all chief officer respondents, however, were convinced of its coherence even at the top echelons of the Service. A Force 2 ACC (interview 038 23.8.93) thought that the initiative was unclear, and was not sure what could be achieved by it (TC 010). He added that the national programme had followed sequentially the quality efforts of his own force (TC052).

One Detective Chief Superintendent (interview 073 24.1.94) commented that the concept of 'customer' is generally increasingly accepted, especially by younger officers (TC 081). He also made an interesting point about the transplant of quality into the police:

"We're trying to implement good ideas from industry, good management ideas. But we're forgetting that we're still based virtually on the military, and that some of these good ideas you have difficulty in actually co-ordinating them into the police service." (TC 289-299)

Walker (in Stephens and Becker, 1994, p.34-35) pinpoints the traditional "military-bureaucratic" culture and management structure within the police, “with many of the symbolic paraphernalia of the armed forces such as uniform, drill and muster.” He also defines (p.48) the major constituencies of street cops and management cops and the distinct interests of each. Manning (in Holdaway, 1979, p.65) describes the complex command structure and hierarchy and adds:

“The elaborate militarism of insignia and public rhetoric tend to mystify the basic fact that the control of police work lies in the hands of the lowest functionaries.”
Given these sort of organisational characteristics, it is unsurprising if the introduction of management initiatives can meet with some difficulty or resistance. However, the results of my 1993 survey showed that 71% of Chief Inspectors and Superintendents disagreed that 'the quality of service philosophy is fine in theory, but less workable in reality'. In addition, the sample as a whole gave a score of 4.42 out of 7 in rating the common understanding of QOS in their own force (with 1 for poor, through to 7 for good).

Later in the research period, there were some signs that the coherence and impetus of the QOS program were declining. One member of the QOS committee (interview 103 1.9.95) believed that under the guidance of Hirst and Pollard there was a clear vision of quality. It was added, however:

"I just have that concern that if we're not very careful, the Service will start to lose the initiative on it. I've yet to be convinced that there's now a real driving force like Charles Pollard with a vision about where the Police Service is heading in terms of quality." (TC 118-123)

This rather dispirited officer also reflected on the whole concept of quality:

"... and it's a message that really hasn't got through to the Service totally yet, exactly what quality is, what quality means, what quality can do for the organisation. I don't think everybody's fully realised yet what the potential is for (a) doing it, and equally important what the consequences are of not actually continuing to put lots of energy in quality... if you haven't got the people at the top with the energy to put in, nobody else is going to bother." (TC 204-213)

This extract tends to confirm other assessments of the success (or otherwise) of QOS initiatives. In 1994 Stephens and Becker (ibid, p.219) argued that:

"An analysis of the policy process... would suggest that care and service is a predominant intention and aim of current police policies. There is considerable emphasis on care by chief constables...."

Nevertheless, with the focus on crime-fighting and performance culture the "considerable emphasis" on care and service (symbolised by QOS) has undoubtedly weakened.
4.3 The impact and success of the QOS programme

In 1992, Reiner wrote that chief constables continue to pay "lip-service" to the Service role (Reiner, 1992, p96). He drew attention also to the work of Alderson and the more general promulgation of community policing, and added:

"The very energy put into this campaign is an index of the degree to which the service aspects of policing were devalued and downgraded by the operative force status system. There is copious evidence that most rank-and-file policemen believe the service aspects of the work should have low or no priority." (p.96-97)

Providing a rather different perspective, Jefferson (1990) emphasises the contingency of 'community-oriented' and repressive policing. Building on the analysis of Cohen (1979) he suggests (p.24) that policing moved from a rather stark confrontational stance to one which includes negotiation. Jefferson adds (p.24) that the organisational solution for the police was to create a division of labour; on the one hand groups such as the SPG are formed, and on the other local beat constables (for example) are engaged in "negotiated settlements" with the community. Jefferson concludes on Cohen's analysis:

".... the advantages of the approach are that neither consensus nor coercion are seen as inevitable features of police-public relations. Each is regarded as contingent." (Ibid, p.25)

I tend to agree that the force/service dimension cannot be separated from one another. Achieving an equilibrium between the two is the aim of the police in maintaining social order.

Reiner tends to collapse within the same analysis the concept of community policing and 'quality of service'. There is, however, some difference between the type of community policing advocated by Alderson and the quality approach which is the subject of this thesis. As indicated in chapter 3, the quality drive has also taken account of the internal dimension of organisational quality, and as demonstrated elsewhere, has incorporated elements of 'business quality'. The quality movement within the police has been greatly influenced by the New Agenda of public sector reform (see chapter 2).

Reiner notes (p.97) a dismissive 'rank-and-file' attitude to the service function; some recent evidence suggests however that a significant proportion of officers do identify with the philosophy of 'service' and the tenets of the QOS programme. It is perhaps too sweeping to suggest that all chief constables
are paying lip-service to the service role; it is true, however, that there appears to be some variety within the senior ranks of the service with regard to embracing QOS. Several respondents also referred to a 'North-South divide', with more southerly forces such as Thames Valley, Kent and Sussex apparently adopting more readily the concept of QOS.

One should be wary about generalising across the entire police service, and across all ranks, and all specialisations. Most respondents felt that the QOS programme and 'philosophy' was positively impacting upon the service; a minority, however, felt that the QOS concept has had little penetration in the junior ranks, and indeed that there is a limited chance of any management initiative impacting on the culture or working practices of the police.

Senior Officer Perceptions

One Chief Superintendent (interview 106 21.7.95), responsible for strategic development, was in no doubt about the success of the QOS programme:

"... if the aim of quality of service was to bring the service part of policing to the fore it has succeeded better than anything else that I've known in terms of initiatives... And I think if you go and speak to individual officers, and I mean at ground level, that they will tell you about quality of service and the way we treat people. And I think that actually it's made people much, much more aware of the way we treat our customers." (TC 013/025)

One Superintendent (interview 102 7.4.95) with a good knowledge of the national policing agenda felt that the QOS programme had impacted, although believed it is more difficult to specify this impact:

"I think it has unquestionably had a very wide impact on people's thinking over the last five years, I don't think there's any doubt about that. What the precise impact has been, God only knows! ... But issues of quality are the regular currency of discussions at all levels, and in all departments of the service, and I would have thought that that probably was a result of the Quality of Service initiative." (TC 568-585)

Although this officer felt that in a general sense QOS had impacted, he did not believe that GTR had any significant impact. Several officers commented about the lack of impact of GTR, although as one member of the QOS committee pointed out, that particular initiative (unlike the SCPV) had a fairly low-key launch
There was a fear that the Service could 'shoot itself in the foot' if GTR had a high profile launch, in that the Press might then accuse the police of serious management difficulties (TC 648).

One Chief (098 14.10.94) was optimistic about the impact of QOS generally, and said in relation to GTR:

"... Getting Things Right is about changing the culture. And I sense, and this is purely subjective, I sense when I talk to chief constables, well, and people from other forces in general, I sense that the police service is changing at a frantic rate from a very hierarchical based type of organisations to much more devolved organisations with valuing people and ownership."

Another chief (interview 055 9.11.93) thought that the QOS programme had been effective, and, defined the programme as a 'philosophy':

"It was a sophisticated form of the service versus force debate that was going on, so yes, it was philosophical and still is. I mean, it's a statement of philosophy and style, rather than something that's got identifiable, fixed stages... the Service needed to take a very clear line as to what sort of service it was going to be, or else somebody else would have written it for us" (TC 097)

This Chief commented, however, (interview 101 24.4.95) that junior officers question the commitment of senior officers, and that the penetration of the QOS philosophy at junior level is variable:

"I think if you're scuffling around in the alligators in the swamp, I don't think it is going to get very far, and there are some bad places in that sense." (TC 371)

An ACC in the same force (interview 079 28.2.94) noted the impact of QOS and admitted that his own attitudes had changed as a result of the philosophy of 'meeting community expectation'.

The third Chief Constable was rather more ambivalent about the impact and success of the QOS programme (interview 031 2.8.93). While he praised the efforts of Michael Hirst, he thought the early debate about quality focussed too much on what was not achievable (that is, meeting community expectations):

"I'm sympathetic to that view, but I don't think it's logical, because... most people don't think very much about their services... and that is where the Quality of Service debate was starting to give me a bit of a headache... when it was starting about getting involved with these meeting community expectations..."
An ACC in Force 1 (interview 033 2.8.93) agreed that QOS had 'energised' forces, and was convinced of the impact upon PCs. One DCC (interview 039 23.8.93) assumed that his senior officers had a "very fair" shared understanding of QOS (TC 880). Another DCC (interview 067 13.12.93) believed there was a "reasonable" common understanding, but acknowledged the difficulty of communication within an organisation like the police (TC 850). He noted how chief inspectors and superintendents determine how things happen, because they have the hands-on control of resources (TC 860), despite all the "huff-and-puff" of the chief officers (TC 865).

Several officers had some mixed feelings about the impact and success of QOS. An ACC in Force 3 (interview 053 2.11.93) suggested that the QOS committee had "enjoyed modest success", but thought that much more could be done by the individual forces (TC 662). In talking of the impact of the national impact, he expressed serious doubts about promulgating the philosophy in the junior ranks. This ACC did not feel that QOS would fade away, because it was now "under the skin" (TC 550), but acknowledged that many within the force did not recognise that quality is also about operational policing (TC 594). Another ACC, also in force 3, talked of the original initiative in 1990:

"it didn't have the impact we hoped it would have. It was written at too high a level... that impact has increased slowly but surely... People have probably been driven to look at it more fundamentally by things like Sheehy and the White Paper..." (interview 059 11.11.93 TC 034-044)

He felt that "canteen culture" was still an important issue, and a threat to the development of the QOS concept (TC 213). The "youngsters" start off with good ideals, but then become "immersed" in the canteen culture of their stations (TC 256). Similarly Fielding (1988, p.206) concludes that after a while the early idealism of new police recruits is displaced as instrumentalism grows.

A Force 1 ACC (interview 045 13.9.93) reflected on the impact of his force's localised QOS initiative (utilising again a reptilian analogy):

"I think there's a real problem in taking people with you, and I think the people on the ground who are sort of fighting the alligators are a bit, shall we say, a bit sceptical about some of the organisational labels that we stick on things.... But I think underlying all that, the essence of it, I think, they understand." (TC 016-048)
A Force 3 Chief Superintendent (interview 060 11.11.93) involved in strategic development felt it unlikely that the national QOS programme could ever result in uniformity of approach (TC 408), given that some forces (like Kent) had already embarked on their own quality drives. This officer had insight into other forces and felt that they were generally at different stages of development (TC 435). It was added:

"I think you'd be hard-pressed to find a force that is not doing something... some forces looked very good on the surface, and they had all the 'glossies', but when you scratch it and look underneath it, it's, you know, operating at one level." (TC 451-462)

This officer noted that there had been a loose attempt to "bang heads" on QOS, by the HMIC, but that this was difficult given the nature of QOS:

"... I mean quality of service, I think essentially, is not about systems, I mean quality of service is about attitudes and about, you know, hearts and minds sort of stuff. It's more of a philosophy... any attempt to bang heads on that is going to be, you know, you're really wasting your time, I think." (TC 123-129)

This extract probably reflects the “sense of mission” which Reiner (1992, p.111) suggests is a central feature of cop culture. In other words, if quality is not accepted as an integral part of this mission, then no systems will succeed in promulgating the QOS initiative.

A minority of officers were altogether more sceptical about the impact of the QOS programme. A Force 1 Detective Chief Superintendent (interview 073 24.1.94) highlighted the gulf between senior and junior ranks and said:

"... that's one of the problems... with this 'quality'. That it's looked upon as something by the workforce as just another management initiative, just another management idea... and it's trying to convince your workforce, who are working in a conflict organisation, that they need, they need to provide that quality service." (TC 185-200)

Later in the interview, he added:

"It's to do with the culture of the Police Service, it is. And it's seen as a sign of weakness, really, by some police officers, it is. The idea of customers and quality, you know, a lot of our culture's based on
In a similar vein, a Force 3 Chief Superintendent (interview 054 8.11.93) questioned whether QOS had been successful or relevant to those “wrestling with the alligators in the swamp” (TC 544). He felt that his force’s localised version of the QOS initiative was a “nice, sanitised piece of management spiel”, but that it created a backlash from the workforce when launched in 1990 because junior ranks felt they were providing a quality service already and many were insulted by the initiative. A Force 2 Chief Superintendent (interview 070 14.12.93) felt that the national initiative had little impact, as his own force was already focussing on its own approach to quality, while another (interview 049 27.10.93) acknowledged the benefit of the national QOS drive “in that it has made a lot of people sit up and think about what we do” (TC 280). He believed however, that the impact would vary greatly according to police areas and cultures:

"So if you work in a rough, tough area where people are pretty rude and difficult to deal with, you are very harsh as a police force, and you’re pretty rough and tough back to them..." (TC 300)

He also provided a rather critical portrayal of many junior officers in the force who would take no notice of quality initiatives:

"... there is a gulf, I think, in the police force. There's those that are quite bright, who read a lot, read good papers, devour books, and there are those that come to work, go home, watch satellite TV, read the Mirror and the Sun, never read anything else, no matter what you pump out from the Headquarters, they never read, not got open minds, not interested in any of these issues..." (TC 443-450)

Possibly this extract tells us something about the predominance of officers from a working-class (and perhaps modestly educated) background, who have little interest in the ‘academic’ niceties of mission statements. Fielding (1988, p.58) notes that police culture does not place much value on academic ability or “book learning”. Fielding records (p.39) that 56% of the new recruits in his study came from a working class background.

It was also suggested by this officer that 'many things go wrong' because these officers are not familiar with PACE:

"... and that's the problem. We actually have in the police force an awful lot of Indians. They're not very bright. They're not very interested in the technicalities of the job. Salt of the earth guys, I mean..."
they'd never let you down... they risk their lives... these are a lot of the guys who actually do really the
difficult job, but they're not interested in all this stuff... They just don't listen. They just don't listen.
They don't read, they don't learn, they just don't listen." (TC 452-468)

A Force 2 Chief Inspector (interview 015 30.4.93) said:

"The older officers think it's a gimmick, which'll go away if you ignore it long enough." (TC 390)

He also commented on the gulf in the commitment to quality improvement, and the high expectation
of senior management:

"There's a big gap between what they want, and what the rest of the force is able to deliver. There
should always be a gap, because if they stopped and we caught up, it would be stagnation. But
sometimes the gap is too big, they're running ahead leaving..." (TC 480)

One Traffic Superintendent (interview 029 029 5.7.93) said that his department had been rather ignored in
the early stages of his force's localised QOS initiative, but did feel there had been a considerable impact on
officers' attitudes and awareness of quality issues (TC 425). He expressed some concern, however, about
internal development:

"... what worries me is that we are all making changes at such a pace that I'm not convinced we are
checking behind to make sure the troops are coming with us. It actually worries me that I'm on the
white charger out up front." (TC 006/085)

This extract strengthens the argument that the gulf between junior and senior ranks has widened markedly,
and that new managerialist initiatives (such as QOS) have been instrumental in this process. Jim Fraser
(then chairman of the Scottish Police Federation) also criticised the speed of reform at the national level and
highlighted the damage to morale within the service (Police Review 29.4.94, p.12).

A Force 2 superintendent (interview 017 6.5.93) felt the rank-and-file were committed to quality service, but
not to the type of packaged initiative promulgated by senior ranks. One Chief Superintendent (interview
074 25.1.94) in charge of a conurbation questioned the impact of GTR, and indeed any quality initiative:

"I don't think if I'm honest that anything's going to have enormous impact. And I think anybody who
thinks that that is going to happen is deluding themselves, by the very nature of the Police Service and the culture that operates within it." (TC 045)

Some respondents thought that the QOS drive had focussed primarily (or excessively) on the internal dimension, with little identifiable impact on operational or functional quality. A Chief Superintendent from Force 2 said:

"I think we need to look at our own navel, because the world has changed, and we haven't necessarily changed with it, so we do need to look at our own navel, but you can do too much of it." (interview 070 14.12.93 TC 485)

A Force 1 Chief Superintendent (interview 034 19.8.93) thought that the efforts of his force to deal with internal organisation and culture had taken priority over operational needs (TC 238), and that there had been little improvement in QOS to the public. Some of the fairly radical organisational changes in Force 1 caused some concern, and as one Chief Superintendent put it:

"We've focussed an awful lot on our organisational issues, to the extent that I am concerned that we've actually lost sight of what we're here to do. And I think that has led to a bit of a feeling of alienation on the part of patrolling officers... alienation from us, from the management." (interview 041 25.8.93 TC 437-445)

Another Force 1 Chief Superintendent thought that the thrust toward improving service delivery had caused a temporary 'loss of the ball':

"I suppose crime is once again emerging as one of our top priorities. But it certainly disappeared in the, I suppose in all the deliberations that were going on about quality, responding to the public, asking the public actually what they thought of us, and what they wanted of us. And we lost our way really." (interview 047 14.9.93 TC 187-200)

Evidence that some of the 'rank-and-file' do not relate to the service aim of management is provided by a Police Review article (written by a constable) which appeared in 1994:

"Increased criticism has seen the police respond by taking on the service ethos and the community-policing philosophy. Scarmanism rules and the service strives to maintain the image epitomised by
Dixon. Mission statements, codes of practice and quality-of-service charters proliferate - community sections, domestic-violence units, child protection units and schools liaison flourish .... admirable though the community-service policing image is, that ethos doesn't confront the realities of policing today's society.” (Police Review 3.6.94, p.20)

It is clear that the 'quality culture' sought by many senior officers does not necessarily correspond to the working culture and objectives of those at the 'sharp end' of policing.

Finally, one of the ACCs in Force 1 (interview 077 3.2.94) said he knew of no forces which had implemented TQM, and in his 'workshop' at the 1993 QOS seminar at Bramshill, only one other person knew of the work of Deming (TC 888). He felt that the Police approach to quality was shallow, and asserted:

"I think we're quite a long way off... because I don't think we have made a decision, as a service or as a force, to talk about quality other than as a concept at the top..." (TC 832)

Nevertheless, despite these opinions on the limited impact of QOS, we can list here some of the benefits cited by those officers who felt that quality had influenced the style and ethos of the police:

* Closer work with the public in community liaison groups.
* Higher prioritisation of the community officer role.
* Taking account of customer needs and expectations.
* Better care of victims of crime.
* More 'openness and honesty' within the organisation.
* Development of internal service level agreements.
* 'Slow but sure' culture change.
* A clear focus on EO issues.
* Management development programmes.

It is clear, however, that not all respondents were convinced about the impact of QOS. Some felt that quality discourse was too abstract, and too far removed from the harsh realities of policing on the street. Other criticisms or problems included the excessive internal focus (or navel-gazing), with little identifiable impact on operational policing. In sum, it would be naive to assume that QOS has been an unmitigated success, or that there have been no detractors in the senior ranks. It would appear that those who were most supportive were also those most directly involved in promulgating 'quality' or in formulating force strategic policy.
Some of those officers more directly concerned with operational policing were more sceptical about the initiative.

Home Office Views

Police department officials were generally positive about the impact of the QOS programme. One senior civil servant involved in the programme stressed the almost abstract nature of achieving 'quality', but nevertheless felt it had been successful:

"It is clear that the position is very varied across the country... but then, you know, the nature and traditions of policing in different parts of the country are rather different... I'm not sure that one would ever know if all police forces had reached some sort of abstract goal... it seems to me it's much better seen as a process, you know, a philosophy, not something that has a particular goal at the end of it." (interview 058 10.11.93 TC 561-580)

Another official who had been heavily involved in QOS also said in November 1993:

"I think increasingly people are recognising that the quality of service agenda, for what it is, is not a glib phrase, it's not 'here today, gone tomorrow'. ... the terminology of quality of service, the language, or the lexicon is increasingly being played back to me. And I think that's actually symptomatic of change, and we have a significant, a significant step forward." (interview 057 10.11.93 TC 076/093)

One of the Police department officials who had been instrumental in launching the QOS initiative (interview 019 27.5.93) firmly believed that it had been successful in raising quality issues on the agenda, strengthening the commitment to professional standards, and ensuring that the Police Service was not just 'moaning' in public or lamenting the shortage of resources (TC 540). He felt that this would not have occurred "naturally" or even with the impetus of Citizen's Charter (TC 548). He also regarded the QOS initiative as representing a "culture change", and a move away from the defensive attitude of the "thin, blue line", with its apocalyptic visions of policing in society:

"I felt good and proud that I'd been able to play a part in staving off some of that and putting it in
Another official involved in the launch of QOS (interview 023 15.6.93) was disappointed that the initiative had limited impact on the Police department itself. In 1991, it was recalled, there were efforts to apply the QOS principles within the department, but this official remembered only limited success (TC 545). This official was "modestly pleased" with what was happening in forces (although this was patchy), and there appeared to be some people who were 'using the words', but not understanding the concept (TC 564).

An official in F8 (interview 065 29.11.93) was also asked about the impact of QOS, and noted how his division had been asked to comment on PIs, but suggested that F8 had been fairly 'unhelpful' and 'negative' on this. The division felt that attempts to measure public order policing in terms of QOS and PIs were rather "crass" (TC 500). He did add, nevertheless, that there was some effect on F8 in terms of self-assessment (TC 510). This official registered a dislike of the term "customers" (TC 519), but stressed there had been an attempt to improve service to ministers and forces (as the main customers) (TC 521).

Another senior official (interview 064 29.11.93) noted that there were some quality-type objectives in the corporate strategy of the department, and joked that they were something about 'being nice to everybody' (TC 106). She had also seen some quality related material from F2, and was "generally aware" of the initiative (TC 109). It was suggested that a successful initiative becomes 'subliminal in terms of expectations' (TC 112). The respondent was asked if Plus had had much impact on the Met:

"I suspect not as much as we would have liked it to. But it's a drip, drip, drip effect. I really do think that some of this is sort of subliminal, that you do change attitudes without recognising that you have, or how you are...."

One head of division (interview 071 20.1.94) did not believe that the QOS initiative had impacted directly on her own division, but did suggest:

"... what it's done is articulate, I think, very clearly, what the police ought to be thinking about in terms of quality of service, and therefore what we as, you know, in our relationships with the police and indeed all our other 'customers', if you have to use that expression, what, you know, what we ought to have at the back of our minds all the time what we're about..." (DC 610-614)
It is interesting that this official also disliked the term 'customer'. One respondent of Assistant Under-Secretary grade (interview 086 6.4.94) was unsure if the tumultuous events of 1993 had tempered the thrust of quality, but did feel that the programme had strengthened the recognition that the police should provide a service, that quality entails rather more than politeness, and that one needs to scrutinise quality within the organisation (TC 290).

A rather more cynical head of division (interview 090 21.7.94) was not convinced the emphasis of QOS was really what the public wanted, and questioned whether operational service was actually being improved (TC 270). QOS should not just be about smiling more! (TC 300).

In sum, most police department officials felt that the QOS programme had impacted on both 'interactional' and 'internal' dimensions; the impact on the Police department, however, was perceived to be rather more limited.

Evidence from the Chief Inspector and Superintendent survey

Several questions in the survey were designed to measure the impact, or perceived impact, of the QOS initiative. In Section C (question 2) of the questionnaire, officers were asked to indicate if the SCPV and the 1990 SPD had impacted upon their force:

Statement of Common purpose and values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A negative impact</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A positive impact</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
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The majority indicated a positive impact, but just over one-quarter of officers felt the SCPV had had no impact on their force.
Strategic Policy Document of 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A negative impact</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A positive impact</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Once again, around one-quarter of officers suggested that the SPD had had no impact: just under half thought there had been a positive impact on their force. Another quarter were 'not sure'. These results tend to confirm the interview findings that the SCPV had more impact, and that police officers were more aware of it, than the SPD.

As would be expected, there were some differences when respondents were sub-categorised. For example, a lower proportion (26%) of those officers who had a 'low' commitment to the QOS philosophy indicated a positive impact from the SCPV; this compares with 79% of officers who had a 'high' commitment to the QOS philosophy.

Similarly, with respect to perceived impact of the SPD, only 20% of the 'low' commitment group felt there had been a positive impact compared to 78% of the 'very high' commitment group.

Officers were also asked to indicate how beneficial the national QOS initiative had been to the police as a whole:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benefit</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all beneficial</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very beneficial</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite beneficial</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very beneficial</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Quite clearly, most felt that the initiative had benefited the Service. A smaller proportion suggested
that QOS had benefited the public:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all beneficial</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very beneficial</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite beneficial</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very beneficial</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Section C of the questionnaire also contained items on the QOS video and the Statement of Ethical principles. 69 officers (45%) stated that they had seen the national quality of service video "If the job's worth doing". In scoring the video out of 7 for overall usefulness, a mean rating of 3.61 was obtained, with quite a high standard deviation of 1.56.

In rating the importance of the service having the statement of Ethical Principles (again out of 7) a mean score of 5.33 was obtained. A high standard deviation of 1.82 was obtained, indicating considerable variation in the scores given.

To test attitudes to the QOS philosophy more generally, officers were asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statements shown below:

The public generally are not aware of the policing that they need

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know/ no opinion</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interestingly, around 4 out of 10 officers tended to agree that the public are unaware of the policing they
require (in some contradiction to one of the philosophical tenets of QOS).

The QOS philosophy is fine in theory, but less workable in reality

| Strongly agree | 3% |
| Agree          | 22% |
| Don't know/no opinion | 4% |
| Disagree       | 51% |
| Strongly disagree | 20% |

Total 100%

7 out of 10 officers tended to disagree with this statement.

Section D of the questionnaire contained a number of items about QOS in the respondent's force. In question 1, respondents were asked to score out of 7 the perceived level of commitment to the current philosophy, for each of the ranks. (A rating of one would indicate 'not committed', and a rating of 7 'very committed').

The mean score and standard deviation for each rank are presented below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Officers</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Superintendents</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Inspectors</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectors</td>
<td>5.16</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constables</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probationers</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Chief Officers were seen as the most highly committed to the quality of service philosophy. Generally, there was a trend for the commitment rating to decline with descending rank. However, Superintendents received a slightly higher rating than the Chief Superintendents, and the Probationers received a high average rating than Constables, Sergeants and Inspectors. This is consistent with research which identifies the idealism in training and early service (see Fielding, 1988).
In rating their own commitment to the current quality of service philosophy, the average score was 6.31, with a low standard deviation of 0.86. Interestingly, this indicates that respondents tended to rate themselves higher than the score they gave to their Chief Inspector and Superintendent colleagues, and indeed the Chief Officers.

In question 3 respondents were asked to agree or disagree with six statements pertaining to quality of service:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Don’t know or have no Opinion</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Police’s national Quality of service has had a positive impact on my force</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My force places too much emphasis on the idea of serving the public</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My force places too much emphasis on the idea of colleagues being ‘customers’</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting the expectations of the community should be the main priority of the force</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current emphasis on quality of service has penetrated most levels of my force</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current quality of service emphasis in my force will eventually fade away</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Roughly 8 out of 10 officers (77%) felt that the National Quality of Service initiative had had a positive impact. A very clear majority of officers (85%) disagreed with the statement that the force placed too much emphasis on 'serving the public', and 71% of respondents disagreed that the current quality of service emphasis would eventually fade away. Most (79%) thought the current emphasis on QOS had penetrated most levels of their force.
Only around one-fifth of officers agreed that their force was placing excessive emphasis on the idea of colleagues being 'customers'.

On the whole, then, the results do suggest that Chief Inspectors and Superintendents were in support of the major philosophical planks of the QOS initiative. Many respondents, of course, suggested that the planks were already there, and that the QOS initiative rejuvenated or re-emphasised these.

Nearly half (48%) of the officers believed that their jobs had changed considerably as a result of the emphasis on 'quality of service'. As one might anticipate, the majority (61%) of officers with 'high' levels of strategic involvement in their force indicated that QOS had markedly changed the way in which they did their jobs, compared to only 30% of the ‘low’ involvement respondents.

Views of HMIC respondents

HMIC staff were asked for their opinions on the impact and success of QOS. In one of the earlier interviews (010 8.3.93, not taped) a senior respondent at the London office thought that QOS was "moving fairly slowly". It was also suggested that some forces had not 'taken on board' the concept of internal QOS, and that there is "myopic internal management". The more advanced forces, it was noted, would include Kent, Leicestershire and South Yorkshire. Although it was felt that all forces were 'doing something', some were rather good at the rhetoric! It was thought that the Met had been a powerful influence, and that the Plus programme had been very beneficial.

An HMIC Chief Inspector (interview 004 19.11.92 not taped) noted that QOS had been the "buzz word" for a couple of years, and although it can mean different things to different people, it should permeate the entire organisation. Importantly, QOS concerns 'changing the whole ethos and culture of an organisation'. It was noted that the creation and use of qualitative PIs is difficult. One very senior member of HMIC (interview 024 15.6.93) suggested that QOS "has been the springboard for a lot of commonality of actions" within the ACPO ranks, although he felt it had taken a while for the QOS concept to 'get through' and that it had met with some cynicism. The SCPV was described as a "template for quality of service" (TC 553), but it was noted:

"... even twelve months later, less than half the number of forces in the country had actually signed up to the statement of common purpose and values..."

This respondent recalled how the HMIC had to 'push' QOS within the Service, and that they turned it
into a "realism" against some opposition (TC 023):

"We were very keen, and some members of ACPO were not all that keen, to turn those words into action, to make it happen, to start to measure what you were doing, and how you were doing it..." (TC 015).

While acknowledging the danger that the QOS emphasis could fade, it was thought the service had gone beyond this, particularly with the influence of Citizen's Charter and the Audit Commission (TC 106). In contrast to some of those views noted above, a Chief Superintendent within the HMIC (interview 021 7.6.93) thought that some of the QOS documentation produced by the Inspectorate was not even understood by the Inspectors of Constabulary:

"There was difficulty within the HMIC in getting the Inspectors of Constabulary to understand what quality of service was about..." (TC 168)

He believed some Inspectors tend to focus on their specialities, and "sod the rest" (TC 176). There was a danger that the initiative would be seen only as Trefor Morris' issue (Trefor Morris was the HMI at Cambridge with special responsibility for QOS). Reaction to QOS within forces was not all that it should have been:

"... People were trying to find measures of resistance, rather than actually trying to meet the ethos... not only defensive, but unwilling to take on the ethos of that statement of common purpose and values." (TC 448)

It was recalled how one force had omitted the word "compassionate" from the SCPV: apparently the chief of this force had said it was not the responsibility of the police to be compassionate, and that this was the concern of other agencies! (TC 534).

Another Chief Superintendent (interview 062 26.11.93) was rather more upbeat about the impact of QOS, although noted that its profile was not as high as it had been:

"although it may have gone off the boil, most forces actually are far more aware strategically and quality-wise, of the need for a quality service to the public, and hopefully quality of service internally.... I think if nothing else, the quality of service initiative has made the Service more
aware of the need to consult and listen to other people. That we are a service culture, if nothing else the move away from force to service, the recognition that we have customers, at all different levels - externally and internally - is now into the Service." (TC 452-485)

Another HMIC Chief Superintendent (interview 068 13.12.93) thought QOS had become more diverse, and that it was now difficult to pinpoint specific QOS initiatives in forces (TC 655). The possibility that the events of 1993 had undermined the QOS initiative was put to a central HMIC Chief Superintendent (interview 063 26.11.93):

"I don't think it's faded away, I think that's the easy one to answer. Ideally, it should not be an initiative. It should, as you say, ideally be a way of doing things." (TC 153)

It was conceded that the development of QOS in various forces is "patchy" (TC 163). Importantly, it was felt that there is a wider appreciation of quality in the Police even if this is not "labelled up" as QOS (TC 177). The initiative was deemed to be successful:

"Whether it could have been more of a success in certain parts is always debatable. But the mere fact that we're doing... we have articulated charters, standards of common purpose, values... we have started to bring performance indicators... performance standards... Actually started to say to people, 'This is what you can expect of us.'" (TC 372-380)

A senior member (interview 076 26.1.94) was asked about the impact of HMIC on the development of QOS, and talked of his own input into deriving the SCPV. It was added that in effect the HMIC has "pressurised" forces, and now nearly all were signed up to the basic areas of QOS (TC 300). It was also stressed how some forces had been a 'long way behind', but it was added:

"... We were pushing at an open door, because most forces had started or were very willing to get started along that road. There's still a great variation up and down the country, I have to say. Most of the forces I inspect... are very well advanced, probably amongst the best. There are some forces that are still very slow." (TC 314-319)

This respondent noted the North-South divide which still existed: some Northern forces will 'resist any form of change' and have clung to 'traditional styles of policing' for as long as possible (TC 325). He felt that every force was now signed up to the SCPV, although there had been some resistance.
Another top member of the Inspectorate (interview 088 3.5.94) highlighted the development of PIs as a key element of QOS, and noted how their introduction had been received:

"They were not accepted easily or readily by the Service, the Police Service. The performance indicators have been modified, and we've now got the 24 PIs, Audit Commission, HMI/Home Office, and the quality of service committee's PIs... that's the first time we've had any measurement, proper measurement, comprehensive measurement of the Police Service as a whole, and it's a more radical step than people imagine." (TC 120-134)

Reiner (1994, p.754) records the emphasis on making the police more business-like, and responsive to standards set by central government and its appointees: he stresses that the "police feel under attack as never before". In relation to QOS, the HMIC respondent thought that the service had come on in "leaps and bounds" and that there was a wide recognition that quality is integral to everything. Overall, it was believed that the programme had been successful, even if 'internal quality' can be difficult to achieve (TC 465).

In sum, the HMIC respondents generally held that the programme had been successful. There was a particular emphasis on the HMIC's role in promulgating QOS, and on the significance of PIs. There was also an indication that some difficulties had accompanied the original launch, in terms of securing commitment to, and understanding of, the QOS philosophy. Regional variations were also highlighted.

Other Evidence

In addition to the research interviews and survey, it is worth briefly considering some other evidence of the impact of the QOS programme.

A 1992 staff attitude survey in Hampshire Constabulary revealed that most officers (81%) and civilians (83%) believed their localised version of the QOS initiative to be of benefit to the public. Similarly, most staff thought that the 'Policing Standards' (PS) was of benefit to the force itself.

In extending the analysis, it became clear that there were rank based differences. For example, most senior officers (Chief Inspector and above) thought that Policing Standards had improved the quality of service (QOS) provided. However, the vast majority of Constables (92%) felt that it had made no change. A higher
proportion of Probationers than Constables indicated a positive effect (19%, compared with 8% of constables). 15% and 41%, respectively, of Sergeants and Inspectors indicated improved QOS as a result of Policing Standards. Constables were most likely to feel that PS would just 'fade away', with 35% indicating this. Only 14% of senior officers felt the same.

Overall, the Hampshire results indicate a positive perception of the PS/QOS policy, but a clear difference between junior and senior ranks in terms of stated impact on service provided, and perceived longevity of the policy.

Rather less strictly tied in to the national framework of QOS, but nevertheless resting on the concept of quality and 'customer', has been the approach of Surrey Police. A fundamental plank of this approach has been its derivation of service charters. In addition, the force has focussed very much on performance measures (and was doing so prior to the current emphasis on PIs). In 1992, the force ran an internal staff survey (see Surrey Police's 'Offbeat' newspaper of February 1993), which had a response rate of 61% for police officers. A total of 1055 completed questionnaires were returned for analysis. Some of this survey's questions touched on QOS, and on reaction to the force's first public service charter which was issued in July 1992. The charter set out standards in relation to the key areas of performance, and talked of 'partnership', 'service commitments' and 'meeting public expectations'. Under the heading of "Impact of the Quality Initiative", the results of the 1992 staff survey were presented in the force newspaper (p4):

* I have read the Surrey Charter (92%)
* I have a good understanding of it (78%)
* It is important to set policing standards (78%)

The 'Offbeat' report also showed that the majority of officers agreed that competence, courtesy, fairness, sensitivity, the updating of customers, and smart appearance are important factors in providing a high quality of service to the public (p4).

As well as surveys conducted within police forces, some insight into the issues of quality can be obtained by considering public studies. For example, the 1990 OPCS Omnibus Survey (OPCS, 1990) demonstrated that 73% of those who had come into contact with the police in the last year were 'very' or 'fairly' satisfied with the way in which the Police had handled their call or inquiry. Only 7% were 'very dissatisfied', and around 6% were 'dissatisfied'. In addition 72% of respondents felt that police in their area were doing a 'very' or 'fairly' good job. The 1990 Omnibus survey results demonstrate a broad level of satisfaction with
the police: the attitude of the public certainly was not at 'rock bottom' prior to the inception of the national QOS initiative.

Reiner (1992, p.59) highlights the favourable survey results of the Royal Commission (1962) and notes that 81.9% of the semi- and unskilled working class groups expressed 'great respect' for the police. Fielding (1991, p.49) draws attention to the work of Belson (1975) which found a high level of support for the police in London (although Fielding notes Belson's tendency to ignore the negative data). Fielding (p.50) adds that in 1980 "police came second only to doctors in terms of honesty and ethical standards; by 1984 they fell to sixth place." He notes too the 1983 BCS results in which 75% of respondents agreed that the police 'did a good job' (p.50). The 1990 OPCS results indicate little change in positive attitudes about the police.

During the December 1994 seminar at Bramshill, the 1993 OPCS Omnibus survey was cited as evidence that the 'quality' approach was having a beneficial effect. The Home Office press release on the survey stated that police officers were becoming more attentive, polite and competent (Home Office, Jan 1994b). Charles Pollard drew attention to the fact that the OPCS survey revealed that around 3 out of 4 people were very or fairly satisfied with the service they received from the police. These results might imply that quality of service had improved, but it is difficult (if impossible) to isolate the precise 'causal' influence of the programme. Given the fact that the 1990 Omnibus survey had shown 73% of respondents were very or fairly satisfied with their contact with the police, one might argue that there was little marked improvement in 1993 on an already high level of satisfaction.

The 1994/95 report of the Chief HMI noted the difficulty in comparing levels of public satisfaction across forces (p.83), but did conclude there was a "commendable level of performance in terms of public satisfaction with the nature and level of services received." The MORI poll of June 1994 (conducted on behalf of the Sunday Times) was cited as evidence that police officers are amongst the most trusted of professional groups (p.84).

A major aim of the QOS programme has been to impact on police culture, and improve management and lines of communication (see 'Getting Things Right', 1993). There is evidence to suggest, however, that internal quality has not improved significantly, and that the adversarial or difficult relationship between junior and senior officers (which Reiner, 1994, p.736 identifies) has not been ameliorated to any large extent.

In 1995, the Police Federation of England and Wales commissioned a staff attitude survey of officers from the rank of Constable to Chief Inspector. Some of the questions touched upon 'internal quality' issues, and
are pertinent here. For example, while the majority of officers (73%) were satisfied with the direction and guidance from their immediate line supervisor(s), around 6 out of 10 respondents were dissatisfied with direction and guidance from senior management. A similar proportion expressed dissatisfaction with support from senior management. The results perhaps suggest there is probably still some way to go before internal quality initiatives (such as GTR) have a profound impact upon the service.

In the early part of 1995, the QOS committee conducted a survey of forces to establish if, and how, GTR was being implemented (ACPO, 1995c). Some of the key results are summarised below:

* The majority (93%) of forces indicated they were adopting some or all of the principles within the GTR framework.
* A minority (13%) of forces had developed performance indicators (or other form of evaluation) to assess the impact of adopting GTR.
* 31% of forces felt that the documents supplied by ACPO QOS committee did not satisfy their needs in promoting GTR.

The GTR survey report (p7) suggested that the:

"Results show that a considerable amount of work has been done by individual forces in an effort to promote quality issues and encourage staff to deliver a high quality service to all customers, internal and external to the organisation."

However, one member of the QOS committee (interview 107 26.7.95) was sceptical about the value of the survey:

"I'm not actually sure it proves the square root of bugger all!" (054)

He thought it inevitable that forces would assert that they are implementing GTR (even if they are not), and was cynical about the 'wonderful' portrait painted by many forces (TC 068). He also stressed that very little money had been spent on implementing GTR (TC 080). This respondent contrasted the apparently favourable GTR results with the Federation Survey findings, and noted that the GTR survey had itself impacted minimally on the work of the QOS committee (TC 175).
Reference has already been made to the work of Hood (1992) in which officers passing through Bramshill were surveyed about their perception of 'quality'. In 1994, a Bramshill-based study was conducted on behalf of the QOS committee, which built upon Hood's work. Officers attending Bramshill were subjected to some of the same questions posed in 1991; for example:

1) How would you rate the actual quality of service which your force gave?

2) How would you rate the actual quality of service which your staff gave?

The results suggested an increase in perceived QOS provided by respondent's force (although the difference was small). Similarly, there was a very small positive shift in perceived QOS provided by staff, when comparing the figures for 1991 and 1994. The QOS committee also had an interest in identifying any common definition of 'quality'. One academic staff member from Bramshill (interview 110 3.8.95) felt that the survey had not really revealed a common definition of QOS:

"I mean broadly, all it really shows us is that officers seem to feel a lot more positive about quality of service than they did in 1991... It appears that quality of service still means everything to everyone... basically, it, all it really said is people feel better about it. I suppose if they feel better about it, then the chance is they're doing better..." (TC 017/048-072)

It was intimated that the concept of a customer-driven service was generally much less supported, and added:

"If you think about 1991, and you think about all the effort which ACPO quality of service committee put into driving quality, I think... they should be disappointed about the results they’ve had in terms of people's perceptions." (TC 137-143)

Summary

In sum, the evidence about the impact of QOS is mixed: some respondents perceived considerable changes while others doubted any real impact on operational policing. Some of the survey evidence (such as the Federation study) perhaps indicates that there are persistent organisational problems, (such as manager/worker interaction) which have not been significantly alleviated by the emphasis on a quality culture. The Bramshill survey (1994) would also suggest that there has been little discernible impact on senior officers’ attitudes to the quality concept.
More generally, the main Audit Commission respondent (interview 085 25.4.94) commented on the QOS programme:

"I think it has had quite a significant impact, both internally - the way that individual officers are now drawn into discussion about the way the service is delivered.... I think it's raised issues like internal communications which I think in the past have been very problematic in the Police Service.... I think in terms of the impact on members of the public, that's much more difficult to gauge...." (TC 363-380)

The precise measurement of such an initiative is practically impossible; there are countless operational, social and political variables which will affect the perception and implementation of police initiatives, including QOS. Given my research evidence, and findings of other studies, I would nevertheless conclude that the QOS programme has been modestly successful.
4.4 Quality of Service: Professionalism or New Managerialism?

What is critical to the understanding of the QOS programme is the fact that it has straddled two schools of thought. On the one hand it has been firmly rooted in the traditional 'public service ethic' (Farnham and Horton 1993, p253) with its emphases on equity, probity and professionalism. The original Statement of Common Purpose and Values and the work on ethics/personal standards typifies this school of thought. On the other hand, some elements of the QOS programme (especially more recently) have reflected the discourse of new managerialism, with its emphases on consumerisation, customer satisfaction, marketing, and performance indicators.

This bi-polar approach lies at the heart of some of the logical inconsistency in the programme. There is a tension between the professionally oriented brand of 'quality' and the brand of 'consumerist quality'; the former reflects more the impartial and professional definition of policing need, while the latter places more importance on responding to consumer demand, generic managerial skills and 'charterism'. Brooke (1992, p11) stresses that all professions have an independent duty from that owed to their customers, even if "a consumer driven agenda has much to commend it". There is sometimes a tension between the public service model and the business model (see Waters and Brown, 1993).

Such ideas were put to a leading member of the QOS committee during interview, and it was asked whether the 'consumerist' model of quality might increasingly displace the professional model:

"I think it's important to have both aspects, it seems to me... but what I am impressed with is just how far forces and individuals are actually moving more towards what you call the consumerist model. That when you speak to people now, they actually do talk about customers, they do actually say we need to know what people actually want, we need to be setting our standards to what they want rather than, you know, what we think is right..." (interview 103 1.5.95 TC 390-402)

It was clear that this key respondent supported the 'consumerist' model of quality: indeed many officers talked of 'customers' during interviews and there was a clear consumerist orientation at the 1994 Bramshill QOS conference. The quintessential aspects of the two brands of quality, and examples of comment which embrace or support either brand, will be further developed below.

The early stage of the QOS programme was clearly imbued with a professional model of quality, although of course the OPR had emphasised the gap between public and service definitions of 'good policing,' and
led to the important idea of meeting community expectation (which is more representative of the consumerist model).

There can be little doubt that the SCPV itself appeals to professional ideals of integrity and impartiality. Michael Hirst (1990b) in his address at the launch of the QOS initiative emphasised the Service's commitment to "traditional policing" (p4), and stressed that his role was not to "rewrite the role of police in society" (p6). Hirst highlighted the need to re-focus on the service role, and while he accepted the importance of public demands and satisfaction in no way did he advocate a de-professionalisation of the Police, or a policing service dominated by the consumerist ethic. Several senior officers perceived the QOS programme as predominantly philosophical, rather than as a vehicle with which to usher in far-reaching new managerialist reforms. One DCC (interview 099 23.2.95) said of the original initiative:

"Oh, yes, without doubt, it was an attitudinal initiative... I never saw that as a move to structural change within the police service. I saw it always as a move to heighten awareness within the police service, to rekindle the old philosophies of public co-operation, partnership with the public, and a recognition by the service that a more sophisticated, a more demanding public demanded a more enhanced, polished service from the police service than hitherto." (TC 012/040)

As well as the SCPV, the original statement of ethical principles clearly resonated with the professional ethos:

"The Police do not deserve trust confidence and respect unless we as a service and as individuals, in the application of our responsibilities, demonstrate the professional values and standards which the public has a right to expect..."
(introduction to Statement of Ethical Principles, ACPO 1992)

One Chief Superintendent (interview 041 25.8.93) said of such initiatives within the QOS programme:

"If you like, we're anchoring the Service to an independent set of values... to focus people's attention on these values, so that if we do get a renegade government, that starts wanting us to do this, that and everything else, you may have people who (a) have been conditioned, and (b) have the strength of character to stand up say, 'No, hang on a minute, this isn't what we're about.'" (TC 327-341)

This extract lends weight to the concept of state elites engaged in conflict rather than consensus.
In a sense, the Service's re-emphasis of professional standards and status has acted to counter (if ineffectively) the government's programme of public sector reform and de-professionalisation. Lawton and Rose (1994, p201) point out that traditionally the role of professionals within the public service has been of great importance. However, they add:

"the 1980s saw an attack upon what many perceived to be the power of the professionals. It was argued, particularly by the Thatcher governments and Kenneth Clarke specifically, that the consumer or user of services should have a greater voice in deciding what services should be provided... Apart from seeking to dilute the power of the professionals it was argued that in order for services to be delivered more efficiently and effectively then professionals should acquire management skills such as managing resources" (p202).

In a Home Office news release of 8th December 1992 ('Quality is key to the future of policing: Home Secretary publishes Gallup survey') part of Kenneth Clarke's address to the QOS seminar at Bramshill was included:

"Quality of service sounds very simple. It is simple. All it requires is a recognition that service delivery means treating others as we would expect to be treated - fairly, sensitively and as individuals. It is not a soft option. It is very easy to let professional preoccupations get in the way of service delivery."

It was added that Clarke thought the police had "particular difficulties in achieving this."

Famham and Horton (1993) discuss at length the tension between the professional/public service ethic, and the tenets of market-dominated new managerialism. They also highlight the pertinence of professional accountability in the public services:

"Professionals claim... that they are accountable to their professions and to their internal codes of ethics. During the 1980s there was an attack on public professional bureaucracies, with the imposition of internal managerial structures subordinating the professionals to hierarchical controls. They are now being held increasingly accountable to 'public managers', who may or may not be drawn from among the professionals they supervise." (Famham and Horton, 1993, p39)

Although the Police Service does not fulfil all of the criteria of professionalism (for example, there is no formal 'policing' qualification which must be attained before entry into the organisation), it is nevertheless
the case that the SCRV and the code of ethics appeal to the professional ethic (which the government has criticised).

The ACPO Factsheet of 1993 countered the accusation that the service lacks effective accountability (a criticism often levelled at professional organisations, see Farnham and Horton, 1993, p39), and concluded that the Service is "working to achieve higher standards of professionalism".

Pritchard (1993) criticises the ascendancy of the charter movement and argues that charterism exposes professional organisations to the dominance of 'consumers', and that the Citizen's Charter movement was designed primarily to prepare public sector organizations for the inevitability of their privatisation. Pritchard (p3) also suggests that because society demands "integrity" from professionals, professions have enjoyed enhanced social standing, and a "freedom in which discretion and integrity can be exercised". She stresses the uneasy relationship between charters and professional ethics (p8), and states:

"Protection is the price of true professionalism. If the society fails to give protection to the exercise of discretion, then it will suffocate and kill all integrity - the result will not be a nation of honest experts but a nation of slaves. These aspects of professional freedom have been stressed because it can be argued that the charters, by seeking to impose rules, actually undermine the quality of service they purport to improve." (Pritchard, 1993, p4)

Fielding (1991) discusses the controversy surrounding police discretion (or "selective enforcement" as he phrases it):

"... police efforts are unlikely to be equal, either between statuses, demographic groups or jurisdictions. The exercise of discretion is inevitable in a society where resources are limited.... The police have to decide priorities, and that is, of course, a question of politics. Setting police action in relation to particularly conditions is a discretion with which every officer is familiar." (p.11)

Given these assumptions, perhaps Pritchard is being too alarmist about the erosion of professional discretion: discretion will always be a part of street policing. Kemp, Norris and Fielding (1992, p.84) note, for example, that the "role that police play at disputes differs from that in circumstances where the demands are fewer and discretion more circumscribed." They suggest that in relation to role theory, the type of problem which officers confront in these situations is akin to those encountered in professions such as science and medicine. I would suggest that the ambivalence in much street policing (such as disputes) runs in parallel to the level
of discretion' enjoyed' by the rank-and-file officer. Perhaps, however, professional autonomy at more strategic or tactical levels is more likely to be undermined; the discretion of divisional commanders is probably narrowed by the growing emphasis on the national objectives and the paraphernalia of new managerialism.

Several forces have applied for, or succeeded in obtaining, the Citizen's 'Charter Mark', thereby embracing a more consumerist model of quality. Not all police leaders, however, feel at ease with this. Butler (1992b) for example, suggested that the Service is entitled to be cautious about the implications of the Citizen's Charter movement, with its emphasis on good financial management and performance measurement, and concluded that it (and the statutory role of the Audit Commission) could be to the detriment of QOS. He added:

"The skill will be convincing the Audit Commission that the world does not revolve around the concept of cost, economy and efficiency" (p49).

In 1993, Hampshire Constabulary's 'Policing Standards' steering group was seriously considering applying for the Charter Mark, although some senior personnel within the force were very uneasy about this. In September 1993, a member of the Citizen's Charter Unit gave a presentation to Hampshire's quality Steering group. The presentation and ensuing discussion was tape recorded ('interview' 048, 16.9.93). The Citizen's Charter representative repeatedly emphasized the importance of reflecting the customers' priorities in service delivery:

"... we are particularly interested in really making public services more responsive to their users... and moving away from a kind of defensive 'not my fault guv' culture... Essentially, what Charter Mark does is to try and assess the extent to which public service organisations are meeting... the six principles of the Citizen's Charter... ideally in developing and setting the standards if you can, in any way, get, take account of local views as directly as you possibly can. That will inevitably make the thing more appropriate, more effective... if you're actually doing what the public think you should be doing, and if you're telling them about how you're performing in areas that they think you should be performing." (TC 051/185/207)

The respondent talked of 'VFM', the best use of resources, and financial savings (TC 051, Side 2), and noted (quite candidly) that in any application for the Charter mark, the Charter Unit would seek evidence on how money has been saved within the organisation (TC 160). I asked the respondent about
the factors which contributed to the genesis of Citizen's Charter: it was replied that it fits into the whole programme of "public service reform" of the 1980s (TC 268). It was noted that Citizen's Charter is also concerned with continuing "customer service initiatives" originating in the private sector, and giving users "more say":

"... in a way that's again what Citizen's Charter is trying to encourage, to make public services realise that the reason they're there is to provide a service, not because important providers have their, sort of, status and their, sort of, professional egos to be massaged." (TC 297)

Again, the idea of questioning the professional model of service provision emerges here. It was stated later in the discussion:

"But what the Citizen's Charter is trying to do is to inject the sort of environment and attitude that comes by definition if you're operating in a competitive environment, because, you know Marks and Spencer has to sort of make sure that it keeps its customers, because if they don't the profits will fall down... in a way the Citizen's Charter is trying to inject, is acting as a proxy for competition if you like..." (TC 309/318)

The respondent added that one can start "engendering a sort of quasi-competitive spirit" (TC 323). As it happened, Hampshire Constabulary did not proceed with its application for the Charter Mark, partially because some at ACPO level considered Citizen's Charter to be too closely allied to the policies and ideology of the government. One Chief Superintendent (interview 106 21.7.95), involved in strategic development, also thought it wise for the Police to avoid the 'political implication' of the Charter Mark (TC 050). He felt that the philosophy of QOS required defending against the "government moves towards number counting and number crunching" (TC 024).

With the onset of the police reforms, and the growing influence of the police performance indicators from 1993 onward, the QOS programme has become increasingly dominated by a market-oriented and new managerialist ethos. Paralleling this, the QOS programme has become increasingly politicised (see Chapter 6), and the Police Service has become embroiled more in the discourse of the business world, rather than the public service and professional ethic which Farnham and Horton (1993, p.241) talk of. These authors define new managerialism as the:

"structural, organisational and managerial changes which have taken place in the public services in
recent years. In essence, it incorporates the application of private sector management systems and managerial techniques into the public services." (ibid, p237)

The emphasis on policing style, ethos and 're-kindling' the close relationship with the public has increasingly given way to the exigencies of contemporary political imperatives. The Chief Superintendent last cited above (interview 106 21.7.95) was asked if the QOS programme was as "vital" as it had been:

"No, I don't... I don't think that it's lost its way, but it's become much more involved with performance management and performance indicators, which to a certain extent we have as well, because the planning process is pushing us that way. But I think that we've got to keep quality in there and not be looking to measure things all the time." (TC 192-197)

He added:

"The next fashionable thing is going to be bench-marking. And we could be in difficulties in terms of quality on that, because benchmarking is about doing things for the cheapest." (TC 205)

It was felt that this new business thrust could seriously jeopardise quality and agreed that the "economy and efficiency" imperative was biting:

"Yes, yes, and I think that's the way that the Police service is definitely going..." (TC 218)

Butler (in Leishman et al, 1996) questions the 'social market' reforms of the police:

“The purchasers who have the money will get the police service they request, while people with limited means will get the ‘economy’ police service.... In the policing context, the profit motive is now a major incentive in the provision of crime prevention and detection, as well as the incarceration of offenders." (p.230)

One member of the QOS committee (interview 100 19.4.95) was in no doubt that the tenor of quality was changing markedly, and away from what we might call the original public service or philosophical direction of the QOS initiative. In this respondent's second interview (107, 26.7.95) he reiterated that performance management dominates the quality agenda, and would continue to do so:
"You see the rest of the quality of service initiative is vaguely airy-fairy, it's quasi-philosophical... Trying to convince people in the canteen at three o'clock in the morning when they've just been stoned by rioters that quality of service is a major issue... performance measurement is at least quantifiable, it is at least something that you can put down on paper, and say we have got these things which actually measure we are doing something..." (TC 244-252)

This conception fits very neatly with the new managerialist emphasis. It was added that trying to measure the impact of GTR is like "nailing jelly to the ceiling" (TC 256), and that the work on ethics/shared values is similarly ethereal. It was also felt that the private sector can offer much to the development of the debate, and that a business venue (such as the Institute of Directors) would be an ideal venue for the next QOS seminar (TC 344-352). The respondent questioned whether the "airy-fairy" aspects of the QOS programme could ever really impact if they could not be measured (TC 381). Performance management was seen as the way forward:

"I think that is the way forward actually for the quality of service, in other words if you can get your qualitative indicators right, that is the best way of taking forward the quality of service initiative, at least it's got an edge to it." (TC 375)

Horton (1993, p127) successfully highlights the radical structural, cultural and managerial changes in the civil service since 1979 which:

"involved redefining the role of the civil service, evolving it from an administrative to a managerialist culture and putting in place new management structures and processes. Businessmen (sic) were co-opted and recruited to introduce private sector approaches to economy, efficiency and effectiveness (the three 'Es') which have dominated thinking on the civil service since the 1980s."

One head of division within the police department (interview 104 25.5.95) was asked if the ethos of the department had changed considerably in the last couple of years:

"Yes, I think... particularly in this area of performance management. I think by asking the Police to be more responsive, to be more accountable to local structures, more responsive to the needs of their, to whom they provide a service... that discipline has made the department, the police department itself think about, you know, what it means itself in terms of its relation with its customers, some of whom are the police themselves, some of whom are ministers..." (TC 270-282)
He thought that his division was "now essentially about performance management" (TC 033) and said:

"We are equally infected by the Zeitgeist, the concern to be efficient, customer-oriented, all of these things... the business model much more..." (TC 290)

This official was asked if the QOS programme had faded in the police:

"... I think, quite rightly, Paul Whitehouse has sort of sensed, as we have sensed that, you know, it's done its job. The agenda has moved on in a way, and the Quality of Service committee is now concentrating through its performance management working group on these issues, the objectives, the indicators, just as F1 division is here. So I think they have mirrored in a way the change that we have found inevitable in the department. And I think it also reflects a sense, you know, that the world has moved on, and it's only so long that you can go on using a slogan I think, before it becomes rather tired." (TC493-516)

It would seem, then, that the 'Zeitgeist' of the business-oriented, consumerist brand of quality has taken precedence over the traditional public-service ethic/professional model. The Service (and the QOS committee) have been unable to resist the tide of change, and cannot cling to the raft of professionalism.

McLaughlin (1992, p473) recalls the pressures on the police to be subjected to "rational reform", discusses at some length the growing prospects of policing privatization (p477), and questions the appropriateness of a consumerist model in the face of monopolistic service provision:

"We are being promised that the 'modern' localised police service will be accountable to the customer, and in principle, recasting the police/community relationship in market terms might indeed make the police more responsive... If the police are going to adopt only the jargon of the free market while remaining in a monopolistic position it is very difficult to see how accountability, in free market terms, will be imposed." (p 485)

McLaughlin pinpoints an important fact, which is that to a large extent the words and concepts (or jargon) of the market have been used to promulgate quality without a conscious fundamental de-emphasis of the professional/public-service model.

While the business derived language of 'customers' and 'client demands' has been adopted by the police such
usage has had less to do with the new managerialist emphasis on economy, efficiency and effectiveness, value for money, of the principles of market competitiveness (see Farnham and Horton, 1993) and more to do with promoting a responsive and caring service, and repairing the damaged image of the police. This analysis is, at least, pertinent for the early phase of the QOS programme. In the current highly politicised, and increasingly managerialist, phase of the quality agenda, the 'jargon' of the market and the imperatives of new managerialism are taking on a much more pervasive and meaningful significance.

At IPEC 1992, John Newing (the chief of Derbyshire) stated:

"Commercial concepts such as customer surveys, service delivery, marketing and business plans have been embraced and adapted to meet the requirements of police forces... change within the police service is increasingly focused upon quality of service... [the SPD] pre-dated the Citizen's Charter by ten months. It is the foundation stone upon which a whole raft of work to establish customer-based performance measures and service standards had been and still is being undertaken by ACPO."

(Newing, p23)

It was already clear in 1992 (before the onslaught of Sheehy and the White Paper) that the business model was in the ascendancy vis-a-vis the traditional public service model. Newing concluded:

"You may not agree with my proposals for change. But of one thing we can all be certain. The pressures on the public purse are mounting. The police service cannot divorce itself from the cold realities of the real world. There is less money available; we must provide added value. Change is inevitable."

(p30)

Perhaps it was inevitable that the 'philosophical' or 'professional' caste of the original QOS initiative would soon be superseded by the new managerialist ethos. In the Autumn of 1991, Sir John Woodcock (in a 'Policing' article entitled "Overturning police culture") emphasised the "signs and omens of change in society" (p173) and asserted that the rights of the police customer should be "raised to the pinnacle of all police activity" (p172). He also emphasised the need to demolish the barriers between professions (like the police) and the public (p175):

"The challenge from the public is to open up the police service to its fellow citizens. The service needs to be thrown open to the consumer, its structures redesigned to allow the public more fully to assist in the setting of its priorities. The police service needs to admit the limits of its power. In a single, ugly
phrase, the service needs to de-professionalise."

The push toward a business model, and meeting the requirements of VFM and TQM is also symbolised by an article which appeared in 'The Police Journal' (Jan 1992) entitled "Abandoning Tradition: The Concept of Total Quality Management in the Police" (Warcup, 1992).

McLaughlin and Murji (1993) challenge the notion that policing is a 'special' profession and note that "the police have already embraced managerialism in an attempt to put their own house in order and there is little doubt that a managerialist culture has taken root." (p13). They recall too, that the White Paper and Sheehy were part of the wider "dynamic managerialisation process" (p8) in the public services, and that the voluntary adoption by the police of elements of the new managerialist philosophy (which, of course, includes the consumerist aspects of the QOS programme) placed the police in a position from which it was difficult to resist the reform agenda. Embracing consumerist quality had undermined the ability of police leaders to claim a special professional status.

Despite the enthusiasm with which some officers and writers have embraced a consumerist 'quality', nestled within the lap of new managerialism, there are those who are more sceptical. We have already cited Pritchard (1993); Famham and Horton (1993, pg251) also question the ethics of marketing public services and treating people as commercial consumers and refer to the introduction of private sector management systems generally as 'covert privatisation' (pg 241).

Leishman, Cope and Starie (in Leishman et al, 1996) suggest that privatisation "is firmly on the policing agenda", and that this has included load-shedding, contracting out and charging for services (p.22). They add that the scope of the latter is likely to expand, possibly by forces selling security services or providing training courses. Johnston (in Leishman et al, 1996, p.61) talks of the privatisation mentality in the police:

"A decade after the publication of Circular 114/83, police agencies are run, more and more, like private sector companies.... the key symbolic shift within the privatisation mentality is encapsulated, however, in the 'Strategic Policy Document's' transformation of police clients into 'customers'...."

Johnston does add, however, that this transformation is part of a laudable attempt at improving service. Nevertheless, the "ideology of consumerism" could act to justify the exposure of the police to competition (p.61). Jefferson, Sim and Walklate (1992) cite Edgar (1991) in criticising the 'cult of the customer', which can lead to:
* Limiting the power of the customer to that of individual preference.
* Homogenising the relationships people have with the outside world.
* Obfuscation of the structural dimensions in individual paying power.
* A gloss of equality where none exists.
* Discrimination between individuals according to their level of payment.

These consequences run contradictory to the ethics and rationale of the traditional public service model, as aspired to in the SCPV of 1990, and the statement of ethical principles/shared values; such is the logical inconsistency of the QOS programme and the actions of police leaders. To put it bluntly, senior officers have themselves opened the doors to a marketization of their profession, and thereby threatened the chance that "need, equity, fairness and altruism" (Farnham and Horton, p241) would remain as the cornerstone of the policing service.

Although it can be argued that consumerism represents a populist form of accountability, it is the case that consumers have no right to be consulted. The promulgation of a 'social market' model (as identified by Savage and Charman, in Leishman et al, 1996, p.51) does not guarantee the enhancement of accountability or democratic governance. In fact, I believe it results in quite the opposite; I agree with Butler’s (ibid) fears that the premise of the social market could herald an inegalitarian and divided (and perhaps divisive) police service.

In conclusion, although police leaders driving the quality movement utilised the consumerist concepts of 'quality' and transplanted these into the sphere of policing, there was not (at the outset) a serious attempt to emulate a business model in the pursuit of quality. However, given the pressure from central government, and the hegemony of private sector philosophies, the consumerist model of quality has increasingly displaced the professional model. While the QOS programme has been successful in raising awareness about a service-oriented style of policing (in the tradition of the public services) one might wonder if this emphasis will continue given the obligation to meet 'economy, efficiency, and effectiveness' and the other dimensions of the new managerialist reform process.
5. Power, Politics and Quality

5.1 The Concept of Power

The concept of power is crucial for the thesis because analysis of the police reforms requires its utilisation, and there are certain implications for the balance of police/public ‘power’ relations which flow from the principle of ‘meeting community expectation’. The power of the state is an important ingredient in the maelstrom of recent police developments and reform: critical questions rest on whether the power of the central state has been augmented by recent events, and how the QOS programme has become embroiled in the politics of reform.

Wrong (1979) distinguishes between "manifest" or "actual power" (where a social actor observably instructs or controls the power subject) and "latent" or "potential" power (where for example, "others carry out the wishes or intentions of the power holder without his ever actually having issued a command to them or even having interacted with them at all to communicate his aims" [ibid p7]). At the same time as highlighting the asymmetry of power relations, he also notes (p10) that there is generally some reciprocity of influence, in that "actors continually alternate the roles of power holder and power subject in the course of their interaction". The asymmetry of the power relations within the tripartite structure
Wrong uses the term "intercursive power" to represent those relations in which there is a balance of power, and in which the power of one party is countervailed by that of the other (p.11). In contrast, "integral power" characterises a situation where one actor monopolises decision-making processes (p.11). It might be argued that vis-a-vis policing, the scopes of state integral power have been widening, and that this process has accelerated with the introduction of the police reforms. Some senior civil servants tended to agree with this, while others disagreed that the central state was gaining more control over police forces. Many senior police officers claimed that the Government was attempting to create a clearly asymmetrical power relation, with the police quite obviously the power subject. Johnston (1992, p.196) notes that the issue of centralization of policing has a long history. Interestingly, he adds that one should not automatically assume the superiority of a localist strategy: the model of a democratically accountable centralist strategy could in fact be more effective in limiting central power (p.198).

Wrong also identifies the "three variable attributes of all power relations" (ibid, p.14) as extensiveness, comprehensiveness, and intensity. The extensiveness of a power relation depends on the ratio of the power holder(s) to power subjects. Comprehensiveness of power concerns the number of 'scopes' in which the power holder can dictate or control the power subject (p.15). Critics of the police reforms (including chief police officers) might suggest that the comprehensiveness of central state power has expanded, although this is not indisputable.

The intensity of a power relation refers to the "range of effective options open to the power holder within each and every scope of the power subject's conduct over which he wields power" (ibid, p.16). For example, a court of law can impose punishment, but the intensity of this punishment will be effectively limited.
Wrong (p17) also cites Simon's (1969) concept of 'zone of acceptance', which (he argues) parallels most closely the intensity of a power relation. It is suggested that the authority of a power holder will be challenged if he or she moves beyond the 'zone of acceptance' in seeking objectives or dictating behaviour. With the police, and its reforms, one can identify the extent to which the comprehensiveness and intensity (or zone of acceptance) of power relations have been questioned by leaders of the police (as the power subjects). These power relations of course include the interaction between the police, the HMIC, the government, the Audit Commission and the Home Office. Thus we can conceptualise a matrix of power relations whose dynamics are still in flux, and which vary according to extensiveness, comprehensiveness and intensity.

Wrong (ibid) identifies sub-categories of authority, namely: Coercive; Induced; Legitimate; Competent; Personal. Wrong (p39) defines authority as "successful ordering or forbidding"; he suggests that legitimate authority represents a power relation where, for example, the power holder has an acknowledged right to command (p49). From Wrong's description, the term 'legitimate authority' would seem to fit closely the type of authority possessed by (or at least used to represent) the police service in relation to many of its power subjects (although not all). In addition, it is generally argued that the HO ultimately has legitimate authority over the Police Service; Reiner (1991a, p.271) notes that his Chief Constables generally accepted the authority of the HO. However, the police reforms have induced a questioning of this authority.

Alderson wrote in 1979:

"Police in superior democratic systems have two sources of authority, one from the law and the other from their reputation. It is an unwise police that begins to feel that its authority lies totally within the law, since this can induce an authoritarian attitude ... superior police, therefore, always aim to achieve their goals by true authority and persuasion." (1979, p12-13)

More recently, the Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Role and Responsibilities of the Police (August 1994) echoed the type of reputational-based authority described by Alderson:

"The police enjoy a high level of public regard and trust in the country. They remain largely unarmed, retain the principle of the minimum use of force, continue to patrol on foot, have strong local ties and encourage community consultation. The British policing tradition is something of which the country can be proud. If there is to be change, therefore, it has to be the right change, carried out in the right way and for the right reasons." (1994, p2)

184
Wrong (ibid, p52) concludes that legitimate authority is more efficient than either coercive or induced authority, as there is less need to watch over power subjects, and to keep at the ready the means of coercion. **Competent authority** (based on the authority of the "expert") tends to "shade into" legitimate authority in the context of professional roles (p56). Wrong suggests that figurehead roles can emerge at the top of the organisation (and we might immediately think of Chief Constables) who symbolise ultimate authority (p57). Competent authority is also used to legitimate power relations and acts as an "idealised exemplar" for authority in general (p59). Taking recent implications of the Quality drive in the police, it becomes clear that certain elements of it apparently encourage the competent authority of the police as a whole to be questioned (at least to a certain extent). A number of senior officers in the research survey and interviews accepted that the police should not have a monopoly on selecting policing objectives. The greater emphasis on responding to "customer" needs and wishes is clearly reflected in the QOS programme, and it is acknowledged by many police managers that the service does not have a body of professional knowledge which can solve all problems.

Personal authority is defined as a 'pure' type, often associated with love, friendship and admiration (p60-61), and as such is less important for the current analysis. However, the personal charisma and leadership qualities of certain key players in the police environment cannot be lightly dismissed.

In distinguishing 'influence' from authority and power, Coxall and Robins (1994) suggest that the first term is useful in that it focuses attention to the "process by which opinions are changed and behaviour altered" (p7). They add that:

"The term 'influence' directs attention to the ways in which collective decisions are moulded by a whole range of individuals and organisations other than - but of course not excluding - the formal authorities." (p7)

Certain individuals (such as Michael Hirst) have been influential in pushing Quality; other individuals and organisations (such as Kate Flannery and the Audit Commission) have also moulded the development of policing. Coxall and Robins (p7) elaborate on the concept of influence by noting that 'pressure' entails the conscious pursuit of influence, often by specific pressure groups (and we might define the Police Federation or ACPO as pressure groups, for example). One of the issues that has been explored is the rising influence of the Audit Commission, and the possible decline in influence (and indeed authority) of the HMIC. This is discussed in chapter 6.
Wrong (ibid p24) notes that the term 'force' refers most commonly to physical (or biological) force. Importantly, Wrong (p27) notes that force is more effective in preventing people acting in certain ways, rather than causing them to behave in a chosen manner. Jefferson (1990) describes the emergence and normalization of paramilitary policing tactics, which clearly are imbued with the philosophy of employing physical force. Such force is used in public disorder situations to prevent 'offenders' pursuing their chosen form of protest, lifestyle or politics. Fielding (1991, p.136) notes, however, that concerns about being tainted by a 'third force' image does tend to restrain the employment of paramilitaristic hardware and techniques, and that the police do not make use of what, technologically, is available.

It is important to note that most police 'forces' no longer refer to themselves as such: we now have for example, the Metropolitan Police 'Service' as opposed to 'Force'. Rather candidly, Alderson wrote in 1979:

"The police are instruments of the legal coercive power of the state to produce effects intended by the legislature... The police represent force as a form of coercive power, and it is regarded as important that it should not be concentrated in the hands of a government or a person... Force can be dangerous for both the user and object, since undue force incites retaliation on a bigger scale and is the genesis of escalation." (1979 p11-13)

As discussed in chapter 2, the 'force' of the police was clearly evidenced in the 1980s, and reached a climax of state repression with the Miners' Strike of 1984/1985. Many senior officers acknowledged that this aspect of the policing function had created problems in terms of attitudes, demeanour of officers and style of policing within their Constabularies.

The work of Max Weber has been important for the thesis. In Weberian theory, the essential feature of the state is its possession of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force (Orum, 1978, p52). As well as this observation, it is important to note the Weberian typology of domination. Firstly, there is domination based on 'traditional' authority; secondly, there is charismatic domination; thirdly (and most importantly for the current analysis) there is 'rational-legal' domination. It will be argued later that the ongoing rationalisation of society forms part of the process by which power increasingly gravitates toward the central state. Orum (ibid, p53) cites Weber (Economy and Society, iii, 1393):

"In a modern state the actual ruler is necessarily and unavoidably the bureaucracy, since power is exercised neither through parliamentary speeches nor monarchical enunciations but through the routines of administration."
Smith (1988, p.43) discusses the power resources of bureaucracies, and notes that the “potential political influence of bureaucracy has long been acknowledged within the liberal state.” He iterates the Weberian assumption that the development of capitalism necessitated the bureaucratization of organisations, and especially those which constituted the administrative apparatus of the state:

“It also required the state to have a technically superior form of organization.... Efficient administration has become more and more indispensable in expanding spheres of state intervention.” (p.44)

Dandeker (1990) assesses the importance of Weberian theory in analysing modernity, power and societal surveillance and highlights Weber’s conception of the ‘iron cage’ of the capitalist bureaucratic order (p.14). I would posit that this iron cage is becoming ever more restrictive and all-encompassing. Given the Weberian assumption that bureaucracy represents a superior form of organisation, Dandeker writes:

"This makes the modern bureaucratic order both indispensable and indestructible. It confines realistic political analysis to questions relating to the control of bureaucracy rather than utopian schemes concerning its destruction." (p.14)

Drawing on the work of Giddens (1985), Dandeker notes (p.2) that bureaucracy within modern societies is “ubiquitous” and without it many aspects of contemporary existence (including internal policing) would be impossible. He adds (p.2) that the massive expansion of personal information held by agencies and organisations is indicative of the pervasiveness of bureaucracy: “The age of bureaucracy is also the era of the information society.”

Staunton (in Baxter and Koffman, 1985) highlights the threat to privacy and civil liberties raised by the increasing police use of information technology/gathering (p.216). She feels that there is poor accountability in relation to this area, but does acknowledge (p.204) that improvements in information collection and retrieval can have clear operational benefits. Lea and Young (in Caffrey and Mundy, 1995, p.268) maintain that one factor in the drift toward ‘military policing’ is the growing use of technology, and data recording, storage and retrieval systems. I would argue that such expansion of surveillance capacity is endemic to the inexorable momentum of state bureaucracy and the state’s need to police its citizens. Importantly, the central state needs to police its own agents of social control, including the police.

Leadbeater (in Hall and Jacques, 1990, p.408) outlines how the role of the state has changed; I agree with
his assertion that the "modern state faces a bewildering range of pressures and demands" and that the state has a strategic role to play in societal development. A state without the means to police (in the widest sense) civic society, and the apparatus of the state itself, cannot hope to play a strategic role in meeting the pressures and demands to which it is exposed.

There is little doubt that the police have also been increasingly subject to bureaucratic, legal-rational domination; this is probably inevitable given the complexity and cost of policing society, and the need for the central state to maintain control. To maintain the situation whereby the "political order permits rational calculation of the consequences of action" (Dandeker, ibid, p.11), the central state is committed to bureaucratic surveillance. The growth of the centrally determined performance indicators and policing objectives bear witness to this process. Butler (in Leishman et al, 1996, p.223) concludes that the 'Policing Plan' can be seen as an instrument to test the limits of operational control over the police.

Thus far, I have suggested that the concept of power is critical for the thesis, in that it informs the discussion of the police reforms and the QOS programme itself. I have also emphasised the need to focus on the role (and power) of the state, and the way in which 'legal-rational' domination becomes manifest in the state's bureaucratic surveillance of civic society, and indeed of its own apparatus (including the police). Allum (1995, p.539-540) presents the analyses of Habermas (1973) in discussing crises of the state. If we accept that such crises "are the result of the contradiction in which the state is enmeshed in advanced capitalism" (Allum, ibid, p.539), then it is meaningful to acknowledge the distinct possibility of a 'rationality crisis' (Allum, ibid, p.539). In order to make rational and effective decisions the central state must enhance its social control and surveillance - in simple terms, the state is bound to become more powerful. The following section of this chapter will explore more deeply the concept of the state.

5.2 The State

There would appear to be few times within the history of the modern police service where debates about its accountability and relationship with the central state have not figured on the agenda. For example, Fielding (1991, p.29) notes the resistance to the idea of an "organised, salaried, full-time police force" in the 1820s. Fielding also draws attention to the growing centralisation of control over the police (ibid, p.102), but notes that centralising developments in the past have centred on those which are technological, rather than fiscal or statutory. With the advent of the recent police reforms, it is increasingly clear that the central state is now also tightening its fiscal and statutory control. This centralisation of 'power' (which shall be dissected further) elicited some impassioned response from senior officers during interview.
Members of ACPO have also reacted strongly within the media.

Held (1984) argues:

"Modern liberal and liberal democratic theory has constantly sought to justify the sovereign power of the state while at the same time justifying limits upon that power... the state must have a monopoly of coercive power in order to provide a secure basis upon which trade, commerce and family life can prosper." (p70-71)

Much debate on the police reforms has rested on the balance between legitimate state authority and its possible over-extension. Brewer et al (1988) explore the relationship between the state, the police and public order. They also conclude that irrespective of the political system or ideological base, all states need to maintain internal order; they propose that it is this "defining activity" which dictates the relationship between the state, public order and the police (p215). Dearlove and Saunders (1991, p.419) remind us that the use of coercion is also the defining feature of the modern state: however, the "propagation of a spirit of consensus in society" is also vital:

"... state agencies are centrally involved in both coercion and legitimation.... the division between 'state' and 'civil society' has become blurred.... Legitimation has been twinned with coercion, for both are today organised and managed by state agencies." (p.420)

These authors outline the Thatcherite emphasis on law-and-order (p.445-446), and define the police as the "hard front line acting as guardians of the social order as a whole" (p.449). As socio-economic conditions falter (as they did in the 1980s) the state must rely on its more coercive agencies such as the police to maintain the social order (p.458). Dearlove and Saunders conclude (p.462) that the government has recognised the danger of relying excessively on legitimation strategies:

"It is for this reason that, within the velvet glove, the iron fist has been recast."

Hall (1984, p19) emphasises the notion of 'state apparatus' (which obviously would include the police) and adds that state apparatuses can "acquire distinctive political and policy characteristics of their own. They can become the power bases for quite distinct interests..." (p20). Much of the current research has sought to juxtapose the interests of the police (and its leaders) with those of the central state.
The "distinct interests" of elements of the state are highlighted less by critical writers such as Scraton (1985, 1987). Sim, Scraton and Gordon (1987, p61) emphasize the consensus between the government, the judiciary and senior police officers in the "mobilization of the law" against political protesters, demonstrators, pickets and "alien" populations. In the same book, Gilroy and Sim (1987, p72) rehearse the arguments of the 'Left' which identify the growth of authoritarian and "neo-liberal" statism:

"The riots of 1981, the 1984-1985 miners' strike, and the Wapping dispute confirmed the centrality of law and policing to contemporary British politics... The Thatcher record on law and order is revealed to be a series of signposts on the road to a police state."

Hall (1984, p27) neatly summarises the Marxist perspective:

"Class interests are stubborn and structural. The power of the state will therefore be monopolized either directly by the dominant classes in society, or harnessed to expand, protect and advance their general interests. Marxist perspectives would see the state as a structural element systematically weighing the balance of advantage towards the general interest of the ruling class".

To this end, the apparatus of the police would be harnessed and mobilized to protect the interests of the 'ruling class'. Quinney (1974, p.95) asserts unequivocally:

"... the role of the state in capitalist society is to defend the interests of the ruling class, and crime control becomes a major device in that defence.... A dominant economic class is able by means of the state to advance its own interests.... The directly coercive forces of the state, at home and abroad, are the police and the military."

It might be argued that the recent police reforms of the Conservative government, in stressing the paramount importance of 'fighting crime', are aimed predominantly at defending the position of the 'ruling class'. The state apparatus is utilised in naked class domination. Weber, however, dismisses such analysis; as Orum (ibid, p53) indicates:

"...the state does not represent an instrument of oppression to be wielded by a particular class or status group. Rather, it is an arena of constant conflict and involves the representatives of a variety of different status groups. In addition, it also represents an arena that can involve conflict among the separate agencies of the state."
The research, inductively, tends to substantiate this Weberian analysis. What has been fascinating to identify is the extent to which police leaders perceive themselves as instruments of the state, and the extent to which they accept or reject the predominant ideologies and policies of the government and the Home Office.

I would suggest that with QOS the police have tried to de-emphasise their repressive and coercive image, and indeed have attempted to distance themselves from the tough law-and-order policies and rhetoric of the (ruling class) Conservative government. Although the police are key agents of social control, I think it too simplistic to assume that they embrace unwittingly, and without question, the crime control imperatives which Quinney (1974), and Loveday (in Leishman et al, 1996), identify.

Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) systematically develop three "images" of the state, in conjunction with five theories of the state. The three images are Cipher, Guardian and Partisan. The five theories are Pluralism, New Right, Elite theory, Marxism and Neo-pluralism.

In the context of this research (with its underlying premise of 'conflictual' rather than 'consensual' interaction) elite theory offers certain attractions because of its emphasis on strong behaviourist research methodology, and its emphasis on power, organisation and compliance (see chapter 4 of Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1987). The images of the state appear to vary in relevance according to the eye of the beholder. Senior police officers interviewed tended to view the police (as a state apparatus) as conforming to the Guardian image. Several of the Home Office officials appeared to perceive their role as conforming to the Cipher image. I personally would view the actions of government (as a specific part of the state) as reflecting the Partisan image.

According to Dunleavy and O'Leary, a passive cipher state provides what is required of it by the dominant groups in society, and can be regarded as "nonentity or a pawn" (p11). Cipher models stress that ultimate power lies with the groups in civil society. Some HOPD officials appeared to hold this view of the state. The state in the guardian image can balance the forces in society in the light of "longer term or general interest" (ibid, p12): some officials gave the impression that they valued a guardian image, in that the role of the police department has been to act as arbiter, and to maintain good working relations with the Service (and other groups) for the common good of the policing function in society. Some officials were concerned that the delicate balance within the tripartite structure was threatened by government actions. Interviews and 'rumour' within policing circles have suggested that officials in the Home Office
have been increasingly disempowered by Ministers, who have sought to use more overtly the state machinery of the police department (and Police Authorities) for partisan purposes.

The partisan image suggests that, in the main, the goals of state officials are pursued, while simultaneously incorporating the interests of other parties whose co-operation is needed (ibid, p11). I propose that the 'cipher' model of the state seems the least plausible given the current political scenario. The police reforms have indicated a growth of state power, rather than a decline. In the guardian model, the state is strong, but in an environment where other "social forces" (p333) are comparatively weak. The partisan model could seem most plausible for the current analysis, but there are certain difficulties with this model. With a partisan model, the state is seen as powerful:

"Partisan approaches take an altogether more pessimistic view. A strong state is needed to cope with intractable policy-making problems. Decision-makers are typically pushed to the limits of available policy technologies...." (ibid, p333) 

The three images of the state are 'ideal types'; none is perfect, and can only be analytic approximations to social reality. Although it is not suggested here that every state intervention and decision (or non-decision) is driven by self-interest, the actions of the government (as one element of the state) do appear to be forging ever stronger state mechanisms which act to bolster and promulgate their policies, ideologies and power. This perception was also shared by many senior police respondents.

Power of the state

Schwarzmantel (1993, p1) asserts that the terms “power” and “the state” are essential in defining the idea of politics. Additionally, the varied elements of the state need not be "in harmony" (p4). He suggests that the military or the bureaucracy can use their sectional powers to impede government initiatives. In analysing the power of the state, it is dangerous to assume that power will be exercised in a monolithic and coherent fashion. What we are particularly interested in here is the 'power balance' (or imbalance) between elements of the state apparatus, rather than power over the remainder of civil society. In relation to the power of the state, Schwarzmantel notes:

"the continued growth and centralisation of state power. If one sees the state in terms of a specialised apparatus of domination, then the history of modern times has been marked by the extension of its scale and grip. The modern state requires an increasingly complex bureaucracy dealing with a
mounting variety of tasks. It needs larger and more sophisticated armed forces, more regulative welfare agencies, and engages in a wider range of activities than was the case before." (ibid, p6)

The police reforms encapsulate the expansion of central state bureaucracy and control.

Smith (1988, p.43) argues that one of the contradictions of the liberal state is that "capitalism has required rational administration and greater state intervention" (p.43). He adds (p.45) that the analytic techniques which can be utilised by modern state bureaucracies have become increasingly sophisticated, and notes (p.46) the problem of excessive bureaucratic power for modern democracy. In discussing the growth of state intervention in the second half of the twentieth century, he suggests that the model of a corporatist capitalist state might more logically replace a pluralist model (p.52). One dimension of a corporatist bureaucracy is centralisation, or "the domination of a given sector by a single agency". (p.62)

Navari (1991) disagrees (as I do) that the state will necessarily wither away, and argues that there is a distinct "logic" of the state, as well as interests which are state interests, rather than social interests (p.147). Navari also makes the following points: one should not assume that 'less' states are weaker states, or less "statist" (p.150); the setting of standards by central authorities, and "arbitration and surveillance" also serve and enhance the state (p.151). This point is especially relevant in the context of national police objectives and PIs; the creation of adversarial relations can enhance state power, as long as 'winners' are created (we might think immediately of the new national police funding formula). The winners rely on the state for protection of their gain, while the losers also become dependent on the state to alter the arrangements (p.152). Navari concludes:

"In our subjective age, the state is the only authoritative allocator of value, and government the only authoritative standard setter. Who else will monitor, intervene, redistribute, cajole, convince and enforce, besides setting standards?" (ibid, p.162)

Dandeker (ibid, p.10) writes:

"... the modern state is a rational structure of domination and surveillance, in that it comprises a relationship between leaders and led that is mediated by bureaucracy.... The bureaucracy is charged with implementing [... ] legal norms over the state's territory and population. This activity involves a permanent and continuous exercise of surveillance."

193
More specifically, Dearlove and Saunders (1991, p.482) note how local government has been subject to
domination by central government through an increase in “the intensity and strength of its interventions
through the development of a number of strategies of control.” They note too (p.483) the government’s
attacks on local authority spending, and the ensuing struggle between the centre and local authorities (p.485).
Lustgarten (1986, p.100) identifies the “ever-strengthening centripetal force - the steady accretion of power
to the centre” when discussing the relationship between central government and provincial policing. He
notes too that the feature of British politics, with its informality and “quiet words in ears” (p.100) resulted
in the centralising tendencies being imperfectly reflected in statute. Times have changed, however, and with
the recent reforms the centralisation of power, and its formalisation, have been made much more overt. We
could, of course, regard this as much more desirable than the old style of covert governance which Lustgarten
presents.

Lustgarten (p.104), laments the inflexibility of centrally-imposed uniformity, but I believe that this is
inevitable given the need for the central state to maintain and extend its authority. The ‘logic of the state’
is invoked when Dearlove and Saunders (1991) conclude:

“... all central governments always have an interest in trying to reduce local authorities to agents of
the centre, but all of them also face the problem of confronting interests outside of the centre that see
in the tradition of local democracy a basis for autonomy and challenge.” (p.488)

Jessop (1992) notes that a "redrawing of state boundaries" (p32) does not translate into a weakening of
the state; in fact the opposite is true. Although the government has rolled back the frontier of the Fordist
state (p28), it has rolled forward new forms of state intervention (p28). Jessop notes that in post-Fordist
society, a key role has been given to financial controls, value-for-money, good management practice and
market proxies (p32-33), that power has tended to concentrate in Whitehall (p33), and that residual welfare
activities are overseen increasingly by a "centrist, executive power" (p33). The post-Fordist momentum
has clearly impacted on police organisation.

Dearlove and Saunders (1991, p367) highlight the government's promotion of the market, and the state's role
in ensuring that the condition under which "free choice" can occur. Paralleling this, there was a:

"new authoritarian ideology which stressed the need for a strong state which would stand up to
Britain's enemies abroad and at home (by strengthening the police force, imposing stiffer
sentences through the courts, and confronting the power of 'anti-social' elements in British society -
Gamble (1994) also discusses the 'free economy, strong state' thesis, and notes (p4) that one of the three overriding objectives of Thatcherism as a political project was to "create the conditions for a free economy by limiting the scope of the state while restoring its authority and competence to act." Part of making the state strong has been focusing on 'law and order'. Gamble recalls how "strengthening the police and restoring public order" were key themes in the electoral campaign of 1979 (p241). Gamble also cites the Criminal Justice Act (1982), PACE (1984), and the Public order Act (1986) as evidence of increasing state strength in the area of law and order. Gamble continues:

"Coordination between police forces, as in the miners' strike of 1984-5, was organised through the National Reporting Centre, which looked like the organisational base for a future national police force. This trend was strengthened by the attempts by some local police authorities to make their police forces more accountable. In this as in so many areas, however, the government, while encouraging chief constables to assert their independence, was reluctant to take the final step and formally organise the police as a national force." (ibid, p241-242)

Given some of the recent development (or proposed reforms) in the policing agenda one might conclude that the "independence" of Chief Constables is now being discouraged, and that there is far greater willingness to accept the idea of a more centrally directed and standardised police service by state officials and the government. In 1991, Dearlove and Saunders (p.231) concluded that chief constables occupied positions of "immense power and influence". I would argue that their power is on the decline, and that the central state (and its burgeoning bureaucratic control) will increasingly dictate operational and strategic direction.

In 1986, Lustgarten (ibid, p.105) argued that while the Home Office exercised considerable influence over the police, it did so without threatening the independence of chief constables. One of his civil servant respondents suggested that it would be a sad day when a chief could not tell the Home Office to "get lost". This day has now arrived: given the emphasis on performance management and the general tightening up of police governance, no chief can realistically tell the Home Office to "get lost". There may be continuing conflict and tension between police leaders and the central state, but the former must pay increasing attention to the directives of the latter. In an editorial of 'Policing Today' (volume 1, issue 2, 1994) entitled "Honouring our roots", the local/national policing tensions are discussed, and the danger of excessive centralism highlighted:
"There are now over-arching national policing objectives set by the Home Secretary. Even our own Association battles with the same local/national tensions, our schizophrenic whole trying to transcend the sum of our 43 parts. We are justifiably excited when we coalesce into a powerful lobby, pressing our corporate professional view, and then immediately - and wisely - express concern lest we become too corporate for the health of the nation."

Coxall and Robins (1994, p454) conclude that "there have been clear trends towards the creation of a more national force", even though policing is still organised on a local basis. This centralism, or rationalism, of the policing function appears inevitable given the areas in which the state must be strong; that is, in which there is greater "rolling forward" of state boundaries and intervention. Lustgarten (ibid, p.177-178) debates the local-central balance in governance, and notes that the disadvantages of centralism include excessively long chains of command, unnecessary administrative costs, and reduced responsiveness to local needs and wishes. On the other hand, centralism benefits co-ordination and uniformity of services, and can in fact “compensate for local inequalities in the service or opportunities available to individuals in different areas” (p.178). Few senior police leaders have embraced the possible advantages of centralism, and most (if not all) have supported the point made by Lustgarten that it is dangerous to concentrate power over a service at any one level of government (ibid, p.178). Lustgarten argues that the wholly elected police authority “should exercise the full scope of legitimate control”, and comments:

“The Home Office is the Ministry of Repression. Its entire orientation, reflecting its historical succession to the prerogative power of maintaining the Sovereign Peace, is towards order and restriction. Prisons, subversion, official secrets, Sunday trading, drugs, civil defence and the admission of aliens all comprise a disparate catalogue whose sole common feature is that they involve prohibitions or strict controls.”

Lustgarten suggests that the “cold dead hand” of the HO should be removed from policing; it is now clear to us in the 1990s that the cold, dead hand of the HO has tightened its grip around the throat of the service.

The power of the central state over the police has augmented in terms of its comprehensiveness and intensity. From the point of view of many police leaders, however, the legitimate authority of the central state has not increased; the latter relies more on coercive authority in shaping the police service, with some element of inducive authority (such as potentially rewarding chief constables who meet objectives set by the central state). There would appear to be few police leaders who regard the central state as having
competent authority. We shall now explore some of the concepts discussed above using the views of research respondents.

**Police Perception of the state and state power**

Reiner (1991a, p.271) concludes that the authority of the Home Office was largely accepted by the Chief Officers he interviewed, but did note (p.276) that its power to direct policy was sometimes resented. Reiner notes too (p.264) the perceived arguments against a nationally organised (and centralised) police service.

A high proportion of senior police officers in my sample voiced concerns about the growth of central state power, and the 1993 White Paper in particular. One Chief Superintendent agreed that policing would be taken out of local control with the White Paper proposals:

"*Oh yes, without a doubt. It's more toward a much tighter control by the Home Secretary... it's seen as a very crude measure, you know, to actually take the control of police authorities away from local government and put it closely in the centre...*" (interview 051 11.11.93 TC 065)

Another Chief Superintendent thought that the White Paper, national policing objectives and the growing emphasis on crime would significantly alter the police role (interview 059 11.11.93 TC 010). He felt that the national objectives were untenable, and that politically they would become a liability (TC 065). He also agreed that the government was gaining more power over the police, but at the same time was shifting any potential blame out to individual forces, with regard to performance (TC 090). It was felt that there was an increasing danger of the police becoming an instrument of the State, and that one major reason for this was the frustration of government being stymied (in that the government needs to secure the co-operation of 43 chief constables on policy):

*I have no evidence to say that. But certainly in talking to people in 'high places' there is a perception that there is a certain frustration in the Home Office*. (TC 480)

This view was echoed in the words of one ACC who had "no doubt" about the creeping centralisation of power, and suggested that Kenneth Clarke had become "fed up" going to international meetings (such as TREFI) and being unable to make commitments for the Service (interview 080 22.3.94 TC 515). He had been told by informed sources that Sheehy had been instigated because of this frustration. This particular research interview was dominated by views on the central state, and the respondent was
dismayed by the "arrogant" and "illegal" behaviour of the government (TC 542) which refused to heed the advice of civil servants (TC 172). He had recently had close contact with state officials and said:

"...the closer you get, the higher the smell, shall we say." (TC181)

Top civil servants were dismissed as sycophantic and arrogant; those who had 'stood up' up to Ministers (like Clive Whitmore and Margaret Clayton) were subsequently obliged to move from their positions (TC 747). The respondent believed there are Conservative "patricians" such as Hurd and Heseltine, but "revolutionaries" and "interventionists" like Clarke, Howard and Portillo (TC 690). Moreover, there are "idiots" like Gummer who believe it necessary to be in a "perpetual Thatcherite revolution"; these people are "mad" (TC 703).

This ACC agreed that ACPO was becoming increasingly powerful, with certain chief officers 'coming to the fore'. It was also felt that the old tripartite structure had worked "fairly well", with "nice checks and balances". It was added:

"and the Home Office, where it had responsibility really didn't want to exercise it much, it was half asleep most of the time... you know, you could trust it not to want to take more power than it actually had to.... the Home Office ministers, through the Home Office, are wanting to be more and more prescriptive, more and more centralising and controlling, and therefore ACPO's to be more and more powerful and relevant to provide an adequate method of thwarting that. The extent to which it will be successful remains to be seen. I mean, one can only hope for a fall of this government and an influx of a more temperate, less arrogant bunch of ministers." (TC 627-685)

A much more aggressive stance toward the government would be difficult to find in a police officer! This extract provides a neat illustration of the conflict between status groups. It also reflects Lustgarten's point that the tripartite structure depended upon a degree of consensus and reasonableness between the parties involved (ibid, p.113). Importantly, Lustgarten suggests that the traditional tripartite arrangement cannot easily sustain the "heavy weight of conflict". I would suggest that this is still the case, and predict ongoing difficulties between the three elements.

One Chief Superintendent thought that Clarke had managed to centralise power "within a veil of decentralisation" (interview 039 25.8.93 TC 452), and wondered how QUANGO-ish the police would become (TC 464). This respondent questioned, however, why the government would wish to "de-stabilise"
and control the police, unless it feared "something horrible" like a coup d'état (TC 473). It was suggested that the lost battle against crime has also stimulated greater government intervention:

"I think we failed to give the government what they thought they were going to get" (TC 540)

This reasoning for greater central control was put forward by several other respondents. Dearlove and Saunders (ibid, p.453) also recalls the apparent failure of the police to combat crime.

Another chief superintendent (interview 040 25.8.93) talked at some length on power, policing and the role of the state. He identified the Miners' strike as a crucial period, when attitudes inside and outside the Service altered radically. In addition;

"It actually showed us to be quite a potent force, and I think that scared some people... both inside and outside the organisation..." (TC 100)

He now questioned the forceful and repressive policing of the Strike, and added that he joined in the Dixon of Dock Green era:

"I did and I still actually firmly believe that my role is to redress the balances of inequality in society. I represent those who are perhaps the less able to defend themselves... I actually see that as a key role as a police officer, a sort of guardian of the weak, I suppose to put in very basic terms." (TC 109-145)

One DCC firmly agreed that the White Paper heralded excessive centralism:

"Yes I do... when somebody comes to write the history of the police service in 50 years time, they will find that between 1960 and the end of this century, there has been an absolutely irresistible movement towards central control. And there have been high spots along the way, like 114 of '83... Yes, I see this White Paper as a totally inevitable, chronological development. It was inevitably going to go that way, that this government was never going to allow something as expensive and sensitive as policing to remain in the hands of local government." (interview 066 13.12.93 TC 605/680)

This respondent added that the government had "captured" health and education, and would do the same with the police. Leishman, Cope and Starie (in Leishman et al, 1996, p.20) remind us that the centralisation
of policing must be understood against a backdrop of centralisation of local government. They note too the developments which have led to "creeping centralisation" of policing, including the commissioning of PNC, the National Reporting Centre, NCIS and the growing impact of HO circulars.

In his second interview in 1995 (interview 095, 23.2.95) the DCC again stressed the "inexorable rise" of central government influence, and expressed concern about the composition of the new police authorities. Newburn and Jones (1996, p.125) note the suspicion that the appointment of 'independent' members of the PA may actually undermine the concept of local accountability, and suggest that there is evidence of targeting of candidates (who may be more sympathetic to the aims of the Home Secretary). Looking to the future, the DCC above thought there would be fewer forces, and envisaged the role of the HMIC becoming more prescriptive (TC 034).

One Chief (interview 032 2.8.93) had 'real reservations' about the centralism inherent in the White Paper and the national policing objectives, and thought that there were serious constitutional problems:

"... if you have new police authorities with paid chairmen, they will exercise considerable control over chief constables... We are better separated from the executive.." (TC 126/141)

In this chief's follow up interview in August 1994, he felt that the police service was exposed to greater danger than in 1993:

"I think it's more threatened this year than it was last year... I think that the problems of Sheehy blinded us, chief officers and others, to the real problem of the Police and Magistrates Court Act... that's where the Home Office have now gained a tremendous foothold in the Police Service - much stronger than they ever were before." (interview 090 23.8.94 TC 350 -359)

He believed that the new PAs were another "instrument" through which the HO could control policing (TC 362), and noted the danger that chief constables could become employees rather than constitutional officers (with performance related contracts). Rather than Sheehy, he thought that the Police Bill was the 'dangerous one'.

On being asked if the stance of the government threatened the Service's professionalism, one Chief replied:
"Well, if professionalism means that you have your own independence, your own ethical independence, and that you have your own work standards, directed, generated, developed, by your organisation then yes it does. Quite clearly the proposals attack the professionalism, because they attack the independence of the police... and the proposals, particularly the White Paper proposals, will see us more closely driven to do that which a senior politician wants us to do."

(interview 054 9.11.93 TC 334-344)

Newburn and Jones (1996, p.130) conclude that there has recently been a move away from political forms of accountability, towards a more financial and managerial emphasis, which they refer to as a "contractual and calculative" mode:

"This still allows the doctrine of constabulary independence to remain apparently unchanged, whilst imposing a large variety of specific constraints on the degree to which that independence is likely to be utilized."

One Superintendent, with considerable involvement in national policing issues, was asked if there had been a centralisation of power in the last two or three years:

"There has been an increase in centralisation in one sense. There are a lot more things that are agreed and done in the Home Office. The Home Office certainly has a mind set which feels that it can, in a great many areas, say 'Go and do', and the Police Service will do... And if you look at the way in which policing plans have been approached, there is a very considerable resistance to national objectives, because police forces do not perceive it as legitimate for the Home Secretary to set detailed objectives for local policing..." (interview 098 7.4.95 TC 604/802)

This comment illustrates how the legitimate authority of the HO is currently questioned by police leaders. This superintendent added that the Police regard as legitimate 'broad guidelines' for policing (we might say of lower intensity in power terms) but the detail of the national objectives (high in perceived intensity) are "bitterly resisted" (TC 832). The way that objectives and policing plans have been imposed is regarded by most police leaders as "illegitimate" (TC 840).

A leading member of the QOS committee (interview 092 7.9.94) noted the gradual realisation by the police leaders that there was a clear intention to "manage police performance from the centre" (TC 053); this represents a 'totally new constitutional position' (TC 060). Some officers were rather less surprised or
perturbed by the growth in centralism and the reforms. One Chief Superintendent said of the White Paper: "A lot of that's wafted over me." (interview 048 27.10.93 TC 144). When asked if the government was trying to wield excessive power over the government, he replied in a somewhat resigned manner:

"... Yeh that is a concern, is that the local autonomy's gone, but they've been doing it for ages, haven't they? They've been driving... it's just another step down the road, isn't it, of central control. They control the army, and that hasn't really caused any problem has it? ... I don't get paranoid about these things..." (TC 171/185)

Brogden et al (1988, p.71-73) outline the trends in this century toward the centralization of policing, punctuated by such things as the 1919 Police Act, the setting up of the Police Staff College, and the 1946 Police Act. The recent reforms are but another stage in this centralizing trend. Newburn and Jones (1996, p.130) conclude that there has been a greater concentration of power at the centre.

One DCC was quite certain that any future force amalgamations would make little difference to the service, as the government has control already (interview 038 23.8.93 TC 233). In relation to the public disorder policing of the 1980s, he said:

"I believe we were taken down that road by central government. This notion of having an independent police force accountable to the law is flawed in my opinion. I believe we are centrally controlled, have been for years, that we are a national police force and that there are 43 titular heads around the country as a sop to local democracy. Now that's a pretty radical statement, but I believe it's correct. If it wasn't correct, we wouldn't have gone into the minefields. If it wasn't correct we wouldn't have gone into policing such things as major sporting events, like football, in the way that we have, because we've been centrally driven on those issues. If it wasn't, we wouldn't have been into community activity as much as we have, because there isn't the will on the ground to be in community activity. The will on the ground is there to nick people, feel collars and lock the bad buggers up, because that's what people joined to do, the majority of them anyway." (TC 227-240)

In other words, the natural inclination of most officers is to embrace an 'enforcement' model of policing, rather than a 'service' or 'community' model as identified by Fielding (1996). It is interesting to note that this officer implies that the police service would not have pursued a service/community orientation without the push from the centre; this is a relatively uncommon view amongst police leaders. This officer also stated that he had become increasingly aware of the government's influence as he passed through the ranks.
Reiner (1991a, p.266-267) also notes that as prospective chiefs move up the hierarchy they become increasingly oriented towards the HO:

"The Home Office, to which so many ambitious men owe so much of their careers, will clearly be a potent influence over them."

We might suggest there is almost a sort of 'love/hate' relationship between the HO and police leaders: the latter need the former, but often resent the hold that the HO has over their lives (and forces). The DCC cited above said later:

"I still feel that Sheehy has been a very, very cunning political ploy. I think it's been written under the guidance of government. I think it's been introduced at the time which is just right - I think Sheehy is the smokescreen to concentrate everybody's fury on, whilst the White Paper actually goes through... there's the biggest mischief. There lies real central control..." (TC 165)

One Detective Chief Superintendent had a somewhat uncommon view of Sheehy, in that he openly acknowledged its inevitability:

"... we laid ourselves open for it by our, by our actions, by our culture, we laid ourselves open for it. The Police Officer could not provide the product that the Criminal Justice System and public wanted, (ie) an honest fair treatment of individuals...or detection of their offences... My initial reaction to Sheehy was we don't deserve this, I mean, and I do think he was a hatchet man who was just put in by the government.... but now, I do think we do deserve it... we opened the door for people like Sheehy, if it hadn't been Sheehy it would have been somebody else." (interview 072 24.1.94 TC 445/530)

The questionnaire to Chief Inspectors and Superintendent included an item on perceived influence of agencies over the police. On a scale of 1 to 7 (1 for 'too little' and 7 for 'too much' influence), central government received a relatively high score of 5.25 (standard deviation 1.32). Local government, by comparison, received a score of 3.90 out of 7 (standard deviation 1.07) and Police Authorities a mean score of 3.85 (standard deviation 0.93). Politicians received quite a high score of 5.01 (standard deviation 1.20).

In sum, the interviews and survey data clearly confirmed the type of concerns about the centralisation of
policing, and excessive HO influence, identified by writers such as Reiner (1991a). It became obvious during the research that most senior police leaders feared (or resented) the encroachment by the central state agencies, although there was clear acknowledgement that the pattern of centralisation was already evident.

The View of Police Department Officials

As one might anticipate, the views of HO officials about the 'scopes' and 'zones of acceptance' in the power relation were mostly different from those of senior police officers. Although respondents were sometimes reticent to discuss certain issues during interview, there was some indication of frustration with the behaviour and/or attitudes of government.

Leishman, Cope and Starie (in Leishman et al, 1996, p.21) argue that the restructuring of the police has involved both centralisation and decentralisation. In theory, they note, chief constables have more freedom to manage their forces. Additionally, local policing plans are now derived by the Police Authorities in conjunction with their chief officers. They conclude:

"Steering the police is increasingly centralized, whereas rowing the police is increasingly decentralized." (p.21)

One head of division (interview 060 26.11.93) disagreed that there was a drift to a national police force, and felt that centralisation of certain functions or services does not necessarily run counter to the devolution of power (TC 347):

"... there are some things which relatively small police forces can't do effectively .... there's always been a central element in policing." (TC 384/352)

He had also stated:

"... for us to decide what the police service needs centrally is always a dangerous, a dangerous business. We don't know precisely what the police service wants. If the things which we were doing were centralised in a police body you would be a lot nearer having a centralised police force. You'd need a considerable central staff." (TC 277/340)

Another head of division suggested that the reform program was more 'fundamental than might appear
to those outside' (interview 087 21.7.94 TC 026), and thought that was why the Service had been "stirred up" (TC 030). The Police "rightly" see the reforms as a "direct intervention" (TC 031). The respondent agreed that for the first time the Home Secretary (one of the stakeholders) was saying 'This is what I'd like to see' (TC 038). It was felt, however, that the police were wrong in being "so upset" by the reforms, although it was understandable (TC 040). According to this official, the Home Secretary (and the public) have a right to dictate more to the Service (TC 042). This head of division was asked why the 'Posen Inquiry' had been undertaken:

"It's the absolute realisation that the police are over-burdened, and in that sense a response, a drive here for looking for ways that we can help that..." (TC 418)

It was felt that ACPO were not being "enormously straight" about the review of tasks, and that the Posen inquiry was more modest than it appeared to some (TC 448). In relation to the notion of power drifting to the centre, the respondent replied:

"I genuinely don't think that it is the case actually... but crucial in that is the role of the new Police Authorities... Genuinely I don't think there's a desire either in officials or ministers for the centre to get stronger. It is just for the management and the stakeholders to be stronger, and to exert more of an influence." (TC 606-618)

It was added, however, that any potential centralisation of power would be halted by the strengthening role of the PAs. The "thrust" of the reforms was the greater influence of the stakeholders (TC 630), including the independent members of the PA. This respondent would seem to reject the model that the central state is seeking to enhance its 'integral power', and would rather suggest that the 'intercursive' power relation is being strengthened by involvement of stakeholders in the tripartite structure.

Dearlove and Saunders (ibid, p.203) note the New Right critique of civil servants who were regarded as having a vested interest in maximising public sector spending and extending the role of the state. They argue too that Margaret Thatcher successfully asserted tighter political control over the Civil Service. The Civil Service has declined in numbers, and improving efficiency has dominated the agenda (p.205). Dearlove and Saunders (p.201-202) identify the still powerful resources and influence of senior civil servants. One head of division was asked if the police department were the 'political masters' of the Service:

"No, I mean, I think when push comes to shove, I mean I suppose we have the ultimate sort of legal

205
weapon in the sense that we can make legislation which changes the law, but its rarely legislation which actually affects, as it were, the operational priorities of the police..." (interview 057 10.11.93 TC 319)

The idea was rejected that chief constables were subject to operational guidance (TC 30). He commented on the position of the department:

"Well I think it's a moot point that we, in a sense, we serve the interests of the Police Service and Ministers in somewhat equal proportion ... it's sort of, it's one of the curious sort of Janus-like positions that we have to adopt." (TC 340)

When asked if there had recently been an excessive drift of power over the Police, the official said:

"I think it will be necessary to see how the reform package works in practice to make a judgement... the rationale of the, of the reform package is that there should be more independence and flexibility 'out there' in police authorities and police forces about things which traditionally, in the past, the Home Office has had their finger on, such as staffing and money. So that is a clear shift of powers, you know, if you want to use the word power, to the outside. On the other hand the corollary of that is there should be more accountability ... how the balance sort of works I think is something we'll have to see. I don't think it's intended to alter the balance of power, I think it's intended to alter the relationship to one that is a more sensible one, one that is more efficient, but I don't think it's really about a shift of power..." (TC 381-408)

Another official was rather wary during interview, and hesitant to say anything on tape which appeared critical of the government (interview 064 29.11.93). This respondent was asked if his division spoke through the Ministers, or vice versa:

"Our role is to advise ministers as to the policies we think they should adopt. It's for them to make the decision, and it's then for us to implement it, whether that decision is the one which we would have originally recommended or not. So in that sense we, we implement. We certainly tell them what we think..." (TC 315)

Dearlove and Saunders (ibid, p.198) identify the orthodox perspective on the power of civil servants who are deemed to be “anonymous, permanent and politically neutral, and serve with equal loyalty and duly elected government of the day...”. The respondent was asked to comment on the 'tone' within the police
"I think ministers have a very clear agenda of what they want, what they regard as their priorities. Value-for-money and efficiency in terms of what the Police Service deliver from the resources which they are given." (TC 612)

One very senior official within the department disagreed that senior civil servants regard themselves as 'masters' of the police, but qualified this judgement by suggesting that often the Service itself has no particular views on policy:

"... and therefore the Home Office finds itself initiating the debate." (interview 089 9.8.94 TC 277)

This official found it 'quite surprising' how reactive the Service has been, but nevertheless detected a change in that the Police Service is becoming more active in proposing policy (TC 334). It was agreed that there was a centralising tendency with the national objectives, and indeed that this presents a dilemma given the local nature of policing (TC 560). However, no "expansionist tendency" could be detected (TC 593). It was thought possible that the influence of the police department could decrease, rather than increase (TC 604). In what could seem a contradictory manner, the official suggested that in the past, the HO had relied more on "indirect influence". This influence rested on the publication of circulars, and guidance and encouragements (TC 037). However, one could now say that influence was more direct (TC 050).

Lustgarten (1986, p.105) identifies the considerable influence of the HO Circulars, but notes that the independence of the chief constables was not directly infringed by the Home Office. Perhaps the respondent above was suggesting that the scope of authority was declining, but the intensity of influence was increasing. It was felt that the previous Home Secretary (Clarke) had a 'clear view of what he wanted' (TC 730), and that the White Paper expressed those views. However, this official felt there was "nothing revolutionary" in the recent changes:

"It seems to me that the Police reform proposals were pretty modest. You know, they didn't change the tri-partite structure... they changed the balance a bit..." (TC 789)

He stressed that there was a deep commitment within the department to the tripartite system (TC 086). Another senior official defined the role of F1, which is to:

207
"... encourage much greater devolution of management responsibility, financial and management... from the police authority, to the Chief Constable, from the Chief Constable down... very much in line with the Audit Commission's recommendation..." (interview 084 3.5.94 TC 058)

It was felt that Michael Howard had "loyally" carried forward the policy stimulated by his predecessor (TC 320), and that he had also injected his own key interests of developing the partnership between the public and the police (TC 325). This official 'sympathised' with Howard's views. It was then stated:

"Inevitably, I think there are a range of factors which probably over a number of years contributed to increasing influence on the part of the Home Office, some of it very much sought by the Police themselves. It is quite complex though. There's a tremendous drive to have standards promulgated centrally, and there isn't a central police organisation and so you get the Home Office into that business. Over the last decade or so, there is, frankly, more of a tendency for the police to look for guidance to the Home Office, so they don't want to be criticised for what they're doing, in their behaviour. And it's this great amalgam of things which I think makes it inevitable that, if one looks back, say to the time of the last Police Act of 1964, we're 30 years on. Yes, I think it's probably true that all these have been forces that are bound to strengthen the Home Office in default of the Police themselves having set up a very strong central body of their own." (TC 372/421-443)

This extract is replete with the logic of a centralising bureaucratic momentum. This official also acknowledged the growing influence of ACPO (TC 447), and then referred to the process of devolution:

"The government, I think, genuinely would like to devolve the running of services away from itself and down there, whether it's the NHS... or be it the police." (TC 455)

The idea that the 'reins of power' were being hauled in to the centre was scoffed at:

"Oh, well I can exonerate my, I can certainly exonerate my Home Office official colleagues of that. Never have I seen more reluctant 'gatherers-in' of power. That has certainly not been a conscious policy, being pursued either by officials or Home Secretaries over decades... individual Home Secretaries might have rather different views, but it's certainly not been a conscious policy." (TC 481-492)

I would suggest that the logic of the central state, and the need for the growth of bureaucratic surveillance,
overarches any individualised or ‘conscious’ decision (or non-decision). In order to substantiate this assertion, it is necessary to invoke a ‘systems’ model of policy and social action. Carson (in Rock and McIntosh, 1974, p.77) notes that there may be laws passed which apparently do not favour powerful interests (and we can define the central state agencies as a ‘powerful’ interest). Carson refers to criminal law: “the emergence of which would not, on the face of it, seem to have any immediate bearing upon dominant interests or prevailing ideologies” (p.76). Carson notes too that apparently humanitarian and altruistic acts (such as those improving working conditions in factories) ultimately prove to be of benefit at a higher ‘systemic’ level. That is, a system of existing social (or power) relations becomes the beneficiary of particular individual or group acts. In the case of factory health legislation, the capitalistic system of manufacturing ultimately benefits from healthier workers. Dominant interests and prevailing ideologies are often serviced by policy or law which would seem not immediately partisan. In a similar way, even if the conscious perception and actions of state officials would appear not to reinforce the dominant ideologies and interests of an increasingly powerful central state, I would argue that systematically, the surveillance requirement of the central state are ultimately served by the recent police reforms. The apparent devolutionary actions and rhetoric of state officials and ministers in fact obscure and enhance the interests of dominant ideologies and the ‘system’ of central/local accountability which increasingly favours the centralised power bloc. Officials may not consciously perceive or deem their actions to be conducted in the pursuit of centralised power, but the consequence at a broader sociological level is that the setting of objectives and the use of ‘policing plans’ (for example) do enhance the ideological standpoint of the central state elite and effectively centralise power over the police apparatus.

It is useful to conceptualise the decisions (or non-decisions) of senior officials and ministers as the ‘spirals’ within the linear tube of time (an image which was presented in chapter 1). Social actions may adopt a spiral form, and appear at first to contradict the dominant ideologies in that segment of historical development - nevertheless these ‘spiral’ actions are conducted within the tube of social and historical forces which inexorably constrain the direction (and latitude) of those actions. Policy decisions, such as allowing chief constables to determine force establishment, are ultimately made within a restricted policy context, and are ones which do not threaten the dominant systemic or structural features (such as relations of power). With such a systemic ‘tube’ model, the range of policy options are limited by the parameters of dominant social structures and ideology.

Layder (1994, p.207) exposes the myth of the split between individual and society and notes that most figures within sociological thought “have understood individuals and society to be intertwined and inextricably fused.” However, a major area of sociological debate has been the extent to which individual
action is free of social constraint. I would agree with Layder’s assertion (p.209) that individuals are “capable of both creatively resisting and embracing the cultural and structural guidelines that surround them”, but would maintain that this creative action is constrained by the ‘tubilinear universe’ surrounding them.

In addition, Layder (ibid, p.211), following Giddens, identifies the “intrinsic powers of human beings as social agents” in discussing the agency/structure dichotomy. Senior police officers, HO officials and ministers of course have ‘power’ and act (often vigorously) as creative social agents; they wield their influence, however, within a web of structural, political and ideological constraints which effectively limits the available options.

What I would call the ‘tubilinear universe’ (of policing at least) has been dominated by the demands and development of the central state, and the police reforms have formed part of a systemic and historical inevitability. Layder (ibid) emphasises the need to combine the micro-and macro-levels of sociological analysis, and it is hoped that this has been successfully reflected in the current thesis, by focusing on the views and actions of individuals, yet placing these within a broader sociological framework.

The senior official above felt that it is difficult to reconcile devolution of control with the greater intolerance of "diversity" within society and the media (TC 500). When asked if more influence might in future gravitate to the centre, it was stated:

"Well, the aim of the reforms, of course, is to take a step in the other direction by setting up stronger local police authorities and certainly giving them more management responsibility. ...I think what we felt, and what ministers felt... that a structure that's not been changed for 30 years is probably a bit out of date. And certainly the financial control was very out of date..." (TC 519-575)

It was acknowledged that some in society were concerned about the length of time the Conservatives had been in power:

"... they're concerned about the politicisation of the civil service.... What we do as officials is provide advice, and the nature of that advice normally will have to be confidential.... I cannot, I must say myself, see any politicisation having taken place in the Civil Service as I know it. The only thing that I suppose, it's only human I suppose, as one can understand, when you are giving your advice as a civil servant, you do take account of the broad political approach of the government you work for." (TC 860-906)
This last data extract could fuel the accusation that officials tend to 'feed' ministers what they know will be more acceptable. On the question of centralisation of power, another senior official (interview 071) suggested (after some hesitation):

"Yes, I think broadly that a lot of services, not just the police, have been moving increasingly towards central direction. I mean, I think the position of local authorities has been eroded over the last 15 years or whatever. So that quite a lot of local authority services now seem to me more centralised than they were 15 years ago, and the police is another example of, you know, the way things appear to be moving in that direction." (TC 260-270)

However, this respondent disagreed that this was the intended vision of senior civil servants. Another official (interview 088 21.7.94) was quite clear that the Police Bill was a reflection of Ministers' policy. This respondent believed that the police reforms were essentially the ideas of Clarke (TC 046), and it was acknowledged there had been very little local consultation in development of the Bill. According to this official the lack of consultation left civil servants with an uneasy feeling (TC 136); the respondent was also concerned about the potential damage to the tripartite structure:

"I was very worried indeed that this was liable to place great strains on the relationship between the Home Office and the Police Service, and the Police Authorities, but I think the relationship with the Police Service is particularly important given the sort of style of decentralised policing that we have. It's a very complex relationship between central government and locally-based police forces. I was very worried that it would place a great strain on that relationship, and I'm sad to say that I think I was right, I think it has." (TC 139-164)

It was felt that there was much work to do to "row back", and restore the relationship between elements of the tripartite structure (TC 166), not that this meant there should be a "cosy" relationship. Previously, however, there had been an "underlying trust" which had been jeopardised (TC 176). This official felt that the way in which the police reforms had been presented was the main cause of anxiety and added:

"It was never a part of the present Home Secretary's intention seriously to jeopardise the operational independence of the Chief Constable. I mean, apart from anything else, that's a political minefield for any Home Secretary... that would be wrong in principle in our system, but politically it would be a disaster... so I don't think Michael Howard ever had that remotely in his
The idea that there was an ongoing drift of power to the centre was largely rejected, and the national objectives were not viewed as insidious. It was suggested, nevertheless, that Clarke’s original measures would have been “highly centralising”. It was added:

"I’m very puzzled by what ministers are trying to do actually, because they really actually sound to me as if they mean it when they say they don’t want it to be centralising. And I don’t regard the Home Secretary having the power to set a few national objectives as being in itself centralising. I think it is reasonable that he should be able to give a steer, I mean in practice, he has always done so. It’s arguable that it needn’t have been in the Bill at all." (TC 412-439)

It is apposite that this informant should highlight how "puzzled" he was about government intentions. One ACC (interview 052 2.11.93) felt that government actions 'defied logic': on the one hand some reform measures implied centralisation of power, and yet others threatened policing resources:

"So if this is getting this elite police service under control you know, they're going about it in a very odd way... I've seen just as much frustration and lack of understanding amongst the top people in the police department as I've seen inside the Police Service. They have no ideas of what's going on either, I can assure you!" (TC 563/575)

Perhaps such comments reflect the apparently incongruous ‘spiral-form’ decisions (or spiral-time) contained within the tubilinear vessel of history. Butler (in Leishman et al, 1996, p.219-220) seriously questions whether the government has a clear vision of policing, and its reform. The chief officer above had heard quotes from "senior people" about Clarke, and how dismissive he was about their advice (TC 582). This ACC worked through his analysis of government actions during the interview:

"I’d like to be able to give the government credit that they have got a secret strategic objective to doing all of this to the Police Service... they want a strong police force, control from the centre, that they can actually cope with the civil disorder that they see is possibly on the horizon. And I do see actually in some areas that there is going to be a lot of trouble. But one part of all this that didn’t make any sense at all, it was actually kicking the arse out of policemen, it was centralising and getting control over them, but then actually reducing their pay, reducing the quality of recruits, doing everything actually to destroy the Service and vocational sense of our job... in a sense they were contradictory.
So I therefore couldn't see that this was, and therefore I can't give any credit to, a long-term strategic plan by the government in which to achieve a particular type of police service. I actually see it as a cost-cutting exercise and nothing more. I do not believe they have the interests of the Police Service at heart..." (TC 475-509)

Returning to the official last cited above, he said of centralism:

"I believe ministers when they say they don't want to centralise. I have been very worried that they frankly haven't been able to perceive the likely effect of some of the things they have been trying to do... No, I really don't think there is a grand conspiracy. I mean I think, frankly there would have been a grand conspiracy on the part of Kenneth Clarke, but I don't think he would have known what he was walking into. But he was reined back by his colleagues, and Howard when he came into office made it clear that he didn't quite want to go that far anyway." (TC 465/510)

He reiterated how uncomfortable ministers are at the suggestion that they might be responsible for operational policing matters, and that it is "constitutionally impeccable" for ministers to respond to parliamentary questions by stressing that operational matters are the responsibility of chief constables (TC 535). Another ACC tended to disagree, however:

"... we're getting closer and closer to operational policing being the responsibility of politicians." (interview 037 23.8.93 TC 136)

One head of division within the police department (interview 063 29.11.93) disagreed that the HO was increasingly the 'political master' of the Service, but agreed that the Police Bill was centralising:

"The official line, of course, is that it's giving an awful lot more local autonomy. But the essential feature of it is the centralising one. Whether in practice that will work as a political lever and control, I'm not so sure actually. I mean, I know it looks like it... but in practice it may ease off a bit." (TC 079-088)

Another official (interview 070 20.1.94) was asked if HO circulars have had increasing 'clout':

"... they can't be prescriptive, or sort of mandatory in the strict sense. They can only be guidance. Of course, some of them are bound to have a more direct, specific influence than others because of what
the subject matter is.... I wouldn't say that circulars for which I've been responsible over the last 5 years have become more prescriptive. And I don't see them becoming more prescriptive in the future either..." (TC 083-116)

The inevitability of centralised power was rejected, but it is something that 'one needs to keep an eye on' (TC 148). One very senior official (interview 086 3.5.95) acknowledged greater interest in operational matters on the part of the department, but added:

"I hasten to say, I mean, we're not actually poking our nose in to, you know, directing people how to behave or even really give, you know, very pointed advice... we're trying to act as a sort of coordinating point, to pick up the lessons that are being learnt in certain parts of the Service..." (TC 240-252)

It was also noted that the department was trying to improve and "streamline" the service, and to achieve better management and personnel structures (TC 200). It was suggested that the greater proactivity of the department was matched by ACPO's desire to do the same (TC 342). On the question of an excessive drift of power to the centre, the reply was as follows:

"I don't know, I mean I think you know once one starts talking about quality of service and initiatives of that sort being led from the centre, it inevitably involves some sort of central, greater centralisation in terms of the work... what one is trying to do is to pick up from all round the place best practice and disseminate it out again. And that involves the sort of central type process... the crucial thing is whether there is sort of central direction or not..." (TC 634-673)

More information is coming to the centre (TC 674), but there is still the freedom to reject information and advice given to forces. This senior official continued:

"But as the systems get more complex, then the natural tendency is toward centralisation. And as people want to achieve more things, then the natural thing is for people to be dissatisfied with 43 different solutions to the problem... One of the things that I think is true, or I'm told is true, is that ACPO is looking more towards this central, managerial role than it has been perhaps in the past. Much more prepared to think about central solutions, much more prepared to come and join working forums or groups with us in order to produce centrally promulgated ideas..." (TC 680-706)
It would appear, then, that ACPO is contributing to the centralism of the policing function. Perhaps as a political actor it has no choice but to collaborate increasingly with the central state. In fact, given the empirical data above, one could argue that ACPO is increasingly part of the central state. Lustgarten (1986, p.108) emphasises the importance of ACPO's influence on policy formulation, as well as its relatively recent political role as a lobbying organisation. He stresses, nevertheless, "it is not a case of what A.C.P.O. wants, A.C.P.O. gets" (p.109); I would maintain that this is still the case, especially given the recently undermined autonomy of police leaders. The intimacy or intertwining between ACPO and the Home Office is also noted by Lustgarten (p.111), and this intertwining will continue to produce the "centrally promulgated" ideas suggested by the senior official above. The research data supports the analysis that given the increasing complexity of society, and its management, there must be greater centralisation of bureaucratic systems with which to maintain 'legal-rational' control; the 'iron cage' becomes even more pervasive.

5.3 The Politics of Quality

As Jones and Kavanagh (1994, p256) suggest, the "common thread" in politics is conflict. 'Interests', which are the objects of the conflict, can include status, power, money, dignity and honours (ibid, p256). It is the aim of this section to apply a political analysis to the concept of quality, and the development of the QOS programme. This analysis will centre on the question as to whether the QOS programme been at the heart of conflict between elements of the state. Has quality been a political pawn?

To develop the analysis, it will be critical to call upon the qualitative data gained during interviews with senior officers, the HMIC, the Police Department and the Audit Commission. Some very revealing and candid data were obtained which illustrate the degree of conflict within the 'corridors of power'.

It is also important to ask whether the QOS programme has been a genuine attempt to improve quality of service to the public, or else a cynical, politically-driven device to secure the credibility of the Police within the State.

It is useful to dissect the concept of quality into three dimensions: 'functional', 'internal', and 'interactional'. Functional quality embraces operational aspects such as crime clear-up rates and response times to 999 calls; internal quality is concerned with organisational culture, management, and staff development; interactional quality is concerned with such things as external involvement with other agencies, responding to community requirements, and generally providing the 'reassuring' service to the public as espoused in the QOS programme. The consumerist aspect of this last dimension is typified by the six ACPO
performance indicators.

Stephens and Becker (1994) emphasise the problems of credibility and image suffered by the police in the 1980s, and suggest that a cocktail of factors led to reverting to the "essentials of the traditional image" (p224). This cocktail included increasing crime levels, government pressure on the Police to become more efficient, and growing awareness on the part of police leaders that they could not combat crime alone.

Rather than satisfy political expediency, it is usually argued by police leaders that the QOS programme has been a genuine attempt to address policing style and philosophy. At the launch of the initiative in October 1990, it was acknowledged that the Police had concentrated on its enforcement dimension at the expense of the "helping, service, reassurance dimension" (Hirst, 1990b, p3). However, it could be argued that the Police had little chance of improving on functional quality, so therefore concentrated their efforts on the other two dimensions. The 1990 SPD trumpeted the need for a more caring and reassuring style of policing and the measurement of 'customer' satisfaction. Reiner (1992) describes how the rhetoric of consumerism has become the new panacea in public sector reform, and suggests that police leaders adopted the language and concepts of consumerism to "revive their flagging status, and a way of circumventing the more political forms of accountability which once threatened" (pg266).

A number of officers were asked about these issues; an attempt was made during interview to establish if the Police Service had been 'pushed' into quality by the central state, or had adopted a quality approach voluntarily (but perhaps primarily as a means of 'political' survival).

One ACC drew attention to the pressures and changes in the 1980s (see chapter 2), and said of the original QOS initiative:

"I think there was a fear that if we didn't do it, somebody else would do it for us, and not very well. So I think this was a natural development." (Interview 044 13.9.93 TC 090)

The time was 'ripe' for such an initiative (TC 107), and it was suggested by this ACC that the Service had been:

"Prodded a bit, but I think it was just sat down and articulated what was in fact taking place anyhow. Most forces were producing something along these lines." (TC 265)
A chief constable was asked if the QOS programme was borne out of political expediency:

"It depends what they mean by political expediency. If they mean that it was convenient for very senior officers to shown political masters that they were clever guys, I think that's crap. If it was political expediency with small 'p' and 'e', (ie) the Police Service lives a political life and has a small 'p' political existence and therefore has to describe its own position and take initiatives, yes, it most certainly would [come] out of political expediency." (interview 054 9.11.93 TC 032-040)

One ACC felt that the impetus for the QOS initiative lay firmly with the Police:

"I think it was clear that if we were to go forward into the 90s, that we had to have a look at our organisation... we then recognised that and then we initiated it, so there was no real pressure to initiate this change..." (interview 052 2.11.93 TC 108)

An ACC from Force 3 was asked if the QOS initiative arose out of political expediency:

"No, I wouldn't agree with that, I know the service tends to be reactive, but I'm judging it by the characters of the people who were involved... and my view is that they were attempting to take the service down a defined path which they believed in..." (interview 059 11.11.93 TC 138)

The idea that leaders of the Service were developing a vision for the Police was echoed by one DCC (interview 067 13.12.93). He agreed, however, that if the Police had not initiated reform, this would have been imposed by others [as it was anyway].

One chief constable (interview 031 2.8.93) expressed some annoyance that the government were 'taking the laurels' for quality of service and other reforms initiated by the police, but added:

"I think there was a time when ACPO could have started this debate off much earlier." (TC 145)

He referred to the pressure of reports such as Sheehy, and the White Paper:

"... which in fact have concentrated people's minds on survival, and survival may be actually tied up with quality of service, maybe that's a bit cynical..." (TC 218)
A DCC (interview 035 19.8.93) was asked if the Police had been pushed into quality:

"I'm quite clear in my own mind that a lot of pushing and shoving by government has really been behind what the Police have already been doing. So in a lot of areas, and I think quality of service is one, there was a very strong move in the service to try and improve things, and that goes back long before the quality of service sub-committee was actually formed." (TC 067-075)

Other evidence gained during the research suggested that the impetus of political "survival" would have ushered in the QOS initiative. For example, the Chief Inspector of Constabulary addressed the Senior Command Course (SCC) at Bramshill in April 1990 (Woodcock 1990). Sir John Woodcock was concerned to "proclaim the need for constant change" within the Police (p5). Sir John (p5) drew attention to the recent bad media reports on the police (including miscarriages of justice, the West Midlands Crime Squad, and Wapping). While suggesting that Thatcher's idea of an "officer class" was not supported by the Home Secretary or the Home Office, he added:

"That is not to say that there is not concern in the Home Office and in the government circles about policing and its development. Privately I think that there are many who think that some reforms are due. The real problem is where and how to start especially as the possibility of a Royal Commission has been firmly rejected..." (p7)

Sir John talked of the possibility of force amalgamation, and hinted at police reform in the near future (p.12). He also stressed the need to loosen up bureaucracy within the police (p18), and noted the "desperate need for the Service to be more positive and more cohesive" than ever before (p20). Sir John stressed the need for ACPO to become "a major voice in policy matters" (p23) and for the police to be leading itself rather than responding to HO initiatives (p20). In his closing comments, Sir John talked of 'quality':

"The final and perhaps the most important strength the police service has is that of public support.... I am still convinced that the vast majority of the law abiding public feel warmly about the police. It is in the interests of the service to ensure this situation remains. Not only has the 'marketing' to be done but more fundamentally, the 'quality of the service' to the customer must be raised. Quality is essential - nothing less will do. This must be the message that all police officers work towards." (p32)

Syndicate 4 of the 1990 (27th) SCC produced a paper entitled "A Crisis in the Police Service: Some
Possible Solutions" (SCC, 1990). It was noted (pi) that media coverage of police cases had "created a situation whereby public confidence in the Police service is questioned", and that the Police had already been "convicted" (p2). Possible "sentences" could include regionalisation, more control by PAs, and independent investigation of complaints (p2). The Syndicate paper continued:

"Fortunately in this bizarre world, the Service itself has the opportunity to determine its own sentence. It is an opportunity that must be grasped with a sense of urgency and resolved if the police profession is to influence its own future... If the leaders of the Police Service do not put their house in order, then the politicians will do it for them." (ibid, p2)

According to the SCC Syndicate, the OPR demonstrated an acknowledged sense of crisis within the Police (p10), and that this sense of crisis acts as a powerful motivator, in that "fear has no equal" as a motivator (p12). The SCC syndicate recommended re-structuring ACPO (p15), producing a common statement of purpose and values (p17), and addressing the elements of organisational culture (p18). It was stressed:

"Reform or go out of business - or in our case, be reformed. United we stand; divided we fall victim to external imperatives which may not only be very uncomfortable but damaging to the Service." (p17)

On the need for development of PIs, it was added:

"Measures of effectiveness and quality of service delivery are of paramount importance... and ultimately to make an adequate case for resources in an increasingly competitive environment... It is essential that the development of performance indicators for the Service are police led, so that the indicators finally chosen are relevant and useful to the service as a whole..." (p20-21)

In concluding, the syndicate proclaimed that the Service would have to address the perceived crisis, before external solutions were imposed; it was warned that the "writing is clearly on the wall" (p22). It is obvious that the type of reforms proposed by the SCC syndicate have actually formed key elements of the QOS programme: it is naive to assume that the emergence of QOS had little to do with 'politics' or survival. An ACC from Force 2 (interview 038 23.8.93) tended to confirm this view when asked if QOS was a political response to centralising government control:

"I don't know, but I wouldn't be surprised if it wasn't." (TC 242)
He cited the pressure from HO circular 114/83, and suggested that an initiative such as QOS would 'cross his mind' given the threat of centralisation (TC 250).

However, while it is important to acknowledge the broader political context of the QOS initiative, it would be overly simplistic to maintain that quality was merely a politically-driven venture to counteract the centralising overtures of the central state. 'Quality', as typified by the SCPV, has been about promulgating a vision of the Police which appeals to professional integrity and ideas of responding more sensitively to the requirements of the public. It has not just been aimed at nullifying the spectre of externally imposed reforms; it has also been about addressing the ethos within the organisation, as was attempted in the Plus programme.

It is useful to analyse the QOS programme in terms of darkening hues of politicisation. In the beginning, the nascent QOS sub-committee was concerned to develop a vision of policing which emphasised the concept of 'customer', and to address the mismatch of priorities and expectations of policing, which had been highlighted in the OPR. We might call this the relatively apolitical 'phase 1'.

In 'phase two,' there was a growing focus on PIs, and an added political dimension in the form of Citizen's Charter. There was also inter-organisational conflict, which will be highlighted in this section. In 'Phase 3', which has been increasingly politicized, the QOS programme has been used as a political chess piece in the power struggle between the service and the central state. That is, the QOS program has been increasingly politicised out of a response to the policy and ideological imperatives of the government. A leading member of the QOS committee (interview 103 1.5.95) was asked if the QOS program had become increasingly politicised:

"Yes, I mean to a large extent of course, it has. And I suppose the starting point for that was when John Major came up with this wonderful new innovation called the Citizen's Charter... he actually then stole the initiative, as it were, on that sort of front." (TC310)

The main focus of the QOS committee inexorably moved away from 'internal' and 'interactional' quality dimensions, and become directed at the highly politicised debate about the definition and measurement of operational performance and standards. The leaders of the Service were striving to be more proactive in the delineation of the policing function; expressed another way, the Service tried to redress the balance of power which has tipped in favour of the central state (see Loveday 1993, p13), and to regain some
control over the policing agenda. In this endeavour the work of the QOS committee is pivotal, and is true to say that their work has become more narrowly focussed than was the case in phases 1 and 2 of the QOS programmes.

In exploring the idea that various elements of the QOS programme acted as symbolic 'pawns' in the power game, there were some conflicting views expressed during interview. It is useful to conceptualise the QOS programme as a "power stage" upon which the drama of intra-state conflict is played. To an increasing extent QOS has been the forum in which this power struggle has been manifest. Interview data indicated some of the sub-plots played out on the power stage; such sub-plots generally do not reach the public domain of the media, and are usually difficult to identify empirically.

Several interviews included discussion about the initial derivation of PIs by the ACPO, HMIC and the Audit Commission (AC). One HMIC Chief Superintendent who had extensive knowledge of the early days of the initiative talked of the rivalry between the HMIC and the Audit Commission (interview 021 7.6.93). He noted how HMIC documentation had been leaked (TC 277) and that the AC had "plagiarised" many of their PIs, and presented these in one of their own discussion documents (TC 273). There was meant to be a lengthy consultative process before the 45 PIs of the HMIC were released, but there was an attitude of "bugger consultation" (TC 282) so that the HMIC could beat the AC to the publication of indicators. Therefore the HMIC indicators 'hit' forces without due consultation (see HMCIC, 1991b). More generally on the early development of the QOS initiative, it was recalled:

"A lot of meetings were going on at the Home Office. The political scene was a bit fragile at times, because Mr Hirst was a little bit fickle with his manner. And there were dangers at times of people meeting outside of committee..." (TC 410)

This extract implies that 'real' power was being wielded outside of formal meetings, and naturally less amenable to scrutiny. On 8th October 1991, a QOS meeting was held. The role of the Citizen's Charter Unit was discussed in that meeting: it was felt that they were unaware of the amount of progress already achieved within the police:

"By that time, as well, Citizen's Charter had come on the scene... nationally I think there's another rival, rather than as a complement to quality of service. Seen as a bit of a threat, and the Citizen's Charter unit probably saw themselves far further forward than we were at that particular time as well."
During this 'phase 2' period (as we are referring to it), and after the second QOS seminar at Bramshill in December 1991, there was a feeling (according to the HMIC respondent) that the way forward 'was not too clear' (TC030). There was frustration at the 'tortuous time' (TC 100), and:

"...within police department there is a lot of jockeying for position as well... a lot of left and right hands not knowing what they're doing..." (TC 040)

This officer noted that by January 1992, there was a commitment to 'jumping back into bed' with the other key players (TC 085), and that there was a keenness by the HMIC to take forward performance measurement with the AC. However, Michael Hirst displayed some resistance to measurement:

"... the only real measurement that he ever really thought about was customer surveys. He didn't like all these other hard measures" (TC 069)

By November 1992, the HMIC were fairly clear on what the AC wanted for PIs, but still felt there was a need for the HMIC to have indicators "over and above those of the Audit Commission" (TC 277). Another HMIC Chief Superintendent (interview 062 26.11.93) felt that the AC had forged its own role with quantitative measures; it was added:

"... and the inspectorate, I think found itself squeezed in the middle, and was trying to find a role for itself, with a foot in each camp. But also, obviously try to ensure what either of those come up with, is if it's worth it and it's good practice, it's actually implemented across the Service..." (TC 066-088)

In the earlier stages of the QOS initiative, it was suggested, ACPO, HMIC and the AC were 're-designing wheels' and producing PIs which overlapped:

"There is no doubt in my mind that the three were in competition. I can go back in some papers that I've got, which to my mind, reading between the lines, says that one, you know, they wanted to get there first. That competition I think has gone now..." (TC 328)

It was put to the main AC respondent (interview 085 25.4.94) that these were tensions between the key players in some of the early QOS meetings:
"I think tension's the wrong word. They were very lively discussions, but very productive. We actually did a lot of work thrashing out the detail because we felt that the detail was important in terms of getting, you know, an unambiguous way of collecting the information and interpreting it." (TC 695)

It was acknowledged, however, that sometimes meetings were "painful" (TC 740), and that the AC PIs were criticised as being quantitative (TC 770). It was also recalled that:

"Some of the tension was also about trying to get complementary indicators with the Inspectorate and the Home Office, and the ACPO themselves who wanted a range of survey based indicators." (TC 755)

Another official (interview 019 27.5.93) commented on the "prickly" relationship between HMIC and ACPO (including Hirst):

"Hirst always felt the Inspectorate were operating for their own agenda, and that at times got a bit tiresome..." (TC 525)

One chief (interview (046 14.9.93), talked about the tension between ACPO, HMIC and the AC, and agreed that there were:

"... very big frictions where certain parties... they all talk about quality until it comes to doing something, and then they'll do things which totally disregard quality, as they were trying to do with... the performance indicators, that's my view... not totally disregard quality, but did not give the concept of quality the high priority it ought to have." (TC 636-657)

In addition to the politics of PIs, it is useful to recall the symbolic importance of the Police 'Factsheets', the first of which was produced in 1993. There was some variation as to the perceived 'political' role of these Factsheets. One Force 3 ACC (interview 059 11.11.93) said:

"I don't think it was a political statement... it was trying to [place] in the public domain a series of arguments. That factsheet was planned way before, in fact it was planned a year before Sheehy and the White Paper... at one stage it was even considered that is shouldn't be printed..." (TC 535)
This respondent recalled how there was much "soul searching" (TC 538) within ACPO before the publication of the first Factsheet. One very senior HMIC respondent (interview 024 15.6.93) said of the first Factsheet:

"The basis of it is defensive... instead of it being a sort of vehicle for making improvements, it becomes a response to all these initiatives..." (TC 565)

One Force 3 Chief Superintendent (interview 052 1.11.93) applauded the factsheet and added:

"I don't see any reason why the police shouldn't get more political, provided that, you know, it's kept with a small 'p'... I think that in the past the police have been very backward at initially stating their position... but I think that there is, there certainly is, a lot of scope for upfront comment..." (TC 515)

Another Chief Superintendent (in force 2) talked of the work on national policing standards (interview 080 3.3.94), and said that he thought that the HO had not yet seen the report from the working group:

"... they know it's going on, and they're quite concerned about it... they haven't seen it yet. HMI are quite concerned about it as well, because a lot of it is criticism of their performance measurement framework."

This officer indicated that one possible use of the policing standards work was to demonstrate to government the resources required given a certain standard of service (TC 080). This is clearly an element of the QOS programme with a strong political function, and mirrors the original objective of the OPR.

Ultimately, then 'quality of service' has become increasingly politicised. In its relatively apolitical phase 1 the initiative emphasised interactional quality, with its themes of consumerism, policing style and ethos. A rather more politicised Phase 2 was ushered in by the input of the Audit Commission, and to a lesser extent, the HMIC. In this phase, most debate centred on performance measurement. At the same time, the QOS committee was focussing on internal quality, as epitomised by GTR. After 1993, however, the weight of police reforms and externally imposed performance indicators heralded the most 'politically' phase of the QOS programme, with a growing emphasis on functional quality, and 'performance culture'. The factsheets and the work on National Standards and performance management bear witness to this development.
The work of the Performance Management Working Group (PMWG), a sub-group of QOS committee, had increasingly dominated the Quality agenda. It has been obliged to confront the conflict over 'functional' quality and its measurement. The disagreement over the use of PIs which emerged at the 1994 Cheltenham conference has already been highlighted elsewhere. This tension also emerged at the Bramshill QOS conference in December (which I attended). It was clear that the 'politicised' elements of quality dominated the agenda (or 'power stage').

Charles Pollard's address at the Bramshill conference (ACPO 1994c) was peppered with 'evidence' to show what good 'value-for-money' the Police represent, and to question the reliance on 'functional costings' in achieving focus and efficiency within the police (p4). In listing recent QOS committee work it is clear that it was dominated by 'politicised' aspects of the quality agenda:

- seeking to establish policing standards;
- monitoring the Police Service Performance Indicator package;
- the consultation on key objectives, policing plans, national publication of performance indicator data and activity sampling;
- the organisation of a conference at Cheltenham to begin the process of developing a Performance Management Strategy for the Service.

Charles Pollard also mentioned the work on 'shared values', but this was a comparatively minor topic in the day's proceedings (one might suggest a relic from the earlier phases of the programme). The tone of the conference was dominated by the work of the PMWG. Tony Butler (chair of the PMWG and then chief of Gloucestershire) gave a presentation on management performance strategy, and made numerous points, including the following:

- What gets measured, gets done
- The three 'Es' neglect the 'human' element
- There is a danger of over-simplifying the policing function
* Performance measurement by the centre could result in 'control by stealth', and direction without responsibility

* There are difficulties in linking abstract performance measurement and reality. PI's do not necessarily measure reality

* One must avoid a "bean-counting" philosophy

* There needs to be a national framework for performance measurement/management

* One must ask of we are managing performance, or is performance measurement managing us? (taken from personal field notes 6.12.94)

In his opening address to the conference John Hoddinott (then Chief of Hampshire and ACPO President) proclaimed that the QOS programme had stimulated a recovery in confidence in the Police, ensured a commitment to quality and equality, and was now working toward more effective management of performance. He warned, however, that the Police Service could not become complacement.

Field notes were also taken of the Home Secretary's speech, which included the following points:

* The Police Service is at the leading edge of change

* There has rightly been a fundamental change in attitude - the police is there to serve the public - this is "trite but true".

* Professionals can no longer dictate 'what the answer is'. There must be more "humility" on the part of professionals such as the police.

* One must consult the public, and/or give power to the public to change things.

* The public needs the information to decide what is right or wrong.

* It is necessary to make comparisons and to monitor services.
* The government must provide the overall framework (or regulatory structure) which will support quality in the police.

* The 1993 White Paper was a "milestone of reform". "We" (the government) decided that there was a need to update the tripartite structure.

* The use of policing plans forms part of the new approach.

* The Police Service has "taken to heart" the Charter movement. Charter documents should be "proudly displayed". Charters provide a close link between PIs and results.

* It is quite right that charters expose organisations to public gaze.

* The national key objectives are designed to meet the concerns of the public.

* PIs are part of the culture of all forces. The Service wishes to rationalise the suite of indicators.

* The Review of Core and Ancillary tasks fulfils a need to consider resource prioritisation. There is no intention, however, to change the style of policing.

* Some forces (including Lincolnshire and Northumbria) have achieved the "coveted" Citizen's Charter Charter Mark.

* It is the wish of the government to "listen and facilitate", rather than regulate.

(from field notes, 6.12.94)

It was inevitable, and obvious, that the Home Secretary was using the 1994 QOS seminar as a platform to promulgate the policies and ideology of the government. (It was interesting that no questions arose from the floor after the Home Secretary's speech!). It was also evident that the conference was also a stage on which the leaders of the Service were presenting their standpoint, and was far from limited to furtherance of the quality concept.
We can say with some confidence that the QOS programme has been one anvil upon which intra-state conflicts of interest have been beaten out. The QOS committee has certainly been at the core of the policing agenda, although with the passing of time the principal focus of debate will no doubt move from this to another committee and another set of issues. One ACC (interview 105 26.5.95) interviewed in May 1995, for example, foresaw that the "new agenda coming over the horizon" would be that centering on the development of a "super" or national crime agency (TC 282). It is clear, nevertheless, that quality has lain at the heart of debate about the national policing agenda, and has taken on a symbolic importance in the interaction between the 'power players' within the state. I would assert that quality has been employed as a political pawn to counter the attempts by government to establish, or perhaps strengthen, its grip on 'integral' power.

It seems defensible to conclude that 'Quality' in the police has become embroiled in the politics of the reform agenda; it is overly simplistic, however, to argue that the initiative was borne simply out of political expediency. The genesis and development of the programme is more complex than that conclusion would suggest. In a sense the OPR provided one of the key catalysts for the launch of the national initiative, and the OPR in itself had a strong political objective (to demonstrate the need for more resources and the damage to 'traditional' policing): the QOS programme therefore has a political pedigree. However, the early days of the initiative witnessed close liaison between the police service hierarchy and the police department. Certainly at that point there appeared to be more collaboration than conflict between elements of the state. However, this soon changed with the growing emphasis on performance indicators and the impact of the Citizen's charter movement. This chapter has aimed to demonstrate the tension between police leaders, the AC, and HMIC, in particular.

The police service was fully aware that its image had been tarnished in the 1980s, and embraced tenets of the quality philosophy with which to bolster its credibility. One could suggest that this is in itself a 'political' motivation in that increasing the perceived legitimacy and authority of the police permits the latter to achieve its objectives more successfully. This parallels the sort of argument which suggests that 'community policing' initiatives represent another, rather insidious, way for the police to extend its social control function. Scraton (1985, p129) questions the involvement of police in schools liaison programmes and the "cultivation of community spies" (p130).

In a similar vein, Uglow (1988) writes:

"The growth of the multi-agency approach, of community, juvenile, and school liaison officers, involves
It might be argued that some elements of the QOS programme, with its overtures of becoming closer to the public, represent a deeper penetration into the fabric of community life. In a sense, the quality approach in the police does signpost a move to break down the distance or barrier between the police and public - whether this is viewed as negative or positive depends on one's political and ideological standpoint.

Personally, I do not regard the QOS programme as an insidious means of social control; there are far more 'dangerous' aspects of policing (in its widest sense) especially those co-ordinated at a national level, which pose a threat to civil liberty. I believe it would be alarmist to dismiss the QOS programme as a sinister and calculated attempt at greater social control, although ultimately being more 'in tune' with the community (which perhaps is the essence of the QOS thrust) should, in theory, allow the police to fulfil its functions more readily. In contradiction to largely discredited 'left idealist' assumptions, I believe there will always be a need for societal policing: surely it is better to strive to conduct this policing in a largely consensual manner, with greater liaison in (rather than distance from) the public. To remove the police from the community can only fuel an image and ethos of a state-controlled and somewhat repressive force of occupation. This is essentially the type of image which was being propagated in the 1980s, and one which police leaders realised would threaten the legitimate authority of the service. As Wrong (ibid p52) indicates, legitimate authority is more efficient than coercive or induced authority, and QOS has symbolised a concerted effort to bolster the slightly ailing legitimate authority of the police. In that sense, because legitimate authority is one sub-set of 'power', the QOS programme represents an attempt to increase the power of the police vis-a-vis society. Again, critics such as Scraton would probably maintain that this is, in itself, bad. Taking a more functionalist stance, however, power might be regarded as a positive phenomenon or medium of exchange (or social interaction). Parsons (1986, p124-125) argues that authority is the "institutionalised code" of power, and that compulsion or coercion cannot rightly be conceived as power. The QOS programme, by building up community involvement and obligations, reinforces the authoritative status of the police, and attempts to counter the de-legitimised state of coercion and compulsion which typified many police-community interactions of the 1980s.

In a more consensual or functionalist vein, it is agreed here that power does not necessarily have to be an 'evil' or socially undesirable phenomenon. There are, and always will be, those who possess more power (in all its guises) than others. It is the way in which types of power are used, or indeed nullified, that is critical
for the pursuit of a liberal society. Very crudely, power between social groups must achieve a certain
equilibrium: of course, the police have greater powers over the citizenry, but in some ways the QOS
programme was designed to yield influence to the community in terms of 'meeting community expectation'.
Many officers in the research sample supported this concept, and were attempting to promulgate the aim of
satisfying 'customers'. Cynically, one might say this was only to maintain the interests of the police in an
increasingly competitive environment, or to boost the careers of senior officers embracing the 'politically
correct' policy. Nevertheless, the idea of acknowledging the wishes of the community, and monitoring their
appreciation (or otherwise) of services has been a significant step for the police.

Another political interpretation might posit that the adoption of a business-derived philosophy (entailing
customers, performance measures and mission statements) was in itself pandering to the ideological and
policy objectives of the Tory government. This could perhaps reinforce the perception that the service was
in collaboration with the central state in reinforcing the values of marketisation and new managerialism,
which ultimately threaten the egalitarian provision of service to the public. There is no doubt that police
leaders themselves were adopting some principles of business, and of course aspects of consumerist quality,
in advance of Citizen's Charter and the Police Reform. This, for critics of the police and its QOS programme,
could suggest that the police were volunteers in the process to transform the public sector beyond all
recognition. However, such critics might struggle in explaining the conflict between the police and the central
state in the early 1990s, and indeed the politicisation of the QOS programme itself. It is not suggested here
that the police followed the path of quality in order to 'go to bed' with the government, although it might be
argued that police leaders perceived the zeitgeist and realised they would have to swim in the same direction
to appease their political masters, or (less cynically) to simply fit in with what was happening around them.

One member of the QOS committee (interview 018 14.5.93) recalled that 'quality' in his own force emerged
on the agenda when "avoidable complaints" (such as incivility) increased, and added:

"... the other point, I think, was it was about time that much of the service industry was beginning to
talk about quality I think, and these sort of quality issues, and for those that were actually leading (...) Police
at that time, they sort of latched on to it" (TC 130).

In the world of political realism, it is inevitable that public sector organisations (including the police) have
had to embrace many elements of business-based philosophy in order to respond to the public sector reform
agenda. The central state, and most particularly the government itself, is imbued with a neo-liberal business
ethos and of course controls the provision of resources. If those at the centre embrace a business model, then
public sector organisations are obliged to reflect a similar philosophy in their own activities and reformation
in order to secure resources from, and appear credible to, the power elite.

In some ways the QOS programme represents a move to share or yield power. However this is relatively minimal, and does little to change the status of the police as (ultimately) the coercive apparatus of the state. The QOS programme has extended the domain of the 'softer' or more community-oriented brand of policing but does not obviate the 'harder' public order brand of policing, or crime control function, at the other end of the spectrum.

Analysing the proportion of resources devoted to 'softer' forms of policing service (such as localised customer surveys) in comparison to 'harder' forms (such as crime investigation or public order) would indicate that the latter still take precedence over the former.

QOS has attempted to redress the imbalance in the wide range of functions which the police perform. In the 1980s, the scales had clearly tipped in favour of the repressive or controlling functions; equilibrium had to be restored, because it is this equilibrium which has lain at the heart of the success of the British police service. Too much 'force' and the police loses authority and legitimacy; too much 'service' and the police cannot fulfil its more coercive social control duties. As senior officers indicated during interview, without the service or care aspects of policing, the somewhat harder-edged functions cannot be properly carried out.

Supporters of the QOS programme would argue that it has signified a move away from the highly aggressive and politicised image of the police which reacted its apotheosis in the miners' strike; that is, quality facilitates de-politicisation in the sense of being more responsive to the public and representing a less partisan enforcement-oriented force of oppression.

Stephens and Becker (1994, p225) note that the essence of the QOS programme is "the police putting aside the term police force and stressing a more caring and service-oriented image and set of activities". While the term "force" has been put aside, the ability and willingness to use it, has not. The 1990s have witnessed the consideration or introduction of new policing hardware (such as incapacitant sprays, and side-handled batons) which themselves symbolise a 'tougher' style of policing. Even if QOS has assisted in re-legitimation and de-politicisation it has not displaced the dimension of force. Reiner (1992, p267) concludes that the consumerist, service-based approach is preferable to the tough 'law-and-order' stance of the 1980s.

While QOS has remained a significant part of policing discourse (at least in the upper echelons of the service), there is no doubt that its importance has declined in the mid-1990s, and that the 'enforcement' issues
of arming, defence and hardware have taken more of the limelight. Issues of 'service' or 'force' seem to oscillate, as they did in the 1980s; neither disappears altogether, but as we enter the second half of the decade, it would seem that debates about enforcement have taken precedence over those of service. This would seem particularly the case given the 'law-and-order' resurgence in the government, and the current emphasis on fighting crime. As Stephens and Becker (ibid, p228) argue, the main thrust of the 1993 White Paper was "not in the direction of care, but towards control".

5.4 Conclusions

"The police have a complex relationship with the law, with the state, and with the community ... modern policing is imposed authority, whether its style is paramilitary or community ... The police are not immune from the pressures of public opinion, but the influence and interests of the state ultimately predominate. They would, however, be seriously flawed in public estimation were they clearly seen to be 'state police'. On a continuum between integration and imposition, the theory of 'proper' policing tends strongly to the former, eschewing violence and stressing local involvement." (Uglow, 1988, p9-11).

This extract encapsulates much that is touched upon in this thesis. It is important to stress the complexity of the relationship that the police has with other groups in society. However, what the research has shown is that the relationship with the central state has in a way been simplified. The police reforms have, for example, simplified the funding arrangements for the service, and as Navari (1991) might propose, the rivalry between forces that the new funding formula creates has enhanced the power of the central state. Police forces have been in competition with one another, and have been obliged to make appeals to the centre for a larger share of the police 'cake'. Navari (ibid, p152) argues that 'winners' in any adversarial relationship will subsequently rely on the state for protection of their gain: thus police forces who have benefitted under the new arrangements will be indebted to the centre.

We can also conclude that the police reforms have resulted in the central state gaining greater power, but less responsibility. Forces, via their Police Authorities, have now been given national objectives to satisfy. Police Authorities are obliged to respond to these objectives, that is take responsibility, but are even more accountable (effectively) to the Home Secretary. If an objective is not met, it is the 'fault' of the Police Authority or the Chief Constable. The role of the Audit Commission and HMIC has been enhanced in recent years, and this development also strengthens accountability to the centre. Navari (p151) stresses how augmented standard setting and "surveillance" enhances the state, and this is evidently the case with the
recent explosion in performance indicators. The QOS programme itself has been used in the conflict over this increased monitoring and control of the policing function.

It is clear then, that the State is not withering away - it is, in fact, becoming more 'statist' (see Navari, p150), even if in some areas the State has been 'rolled back'. The arguments of Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987) and Jessop (1992) have been presented to strengthen the contention that the State is 'rolling forward' on areas such as law-and-order. Society is generally being increasingly 'policed' in the broadest sense: the police service, and other public bodies are increasingly monitored and subject to standardisation and compliance by the Central State. Uglow (ibid, p137-138) soberly concludes:

"The 1980s have seen economic liberalism in full flood: deregulation and privatization have removed many controls from the economic life of individuals. Yet these new 'freedoms' have been matched by repressive social policies - law and order budgets soar, central curricula are imposed upon schools, and welfare recipients are spied upon. We have witnessed the retreat of the State in certain spheres but an inexorable advance in others."

The State will increasingly "monitor, intervene, redistribute, cajole, convince and enforce" (Navari, p162): this is the 'logic of the state', and the police reform programme has shown itself to be an ideal-type case study in this respect. Some senior civil servants themselves felt able to confirm the centralisation of power over the police.

Cohen (1985, p37) argues that the State gains an increasing grip on social control and deviancy despite the 'destructuring' agenda of the 1960s:

"far from any decrease, the reach and intensity of State control have been increased; centralisation and bureaucracy remain...".

A decade after Cohen's assertion, it would seem that State control over criminal justice has tightened, and that the tightening grip over police objectives is but one facet of this momentum. Orum (1978) discusses Weber's conception of the modern state bureaucracy as the "most prominent structural embodiment of rationality" (p.57). I would argue here that our society is becoming increasingly rationalised, and that the central state is the lynch pin in societal development. The growth of administrative apparatus, and 'rational-legal' domination (Orum, ibid, p.55) of social groups (including the police) continue apace.
The growth of central state power is not restricted to control over the Criminal Justice System, but such developments do typify the continuing rise of state bureaucracy. The claim of ‘rolling back the state’ is nonsensical given the historical trend which still unfolds. The bureaucratic form of organisation to which we are subject is now increasingly manifest in public sector organisations such as the police. Such rational-legal domination is not restricted to the current Conservative government, and will continue if or when another political party secures power.

As shown at the beginning of the chapter, power is not a uni-dimensional concept. Using Wrong's framework, we can make several conclusions:

1. With regard to the police reforms, the government has demonstrated an 'intentionality of power', which (at this stage) appears to be mainly effective, although there have been some failures in attempted reform (see chapter 2).

2. The latent power emanating from the Audit Commission is evidenced by the extent to which forces respond to their findings in the absence of any direct command from the AC (or HMIC). Quite possibly the power of the AC is becoming more overt or manifest, using Wrong's terminology.

3. It is perceived by many critics of the police reforms (including police leaders) that the latter ushered in an asymmetrical power relation. That is, the "reciprocity" of influence in the tripartite structure has been eroded to the extent that the Home Office has attained the position of dominant power holder. Concomitantly, chief officers have more clearly become the power subjects.

4. The situation of the Police Authorities is not as clear, however. To some extent, it was the aim to bolster the power of the PAs, but in a way which would tie them directly to the dictates of the government (with a centrally appointed chairperson). However, possibly an unintended consequence of the reforms is the increase in power of the PAs, with an increase in their relative autonomy from the Central State. The power of the PAs appears to have increased while that of chief officers has declined. Nevertheless, the PA is still accountable to the Home Secretary in terms of the national policy objectives. The dynamics of the power relations with regard to PAs is yet to emerge clearly.

5. In some ways, the comprehensiveness of central state power over the police has increased, in that a wider range of policing activities are now scrutinised in formal inspection processes. On the other hand, the centre no longer dictates, for example, the officer complement in each force. Some 'scopes' have
increased while others have diminished.

(6) It is proposed here that the intensity of power over the police has increased. The Central State has pushed beyond the previously accepted 'zone of acceptance' in dictating the activities or objectives of the police. It could transpire that the PAs' intensity of power over respective Chief Constables will be similarly augmented.

Altogether, it should be obvious that the power relations within the police sphere have entered a new historical phase. It is postulated here that the power relations have shifted further toward an integral situation where the decision making process is dominated by one party (that is, the Central State).

In a way the research has been conducted within a rather more 'radical' or critical conception of the State, where the State is deemed to be "intrusive and expansive" (Brewer et al, 1988, p214), and one which gravitates towards Dunleavy and O'Leary's (1987) 'partisan' image. While most civil servants (understandably) held what appeared to be a cipher or guardian image of the state, I hold the view that it is increasingly partisan and progressively dominated by the imperatives of the Conservative government. In Dunleavy and O'Leary's typology (ibid, p333) the partisan image of the state is one replete with severe difficulties in policy making, which has been the case with the police reform legislation. The research concern with power, 'input' politics, short-term decision making and "democratic elitist" behaviour reflects Dunleavy and O'Leary's hybrid of elite and pluralist theory. The research has highlighted the conflict between the state elites (see also chapter 6) and the political behaviour surrounding the police reforms and the development of the QOS programme.

Schwarzmantel (1993 p64) defines the crude elitist perspective:

"We have here a view which stressed the concentration of power, not its diffusion. In its most basic form the elitist argument asserts that in any society political power is concentrated in the hands of a comparatively small group, an elite. Elitists differ on the factors which secure this leading group its power, but they agree on the inevitability of minority rule."

I would argue that elite theory will be increasingly important, given the centralisation of power over public agencies. I would also hypothesise that even given the demise of the Conservative government, the state will continue in its 'logic of statism', and the power of the central state will continue to increase. This will occur whichever political party secures power. One state elite is merely replaced by another state elite.
As Schwarzmantel (p75) points out, much of elite theory is at odds with Marxian theory; the latter of course rests upon economic determinism and conceptualising a "ruling class whose power is based on its ownership and control of the means of production" (ibid, p75). Schwarzmantel provides a useful discussion of elite theory and democracy which encapsulates the elite/pluralist hybrid propounded by Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987). In citing the work of Raymond Aron (1972) he develops the concept of elite pluralism:

"... there is a set of different organisations, each with its own elite. They compete with each other. They are 'disassociated'. The picture is one of a range of peaks, or tops of different pyramids of power, which do not fuse into one pyramid and therefore do not constitute one cohesive elite. This view reconciles elitism with pluralism ... no one elite will always command the machinery of the state." (ibid, p91).

Weber conceives of 'status groups' and bureaucracies, and Orum (ibid, p.48-49) identifies the Weberian analysis of group interaction:

"... the relationship between groups - as opposed to that within them - is essentially one of continuous conflict and struggle .... status groups in many different situations are opposed to the interests of one another and struggle either to monopolize limited material resources or to gain control over groups through the hegemony of their beliefs and ideals.... The bureaucracies in different institutional spheres are themselves in competition with one another for the dominance of their interest; for Weber, this is preferable to control vested only in a state bureaucracy."

I would maintain that the dominance of only one bureaucracy (that of the central state) will be deleterious to the 'health' of power relations between 'status groups', such as the police and government, and the wider society. It would appear however that the legal-rational domination by central state bureaucracy in Weberian terms, is set to continue.

Brogden et al (1988, p.70) write of the dynamic of bureaucratisation, and the manifestation of two key elements of this in policing:

"- centralization and standardization - are clearly linked to that of efficiency: the impetus towards centralizing power is effectual so that standardized practices, in the interests of rational administration or 'efficiency', may more easily be introduced. Both elements are observable in the twentieth-century development in police work."
The research has been concerned primarily with the actions and views of the police elite (as a status group), as well as elites within the central state. At the moment, there are still different "pyramids of power", and conflict between the different elite groups has been identified empirically. Nevertheless, the central political elite (the government) and the civil service bureaucracy have become increasingly dominant, and this has accelerated the centralisation of state control overall. The central state 'pyramid' has grown taller at the expense of local state apparatus. Perhaps increasingly there will be a unified, centralised elite or status group with an unprecedented concentration of power over state machinery.

Quite probably the police reforms have signalled another stage in this process. Possibly the central state machinery, or bureaucratic elite, will become more powerful than any political party elite. Perhaps the legacy of the Conservative government will be the hastening of statism which takes on an irrepressible dynamic and momentum of its own.

In this case, the 'structural' or institutionalised power of an increasingly bureaucratised and controlling state group (such as the Police Department or Home Office) could outweigh that of any one central government elite. The latter would serve the former, rather than vice versa. Perhaps in the not too distant future the State will be the only true governing elite, neutralising the influence of political parties altogether, unless of course their policies fulfil the logic of the state itself. Leaving aside a doomladen vision of the future (at least for the moment), the research findings have built up a theoretical framework, inductively, which is best represented by the term 'elite pluralist'. The research process has not followed a hypothetico-deductive model, and therefore entailed no formalised testing of pre-determined hypotheses about power structures.

In relation to quality, and the QOS programme, it has been demonstrated that conflicts between the state elites have been acted out on the quality stage. It is also clear that the police were adopting the language and concepts of quality prior to the government's Citizens' Charter initiative. Police leaders, however, realised prior to the police reforms that they would have to 'put their house in order', before it was done for them. One way of attempting this was to take the quality route, which is hardly surprising given the number of private (and public sector) organizations who were following a similar path in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The police leaders were aware of the changes around them, many of which were driven by the public sector reform agenda and the new managerialist imperatives. The 'business' ethos and policies of the government have acted to increasingly politicise the QOS programme to the point where the original visions have been superseded by the pressures of the 'performance culture'. If Uglow (ibid, 1988 p9-11) writes of the continuum between integration and imposition, and the assumption that 'proper' policing gravitates toward the former (with the emphasis on local involvement), it should be clear that this is what the QOS programme
symbolised. It has failed, however, to reverse the momentum of state centralisation and accountability which has been markedly accelerated by the recent police reforms. As Uglow suggests, the interests of the state ultimately predominate: the QOS programme has failed politically in the face of authoritarian centralism.
6. Visions of the future

6.1 Introduction

During the turbulent period when the research took place, it was inevitable that the question 'what of the future?' would have to be posed. This was asked of the Chief Inspectors and Superintendents in the survey, and during interview with senior officers and police department officials; the commentary of the latter afforded an insight into the foreseen development of the police department.

6.2 The Pessimistic Vision

In the survey and qualitative interviews respondents were asked to comment on the future of the service. More specifically, Chief Inspectors and Superintendents were asked: "On a scale of 1 to 7, how optimistic or pessimistic are you about the future of the Service?".

A mean score of 3.62 was calculated, hovering around the centre of the score range, but slightly more optimistic overall. Officers were then asked to expand upon their answers, and 148 respondents did so. The qualitative data fell broadly into optimistic and pessimistic answers, and these were categorised according to the dominant theme of each comment. 87 of the answers (59%) were on the more optimistic end of the scale, and 52 (or 35%) were more pessimistic. 9 responses (or 6%) were categorised as 'ambivalent'.

The pessimistic answers were categorised as shown below:

| Pessimistic                  | Ch.Insps | Supts. | Total |%
|------------------------------|----------|--------|-------|---
| Govt/political actions       | 8        | 4      | 12    | (23)%
| The Policing Function        | 7        | 5      | 12    | (23)%
| External pressure/agencies   | 2        | 4      | 6     | (12)%
| Change and uncertainty       | 3        | 0      | 3     | (6)%
| 'Too many experts'           | 2        | 0      | 2     | (4)%
| Misc/Mixed                   | 8        | 9      | 17    | (33)%
| **Totals**                   | **30**   | **22** | **52**| **(101)%**

As suggested by this table, there was some concern about the actions of the government. In some contrast to the idea that the Tories have bolstered 'law and order', one Chief Inspector from Force 1 wrote:
"The Government gives me no confidence having watered down the whole criminal justice system. The public needs protection. The C.P.S. were introduced for economic grounds and this has lowered the morale of the operational officer, which makes the public less sympathetic to our aims." (008)

Other respondents expressed anxiety about the centralisation of power over the Police, including a Superintendent from Force 3:

"Current white paper proposals in the context of Tory politics will centralise control over policing through cash limited budgets and Home Office appointed Commissar (chair of police authority), while deceiving the public into perceiving police as local." (248)

After 'government/political actions' the next most common analytic category was the 'policing function'. There was an indication from some officers that the real aims of policing (perhaps what we could call 'functional quality') were in danger of being lost in the current melee. It is perhaps unsurprising that detective officers were amongst those who voiced such concerns and as one noted:

"Unless we develop a method and a will - whereby we explain to the public and politicians where it is going wrong and reject this glossy 'sexy' management style and 'buzz words' I fear for the efficiency of the service."

(Force 1 Detective Superintendent 056)

Given the impact of the police and CJS reforms, it is little wonder that a number of comments centred on external pressures. One officer from Force 2 obviously felt this:

"Too many outside factors impinging on service i.e. Criminal Justice System, Central Government, Audit Commission etc. They are setting priorities which are not necessarily best for future of service."

(Supt 128)

One third of the 52 pessimistic responses were classified as 'miscellaneous' due to their disparate and wide-ranging nature. Amongst the issues of concern were: perceived declining standards in society; lack of support from the public; the liberal attitude to offenders; lack of resources in the Police; the increase in police personnel concerned primarily with their own advancement.

The emphasis on managerialist evolution had obviously not impressed one Chief Inspector from Force 2:
"It's nothing I can put my finger on. Past 10 years have seen a plethora of management styles and tools, yet I wonder whether the professionalism and effectiveness of the service has changed markedly for the better. A lot of espoused theory which seemingly is not translated into action." (103)

More generally, there was a sense of uncertainty about the development of policing, and considerable frustration with the government and other aspects of the CJS.

Turning to the qualitative interviews, it was obvious that most senior officers were confident about the future of the police, despite all the contemporary events. However, in a minority of cases, some more pessimistic views were expressed. One particularly outspoken ACC (from Force 3, interview 082 22.3.94) held a bleak view of the government and indeed of broader societal/sociological developments. On the former, he stated:

"One really gets a very clear picture of a government with no strategy... There's no long-term vision at all, and everything is being, is being led by short-term political imperatives..." (TC 165)

This officer was annoyed by the unrealistic criticism of the police in terms of their apparent failure to combat crime, and the attempt to take the "heat" off the government with proposed reforms such as Sheehy. The "juvenile notion" of assessing the police like a business was blamed on a "totally feeble" understanding of policing (TC 291). Concern was expressed about the weakening of local accountability and the threat to the police function of achieving compromise. He defined the police role:

"... it's actually been about cooling the friction between different parts of society, and the more power of direction to police that you give to one of those parts of society, which has actually been the Tory objectives in this, then the less legitimacy we have as a servant to the whole of society - and I think that's a very dangerous issue, and I think that we need to guard against that. I think we will, but not without a lot of pain." (TC 235-244)

The "management dogma" of the 1980s was lambasted by this respondent (TC 270); it was felt too that the government's "absurd lack of strategy" could lead to an increasingly fragmented society. It was clear that this particular officer rejected the values of new managerialism and those of the Conservative government which Farnham and Horton (1993) outline.

A rather less sanguine ACC from Force 3 (interview 059 11.11.93) was certain that the 'service' aspect of
policing would "slowly, but surely, disappear", and predicted that other bodies would undertake service functions, more cheaply (TC 350). It was felt that the White Paper would transform the police into a enforcement agency, and the possibility of a CRS-style police force was regarded as abhorrent (TC 361). On a totally depressing note, the direction of policing in society would parallel George Orwell's vision of '1984' (TC 376).

Generally where respondents had concerns about the future of the service, a key factor was the threat to localised accountability and control of policing. One less than optimistic Force 1 Chief Superintendent (interview 040 25.8.93) expressed grave concerns about the centralising activities of government (TC 452), and regretted the amount of stress on the service:

"You've got the potential for a very destabilised organisation. And I just don't know what the critical mass of destabilisation is before it actually starts to fragment." (TC 423)

One Chief Superintendent (interview 074 25.1.94) was concerned about the danger of growing instrumentality in the police: he worried that with greater emphasis on contracts within the police some officers would cease to 'give their all' and may be reluctant to perform duties which were not formally designated as theirs. He felt that there is a new breed of officers who do not join the police for life, and said:

"In some ways I think we have a less professional police service than we've had in the past, purely because a lot of people are working to their own agendas throughout the organisation...I actually think the Service changed inexorably after the Miners' Strike. It became a very money-oriented service then, I think that was part of it." (TC 170-183)

In May 1995 I interviewed a key member of the ACPO QOS committee who was rather gloomy about the impact of the police reforms and the status of the QOS programme (interview 103 1.5.95). He tended to agree that the ascendancy of the crime agenda was displacing the emphasis on quality:

"I sense that that's the way that most forces are now directing their energy, that crime is the main job of the police ... the Home Secretary's key objectives would reinforce that ... the focus of all of the objectives I think is really towards crime, and that's the way the service is necessarily heading." (TC 060-070)

A very despondent Chief Superintendent (interview 054 8.11.93) was asked if the Police Service had
changed for the worse in recent years:

"No, Society's changed for the worse in the last 10 years, not the police force, and it reflects that." (TC 636)

This officer was nearing the end of his service and added:

"Because I'm at the end I have no investment in the future, so I cannot look at it in other than, I find it very difficult to look at it in other than a pessimistic way, because it's not what I knew. And it's not what I enjoy, the society's policing is not one that I necessarily feel comfortable with anymore." (TC 712-725)

He felt that the "pendulum has swung so far" that the public avoid all accountability, the burden of which falls upon the police which is "now held incredibly accountable for everything that it does" (TC 770). He admitted, rather poignantly, that he was "cynical and jaundiced" and stated:

"The whole culture of the organisation has changed. It's not an organisation I feel comfortable with anymore, and that's sad... Get me another Chief Superintendent, this one's broken." (TC 120/211)

In summary, while most interview respondents were optimistic about the future of policing, there were some concerns as indicated in this section. Such concerns included the centralising tendencies of the police reforms, the injection of market concepts and values, as well as the wider social milieu with its increased fragmentation. The competitive ethos of the Tory government, and its New Agenda of reform, has without doubt dented the optimism of some senior officers.

There was also some feeling that the public service ethos of the police is already being eroded by the egocentric attitudes of some officers and the dominance of the market model. One Force 3 Chief Superintendent (interview 060 11.11.93) was very concerned by the emphasis on competitive tendering and the police 'being driven more by the balance sheet' (TC 500):

"... and potentially if that momentum gets going, then I think inevitably a, you know, a Police Service that is not so committed, is more remote from its public... I have severe personal doubts about the utility of, sort of, market forces..." (TC 502/555)
In a similar vein, a Chief Inspector (interview 015 30.4.93) said of the business driven police reforms such as Sheehy:

"They want to make it like any other job, and it isn't like any other job..." (TC 172)

6.3 The optimistic vision

A higher proportion of Chief Inspectors and Superintendents were optimistic about the future of the Service. The 87 responses from these officers were categorised as shown in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optimism about future of the Police</th>
<th>Ch.Insps</th>
<th>Supts.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change is required</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13    (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police open to change</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6     (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7     (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Things will settle'</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5     (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive national debate/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government influence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5     (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivability of the Police</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5     (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police will always be needed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4     (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence/importance of the public</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2     (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QOS focus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2     (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement in CJS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2     (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force development</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3     (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc/Mixed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33    (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>87    (99%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was quite a range of response, and over one third of answers could not be categorised easily under one heading. Statistical analysis revealed that the older (and longest serving) group of officers were least optimistic about the future of the service. What is interesting is that few respondents referred directly to the QOS initiative as a good cause for optimism, although several touched upon themes associated with the programme (such as cultural change). Examples of comment are discussed below.

Interestingly, 19 officers felt that change is required in the police, or indeed that the Service is receptive to...
Typical of the belief that change is to be welcomed was the response of a Force 1 Chief Inspector:

"I do believe that changes are required and I am prepared to support change for the better. There needs to be a culture change and the sooner it happens the better. I believe the Police Service is well on the way to creating those improvements." (028)

A Force 3 Chief Inspector echoed the view that the Service is open to evolution:

"There are some very encouraging signs in some areas of new leadership style (balanced and flexible) both in middle and upper management. New recruits are also encouraged to have a wider vision, although it may be an uphill battle for some against the changing culture. We must strive collectively for continuous improvement." (227)

Similar numbers of officers emphasised the high quality of staff now recruited to the police, the fact that the period of upheaval in the police would pass, the positive impact of the national debate, and the 'survivability' of the police. On the topic of national debate, a Force 2 Superintendent asserted:

"Save for Sheehy, the other debates over policing auger well for the future. More local accountability on specified measurable criteria will focus effort towards those issues which count." (127)

Several survey respondents (and indeed interviewees) were sure that the police would always survive periods of change and upheaval. As one Chief Inspector (Force 3) stated:

"Thankfully common sense still rules in the service - which has a remarkable ability to accept and absorb changes whilst continuing to police fairly and effectively." (229)

Given the focus of this thesis on QOS, it is noteworthy that there was very little direct and specific reference to the 'quality approach'. However, a Force 2 Chief Inspector did cite this as a cause for optimism:

"The quality of service/customer orientation of the service gives great cause for optimism. The proposals creating greater central government control and the drive for centrally developed PIs give cause for pessimism. Local accountability and local control are imperative, judged on local PIs." (115)

Some mixed commentary included reference to the benefits of 'partnership':
"With the onset of sector policing, community partnerships, problem solving, joint agency training, aligned boundaries, data sharing, better training and more enlightened management. There is still a good deal to be done though!"
(Force 1 Superintendent 058)

The majority of police interviewees tended to be optimistic about the future of the Service, with many stressing the high calibre of current recruits, and the way in which the Police Service is able to adapt to change. In some contrast to many respondents, one DCC (interview 035 19.8.93) was generally optimistic about the police reforms; when questioned if the government was trying to undermine the professional status of the Service, he replied:

"I think the result of Sheehy, if it was adopted, might actually accomplish that. I honestly don't think it's the government's intention... I think the reverse is true. I very much sense they're giving a lot more responsibility to Chief Constables, and facilitating them in a way that they can actually achieve more for the force..." (TC 746-766)

This DCC also supported the main thrust of the White Paper (TC 820), although he did question the mooted composition of the new PAs.

Another DCC (interview 039 23.8.93) emphasised that (given his role) he would have to hold an optimistic vision of the future, and added:

"...We've got such a lot of talented people in the job. And people really think things through... we call ourselves a Police Service now, don't we, and that's what we are. We want to provide a service, we are keen to provide that service, and we'll have the professional skills to be able to do it. We're no longer just policemen, we're running the Service in a business-like way, that's what I think we have to do. Not as a business, but in a business-like way." (TC 287-297)

It was felt that elements of the White Paper, Runciman and Sheehy provided a "springboard" for development. (TC 305)

Although the third DCC (interview 067 13.12.93) had grave concerns about the centralisation of power, he nevertheless expressed optimism about the calibre of staff and said:
"I'm always optimistic... the Police Service, ever since it began, has an amazing ability to change. It may be slow to change, but when you look at the changes that the Police Service has absorbed, say over the last 25 years, I don't know any other organisation that would have done that." (TC 170)

One of the Chief Constables (interview 098 14.10.94) was confident that some 'good bits' would emerge from the police reforms, and was pleased that "the really stupid bits of Sheehy have been kicked into touch" (TC 500). He reflected that he always tried to be "upbeat" about major developments, but his optimism was tinged by fear about the reduction of funding for the Service.

Another Chief had a more optimistic view during his first interview (031 2.8.93) when he said:

"I think pessimistic would have been my answer some time ago, because I think that we weren't making the impact that we should have been doing, particularly at ACPO rank. I think we are now doing that. So I'm an optimist..." (TC 162)

In this chief's second interview (093 23.8.94) he expressed concern about the "new arrangements" and how these could adversely impact on the provision of service in this force.

As with police officers in-force, HMIC respondents were predominantly optimistic about the future of the Service. One senior member (interview 076 26.1.94) stated:

"Absolute optimism, I've no doubt about that. I think, I think there's been a lot of posturing over the changes that are imminent. They are fundamental, they're by and large ones though as a Chief Constable I would have welcomed. I welcome the changes to Police Authorities, despite all the arguments going on about them. I welcome the change to funding, because I think it will give the Chief Constable a lot more scope. I welcome all that the Service is doing on quality of service and ethics. I welcome the introduction of performance measures and evaluation... the one issue I'm uncomfortable about, and I think the whole of the Inspectorate is uncomfortable about, is the Home Secretary nominating the Chairman of Police Authorities." (TC 612-633)

A very senior HMIC respondent (interview 088 3.5.94) was "very optimistic" about the future, and felt strongly that the police reforms would bring about greater efficiency (TC 890). In addition, it was thought that the introduction of better IT systems within the next four years would be of great benefit.
6.4 The Police Department

Interviews with police department officials formed a significant element of the research, especially with the emphasis on analysing the relationship between the service and the central state. As well as eliciting views on the QOS programme, HO officials were interviewed on the topic of the department itself; examples of interview questions are shown below:

* Does the department share a corporate vision?
* Is there a clear hierarchy of divisions within the department?
* What is your vision of the department in 5 to 10 years time?

This section will focus predominantly on the views put forward by HO officials, and offers a rare insight into their perceptions. Lustgarten (1986, p.100) notes his interviews with HO officials, and justifies this focus by emphasising the dearth of material on the workings of central government.

In one of the earliest interviews (011 8.3.93 not taped) one official was asked if the police department was a unitary entity (see appendix for departmental organisation). In reply, it was noted that the divisions were still mainly based around ‘functional units’, but that future business plans would cut across divisional boundaries rather more. In response to the same question, a head of division (interview 058 10.11.93) suggested that the department was “reasonably” unified, but less so than other departments (TC 071). Nevertheless, it was added, the coherent objectives of the department provided the “cement”, and that officials tend to “speak the same language” when together (TC 092). This perhaps suggests the civil service equivalent of a police occupational culture.

A former head of division (interview 020 27.9.93) who had worked in the department in the late 1980s criticised the manner in which the department tended to work in small divisions (TC 086). It was felt that the department worked in separate compartments (TC 107), and that it was difficult to have a clear mission statement given the turnover of Home Secretaries and the difficulties of management (TC 206). In his old division, officials were largely left “to carry on .... as we thought best” (TC 219), without a clear blueprint.
Evidence that there was now a clearer sense of ‘direction’ was provided by a head of division (interview 056 10.11.93), who felt that there was a very different ethos within the department (TC 348). It was felt that Ian Burns (then Deputy Under-Secretary of State) was managing in a positive manner and ‘forcing things through’ (TC 357). The strategy of the department was deemed to be much clearer than it was ‘even four years ago’, and he noted that the relationship with the police was now very different:

“It wouldn’t have been appropriate for the Home Office to have a strategy for policing, that was a police matter. Now it’s seen to be highly appropriate that we have a strategy for policing, and that we do make statements to the police....” (TC 336).

This clearly replaces the less direct mode of influence pinpointed by Lustgarten (1986). It was stressed that the department was defining its role much ‘more tightly’ (TC 430):

“Beforehand the very close link between the police, the police department and Home Office, it was almost a sort of club. Money was freely available, if the Home Secretary went to speak to a police audience, it was all terribly friendly....” (TC 440).

The penetration of new managerialist imperatives, and the concomitant emphasis on the three Es, was echoed in the comments that there is an ‘awful lot of money’ going into the police, and that the Home Secretary:

“cannot carry on that sort of very relaxed, easy relationship between the police and the Home Office.... It is now much more business-like, much more professional, far more searching questions are being asked.... The whole question of what this division should be doing is a very live issue, and it’s a part of the process of the office, of the police department, trying to redefine its role vis-a-vis the police.” (TC 460/525)

A very senior official (interview 086 26.4.94) believed that there was a clear sense of mission within the department, and refuted the idea that divisions ‘went their own way’ (TC 115). Another (interview 092 9.8.94) similarly rejected the notion that the F divisions complete tasks in some isolation:

“.... they don’t have the luxury of being able to do things that they’d quite like to do, because they just don’t have resources there, the pressure is really on....” (TC 150)

It was agreed there was a sense of corporacy within the department, but that this was stronger in some areas.
than others (TC 190). It was felt that the police reforms had not enhanced the sense of corporacy (TC 808).

Somewhat more jaded views were provided by a head of division (interview 068 29.11.93) who reflected on the achievements of the division:

"Well we're limping towards a sort of planning process.... I think that our pressures on it have sharpened that up a bit, certainly in recent months." (TC 169)

On the question of a common mission and departmental corporacy it was stated:

"No, I wouldn't have thought so. There's quite a split, I think, between.... I think there are three or four corporacies, there are natural clusters. And I think there's a serious split between divisions that I would say are operational.... [and those that are not]"

One head of division (interview 090 21.7.94) did not feel there was a "terribly" common understanding of mission (TC 150), and suggested this could be due to some ambivalence about the consequences of the police reforms (TC 159). She added that she had not tested out any level of corporacy, but sensed some cynicism about government policy (TC 167). This respondent stressed she had to be "very careful" about commenting on the impact of the Police Bill (and any ramifications for corporacy) because she and her colleagues were part of the government machine (TC 180). Apparently some civil servants in the department were not surprised at some of the opposition to the Bill, especially given the emphasis on introducing "management principles", as opposed 'to a democratic way of looking at it' (TC 220). This would suggest, then, a measure of cynicism about the reforms and the introduction of new managerialist principles on the part of some officials.

In some contradiction to this last respondent another division head (interview 061 26.11.93) did perceive a corporate approach, while another (interview 091 21.7.94) felt that traditions within the civil service, and the free flow of information between divisions whose responsibilities overlap, help to engender a strong sense of mission (TC 195). Moreover, despite its "inchoate" nature, there is a clear commitment to the tripartite structure as understood within the department (TC 200).

Brogden (1982) discusses the impact and perception of the 1964 Police Act, and the standardization of the tripartite structure. He reflects on (p.77) the common view that the power of chief constables was enhanced, whilst the power of the Police Authority was limited. He notes too (p.78) the "rigid managerialist perspective" of the 1964 Act that "democracy is an unnatural intrusion into the expert practice of social
control by professional police officers”. Lustgarten (ibid, p.74-75) also delineates the parameters of the tripartite structure after the 1964 Act, and discusses the “working relationships” within the structure (p.105). Given the recent police reforms, and the impact of new public managerialism, it has become clear that the necessary consensus about policing and its management within tripartite system which Lustgarten highlights (p.113) has been severely threatened. It was evident from my interviews that officials still valued highly the tenets of the tripartite arrangement, but that some feared the disequilibrium caused by recent changes.

Nevertheless, compared to three years ago, according to the official cited above, the cohesiveness of the department had strengthened, due in part to growing financial pressure and the imperative of prioritising and reaching a collective view (TC 246).

One senior official (interview 072 20.1.94) who had previously been in the department also commented on the common sense of mission:

“Well, I think probably not as clear as there is in the prison service, but that’s the nature of the police really. I mean, the Home Office is not directly running the police service.... so I mean any vision is a bit more diffuse anyway, I think, because the police service is that kind of service, you know despite the current furore going on about it it remains, for the moment anyway, a locally-based service. And the Home Office is a player in the tri-partite structure, an important player, and an influential player, but it’s not the management of the police service. It’s not directing the police service.... (TC 089-104)

An Assistant Under-Secretary of State (AUS) (interview 089 3.5.94) was quite convinced that there was a clear sense of mission and that this had been enhanced by the reform programme:

“Yes, yes I think there certainly is. I think it’s particularly tied to the new developments, the reform programme.... One senses coming in here, that there is a feeling here of change going on, and quite practical change all over the place. And a feeling that, on the whole.... this is the right way for the department and the police service to be moving.... There’s quite a close knit feeling, I think, in the police department....” (TC 121-130)

Another AUS (interview 087 3.5.94), when asked about any clear sense of mission, joked that this was not really the language which ‘sprang to mind’! (TC 195). It was felt that the HO has its own “strong cultural characteristics of its own within Whitehall” (TC 201), and indeed that within the HO the police department has its unique sense of identity. This official believed that the different ethos of the department very much
stemmed from the power-sharing and co-operative work within the tripartite system (TC 225). We might wonder if this ethos will alter given the changing dynamics of that system. As suggested already this certainly seemed to be the fear hinted at by some respondents. This AUS claimed that:

“... there’s not a great mission to do something to the police one way or another!” (TC 242)

An AUS (interview 092 9.8.94) doubted that there was a hierarchy of divisions within the department (TC 248), but another official at this level (interview 086 26.4.94) believed that the predominance of a division varied from time-to-time and the subject prevalent at the time (TC 105). Another senior official (interview 072 20.1.94) was asked about a possible hierarchy:

“If there were, I think F1 would be very close to the top, if not at the top. I’m not sure that there was a pecking order in quite the way you mean. I think in practical terms F1 probably had more influence than other divisions, but I mean that was the nature of the subject as much as anything.” (TC 064-075)

While one head of division (interview 091 21.7.94) doubted there was an internal hierarchy, it was added:

“Some of us are worried that F1 is becoming too big, finance division is starting to suck in policy and at a time of public expenditure constraint, that’s probably inevitable, but in my view it needs to be resisted because I think part of the role of the finance division is ruthlessly to test the priorities and policy assumptions.... .... and if they’ve actually taken some of the policy matters into their own division, then I think they cease to ask the questions quite as acutely, and you know, they may be biased about some areas of policies.” (TC 261-277).

This respondent was certainly one of the most candid civil servants interviewed, and added that in terms of internal office politics, there were some head of division posts which were regarded as more or less attractive and/or ‘heavily-loaded’ (TC 279).

With the onset of the police reforms, it was deemed critical to question officials about the future of the department. Some respondents answered this more specifically than others; some appeared a little hesitant about committing themselves on tape-recorder! Having completed the interviews, I gained the general impression that the department would shrink in size, but become more powerful in terms of holding the service to account. It was clear that the department (as well as the police) was undergoing a period of significant change, and that its operational framework was increasingly imbued with a ‘business-like’,
managerialist ethos. The more candid interviewees suggested that not all within the department were happy with the current changes. A selection of comments are provided here to present a vision of the future.

It is perhaps more useful to present data from 1993-1995 in a roughly chronological order. This will help to reflect the policy development in that period, and be more attuned to the ‘process’ of social phenomena (see Bryman, 1988 Chapter 3). A clutch of civil servants were interviewed in November 1993, and one division head (interview 064 29.11.93) was asked about any radical evolution in the department over the next 3 years:

“Radical? I think there is evolution, I don’t think there’s any radical evolution. It ought to slim down, but my fear would be that bits, that the directive bits, the analysing police planning bits, and all this sort of, you know, ‘you must manage it right’ bits will grow to the detriment of the bits that might be helping in a more practical sense.” (TC 321-336)

Another head was asked a similar question:

“I think police department is going to be, or should be, and certainly expects to be, quite substantially affected by the police reforms, the Home Secretary’s reforms, in the sense that we will not have the same, the department will not have the same, hands-on involvement in things like complement levels. And financial matters, as it has had.... and I think some of the subsidiary reforms, like discipline reforms, means that again that we become more distant.... The police service and police authorities are expected to have much more of the primary management responsibility. And that must reflect on what we do....” (TC 176-188)

It was anticipated that from April 1995, when ‘new financial regimes’ would come into play, the department would be subject to considerable restructuring. One division head (interview 056 10.11.93), who clearly acknowledged the centralising tendencies of the police reforms, reflected on the radical changes afoot:

“So the Inspectorate’s changing, ACPO’s changing, police department’s changing in the whole emphasis with the White Paper, it’s a major shift.... the whole process of setting targets for the police. The whole, much greater central direction then we’ve ever seen in the past. Always in the past the police department has stood way back from the police service.... So there’s much greater centralisation, which again affects the organisation of this place.” (TC 190-204)
Despite the shrinkage of central government departments, it was suggested, the latter are “in many respects becoming far more powerful, because they are the ones that are actually setting the key objectives” (TC 237). It was felt that the new model was much simpler than the previous arrangements (TC 257); having set the targets, one can now “bang the police over the head if they don’t deliver” (TC 702). Later in the interview, this head of division suggested that the department would become more directive in an operational sense (which perhaps contrasts with some earlier comments about devolved responsibility):

“We will see government being very active, but that poses a problem for us in terms of the constant shrinkage of central government at the centre.... there’s no expansion of central government, but the complexities of central government get greater and greater.” (TC 209-214)

In sociological terms, the power elite in the central state will grow smaller, but more concentrated; neither will state involvement be ‘rolled back’. An AUS (interview 087 3.5.94) referred to “strengthening the influence of the Home Office”, but found it difficult to predict what would happen in the near future with:

“Devolution, of control, and the police taking a closer grip on their own management.... it could change things in a way that will surprise us....” (TC 190)

Another AUS interviewed on the same day in May 1994 (089 3.5.94) noted the growing departmental emphasis on police operations against crime. This respondent highlighted the recent AC work on crime management and suggested that there was a whole range of areas in which the department wished to develop “better practice” and “better dissemination of good practice” (TC 110): this development is also linked specifically to the PRG. This official was keen to point out that the department did not wish to dictate to the police, but being at the centre facilitated the acquisition of beneficial knowledge (TC 280). This AUS believed there had been a feeling within the HO that the reforms were necessary, and that the “whole thing needs to be drawn together and focussed” (TC 460). On the performance review unit in F1, it was stated:

“I think broadly the role of that unit will be to, as it were, police the key objectives and policing plans, in the sense of picking up the information of what is happening locally and nationally, and all of that .... towards setting future performance indicators, future key objectives and all of that, I mean as a continuing programme.” (TC 503-508)

One of the respondents at AUS grade, interviewed in August 1994 (interview 092 9.8.94) believed that the influence of the police department was possibly decreasing, and emphasised that s/he could detect no
“expansionist tendency” (TC 593). However, s/he acknowledged that some might perceive the growth of direct department influence over the police, and that in the past, there has been a greater tendency to rely on “indirect influence” (TC 040). The recent departmental strategic document (provided by the respondent) overtly addressed its aims and raison d’etre (TC 039).

One of the last interviewees (104 25.5.95) asserted that F1 was “now essentially about performance management” (TC 033) and that the change in funding arrangements:

“Very significantly affects the role of our part of the office because there used to be a great deal of politics in the setting of complements. .... there’s been a significant change, I think in the sense that the way in which we exert, the way in which the Home Secretary exerts his influence in the tripartite process has very considerably changed, and as it was intended to do....” (TC 162/190)

This division head continued on the wider pressure for change within government:

“.... which is much more to do with management structures and accountability structures.... There is a senior management review going on at the moment in the Home Office.... there is a remit by April 1st next year to change the senior management structure, in such a way that there are fewer layers than at present, and by implication it is rationalised in some sense to make it better suited than it is at the moment to meeting the needs of both the Home Secretary and his colleagues, and, as it were, our customers.” (TC 200-215)

This data extract neatly echoes the imperatives of new managerialism discussed in chapter 2. The broader ideas of market testing, service functions, and agency status, permeating the whole of Whitehall, were noted (TC 252-260): department officials are conscious that they are on the “brink” of radical changes, and that these should “bite” in a few months time (TC 320). Some civil servants, it was added, would be unable to live with the changes (TC 329), and already there are some changes in ethos (but the “real changes” are yet to come) [TC 338]. The “broad thrust” is to establish a core of policy advisers, with those providing the services subject to market-testing, or else forming part of an agency (TC 252).

Horton (in Farnham and Horton 1993) adroitly charts the evolution of the civil service and provides an analysis concordant with the empirical data obtained during interview. She recalls (p.127) that the Conservative government has been committed to eradicating the inefficiency of state bureaucracy, ‘deprivilegising’ the civil service, and altering its culture so that it might embrace VFM and new
managerialist principles (p.133). She suggests (p.137) that by 1987 the government’s approach to public service management had begun to crystallise and writes (p.145):

"The 1980s was a period of radical organisational development in the civil service. Managerialism in the sense of a preoccupation with the economical, efficient and effective use of resources to achieve predetermined goals and objectives is now anchored as part of the mission of all civil servants.... There is greater decentralisation and devolution of budgets, clearer line management accountabilities and an efficiency ethos is pervasive."

We might suggest here that the civil service reforms have come relatively late to the police department (as indeed the broader public sector reforms came late to the police service), but that the changes ushered in by the ‘Next Steps’ initiative (see Horton, ibid, p.138) have, as the respondent above evinced, begun to bite. Horton (p.139) attests that ‘Next Steps’ has begun the process of breaking up the unified civil service created in 1920, has embraced the lessons of TQM and the quest for customer satisfaction (ibid, p.146), and adds (p.147) that the new brand of civil service management:

"challenges traditional forms of public accountability, ministerial responsibility, and the anonymity and impartiality of civil servants."

Horton concludes (p.148) that the trends of the 1980s continue into the 1990s, that the new civil service will be less monolithic, and that it will be characterised by small policy departments based centrally in Whitehall. This latter point particularly was emphasised by several police department officials who were well aware of the radical changes just beyond the horizon. It was also clear from the interviews that the tenets of the three Es had already permeated the departmental philosophy, and that the strategic focus had been acutely sharpened in the early 1990s.

Coxall and Robins (1994, p.150) indicate that in 1992, there were just under 3500 civil servants in the top five grades (which equated to 0.7% of the non-industrial civil servants) and that this “administrative elite” run the country in conjunction with their ministerial superiors. They distinguish (p.151) the traditional constitutional difference between the political role of ministers and the administrative role of civil servants, but too note (p.152) the erosion of neutrality and anonymity of officials. By reference to the government’s efficiency scrutinies under Derek Rayner, the FMI and the ‘Next Steps’ programme, they outline the civil service reform programme.
They pinpoint (p.158) the criticism of the ‘Next Steps’ programme which include dangers of blurred accountability, the fragmentation of a national civil service and the increasing privatisation of civil service functions and add:

"By 1992 the concern was being expressed that managerialism, performance-related pay, competitive tendering and hiving off were de-motivating and demoralising the civil service and in the process undermining its traditional ethic of disinterested public service.” (P.159)

From the police department interviews, it became clear that there was a range of views about the sense of cohesion; less varied, however, were the perceived changes to the department which reflect (or will reflect) the programme of reform set in motion by the government. Officials could foresee the shrinkage of the department, and the growing emphasis on establishing a core policy group and service-providing agencies. There was some diversity of opinion, however, on the topic of centralisation (or otherwise) of control over the police [see also chapter 5]. It was clear, nevertheless, that the tenets of ‘new managerialism’ and cultural changes as discussed by Horton (1993) and Coxall and Robins (1994) had penetrated the ranks of the police department, and that since 1990 officials perceived a clearer strategy and sense of direction. Coxall and Robins (1994, p.153) refer to the reassertion of political control over the civil service; it would appear from some interview data that the government’s assertion of control over the police had caused some discomfort for officials. We might conclude too that the political control over the police has been logically paralleled by the political control over civil servants who are themselves increasingly accountable to the ideological and political imperatives of the Conservative government. The state machinery is more rigidly locked into the political prerogatives of the government - perhaps very soon there will be no reason to distinguish between the government and the apparatus of the state, with the latter increasingly subject to the CCTV mentality of the former. Perhaps the 1990s have taken us that bit closer to ‘Big Brother’. Perhaps this is an historical inevitability. Possibly history will reveal the apposite nature of the phrase ‘Next Steps’.

6.5 The HMIC and the Audit Commission

In chapter 2 it was indicated that the AC has become increasingly influential in setting the policing agenda. One of the research questions was whether or not this influence has augmented at the expense of the HMIC’s authority. I was keen to determine how significant actors in the policing world envisaged the future role of the HMIC, and whether the stature of the AC would increasingly overshadow the HMIC. Chapter 5 was concerned with pinpointing conflict between (amongst others) the HMIC and the AC: it is intended that this section will explore further the relationship between these two bodies.
It is often argued that the ‘teeth’ of the HMIC have become sharper in recent years, and that the abilities of
the Inspectors are far more pronounced than in previous decades. Tony Judge (in ‘Police’) wrote in 1991:

“.... nowhere has change in policing been more emphatic than in Her Majesty’s Inspectors of
Constabulary. The new breed of youngish ex-chief officers, plucked from their commands while
ambition still drives them, has little in common with the patrician, elderly, decent old buffers for whom
the Inspectorate was a congenial sinecure.... Today’s HMIs are a far more hard nosed bunch than the
“gentlemen policemen” they have replaced... In a service that resents the “value for money” obsessions
of Home Office Ministers and senior civil servants, the Inspectorate is viewed with a mixture of
suspicion and puzzlement.” (p.24)

Lustgarten suggested in 1986 that the HMIC “occupies the critical space between central government, chief
constables, and, on occasion, police authorities” (p.106). He noted too (p.107) that the Inspectors of
Constabulary had become increasingly influential, and that although the expertise of HMIC commanded
“considerable influence, the policies it promotes, and the ends it services, are ultimately those of the Home
Office” (p.107).

Leishman and Savage (1993, p.217) discuss the “more assertive and demanding approach” of the HMIC in
its annual inspections, and the 1993 White Paper on Police Reform (p.35) noted the government’s intention
to strengthen the Inspectorate and to “reinforce its ability to act as an independent, open and objective
assessor of the quality of policing.”

Despite such sentiments, however, there was empirical evidence to suggest that the HMIC were regarded
as decreasingly significant actors, and that their legitimacy to effect change was somewhat limited (and
probably on the wane). This was especially the case when the role and power of the HMIC was contrasted
to that of the AC. Tony Judge (ibid, p.24) made an apposite observation in noting that HM Inspectors are
fairly low down in the “social and procedural pecking order in the Establishment”, and some interview data
tended to reinforce this.

One of the principal themes in interviews with HMIC respondents and senior officers was whether or not
the Inspectorate had gained in impact, and indeed whether or not this would increase. Unsurprisingly,
practically all HMIC respondents indicated that the Inspectorate had grown sharper ‘teeth’, and that it would
be an increasingly important agency.
One senior HMIC respondent (interview 076 26.1.94), who was very keen to emphasise the independence of the Inspectorate (and his appointment under the Crown, and not the civil service), was asked if he had seen the role of the HMIC change:

“Yes, dramatic. I would say dramatic. And I would have been disappointed had it been otherwise.... I think there was a deliberate attempt to try to get people of better quality into the Inspectorate.... It was seen by the Service as a bit of a sinecure....” (TC 148-159)

This respondent talked of the HMIC role during the reform process, as well as the frustration that the direct attention of ministers and the Home Secretary is not always forthcoming (as intimated by Tony Judge in the 'Police' article):

“I find that through our meetings with the civil servants, senior civil servants, our views are always well taken on board and taken into consideration. I think the greatest disappointment for me has been our lack of direct influence on ministers. The Chief HMI is supposed to be the senior police adviser to the Home Secretary, that is his role. I know that he doesn't see the Home Secretary as often as he would wish.” (TC 036-056)

It was added that ‘we as a group’ see Ministers and the Home Secretary from time-to-time:

“.... but it isn't really often enough to get a proper dialogue going, and the general feeling is that what we have to say is diluted through senior civil servants on its way to getting to ministers, and it's like trying to put your views through a marshmallow really. It's tough getting through.” (060-063)

The early 1990s have seen thematic inspections and the open publication of HMIC reports on forces, and this respondent noted that such reports were now written with much more care, and helped engender greater respect for the Inspectorate (TC 202). I asked if the HMIC would become increasingly influential in the way that forces operate:

“I think it already has, and I think the Chief Officers would agree to that, they don’t always like it.” (TC 212)

Although the HMIC do not have operational responsibility and the Chief is “still king in his own castle” (TC 216), it would be a foolish chief constable who ignores the advice of the HMIC, and also according to this
respondent, not many chiefs do (TC 227). Another very senior respondent, interviewed at Queen Anne’s Gate (interview 024 15.6.93), felt it difficult to assess personally if the role of HMIC had changed markedly during his period in office (TC 207). He suspected that Inspectorate had not yet impacted fully service-wise but agreed that the HMIC has had a growing influence over the service:

“Our aim is to help the Service to be better.... ... I see us getting deeper and deeper, through performance indicators and the like, into the real issues of the policing, to be able to ask the right questions, and be able to give it the right thrust to make conclusions....” (TC 254-265)

An HMIC Chief Superintendent, also interviewed at QAG (interview 062 26.11.93) looked to the future:

“I think we will see in the next few years the Inspectorate being more up-front in providing guidance on minimum standards in certain areas.... ....and we’re looking to try and gain greater corporacy, greater similarities in the methodologies used by each Inspector, and his support staff in inspections.” (TC 094-117)

This officer disagreed that the HMIC was too closely allied to the policies of the HO, but this view is not necessarily shared by others. A ‘Police’ article (November 1995, p.5) questioned the HMIC claim of independence from the HO and criticised the then Chief HMI (Trefor Morris):

“Mr Morris sounds exactly like a junior Minister when he takes issue with his former chief officer colleagues who complain about inadequate funding.”

Another HMIC Chief Superintendent (interview 068 13.12.93) reflected on the development of HMIC over the next few years:

“What it might look like in five years time is slightly more problematic, but there is clearly a need because there are not any systems in being whereby the Home Office can be informed of what is going on in forces, basically. There is a need for a channel of communication.” (TC 351-370)

Lustgarten (ibid, p.106) notes the communication link between the HO and chief constables which is fulfilled by the HMIC.

Some concern was expressed about the lack of policing background on the part of lay inspectors (TC 289)
and this officer wondered if the Inspectorate would be privatised in the future (TC 300):

"If the inspection process becomes much more prescriptive, and becomes much more a matter of looking at a set of criteria of performance, then it takes away the need for what we currently call professional judgement, and that is difficult to define." (TC 342-349)

It is appropriate at this point to remember the growing influence of the Audit Commission who in a sense are 'outsiders' (bereft of police experience) and particularly wedded to the use of performance criteria - that is, a 'new managerialist' approach rather than a professional, public sector 'service ethic' approach. The Chief Superintendent was asked if he thought the influence of HMIC would increase or decrease in the next 5 years.

"I think it's going to increase, because of the increasing accountability pushed onto Police Authorities and Chief Constables. Someone has to be in a position to make judgements on that.... In global terms, I would say, the influence and possibly the power of the Inspectorate will grow." (TC 176-196)

A very senior respondent (interview 088 3.5.94) stressed the HMIC role of ensuring that the key objectives of the Home Secretary were "sensitive" and "achievable" (TC 032). It was added that the police reforms require a "fresh approach" by the Inspectorate (TC 050). I asked if the influence of HMIC over forces was likely to grow:

"I think the influence of the Inspectorate has grown, how much further it will grow remains to be seen. In a sense, even though the criticism is constructive, most people criticise to resent the criticism...." (TC 167-172)

This respondent felt that the HMIC is influential in the HO (TC 187), and noted that additional funds to "help out" police forces can be extricated by the Inspectorate. I questioned whether the relationship between the HO and HMIC might become too close: it was replied that the prime responsibility is to the Home Secretary, and added:

"... when you say close, that's what we're all about.... We are independent of judgement, but we can't get away from the fact that we're there, our prime purpose in life is to advise the Home Secretary on policing and tell him that all is well out there. People forget that, but we are independent, and there is clear evidence and demonstration that if the Inspectorate on its travels finds that the Home Office are
at fault then the Home Office will be criticised, because it's generally the Home Office officials that are at fault...” (TC 249-259)

It was firmly (and curtly) denied that some HMIC functions have been lost to the AC:

“No, they do a different job....” (TC 544)

The AC, it was argued, look at ‘particular issues’, and the HMIC helps them (TC 564). It was added that District Auditors rely on the HMIC to push through the AC recommendations, which is “hard work” (TC 600). I asked what the respondent saw as the greatest future challenge for HMIC:

“If the Inspectorate is going to do its job right, it’s got to take on board a more objective view of policing, rather than the exercise of professional judgement. So, keeping that balance is extremely difficult. That’s going to be the big test.... Inspections have been largely on professional judgement.... I think we’ve got to be more objective and have evidence for our views.” (TC 754-764)

In some contrast to the Chief Superintendent (interview 068) quoted above, this informant was keen to embrace the emphasis on ‘objective’ measurement at the expense of a professionalist approach. In defining a vision, this member suggested the HMIC would need to be more robust (TC 829), and that chief constables (with more “power over money”) and the police authorities would need “careful watching” (TC 825). The lay inspectors represent the “proxy intelligent customer” [which encapsulates neatly the consumerisation of public services], but it was not felt that there would be an increase in the number of such members (TC 850).

My analytic interest in the role of the Audit Commission vis-a-vis HMIC increased as the research progressed, and some of the later interviews focussed more specifically on this. The main AC respondent (interview 085 25.4.94) provided a very useful insight into self-perceptions of the Commission, and opinions on the HMIC. In relation to the AC function, it was said:

“We don’t see the police as an area where there are potentially large savings to be made, by, for example, looking to reduce the unit cost of an activity in the way that we would with a local authority service like, you know, refuse collection. So we’ve concentrated more on effectiveness issues, and the last report we published on ‘Tackling Crime’ I think was a good example of that. There weren’t many pounds and pence signs in that.” (TC 120-128)
According to this respondent, the AC ‘tease out what works’ by comparing and contrasting forces (TC 138). I asked if the AC role was becoming too high profile, which was answered affirmatively:

"I think, I’m constantly surprised by the credibility that our reports have with relatively little.... challenge to them. That’s partly because we are very open about the fact that the methodology draws on good practice which we observe. We’re not a think-tank, we don’t sit with sort of damp towels draped round our heads, and beaver away for hours on sort of new models of policing." (TC 204-215)

The advantage of the AC, it was felt, was that they have a friendlier approach, rather than the prescriptive mode of HMIC (TC 294). The HMIC have a difficulty in that their credibility can be weakened when their recommendations are challenged by chiefs (TC 318), while the Audit Commission:

"We do obviously have an independence from the Home Office which is important. I think also one advantage we have over the Inspectorate is that, you know, we’re not poacher-turned-gamekeeper. We’re people who’ve always been on the outside of policing...." (TC 309-315)

Interestingly, it was recalled that the HO tended to ignore AC reports in the “early days” (TC 340); I asked if the AC would become increasingly influential: it was suggested that this would depend on the perception of HMIC, ACPO and the other associations about whether or not the AC has successfully ‘pointed the way to doing things which can be adopted’. It was disagreed that the AC has had too much influence over the police (TC 521).

The majority of senior officers in the research supported and welcomed the efforts of the AC, but one ACC (interview 079 28.2.94) stated:

"I’ve been a bit disappointed by the Audit Commission, because they’ve come in, they’ve done a number of things now, they seem to come in fairly speedily.... And they go away and they make all sorts of grandiose recommendations that we’re supposed to take on board straightaway.... I don’t think they’re necessarily as well thought out as some people will give them credit for, and I think history will prove that to be the case, I really do think that." (TC 030-044)

This officer dismissed as superficial some of the AC reports and resented the fact that the findings in their recent ‘Tackling Crime’ paper had already been reached by his own force CID review, but the AC “take all sorts of credit” (TC 047). He also found it very difficult to accept the credentials of the district auditors who
had visited his force to check on effectiveness following the AC report (TC 067).

There was some suggestion during the research that the work of the AC had enhanced the role of HMIC. One police department official (interview 104 25.5.95) was asked if the influence of the AC had increased at the expense of HMIC:

“No, I don’t think so. Oddly enough, I would say the opposite. I would have said that the, because the Audit Commission is a very professional, powerful.... because it has got into this area, it has made respectable and effective things like performance indicators.... I don’t think it steals the Inspectorate’s thunder, I mean, I think it allows the Inspectorate to pick up the issue and run with it in its own way more effectively.... and to be taken more seriously than might otherwise have been.” (TC 569-624)

One Superintendent (interview 102 7.4.95) involved closely with the national policing agenda, felt that the AC is a ‘considerable threat’ to the HMIC, and that those in the Inspectorate were themselves undermining the argument for the element of ‘professional judgement’ (TC 057). It was suggested that the performance unit in F1 is not now a threat to the HMIC role because the ‘initial exciting idea’ that they would practically inspect forces has “gone out of the window” (TC 079). The HMIC, it was proposed, can also see that this threat is diminishing. Generally, however, there is ‘a lot to play for’, in the first year of the new PAs, the new HMIC and the new funding formula (TC 108). These comments certainly do give the impression that the policing stage is dominated by conflict, ambition and empire-building - what one might call a battle of the elites within the Establishment. It is erroneous to conceive of the central state as a monolithic, or necessarily united, group of bodies with a harmonised set of objectives and values. Those in governance jostle for position (and resources) and this has been made quite transparent during the period of police reform.

One of the principal police informants in the research (interview 103) agreed (at the beginning of May 1995) that the influence of HMIC had waned with the rise of the AC:

“Most certainly. Increasingly, I’m beginning to wonder what the relevance of the, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary is.” (TC 865)

According to this officer there had been a suggestion that the AC might produce ‘profiles’ of forces which would assist district auditors (TC 883); ‘one or two people’ had also proposed that the Inspectorate could become one of the “operational units” of the AC (TC 006, side 2). This officer thought it would not be too long until somebody in government suggested this.
One Chief Superintendent (interview 106, 27.7.95) who was intimately involved in the strategic development of his force recalled how, out of rivalry, HMIC reached the point of not sharing ideas with the AC (TC 555), and said:

"I think the Inspectorate have come through a very dodgy period for them. I think they were seriously frightened by the Audit Commission, whom they saw as taking their ground, and there's no doubt the Audit Commission were taking their ground...." (TC 548-553)

This officer added that HMIC's new process of inspection was still "shaking down", that this was channelled primarily through the service plans of each force (TC 581) and that it is therefore difficult to predict how HMIC will develop. An ACC in the same force (interview 105 26.5.95) believed that the role of HMIC has been enhanced because of the AC involvement in policing; he felt that the work of the Inspectorate was focussed on disseminating 'best practice', and rejected the idea that Inspectorate would fade in significance (TC 520-552).

To summarise, it is hoped that this section has illuminated opinions on the role and development of HMIC and the Audit Commission. Given the ascendancy of the latter, and its move into more 'operational' areas (such as crime management) it is unsurprising that there would be evidence of rivalry between the AC and HMIC. The emphasis on performance measurement, as evidenced by the HMIC PIs (and the research interviews) heralds an approach to inspection which is infiltrated by the essence of new managerialism. It is clear that there is much less emphasis on the use of professional judgement to assess the service - the installation of lay inspectors is indicative of this development; as such the style adopted by HMIC has gravitated toward that of a body like the AC. There was also some indication, at least from the key AC respondent, that the Commission has partially moved away from its central concern with VFM, and has become more focussed on effectiveness. Altogether, then, there seems to be some convergence of trajectory between the AC and HMIC: there was some suggestion (albeit unofficial and 'secretive') that the HMIC might fall under the jurisdiction of the AC. There was some concern expressed by HMIC informants that the Inspectorate could be privatised, which of course would be a logical stage in public sector reform.

In addition to elaborating the frisson between HMIC and the AC, this section has perhaps demonstrated how the enthusiastic vision for the HMIC, as symbolised by the appointment of 'fresh' and enlivened Inspectors in the early part of the decade, has not been quite concretized. It would seem logical to conclude that the parallel growth in the influence of the AC has tempered the impact and power of HMIC, even though the
latter has become more ‘rigorous’ in its inspection process.

6.6 Some Conclusions

This chapter has presented ‘visions of the future’ primarily from the point of view of respondents. In that sense, the research reflects a clearly qualitative orientation (see Bryman 1988, p.61). For police officers who took part in the research, the vision was predominantly an optimistic one, although some concern was expressed about the impact of government policy, and the inexorable centralisation of power over the police.

Having interviewed senior HO officials, it became obvious that the zeitgeist of managerialism and civil service reform was destined to transform the workings and ethos of the police department. Such changes are inevitable given the critical attention on the civil service which gained momentum in the 1980s with the ‘Next Steps’ initiative. Again concurrent with the concept of establishing small (yet powerful) policy groups at the centre of the state machinery, police department officials envisaged its shrinkage and hierarchical flattening. The more candid officials acknowledged the centralisation of power over the police, with the introduction of national objectives and PI’s. Reiner (1991a, p.267) highlights the perception of the HO as a “powerful, increasingly interventionist body”.

This chapter has also covered the ascendancy of the AC, and the possible demise of HMIC. Perhaps ‘demise’ is too strong a word, but there has been at least a significant shift in the Inspectorate which would appear to symbolise a move to become a quasi-Audit Commission, rather than a professionally respected body. Increasingly, there may be little to distinguish the methods and philosophy of the AC and HMIC. I would suggest that the HMIC will increasingly become a partisan tool of the central state in monitoring and controlling the police.

There can be no doubt that the seed of new managerialism has been firmly planted in the policing environment, and successfully propagated by the likes of the Audit Commission. As argued elsewhere, the QOS initiative has been successful (at least in the higher echelons of the service) in heightening awareness about ‘quality’, customer care and re-emphasising the service function. Given the impetus of new managerialist reform, it is inevitable that the brand of consumerist quality will predominate: it is already clear that the ‘professionalism’ of policing is being continually de-emphasised, and that this is evident in the function of HMIC. The element of the QOS initiative which served to strengthen the public service ethos of a professional organisation (or at least one with pretensions to professionalisation) has already lost its vitality. The focus on ‘business’ objectives, economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and the imperative of
centrally-set objectives has tended to nullify one of the last calls for ‘professional’ service in the socio-economic landscape of the late 20th century. Consumerization dominates, and in a sense the central state becomes increasingly the customer of the public sector organisations. The police service is now obliged to fulfil the diktats of central state in a far more overt, and binding fashion. It is serving the requirements of the centre as if it were its customer; the central state provides the money, and the police must respond to its demands. It is this somewhat crass arrangement which sits at the apex of the police reforms. It would seem that the power of the chief officers will decline, and that of the Centre will increase. The relative power of the Police Authorities is yet to be revealed. There is some evidence to suggest that PAs have begun to flex their muscles.

ACPO has shown itself to be more politically aggressive; this was demonstrated during the unprecedented protestations about many of the police reforms (see chapter 2). It is possible that ACPO will continue (at least in the near future) with the confidence to engage in combat with the central state and other elements of the Establishment, as evidenced by the Police Service ‘Factsheets’. One Chief Superintendent (interview 106 21.7.95) reflected on the relativities of power in the tripartite structure:

"ACPO feel that they’ve actually managed to influence things dramatically over the last year.... that’s why we’ve seen some of the core and ancillary tasks, for example, come out much, much better than the police service, I think, ever hoped.... .... I think the relationship between the Home Office, and Chief Constables and the Police Authorities is still settling down, and I think that that will be an interesting one to watch. I was amazed how publicly, yesterday, the local police authority.... how attacking they were over and over again of the Home Office...." (TC 518-536)

Paralleling the fluidity of the tripartite dynamics at the point of finishing the research fieldwork, there was still a kaleidoscopic vision about the future direction of policing. This is probably inevitable given the number of different agencies pushing and pulling the service in one direction or another. Newburn and Morgan (in ‘Policing’ Autumn 1994, p.144) commented that there was “considerable muddle and concern about the role of the police”; this situation was hardly different in the closing stages of the research period. However, at least one variable, that is the Posen Inquiry, had been partially removed from the multiplicity of factors which were actively contributing to the heady brew of the policing agenda. One senior official (interview 071 20.1.94) admitted in January 1994 that things had “been a bit steamy” with all of the police reforms, and that her division in the police department had changed significantly during her period in office (TC 133).
Newburn and Morgan (ibid, p.145) recognised the range of pressures for change in the police, and moreover
the consequential dilemmas: the “vigorous” government drive for efficiency, and the constraints on public
expenditure are in some conflict with the spiralling public demands for policing service. I certainly gained
the impression from police leaders that they failed to identify the logic of government actions, and that the
dilemmas for policing were not being addressed intelligently (or honestly). As one superintendent, involved
in his force strategy, commented:

"... they have looked at the best inept, and at worst duplicitous in their failure to consult, to the extent
that it was necessary to consult with the police and others who could actually have given them an
informed view.... .... I am concerned that we see a government in its sort of final death throes, with 40
billion pound public sector borrowing requirement, desperately trying to reduce debt...." (Interview 097
14.10.94 TC 705/755)

Another superintendent (interview 102 7.4.95), similarly involved in force policy, dismissed as “quite
farcical” the actions of government in the reform process:

"... this is not government of rational planning....." (TC 312)

It is likely that the disdain with which many police leaders regard the government and the HO will continue
for some time. The cosy and symbiotic relationship which reached its zenith during the Miners’ Strike in
1984-1985 has without doubt been damaged. One Chief suggested, however, (in October 1994) that the
government were in “enormous retreat” from its attempts to wrestle power from the police. He recalled that
the Home Secretary had been “literally terrified” the previous week when delivering a speech on the new
funding formula:

“It shouldn’t be like that, it should be a sort of partnership, working together, and that’s what’s
changed.... Kenneth Clarke set it all up, in such a confrontational way that they completely destroyed
trust. There’s no trust between the police and the government, or trust in the Home Office. Home
Office officials now are not trusted.... they completely bugger up all the team-work .... and they’re
desperately trying to retrieve that.” (Interview 098 14.10.94 TC 540-553)

This chief thought it would take 4 or 5 years to re-establish trust:

“They were just so crassly inept in the way they handled things, because they didn’t have any concept
that the things they were talking about or thinking of doing, the impact that will have....” (TC 583)

It would appear that the reasonableness and consensus required for the smooth operation of the tripartite structure (as noted by Lustgarten, 1986, p.113) has been severely strained.

With the growth of emphasis on performance indicators, and the introduction of the Home Secretary’s key policing objectives, there has been a clear shift to ‘performance culture’. This was witnessed personally within Hampshire Constabulary, with sub-divisional commanders and departmental heads obliged to set clearly their ‘operational’ objectives and targets for achievement in their service plans. Given the central drive for greater financial and operational accountability this trend is set to continue for the foreseeable future. Several research respondents, however, expressed concern that the emphasis on performance measures would skew policing efforts to meet those measures: it is contended here that this is highly probably, and indeed unpalatable. Hampshire PA’s Annual Policing Plan for 1995-96 encompassed both the national key objectives and the PA’s local objectives, but warned:

“It must be remembered however that providing a policing service is not like manufacturing goods or even delivering letters. Policing is about people’s lives, feelings and sometimes sadly their deaths....So it is not a simple thing to set targets for - or plan for - because at force level a major disaster on land, in the air, or on the sea could throw this plan awry and the projected spend of the budget.” (1995, p.10)

In an address at the Henry Fielding Centre in September 1994, Malcolm Hibberd (p.9) lamented the common adage that “what is measured gets done”, warned against the inchoate use of performance indicators and concluded:

“While there are anecdotes in abundance, there is no hard evidence that better analysis and interpretation will improve the effectiveness of policing. But then neither is there hard evidence that the collection of performance indicators helps in the delivery of better policing services to the public.” (p.11)

The use of PIs in the police, as endemic in the onward march of new managerialism, is still in a nascent phase, and it is predicted that the suspicion and hostility within certain quarters of the police (including the very senior) to the ‘performance culture’ will continue for some time. Allied to this, of course, is the more general notion that policing should be conceptualised as a ‘business’ rather than a public service. The thesis has illuminated opinions of those who both condemn and support the pursuit of a business model. The QOS
programme itself was built upon the somewhat contradictory formulations of both a professional/service and consumerist/business model. It is suggested here that the latter will continue to predominate, especially with the increasing incursion of privatisation into the public sector reform agenda, and indeed the police debate. One of the key informants already cited above (interview 103 1.9.95) emphasised the impact of business philosophy in the police and said:

“I actually think and believe that the service is now professional, if I can use that word, and good enough, to actually continue to head off some of the worst aspects of what might have been, and I’m thinking here particularly about the business ethos. I think there is so much awareness now of the damage that could do to policing..... But I think it’s unlikely in the foreseeable future that the people at the top of the service will allow us to become just a business. Perhaps I’m being over-optimistic.” (TC 507-538)

Perhaps this respondent is being over-optimistic: I would suggest that the ‘ethics’ of business (and that term is used loosely) will increasingly encroach into the philosophy of policing.

The business ethos has already taken root, and as McLaughlin and Murji (1993) point out, police leaders have been instrumental in planting that ethos, and embracing the strands of new managerialism (p.10). It is not a simple case of the police being coerced into adopting the paraphernalia of managerialism. As McLaughlin and Murji indicate (p.15) the police will remain as the monopolistic provider of policing service, but they add:

“The edges are beginning to blur because of the scale of involvement of the private sector, the hiving off of certain police tasks to other agencies and the increase in direct community self-policing. If this ‘creeping privatisation’ continues, the police may find that their local role begins to crumble away, leaving them with elite nationalized policing as their core responsibility.”

Given the ‘strong state’ imperative, or the fulfilment of the ‘repressive state apparatus’ function, it is unlikely that the government would (or could) wholly privatise the police. The central state must maintain unequivocal control over the means with which to maintain order: without these means, and firm central direction, the model of the state becomes weakened and antithetical to the New Right blueprint. I disagree with McLaughlin and Murji when they suggest that the local policing role could “crumble away”. It is precisely this level of local control which the state needs to maintain, and without which threats to the existing social order could multiply. I do agree with the idea of Anthony Bottoms (as presented during the
Bramshill/LSE seminar series ‘The Future of Policing’) that the policing of ‘private security bubbles’ (such as massive shopping centres) will fall increasingly to commercial organisations; at the same time the ‘public police’ will still be responsible for the more difficult regulation of public spaces in between the increasingly large private security bubbles.

The centralising grip of state control over the police is evinced by the police reforms. These reforms have not opened up the police ‘industry’ to all and sundry, but they have heralded an injection of quasi-market disciplines and the philosophies of business and managerialism; not with the aim of loosening state control, but with the effect of strengthening accountability to the centre. Very soon, the chief constable will no longer be ‘king in his/her own castle’, but a baron tied more overtly to the ideological, political and operational objectives of the central state. This development strengthens the argument that the ‘legal-rational’ and bureaucratic power of the central state is set to increase. There may, at the moment, be disharmony between leaders of the service and the government - no powerful creature likes to be tamed, and it is ACPO which is being brought into line, despite its recent protestations and higher political profile. Once the ‘dust settles’ over the police reforms and the recalibrated police authorities, a level of stability and homomorphism will be attained, after which the upheavals of the early 1990s will soon be left behind. The ‘Thatcher project’ of building a strong state will have been achieved; already during the research some senior officers noted discomfort with the politicisation of ACPO and the conflict with the government. One chief (interview 093 23.8.94) expressed unease at the “power struggle” between the presidency of ACPO and central government (TC 570) and believed that conflict would lead nowhere. He thought that to a large extent ACPO had been ‘hoist on its own petard’ by rejecting Federation calls for a Royal Commission:

“... but now that we’re in this position what we should be doing is operating a dialogue with the Home Office to try and create out of this threat, which is being seen for the police service, an opportunity.” (TC 656)

One ACC (interview 079 28.2.94) was “amazed” at the recent public criticisms from ACPO, but added:

“... I think it has much more to do with chief constables wishing to retain their own positions and autonomy.... I honestly wondered as a member of ACPO .... whether we should be doing it, and what we were achieving, and whether that’s the way. I would have thought that negotiation was better than confrontation.... I think we’re reducing ourselves more to the trade-union type leaders, than what I feel that ACPO should be about.” (TC 088-099)
One very senior civil servant (interview 089 3.5.95) was convinced that a greater sense of cooperation between ACPO and the HO was evolving, with the former “more prepared to come and join working forums or groups with us in order to produce centrally promulgated ideas....” (TC 705) It was argued that power is being shared within the tripartite structure, and that there would be ‘stronger management of the service through ACPO’ (TC 811). This seems to reinforce the idea that ACPO is being increasingly tamed.

Johnston (1992, p.51) asserts that it is impossible to analyse the costs and benefits of privatisation without identifying the form of privatisation and its context. He identifies (p.50) the typology of privatisation put forward by Saunders and Harris (1990) which is based around four types:

1. **Denationalization/Demunicipalization**
2. **Commodification**
3. **Liberalization**
4. **Marketization**

From what has transpired thus far, the mode of liberalization appears most applicable to current and future police reforms. As Johnston writes (p.50) liberalization involves no change of ownership, and the state retains responsibility for funding and providing services. However:

> "Non-state agencies engage in the organization of provision.... This has a major impact on producers (since state employees may lose their jobs, or experience deteriorating conditions of service), and it may affect standards of service to consumers." (p.50)

Johnston predicts (p.59) that contracting out will be the principal form of liberalization in the police service, and notes that this has already occurred in uncontroversial areas. The Posen Inquiry of course raised the spectre about more wholesale privatisation (including the other ‘types’ noted above), but this phantom was predominantly laid to rest in 1995, with ACPO’s lobbying apparently a major element in this retreat. The issue of privatisation is obviously one which may loiter in the wings of the national policing agenda, even if it has been pushed off the main stage (at least for the moment). It can never, however, be a serious contender for the policy limelight given the primacy of the police role in social control, and the State’s need to directly orchestrate this control. Johnston (ibid, p.53) writes of a:

> “Home Office dedicated to increased central control of police resources, and it is possible that future performance indicators may be imposed on the police service from the centre. To some extent, of
course, such a centralization has already emerged with the growing influence of the Inspectorate. .... Of course, this centralization is a complex one, for as with other public services (such as education and health), the police service has experienced centralization in some areas, coupled with decentralization in others.”

Time has witnessed the imposition of PI's, and, as Johnston emphasises (p.54), even though daily financial administration has been subject to devolution, there is a “thoroughgoing centralization of elements of financial and operational policy making at central state level.”

It could well be argued that the threat of ‘privatisation’ is a smokescreen under which the state is successfully undertaking its programme of centralization, in much the same way that the Sheehy Inquiry deflected attention from the fundamental consequences of the White Paper in 1993.

It is perhaps noteworthy (and suspicious?) that the ‘Posen Inquiry’ was apparently so drastically and easily diluted, as was Sheehy. Perhaps these were not the principal programmes of policy targeted by the government, although they successfully attuned the police to the principles of competition and business, and in that regard were successful. I would tend to agree with those civil servants who suggested that the Posen Inquiry was never intended to be that far-reaching and radical. It contradicts the ‘strong state’ thesis to suggest that the core of policing could ever be relinquished to the vagaries of the market: the ‘iron fist’ of social control needs to be kept on a strong leash so that it can be used in times of civil disobedience. Certainly, there has been a blurring between the private and public sector, but this blurring will not continue to the stage where the apparatus of the state is dismantled. Policing at the periphery of the main functions (such as wide load escort or firearm registration) will probably be ‘privatized’, but a strong state can never afford to lose its grip on the instruments of domination.

To close this chapter, the words of two senior officers are provided. The first was asked if the government was tightening its grip on policing (interview 103 1.5.95).

“Yes, I mean, I think in some ways they are .... when you actually look at the police and Magistrates’ Courts Act and, you know, the authority that that gives, the power that that gives to the Home Secretary.... I still find it difficult to understand how, you know, a government that talks about not controlling things from the centre, about the local aspects being all important, and then actually sits down and sets, you know, what are at the end of the day tactical objectives for the police that we’re expected to put our energy into.... the two for me just don’t go together. And I think through the
policing plan process, through the contracts for chief officers.... do point towards more of a centralist approach.” (TC 554-575)

Perhaps the government is playing an exceptionally clever game with the police, in apparently conceding ground to the service. This officer tended to agree with the possibility:

“I think to a large extent they’ve let the service think that it’s winning on one or two of the issues. I think the sting in the tail is yet to come....” (TC 587)

One ACC (interview 053 2.11.93) commented toward the end of 1993, when the idea of a centrally appointed chair of the PA was still being mooted:

“I really couldn’t have done the job, couldn’t do the job, if I genuinely felt we were instruments of the state..... which is why I’m actually concerned about the developments that have taken place now.” (TC 536)

He added later in the interview:

“The other government changes about how a police force is managed at government level, that I find very, very threatening.... I don’t want a Home Office mandarin in the Police Authority with direct control no matter how you want to couch it.... but who has an influence over my chief constable.... I find that very, very threatening, and I don’t like that move to the right-wing as far as I’m concerned, of centralism in the guise of being devolution.... You’d think you were watching a plot here, a right wing plot, to take over the police, a Police State.” (TC 290-367)
7. Concluding-Comments

“When the concept of social change is invoked, the chaotic present is invariably contrasted with the stable past.... This ‘social change’ cannot be reconciled with history.... The bottom line on the police and social conflict is stark. Both will always be with us.”

(Fielding, 1991, p.247)

Like Fielding, I agree that social conflict, and therefore the police, will always be with us. One of the underlying questions in this thesis has been: ‘What type of police or policing service will we have?’ It is hoped that this question has been tackled against the backdrop of the QOS programme and some of the police reforms of the 1990s. Limitations of space have, naturally, precluded a discussion of wider social conflict, but the thesis has provided accounts of conflict between the state elites. Similarly, a discussion of the entire Criminal Justice System could not have been attempted within the confines of the present work, which has necessarily focused on the “first actors” in the “coercive and judicial function” (Alderson in Stockdale and Casale, 1992, p.10).

Fielding (ibid) successfully warns against the perception that social change of the present is clearly distinguishable from the status quo of the past. Although the police QOS initiative of 1990, and the impositions of the government from 1993 onward have been truly noteworthy developments, it would be naive (and vainglorious) to assume that these have been, or indeed will be, the most significant events in the history of policing, or furthermore that they symbolise a period of turmoil which has seen no match before. For example, Alderson (ibid, p.10) highlights PACE as “the most comprehensive and detailed of all legislation affecting the police function in its history”. Delving further into history, Fielding (ibid, p.35) pinpoints the troubled times for the Metropolitan Police in the 1880s, as well as the police strikes of the early 20th century (p.62-65). It is generally agreed that the 1960s witnessed major social change, and argued that in terms of policing they marked a clear departure from the predominantly consensual approach to policing in the post-war period. Reiner (1992, p.58) posits that with regard to public acceptance of the police, the 1950s appear to represent a “Golden Age” of “tranquillity and accord”; he notes, however, that by the late 1950s tensions were increasing, with certain causes celebres pointing to the coming crisis. Graef (in the Daily Telegraph 10.7.93, p.19) questions the ‘Dixon of Dock Green’ image of the 1950s, but reminds us that the 1960s did witness major social upheaval, with a sharp decline in the deference to authority, and an inadequate police response to the tide of change. Graef (1989) asserts that:

"The British police are going through an extraordinary period of change, not apparent to the general
public.... The force is split between the Old Guard and New Guard, the “hard” and “soft” policemen.... This struggle between old and new, hard and soft, liberal and autocratic styles of policing and management is being fought in earnest.” (p.9-13)

It might be claimed that the police is nearly always going through an extraordinary period of change, as indeed is the rest of society. One only has to recall the breadth of societal development after the second world war and up until the present day. It is, therefore, stating the exceedingly obvious that the 1990s have witnessed ‘extraordinary’ developments.

This thesis has covered the impact, or perceived impact, of the police reforms, and moreover drawn some rather depressing and critical conclusions about these. It would be incorrect to assume, however, that the reform programme, and the apparent swing toward the ‘hard’ policing that Graef refers to, signals a uniquely gloomy epoch in the history of policing. Fielding (ibid) casts doubt on any ‘golden age’ of policing:

“It is natural to assume the problems we face are both unique and pressing. We tend not to take the long view. This is amplified by the tendency to nostalgia, a belief that, for example, our problems with policing are out of step with some fanciful golden age.” (p.28)

This view reflects a clear commitment to a long-range perspective and a ‘realist’ avoidance of a nostalgic perception which tends to obscure the historical continuity of themes such as social conflict. Although Reiner (1991b) concedes that there was a “hidden side” (p.230) to the “Golden Age of Dixon”, he nevertheless couches his arguments in terms of the decline of this symbolic state:

“.... the Dixon pedestal is an unattainable target today.... In the much more fragmented and pluralistic post-modern age they cannot re-acquire a sacred aura as guardians of a fundamental moral consensus which has become attenuated, perhaps non-existent. Efforts to restore the police to their postwar pedestal are fundamentally misguided.”

One should remain cautious about treating the Dixon image as some form of tangible reality, or at least as a totemic symbol to which the current police (or academics) must pay homage. I would reject the postmodernist assumption that there has suddenly or recently (perhaps in the 1970s) emerged a “more fragmented and pluralistic” era. As Fielding (ibid) points out (p.7) social conflict has held a central position in the development of social theory, and in the history of policing (p.9). There is nothing new (or postmodern) about societal fragmentation and pluralistic divisions and competition. Post-modernism is more
of an academic heuristic device than an accurate portrayal of social history. As ‘power’ has always featured in every societal epoch, so has social division and social conflict. Possibly we should not focus unduly on the ‘golden age’ of the 1950s. Perhaps Reiner is unduly deterministic and pessimistic when he proposes (ibid, p.230) that the police will “inevitably fail” in their efforts to re-legitimise. Nevertheless, the Dixon image provides a useful foil against which to unveil a tainted vision of the future, and Reiner (p.236) predicts greater variegation in policing, diminished local accountability and a gulf between ‘high flyers’ and rank and file. He concludes:

“... they will not be restored to a pedestal, as beloved symbols of British national pride. They will have become a demystified, mundane institution of government, not sacred totems of the collective conscience.”

Perhaps the nostalgic media images of PC 49 et al, yields a common belief that the police were always beloved symbols of national pride (rather than ‘rozzers’, or ‘pigs’). Critchley (1978, p.263) discusses the “intensely human” image of P.C. Dixon and adds:

“These friendly programmes must have taken something of the sting out of relations between police and public at a time when many people were ready to support police action to regulate any driving standards but their own.”

Graef (Daily Telegraph, 10.7.93, p.19) agrees that the 1950s marked a high point in police-public relations but notes that the police had much more freedom in their actions: he cites the admission of Robert Mark (in his autobiography) that suspects used to be held upside down in lavatory bowls until they confessed (!). We must not be seduced by the nostalgic images of the past.

Reiner entitles the concluding chapter to his 1992 book ‘Fin de Siecle Blues’. He identifies two “contradictory pressures” (p.261) which neutralised the Scarman/Newman reforms of the 1980s; firstly, there was the ‘rejectionist’ stance of the Left, and secondly the “social polarisation” caused by the social and economic policies of the government. Reiner (p.263) writes of the “precipitous” decline in public approval ratings of the police since 1989, and again indicates how unlikely it is that service-based initiatives (such as the 1990 SPD) will “restore the police to their former beloved and respected place in popular esteem” (p.267).

Perhaps there is a danger in placing too much emphasis on contrasting the present with the past. It is
precarious to place too much faith in public opinion polls, and impossible to sustain that most of the public would have an everyday awareness of the police, and its social standing, or indeed care about this. Interestingly, one ACC (interview 033 17.8.93) reflected on his long career:

"It's been a great source of disappointment to me over the years just how little the community does care...." (TC 473)

Moreover, it is probable that the vast majority of the public are unaware of quality or service initiatives: police customers might be more aware when they receive a post-service questionnaire, but they are unlikely to perceive the significance of this in the context of the QOS programme and the public sector reform agenda.

At this juncture, it is apposite to make some conclusions about the QOS programme itself. Following the logic of the arguments set out above, it would be unrealistic to conclude that the quality approach is unique in its attempts to promulgate a "soft" model of policing, or one which de-emphasises the autocratic, quasi-military style of police organisation. Several senior research respondents wished to emphasise that 'quality is nothing new' and recalled the efforts to inculcate a brand of community-oriented policing. In chapter 3 I drew attention to the efforts of John Alderson and Kenneth Newman. In 1987 Brian Hayes (then Chief of Surrey Police) emphasised the role of Neighbourhood Policing, whose "major concern must be with the quality of service. That is undoubtedly the public's expectation." ('Police' Vol.19, No.11, July 1987). Critchley (1978, p.327) emphasises the police efforts to develop "a wide range of community relations schemes" in preceding years. What is unique, however, to the QOS initiative is its appropriation of business philosophies and management techniques. The reform agenda of the 1980s provided an available set of conceptual tools and objectives from the business world which could be used in the quest to enhance the social and political standing of the police. More cynically, one might argue that senior police leaders picked up on 'quality' as a means with which they could enhance their own careers, and which fitted neatly with the new managerialist zeitgeist of the late 1980s and early 1990s. It is clear, nevertheless, that the police were unwilling to relinquish the public service ethic, and to embrace wholeheartedly the tenets of a business or customer brand of quality. As developed in chapter four, the police QOS programme has been an often uncomfortable mix of consumerism and professional, public sector sentiments. As the 1990s have progressed the latter dimension of the programme has waned, which is unsurprising giving the imposition of the government reforms and the ascendancy of charterism and managerialism.

It has been argued that to a large extent the QOS programme has been successful, at least to the extent that quality has secured a place on the agenda of internal reform and policing provision. Its success at stimulating
awareness and debate about quality service (and what this means) in the upper echelons of the police has hopefully been illuminated. As for the lower levels of the service, there are mixed views as to the impact of the QOS programme. Some senior respondents were convinced that there was impact at the rank-and-file level, while others believed the ‘canteen culture’ and operational priorities (fighting the alligators in the swamp) had nullified the efforts of senior officers. Internal staff surveys would suggest that the majority of all staff support the concept of quality or ‘policing standards’, but that the initiative has hardly affected the way in which junior staff conduct their tasks. In a sense, the senior officer discourse, and business-derived models of quality, have been of limited significance and meaning to constables and sergeants (and indeed to some inspectors). The results of the research demonstrated, unsurprisingly, that officers with higher morale, and who felt more involved in the strategic development of their force, were more likely to support the principles of the quality initiative.

It is now clear that the original impetus of the QOS programme has declined, and as several officers (and HO officials) stressed, ‘things have moved on’. There has more recently been a much greater emphasis on performance culture, and this has tended to leave behind the public service ethos, and statement of common purpose and values, of the early initiative. Increasingly during the research period the QOS programme became embroiled in the politics of police reform. It is difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain if the QOS programme has had a marked impact on the social standing of the police, and indeed the provision of services out on the streets. Within Hampshire Constabulary, however, there was certainly heightened awareness about providing a swift and caring response to the public (such as updating ‘customers’ on their cases) and a concerted effort to survey those who had required the services of the force. In theory, this kind of attention should improve the provision of service, but definitive evidence of such improvement is rather elusive. Perhaps this will become clearer to the police historian who looks back in 10 years time. What did emerge from my research findings was the value placed by senior officers on the ‘traditional’ functions of policing, such as the maintenance of public tranquillity. The QOS programme has affected their attitudes and working practices, but not to the extent of displacing the core functions of policing. What QOS achieved was the rebalancing of the force-service dichotomy which had so patently been tipped toward ‘force’ in the 1980s. Police leaders had two driving imperatives - one was to address the government induced reform agenda (change or be changed), and the other was to re-legitimise in the eyes of the public the media and the ‘chattering classes’. It would appear that key police leaders were genuinely concerned about the cultural fallout from events such as the Miners’ Strike and feared that the service dimension of policing had been lost sight of. Let us avoid abject cynicism and conclude that QOS has not been wholly underpinned by political expediency, and that it has appealed to ‘higher’ values and objectives.
A significant portion of the thesis has been devoted to conceptualising the role and evolution of the state. It has been concluded that the state is becoming more ‘statist’, and intervening increasingly on what Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) call the ‘Y dimension’ (law, order, defence and maintenance of traditional values). This conclusion concurs with the type of ‘social control’ theories espoused by Cohen (1985) who argues that the “reach and intensity” (p.37) of state control has increased.

What has been analysed specifically in this thesis is the growth of central state power at the expense of the local state apparatus. The centralisation of power and ‘law and order’ is nothing new. Garland (1985, p.9) outlines the development of the prison system:

“By 1865, the organisation and control of Britain’s prison institutions had been subjected to a process of centralisation and rationalisation, brought about through the mechanisms of state inspection, regulation and financial subvention.”

As Garland indicates, the Prison Act of 1877 transferred ownership of local jails to central government and marked the end of a “protracted local/central power struggle” (p.9). The local/central power struggle over the police is still continuing, but there is no doubt that the police reforms of the 1990s have represented a significant step in the centralisation of power. Several senior officers recognised that the drift of power over the police has continued for some time. It could, of course, be argued that the centralisation (and standardisation) of policing began in the 19th century. The formation of the Metropolitan Police in 1829, and the County and Borough Police Act of 1856 can be seen as significant steps in laying the foundations for a state-controlled police. As Fielding notes (ibid, p.31) the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 established a police office for the Metropolitan area and the position of the justices who were accountable to the Home Secretary. With the 1856 Act, the Home Office were subsequently able to appoint inspectors of constabulary (Fielding, ibid, p.32). Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that policing fell immediately under the control of the central state, nor that it became homogenised. Mawby (1990, p.21) notes that local variation in policing continued in the 19th century, and adds that central government were only able to impose national standards in a gradual manner. What we have witnessed in the late years of the 20th century, however, is a clear rationalisation of forces (with a reduction in number resulting from the 1964 Police Act) and significantly heightened state inspection, regulation and “financial subvention” (Garland, ibid, p.9).

Brogden (1982, p.75) notes that after the 1900s the “managerial authority” of the chief officer developed significantly: “The Chief Officer is a major figure in local society”. He adds (p.76) that the 1964 Police Act was the first attempt to standardize the relationship between the central and local state, and the police. It is
argued, nevertheless, that the 1964 Act merely formalised the weakness of the Police Authority vis-a-vis the Chief Constable (p.87). Brogden also argues (p.87) that increased political intervention by the central state, the rise of corporate managerialism and the need for the central state to re-direct resources (given the fiscal crisis) were bound to lead to the relative autonomy of each force from the local PA:

"... the complex relations of the central state now affect policing ideology and policy, as well as organizational form. No longer is policing susceptible to the general direction of a local political class." (p.87)

Brogden, quite rightly, notes also that political centralization and standardization entail "by definition, tighter control by the central state over local society" (p.83). In some apparent contradiction, however, he notes that some forms of urban manager (like the chief officer) may temporarily benefit from the fiscal crisis, given that the response of the central state "is in terms of coercion rather than legitimation" (p.85). This analysis probably fits the situation in the early years of Thatcher rule (and of course Brogden was writing in 1982).

I would emphasise that the temporary benefits for police leaders have clearly passed. Since the growing scrutiny of the police in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and with the discourse of marketisation and privatisation, the police 'urban manager' has acutely felt the grip of economic (and policy) constraint. Political centralization and standardization, and the continuing fiscal crisis, have ushered in a new era of tripartite relations. Kenneth Clarke clearly intended, with the appointment of a centrally nominated chair, to secure enhanced control over each police force through the reconstituted police authorities. It was not intended that the new PAs should become paragons of local accountability: it was clear that they would form part of the 'pincer' movement to capture the local force. The central state (Home Office) element of this pincer movement has been substantially strengthened, but the PA part of the master plan was significantly (but not fatally) weakened. The power of the local state has decreased over many decades. Brogden (p.81) accounts for this in Liverpool in terms of changes in the structure of capital and the usurpation of the merchant class:

"Political authority became increasingly the prerogative of the central state in a representation of economic interests outside the local context."

Dearlove and Saunders (1991, p.479) also note that since the 1930s, central government has "legislated to strip local authorities of many of their most significant functions". They do stress that this has not simply reflected Conservative party attacks on Labour local authorities, and do remind us that between 1955 and
1975 there was some "intensification of performance" within certain established areas of concern (p.480-481). Nevertheless, we can conclude (as do Dearlove and Saunders, p.482) that the central state has significantly intensified its control through "a number of strategies of control". Having 'hollowed out' the power base of the local state, the central state has moved to broaden its own power base by capturing the Police Authorities. An essential aspect of this control is the production of the 'policing plan' which must incorporate the national policing objectives of the Home Secretary. Even if the central state has failed to gain full control over the Police Authorities, it is clear that the situation of relative autonomy of the force from its PA (as outlined by Brodgen) no longer exists. To some extent this ostensibly strengthens the accountability of the police to locally elected citizens; on a less optimistic note, the changes to the tripartite system represent yet another stage in the growth of "formal-legal regulations" (Dandeker, 1990, p.196). The enhanced role of the PA could well serve to bolster the administrative power of the central state.

Fielding (ibid, p.212) notes the "significant position" of HMIC, and suggests that they act as a conduit between ACPO and the Home Office. As demonstrated earlier, the Audit Commission has gained in profile and influence, to the point of inducing some rivalry between it and the Inspectorate. The growing role of the Audit Commission is again indicative of the growing imposition of central standards and surveillance.

As highlighted in chapter 2, the possibility of further force amalgamation recently surfaced on the police agenda. It is likely that this will surface once again in the near future. Advocates of creating larger forces have included the ex-Chief HMI Sir John Woodcock, and it is perhaps inevitable that the 21st century will witness the creation of a small number of regional forces, and then logically the subsequent creation of a truly national structure. There have been 'functional' trends which would help usher in such development. Fielding (ibid, p.211), for example, writes that the growth in policing services and operations which need regional or national organisation (such as the administration of forensic evidence) forms one part of the "recently sustained impetus to centralisation".

Just as the rationalisation of forces or policing services forms part of the momentum of centralism (or statism), so does the contraction of the police department, and Home Office more generally. Several senior officials talked of the rationalisation of the central civil service departments; some volunteered that there would be a concentration of power in a smaller policy group at the centre. There was also some indication that the Police Department would or could become more directly involved in contributing to operational matters.

Perhaps it is inevitable historically that the central state has to take a tighter grip on policing society (in its
widest sense). This argument can be developed in more than one way. Firstly, Cotterrell (1992, p.296) draws on the work of Poulantzas (1978) and develops the propositions that:

1. With the expansion of state scope, there has been a tendency for dissent and conflict to arise within the state structure.

2. It is inaccurate to assign a united strategy and outlook to the various elements of the state.

3. The state has increasingly mirrored within itself the conflicts within civil society.

4. An internal weakening of the state occurs simultaneously with external strengthening.

5. Those controlling the “higher levels of the state apparatus” (p.9) need to extend more control over the lower levels to sustain the “cohesiveness of an unwieldy political-administrative state structure”.

In this thesis I have (amongst other things) been concerned with the actions and beliefs of members of the ‘higher state’ (Home Office). It would appear that the police reforms have acted to redress the internal weakening of the state, and to exert more control over the lower levels of state apparatus (the police). It is often argued that the tripartite structure, and old police funding arrangements, were excessively ‘messy’ and that accountability was unclear. The police reforms have sought to clarify and simplify this situation, partially through the provision of national objectives and increased central monitoring.

Kamenka (1989, p.ix) notes that the growth and increasing power of bureaucracy is one of the most discussed phenomena in contemporary society. He suggests also that the concept “cuts across the distinctions between capitalism and communism, democracy and dictatorship”. Kamenka (p.171) laments, as I do, the “bureaucratic - administrative values of ‘economic rationalization’ and the reducing of all to a common administrative measure.” He suggests that bureaucratization itself (rather than bureaucrats or bureaucracy) is the ‘enemy’. The bureaucratization of social control, including the centralized administrative surveillance of the police and policing is, I suggest, something to fear. Kamenka (ibid, p.165) notes the rigidity of centralized direction in an increasingly complex society:

“Centralized direction as the imposition of a system of general rules comes to have greater and greater difficulty in dealing not only with special cases, but with particular areas of concern, particular classes of people, particular and often transitional problems.”
The imposition of policing ‘rules’ could threaten the flexibility and innovation which Kamenka (p.165) argues is sometimes required in a society characterised by rapid change. I lament the growing standardisation of policing objectives and services which appears to form part of the bureaucratic drift. Although the QOS initiative has promulgated important philosophies about ‘service’ rather than ‘force’, it too forms part of the bureaucratisation of social life.

The imperatives of economy and efficiency, which go hand-in-hand with the growth of bureaucratisation, say little (if anything) about the provision of an egalitarian and sensitive public service. The efficient, impersonal and *standardized* approach to the provision of public services, including the police, is intimately related to the “intertwining of public and private economic activity and services” (Kamenka, p.167). It is suggested by Kamenka that the growth of ‘new public management’ (see Leishman et al, 1996) has weakened the dedication of those working in the public services. Kamenka (p.166) notes the resentment of bureaucratization with its:

"Distortion of facts, values and activities in the interest of making them quantifiable, categorizable and more easily administered."

This has been the type of criticism levelled by key police leaders (such as Charles Pollard and Tony Butler) in relation to the recent explosion of performance measurement, and is criticism to which I subscribe.

Smith (1988, p.237) concludes that:

"It is important to remember that in principle, at least, bureaucracy stands for justice and equality of treatment.... It is the antithesis of arbitrary and biased decision making. In so far as bureaucracies discriminate, they do so according to rules and not according to personal whim or favouritism. Unfortunately, bureaucracy may be employed to implement unjust rules or harmful policies. But that is not inherent in the nature of bureaucracy."

If it is not the concept of bureaucracy itself which is problematic, it is perhaps the employment of bureaucratisation in the growth of power of the central state. Smith (ibid, p.2) notes the trend since the 1960s to improve management efficiency in central government; he notes too the importance of the FMI (see Chapter 2), and posits that with the enhanced authority of managers to control resources, and clarified lines of responsibility, central government administration has become more ‘bureaucratic’. There is no doubt about the growth of state intervention (see Smith, ibid, p.52): Farnham and Horton (1992, p.21) discuss the
‘strong state’ and write:

“During the 1980s there was an explosion of legislative initiatives, aimed at strengthening central government, weakening local government and making local authorities and other public bodies the agents of central government policies. Legislation was used to strengthen the powers of central government in a number of ways.”

The strengthening of the central state continues apace, and the agencies of the state (including the police) are caught up in the tide of growing centralisation, monitoring and standardisation. Reiner and Cross (1991, p.7) note the recent themes of government rhetoric (such as privatisation and voluntarism), but add:

“The strength and power of the official system continues to be enhanced, and to become even more tightly controlled from the centre.”

In years to come there will be increasingly restricted discretion in the policing of society, limited originality and spontaneity, and an ongoing surveillance (whether through technological applications or police intelligence) of social life. There is already burgeoning camera surveillance of public and private space (including university buildings): how long will it be before nearly every street, home or building is monitored? Dandeker (1990, p.202) concludes:

“One of the most important sources of the growth of bureaucratic surveillance in modern societies has been the emergence of the modern nation-state.”

Despite common arguments about the ‘hollowing out’ of the state (see Leishman et al, 1996, p.11) I propose that social life will become increasingly dominated by the state. The action of the Conservative government have done much to speed up this historical inevitability.

The conflicts between the elements of the state have been couched within an ‘elite pluralist’ framework. What is quite possible is that as the central state becomes more statist and powerful, these intra-state conflicts will diminish and the differing peaks of power will be smoothed. Once the police chief/central state conflict has subsided, there could well be a new plateau of cooperation and cohesion between these power elites. As power is sucked into the black hole of the Home Office, Chief Officers will become increasingly dependent on the patronage of the central state in securing their own, and force, resources. The Chief Constable who does not meet the national objectives will not be favoured by the higher levels of the state.
The same could be said of the new Police Authority, although there is some early indication that they have tried to ‘flex their own muscles’ of independence. This will probably be short-term given the inexorable growth of authoritarian centralism. Cotterrell (ibid, p.296) asserts:

“The rhetoric of liberalisation goes along with considerable state involvement. In this way civil society seems to be strengthened only by being further invaded.”

Importantly, Cotterrell talks of consensual authoritarianism (after Norrie and Adelman, 1989); this implies that “ordinary beneficiaries” of civil society come increasingly to accept the invasion of state regulation in ever wider areas. The growth of state-induced regulation of policing in the 1980s and 1990s is symptomatic of a wider trend of societal regulation and surveillance. Not only is civic society subject to an escalation of monitoring (whether this is through the use of CCTV on the streets and roads or the potential use of national identity cards), but agencies of the state (such as the police) are subject to increased centralisation of control, and homogenisation of service provision. The leaders of the police have themselves contributed to the standardisation of their services, and reinforced to a considerable extent the trends of de-professionalization and consumerization. The police apparatus is itself increasingly subject to the state-dominated, panoptic world in which we live. Let us, however, retain a modernist vision of progress and optimism, and await the turning point in history where the momentum of ‘centralist statism’ is impeded or indeed reversed.
List of Appendices

1. Table showing research survey reports.


4. Indication of policy divisions within the Police Department of the Home Office (at May 1995).


## APPENDIX 1

Table showing research survey reports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force 1 report:</th>
<th>Basic set of quantitative results.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force 2 report:</td>
<td>Basic set of quantitative results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force 3 report:</td>
<td>Basic set of quantitative results.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample report:</td>
<td>Combined quantitative results for all three forces, with summary of 'force' differences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample analysis for primary independent variables:</td>
<td>Outlining significant relationships between other 'primary' independent, and dependent variables for combined sample.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total sample analysis for secondary independent variables:</td>
<td>Outlining significant relationships between 'secondary' independent, and dependent variables for combined sample.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative data for Force 1:</td>
<td>'Raw' data from each qualitative question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative data for Force 2:</td>
<td>'Raw' data from each qualitative question.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative data for Force 3:</td>
<td>'Raw' data from each qualitative question.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2

Methods of Investigation

The research has entailed both quantitative and qualitative methodology, as well as the use of documentary materials. It was decided to conduct the empirical investigation in three police forces, and research access to these forces was negotiated in the early part of 1993. This access was facilitated by my Deputy Chief Constable who supplied a letter of support addressed to Chief Constables in the forces selected. The forces were selected on the basis of the following:

i) Apparent stage of development in relation to quality of service and corporate strategy.

ii) Previous contact with force personnel.

iii) Reasonable physical proximity to Hampshire.

Once permission had been granted by the Chief Constables, contact was made with designated individuals who acted as liaison officers. These officers later supplied name and location of Chief Inspectors, Superintendents and Chief Superintendents, and also supplied documents and reports relating to strategic and 'quality' initiatives. Sample sizes are shown below, in relation to each method.

Direct contact was made with individuals in the Home Office Police Department (HOPD), the HMIC, the Audit Commission, Bramshill Police Staff College, and the Metropolitan Police. Research access proved to be unproblematic, and practically all respondents were helpful and happy to participate in the research.

Proximity to Bramshill Police Staff College, and its excellent library, assisted greatly in the research, enabling access to reports and documents which normally would be unavailable outside policing circles.

Involvement in Hampshire Constabulary's Policing Standards Steering Group, and the Technical sub-group of the Home Office Funding Formula Working Party, greatly assisted in remaining attuned to developments in the national policing agenda. Attendance at some of the Bramshill/LSE seminar series 'The future of policing' (held at the LSE and aimed at senior officers and academics) also helped in the formulation of ideas and the exchange of information.
Qualitative Research

i) Interviews

114 interviews were carried out with a range of senior personnel in the police, HMIC, police department, Audit Commission and Bramshill Police Staff College. On average, the interviews lasted one hour and practically all were tape-recorded. A minority were conducted over the telephone. Summary notes of those interviews which were not tape-recorded were written up as soon as possible after the event.

Summaries of tape-recorded interviews included a note of every salient point being made by the respondent, as well as a considerable amount of verbatim transcription. Examples of this verbatim transcription are used to illustrate themes as they are discussed in the main body of the report.

To systematise the use of interview data, each interviewee was subsequently given a respondent number. An index of respondents and numbers is provided in the appendix, although every effort has been made to conceal the identity of respondents. Where verbatim comments appear in the report, these are accompanied by the tape counter number, from the machine on which the tapes were played back for transcription.

In the three subject forces, which will be referred to as forces 1, 2 and 3, the following respondents were interviewed:

**Force 1**

Chief Constable  
Deputy Chief Constable  
3 Assistant Chief Constables  
11 Chief Superintendents  
4 Superintendents  
1 Chief Inspector  
1 Inspector  

**Force 2**

Chief Constable  
Deputy Chief Constable
Most of the Superintendents and Chief Inspectors indicated above were interviewed in the early stages of the research in order to explore strategic and quality issues, and to assist in the development of a questionnaire for distribution to remaining Superintendents and Chief Inspectors in October 1993.

24 interviews were conducted with senior civil servants, the majority of whom were in the Home Office Police Department.

Interviews were semi-structured, with a set of pre-determined questions; however, most respondents took the opportunity to add further comments and raise their own issues of concern. Occasionally, the set of pre-determined questions was not adhered to strictly if the information supplied by the respondent highlighted other important issues.

Some respondents were interviewed on more than one occasion, most especially when they were acting as liaison officers for the research.

ii) Qualitative survey data

In addition to the interviews, a considerable amount of qualitative data was obtained during the survey of Chief Inspectors and Superintendents in the three subject forces. Altogether 154 of these officers returned questionnaires in the survey (out of a total of 207 distributed). Contained in the self-completion questionnaires were seven questions which invited free response. These questions are reproduced below,
with an indication of the response rate for each one, for the sample as a whole.

**Section B - Question 3**

What do you regard as the most important function of the Police? (98% response rate)

**Section D - Question 4**

What do you think your Force will have to work hardest at to improve quality of service to the public? (99% response rate)

**Section D - Question 5**

What do you think your Force will have to work hardest at to improve quality of service to colleagues? (93% response rate)

**Section D - Question 13**

What do you personally think are the most important aspects of quality policing? (95% response rate)

**Section D - Question 14**

What factors most often prevent you from doing your job as you would like to? (97% response rate)

**Section E - Question 5**

Please explain your answer about how optimistic or pessimistic you are about the future of the Service. (96% response rate)

**Section E - Question 8**

Do you have any final comments on any matter? (47% response rate)

The response rates were excellent, yielding a considerable amount of data. All comments were typed up in separate documents for each force. Then, for each force, and question-by-question, the data were categorised according to emergent themes, with the result that comments were re-grouped under separate
headings for each question (this will become apparent when the results are presented in later sections of
the report).

Where comments are reproduced, these are accompanied by the survey respondent index number. Respondents with index numbers from 001 to 067 are from Force 1, those with numbers from 100 to 136 are from Force 2, and numbers from 200 to 260 represent officers from Force 3.

Quantitative research

i) Chief Inspector and Superintendent survey

The survey of Superintendents and Chief Inspectors in the three subject forces was carried out in October 1993. 207 questionnaires were distributed, 91 to Superintendents and 116 to Chief Inspectors. 154 officers returned questionnaires (87 Superintendents, 66 Chief Inspectors, and one officer who did not indicate rank) yielding a good overall response rate of 74%.

The force liaison officers had provided name and location lists of senior officers, and the survey instrument (see example in the appendix) was sent directly to each officer. The questionnaire was accompanied by an explanatory letter from the researcher (see appendix), plus a supporting letter from the research liaison officer and/or the Chief Constable of the subject force.

Three slightly different versions of the questionnaire were designed to take account of different strategic aims and quality initiatives in the forces. However, the bulk of questions were common to all questionnaires, allowing comparison of results.

Completed questionnaires were returned directly to Hampshire Police Headquarters in addressed return envelopes (marked confidential). Nearly all of the 154 completed questionnaires were returned within three weeks of the distribution date.

ii) Design of the questionnaire

Exploratory interviews were conducted in each subject force early in the research period. These assisted in assessing the extent to which QOS initiatives which had developed in each force identified important issues from the officers' perspective, and were important in the design of the questionnaire. Having created a 'pilot' version of the questionnaire, each officer who had taken part in the exploratory interviews was subsequently sent a copy and asked to complete and return it. Comments about the format and content of
the questionnaire were also invited. Having taken this feedback into account, an improved version of the questionnaire was produced, which was built around five sections:

- **Section A:** Background information
- **Section B:** The Policing Function
- **Section C:** National Quality of Service initiative
- **Section D:** Approach to QOS in Your Force
- **Section E:** Wider issues

The final questionnaire was quite long (13 pages) and altogether there were 121 variables. In an attempt to make the questionnaire more interesting for the respondent, there was some variety in the question structure. For example, in some questions, respondents were asked to indicate their answers on a scale of 1 to 7. In others, officers could indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements. Apart from the qualitative questions, all were pre-coded and the respondent had simply to circle a number to indicate his or her answer.

Questionnaires were printed, single-sided, on three different colours of paper, with a specific colour for each force. This was to facilitate the rapid sorting of questionnaires on their return.

iii) **Data analysis**

Analysis of the quantitative data was conducted using SPSS (Statistical Packages for the Social Sciences) on a mainframe computer. Given the structure of the questions, data were collected at nominal, ordinal and interval levels of measurement.

The data set was explored by the following:

'**Frequencies**'

Simple frequency counts were used for the nominal and ordinal data questions. For example, for Question 3 of Section C of the questionnaire, 32% of respondents indicated their belief that the national quality of service initiative had been 'very beneficial' to the police as a whole.

'**Descriptives**'

For the numerically-scaled (interval data) questions, mean scores and standard deviations were established.
As an example, in question 1 of Section D of the instrument, respondents were asked to rate (on a scale of 1 to 7) the commitment of their Chief Officers to the current quality of service philosophy. For the sample as a whole, a mean score of 6.23 out of 7 was obtained, which happened to be the highest rating given for all the ranks. A relatively low standard deviation of 1.14 indicated limited variability in the rating given.

'Cross-tabulation and chi-square'

The relationship between variables at the nominal and ordinal levels of measurement was explored with cross-tabulation. Any statistically significant association was established using the chi-square test available in SPSS. For example, in exploring the association between Job Specialism and other variables, the categories used were 'Uniform', 'CID', 'Support/Admin', and 'Other'. In this case, as with most other analyses, it was necessary to recode values. As there were only 6 Traffic, and 5 Training Officers, these were combined with those who had indicated 'Other' on the job specialism question.

Paralleling this, the categories of strongly agree/agree on the 'strength of agreement' questions were collapsed into one, as were the categories of strongly disagree/disagree.

This type of recoding was necessary to ensure that the chi-square tests were valid. Using chi-square, it is necessary to ensure that the expected cell frequencies are sufficiently high. As is stated by Harper (1971):

"If any of the expected cell values (observed values are not relevant here) are less than 5, then the [chi-square] test tends to become inaccurate. In such a case the difficulty is surmounted by merging the "below 5" cells with adjoining ones so that the combined expected values in all the resulting cells are 5 or more". (p.179)

An example of the cross-tabulation between 'job specialism' (as the independent variable) and another nominal variable is presented below. The dependent variable centres on agreement or disagreement with the statement 'My force places too much emphasis on the idea of colleagues being customers'.
In this case, the table demonstrates that the CID officers were the least receptive to the idea of colleagues being 'customers' (63% agreeing with the statement). We see from the above that the result of the chi-square test was significant at or below the 0.05 level: this criterion of significance was employed in all of the statistical tests. The results of every significant cross-tabulation were written up in separate reports, and the original computer print-outs have been retained.

The relationships between independent and dependent variables were explored in two phases.

The 'primary' independent variables were defined as follows:

* 'Force'
  (that is, Force 1, 2 or 3)

* 'Rank'
  (Chief Inspector or Superintendent)

* 'Job Specialism'
  (as explained above)

* 'Age'
  (Respondents were recoded into two groups - 45 years and under, and 46 years and over).
*'Length of Service'  
(for analysis, the variable was recoded into three categories: 11-21 years, 22-25 years and 26 to 33 years)

*'Length of Service at current rank'  
(the values were divided into three categories: 1-2 years, 3-5 years and 6-11 years)

*'Military Service'  
(whether or not respondents had military service)

*'Level of Educational attainment'  
grouped as follows:

1. City and Guilds/GCSE/O-levels
2. A-level or HND equivalent
3. University/College degree

It was decided to include an age variable to explore the possible association between younger age and more liberal or 'progressive' views above the policing function. A 1992 staff survey within Hampshire Constabulary had highlighted 'age' as a significant variable. The recoding of age for the current survey was chosen because of the limited age range of respondents, as well as to simplify (and strengthen) the statistical analysis.

The inclusion of military service as a variable reflected an interest in whether or not this would be associated with more reactionary or 'harder' views about quality and the policing function.

The relationship between each of these 'primary' independent variables and dependent variables was explored using chi-square; the same was done for the 'secondary' independent variables, which are indicated below:

* Rating of personal commitment to current quality of service philosophy (Question D2).

* The extent to which the current emphasis on quality of service has changed the way in which respondent's job is carried out (Question D6).

* Rating of personal involvement in strategic development of the force (Question D8).
* Rating of personal morale (Question E2).

* Personal anxiety rating about development of police career (Question E3).

* Optimism/Pessimism rating of future of Police Service (Question E5).

* Effect of results of Sheehy enquiry on respondent's morale (Question E6).

* Whether or not respondent would choose to become a police officer again (Question E7).

Those variables at the 'interval' level of measurement were recoded and treated as categorical type variables (these were Questions D2, E2, E3 and E5). For example, 'personal commitment to the quality of service philosophy' (Question D2) was originally a 7-point interval level question. In this analysis, scores 1 to 5 were re-grouped together, yielding the following frequencies for each value:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 to 5 (low)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (high)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (very high)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>154</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The values 1 to 5 were taken to mean 'low' commitment to the current QOS philosophy, and the values 6 and 7 'high' and 'very high' respectively. An example of cross-tabulation is provided below; the dependent variable rested on agreement or disagreement that the 'police should harden their policing style'.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitment:</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>100% (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>101% (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>100% (77)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals 100% (144)

Chi-square value = 10.63

As might be anticipated, there was a higher probability that the 'low' personal commitment group would agree that the 'police should harden their policing style' (65% doing so).

**T-tests**

T-tests were used to explore the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables at the interval level of measurement.

As Walsh (1990) states:

"The t distribution is a popular statistic for comparing means between two samples regardless of the sample size. Its popularity rests in the observation that as sample size increases the t distribution becomes more and more like the normal distribution." (Pg 111)

The test was used for the following independent variables:

* Rank of respondent
* Age of respondent
* Whether respondent had military service
* Effect of the Sheehy enquiry on morale

'Two-tailed' or non-directional tests were utilised. For example, it was not hypothesised that the mean score for Superintendents on a particular dependent variable would be higher than the score for Chief Inspectors. The main hypothesis in this case would be that there would be no significant difference
between the mean scores for these two sets of officers. An example of analysis is provided below:

**Perceived importance of reflecting public concern in the setting of policing priorities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Inspectors</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5.68</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>1.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F-value</th>
<th>2-tail prob.</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>2-tail prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.791</td>
<td>-2.19</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is, the mean rating given by Chief Inspectors was significantly different (at or below the 5% threshold) from the mean rating given by Superintendents: Superintendents regarded as more important the reflection of public concern in the setting of policing priorities.

The output from SPSS presents results based on both equal (pooled) and unequal (separate) sample variances. As Walsh (1990) points out, the t-test generally assumes equality of variances (homogeneity of variance). In interpreting the SPSS output it was necessary to decide which of the two versions of the t-test (using pooled or separate variances) was the appropriate one. To assist in this decision, SPSS produces the F-value and an indication of its statistical significance. Where the F-value is significant at or below 0.05, it is necessary to use the t-test based on separate or unequal variance; where the F-value is not significant, the t-test based on pooled or equal variance should be used.

In the example above (and indeed in all of the t-tests used for analysis) the F-value was not significant at or below the 5% level; therefore the t-test based on pooled variance was used. Walsh (1990) indicates the logic of assuming homogeneity of variance where the two groups (such as Chief Inspectors and Superintendents) are sampled from the same population (Pg 118). Given that the F-value can be regarded as a test of the significance of difference between sample variances, it is clear that the independent variable groups did not have significantly different variances.

The variable 'Sheehy; (Question E6) was subject to t-tests. In this case only 6% of the total sample had indicated a positive impact on their morale from the Sheehy enquiry: these officers were therefore excluded from the analysis, which was conducted using 145 cases, 70% of whom felt that the Sheehy enquiry had adversely affected their morale, and 30% of whom indicated no impact. The relationship between 'Sheehy'
and the 'interval' dependent variables was explored using t-test, and an example is provided below:

**Level of anxiety about development of police career**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect of Sheehy on morale</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adverse impact</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No impact</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F-value</th>
<th>2-tail prob.</th>
<th>t-value</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>2-tail prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>-2.05</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this case, the mean anxiety rating from those who indicated 'no impact' from Sheehy (3.19 out of 7) was significantly different from the mean rating of those who indicated a negative impact (3.99 out of 7).

**Analysis of variance**

One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) allows us to "compare more than two means simultaneously to determine whether any differences among two or more of them are greater than would be expected by chance... In one-way ANOVA we are interested in the mean values of an interval or ratio level dependent variable within different categories (usually three or more) of an independent variable... The logic of ANOVA is that if the variance between groups is significantly greater than the variance within the groups, the populations from which the groups came can also be considered to be different with regard to the dependent variable". (Walsh 1990, p 124-125)

One-way ANOVA was used to explore the relationship between independent variables (such as length of service at current rank) and interval level dependent variables (such as perceived commitment to the QOS philosophy). The research hypothesis was that at least two category means would differ from one another. Because ANOVA only indicates that two or more means differ (and not which ones) it was necessary to employ the Scheffe test, which is used when there are unequal sample sizes. SPSS has a statistical subcommand for the Scheffe test, which will identify the category means that are statistically significant from one another at or below the 0.05 level.

The example below illustrates the main elements of the SPSS analysis: the independent variable is length of service, and the dependent variable is optimism or pessimism about the future of the Police Service
In the top part of the SPSS output reproduced above, the F-ratio of 4.2844 indicates that the between-group variance (that is, between the three 'length of service' groups) is larger than the within-group variance.

As Walsh (1990) makes clear:

"The F-ratio is determined by the ratio of the mean square within to the mean square between... If there are no differences among the groups, the between-group and within-group variances will be approximately equal, and the value of F will be about 1". (p 132-133)

We also see that the F-ratio is significant at or below the 0.05 level. The second part of the output shows the number of officers in each of the length of service categories (for example, 32 officers had 11 to 21 years service), as well as the mean score on the optimism/pessimism scale of 1 to 7. On the printout, SPSS also indicated that the most pessimistic score (3.9383) was significantly different from the most optimistic (2.9375). The difference between these two mean scores (1.0008) exceeded the minimum required 'distance' to indicate a significant difference between means (that is, exceeded the Scheffe range of 0.8629 between these two groups).

In sum, the one-way ANOVA tests were employed where there was an independent variable with three or more categories, and where the relationship between this independent variable and an 'interval' type variable required exploration. The use of the Scheffe test highlighted exactly which of the category means...
were statistically significant from one another at or below the 0.05 level.

iv) Production of survey reports

A number of separate documents have been produced, which are indicated elsewhere in the appendix.
Methodological Reflections

Although the research has entailed both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, the analysis and write-up period has reflected a predominantly qualitative orientation. Of course, the research has not been built upon anything like a participant observation approach, as typified by Holdaway (1983), but the approach to data collection, and the flexibility of the field work and analysis has more in common with a qualitative, rather than quantitative genre.

Bryman (1988 chapter 3) presents some key elements of qualitative research:
1. 'Seeing through the eyes of'
2. Description
3. Contextualism
4. Process
5. Flexibility and lack of structure
6. Theory and Concepts

Each of these elements will be briefly discussed in the context of the thesis. Bryman (ibid, p61) suggests that the most fundamental aspect of qualitative research is its "commitment to viewing events, actions, norms, values etc. from the perspective of the people who are being studied". I have attempted in the collection and presentation of data to reflect accurately the viewpoint of social actors. In the interviews, I tried to empathise with the respondents' viewpoint and to allow them the opportunity to verbalise utilising their own conceptions and linguistic categories. As Bryman (p62) suggests, however, it is impossible for the researcher to rely solely on perceptions of respondents. There must come a point at which the theoretical interests must structure the collection of data and its analysis.

The element of 'description', in the sense of describing events, locations or respondents has not been sustained in the research. This element of qualitative research is perhaps more pertinent in ethnographic studies, and the current research cannot be classified as such.

With regard to the third element of 'contextualism', it is hoped that the current work has gone some way in meeting this qualitative requisite. Contextualism presents quite a challenge for the researcher:

"The emphasis here is on the need to interpret what is going on in terms of an understanding of the whole society and the meaning it has for the participants... we can understand events only when they are situated in the wider social and historical context." (p65)
The wider historical and social context is introduced in Chapter 2; it is also hoped that the research process involved exploring the meanings respondents held in relation to quality policing, police reforms, and the role of the state.

The fourth element in Bryman's typology centres on 'process'. Here it is assumed that a longitudinal element in research is part of "an undertaking to view social life in processual, rather than static terms" (p65). While I did employ a one-off survey of senior officers, I have nevertheless endeavoured to trace the origins and development of the QOS programme, thereby reflecting it as an unfolding process. This has been particularly critical given the imposition of the police reforms; the extent to which the latter interrupted the flow of development was one object of investigation. Follow up interviews with some key respondents permitted a clearer understanding of social and political processes. Connected to the concept of contextualism has been the aim to consider sociologically the police reforms as part of a longer term historical process, and not something that can be considered in isolation.

Fifthly, Bryman discusses the 'flexibility and lack of structure' in qualitative research (p66). Again, although it was necessary to specify certain research 'problems' in order to construct the survey instrument, and to conduct interviews in a coherent fashion, there has nevertheless been a flexible approach in the research. I would not go as far as saying that there has been a lack of structure, but would argue that the structure has been amenable to revision. Once again this was especially necessary given the police reforms from 1993 onward. Bryman (p67) states:

"qualitative researchers tend to the view that the predominantly open approach which they adopt in the examination of social phenomena allows them access to unexpectedly important topics which may not have been visible to them had they foreclosed the domain of study by a structured, and hence potentially rigid, strategy."

The conflict between 'elite groups' such as HMIC and the Audit Commission emerged as an unexpectedly important topic: it was certainly not a topic that had constituted a 'foreshadowed problem'. The issue of elite conflict became increasingly vital as the research (and analysis) progressed.

On the sixth and final element of 'theory and concepts' Bryman writes:

"qualitative researchers frequently reject the formulation of theories and concepts in advance of beginning their field-work. In particular, they view the imposition of a pre-ordained theoretical framework as deleterious because it may excessively constrain the researcher and also may exhibit a poor fit with participants' perspectives." (p68)
I certainly did not use a pre-ordained theoretical framework in the research, nor (in the main) deduce specific hypotheses at the outset which had to be tested. Especially with regard to the fieldwork, my methodology reflected "an approach in which the formulation and testing of theories and concepts proceeds in tandem with data collection "(Bryman, p68). Nevertheless, certain questions in the Superintendent and Chief Inspectors' questionnaire were constructed with the aim of testing associations. For example, I wished to explore the relationship between involvement in force strategic development and perception of the QOS initiative. As it happened there were some statistically significant relationships which in a sense had been hypothesised.

It is useful to call upon the work of Bulmer (1993) at this point. Drawing on the typology of the 'scientific approach' propounded by Wallace (1969), Bulmer provides a diagram which successfully distinguishes between a deductive (or hypothetico - deductive) and inductive approach to the research process. As with much qualitative work, this thesis represents a predominantly inductive approach, in that a 'conceptual structure' has been built-up from a series of empirical observations. Bulmer's diagram (p21) is reproduced below:
Such representation is, of course, only ideal-typical, but does serve to signify how the current research does not reflect a 'top-down' approach to the collection of data. It represents more a 'bottom-up' strategy in which the fieldwork has yielded the development of theoretical constructs or conclusions. This is not to suggest that the research has strictly followed the 'grounded theory' approach advocated by Glaser and Strauss (1967). Nor has 'analytic induction' been strictly used (see Burgess 1984, p179). Burgess (ibid, p166) recognises that researchers seldom report the way in which they have recorded and analysed their data. I think this is partly due to the complex thought processes and sometimes haphazard periods of data collection (and analysis) which typify research, especially in research which is 'flexible'. There is a danger at the writing up stage of portraying a process of investigation which is totally controlled, clear and unequivocally logical. I do not pretend here that the process of data collection, analysis and theory construction has been clear enough to be represented in a step-by-step linear fashion. Perhaps reflecting a more postmodernist view, it would be sensible to conceive of data collection and analysis in a spiral rather than linear form. This type of conception is reflected by Dey (1993).

There are other issues to which the qualitative researcher must pay attention; such issues are usefully identified by Silverman (1993) who questions the remnants of Romanticism in qualitative research (p197). He highlights the tension of treating qualitative data (such as interview material) as "privileged data" or as "perspectival" (that which is subject to verification as any other piece of evidence). Importantly, and related to this point, is Silverman's warning against naive interview studies in which the subject's point of view is treated as an explanation of a social phenomenon. Citing the work of the Chicago School (p199), Silverman reminds us that the behaviour and "consciousness" of subject need to be contextualised "in specific problems of social organisation". It is naive and limited to rely simply on the words of interviewees to account for the events and behaviour in which they are immersed.

Having discussed the work of Gilbert and Mulkay (1983), Silverman concludes that the discourse of respondents can never lead to the identification of one truth or one reality (p201). This seemed very much the case in relation to the current research. There were some very clear differences between the accounts of police leaders and senior Home Office officials, for example. Which accounts were to be treated as more valid explanations or perceptions of the social world of policing and politics? Should all accounts be treated as equally valid, but nevertheless different as a result of their discrepant contexts? Police leaders, of course, have rather different working environments and objectives compared to Home Office officials. Their explanation of events was perhaps bound to be different from other key respondents in the HOPD or Audit Commission. In this thesis I have endeavoured to present a range of accounts, but not to rely on these as explanations of social phenomena. Unless one adopts the type of 'documents of life' approach advocated by Plummer (1990), it is incumbent upon the researcher to impose his or her analytic framework upon the research data.
It is hoped that the varieties of official and unofficial accounts and data have been used here in a manner that does not demand too much of each. Paralleling this, Silverman argues (p205) that "multi-factorial explanation is likely to be more satisfactory than explanations which appeal to what I have called a 'single element'". In researching the origins and developments of the QOS initiative it indeed became clear that no one factor could be identified as causal. In the 'real' social world, I would argue, no one aspect or act can be isolated as the precipitating factor. However, the more abstract one's analysis becomes, the more sweeping one's generalisations about social or historical trends. It is useful to conceive of analysis being conducted at low or high altitude - the more stratospheric the analysis becomes the more likely the researcher is to isolate one or two factors which account for identified developments. The researcher can be engaged at one (or more) of many levels of analysis. With a more inductive beginning, the researcher is concerned with empirical observations at almost 'ground-zero' level, with limited theorisation. In this research, I have moved conceptually from a lower level of analysis to one that reaches into the higher zones of academic altitude, with broad conclusions about the state and social control.

Finally in this section, it is useful to reproduce two diagrams which were used in developing ideas about the thesis. The first one below represents the different sets of discourse from key types of respondent. The overlapping portion in the middle of the diagram represents the commonality of account: the question to ask is whether this symbolises the 'truth' (or perhaps a truth) which the researcher identifies in his or her own endeavours. This was a useful conceptualisation during data collection and write-up.
The second diagram expresses similar ideas in a different form. In this case, greater weighting given to the accounts of HMIC (for example) would pull the 'ball of truth' toward its own vector. This ball floats around inside the cube, and depending on one's viewpoint, or attribution of validity, the 'truth' gravitates to one side or corner of the cube. Perhaps it is the aim of the objective researcher to locate this ball of truth perfectly in the centre of the cube!

(These diagrams were presented at a University of Surrey postgraduate workshop in 1994)
Example of questionnaire used in Superintendent and Chief Inspector Survey (1993)

The Policing Function and Quality of Service

This questionnaire will be treated in the strictest confidence. You are not required to provide your name on the form.

No individual will be named in the final report, nor will any comments be attributed.

Most questions can be answered by circling a number. In some questions, you are able to provide your own comments.

Once you have completed the questionnaire, please return it to:

Ian Waters,
Research and Development.

Many thanks for your help
**SECTION A – BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

1. What is your rank?
   - Chief Inspector 1
   - Superintendent 2

2. Are you presently working in: *(Please circle ONE only)*
   - Uniformed operations? 1
   - CID? 2
   - Traffic Division? 3
   - Support or Administration? 4
   - Training? 5
   - Other? (please specify) 6

3. Which of the following is your age bracket?
   - 26 - 35 years 1
   - 36 - 45 years 2
   - 46 - 55 years 3
   - 56 years and over 4

4. How long have you been a police officer? *(to the nearest year)*
   

5. How long have you been at your current rank? *(to the nearest year)*
   

6. Have you ever had military service?
   - Yes 1
   - No 0
7. What is your highest level of educational attainment? (Please circle ONE only)
   No educational qualifications  1
   GCSE/CSE/O Level  2
   City and Guilds  3
   A Level or HND equivalent  4
   University/College Degree  5
   Other (please specify)  6

SECTION B – THE POLICING FUNCTION

1. Please show how important you think it is for the police service to be involved in the activities listed below, on a scale of 1 to 7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Not at all important</th>
<th>Very important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community liaison</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools liaison</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting the image of the Police as a community service</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassuring the community</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflecting public concern in the setting of policing priorities</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with other agencies to address the root causes of crime and social nuisance</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Below are a number of statements. Indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each of them by circling the appropriate number.

Key:
1 I strongly agree
2 I agree
3 Don't know or have no opinion
4 I disagree
5 I strongly disagree

The Police should harden their policing style
1 2 3 4 5

The Police should have greater powers in their daily duties
1 2 3 4 5

Policing has become too 'liberal'
1 2 3 4 5

Police officers should be issued with more effective defensive equipment (such as side-handled batons)
1 2 3 4 5

The Police Service should focus more on its 'enforcement' duties
1 2 3 4 5

Too much emphasis is now placed on the 'service' side of policing
1 2 3 4 5

Greater emphasis should be placed on public order training
1 2 3 4 5

3. What do you regard as the most important function of the Police? (please describe in your own words)
### SECTION C – NATIONAL QUALITY OF SERVICE INITIATIVE

1. How well acquainted are you with the following?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Policing Review of 1990</th>
<th>Not at all acquainted</th>
<th>Quite well acquainted</th>
<th>Very well acquainted</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Service's statement of common purpose and values</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPO's Strategic Policy Document of 1990 &quot;Setting the Standards for Policing: meeting community expectation&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. What sort of impact, if any, do you think the following have had on your Force?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Policing Review of 1990</th>
<th>A negative impact</th>
<th>No impact</th>
<th>A positive impact</th>
<th>Not sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Service's statement of common purpose and values</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPO's Strategic Policy Document of 1990 &quot;Setting the Standards for Policing: meeting community expectation&quot;</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. How beneficial do you think the national 'Quality of Service' initiative has been for the police as a whole?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all beneficial</th>
<th>Not very beneficial</th>
<th>Quite beneficial</th>
<th>Very beneficial</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. How beneficial do you think the national 'Quality of Service' initiative has been for the general public in this country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all beneficial</th>
<th>Not very beneficial</th>
<th>Quite beneficial</th>
<th>Very Beneficial</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Have you watched the national quality of service video, commissioned by the ACPO quality of service committee, which is entitled "If the job's worth doing.."?

Yes 1  No 0

If yes, how would you rate its overall usefulness?

Not very useful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very useful

6. How important do you think it is for the Service to have the statement of Ethical Principles? (on a scale of 1 to 7)

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very important

SECTION D – THE APPROACH TO QUALITY OF SERVICE IN YOUR FORCE

1. How committed do you think most of the following in your Force are to the current 'quality of service' philosophy? (on a scale of 1 to 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not committed</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very committed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Officers</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Superintendents</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendents</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Inspectors</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectors</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constables</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probationers'</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. How committed are you to the current 'quality of service' philosophy?
(On a scale of 1 to 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not committed</th>
<th></th>
<th>Very committed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Please give your opinion on each statement below by circling the appropriate number.

Key:
1 I strongly agree
2 I agree
3 Don't know or have no opinion
4 I disagree
5 I strongly disagree

(a) The Police's national Quality of Service initiative has had a positive impact on my Force.

(b) My Force places too much emphasis on the idea of 'serving the public'.

(c) My Force places too much emphasis on the idea of colleagues being 'customers'.

(d) Meeting the expectations of the community should be the main aim of my Force.

(e) The current emphasis on quality of service has penetrated most levels of my Force

(f) The current quality of service emphasis in my Force will eventually fade away.

4. What do you think your Force will have to work hardest at to improve quality of service to the public? (Please describe in your own words.)

5. What do you think your Force will have to work hardest at to improve quality of service to colleagues? (Please describe in your own words)
6. To what extent, if at all, has the current emphasis on 'quality of service' changed the way in which you actually do your job?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>A little</th>
<th>Quite a lot</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. On a scale of 1 to 7, please rate your Force on the following factors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Poor (1-7)</th>
<th>Good (1-7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A commitment to improve service</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A shared sense of mission</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A willingness to respond to criticism</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A commitment to respond to the community's needs</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A common understanding of quality of service</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. How involved do you feel in the strategic development of your force?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all involved</th>
<th>Not very involved</th>
<th>Quite involved</th>
<th>Very much involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. On a scale of 1 to 7, how valuable do you think the following are to quality policing?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Very valuable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal staff opinion surveys</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External public attitude surveys</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Customer' satisfaction surveys (excluding offenders)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offender satisfaction surveys</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal service charters</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking the Citizen's Charter 'Charter Mark'</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

   Key:
   1 I strongly agree
   2 I agree
   3 Don't know or have no opinion
   4 I disagree
   5 I strongly disagree

   a) My Force is progressive and forward thinking  1 2 3 4 5
   b) My Force is at the forefront of developing quality of service  1 2 3 4 5
   c) A first class police service is generally provided for the citizens of  1 2 3 4 5
   d) Constabulary ranks as one of the best Forces in the country.  1 2 3 4 5
   e) My Force is committed to improving quality of life in the community  1 2 3 4 5
   f) My Force has developed too rapidly in the last two or three years  1 2 3 4 5
   g) 'Sector' or area policing provides a higher quality of policing than shift-based systems  1 2 3 4 5
   h) 'Problem-oriented' policing is the best way to provide a high quality service  1 2 3 4 5

11. How would you rate the 'charter' leaflet on the following aspects?

   Usefulness for your job  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Clarity of aims  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Creating a strategic direction  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
   Improvement of policing service  1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12. To what extent do you think Constabulary is achieving the strategic aims listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Aim</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Very much so</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To promote, and to increase public confidence in, community safety</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To be more responsive to the policing priorities of the public</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve recognition of the work of our staff</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To increase operational strength</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To improve efficiency and effectiveness through information technology</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13. What do you personally think are the most important aspects of quality policing? (please describe in your own words)

14. What factors most often prevent you from doing your job as you would like to? (please describe in your own words)
1. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Key:
1 I strongly agree
2 I agree
3 Don't know or have no opinion
4 I disagree
5 I strongly disagree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Police Service has changed for the worse in the last 10 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police Service is losing its grip on the policing of society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The public generally are not aware of the policing that they need</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The best officers are usually those who do what they're told to do by supervisors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the ideals of decency and politeness to the public are unworkable under the conditions of operational duty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The quality of service philosophy is fine in theory, but less workable in reality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Service is suffering from lack of discipline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society doesn't deserve the high quality police service it has already</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. How would you rate your morale at the moment? (on a scale of 1 to 7)

Low 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High
3. How anxious are you, if at all, about the development of your police career?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Not at all anxious</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>Very anxious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. Would you say that the following have too little or too much influence over the Police? 
*(on a scale of 1 to 7)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Too little</th>
<th></th>
<th>Too much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local government</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMIC</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Authorities</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit Commission</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National media</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local media</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local communities</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community consultation groups</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority groups</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other agencies (eg Social Services)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. On a scale of 1 to 7, how optimistic or pessimistic are you about the future of the Service?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Optimistic</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5 6 7</th>
<th>Pessimistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

*Please explain your answer:*
6. How have the results of the Sheehy enquiry affected your morale?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adversely affected</th>
<th>No effect</th>
<th>Positively affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Would you still choose to become a police officer, given the choice tomorrow?
   - Definitely yes 1
   - Probably yes 2
   - Not sure 3
   - Probably no 4
   - Definitely no 5

8. Do you have any final comments on any matter? (please continue overleaf if necessary)

Thank you for your help!
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit or Division</th>
<th>Key Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Department Strategy Group</td>
<td>Finance, Planning, Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1 Division</td>
<td>‘Police Resources’ (including implementation of the Police and Magistrates Court Act, funding formula and police authorities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2 Division</td>
<td>‘Police and the Public’ (including Quality of Service, police powers and procedures and police complaints)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3 Division</td>
<td>‘International and Serious Crime’ (including international drugs enforcement and Regional Crime Squads)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4 Division</td>
<td>‘Counter Terrorism’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5 Division</td>
<td>‘Personnel and Training’ (including pay and conditions of service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6 Division</td>
<td>Administration of Interception of Communications Act 1985, the Security Service Act 1989, and HO interest in Intelligence Services Act 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7 Division</td>
<td>‘Police Science, Technology and Equipment’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8 Division</td>
<td>‘Public Order, Firearms and Traffic’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F10 Division</td>
<td>‘Crime Prevention’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F11 Division</td>
<td>‘Policy on Information Technology’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other units within the Police Department included the Technical Policy Division, the Police Research Group (PRG), and, of course, HMIC.

It must be noted that since 1995, the Police Department has undergone considerable re-organisation, and is now referred to as a ‘Police Policy Directorate’.
The Chief Constable and members of the Hampshire Constabulary are committed to upholding the law fairly but firmly; to preventing crime; to pursuing and bringing to justice those who break the law; to keeping the Queen's Peace; to protecting, helping and reassuring the community and to be seen to do all this with integrity, common sense and sound judgement.

We will ensure that, in delivering this service, we treat people equally regardless of their age, gender, race, colour, ethnic or national origins and that our policies and procedures are designed so as not to discriminate either intentionally or unintentionally against any group or individual. We will also seek to respond sensitively to any special needs experienced by particular groups.

We will be compassionate, courteous and patient, acting without fear or prejudice to the rights of others. We will be professional, calm and restrained in the face of violence and apply only that force which is necessary to accomplish our lawful duty.

We will strive to reduce the fears of the public and, so far as we can, reflect their priorities in the action we take. We will respond to well-founded criticism, with a willingness to change.
APPENDIX 6

A list of the AC police papers is shown below:

Audit Commission Police Papers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrative Support for Operational Police Officers</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Out of print - photocopy available at a reduction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Improving the Performance of the Fingerprint Service</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Improving Vehicle Fleet Management in the Police Service</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Calling All Forces: Improving Police Communications Rooms</td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(out of print - photocopy available at a reduction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(out of print - photocopy available at a reduction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(out of print - photocopy available at a reduction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(out of print - photocopy available at a reduction)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Cheques and Balances: A Framework for Improving Police Accountability Executive Briefing</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


* Hirst M. (1990a) 'Meeting Community Expectation', Address to 1990 ACPO summer conference, Bramshill Police Staff College.


Telecom and the Kent Police', Kent County Constabulary.


* Love S. (1991) 'What is the Audit Commission up to?' in Police, Vol.7 No.2.


New Scotland Yard.


* Operational Policing Review (1990), Joint Consultative Committee of the Police Staff Associations, Surbiton: The Police Federation.


responsibilities of the Police', London.


* 'Professional Manager', September 1993.


* Senior Command Course (1990) 'A Crisis in the Police Service: Some Possible Solutions', paper by Syndicate Four, Bramshill Police Staff College.


to the 27th Senior Command Course), London: HMIC.


