Understanding Russian Foreign Policy after 1991: A Contextual Analysis

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Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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2009
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My first thanks go to the three supervisors who have overseen me at various stages in my research. The first, Dr Noel Parker, was responsible for me undertaking the PhD. Although the thesis is almost wholly different from where I started, his work and encouragement is remembered and appreciated. Professor Chris Flood, despite having signed on initially as second supervisor, has moved from secondary to primary and back again: In whichever capacity, he has stayed the course and warrants my sincere thanks, not least for always making me ask questions of myself. Finally, Dr Roberta Guerrina 'inherited' me when she arrived at Surrey but in the latter years has been the absolute mainstay of my supervision. I literally do not think I would have finished without her. She has done what all supervisors have to do but far more beyond, boosting my confidence when I needed it most and pushing and encouraging me to put my work out there and face any criticism. From all my supervisors, I have learned perhaps the most important lesson, that we are nothing without our peers and their insights.

The Politics Department at Surrey is not a large one and the postgraduate community is small. Some of my colleagues there have supported me throughout, but I am most grateful to my fellow student, Rafal Soborski. We have run the path together and knowing he was there has made all the difference. I must thank also the academic community beyond Surrey. It is perhaps unusual to thank a professional association but UACES deserves particular acknowledgement for running an Annual Conference that makes plenty of room for postgraduate students and at which I have received nothing but constructive criticism and help. My advice to any postgraduate student would be to make the most of such associations and conferences given the huge part they play in seeing us through.

On a personal level, certain of my friends have been great, knowing when to ask questions and when not – for their interest and cheerleading, I thank them. But it is to my husband, Cosmo, that I owe the greatest debt, not least for proof-reading and all the IT support. He has seen me through every stage of this, reminding me of why I undertook the task in the first place. I hope he knows how much I love, respect and admire him: ultimately no opinion matters more than his. I am reminded finally by reviewing my hard copy notes and seeing all the paw prints that others have been a source of comfort - and distraction - when needed.

This work is dedicated to my father, who has not been here to see any of this, but whose presence I have nevertheless felt, and valued, along the way.
ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to understand Russia's foreign policy behaviour since the end of the Cold War. The primary objective is to discover whether there are grounds for considering Russia to be a values actor. A review of the Foreign Policy literature reveals the necessity of grounding any foreign policy analysis within the international and domestic contexts. Perceptions of Russian behaviour, however, too often lack any understanding of the specific circumstances of the Russian situation and this can result in a flawed analysis that reveals more about prejudices of Russia than Russia itself. This thesis seeks to correct this by providing a fully contextualised analysis.

This objective requires new ways of analysing Russia. I first of all consider the possibility of applying a values approach to any actor. In a chapter on Values, I consider the role that values play in any actor's foreign policy, how they are formulated and at what level and what happens when there is a conflict between the values of the international community and those of one actor. With the significance of context already established, the research there shows that international-level values today cannot be understood without reference to the debate on whether we are now living in a modern or post-modern era. In another chapter, therefore, I juxtapose the values of the modern world with those of the post-modern and attempt to answer the question of whether Russia is modern or post-modern. These two chapters lead to a third one on Marginality.

The Marginality framework is treated crucial to understanding the choices that lie before Russia and the West. Here, I show that despite its weakness and the failure of many of its post-Cold War objectives Russia has won gains that we would not normally associate with a 'defeated' state. Despite attempts to marginalise Russia within the European space, Russia has found much room for manoeuvre. In its relations with the EU particularly it has shown itself capable of adhering to certain standards of behaviour, which suggests the values gap between the EU and Russia is not as insurmountable as some analysis suggests. Finally, I apply each of these to Russia's behaviour throughout the Kosovo Crisis, testing hypotheses raised in the previous chapters to conclude that Russia does indeed show that it can be an important partner for Europe and that a discernible value set underpins many of its actions.

The analysis is important in the context of perceptions of a stronger, more aggressive Russia that resulted in 2007-8 in much talk about whether a New Cold War was occurring. Since 1991, too many opportunities have already been lost to ensure that Russia commits to western values and conducts itself in a manner consistent with that of a European actor. This thesis shows that, when properly engaged, Russia has proved itself capable of being a reliable and cooperative partner and even of adhering to post-modern, European values.
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This thesis examines Russian foreign policy with the primary objective of contributing to understandings of Russia's orientation in global politics. A review of the literature and of key speeches by a succession of Russian leaders reveals that Russia is intent on being perceived as part of Europe, and therefore the West. In a context where Europe is spoken of as a post-modern actor, Russia's ability to cast itself as European becomes problematic. Thus, the issue of values becomes a crucial component in understanding foreign policy behaviour. The primary objective of this work is to answer whether there are grounds for arguing that Russia is a values actor. This research has become all the more compelling and meaningful in the context of a discourse where it is claimed that Russia has reverted to the behaviour of the Cold War period: bullying and aggressive in both tone and action, and authoritarian in its tendencies (see, for instance, Lucas, 2008 for a highly anti-Russian reading). Two questions need to be posed in order to understand Russia's behaviour: i) how can we account for Russia's often antagonistic foreign policy statements and actions? ii) why has the optimism of the early 1990s, where Russia was seen as a state with which the West could do business, been replaced by a situation where Russia is increasingly seen as a pariah?

The review of the literature reveals Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to be a distinct field with its own well-developed methodologies. However, as a sub-discipline of International Relations (IR), it remains heavily informed by the theoretical frameworks of IR and thus the analysis of Russian foreign policy also has to be grounded in this literature. As this thesis focuses on
values, it is important to set out the distinction between explaining and understanding, an argument articulated most famously in the IR literature by Hollis and Smith (1990) and discussed in more detail below. While striving, à la Hill (2003), to exhibit a high degree of detachment in my analysis, the thesis is ultimately underpinned by a critique of positivism. I argue that while IR theory increasingly drives us to consider events in more pluralistic and reflectivist fashions, such considerations are applied asymmetrically. Much political commentary, and even much academic analysis treats Russia as being interest-driven and denies the existence of values in Russian foreign policy. But I am examining a dynamic policy area where policy outcomes have the power to affect not just a state but the international system itself: positivist explanations in respect of Russia have the capacity to do much damage. Three hypotheses therefore underpin the research: i) that Russia is as much a values actor as, for instance, the EU; ii) that only by examining the context in which Russia makes its foreign policy can we appreciate the existence of those values and iii) that failure to see the values in foreign policy results in a more general failure to ‘forecast’ foreign policy (FP) (Hermann, 1995).

The nature and scope of the thesis see contributions made to more than one body of literature. Principal here is the Russian foreign policy literature. As Chapter 3 reveals, despite a welter of excellent post-1991 research into Russia, a large gap remains between knowledge and understanding. Much of the literature lacks a clear theoretical framework. This thesis offers one method of correcting this by using the extant, extensive empirical body of work to aid in a contextual foreign policy analysis. The research conducted here benefits enormously from the apparently massive changes that have taken place in Russia over the last two decades. Russian foreign policy literature in the late 1990s and early 2000s was already speaking of three phases in Russian foreign policy after 1991. With the advantage of more hindsight, I argue that the bulk of the work done has focused on change in Russian foreign policy and not enough on
continuity. In actual fact, we would have done better to remember arguments that Russia was in a revolutionary period (Trenin 2004, Tilly 1993). Even if revolution is not admitted, at the very least Russia was undergoing quite dramatic transformation (Adomeit, 1995). Under such circumstances, we could have expected that the struggle and capacity for change would be constrained by the forces for continuity. In brief, though, I argue that over-emphasis on change blinds analysis to the existence of independent variables, even while I bear in mind that over-emphasis on continuity can make us see a variable as independent when it is actually intervening. In the case of Russia, understandable excitement over Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ perhaps made analysts forget that much remains the same even in times of change.

The thesis presented in this work is that Russia's recent assertiveness in foreign policy, and its perceived hostility towards the USA and some European states, is the consequence not of Russian actions but rather its reactions to misguided western foreign policies. Directing accusations of recidivism at Russia (Thompson, 2007) is not only unhelpful, it is to ignore the fact that Russia has not been able to shake off the effects of its historical legacy. The enduring perception of Russia is a negative one, it seems. But if Russia is suffering from a post-Cold War hangover, so too are western perceptions (Kupchan, 2008). The apparent inability to move beyond the framework of past relationships and theoretical lenses is not purely a Russian condition. More than this, for much of the 1990s it was not even a Russian condition. Russia called instead for proper debate about the future of the international and European security architecture. The difficulty here lay in the differing perceptions about the nature of the end of the Cold War. For the West, the USSR was the loser. Russia, however, saw itself as instrumental in bringing about the end and therefore worthy of equal partnership in shaping what followed.

This assessment supports Shevtsova's claim (2007) that opportunities were missed to bring
Russia into the western 'fold'. Opportunities to engage in debate and to understand Russian concerns were missed. More importantly, the chance to construct a 'New Europe' in which Russia had a clear role and investment was also missed. How do we account for this? Despite Gorbachev's New Thinking, the end of the Cold War and the exponential increase in information about Russia that resulted, a Realist view of Russia dominates the discourse. Additionally, Russia has experienced enormous difficulty in its attempt to be treated as a European state, with more Eurasian than European credentials, it has struggled to win (in its view) a worthy place in NATO and the EU (Straus, 2001). Russia's claim to be a Great Power requires a western identity for only this way can it achieve a decisive role in western-led organisations. The pivotal place of ideas, perceptions and identity mean that it is only when we apply a Constructivist account of foreign policy behaviour that we can account for New Thinking, the level of cooperation that we have seen from Russia since 1991 but crucially too, the deterioration that has characterised relations between Russia and the West in more recent times.

In today's climate, Kagan's (2003) argument seemingly holds more weight: in a time of weakness it was undoubtedly easier to enfold Russia in a community, but this was primarily because this was what Russia itself wanted. It is well documented that in the 1990s Russia was intent on integrating into as many international organisations as possible (see Odom, 1998). It sought dialogue and cooperation in a range of fora. However, this was underpinned by a belief that membership of the international community could be established on equal terms. Believing that it had helped to bring an end to the Cold War, Russia wanted to help build a society of shared norms and values and accepted standards of behaviour. This did not necessarily indicate a Russian desire to be a revisionist state, rather it was recognition that change had come and that conditions would not necessarily be favourable in respect of Russia being able to achieve its future objectives. Indeed, it was treated as a defeated state, with
membership dictated on pre-ordained terms. As much as it was dissatisfied with the status quo, Russia was not able to win a place for itself in discussions about the future of the European security architecture and so stood in opposition to those changes over which it had no control, defending instead what it had hitherto preferred to remodel. It is easy to trace a connection between each failure of Russia to achieve its objectives and a growing antagonism between Russia and the West. As a result, Russia has spoken of situating missiles on NATO's borders and it has engaged in a short, but hot, war with Georgia. It is in relation to the West, then, that Russia has invested most and won least and this, coupled with Russia's continued claim to a European identity, means that I focus primarily on Russia's relations with the West, particularly Europe, rather than focusing on its policies towards Eurasia and its Eurasian identity. In this decision too, I am guided by the arguments of those such as Straus, who argues that 'Eurasianism or non-Westernism will be weak and unstable as an identity for Russia in the world' (2001: 2).

That leaves Russia with little choice but to focus on relations with the West but as already set out, these have been troubled. The New Cold War literature is divided on the issue of who is to blame for poor relations (Lucas, 2008 versus Cohen, 2006, for example). There are two key problems with arguing that Russia is primarily at fault. Firstly, foreign policy is about action and reaction (Hermann 1995, Modelski 1962, Snyder, Bruck & Sapin 1962), we cannot therefore lay the blame solely at the Russian door. Secondly, there is the question of whose responsibility it was to put in place a security framework that could assure peace. It is difficult to see how the then-President Clinton's breaking of the promise not to expand NATO to the Baltic states, the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the placing of US missile defence bases in Poland and the Czech Republic were calculated to assure peace. In the context of such a political setting Russia's actions – if seen as actions – are consistent with Realist perspectives. But if seen as reactions, new questions have to be asked.
From a Social Constructivist viewpoint, the question of socialisation is central. In the case of Russia, Constructivism allows us to ask the following questions: i) can Russia be socialised into a western society of states? ii) do western states want to bring Russia into the fold? iii) what does this imply about Russia's orientation in the international system? Theoretical arguments claiming that a socialisation process can and does take place are abundant (see Christiansen et al., 1999). On a practical level, belief in such processes informs the very existence and operation of organisations such as the Council of Europe (CoE). In defending itself against arguments that it has admitted states which violate rather than uphold human rights, so breaching CoE principles, the CoE has argued influence can be brought to bear more effectively upon members rather than non-members (Jordan, 2003). This, essentially, constitutes an argument that socialisation can take place most effectively from within. But in the wider international sphere, as evidenced by the New Cold War discourse, such a rationale has not been applied to Russia. The lessons of Social Constructivism are seemingly only selectively applied. It is on the basis of a Kagan-like argument, i.e. that being norm-driven is contingent on weakness, that Shevtsova (2007) makes her argument that an opportunity has been missed, in short that socialisation works on the weak but not the strong. But it is precisely this basis that I refute. A socialisation process takes place when certain actors can convince others of the rightness of their values and standards of behaviour. This suggests that any actor is capable of recognising the worth of applying standards and operating on an agreed value basis.

Believing in and adhering to values is not purely the preserve of weak actors and Kagan's argument belongs to what Hudson has called a 'denatured perspective of international politics' (2002: 2). By ignoring the role of ideas and therefore culture, we fail to see that Russia, strong or not, is constrained by a wide range of domestic and international factors - including ideational and cultural factors - but we fail also to consider properly the reasons why
socialisation may not take place. In the context of this thesis, I argue that attempts were made to convince Russia of the existence of a post-modern order where the rules of the modern era no longer prevailed. It was not that Russia could not and cannot abide by the values of this order but more that Russia sees the dominant actors within that discourse, particularly the USA but the EU too, as delivering self-serving rhetoric that is not legitimated in their dealings with other members of the international community.

Consequently, I claim that even relatively powerful states accept the need to couch their general behaviour in ways acceptable to the wider international community (there are, of course, exceptions to this, e.g. 'rogue' states). The perceptions of what Modelski (1962) terms the 'ego' (the first) actor shape interactions with the 'alter' (other) actor and can act as a constraining influence upon the latter, provided that actor sees a legitimate basis underlying the ego actor's interactions. Legitimacy therefore becomes an important independent variable in our understanding of foreign policy interactions. But from this perspective too it becomes apparent that the fact-value dichotomy is a false one and too often used as a convenience to avoid what are likely to be the awkward truths of the self-reflective process that is otherwise required. In a post-modern context, this lack of reflexivity is highly damaging and accounts for much of the New Cold War discourse that we have latterly seen.

The thesis is thus further underpinned by a challenge to the facts-values dichotomy. Such challenges are the norm in the field of Political and Social Theory but are rarely considered in IR. I make a case for seeing that even in high politics interests can be values and that values are often, if not always, interest-driven. It is possible to juxtapose these two only if we forget perspective and ignore the need to remember that the view is not the same from everywhere. Further to this, while we cannot possibly see events from precisely the perspective of another, as Rosenau (1974) warned, we can shed much of our subjectivity and at least attempt to view
events from a different point. If we take the issue of security with Russia as the subject, it does not take too much imagination to see that in the context of a state that straddles eleven time zones, two continents and has borders with fourteen countries, security is, at the very least, as much of a value - i.e. a group's idea about what constitutes accepted standards of what is desirable - as it is an interest. In treating Russian attitudes to security as interest-driven it becomes too easy in the post-modern context to cast this perceived interest aside as something that should not affect another state's foreign policy interactions with Russia. With such distorted lenses we risk providing yesterday's answers to today's questions (to paraphrase Jørgensen, 2004: 35). In seeing it as a value, however, we can understand that a security issue might constitute a red line that the Russians cannot allow to be crossed, or at least not without a number of assurances or even pay-offs in associated directions. Any study of values, however, presents the analyst with a number of theoretical and methodological questions.

1.1 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS

As already discussed in brief, I adopt a post-positivist perspective that seeks to understand Russia's position in the international arena. While the IR literature is important and has a place in such a study, I rely primarily on the FP literature since it is this sub-discipline that requires us to consider both the external and internal constraints upon any actor's behaviour and so offers the prospect of a more complete understanding of why any state takes the viewpoint it does. I have outlined the case for adopting a values approach and this is expanded on in greater depth in Chapter 5. But any such approach stems from a belief that as important as material factors can be in understanding why any actor behaves as they do, it is at least as important to consider the role of ideas and culture. A seminal work by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (hereafter, à la Hudson (2002), referred to as SBS) published in 1962 that itself built on their earlier 1954
work advocated investigation of the role of ideas and culture on foreign policy to balance the preoccupation of analysis with states and power. Despite this early call, Hudson argues that it was not until the end of the Cold War that alternatives to state-centric approaches began to emerge. Where the state, the system and power had long formed essential parts of any foreign policy analysis, as a result of the work of the Constructivists, 'ideas' now came to be seen as just as important to understandings and explanations in FPA (Hudson, 2002: 3). The SBS decision-making approach put the individual at the centre of any understanding of FP, as discussed in greater depth in Chapter 2.

But the work also presented future analysts with the dilemma of determining what could feasibly be undertaken by any one individual and how to avoid reductionist work that would be of little utility. McClosky set out the scope of what SBS advocated, while also identifying the major problem with their work:

The inordinate complexity of the [SBS] scheme as it has so far been outlined is unquestionably its greatest shortcoming; one which in the end may prove its undoing. ... A research design that requires an investigator to collect detailed information about such diverse matters as the social system, the economy, the foreign situation, the actors, the perceptions, the motivations, the values, the goals, the communication problems, the personality – in short, that asks him to account for a decision-making event in its totality – places a back-breaking burden upon him, one that he could never adequately accomplish even if he were to invest an exorbitant effort (McClosky in Hudson, 2002: 9).

This problem and its responses – as well as the analytical legacy of SBS – is returned to in more detail in the next chapter but it has inevitable consequences for any methodological considerations. While I do not root my work fully in the SBS tradition, inasmuch as the thesis is not about decision-making per se, I do seek to reveal the main determinants of Russian foreign policy behaviour since 1991, and despite the extensive problems such approaches involve, cultural and ideational factors must necessarily play a large part in our understanding of any state's foreign policy. In an attempt to overcome some of the dangers that a subjective account can bring, I draw somewhat on the work of Rosenau (1974), although it should be said

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at the outset that I do not adopt the comparative approach he ultimately supported. However, he offered important insights as to the place of the actor and the observer. Citing SBS (1962), he argued that their approach required the analyst to adopt the perspective of the actor observed rather than that of the observer. While he understood the underlying reasoning of their argument, he detected flaws, saying that 'it unduly prejudges the nature of the dependent variable by confining it to decisional phenomena' (Rosenau, 1974: 19). Instead, under what he referred to as the adaptive perspective, we must consider outcomes and interactions and not just decisions and actions. He expanded further by explaining that there was the added problem that the observer cannot know whether they are reconstructing (since that is what they are doing) the world in the same way that the observed actor would. Thus any such analysis would inevitably be flawed. Here Rosenau and SBS are in agreement:

Although it might seem as though limitations in the setting, that is, internal and external, are “objective” to the decision-makers, it cannot be overemphasized that the estimates of such limitations by the observer and by actors may not be identical. In other words, it cannot — or rather, should not — be assumed that the observer and the actor will agree. Presumably — by some criteria of rational behavior — it is irrational for a state to select objectives for which it has inadequate means of achievement or to select techniques which are less conducive to the achievement of feasible objectives than others. By implication, these judgments are made from a vantage point not shared necessarily by the actor. The actor may have less knowledge than the observer or the actor may also know what the observer knows but be — in his view — unable to behave differently (SBS, 2002: 86).

To this we can add the problem that even an interview-based methodology can fall foul of the fact that the actors may not themselves know what motivates them to behave in a certain way and so the observer would be working with an incomplete set of data (Rosenau, 1974: 19). Thus, while Rosenau rejected positivist approaches he also saw inherent flaws in attempts to adopt a subjective analysis. He went on to say that:

the observer's perceptions and assessments must organize the analysis and [treat] the relationship between the perceptions and the actions of decision-makers as among the important theoretical and empirical problems with which the observer must contend. More specifically, such an approach posits behavior as being undertaken by concrete and identifiable officials, but it considers official behavior to be the product of several types of independent
variables, only one of which (idiosyncratic variables) includes their perceptions. With respect to the other types, the perceptions of officials are regarded as among the intervening variables — as logical and necessary links between the sources of foreign policy behavior and the behavior itself. The task is thus to develop and test theories that predict how decision-makers will behave under varying circumstances, irrespective of whether or not their perceptions of these circumstances coincide with those of the observer' (Rosenau, 1974: 19).

While I do not seek to develop a testable theory or to predict future FP conduct, I do seek to provide understanding of how and under what circumstances we can account for Russia's behaviour on the international stage. For reasons elaborated on later, a focus on individual decisions is not the best analytical framework through which to achieve this. Nor will a comparative approach suffice since this too has limited utility in respect of my overarching task.

1.1.1 Rethinking Structure and Agency in FPA

SBS sought to understand the 'why' of any state's behaviour and argued that this could only be achieved if the individual sat at the heart of analysis:

It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision-makers — those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. *State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state.* Hence, the state is its decision-makers (SBS, 2002: 59).

Hudson goes further, saying that events such as the collapse of the USSR and 9/11 render it 'theoretically foolish to retain a primary focus on system-level variables, or even on enduring structural constraints' (Hudson, 2002: 16). But this conclusion stems from a specific understanding about the source of ideas, where SBS and Hudson argue that 'one must move below the state level to find the unit of analysis that can think of those ideas, and be persuaded by the ideas of others and that can be motivated to act and even change action on the basis of
ideas' (Hudson, 2002: 16). Thus, individuals and groups, such as bureaucracies and interest
groups, could be the sources of ideas but not a non-human entity such as the state.

There are at least two major criticisms that can be applied here, both of which warrant some
consideration. Hudson and SBS reject any idea that the state can be considered as a person or
at least as maintaining the types of characteristics more commonly identified with humans.
Wendt (2004, 2005), on the other hand, makes compelling arguments for seeing the state as a
person. He argues 'that state persons are real in at least one important sense: they are
'intentional' or purposive actors' (Wendt, 2004: 291). Additionally, while states cannot be
considered as organisms (as a person can), they share enough of the same properties to be
considered as superorganisms (Wendt, 2004: 309-11) and, secondly they 'might have collective
consciousness, understood as subjective experience' (Wendt, 2004: 291), another facet of
personhood. This latter conclusion is ably supported by Hall and Taylor's work on historical
institutionalism, which shows that at the institutional level, history, i.e. subjective experience,
'matters'. This is not to say that I advocate an approach that has 'agency, but no human activity'
(Wight, 2004: 270), but it is to say, firstly, that ideas do not solely emanate from individuals
and that, secondly, agency does not only reside at the national level (Dunne 2001, Reus-Smit
1999). The case has thus been well made for seeing both states and international organisations
as acquiring a 'personality', as well as ideas and culture of their own. One additional criticism
of the decision-making approach that can be attached here is that it entails ignoring the insights
of work on path-dependence and so fails to account adequately for the continuity that we see in
foreign policy behaviour.

The second criticism arises from the work of Hollis and Smith, who distinguished between
positivism and post-positivism by saying that the former was concerned with explanation and
sought to achieve that by telling the story from the outside. In contrast, the post-positivist
concern was with understanding, a story that could only be told from the inside, from the individual's point of view. But they highlighted the risk of post-positivism ignoring the role of structure in outcomes:

It is worth pointing out one obvious hostage given by treating the "inside" as a matter of the desires and beliefs of individual actors. It is that the actors' desires, beliefs and resulting reasons for action may be generated in turn by external factors. In the jargon of social science, they may be intervening and not independent variables (1991: 3).

Hollis and Smith's argument is itself problematic in respect of the binary oppositions that it generated: A holistic account, i.e. of structure, lay in the realm of explanation; an account of actors, i.e. an individualistic account, resulted in understanding. But they themselves acknowledged that explanations in respect of individuals are possible: psychologists, for instance, look for explanations in and of individuals. The same, I argue is true the other way. This, after all, is just one aspect that distinguishes the positivists from the post-positivists and as one who claims to be the latter, I am uncomfortable with being confined to the analysis of the individual - no matter how important that may be - when it is clear that we can overstate the agency of the individual and fail to see too that, 'the truth of synthetic statements can be judged only by reference to facts of the world' (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 57). Understanding is possible to achieve through a top-down approach that focuses on structure, and while Hollis and Smith went on to caution that 'there are always two stories to tell and ... combinations do not solve the problem' (1991: 7), it is through a values approach to Russian FP that I seek to do just that. This returns us to Hudson's and SBS's point that individuals at the state level were the source of ideas, not structures or even the state itself. Hollis and Smith say:

To locate the idea in an interpretative or hermeneutic setting, we need to specify that there is meaning, both in "the behaviour of others" and in the "account" which the acting individual takes of it. That leads directly to the central hermeneutic theme that action must always be understood from within (1991: 72).

In this much, Hudson and Hollis and Smith agree. But the latter two also argue that, [p]art of
understanding action from within, then, is understanding the rules which are operative' (1991: 73. They identify two approaches in hermeneutics, one of which is top-down and speaks of 'understanding actions through social rules and collective meaning' (1991: 74) This suggests that ideas do not solely emanate from individuals. It is to this realm of ideas that I confine myself, not least because I would argue too that any analysis of the individual would need to consider the environment in which they make decisions and given the nature of the policy area, it would be extremely foolish to disregard the international arena.

It is clear then that the question of what constitutes the appropriate level of analysis is somewhat less problematic for FP analysts than IR theorists in that in FP all levels at which decisions are deemed to be made must be examined. Since all levels are of some significance to FPA, the major difficulty arises in determining which level is most important. Inevitably, different analysts will emphasise certain levels more than others and this is often dependent on what precisely the task of the analyst is. The resurgence of Russia, its essentially reactive foreign policy and the New Cold War discourse make it clear that we must first understand the context in respect of which Russia makes its foreign policy. Globalisation and the post-modern order make the external level of paramount importance. This inevitably makes the structure-agency debate as problematic for FPA as IR theory. Agency, Hudson points out, is under-emphasised and researched and one of the strengths of SBS's work is that it provides a framework for doing so. However, I depart from Hudson and SBS by arguing that Russia has, since 1991, not fully thrown off the constraints of the international structure and its own past. That departure takes the form of two arguments: i) agency is not the sole preserve of humans - states, institutions and other such 'superorganisms' can acquire personalities and therefore agency of their own, and the ideas and values that emanate from such actors can exert powerful constraints upon them; ii) agency does not reside solely or even mainly at the national level, in the context of globalisation and the post-modern era, ideas and values issue
as much from the international arena as the national, although the extent to which international institutions affect state actors is variable. But the potential for the international system to have an impact upon state actors is well-established within the literature (Hill 2003, Neack 2003 & 1995, Hermann 1995, Allen 1989, Farrands 1989, White 1989, Modelski 1962). Although the existence of an international society is disputed, depending on which theoretical lens is used, the role of international structures is acknowledged under most perspectives:

The structure of international society, then, together with the alliance and commitment framework within which states operate, form significant elements of an international structure which constrains and shapes foreign policy processes (Farrands, 1989: 95).

Since 1991, Russia has suffered from something of a lack of agency. This is not to say that this has not been true for many states but for Russia the issue has acquired more salience since it is argued that Putin particularly responded to Russia weakness with a policy - ideology even - of sovereign democracy, described by Krastev (2006) as a 'Kremlin-made mixture of Guizot's anti-populism and Schmitt's anti-liberalism'. Further to this, although we know much more about Russia than has been the case at any time in its history, it remains unclear who actually makes policy in Russia or at least who does so consistently and as such any analysis must proceed cautiously. This is explored further in Chapter 3 where I set out the number of state agencies that exist or have done since 1991 and which seemingly bear some responsibility for FP. Additionally, Russian intervention in Moldova and Yugoslavia as was and the question of whether the military acted on the Kremlin's orders or on its own casts doubt upon who really has agency in Russia. A decision-making approach or even a comparative one can provide illumination in specific cases but I seek to generate a broader understanding of Russian FP and therefore move to a more generalisable case, even while recognising the associated limitations and rejecting any idea of trying to create a grand theory. However, I do not reject the SBS principle that Hudson elucidates, that more attention must be paid to agency. For as Hudson
says, the present context makes clear that agency must be raised up the list of analytical priorities, although by doing so she herself offers an argument for focusing on the international arena as a level of analysis:

That a standing international court to try individuals for crimes against humanity is now in the offing suggests that the broader world community hungers after ideational frameworks that manifest the agency embedded in international affairs (Hudson, 2002: 6).

In summary, I privilege the external level over that of the internal and privilege also structure over agency, while recognising that while this is appropriate in the post Cold War context to date, the time may come when it is clearer who does have true agency within Russia at a time when the Russian state has moved fully out of this transitional one. Additionally, settling the question of whether a post-modern order is in place will require legitimated acceptance of a set of norms and values. Under current conditions, dissenters from the dominant ideas are likely to have less agency than under conditions where a widely-accepted 'constitutional structure' (Reus-Smit, 1999) is in place.

1.1.2 The Centrality of Context to Method and Methodology

The nature of my hypotheses and assumptions leads inevitably to a method of contextual analysis. The international system after 1991 is a crucial variable for Russian decision-makers. Certain facets of the international system can be described objectively,\(^1\) while others must be seen as subjectively framed.\(^2\) It is here too that Reus-Smit's constitutional structures argument becomes important, particularly as Russia did not, as part of the Soviet Union, subscribe to many of the normative elements that Reus-Smit identifies, except in the latter years under

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1 For instance, that the system is unipolar, hegemonic (for a time at least) and therefore dominated by liberal views.
2 Particularly as regards normative conceptions of the future, especially in relation to international institutions and security issues. Additionally, Russia labours after 1991 under the legacy of its past actions in terms of others' perceptions but the same is true of other states for Russia, e.g. the USA.
Gorbachev's New Thinking. Reus-Smit speaks of the importance of what he terms 'constitutional structures', defined in summary as 'complexes of metavalues [that] define the social identity of the state, and the broad parameters of legitimate state action' (1999: 39). They are 'constitutional' in as much as they set out basic defining principles and they are 'structural' in that they shape and constrain possibilities for action (Reus-Smit, 1999: 30-31). He allows, incidentally, for other factors affecting state behaviour, including geopolitical and economic factors, but sees the constitutional structures as defining membership, setting boundaries for action and establishing norms of practice.

The FP literature is universal in its call to see context as vital to any understanding of FP. Context is seen in part as the situation in which foreign policy is operated (Modelski, 1962), but the significant environment is the international system, which incorporates more than just the foreign policies of other states, but also certain international level institutions, described by Reus-Smit (1999) as 'fundamental institutions'. The UN, NATO, and the EU are of particular significance given the nature of Russia's aspirations, consideration of which forms a larger part of the thesis as a whole. These are scrutinised not only as examples of institutions which promote certain norms and standards of behaviour but also because power, defined as the ability to influence the behaviour of other actors, cannot be ignored in any foreign policy analysis. The imperative for such an approach is affirmed by Thompson:

If the aim of any inquiry is to demonstrate the relevance of norms and standards of morality, it must be done by relating such norms to the realities that prevail in a given political system.

Thus, discussion of morality and international relations cannot proceed realistically in isolation from the problem of power. The task is to restore the focus to an ancient discourse that considers the interrelatedness of power and morality. In international relations as in politics, the dynamics of power relations channels, controls and limits the effectiveness of moral standards (1992: 149).

What Thompson makes clear then is that: i) context must be considered – although the
'realities that prevail' may well be debatable; ii) that power relationships may constrain states from exercising certain of their values in their international relations; iii) that power relations may be such that a powerful institution actually sets out the norms under which states in the international system are required to work; and iv) that the exigencies of certain power relations may actually require that moral standards are set aside. That the institutions named above are powerful is accepted but the question remains of how they can act as constraining influences – particularly upon Russia’s agency.

My claim that international institutions matter and act as powerful constraints upon states is further based on Wight’s assertion that the very existence of a states system implies a certain amount of ‘cultural unity’ (in Dunne, 2001: 228). Reus-Smit elaborates by speaking of how:

... a set of historically contingent intersubjective beliefs about what constitutes a legitimate state, entitled to all the rights and privileges of sovereignty, preceded and shaped the construction of practical institutions. The constitution of the state’s social identity thus provided the foundations upon which authoritative fundamental institutions were constructed (1999: 37).

He goes on to say,

In one sense, therefore, modern international society is indeed a practical association, but in an equally important sense, a deep structural sense, it is informed by the institutional and organizational values of the constitutively prior European (now Western) gemeinschaft society (ibid: 38).

With such a society, therefore, comes particular notions of what constitutes acceptable behaviour and it is these notions that both shape and constrain actors. Reus-Smit identifies three primary normative elements in various stages of history, including the modern era. These are: i) the moral purpose of the state, (this is the hegemonic belief); ii) an organising principle of sovereignty and; iii) a norm of procedural justice. This results in ‘a single, coherent normative system’ (1999: 33).3 Sovereignty is defended on the basis that it provides a good

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3 This is consistent with Wight (1966) who identifies certain attributes of the international society of states, including ‘the maintenance of order’ (with a principle acknowledged after 1919 that ‘order precedes justice’ (1966: 107)); the independence of states (except where intervention is necessary to uphold the balance of power; or to uphold ‘civilized standards’ (1966: 115-6); ‘awareness of the moral
system of rule based on a certain order but good can only be justified with reference to procedural justice. I return to this issue later when talking about post-modernism and the Kosovo Crisis since the latter in many ways elevates the post-modern value of humanitarian intervention over the modern value of sovereignty.

Wight quotes George Kennan (in Wight, 1966: 99) and his rhetorical question about those attributes that members of the world community could reasonably expect other members to exhibit. Kennan spoke of tolerance, communication, and forthright relations, as well as acceptance of the need for coexistence, opposition to totalitarianism, basic freedoms, relaxation of internal authority and support of the right to national self-determination, i.e. non-interventionism. Such expectations themselves relate to perceptions of legitimacy and so constitute constraining factors inasmuch as states recognise that they cannot constantly frustrate the expectations of others if they are to achieve their objectives in respect of them. The work presented here is based therefore on the premise that in this way international institutional structures wield some influence over states, even as states themselves create and shape the institutional structures. There is no assumption of the existence of universal values. Instead I claim that those states holding most power in the international system will exert most influence over the construction of institutional structures and in a unipolar system in which the USA is hegemonic, it is liberal values and norms that dominate. Therefore those structures reflect, to a large extent, the liberal preferences of the USA. This is the ideological context in which Russia must operate. However, for Russia, the problems are exacerbated by a decade of discourse and actions which argue that the modern era is past and superseded by a post-modern one. In this new era, attributes other than those identified are emphasised, but crucially, Russia is seen as sitting outside this order: in effect, it is perceived as an 'Other'.

The contextual analysis uses a framework based on the work of Northedge (1968). Northedge
likened foreign policy decision-making to a game of cards, wherein states are seen as constrained in their actions by the wider external environment. The analogy is useful in allowing us to break down the effects of environmental factors further as well as to assist in understanding the role of outside structure. At least four characteristics can be attached to a card game: rules, choices, perceptions and opportunity:

i. Rules - each player is constrained by the rules of the game, which have at some point in the past been agreed by other players but which nevertheless originate from outside the players' own environments. All players, however, abide by them: certain standards of behaviour are expected, certain actions are forbidden and to refuse to play by the rules of the game is to invite expulsion. However, suggestions about changing the rules might be accepted if a) they get the backing of a sufficient number of other players and/or b) are deemed to be an improvement.

ii. Choices - these are not limitless, each player makes decisions based on the cards they hold in their own hand. If we see cards as resources we see that only certain possibilities for play are open, although there may well be opportunity to play a bluff. In addition, choices are constrained by the rules of the game as well as the attitudes of the player, if the player's values do not allow for unnecessary risk-taking, for instance, this affects the range of choices open to that player.

iii. Perceptions - any card player knows the value of understanding opponents. A strategy can only be successful if the likely actions of other players are taken into account. This involves making estimates of what cards other players hold and understanding what choices are available to them and which are likely to be the more attractive. But your perception is obviously affected by your own values: If you see nothing wrong with cheating, you are likely to think other players might cheat. But it follows that if your success is dependent upon an accurate assessment of your opponents' hand and likely play, they too are dependent in the same way.
iv. Opportunity - each game will present its own opportunities. Each player must be able to recognise an opportunity, capitalise on it, exploiting opponents' weaknesses or mistakes, but still working within the rules of the game.

The rules (and consequences for breaching them) are dictated by the international structure, while choices will be dictated to a large extent by the capacity and resources available to any state, be those housed at the national level or international, for instance relations with other states. Perceptions are perhaps the most easily changed and affected of these four aspects. They will be dictated not only by long-held, experience-based viewpoints but by ideas about what constitutes the external environment, including what the dominant rules are and whether they are legitimate. Opportunity is also interesting given the differing forms that this might take and given what we often see of states' capacity for eking much out of apparently few resources.

All of these aspects are returned to in later chapters but they form both part of the rationale as well as the framework for the contextual analysis that follows.

1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

While the overarching purpose of the thesis is to provide an understanding of Russia's behaviour in global politics, at some level, I apply the general FP literature to Russia as a case study. In Chapter 2, I first set out the lessons of the FPA literature. This reveals that while FPA is often perceived as a Realist-driven field, there is much scope to apply a Social Constructivist perspective. FP analysts are counselled to apply wider understandings of foreign policy, to extend the range of their examination and to consider in their analysis ideas on norms and values and to consider too a wider range of actors and affecting forces. Social Constructivism,
to a large extent, sits within the middle ground of the IR theoretical fray. It accepts some of rationalism while it is guided also by reflectivist approaches. It rejects individualism, however, and sees matters as being the outcome of societal pressures. It also emphasises the role of norms and values and this perspective, I argue, is most appropriate in the current Russian case, not least because the default perception of Russia is that it is not a values actor, a position which *a priori* skews analysis of Russian FP behaviour. FPA shows that foreign policy is constructed at different levels and is the subject of a number of different forces. Discussions revolving around definitions of FP as 'action-reaction' show that FP actors are constrained at both the domestic and international levels. As has been made clear already, I accept claims that society is not solely the preserve of the domestic environment and that it exists at the international level too. In accepting the argument that FP reflects societal beliefs, values etc., it follows that the argument is also accepted that FP will itself embody the beliefs of the society to which the foreign policy belongs, i.e. the state. But that is also true for the wider international society so that any state's FP is not purely a reflection of the domestic condition, it reflects that of the external condition too – even if at times in a negative rather than positive way.

It is interesting to note when moving on to look at the Russian foreign policy literature in Chapter 3 that while one might reasonably expect this body of literature to be informed by that of FPA, this is not necessarily the case. Many of the available insights into Russian foreign policy emerge from area specialists rather than foreign policy analysts *per se*. This latter body of literature illuminates further some of the criticisms that have been made of foreign policy analysts. I argue, however, that in respect of Russia much analysis falls into old patterns. It is either too highly abstracted, i.e. showing little accurate, detailed knowledge of the Russian condition, or it is overly reductionist, providing useful insights into Russian decisions and actions without setting these within a wider theoretical framework that provides some capacity
to generalise upwards. But this failure is itself a manifestation of FPA's own problems.

A number of issues important to understanding Russian FP are considered. The Russian FP literature reflects two perceptions about the nature of Russian identity. Opinions are divided between those who argue that identity is disputed and those who claim none exists. All agree, however, that identity is a real problem for Russia. Thus analysis must recognise that Russian decision-makers are treading very carefully between competing opinions and goals. Other vital arguments revolve around public perceptions. Petersson's (2001) work in particular shows that Russians are very concerned with Russia's image and with ensuring it occupies a prominent position internationally. Both Russia's identity problem and the public's perceptions of their state hold implications for the conduct of Russian foreign policy, as discussed in Chapter 3.

The other aspect of the Russian FP literature considered is the claim that Russian foreign policy has gone through a series of phases since 1991. I set this discussion within an FPA framework, arguing that arguments here relate to the change and continuity debate in FPA and hypothesise that actually Russian FP has been far more about continuity than analysts have recognised. I do not deny that real capacity for change existed but with missed opportunities on the part of the global community, Russia merely reasserted many of its traditional priorities. Inevitably, certain perceptions of the Russian domestic context underpin this analysis. In the final part of the chapter, I review the literature on actors in Russian FP in order to determine who the actors are, versus those who have agency and the power to exert some influence. Conclusions drawn here affect the choice of method and also demonstrate the extent to which policy-making is constrained by the need to satisfy the various relevant actors and influences.

Despite privileging the external environment over the internal, no study of foreign policy can be undertaken without detailed reference to domestic conditions. In Chapter 4, I therefore outline some of the domestic challenges that Russia currently faces: a declining birth rate, low
life expectancy and the near epidemic occurrence of HIV/AIDS. I consider too aspects such as
the military and defence-related resources and consider more recent arguments about global re-
nuclearisation and Russian militarisation and what this means for Russia's foreign relations.
There is much which is more overtly positive, however, which must also be considered. I
examine Russia's resource base, on the grounds that this is important to understanding whether
and how a state is likely to achieve its aims. In fewer than two decades, Russia has experienced
economic collapse and then resurgence. This has been achieved through its abundant natural
resources, particularly energy. It is energy (even if not only this) that makes Russia an actor of
which to take account. It is this also, however, that has, to a large extent, soured further
relations with many of its near neighbours and beyond. Thus, I emphasise the need to conceive
of resources as both opportunity-giving and constraining factors. I adopt a broad understanding
of 'resources' however, considering also relations with other actors, particularly amongst
Russia's near neighbours. The EU comes under special consideration in light of Russia's claim
to be a European state and its perceived right to be part of European decision-making
processes. Arguments about identity are again identified as key.

It is from this that I conclude Russian foreign policy after 1991 must be understood as highly
contextualised and highly affected by what others do or do not do in relation to Russia. More
than this, Russia in many ways uses foreign policy to define itself and to portray itself as a
strong and prestigious state, understanding that this plays well to the domestic audience. As
Shevtsova (2007: 900) points out, this is not a purely Russian trait, but it is important to
understand the significance that foreign policy has to how Russia and Russians view
themselves. Russia has not achieved its primary objective after 1991: To open real and
inclusive debate about what the world could look like in a post-Cold War world and this failure
marks its relations with other states and actors. The next three chapters follow on directly from
this assertion.
In Chapter 5 on Values, I use particularly that FPA literature which has challenged the tenets of rational choice theory, asserting the need to consider the role of environment in any decision-making process. Whether analysis is focused at the individual, state or system level, an understanding of context is crucial. I argue that any analysis of a state's foreign policy must first address the dependence of values upon interests, that rather than viewing them as a separate and therefore methodologically distinct area, we must view them as inseparable, as sometimes synonymous, and fundamental to our understanding. Despite recent emphasis on the importance of considering ideas and values specifically, definitions of values are relatively rare and treated as self-evident. It is this very gap that enables us to continue on a fixed route of seeing interests as wholly distinct and separate from values. I therefore spend some time examining what has been said about values in order to arrive at a working definition designed to close this gap and so assist in achieving a more nuanced view of Russia's foreign policy. Aside from this, the chapter is concerned with considering how and where values are formulated. Both the domestic and international environments are examined as value-bearing domains, both of which shape and constrain Russia's actions. It is from this discussion that my argument that the post-modern order, or at least the belief that such a thing exists, takes form. Essentially, Russia in the post-Cold War period finds itself in the midst of a values debate. The Values and Post-Modern chapters are set out separately but the connections, and sometimes contingency, between them are clear. It is most obviously within the realm of values that the post-modern era begins to look different to the modern era.

In Chapter 6, I consider Cooper's (2000, 2004) notion of the existence of three concurrent world orders: the pre-modern, modem and post-modern. Post-modern states are said to operate on the basis of norms and values and a rejection of the pursuit of interests and this is reflected in a range of differing attitudes to traditional policies, for instance, de-securitisation. Russia, by contrast, is said to be a modern actor, intent on the pursuit of interests and territory at the
expense of the rights of individuals, and for this primary reason is something 'other' than European: post-modernism being a condition of Europe. Ultimately, the 'othering' of Russia is performed on a values basis that is itself rooted in perceptions of an increasingly felt post-modern era. The question, of course, is less whether Russia really is a 'modern' actor than whether others are really 'post-modern'. In considering the case for post-modernism, I argue that even while certain Member States within the EU might embody post-modern values, not all of them do. Additionally, we must consider the question of when and where such values are applied. From Russia's perspective, post-modernism requires a re-prioritisation of governing principles for action in the international arena, but this must be the outcome of multilateral debate and consensus, not unilateral (American) imposition. I argue that, in fact, Russia does not necessarily reject out of hand the idea that a sea-change in international priorities might be possible but it rejects the method, the lack of debate and has concerns about the effects that the elevation of human rights over the sovereignty of states, for example, might have on its own territorial integrity and so for the security of its region of the world and beyond. Whatever the strength of its arguments, for Russia the result is the same, it has become the 'other' (whether within or outwith Europe remains unclear) and so has been marginalised in the European space.

In Chapter 7 therefore, I consider concepts of Marginality and how Russia can be considered as marginal. In respect of the latter, I argue that it is in terms of both its own ambitions that we must see it as marginal, and that how it is identified by EU states as the 'other' immediately precludes it from a seat at the table where key decisions about Europe's future are made. But I examine too arguments about the strength that can accrue to margins and of the opportunities that are opened up for Russia as a result. It is certainly true that at the current time these opportunities do not look like being exploited. While my original conclusions about this may currently look more hopeful than realistic, I do not rule out the possibility of a true strategic
partnership between the EU and Russia and I see, for example, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as evidence that Russia has learned many of the lessons that marginality confers, although I would not overstate the depth of integration manifested in any of these currently.

Russia's capacity, its values, its othering and marginalisation, as well as the basis for claiming a post-modern era is gradually eclipsing the modern era, are brought together in one final chapter, which sets out a Case Study of the 1999 Kosovo crisis. In this event, we see the importance of context, the marginality of Russia, the challenge of the post-modern to the modern and the application of rhetoric about the elevation of values over interests to another European crisis. In this chapter, I show that Russia seeks, above all else, to be seen as a part of Europe and therefore necessarily to play a part in decision-making that affects the wider European space. More than this, with its vital diplomatic role, Russia shows that it can really be a strategic partner to Europe, that it can put aside differences and that resolution of crises in Europe is simply easier with Russia a part of rather than opposed to the search for solution. Kosovo represents a time of crisis not just for the Balkans but for all of Europe. Despite major, seemingly insurmountable, differences between Russia and the West, neither hot nor cold war ensues. Kosovo is an event that lays bare Russian ambitions and desires and defies those who would argue for seeing Russia as Europe's enemy rather than its partner. Cooper (2004) claims that Russia shows elements of belonging to each of the orders: pre-modern, modern and post-modern. Kosovo reveals the basis for such a claim. Chechnya is symptomatic of Russia's vulnerability to internal chaos and even collapse (ultimately this is highly unlikely to occur but for the Russians it is undoubtedly a possibility that must be considered at least). Substitute Kosovo for Chechnya and Belgrade for Moscow and the concerns of the Russians become understandable. Whether the West agrees is immaterial, for the Russians this is a genuine fear.
In arguing against the NATO air-strikes on the grounds that it breaches international law (in bypassing the UN) and the sovereignty of states, Russia positions itself firmly within the modern world. But ultimately, compared to China, for instance, we see a Russia that does not reject the values argument of the 'West' but simply argues that change at the international level must be an outcome of multilateral debate. And we cannot forget that without Russia's relationship with Belgrade and diplomatic role, the air-strikes – and the killing – would have gone on for longer. Russia showed itself capable of behaving like a post-modern actor. In summary, I treat Kosovo as a turning point in Russia's fortunes. It is here in 1999 that Russia makes clear it will not adopt isolationist policies, that it will not retreat from its claim to be European and that it will not meekly accept a reduction of its sphere of influence. It is here too that the benefits of cooperation are most clearly, of all Russia's foreign policy activities, seen. That those benefits are not fully recognised is less the failure of Russia to make them obvious than the failure of the West to exploit an obvious opportunity.

1.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the theoretical chapters, I argue the case for a foreign policy analysis that champions contextual understanding and argumentation. This is nothing new in itself. The idea is built on post-positivist thought, the contribution of psychological thinking to FPA and the accident of living at the beginning of a post-modern era. If FPA is to remain and to make its mark separate from IR it will have to be applied in a practical way, i.e. in such a way as to affect our understandings and therefore policies. In his The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Hill (2003) does not simply argue that FPA is changing, a priori, he argues that the world, the nature of what is out there, has changed.
My examination of Russia shows a state that, although relatively powerful, is far from immune to the effects of changes at the international level. The level of emphasis directed at external pressures rather than internal is not an indication of any belief that this will be so for all states or for all time but neither does it accept Hudson's argument that system level variables are, in the post 9/11 world, relatively unimportant (Hudson, 2002: 16). Rather, it is born out of consideration for the overwhelming need to consider the policy of any state from that state's perspective and to take full account of the international context of the time. Thus, a contribution is made to the FPA literature in respect of the structure-agency debate. This continues to be an important referent, past failings in respect of considering domestic agency should not blind us to the conditions under which structure should still be privileged.

My primary contribution, however, is made in respect of the Russian foreign policy literature where I show that new ideas about both the world and how we can analyse it have not been applied to Russia. The West has been guilty of prejudiced and prejudicial thinking, rooted in Cold War, i.e. modern, perceptions and this has recently brought us to the brink of a new era of antagonism between two European actors. Very little analysis of Russian FP admits the possibility of Russia being as much a values actor as any other and it is this Cold War thinking on the part of the West that brought us so close to a new Cold War. Thus, the final contribution lies in the area of values, not merely in the application of such an approach to Russia, but in a re-examination of where values sit in relation to interests and consideration of the 'places' from which values arise and the relationship between a state's national values and those of the international system.
CHAPTER 2

CURRENT DEBATES IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

The subject of the research, understanding Russian foreign policy after 1991, suggests two immediate areas as foci for analysis: foreign policy and Russia's foreign policy. This chapter offers a review of academic literature relevant to the first of these. The primary objectives here are to highlight the gaps in the literature and/or in its application, to outline my contribution in respect of them and to understand the challenges facing the FP analyst today. The foreign policy literature reveals itself as preoccupied with resolving the many problems presented by a number of areas: The identification of key concepts; actorness; levels of analysis; structure versus agency; and with debate over what constitute the 'best' frameworks for analysis.

It is always necessary, perhaps, to return to theoretical frameworks and general schools of thought on analysis when discussing any policy area. But given the nature of criticisms (Pursiainen, 2000) made of Russian foreign policy analysis that I later identify, it is even more crucial that reference be made to the wider area of foreign policy analysis, in order to determine the best method for understanding (and explaining) Russian foreign policy. It is through this body of literature, as well as that of IR already discussed, that the theoretical framework applied to the thesis is devised. Additionally, all conclusions ultimately arrived at in the chapters that follow are grounded in at least some of the works reviewed here. As with any theoretical field, much of the work reviewed here is revealed as part of a continuing discussion about the worth of certain theoretical frameworks, approaches to analysis, and methods of gathering data, and how they allow us to move closer to either explanation and understanding (or both) of a state's actions.
2.1 ANALYSIS OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Gerner (1995) identifies three types of analysis within the field: descriptive, evaluative and analytical. This review is primarily concerned with the latter type since it is in this area that debate about methods and approaches is undertaken. One particularly useful text outlines the evolution of foreign policy analysis (Neack, Hey and Haney, 1995a). This identified two generations in the study of FP. In the first generation, the study of FP was marked by a preoccupation with quite different concerns to the second. It was state-centric, often accused (justifiably) of being Realist-dominated and focused relatively little on the domestic environment and developments therein. In the second generation, attempts have been made to address these deficiencies, more attention is paid to a wider range of actors, different theories are applied and focus has shifted from the international to the domestic environment. Neack et al (1995a) therefore conclude that much reliance must be placed on developments in foreign policy analysis after the end of the Cold War, in recognition of the extent of change that occurred in the international system and within states as a result of the end of the bipolar era. It speaks also to the consequent need to find new theories or to adjust old theories in order to aid explanation and understanding of the foreign policy field. While the changes that have occurred are understandable, there is a danger, of course, that redress will go too far. There were good reasons for focusing on the international environment, and Hermann (1995) argues that there remains today plenty of scope to look at the effects of systemic transformation of foreign policy behaviour. Also, the continued utility of first generation FP literature is undeniable. Hudson (2002) and Chollet and Goldgeier (2002), for instance, demonstrate how a work written in a quite different era can still have insights for the present one and so I too argue for the relevance of other 'Cold War' works and apply some of their theoretical insights.

Undeniably, however, the preoccupations of the FPA field reflect the failure of both IR and FP
analysts to 'predict' the end of the Cold War, a failure felt more keenly by FP analysts perhaps
given that their failure took place at two levels, the international and the domestic. The
question of whether or not prediction should have been possible is less meaningful than the
effects it has had on the study of foreign policy. A general feeling of failure was the catalyst for
a good deal of self-reflection, resulting in various calls for major changes in how we study
foreign policy: Hermann (1995), for instance, argued that the most intriguing question raised
was whether the theories available simply were not up to the task. As a result, and marking a
major shift from the pre-1989 FP study, the search for a grand theory of foreign policy has
been abandoned and instead mid-range theories predominate (Neack et al, 1995a). However,
as a result of interdependence and globalisation and the blurring between the domestic and
foreign policy areas that has ensued, it may be increasingly easy to argue that FP no longer
constitutes a distinct field. Hermann (1995), however, argues that FPA has assumed even more
significance since 1989 because it now offers half the story not pursued by IR theorists,
therefore the virtue of FPA over its overarching discipline of IR is that it sits at the nexus of the
domestic and international environments. The real task of FP study today is thus to ensure that
it incorporates both internal and external elements in its analysis:

The image of the state-leaders as "Janus-faced", forced to balance domestic
and international concerns, stands at the core of the integrative approach,
making it "state centric", not in the realist sense of emphasizing nation-states
as units but in the sense of seeing chief executives, and state bureaucracies
more generally, as actors whose aims cannot be reduced to reflections of

Inevitably, therefore, the FP analyst is forced to consider the effects of a large number of
variables, located at different levels. It is unsurprising that analysts seek to reduce the extent of
their investigations by treating either the domestic level or the international as more significant
than the other. However, a balance must be maintained if the work of FPA is to be seen as
something distinct from IR or comparative or area studies work. Therefore, while I argue that
in the context of the post-Cold War period to date, international structures are crucial to our
understanding of why Russia behaves the way it does, a good understanding of the structures and constraints under which Russia works at home is also important and it is at the level of the relative interaction of these constraints that we can begin to understand Russia's behaviour. For FPA generally, the level of analysis problem goes deeper than whether to focus on the domestic versus international level, of course. There is the question of whether focus should be levied at individuals, bureaucracies or society itself. In the light of calls for multi-level and multi-faceted approaches (Neack et al, 1995a), the problem has been to find a methodology that is both workable and insightful and in this respect not much has changed since McClosky's criticism of the 1960s, as discussed in the previous chapter.

What has changed, as already stated, is the move from seeking to establish a grand theory of FP to focus on middle-range theories. Besides representing a reasonable step back from universality, Hermann (1995) says we can also see such theories as a call for us to be more precise about defining precisely what kind of activity it is that we are trying to explain, i.e. the dependent variables. Up to now, the only thing specified has been the causes of war - but middle range theories show that a whole raft of other activities exist - 'military interventions, trade agreements, sanctions, scientific cooperation on joint projects, diplomatic recognition, peacekeeping initiatives, and so on' (Hermann, 1995: 253). By making 'clear what is to be explained', he says, 'the theorist moves a considerable way down the path toward establishing the scope of the theoretical effort' (Hermann, 1995: 253). As such, it can offer more rounded insights and understandings of foreign policy behaviour. This I do not dispute but the literature generally offers few solutions to the question of how to deliver a meaningful analysis that can be said to offer insight beyond the particular event or actor examined. This thesis is driven by my contention that it is in an actor's interactions that we will find most scope for understanding, and in order to study interactions we must first establish relevant context. First, however, it is necessary to establish what we mean by foreign policy and to identify from the
various alternatives those understandings which I consider most relevant to my own work here.

Definitions of foreign policy are numerous, each one having implications for what we study. Most reveal foreign policy as a dynamic policy area and it is these revelations, for instance, that give cause to consider the role of change versus continuity in FP, as discussed below.

Next, I review the work on actors, which itself entails some examination of the levels of analysis problem, as well as structure and agency. The discussion then moves on to look at some of the approaches used in analysis. These include rational choice theory, decision-making, cognitive psychology, schools-of-thought analysis, and belief systems. At this point, I identify those analysts who most influence my work. Most significant in this respect are those who give scope to consider the role of ideas and values: Jensen (1982), Rosenau (1972), Northedge (1968) Modelski (1962) and SBS (1962 & 1954). In the more recent literature, Hill's (2003) work is of particular interest despite the fact that it too raises more problems for methodology than it answers. Ultimately, I conclude, this is both the strength and weakness of FPA. The criticisms made of it are understandable but they arise from FPA's attempt to avoid the reductionist analysis of so much work on IR. It provides a more complete understanding of why states behave as they do than any other field and does not over-concern itself with rigour and methodology where this comes at the expense of comprehension. The difficulty for the analyst lies in trying to answer the question of state behaviour 'in its totality' (McClosky in Hudson, 2002: 9), always therefore the first problem is to know how to limit the scope of the task.

From each of these sections, the centrality of context to FPA is clear and discussion therefore moves to this before considering the change and continuity debate. In the final section, I review just one work in more detail, on the grounds that it is not often cited but was a rare attempt to produce a theory of foreign policy. Modelski's 1962 work of this very name is
instructive and insightful but is useful too in demonstrating, through its shortcomings, the complexity and challenge of FPA. I show that some of the problems with Modelski’s work arise from his definition of foreign policy, underlining the importance of articulating a meaningful definition in respect of our analysis. The next section therefore considers this issue.

2.1.1 Defining Foreign Policy

Foreign policy itself is, as Hill (2003) points out, a policy rarely defined and certainly not all analysts spend time in such an exercise (see Jensen 1982 and Donaldson and Nogee 2002). Many definitions highlight the more functional aspects of foreign policy. Jackson and Sørensen (2003), for instance, define policy first as the identification of goals, which then sets out the course of action for a state. Foreign policy, they say, defines both government and foreign ministry goals and activity in relations with other states. They explain further by saying that foreign policy is constituted of aims and measures which act as guidelines for government decisions and actions. For White it is 'that area of governmental activity which is concerned with relationships between the state and other actors, particularly other states, in the international system' (1989: 1). Hill defines it as 'the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor' (2003: 3). At some level these are useful definitions in that they tell us something about where foreign policy is made and therefore where foreign policy analysis must focus. But they tell us too that foreign policy is made in relation to another actor. It is in those definitions that emphasise this point particularly that the analyst is provided with further clues about the nature of the undertaking.

Modelski speaks of FP as a matter 'of adjusting the actions of states to each other' (1962: 3-4) and in similar vein, Hermann speaks of 'the essence of foreign policy as a sequence of
exchanges' (1995: 256). These two latter definitions are in the tradition of the early SBS (1954) work on action-reaction-interaction modelling, which additionally emphasised the importance of understanding the way the actor defines their situation, so making definition of situation crucial to an analysis of decision-making. Both 'situation', under the guise of 'context', and 'decision-making' are returned to below. It should be noted that SBS's (1954, 1962) work also implies a strong measure of dynamism in foreign policy. This suggests that long-term planning in foreign policy must necessarily be something of a hit and miss affair. Such a conclusion is supported by Northedge (1968), who says that, 'foreign policy constitutes an endless dialogue between the powers of continuity and the powers of change' (1968: 11). Northedge is not alone in referring to the continuity and change debate within foreign policy (see, for example, Hill 2003, Donaldson & Nogee 2002, White 2000, Modelski 1962) but most definitions imply that foreign policy is a dynamic rather than a static area. As becomes clear throughout this chapter, for many analysts the change in foreign policy is more important than the continuity and this is not irrelevant to the work of this thesis, as discussed in more detail below.

One former Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office described, rather than defined, foreign policy as,

not a fully independent invention capable of guiding diplomatic action ... it is a dominant or a prevailing trend, established only in part, if at all, by premeditated and pre-determined intention, and revealing itself through the cumulative effect of a succession of individual acts of greater or lesser moment, each decided upon in the light of practical international possibilities as they manifested themselves at the relevant time and under the impulse of a traditional manner of behaviour characteristic of the government concerned (Strang in Coles, 2002: 49).

We can draw a number of conclusions from this. It speaks really about the limited utility of a rational choice approach, indeed, it seems to argue, by talking of 'individual acts', for a bureaucratic approach to FP study. But here too it suggests a lack of coherence and consistency in any state's foreign policy. The importance of the international arena is clear but it suggests
that external effects will be felt differently according to who is in office. The prime purpose in defining foreign policy, of course, is to aid us in the analysis of foreign policy and this 'description' does just that. To this though I would add a final set of definitions that provide the clearest guidance yet for this purpose.

Foreign policy consists of those discrete official actions of the authoritative decision-makers of a nation's government, or their agents, which are intended by the decision makers to influence the behavior of international actors external to their own polity. The recipient international actors are individuals acting on their own behalf or as decision makers or as agents for organizations (governmental or private) including the governments of other nations. Foreign policy results from the decision makers' perceptions of present or expected problems in the relationships between a nation and its international environment (both human and nonhuman) including the consequences of the initiating state's own prior actions (Hermann, 1972: 72).

This definition, extensive as it is, is extremely instructive. It reveals that foreign policy is about influence and the attempt to change the way others behave; a rarity in the literature, it distinguishes between actors and agents, so providing method by which to limit or at least frame analysis; and it says something too about the context in which policy is made and the role of psychological factors in that policy-making. Others too are of equal use. Neack (2003) adopts a broad definition that includes statements and behaviour or actions, saying that the 'stuff' of her study includes processes, statements and behaviours. She also cautions that analysts must consider how goals arise and why certain behaviours result. Neack therefore offers insight not only into the necessary level of analysis but the subject of that analysis too and the definition is also suggestive of how analysis might proceed. Gerner follows the same line, guiding us to what and who:

The central focus of foreign policy analysis is on the intentions, statements, and actions of an actor - often, but not always, a state - directed toward the external world and the response of other actors to these intentions, statements, and actions (Gerner, 1995: 18)

The shadow of SBS (1954, 1962), incidentally, is discernible too in Gerner, with this claim that foreign policy analysis is about action and reaction and in the advocacy of focus on the
decision-making process. Gerner differs somewhat, however, in respect of the level of state
analysis since she makes no clear statement about where precisely the decision is made.

In respect of this thesis and my own tasks, it is Webber and Smith (2002) who provide the
most comprehensive and useful definition. They refer us to the subject of analysis as well as
levels and speak too of context. Their definition reflects therefore the greater body of literature
but goes further by speaking of values, so comprising more recent developments and the
Constructivist perspective.

Foreign policy is composed of the goals sought, values set, decisions made and
actions taken by states, and national governments acting on their behalf, in the
context of the external relations of national societies. It constitutes an attempt
to design, manage and control the foreign relations of national societies (2002: 9-10)

The obvious question that arises from this and which is not satisfactorily answered
(understandably) in the definition is who is responsible for designing, managing and
controlling these foreign relations? The literature is not as helpful on this as it might be, again
demonstrating the underlying complexities of FPA.

2.1.2 Actors

If there is a relative (to output) lack of definition of Foreign Policy, it is as nothing to the lack
of definition about what constitutes an actor. A perfunctory scan of the literature may suggest
that this is perhaps because it is self-evident: an actor is a decision-maker. But it should be
clear from what has been discussed so far that this is an unsatisfactory definition, not only
because it locks the analyst into a study then of decision-making but because it fails to
distinguish between actors and agents. Again, this may not be deemed necessary, depending on the approach undertaken to the study of FP, i.e. whether structure or agency is emphasised, and depending on one's position on whether personhood, and therefore actorness, can be conferred on entities versus individuals, as already discussed. Incidentally, it is in this context that one can understand why actor and agent are rarely differentiated in the FPA literature. The structure-agency debate obviously comes a priori to that of actor and agent, but meaning has already been muddied by referring to an agent, when really we mean an actor. Another self-evident definition is to speak of actors as those who make policy, but again this raises a number of questions about: i) whether we distinguish between those who make policy versus those who influence it; ii) how we consider those actions which seem to be an indication of official policy but which may also have been made without reference to the constitutionally legitimated policy-making authority; iii) whether we need to distinguish between policy-makers and those who implement it, and whether the act of implementation infers actorness. The question then of how to define an actor and whether to distinguish between it and an agent is vital if we are to be clear about what we are saying and meaning what we say.

I therefore argue contra to Hill, who suggests that the terms can be used interchangeably, saying that the literature will speak of either actors or agents. Hill ultimately opts to use the term 'actors' on the basis that in English 'agents' holds some connotation with subordination (2003: 27), but somewhat confusingly, since this would seem to be a description of an actor, he begins by defining agents as,

the entities capable of decisions and actions in any given context. They may be single individuals or collectives, and they may be characterized by conscious intentions or by patterns of behaviour which at least in part do not result from deliberation (Hill, 2003: 27).

The argument that the term 'agent' has the connotation of subordination is, surely, precisely the point as principal-agent theory makes clear:
Principal-agent theory investigates into [sic] the scope and limits of a principal's ability to control and constrain the actions of its agents and delineates this agent's autonomous room for manoeuvre. At its core, the theory has generated insights into the determinants of an agent's discretion vis-à-vis its principals (Opperman, 2008: 180).

In applying principal-agent theory in order to make a distinction between actor and agent much can be learned. If, for instance, the element of subordination we would expect to see is not in place this directs us to ask questions about whether there is a break-down in hierarchical structures, or a gap between rhetoric and reality. In short, it says much about the domestic constraints faced by state actors. It is applicable to non-state actors too and in a globalised world it is all the more intriguing that more analysts do not see reason to mark the difference between actor (or principal) and agent. Hermann (1972), as already noted, is one who does and Dreher and Jensen (2007) demonstrate both the necessity and the utility of doing so in their article which questions whether the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is an independent actor or an agent of the USA. How one answers that question obviously affects analysis of that body. Evidently it is useful – and necessary – to make the distinction.

If treated as a definition of an 'actor', Hill's definition is less problematic and useful. Actorness has been explored more recently in relation to the EU particularly and such discussions have some utility here. White (2004) talks about the links between definitions of actors and their impact on global politics, about resources and capabilities, identity and 'international presence'. But he also points out the necessity of considering policy processes (White, 2004: 16-18). Hill's definition encompasses many of these aspects and is therefore the understanding of what constitutes an actor that I apply through the work, although I must add too I would consider that an actor must have an international identity.

This then moves us to discussion of who or what we might call actors. States are the obvious
first port of call since they have been the primary focus of FPA. Modelski's study (1962) puts
states at the centre of analysis, as does Hulsman (1997) while Johansen (1980) implicitly
makes the state the central actor, notwithstanding his advocacy of global humanism. Allen too
'takes the state as [the] central focus of attention, within which the foreign policy-making
process is located' (1989: 60). In the more recent literature, we have seen that Gerner sees
foreign policy actors as 'often, but not always, a state' (1995: 18) and Hill describes foreign
policy study as 'state-centric' (2003: 30), even while leaving room for organisations such as the
EU to be considered as a foreign policy actor (2003: 3-4).

It is at this more general level that the decision to distinguish between actors and agents
becomes problematic but it is at this point too that the need to classify foreign policy
approaches becomes apparent. Approaches that emphasise the role of the individual are
naturally focused on agency but their examination proceeds from the assumption that agency
may be focused at a variety of levels and will seek therefore to find, effectively, the *actors* in
foreign policy, even as they will consider what or who influences them. Therefore, their study
does not *a priori* have to make the distinction between actors and agents. Such approaches
argue that saying that states are actors is not sufficient for us to decide where policy actually
comes from. We must decide who defines policy - who are the decision-makers? Thus, we
must look *inside* the state for actors too, rather than just claiming the state as actor. SBS (1954)
placed leaders as the central locus for foreign policy decision-making. For Allison (1971)
though, analysis had necessarily to be extended through the ranks of the governmental
apparatus and decision-making regarded as emerging from actors within a number of large
organisations. He rejected the idea of a decision emerging out of a rational decision taken by
just one person and illuminated the field by talking of the 'pulling and hauling' that instead
characterises politics (Allison, 1971). Such thinking was to make a real impact in his
development of the bureaucratic politics model, which resulted in some very influential work
on bureaucracies by him alone and in conjunction with others as well as by other analysts (see Allison 1971, Allison and Halperin 1972, Allison and Zelikow 1999, Smith 1989).

As the foreign policy field has developed, so the number of potential actors to be considered, it is argued, has increased dramatically. Hill (2003) identifies a shift from SBS's work to the present time where we accept that many actors exist in relation to foreign policy. Actors he identified in 2003 were: states, heads of state and/or government, foreign policy ministers, certain cabinet ministers of relevant departments, e.g. defence and trade, intelligence services, directors or vice presidents or chief executives of transnational enterprises, political parties, international pressure groups, bureaucracies, the public, interest groups and the media, as well as individuals - such as Princess Diana. The reasons for inclusion of many of these as actors are obvious, but some less so: the heads of transnational enterprises and interest or pressure groups may be better considered as influences rather than actors, and the big question here is how to incorporate them into a viable methodology. Hill is not alone in widening the net in the search for possible foreign policy actors. In a globalised world particularly, we cannot ignore the potential for influence that sub-national, trans-national – what Allen (1989) calls 'non-state' – actors have. Allen identifies the existence of both governmental and non-governmental non-state actors, seeing them as capable of producing input into foreign policy, citing the instances of the UN, Amnesty International, IBM and the Roman Catholic Church. In his foreign policy study, Cyr (2000) concentrates on the ideas that influence policy, which broadens the scope of actoriness to intergovernmental, regional economic and military security organisations, all those arenas where debate takes place, including private international organisations, such as corporations. He also speaks of the necessity of including the sociological dimension of international politics and so also looks at public opinion.

It is difficult to avoiding concluding from Hill that everything has potentially to be considered
but this is not a new notion. Rosenau (1966), in his pre-theoretical framework, identified five sources of policy: individual, role, governmental, societal and systemic. Influential studies by Hermann, Hermann and Hagan (1987) and Hermann and Hermann (1989) on decision-making structures, concluded that three decision-making units exist, the predominant leader, the single group and multiple autonomous actors. This meant a multilevel approach to analysis would have to be adopted, with each unit requiring a tailored approach. Neack (2003) employs a three level analysis in her approach, albeit incorporating different units: firstly looking at individuals, that is the leadership, through rational decision-making and cognition approaches; secondly, the state level, here Neack identifies important foci as national self-image and culture, the ways that domestic political opposition, public opinion, interest groups and the media affect foreign policy; and finally, the system level, requiring an examination of the interaction of power and position on foreign policy behaviour and consideration of the opportunities and constraints presented. There seems little then that the FP analyst should not cover. But it is worth reiterating again the importance of how one defines an actor. In effect, some of what Neack sees as a necessary unit for analysis is so not because of their capacity to make 'decisions and actions in any given context' (Hill, 2003: 27) but because of their capacity to influence decision-making and action — but this does not make them actors in foreign policy. Indeed, Rosenau said of his pre-theoretical framework that his five sources were to be considered as variables and could be ranked depending on the nature of other variables at work, for instance, the size of a country or its level of development. Here, we see some scope for limiting the range of analysis at an early stage. The risk is, of course, that assumptions are made too early on for the sake of convenience. Given the extended range of possible variables, it is necessary to have some method by which to decide which variables are more significant. Where and when you are studying makes a difference, underlining again the inescapable significance of context.
While this literature is instructive in helping us to understand the possible multiplicity of interests with which policy-makers may have to contend, it is still marked by a failure to apply a rigorous definition of an actor and to differentiate between actors and agents, plus those who have the potential to influence policy but not to make decisions or to act 'in any given context' (Hill, 2003: 27). Resolving this problem in wider terms is outside the scope of this thesis but it remains a significant gap in analysis. For my purposes, I draw a line between actors and agents and draw on a strong body of literature in order to help decide which variables are of most importance. But no discussion of actors can proceed in isolation from how analysis of their roles, decisions etc. can be achieved. The next section looks at the variety of ways that analysis might be performed. This literature, it should be noted, not only suggests possible approaches, it also suggests possibilities for where we should look, be it the intention, the decision, statement or action.

2.1.3 Approaches To Analysis

Once again, we can divide the analytical approaches into those who emphasise structure versus those who emphasise agents/actors. Those who emphasise the former tend to be far more rooted in the IR literature than the latter. Therefore, we can see elements particularly of Realism and Liberalism — in their various strands — as well as Social Constructivism. In their emphasis on structure, they are also obviously top-down approaches, and privilege study from the 'outside' (Hollis and Smith, 1991). On the other hand, those approaches which emphasise actor and agent have borrowed from beyond the IR literature. This is particularly true of those works which apply lessons from studies on cognition and psychology. But included here, on the basis of their attempts to understand from the 'inside' (Hollis & Smith, 1991), are bureaucratic politics and interpretative approaches. But this is a very broad overview and the
variety of possibilities open to the analyst warrant far more attention. Nor is it completely instructive to examine the approaches on the basis of these two typologies. Various approaches exist in relation to foreign policy analysis. Alternatives include a focus on decision-making, rational choice, bureaucratic politics, cognitive psychology, belief systems and values. A review of them is best undertaken from something of an evolutionary perspective in order to understand how the field has developed and the contingency that exists between them, despite the differences - often major - in their approaches.

As already discussed, Neack et al (1995a) identified two generations in the study of FP, with some sharp distinctions drawn between them. In respect of approaches, the first generation was characterised by an emphasis on comparative foreign policy (CFP) and a reliance on the methods of social scientists, influenced by Kuhn and a desire to apply 'normal science' methods to analysis of foreign policy. As such, a number of studies applied quantitative, positivist models and methodologies (for example East, Salmore and Herman 1978; Hermann and Peacock 1987; McGowan and Shapiro 1973; Rosenau 1966, 1987; Moore 1974; Kegley et al 1975, Neack et al, 1995b). They, like so many others, recognise Rosenau's 1966 work as seminal. This envisaged a time when numerous works on various levels would add up to a general theory of foreign policy. It was this search for a general or a grand theory that also characterised the first generation of foreign policy study (Neack et al, 1995b). The second generation differs in its move to post-positivist, qualitative studies, which have abandoned the search for a grand theory, preferring instead to focus on building theory at the mid range, and incorporating new variables into analysis.

One of the earliest approaches was the rational choice model (RCT), itself influenced by the behaviouralist tradition in IR theory. Under this state-centric approach decision-makers are seen as 'rational actors' (Allison, 1971) making decisions based on a full determination of the
expected consequences of those decisions, accounting for all political factors and performing a
cost-benefit analysis. As Redd (2002) points out, this means that rational choice theories are at
base preoccupied with 'outcome validity' since they start from a set of assumptions which form
the basis for prediction of which choices will be made, giving rational choice high predictive
scores. Danilovic sees rational choice theory as about the desire of humans to maximise
preferences, with decision-making based on a rational choice from the alternatives with a
particular objective in mind (2002: 128-9). Thus, according to Danilovic, rational choice does
not attempt to describe, its primary purpose is as a predictive tool, hence it has been heavily
used in gaming and modelling:

States or decision makers are viewed as solitary actors searching to maximise
their goals in global politics. As such, the decision-making unit is treated as a
“black box” and little, if any, effort is made to understand the internal political
forces affecting its choices. What one has is an action-reaction model in which
the analyst seeks to explain each response as a rational calculation to a move
made by the other side (Jensen, 1982: 5).

The prime utility of rational choice has lain in its relative simplicity, but it also this simplicity
that has drawn criticism upon its head. Jensen, for instance, makes an implicit criticism of
rational choice in relation to the lack of emphasis on the 'internal political forces affecting its
choices' (1982: 5). But it was not only in relation to lack of comprehensive consideration of
input that Jensen deemed it vulnerable. Rational choice imagines an ideal set of conditions for
decision-making and it also assumes that there is an objective standard by which we can
assume that one alternative is the most rational of the alternatives available (Jensen, 1982: 5).
Other approaches were to answer such criticisms and fill some of the gaps in the explanatory
power of RCT.

The decision-making approach injected at least some of the complexity missing from RCT.
SBS (1954, 1962) were in the vanguard of work here. Their work revealed decision-making as
affected by both the external and internal dimensions. Thus the approach emphasised (i) the
importance of the 'decision' as the focus for analysis; (ii) the decision-maker - be it an individual or a group; and (iii) the process of decision-making itself - those factors which feed into decision-making by influencing the decision-maker. As White makes clear, however, decision-making did not drastically change thought on foreign policy:

The notion of an aggregation which acts on behalf of the state is still the dominant conception. To this extent, state-centric assumptions are retained if not reinforced (1989: 12).

Additionally, White claims that many of the assumptions of rational choice remained in place, an analysis supported indirectly by Jensen (1982) and more explicitly and recently by Hudson, as already discussed in Chapter 1.

It has been in the work on bureaucratic politics that the SBS tradition has been most deeply felt and in which gains have been made in providing an alternative to reliance on rationality in examination of decision-making processes. Further reason to focus a little on the work on bureaucracies is the fact that it has, as Hill (2003) indicates, complicated analysis as much as it has clarified it. The study of bureaucracies also injects a measure of understanding of continuity in the foreign policy process since leaders may come and go but the administration remains (Jensen, 1982). But the model also challenges both rational choice and the decision-making approach through those conclusions that show decision-making as the outcome of Allison's (1971) 'pulling and hauling' as discussed above. As a result, bargaining becomes central to understanding of decision-making processes and has influenced the thinking of those such as Neack (2003), whose work on linkage and delinkage, and foreign policy as bargain and compromise follows in the footsteps of Allison's work. Hill (2003) calls attention to those studies of bureaucratic politics which have challenged the idea of rational decision-making done in the service of the state and who have concluded instead that it is clear that decisions are not always made either rationally or in the public interest, a vast step forward from the state-centricity of both rational choice and the decision-making approach. If bureaucratic
models are correct, Hill (2003) says, then belief in the state as an actor can no longer be taken for granted, since decisions look to be more the result of self-interested inter-departmental squabbling than a result of level-headed, logical decision-making in the service of the state. However, many criticisms have been made of Allison's work (see Smith, 1989 for a review of these) although the approach has remained important, not least for offering an alternative to rational choice (Hill 2003, Smith 1989, Jensen 1982). Hill (2003) says that arguments that administrative departments compete with each other are not fully explained, nor are statements that policy-makers do not always work in the national interest fully explicated. Gerner (1995) points out the limitations of applicability, saying that most work on bureaucracies has been performed on states within the industrialised world, specifically the USA and western Europe and attributes this to the fact that to be fruitful as an approach, a lot of information is required on governmental processes, the bargaining process, the responsible organisations and actors. A relatively recent method to address some of the criticisms is found in Mintz's (2002) work marrying rational theory with cognitive psychology.

Before moving on to this far more recent body of work, it is worth considering what else motivates a change in theoretical and methodological approaches. Neack et al (1995b) argue that events in the real world are mirrored in scholarship itself. They attribute the reliance on positivism in the first generation of FP study, for instance, to the fact of two world wars and the fascist and communist threats and point to examples of the effects of positivism in the form of subsequent attempts to model new or developing states on the western example. Scholarship has had to move with events. Decolonisation and the emergence of new states meant new voices and issues were heard in the 1970s. Power had to be rethought - economic power became increasingly important and focus began to shift away from the most powerful states. State-building, development, aid - all these moved higher up political and scholarly agenda (Neack et al, 1995a). Hermann asserts that the end of the Cold War brought about two more
developments, understanding cooperation rather than hostilities became more important and economics took a higher priority for investigation (1995: 248). Such arguments have implications for how I speak of Russia's marginalisation in Chapter 6. They are deemed to be of considerable significance not only because of the inherent 'rightness' of such argumentation but also because of the prominence given by foreign policy analysts to 'context'. In times of great change, it becomes all the more vital to establish context and consider the effect changes in it are likely to have.

Both changing times and perceived deficiencies in methodological approaches have driven change in FPA. Reflecting their own criticisms of the first generation of foreign policy study where they lament the insufficient crossover from relevant fields, especially comparative politics and IR, Neack et al do not concentrate exclusively on works grounded in foreign policy, citing, for example, the IR Neo-Realist thinker, Waltz. Nor are they alone in their lament, Schmidt (2002) and Hermann (1995) also argue that little FP work, up to the mid 1980s at least, married the international and the domestic fields. The second generation addresses some of the gaps left by the first. It is eclectic in its use of methodologies, featuring both quantitative and qualitative approaches and drawing on a multiplicity of theories, accounted for by the following,

The eschewing of the need to have a field organized around a central paradigmatic and methodological core has freed foreign policy analysts to draw upon multiple literatures that speak to the central preoccupation: foreign policy theory and behavior (Neack et al, 1995: 9).

Approaches are now far more complex, a reflection of the increased complexity of the international situation. Context figures highly, and research attempts to make links to the most significant foreign policy concerns. The result is a far more diverse body of literature that incorporates both domestic and international aspects, relying on other specialists within the Politics and IR disciplines, such as area specialists and comparativists, as well as those outside,
such as psychologists.

It is in the work on cognitive processes and the role of psychology, which selects individuals as the level of analysis, looking at their belief systems and personal characteristics as a guide to decision-making, that we most clearly see the impact of person on foreign policy. Despite belonging, as Hollis and Smith acknowledged, in the realm of explanation rather than understanding, such work has been vital in showing the limits of rational decision making. Simon's (1959) concepts of 'bounded rationality' and 'satisficing' remain seminal in this field:

> fully rational decision making is impossible. Instead people satisfice: they examine sequentially the choices facing them until they come upon one that meets their minimum standards of acceptability, one that will “suffice” and “satisfy” (Gerner, 1995: 25).

The way to such work was paved by the early work of the Sprouts (1962), who were themselves influential on SBS (Rosenau et al, 1972: 5). Harold and Margaret Sprout opened up the scope of analysis and theory more generally by their emphasis on understanding the decision-making context, on their focus on the decision-makers and particularly those factors which they saw as having the potential to affect decision-making itself. In their work on the psycho-milieu, Sprout and Sprout showed that decisions were taken in two environments: the 'operational' - self-explanatory but objectively defined; and the psychological - i.e. 'the milieu as it is perceived and reacted to by a particular individual' (Sprout & Sprout in Zinnes, 1972: 211), and therefore subjective. As a result, the Sprouts argued that behaviour could not only be understood by reference to capabilities.

Other works slowly built on such ideas, debunking rational choice and at the same time gradually elevating beliefs and values through the ranks of significant factors to be accounted for. Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) were important in refuting claims that decision-makers are always cognisant of their own values as well as all the possible consequences and
probabilities when they make decisions. They cited the lack of time and the lack of resources available to make this truly the case. This was supported empirically by Johansen (1980) who argued it was often evident that decision-makers were completely blind to alternatives, that decisions would be taken without fully inclusive consultation. Other significant works included Jervis's (1976), whose work on perception and misperception cited a number of factors when discussing why rational decision making does not work – actors' failure to recognise their own value-driven basis, the role of wishful thinking and general inability to see all round a situation. The influence of cognition was further evidenced in those cognitive studies which looked at individual and communal belief systems, especially Holsti and Rosenau (1990, 1990a, 1984) with their identification of three different belief systems and their effects in the USA after the end of the Vietnam War. It is on the basis of such works that Hill could claim much later that 'substantive rationality is barely distinguishable from a debate over values' (2003: 101). Belief systems are discussed in a little more detail subsequent to the following discussion on rational choice and cognitive psychology.

In 2002, Mintz claimed that two theoretical schools of thought currently exist on foreign policy decision-making - rational choice and cognitive psychology. His work on poliheuristic theory is directed at a merging of the two. The marriage of the cognitive and the rational uniquely explains both the processes of decision making and outcomes (Mintz, 2002: 2). The virtue lies in the way the two schools complement each other, with each having different strengths and weaknesses, that is, cognitive psychology for processes, rationality for outcome: Cognitive psychology helps in understanding why the decisions were taken while rationality has good predictive power (Mintz 2002, Redd 2002). Therefore the poliheuristic model should answer both the how and why. Cognitive psychology does give some room to beliefs, the idea that decisions are made based on an individual's pre-existing 'schemata' (Danilovic, 2002: 132) but Danilovic went on to offer a criticism of the approach, particularly on the basis that the
experimental results might be flawed since the experiments do not use the same type of trained
and well-informed actors we would see in foreign policy and because the experimental
conditions do not mimic the real world of decision-making, for example, allowing access to
debates (2002: 132). But Danilovic did not deem this to be a fatal deficiency, advocating work
particularly on preference formation and the process of decision-makers moving from the first
to the second stage.

A recent analysis looking at communal belief systems is that of Hulsman (1997), who justified
a 'schools-of-thought' analysis on the basis that the Cold War had ended and with it the US
bipartisan consensus that existed for its duration. According to Hulsman, there is now
enormous difference of opinion about what US foreign policy should be, underlain by a
variation in reliance upon the various schools of thought. Hulsman therefore looked at the
existing schools of thought to determine the nature of underlying principles, underpinned by
his conviction that political leaders have their own belief systems, leading him to look at the
'sub-ideologies' (1997: 3) of foreign policy actors. Hulsman argued that beliefs and ideas are
very important to foreign policy formulation and contended that it is especially important that
the underpinnings of belief systems are identified and seen as having a real effect on decision-
making:

The choice for practitioners is not between being influenced by theory or
examining each case "on its own merits": it's rather between being aware of the
theoretical basis for one's interpretation and action and being unaware of it
(Keohane in Hulsman, 1997: 17).

The contribution of the work of those such as Mintz and Hulsman is to emphasise the necessity
of seeing the impact that an individual's beliefs could have on decisions and policy and
therefore the limitations of other, contrary approaches. But while they offer insight into the
whys of decision-making, there remain other aspects of foreign policy that are unexplained.
Interestingly, while belief systems and cognitive psychology approaches both give a role to the influence of ideas and values in decision-making, relatively little analysis has focused on values alone. Johansen (1980) is a major exception here. For Johansen, the context of the last quarter of the twentieth century, with its global and complex problems, was such that 'different normative standards' were necessary. Although he was most preoccupied with a desired value orientation, he talked too of the values exercised by policy-makers in their decision-making, claiming that a 'value-centred approach to foreign policy analysis is admittedly a break with the prevailing intellectual tradition' (1980: 23). Johansen's work, of course, preceded that of Mintz or Hulsman, and at the time he rightly argued that the two prevailing traditional ways of looking at foreign policy processes of decision-making were the historical and the behavioural scientific fashion. His approach was designed to redress some of the balance in regard to the emphasis to that date on power instead of values but other worth attaches to his approach:


If observers examine foreign policy as a value-realizing process they are able to see more clearly the recurring values that apparently idiosyncratic policies often are advancing. If similar values are repeatedly served by political leaders, one can extrapolate from this the structure of interests or the classes that benefit from the ruling group's policies (Johansen, 1980: 24).

In focusing on values rather than individual belief systems, Johansen's work suggested that decision-making could not always and solely be attributed to individuals. It seemed that values could endure beyond the influential position held by any individual or group and that therefore values had to be considered as more enduring than any one person's hold on power. Johansen showed that a value centred approach can aid in understanding of those structures that need reform as well as in understanding of the position of relevant people in terms of supporting or rejecting such reform. The work was important too in showing that every decision has a moral aspect to it but that politicians usually wish to disguise this: A values approach can therefore aid transparency. For the policy-maker values were important because they led him or her to think change can be effected and that they could guide the nature of that change. Much of this analysis informs my own work here.
A more recent study on beliefs combined a beliefs approach with a different methodology and in doing so made an incisive criticism of work that focused on individuals. Larsen's (1997) comparative study of French and British foreign policies through their discourse towards Europe hypothesised that '[t]he belief aspect, rather than being seen as just variables affecting action, should be seen as something which constitutes a frame for action' (1997: 7). While primarily interested in the role of discourse, Larsen makes important, wider theoretical points too. He maintains, for instance, that where beliefs are examined in foreign policy, emphasis is usually placed on the beliefs of individuals without regard for the effects of language usage on these individuals or indeed for the fact that their beliefs are both rooted in and reflections of wider societal beliefs (1997: 1-4). Thus Larsen counselled against individualist explanations, saying too much emphasis was placed on particular events and their effects on individuals, so failing to account for the differing perceptions the same event can have for different actors. In addition, Larsen was concerned that studies that focus on individuals can lead to short-termism, individuals come and go, and so such studies do not account for the continuity in foreign policy which many analysts identify. Thus, he advised we attempt to identify what it is that informs the policy-makers' perception of the world and see this as more than an individualist perception:

The point here is that when it comes to general lines in a country's foreign policy, for instance British and French policies towards Europe in the 1980s, individualist beliefs give way to social beliefs and those beliefs constitute a central framework within which policy-making takes place (rather than being just one variable amongst many) (1997: 10).

Many of Larsen's conclusions are not unlike Johansen's, despite a distance of many years and a quite different method and certainly both share at least some of the sympathies of the Social Constructivists. As such, both works have heavily influenced what follows here. One final lesson applied from Larsen is that both domestic and external factors are important to understanding of foreign policy since perceptions will be guided not only by internal but also external actions. In this advice that we try and understand decision-making as rooted within a
context, Larsen is far from alone. The following section will consider context and its place in the analysis of foreign policy.

2.1.4 Context and Identity

[T]here are some important contextual variables that ought to be included in any analysis of foreign policy behavior: the nature of the international system, countries' perceptions of opportunities and dangers in that system, and national self-perceptions. That the nature of the international system would somehow affect the foreign policy choices of states no matter their type and/or national attributes seems intuitive and is a fundamental tenet of international relations theory. That national self-perception (of the country's mission, of its international responsibilities, of its historical legacies, and so on) and the country's perception of the opportunities and dangers present in the international system would have an effect on foreign policy behavior also seems intuitive (Neack, 1995: 223-4).

No matter what it is called, 'context', 'setting', 'situation' or 'environment', analysts are agreed on the necessity of accounting for the effects of it upon foreign policy. Policy-makers make decisions based on their perception of their situation. In considering their situation, they have, perforce, to assess not only their own, domestic environment but that of the external one too, for each is possessed of structures with the capacity to impact upon foreign policy-making (Sprout and Sprout 1962, SBS 1954). Beyond this, analysis shows that how an actor perceives their situation may not equate to the 'reality' of their situation (Jervis 1976, Sprout and Sprout 1962).

On the subject of context, Modelski (1962) argued that only the policies of members of the international society are important in foreign policy analysis: 'The only significant facts are those that are reflected in foreign policies' (Modelski, 1962: 11). While this is almost certainly a very problematic conception for thoseFP analysts who stress the domestic levels of analysis and those who favour agency over structure, it is a conception that heavily informs my own

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work in respect of its underlying insight that policy is only ever made in relation to something else and that in the foreign policy field, that something is always to be found outside the state, such that we must see FP as only partially directed at the domestic audience.

However, it is important to remember that a state's responses to the behaviour of another actor will itself be conditioned by its aims in respect of its immediate environment. Thus, not all states are affected in the same way by their environment. It matters both where they are situated and what role they seek to play within that situation. Mouritzen (1996) is instructive in this respect, arguing that a number of 'poles' exist in the international system and that these exert a magnetic 'pull' on neighbouring states. In some cases, states may feel the pull of more than one pole and this will have an inevitable effect upon their external orientation. He goes on to argue that it is important to consider the effect of what he calls the 'salient environment' upon states, that we must understand where the 'centre' lies and the range and extent of effect such centres may exert. Other studies have also relied upon geopolitical frameworks. Smith and Timmins (2001), for instance, make a compelling argument for seeing Russia as either extracting opportunity or suffering vulnerability as a consequence of its geopolitical situation, a study not entirely dissimilar to my own later use of marginality as a framework by which to understand how a supposedly weakened Russia manages to win its place at so many internationally significant tables (Odom, 1998). Incidentally, what Mouritzen, Smith and Timmins and myself share in common is a belief that aims constitute an important part of FPA. The importance of this element in FP is returned to in the section where I consider Modelski's work.

Structure is no less important in respect of the domestic environment (Hill 2003, White 1989). White (1989: 19), for example, speaks of societal and cultural structures but Gerner gives more clues to the number and type of domestic contextual factors worth considering, including,
the values, national character, political culture, and historical traditions of a society, its structural attributes (size, level of industrialization, form of government, etc.), and the particular political issues that are important at any given time (1995: 21).

Some of these factors, of course, will themselves be affected by the external environment, so that we cannot regard either arena as wholly separate from the other. Context, both external and internal, plays a particularly interesting role in respect of how identities are formed:

"... foreign policy decision makers and elites construct their meaning of international affairs and their state's interests within the geopolitical culture of their state. Geopolitical culture can be defined as the interpretative culture and traditions within which a state makes sense of its identity and its encounter with the world of states, and codifies a set of strategies for negotiating that encounter (O'Loughlin et al, 2004: 5)."

This argument about the contingency of context and identity is explored in more detail by Hill (2003). For him, identity forms an integral part of foreign policy and so must be considered explicitly as constituting part of the domestic and international context. Hill says that we expect states to project their identity abroad, after all visits are made between states, exchanges organised etc. (2003: 44). He also makes a connection between identity and territory, contending that this is particularly pertinent for border communities, and that regional identities are built to overcome any potential for conflict (Hill, 2003: 169). In these contexts, identity is seen as a potential cause of trouble so that the sense of identity built must be one that can be accepted by all necessary parties within that context. But it is not only these obviously problematic environments that are subject to constraints and these can emanate from outside as well as inside. In an increasingly interdependent world the international environment is a moulding influence such that 'states' own identity is increasingly shaped by their political context' (Hill, 2003: 175). Further,

"... a state's identity, and so interests, and understandings of legitimate international behaviour, is a social product. But it is a product that is the result of a state's interactions both with its own society and with other states. As such, it is a variable, subject to both domestic and international influence. This means significant international others can effect changes in a state's identity, working within the constraints of that state's domestic identity terrain (Hopf,
It is increasingly clear that the study of foreign policy cannot be entirely divorced from considerations of identity. We must see FP 'as an identity-producing practice' and study it 'as an essential, if not always easily operational, variable in the foreign policy process' (Kassianova, 2001: 821). Thus, in Chapter 3, I consider the effect of identity on Russia's foreign policy orientation and, again, the interaction of FP and what it means for even domestic conditions is emphasised. However, at this point the detail of Hopf's argument must be considered. An actor's identity is not solely, or even mainly, the product of its foreign policy, although this is an important consideration. It is also the product of interactions at the domestic level and these interactions will have an effect on its foreign policy orientation. This becomes very obvious in the case of Russia.

The effect of the external environment on a state's identity must be considered, in part at least, in respect of legitimacy. Reputation can be very important to some actors, such that their desire to promote and maintain external perceptions of themselves in a certain light acts as a constraining factor, beyond that which everyday exposure to an accepted canon of norms and values confers. 'Britain has the opportunity to play, and is often expected by the international community to play, a leading role in this kind of diplomacy ...' (emphasis added) (Coles, 2000: 110). Combined with the action-reaction aspects of foreign policy, this means that the current situation is such that actors must recognise the need to conduct policy with a regard for the effect it will have on others since this ultimately can rebound upon their own state. Hill (2003a) has expounded on the dangers of states operating double standards in respect of the effect on their legitimacy and this is consonant with what Modelski terms 'power liabilities' (1962), as discussed below. Thus identity can still be "a site in which political struggles are enacted" (Campbell in Hill, 2003: 302) since the very definition of foreign policy entails distinguishing between 'us' and 'them' (O'Loughlin et al, 2004), but the chance of the 'other'
becoming one of 'us' is reduced where 'we' are not seen as legitimate.

Discussion on identity is relatively new in the foreign policy literature, but while it is only latterly rising up the list of analytical priorities, few could now deny that it forms part of the domestic and international context which we seek to understand. Despite this, in Gerner's (1995) list of important domestic contextual factors, identity is missing, although room is left for its consideration if it is deemed one of 'the particular political issues that are important at any given time' (1995: 21). As such, we must consider the possibility too that identity might be projected, or affected differently, depending on who the actors are (Hopf, 2005: 227). If foreign policy is about reacting to other states' behaviour, knowledge of other states is vital to the formulation of foreign policy; it follows that some perception of other states is held by the ego state. It follows too that states may seek to project different images to different actors or environments. To this extent, states must be considered to have the capacity to hold, or at least project, multiple identities and it should be remembered that the image of identity projected at home may be wholly different again from that projected abroad.

The absence of identity as an important variable in the older foreign policy literature is partly a result of the emphasis on rationality in foreign policy scholarship, but it is a consequence too, perhaps, of the fact that it is of varying importance, depending on which actor's foreign policy is under consideration. Identity figures relatively highly in literature relevant to Russian FPA, reflecting the importance of this particular issue in the Russian context as a result of Russia's disputed identity. But in the broader FPA literature, search terms have to be widened before identity-related issues become more prominent. For instance, Neack (1995) and her talk of 'national self-perceptions', as well as her later work on national self-image (2003), and Larsen (1997) and his reference to societal beliefs, inevitably draw on thinking on identity. Links are therefore often rather more implicit than explicit. It is not difficult either to see the relevance to
and occurrence of identity in belief systems analysis, schools of thought analysis, as well as more empirical works on the transatlantic relationship.

As suggested, identity is covered in depth in actor-specific terms and this is most true for the European Union. It is in the European integration literature, particularly that of the Social Constructivists, that we find work on identity that casts the net rather further than country studies (see, for instance, Risse 2005, Banchoff 1999, Checkel 1999, and Marcussen et al 1999), so giving us more obviously generalisable conclusions to draw upon. In their study of French, British and German nation state identities, Marcussen et al draw upon social psychology to show that identity is not subject to frequent change, people 'cannot constantly adjust their cognitive schemes to the many complex and often contradictory signals from the social world around them ...' (1999: 616). But they also reveal the circumstances under which identities can change, including in times of crisis such as war, when they have undergone a process of socialisation and, most interesting for my purposes, when they 'resonate with previously embedded and institutionalized values, symbols and myths' (Marcussen et al, 1999: 616). I will return to this point when I look at the question of the Russian identity and its marginalisation. But is is an important argument for what it suggests about where a socialisation process may be most effectively situated. In his discussion on the utility of applying a social constructivist cut to analysing state identity, Banchoff argues that constructivist FPA 'must not only pinpoint the content of state identity; it must also demonstrate its effects' (1999: 262). The Russian state identity is considered in detail in the next chapter and it is, I will argue later in the Kosovo case study, a key factor in understanding why Russia behaves as it does. First of all, and not irrelevant to the question of context and identity, I look at continuity and change and the challenge that this presents for analysis.
2.1.5 Continuity and Change

The dynamism of FP should be self-evident. After all, as the definitions showed, foreign policy is about action, reaction and interaction. Modelski argues that '... foreign-policy analysis is the analysis of the causes and effects of changes in the elements of foreign policy' (1962: 102). Actors, are constantly having to make adjustments, such that one former long-standing officer in the Foreign Office talked about the 'conditioned reflex' (in Coles, 2002: 50) as a governing principle of foreign policy-making. And yet this would seem to fly in the face of one of the basic lessons of the study of democratic political systems, i.e. that the civil service acts as a force for continuity. It denies also the lessons of New Institutionalism and its insights on lock-in and path dependence (Hall, P & Taylor, R, 1996). It seems then that we are faced with a contradiction and, indeed, despite the dynamism definitions suggest is typical of FP, Hermann (1995) finds cause to advocate a more dynamic approach to foreign policy analysis, saying we must have an eye to when and how policies might change (1995: 255). While it may be easier for foreign policy analysts to look at short-term interaction, Hermann claims we would be able to better explain and to forecast foreign policy if we looked at 'patterns of interaction that develop over extended periods of time' (1995: 256). Which is not to say he underestimates the complexity of the necessary task.

How does one create an interactive theory that takes the perspective of an actor in the system, rather than that of the system itself, while at the same time taking into account that the actor is constantly responding to perceived external feedback to its prior actions, new initiatives of others, differing situations, and shifts in the international structure? (Hermann, 1995: 256).

This, incidentally, is one of the main reasons why I treat Russian FP as a heavily constrained field, both in its internal and external contexts. If this were not the case, no state would have to make the continual series of adjustments that it is clear they must. But this is not to deny the extent to which matters remain the same. Thus, we must see the seeming contradictions inherent in the FP literature on this subject as perhaps less contradiction than paradox,
reflecting that found within the policy field itself. We can speak then of:

the paradox of foreign policy: that its aims, the product of interaction between pressures internal and external to the state, have a certain perennial quality about them ... and yet the implementation of these aims in the concrete circumstances of the times has to bow to ever-changing realities (Northedge, 1968: 10).

Thus, we must see foreign policy as being constituted of some elements of continuity even while they will not remain fully immune from the effects of change. Forces for continuity, and therefore significant variables, include the international system, geography, and, relevant to my later analysis on values,

[p]erhaps too the ethos of a nation, the thoughts and feelings which come natural on the particular piece of earth which they inhabit ... all dispose a state to take the same things for granted about foreign policy, to indulge the same prejudices, dream the same dreams (1968: 12).

As with so much else in the FP field, we are presented with a complex challenge in this area and, if Coles is right, our capacity as analysts to decipher it, is reduced:

The pattern constantly shifts. Case studies are more valuable than generalizations. But since Cabinet archives in general remain closed for thirty years it is virtually impossible for scholars to produce case studies that have much relevance to contemporary government' (Coles, 2000:31).

But it is often difficult to recognise the full nature of change while one is in the midst of it. Analysing FP through an assessment of relative levels of change and continuity may therefore have little utility except when some time has elapsed since the events one is trying to analyse. That this is so becomes obvious in my discussion in the next chapter on the so-called 'phases' and identity issues in Russian foreign policy.

Without some understanding of the type of system that exists at any given time, we cannot fully understand some of the choices and changes that states are forced to make. Modelski (1962) intended systemic constraints to be accounted for in terms of changes states make to their foreign policies because the foreign policies will reflect the interests of individuals and
groups within the policy-makers' community. But this is to deny that change occurs outside the foreign policies of other states that nevertheless effects change within them. By dealing with such systemic change only as part of foreign policy, we cease to see systemic change as the important and distinct variable it actually is. In Modelski's defence, we must see not only foreign policy but theory too as dynamic, as new phenomena occur theory must adapt in order to account for them, in 1962 the system was actually far more predictable and stable than it is in the post-Cold War world. 'Context' must therefore be reviewed to account for more than just the policies of other states and in this way we will also come to a better understanding of change.

The challenges inherent in FPA are undeniably enormous. It is agreed that no one theory will ever be able to manage the entirety of the FPA task and few indeed have ever attempted to produce one. Hill and Light point in 1985 to Modelski's 1962 model of foreign analysis as uncontested in terms of constituting a theory of foreign policy. Modelski set out a scheme by which the dynamics of foreign policy could be accounted for. He argued for the necessity of describing certain variable elements, limiting them in order to make analysis workable. Once the elements were decided, change could be measured by reference to changes in them. However, this too reflected the thinking of its time and the need for employing rigorous scientific method, without consideration for what we have learned since about rationality, perception and misperception and cognitive psychology. Despite its shortcomings, and they are many, it still has much that is positive to offer the field.

2.2 MODELSKI'S THEORY OF FOREIGN POLICY

Modelski's 1962 publication constitutes then something of a rarity in the FP literature, a theory
of foreign policy. The book was the published version of Modelski’s doctoral thesis, itself completed in 1954. It arose from his perceived necessity to adopt a theoretical approach to the study of foreign policy. The intention was also to provide a methodological framework and he advocated a deductive and analytical approach, admitting too the importance of empiricism if combined with discussion on new concepts and the emergence of new theories (1962: 2). The work warrants particular attention precisely because of its singularity and detailed study reveals it to be a work that was, in many ways, as prescient as that of SBS. On the grounds that few reviews have given this work the attention it deserves and on the basis that it actually has much to say about my own thesis, in this section I set out the main areas of Modelski’s work and demonstrate its relationship with other FP works and its relevance to FP study today.

I have already cited Modelski’s definition of foreign policy, but it is worth emphasising his conception of foreign policy and the underpinning belief that even independent states can be affected by the actions of other states.

This fact that the behavior of states has favourable or adverse effects on other states confronts every state with a problem: that of minimizing the adverse actions and maximizing the favourable actions of foreign states. Thus, the foreign-policy problem is essentially a question of adjusting the actions of states to each other (Modelski, 1962: 3-4).

This is not at all inconsistent with the discussion so far, although Modelski took the discussion further back to basics. He argued, in essence, that it was the very fact of the existence of other (or 'alter' (Modelski: 1962)) states and their potential to exert influence over the first (or 'ego' (Modelski, 1962)) state that makes it necessary for states to have a foreign policy at all. From this it is but a short step to understanding what is required of foreign policy analysis: the 'foremost task of foreign policy analysis must be to throw light on the ways in which states attempt to change, and succeed in changing, the behavior of other states' (Modelski, 1962: 7). Five concepts are central to Modelski’s vision of foreign policy: policy-makers, aims, principles, power and context (1962: 11). In the next section I will therefore look in some
detail at four of the five concepts (context having already been discussed, including Modelski's view of it) and consider also how Modelski speaks of community, since this is relatively under-developed in the FP literature generally and yet is salient for how I consider Russia.

2.2.1 Policy-Makers

Policy-makers are the full-time practitioners of foreign policy whose job it is to influence other states (Modelski: 1962: 3-4). They are distinguished from the functionaries of foreign policy, such as soldiers, by the fact of 'their representative status and function, their ability to act and their responsibility for acting 'on behalf' of their community' (Modelski, 1962: 4). Here, then, as with Hermann (1972), was an argument for distinguishing between actor and agent, although Modelski himself was not consistent in doing so. Two primary aspects, he went on, make up their work — the 'input', i.e. what is addressed to them by their own community; and the 'output', the actions of the policy maker externally. Notwithstanding the broad definition of community he applied (below), here he failed to acknowledge that input would not solely come from the community but that it would be made outside the community through negotiation too, but, to be fair, it would be another 26 years before this point would emerge through Putnam's theory of two-level games (1988). He did distinguish between 'policy as planned' and 'policy as executed', but with little further explicit explanation but to say that planning was as much an action as execution, an assertion that has implications for whether and how we differentiate between policy-making and policy-implementation.

Modelski differed little from SBS (1962, 1954) in his own insistence that all this made policy-makers central to decision-making, he saw them as the representatives of the state, representing interests, defining and pursuing objectives, trying to influence the behaviour of
other states and ensuring all foreign policy actors act in a manner consistent with defined objectives. But he muddied the waters somewhat in conceiving of foreign policy as a 'system of action' in which policy-makers are important but not the only actors, any community member whose actions have significance for the policy must be deemed to be foreign policy actors. If we are to reduce the complexity of the FPA task, it is vital to distinguish between those 'capable of decisions and actions in any given context' (Hill, 2003: 27) and those capable of influencing decisions but not making them, and Modelski did not consistently make this distinction.

2.2.2 Aims

In order to clarify the importance and constitution of aims, Modelski spent some time discussing 'action', speaking of 'action' as forming part of most ideas of foreign policy with policy conceived as 'consistent' and 'rational', a 'course' of action. He relied on Parsons's notion of the unit act, consisting of four components: i) an actor (aka agent); ii) an end -- the ultimate aim or goal of the policy maker; iii) a 'situation' capable of developing in a way different to that desired by the actor, therefore failing to bring about the desired end, and with two sets of components, one consisting of components which the actor cannot control - 'the “conditions” of action' - and those consisting of components which he or she can control - 'the “means” of action'; iv) the relationship between these components means that choice of action is possible, such that we can talk of a "normative orientation" of action (Parsons in Modelski, 1962: 8). Foreign policy is concerned with 'ends' but only those ends which are desirable or which are achievable, so that the 'aims' of foreign policy are the 'future desirable behavior of other states' (1962: 9-10). It is precisely this point, I argue, that is too often forgotten in FP. As already alluded to, while it is important, of course, to understand processes, we must not allow
ourselves to lose sight of the fact that foreign policy is about the pursuit of aims. And in order to know whether an actor is likely to achieve those aims we must consider not only the means available but the conditions that have the capacity to prevent them doing so. To this we must add the Sprouts' (1962) psycho-milieu and remember that the operational milieu may differ from the psychological. Parsons's unit act constitutes a useful framework where RCT is relied upon but is otherwise problematic.

In order to set out what he meant by 'aims', Modelski first talked about the difference between interests and objectives. Interests, he said, constitute those aims important to community members and which they communicate to policy-makers; objectives are those notions of what is the future and desirable behaviour of other states (1962: 9-10). However, policy-makers' objectives do not necessarily reflect the totality of what the community wishes and demands from its foreign policy, i.e. the interests of the community, and nor do the constraints within which policy-makers must work necessarily register on what the community wants (1962: 118). He subsumed 'interests' and 'objectives' under 'aims' on the grounds that for both inputs and outputs the aims are the same, that is the 'future desirable behavior of other states'. In doing this, however, he ended by summarising both objectives and aims the same way, so that as with 'aims', 'objectives' are 'the conceptions of the future, desirable behavior of other states implicit in the policy-makers' actions in relations with the outside world' (1962: 10) (italics added) and, perhaps more explicitly, '[o]bjectives are the aims of foreign-policy operations. They define the policy that it is desired to induce in other states and that is to be attained through foreign-policy operations' (1962: 87). The rationale for defining objectives in this manner was to highlight the difference between policy in its desired form and policy in its actual form (1962: 88), so providing a framework for judging the effect of an actor's policy. In this sense, Modelski offered something to those occupied in the evaluative work done in FP, as identified by Gerner (1995).
2.2.3 Principles

As for principles, the third of Modelski's concepts, he says, '[t]he sentiments that certain foreign-policy activities are desirable in themselves may be termed the 'principles' of foreign policy' (Modelski, 1962: 10). As will be seen in the section in this chapter on 'values', there is a good deal of parity between Modelski's conception of 'principles' and my own conception of 'values', not least the notions of worth that Modelski attaches to his 'principles'. In fact, I argue that based on the literature that has followed on from Modelski's own, he was, effectively, speaking less of 'principles' than he was of 'values', and as such, although I do not claim that principles and values are the same, Modelski's account of what constitutes a principle makes it less than a value. This becomes clear when we consider Modelski alongside those such as Reus-Smit (1999). It is, however, necessary first to consider his argument on its own terms.

Principles are important in respect of their relation to both community (see below) and interests. Modelski says,

Every community cherishes certain interests above all else: These are its minimum interests. They are common to the entire community, being the lowest common denominator of its consensus; they are so important and so well grounded that they turn into "principles" and gain unquestionable and unreasoned acceptance. They become part of the articles of faith and are upheld with great vigor. Any important and general interest can be supported in this enduring and passionate manner. Frequently, the integrity of national territory or of political institutions can become the object of such attachment.' (1962: 86).

He distinguished between two types of foreign policy principles – 'those that are conveyed by the community to the policy-makers along with interests, and those that guide or limit foreign-policy objectives' (1962: 94). He went on though to talk about 'principled interests' as those that either cause a policy-maker to abstain from a certain action because of its 'inherent wickedness' (e.g. aggression) or to undertake it on the basis of 'justice or righteousness' (e.g. humanitarian aid) (Modelski, 1962: 94). Interestingly, he ties almost all these to systemic
"principled objectives" are pursued because of a belief in their unconditional validity. Action in accordance with international law, strict adherence to treaties and agreements, and respect for the recommendations of international institutions are instances of this type of principle (1962: 94).

This is consistent both with the English School's work on international society (Wight, 1966) and Reus-Smit's (1999) arguments, already discussed, about the existence and influence of 'constitutional structures', those 'complexes of metavalues', works pre-dated by Modelski's own. In this way, Modelski's work often bore the imprint of rather more idealism than might be expected. Despite relying on RCT, he saw scope to consider the role of beliefs, and, I argue, values. His failure to provide guidance as to how one would establish the nature of guiding beliefs suggests he believed in the existence of an international society.

He saw principles as 'inextricably fused with aims of foreign policy. A change in aims leads to a change in principles' (Modelski, 1962: 94). However, he also pointed out the wisdom of policy-makers couching their principles with an eye to a wider audience than just their own community, on the basis that 'if the support of other states is to be gained for national policies, at least some of the national aspirations must be stated in universal terms - that is, in terms of principles upheld by other states too' (1962: 97). Again, the links to Wight and Reus-Smit are clear, referring as this does, essentially, to ensuring actions can be seen as legitimate by the international society. And in arguing this, he was arguing too for seeing real limitations on any actor's capacity for fully independent action. He claimed that principles are useful to foreign policy as a result of the fact that they are simple, forceful and general. 'Principles are commands to act inspired by a strong sentiment that such action is worth doing for its own sake' (Modelski, 1962: 95). They can be considered as general because unlike aims they can be applied to a number of cases, also, they are formulated in a simplistic fashion. This simplicity makes them persuasive and useful, the complexities that policy-makers have to face elsewhere...
makes these, founded in long-term experiences and/or accepted moral and legal ideas, an attractive 'guide to action' (1962: 95).

But he also sees principles as having 'dysfunctional effects' (1962; 97), such that they must be deemed by policy-makers to have limited utility. Their very simplicity fails to reflect the complexities encountered within FP and 'excessive resort' to them hinders considered decision-making (1962: 97). This essentially is to say that there must be an element, at least, of rational decision-making. Again, Modelski showed his rootedness in RCT but did not appear to see that emphasis on aspects such as principles and community is itself an implicit criticism of such narrow approaches. But, based on my own work on values, I would argue that Modelski was at least right to argue that undue reliance on what he termed principles would come at too much cost to the policy-maker, and indeed, as my own work will show, there are clear points at which principles (values) must be set aside. For Modelski, it was simply a question of the fact that the issues involved were too important and too much responsibility was attached to actions. Alternatives for action, he said, are explored before a decision is taken, therefore principles 'at best can only be a rough and ready guide to action' (Modelski, 1962: 98). He identified generality as also causing problems, that partly because principles are generalised they sometimes look as if they have very little to do with what the community actually wants. Additionally, the international situation was such that issues tended to be different from one another — it would be difficult to adopt a 'standardized treatment' (1962, 98). Therefore, for Modelski, principles were less applicable in international than in national relations. This may have been true in the context in which Modelski was writing, although that is arguable. It is not true today. The impact of international 'constitutional structures' is now too deeply and widely felt. In the mooted post-modern order, the types of principles that Modelski saw as extant at the international level have taken on greater significance, such that 'pursuit of the good' has become a familiar referent in the rhetoric and, increasingly in the actions, of international
actors. Standardised treatments are therefore possible at least in respect of the significant environment. Thus, for me, values are as applicable in externally directed policies as they are in their internally directed counterparts.

This was not to say that Modelski saw principles as having no effect on FP, it was just, he said, that their utility was limited. In his explanation of why this was so, I am also forced to disagree with him:

If the wishes and desires conveyed to policy-makers contain expressions of principles, then for analytical purposes such principles do not differ from interests. If principles guide foreign-policy operations, they can be assimilated to objectives. To that extent, principles do not constitute one of the “variable” elements of foreign policy. They give rise to separate problems by reason of the features that distinguish them from aims – namely, simplicity, strength, and generality (Modelski, 1962: 99).

In the context of analysis where the fact-value dichotomy is still largely accepted, it is important to distinguish between interests and wishes/desires. Ultimately, in respect of the first sentence of the above quote, while I would welcome common agreement on the contingency of facts upon values and *vice versa*, it is just the case that we are not at that point. Analysis has proceeded on the basis that these are two distinct things. Secondly, on the question of the assimilation of principles to objectives, this may be the case but we should not assume it is. The problem arises in Modelski's conception of what a principle is and what foreign policy is. In seeing foreign policy as something constructed in relation to something else, there is a presumption too that *all* aspects of foreign policy are also constructed in that way. This is simply not the case. As Chapter 4 on Values makes clear, we have to see values as arising not only out of a shared external environment but also out of a specific internal one. Such domestic values may bear little or no relation to the outside world and reflect internal conditions such as identity and demography. What I show later in the Kosovo case study is that a certain group's values may themselves run counter to the state's foreign policy objectives and force the state to take account of them in a manner they might prefer not to. In such a way, we *must* treat values
(principles) as a variable.

Modelski's argument for the limited utility of principles becomes more understandable when we consider how he effectively blurs the lines between principles and values. It is only when he speaks of stability that a real difference can be discerned. He sees principles as important to studies on stability in the international society, arguing that principles change more slowly than aims, thus the adjustment process is slowed down and their generality means they can 'embody the common values and interests of many groups and states' (Modelski, 1962: 99). Even so, until we remember that his work is rooted to a large extent in RCT, it is difficult to see how he comes to the conclusion that 'the analysis of principles ... is of no independent significance in the analysis of foreign policy' (1962: 99). It is precisely here that Modelski and I part company and I make the argument for why that is so in more detail in Chapter 5.

2.2.4 Power

Modelski claims that in IR usage 'power' is used to denote the 'means' of FP and he defines power in regard to foreign policy analysis as, 'the community's present means to obtain the future desirable behavior of other states' (1962:21). Means are those instruments available to policy-makers to help them to achieve their aims. They are part of what the policy-maker can control (as in Parsons's third component of the unit act above). In equating power with means, Modelski identifies two aspects to power: input, the internal reserves of the state; and output, how much of its reserves it expends in its outside relations.

'Basically, all power consists of capacity for organized action in the service of foreign policy' (Modelski: 1962: 59). Power-input and power-output are treated as variables since the services
and resources made available to policy-makers will vary over time (1962: 23). Power-input has internal and external aspects (with control over the internal aspects relatively easier to achieve), as well as human (diplomatic service, armed forces etc.) and non-human (territory, weaponry, industry etc.) aspects. Internal power-input includes internal 'power-resources', some of which will be the result of 'past power-output'. The success of a foreign policy is dependent on, for example, the diplomatic service, a well-reputed military, and 'the moral cohesion of a united nation' (Modelski, 1962: 27). This latter aspect is returned to in Chapter 3 in relation to the specific Russian situation. External power-inputs include friendships and alliances with others, Modelski conceiving of states as operating within a 'society' of states. Diplomatic support, alliance in war, sharing of intelligence, planning, advice, commentary on strategy, consultation, all of these are vital to the organisation of foreign policy. Also relevant are levels of trade, supply of equipment, incoming aid as well as the 'services of power-resources of other states' (1962: 34), for example the dependence of alter states upon the oil of the ego state. Past actions cannot be ignored either.

Modelski sees certain actions as resulting in 'power liabilities', where a state's past means it is constrained in its future power output, or, indeed, input, one supposes (1962: 54). He identifies three types of liability: '(1) obligations accruing as the result of benefits received, (2) past weakness, and (3) bad reputation' (1962: 54). It is also necessary to consider how other states might try and eliminate or hinder access to an external power-input. Policy-makers will oppose any attempt to reduce their power-input, since it is in opposition to their tasks of maintaining and increasing it and, according to Modelski, it is in this sense alone that power is an aim of foreign policy – power-input is what facilitates achievement of objectives and so is crucial. The applicability of such an analysis to Russia is clearly seen today in the arguments over Russia's use of energy, which, although we may argue about the nature of Russia's objectives in respect of it, under Modelski's (or indeed any other) analysis, must be seen as one form of
internal power-input. It is worth remembering too power liabilities and the long-term effects that he suggested past actions could have on a state's reputation. These could act as a major constraint on its ability to build future, cooperative relations and again, this is revisited in the discussion on marginality.

Vital to both power-input and output is 'power-investment' (Modelski, 1962: 45) - what a state expends in power terms in order to reap benefits in the future. Two aspects attach to this: the maintenance of resources; and the building of new resources, and both affect power-input since they either require the diversion of monies or an increase in them. The various components of power-inputs are both complementary and interchangeable, an aspect of their interdependence. No one power-input component is indispensable, for example, the lack of foreign bases can be compensated for by strong alliances (1962: 111). In addition, any increase in components making up power-input may logically require an increase in associated components, the acquisition of new bases in another state leads to more spending on associated costs, such as equipment and personnel (Modelski, 1962: 111).

In Chapter 4 where I set out Russia's domestic foreign policy context, I consider many of the issues that Modelski raises in respect of power, albeit I fall far short of creating first, what Gerner (1995) has referred to as 'laundry lists' of those elements important to FP and secondly, the resulting balance sheet of inputs and outputs that Modelski favoured. He argued that such a tool would reveal changes in assets and liabilities and in rates of input and output and advocated drawing up 'an inventory [which] would show the state of the policy-makers' power-resources and liabilities and the composition of their community' (1962: 152). This would also act as a summary of change in the four elements. At the very least, any foreign policy analyst of Russia could expect to be kept occupied over the long term updating Modelski's balance sheet! All facetious comments aside, this is just one of the many failings of Modelski's work as
a 'theory'. First of all, acquiring the data to make such a sheet worthwhile would, especially at that time, be extremely difficult. Secondly, while I will argue that continuity is underestimated as a factor in FP, change is an inevitability and one has to wonder how up-to-date such a balance sheet could be. Thirdly, and most importantly, such an approach to analysis would lock the analyst into a type of thinking that might itself prevent the possibility of change being admitted. FP behaviour, I would argue, already suffers too much from the effects of lock-in and path dependence, we should shy away from any approach from which these are inevitable by-products. That said, in a generation of FPA where we are no longer seeking a grand theory, it should be clear that notwithstanding the many problems, Modelski offers much food for thought. There remains much that is positive that we can take from him, not least when it comes to community.

2.2.5 Community

Modelski distinguishes between a state's citizens and the policy-makers' community. Within any state a portion of the citizenry is ignored by policy-makers, therefore not all citizens' demands are heard or met. Beyond the state, the policy-maker has allies whose demands he or she does hear and consider. Therefore the community extends beyond state borders. If the make-up of the community changes, so the interests conveyed to the policy-maker will change. The community is subject to change as a consequence of foreign policy actions as well since some policies will alienate parts of the community, causing them to leave, while others might attract new members. The community might thus be defined as, “the present result of the past pursuit of objectives” (Modelski, 1962: 66-7).

We can see the community as being comprised of individuals and groups both within the state
and external to it (the internal and external aspects of the community), and perhaps even states (as an external part of the community). In terms of the external community, for policy-makers there are two main groups, the policy-makers in friendly states and also groups or individuals in other states, including national minorities. This is a vital point and one worth considering in respect of Russia's sphere of influence. It is all too easy, perhaps, to ignore that Russia may in its 'near-abroad' consider an important part of its community to reside and to feel a sense of responsibility in respect of them. In this, Russia is no different to the UK and the Commonwealth (although certainly there is far less of a sense of compulsion felt on the part of the Commonwealth than Russia's 'near-abroad'). Nonetheless, this kind of conception of community warrants much more consideration than it usually receives. It is considered here in respect of Serbia and Russia, although I also consider how a reference to community and the need to defend it may be used instrumentally. Policy-makers are there to defend community interests but sometimes they will find certain individuals or groups cooperating with them on a short-term, therefore temporary basis, because interests come together, for instance. Modelski recommends separate consideration of temporary and permanent alignments, on the basis of a distinct division between them.

Modelski claims there is more temporary cooperation and accommodation in international than in domestic affairs and that this must be considered as different to membership of the external community. This is not to say that the community is only made up of groups or individuals friendly to the ego-state. In fact, Modelski identifies three groups in relation to community - the 'in-group' (friends), 'out-group' (enemies) and those 'in-between' (those who are indifferent but who might cooperate when and as is beneficial). Enemies are the consequences of past actions or, as Modelski rather neatly puts it, the 'results of past disregard of interests' (1962: 69).
Unsurprisingly, he saw policy-makers as having little liking for interference of other states in their community, on the basis that 'they oppose attempts at weakening their links with their community in the fields of 'formulation of interests' and of 'procurement of power-input' (Modelski, 1962: 84). But policy-makers must also be aware, he argued, of the effects of their own actions upon the community and they should be mindful of the minimum that must be done. The cohesion and unity of a state is all-important and no policy should work to undermine this, particularly where principles, as discussed above, are concerned. This is also returned to in the Kosovo case study where I argue that Russia trod carefully in order to try and avoid upsetting members of its community, albeit it was more successful in certain directions than others. On the other hand, Modelski reminded us, certain international situations present opportunities to acquire new friends and allies, therefore certain objectives can be adapted in order to facilitate inter-state cooperation under certain circumstances, e.g. a common threat.

2.2.6 The Utility of Modelski’s Theory of Foreign Policy

There remains the question of whether Modelski's theory is applicable in practice. What the foreign policy literature as a whole suggests is that it is not. The search for a grand theory has been abandoned because any such theory must necessarily extend the bounds of analysis too far. Modelski asserts that the number of variables must be limited if theory is to be workable but an examination of what he suggests must be incorporated in analysis reveals a range of elements unmanageable in any one study. Power-input and power-output, for instance, constitute two sub-components of the element of power. Just some of the factors that Modelski claims constitute part of these sub-components are the diplomatic service, including foreign ministry and consular service; armed forces, including intelligence service; those who have
roles in area or departments that see them interacting with other states, for example, trade and finance; a military reputed for its success in military operations, an expert administration, channels of communication; 'the moral cohesion of a united nation' (1962: 27); a well-trained and flexible population; territory; resources related to the military, for example permanent installations and atomic weapons; transport and communication organisation; industry; friendships and alliances with other states. Thus, in applying Modelski's theory, any analyst would have to research and describe all these aspects and then analyse their efficacy or otherwise. And these are just two parts of a greater whole, with a further three elements and their sub-components as well as the foreign policies of other states, all needing to be incorporated as well. This being the case, the abandonment of the search for a grand theory of foreign policy, as perceived by Neack et al (1995b) looks justified.

Certain of Modelski's thoughts remain salient today, however, and do inform my thesis. The difference between interests and objectives, for instance, is vital to an understanding of the place of values, while his advice to focus analysis on the attempts states make to change the behaviour of other states is not inconsequential to my work. His description of 'principles' as '[t]he sentiments that certain foreign-policy activities are desirable in themselves' (1962: 10) makes his 'principles' largely applicable to and consonant with my own thoughts on values as this description closely equates to some definitions of values (see below), such that we might fairly term Modelski's 'principles' as 'values', as Hill (2003) makes clear. Modelski's thinking on community is also revealing for those aspects that allow us to perceive a state's community as having internal and external aspects, and particularly pertinent in the Russian case given the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as denoted by Russia's own conception of this territory as its 'near-abroad'. In these areas, Modelski offers something rather distinct from much else in the FP literature.
2.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Two decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall, an event which propelled us into a new era in international politics, FPA continues to face challenges. Today, the scope of the FP field is immense and this presents huge problems in respect of method. A vast number of actors, agents and influences must be considered and the number and classification varies depending on where one is looking. Despite the move from grand to mid-range theory, theory must still speak somehow to what is generalisable if it is not to remain in the realm of area or comparative studies. In his discussion about the relative virtues of pure and applied research, Rosenau (1974) argued that it is from pure research that more understanding may come: for the applied researcher, an answer is being sought to a specific problem, the risk is that such research may not yield answers applicable to other questions or the search for broader understanding (Rosenau, 1974: 8-9). This is the potential hazard of mid-range theory but it is not insurmountable. In the next chapter, I show that Russian FP differs little in many respects from other actors, thus there is plenty of scope to apply the same theoretical and analytical frameworks to different actors. For example, the problem of what constitutes an actor and how to analyse them is applicable across the board. Thus, mid range theory must still, in a sense, speak to some of the concerns expressed in the search for a grand theory. In all cases, it behoves the analyst to remember Hermann's (1995) warning to be more precise about what is being explained.

The primary challenge is therefore how, in an increasingly complex age of global politics, to make analysis comprehensive and meaningful beyond the particular actor under scrutiny, but also viable. The move from grand theorising to mid range theorising has done much to ensure that analysts realise that, like the policy area, analysis must sit properly at the nexus of the domestic and external environments and provide the answers to the questions that arise within that dual context. In reviewing the literature, however, it seems that for the most part the
preoccupation is with what and how we are going about analysis but not with why. Thus, I see one of the challenges as how we can bear in mind the aim of foreign policy analysis: if it is not to provide illumination on this policy area, what is it for? Foreign policy is a 'site for political action' (Hill, 2003a). In 2007-8, we came very close to seeing the start of a New Cold War, an incomprehensible situation when set against any reasonable objectives of any of the parties concerned. It seems that we have made little progress in the last twenty years in achieving understanding about 'others', and Russia particularly. In considering the reasons for this, I conclude that three things are missing: i) the necessary consideration of context; ii) a failure to consider Russia's psycho-milieu; iii) and to see that Russia too has values underpinning its policies and actions. These are the gaps I seek to fill with this thesis.

The definition of foreign policy which I apply has already been set out (Webber & Smith, 2002) but more broadly I rely on those definitions that: i) treat foreign policy as being about interaction and the attempt to influence how others behave; ii) that imply actoriness is constrained at both the domestic and international levels; iii) and which allow room to see policy aims as reflecting not only the perceived interests of the state but its values too. Primary actors are considered to be states and international organisations on the grounds that these have the capacity to 'design, manage and control the foreign relations of national societies' (Webber & Smith, 2002: 9-10) but I do not deny that individuals who have decision-making power are actors too. I have already set out at length my arguments for distinguishing between actors and agents but it is worth reiterating that, by distinguishing between the two I seek to correct what I consider to be a deficiency in analysis. This argument is given more force when we consider Modelski's distinction between interests and objectives. Pressure groups, for instance, may be considered to be foreign policy actors where they have capacity to decide or take effective action but if they merely seek to influence the shape of decision-making, for instance through lobbying, they are relevant to interests but not objectives, unless the policy actually reflects
those objectives. And if we work with Hill's own definition of an actor, for instance, we cannot include Princess Diana since she had the power to influence policy but not to direct where power resources were applied. The distinction is an important one, for it says much about the domestic constraints to which actors are susceptible, as well as potentially extending the range of whom we consider to be domestic actors. As will be seen in the Kosovo case study, applying the distinction helps to shed light on why Russia behaves the way it does and how its response range is limited.

As for the approach of analysis, obviously the subject of the thesis itself militates against decision-making or rational-choice approaches. There is little point in adopting a decision-making approach since I am not seeking to understand a decision as such, for as Modelski put it, '[t]here is more to a policy than the decision that initiated it' (1962: 14). Additionally, I do not focus on the individual since I proceed from the belief that we can attribute personhood to states, as discussed in Chapter 1. In doing so I reject the idea that ideas and values can only emanate from individuals. For these reasons, the individual does not constitute the appropriate level of analysis. Nor will a policy-making process yield much information – it has not been Russia's policy to antagonise the West. I come closest to Allison's approach in terms of what I seek to understand, i.e. actions rather than policy or process, but even here individual actions are not the subject of study so much as Russia's foreign policy behaviour. In order to deliver a meaningful contextual analysis, I set out what I consider to be a range of appropriate (to the time) theoretical frameworks, each of which is either related to or contingent upon the other. With the Kosovo Case Study I apply these frameworks in order to understand Russia's behaviour during the crisis. Russia's behaviour during the crisis therefore constitutes the dependent variable, its values and those of the international community, constitute independent variables. As such, RCT is inapplicable given the inevitable reductionism of that approach. The bureaucratic politics approach is also ruled out because Russia is not an appropriate subject,
given Gerner’s thoughts on the limits of applicability and Coles’s (2000) support of that analysis. However, as will be seen, the Russian foreign policy literature argues the Russian leadership is not alone in making decisions and so some attention must be paid to the other potential sources of decision-making, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministry particularly. It is through work on bureaucratic politics that analysts are forced to see policymaking as the outcome of bargaining and compromise with other interested parties and it is in this capacity, i.e. in the tenets, rather than models, that the bureaucratic approach is of utility to the thesis.

Other approaches have more to offer here. The schools-of-thought analysis of Hulsman (1997) has potential in the Russian case, as becomes clear in Chapter 3, but ultimately this does not provide us with sufficient information to achieve a broader understanding of Russian FP behaviour. In the Russian foreign policy field too, very persuasive arguments have been made that we need to look at multi-factor theories if we are to understand the future direction of Russian foreign policy and if we are to avoid explanations that are reliant on current conditions when those conditions are subject to change (Menon 1998, Pursiainen 2000). I therefore adopt a somewhat 'pick-n-mix' approach to the analysis of Russian foreign policy but this is entirely in keeping with Neack et al’s assertion that ‘foreign policy analysts are free to draw upon multiple literatures’ (1995: 9). I follow also in the footsteps of Johansen in attaching significance to understanding that all FPs are underpinned by values and argue later that the refusal to recognise this is the case for Russia too has led to inadequate understanding of that state. The values approach is relatively unexplored to date in Russian relations, with most analysts still adopting either a descriptive approach or continuing to frame arguments on Russian foreign policy behaviour in explanations rooted in the Realist tradition of IR. In short, scholarship on Russia has not moved with the times. In advocating a values approach and setting out a contextual analysis in respect of it, I contribute to both the FPA and Russian FP
The section on Context demonstrates two points of great relevance to the wider thesis. Firstly, the admonition to foreign policy analysts to recognise the role of perception in decision-making retains its cogency (Jervis 1976, Sprout & Sprout 1965, SBS 1954). In relation to Russia after 1991 it is a particularly indispensable reminder. The effect upon policy-makers' perceptions of Russia's defeat in the Cold War, the continued existence and enlargement eastwards of NATO, the hegemonic power of the USA and the expansion of the EU to former soviet republics must be considered. Secondly, this thesis seeks to show that FPA must continue to look at the domestic and international environments and understand that in certain situations – times, in this case – we cannot treat the international environment as less significant than the other. External factors act as both a shaping and constraining influence on foreign policy. The analysis undertaken throughout the thesis therefore accords a central role to context and Chapter 3 offers an overview of the international and domestic situation in order to understand the situation in which Russia has to operate its foreign policy throughout the period after 1991. In each successive chapter, I contend that Russia after 1991 operates a reactive rather than proactive FP, reflecting the constraints it perceives in the international arena as a consequence of US domination. The significance of context too is demonstrated in Neack et al's (1995b) thoughts on the evolution of foreign policy and that aspect that speaks of how scholarship reflects real global events. Perceptions, ideas and values all look more relevant in the globalised, post-modern world and this thesis reflects that reality.

Discussion of context also highlighted the increasing significance of identity to the analysis of FP. As the next chapter shows, this is particularly so in the Russian case. To date in the FP literature, Social Constructivist approaches to the study of European integration have been most influential in promoting identity up the list of scholarly agenda. Such work has shown
that identity is a social construction and that it is not only constructed within states. Identity is shaped at least in part in response to events and interactions in the international system. Russia presents an excellent example of precisely this.

The ideas of change and continuity are important to any analysis of foreign policy since they point us in the direction of variables in foreign policy, they become particularly relevant in the case of Russian foreign policy given the two revolutions that took place in the twentieth century and given the huge variance in ideological basis of the Russian state in that century, such that we might reasonably expect to see more change than continuity. Change and continuity features in much writing on Russian foreign policy, whether explicitly as in the cases of Tsygankov (200) and White (2000), or implicitly as with Sakwa (1994). However, as Modelski (1962) and Hermann (1995) make clear, in the foreign policy field, change is deemed to be the appropriate site for focus. That the field is dynamic is not disputed here, that foreign policy actors act and others react is unarguable. However, this thesis seeks to inject a measure of balance into analysis. Yes, Russia is constrained in its actions by the behaviour of others but the way that it perceives and interprets that behaviour is the outcome of traditions, culture, history and experience and much of this is static rather than dynamic. It is in the realms of identity and values that we can best encapsulate the continuity – even while remembering to maintain focus on how change is produced. Foreign policy analysis should incorporate both what changes and what does not change (or what only changes slowly) and it is here too that this thesis seeks to contribute to the wider foreign policy field.

Finally, the importance of values has been discussed at length throughout the chapter and needs little reiteration here except to point out that values constitute a gap in the literature to date and that this thesis works to address this void. While the work emphasising psychology, cognition and beliefs are all important to my own, it is Johansen's that most informs my thesis,
even if only by virtue of his focus on values. If Johansen could argue in 1980 about the need to consider normative standards, how much more urgent is the need now. And yet little work in FPA (the major exception here is work done on the EU) seeks to marry what we know about the exercise of values at the domestic level with what we know of their exercise and influence in the international system. The contention that values are an issue that must be considered within foreign policy is supported by both events and wider scholarship. Morality has entered the discourse of the international as a result of the relative decline of Realism and the comparative rise of Liberalism, successor to the Idealist strand in IR. Arguments which touch on the legitimacy of states and international organisations mean that the international system does not have to be conceived of in anarchical terms and the influence of international organisations upon state behaviour must be recognised and accounted for and it is here that ideas, and therefore values, matter. This, coupled with the less rationalist and positivist dependent world that scholars now appear to live in, calls for an approach to foreign policy that reflects these environmental and theoretical changes. This thesis is one such approach.
In this chapter I review the literature on Russian foreign policy, in order to understand the specifics of the Russian situation and the problems these may or may not present for analysis. The empirical nature of much of the literature reviewed here renders it rather different to that already discussed in the context of the general foreign policy field and it is on this basis that this review is undertaken separately. The literature here often falls into the first category identified by Gerner (1995), that is, the descriptive, but increasingly visible is an attempt to apply theoretical models borrowed from a range of fields. Here too then the influence of Constructivism, geopolitics, cognitive approaches etc. can be seen. In this sense, Gerner's three distinct categories look less applicable, since description is combined with analysis. The other type of literature, evaluative, looking at the consequences of actions, their desirability and an assessment of success or failure, is much in evidence in this body of work, and this too is often combined with an analytical framework (see, for instance, Tsygankov 2006, Hopf 2005, Smith & Timmins 2001). This suggests, therefore, that latterly attempts have been made to address the criticisms made of soviet studies (see Pursiainen, 2000), although much of the field is still over-reliant on description rather than analysis. Here, however, I have focused more directly on that literature which does move beyond pure detail. That said, it should also be noted that many of the concerns voiced in the wider field are entirely germane to the Russian one: the need to understand both internal and external influences upon foreign policy, the need to consider context and the multiplicity of actors, all these are echoed in the Russian foreign policy literature, albeit primarily from an empirical rather than theoretical point of view.
As will be seen, Russia is a prime example of the entwined nature of the foreign and domestic fields. Sakwa (1993), for instance, points out that under Yeltsin the domestic economic needs of Russia directed the course of Russian foreign policy with good relations being sought with the West in order to ensure financial investment and aid. Before, however, looking at the influence of the international arena upon Russian foreign policy, I consider how foreign policy is constructed internally. Four areas are identified in the Russian foreign policy literature as either constituting or highlighting difficulties for analysis. These do not always mirror those seen in the foreign policy field in general, for reasons now discussed.

The first subject considered is identity, a relatively new focus in FPA, but which has featured in discussions related to Russian foreign policy since the time of Peter the Great at least. In respect of Russia most of the literature (compared to very little in the wider field) talks about the question of identity in more or less explicit terms. The significance of identity to FP has already been discussed in general terms and it is clear that such arguments are entirely pertinent to the Russian case:

The prevailing discourse of Russian identity is simultaneously the product of both domestic identity construction, the interaction between the Russian state and society, and international identity construction, the interaction between the Russian state and international actors (Hopf, 2005: 225).

Obviously here the interaction between state and international actors is emphasised, but still I necessarily consider the alternatives contested within the state and how these relate to political groupings. What all the evidence shows is that identity assumes considerably more significance for Russia given what is essentially its lack of a defined and coherent identity and this has an inevitable effect on the relations it builds with other actors. It is for this reason that identity has long constituted an important component in the study of Russian foreign policy, while being relatively under-analysed in the wider FPA work. In other respects though there are many commonalities in the two bodies of literature: identity generally, and for Russia
particularly, is revealed as indisputably linked to historical and geographical context; the same is true of relations with other states and objectives in respect of them.

Secondly, in what might be described as a sub-section of the identity issue, further commonality is evident. Identifiable in the literature are at least two broad groups of political thought after 1991, emerging ultimately in a centrist consensus. This is consistent with Hulsman's (1997) own findings in respect of the USA and his schools of thought analysis as set out in Chapter 2. Thus, there is plenty of scope to apply the same theoretical frameworks to different actors, including Russia. Next, I examine those works which claim that Russian foreign policy after 1991 occupied distinct phases, an indication of the evolution not only of the policy itself but also of the sense of Russianness. In moving from this second section to the third, the relevance of context is made plain since accounts of that evolution demonstrate the pivotal effect of Russia's foreign policy interactions. The final area of examination concentrates on the fragmentation of foreign policy decision-making within Russia, supported again by thoughts within the wider field on the plurality of actors. This is a vital subject of discussion within this thesis since the results of the literature survey in this regard have direct consequences for the choice of state values as the overall area of research and also for the selected method. As with the preceding discussion on foreign policy, the literature on each subject is considered before concluding remarks demonstrate the relevance of each to the thesis as a whole. Russian identity is the first focus for review.

3.1 IDENTITY

There are at least three important reasons for looking at identity in respect of Russian foreign policy. These relate to: i) the transformation Russia undergoes after 1991; ii) the type of identity constructed; iii) and the question of what actually constitutes the external environment.
On the question of the first of these, after 1991 Russia can be seen as an emerging state. It is clearly not a 'new' state in the way that Czechoslovakia was after 1919 but it is a quite different state to that which preceded it (Trenin 2002, Mandelbaum 1998). In such circumstances, as Prizel (1998) points out, national identity takes on a particular importance since it is often a strong sense of nationalism or at least of national identity that is responsible for maintaining the integrity of the state. Straus points out that this is a particular problem for the former Communist states where, 'national identity-formation has emerged as a critical issue in determining a country's policies and purposes' (2001: 2). Here Russia has had to tread a very fine line. The Chechen Wars have provided salutary lessons on the danger of relying on nationalistic messages which can backfire and provide more fuel for secessionist movements. At the same time, remembering the argument that a successful foreign policy relies on, in part at least, 'the moral cohesion of a united nation' (Modelski, 1962: 27), it has also been vital that Russia find a way to build a sense of unity and therefore national identity.

There is also the question of the nature of the identity. Petersson (2001) makes the case for a civic national identity rather than an ethnic national one on the grounds that a civic conception of identity is vital to ward off state disintegration. The perceived lack of a distinct Russian national identity (Service, 1997) raises questions therefore about the ability of the state to hold together but it also creates enormous problems for its foreign policy interactions, in terms of deciding where alliances and or stronger relationships should be built (Prizel, 1998). While the question of the conception of nationhood is an important one for Russia, for FP purposes, it is best situated within the long-standing Westerniser-Slavophile debate, reflected today in the ideological differences of Russia's various political movements, which can, however, be broadly classified into two groups. Both groups have had influence over the evolution of Russia's foreign policy since 1991.
Finally, the disputed identity translates into dilemmas over what constitutes the external, such that it is common amongst Russians to refer to much of their neighbouring territory, primarily the former soviet republics, as the *blizhnoe zarubezh'e* ('near abroad') (Donaldson & Nogee, 2002, Ra'anan, 1996, Sakwa, 1993). In this expression can be seen the continued Russian desire to maintain influence in the territory of the former empire but it is enlightening also in shedding light on the suspicions that neighbouring states, whether in the near or far abroad, still exhibit in their relations with Russia. Present actions are not the only consideration. Empire-building had consequences both for Russia's identity and how others would perceive it. The Russian state was created through a succession of expansionist waves, through the use of annexation, armed force, acquisition of land etc. (Trenin, 2002). This has inevitably left a legacy of negative perceptions about the kind of state Russia is. This poor reputation has, as Modelski (1962: 54) theorised it would, severely constrained its capacity to build cooperative relations today and to succeed in its objectives. The Russian attempt, for instance, unilaterally to bring pressure to bear on the Baltic states in order to improve the rights of ethnic Russians (Garnett, 1998: 81) was inevitably received badly within these states. And the refusal to confer full citizenship rights on ethnic Russians in the Baltics was itself a policy borne out of extremely poor past relations. Russia's capacity to build a new identity and thereby to change external perceptions thus has a strong bearing on its ability to achieve its objectives.

A couple of notes of caution, however: The interactive nature of FP and the (even limited) independent FPs of other actors must not be forgotten. How others perceive Russia's identity and how it perceives itself are undoubtedly important but identity and perceptions thereof are not the only variables at work, states are constrained or freed according to other intervening factors. Within the CIS the relative dependence of member states on Russian aid, knowledge or intervention has been reflected in the depth of relative integrationist impulses. For instance, more dependent states like Belarus and Armenia have been more inclined to integration than
those more stable and with a strong sense of place, for example Ukraine and Azerbaijan (Aron, 1998: 38). For Menon, it was the ability of some of Russia's near neighbours to build insulating relations with other states that allowed them to move out of Russia's orbit (1998: 104-5). Thus, there are limits to the explanatory power of identity alone. Notwithstanding this, it remains a significant variable. The lack of national identity - which suggests that Russia still does not know what it is to be Russian - is considered first.

3.1.1 A Lack Of Identity

From historians (Service, 1997) to identity analysts (Petersson 2002, Prizel 1998) to Russian policy experts (Trenin, 2002), it is generally agreed that Russia suffers from a lack of a cohesive and coherent identity. Prizel (1998) argues it is a consequence of the simultaneity of the state and empire-building processes. He cites also Dawisha and Parrott's claim that imperial colonialism occurred even as the Russian nation was being formed, resulting in a blurring of "ethnic and cultural definition of Russian nationality" (in Prizel, 1998: 173). That this is so is evident in the discussion below of the two words in the Russian language for Russian, rossiisskie and russkie. Unlike the British, to whom the Russians have been compared (Kumar, 2003) the Russians built their state at the same time as their empire, resulting in Russian Prime Minister Witte's early twentieth century assertion that "ever since the time of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great there has not been such a thing as Russia only the Russian empire" (in Prizel, 1998: 177). Tolz (1998) also subscribes to this explanation for what she calls the 'Russians' identity crisis'. Internally today, the consequences are felt. The simultaneous state and empire-building processes have left Russia with a residual dilemma, centred around what it really means to be Russian. The fact that Russia has for many years, even centuries, defined its identity in relation to empire and not state, means that loss of
empire leaves Russia without an identity. White et al (2002) say that Russia has no 'national idea' and Trenin (2002) takes this further, saying that Russia has suffered also from a lack of nation, occasioned by state patrimony which mitigated against the formation of a civil society.

It is perhaps less accurate to argue that Russia lacks an identity than to say that it has a disputed one. Russia may certainly yet have to choose between a civic and an ethnic conception of identity but first it must resolve its age-old problem of which path it should follow: that of the Westernisers or the Slavophiles. This is such a well-known and debated issue (Duncan 2005, Donaldson & Nogee 2002, White et al 2002, Straus 2001, Ransel 1997, Service, 1997, Acton 1995, Neumann 1996, Foote 1972) that it almost seems clichéd and yet its continued relevance after 1991 makes it an unavoidable point of reference in any discussion of Russia's identity. The debate has significance for whether Russia chooses to follow a western path or a Slavic path, with obvious implications for policy choices, as well as conceptions of nationhood. In order to understand foreign policy choices and actions the cleavages that exist in respect of Russia's identity must be understood.

3.1.2 Division or Consensus?

The general view of that literature written in the first two thirds of the 1990s is that Russia's identity suffers from what Whitefield (2001) has termed a 'unidimensional divide': in other words, that Russia had still not managed to resolve the question of whether it should follow a western or a Eurasian path. From towards the end of the 1990s and certainly in the 2000s a shift in the literature is discernible, suggesting that this division has been overcome and a path between the two mediated. Delving deeper into the literature, two related arguments are revealed. First, Russia's foreign policy fluctuates depending on whether the Westernisers or the
Slavophiles (remaining with these two groups for the moment) are in the ascendant:

There is no one Russia. Instead, depending on which discursive construction of the Russian self is empowered by Russia's political system at a given time, a different Russia is acting in the world (Hopf, 2005: 225).

It is this 'fluctuation' that resulted in the early 1990s in what some have termed an 'erratic' foreign policy (Lo 2003: 15, Timmins 2002: 87, Adomeit 1995). But based on more recent evidence, it is argued that a 'unique' sense of Russianness and therefore of Russian foreign policy has emerged from the middle ground (Hopf 2005: 234, Trenin 2004: 15) and that this has resulted in more consistency (Timmins, 2002: 87). Second, and again related, 'phases' in Russian foreign policy are the subject of much discussion, such that we can speak of the evolution of Russia's foreign policy after 1991. If a mediated position has indeed triumphed, we can speak of a relatively evolved FP and therefore the capacity to understand and forecast Russian FP behaviour should be greatly enhanced. If it has not, the converse is true. How one answers the question of whether Russia has a divided or a united identity obviously colours analysis and conclusions.

3.1.2.1 Division

The 1840 intellectuals' Westernisers-Slavophile debate saw what Ransel (1997: 163) has called, 'a contest over the meaning of Russia's past and Russia's future', a description which some see as apposite in respect of Russia in the post-soviet period (White et al, 2002). The Westernisers supported a progressive western line, advocating liberalism, rule of law, and western-style enlightenment. The Slavophiles stressed Russianness, based on a sense of community underpinned by Orthodoxy and the peasant commune. They occupied what Ransel (1997) has called a 'nativist position' and were anti-Peter the Great, seeing his reforms as having prevented the Russians following a Russian path, bringing in values detached from the
Russian experience and so creating a divide between various groups in Russian society (Acton, 1995).

The echoes of this debate can indeed be felt in the post-soviet experience, with most analysts identifying two broad groups of political thought in Russia after 1991 (White et al 2002, Lynch 2001, Ordeshook 2001, Suny 2001, Kubicek 1999-2000, Aron 1998, Lloyd 1998, Sakwa 1993). The two groups are called by Sakwa (1993), (i) liberal and (ii) national-patriotic, echoed in Service's (1997) (i) liberal and (ii) patriot groupings. Sakwa (1993) also points out that these essentially equate to two further descriptions (more explicitly indicative of FP orientations): the liberals can be seen as Atlanticists and the national-patriots as Eurasians, categories also used by Straus (2001). The liberals in this vision are pro-market, western-looking and support liberalism at both the social and political level. It is therefore not difficult to draw comparisons between group i) and the Westernisers. They support reintegration into the world economy and the building of international relationships, including global institutions. The vision of the Russian state is a restrained one, exemplified by a desire for good relations with the near abroad, not a position as hegemon (Acton 1995, Sakwa, 1993). The national-patriots occupy positions mostly antithetical to the liberals and are often referred to as gosudarstvenniki (statists) and/or derzhavniki (Great Power supporters) (Aron, 1998, Sakwa, 1993) because of their belief that the state must follow great power interests, and because they want a strong state to push through democratic change. For this group, democracy features, but it is one imposed from above. A patriotic foreign policy is advocated, with Russia as a great power within a Eurasian tradition and with much emphasis placed on the near-abroad. Group ii) therefore contains strong elements of pan-Slavism and so is consistent with the Slavophiles.

Ordeshook (2001) also identifies two strands in public political thought, (i) the democratic
reformers and (ii) the fascists, ultranationalists and anti-reformists. He concurs, in essence, with the characteristics that Sakwa applies to his groups, seeing group (ii) additionally as having a strong identification with the former Soviet Union and a regret for its collapse. Suny also identifies two types of political thinking: (i) those who support the economic and political changes initiated by both Gorbachev and Yeltsin and; (ii) those who deem the rejection of the soviet past as constituting a rejection of nation-building. Trenin (2002) also identifies two groups, (i) liberals and (ii) Realpolitik conservatives, nationalists and nativists (consonant with Ransel's (1997) description of the Slavophiles as nativists). The divide translates politically in terms of division between political parties with Russia's Choice and Yabloko, for instance, forming part of group (i) and the Communist Party (CPRF) and Zhirinovskii's ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) falling into group (ii).

Exceptions to this binary opposition, however, can be found. Lo (2002) describes five 'ideological currents'. Shearman (1997) cites Alex Pravda's identification of three groups: liberal internationalists, patriots and pragmatic nationalists and Arbatov's four groups: pro-western, moderate liberals, moderate centrists and neo-communists and nationalists. Kotz and Weir (1997) identify three groups, (i) radical reformers or democrats, (ii) centrists and (iii) Communists and nationalists. Grigoriev (1996) also speaks of centrists while Donaldson and Nogee (2002) also at times make reference to two opposition groups, the centrists and the red-brown (Communists and nationalists) extremists. It is the identification of centrists, incidentally, that suggests some resolution of the identity crisis is possible, in policy terms at least, but this argument will be pursued in a moment when I consider the literature that identifies an emerging consensus.

While there are differences between how these groups are categorised, essentially the same voices and opinions are identified within each of them. However, some crosscutting of opinion
is also evident. Ordeshook acknowledges that authoritarian instincts exist amongst even the economic liberals. Kubicek (1999-2000) points out that the liberal Kozyrev supported Ukrainian-Russian unification in 1993, a policy much more likely to be associated with group (ii) than group (i). Sakwa (1993) does not see the groups as mutually exclusive, identifying overlap, as well as quite different views being accommodated within the same broader group, a view echoed by Acton (1995). Analysis is largely agreed, however, on the nature of the differences and broadly speaking the division into two categories seems justified. It should be noted though that the vast majority of this literature was published in the 1990s or is likely to have been based on 1990s-related data. Once in the 2000s it became clear that arguments for division were being challenged by evidence of a consensus, built around a centrist agenda.

3.1.2.2 Consensus

If Russia was ever to escape the impression of unpredictability and inconsistency in its FP behaviour, something had to be done to overcome the effects of its divided identity:

This, then, was the conundrum facing Putin on his accession: how to transform the discussion of identity into a unifying force in society, while ensuring a plausible concordance between ambitious self-perceptions and uncomfortable realities (Lo, 2003: 15)

Evidence that this has been achieved is usually situated in the association of Putin with United Russia (UR) and that party's consequent dominance of the Duma from the early 2000s. Formed in 2002 from Fatherland-All Russia and Unity, UR came into being on the promise of standing for 'patriotism and democracy, freedom and justice, and a strong state' (in Waller, 2005: 155). In these nods to the concerns of groups i) and ii), the UR established itself as a party of the centre. Under Putin's presidency, its political agenda was consistent with that of the Kremlin, with little or no reason to date to imagine that convergence will change under Medvedev.
Even before the dominance of UR, however, some analysis did speak of the centrists. Kotz and Weir (1997) contrasted their centrists with radical reformers or democrats and Communists and nationalists. Interestingly, however while they give the centrists the leading role in opposition in the early years of the Russian Federation, they point out that the rejuvenated fortunes of the Communists from February 1993 onwards under Zyuganov saw the centrists fall behind the Communists and the nationalists in the December 1993 elections and by December 1995 decline even further. The benefits of hindsight are various and wonderful and it is all too easy to find fault with this analysis based on what we now know. But this example does serve to demonstrate and reiterate the virtue of Hermann's advice to look at 'patterns of interaction that develop over extended periods of time' (1995: 256). With the distance of time, Kotz and Weir's analysis looks speculative and based on very narrow data.

By 2005, Hopf was able to identify three significant groups, the Liberals, Conservatives and Centrists. The first two groups equate broadly with those identified by Sakwa (1993) and Service (1997) in the preceding discussion on division. The Liberals identified with the West, advocated Liberal Democracy, market economics and multilateralism. The Conservatives were associated with Orthodoxy, Eurasianism, ethnonationalism and the exercise of military power. The Centrists (Hopf does not detail his political groupings) beat a path between these two. Their discourse reflected an identification with Russia's past but a rejection of ethnonationalism. They saw some virtue in multilateralism but only within the context of a strong Russia that could follow its own path (Hopf, 2005). Ultimately, Hopf argues, the Centrist position and agenda triumphed over the other two. In his examination of the 2003-2004 elections, Sakwa (2005) found much common ground with Hopf's analysis. Remembering the group ii) identified above, these elections saw the relegation of this group far down the polls. Zhirinovsky's LDPR and the Communists won just 90 seats between them
(Sakwa, 2005: 372) and fared little better in the 2007 elections when they won 97 (Centre for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP), 2009). In 2003, Rodina, a party compatible with group ii) won 37 seats (Sakwa, 2005: 372) and increased that by just one seat in 2007 (CSPP, 2009), albeit by then they were running as part of the amalgamation that was Fair Russia. By 2003 and repeated in 2007, none of the members of group i) won any Duma seats, the Liberals failing to win sufficient votes to cross the threshold. The overwhelming victory in both cases went to UR, winning 221 (rising to 310 in 2004 as a result of a change in electoral law) and 315 seats in the respective elections (Sakwa 2005, CSPP 2009).

United Russia has earned much attention of late (Reuter & Remington 2009, Smyth et al 2007, Gel'man 2006, Konitzer & Wegren 2006) as a result of its dominance in the 2000s but also because it is deemed to have captured the central ground, offering something to both group i) and group ii). Additionally, it is in relation to the ascendant fortunes of UR and Putin's association with it that arguments about Russia's 'sovereign democracy' have been most prominent, following on from Surkov's now infamous February 2006 speech to UR. Ultimately, I reject the discourse on sovereign democracy on the grounds that many of the identifying trends – anti-populist measures, for instance – can be found in other, undisputedly democratic countries, and because the conceptions of power attached to sovereign democracy attribute more control to Putin and UR than either have in reality. Lipman (2006), for example, speaks of how, as a result, Russia acts 'with little or no regard for the judgments of outsiders', which is to deny its (like others) highly interdependent relationships. If anything, Shevtsova's (2006) description of Russia as an 'imitation democracy', is more accurate. Finally, other analytical frameworks suffice, revealing just as much without falling into the trap of over-attribution of agency. Reuter and Remington (2009), for instance, treat UR as a dominant party regime by reason of Putin's long association with it, culminating in his leadership of the party from 2008 and the (not unrelated) fact that it,
has the leading role in determining access to most political offices. It shares some powers over policy making, patronage distribution, and political appointments, and uses privileged access to the public purse and public policy to maintain its position in power (2009: 503).

Both the dominance of UR and its credentials as a Centrist party are noted further by Hopf, and the effects of such dominance on all areas of policy recognised:

As the Russian state solidifies, first against its own Liberal Foreign Ministry, and then violently, against its Conservative parliament, the Centrist discourse of Russian identity is institutionally empowered in the Presidential Administration, its Security Council, increasingly in the Duma, and in the foreign, security, and military institutions of state (2005: 236).

However, and again suggesting that it is possible to credit UR with too much power, it should also be noted that the lack of representation of group i) in the Duma meant UR had necessarily to take greater account of group ii). In speaking of the effect the 2003 election results had on Putin, Sakwa argues that the 'effective destruction of organised liberalism on the right made him more reliant on the bureaucracy, the siloviki and the nationalists' (2005: 383). This did not, however, indicate a wholesale turn from liberalism, as demonstrated by the continued influence of liberal ideas on economic policy (Sakwa, 2008: 891-2). Thus, so far the state and UR have managed (and had) to steer a course down the middle line, such that at the present time, the question of Russia's identity appears to have been set aside.

The turn to consensus in the domestic arena has been mirrored in the external one as well. Foreign policy is deemed to be following a more consistent and uniquely Russian path (Hopf 2005, Trenin 2004, Lo 2003, Timmins 2002), which seeks to build good relations with other actors and to participate in multilateral organisations, even while it remains intent on ensuring that Russia is recognised as a strong state with its own foreign policy agenda. Whatever the perceptions other states hold of this increasingly certain and assertive Russia – and the New Cold War discourse suggests that for some at least they are negative - they cannot, for the time being at least, continue to accuse Russia of inconsistency. Internally, however, there remains
the question of what form of nationhood the Centrists occupy. As discussed in the next section, there would appear to be little scope for treading middle ground between the civic and ethnic forms.

3.1.3 The Nature of Identity

The English language inadequately conveys the different identities that exist and cause problems for the Russian state. In Russian, two words exist to explain 'Russian': Rossiiskie and russkie. These in turn equate respectively to Petersson's (2001) civic and ethnic visions of nationhood. Rossiiskie suggests people have nationhood conferred by right of citizenship. Russkie that people are Russian by right of ethnicity, a far less inclusive right. From the discussion above and the identified preferences and positions of Sakwa's (1993) and Service's (1997) groups i) and ii), it is safe to conclude that group (i) advocates a civic national identity while group (ii) on the whole advocates an ethnic one. This is supported by Tolz (2001), who has conflated the Westernisers-Slavophile divide with, respectively, the rossisskie-russkie divide, seeing two members of group ii), Gennadii Zyuganov, the leader of the Communists and Zhirinovskii, the leader of the inaptly named LDPR, as advocates of an ethnic (russkie) identity.

The form of identity decided upon has implications for the integrity of the state, if ethnicity is the basis, certain component parts of the Russian state might prefer secession rather than to continue within a state in which they are second-class citizens. While a concerted secessionist movement would initially be Russia's problem, it might very swiftly become a problem for other states, but at the very least, it would have an effect on Russia's relations abroad, as the Chechen Wars have shown. Even without the risk of secessionism, choice of an ethnic
conception is tantamount to Russia selecting a Slavic identity, which will inevitably have an effect on how it is perceived abroad, and also, potentially, give rise to demands to create a greater Slavic union. That this danger exists and that Russia recognises it, became very evident during the Kosovo Crisis (see Chapter 8). A civic conception, on the other hand, creates fewer problems internally but also speaks to how Russia is orientating itself in the international system.

As the section on Consensus suggests, however, some resolution is possible. That the Centrists cannot advocate both a civic and ethnic vision of nationhood is clear. Hopf argues that:

Within Centrist discourse, Russian identified with a genuine and unique Russia, although associated with European social democracy. It also identified with an idealised Soviet past, but explicitly rejected an ethnonational conceptualisation of Russia. Centrist discourse instead adopted a civic national 'Rossian' identity designed to capture the multinational character of the Russian Federation. While Russia was unique, it was situated within a universal civilisation of modern social democracy (Hopf, 2005: 234).

The picture, however, is not as clear as this quote suggests. Officially, the civic version is operated (Duncan, 2005: 286) but Dannreuther and March (2008), for instance, argue that under Putin 'the forces of nationalism [were] unleashed' (2008: 108) such that 'the promotion of a defensive nationalist mindset, which interprets local difficulties as proceeding from the deliberate designs of hostile foreign forces, has bred an anti-Western popular sentiment' (Dannreuther & March, 2008: 108). This does not suggest the civic identity of group i). The relative political strength of the nationalists over the liberals also indicates that exclusive nationalist messages will continue to be heard in official statements. What will matter is whether the state can continue to invoke an ethnic identity when necessary but keep putting that particular genie back in the bottle when the need has subsided. Here the interconnectedness of foreign and domestic policy may prove the best chance for the state to retain its hold over divisive nationalist feeling:

One hopes that continuing to include Russia in a dense web of European and
international organizations, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, will help to preserve and even to expand the real gains that Russia has made in democratic multiculturalism during the post-Soviet period, even in the face of powerful pressures to the contrary (Graney, 2004: 216).

This, not incidentally, is another reason to privilege study of Russia's westward-looking foreign policy since what happens in this arena is so crucial to events at home.

3.2 THREE FOREIGN POLICY PHASES

The dispute over Russia's identity in the 1990s had its effects, as already outlined, in external perceptions of Russia operating an inconsistent, even erratic foreign policy. In this section, I show how this dispute was manifested in foreign policy itself. Much of the literature speaks of different phases in Russian foreign policy. While there is some difference in the timelines of different analysts, there is broad agreement that three phases are identifiable. 1991-93 is the first phase and sees a Russia firmly orientated to the West (Waller, 2005). White et al (2002) and Sakwa (1993) speak of this as the 'romantic' phase in Russian foreign policy, characterised by a very pro-western, pro-liberal orientation and a somewhat subservient relationship with the West. 1993-2001 is the next phase and the shift is occasioned by a reaction to the earlier accommodation with the West, but also by the negative international reaction to intervention in Chechnya (Timmins, 2002: 82). At this time, Russia placed more emphasis on maintaining stability in the former soviet republics and asserted its major power status. From 2001 onwards the third phase began and is distinguished by two strands, firstly the desire to keep a firmer hold on the CIS countries, advocating force in defence of interests, including the use of nuclear weapons while secondly (and simultaneously), downscaling Russian self-assertion and working on maintaining relations with the USA and the war on terror (Waller, 2005). It should be noted, however, that at no stage has Russia's identity as a Eurasian state been challenged by other Eurasian states. The same has not been true of its claim to be European, and this must
explain, to some extent at least, the perceived movement between phases.

Trenin’s (2004) comment that the West’s influence on Russia was never felt so deeply as it was in the period from 1988-1993 does not, in the light of other analysis, look overstated. This was an unprecedented period in which the West truly had a chance to bring about change. It is with reference to this period primarily that I argue, like Shevtsova (2007), that an opportunity to build a New Europe in which Russia had a recognised and vested interest was missed and this argument will be raised again later in the context of discussion on the effects of the post-modern era and the marginalisation of Russia. To return to the phases, Sakwa (1993) concurs with Waller’s and Trenin’s assessments of the first phase, calling foreign policy at this time internationalist and democratic. Although this work was an early one on this period, Sakwa was already speaking of the first phase as if it were over, emphasising the increasing effect of the military through the Defence Ministry, and the undermining of Kozyrev (Foreign Affairs Minister) as factors in the shift.

In fact, events at both home and abroad occasioned the move into the second phase. Key external events included the Bosnian crisis where western ineffectiveness there acted as encouragement to nationalists in Russia who believed this left space to forge good relations within the region (Kubicek, 1999-2000). Additionally, Yeltsin’s foreign policy advisor, Migranyan, believed that the western failure to defend Moldova against Russian interference in 1992 reduced the effectiveness of the liberal argument that the West would never permit Russia to intervene in the affairs of now-sovereign territories. This served to liberate Russia somewhat from its self-imposed constraints (in Lynch, 2001). At home, the 1993 Duma elections in which the ultra-nationalist Zhirinovsky performed so successfully was a key move towards a more Russian foreign policy (Donaldson & Nogee 2002, Kubicek 1999-200), and this combined with a deepening relationship between the Communists and Nationalists (Donaldson
& Nogee 2002), so asserting the voice of group ii) more forcibly. These gains were consolidated in the December 1995 Duma elections where the Communists won seats at the expense of the liberals. As a result, Yeltsin replaced Kozyrev with Primakov (White et al, 2002).

Thus, the changing fortunes of the political groups within Russia, each with its own different views on what Russia's identity should be, were reflected in the changing foreign policy orientations of Russia. But equally, external events played their part in those changing fortunes. As the West failed to see or exploit the opportunity to turn Russia fully westwards, so nationalist groups won ground and diverted Russia back from its westward course, moving Russian FP into a second phase.

Although there are those such as White et al (2002) who see the second phase as beginning with Kozyrev's replacement by Primakov in 1996, most see the phase as beginning or at least having its roots in 1993. In the second phase, Russia began to find its feet after the end of the Cold War and the period was marked by relative self-assertion and a shift in attention to the 'near abroad' – unsurprising given the relative success of the nationalists and their interest in this area as the focus for Russian policy. Identity featured highly in Russia's attempt to win more favourable terms of citizenship for its diaspora located in the 'near abroad', where the Baltic States, for instance, denied rights of citizenship to ethnic Russians (Tolz, 2001). Heikka (1999) also identified a shift from a liberal orientation to a 'more assertive postimperialism'. Such arguments can be overstated, however. While the attempt to win more rights for their diaspora is not denied, Russia also sought to achieve this through the use of international organisations, particularly the Council of Europe, indicative of its continued intent to work on a multilateral basis. It is accurate, however, to say that in this phase Russia did adjust its perspective to the near field, becoming more confident and less willing to subjugate its own
national interests to those of the West.

The Kosovo crisis played the major part in bringing the move from the second to the third phase, and it is the pivotal part that Kosovo played here as well as elsewhere that causes me to look at the crisis in more detail in Chapter 8. Gorodetsky (2003) sees Kosovo as constituting a 'wake-up' call for the Kremlin. The effects were felt beyond the Kremlin, with White et al (2002: 185) reporting 'rather more sombre tones' in their surveys with Russian respondents. The effects of the crisis were visibly seen in a revised Military Doctrine in April 2000, which emphasised the threats to Russian security and raised the potential for use of nuclear weapons. Baranovskii (1999) sees the attention paid to the Russian Military and Security Doctrines following the crisis as recognition by Russia that it would go the way of Serbia if, like Serbia, it was weak. Ultimately, the Kosovo Crisis must be seen as bringing about a shift in Russian perceptions of the West and more cautious dealings with them. Lynch (2001) speaks of 'stronger scepticism towards the West', such that at the very least the third phase is distinguished by scepticism of the West. Kosovo, however, was but the last straw (Polikanov & Timmins, 2004: 224). The enlargements of NATO and, albeit to a lesser degree, the EU, were also viewed negatively by Russia and the suspicion which eastwards integration generated was only exacerbated when NATO agreed to admit the Baltic states, in direct contradiction to its previous promises to Russia.

The Russian political elite took this as a sign of indifference to Russian sensitivities at best and the beginning of a campaign to exclude, isolate, and humiliate the new Russia at worst (Mandelbaum, 1998: 6).

After 1999, the increased reference to external threats to Russian security and emphasis on the use of force, including nuclear weapons, were sure signs not only that the West had missed opportunities but that it had managed to convince Russia that it could not be trusted. Again, such arguments must be tempered. As Waller (2005) has pointed out, this third phase also saw the effects of September 11 2001, namely the war on terror, in which Russia attempted to play...
a key role and continued to cooperate with the West. In this, the Centrist agenda is patently clear.

The combination of this assertive tone with cooperative relations with the West is attributed by Kubicek (1999-2000) to an expanded western role and diminished Russian power. He claims that ultimately this is because policy is defined by power in Realist terms, rather than by who wins in the foreign policy debate. But this is to fail to question just how much has changed. As Webber says, 'no credible political movement within Russia has argued in favour of an active, militarily interventionist policy aimed at subverting the European balance on ideological or power-related grounds' (2000: 43). Webber goes on to say that the varying currents in Russian foreign policy after 1991 were a result of an attempt by Yeltsin to appease domestic nationalist instincts and also by the objective of creating a role for Russia within Europe appropriate to its status.

Not everyone is agreed that phases are identifiable. Lynch (2001), for instance, questions the depth of difference manifested. He ascribes less difference in policy orientation between Kozyrev and Primakov than do others and he sees Russian foreign policy in the 1990s as representing a balancing act. Nor does Lynch see much empirical evidence of significant differences in the three phases, seeing Russian political elites as 'united on a core nationalist consensus' (2001: 11). He acknowledges a shift but attributes this to Russia adopting a more realistic assessment of the opportunities available to it. Shearman (1997) offers similar conclusions. He claims that differences between groups of political thought shifted until in the mid 1990s a more coherent conception of national interest had been formed. In fact, he claims that in early 1993 it was clear that a consensus was emerging centred on the idea of Russia as a great power whose primary national interests were focused in the near abroad. This consensus related to the 'fundamentals of national interest' rather than execution of policy but nonetheless
it happened in a relatively short time frame. Ultimately, I deem it both useful and necessary to look at this period in terms of stages. Certainly, Russia was undergoing a period of real transition such that even without pivotal events such as Moldova in 1992 or Kosovo in 1999, shifts in its domestic and foreign policies would be expected. However, the point remains that key moments are identifiable and reactive changes identifiable in respect of them. Just who was responsible for making those changes is a matter of some debate, however.

3.3 FRAGMENTATION IN FOREIGN-POLICY MAKING

As discussed earlier in the context of the foreign policy field in general, foreign policy is an increasingly complex area, particularly when trying to decide who is responsible for decision-making. In Chapter 2, a multiplicity of possible foreign policy actors was identified, including states, bureaucrats, individual leaders, governments, political parties, pressure groups, transnational corporations and so on. This complexity is reflected in the Russian case too where a number of official foreign policy decision-making fora can be identified. In this section, the literature related to actors in Russian foreign policy is reviewed in order to try and determine where the focus of attention should lie.

Obvious candidates as actors in Russia's foreign policy since 1991 include the President, presidential advisers, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Foreign Minister, the Ministry of Defence, Minister for Defence, the Military, the Duma and the Foreign Intelligence Service. Other identified entities are the Federal Border Guard Service, the Security Council (which includes the Prime Minister, the Minister of International Affairs and the Head of the Foreign Intelligence Service) and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Assembly (Waller, 2005), the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy. To these could be added a number
of NGOs and think-tanks, as well as the oligarchs of the 1990s, to say nothing of the media and public opinion. It is not without cause, therefore, that Lynch (2001) speaks of the 'amorphous', 'unstructured' and often 'incoherent' decision-making in foreign and security policy. What most commentators agree on though is the dominant role of the presidency in Russian foreign policy-making and/or the weakness of the legislature (Huskey 2001, Kotz with Weir 1997, Light 2001, Ordeshook 2001, Service 1997, White et al 2002, Whitefield 2001). Russian foreign policy is therefore very much a presidential one, albeit subject to a number of influences.

Precisely who has agency within Russian foreign policy decision-making and where the appropriate level of analysis is, for example, the individual, the government or society (Rosenau, 1966), must obviously be answered. But at this point it is also important to remember the task. My purpose is to understand Russian foreign policy behaviour in the post Cold War period and that cannot be attributed solely or even mostly to one individual. Despite the presidential nature of Russian FP, it will become clear from the discussion below that the President is not the only locus of decision-making and that at times the influence, even actoriness of others, has been palpable. I consider it, therefore, fundamentally wrong to conclude that the President is the only appropriate point of analysis within the state. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, I treat FP as more reactive than proactive. While a decision or action chosen may, to some extent (but not wholly) reflect the personality of the president, the president's scope for action is still circumscribed by a number of contextual factors, not least the behaviour of other actors. Secondly, it is important to remember that I employ Wendt's (2004) concept of the 'state as person'. Just as individual decision-makers are affected by their psycho-milieu (Sprout and Sprout, 1962), so too states, as superorganisms, are affected by their particular experiences, such that 'they might have collective consciousness' (Wendt, 2004: 291). In this way, I see Russia's foreign policy as rooted in and reflecting not just one
Discerning actorness versus agency is not always easy in the Russian case. There have been moments when it has not been clear who made specific foreign policy decisions, such as Moldova in 1992, the swift despatch of Russian troops to Pristina airport in Kosovo in 1999, the military intervention in Georgia in 2008. In each of these, the orders are as likely, or more, to have come from the military as from the Kremlin. Presidential advisers have also sometimes seemed to carry rather more responsibility than they should. Light (2001) points out that Yeltsin was reliant on advisers who would issue statements in his name and travel abroad in his stead without coordinating their activities with those of the MFA or, indeed, the Security Council. It is therefore not always easy to see where a delegation of power took place rather than an assumption of it.

Donaldson and Nogee (2002) offer a good guide to the configurations and affiliations of the main foreign policy actors but ultimately do not shed light on the precise area from which foreign policy emerges. Under Yeltsin, it seems, it was extremely difficult to determine the order in the foreign policy hierarchy and any such conclusions would be very arguable. The Foreign Ministry might fairly be expected to figure highly in the stakes but in the very early years Kozyrev, the Foreign Minister, was heavily undermined in his policy by the formation in 1992 of the Defence Ministry and the Security Council. The Security Council’s Interdepartmental Commission for Foreign Policy (ICFP), was given powers to coordinate foreign and security policy, thereby seriously undermining the role of the MFA (Sakwa, 1993) and so its liberal internationalist agenda began to be circumscribed by the more nationalist, nativist positions of the Defence Ministry and the Security Council (Donaldson & Nogee 2002, Lo 2002). Donaldson and Nogee (2002) attribute a heavy influence over the 1993 Foreign Policy Concept to the CFDP. This is unsurprising given its constitution, which in June 1992
had thirty-seven members, including Kozyrev, Stankevich, Vorontsev (another adviser to Yeltsin and Kokoshin (First Deputy Minister of Defence) (Sakwa, 1993). Added to this the MFA was not immune from events, for instance the 1993 electoral success of the nationalists that saw foreign policy necessarily retreating somewhat from the MFA's perceived pro-western leanings, as well as the effects of the Balkans Crisis on Russia's relationship with the West (Lynch 2001, Webber 2000, Kubicek 1999-2000). However, the MFA also proved able to adapt to changing circumstances and under Primakov it managed to assert more authority (Donaldson & Nogee, 2002). This, however, occurred at the same time as something of a retreat from the West as discussed above, suggesting that the MFA was wise enough to recognise changing times and adapt accordingly.

The role of presidential advisers is not to be neglected either:

The informal network of counsellors with whom Yeltsin surrounded himself was more than a team of political advisers. It was a clan-like structure with tentacles in both political and economic life. It brought wealth to many of its most prominent members, including Yeltsin's family. The influence of the 'Family' lived on into and through Putin's first presidency (Waller, 2005: 24).

Lo (2003) confirms the significance of this group, speaking of Yeltsin's 'apparat,' and how 'many observers considered the presidential apparatus to be an alternative foreign ministry,' citing their influence over Yeltsin's response to NATO enlargement and the Kosovo crisis (2003: 37). However, Smith and Timmins (2001:77-8) argue that the MFA took the initial role in ensuring Russia took a 'tolerant' line in respect of NATO enlargement, such that we must conclude that Yeltsin was being pushed the same way from two sides (or that a definitive answer on influence is not possible). Lo confirms also the continued influence of key players in the 'Family' such as Voloshin, head of the Presidential Administration. Under Putin some changes in the President's relationship with the Administration took place. Waller (2005) argues that Putin maintained close relations so that he was able to attribute his decisions to them when it suited but moderates this with the admission that there was scope for actorness.
within the Administration. He cites Shevtsova in her assertion that,

there is a general paradox, according to which the more power a leader has, the more he has to share it with his entourage, and the more he shares it, the weaker he becomes (Waller, 2005: 36).

Clearly, the Administration cannot be regarded solely as the pawn of the President. On the other hand, the Administration is itself constrained, by its size and limited information base, such that it

is stretched too thinly to be able to contribute in a substantive way to the development of foreign policy positions across the board; it must be selective if it is to make any impact at all (Lo, 2003: 38).

Waller (2005) identifies four groups in Russian politics. These are: formally organised interest groups; social groups with some political salience, for example religious groups; issue groups and NGOs and; informal groups. He concludes that overall these groups have emerged very slowly and have had little success in asserting themselves. The government does deal with interest groups that make up the first grouping and potential exists for increased participation here. The second grouping has had rather more impact in terms of bringing government to account but not in terms of effect on policy, with one exception, religious groups. Religion must be considered as exercising a restraining influence on Russian foreign policy, or perhaps more accurately, Islam must. During the Kosovo Crisis, the umbrella organisation for the two Muslim Directorates in Russia, the Council of Muftis, warned that the divisions experienced within Yugoslavia might be reproduced within Russia, forcing a more measured Russian response to the Crisis and also to Yugoslavia's request to join the Russia-Belarus Union than might otherwise have been the case (Sherr and Main, 1999). The Kosovo Crisis (and September 11), therefore gave Muslims within Russia an importance disproportionate to their numbers (Waller, 2005). This is in marked contrast to the Russian Orthodox Church which, while it has managed to claw back a pre-eminent position for itself, has not been re-established
and has found itself being used rather instrumentally by politicians (Waller, 2005).

In the third grouping, NGOs are a real presence in Russia but their influence is felt more keenly on matters related to domestic politics. In foreign policy terms, they are distrusted as foreign elements and so lack influence. Much of the literature speaking of actors either fails to mention them at all or is dismissive of them (Light 2005, Waller 2005, White 2004, Lo 2003). Others, however, are more optimistic, identifying a number of active NGOs (Evans 2005, Sundstrom 2005), which experience varying success. Evans, however, concluded that NGOs have and will continue to experience state interference in their activities. He cited the example of Foreign Minister Lavrov meeting with representatives of a number of NGOs, saying:

While ostensibly calling for dialogue and cooperation with civil society, Lavrov clearly suggested that non-governmental organizations should serve Russia's national interests as interpreted by the regime itself, and should refrain from actions that would tarnish Russia's image (Evans, 2005: 110).

Sundstrom's article where she looked at foreign funding of NGOs in Russia shows that such funding has more effect where it promotes universal norms, but that where

foreign assistance is employed in pursuit of norms that are not universal and are specific to other societal contexts, it will fail to engender the development of an NGO movement (2005: 421).

This, incidentally, is consistent with Constructivist thought, which, as set out in Chapter 2, argues that socialisation is most likely to take place where there is already some common normative ground. Regardless, outside funding of NGOs is viewed with suspicion by the Russian state and was one of the reasons for the 2006 NGO law that placed constraints on outside funding and generally established greater state control over such organisations. In May 2009, President Medvedev established a working group whose remit includes a review of the NGO Law. This has generated optimism that Russia will restore some of the democratic freedoms of at least some NGOs (Human Rights Watch, 2009) but only time will tell whether this is part of a wider trend that may lead to NGOs acquiring influence. At the present time,
however, NGOs really are something of a non-runner in Russian foreign policy.

The fourth grouping has had rather more success in the form of clientelism, a thought echoed in Service (1997). Service also identifies groups, including workers' trade union, saying, like Waller, that they have had little influence, except in the case of the miners. This is rather telling since White's study (2004) shows that, relative to other groups, membership of trade unions at least has remained buoyant. Otherwise,

Russia emerges reasonably clearly as a “nation of non-joiners”, with very few mechanisms that can still connect ordinary people with the society in which they live and not simply with its political system (White, 2004: 86).

However, within this grouping, directors of key industries such as energy, manufacturing and agriculture have fared somewhat better, becoming effective lobbyists. Or, in the case of the former Chairman of Gazprom, Viktor Chernomyrdin, first Energy Minister and eventually Prime Minister (Service, 1997). These directors were able to force government concessions on matters like energy development in the Caspian Sea in order to ratify the programme of privatisation. They too have been drivers in the pursuit of WTO accession (Lo, 2002). In the 1990s, the oligarchy and certain economic groups necessarily had to be seen as exerting substantial influence over foreign policy. Indeed, given their key role in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI), selling stakes in Russian companies and opening up markets, plus their political ambitions, many of which were realised, they had to be seen as actors. That the state recognised certain economic interests as actors was most famously seen in the state's battle with the oil company, Yukos, and its head, Khodorkovsky. However, under Putin, the power of the oligarchs was severely curtailed, such that they must now be considered as influences rather than actors (Sakwa, 2008a: 186-7).

One actor in foreign policy that cannot be ignored is the military. Key organisations when discussing militarism in Russia are the Security Council, Ministry of Defence and the Army
itself. Sakwa (1993) identifies the Defence Ministry as being more patriotic (even nationalist) than liberal, unsurprisingly, and both he and Acton (1995) agree that the Defence Ministry works to preserve defence industries and Russia's status as a great power. The conservative nature of military-related organisations makes them a powerful force for continuity rather than change in any state. In a period of great change in Russia, they have also seemingly seen a need to pursue their own separate agenda. Inasmuch, Lynch (2001) talks about the pursuit of institutional, even personal interests rather than state interests and identified the Defence Ministry and the military as transgressors here. Both have pursued foreign policy actions without instruction from the MFA and in such a way as to secure their own position. Examples include the 14th Russian Army action in the Transnistria area of Moldova in 1992 and the sending of Russian troops to Pristina Airport at the end of the Kosovo Crisis in 1999 (Lynch, 2001) as well as other peacekeeping operations in the CIS and Bosnia (Lo, 2002). Kotz with Weir (1997) say that the decision to take the first military action in Chechnya was taken without the involvement of either the Duma or the Prime Minister and his cabinet. Sakwa, like Lynch, also accuses the military of undermining Kozyrev and of trying to shape policy, for instance in the near abroad. Waller (2005) also points out that the Commander of the 14th Army stationed in Moldova's Trans-Dniester was Lebed, it was he who went on to negotiate the 1996 peace in Chechnya, to help Yeltsin to win his second term in 1996 and who in return became governor of Krasnoyarsk. This military commander was even tipped for the presidency until his death in a helicopter accident.

It is not only the military's demonstrated capacity to take independent action, however, that renders it an important actor. 1993 and their role in the White House coup is not so long ago that it should not serve as a salutary reminder of the importance of the military to any authoritarian government, which few would deny is what Russia operates (Donaldson and Nogee 2002, Kotz with Weir 1997, Ra'anan 1996). The hand of the military has also been felt
in the drafting of policy as well as its execution. Smith and Timmins say the 1993 Military Doctrine 'was reportedly drafted by the defence ministry and the military themselves and, as such, constituted an authoritative statement of their views' (2001: 75). However, not all agree on the pivotal role of the military, Aron (1998) sees militarism as taking a back seat to economic concerns, for instance, but this, I argue, really reflects the context-specific nature of actorness. In the mid 1990s economic concerns were very high on the political agenda but even so, perhaps because of that, when opportunities did present themselves, such as in Moldova and Kosovo, the Defence Ministry and Army showed themselves capable of exploiting them. Aside from this, it is worth highlighting the wisdom of Menon's (1998) cautionary word that current circumstances do not form a good basis for formulating expectations about the future. Menon's warning was prescient. The economisation of foreign policy that was seen in the 1990s is still seen, notably in respect of energy, but once the Russian economy strengthened, a return to militarism was also evidenced. To cite Hermann (1995) again, analysis must be based on more than just short-term evidence rooted in particular, variable circumstances.

Given that most consider Russia to be operating under an authoritarian regime and that the military have assumed a significant role in the formulation of security policy, it is not surprising that the Foreign Intelligence Service must also be considered an important actor in Russian foreign policy (Donaldson & Nogee, 2002). This is even more the case under Putin, given his professional background. Donaldson and Nogee (2002) and Trenin (2002) also point out the significance of the Federal Border Service, in its guise as protector of the outside borders of the CIS and this body should not be underestimated given the cooperative links it has necessarily built abroad, working with Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States and Norway (Trenin, 2002). However, under Putin, foreign policy became rather more regularised than was the case under Yeltsin (Lo 2003, Donaldson and Nogee 2002) and the vertical power structures
looked to work more efficiently. But the bigger problem with such bodies as the Foreign Intelligence Service or Federal Border Service is the sheer unavailability of data for analysis.

There is little to be said about the Duma, although this is not only because constitutionally foreign policy is primarily the prerogative of the President. It is in rather more indirect ways that the influence of the Duma is seen rather than the more direct effects actors have (Donaldson and Nogee, 2002). Nevertheless, as already discussed in relation to nationalist parties in the early 1990s, the opposition has demonstrably influenced both Government and policy by facilitating a shift towards the centre. That said, in a federal state, it would not be unusual to expect regional political representatives to have at least influence, if not actorness in respect of FP. The crackdown on regional governors that occurred under Putin and the increased vertical political structure that was part of this process has ensured that the regions are not a significant independent voice in Russian FP (Reuter & Remington, 2009). However, the dominance of UR and its close association with the Prime Minister and the Kremlin (to date), does still tie the fortunes of the Kremlin to those of UR and therefore elites in the regions (Reuter & Remingon 2009: 521). On the whole though, under present conditions, political parties do not look like a very fruitful subject for actorness in analysis of Russia's foreign policy.

The media and public opinion are two possible loci for influence, even actorness. However, as has been much discussed in recent years, the media has suffered from a good deal of repressive practices recently with much of it subject to state-ownership (Bressler 2009, Duncan 2005, Oates 2005, Belin 2004). Even under Yeltsin, however, the media was not wholly free (Belin, 2004). Thus the media cannot be said to constitute actors in Russian FP and, except insofar as they reflect the official opinion, even influences. Public opinion is a rather more interesting area. Prima facie, the public cannot be said to have much influence, not least because the
public does not believe it does (White, 2005: 80). However, while much is made of the increasingly strong Russian state and Putin's authoritarian tendencies, Putin's popularity is real (Sakwa 2005, Rahr 2004, Lo 2003). This would appear to translate into domestic perceptions of Russia's foreign policy. Overall, the public cannot be said to constitute actors but none of the literature suggests that FP is not wholly consistent with the public's view, rather the reverse: 'Putin's foreign policy that led to Russia no longer being perceived as the loser of the Cold War in world politics享受 broad popular support' (Rahr, 2004). But consideration of the public's view inevitably forms part of FP thinking. The disproportionate influence of the Islamic religious grouping is evidence of that, the civic versus ethnic identity debate yet more. No policy, even foreign policy, can be made with total disregard for the population it is said to serve. This, not coincidentally, is yet more reason to look at the state as the level of analysis since this necessarily incorporates more than just elitist views, but those of the people as well. Not that this makes the public an actor per se, nor can it even be said to be a direct influence except in very special circumstances (Kosovo, for instance) but its hand is felt indirectly in the shaping of policy.

3.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In his attempt to understand the reasons for what he saw as the failure of Soviet foreign policy analysis, Pursiainen (2000) counselled against treating Russian foreign policy as a distinct field. Ultimately, the discussion above supports this advice in revealing that the preoccupations of Russian foreign policy are no different to that of FPA generally. Despite this, the metatheoretical debates common to the wider field after 1991 are not a major feature in the body of Russia-specific work. Nevertheless, in some senses the Russian foreign policy field looks more progressive than the wider field. Identity, for instance, has long been a feature of
Russian (and Soviet) foreign policy analysis, as compared to the wider field. Much analysis focuses on the domestic context, but this is often coupled with an appreciation of the importance of the international situation to the shape and definition of foreign policy. Thus the bridging between the international and domestic fields advocated by foreign policy analysts is performed after 1991 as a matter of course by many Russian foreign policy experts.

The chapter sought to understand those variables which are key to developments in Russian foreign policy after 1991. Four areas were singled out as vital elements, the first of which, and connected to the three others, was identity. Russia continues to suffer from a troubled identity and, as has been seen, identity says something about the likely orientation of a state's foreign policy. If Russia looks westward, we might fairly expect to see a good deal of engagement with western institutions, values etc., as well as pluralistic and inclusive policy choices. If it chooses a Slavic path, its foreign policy will be expected to reflect that choice in the form of closer engagement with other Slavic states. In this way the debate over Russian identity becomes crucial to our understanding of why Russia makes the choices it does. Until more recent times, a certain amount of perceived inconsistency characterised Russia's international relations. Putin has been credited with reversing this impression. But even if Duncan (2005) is correct and the official version of identity is a civic one, there is evidence yet that concessions are made to those who advocate a national one, thus, that the question of identity has been hedged to a certain extent and that at best a form of consensual evasion has been agreed. This carries with it some dangers as discussed. However, there is reason to believe too that there is recognition that it is the civic conception that will win Russia more legitimacy in the eyes of external actors. It is also this that will root Russia within post-modern trends, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. While the continued equivocation over Russia's identity suggests the issue is less resolved than it might be, like Graney (2004), I believe that it is Russia's entanglement in international organisations and its relations with other actors, most especially
the EU, that offers the best scope for crystallising Russia's civic identity. This argument is picked up on in later discussions of values, post-modernity and marginality. It should be noted here, however, that the notable failure of the West to exploit its opportunities in respect of Russia, coupled with the New Cold War discourse, should not make anyone optimistic that opportunities will now be taken.

In the second section, I considered the literature on 'phases' in Russia's FP. This literature clearly demonstrates the effects that the external environment can have on domestic conditions. Here too the lost opportunities of the first phase were evident. It was at this point that the West had the best and easiest chance of turning Russia more definitively to western, liberal ways. In the first phase, the Liberals were proved wrong in all their predictions about how constrained Russia would be by the West. This facilitated transition to the second phase when the nationalist message won popular support and moved the eye of the Kremlin from its far westward gaze, more closely in to what Russia calls its 'near abroad'. The turn away from the West was given further fodder by a series of what could only be seen by the Russians as betrayals on the part of the USA particularly but western European states too. The West's failure to take account of the political forces at work in Russia and to make the necessary concessions to liberal voices moved Russia into a third phase, where its improved economic situation allowed it to back up its more assertive tones with credible threats. I treat 1999 as the watershed moment in the move to the third phase, and Kosovo as the critical event. But it is important too to show caution. Webber's (2000) assertion that not much has changed must be borne in mind. Despite what could only be seen as intense international provocation, despite a powerful nationalist voice, and despite an evident willingness on the part of the Kremlin to invoke that voice, as with Chechnya, Russia has remained cooperative and evinced continued willingness to do business with the West. The question is how many more opportunities will be lost and how long it will be before the genie is out of the bottle and the door shut on the West.
altogether.

The final aspect considered was that of actors in Russian foreign policy. The literature here is helpful in reducing the number of potential actors that the wider field identifies. What is clear is that a primary role in decision-making must be accorded to the Russian leadership, with the discussion on the three phases confirming the view of most that the Presidency has the upper hand in foreign policy-making. The power of the President may be somewhat circumscribed by the multiplicity of other actors, but the distinct view conveyed in the literature is that foreign policy reflects the personality and preferences of the President himself (Lynch 2009, Tsygankov 2006, Waller 2005, Lo 2003). This would therefore suggest that the method of analysis should be focused on the person of the President, and that a decision-making approach would be most appropriate. To return to Rosenau, however, 'official behavior [is] the product of several types of independent variables' (1974: 19), of which the perceptions and preferences of the President form only one. Still, the possibility that Russian FP is less that of Russia's than that of Putin or Yeltsin is worth considering. With the President's clear constitutional responsibility for FP, individual personalities in Russian FP certainly do matter. (Whether this will remain so under Medvedev is so far unclear.) This was, of course the Sprout and Sprout (1962) argument, that how a decision-maker saw the world was reflected in their FP. In his examination of the relative challenges and responses experienced by Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin, Tsygankov says:

Confronted with those challenges and opportunities, some leaders, in Albert Sorel's memorable formulation, arranged "their policy to suit the realities of the world," while others imagined "the world to suit their reality" (2006: 176).

Under Putin, foreign policy was conducted in more organised fashion. It also became increasingly securitised, consistent with the phases as set out above, but also Putin's own career history in the security forces. But in remembering the dynamic, reactive nature of FP, the biggest constraint upon any President's FP must be events themselves because, 'national
interests fluctuate with changes on the domestic and international political scene' (Tsygankov, 2006: 167). While the perception of the President of key events is important, it is not only that perception that counts. Whether Lo (2003) or Smith and Timmins (2001) is/are right about the pivotal role of the apparat or the MFA over NATO's enlargement (above) is immaterial, what is material is that they exerted a good deal of influence over Yeltsin and shaped his response to that. Lynch (2001) reminds us that notwithstanding the perceived dominant role of the presidency, power is actually quite widely dispersed as a result of a very 'flexible' Russian political structure. That the President is the most important actor in Russia's foreign policy is clear, but it is also clear that FP is subject to a number of inputs from a number of sources and that those sources may vary in influence from time to time and that variance may itself reflect events.

Other significant variables include the other actors identified in the literature. These constitute the Presidential Administration, the MFA, the Foreign Minister, the Ministry of Defence, and, more broadly, the military. What was seen from the literature is that the President is always constrained in decision-making by a number of factors, although not necessarily simultaneously. Firstly, other actors do exist and the President must take account of them, but the reason that he must do so is that between them they represent the gamut of views that exists within the state. This extension of actorness beyond the presidency opens the possibility that a bureaucratic politics approach would be fruitful. Certainly, this is a more encompassing avenue than the individual as the level of analysis but it is problematic in two ways. First there is the question of access: As Coles (2000: 31) said, some situations are understood only decades later when archives are opened, in the Russian case, the accuracy and scope of data that could be acquired under a bureaucratic approach would be limited to an unknown and therefore unacceptable degree. Secondly, since 1991 there has been a shift in the levels of involvement in FP amongst the different actors, such that the very nature of the bureaucracy is
not the same over even this relatively short time period. There must therefore be some doubt as to what such an approach could tell us over the longer term. This is not to say that insights derived from such approaches are not useful but given the scope of the FPA task, it is important that research takes place at a variety of levels. One FP analyst cannot do all things (McClosky in Hudson, 2002: 9), so it is doubly important that research be directed at the level where most answers in respect of the questions asked can be found. To this end, I treat the Russian state as a 'person', attributing it with values, perceptions, ideas and policy. I treat FP as the policy of the collective state, this is not to confer actoriness or influence upon all constituent parts of the state but it is to say that FP cannot be made without reference to the wider view and without consideration of which values enjoy popular support and are rooted in the specificities of the Russian situation.

The work reviewed here reveals a Russia that is subject to the vagaries of environmental changes. It would not be appropriate therefore to proceed without some discussion of change and continuity. Russia's foreign policy has evolved in response to changes at home and abroad, actors have changed and the question of Russian identity seems to have been, if not laid to rest, at least put aside. Russian foreign policy since 1991 seems therefore to have been all about change. But it is the perceived nature of that change that is important. The literature is strong on analysis, for every shift in Russia's FP, an underlying compulsion is recognised, even if different analysts identify different compulsions. The constraints, both at home and abroad, under which Russia must work are recognised and understood. I am returned then to my original state of bafflement: with so much knowledge and so much excellent analysis, how did a New Cold War discourse even arise? I am still impelled to argue that this is because our perceptions of Russia have not changed. It remains too easy for analysis to recognise change, to understand the reasons for it and yet to conclude that change has been in the shape of a return to behaviour more consistent with the Soviet period than the post-modern era. My
primary contribution therefore lies in the very configuration of the first of those three hypotheses that I set out in Chapter 1 as underpinning my research: that Russia is a values actor. What is missing is a fully contextualised approach that attempts to take account of Russian perceptions and to consider, in as objective a fashion as possible, whether and how Russia fits within the New Europe and the post Cold War world. In order to achieve this, I must first consider those resources that Russia can bring to bear in its foreign policy. While this does not approach anything like the scale of what Modelski advocated with his 'balance-sheet', it does assist in seeing the domestic constraints and opportunities to which Russia's foreign policy is subject.
CHAPTER 4

RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY CONTEXT

I have already set out the need to consider the context in which any state has to operate its foreign policy and so the primary purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of and background to Russia's FP. So far I have identified the nature of the international system and the foreign policies of other states as constraining variables. But what resources an actor can bring to bear upon its foreign policy and how it perceives the world must also be considered. However, as discussed in reference to Modelski (1962), this could include just about everything and so make analysis infeasible. My first task here was therefore to eliminate what I could. I have considered some of the issues that make up Russia's domestic context already, foreign policy actors, for instance. Elsewhere too, I necessarily make reference to issues that relate to Russia's foreign policy context and so I do not spend time reiterating them here. Other aspects I have had necessarily to deal with in somewhat cursory fashion, Russia's geography, for instance, is talked of in more telegraphic style than anything, by reason of the fact that background information is what is required here, not detailed analysis. In fact, this chapter falls into Gerner's (1995) category of a descriptive FP work, although obviously what is revealed here has implications for my subsequent analysis. Returning to Northedge's card game analogy, it is the equivalent of looking at Russia's cards (resources), with guidance as to its mindset (perceptions) also provided.

I begin by looking at Russian perceptions of the global environment in order to gain insight into Russia's behaviour and actions. The nature of its perceptions are determined through reference to official documents and statements. In the second half of the chapter, I consider the resources that Russia can bring to bear in order to achieve its objectives. In accordance with
Modelski (1962), I adopt a broad view of these, examining Russia's economic situation, its natural resources, the military and the population. Here it is shown that Russia's capacity for power-output (Modelski, 1962) is somewhat constrained by an uneven set of resources.

4.1 RUSSIA IN THE POST COLD-WAR WORLD

Examination of the international environment is vital in order to understand the nature of interactions between states and other actors at the international level. In this section, Russia's place in and perception of the world is outlined in order to understand where it considers power to lie and the nature of that power. I treat FP as an area that is constrained at both the domestic and international levels, but the form constraints will take is obviously linked to the question of which actors are perceived to have more power and what form that power takes. It will also depend on where and when the more powerful actors wish to get involved, as becomes clear in later chapters.

In accordance with the understandings of FP set out in Chapter 2, power is defined here as the ability to control and/or influence the behaviour of other actors. By this standard, after 1991, Russia was forced to accept that, except in relation to its immediate neighbours, its 'near abroad', it had very little power. Since 1991 many of its most important preferences in regard to Europe have not been met. NATO was not disbanded, and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) not elevated in the security hierarchy. EU enlargement to former Warsaw Pact countries was not prevented. NATO also enlarged, the critical blow being the Baltic States' accession, crossing Primakov's 'red line' and removing them firmly from Russia's sphere of influence. Further, Russia had not been able to fulfil a fundamental legitimating role – to protect its people: Poor treatment of the diaspora within the Baltic States
had not been prevented, nor was Russia able to convince the Council of Europe to act decisively to do so. Added to these problems, the CIS had proved to be a shadow of Russian ambitions for it, and Russia and the USA became competing centres of gravity for Ukraine, Moldova, Central Asia and the South Caucasus (Trenin, 2004: 19). Internal problems also figured, Yeltsin's various illnesses being symbolic of the country's disrepair. Symbol turned to reality with the 1998 financial collapse. Finally, the century ended with Russian humiliation complete, as it failed to protect a fellow Slavic country, Serbia, against NATO bombardment. The picture has been rather less bleak in the years since, occasioning comment about Russia's aggressive FP and return to the Cold War ways (Cimbala, 2004). What has not been adequately considered is the fact that the re-assertion of Russia's preferences has been assisted by an improved economic situation, yes, but is necessitated, in the Russian view, by a threat, in the form of the USA.

4.1.1 The Sources of Russia's Foreign Policy

As part of understanding Russia's foreign policy context, I therefore look at its threat perceptions and geopolitical objectives. In the card game analogy (Northedge, 1968: 14), both perceptions and rules were isolated as two key features of a game of cards. Here I conflate these somewhat in order to determine what Russia's perceptions are of those rules. I look first for evidence in the Russian Federation's official documents as relevant to FP. Possibilities for examination here include the: three Foreign Policy Concepts (1993, 2000 and 2009), two National Security Concepts (1997 and 2000) and two Military Doctrines (1993 and 2000). Other sources include official statements and interviews. Official statements and documentation are, of course, instrumental devices and are constructed, usually, in relation to a specific audience. They can also be static media in a dynamic environment. Recognition of

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4 For detailed analysis of these doctrines see De Haas 2001 & 2003.
these latter aspects was evidenced by the publication of no fewer than six Russian military doctrines between 1990 and 2000 (De Haas, 2001: 2) and the fact that the first two Concepts and the one Doctrine referred to above were rewritten in the space of less than a decade. However, the possibility of such documents reflecting outdated perceptions still cannot be dismissed, the 2000 versions were each promulgated in the year immediately following on from NATO's air strikes against Russia's traditional ally, Serbia. Additionally, by this time NATO had enlarged to or agreed to enlarge to former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet countries, in clear defiance of Russian preferences. Much of the content of the documents is therefore informed by these events, although they do not necessarily negate the strength of feeling which the Russian Federation attaches to the values identifiable therein.

Despite the problems this may raise, I rely on the 2000 version of each of the documents for a number of reasons: i) this was the only year in which all three were promulgated simultaneously, injecting a good deal of consistency between them; ii) remembering the earlier discussion in Chapter 3 on the phases in Russian FP, it was at this point that the Centrists began to exert their influence and here also that Putin came into power and began to carve the Russian path between those of the Westernisers and the Slavophiles. If the 2000 documents are a product of their time, the same is more true of the 1993 versions of the FPC and MD given that 1993 was identified as marking the end of the first phase; iii) it is these documents that currently inform external perceptions of Russia.5

In order to be certain of avoiding reliance on outdated sentiments, I looked additionally for supporting statements outside of the documents to substantiate any conclusions I arrived at from a reading of the three documents. Without substantiation elsewhere, no conclusion as to values was drawn. Also, in my readings, I bore in mind the need to identify the temporally-

5 At the time of writing, the 2009 Concept is far too recent for reliable conclusions to be drawn as to its effects on external perceptions.
located characteristics of each of the documents and these, in fact, were not difficult to discern. For example, the instance below of the FPC's strong language in defence of sovereignty was easily interpreted as reflecting Russia's antipathy towards the European integration process at this particular point in time:

Integration processes, in particular in the Euro-Atlantic region, frequently have a selective and limited character. Attempts to belittle the role of the sovereign state as a fundamental element in international relations creates the threat of arbitrary interference in internal affairs (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a).

Despite this, when I contrasted such statements with what is said in the other documents as well as what was said over a longer time period, a good deal of consistency in the message itself was identifiable. It was the tone and the language used here that was indicative of the troubled times rather than what was said for, at another level, this statement could be read as an utterance of the sense of exclusion from European decision-making that is deeply felt by the Russians even today. In other places there were indications that attempts at real engagement and inclusion would be well-received:

In the last decade, Russia has been able to utilise additional possibilities of international cooperation which are opening up as a result of radical transformations in the country. Russia has advanced significantly along the path of integration into the system of world economic ties, joining a number of influential international organisations and institutions (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a).

Thus, while I bear in mind the possibility that what is said in the documents is a reflection of short-term perceptions, I do not agree that it is necessarily that.

Given the heavy reliance on the NSC, FPC and MD, the relationship between the main documents must also be noted. Despite many areas of overlap, the Concepts and Doctrine are differentiated in terms of focus. The NSC is:

a system of views on the protection within the Russian Federation of the security of the individual, society and the state from external and internal
Within the Concept are formulated the most important directions of state politics (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000). Within it can be found headings such as 'Russia within the world association', 'Russia's national interests', 'Ensuring the Russian federation's national security' (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000). The NSC is, therefore, 'Russia's grand strategy' (de Haas, 2003) for securing the Russian space. The Foreign Policy Concept (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a) cites the NSC as one of the documents which forms the legal basis for the FPC itself, the main priority of which is the protection of 'the interests of the individual and society'. Also consonant with expectations of any foreign policy concept, a wider reading reveals that the FPC is concerned too with relations with other states as well as regional and international organisations. The MD is concerned primarily with military-political threats, and ensuring, militarily-speaking, the security of the state, although it has a self-professed 'defensive character' (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000b). Here issues of war, conflict, weaponry, threat (both internal and external), prevention, resources (in the widest sense), military organisation and hierarchy feature highly. Within the Military Doctrine, it is stated,

are developed the fundamental provisions of the Russian Federation's 1993 military doctrines which, in conformity with the military sphere, give concrete expression to the circumstances of the Russian Federation's National Security Concept (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000b).

The Foreign Policy Concept and the Military Doctrine therefore are documents subordinate to the NSC, setting out more precise formulations of how the wider NSC strategy for security can be achieved. In each of the documents, Russia's perceptions of the threats and challenges it faces are well-articulated. Before looking at those, however, I consider, in brief, the structural conditions in place after the end of the Cold War.
This section sets out to describe the international system post 1991 but exhibits a strong European bias: this reflects two things. Firstly the heavy dominance of western states and institutions (the rule-setters) and their ideas in the international environment. Secondly, there is the fact that Russia has concentrated the bulk of its efforts in the European arena. The expansion of the West eastwards left Russia with a number of alternatives: i) retreat into an isolationist policy; ii) retreat into a regional policy through the CIS; iii) of looking eastwards and building relations with China and India; iv) or attempting to influence developments in Europe through multilateralist policies. Ultimately Russia rejected the first, has been hampered in the achievement of its objectives in respect of the second by its past relations with certain CIS states, and has hedged its bets somewhat between the two latter alternatives. Ultimately, it has shown far more willingness to build deep relations with the EU than it has with either China or India. The heaviest emphasis, therefore, has been on building relations in Europe. Undoubtedly, Russia sees its place in Europe and it has resisted all attempts to marginalise it in this space. In relation to the wider Russian identity question, Russian foreign policy indicates a desire to be considered European rather than Eurasian.

The most obvious consequence of the end of the Cold War was the end to bilateralism that had defined the era. In 1993 the new Russian constitution was promulgated on the basis of liberal democratic values, signalling the defeat of one ideology by another. Thus the end of the Cold War was easily adjudged a defeat for Communism and Russia and a victory for the USA and liberalism. But it was not just the defeat of an ideology, it demanded the removal of the concomitant institutional structures and policies, e.g. the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. In contrast, not only the western ideology but all the associated structures remained, giving the West, and the USA especially, unprecedented power in international relations through their
alliances and organisations and/or leading roles within them. Notwithstanding a mass of evidence to the contrary, Russia sought to escape the label of defeat and all which follows from that. In this it was assisted by the fact that the Cold War ended without treaty, acceptance of guilt or payment of reparations. Webber (2000: 34) contends that a de facto peace settlement was put in place by the 1990 CSCE Paris Charter, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and 1990 CFE Treaties. While Russia may not have had to accept, officially, the label of defeat, the resultant fluidity and uncertainty left the way open for not only NATO's continued existence but also its expansion eastwards. In the longer term, therefore, although a proper peace treaty would almost certainly have claimed the West as victor, it might too have opened up a far wider debate about what post-Cold War structures should look like. As it was, as the inheritor of the USSR's nuclear weapons, Russia could fairly claim to be the only eastern European regional superpower (Aron, 1998: 28). However, any claim it made to global parity with the USA lost its foundation early on in the years after 1991 with Russia soon struggling to retain special status in the former soviet republics, having lost it altogether in the Baltic states at least. Clearly Russia was no longer worthy of the title 'superpower', a fact emphasised with the 1998 Russian financial crisis, which left the USA as the hegemonic power within the system (Brooks & Wohlforth, 2002).

The post-Cold War era, then, was clearly going to be characterised by a unipolar system but one exhibiting signs of growing interdependence and therefore more reliance on collective organisations, some of which transcended policy boundaries: The EU is an obvious example but NATO too has expanded both its membership and its identity from a military security organisation to a political one. Cimbala says that from the Russian 'old-think' or 'post-Cold War hangover' (2004: 603) point of view, NATO embodies significant threats. However, seeing NATO as a threat does not have to signal an inability to apply 'new thinking', as I discuss in

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6 Schimmelfennig (2003) speaks of NATO's role today as a socialising agent, helping the central and east European states in the transition to liberal democracy.
more detail in a moment. Despite the unipolar era, uncertainty over the shape of the new world order left much room for debate and not least of the role of the USA within it. The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe (later institutionalised into the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)) was Russia's preferred candidate for the leading role in European security (Hopmann 2003, Krupnick 1998) and the EU too received an injection of adrenalin as the Member States' will for political integration was now revived. These two organisations had the virtue, at least, of being clearly European and relatively free from US domination.

But the Russian preference for a dominant role for the CSCE/OSCE and the removal of NATO was not to be fulfilled and the Yugoslav crisis seemed to cement the USA's presence in Europe. Post-1991, Russia has had to deal with Western encroachment on a traditional Russian sphere of influence. Garnett says,

The West sees itself both as a partner and also a revolutionary, coming to overturn the geopolitically based international order in this part of Europe by exporting the system that has tamed old rivalries, domesticated German power, and created a high level of political stability and economic prosperity (1998: 91).

Evidence for this lies in expansion of both the EU and NATO eastwards as well as the increasing influence of the USA in the European and Transcaucasian former soviet republics.

Finally, it is not only the nature of the international system that has changed, so has the type of conflict (United Nations, 2004). The 1990s were characterised by relatively low-scale, regional or local conflicts, such as those in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda and Iraq. Despite predictions of a wider Balkan crisis, the Yugoslav crisis did not escalate beyond the Yugoslav territory and none of the interventions in these states was challenged militarily by third states. The early 2000s were defined by the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001. Conflict in the years since has been distinguished by both terrorist and guerilla activities. The wide coalition
formed to fight the 'war on terror' has not been a cohesive and unified one, however, and the Russians have been forced to conclude that despite cooperating with the USA in its 'war', the USA has failed to appreciate properly the Russian contribution and has, instead, used it as an excuse to encroach upon the Russian near-abroad. This has, inevitably, had a further detrimental effect on Russia's perceptions of the USA.

4.1.3 'Facts' and Perceptions in Russia's View of the Post-Cold War World

The NSC details both internal and external threats. Here I focus on perceptions of the latter. The key threat expressed in the documents is deemed to emanate from the unipolar structural conditions which allow the USA to dominate and which threaten the place and role of more inclusive organisations such as the OSCE and UN. NATO expansion, the siting of military bases near Russian territory and attempts to weaken Russia all figure highly in the list of threats and it does not require a deep understanding of sub-text to see the impact of the time upon Russian perceptions.

The NSC speaks of two noticeable trends after 1991. The first is viewed as less of a threat than a fact and therefore a challenge. It relates to recognition of increasing regionalisation, collective action and general multilateral tendencies. However, the second trend is spoken of in more critical tones:

The second trend shows itself in attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries in the international community, under US leadership and designed for unilateral solutions (including the use of military force) to key issues in world politics in circumvention of the fundamental rules of international law (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000).

Despite this, it is said that Russia continues to seek integration into the world community and
points out that its interests are those of the wider community too. But:

At the same time, a number of states are stepping up efforts to weaken Russia politically, economically, militarily and in other ways. Attempts to ignore Russia’s interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict situations, are capable of undermining international security, stability, and the positive changes achieved in international relations (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000).

It is not difficult to see who is being talked about, but lest there were any doubts, Putin dispelled them at Munich in 2007:

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations (Putin, 2007)

Despite some analysts speaking of Russia as being 'paranoid' and 'unreasonable' in insisting upon seeing the USA as a threat (Schneider, 2008: 413-14), the Russian perception does not look irrational, even from an outsider’s point of view.

From the Russian perspective, US dominance has been felt in a number of ways. The USA represents a possible threat, if not militarily, at least in terms of a loss of influence over the former soviet republics. This is no small matter for Russia. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 was a particularly bitter blow given the historical ties between the two countries, and the blow was all the more bitter representing as it did a victory for US diplomacy. Nor has the US restricted its activities to the Ukraine, the War on Terror giving it the opportunity to move military bases into Russia’s 'backyard', for instance, in Uzbekistan. It is over the issue of nuclear weapons that the widest differences are seen, although the Obama-Medvedev

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7 Russian resistance to the elevation of the principle of humanitarian intervention over that of state sovereignty can be considered to arise from Russia’s own vulnerability here given the course of the Chechen Wars. Russia is now faced with two occasions (Kosovo 1999 and Iraq 2003) where the USA has been willing to circumvent the UN and use military force to prevent continued breaches of human rights by sovereign states.

8 At the time of writing, this relationship is, admittedly, far more precarious.
relationship may yet result in more positive news. Finally, expansion to the Baltic States and NATO’s undermining of the UN have resulted in the Russians having real trouble being able to trust the USA. Seen through Russian eyes, mistrust seems a reasonable response. Other threats are also referred to: Terrorism, for instance, but all others, for instance loss of influence with the CIS states, relate primarily to the dominance of the USA and the threat this represents to multipolarity and international law. In the Russian view, therefore, the USA is the single biggest obstacle to achievement of Russia’s objectives.

There is no conflation, however, of the USA or NATO with Europe. Despite, or more likely because of its experiences with the USA, Russia continues to set its sights westwards to Europe to achieve its ambitions, arguing its place there is based on historical, economic and cultural factors. ‘Relations with European states are a traditional priority in Russia’s foreign policy’ (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] 2000). Former Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov spoke of a ‘big Europe’ of which Russia is a part, saying that while Russia was not seeking full membership of the EU, it ‘was and will be a European power’ (Ivanov, 2003). Putin too referred to Russia’s European credentials, ‘Russia is a member of the “European family” in spirit, history and culture’ (Putin, 2006). More pragmatically, the EU is a crucial player in the European security architecture, vital to Russia’s economic interests and the enhancement of its image (Russia’s Middle Term Strategy). While NATO undoubtedly has the potential to subvert Russian ambitions, it is the EU that is the bigger, if not threat, at least challenge. Foreign Minister Lavrov acknowledged that materially and economically-speaking the consequences of EU enlargement could be more damaging than NATO enlargement (Lavrov, 2004). But Russia has faced the challenge head on. As with NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) before it, Russia refused straightforward membership of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), instead negotiating a separate arrangement, the Four Common Spaces.
Other actors singled out for mention within the FPC include China, India and, of course, the CIS. China represents a particular threat given its recent economic success and predictions of its future world power status. Russia’s long border with China necessitates some attention being paid to the relationship anyway, but particularly given Russia’s declining population, notably in its eastern territory, versus China’s growing population. Relations with India are good and likely to remain so given India’s problems with Pakistan and its reliance upon Russian armament exports. The relationship is an important one for Russia, giving credence to its claims to be pursuing a multilateral world and multi-vector foreign policy and acting as a possible balance to Western power. In the case of both these major powers, Russia has drawn on shared interests to participate in organisations that some see as a reaction to US hegemony and the attempt to find common voice against that dominance (Halpin, 2009).

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) was formed in 2001 out of the former Shanghai Five. Its members are China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Scheineson (2009) says that the SCO has demonstrated some ability to coordinate its messages, for instance, in agreeing a deadline for the USA to quit its bases in central Asia. However, he also cites those who argue that the biggest constraint upon its effectiveness may prove to be the fractious relations of China and Russia. Still, there is some evidence here that Russia is finding support in its denunciation of the USA. Russia’s relations with India form a part of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), those states whose economies are likely to overtake the leading economies of today. According to Halpin (2009), these four states represent 40% of the global population and 15% of its GDP. Both BRIC and the SCO met in June 2009 in Russia, ‘which further underlined the determination of Moscow and Beijing to assert themselves against the West’ (Halpin, 2009). At the current time, therefore, it is clear that Russia believes, or at least wishes to convey the message that it believes, that its biggest threat

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9 Urnov (2005), in an excellent statement of this problem, spoke of 8 million people on the Russian territory bordering China compared to 300 million on the Chinese territory bordering Russia.
lies in the West, not the East.

There is little to say about the CIS, on the grounds that Russia's relative asymmetry and its historical relations with some of these states has meant it has not proved to be a very effective vehicle for Russia to achieve its objectives. In more recent years, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation was formed out of the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS. Its members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This may prove a more fruitful avenue for military integration but it is currently difficult to see what it can achieve for Russia that Russia cannot achieve through bilateral relations with each of these states.

In most respects, notwithstanding the CSTO, SCO etc., Russia delivers a clear impression of having a preference for a strong relationship with Europe. In view of the relative instability it faces in its relations with China, India and the CIS states, this is hardly surprising. It is the EU too that may be of more assistance in the insecurities Russia faces in the TransCaucacus and Central Asia. Ethnic division in Chechnya has long been expected to have spillover effects in the region as a whole, explaining at least in part Russia's desire to maintain influence in the region, particularly in light of possible Turkish ambitions in this area.

The final part of this chapter looks at the 'power-input' (Modelski, 1962) available to the Russian state, including its economy, the defence budget, weaponry and personnel. These are obviously all vital to the output of power. I begin, however, by outlining Russia's geographical situation and its access to natural resources, since these too tell us something about Russia's capacities and also its opportunities.
Russia's situation after 1991 is a complicated and often contradictory one. Almost every advantage enjoyed by the Russian state is accompanied by a negative, putting Russia in a paradoxical situation, and contributing, perhaps, to the uncertainty that other states feel typify relations with Russia. The largest country in the world, Russia covers an area of 17,075,200 sq km, almost twice the size of the USA (Russian Embassy & CIA), operating a federal system of government, comprising forty-nine regions, twenty-one of which are national republics. The territory straddles eleven time zones, two continents and shares land boundaries with no fewer than fourteen states and enjoys a long coastline as well. Despite a long coastline, the largely cold-water sea borders make this, for many intents and purposes, a landlocked territory, which, historically, has driven Russia to ensure secure access to the Black and Caspian Seas, and so affected its foreign policy preferences and actions. Multiple borders and the fact of being both European and Asian have rendered the country vulnerable to attack and destabilising influences, and have also resulted in the lack of a clear identity as discussed in the previous chapter. These extensive borders are an important component in understanding Russian attitudes, contributing as they do to feelings of insecurity which are then reflected in the stress placed on territorial security.

While the extensive territory can be seen as an important resource, it must be remembered that much of the territory endures permafrost, only 8% of the land is arable (Russian Embassy), for instance, while huge swaths have insignificant populations by reason of climate or lack of development or both. The territory holds vast natural resources, accounting for 15-20% of the world's oil reserves, 42% of its natural gas and 43% of its coal (Klepatskii, 2003: 7), as well as other minerals and timber. The capacity of Russia's oil and gas resources to transform the economy was seen in the turnaround in Russian fortunes after 1998's financial crash. The swift
recovery was achieved on the back of a rise in exports and high oil prices, facilitating early repayment of its IMF loan. But the state must deal also with the associated logistical problems of extraction, production and transportation. Investment in the oil industry is urgently needed to increase capacity on the supply side for capacity utilisation for oil refining, iron ore, minerals and chemicals was, in 2005, already near 90%, with no investment made in the preceding years (Anon, 2005). Additionally, it is expected that less oil will be available for export as demand for domestic consumption versus production converge (Anon, 2005). Clearly, Russia's economic situation and the question of energy warrant a little more attention.

4.2.1 The Role of Energy in Russia's Economic Recovery

Russia's economic recovery since the 1998 financial crash has been nothing short of phenomenal. However, economists have been keen to understand what has 'fuelled' the recovery. Russia's access to natural gas supplies has been the usual answer and this in turn has generated some concern that Russia cannot sustain growth by relying on just one industry and that diversification is called for if Russia is to insulate itself against future crises. Bogetic, Lead Economist for Russia at the World Bank has said of the recent global financial crisis:

The crisis has already, *de facto*, taken away half a decade of Russia's prosperity that would have taken place without the global crisis ... In this much more constrained international environment, the importance of sound economic policies aimed at improved effectiveness of public expenditures, productivity growth, better investment climate, and diversification cannot be overemphasized (World Bank, 2009a).

Russia is not the only country to have fared badly and it was in a far better position in 2008 when crisis hit, than in 1998. However, its lack of diversification and the lack of investment in key industries identified above, combined with the financial crisis, jointly deliver a somewhat worrying picture.
That said, Russia's GDP in 2008 put it amongst the top ten performing countries in these terms, with a figure of US$1, 607, 816 million (World Bank, 2009c). It was Russia's capacity for growth that drew comparisons too with other growth countries, Brazil, India and China, that generated talk of BRIC. That capacity was made visible when Russia was able to pay back US$15 billion in foreign debt (Anon, 2005) ahead of schedule. The early repayment, rather than investment in key industries domestically, signalled, unequivocally, the desire to be independent of foreign money. There is some doubt about whether this will serve Russia's interests in the longer term, however. Lane (2009) points out that one key economic indicator is revenue. He cites Fortune Magazine's revenue-based list of non-stock exchange listed companies and the fact that Russia has only five companies in the list, all of which are in the energy sector, with the exception of Sberbank. This compares to China with 29 companies and the USA with 153 (Lane, 2009: 103). This therefore speaks again to the lack of diversification and also a lack of vital investment. In relation to those companies with market valuations, another key indicator, within Europe Russia has just 19 companies amongst the top 500, although Gazprom does top the list (Lane, 2009: 104). Ultimately, Lane concludes that energy aside, Russia, like Ukraine, lacks 'capital accumulation ... to such an extent that one may question whether they are sustainable growth-inducing capitalist economies' (2009: 116).

Thus, all the evidence points to Russia's own dependence upon: its oil and gas reserves; upon demand; its capacity to supply; and high market prices. In her article considering whether oil was the sole source of Russia's economic recovery, however, Appel (2008) concluded that too little credit was given to Putin for having tackled corruption, reforming fiscal policy and insulating Russia from foreign credit. These are all important measures in ensuring long-term economic stability. Despite this, diversification and investment are what is now necessary to ensure Russia's continued economic growth. In Chapter 7, I look at Russia's economic situation in relation to that of the EU for, in respect of its aims, particularly to be seen as a
equal partner, it is Russia's performance in relation to others that says the most about its real capacities.

4.3 SECURITY MATTERS

This is an already well-researched and documented area of study as a result of the fact that Russia's security and military policies have undergone immense reform since 1991, impelled by the parlous state of these two areas, as articulated within the NSC:

Adverse trends in the military sphere are being assisted by delays in reforming the military and the defence industry of the Russian Federation, by inadequate funding for defence and by a poor regulatory and legal framework. At the present time, this can be seen in the critically low level of operational and military training in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and of the other forces and military bodies and authorities, and in the impermissible drop in equipment of the forces with modern armaments and military and special hardware, and in the extreme acuteness of social problems; this leads to a weakening of the military security of the Russian Federation as a whole (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000).

Previous to this, the Deputy Chairman of the Duma's Defence Committee had said: 'Not since June 1941 has the Russian military stood as perilously close to ruin as it does now' (Arbatov, 1998: 83). Military reform has been driven by a number of motives, not least, budgetary difficulties, but also internal political developments and international change. In the years since this analysis, there has been some evidence of improvement but there is still some doubt about Russia's capacity to meet its goals in respect of nuclearisation, R & D etc.

10 See, for instance, Staples and Otto's contention that, 'Russia's security dilemma is rooted in its catastrophic economic decline' (2000: v).
4.3.1 The Defence Budget

In a word, the contemporary world has become too small and fragile for wars and policies of force. It is impossible to save and preserve it unless a resolute and irrevocable break is made in the way of thinking and acting which for centuries was based on the acceptability and admissibility of wars and armed conflict (Gorbachev, 1986:80).

There is little in what follows here to suggest that Gorbachev's New Thinking has penetrated to the military. The global climate today is very different to the Cold War period, the nature of future conflict is widely predicted to require a different type of response and the Russian territory is obviously smaller than that of the USSR. Additionally, the 1991 revolution was a clear sign that the Russian population expected a greater emphasis on, and therefore budgetary allocation to, social and consumer rather than security demands. This latter reason has struck a note with Russian politicians, as did, perhaps more effectively, economic crisis. However, towards the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, there is little evidence to suggest that Russia does not continue to place a high priority on preparedness for conflict.

Russian defence spending has, naturally, drastically reduced from the levels spent by the USSR. However, judging by differing estimates and overt statements to that effect, some difficulty attaches to citing precise figures on Russian military spending. This is a result of a general lack of transparency, particularly in the later 1990s, in government information, the dispersal of funds to bodies other than the Ministry of Defence, effects of high inflation on analysis of budgets and discrepancies between budget and expenditure (Global Security, Arbatov & Romashkin, 2004).

Staples and Otto point out that while Russia may still have larger stockpiles of weaponry than...

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11 Alexei Arbatov speaks of a consensus amongst most Russian politicians that, 'Russia needs to maintain a defence capability that can address real threats and conceivable contingencies but that will not overburden the national economy' (Arbatov, 1998: 86). Staples and Otto also speak of 'fiscal constraints' and 'economic collapse' as necessitating military reform (Staples & Otto, 2000)

the USA, these are being maintained 'on a budget less than 5 percent than that of the American military' (2000: 28). Significantly for this comparison, from the Russian point of view finances for maintenance are not negligible. Arbatov and Romashkin (2004: 19) claim that over 60% of the 2003 budget was envisaged as being spent on maintenance alone. This in turn has implications for future development:

In other words, the army continues to "eat up" its money, draining its budget for future defense in the form of technological and equipment and infrastructure. Russia's armed forces are being "detechnologized" and the share of new weapons systems and military equipment is falling to an unacceptably low level (Arbatov and Romashkin, 2004: 19).

Nor are the consequences of budgetary reductions confined to the short-term. Research and Development especially, but the defence industry in particular, cannot survive in the face of lack of demand. The export market does, of course, keep the defence industry alive to some extent but most analysts see internal demand as the essential pre-condition for a state's defence industry. This is all the more the case for a state that is not a member of a collective security organisation.¹³ There is an obvious domino-effect at work here, such that the prognosis for Russia's future security, based on any notions of self-sufficiency at least, looked grim, even in the early 2000s. This is at least one reason for Russia to agree to participate in regional organisations, such as the SCO and CSTO.

It should be noted, however, that the defence budget has not been in a consistent decline since 1991. Staples and Otto, for instance, speak of a 25% increase in the 2000 budget for investment in defence industries and research and development compared to the preceding year (although this still equates to just 1.3% of the 1985 figures) (2000: 29). Golts shows the defence budget increasing threefold between 1999 and 2003 (2004: 30). Some recovery was therefore made quite quickly after the 1998 financial crash. The 2004 defence budget

¹³ For an interesting argument on how the production of arms for export can stimulate a state's defence industry, see Sanchez-Andres 2004.
amounted to approximately USD 14 billion\textsuperscript{14} (Litovkin, 2003), this is compared to a US defence budget of USD 434 billion and a UK budget of USD 47 billion (Armed Forces UK). Having ascertained that Russia's defence budget compared to soviet times and to the USA today is drastically reduced, it should be noted also that the budget is not the same as actual expenditure. Miscalculations have led to expenditure being exercised at a level lower than that set out in the federal budget, which meant that in May 1997 a draft law on budget expenditure reduction saw the defence budget being cut by as much as 21% (Arbatov, 1998: 97).\textsuperscript{15}

Bjelakovic confirms that budget allocation is not the same as expenditure. He cites a June 2006 announcement for 'a massive arms procurement program' and the figure of 'almost US$190 billion' for the 2007-2015 period (2008: 527) but goes on to say that:

Given Russia’s past difficulties in implementing its State Armaments Program, the likelihood that this new program will succeed is certainly open to debate (2008: 528).

However, he points out too that since the last failed attempt in 2002 to meet budget allocation, matters have changed. Administrative changes have been enacted and profit from oil means that budgetary shortfalls may not be as severe as in the past (Bjelakovic, 2008: 528). Bjelakovic concludes that the problems that beset the defence programme in the past are less likely to be repeated in the current period as a result of 'a long-term policy of maximizing industrial benefit' (2008: 541).

Unsatisfactory though it might be to have imprecise figures to rely on, and not withstanding more recent and more optimistic analysis, all budgetary and therefore expenditure estimates

\textsuperscript{14} Calculation based on Interbank exchange rate as of Jan 01 2004 (0.03421 roubles to dollar)
\textsuperscript{15} GlobalSecurity.org concurs, saying, 'the Finance Ministry and treasury have been unsuccessful in obtaining a detailed accounting of defense expenditures consistent with the budget. The Defense Ministry maintains the only federal government agency not yet included in the treasury's cash management system'. For 1999, Global Security cites a figure of 71% fulfilment of the defence budget so that notwithstanding the opaque nature of records, it is clear that a gap exists between defence budget and defence expenditure.
are of a declining Russia in relation to its nearest competitor, the USA. This has implications for future security values. Other European states see a value for collective security in NATO not only for security but also for the defraying of costs. With finance clearly a problem for Russia but with a high value put on security, we might fairly expect to see some movement from Russia to compensate, although with the CSTO there has been little worth noting in this respect.

Two more important aspects of defence must also be considered. These relate to military equipment itself and also personnel. The next section examines in brief those aspects of the military reform that relate to weaponry in order to determine the appropriateness of Russia's resources in the face of today's security environment and how this might impact upon the conduct of Russian foreign policy.

### 4.3.2 Weaponry

Discussion of weaponry is necessitated by the simple fact that military resources are significant factors in whether a state can achieve its goals or not. Much has been made recently of Russia's nuclearisation and the lowering of its use threshold (Schneider, 2008), and the link to threat perception. Consideration of this particular security issue should therefore be able to provide more insight into what Russia seeks to achieve. On a general note, however, it should first be noted that, as with spending, accuracy of information on troops and weaponry is difficult to determine, even for those seemingly best situated to know:

>The lion's share of information on the armed forces – their structure and composition, their deployment and contingency plans, and their program covering equipment and reforms – is kept secret from society and its representative institutions, such as the parliament, the press, public
While this difficulty does not have an impact on the ability to analyse the nuclearisation debate, it does beg the question of why such opacity surrounds matters such as this, even for those who would seemingly need to know. Ultimately, this lack of transparency is seen as a relic of the Cold-War era, unsurprising considering that the military constitutes one of the traditionally more conservative and suspicious agencies in any state.

The changed global environment alone provides the clue as to the kinds of choices the Russians are forced to make after 1991. Given the end of the Cold War, which should have reduced the nuclear imperative, combined with the nature of post-1991 conflicts (smaller-scale, guerilla-type), any debate over nuclearisation versus conventionalisation would seem almost immediately redundant. This is to fail to account for the particular Russian viewpoint though. Pikayev contends that the Russian military in 1993 gained what might, for a liberal democracy, be characterised as inappropriate influence when they assisted Yeltsin in fending off the attempted Communist coup (2004: 111) and certainly in 1993 Russia retracted its promise of no first-use of nuclear weapons. Continued military influence in political life was evident in the appointment as Defence Minister in 1997 of Igor Sergeyev, former head of the Russian Strategic Forces. Any doubt over Sergeyev's intentions was dispelled in December of 1996 when in an interview Sergeyev made amply clear that declining conventional forces put pressure on the strategic forces to provide for the country's defence. More than that, his vision for Russia's role was obvious when he spoke of 'the preservation of the strategic balance', going on to talk of how the USA had more strategic nuclear warheads than Russia, an imbalance that START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) would address (Press Conference, 1996).

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16 In 2004, Arbatov was a Duma deputy and vice-chairman of the Defence Committee while Romashkin was a retired colonel and an expert for Yabloko within the Duma. See also Pikayev (2004) for the difficulties in accessing data relating to Russian security policy.

17 See Pikayev 2004 for an incisive argument on the Russian reliance on nuclear weapons given drastic conventional decline.
The traditionally conservative nature of military organisations should not be underestimated as a factor in the pro-nuclearisation debate and as an indication of wider policy values. The clue lies in Sergeyev's reference to the US-Russian imbalance and to the concern showed by the Russian military generally over the US's commitment to deploying an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system. Desire for a strategic balance between the USA and Russia hold evocations of the Cold War era, and the failure to date to cooperate on a joint ABM defence system points to the retention of old ideas and suspicions. With the final American decision in December 2001 to withdraw from the ABM Treaty Russia has instead pursued its own ABM system. As long as the military holds a prominent place in the decision-making of political elites, we might fairly expect old suspicions to guide policy and to hinder moves towards western norms and values. It should be noted, however, that in more recent months there has been evidence that Russia and the USA will begin to engage in more fruitful discussion of nuclearisation and nuclear proliferation.

To return to the wider debate under discussion here, intentions were enacted under Sergeyev with 'more than half of defence procurement (spent) on nuclear-related needs' (Pikayev, 2004: 111). Ultimately, however, nuclearisation did not necessarily represent the cheaper option. Cimbala (2004) identifies a severe level of deterioration of early warning systems and command and control systems and this undoubtedly was a factor in the halting of the nuclearisation trend from 2000 as identified by Pikayev (2004, 112). Finance was not the only motivation. Pikayev (2004) himself concluded that Chechnya, border unrest and a diminishing perception of a threat from the West occasioned the shift away from nuclearisation towards conventionalisation. Thus a climate emerged that necessitated Russian investment in information-based weaponry:

the emerging superiority of information-based weapons and communication, command and control systems demonstrated that a new relationship between force superiority and deterrence had emerged (Cimbala, 2004: 601).
Pikayev was not alone in his analysis. Cimbala (2004), Golts (2004), Yost (2001) and Arbatov (1998) all support such conclusions. The argument then was that, belatedly, Russia seemed to have realised the nature of threats in the current climate and the limited utility of nuclear weaponry in resolution of them. Since then, Russia has re-embarked on a course of nuclearisation. This has, at least partly, to be seen as the result of a shift, again, in perception of threat. Chechnya is no longer a defining issue in defence terms, nuclear proliferation, as seen by events in Iran and North Korea, is.

The necessity of modernisation may, however, be thwarted for the Russians by a lack of budgetary and other capacities. Golts contends that, '[m]any independent experts doubt seriously that the Russian military-industrial complex is capable of producing modern weapons' (2004: 30). It is for this reason that investment in R&D, as well as people, is so vital.

An increasing amount in the budget could be allocated to defence and this has been the case in recent years, as we have seen, though not to anything approaching the proportion in soviet times. However, the financing required by what amounts to a need to revolutionise the defence machinery may, even today, be out of Russia's reach. Here though we should bear in mind Cimbala's reminder that:

Russia's territory, scientific base, economic potential and military traditions are assets that can be drawn upon by prudent military planners and future political leaders (Cimbala, 2004: 616).

Ultimately, lack of capacity is surmountable if Russia proves willing to move further down the route of a collective security arrangement, most obviously by deepening its relationship with NATO. Two occurrences have undoubtedly hindered this, notably the 1999 Kosovo Crisis and the enlargement of NATO to the east. The fact that Russia has not so far sought membership of NATO implies that relative lack of capacity alone is not enough to drive Russia fully
westwards. In fact, it might well indicate that lack of relative capacity is not enough to drive any state into the arms of a collective with which it does not share certain norms and values. Both Kosovo and NATO enlargement have been interpreted within Russia as threats to Russian security, as discussed below in relation to the foreign policy documents. This fear of NATO is impelled by distrust over motives, indicating, if not a divergence in values, at least the perception that one might exist. Any Russian attempt in the future to engage more fully with NATO must therefore be examined for indications of a shift in either values or perceptions, or both. Importantly, Russia has also resisted initiatives that fall short of membership of a security organisation, for instance cooperation with the USA on the ABM defence system or establishing a joint nuclear attack warning centre with the USA (Cimbala, 2004: 615). However, Russia and the USA do have common concerns. In a more recent article, Cimbala (2008) noted that:

Despite recent disagreements over the planned deployment of U.S. Missile defenses in Eastern Europe, the United States and Russia have more common than opposed interests. One of these interests is the prevention of nuclear weapons spread, especially among states having grievances against regional neighbors or the existing international order. Another common interest is keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of nonstate actors, including terrorists, who may be beyond the reach of nuclear deterrence. A third shared interest between the United States and Russia is to prevent the outbreak of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war (Cimbala, 2008: 432)

Whether NATO / the USA will be able to provide some of the reassurances that Russia needs before it can embark on a path of deep cooperation and whether Russia itself can exhibit the political will to put past mistakes behind and move forward is what will decide whether these common concerns can form the basis for a wider and more multilateral defence policy involving both Russia and the USA, as opposed to the opposing regional and unilateral measures currently in place.

The final aspect pertaining to defence is personnel. In this area too Russia is faced with difficult and urgent problems.
4.3.3 Human Resources

The problems that Russia faces here are immense, reflecting the wider social problems with which Russia has to contend, and which have acted as a key imperative in military reform. In relation to personnel problems, the main issue in reform has been whether to move to a voluntary army.\footnote{For analysis of the conscription debate see, inter alia, Arbatov 1998, Bouldin, 2004, Golts 2004.} This debate is revealing for values in Russian foreign policy since it has laid bare the extent of the influence that both the military and the Ministry of Defence hold in Russian politics and the emphasis placed on a strong Russian military. The next section will lay out in brief the extent and nature of the problems faced by the military before looking at those reforms that have been made and their efficacy.

According to the NSC,

A threat to the nation's physical health can be seen in the crisis in the systems of public health and social protection of the population, in increasing consumption of alcohol and narcotics.

The consequences of this profound social crisis are a sharp drop in the birth rate and average life expectancy, distortion of the demographic and social composition of society, an undermining of the workforce as the foundation for industrial development, a weakening of the fundamental nucleus of society - the family - and a decline in society's spiritual, moral and creative potential.

Demographic trends therefore constitutes a vital piece of analysis of Russia's foreign policy resources. Russia is distinguished currently by a declining population, characterised by low life expectancy, particularly for men, and suffering what has been characterised as an AIDS epidemic (Urnov, 2005: 4). Alcoholism, drug addiction and mental health problems are rife, all of which have implications for general health levels as well as intellectual capacities. There is also little evidence to suggest that the state makes social concerns a high priority. For instance, the World Bank noted that Russia's response to the global financial crisis was to support
business but not the wider society and that swift measures would be necessary to prevent the vulnerable being very hard hit (World Bank, 2009). It predicted a sharp rise in unemployment, citing a possible figure of 15.5% living in poverty by the end of 2009, and underlined the importance of addressing the issue with its warning that: Building the country's human capital ... is an essential prerequisite for long-term economic growth' (2009). To date, despite the fact that the NSC itself recognised the threat, Russia has not engaged in the deep social reform necessary to protect its broader society.

These problems have obvious implications for Russia's ability to maintain an effective military in the future, particularly when that is reliant upon conscription. They will also require a state that has traditionally not had to worry about its resources in this regard to adopt strategies that protect now-dwindling resources.

Aside from these wider society-based complications, the military has been faced with its own set of problems, which it has so far failed to address effectively (Golts, 2004). Low morale pervades the Russian forces. Draft-dodging and desertion are common, caused by a variety of issues: poor conditions and low pay; humiliating defeats (Afghanistan, Chechen wars); accusations of abuse (hazing); high accidental death and suicide rates. According to Barylski (2006), Putin admitted that

when he needed to find 65,000 combat ready troops to throw into the Chechen war, the Ministry of Defense could only identity 55,000 out of the 1,400,000 men and women in uniform and these were scattered across Russia. As a result, the Russian state sent poorly trained draftees to war (2006: 663-4).

Faced with such extensive problems, analysts agree upon the necessity for reform in the shape of professionalisation and a smaller army and argue strongly that developments here have allowed the military to scupper planned transition to a volunteer army, so creating future

19 See particularly, Arbatov, 1998: 100 for percentages of draftees afflicted with illness, addictions, low intelligence etc. See also Golts, 2004: 35.
problems for the military and Russian interests. The lack of such reform is attributed to resistance on the part of both the Ministry of Defence and the military and even to Putin himself. A strong military is seemingly still considered to be a large one. Given the weight of evidence in favour of a reduced army and radical reform, this emphasis indicates that Russia is still preoccupied with the projection of great power status.\textsuperscript{20} The continued reliance upon conscription is easily interpreted as a continued commitment to self-reliance and bodes ill for predictions of Russian reliance upon collective security organisations. It also indicates a Russia concerned with external rather than internal threats to its own security, given that the Chechen problem did not demand a large army, merely an efficient, well-equipped one.\textsuperscript{21} Russia remains fearful and suspicious of the motives of external groups and states and this will drive it to behave in a manner consistent with that view of the world. Without pressure from abroad to behave differently, in terms of values, we can expect Russia to: i) protect its own security above all else, including human rights; ii) promote self-sufficiency over cooperation; iii) use military force where it can; iv) remain preoccupied with Russia's place in the world and; v) seek its own elevation by whatever means necessary. This analysis looks entirely consistent with Realist theories in International Relations. In order to prove its rectitude or otherwise, however, great attention must be paid to the consequences of weakness and the effects of cooperation, as I do in Chapters 7 and 8.

\textbf{4.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS}

Analysis in the first part of the chapter shows that of the various alternative directions open to Russian foreign policy makers, the European arena has exerted most appeal. This is partly due to the dominance of the West in international organisations and partly because, while identity

\textsuperscript{20} For further evidence see Ivanov 2002, Putin 2000.

\textsuperscript{21} This is not to suggest that Russian actions in Chechnya were justified, clearly the problem was potentially resolvable through political means.
remains a problematic issue for Russian policy-makers, Russia has not been willing to forgo the possibility of being considered anything other than a European state. However, certain tensions are evident in Russia’s relationship with the West, less so in regards to the EU and European states, more so in regards to NATO and the USA. This can be explained in part by recourse to thinking on security dilemmas and the balance achieved between threat and reassurance. The EU offers a more reassuring and therefore less threatening explanation for its enlargement while NATO, as the old Cold War enemy,labours under the burden of past relations and comes under more suspicion because it adopts a less reassuring stance in relations with Russia, as becomes clear in the case study on Kosovo. While such explanations are valid, they are not comprehensive. Understanding is furthered by the modern versus post-modern argument. Russian values are not dissonant with Western values of the modern era, divergence lies in the fact that Russia remains rooted in this era while European states, particularly in the context of the EU, have allegedly moved into a post-modern era. The question of the USA is rather more problematic, the USA advocates values associated with post-modernism but its own behaviour is more easily associated with the values of the modern era. Predictions on future Russian behaviour are dependent on a number of factors, but primarily the question is whether Russia will prove willing to renounce any quest for great power status in favour of cooperative practices based on a more equal relationship with other states. Any conclusion in this regard will be contingent in part upon capacity but more important, as argued in the next chapter, will be the effects of participation in international and regional organisations.

This chapter has demonstrated a Russia full of potential but with seemingly insuperable problems in the security arena, an arena vital for the exertion of great 'powerness' as the Russians define it. In the section on the Russian military budget, for example, the possibility of Russia's future reliance upon imports of military equipment was mooted. This means that in an
area traditionally typified by self-interested, self-reliant behaviour, Russia might have to come
to terms with the fact of interdependence, even dependence. Pikayev (2004) makes the point
that even as Russia reduced reliance upon nuclear weapons, it increased its participation in
international organisations, so 'replacing' one source of power with another. Further chapters
will seek to demonstrate that Russian weakness draws it increasingly into the realm of
cooperation. No presumption is made, therefore, of shared values as the initial motivation for
this. However, as said, constructivist arguments are not reliant on a shared value basis in initial
stages, they show how cooperation breeds a sense of shared norms, values and standards and
how these are 'fed back' into the unit level, modifying and changing state behaviour.

The conclusion I draw here and which is applied in further chapters is that Russia is in a strong
position in the 2000s relative to the 1990s. However, it cannot afford to be complacent. Nor
can it ignore the interdependency of the globalised world. That Russia recognises this is
evident in its partnership within the CSTO and SCO, as well as its continued cooperation with
the EU. Even if it is 'only' recognition of its interdependence that drives Russia to participate in
integration process, it is not unreasonable to expect that it will move closer to exhibiting
dominant values, as discussed in the next chapter. However, in that chapter, I highlight too the
limited explanatory power of a set of resources as set out here. For even if Russia can afford to
maintain a large standing army and an arsenal of conventional and nuclear weapons, it will still
be heavily constrained in its capacity to use them, not least because of the rules - and values -
of the international system.
CHAPTER 5

VALUES

This chapter expands upon my earlier claim about the necessity of making values a focus for analysis, a claim rooted in wider arguments in the IR and FPA literature. 'Power' continues to be examined, but increasingly in its more ideational aspects. This has been particularly true of studies of the European Union, where many western analysts (Emerson 2005, Schimmelfennig 2001, Sjursen 2002) treat the EU as a civilian or values actor, whose values are underpinned by an adherence to democratic teachings. In marked contrast, certain post Soviet states, especially Russia, are still considered in terms of interests rather than values and at best are deemed to be learning about the operation of democratic politics. In 2007, one political economist and analyst on matters Russian even called for the EU to realise that Russia and the EU did not share values and advocated a return to more realist approaches in their relations (Barysch, 2007). This thesis is underpinned, however, by a question about the wisdom of excluding Russia from the range of those actors to which a values-approach is applicable. Certainly, the pursuit of interests is evident in Russia's FP, but the same is true of all actors, even so-called values actors like the EU. Here, therefore, I contend that interests and values are not mutually exclusive: Interests sometimes are values (and vice versa for that matter); and the pursuit of interests leads to actors adopting certain values.

Values, though, are an inherently problematic area. In the first section, I discuss why this is so, looking at the fact-value dichotomy and referring again to the limits of rationality, as discussed already. I then move on to define a value, a necessary exercise since too often scholarship seems to consider understandings of what is meant by it to be self-evident and uniformly-held. In the subsequent section, I return to the issue of what constitutes the appropriate level of
analysis for the search for values, justifying my focus on the state as the holder and operator of values. Finally, I demonstrate the 'fit' of a values approach with FPA, drawing on Hill's (2003) work particularly. Here too I set out what I consider to be missing from all the literature on values, that is, a clear understanding of how values arise and what happens when they converge at the negotiating level, as they surely must within the operation of FP. It is here, therefore, as well as in the application of a values approach to Russia that my primary contributions to the literature lie.

5.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VALUES

Politicians today are openly talking values, raising them up the political agenda. In his first speech as Foreign Secretary, David Miliband (2007) said that 'foreign policy is about values and interests together' and claimed too that alliances with the USA, the EU, the UN and the Commonwealth were all 'founded on shared values'. For my purposes in respect of Russia, the key word here is 'shared' rather than 'values'. For Russia may not share values, for instance with the EU, but that is not the same as saying it does not have values of its own: The distinction is an important one if understanding of Russia's behaviour is to be achieved. Besides, this, it is counter-intuitive to put values on the agenda for discussions at the international level, and then argue that certain states are not guided by them, they are only worth discussion if some concession to them can be achieved. Besides, as already set out in preceding chapters, the capacity of the international society to influence how other states behave is acknowledged. Therefore, what is really being debated is not whether state A and state B operate on the basis of the values but what those values are. Attempts are made to persuade all international actors of the need to adhere to an agreed standard of behaviour — in

22 For arguments that a values gap exists between Russia and the EU, see Tangiashvili 2006, Lo 2005, Rahr 2004b.
short, to operate on the basis of a shared value system. I therefore contend here that a shared value system – a constitutional structure – is in place, and that states are operating on the basis of a set of values that has been formulated under pressure of both universal and particular influences (Reus-Smit 1999, Wight 1966).

The decision to look at values in Russian foreign policy is primarily guided by the nature of global transformation and in the belief that Russia has carried the burden of this transformation fully as much as any western European actor. However, I am also guided by the belief that Russia has so far been exempt from a values approach because western analysts see their own political environment through less critical eyes than they do states such as Russia. In other words, there is little evidence of reflexive thinking in respect of Russia. As stated above, the EU is often treated as a values actor but in the eyes of third parties the reasons for such approaches are rather less clear. Research conducted into the EU’s external image concludes:

> Surprisingly, we could not find much evidence of the EU being widely seen as a “normative power” exporting universal values of democracy and human rights ... Equally surprisingly, the EU does not seem to be regarded anymore as a social model to be imitated (Lucarelli, 2007: 2).

This is not to say that a values approach is inappropriate, but it does suggest that other actors do not make the mistake of disassociating the EU’s pursuit of its interests from the values it claims to have: after all, even a self-professed values actor has interests. No matter what the impression of Russian foreign policy, Russia is as subject to the formulation and the operation of values as any other actor. To ignore this fact on the basis that Russia seems to operate a Realist and therefore interest-based, foreign policy is to ignore an important variable that is a guide to understanding its behaviour.

Events in the ‘real world’ (interdependence, globalisation, institutionalisation) have resulted (as

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23 Lucarelli surveyed a range of other states from around the world, including Brazil, China, India and South Africa.
recognised by Neack et al (1995)) in changes in methods of analysis. This has become very obvious in the IR field with the rise of Constructivism and its influences on even Realism. The differences between Realists, on the one hand, who stress structure and power, and Constructivists, on the other, who stress the influence of ideas are beginning to look surmountable. Nor can foreign policy be immune from these changes given the many assertions, as set out in Chapter 2, that FPA must begin to incorporate the external as well as the internal, and that an extension of developments in the IR field to that of foreign policy must occur. To date though, Constructivism has remained largely outside the foreign policy field (Kaarbo, 2003: 160). Those few scholars who have incorporated certain of its preoccupations, such as identity, have simultaneously disassociated themselves from Constructivism itself (see Banchoff 1999 and Barnett 1999). It is therefore past time for the lessons of Constructivism to be applied to FPA, but the place of foreign policy at the nexus between the domestic and the international requires some reference to treatments of values in Political Theory as well as in IR.

In his work, Holland (2003) says the virtue of values lies in the alternative they provide to Weberian state structures, particularly as these relate to questions of governance and bureaucracy. In his view, the debate over changes relating to state sovereignty and the increased internationalisation of decision-making necessitates changes of Weberian bureaucratic decision-making structures to reflect the need for different forms of organisation (Holland, 2003: 2-3). Additionally, the value-judgments made by states' societies have led to increasing pressure on governments to extend their scope of responsibility in order to find solutions to problems affecting everyday lives. Finally, the call for diversity in government membership, practices and programmes represents a demand for government to reflect increased diversity of values. While foreign policy remains outside the scope of Holland's book, the analysis therein identifies a value shift in domestic policy and so is significant in

24 Barkin (2003), for instance, argues the viability of a 'realist constructivism' or a 'constructivist realism'.

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showing how values are subject to pressures which produce change. It is also important in that the reason that we see politicians now speaking about values in the international system is undoubtedly a partial consequence of the public's beliefs that international relations are not exempt from the standards of domestic relations. The CNN effect is well-documented in the International Intervention literature, for instance, where the role of public opinion in making sure governments pay attention to humanitarian crises has been explored and is seen as having influenced policy agendas (Freedman 2000, Robinson 1999). As for how to conceive of values, some analyses within the field of Ideology are of use.

Formerly, values did not figure higher on scholarly agenda as a consequence of reliance on Rationalist rather than Reflectivist approaches. Additionally, values raise a number of epistemological and methodological problems. These include the question of whether values can be treated as self-evident, or if they must be 'discovered'. If they must be discovered, there is the question of how this can be achieved, whether through reliance on political pronouncements, or reference to action. Nor is the 'discovery' of values the only difficulty that appertains to the application of values. In the next section, I consider the difficulties inherent in a values approach and how these can be overcome.

5.2 THE VALUES PROBLEM

A useful starting point for this analysis is what Jackson calls the 'window-dressing critique', the belief that,

the normative sphere is merely rhetorical camouflage to cover up, or dress up, or render palatable by clever civilized rhetoric, the hard and sometimes brutal realities of power and narrow self-interest in world politics (Jackson, 2000: 67).
The problem is therefore how to decide whether a value really is a value or whether it is just a convenience. Putnam says something cannot be accepted as the truth without a 'system of criteria of rational acceptability' (1981: 129). Take a scenario where a policy-maker states his or her view of the world and presents some justification of this view in such a way as to present the view as factual. The problem is then to decide whether the proponent of this 'truth' adheres to certain notions of objectivity, looking at which facts they have selected for inclusion and deciding if their inquiry is based on a rational foundation. If the answer is 'yes, it is a 'coherent' world, if not, it is an 'incoherent' one (Putnam, 1981: 132). This is itself problematic. Reason is not a reliable guide to the promotion of particular values over others since a 'correct answer' may not exist and even if it does it is not transparent and obvious (Gaus, 2001: 24). These, then, are the kinds of problems with which a values approach must contend.

It is not denied here that sometimes values will be called upon as justification for actions that were actually performed on a level of self-interest, but the problem this presents for analysis can be surmounted and the imperative to do so is great, as already discussed. Jackson goes on to make the persuasive argument that pure instrumentalism does not account for the existence of certain norms and rules and certainly does not account for the ways that states justify their actions in moral terms. After all, he points out, if an appeal to values on the basis of altruism and not self-interest is mere, but obvious, manipulation, it would not be worth doing because only the very naive would fall for the ploy (Jackson: 68-69). I add to this the contention that interests and values are not incompatible, nor should they be disassociated. The pursuit of power and self-interest in itself requires value judgments, indeed certain interests are entirely consonant with values: security, for instance, is definable as both a value and an interest. For example, few would see the wartime alliance of the USSR with the western Allies as anything but instrumental and self-interested. Yet both anti-fascism and security are two credible motivating values for Soviet actions, which nevertheless also simultaneously served their
interests. The potential for encountering pitfalls when dealing with values is greater perhaps than in other approaches, and given their highly subjective and sometimes 'irrational' nature they may be difficult to determine, let alone to understand. However, the requirement for caution does not outweigh the requirement to incorporate values studies into foreign policy explanations and understandings. To concentrate purely on the instrumental motives is to ignore half the story and to misunderstand the complexity of decision-making.

What is required is further analytical range in order to detect reasons for most actions. Incorporating values approaches into foreign policy analysis extends the range of that analysis and therefore, hopefully, understanding and explanation. I add the caveat, however, that not all decisions are rational. Sometimes actors make decisions that later they consider to have been misguided or sometimes act in a certain way despite the fact that they know it is not the most rational of the alternatives available (Raz, 2001: 75). It follows then that knowledge of another's values does not translate into a capacity to completely understand them and it certainly does not offer a foolproof method for prediction (if that were the task). But it does, the claim is made here, move us closer to understanding of, in this case, foreign policy, and so removes some of the uncertainty inherent in inter-state relations.

The value of security, for example, can objectively (coherently) be seen to be just that for the Russians in light of their historical experience of invasion which has served to emphasise their own insecurity: mistrust is based on the 'fact' of historical but still memorable experiences. The value of security, coupled with those historical experiences that promote distrust of outsiders, rationally leads to a value of autonomy. In these terms, it is easy to understand why the Russians attach such importance to security and autonomy and this helps us to understand those actions designed to preserve these even when in other respects such actions may seem inexplicable (incoherent). It should also be possible to understand that since historical
experiences commending such values have occurred over a variety of decades, even centuries, these might be very deep-rooted values. We may not agree with the Russian perception of the contemporary world but we should be able to see why they might see it as such.

Weber's arguments regarding the existence of a fact-value dichotomy are well known and have long provided the rationalist argument for looking at facts rather than values, despite the very real question of whether this was what Weber actually advocated (Ciaffa 1998, Giddens 1995). However, this thesis is dependent on the belief that mere facts can exist separately from values and more, that values have their place in our interpretation of 'facts'. Such an approach is rooted in post-positivist arguments:

The separation between fact and value, or cognition and evaluation, made in positivistic philosophies ... condemned practical questions to irrationality or the 'closed world' of myth which it was supposedly the object of positivism to dispel (Giddens, 1995: 179).

In Chapter 2, I considered rationalist accounts of foreign policy where decision-makers are deemed to be rational actors, who, with a particular objective in mind, take decisions by evaluating the full range of political factors, considering the possible consequences of each possible course of action and undertaking a cost-benefit analysis. The arguments against such a view of decision-making were also set out and are applied here. I do not reject the place of rationality in decision-making completely. Employing the insights of SBS (1954, 1962), Sprout and Sprout (1962) and Jervis (1976), I argue instead that from the subjective point of view, all decisions are rational: therefore a rational choice can still be made with reference to values. It is only without an understanding of the underlying subjectivity of decision-making that a decision can easily look irrational. There is a need, therefore, to make 'incoherent' worlds look 'coherent'. This is not the only problem associated with a values approach, though. No less debatable is what, precisely, is meant by 'values'.

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5.2.1 Understandings of Values

The fact-value dichotomy holds significance, of course. It essentially refers to the objectivity of one and the subjectivity of the other. That values cannot be considered as an objective element in any explanation is theoretically established:

Subjectivist accounts of value have been defended by philosophers as well as economists: indeed it may well be that some form of subjectivism — that locates value either in the desires or feelings of agents — is the dominant account of value in twentieth-century philosophy (Gaus, 2001: 24)

Values, according to Gaus and his analysis of liberal theory in the twentieth century, relate to 'tastes or preference'. For most of those who write on values, values refer to what is good: either in terms of moral standards (Thompson, 1992); or because of the potential good that will result (Raz 2001, Adams 1989). For Holland (2003) values are a particular form of ideas - about desirability and goodness. Bell concurs, defining values as 'essentially normative ideas' (2003: 25). In this sense, values are absolutely subjective. To these understandings can be added Van Deth and Scarbrough's definition of values as 'conceptions of the desirable' (in Holland, 2003). Miller (1990) and Adams (1989) go further by talking about values that relate to the realisation of human potential as well as our needs. For some, values relate to morality. Freeden says, 'values delineate what is good or bad, right or wrong, for all human beings ...' (2004:4). In conjunction with this, Robinson's (1964) elements of affirmation and conversion, which he sees as connected to values, are consistent with Constructivist notions of socialisation processes and underline again the importance of legitimation. People want confirmation that their values are shared by others and seek also to convert others to their idea of what is of value. These notions of affirmation and conversion are very useful in helping to understand debates at the international level. Affirmation is a familiar concept in relation to states which seek recognition from other states in order to ensure their own legitimacy and therefore their sovereignty (Spruyt, 1994). Affirmation and legitimacy are therefore
inextricably tied. The significance of attempted ideological conversion in the context of the Cold War is obvious but today states continue to try and 'convert' others to their way of thinking: In the elevation of human rights over sovereignty for example.

The very language used to describe values — affirmation, moral standards, desirability — suggest they may be deeply-felt and therefore not subject to the type of bargaining commonly seen in diplomatic negotiation (Putnam, 1988). This is supported by Freeden (2004), who says that for both philosophers and ideologists values are non-negotiable. This means that they are not subject to the kinds of costs-benefits analysis that instrumental rationality would entail: ‘Substantive rationality endorses values at whatever cost to their champions, and is sustained by an attachment that transcends the quantitative and purposive features of instrumental rationality’ such that values are something which ‘cannot be traded in wholesale for other values under any circumstances’ (Freeden, 2004: 12). It is here that any understanding of values in a foreign policy context must necessarily part with understandings in an ideological one. In foreign policy a good proportion of what is on the negotiating table must be negotiable. Additionally here, values can be prioritised not only in relation to each other but in relation to interests too. Both interests and values, under certain circumstances, will be vulnerable to sacrifice (through negotiation). This is simply because domestic conceptions of what is desirable may not meet with reciprocation abroad. The nature of foreign policy is such that some domestic values will necessarily give way to more universally-held values. Even if Freeden's analysis were correct in relation to foreign policy, it does not take into account Robinson's claims about conversion or the Constructivists on socialisation, which both suggest that values are mutable. Finally, foreign policy, as already ascertained, is characterised by both continuity and change. Values are susceptible to the forces of change, as current debates about the relative priority of the values of protections of human rights and state sovereignty show. The nature of the forces for change in relation to values is discussed in the next chapter where
I set out the differences between the values of the modern versus the post-modern era.

Thus, values are subjective, they relate to what is good, to moral standards and encompass elements of affirmation and conversion. Added to this is the possibility, hinted at above, that they can be ranked. This suggests a value system is an hierarchical one. In his examination of Conservative ideology, Kekes identifies three debates on values: Absolutists, Relativists and Pluralists. The Absolutists acknowledge that there are a number of values but believe they can be ranked by reference to a 'universal and objective standard' because any diversity in values is 'apparent, not real'. This universal objective standard tops the hierarchy of values, a hierarchy established by determining how each contributes to achieving the top-ranking value. However, the prime value may itself be disputed and usually is, therefore ranking becomes impossible (Kekes, 2004: 133). Relativists, on the other hand, acknowledge the same diversity of values but see it as a real, not apparent, diversity. Therefore a number of possible combinations and rankings is possible. Both values and ranking are reliant on context:

A good society, however, requires some consensus about what is accepted as a possibility and what is placed beyond limits. The political arrangements of a good society reflect this consensus, and the arrangements change as the consensus does. What counts as a value and how important it is depends, then, according to relativists, on the consensus of a society. A value is what is valued in a particular context; all values, therefore, are context-dependent (Kekes, 2004: 134).

This belief is reflected in my understanding of state values. A state's particular experiences are a guide to values and also, should the feat be attempted, to a ranking. The absence of reference to a universal standard by the Relativists, however, is problematic, just as with the Absolutists, the absence of context-dependency is a problem. If foreign policy is where the domestic meets the international, the universal (the international) and the particular (the state) must be brought together.
Pluralists in the Conservative debate occupy the necessary (for foreign policy purposes at least) mid-point. They claim that a universal and objective standard is discernible but not applicable to all values.

The standard is universal and objective enough to apply to some values that must be recognized by all political arrangements that foster good lives, but it is not sufficiently universal and objective to apply to all the many diverse values that may contribute to good lives. The standard, in other words, is a minimal one (Kekes, 2004: 134).

This is consistent with Reus-Smit's (1999) notion of a constitutional structure, which sets out the rules that guide actors in their foreign policy behaviour but which does not mean that additional particular standards and values cannot also be discerned. As the definitions of values demonstrate, Conservatism is not alone in attaching notions of 'the good life' to values'. The Pluralists, however, in speaking of universal standards, show that values are not necessarily particular to one actor. By accepting that the good life is dependent on the satisfaction of needs, certain notions of this good life are made universal in that certain needs, e.g. 'nutrition, shelter, and rest' (Kekes, 2004: 135) are also universal. This is another reason for seeing values and interests as interlinked, in order to achieve what is necessary and desirable, certain interests must be pursued. The relative applicability of pluralist arguments to FP means much of this thinking informs my own.

Russia will adopt those values that allow it to satisfy its needs and will change them when needs are not being satisfied and this is precisely why socialisation can work. This suggests, however, that dependency on values is substantively rational, although the rational choice is not always obvious. If some values are particular, they need to be understood within the particular context:

There are ... conditions that vary with societies. They are particular, not universal, and they reflect the diversity of values. They can also be reasonably evaluated, but only within the context of particular societies (Kekes, 2004: 135).
On the basis of this literature, I treat values as a group's accepted standards of the desirable, admitting that they are for the most part subjective and therefore context-dependent.

Finally, in reviewing Modelski, I made reference to what he calls 'principles'. As Modelski refers to them, it would be possible to speak of principles here rather than values. For him, principles connote activities that are desirable (1962: 10), in common with those definitions of values above that refer to a potential good that will arise. In speaking of 'principled objectives' Modelski talks of their unconditional validity, similar to the 'good-making properties' that Raz (2001: 2) attributes to values. Hill also ties values to principles, defining domestic values as, 'the particular set of principles which the government asserts, as well as those society as a whole (or the “nation”) seems to embody' (2003: 296). However, this nomenclature is unsatisfactory from the perspective of the layperson's understanding of what constitutes a principle. A 'principle' is, variously, 'a standard or rule of personal conduct', 'a set of such moral rules', a fundamental or general truth', 'a law concerning a natural phenomenon or the behaviour of a system' (Collins: 2000: 1175). Values, I claim, lack the connotation with 'rules' that characterises principles. Values, in essence, are prior to principles since the latter look like the application of the former.

On the basis of the literature just set out, the definition of values which I apply throughout the thesis is that they are: the group's subjective ideas of what constitutes acceptable standards for policy decision-makers to apply in respect of both attaining the group's basic needs and allowing them to achieve full potential.

Determining what is meant by values is only part of the puzzle, of course. In referring to the 'group's' accepted standards, I do not clarify the nature and scope of the group. Earlier, some discussion took place on the question of actors in foreign policy. The state, it was decided, still
occupied the primary position in the hierarchy of foreign policy actors but there remains the question of what this means for values.

5.3 VALUES AND THE STATE

A problematic area for this thesis is that where values are applied in the literature they are usually applied to individuals or groups, they are not commonly attached to abstract entities such as states (Hudson, 2002). Thus, studies of ideas in foreign policy focus on those individuals responsible for them, foreign ministers, heads of government etc., for the state is 'a legal abstraction' (Jensen, 1982: 13) and as such cannot be considered to have values. Despite this, scholars have long been attributing states with human properties simply by referring to them as 'actors', what is disputed are the types of properties of 'persons' that can be attributed to states, not whether we can do so at all (Wendt, 2004). Therefore, 'state personhood' has meaning. What Wendt meant by 'person' was set out in Chapter 1 but his understanding related to the fact of the state having intention and purpose and 'collective consciousness' (Wendt, 2004: 291). Therefore, I talk about state values on the grounds that there are certain values which we associate with states.

This is the essence of the Hudson (2002) versus Wendt (2004, 2005) debate set out already. There are four general reasons for me to look at state-held values (as opposed to other levels): i) both individual decision-making approaches as well as bureaucratic approaches may be fruitful to only a limited extent; ii) individual policy-makers' beliefs will in large part be a reflection of the wider state experience and the usual formative influences associated with personal environments; iii) the state can be treated as 'person'; iv) the need to adopt longer-term perspectives than a focus on individuals sometimes allows (Larsen 1997, Hermann 1995).
The second and third reasons are related and require a little more elucidation. In his discussion of value judgments in respect of opera, Raz (2001: 67-68) concludes that some values arise in relation to a particular institution or structure, be it political or social, and are therefore attached to those institutions or structures. So to say that values can only attach to individuals or groups is incorrect. Additionally, it is the state that takes positions vis-à-vis other actors rather than individual policy-makers themselves but it takes those positions on behalf of the domestic community. For Menon:

the state is more than the sum of its parts or a reflection of rivalrous social and institutional forces ... although its capacity to do so waxes and wanes, it can articulate a transcending and abiding interest rooted in durable historical and geo-strategic conditions. (1998:102)

In a reply to criticism of his thinking on the subject, Wendt asserted that the real question that should be asked is not whether we can treat states as persons but 'under what conditions' we should do so (Wendt, 2005: 359). In answer to this question, I argue that we can treat states as persons in regard to values for the following reasons. Firstly, values bear a relation to intentions and purposive actions (Wendt, 2004: 291) since states seek to exercise their values within policy. That this is not always achieved, as noted in the earlier discussion of the difference between interests and objectives, is irrelevant. Secondly, Wendt speaks of consciousness as subjective experience. Such experience is one of the building blocks of values. If states can be deemed to have consciousness in the form of subjective experience, they can be said to have values too. Thirdly, both the benefits and the deficiencies of the rationalist approach must be borne in mind. One of the benefits is the high predictive outcome, hence the use of rationality in gaming. But the almost total failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Union brought even this into question. More powerful is the notion that external actors themselves held a particular view of the Soviet Union, and characterised that state in a particular way, despite all the evidence to suggest a sea change, in the form of 'New Thinking', had occurred. The values of the Soviet Union had changed but outside perceptions had not,
thus the limits of rationality were revealed. Finally, we have no problem with ascribing states with interests and concerns. Since values bear a strong relationship to both interests and concerns and since these are very important in the foreign policy context, it follows that values are too. This point is clarified in the next section where discussion moves to Hill's (2003) thoughts on values in foreign policy, including the links he makes between values, interests and concerns.

5.4 VALUES AND FOREIGN POLICY

In this final part of the chapter, I consider the question of values in relation to second generation FPA literature where emphasis is placed on the need to ensure the international and domestic environments are considered. Here, then, I look at values in FP, at how they are formulated at home and in the international arena, and what happens when they, inevitably, interact. Despite the increasing influence of Social Constructivist thought, few studies have looked at the matter of state values as expressed through foreign policy. Reference has already been made to Johansen's (1980) study on US foreign policy and the gap between those values which the US claimed underpinned their policy and the values which were actually implicit in the conduct of their foreign policy. Johansen says 'one's understanding of political events is enhanced if international politics is viewed as a value-realizing process' (1980: 24). There is much to this argument, the Cold War, for instance, was not just about power in military terms, it was about ideological supremacy and the export of attached values. There is evidence too that perceptions of values influences individual foreign policy decisions. Erickson cited the US Energy Secretary as saying about Russia that the US sought to prevent anyone having influence in the Caspian region if they did not share US values (Erickson, 1999: 260). Perhaps the most definitive evidence has come through the 2003 war on Iraq and the Kosovo Crisis in
1999 where both interventions were rigorously defended, even if after the fact, as value acts by both then-President George W Bush and then-Prime Minister Blair (Bush 2003, Blair 1999). In recent years, therefore, foreign policy has been shaped with a consideration for the normative and analysis should not ignore this fact (Neack et al, 1995b).

Both the contemporary environment and recent thinking on the uses of values in relation to foreign policy warrant more attention.

We are now confronted with a plethora of strategic signposts, all pointing in different directions and making the art of drafting coherent foreign policies a futile exercise. Politicians are now being guided by various competing rationalities and shift from one strategic paradigm to another with amazing flexibility. They pursue a policy à la carte, constantly switching gears, from idealistic schemes envisaged by symbolic politics to crude manipulation envisaged by traditional realpolitik (Zielonka, 1998: 483).

On many levels, it is easy to have some measure of sympathy with Zielonka's analysis but such assessments seem to suggest that we should not try and understand foreign policy choices, and certainly not try and forecast future directions. An actor's FP may look unpredictable because there is too little understanding of said actor's psycho-milieu: here values (with their subjectivity) can be of assistance. The assessment also demonstrates the danger of emphasising change in foreign policy at the expense of continuity, if more attention is paid to looking for patterns in behaviour, rather than dismissing inconsistent behaviour as just that, more accuracy in forecasting may result. Values can again be of assistance since they have the capacity to make up the difference between objective and subjective rationality. Additionally, this analysis highlights the fact that the international system does not have to be conceived of in anarchical terms, some measure of order does exist at the international level as International Society theorists and Constructivists have shown (Dunne 2001, Reus-Smit 1999, Wight 1966).

Few other foreign policy scholars may have lingered on values to any great degree but Hill (2003) makes them an indispensable part of his thoughts on foreign policy. In answer to the
question of how we can deem interests to be national interests and on what grounds, he says that, '[t]he analysis of subjective and competing versions of the national interest then leads us into the important areas of ideology, values and private interests' (2003: 119). In other words, unless we consider factors such as values, the national interest cannot be understood, which again suggests Rationalism has limited explanatory power. Hill is also of help in distinguishing interests from values, speaking of an interest, 'in the sense of a stake which a given unit has in a problem' (2003: 119). While he differentiates between values and interests, Hill conceives of them as subsumable under a wider heading of core concerns, revolving around the universal issues of security, prosperity, identity and prestige (2003: 132). Both interests and values will require states to conduct their foreign policy in such a way as to further their preferences both internationally and domestically, while simultaneously undertaking some kind of cost-benefit analysis. As for whether to consider values as universal or particularistic, Hill cites Arnold Wolfer and the way he distinguished between possession and milieu goals, with Hill saying that this distinction is similar to the difference between policy which can be achieved unilaterally versus that which requires a multilateral approach (2003: 121). This distinction becomes important to this thesis in, for example, the case study on Kosovo when Russia recognised it could not achieve its goals unilaterally and so made much of the need for legitimate multilateral measures.

Hill also points out that states must carefully consider whether their values are particularistic, shared with a group or universal. Failure to get this right can lead to miscalculation (Hill, 2003: 122). This is consistent with both Sundstrom (2005) and Marcussen et al (1999), as already discussed, who have also shown that the 'conversion' Robinson (1964) talked about is more achievable where there is, if not universality, at least some degree of congruence between vaunted values. In these ways, Hill makes values a necessary part of foreign policy and one of which policy-makers are aware:
Governments have come to recognize more explicitly in recent years that the capacity to shape images and values can have concrete pay-offs. But the wider range of foreign policy instruments now available, and their overlap with the values of conflict versus cooperation, makes decisions on which route to go down particularly problematical (2003: 135).

Ultimately, states are not entirely free to make such decisions, for, as the English School in IR theory has argued, institutional rules and norms are causal factors in states' decision-making (Wight, 1966). More recent Constructivist thought sees the importance of values in explanations of international relations and foreign policy. Reus-Smit says, 'Constructivists rightly direct our attention to how primary social institutions shape state identity and in turn affect basic institutional practices' (1999: 26). Reus-Smit develops Constructivism further, showing the importance of values and their effect on state identity.

When states formulate, maintain, and redefine the fundamental institutional rules that facilitate international cooperation, they engage in a process of communicative action. That is, they debate how legitimate states should, or should not, act. Such debate does not occur in a vacuum; it takes place within the context of preexisting values that define legitimate agency and action. These values structure the debate, licensing some institutional propositions and proscribing others (1999: 27).

Based on such thinking, I contend that the role of the external environment in the formulation of values has to be considered to play a part. While external values may shape state identity in terms of institutional structures and acceptable action, each state will interpret and react with these values in manners peculiar to them and guided by values which are formulated through a mix of certain internal factors.
5.4.1  The Formulation of Values

From the definition set out above in section 5.2.1, four interconnected comments about the emergence of values can be made. Firstly, in order for an idea to bear fruit it must be influential, this implies that an idea must have appeal for a sufficiently critical mass. Secondly, in order to be influential, some good must be thought potentially to emanate from the idea, so that final acceptance of the value might be conditional upon results. Thirdly, the idea, once put into operation, must bring about at least some desired results. Finally, since values are derived from needs, we can speculate that certain values will arise out of certain conditions. Looking at international level values, in a post-modern era, non-intervention and self-help are replaced by the values of intervention to protect human rights and to promote collective security solutions.

The conditions for the existence of one set of values have changed and are superseded by a new value set. Values in this scenario look as if they are maintained only as long as the conditions for their emergence remain in place or as long as no overriding need for a change in values is identified.25 Leurdijk, for instance, argues that, '[a]t least from the Western perspective, the international relations of the 20th century have revolved around the defence of democratic values' (1998: 329). He identifies a shift in attitudes, however, between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods:

Now the Cold War is over, interventions do no [sic] longer need to be judged in terms of their Cold War impact, but rather can be evaluated in terms of their contribution to universal, democratic values and the establishment of democratic government as a universal norm (Leurdijk, 1998: 229-30).

Such sea-changes in values are not common, any contestation in values usually taking place, as Reus-Smit (1999) points out, at the margins. It is in this context – the possibility of a new global order having come into existence, and the likelihood of contestation of values taking

25 Modelski and Miller both provide insights that require some modification of this statement, as discussed in more detail in the discussion of internal state values
place at the margins, that I look at Russian foreign policy through both a post-modern and a marginal lens. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to say that a state’s behaviour is affected to a large extent by the values that it holds. These values have both external and internal aspects, such that we can refer to the existence of both universal and particular influences and therefore, in line with Pluralist thinking to minimum universal values and more extensive particularist values. In the next section, I consider how the external environment shapes the values of the group – the state in this case, before moving on to set out those variables which shape the group’s particular values.

5.4.2 The Influence Of External Values Upon The State

As should be clear at this point this thesis is reliant on the belief that institutions play a role in the formulation of values. In turn, those values affect the cognitive processes of decision-makers within states; essentially values work to limit the choices available, some actions simply lying outside the realm of accepted behaviour while others are necessary. The argument that certain norms of behaviour become standardised through institutions is a familiar one but norms must be based upon something else in order to have arisen in the first place. The fact is that institutions themselves have some sense of identity, and this identity rests on a bedrock of values. Debate may exist over when a states system emerged but it is accepted that in the modern era at least such a system exists (Dunne 2001, Reus-Smit 1999, Wight 1966), as already discussed in Chapter 1. Many of the values of international institutions (IMF, OSCE) may look much more western than universal but the effects of interaction, the significance of interdependence and the capacity for socialisation to take place are suggestive of how even non-western states might be converted to western ideas. Besides, even non-western states with a different value basis have, perforce, to play by western rules and this has affected many of
the structures and procedures that they have themselves put in place.

As suggested earlier, not all values are equal, there is a discernible hierarchical element to them. Dunne (2001: 232) uses the analogy of an archaeological excavation, appropriate to an understanding of how dominant values underpin international structures and states as well as other associated values. His argument is given substance by the recent debate about the relative priority of human rights over state sovereignty. In the modern world, as discussed in more detail in the next chapter, sovereignty was the guiding principle of the states system. This prioritisation has been questioned by debate about a post-modern world where human rights top the hierarchy of international law. Even where state sovereignty was supreme, it did not act as the sole guide for action; self-help and non-intervention were (are) additional values underpinning state activity in the international system (Brown 2000, Miller 1990). What is clear then is that states cannot simply appeal to sovereignty as reason and justification for their actions, they have to call upon other accepted values, which act both to legitimate and explain their actions, hence Dunne's analogy of excavation where the underpinnings must be discovered. Reus-Smit says that,

[This is a necessary feature of international communicative action, and historically it has entailed a common moral discourse that grounds sovereign rights in deeper values that define the social identity of the state (1999: 30).

Certain values work in tandem with each other such that sovereignty only becomes meaningful when juxtaposed with other, related values, such as legitimacy or autonomy. It is here that the pluralists' idea of minimum shared values is of significance since it is unlikely that all states will juxtapose precisely the same values in precisely the same ways. However, I argue that the 'universal' value set is dominant, which at the present time is constituted of those values advocated by the West. What this means for Russia is set out in the following chapter. The starting point may be the same but the scope for interpretation and therefore divergence is great and the interpretation will be heavily influenced by particular values held. In the next
section, I consider what produces these particular values.

5.4.3 The Formulation Of Internal State Values

The collective experiences of a people generate a historical tradition that forms part of the belief system of a state and can also influence the course of foreign policy. Indeed, one can tell much about the future foreign policy of a state simply by knowing something about its past experiences. Decision makers make judgments about the present on the basis of their images of the past and their perceptions of the consequences of previous decisions. Habit also plays a critical role in providing continuity over time, again suggesting the importance of past experiences. (Jensen, 1982: 72)

Jensen's words about a country's own experiences and their connection to FP suggest that the relativists are right in their contention that 'all values ...are context-dependent.' (Kekes, 2004: 134). Values might arise as a result of historical experience, geographical location (since this will affect historical experience), culture and traditions. Other possibilities exist, of course but four possibilities are examined here in brief to demonstrate how they might affect values: history, geography, identity and demography.

I treat historical experience in a fashion consistent with Wendt's (2005) idea of consciousness as subjective experience. An example of the effect of historical experience upon a state's values can be found in Germany's continuing preoccupation with ensuring inflation is controlled, a value that has shaped its economic policy for decades now but which was the product of its inter-war experience. Geographical location must also be considered as a shaping factor for a 'group that is physically isolated from its nearest neighbor will develop a very different foreign policy from one constantly subject to attack and subjugation' (Miller, 1990: 13). Thus, its geography dictates to a certain extent the perceptions a state has of outsiders, but it also affects a state's image of itself, at least part of British identity was built
upon its past as a sea-faring nation, an identity that would not exist if it were a land-locked
country. For Russia too, if it were situated in either Europe or Asia, identity may not be the
political dilemma it has been. Identity has already been discussed in Chapter 3 but I would
add here that there are many factors that go to make up identity, not least values. But religious
identity, whether a state is Catholic or Orthodox, will inevitably affect values and a strong
sense of ethnic identity might also breed strong attachment to outside groups or even states
and affect ideas about what is desirable in regard to those attachments. Finally, demography
must be considered. The relative heterogeneity or homogeneity of a state is worth considering
for its potential effects on values. In a heterogeneous state where there is heightened capacity
for outside groups to appeal to fellow ethnicities within and/or because of an increased
incidence of secessionist tendencies, a state might understandably be preoccupied with matters
of security.

A state can be understood through knowledge of its past, its actions, traditions and its sense of
responsibility in respect of its community. In this way attachments to certain ideas and the
value placed on that attachment become comprehensible. Certain attachments may die out as
generations die out but others remain and are passed on through generations. Such attachments
that survive do so because they are seen to be in the interests of the people, they have value in
that they give results, whether these be tangible or not. But it is in their sometimes enduring
nature that problems may arise and here objective rationalist accounts will founder. Certain
ideas create the environment for the perpetuation of them. There may be no obvious logic for a
value to be perpetuated simply because the conditions that once existed and explained that
value may no longer exist. For example, the USA may think it is irrational for Russia to
interpret the continued existence of NATO as a threat to it but Russia's perceptions are
inevitably coloured by historical experiences, and so difficult to overcome. This is consistent
with Modelski's (1962) arguments about the impact of past actions on current perceptions.
Both Modelski (1962) and Miller (1990) point out that values change slowly. Therefore, it is possible that a value will continue to be held even in circumstances inappropriate to the holding of that value. Miller sees this as a consequence of 'unthinking habit' that might result in 'structural lethargy' (1990: 13), and such effects are well-documented in the Historical Institutionalism literature too (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Additionally, dominant groups may feel that their interests are best achieved by upholding old values and this tendency extends through society. The conservative nature of the Russian military and its concomitant effects are some evidence of that.

5.4.4 The Juncture Of External Values With Internal Values

Given all that has been said about the capacity for the external environment to have an effect upon the internal one, and the perceived need to couch particular values in universal terms, the obvious question is whether state-level or international-level values will prevail where the two conflict. In Chapter 1, I cited Northedge's analogy of foreign policy decision-making as the playing of a game of cards (1968: 14). Four card game characteristics were identified: rules, choices, perceptions and opportunity, and these warrant a little more attention and can now be aligned with the other literature discussed above.

The rules are easily equated to Reus-Smit's constitutional structure, which sets the framework for legitimate state behaviour. Change may occur if sufficient actors agree and/or where change is legitimated by the obvious potential for improvement. This I liken to the transition from the modern to the post-modern, with the legitimating argument being the improvement that follows if the rights of people are prioritised over the rights of states. Choices were the next characteristic discussed, but here, following on from Modelski's line of reasoning on
power and the need to consider resources as outlined in Chapter 2, I now add 'resources' since it is clear that resources are what will (even if only in part, and however inaccurately) condition perception of choices. In analogous terms, if cards are resources, only certain possibilities are open for play, although there may well be opportunity to play a bluff. The better the cards, the wider the choices and opportunities. I do not, however, overstate this point, instead I bear in mind all previously stated arguments about the limits of rationality in this respect, the chance of miscalculation and the chance of sheer recklessness playing its part. Choices are finite for any player and the psycho-milieu will necessarily play its part too. The knowledge that the other side has a minimum win set (Putnam: 1988), reduces both choices and opportunities, but this is itself recognised in the rules where the game is seen as, minimally, a two level one. Perceptions are an integral part of the card and foreign policy game, but the likelihood of misperception must also be considered. In socialisation terms, it should also be noted that the greater the extent of exposure to an opponent or even partner, the greater the chance of reducing misperception. Trust is an important element in perception and where players do not give others cause for concern about cheating, the more positive the perception will be. Finally, there is opportunity. Some players are, *prima facie* positioned in a stronger place than others. Still, every player will be presented with opportunities, whether they prove themselves able to exploit them is a different matter. In the chapter on Marginality, I argue that far from denoting a wholly weak position, a position on the margins opens up a range of opportunities not open to the centre. Thus, opportunities will present themselves in different forms to different players.

The card game analogy allows us to see that internal state values do not offer a total explanation for why a state behaves as it does. Instead, from the outset, states are working within a constrained structure. In hierarchy terms, I treat external values as a major, but not sole, constraint upon the operation of internal values. States are further constrained by their
own resources, they cannot play the game without sufficient stake to keep them in it long enough to make gains, either through 'upping the ante' or by calling a bluff. The ability to win or at the very least to remain in the game, is therefore affected by, in Modelski's (1962) terms, power-input. Thus, reference to internal values alone would be of limited utility in regard to the foreign policy field. In the interaction of external and internal values, however, there is considerably more scope to develop understanding.

5.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Values are treated within the thesis as context-dependent ideas about what a group considers acceptable standards and which decision-makers should apply in order to fulfil the needs of the group and to try and ensure they can achieve their full potential. I spent some time discussing what is understood by values on the basis that this is rarely done. Values are treated here as being founded in a perceived truth, they are the product of certain factors evident in both the local and wider environment and are true for those holding them, the 'coherence' lying in their own experiences. Values are similar to principles but distinguished by the latter's reliance on rules, which are not applicable to values. Besides, in IR terms, particularly Constructivist and post-positivist thinking, the concept of 'values' features much more highly, reflecting the subjectivity that positivism has hitherto denied or ignored. In the domestic area, foreign policy has long looked at belief systems, of which values must necessarily form a part, but 'values' also sustains something more of an irrational quality than 'principles' and so sits in quite direct opposition to rationalist approaches.

In answer to the question of whether it is possible to speak of state values, I clearly believe it is. This seems like an intuitively correct conclusion but it is the cogency of Wendt's
argumentation that is the decisive factor. A better question is that of Wendt’s, 'under what conditions' (2005: 359) can states be treated as persons, and this is unproblematic in respect of values, just as is the case with interests. As a final point, context is significant. As Holland and Fleming's (2003) work shows, states increasingly project certain values internally, directed towards their own populations. Hitherto, the main argument against saying the same occurs at the international level has come from Realist driven explanations of an anarchical international system. Even without going as far as some Constructivists, it is difficult to argue against the conclusions of Institutionalists who have shown that states modify their behaviour at the international level in response to membership in international organisations, so providing fodder for those who would argue that the international system is no longer characterised by anarchy.

Finally, the application of a values approach to foreign policy is called for on the following grounds. Firstly, there is the change and continuity argument. Notwithstanding the fact that foreign policy is a dynamic field, in order to understand the decisions that states make, it must be accepted that they are not continually reacting to a situation based only on that situation’s events but are guided also by their own standards of what constitutes desirable behaviour. Secondly, while rational approaches have clear limits, there is some truth in their assertions that decisions are made based on a determination of the expected consequences of that decision. What they fail to understand is that that determination is ultimately a subjective one, based on particular value-judgments. Those value-judgments in turn will be the outcome of a wider societal experience.

Changes in the international environment provide the most convincing argument for an incorporation of values into analysis. Events in the last two decades of the twentieth century and beyond have brought an emphasis on morality. It was once possible for western states to
escape devastating criticism over their failure to intervene in the events of the Prague Spring. By the 1990s the failure of individual states and international and regional organisations like the UN and the EU to intervene meaningfully in crises such as those that overtook Rwanda and Yugoslavia brought peace-keeping to the fore of international debate and prompted deep questions about the morality of non-intervention. Morality, indelibly linked to values, has been elevated to the centre of international concerns and scholarship must reflect this (Neack et al, 1995b).

I argue then for the necessity of finding new frameworks for analysis of foreign policy, frameworks that allow for the incorporation of both international and domestic factors (Schmidt, 2002). The compulsion for such an argument lies in the nature and extent of international change in recent years. Further, the claim is made that change has been of a type that demands analytical frameworks that see the importance of normative ideas in explanations of foreign policy. Hence, the thesis is grounded in the work of both the English School in International Relations and Constructivism. While some emphasis is placed on change, continuity is also asserted as a feature of foreign policy.

It is in regard to continuity in foreign policy that values may be said to look vulnerable but this is perhaps because of the emphasis placed hitherto on the values of individuals or small groups in policy-making. As said in Chapter 3, individuals do matter, but foreign policy is not only the outcome of one person's thinking, other variables also come into the equation. In this way for a long time, explanations related to power and rational decision-making looked to have some force since they offered a better explanation as to why two ideologically different states would operate similar foreign policies, the Cold War being the best example of this. However, such similarities are also understandable if we see that external institutional structures embody sets of values and that these dictate, to a large extent, the institutional set-up and practices within a
state and its inter-state relations. External environment helps to shape a state's identity and therefore its behaviour.

I am essentially talking then about states as being constrained in their behaviour by exogenous values. This is not to deny that power and resources have some explanatory capacity, as evidenced in the card game analogy. Despite the presence of overarching common values, room is also left for the development of individual state values. Both exogenous and endogenous values therefore figure in explanations of foreign policy behaviour. For the sake of clarity as to priority of influence, I divide these into notions of dominant (exogenous) values and dependent (endogenous) values. Thus, the range of endogenous values is itself constrained by the exogenous. If a state accepts justice as an exogenous value, it will not vaunt injustice as an endogenous value. However, crucially, how each state exercises the value of justice will depend on their own interpretation of how justice is best achieved. Their interpretation is dependent on how they view the world, which is dependent on their own values. This settled, I now move on to establish the nature of today's dominant, exogenous, values, underpinned by the hypothesis that these primarily relate to those of a post-modern era.
CHAPTER 6

THE POST-MODERN PERSPECTIVE
AND THE NEW COLD WAR

In this chapter I examine claims that Europe is a post-modern space. As quickly becomes clear, this is a complex claim, that raises a number of difficult questions about what Europe is and where it lies, about what is really meant by post-modernity and what makes an actor post-modern. Despite the inherent problems, the claim is an important part of my overall analysis since it raises questions too about whether Russia is European and if so on what basis. The post-modernist literature and prism are significant in understandings of Russian foreign policy generally and its values in particular for a number of reasons: i) Russia's geographical position (at least in part) within Europe; ii) its desire to be considered unequivocally as European; iii) the continuing westward orientation of its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Thus, in these contexts what Europe is, or is perceived to be, matters for the Russians. These are issues that arise again in the context of the subsequent chapter on marginality. In fact, while the established literature on either post-modernism or marginality does not make connections between the two frameworks, this chapter demonstrates that marginality at least can be as contingent upon ideas about post-modernity as it is upon globalisation.

A more immediate rationale for looking at post-modernity in respect of Russia's relations with Europe is the New Cold War discourse that was so prevalent in 2007-8. This highlighted the dangers of attempts to marginalise Russia and was itself based on the perception that Russia had reverted to 'Old' thinking and Cold War ways (Cimbala, 2004: 603). The more immediate compulsion behind this chapter is therefore the New Cold War discourse. Two hypotheses are considered: i) that Europe's claim to post-modern status provides the justification behind recent
accelerated attempts to 'other' Russia; ii) that this facilitated the New Cold War discourse.

The problem for Russia that arises in respect of these issues is that Europe is increasingly spoken of as a post-modern space characterised by adherence to a distinct set of values that is shared by few other regions or actors. In the years since the end of the Cold War Europe has sought to create a "security community" premised on de-securitization (Joenniemi, 2007: 127-8) and as a result, in no other geographical region does the existence of a society of states look more credible. Claims about the existence of a post-modern world or post-modern order are connected, however, to the EU, or at least certain influential Member States. Applications for membership and recent substantial enlargements have established the EU as the 'pole' in Europe (Mouritzen, 1996), which means that the onus is immediately upon Russia to prove its post-modern credentials if it wants to be considered to be part of Europe; but it is forced to do this against a background of attempts to marginalise it in global prestige terms. Two assertions therefore underpin this chapter: first, that Russia wants to be seen as European and second, that its perceived lack of post-modern credentials is one of the largest hindrances to achieving this.

I begin by examining some of the post-modernist literature that argues for a post-modern order and the centrality of the EU to that order. With the 'ideational' at the core of post-modernism, it is a relatively simple exercise to identify the values that attach to the post-modern condition and to show in what respects the EU embodies them. The EU and Russia are then contrasted in terms of their relative value systems, which in turn must be attributed in large part to their perceptions of what type of world they live in, i.e. modern or post-modern. However, even if the EU and Russia are deemed to have different values systems, they can still build a strong and lasting relationship, as Barysch, in her call for the EU to revert to more Realist thinking in its relationship with Russia, makes clear:
Disappointment and discord seem to have become the main ingredients of EU-Russia relations. But although bilateral relations may not evolve on the basis of 'shared values' as the EU once hoped, the two sides have enough common interests to build a constructive partnership (2006: 1).

Of course, given my previous argument about the interconnectedness of interests and values, it follows that I consider such a partnership can be successfully built as long as greater understanding of each other is achieved, and this is supported by Prozorov (2005) and Sergounin (2005), whose work is also explored below.

Since the EU's post-modern status is largely accepted, I spend rather more time looking at the Russian value set than that of the EU. Cooper's analysis of Russia as potentially meeting the requirements of three different world orders, the pre-modern, modern and post-modern is highly significant here, but I show that events occurring subsequent to the publication of Cooper's work make it more difficult to uphold his fairly optimistic analysis. Russia appears to regress (assuming that post-modernism is about progress) and, _prima facie_ at least, now shares more modern than post-modern values and characteristics than Cooper's work allows. There are both internal and external pressures for this regressive process. With Post-Modern arguments discredited within Russia itself, associated with the failures of liberal democracy in the Yeltsin years and the double-standards of the West (as discussed in the context on the Kosovo Crisis particularly), in the 2000s, there has been increasing pressure from internal voices for Russia to pursue its own path. Such arguments are most tangibly encapsulated in the debate about Russia's sovereign democracy. While I argued earlier for a rejection of this discussion as less than fruitful, it does raise issues of Russian disenchantment with western models of democracy. Despite this undoubted internal dynamic, I argue that the 'regression' is primarily externally caused and that it can be stemmed with positive action on the part of other actors. This contention is contingent on the argument that the international society exerts a good deal of influence over actors and thus that exogenous values are dominant, as already set out in Chapter 5.
In the final part of the chapter, therefore, I focus on showing how Russia’s seeming defence of modern values has affected the wider discourse about Russia and consider the effects of that. The New Cold War discourse is treated as a consequence of post-modernity and it shows the importance of perceptions in the construction of images of, and policies towards, a state. What is most interesting about the New Cold War discourse, at least as discussed by commentators such as Lucas (2008, 2008b), is that it seems to serve no one’s interests at all. After all, while enemy images can serve useful purposes, the nature of the challenges faced by the West today suggest that the very last thing needed is another enemy. Unless attributed to a ‘lack of intellectual imagination’ (Sakwa, 2008: 265-6), the only way in which the discourse becomes comprehensible in terms of serving a purpose is if we see it as an attempt to gain the ideational ground. In the discourse, Russia is portrayed as a state entrenched in old ways, as returning to its old authoritarian past with reliance on bullying tactics: in short, as a modern state. Thus, while post-modernity is not an explicit feature of the New Cold War, I argue that the latter is a consequence of it. In this way, by contrasting itself to Russia, in essence ‘othering’ it, the West’s identity as a post-modern actor is given substance. That the effects will work in reverse seems not to matter, despite the fact that such negative images have the capacity to have a profound and lasting effect on Russia’s own identity: ‘Interaction with the US and Europe produces, reinforces, and counteracts the discourses of Russian identity at home’ (Hopf, 2005: 238). Given the strength of the nationalist voices in Russia, attempting to ‘other’ it is a risky strategy for the West.

In being cast as modern and non-European, Russia is relegated to a place on the margins of Europe, potentially as an insider, it is true, but potentially too as an outsider. The outcomes of this analysis are pursued further in the next chapter on Marginality. The central argument in this chapter and what follows further on is that Russia is perceived as something ‘different’ to other European states and that increasingly this is because the EU is seen as the bastion of
post-modernism. This is less a clash of civilisations than an overlapping of eras, with Russia
seen as wholly committed to maintaining modern values and the EU – and USA – as leading
the transition to a post-modern era. I begin my analysis with consideration of what it means to
be modern and post-modern.

6.1 THE MODERN AND POST-MODERN

Demarcating the origins of the modern era is relatively easy. The Westphalian state system is
the beginning of the modern state system, characterised by emphasis on state sovereignty,
defined territories, the balance of power and an international state system based upon these
basic principles (Caporaso, 1996, March & Olsen, 1998). In the modern world, 'the classical
state system remains intact' (Cooper, 2000: 16); the status quo is retained through balance of
power or hegemonic tactics; states are sovereign, so domestic and foreign affairs are separate
and the principle of non-intervention is vaunted; states monopolise force, important in this
conception of the world where security is achieved through the exercise of force. Given that
post-modernity is spoken of in contrast to these features, Cooper accurately observes that: 'The
concepts, values and vocabulary of the modern world still dominate our thinking' (2000: 16-
17).

As for the post-modern era, March and Olsen (1998) claim that this is characterised by
changes in state borders; fragmentation; and increasing contact at the national, international
and sub-national level that undermines state autonomy. These features are accompanied by the
rise of international-level institutions, organisations, networks etc., which also compromise
state dominance. For Trainor (1998), the modern era begins with the end of the feudal,
In such visions, the modern era is distinguished most obviously from the post-modern one in the emphasis the one places upon the nation state and the preservation of state borders, versus the emphasis in the other upon the building of communities that consciously seek to transcend state boundaries. These are points supported by Smith (2003), who speaks of a "post-modern" or "post-sovereign" foreign policy where power and resources are 'diffuse' (2003:569). Trainor characterises the post-modern era as a universe constituted of various communities, each conscious of existing within 'ever wider worlds' and asserts:

The current trend, however, seems to be towards a less contractual/atomistic and more organic/"substantive" view of the international community, one which raises complex questions about the (post) modern state, its role as a medium of the international community and the source of its authority when it acts in the latter capacity (Trainor, 1998: 141).

This, to a large extent, encapsulates the tension now evident between sovereignty and human rights, the idea that something more important than nation state sovereignty must be defended at the international level. A clear enunciation of this change is found in Douzinas's claim that:

Human rights are the fate of postmodernity, the fulfilment of the Enlightenment promise of emancipation and self-realization, the ideology after the end, the defeat of ideologies, at the "end of history" (2006: 362-3).

Thus the Kosovo Crisis can be interpreted as a pivotal moment in history, an event that heralds the end of the modern era and the dawn of a new, progressive one.

For Cooper (2000), it is the Treaty of Rome and the CFE Treaty that are the harbingers of the post-modern world. Full transition is seen as contingent particularly upon the development of the OSCE, but other key institutions are identified as The Court of Human Rights, the IMF and
the OECD. What each of these has in common is monitoring: 'In this environment security, which was once based on walls, is now based on openness and transparency and mutual vulnerability' (Cooper, 2004: 30). Therefore, for Cooper (as for others set out above), distinguishing itself from the modern system, the post-modern system lacks the reliance on balance and de-emphasises sovereignty. Additionally, the line between the domestic and the foreign, as well as borders, becomes more difficult to discern.

De-territorialisation is another common reference point for post-modernists for 'although modern sovereignty was bound to place, the new order is both modelled on the openness of space and uses the air as its most appropriate conduit' (Douzinas, 2006: 367). The preoccupation with territory is familiar in respect of the modern era but it reveals too the close links between the post-modern condition and the process of globalisation. In the post-modern globalist literature, 'boundaries (and nation-states) are comprehended as fading dimensions in socio-spatial transformation rather than fixed physical lines' (Paasi, 1999: 71). However, one of the main criticisms levelled at the post-modern literature is that many of its predictions, particularly concerning de-territorialisation, have simply not come to pass in most parts of the world (see, for instance, Hirst and Thompson, 1996).

In his attempt to address such criticisms, Cooper (2000) argues that no single political system is discernible in today's world. He identifies instead the existence of three worlds concurrently: the pre-modern, modern and post-modern. Further, the element of progress evident in much post-modern argumentation is lost (cf. Trainor's work, which has a linear and progressive quality). Instead, Cooper asserts that states or parts of states may, under certain circumstances (war, civil war) descend into the chaos of the pre-modern era, becoming, in effect, 'pre-states' (2004: 1). Cooper's point about the co-existence of three worlds and the fact that a modern state might collapse into a pre-state or develop into a post-modern one is accepted to a degree
here, but in systemic terms and in the long run, it may prove very difficult to undo the effects of post-modernism, connected in so many ways as they are to globalisation. In Wallace's (1999) commentary on the blurring between the domestic and the foreign, he highlights the emergence of collective security measures, and argues that post-modernism in this respect is dependent upon the absence of threat (1999: 519), an argument taken up by Cooper (2000) as well.

The differences between the modern and post-modern are set out here in tabular form.

Table 1  Modern versus Post-Modern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modern</th>
<th>Post-Modern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State sovereignty</td>
<td>State autonomy undermined by increasing contact at international level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-intervention</td>
<td>Humanitarian intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined territory</td>
<td>Fragmentation: shared responsibility for borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of power</td>
<td>Collective security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International state system</td>
<td>Internationalism: increasing numbers of international institutions &amp; organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separation of domestic and foreign</td>
<td>Blurring of domestic and foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State monopoly of force</td>
<td>Diffusion of power and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence of status quo</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are inherent problems involved in employing such binary oppositions, but I do so to illustrate the fact that images of post-modernity and modernity are often contrasted this simplistically. Such strict delineations therefore often represent the grammar of interactions, with all the exceptions, seeming illogical and irregularities that involves. When applied to reality, however, the simplicity of such oppositions should be seen as nothing but problematic for they distinctly and damningly demonstrate the lack of complexity being applied to what are complex problems, as the New Cold War discourse makes amply clear. For instance, state
sovereignty is problematic in any circumstance since it is questionable as to whether states have ever been wholly sovereign. However, arguments for the existence of an international society have never looked as credible as they now do, given the existence of the International Criminal Court and the European Court of Justice. These courts are symptomatic not only of new thinking at the global as well as European level but of systemic changes too and the recognition that states are not 'black boxes' and that their actions impact heavily upon others. Whether Russia will accept such limitations upon its sovereignty voluntarily is really neither here nor there. That it cannot withstand the tide of such change seems obvious; that Russia has recognised this is also clear. A post-modern era can really only be said to exist where there is a high level of self-reflexivity or otherwise the same intolerance, suspicion and mistrust that apparently characterised the modern era is carried through into the post-modern one. Such contrasts raise, but do not answer, questions about whether, inter alia, actors will always adhere to their relative characteristics, about how post-modern actors interact with modern actors and about what scope exists for a post-modern actor to behave like a modern one and vice versa. In the section below, I consider two of the actors which can each be said to epitomise these contrasting features of the modern and post-modern eras.

6.2 RUSSIA AND THE EU IN POST-MODERN EUROPE

With the exception of Cooper (2003), Russia is most usually cited as an example of a modern, rather than post-modern actor. Within the European space, it is the EU that occupies the post-modern ground, although Wallace (1999) has argued that it is the five states situated around the Rhine valley and delta that constitute the post-modern core. From this we can infer that not all the EU Member States carry the same post-modern credentials, although this in turn must be qualified by the claim that membership will bring about socialisation (Risse 2005, Checkel
1999, Marcussen et al 1999). For Cooper - and remembering his analysis pre-dated the 2004 and 2007 enlargements - the situation is more clear-cut for the EU, which he saw as unquestionably post-modern. One important caveat came in the form of his warning that these types of relations pertain only to intra-EU relations and that bilateral relations between an EU state and a non EU state might still be defined by the rules of the modern state system. Here though, I examine the grounds for claiming that the EU is post-modern and Russia modern and show that the differences between the two are less delineated than the literature suggests.

The essence of my argument is that Russia is affected by post-modernity and contrasted with it but in some respects has little choice but to conform to some of its values. Since Europe is Russia's salient environment (by reason of its own objectives and wishes), Russia and Europe stand out in marked contrast to each other. The issue is further complicated by the fact that while Europe lays claim to post-modern thinking, there is a high degree of lock-in and path-dependence in respect of how it sees Russia, and in this way past experiences of Russia impact negatively on how it is perceived. Thus, post-modern attitudes are directed inwards and projected outwards, but in that external projection the differences between 'us' and 'them' are made plain. This is returned to below in respect of how it detracts from the EU's post-modern credentials.

6.2.1 The EU's Post-Modern Values

The EU's values are stated in the Union's own Treaty and accepted as such within much of the EU literature. Article 6 (1) of the Treaty on European Union cites the Union's founding principles as consisting of, 'liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and the rule of law'. Most significant though is the existence of the ECJ (European Court of Justice) and the role it has played in limiting the sovereignty of the Member States through, for example, the Doctrines of Supremacy and Direct Effect. In making EC (European Community) law supreme over national law, the ECJ muddied the distinction between the national and the international environments. In conferring European rights upon citizens through the doctrine of direct effect, the ECJ fractured the traditional relationship between state and citizen, and so made sovereign states look less sovereign. Through the powers of scrutiny that the European Commission and ECJ have, the monitoring of the post-modern era is achieved, as is relative transparency. None of this would have been possible in the presence of threat, so that here too the 'absence of threat' (Wallace, 1999: 519) integral to the post-modern era is found. Finally, notwithstanding the CFSP and ESDP, the EU has primarily relied on economic and ideational tools in its relations with other actors. This has been particularly true in relation to the resort to conditionality that is a feature of, for instance, the 2003 Cotonou Agreement. The EU therefore visibly places a high value on limited sovereignty, pluralism, multilateralism, transparency, openness as well as the use of soft power to resolve problems – all features of a post-modern world. Member States have accepted their interdependence with other states and committed themselves to cooperation, negotiation and therefore compromise.

It would be overstating the case, however, to claim that the EU Member States have sacrificed their interests at the altar of values. Their values serve their interests and reflect also the reduced international circumstances of many of the Member States. Nor does the EU lack pragmatic instincts. In regard to cooperation between the EU and Russia in freedom, security and justice, it is said that

cooperation, carried out on the basis of common values which underpin EU-Russia relations must reflect the necessary balance between security, on the one hand, and justice and freedom, on the other (Council of EU).
This is an indication of the understanding that certain situations require certain values to be set aside. On the other hand, it is almost certainly the case too that the EU is now necessarily in thrall to its own normative rhetoric (Sjursen 2002, Schimmelfennig 2001, Fierke & Wiener 1999). Schimmelfennig argues that rhetorical action is used to remind members of a community of their obligations and shared interests to and within that community (2001: 62). The EU’s continued legitimacy is dependent on adherence to its expressed and particular set of values to a degree that suggests its room for manoeuvre is constrained relative to Russia, for instance. This is also considered in respect of Russia’s marginality.

The EU’s economic strength, its strong normative base and its consequent success in ensuring peace over its territory made the EU in the 1990s a magnet for its neighbours, especially the former soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries. As for its place within the modern / post-modern world, the EU projects a post-modern image, even in its relations with third states. The carrot of membership has allowed the EU to 'convert' such states to EU models, policies and values through its accession criteria. The question, of course, remains whether the same can be achieved for states where prospects for membership are distant or non-existent. In direct regard to the relationship with Russia the EU refers to 'common interests and shared values', the latter including democracy, human rights and the rule of law and yet the EU has no compelling power given the nature of their interdependent relationship. Still, a positive answer is certainly more likely where there is not too great a values gap to begin with (Sundstrom 2005, Marcussen et al 1999). Given Russia's deeply-held claim to be European and to have shared experiences the EU appears best placed to succeed in socialising Russia into 'European' values. Straus argues that 'Russian society is far more European than Asian' (201: 9) and Hopf confirms this when he says:

The average Russian understand herself as European, as part of European

26 Socialisation can occur both ways, of course, so the EU may 'learn' too from Russia.
culture and civilisation, and as engaging in European daily practices. This implies Europe has a greater capacity to more profoundly affect how Russia understands itself than the United States (2005: 240).

6.2.2 Russia’s Values: Modern or Post-Modern?

Russia’s credentials in respect of either modernity or post-modernity are far less clear-cut. Cooper singles it out as ‘an important problem’ (2000: 27), with signs that it could meet the conditions of any one of his three types of state, although he ultimately argues against a pre-modern categorisation. Arguments for Russia as a modern state lie in the power of the state itself and the apparent continued reliance on balance. A possible claim to post-modernism is substantiated by the CFE Treaty and the initial presence of OSCE observers in Chechnya. This latter argument is undermined, of course, by the fact that after the publication of Cooper’s work, the Russians withdrew cooperation with the OSCE observers in 2003 and in 2007 unilaterally suspended participation in the CFE Treaty. These events highlight too the transitory nature of international relations and suggest that Cooper is right in his argument that ‘progress’ cannot only be halted but can be reversed. At the current time, therefore, based on Cooper’s evidence, there is no foundation for a claim that Russia is a post-modern actor. Nonetheless, other evidence suggests Russia is not without some post-modern characteristics.

Statements of Russia’s values can be found in the Russian Federation’s official documents from 2000, the Foreign Policy Concept, National Security Concept and the Military Doctrine. These have been considered in some detail already so here I seek only for evidence of Russia’s commitment to either modern or post-modern values, perhaps both. Unlike the EU, Russia does not make reference to values specifically, although interests are clearly articulated. I therefore draw on my earlier argument about the interconnectedness of interests and values.
Articulation of objectives is another source of information about values, since these are the notions of the future, desirable behaviour of other states (Modelski, 1962: 9-10), and so say something about what Russia values most.

Beginning with the NSC,

Russia's national interests in the international sphere lie in upholding its sovereignty and strengthening its position as a great power and as one of the influential centres of a multipolar world, in development of equal and equitable relations with all countries and integrative associations and in particular with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and Russia's traditional partners, in universal observance of human rights and freedoms and the impermissibility of dual standards in this respect.

Russia's national interests in the military sphere lie in protection of its independence, sovereignty and state and territorial integrity, in the prevention of military aggression against Russia and its allies and in ensuring the conditions for peaceful and democratic development of the state (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000).

Noticeable here are the references to state sovereignty, territorial integrity of states, non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and the inviolability of state borders. Claims to these 'modern' values are further echoed in the MD. Objectives as set out in the FPC are to ensure the reliable security of the country, to preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity, to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a).

Thus, there is a high degree of consistency within the documents about what the Russian Federation values, all of which are most often associated with modernity and the classical state system. In its invocation of sovereignty, territorial integrity, prestige and great power status, Russia projects the very image of a modern state.

However, within the FPC statement too was a more subtle reference that shows Russia is fully
aware of the need to integrate into the 'world community' (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a), an objective strongly associated with the post-modern modern era where:

[Internationally the emphasis has shifted from the control of territory and armies to the capacity to join international bodies and to make international agreements. Making peace is as much a part of sovereignty as making war. For the postmodern state, sovereignty is a seat at the table (Cooper, 2004:44).

In its pursuit (and success in achieving them sometimes) of 'seats at the table', Russia proves itself to be somewhat post-modern at least. It does not necessarily make Russia any different to EU Member States to see that this is occasioned by a pragmatic acceptance of necessity, as the then-Minister for Foreign Affairs, admitted: 'it is entirely obvious that there is no alternative to further integration into the world fellowship' (Ivanov, 2002). The same could have been said of France, Germany and Italy in the immediate post World War II era. Where Russia does look different is in its relative commitment to possessional rather than milieu goals, for as Ivanov went on, 'the problem here is to secure this under maximum favourable conditions from the point of view of Russia’s national interests' (Ivanov, 2002). With such conflicting messages emanating from the highest levels of state, it is hard to dispute Cooper's statement about Russia being a 'problem'.

Despite the emphasis on sovereignty, there are questions too about what Russia can expect to maintain in the longer term. Even in the modern state system, some limits on sovereignty are accepted, even by Russia. In the NSC (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000), for instance, it is stated that sovereignty is to be set aside in cases where it is necessary to pursue those participating in terrorist activity where such activity constitutes a threat to Russia. Additionally, the NSC accepts limited sovereignty where there is an international legal basis. The strength of feeling evident in regard to sovereignty does not have to be regarded as an insurmountable obstacle in any attempt to 'elevate' Russia from the modern to post-modern. Russia is not opposed to dialogue and debate, indeed, the MD describes itself as a 'document
of a transitional period', a time in which 'to establish a dynamic transformation of the international relations system' (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000b). What is clear, however, is that any such transformation must be de jure rather than de facto – although a cynical argument could be made that this is true only while Russia is not included in any transformative action. Russia’s recognition of the necessity of joining international institutions/organisations is positive, indicating as it does Russia’s desire to engage with other states, to legitimate itself on the basis of its membership within the international community and its acceptance of the fact of state interdependence. It is clear from the documents too, that Russia seeks to extend its range of cooperation, advocating the 'collective resolution of key problems' (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a) particularly those stemming from terrorism and extremism. The important factor in either liberal or constructivist thinking is that Russia forms a part of international society/community interaction within which the shaping/construction of desirable standards of behaviour for individual states can be achieved. Added to which, just as states may move in a linear, progressive fashion, so too may systems.

Further evidence for a 'modern' designation is to be found in the statement that the Russian Federation 'pursues' a consistent and predictable policy that is based also on 'mutually advantageous pragmatism' (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a). This pragmatism has been noted by analysts who agree that Russian foreign policy evinces a highly pragmatic streak (Pravda 2003, Lynch 2001, Kubicek 1999-2000). Pragmatism suggests a rational weighing-up of alternatives with decisions taken on the basis of pursuit of interests and an assessment of what constitutes the best way to achieve them. However, whether viewed through neofunctionalist, Liberal, Liberal Intergovernmentalist or Social Constructivist lenses, this pragmatism leaves much scope to convince Russia of the benefits of cooperation and so to have this spill over into other forms of cooperation, perhaps to socialise it into certain standards of behaviour or that the discourse of cooperative relations will serve as 'a
'transmission belt' by which ... international impulses are translated into policy' (Moravcsik in Larsen, 1997: 186).

Given Russia's large land mass, its many borders and the Chechen problem, a preoccupation with territorial integrity is not unexpected. Russia was long vulnerable to intervention on the basis of accusations that it committed human rights violations in Chechnya. But the strong value placed here also explains the Russian ranking sovereignty a over human rights and its insistence upon the principle of non-intervention. The Kosovo Crisis is again responsible for the determinedly defensive nature of the MD, as indicated by the statement that the new doctrine is occasioned by 'changes in the military-political situation', including mention of the attempt to intervene on a humanitarian basis without the sanction of the UN (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000b). The MD also identifies territorial claims against the RF as one of the principal external threats faced and speaks of the 'build-up of a distribution of troops, leading to the breach of a fully developed balance of power close to the state borders of the Russian Federation and its allies' (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000b). This is not purely about Russian security, it is a reference also to Russian fears of loss of influence in its near-abroad.

It is in the realm of power that Russia apparently keeps the strongest foothold in the modern system. The desire to retain or regain great power status is reflected in all three documents although it is the FPC that tells us most about what makes Russia a great power. It is said here that 'Russia exerts significant influence on the formation of a new world order' by virtue of its potential and resources, its permanent membership of the UNSC and relations with the world's leading states (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a). Despite Russia's many claims to desire democracy and equality in international relations, it is clear from this that Russia does not believe all states to be equal, seemingly some states have a right to wield more influence than
others. This analysis is supported by Russian support of the retention of the veto within the UNSC and the 'great importance' attached to the G8 (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a). In terms of Russia's preferences, therefore, a post-modern attitude is not reflected. More positive signs are discernible.

A perceived need for military power is evident in all three documents, but even the MD recognises that action here must be as a last resort. Power, in Russian thinking (as well as post-modern thinking), is now more diffuse and military power forms only part of the arsenal of power generally. Thus political and economic power are as likely to allow Russia to achieve its goals as the use of military force. Statements such as these are cause for optimism:

The use of power methods in circumvention of functioning international-legal mechanisms cannot remove the deep socio-economic, inter-ethnic and other contradictions which are at the basis of conflicts and which undermine the foundations of law and order (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a).

It is true that for a long time Russia did not act as if it understood the underlying complexity of its problems in Chechnya, but more recently it has sought to address some of the underlying causes of that conflict, with some success (Dannreuther & March, 2003). Additionally, Wallace (1999) cites collective security measures as evidence of the increasing lack of separation between the foreign and domestic. While the scope of Russian activity in this regard is so far narrow, the fact is that Russia has performed joint peacekeeping roles (with NATO) in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Kosovo for a number of years now. By virtue of its peacekeeping therefore, it is not possible to exclude Russia entirely from the post-modern camp.

Another recurrent emphasis in the three documents is that placed on achieving domestic economic goals through foreign policy. Russia remains obviously mindful of the link between domestic prosperity and external conditions. It follows therefore that Russian domestic policy is vulnerable to external events and actors, since if they can have a positive influence in
allowing the Russian state to achieve domestic economic goals, they can also have a negative influence. In this way the foreign and the domestic is blurred and the Russians recognise this, even if they try and present this as a one-way street affair. Negotiations over pipelines and the pursuit of WTO membership are just two examples of the interconnectedness of foreign policy and domestic economic policy. As a result, the NSC (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000) lists amongst its most important tasks in foreign economic activities, the creation of favourable conditions for international integration of the Russian economy and the formation of a single economic space with the CIS Member States.

Thus, while it is undoubtedly true that Russia talks like a modern state, it is not true that it always talks like one and there is a good deal of further evidence to suggest that a certain amount of optimism about the capacity of Russia to be post-modern would not be misplaced, as now discussed.

6.2.3 Avoiding 'Chaos'

In this section I look at the case for arguing that Russia and the EU are not so very different – both because Russia has proved itself to have post-modern orientations and because the EU itself does not always behave like a post-modern actor (Cooper, 2000). Foreign policy, as set out in Chapter 1, is about exchanges and actions that invoke reactions. Seen from this perspective, Russia's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty is a response to the perceived presence rather than absence of threat as signified by the failure of others to ratify the Adaptation Agreement that seeks to amend the Treaty.27 Further, Russia, while accepting the rationale of the CFE Treaty, might justifiably not accept that further vulnerability through openness is

27 It should be noted that at the time of writing Russia and the USA are due to meet to negotiate a replacement for START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)
beneficial given its already vulnerable position on the Eurasian land mass, with numerous borders and proximity to pre-modern states. As Cooper says,

[C]haos, or at least the crime that lives within it, needs the civilized world and preys upon it. Open societies make this easy. At its worst, in the form of terrorism, chaos can become a serious threat to the whole international order. (Cooper, 2004: 77).

That Russia understands the threat that chaos presents is clear, what is not clear is whether the EU, or indeed any other actor, comprehends the depth of Russian concerns about the nature of the threats it faces. Until these concerns are understood, and engaged with, until Russia is convinced of the absence of threat in and from Europe, there is little hope that it will behave consistently like a post-modern actor.

Within the FPC (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a) a section is dedicated to the formation of a new world order. In point of fact, however, there seems to be little that is 'new', despite the MD's talk of this as the period in which to transform 'dynamically' the international relations system (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000b). Russia's desire for the primacy of the UN in the regulation of international relations is clearly stated. 'Radical reform' of the UN is proposed only in terms of its reaction to situations and its prevention and resolution of conflict. While new permanent members of the UNSC are called for, the right to veto is to be maintained, demonstrating the limits of the extent of Russian willingness to cooperate. The call for the primacy of the UN and, more importantly, the UN Charter, is entirely consistent with the value attached to sovereignty and also the balance of power. But it says something too about the fact that the Russians perceive the international system as an arena of conflict, notwithstanding the fact that the MD speaks of a reduction in threat to the RF (although it should be noted that this refers to a reduction of 'direct military aggression in traditional forms') (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000b).
The high number of references in the documents to the need for what amount to confidence-building measures reveal both Russian suspicions and anxieties but also the potential for furthering cooperation and openness along the lines of that engendered by the CFE Treaty. The documents all call for 'trust' and the MD and FPC for transparency on a reciprocal level. In its meditation on the nature of Russian foreign policy, the FPC speaks of an independent foreign policy that is based on consistency, predictability, mutually advantageous pragmatism, transparency, joint decision-making and which bears in mind the lawful interests of other states (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a). These are all consistent with a traditional foreign policy centred on maintaining a balance of power and the primacy of the state and as such indeed leave Russia in a modern system. But each of these features is also consistent with a post-modern system, therefore in terms of values and bearing in mind the relatively intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, there is little here really to differentiate Russia from the EU.

This aspect of openness in post-modernity is most troublesome for Russia on account of its geographical situation, and there is a good deal of contingency involved. If Russia is to be turned to such transparency, clearly reassurances will be necessary. If the EU is to bring influence to bear upon Russia, it must understand the Russian preoccupation with security and borders. 'Reassurance', it has been argued (Christensen, 2002), is a necessary concomitant to threat in security dilemma terms. With peace projected as a policy goal for post-modern states (Cooper, 2004), threat must be rejected and reassurance increased. And so in order to bring Russia into its 'community of postmodern states' (Cooper, 2004: 78), the EU must use the politics of reassurance and convince Russia of the EU's 'post-national', 'post-imperial' credentials. If the EU is to bring Russia firmly into the post-modern society,\(^{28}\) it must first convince Russia not so much that gains can be made as that losses can be avoided, especially

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\(^{28}\) This does not imply membership of the EU but rather membership of the community based on classification as a post-modern state.
as those losses relate to the Russian value system. If reassurance is to be effective, however, it must be targeted accurately. This requires knowledge and understanding of the Russian position beyond that provided by rational utility-maximising logic. It should be remembered too, if double standards are not to be applied, that the USA has used the very same type of arguments about the emergence of new, post-Cold War threats, to argue that the ABM Treaty is an anachronism (Nichols, 2001). In the context of such threats, a New Cold War would be disastrous for all of Europe. After all, if proximity to pre-modern states risks Russia’s descent into collapse, this will, by extension, become a problem for all of Europe. In short, Russia and the EU need each other and need to find collective solutions.

Again, it is important not to overstate the differences between modernity and post-modernity. While a retreat from individualism to collectivism may be a feature of post-modernity, collectivism was not unknown in the modern era either. Therefore, actors with feet in different world orders can still find a shared value base for action. That this has long been considered so is evident even in the dominant IR theory of the modern era, Realism. Recent theoretical work on Classical Realism has sought to show that this perspective has much to offer even to current conditions and the recognition of the importance of the ideational. A re-reading of Morgenthau’s work reveals the scope for inclusion of ideas into this view of international relations. Williams (2004), Bain (2000) and Brown (2000) all set out arguments for seeing that pursuit of the Good is compatible with Realist thinking. Brown’s work in particular gives grounds for optimism in its assessment of the capacity of Realism to find common ground with both world society and English School thought on a society of states. Williams’s work demonstrates the reliance of Morgenthau upon Weberian thinking, which itself posits a pluralistic rather than universal conception of political life:

29 See Hill (2003a) for a compelling argument on the dangers of applying double standards in FP behaviour.
As a realm without a fixed interest, politics becomes the sphere of activity uniquely concerned with the consideration, generation, and transformation of common interests and understandings: the sphere where the fundamental meanings and values of social life are contested and determined. The lack of fixed understandings of the good and the true is the condition of modern politics, and the basis of its distinctiveness as a realm of freedom, creativity, and change (Williams, 2004: 644).

That such freedom and capacity for change can exist between Russia and the West is most reliably demonstrated in the work that has been done on EU-Russia relations in respect of the Northern Dimension. It is here too that Russia has shown itself capable of learning new values and overcoming old thinking.

The regional cooperation that has emerged in northern Russian regions and northern Europe is out of step with Russian emphasis on the need to respect and maintain the sovereignty of states. Sergounin identified five challenges that regional cooperation presented to the Russians: the need to see the North West as a potential zone of cooperation rather than conflict; the regionalisation of security, especially in terms of the effect this would have on the OSCE and NATO; scope to set the agenda in relations with the West; seeing regionalism as something other than a threat to what was conceived as necessarily a highly centralised federal state; and thinking on national sovereignty, particularly inasmuch as regional initiatives might introduce inequalities into the relationship between the various parts of the state (2005: 106-7). Most of the challenges are easily related to the post-modern condition. Sergounin asserted that a shift in Russian thinking occurred to the extent that the centre realised that regional initiatives do not seek to set the context for eventual devolution from the centre but rather to 'create a zone of stability and economic prosperity' (2005: 108). He went on to say that,

Russia needs to be engaged and not excluded from the new Europe. Moves of debordering and fragmented sovereignty are not designed to further marginalise Russia in European affairs, whilst regionalisation might actually help Russia to consolidate its space and place in Europe. Moscow's preferences have thus gradually shifted from semi-isolationist, unilateral options to a more cooperative model that favours multilateral solutions (as best
Sergounin’s conclusions suggest that Russia is able to accept at least some of the post-modern discourse - even in conditions where it is initially worried that its security and territorial integrity are under threat.

On the other hand, Prozorov asserts a brief and yet formidable criticism of post-modernism and of differences between the EU and Russia. He contends that the opposition of 'liberal-humanitarian' versus 'realist-geopolitical' arguments is a false one in that it 'ignores the way in which the former concerns are necessarily supplemented by the latter considerations' (2005: 127). As for the juxtaposition of the modern and the post-modern, this ignores that the EU governmental practices of “pooling sovereignty” are, in the strict sense, acts of sovereignty, in which its statist form may be amended but its decisions principle is reaffirmed rather than abandoned. Moreover, the very distinction of “modern” and “postmodern” policy projects between which a state might choose appears to rest on an ultimately “modern” instrumental governmental rationality (127-8).

This is consistent with Cooper’s assertion that the 'vocabulary of the modern world' continues to 'dominate our thinking' (2000: 16-17). It is not that Prozorov rejects post-modernism, rather he concludes that the EU and Russia operate 'two distinct logics of regionalisation' (2005: 128) and that, incidentally, Russia is as post-modern as the EU in respect of regionalisation, albeit by accident rather than as with the EU, by design (2005: 131). His analysis, however, shows that Russian emphasis on sovereignty is not incompatible with post-modern thinking. But even if we accept that the EU is a post-modern actor and Russia not, there is plenty of scope for further cooperation. Prozorov suggests that Russia’s 'otherness' does not preclude it from being a site for cooperation with the EU, quite the contrary. Rather 'legitimate difference' should be recognised, which itself 'entails a clear return to the pluralistic political ontology of classical realism' (2005: 137). This is an incisive criticism of the binary oppositions noted earlier and it
is one of the main reasons that I question the wisdom of emphasising the EU's post-modern credentials at the expense of Russia. Rather differences need to be negotiated and similarities emphasised in order to give the reassurances already spoken of.

To summarise before moving on to discussion of the New Cold War itself, the most significant contribution of the post-modern literature to this thesis is the argument that realities must be understood as constructed, particularly through language. In this vision, culture becomes an important variable that cannot be underestimated in our attempts to understand that 'language is constitutive of social reality' (Knutsen, 1997: 277). In the post-modern world the role of norms and ideas is elevated. Power takes on ideational connotations and the international world is conceived of as an intersubjective rather than objective reality, implying a large measure of dynamism and the capacity of international actors to shape their own practices. But the tolerance that this suggests should be a feature of the post-modern world has been curiously absent in the recent New Cold War discourse. My overriding hypothesis here is that it is the dawn of the post-modern era that gives voice to talk of a new Cold War. I argue, however, that this discourse is itself in direct contradiction to everything that post-modernity is about, demonstrating the lack of a necessary reflexivity and perhaps that no actor is truly post-modern.

6.3 THE NEW COLD WAR

Is Russia 'slipping back into its wintry shell of hostility and suspicion?' asked a Newsnight journalist in early 2008 (Wingfield-Hayes, 2008). Such questions have been heard more frequently in recent times (Galbreath 2008, Lucas 2008, Sakwa 2008, Burke 2007, Brzezinski
2007), following on from Stephen Cohen’s (2006) plea for pre-emptive action to avoid a return to Cold War hostilities. In this section, I consider, briefly, the basis for the discourse, the type of images of Russia that are invoked within it and the likely effects of such a discourse upon Russian foreign policy.

There is certainly a chill in relations between Russia and the West, rooted, on the part of the West, in perceptions of an increasingly assertive, even aggressive Russia. Sakwa (2008)classifies the arguments for a New Cold War into a series of strategic failures centred around five issues: nuclear proliferation, NATO enlargement towards Russia with no scope for Russian membership, expansion of the European integration project to states with an historical antipathy towards Russia that has manifested itself in attempts to undermine relations with Russia, the Russian moratorium on the CFE Treaty, and energy. Sakwa’s argument is well-rehearsed and seen from this perspective Russian actions become understandable as part of Hermann’s idea of foreign policy as a ‘sequence of exchanges’ (1996: 256). When asked what was surprising about Russian behaviour today, Lieven said ‘nothing’ (Newsnight, 2008) and in the foreign policy context this is precisely the case. But if that is so, the New Cold War discourse is mystifying.

Western perceptions of Russia are founded upon the belief that Russia pursues interests and the West values; in essence that the West pursues the Good while Russia does not since pursuit of the Good is a concept that is not associated with the pursuit of interests. In this Wild West prism, interests are bad and values are good. This analysis is simplistic but it is precisely that level of simplicity that characterises the New Cold War discourse. It is incompatible though with the post-modern discourse that argues for seeing that there is a multiplicity of views based on the multiplicity of extant cultures, and which should therefore be ushering in an era of
tolerance (Douzinas, 2006: 361). Perceptions of Russia in the New Cold War discourse are rooted in an increasingly transcendent post-modern discourse but it is most decidedly not one of tolerance. The influence of post-modernists, arguing as they do for an 'understanding of the constructed and contested nature of identities, knowledge and “truth”' (Paasi, 1999: 70) is felt, however, in the way that a reality – of Cold War - is being constructed through language. Paasi cites work 'on the construction of foreign policy discourses, ... boundary-producing practices developed by the state' (1999: 81) and Campbell's work in particular where 'representations of threats serve in turn to secure the boundaries of a state's identity' (Paasi, 1999: 81). The New Cold War discourse is invoked in order to serve (if the myriad of double standards and contradictions is ignored) as cement to the USA's and the EU's post-modern credentials, credentials which must be established in opposition to something, in this case, Russia.

Ultimately, however, the discourse shows that the USA and the EU are as much modern actors as Russia itself. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, a good deal of incisive and illuminating analysis is available to policy-makers and commentators: analysis which has made abundantly clear the complexities and vulnerabilities of the Russian situation and the nature of the voices the state must answer at home, not least over the still unresolved question of what it actually means to be Russia (see Duncan 2005, Petersson 2001, Prizel 1998). To conclude that Russia is now expansionist, aggressive, authoritarian, anti-democratic and a threat to western values and interests is to see Russia as a strong actor with a clear identity and a clear vision about its place in the world, a conclusion in contradistinction to everything we know about Russia. As for how analysts and politicians have been able to arrive at such a judgment, Sakwa lays the blame squarely at intellectual failure and goes on to express the fact that the Russian 'problem' is not one that can or should be ignored:

The debate over the onset of a new Cold War raises fundamental issues that we ignore at our peril. The attacks on America in September 2001 and the ensuing
"war on terror" accompanied by a broader disruption in world affairs, has distracted attention from perhaps the most important problem of our era: integrating Russia, China and other rising powers into an expanded global consensus. (2008: 265-6)

The problem, of course, is what that global consensus is and how it can be arrived at. It is likely that as long as the West is disinclined to engage with critiques of globalisation and of the post-modern discourse or to permit divergence from western values and policies, no consensus can be arrived at. From the West's perspective, globalisation is viewed as a benign or positive phenomenon that can be harnessed to the benefit of all and there does indeed seem to be a failure of intellectual imagination (Sakwa, 2008: 261) to see that the view is not the same from everywhere. The consequence for Russia has been a succession of poor images which support my claim that Russia has been marginalised.

6.3.1 Images of Russia

In the face of media images of Russia it is difficult to deny Sjursen's claim that Russia constitutes the 'other' for the West (2002: 505). What is difficult to understand, however, is the disappointment that seems to surround many of the proclamations made about Russian foreign policy today. The western position is a contradictory one, one cannot both treat Russia as the 'other' and then be surprised when it behaves as such. The New Cold War discourse runs the risk of consigning Russia to the outside, for the foreseeable future at least. It is not at all clear, however, that everyone, or even most people, see this as a desirable outcome. On what grounds, however, do I claim that Russia is being driven to outsider status?

The publicity for Lucas's book portrays perhaps the most damning image of Russia to be found today outside the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact countries. The Lucas website, for
instance, trailed the book by saying that, 'Russia's vengeful, xenophobic, and ruthless rulers have turned the sick man of Europe into a menacing bully' (Lucas, 2008a). In a Newsnight interview, Lucas referred to a Russian state run by ex-KGB members that was no longer on a western path, as evidenced by its suppression of the media and an energy policy that sought to divide the west European states. Lucas went on to claim that the situation worsened after he completed the book, citing the, 'contemptuous tone from Vladimir Putin towards both Europe and North America' (Lucas, 2008b). Leaving aside the rights and wrongs of likening Russia today to the dying Ottoman empire, Lucas's portrayal of a Russia disinclined to cooperative engagement with the West is a dangerous one that ignores the West's role in helping to create this 'menacing bully'. And it bears out the view that 'popular discourse is subject to the cheapening impact of consumerism, image-making and sheer disinformation' (Hill, 2003a: 240). Nor is Lucas's wider position a viable one. The Cold War was based on mutual threat. Bullies are usually weak and Russia cannot both be the sick man of Europe and constitute a threat of anything like the magnitude of the USSR in the Cold War.

But Lucas is not alone in suggestions of a ruthless Russia. Nowhere has this been more clear than in consideration of the Litvinenko case and here claims are, admittedly, given substance. But still there seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding of the Russian position. It was difficult to see what was achieved with the British government's expulsion of the four Russian embassy staff in July 2007 and the tit-for-tat retaliation of the Russian government was unsurprising. What was extraordinary, however, was the British stance on the request for the extradition of Andrei Lugovoi, the main suspect in the murder of Litvinenko. In a BBC News article, for instance Russia was accused of refusing to hand over Litvinenko (2007a). Much further down in the article, Russia's right under the European Convention on Extradition 1957 to refuse extradition was set out in brief, but the article did not go on to explain the more pertinent point, i.e. that under the Russian Constitution Russia cannot extradite its citizens.
Extradition would require a change in the Russian Constitution, something that would have received the full weight of western condemnation if it had been done to give Putin a third term in office. Nor is the Russian stance any different to that of the USA, which also refuses to extradite its citizens. Yet none of these considerations prevented the British Ambassador from suggesting that the Russian Constitution was open to interpretation and asking for its revision (in Sakwa, 2008: 250). For the Russians, the question of Lugovoi’s extradition became inextricably linked with that of Berezovsky and Zakayev and Britain was not on firm ground, as the Russian Foreign Minister, Alexander Grushko, pointed out,

We are being punished for observing our own Constitution, which is not just unfair and unacceptable but even contradicts common sense. Russia has asked London to extradite 21 Russian citizens, including businessman Boris Berezovsky and envoy of Chechen separatists Akhmed Zakayev, accused of grave crimes. None of them was extradited. If Russia acted in the same manner as London, over 80 diplomats would have been expelled from the British embassy to Russia (in Halpin, 2007).

Berezovsky's status in the UK is, indeed, a disturbing one. He is regularly wheeled out to make comment on Russia and was given much airtime during the height of the discovery of Litvinenko's poisoning and the immediate aftermath of his death. One wonders how the UK would respond if an equivalent personality, who had made no secret of his or her desire to overthrow the British government, were given as much primetime airtime in Russia as Berezovsky is in Britain.

Russia has also come under attack for its apparent retreat from democracy. Writing for The Guardian, Tisdall spoke of Putin’s winning of a second term, claiming it was achieved 'largely by denying media access to rival candidates' (2004). While irregularities in Russian electoral practices undoubtedly occur, such comments deny implicitly Putin’s enormous popularity at home. There is no evidence to suggest that Putin would not have won a second term even in the face of a more effective opposition given full access to the various media. The question of
a possible third term for Putin exercised the media even more, with titles such as 'Kremlin plots to secure Putin a third term' (Blomfield, 2005) far from uncommon, despite the fact that there was far more evidence to show that any plotting was being undertaken by parties within the Duma rather than by Putin himself (Yasmann, 2007). A number of different possible scenarios were mooted for how Putin might hold on to power. Once Medvedev became the clear favourite media headlines featured him as the 'puppet' of Putin, a loyal servant who would clear the way for Putin's return to the Presidency in 2012 (Faulconbridge, 2008, Franchetti, 2008, Rodgers, 2008). Few credited Putin with abiding by the Constitution and those who did portrayed this as motivated by fear of the western response and unfavourable comparisons with Belarus's President, Lukashenko (Blomfield, 2005). Such analyses are interesting: 'menacing bullies' rarely care about how those they are bullying perceive them. Rather, Putin evinced a strong inclination to ignore western speculation about his future and Russia's democratic future, arguing, 'I don't interfere in your politics, please don't interfere in ours' (in Steele and Harding, 2007).

The interference to which Putin referred though is an inevitability in a globalised and post-modern world, where the line between the domestic and the foreign is increasingly blurred. The Russian insistence on the sovereignty of states is typically out of step with these two discourses, the question is, of course, whether both do indeed represent something of a sea change in international politics or whether they are smokescreens for a renewed western expansionism. The answer, of course, depends on where one stands but currently Russia suffers greatly from western depictions of it as behind the times, less progressive, backward even, as a BBC News report on Russia's planting of a flag under the North Pole shows. The report quotes the Canadian Foreign Minister as saying, 'This isn't the 15th Century. You can't go around the world and just plant flags and say “We're claiming this territory”' (2007b). In fact, Canada is one amongst a few states, including Russia, who have made claims to this
territory so that while the nature of the action was somewhat extraordinary, the claim was not and the Canadian outburst is just one more example of how Russia is feared and treated as a renegade state.

Military capacity and most particularly nuclear proliferation is one more site where the Russians have come under much criticism and been accused of returning to the Cold War era but here too the West, most particularly the USA, is guilty of double standards, as noticed by Russian analysts. According to Frolov, the Bush administration has justified its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty on the basis of the Treaty being a Cold War hangover and therefore unnecessary in the post-Cold War era (2007). Frolov’s claim that the same must necessarily be true for the CFE Treaty is a valid one and yet Russia's 2007 moratorium on this Treaty is cited by the West as evidence of Russian aggression, giving fodder to claims of the existence of a New Cold War. The two positions are decidedly not compatible and in seeking explanations of an allegedly more aggressive Russian foreign policy stance, one does not have to look much further than the incompatibility of western claims, some might say, hypocrisy. Some security experts see US actions as precipitating the CFE crisis:

The existing deadlock in bilateral talks, largely provoked by the tough US START III negotiating position, has significantly narrowed freedom of manoeuvre for Russian supporters of ABM Treaty modification and a START III deal. Therefore, to date, Moscow's traditional diplomatic and military establishment has continued to firmly and unanimously reject and modification of the ABM Treaty (Pikayev, 2000).

If it is true that Russia operates a Realpolitik, the US refusal to see how its actions could only be interpreted as a threat to Russia is mystifying. Even so, this did not have to lead to new divisions: 'Despite the tensions, the uneasy state of the relationship need not augur a renewed cold war', primarily on the basis of relative Russian weakness (Brzezinski, 2007). Which is not to say the dangers have gone unnoticed: 'The U.S. should avoid careless irritants, like its

30 Frolov is Director of a Moscow think-tank, the National Laboratory for Foreign Policy.
clumsily surfaced initiative to deploy its missile defenses next door to Russia' (Brzezinski, 2007).

The summer of 2008 brought more negative images of Russia. US and Russian ambitions in the Caucasus were laid bare when the frozen conflict between Georgia and the separatist region of South Ossetia flared into open conflict. After Georgian troops went into South Ossetia, Russia responded by moving in to defend the human rights of the South Ossetians. Billed as a humanitarian intervention, the Russians undermined this argument by engaging in what was understandably seen as a disproportionate response by the move deep into Georgian territory. In the context of the post-modern European environment, where reliance on military power and geopolitical manoeuvring are seen as relics of the past, even praise can be construed as criticism: The Times Online (Binyon, 2008), for instance, congratulated Russia on its 'mastery' in this chess game but the values it cited were those of the modern rather than the post-modern. Others, though, were unequivocal in their condemnation, accusing Russia of 'ethnic cleansing' (Kouchner in Swaine, 2008), and as a result,

Russia's image plummeted in the West, where Russia was perceived as a forced, complicated and unpredictable partner, and in other parts of the globe, where Moscow's conduct was seen as the one lacking a clear line (Lukin, 2008).

These perceptions were not justified, however. In many ways the Russian response was predictable and consistent with what it had been saying for many years. Following on from the conflict, President Medvedev set out five principles underpinning Russian foreign policy (in Reynolds, 2008a): one of these, the need for multipolarity, has been argued since at least 1991. And although the method was questionable at best, the action in Georgia was consistent with that. Russia made clear that the future of the European space would have to be decided not just by the USA in conjunction with the EU, but with Russia too. This was 'real rather than declared, multipolarity' (Lukin, 2008).
6.3.2 Constructing a Cold War

Lucas's image of Russia is a highly biased one and his New Cold War rhetoric highly dangerous in terms of how it interprets events. Without lingering too long on discourse analysis per se it is widely accepted, not least by post-modernists, that language has its place in the construction of meaning:

Language in its multiple forms is a human artefact through which the world is contingently comprehended and through which the human self is created. Although actions and thoughts exist “out there”, they do not become practices or behaviour without the injection of meaning and interpretation (Freeden, 1996: 42).

It is on this basis that I claim that the New Cold War discourse is a dangerous one that runs the risk of constructing something that does not a priori exist. Cohen’s 2006 article on the New Cold War was an attempt to alert decision-makers to the prospects for a new Cold War unless pre-emptive action was taken. Cohen was highly critical of US foreign policy and laid the blame at the US door for the deteriorating relationship with Russia and, in fact, praised Putin for resisting US actions seemingly calculated to see a return to the Cold War era, especially in the context of a domestic situation where certain groups would welcome such a turn in fortunes (Cohen, 2006). However, later writings on the subject suggested that a Cold War was occurring and this time Russia was seen as culpable. Rather than, like Cohen, praising Putin for resistance, Shevtsova claimed that Putin had conceded to the Russian nationalist element and warned:

There are no guarantees that the state, having started a campaign of anti-western and anti-American mobilization, will be able to stop it down the road. The Kremlin hopes that it can control the genie it has let out of the bottle, but it is unclear if the Kremlin’s insiders can succeed (2007: 899).

If Shevtsova is right, western discourse, if it continues in the vein of what is essentially warmongering, will find answering voices in Russia that Medvedev will not be able to resist and
this would be disastrous for all sides. Whether the Obama-Medvedev combination will be influential enough to contain the voices of those intent on stressing difference and division remained to be seen.

Analysts see it as vital that new divisions are not allowed to emerge in Europe (Reisch, 2003: 27) and even critics of Russia, such as Tisdal (2004), acknowledge that 'the west needs Russia' and suggest that so far this need has underpinned the western European conciliatory rather than condemnatory stance towards Russia. It is precisely this that is needed now to offset the increasingly vocal interpretations that so recently spoke of a New Cold War, and the EU has much that it can draw on to show the potential for effective dealings with Russia.

6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS

Since President Obama took office, talk of a new Cold War has dissipated. I have considered it here, however, on the basis that it highlights the extent of the difficulties that continue to face Russia and the West today. Those difficulties arise primarily in the context of a stronger Russia and a post-modern discourse that paints Russia as something different from the West. The differences emphasised relate primarily to values. There are three aspects to my argument and contribution. First, that any perception of a division between the West and Russia has been constructed through the post-modern discourse. Secondly, that notwithstanding this discourse, Russia and the EU at least share many commonalities and to some extent share values too. Finally, where there is divergence of values, the divide between the two is not so great that it cannot be overcome, as research into the Northern Dimension has shown. On the grounds that Russia wants to be considered European and does share at least some of the values of the EU,
there is scope to be optimistic about the future relations of Russia and the EU, and by extension, with the West more generally. The alternative is a stark one. In speaking of what characterises a Cold War situation, Weir said that it would mean there was 'no chance of reasonable dialogue'. There would be consequences too for our ability to analyse, instead we would 'merely line up along the lines of our geo-political sympathies and that could be quite disastrous' (2008). For those who had forgotten these aspects of the Cold War era, a visible reminder came in 2008 and the conflict between Russia and Georgia.

The New Cold War discourse can be understood as part of a continued attempt to elevate, cement even, those values defended by the West and the EU particularly, and to make them the undisputed foundation for further collective action at the international level at the expense of state sovereignty as traditionally considered. The basis of the post-modern literature is easily found in global change. The first change relates to the end of the Cold War. With the end of bipolarity and policies of deterrence that were deemed necessary to keep balance and therefore peace in the world, the West has found itself in a position where it simply can intervene in humanitarian crises without the risk of plunging the world into massive conflict. The West has therefore made the calculation that while it might be criticised and questioned over its motives, intervention means that conflict will remain localised. The second change relates to globalisation. Progress in technology and communication means that states can no longer act disingenuously and pretend ignorance of a crisis and they are therefore more answerable to their publics. As Holland (2003) showed, western governments today are more answerable to their citizens, and other states' citizens than ever before. In lauding the principles of Liberalism and Democracy for so long throughout the Cold War they have now found themselves required to live up to their own rhetoric (Schimmelfennig, 2001).

Such developments are not necessarily evident in Russian thinking: Russia has not been held
to account by its society to the extent western states have; nor has it had much cause to feel
that it is less vulnerable today than it was during the Cold War. Thus, it is less constrained by
its own public but does remain susceptible to the constraints of its own suspicions and Realist-
defined view of the world. The biggest blow to Russia's global prestige and status has come in
ideational terms where Russia has been perceived as defending 'the concepts, values and
vocabulary of the modern world' at a time when these have been replaced with the quite
different concepts, values and vocabulary of the post-modern world. Not that Russia always
helps itself. In 2008, any of the moral high ground won by its key diplomatic role in resolving
the 1999 Kosovo crisis was lost when Russia invoked that event as defence of its actions in
Georgia. In saying that what was good for NATO was good for it too, Russia applied the same
double standards it had accused NATO of. The argument in Georgia was essentially that Russia
was no worse than NATO. It was a missed opportunity to show that it was better.

To understand fully the extent of the battle which Russia is facing we have to go back to the
end of the Cold War and the lack of 'closure' that ensued, as set out in Chapter 4. The
uncertainty that ensued left the path open too for the persistence of old images and old
arguments. Russia has long argued for 'closure', and that at some point history needs to be set
aside in order to move forward. Its argument has always been that this would not be possible
while the Cold War constructs remained in place. When speaking of NATO, the IMF and the
UN, Lukyanov says:

They should have passed into history ... and given way to something else. However, the “new world order” proposed by the cold war winners provided
not for the creation of new structures but for the extension of the former
western organisations to the whole world (2008).

Such organisations also helped old images of Russia to persist, as well as Cold War metaphors
and discourse, such that it was relatively easy by 2008 to speak of a New Cold War.
Medvedev’s declaration (in Hider, 2008) of Russia’s readiness, if not its desire, for one, echoed
the frustration of the old proverb that one may as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb.

There are two possible routes, then, to Russia’s possible transition to post-modernism. The first relates to Russia’s own desires and objectives. There is no reason, despite being on a distinct Russian path, to think that Russia has given up on its claim to be European. If it truly wants to give credence to such a claim, it will have no choice but to commit to post-modern values. The second is that Russia may not have a choice. The force of international, and particularly European, developments might be so overwhelming that Russia will have to embrace the post-modern world in order to survive and prosper. In either case, it is the EU that is best placed to lead Russia through the transition, for to date it has been the EU that that has managed to find some common ground with Russia and been able to assure it of benign intentions. In the 2000 FPC, the Russians do not interpret enlargement, the Euro, the CFSP or ESDP as threats to Russian security. Indeed they claim to see these as ‘an objective component of European development’, a sentiment not afforded to NATO enlargement (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a). This, coupled with the Northern Dimension initiatives, shows there exists already a strong measure of trust between these two actors.

Much of the New Cold War discourse has arisen as a consequence of perceptions of a stronger, more assertive Russia. That Russia is stronger and more assertive is undoubtedly the case. That the West missed opportunities to engage Russia more deeply than it has is also so (Shevtsova, 2007). Brzezinski (2007) claims that Russia’s growing assertiveness is explained by the failure of the USA particularly to take it to task for unacceptable actions, Chechnya, involvement in Litvinenko’s murder and that of the Russian journalist, Politkovskaya, and media suppression. Thus, if a new Cold War is emerging, the West must take a large share of the responsibility for this. However, my argument centres more around the idea the globalist and post-modern theoretical frameworks at best represent examples of theory running ahead of reality and at
worst of theories couched in universal terms but which in fact serve only western interests. Within these frameworks, ideas are constructed which in actuality are only notionally adhered to or when it is easy and convenient to do so. Russia has fallen victim to an attempt to construe the world in more progressive, revisionist terms, despite much evidence to show that the modern world intrudes rather more than is admitted under this vision. Thus, Russia is a marginalised state, and, as the next chapter shows, marginality carries as many dangers for the centre as it does the margin.
CHAPTER 7

MARGINALITY

Here I bring together many of the claims that I have made in respect of Russia in previous chapters. The primary linking factor between the chapters on Values, the Post-Modern era and this one is context. The full understanding of Russia's foreign policy behaviour that I seek to achieve in this thesis is contingent, I have hypothesised, upon reaching a full understanding of the foreign policy context. As Chapter 2 revealed, it is nothing new to argue for the importance of context in FPA. However, it is perhaps precisely because its significance is self-evident that it is not always, or even mostly, explored sufficiently. One objective in this thesis is to act as a corrective to that deficiency. Additionally, I have attempted to establish frameworks for analysis for Russian foreign policy. For instance, the Values chapter was most obviously concerned with providing a framework for the analysis of Russian foreign policy values, with the expectation that over time such a study would enable analysts to adopt a more subjective perspective of Russia and to understand the forces for both change and continuity that affect Russian foreign policy behaviour. This chapter, however, adopts a theoretical framework that is, in a sense, more temporally located and thus more focused on aspects of change, a focus given impetus by the fast-changing international events of the post-Soviet period.

The marginality framework is selected for its explanatory power in respect of Russia in the post-Soviet period. For the majority of this period, Russia has been in a weak position. In brief, Russian weakness is posited on the evidence of Chapter 4, and what was said there about Russia's uncertain, though improved, economic situation, its shrinking demographic, and health problems. Finally, and coupled with its defeat in the Cold War, externally, it has few true
allies, the Commonwealth of Independent States has benefited it little and it suffers a legacy of poor relations (Modelski, 1962) with neighbouring states who have not forgotten the Soviet years and, for some, even the years prior to that. Russia's main strength lies in its extensive natural resources and its consequent potential – now beginning to be realised – but natural resources are not inexhaustible and even Russian economists are reluctant to predict long-term economic health on the basis of current conditions (Anon: 2005). On the one hand, I claim that after 1991 Russia is marginal to Europe and that it is only when we view Russia through this lens that we understand some of its more aggressive actions. On the other hand, this does not mean Russia will always be marginal – on the contrary, marginality is a shifting status – as the discussion below reveals. The recent literature (Parker 2008, Parker and Armstrong 2000) on Marginality has argued persuasively that a place on the margins does not equate to a place of weakness: Thus a Margin is distinct from a Periphery, the latter being a passive position, reflecting the constructs of the Centre; a Margin, on the other hand, has enormous scope to affect and therefore even shape the Centre. That this is true of Russia is shown by the fact that, despite the relative length of the debit side of my iteration, Russia has managed to win, in William Odom's words, 'several seats at the table' (1998). In contrast to Chapter 4, therefore, in the final chapter on the Kosovo crisis, I argue that Russia manages to put its weakness aside and to exhibit a good deal of strength. The marginality framework shows how this has been possible.

The term 'margin' is used to focus attention on the possibility that what lies on the edge has autonomous, active effects beyond its marginal space, including upon what is central in the space where it is marginal. In this sense, 'marginal' is distinguished from 'peripheral', a more passive condition of being shaped by and/or excluded from the center.

While offering something different to a Values or a Post-Modern approach, Marginality is not

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31 I claim, in fact, that Russia has been marginal to Europe for a much longer period than this. Since this thesis is concerned with the period after 1991, however, I limit the claim to the post-Soviet period.
incompatible with either since it, like them, speaks of the possibility of change, of capacity to shape and influence, and of flexibility. The chapter begins by outlining some of the concepts of marginality that exist today, before moving on to consider those accounts of marginality that posit that it 'implies a site where bold innovation and nimble action are possible' and so require us to see that some strength lies in weakness (Hartnell, 2000: 29). Here I outline the three hypotheses that underpin claims I made in earlier chapters: i) that Russia is both weak and strong; ii) that a position on the margins brings opportunities for manoeuvres; iii) that as the centre extends, it weakens relative to the margins. Next, I discuss the basis on which a centre can be identified versus a margin, arguing that neither can be identified except in relation to the other. This discussion therefore necessarily encapsulates the idea of what constitutes a margin and what a centre. I then consider the ways in which Russia can be deemed a margin to the identified centre, Europe. The centre is determinable only through consideration of those circumstances that makes Russia marginal in the first place: This might be in respect of economics, territory, culture, identity, ideas. Ultimately, I conclude that Russia is marginal to 'Europe' or at least that idea of Europe which is encompassed within the European Union. In the concluding part of the chapter, I consider again the three hypotheses that underpin many of the conclusions arrived at in the case study on the Kosovo Crisis but which also shape the understandings of Chapter 4 on Context.

7.1 CONCEPTS OF MARGINALITY

At the most basic level marginality is constituted of a relationship between two entities – a centre and a margin (Parker, 2008). Russia is obviously considered as the margin here, Europe as the centre. The conceptualisation of Europe as centre is problematic inasmuch as defining
Europe is problematic – this issue is returned to in more detail below. However, to begin, the claim is that marginality refers to distinctions between the (dominant) centre and the margins and the nature of those distinctions therefore require explication about what makes a margin a margin, for instance, it may be economic asymmetry. Marginality is not only relative, it is subjective. Whether or not an entity – group, state etc. – is marginal or not will depend on whose point of view is being considered. Others may consider Russia to be marginal but that does not mean that is how it sees itself. It is worth asking therefore whether there is an objective test for marginality. This is possible for economic marginality, simply by reference, for instance, to reliable sources on relative economic positions, but the answer is less clear-cut in respect of political, social and/or cultural marginality (Cullen & Pretes, 2000: 223).

A margin may be a margin in respect of more than just economic situation. Indeed, a margin / centre relationship can occur at a great geographical remove, making political marginalisation contingent upon geographical marginalisation. For some sub-national groups or regions, for instance, power may be located too far away and little or no notice taken of the particular needs of certain groups or regions, such that they are marginalised. In turn, the distance might mean that little challenge is levied at the centre so that marginalisation continues and perhaps intensifies. Alternatively, geographical, marginalisation might result from proximity to an area long riven by conflict (this is true for Romania and Bulgaria and their positions in/ or near the Balkans) and cause economic and political marginalisation too. Geography can account for marginalisation in other ways too. It decides issues such as climatic conditions, natural resources, ability to sustain large populations, factors for many African states, for instance. Geography may also account for late industrialisation and modernisation etc., which leads to marginalisation in a number of spheres of activity and which impacts on political decision-making and the effects thereof.

32 See, for instance, the Human Development Index and its variable of economy by Leimgruber in Jussila et al, 2001: 13.
Marginality is likely therefore to be related to the political field as well. Here, concepts of power, influence and authority become important. Political power is seen by Realists and Liberals for instance, as contingent upon various capabilities: military capacity and economic capacity respectively. However, explanations of power that relate more to questions of influence and authority reveal that power is more often acquired through the strength of ideas, such that with regard to political marginalisation we must look certainly to possibilities of measuring relative military and economic capacity but, and this may be harder to measure, also to ideational influence (Kaarbo, 2003). It is primarily in this context that marginality offers not only an explanation of weakness but also an explanation for change in the relative situation of margins and centres for if the centre’s ideas are accepted by the margins they inevitably are less marginalised, this has proved to be the case for some central and eastern European states after their accession to the EU. Finally, marginality might be based on socio-cultural factors, with obvious links to political marginalisation. If politics is deemed to be related to any society and its culture then expectations of seeing some mirroring of both culture and society in the politics of the entity concerned are not unreasonable. Marginalisation might be a result therefore of a feeling of alienation of particular cultural values and practices and how these become manifest in political life. Measuring this is far more difficult.

Each of these forms of marginality is discussed separately and in brief. However, division of marginality into aspects of marginality is ultimately not helpful, I conclude, given the interlinked nature of the different aspects, as the discussion makes clear. This reflects the changing context of the international system where lines between the domestic and foreign spheres have become increasingly blurred, as the Post-Modern literature argues, and where the global economy and competition for resources increasingly define the scope of decision-making in any number of fields.
7.1.1 Economic Marginality

Gino Germani says of marginality and poverty that 'both concepts (and realities) are closely related' (Germani, 1980: vii). Since poverty is an undesirable condition, marginality must necessarily be so too, analysis supported by Jussila & Majoral who treat marginality as synonymous with weakness (2001: 1). Such accounts view any group's marginalisation as based purely on figures related to economics but these, I argue, are essentially structuralist arguments and therefore account for continuity far more than they do change. They do not adequately explain the capacity for change that economically marginal groups within Europe have demonstrated is possible. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, formerly on the economic margins of Europe, now constitute a part of the centre on account of their membership within the European Union (they may now still be on the margins of that centre but with insider rather than outsider status – discussed in more detail below). Aside from this aspect of 'escapability', in viewing economic marginality as structural analysis is forced to consider the nature of that structure. Marginality may not be a mere neutral process, a fact of nature rather than a human construction, it may be the case that structures are put in place that result in marginal status for some, and not purely in economic terms.

These latter types of arguments are most commonly seen in relation to debate about the centre versus the periphery. Wallerstein's (2004) World Systems theory and its roots in Marxist and Gramscian thought, for example, examines how economic disparity can be manipulated so that it becomes part of a strategy of marginalisation and/or exploitation. What distinguishes the marginality debate from that of the periphery is primarily the capacity of the margins to exert influence and pressure on the centre and so improve their position relative to it. The periphery-core arguments inherent in Marxist thinking relate to questions of a structure that permit the core to exploit the periphery but which does not consider the reverse to be true. Additionally,
the periphery is seen to have little choice in its status whereas work on marginality admits the possibility of a position on the margin as being one of preference rather than the result of structure and exploitative tendencies (Parker 2008, Leimgruber 2001).

Cullen and Pretes (2000) have in their work, surveyed geographic and social science practitioners of marginality, and conclude that the two aspects are related and linked to economic conditions. Thus, focus on geographic marginality, that is position in relation to markets and type of resource available, shows that domestic access to primary rather than secondary resources contributes to economic marginalisation through economic dependence on external sources (Cullen & Pretes, 2000: 217). Marginality of this type is firmly identifiable as being in relation to the nearest centre of economic power, dictated by trade exigencies. This is likely to result in a more fixed state of marginalisation. This is particularly true if the centre manages to take a hold actually within a marginal state. If a state finds itself in a position, for instance, where a large proportion of its business is foreign-owned, its capacity for leverage is reduced. The same is true where the economic situation of a state is such that it is dependent to a great extent on foreign aid. This was the case for certain central and eastern European states, their accession to the EU, on the other hand, offered the hope that ultimately they would become a firm part of the centre, even if they remain somewhat marginalised compared to certain member states. Thus these states traded a less favourable form of marginalisation (on the outside) for a more favourable one (on the inside). Further, I contend that their chances of escaping marginality altogether were greatly increased by accession, as hypothesis two (discussed in more detail below) makes clear.

Remaining with those on the outside, economic aid and assistance rarely comes without strings. Development aid is increasingly made contingent upon certain reforms, in any number
of fields, as the EU’s development policy makes obvious:

The goal of development policy is to encourage sustainable development that helps to eradicate poverty in developing countries and integrate these countries into the global economy. In addition to these economic and social objectives, there is a political plan: to help reinforce democracy and the rule of law, whilst promoting respect for human rights and basic freedoms (European Union, 2001).

The EU dominates those states in receipt of its aid not only in economic terms but also in social, cultural and political terms. It becomes difficult then to see these developing states as having anything but relatively less power, influence or authority but this is no longer linked purely to economics and it is less easy to quantify. The debate about the probity of EU development policy is a contentious one, focusing on the benefits or otherwise of the imposition of a free market economy, even where that is to be established on a gradual basis, on the type of products or resources selected for favourable export terms and on the exploitation of cheap labour (Gowan, 2002). Here the ideological basis of any arguments about marginality is a factor, one could equally argue that developing states are at least better off as a result of EU policy than they would otherwise be and their position may improve relative both to the centre but also to other marginal states. Marginality is therefore a relative concept in more ways than one and we may have to speak not only in terms of more than one type of marginality but also degrees. For the moment, however, it is clear that economic situation cannot be the sole focus for it is not necessarily the start and end point for margins.

The next typology considered is that of geography where the question of whether marginality is conferred or natural is examined and where it becomes clear that marginality might be a desirable condition and one where the relationship between centre and margin is defined as much by the margin as by the centre.
7.1.2 Geographical Marginality

Many of the ways in which geography can create marginal status are self-evident. In addition, they are numerous and likely to be specific to situation: an overly hot climate, for instance, presents its own set of problems as does an overly cold one. In the Russian context, the quick economic recovery and growth experienced in the 2000s was proof of how natural resources can act to a state's advantage. However, Russia's climate is not an easy one, with much of the territory enduring permafrost, making extraction of natural resources difficult while the huge territory creates problematic and expensive transportation conditions. Additionally, Russia has been reliant on its neighbours for transit of its energy supplies, which has come with its own set of problems. By the same token, and more generally, climate can render much territory either undesirable for habitation or impossible; groups living on such land will find themselves marginalised by virtue of small numbers, and relatively poor access to the centre, which may be able to ignore their demands. This form of marginalisation relates to a more natural form of marginalisation than one that is the result of the actions of other groups or states. That is not to say that geographical marginalisation is always natural or unlikely to be manipulated but it is not necessarily conferred by anyone in the first place. Here then the limited utility of a focus solely on geographical marginality becomes obvious, As with the economic typology, links must be drawn with other forms of marginality. In order to discuss marginality in the context of what challenges it represents, either to the centre or the margins, or both, some consideration must be paid to relations between margin and centre.

If a group is marginal to the centre of power within a territory but is marginal only because of distance from the centre of decision-making and in all other respects is quite prosperous, healthy and contented, there would seem to be little or no point in discussing geographical
marginality. Iceland, for instance, can be classed as a weak country on the basis of geography and lack of markets and investors. Even while it maintains international links it simultaneously desires to limit the possibilities for outside interference (Leimgruber in Jussila et al, 2001: 17). This is Iceland's choice, not a product of an outside entity's policy. In other words, geography (and economics) only matters in so much as how it affects the ability of groups or states to achieve their objectives. However, in considering motivations for the devolution process in the UK, it is clear that this was, in part at least, a consequence of a long-term feeling of marginalisation. While relative geographic distance from the centre may have put in place basic conditions for a Scotland or Wales on the margins, the repercussions of a perceived strategy of marginalisation on the part of the centre in the form of political decision-making drove these countries to seek decision-making powers of their own. In this instance, geographical marginality became important once coupled with a perception of a wider marginalisation process that encompassed the economic and political spheres.

7.1.3 Political and Socio-Cultural Marginality

The conflation of these aspects is a reflection of the close relationship between them as stated above. Here, I treat marginality as related more to issues of social construction, such that, I claim, it is the relative power of ideas and their influence that determines whether a region, state etc. is marginal or not. This analysis is supported by Germani's conclusion that marginalised populations within states were usually disassociated from the values, standards and conduct of behaviour accepted, broadly-speaking, over the national space. Thus, for Germani, '[t]he very lack of national identification appeared to many observers as a distinctive feature of the marginal condition' (Germani, 1980: 4). Those on the margins do not 'fit' with
perceptions of identity that issue from the centre. Essential here is the view from the centre. The problem in the context of this thesis is that the centre is not immediately obvious in relation to Russia as a margin. Later discussions deal with this in more detail but at a more abstract level I claim that the centre might be quite diffuse, actually incorporating a number of territories. Given the current predominance of liberal democracy, I claim that western states, including most western European states and North America constitute the centre by virtue of the fact that it is their norms and standards that are reflected and carry most weight in most international organisations – UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO. Thus the constitutional structure (Reus-Smit, 1999) in place is a western one. All those states 'disassociated' from these norms and standards constitute the margins. The ability evinced by states such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia to overcome such disassociation successfully, however, says much about the surmountable characteristics of marginality.

Returning to the tenets of foreign policy, context is all important to understanding here. I attribute the predominance of the West to certain effects of globalisation and post-modernism where it is increasingly evident that the centre perceives a need to export norms and standards of behaviour, and to the post-Cold War era where there is a willingness (and freedom) on the part of the margins to accept these. Any claim that adoption of the centre’s ideas by certain margins will result in those margins acceding to central status would be very debatable under current conditions: all things are rarely equal. Rather a cautious analysis suggests that a more likely outcome is one of decreased marginality relative to what came before but marginality nonetheless in relation to the centre: hence the importance of conceiving of linkages between the margins and centre or of degrees of marginality. However, as stated before, there is some capacity for a shift in location of the centre. In this sense, the usefulness of marginality lies in the ability to see the fluidity rather than fixedness inherent in all manner of relations, interstate, national, familial etc. and consistent with the continuity and change debate in FPA. Thus
the marginality framework is compatible with FPA and, indeed, may contain lessons for foreign policy in terms of emphasising the susceptibility of decision-makers to a changing international context rather more than analysis is used to admit.

7.2 STRENGTH IN WEAKNESS

Much work on marginality has emerged from studies on globalisation where globalisation is seen to have contributed to the emergence of margins but this work has often neglected those effects of globalisation which have produced cooperative initiatives. While for many marginality had previously equated to weakness, the identification of fluidity has seen a reconceptualisation of marginality in more recent times and as a result margins must be seen as having agency and thus scope to impact and shape the centre as much as the centre can impact and shape the margin (Parker 2008, Hartnell 2000, Parker and Armstrong 2000). What is clear from these accounts is that marginality leaves room for us not only to conceptualise but also to visualise the space we are attempting to understand. Some margins will be located closer to the centre than others. We can therefore speak of degrees of marginality, although Andreoli’s idea of ‘linkages’ might be more appropriate (cited in Jussila et al, 2001: 10). It is possible to understand that as the centre spreads, the margins become less marginal or the linkages stronger. Alternatively, as the centre shrinks and an increase in margins results, consequences can be hypothesised, for instance that the centre might look increasingly less central since the extension of the centre might also be seen as a dispersal of power, and that this would afford a state on the margins the opportunity to capture more influence. There is a limit to how far the centre can extend its power, especially when it is encroaching on the backyard of other entities. For instance, the extension of US influence into the Caucasus will ultimately spread US resources very thin, while Russia has decades of experience in, knowledge of, this region and
benefits from a geographical proximity.

Marginality has more to offer though than a mere exercise in visualisation; it has a fluid quality, that offers, for some, leverage and therefore it is escapable in some, if not all, respects. Parker refers to the capacity of the margins to 'bite back' (2000:8) such that the centre cannot afford to ignore the margins. This, it is argued, is the case for Russia after 1991. I do not deny those studies which assert that some aspect of weakness attaches to a margin but I do embrace the possibility, even the necessity, of seeing marginality as something that can at least be turned to advantage. Admittedly, many of the benefits of marginality have only been felt by states located relatively close to the centre, but such patterns offer the hope that cooperative initiatives might extend further and further out from the centre. Where the centre of power remains state-centric, marginality may well remain a problem in terms of the degrees of difference between the centre and the margins. But for those states or regions close to centres of power where power has been accumulated through integrative processes, the situation is likely to be different. An organisation such as the EU offers the possibility of membership and therefore integration, or at least the establishment of cooperative policies. The motive for participation is the real economic and political benefits that accrue to those who participate – benefits extendible to those on the margins. The logics of integration can be said therefore to comprise arguments that can be harnessed by 'outsiders' as well as 'insiders'.

It is on the basis of these arguments that I consider the three hypotheses already outlined in relation to Russia's marginality: i) Russia is simultaneously weak and strong; ii) a position on the margins does not confine the margins' room for manoeuvre, indeed, it might bring new opportunities; iii) extension of the centre results in a dispersal of power, weakening the centre and strengthening the position of the margins.
Taking the first of the three hypotheses, as already discussed in Chapter 4, two major changes highlight Russian weakness relative to Europe: Russia's Cold War 'defeat' and European enlargement. The accession to the EU of the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) particularly rendered these states more European, by contrast pushing Russia even further to the margins of Europe (although it remained strong relative to CIS states, whose status within Europe, like Russia's, was also undefined). A contraindication to this 'weakness' lies, however, in Russia's prominent membership in a number of influential international organisations, the UN and G8, for example, and its privileged (relative to others) relationship with others of which it is not a full member, such as NATO and the EU (Odom, 1998). It is in the face of this paradox that I hypothesise that in relation to Europe, Russia appears simultaneously weak and strong. Some insight into the puzzle lies in the enlargement experiences of the CEECs.

The European enlargement process had shown clearly that weak states (the CEECs) not only could manoeuvre in such a way as to become far stronger relative to their former situation, but in their weak state could achieve concessions more normally associated with a strong state's achievements through negotiation. A place on the margins, so often equated with weakness, had been turned to one of strength and influence (Parker 2000, Browning & Joenniemi 2004). Accordingly, the second hypothesis is that while enlargement had, prima facie, detrimental effects on Russia, it also gave Russia new opportunities for manoeuvre. In relation to the first hypothesis, then, it is no surprise that Russia has found strength in weakness.

This leads to a third hypothesis, that the centre is also vulnerable to change. This suggests there is a limit to how far the centre can extend its power, especially when it is encroaching on the backyard of other actors, without risking its own security. Additionally, success in terms of exporting political models can serve as both the centre's weakness and strength. As more states adopt these principles and therefore create more linkages, (Andreoli, cited in Jussila et al,
2001: 10) extending the realm of the centre, so the distinctions between centre and margins are less pronounced, making the margins less marginal. The story is not so positive for the centre. As it expands, it encounters new margins, offering them opportunities for manoeuvre. The centre’s potential for insecurity has not gone unrecognised by the EU:

The bigger the Union is, the greater its global interests will be. We will have new neighbors and longer borders with old ones. At the same time, we will be getting nearer to zones of present or recent instability (Verheugen, 2003: 3).

If expansion weakens the centre, it follows that the relative power of what is on the margin will change and the capacity of these new margins begins to look more significant in terms of how they might impact upon the centre. Thus, this third hypothesis informs the first (showing how a marginal position can be one of strength and not just weakness) as well as the second, revealing the scope for manoeuvre that exists on the margins.

Russia is therefore treated here as a state on the margins of Europe but one with enormous potential after 1991 for ‘impacting fully upon the centre’ (Parker, 20008: viii). This impact has both direct and indirect effects. Russian actions have caused it to initiate or participate in debate about contemporary challenges to states. Over the Chechen conflicts, for instance, Russia has raised the spectre of religious fundamentalism and extremism, while the 1999 Kosovo Crisis and the NATO bombing of Belgrade caused Russia to question the future direction of the international system in respect of the relative priority of state sovereignty and humanitarian intervention. In its actions too regarding supply of energy or its role in conflict prevention and peacekeeping and peacemaking activities, Russia has managed to convey an impression of real strength. Indirectly too, its influence is profound. Russia’s past actions have caused neighbours to be suspicious and fearful, and so provide a partial explanation for the CEECs’ turn westwards.
Certain other questions remain. In the next section, I consider how to determine what constitutes an outsider versus an insider and also whether an entity can be on the inside and yet still be marginalised. These questions are set within the context of a wider discussion of what Russia is marginal to.

7.3 DETERMINING THE CENTRE AND THE MARGIN

Having discussed some of the causes of marginality, I have considered partially at least how to determine whether something is marginal or not. Before making anything like a final judgment on this, however, I must clarify what the 'thing' (group, state) is marginal to. In other words, the centre must be identified vis-à-vis the margins. This, as has already been pointed out, is not always self-evident and will be dependent on which of the formulations of marginality is primarily referred to, bearing in mind it might be a combination of these. But I must also decide whether the centre remains the centre in all respects – geographical, social, political, legal etc., for while it may have been possible in previous centuries to identify a centre that achieved just this, in the globalising world this is less possible.

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a tendency, not least on the part of Russia, to speak of a unipolar world (Brooks & Wohlforth 2002, Splidsboel-Hansen 2002: 445). This, however, overestimates the capacity of the USA to dominate all aspects of power while underestimating the effects of globalisation to date and the general capacity of the international system for change, particularly in fortunes. Such assertions also fail to look beyond immediate sources of power. Domination cannot be confined only to the military and economic spheres. Cultural (in its widest sense) domination must also be achieved. The problem with this is that
success can be the dominant power’s weakness, as discussed above. If political domination equates to the export of certain models of political organisation, or the export of certain political beliefs and values, it follows that as more states adopt these principles and therefore create more linkages, they begin to look less marginal.

Further consideration must therefore be given to how marginal status might be assigned. It could be determined externally, i.e. from the centre or by other marginals, or internally, that is from the point of view of the margin in question. In the context of trying to decide how much room for manoeuvre might be afforded to margins, the issue is an important one. In relation to the contemporary international system there is also the question of whether marginality is more prevalent in a uni-polar system than in a bi-polar or multi-polar one. Populations seen as marginalised at the national level are deemed in some cases to be marginalised because they have reduced political participation and have no power to force their voice to be heard. Extrapolating to the global level, some states might have reduced rights of participation in important international organisations and so have no power to force others to take account of them, they are therefore marginalised. If they are economically poor, they have less opportunity to influence policy elsewhere by making aid or investment contingent upon some desired change, and thus also have the potential to be marginalised. At inter-state level, it is perhaps easier to see marginality as commensurate with power or rather lack of it.

In certain cases then, determination of marginality will be dependent on the notion of power operated. If, for instance, it is considered that just one or two states exert real influence over the actions of a majority of states, this would say something about how power is perceived and therefore the field of investigation would be an obvious one and determination of what constitutes the centre and what the margins a relatively easy task. As, however, focus shifts to
less defined territory, for instance cooperative organisations and their impact, marginality becomes more complicated but also more useful in conceptual terms. Here, marginality can be seen in relation to centres made up of 'things' such as norms, rather than in clearly defined territorial terms. Perception of a state's marginality might then be contingent upon some ideological bias. Russia, for instance, might not be marginal in its values if a global poll of values is taken. But in respect of post-modern, European values, as already discussed previously, it is more difficult to see the Russian state as comprising part of the centre; here, at the moment at least, it looks marginal in its commitment to and practice of these values. Therefore, if the centre operates post-modern values, it is from the point of view of these values that Russia is marginal. Russia may well not agree. The centre is described here as taking a possible four forms: The EU, NATO/USA (since Russia sees NATO as the USA in most respects), USA, and the West. It is here that Mourtizen's notion of a 'salient environment' comes into its own, for it is in respect of where Russia is geographically located and in respect of its FP objectives that the centre can be most reliably found.

7.3.1 Determining Russia's Marginality

Russia's geographical status is a confused one, with the Russian space occupying a Eurasian territory rather than a uniquely European or Asian one. Therefore, Russia naturally sits on the margins of both Europe and Asia. To complicate matters further, however, the line between East and West is itself a confused one:

The frontier between East and West is not just a line on a map or even a geographical border. Instead, it is a constantly shifting frontier moulded in the course of history by changing political conditions and cultural identities (Mikkeli, 1998: 157).
This suggests that context again is vital to any determination of whether or not we can consider Russia to be European. Mikkeli claims that Russia has been excluded from Europe, partly on the basis of its relatively poor economic condition but also because, '... the Europeans' bewilderment and fear of Russia in fact runs far deeper than this' (1998: 158). Despite this exclusion, the vast bulk of Russia's foreign policy attention since 1991 has been directed westwards rather than eastwards and Russia has rejected any attempt to construe it as something other than European. Prima facie, however, not least because of its unclear identity, Russia looks marginal to the rest of Europe. If Russia is ever to be fully acculturated, avoiding the state of 'marginal man' (Gennani, 1980: 25-26), it will have to decide whether it is European, Asian or whether there is room for something distinct, i.e. Russian. There are signs, as discussed in Chapter 3, that the latter is true, but even in this scenario, Russia may well remain on the margins of Europe although, like Iceland, this could be a consequence of Russian choice rather than Europe's discrimination. If Russia continues to seek a strong role in European decision-making, it will have to find some means of overcoming the lenses of 'bewilderment and fear' (Mikkeli, 1998: 158) through which other states view it and so 'reduce' its marginality through the construction of relations with other states, peoples etc.. For the moment, however, Russia remains on the margins of Europe, and, what is more, I claim that it is as a marginal outsider rather than insider, as the discussion below explains.

Returning to more typological considerations, determining Russia's economic marginality is also not a complex matter. In the 1990s Russia was heavily reliant on foreign aid and loans, which gave the lenders some leverage over both Russia's economic future but also its political future. This resulted in an inability to act autonomously (insofar as that is possible) and inevitably made Russia look weak. Despite far stronger economic performance in the 2000s, Russia remains marginal to the fifteen states that were members of the EU prior to the 2004 enlargements. It is surpassed too by some of the new members, including Czech Republic,
Estonia and Slovenia (World Bank Group, 2009b). World Bank statistics place Russia in the category of 'upper-middle-income economies', along with Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, for example (World Bank Group, 2009b). It should be noted, however, that in the database of 2004 World Bank statistics, Russia was classed as a 'lower-middle-income country', accompanied by states such as Albania and Turkey (World Bank Group, 2004) and so has clearly demonstrated its capacity to improve its economic situation. In GDP terms, Russia performed well in 2008 relative to all EU Member States, except France, Germany, Italy and the UK (World Bank Group, 2009c). However, it must be remembered that Europe is Russia's salient environment and the EU the 'centre' within Europe. Thus, outperformed in individual GDP terms by four Member States, Russia lags far behind the overall GDP of the EU. Turning to another key performance indicator, FDI, Lane shows that 'West European countries are in a different league' (2009: 103) to Russia. The figures for 2006 show that Italy attracted almost a billion dollars more FDI than Russia and Ireland lagged behind Russia by only $18.6 billion of Russia's total $197.6 (Lane, 2009: 103). Additionally, while Russia's economy (until the recent global economic crisis) has experienced major growth in the 2000s, warnings about its need to diversify are far from unusual (World Bank Group 2009a, Anon 2005), as noted in Chapter 4. It is clear therefore that Russia is economically marginal to the EU, although the case is again made for thinking of marginality as having degrees; not all the EU member states are firmly situated in the centre, but these are marginal insiders as opposed to Russia, a marginal outsider.

As for what Russia is actually marginal to in Europe: In a sense, it is marginal to the idea of 'Europe', it lacks a European identity and a history and traditions based in events such as the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. From the perspective of western Europe, Russia's experiences have not been Europe's experiences. Perhaps more importantly, the rush of the former satellite states and especially the former Soviet Baltic states to accede to membership of the EU and NATO was precipitated as much by a desire to escape the clutches of Russia as
any other motivation (Sjursen 2002, Fierke & Wiener 1999). This again served to underline Russia's 'separateness' from other European states. But even before this, as Sjursen has shown, the former satellite states portrayed themselves, and were portrayed as the 'kidnapped West', kidnapped by the 'other', the Soviet Union (2002: 506). The EU's origins in the attempt to overcome conflict within Europe cannot be forgotten either:

It has often been asserted that the European integration process itself constituted the most outstanding example of desecuritisation in contemporary international politics ... Such a view presents eastern enlargement as another important episode of desecuritisation through integration. This argument rests on the premise that in the aftermath of the cold war both the EU and Europe needed EU enlargement in order to avoid fragmentation and conflict, to guard against a future characterised by Hobbesian mistrust and recurrent wars (O'Brennan, 2006: 162).

Evidence that Russia sits in contrast to such an image can be found in the Hot War with Georgia in 2008 and in its internal politics with the Chechen Wars. Indeed, O'Brennan claims that the EU's very decision to enlarge eastwards was motivated by a desire 'to balance the instability created by the fragmentation of Russian power and the lack of stability in Russia's domestic politics' (2006: 165). While the origins of Russia's status as the 'other' lie far back in its history, such perceptions are reinforced in the period of the Cold War hangover by the fact that Russia is not deemed to share the dominant norms, standards etc. of the West (Barysch 2007, Tangiashvili 2006, Lo 2005, Rahr 2004b). The belief in the existence of 'European' norms and principles is manifested in the existence of a highly institutionalised, post-modern Europe: This is the Europe to which Russia is marginal.

This is not to say that Russia cannot move closer to the centre. But if it is to reduce its own marginality, it will have to cooperate within a highly institutionalised framework that itself speaks to much more than questions of political and economic systems but to questions of ethics, purpose, interests and values — in short, to questions of identity. And lest there be
doubts about whether this form of marginality is surmountable, it is worth remembering that other states now firmly considered as western European once constituted the 'other' in relation to Europe. Neumann points out that this was true of both Germany and Spain at points in their history (1996: 208). The desire that most states evince to escape their own marginal status shows that marginality might progress the institutionalisation of regions at a higher rate than would otherwise be the case.

Currently, however, Russian values either are not or are not believed to be consonant with the type of cooperation demanded by membership within the European Union above all, but also NATO. Belief in 'European' norms and principles is manifested in the existence of a highly institutionalised Europe where Russia's place is not assured. European institutions are reluctant to extend full participation rights because,

...its locus of power, institutional design and conceptual basis places [Russia] at some remove and thus in a position where it is constantly trying to catch up with the evolution of European affairs (Davies in Webber, 2000: 52).

Those organisations which wield the most power and influence in terms of decision-making are of most significance in assessing Russia's marginality. Contenders for power include the Council of Europe, EU, NATO, and the OSCE but here the EU and NATO are considered to be the most significant. This is primarily on the basis of their relative exclusivity but also because of their capacity for decision-making that affects most of Europe in most spheres of activity, i.e. political, economic and military. While Russia is a member of the Council of Europe and OSCE, it is not a member of either the EU or NATO. Russia has solid relations with both these organisations but the relationships do not allow Russia any overtly effective say over decision-making, even where decisions made by both the EU and NATO have huge implications for Russian national interests. Vladimir Baranovskii of the Institute of World Economy & International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences, confirmed not only Russia's
marginalisation but also its own recognition of this state of affairs when he talked about
Russia's 'role in the emerging world order':

It is of a clearly "oligarchic" nature: major decision-making belongs to a small
group of states. Russia's painful emotions are born by her own doubts about
her own possibility to join the group of the chosen and whether or not she will
be accepted as such by its members (1999: 9).

Having once decided that Russia is marginal to certain centres, it is worth perhaps also
considering whether that marginality is less natural (a result of geography) than constructed (a
result of an intention to marginalise). Then, if it is constructed, there is the question of whether
Russia is responsible for its own marginal status in respect of certain centres. For instance, if
Russia were content to fix its interests on its own territory and relations with its immediate
neighbours, the near abroad, rather than seeking to extend its influence over the entire
European space, it would not be marginal in most terms, as in Leimgruber's discussion of
Iceland. In relation to the Russian near abroad, Russia does not look marginal at all, in fact, for
many years it has constituted the centre to which neighbouring states are marginal.

Perceptions of Russia's expansionist tendencies therefore might be said to have contributed to
its marginality elsewhere though: for example, the application of former Warsaw Pact
countries for membership of the EU was a reaction to Russia's previous negative FP actions, as
symbolised most palpably in the military interventions in Hungary in 1956 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968. Their accession has brought the EU to the very borders of Russian
territory, creating the impression at least of increased marginality for Russia. Russia's position
is always likely to be assessed in relation to those with which it is competing, therefore the
more it seeks to influence decision-making in Europe, the more likely it is to be analysed in
relation to Europe. I therefore do not simply surmise that it is the comparatively small
proportion of Russia's territory that is European that has facilitated the state's marginalisation
by western powers, Russia bears some responsibility too.
But there is evidence also to claim that Russia's marginality has been constructed by external bodies, most notably through the enlargements of the EU and NATO. Webber says,

...enlargement, even in an incremental fashion, creates new forms of exclusion in its wake as first, states who want membership are denied it and, second, states who do not seek it find themselves looking askance at the dominance of the enlarging NATO/EU-oriented group (2000: 32).

It should be remembered that the Russians themselves do not seem to see EU enlargement as an attempt at the marginalisation of Russia. In its Foreign Policy Concept, Russia refers, inter alia, to EU enlargement 'as an objective component of European development'. The same cannot be said of NATO / the USA.

The linking of NATO and the USA reflects, as has been stated, the Russian perception that NATO promotes US preferences. Much of the Russian opposition to NATO must therefore be understood as rooted in Russia's mistrust of US policies. The 2000 FPC is helpful here, although it is important to remember the context within which this was written, i.e. after the 1999 Kosovo Crisis and NATO enlargement to the east.

... new threats and challenges to Russian national interests are arising in the international sphere. There is an increasing tendency towards the establishment of a unipolar world structure dominated economically and militarily by the USA (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a).

The proximity of the reference to new threats and challenges and the US domination unmistakeably sends out the message that the motives of the USA are under suspicion by the Russians. The Concept goes on to say,

In deciding the principal questions of international security, the stakes are being placed on western institutions and fora of a limited composition, on the weakening of the role of the UN.

The effects of Kosovo are clear here, the Russians reiterating their oft-made point in 1999 that
the NATO airstrikes were in direct contravention of international law and signalled a lack of respect for those fora which do not permit US dominance, such as the UN.

Although Russia cannot itself avoid a perception of marginalisation, the problem of breach of state sovereignty is presented in the 2000 Foreign Policy Concept as a problem for all states not included in the process of decision-making. In a March 1999 statement in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the then-Foreign Minister Ivanov spoke of Chinese and Indian support for the Russian position in regard to the NATO airstrikes against Belgrade, linking this support to America's objective, 'to establish a unipolar world order in the 21st century, in which the fate of people would be decided in Washington' (Ivanov, 1999: 5). He went on:

Therefore, in defending today the rights of Yugoslavia to sovereignty, we are defending the future of the world and of Europe from the newest form of neocolonialism, so-called "Natocolonisation" (Ivanov, 1999: 5).

In such a way Russia uses its own lack of input at the international level not only to highlight its own marginality (where marginality is seen as an inability to participate in decision-making processes) but also that of the majority of other world states. It is this type of message, the presentation of marginality as a shared problem and therefore one that should concern us all, that has potentially most power, since it is a message that might bear fruit in other states' experiences. If Russia can demonstrate that it, a former super-power, the world's largest state with huge potential, can be marginalised in international fora, other states might too begin to see the dominance of the USA as a real threat to their own interests. In such an instance, the USA might find that marginalised states present less of an opportunity for exploitation than a potential source of challenge and therefore destabilisation. If this is the perception of the USA, we would expect to see adjustments in US policy to limit the challenge. Thus, marginalisation offers the chance of gain. This appears to be what is being attempted within BRIC and the SCO, although it is far too early to make conclusive statements about the effects of this.
Obvious candidates for examples of intention to marginalise Russia lie in US policies in Georgia, the Ukraine, Poland and the Balkans, as well as NATO enlargement itself. For the Russians though, the Kosovo Crisis represents the point at which US motives became unarguable. Andrei Fedorov (President of the Foundation for Political Research and director of the political programmes of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy in 1999) said,

For the first time over the last ten years one of the sides in this world has not only secured a military-political victory, but is using the results rather openly to shape its own new policy on a global scale. We need to honestly tell ourselves that the Kosovo crisis was the de facto beginning of a new political division of the world, the depth and limits of which will be determined above all by the USA and NATO. (1999:19)

Fedorov went on to detail the consequences of this as Russia’s own marginalisation,

In Russia the role of the UN today is acquiring perhaps an even greater significance than before in as much as it is very likely one of the few, if not for us the only, international mechanisms within the framework of which we can act sufficiently actively, consistently and what is more important, to really influence the processes of decision-making over very diverse problems. (1999: 21)

The temptation exists, of course, to interpret all this as ultimate weakness and to conclude that Russia has been so marginalised that it has no effective voice in Europe and is losing much of the influence it has traditionally held in its own near-abroad. When making determinations of marginality and deciding on the consequences of this, we must, however, also be aware of the room for manoeuvre that exists. For some states, marginality might be inescapable as long as they operate alone, for Russia, though, weakness does not have to be a permanent condition, nor does it have to bind Russia to courses of action that are constrained to any extent greater than we would expect under 'normal' conditions. There are limits, it is argued here, to how much Russia can be marginalised. If it continues to be driven back eastwards, Russia may well end up looking to eastern neighbours for support and finding it, which may represent a more severe challenge to both EU and NATO. There is evidence that all sides have recognised the dangers and possibilities of the situation.
In the next section, the Russia-EU relationship is briefly considered as offering an example of how marginality can actually lead to cooperative, even integrative impulses. EU enlargement has required an effort on the part of the EU to court Russia, in an effort to alleviate any Russian anxieties about what, precisely, the motives of the EU are. As such, new initiatives have been made to achieve this and to convince Russia that it is less of an outsider than a partner of the EU. It has been in Russia's interests to cooperate with the EU, on an economic level but also on the socio-political and security levels. Here, therefore, I also consider the type of gains that have been made by the Russians.

7.4 RUSSIA AND THE EU

Russia's Middle Term Strategy of 2000-2010 points out the value of maintaining good relations with the EU. General statements relate to the importance of the EU for enhancing Russia's image in the world. The EU is seen as a crucial player in the European security architecture and vital to Russia's economic interests and its desire to establish a market economy. Many benefits have already been felt in this regard but further gains might also be made, outside of those linked to EU aid programmes: one consequence of EU enlargement might be the same maquilladora forms of foreign investment experienced by many of the states of central and eastern Europe before their accession to membership of the EU (Gowan, 2002: 39). Some other advantages have already been felt close to home. The Baltic States are an obvious example, where Russia failed to protect its own citizens living on the territory of these, after 1991, independent states, to the degree that Russia looked increasingly weakened and ineffective, with the possibility of losing legitimacy as far as its diaspora was concerned. The Baltic states' accession to the EU made Russia look marginalised, particularly as these
states were so antagonistic towards Russia, but gains were also extracted (Gower, 2001: 79). The EU was able to put more effective pressure on the governments of the Baltic State countries to ensure protection of rights for their minorities, including Russian nationals, so improving an embarrassing situation for the Russian state. Further afield, Russia hopes that through the established relations of the EU with other economic and political powers, Russia too will have a voice. In section 1.6 of the Strategy, for instance, Russia itemises the role that the EU can play in securing full membership of the WTO for Russia. This objective was met when, in 2005, amid suggestions that the EU was 'soft' on Russia, the two concluded the bilateral deal required by WTO entry criteria (Kernohan & Vinokurov, 2005). The discourse of the Common Strategy also showed how close relations with the EU might bring dividends, not only in encouraging the internal democratisation process but in its use of language that suggested Russia was indeed part of Europe (Timmins, 2002: 84).

Even if Russia is seen as sitting on the outside (see, for example, Trenin, 2004: 18), the very fact that it must be taken account of suggests it belongs more within Europe than outwith. Any attempt by the EU to 'other' Russia is met with the Russian claim that it is European. Therefore, for the EU Russia may sit on the outside margins of Europe but for the Russians it sits, at the very least, on the inside margins. The gap, I argue, is more likely to be narrowed in Russia's favour by three factors: i) Russia's intractability on its European identity; ii) the shaky claim of some of the EU Member States to Europeanness; iii) the eastwards enlargement of the EU which has brought the EU difficult neighbours about whom Russia knows more than most EU Member States. Even if Russia remains on the outside margins, it must be taken account of, but it would seem to behove the EU little to antagonise Russia by persisting in a process of othering. Russia has not failed to realise, and articulate, this.
7.4.1 Overcoming Weakness

It is primarily through reference to threat that Russia has opportunities to overcome its relative weakness with the EU. *Prima facie*, with no veto in the EU or NATO it has little influence over decision-making in Europe. However, opportunities still exist. With no application for EU membership in sight, Russia is not susceptible to tactics used by the EU against the CEECs. But it does have similar weapons to the CEECs at its disposal, and more. The CEECs 'forced' enlargement through 'rhetorical action' reminding the EU of its founding ethos and shaming it into committing to its own rhetoric (Schimmelfennig, 2001). In promoting itself as a values actor, the EU had little choice but to enlarge (Sjursen 2002, Schimmelfennig 2001, Fierke & Wiener 1999). Russia has played on the fact that the logic of integration comprises arguments that can be harnessed by 'outsiders' and 'insiders'. It has most successfully used rhetoric to underline its vulnerability to a variety of challenges and problems, such as terrorism and organised crime. In speaking of the 'increasing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure...dominated by the economy and power of the United States' (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, 2000a), Russia draws attention to its weakness so as to emphasise the inherent dangers to *all* states in a unipolar system.

Russia's purpose in setting out these challenges is clear. It points to the existence of common threats to *Europe* in order to emphasise that they are best faced within an EU-Russia cooperative framework. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, Russia also applies something of the politics of fear. There are two aspects to this. Firstly, in emphasising weakness Russia points out that strength can be found through multilateral efforts, which coincidentally affords the EU reason to pursue a relationship on a pragmatic basis, rather than on the troubled issue of shared identity. Secondly, Russia reminds the EU of European history's darker aspects and of the solutions found:
It was in Europe that military-political coalitions and alliances arose and fell apart, the fight between which led to the bloodiest of wars. On the basis of this tragic experience a unique culture of regulating problems and conflicts on a collective lawful basis, in a spirit of tolerance, mutual respect and a balance of interests was formed in Europe (Ivanov, 2003a).

Ivanov further referred to Europe's potential as a global force for good, its security system an example for the international system, underlining Russia's place as partner, not opponent. He combined the positive with an implicit threat: that history can be repeated when past lessons are forgotten.

Russia's most effective strategy in 'winning its seat' with the EU has lain in forcing it to confront Russia as marginal. There are limits to how much the EU can afford to let Russia be marginalized given the capacity of margins to 'bite back' (Parker, 2000:8) and Russia's lethal size and perceived unpredictability. It too is faced with unstable borders and uncertain relations with its near abroad. The Russian logic of interdependence is too persuasive to be ignored and demands the EU respond with strategies to prevent large-scale Russian marginalisation. The weakening of the Russian state would invite disaster for Europe itself. Full integration is not on the agenda, but cooperation has intensified - a relationship underpinned most recently by the 'Four Common Spaces' arrangement.

Finally, there is the question of the EU's own rather unclear identity. Russia is relatively 'disassociated' from the centre's norms and standards and is deemed different on cultural grounds (Hosking 2005, Neumann 1996), but the CEECs' ability to overcome such disassociation says something about the surmountable character of marginality. The EU's refusal to define what type of political entity it is and to set clear boundaries leaves the margins room to manoeuvre. Development of the ESDP and deployment of troops, to Bosnia, for instance, also represent a challenge to its image as a civilian actor. If the EU will not say where Europe begins or ends, and embarks on actions that leave its 'civilian' nature open to question,
room is left for others, including Russia, to claim itself as European. The EU has sought to evade the issue of its boundaries and in doing so leaves open the question of what it is to be European. Its attempt to clarify what it is by saying what it is not, i.e. Russian, has been stymied by the Russian refusal to accept that.

Despite the question of relative identities, the Russia-EU relationship is a relatively untroubled one and Russia has benefited rather more than it necessarily had to from EU policies since 1991. This is not to suggest that there are no problems but they are not on the scale of those experienced with the USA, for instance, and are felt most bitterly at the level of bilateral EU Member State relations, for example Estonia and even the UK, rather than at the level of the EU as a whole, which continues to seek to engage Russia. The answer to why this is so lies in considering marginality as a possible destabilising influence on the centre, which constrains to a greater or lesser extent the centre's capacity for action. Conflict has, from the early beginnings of the EU, been deemed to be the biggest single threat to European territory. Prevention of conflict is the very *raison d'être* of the EU, it cannot ignore the presence of an unstable and unhappy state on its borders and certainly does not want to be instrumental in making it so. Peace is not the only founding principle, the seeking of economic prosperity is another. Necessary to this, in the eyes of the EU are good relations with outside states, notwithstanding accusations of fortress Europe. Besides which, Europe's dependence on Russian energy supplies impel the EU to build relations that demonstrate an absence of threat. Full integration may not be on the agenda but an intensification of cooperation is called for and the EU has, by and large, responded in this vein. In return, EU enlargement has not been perceived by Russia as a policy aimed at undermining Russian interests. The nature of the discourse to be found in sources such as the EU-Russia Joint Statement would suggest that the EU's strategy has been successful.
Taking the first of the three hypotheses, two major changes highlighted Russian weakness relative to Europe: Russia's Cold War 'defeat' and European enlargement. The accession particularly of the central and east European countries made them look more European, pushing, by contrast, Russia even further to the margins of Europe. On this basis, I hypothesised that in relation to Europe, Russia appeared *simultaneously* weak and strong and some insight into how this could be so lay in considering the enlargement experiences of the CEECs. The European enlargement process had shown clearly that weak states could manoeuvre themselves into an improved situation, achieving concessions in their weak condition more normally associated with a strong state's negotiations. A place on the margins, so often equated with weakness, was turned to one of strength and influence (Parker & Armstrong 2000; Browning & Joenniemi 2004).

Accordingly, the second hypothesis was that Russia gained new opportunities for manoeuvre as a consequence of enlargement (notwithstanding, *prima facie*, detrimental effects) and other changes. Regarding hypothesis (i), it is no surprise that Russia found strength in weakness. This led to hypothesis (iii), that the centre is vulnerable to change, suggesting limits on how far it can extend its power without risking its own security. Success in exporting political models can serve as both the centre's weakness and strength. As more states adopt these principles and so create more linkages (Andreoli cited in Jussila et al, 2001: 10), distinctions between centre and margins are less pronounced, making the margins *less* marginal. As the centre, in this case the EU, expanded, it encountered new margins and offered them opportunities for manoeuvre. The third hypothesis therefore informed the first; showing how a margin can be simultaneously strong and weak, as well as the second; revealing the scope for manoeuvre that exists on the margins. Therefore, while Russia is treated as a margin to Europe, it is as one with enormous
potential after 1991 for 'impacting fully upon the centre' (Parker, 2008: viii)

I do not dispute that marginality is about weakness, but to a limited extent. The weak can manipulate their situation and force concessions from those more dominant. In the globalised world, marginality becomes more evident, perhaps, but so too does the necessity for cooperative initiatives, even integration. The avoidance of conflict, in particular, becomes the *sine qua non* for centres of power since conflict impedes economic prosperity and has a host of possible other undesirable consequences. This gives unprecedented opportunity for marginal actors to demand and receive concessions from centres. This does not mean that marginality will be completely overcome, although it might be, but it does offer the opportunity for an increase in linkages between the centre and the margins. Thus, instead of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer, the rich may well continue getting richer but the poor get richer too.

Such conclusions also have implications for arrangements across territories. In Europe, the example of the EU has caused much speculation about how to discuss territory, i.e. whether the nation state is in terminal decline and the creation of a federal super-state imminent. Beyond what is happening within the EU itself, a 2003 initiative resulted in the creation of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy, with strategies extending well beyond the European space into Africa and the Middle East. This was followed in 2009 by the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), a regional policymaking venture aimed at Eastern Europe and directed at civil society.33 Such initiatives are not solely directed by a desire for new markets and more influence, they are also recognition that centres of power will inevitably become a target of resentment and so

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33 It should be noted that the EaP is an initiative to watch since it has the capacity, if successful in its ambitions, to antagonise Russia and other affected states. Its inclusive nature suggests it may give voice to separatist groups in the South Caucasus, for example. Additionally, advice given to actors through the EaP is likely to include measures to reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas, which could be interpreted negatively by Russia as an attempt to reduce their influence in the region.
effort is made to extend benefits beyond the territory of the centre itself.

It should be emphasised that Russia is not treated as an example of a typical marginal state, it clearly is not. For instance, in relation to its nearest neighbours it is not a marginal state, quite the contrary. Nor is it marginal to all centres of power. Neither am I suggesting that Russia is always reacting to the policies of others, it undoubtedly formulates its own objectives and I would not deny that those objectives are often formulated through pragmatic, hard-headed thinking. However, it is the nature of Russia's concentration on Europe and the West and particularly its claim to a European identity that motivates (often unfavourable) comparison with western states. That said, it is clear that even large, still relatively powerful states can be marginalised and can therefore be forced to resort to methods designed to alleviate their marginal position. The tools such a state has to achieve this may be different but the objective is the same; to force the centre to take notice, to facilitate the establishment of better routes of participation between margins and centre and so increase the margin's possibilities for influence.

For Russia marginality might bring the benefit also of a shift in how it is perceived. Remembering Mikkeli's assertion that Europeans view Russia with 'bewilderment and fear' (1998: 158), it may be that a perception that it has declined in terms of influence and authority will cause relations to be established on a somewhat more equal and more effective footing. Events in the Baltics, the Balkans and the disputes over Kaliningrad, combined with the increasing foothold that the USA is gaining in the Caucasus, can only lead others to conclude that Russia is fast losing influence. The positives that arise from this condition must not be overstated, this is a volatile area and the line that Russia must tread is of tightrope proportions. But perception of Russian losses might lead some states to believe they can have a more equal
relationship with Russia. Following the German example, Russia might see positive results in the form of intensification of cooperation, so leading to stability as differences are confronted and acknowledged.

Some contribution is already made to the Marginality literature by the simple application of the framework to a state that most would not now consider to be weak. Weakness comes in different forms, as this chapter has made clear. What is paradoxical in the Russian case is that Russia draws on a discourse of weakness in order to extract concessions from other actors and yet behaves in a fashion designed to show that it is not weak. It is often, however, in its weakest moments that it finds greatest strength, as became most evident during the Kosovo crisis of 1999. In the next and final chapter, I apply the theoretical aspects of the Values approach, the Post-Modern perspective and the Marginality framework to Russia's FP actions during this crisis in order to understand why Russia behaved the way that it did. Here the contingency of values upon the post-modern and Russian marginality upon values and the post-modern perspective is most clearly revealed.
CHAPTER 8
THE 1999 CRISIS IN KOSOVO

This chapter considers the impact of the NATO airstrikes on Russian foreign policy behaviour. As I have theorised in earlier chapters and now seek to demonstrate through this case study, once we attempt to see the world from the Russian perspective, it becomes extremely difficult to deny the evidence that values, part of what Northedge refers to as 'the ethos of a nation' (1968: 12), are an important influence upon decision-makers and the building of Russian foreign policy. Values, as Chapter 5 has shown, are formulated as a result of a mix of pressures. These relate to the internal environment, the 'salient environment' (Mouritzen, 1996), relations with other states and international organisations. In addition, particular events might be the catalyst for a reprioritisation in values. In a time of transformation, such as the post-Cold War world, the context of the period in which that state is operating is all-important. Certain events might cause a real shift in values even where those values were identifiable as being long and deeply held. Alternatively, events might cause specific values to become even more deeply entrenched as attachment to them is seen to be justified. For Russia the Kosovo crisis was and remains a pivotal event. In seemingly opposing the attempt to privilege human rights protection over that of a state's sovereignty, Russia set itself up for accusations of being a modern, backward actor in a post-modern, progressive world.

In the years since the crisis, it has become evident that it marked a shift in the relationship between Russia and the West. Within a few months of the end of the NATO airstrikes, Russia rewrote its National Security and Foreign Policy Concepts, as well as its Military Doctrine. Further, in its aftermath, Putin came to power, seeking strategic partnership with the West but, boosted by a swiftly recovering economy, determined also that this be a relationship based on
equality. For the first time since 1991, a *Russian* foreign policy was pursued. The crisis was one of revelation for Russia and it is not coincidental that Russian foreign policy subsequently moved into its third phase of comparative Russian distinctiveness. During and after the Kosovo crisis, a level of clarity was achieved that had not been the case in the preceding eight years. Russia now saw the extent of the reduction of its global influence following its 'defeat' in the Cold War; it saw that it would have to compete not only with the USA but also Europe for its previous sphere of influence; it saw too that the international system itself had changed and that a new constitutional structure was being put in place. As important as Kosovo was to the Russians, it was no less significant for the rest of Europe: 'Kosovo and its neighbourhood are not some place out there in Europe's backyard, but rather they constitute its inner courtyard' (Judah, 2008: xiii). While I have focused throughout this thesis on the misunderstandings that surround Russia, it too failed to understand in 1998 and 1999 that, following on from their failure to act quickly and decisively over Bosnia, the EU Member States particularly could not afford to wait for a diplomatic solution to be found while hundreds were dying and thousands being displaced.

Russia's involvement in the crisis was rather more personal than for almost any other key actor. It has a long history with the Serbs based on a sense of shared Slavic identity and a fight against a common religious enemy, such that Serbia can be seen as part of Russia's wider community (Modelski, 1962). In the first part of the chapter I outline the nature of the Russo-Serb relationship, concentrating particularly on the claims to shared identity and values since conclusions here are vital to how Russia's attitudes towards the NATO intervention is perceived; i.e. as arising out of interests rather more than values. Next, I set out a brief chronology of the crisis and particularly Russia's role in it. Russia's diplomatic efforts, I conclude, were an integral step on the path to ending the airstrikes and thus the loss of life. However, I consider arguments too that this amounted to a betrayal of Belgrade and that
Russia worked to protect its own interests at the expense of those of its fellow Slavs.

Another key aspect that must be considered is the question of the role of international law. Despite long debate, as shown in this section, the legality of the airstrikes is no clearer today than it was in 1999. The debate, however, is important here because it highlights the depths of differences that existed then between Russia and Europe. It is important also in respect of post-modernity since it is about the relative priority of state sovereignty, non-intervention and territorial integrity over the defence of human rights. For the Russians, this was not just about its sphere of influence, it was about its own actions in the Chechen Wars and so the debate acquired additional pertinence and urgency.

In the penultimate section, I consider how the values of the modern era were juxtaposed with those of the post-modern era, with focus, of course, on the behaviour of Russia in respect of its values. My earlier conclusions about Russia's less than crystallised identity and its claim not only to modern but also post-modern credentials, make it less than surprising to see here that Russia does not hold a fixed position (whether in support or opposition) in respect of post-modern values and I account for this in a number of ways. Firstly, Russia is forced to react to a swiftly-changing international situation, this shifting ground has an effect on Russian behaviour and how rigidly it maintains its stance in respect of values. Secondly, and related to the first point, Russia is forced to re-evaluate its priorities as it fails to achieve certain of its objectives, and here the pragmatic nature of its FP is most visibly seen -- which does not, as I explain, mean it does not have values. Thirdly, its own identity problems and other domestic circumstances are such that Russia finds itself heavily constrained and again, given continual external developments, it is sometimes forced to react and rethink its opportunities very swiftly.
In the final part of the chapter, I apply the Marginality framework and the three hypotheses as discussed in Chapter 7, in order to seek understanding of Russian behaviour in 1998 and 1999. In respect of the first, Russia is indeed revealed as weak but it also manages to exploit this weakness to good effect, resorting to the politics of fear. On the second hypothesis, therefore, Russia demonstrates that, constraints notwithstanding, it is presented with opportunities for manoeuvre. Finally, the third hypothesis proves more problematic since there is little evidence to suggest the centre is visibly weakened by the crisis, but I do find evidence to suggest that a certain amount of power is dispersed.

8.1 RUSSO-SERB RELATIONS

The case for applying a values approach in order to understand the relationship between the Serbs and the Russians is a strong one. At the most uncomplicated level, these are two Slavic peoples with a common ethnicity (Slavism) and religion (Orthodoxy). Besides this, the relationship is rooted in a long history. Pan-Slavism was called on in eighteenth and nineteenth century attempts to win full autonomy from the Ottoman empire and then to expand its state. At each step of the way, Russia was turned to as a fellow Slav and key ally (Zagara 2009, Antonenko 2007, Vijacic 1996, Clarke 1945). As with Kosovo itself, analysis must take into account the high degree of mythologising that is so often involved when identity is discussed (Smith, 1991). The matter is made more complex when evidence of values is being sought, for reasons discussed in Chapter 5 that include the problem of window-dressing and how to discern a value. In a sense, the latter is dealt with by the fact that the shared identity of the Russians and Serbs is not disputed, just their level of commitment to that wider sense of community versus the more immediate one of their own states. This also relates to part of the discussion in Chapter 5, when I talked about the possibility of ranking values, as well as
sacrificing them. The sacrifice of the Slav identity as a value is discussed in more detail in relation to Kosovo in 1999 in section 8.4 below. However, what happens then is entirely consistent with events in the nineteenth century. In discussion of this, I do not make the mistake of treating the 1890s like the 1990s. Even if the post-modern era is less the product of reality than hope, the two periods were very different and underpinned by quite separate value systems and distinct imperatives. This section serves the purpose, however, of showing the 'fact' of the Russo-Serb relationship, the history of it and the degree to which the depth of the commitment is exaggerated when the shared identity is invoked in 1999.

The history of the relationship is embedded in that of the Ottoman empire and the other nineteenth century powers. Within the context of, first, the Napoleonic Wars and then the eventual decline of the Ottoman empire, the Serbian question was made unavoidable for Russia and all Europe. It was during this period that European Christian powers sought to roll back the hold of the Ottoman empire on the European space. This was as much a struggle of religion – Christian versus Muslim – as well as ethnicity (Clarke, 1945: 161). 'Russia ... has traditionally felt a close affinity with Orthodox Serbia and its people' (Antonenko, 2007: 95) but this has not always translated into Russia being able to defend its interests, the noticeable exception being World War I. There is no need to recount every moment of the Serb struggle for independence, for certain key moments reveal all that is necessary here. The nineteenth century was riven with the Serb nationalist movement's attempts to throw off Ottoman domination and to become part of Europe rather than be seen as Turkish. The first Serb uprising began in 1804 when the Serbs appealed to both Austria and then Russia for help in their attempt to achieve political autonomy from the Ottoman Turks. Like Austria, the Russians refused, the Foreign Minister telling the Serb delegation that, 'Serbia and Russia are very far apart and we are at peace with the Turks' (Meriage, 1978: 423).
In one of the first instances, therefore, when the Serbs invoked their shared identity, Russia was driven by imperatives other than the value it placed on Slavism. For Russia in this era of great power politics, maintaining a balance of power was an overriding concern and particularly so when Russia faced competition from both the French and the Ottoman Turks. Seen from this perspective, therefore, the Russians placed little or no value on the Serb relationship except insofar as it allowed Russia to achieve its own objectives. To this end, Meriage (1978: 426) speaks of how a south Slavic Balkan state could stand between the French and the Ottomans, even while remaining under Russian tutelage but of how the Russian preference was for peaceful relations with the Turks, which saw them playing the middle ground between the Porte34 and Belgrade (Meriege, 1978). He concluded that:

Tsarist interests in the Serbian insurrection were determined primarily by the military and diplomatic exigencies arising out of the war with the Ottoman empire. St Petersburg, however, in pursuing its objectives, played upon the common ethnocultural and spiritual heritage of the Russian and the Serbian peoples (Meriege, 1978: 439).

What is therefore easily interpreted as a defence of interests and merely instrumental reference to a common identity must be put within a wider geopolitical context, however, and an understanding of the need for the Russians to secure the well-being of their immediate community.

Interests and values do not have to be seen as two entirely separate things. In Chapter 5, I cited Hill's distinction between values and interests but also the fact that he believed they could be subsumed into one category of core concerns, such as security, prosperity, identity and prestige (2003: 132). In his consideration of the aftermath of the Congress of Berlin, Jelavich (1958) did precisely this. He spoke of Russia's 'military and strategic' aims (1958: 3) in securing access to and therefore control of the Straits and the then-Constantinople, but he also referred to a 'parallel' aim, 'the Panslav ideal of the unity of the Slavic, Orthodox people' (1958: 3). The

34 To give it its full name, the Sublime Porte was the name used for the governing institutions of the Ottoman empire.
dominant concern of ensuring continued access to the Straits was not just born out of a desire
to acquire influence or territory, it was motivated by recognition that this was necessary for
Russia's security and its economic prosperity. That Russia put these ahead of the Slavic
identity does not mean Slavism was not valued, merely that some consideration necessarily
had to be paid to whether Serb demands were achievable and at what cost.

This would not be the only time when the Russians would seem to demonstrate commitment to
values other than that of Pan-Slavism. In the 1830s the Serbs made a further attempt to gain
more autonomy by establishing their own constitution. Russia joined with Austria and the
Ottoman Turks in applying pressure on the Serbs to annul it, interpreting this as a precursor to
revolution (Stoianovich, 1959: 245). In response to such Russian behaviour, Stoianovich spoke
of the 'Panslav aim of expanding Russian influence by making Serbia a political tool and an
economic appendage of Russia' (1959: 245). Whatever its objectives, Russia's influence over
the Balkans was severely constrained by the terms of the 1856 Congress of Paris when Russia
lost its protectorate over the Christians (Stojanovic, 1939: 7) to other European powers. It was
in Hercegovina and then Bosnia that a key uprising finally broke out in 1875 that would lead to
the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 and Russia's victory over the Ottomans. In the Treaty of San
Stefano that followed, Russia privileged Bulgaria over Serbia at San Stefano, choosing to
create a large Bulgarian state at the cost of territory won by the Serbs during the war
(Stojanovic, 1939: 276). It was left to the Austrians to grant more land to Serbia at the
Congress of Berlin, the resultant treaty of which rewrote the terms of much of San Stefano.
Russia's preference for a larger Bulgaria over a large Serbia did not signify another sacrifice of
Slavic values, since the Bulgarians too laid claim to a Slavic identity; but it was another
reminder to the Serbs that if it had to choose between supporting Serbia and other, more
immediately-felt concerns, Russia would do what it felt best secured Russian security and
prosperity. Matters were little different when it came to the First World War. Russian
motivations for defending Serbia were less rooted in Pan-Slavism than in the belief that Austria's declaration of war was seen 'as a direct challenge to Russia's standing as a great power' (Zagare, 2009: 67). As in the early 1800s, the Russian preference in 1914 would have been to avoid war altogether.

However, despite the evidently somewhat dilute commitment to Pan-Slavic values, the bond between the Russians and the Serbs remains founded in a sense of shared experiences and, for the Serbs, benefits. It was the Russians who negotiated the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812 with the Ottomans which 'laid the political and territorial foundations on which the modern Serbian nation-state was erected' (Meriage, 1978: 439). It was the Russians too who defeated the Turks in the 1877-78 war, which resulted in, first, the Treaty of San Stefano and then the Congress of Berlin: Whatever the dissatisfaction over the terms of San Stefano, Serb independence was bought at the hands of the Russians. Finally, it was Russia who in 1914 would come to the Serbs' defence against Germany and Austria. From even the most cursory of overviews of the Russo-Serbian relationship, it is clear that a sense of shared identity, of Slavism, underpins their relations, although it would be over-stating the case to argue that 'Russia had always protected [the Balkans people] and supported their aspirations' (Stojanovic, 1939: 8): Both the Russians and the Serbs sought to achieve their own aims, at certain points those aims fortuitously coincided. Much of the longer historical pattern would be repeated in 1999, but not, this time, to the benefit of the Serbs.

When it came to Kosovo, Russia did not believe Belgrade carried the bulk of responsibility for the conflict, and therefore [saw] both the NATO bombing and the political solutions imposed on the former Yugoslavia as unjust and anti-Serbian (Antonenko, 2007: 95).

This is one interpretation of Russia's motivations. A less favourable one is that, following on from the eastwards expansion of NATO, Russia saw this as yet more evidence of an attempt to
narrow its sphere of influence. Intervention in Kosovo also meant breaching state sovereignty and made Russia look vulnerable over Chechnya (Levitin, 2000). Before considering the relative rights and wrongs of these interpretations, I outline a brief chronology of events before and during the crisis, ending my analysis with the eventual G8 Statement that brought about the ceasefire in June 1999.

8.2 CHRONOLOGY OF THE CRISIS

The beginnings of the crisis lay far back in the history of the region such that analysis could go back as far as the sixth century BC: Vickers, for instance, says that the 'battleground over the status of Kosovo has ... now been extended to pre-history (1998:1). For both sides, the purpose has been to establish who was first present on the Kosovan territory, as if that would resolve the situation in any kind of fashion. All that really needs to be said here about such a reach back into history is that it is an indication of the improbability that either Serb or Albanian could, after 1999, have been brought together into peaceful coexistence.

The more relevant roots lay in the creation of the Yugoslav state after World War I, and the continued attempt after World War II to build one single Yugoslav identity out of the many that existed within the state's territory. At this stage, the Albanians in what was then called Kosovo-Metohija declared their desire to remain as part of Greater Albania, a wish rejected when in February 1945 martial law was declared and its annexation to Serbia made fact in September of the same year (Judah, 2008: 47). In the aftermath of Marshal Tito's death in 1980 and the ethnic revival that followed, Kosovo was no more immune from nationalist impulses than was Croatia or Bosnia. Long before that, however, in the 1960s, the Kosavar Albanians had sought

35 Levitin worked on the Balkan desk in the Russian Foreign Ministry from 1990-99 and was present at some of the Dayton peace talk negotiations as well as those of the Contact Group for Kosovo.
to establish themselves as a separate republic within Yugoslavia. They won some autonomy in the shape of a constitution and a name of their own – it was at this point that the province became known as Kosovo (dropping the Serb half of the name 'Metohija') (Vickers, 1998: 169). As a result, other benefits accrued, including over equality for the Albanian and Turkish languages, education and the judiciary. Subsequent to this, Serbs began to leave the province, turning those who remained into even more of a minority (Vickers, 1998: 169). Vickers (1998: 171) cites 1961 census figures of 67.2% Albanians and 27.5% of Serbs and Montenegrins, and Judah (2008: 2) 1981 census figures of 77.4% of the population declared as Albanian and 14.9% Serbs or Montenegrins (Judah, 2008: 2).

Despite these gains and the increasing prominence of Albanian culture and language that followed, the region suffered from low employment rates and a relative lack of prosperity. By 1980, the unemployment rate was 10.5%, the highest in the country (Vickers, 1998: 191). Over the next decade demands for independence became more frequent and vocal and the repressions and imprisonments that followed would serve as the breeding ground for the Kosovo Liberation Army (Judah, 2008: 58). In 1989 Serbia revoked the province's autonomy, sparking riots. The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova, was founded at this time and would be the non-violent face of opposition to the Serbs, foil to the Kosovo Liberation Army's (KLA) more violent methods (whether seen as terrorists or Resistance, the KLA employed guerilla warfare tactics (Freedman, 2000: 350) and remained outside diplomatic processes until persuaded to participate at the Rambouillet Peace Talks begun in February 1999). In 1990, the Serb dissolution of the Kosovan Assembly served as the breaking point in relations and in 1991 the Kosovo Parliament declared its independence. Disturbances between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs continued throughout the 1990s but the tensions between these two groups were overshadowed by the larger matter of the break-up of the Yugoslav republic when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, with all that
followed on from that.

In the 1995 Dayton Peace Plan that brokered the end of the Bosnian war, Kosovo found itself a pawn in a wider game, part of a large Serbia that was designed, along with Croatia, to act as a barrier against Bosnia-Hercegovina (Chomsky, 1999: 25). It is interesting to see Levitin (2000: 135) accuse Moscow of failing to prevent the conflict and Chomsky to accuse the USA of 'neglect' (1999: 26). Ultimately, both actors missed chances to use their relative positions of influence to the benefit of the Kosovars but when Russia is criticised in 1999 for failing to uphold the value of human rights protection, it should not be forgotten that the USA, with Dayton, engineered the situation that would lead inevitably to further suffering on the part of innocent civilians and provide all the justification for violent means that the KLA needed (Chomsky, 1999: 26).

In 1998, the Kosovo problem escalated to the point that it could no longer be ignored by any party. In early 1998, as Serbs and KLA clashed in the Drenica region, resulting in casualties, the USA, UN and Russia all began to attempt to find a resolution. The first of the United Nations (UN) Resolutions (United Nations, 1998a) in the lead-up to the eventual airstrikes was issued on 31 March, imposing an arms embargo against Yugoslavia (UNSC Resolution 1160). Within Yugoslavia, Milosevic and Rugova started to hold meetings. Russia used its relationship with the Serbs to try and bring a diplomatic end to the crisis and in June, Milosevic met with Yeltsin in Moscow, signing a declaration on the peaceful resolution in Kosovo (Nezavisamaya Gazeta, 1999: 6). On 16 June 1998, Yeltsin and Milosevic met and released a joint statement in answer to questions about the crisis. Both presidents held that a political settlement would be sought through negotiation; that refugees would be permitted to return and a reconstruction programme put in place; that monitoring of the crisis by outside groups would be permitted and these groups would be given free movement. The statement
also held that repressive action against groups in the province would cease - but the UN
demand for the withdrawal of Serb security forces was not met. Nor were the terms of any
political settlement made clear in respect to increased autonomy for the province (Smith,
1999). Even if Belgrade kept its word (which it did not) the KLA was not party to this or any
other diplomatic effort in 1998. The statement was insufficient - for western observers and for
Kosovar Albanians.

All the diplomatic efforts failed to have an effect on either side, such that in the autumn of
1998 the world became aware of an impending humanitarian crisis. With winter on the
horizon, the sight of thousands of Kosovar Albanians refugees took on added poignancy. On
September 23, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1199 calling for a ceasefire, the beginning of
'meaningful' dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians, and secure conditions for the safe return of
refugees. Belgrade was also required to allow the European Community Monitoring Mission
access to and freedom of movement over the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) (United
Nations, 1998b). On 13 October NATO threatened military intervention unless Belgrade
fulfilled the demands of the international community (Nezavisamaya Gazeta, 1999: 6). On 15
and 16 October respectively Milosevic signed agreements with NATO and the OSCE (Kosovo
Verification Mission (KVM) permitting NATO to fly verification missions over Yugoslav
territory and 2,000 OSCE observers into the FRY (Nezavisamaya Gazeta, 1999: 6). On 24
October the UNSC was forced to pass another Resolution (UNSC Resolution 1203 (1998)),
demanding that Belgrade comply with these agreements, as well as the terms of Resolutions
1160 and 1199 (United Nations, 1998c). NATO flights commenced 30 October. At this point,
the differing strategies of Russia and NATO were made obvious. Russia favoured the
continuance of diplomatic measures while the USA ordered NATO Supreme Allied
Commander, Wesley Clark, to begin garnering support for military intervention (Smith, 1999).
It was the massacre of 45 Kosovar Albanians at Racak on 15 January 1999 that signalled the
end of any remaining patience with Milosevic, as Finnish specialists investigating the deaths referred to 'crimes against humanity', refuting Belgrade's version of the killings as the responsibility of the KLA (Nezavisamaya Gazeta, 1999: 6). The response of the Head of KVM, William Walker, was to accuse government security forces of the crime. The situation escalated further as Belgrade declared him persona non grata, and demanded he leave FRY territory within 48 hours (Petrovskaya, 1999). On 29 January the Contact Group, (made up of representatives from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the USA) demanded that peace talks begin no later than 6 February, scheduled to take place at Rambouillet in Paris. The talks themselves are of immense interest, not least because of the suspicion of both Belgrade and Moscow that the USA never intended to act in good faith (Gornostaev & Sokolov, 1999) and the suspicion of others that matters were engineered in order to make failure - and therefore the airstrikes - inevitable (Chomsky, 1999: 110). Whatever the truth of that particular matter, it was clear at this point that some form of intervention would have to take place - whether that intervention was with the agreement of the FRY and what form that it would take, peacekeeping or otherwise, would depend on the Serbs. Their failure to sign up to the Rambouillet Accords, in contrast to the Kosovar Albanian delegation, was the catalyst for commencement of the NATO airstrikes on 24 March.

As the airstrikes began, Russia signalled its extreme displeasure by recalling its Ambassador at NATO HQ, ceasing participation in the Permanent Joint Council with NATO and freezing activities within the Partnership for Peace; actions that would be reversed after the June Peace Settlement. Additionally, with an action that would have consequences at Pristina Airport later, Russia also took over command of its SFOR troops in Bosnia (Leurdijk and Zandee, 2001: 190). Despite these obvious signs of its displeasure with NATO's actions, Russia continued to try and use its influence on Milosevic in order to reach terms for a ceasefire. Its role would prove pivotal in bringing about an end to the bombing on 10 June when Milosevic met with
Russia's Special envoy, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and agreed to accept the 'General Principles' of the G8 peace plan (Leurdsijk & Zande, 2001: 199). En route to winning this agreement, however, Russia had to negotiate difficult political times at home, widespread public support for Belgrade and tense relations with NATO.

8.2.1 Cooperation amidst Disapproval

The crisis came at the end of Yeltsin's time as President, when the decision-making structures within the state were not always clear (Levitin, 2000). It was just one year since Russia had suffered catastrophic economic collapse and appeared to be losing influence on a daily basis to NATO and the EU as they attracted demands for accession from eastern European states and beyond. To add insult to injury, on 24 April 1999, it was reported that the USA had delivered another blow to Moscow's position by signalling its intention to take the Baltic States into NATO (Gornostaev & Sokolov, 1999). It would have been impossible for Russia to interpret this as anything but a calculated insult. Just the year before, the US State Department in the person of James Rubin had, in a clear concession to Russian concerns, said that the Baltic states' membership of NATO was 'not just for the USA to decide' (NATO, 1998).

It is all the more extraordinary that Russia pursued its diplomatic role under such circumstances and, whatever, the motivation, more extraordinary that it has received little or no credit for it. That Russia did so in the face of immense opposition and criticism at home says much about the state's determination to ensure that relations with the West did not deteriorate beyond the point of no return. The irony of this 'modern' actor being instrumental in bringing an end to the 'post-modern' bombings is touched on further in the section on marginality. Here I outline those key moments in Russia's decision to act as diplomatic broker.
between Belgrade and NATO, as well as demonstrating the depth of opposition to NATO felt at home.

Russian feeling against NATO actions ran high, leading, for example, to the Duma forming a committee in defence of the Serb people in March 1999 (Ulyanov, 1999: 3). Further opposition led to another long delay in the ratification of START II (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Following long disagreement between the Duma and the executive, an extension to the Treaty had finally been submitted to the Duma in April 1998, the first time that resolution had looked possible. In December of that year, however, the Duma removed it from the agenda in protest at US and British strikes versus Iraq. In March 1999, the-then Prime Minister, Primakov, had finally persuaded the Duma to restart the ratification process. But as the bombings of Belgrade began, the process came to a halt again (Gornostaev, 1999).

The Duma's disapproval of NATO's action had other tangible results too when Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party announced that 'a powerful manifestation of all patriotic forces' would take place outside the US Embassy on 26 March (Ulyanov, 1999: 3). In the face of obvious public anger at the bombings the government promised to do all it could to secure the safety of Embassy staff. Both the US and UK embassies were indeed targeted for protest, with particular venom being reserved for the US one, where the crowds threw eggs, bottles and paint (Ulyanov, 1999: 3). Levitin argued that Russian anger was not solely caused by the airstrikes but instead, 'the outrage was a manifestation of broader anti-NATO sentiments and an outlet for all the humiliations and frustrations of the post-Soviet period' (2000: 138).

It was at this point also that the question of a union of three Slav countries – Russia, Belarus and Yugoslavia – was raised. Here Russia ran into yet more domestic constraints. As already outlined in Chapter 3, Muslim groups within Russia were relatively well-organised. Even had
the Russians wished to provide military backing to the Serbs they could not have done so in the context of what was seen as a Serb attempt at genocide of the Albanian Kosovars, predominantly a Muslim group. The fears of Russian Muslims were aggravated by Yugoslavia’s request to join the Russian-Belarus Union and raised again the question of whether Russia was essentially a Slavic state or a multi-ethnic one. As a result, the Head of the Council of Muftis of Russia, Shaykh Ravil Gaynutdin, warned Yeltsin that the divisions currently being experienced within Yugoslavia might be reproduced within Russia (Sherr and Main, 1999: 15).

More graphically, the All-Tatar Public Centre has warned that this “monstrous formation” [a Russia-Belarus-Yugoslav Union] could produce an “Eastern Union which would include all of the Russian Federation’s ethnic regions and national autonomous regions from the Caucasus to Siberia” (Sherr and Main, 1999: 15).

Russia's domestic community was divided and the situation therefore a very complex one. Russia was faced with voices within its state that demanded it show support for the Serbs, but the primary aim had to be to ensure that the ethnic and religious issues that had torn Yugoslavia apart could not do so in Russia. That Russia was struggling through a severe economic crisis must be remembered and, further, Yeltsin was, at this time, undergoing an impeachment process. To add to these internal problems, NATO and the USA, even the UN, seemed intent on marginalising Russia. Given the talk of the New Cold War that would follow less than a decade later, it is worth reinforcing the fact that, at what constituted the worst moment in Russia's relations with the West for many years, including in the latter end of the Cold War period, Russia did not break relations with the West entirely. Despite Levitin's sometimes damning criticism of Moscow's policy towards the crisis, I argue that Moscow successfully walked the tightrope between conflicting domestic interests and a 'difficult partner' (Ivanov, 1999), in the person of Milosevic.

On 13 April, Chernomyrdin was appointed Russia's Special Representative for the Crisis and
from this point Russia began to play an important diplomatic role, coordinating its diplomatic activities with the EU. For instance, on 26 May talks began between Moscow & Finland at Kuntsevskaya dacha setting out both their positions before a meeting in Belgrade (Pyadishev, 1999: 5). Russia's role is considered to have been crucial to the G8 Statement that brought about the ceasefire and finally to a joint Russia-EU-US Peace Plan (Webber 2000: 48, Ahtisaari in Pyadishev 1999: 3).

The FRY was required by the UN to ensure the establishment of conditions such that all refugees could return in safety to the Kosovo province and later events would show that ultimately the safety of citizens in the province could not be guaranteed without the continued presence of KFOR troops. As a result, the autonomy and sovereignty of the Yugoslav state was threatened by the demands that an OSCE verification mission be allowed free movement over the Yugoslav territory as well as that NATO be permitted air verification. But even in 1998 international demands for greater Kosovar autonomy and 'meaningful self-administration' were problematic. After all, the Kosovar Albanians also had to accept any Serb concessions as sufficient and there was clearly nothing that the Serbs could offer at this stage that the Kosovar Albanians would accept. It was obvious, therefore, even before Rambouillet that resolution could only be possible at the cost of enormous and unacceptable loss of face to the Serbs and only with a good deal of direct involvement on the part of the international community, primarily the United States. To this extent, while the Russian role was important, the evidence suggests that it would not, alone, have secured peaceful resolution. Russian motivation was not purely altruistic either. Yeltsin spoke of his belief that NATO intended to create its own protectorate in Yugoslavia, something Russian could not allow (Gornostaev, 1999a). Clearly, from the Russian point of view, if it was to be a part of the peace plan, it had to be a part of the peace process.
Nevertheless, it was NATO airstrikes, *in combination with Russia's diplomatic efforts* that finally convinced Milosevic to meet NATO's demands for a ceasefire. Under pressure from Russia, to use this forum, Foreign Ministers of the G8 met in Cologne to draft a resolution on the ending of the airstrikes and withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo. This was then presented to the UN Security Council and resulted in UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999) (United Nations, 1999d), compliance with which allowed for what would be a long-continuing search for full resolution of the situation. For Russia too, the effects would be hard and long-felt. Fedorov (President of the Foundation for 'Political Research', Director of the political programmes of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy) explained the significance as Russia saw it:

> For the first time, over the last ten years one of the sides in this world has not only secured a military-political victory, but is using the results sufficiently openly to form its own new policy on a global scale. We need to honestly tell ourselves that the Kosovo crisis has become the de facto beginning of a new political redivision of the world, the depth and limits of which will be determined above all by the USA and NATO (Fedorov, 1999:19).

### 8.3 A BREACH OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The NATO airstrikes provoked debate about whether they lacked basis in international law. The charge of illegality had two aspects. Firstly, that under the terms of the UN Charter, the Kosovo Crisis did not represent a situation that allowed for military intervention. Secondly, that NATO proceeded without UNSC approval. The debate, however, also had distinctly political rather than merely legalistic underpinnings and it is this facet that is examined here. Despite protesting the legality of their actions, NATO participants, especially the USA and Britain, maintained that the intervention was a humanitarian one. It became clear that what was really being debated was whether the rights of states or of individuals took primacy under the
UN Charter and therefore international law. As already discussed at length in Chapter 6, under the rules of the modern world order state sovereignty is paramount. In the post-modern order, however, human rights are elevated over the rights of states. Cooper's argument about the existence of concurrent world orders is borne out by the evidence of the Kosovo crisis where Russia's differences with Europe and the USA stemmed from a conflict of values.

The oft-heard accusation against Russia that it is interest-driven rather than value-driven is a consequence, I have argued, of at least two failures. Firstly, much foreign policy analysis fails to try and understand Russian foreign policy from their point of view, that is to fail to take into account the domestic context. Secondly, although the international context is better accounted for, there is a general failure to situate Russian actions within the 'right' context, that is to say that insufficient attention is paid to whether we are speaking of a post-modern or a modern era.

In this latter aspect I now break down my own examination further, arguing that too little consideration is given to the question of whether post-modern values really are adhered to except at the more rhetorical level. My study of the Kosovo crisis evidences not only Russian suspicion of western actions but also the reasons for them. I argue that the Russians had good cause for questioning the values basis of the NATO intervention. Thus, the legitimacy, in values terms, of NATO's actions is questionable. Legitimacy becomes a major problem, I argue when the post-modern meets the modern, which is the second area that I claim is under-analysed. Before accusing others, the first question that should be asked is what is necessary to ensure that 'our' values can be interpreted as free of interests. If western Europe wishes to be taken seriously as an exporter of values, it must make sure that its 'goods' live up to the marketing material. It is clear that this was not the case in the Kosovo crisis.

In this section, I look first at the role of the United Nations in situations such as that of Kosovo, where the breach of human rights is deemed to be on such a scale that many consider
the sovereignty of states must take second priority to the rights of individuals. This task should provide insights into the Russian position beyond the idea that Russia is a Realist actor driven by imperialist imperatives. Like Cooper, I do not adopt a linear, uni-directional account of progress in the international system: Post-modern states will not necessarily remain post-modern states, they could conceivably collapse back into modernity. However, there can be no doubt that in western conceptions of post-modernity, the post-modern condition is superior to the modern, there is a belief that progress has been achieved. In the transition from the modern to the post-modern order, the rules necessarily changed. The question is, what were these shifting rules and how can they be understood? To say that there was anything approaching international consensus about the necessity for new rules and what they should be would be a gross exaggeration. The future shape of world politics looked as if was being decided by a few states and would be the result of the definition and implementation of a few states' foreign policy objectives. This was precisely the point that Russia argued from early on and on which it sought a wider debate. The UN was sidelined during the Kosovo crisis and it was this event that sparked off much subsequent discussion about whether the UN still had a role to play in international relations and what that role should be (Glennon 2003, Lucas 2003).

8.3.1 The Values of the UN Charter

An examination of the UN Charter reveals that it is not difficult to argue that the NATO airstrikes against the Yugoslav Republic in 1999 had no legal basis in international law. The United Nations was long ago endowed with the responsibility of bringing some sense of order to an international system that, at the inception of the UN, was conceived of as anarchical. Under Article 2.1 of the UN Charter, the sovereign equality of all members is established. Article 2.4 says,
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2.7 goes on to say that 'nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...'. This article does, of course, give fodder to arguments that would say that human rights are universal and therefore transcend the domestic jurisdiction of any state, but the point for dissenters of the NATO action is that this is not the primary basis of international law while the inviolability of sovereign states is. To this end, Bradshaw, for example, says, '[b]ombing Serbia was not merely a case of preventive, or coercive, diplomacy. It was aggression. It was also illegal' (Bradshaw, 1999: 5).

However, there is scope for interpretation given that the Charter also places an emphasis on 'Rights' in the Preamble. Thus, the Charter seemingly seeks to protect two conflicting principles: the sovereignty of states as well as human rights. If human rights are universal they might therefore be said to transcend the domestic jurisdiction of any state. But, founded in the legacies of two World Wars, the UN also seeks to prevent conflict and states were (and for many actors, not least Russia, are) deemed to represent the best means for achieving that aim. Most crucially from the Russian perspective, in 1999 the inviolability of sovereign states was the primary basis of international law, not the protection of human rights.

Other criticisms of the NATO action centred around the perceived breach of Article 24.1 whereby the Members of the United Nations, 'confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security'. Without a UNSC Resolution any breach of state sovereignty is a breach of international law. One of the key questions is therefore whether any of the UNSC Resolutions authorised the NATO action. In
its Press Release of 23 September 1998 (United Nations, 1998), Russia made clear that although it supported Resolution 1199 (1998) (United Nations, 1998b), a further resolution would be required before sanctions or force could be applied. This was never received and on this basis Russia argued that NATO had breached international law, while NATO argued it had sufficient scope within UNSCR 1199 (1998).

A final perceived breach is of Article 33.1 of Chapter VI which deals with dispute settlement. Under this article,

The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

The Article is ambiguous in terms of how long such methods should be employed before resort to other methods can be allowed and, of course, it does not take account of the human cost as lives continue to be lost while a diplomatic route is explored. From Russia's point of view, all signatories to the United Nations were party to Article 33.1, such that it constituted an accepted standard to which all Members should adhere. In this sense the Russian argument that they should have been permitted to continue their negotiations to achieve a diplomatic solution had its basis in accepted international law. After the horrors of the Bosnian War, however, it was not surprising that the West would not allow diplomacy to continue without believing an end was in sight. It was on this moral issue, therefore, that the argument really turned.

In 1999, then, the United Nations bore prime responsibility for resolution of conflict between the warring factions in Yugoslavia. Other institutions that might be attached to any such resolution included NATO and the OSCE, while individual states also had the right to undertake diplomatic missions as long as those missions conformed to UN Charter guidelines.
NATO action, according to NATO’s own Treaty, was dependent upon conformity to UN principles and the UN Charter, which the airstrikes clearly breached since they did not first receive the sanction of the UNSC. The Treaty recognised ‘the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security’. American and British comments to the effect that the UN articles referring to the sovereignty of states were outdated and should be disregarded did not legitimate NATO actions. For these states and others, however, the priorities had changed.

As if to signal the fact that it knew it did not have the necessary Resolution, the case was made for intervention on humanitarian grounds: ‘[t]his is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand’ (Blair, 1999). One does not have to resort to Chomsky-esque arguments and claims ‘that the proclamations of the New Humanism are at best highly dubious’ (1999:15) to see that such proclamations might be problematic. Even the most measured analysis must surely conclude that NATO was requiring states (Russia) to make a conceptual leap that was not underpinned by international law or even wide agreement. Thus, criticisms of the Russians for relying on outdated concepts constituted a grossly prejudicial position. Russia simply continued to play by the rules of the modern world order of which it believed itself and all other states, to be a part. On the other hand, the attempt to delegitimise Russia in this fashion was understandable, for by such action NATO could hope to legitimise itself. Certainly, from NATO’s point of view, the inevitable boycotting by Russia and China of a further UN Resolution to authorise military action against Belgrade was reason enough to permit the breach; indeed it forced it.

If viewed solely from the perspective of Article 24.1, NATO’s actions were unlawful. If viewed, however, from the perspective of the Preamble, the action was justified. In International Society terms, this equated to the question of whether order or justice should
prevail (Bull 1977, Wight 1966), for the NATO argument was centred on the fact that the UN Charter cannot always defend state sovereignty and human rights simultaneously. The deciding argument could be found in Article 33.1 but for its necessary fluidity over when diplomacy can be understood to have failed. The debate over the legality of the airstrikes or otherwise has proved to be irreconcilable from an objective point of view. Ultimately, NATO and Russia defended the interpretation that they believed to be the right one, reflecting quite different beliefs, not about what was desirable, but about the nature of the extant world order. Within some NATO states, most noticeably Britain, a strong discourse emerged about human rights and what that meant for more traditional ways of thinking.

We need to enter a new millennium where dictators know that they cannot get away with ethnic cleansing or repress their peoples with impunity. In this conflict we are fighting not for territory but for values. For a new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole ethnic groups will not be tolerated. For a world where those responsible for such crimes have nowhere to hide (Blair, 1999).

In respect of others it was not clear that all agreed on the method by which peace could be achieved. Morelli (2001), for instance, refers to Italy as a 'reluctant ally' during the Crisis and Ramet and Lyon (2001) to the political divisions within Germany and the preference displayed there for diplomatic efforts to continue.

The final problem for Russia in trying to cast NATO as the villain was that there seemed to be little for the NATO states to gain from the intervention, unless the rolling back of Russian influence in the region was gain enough – but few states, other than Russia, believed that. Russia found it difficult to gather support for its call for wide international debate about the rights and wrongs of the implications of the intervention. Given its historical legacy, as the FPA literature shows, this was unsurprising, but its past history does not mean that Russia cannot make 'good' arguments. There is, after all, something ironic about a post-modern era being heralded in by imposition rather than consensual debate.
The issue of the illegality or not of the airstrikes is important here to an understanding of
Russian policy towards the West over the issue but also to understanding the building of
Russian foreign policy since 1999. It is not, however, the whole story. Yeltsin claimed in the
midst of the airstrikes that: 'We are on a higher moral plane than the Americans' (in Ulyanov,
1999: 1) Russia may have temporarily been able to occupy the moral high ground on the
Kosovo issue by saying that NATO (or rather the USA) changed the rules to justify
intervention but this must not be mistaken for a wholly selfless attitude. Russia may not be the
base actor it is often painted as but that does not make it a wholly worthy one either, as it
would show in Georgia in 2008, when it defended its intervention deep into Georgian territory
on the grounds that Kosovo set the precedent.

8.4 VALUES OR INTERESTS IN A MODERN OR POST-MODERN
WORLD?

From what has been set out so far, little value appears to be placed on normative behaviour on
the part of the Russians. If American and Russian attitudes to sovereignty and human rights
issues are contrasted, what is seen is an overtly greater attachment on the part of the Russians
to the rule of law at the international level than is the case with the Americans. In the case of
the Kosovo crisis the need for reliance on formulated and agreed international law formed a
major part of the Russian discourse. This is consistent with the pragmatism that many (see, for
instance, Pravda 2003, Lynch 2001, Kubicek 1999-2000) have come to expect of the Russians
in their foreign policy. Higher value, then, is placed upon practical solutions and the
achievement of consensus with regard to the international rather than on solutions aimed at
achieving normative aims where not all, even perhaps most, states do share those aims. In an
interview with Der Spiegel in 1999, Yeltsin said, 'it goes without saying that consensus must be
preserved as the basis for decision-making' (Yeltsin, 1999: 62). In this respect, the Russian discourse has struck chords with other states which see the actions of the USA as contrary to international law and their own states' interests. But Russia was not successful in initiating the construction of a debate that seeks a consensual reassessment of international law. Had it been, many of the detrimental perceptions of outsiders to Russia might have been rethought and Russia itself might have seen the value in continued cooperation in collective international organisations. The scope for such opportunities is pursued further in the section below on Marginality. But there were other ways in which the values in Russian foreign policy were evident.

Relations between Russia and the territory of the former Yugoslavia have primarily been conducted within the confines of the Russo-Serb relationship, and the sense of Slav fellowship. Events in 1998 and 1999 served to cause Russia to think somewhat about what the Union between Russia and Belarus meant and how third parties perceived it. After Belgrade requested membership, Yeltsin, when questioned about it, said that the Union was based on a closeness of the two peoples in both cultural and spiritual terms, on a common historical code of laws and friendship, but also on common strategic interests. Discussion about the practical basis revealed that the Union owed something to a study of the EU integration project but with certain features peculiar to the Russo-Belarus experience (Yeltsin, 1999:62). Yeltsin stressed that this was not a Union directed against anyone. In regard to enlargement he said that in principle the Agreement on Union allowed any state to join if it so desired, conditional upon the capacity to fulfil the Union’s obligations. The question of the potential for the inclusion of Yugoslavia was somewhat evaded when he said that currently the prime task in regard to Yugoslavia was to restore a long-term and stable peace: The value of Slavism therefore came very much second to that placed on the integrity of the Russian territory. But to argue that this is evidence of the elevation of interests over values, is to misunderstand what a value is, and/or
to operate on the basis of double standards since for others the avoidance of conflict is viewed differently.

For the EU, prevention of conflict is said to be one of the defining features that makes the EU a civilian power, a values actor (Habermas, 2001). Instability in any region can lead to a vacuum of power and therefore great uncertainty, prevention of conflict is therefore a concern for all states in the region. While imperial Russia was naturally inclined towards seeking influence over the largest amount of territory possible and the geo-strategic importance of the Balkans was undeniable for an empire seeking warm water ports and access to markets, Russia’s national security concerns have also long compelled it to take an interest in this region and to value its relationships there, including because of perceptions of a shared identity. Thus, I treat Slavism as a coherent value for the Russians but one which takes a lower priority than those values that relate more directly to Russia’s security and prosperity.

Respect for other, more 'universal', values was also evident. The rhetoric of the Russians in UN discussions was often more muted than might be expected of a 'modern' power. In UN Press Release SC/6577 of 23 September 1998 detailing the discussion held in a meeting of the UN Security Council the same day, for instance, Sergei Lavrov (then Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN) referred to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, calling for peaceful resolution to the conflict through a negotiated political settlement. Were the necessary responses not received from all the parties concerned, further Council resolution would be necessary before sanctions or force could be used and unilateral intervention should be avoided at the cost of destabilising the whole region. The Chinese, on the other hand, with far less to lose in terms of influence in the region, did not support Resolution 1199 (1998) under discussion, eventually abstaining, saying that this was an internal matter of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and as such any UN intervention there without the express request of the countries concerned would
set a negative precedent as a breach of a state's sovereign territory. The contrast between the Russian and the Chinese rhetoric is marked, although their preferences regarding state sovereignty were the same. However, Russia at this stage did not preclude the use of sanctions or military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, although it made clear another UN resolution would be necessary to achieve this (rather disingenuously since it was very unlikely to have voted for military action). However, there was at this stage no emphasis on the part of the Russians on the affair being a Yugoslav internal matter and, unlike the Chinese, the Russians supported Resolution 1199. There was also mention of the 'serious humanitarian consequences' so that we can identify in the Russian discourse some consensus on the accepted western notion of the importance of human rights. The Chinese discourse on the other hand made little or no reference to the humanitarian consequences, going so far as to say that the situation at that time was actually stabilising.

The Chinese preoccupation was with the upholding of the state's sovereign rights over territory and contrasts sharply with the measured and conciliatory discourse of Lavrov. On the other hand the British and American Representatives both spoke forcefully of the need for Belgrade to do more if it was to avoid more serious action being taken against it. The British and the Americans put far more emphasis on the humanitarian cost being exacted from the Kosovar Albanians, indicating their determination to bring about change in the international security framework in order to re-prioritise the protection of human rights at the expense of the sovereignty of the state. Ultimately Resolution 1199 (1998), inter alia, was relied upon by NATO to justify its airstrikes against Belgrade despite the fact that the UN Press Release recorded that, in his report to the UNSC, 'the Secretary-General said there could be no military solution for the crisis and he urged parties to the conflict to demonstrate restraint and to start the negotiating process' (United Nations, 1998).
For the Russians, a major problem was not just the circumvention of the UN but that it was NATO in control. After 1991, the Russians sought the disbandment of NATO, as has been said, and the reshaping of the OSCE until it could be developed and strengthened to become the 'sole active Europe-wide organisation, with the right to act in the security sphere... not only in the security domain, but also on economic, ecological and humanitarian questions' (Yeltsin, 1999: 62). The Russians have always been clear about their reasons for this. Yeltsin, for example, said that:

Russia comes out for a Europe without dividing lines. To advance this goal might be the acceptance of a Charter of European Security within the OSCE framework: to me it appears as a kind of "code of behaviour" for all states, based on the principles of international law (Yeltsin, 1999: 62).

Even while I seek to redress the balance and show that Russia's actions are open to an interpretation other than that it pursues only interests, the Russians themselves undermined a more positive interpretation when they turned to less inclusive organisations to decide the fate of Kosovo, as now discussed.

It was Russian involvement in the drawing up of the G8 draft resolution that made Russia look weak in terms of the principled stance they had taken with regard to European security matters. Russia maintained throughout the Crisis and afterwards that NATO intervention was illegal. There are two aspects to this illegality. One is that the UN Charter does not permit military intervention in the circumstances surrounding the Kosovo Crisis. The second is that NATO proceeded without UN Security Council approval. Russia has also claimed to operate a multi-vectored foreign policy, one which allows all states to have a say over matters affecting international peace and security. Acting within the framework of the UN, Russia had much right on its side by insisting that the UN must make decisions and authorise the military responses of regional and global organisations. The framework of the UN is one that allows all its signatories to exert some influence over decision-making. However, Russia's desire to use
the G8 as the forum in which to draft a resolution on ending the Kosovo Crisis sent the
message that Russia was as willing as the USA to operate a narrowed form of multipolarity,
where this served its interests. Even before G7 became G8, the member states accounted for
approximately 70% of economic output worldwide (Parkin, 1997). Given this enormous
economic capacity and the power it represents, and the fact that four of the G8 states have four
of the five permanent seats on the UN Security Council, it follows that the G8 draft Resolution
had every chance of success. But given its origins and purposes, it was not the most obvious
forum for drawing up a peace plan. For the Russians it had two particular virtues: i) it was not
NATO; ii) it was at this point that the G7 began metamorphose into the G8, as Russia
consolidated its seat at that particular table. The fact that the plan was then put to the UN is
insufficient to legitimise the use of the G8 on this matter. In values terms, Russia remained on
stronger footing when insisting that the UN was the correct forum for debate and decision-
making, a footing weakened when the G8 issued the UN with a prepared document for
endorsement. This event alone signalled that Russia could find opportunities where, perhaps,
none obviously existed, even if at the expense of being seen as a values actor. Its capacity to
extract advantage from disadvantaged positions is now considered further in this final section,
where I apply the Marginality framework.

8.5 RUSSIA ON THE MARGINS

Chapter 7 on Marginality set out the theoretical basis of the concept and explained the grounds
for my treatment of Russia as marginal. Three hypotheses, it will be remembered, underpinned
my arguments there. Firstly, that Russia is simultaneously weak and strong, secondly, that
marginality can offer many opportunities to make gains and thirdly that as the centre extends
so it encounters a dispersal of its power, causing it to lose strength while those on the margins
may be able to extend their own. This section applies each of these three hypotheses to the 1999 Kosovo crisis in order to understand how it is that what looks like a very weakened state at the end of the 1990s, manages to play a pivotal part in the resolution of a new European crisis. I set out the grounds for claiming that Russia makes gains over this crisis and assess the extent of those gains.

8.5.1 Hypothesis 1: Russia As Both Weak And Strong

To reinforce earlier arguments, I begin with the comparatively simple task of establishing the extent and nature of Russian weakness at the time of the crisis. My earlier theoretical chapter on Marginality considered the various ways in which a state may be marginal, including economic, geographical and political and socio-cultural types of marginality. I have also outlined in Chapter 4 on Russia's Foreign Policy Context the many objectives that Russia failed to achieve after 1991, which demonstrated the extent to which Russia has been excluded from key decision-making about the future of the European space. As if everything else were not proof enough of relative Russian impotence, the Kosovo Crisis put Russia on a clearly opposing side to the NATO membership and ultimately Russia failed in its attempt to protect a fellow Slavic country against NATO bombardment. It was not just the failure to protect fellow Slavs, however. The Kosovo Crisis was the final proof that NATO was the forum for deciding the shape of European security (Webber, 2000: 31). With no power of veto in its relationship with NATO, Russia appeared doomed to watch the rewriting of European security architecture from the outside. The effects, Russia feared, would be felt beyond Europe:

The Yugoslav crisis and the subsequent events in Kosovo abruptly changed the global environment and placed the future of all existing systems of international relations under a big question mark ... Whether we desire it or not, after NATO's war with Yugoslavia the possibilities of preserving, even if in a simplified form, a multipolar world in its traditional understanding, has
sharply narrowed (Fedorov, 1999: 19).

In short, the Crisis apparently emphasised Russia's inability to achieve its objectives in a traditional area of interest.

The airstrikes were an actual, as well as symbolic, marker of Russia's marginalisation. This in turn was underlined further with events such as when the Hungarians held up a Russian relief convoy bound for Yugoslavia (Leerdijk & Zandee: 2001: 192) and when, under pressure from NATO, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania refused use of their airspace to the Russians (Simic, 2001: 111). It was in its arguments with NATO about the relative priority of state sovereignty versus human rights in international relations, however, that Russia looked like being most profoundly sidelined. Much was now at stake. For the Russians this was not just about a traditional sphere of influence, nor was it solely about the European security architecture. This was now about the role of the state, what protections were available to it and, crucial to this last point, the role of the United Nations:

In our eyes, an extremely dangerous precedent for the resolution of situations of conflict has been established -- not on the basis of the UN Charter, of international law, the principles and norms of the OSCE, but on the basis of a primitive law of force (Yeltsin, 1999:62).

Of the two underlying and conflicting principles upon which the UN is predicated, the sovereignty of states had long, until Kosovo, taken precedence over the need to protect human rights. If one accepts the asserted motivation of NATO for its intervention, Kosovo was ushering in a post-Westphalian, a post-modern international system and in this system Russia was located very firmly on the margins. However, Russia's strength now lay in its very weakness.

Foreign Policy analysis makes clear that any analyst must have a consideration for the domestic as well as the international context. I have already set out the evidence of the depth
of Russian anti-Western public opinion. This antipathy was no less reciprocated by key Russian foreign policy decision-makers, including the military. It is pertinent to ask, therefore what prevented Russia from sliding back into Cold War era habits and actions. I argue that in the absence of recourse to other methods, Russia was forced to appeal to weapons of rhetoric. But, in weakness, it made use of language and argument that, although it did not change anything, was met with agreement in other quarters, western quarters too, and would eventually create some debate about the rightness of intervention, where the USA and Britain had sought to avoid debate and instead attempted to impose a new reality. I claim, therefore, that here Russia did indeed have much justification in claiming at least part of the moral high ground. For instance, it showed up the hypocrisy of NATO relying on values arguments to justify intervention even while they minimised risk to their own service-people by launching airstrikes rather than sending in troops on the ground - at the expense of innocent civilians. Russia’s Senior Advisor to Russia’s Permanent Representative to the OSCE in Vienna was, if not objective, at least justified in his argument that,

...in Yugoslavia the Americans were prepared to save the lives of their air crew and soldiers, but gave no thought to the victims when bombing the towns and settlements of the Yugoslavs. Their inhabitants — were mere statistics, drawn on a graph as “collateral damage” (Matveev, 1999:37).

While this did not make the Russians right for arguing against intervention the argument did make it more difficult to see the airstrikes as morally acceptable.

But Matveev went further, moving Russia off the margins of the ideational argument and on to shared ground with the centre,

The crude reality of the politics of force has shed the feeble covering of the sovereignty of states and the pre-eminence of law. The fig-leaves of globalisation, humanitarian intervention, the defence of freedom (and aid in the “fight for freedom”) do not enliven the general greyness of real nature - as in many centuries ago, force has again become the sole criterion of the importance of states and of the admissibility of their inner values (Matveev, 1999: 35).
This was the paradox at the heart of the post-modern argument. After all, if the EU was post-modern by virtue of having overcome its long history of conflict, it was questionable how a military operation could be said to be post-modern, particularly when it took place solely from the air. Despite the strength of these arguments, Russia made little impact on the wider international community. NATO argued that human rights breaches taking place in Kosovo were of such magnitude that human rights must necessarily come first and, faced with Russian and Chinese intransigence, acted without UN authority. This debate would resurface, of course, in the context of the 2003 Iraq War. While Russia in 1999 found itself marginalised in a debate centred on values and norms, in 2008 Russia's stance looks far less marginal. There remains the question, therefore of why Russia was not able to gain more from this debate in 1999.

The answer lay, very simply, in the fact that 'Europe' had already suffered heavy criticism for its failure to prevent the worst occurrences of the Yugoslav crisis earlier in the 1990s. No discourse that permitted further escalation of violence was going to be accepted by the centre. Thus all the NATO countries could fairly refer to atrocities that could not be permitted to be repeated. The necessity for a speedy response in order to limit the extent of the humanitarian crisis was accepted and ultimately Russian and Chinese intransigence in the UN had stymied this, wrong-footing Russia in the values argument. The nature of the actor also reduced Russia's opportunity for manoeuvre. Naturally attracting controversy, military actors tend to be less susceptible to attacks on their norms / values base. It is true, however, that NATO leaders were driven to defending their actions continually and vociferously, suggesting that some of the criticism leveled at them was hitting home. Finally there was the matter of Russia's own 'bad reputation' (Modelski, 1962). With a background of perceived human rights violations in Chechnya and before that Afghanistan, the Prague Spring and the 1956 Hungarian revolution, no-one was going to take lessons in values from the Russians. In this situation then, Russia had very little room for manoeuvre and the failure to have NATO held properly to account served
to stress even further Russia’s relative weakness.

Russia resorted to threats in an attempt to get NATO to see the folly of its actions:

Attempts to organise European security on a so-called Nato-centric model, ignoring the national and political interests of Russia, brings with it the threat of instability not only for Europe, but for the world as a whole (Yeltsin, 1999: 62).

References by the MFA to the need for Russia to strengthen the Moscow-Peking-Delhi triangle were frequent and easily interpreted as warning (Ivanov, 1999). But here too Russian weakness was evident; domestic problems turned such threats into little more than bluster. Yeltsin was undergoing impeachment, relations between Yeltsin and his Prime Minister, Primakov, were strained and Russia was heavily indebted to the IMF and World Bank. Under these conditions, few were taking Russia seriously. When, in the midst of the crisis, it was announced that the US intended to take the Baltic States into NATO, Russian journalists greeted the news with the comment that, ‘they are trying to damage Russia on all fronts’ (Gornostaev & Sokolov, 1999).

Ultimately, however, Russia found strength during the crisis in its relationship with the Serbs. As was set out in Chapter 2, a state’s past can constrain its future power output (Modelski, 1962). Russia’s poor historical reputation too often constrains it in its foreign policy interactions. In the Kosovo Crisis, for once, Russia’s historical legacy was a relatively positive one, as has already been explored in this chapter. But – and this is yet more evidence of the poverty of an analysis that denies Russia behaves as a values-actor – Russia was able to position itself as a state that invested effort in diplomacy rather than military action in order to resolve a crisis. That Russia was motivated by its own interests is neither here nor there, as was argued in Chapter 5. What became clear during the course of the Crisis was that NATO airstrikes alone were not going to be enough to force Belgrade into line. Russian intervention brought about an earlier end to the Crisis than would have otherwise been possible.
Despite this area of strength, Russia's capacity to be a consistent and coherent actor through the crisis was compromised by its indebtedness to those it sought to denigrate. Bradshaw (1999: 8) explains inconsistencies in the Russian position by its prospects of receiving money from the IMF or World Bank. Fedorov was more blunt, saying, 'if it is difficult to speak and to be heard when your voice is first and foremost the voice of a petitioner' (1999: 19). That Russia was a 'petitioner' is clear. After the 1998 financial crisis, the World Bank committed $6 billion and the IMF $11.2 billion to rescue Russia as a result of pressure exerted by the Clinton administration (Stiglitz, 2002: 148–9). Yeltsin's reliance on foreign assistance constrained Russia's opportunities heavily and was proof enough for NATO that Russia did not represent any kind of military threat. Russia's marginalisation therefore carried few risks. It was the Pristina Airport incident that revealed NATO's analysis as flawed and showed unpredictability to be a useful strategy for margins.

8.5.2 Hypothesis 2: Finding Room For Manoeuvre

The decision of Belgrade in early June to comply with international demands gave rise to the question of peacekeeping troops. Russia's concerns now centred on ensuring that Russia had a strong role in the peacekeeping mission that would follow. Fearing that NATO would control the operation, with no role for Russia, the Russian General Staff apparently ordered its SFOR unit stationed in Bosnia to march to Pristina airport in Kosovo. Precisely who gave the orders is disputed but Levitin suggested the military staff acted without coordinating their actions with the MFA (2000: 138).

36 President of the Foundation for 'Political Research' and former Director of the Political Programmes of the CFDP
37 Stiglitz was World Bank Chief Economist 1997-2000.
38 From a marginality point of view, it is interesting to note that Stiglitz explained this action on the basis of the Clinton administration's desire to 'maintain Boris Yeltsin in power, though on the basis of all the principles which should have guided lending, it made little sense' (2002: 166).
As the only large airport in the conflict zone, Pristina was of great strategic importance. The arrival of Russian troops there before NATO forced the latter to decide between confrontation and acceptance. Analysis of Russian motivations here must take into account the following: the small number of troops involved, difficulties in getting further Russian troops out there, Russia's desire for inclusion rather than exclusion in Europe and its reliance on western aid. Pristina is best understood as a Russian reminder of the dangers of marginalisation rather than as any serious threat to NATO. The final decision on Russian participation in KFOR operations may have been achieved even without events at Pristina airport but the swiftness of the decision - Russia and the US hammered out the agreement between 16 and 19 June (Leurdijk & Zandee, 2001: 202) - suggests not.

Aside from this, it was in its attempts at diplomacy that Russia most looked to have strength. Russian diplomacy was vital to the final cessation of violence and peace arrangements, culminating in UN Resolution 1244 (Webber 2000: 48). In the face of the weakness identified above, Russia trod a delicate line between expressing its extreme dissatisfaction and playing a decisive role on the 'right' side, as evidenced by condemnation of the airstrikes, even while admitting the importance of human rights protections.

It was most particularly during the airstrikes rather than before them that Russia used its relationship to good effect. After the initial reactions, Russia became an important player in the cessation of hostilities. Appointed Special Representative of the President, Chernomyrdin played an active role, meeting regularly with Milosevic to mediate between Belgrade and NATO. In so doing, Russia began to be seen more favourably by NATO and other interested parties -- excepting the Serbs themselves. Certainly, the EU representative, Finnish President, Marti Ahtisaari, spoke of Chernomyrdin's 'central, key role' (in Pyadishev, 1999: 3). At the core of this though was Russia's relationship with Belgrade; Defence Minister Sergeev's claim
that only Russia was capable of renewing dialogue between the West and Belgrade was not an entirely idle boast (Rusanova, 1999: 1). While Russia expressed its dismay at NATO’s actions, it nevertheless worked hard to persuade Milosevic to comply with UN demands. In so doing, Russia sent at least two messages: that the Serbs could not rely on Russia for support against NATO; and that it was time to recognise that states were not fully sovereign, that they would sometimes be held accountable to 'higher authorities'. The first message does reflect Russian weakness. The second, however, reflects Russia's capacity to draw strength from that weakness, as Lynch makes clear:

Russian diplomacy avoided the twin traps of outright defiance and abject dependency: a state with far fewer power resources than it desired nevertheless managed to assert its interest (Lynch, 2001:24).

8.5.3 Hypothesis 3: The Weakness Of The Centre?

This third hypothesis is harder to prove in relation to Kosovo since NATO clearly held the upper hand in military terms, both in relation to the Serbs and to Russia. In terms of what would have happened without Russian diplomacy, however, it is sensible to ask whether NATO action alone would have brought an end to the conflict, and when. More 'mistakes' like that of the bombing of the Chinese Embassy may have occurred, NATO may have been forced to send in troops, so escalating the violence even further and certainly more casualties would have been sustained. I surmise, therefore, that, setting aside the differences between the US and Russia over this matter and seeing the airstrikes as a necessity to loosen Milosevic's resolve, the USA and Russia actually made an effective team in bringing about the final June Peace Settlement, the one militarily and the other diplomatically. Any weakness in the centre was an inevitable consequence of the limited range of solutions open to it as a security actor.
But it was also a consequence of its lack of an historical relationship with the Serbs. Russia's past history meant Belgrade was prepared to do diplomatic business with Moscow where it would not with NATO. Russia, accepting marginalisation in military terms, managed to insert itself into the gap that existed in European strategies and experiences.

This did not necessarily render NATO weak though. In Chapter 7, I focused primarily on the opportunities Russia might have to play states off against each other and there is some evidence to suggest that Russia attempted this during the crisis (Kuranov, 1999). In June of 1988 Russia and Germany commenced what would become a habit of high-level bilateral talks, a process repeated with France. A Russian journalist reported that the MFA saw this as constituting a possible line of contact between Russia and the EU (Gornostaev, 1999). However, while France and Germany were not as enthusiastic in their support of NATO's actions as the UK, they did not allow Russia to exploit this.

In view of the values debate and the strong influence of European states throughout the Crisis, we have to see NATO in this instance as far more than a mere military actor. However, even while it cast itself as a values actor, it found itself unable to act as one and this inevitably undermined its capacity to be seen as one. Thus, where Kosovo does reveal weakness was in the fact that as the centre expanded its area of activities, it also encountered more difficulty in staying true to its own values. In the case of Kosovo, we were faced with what should have been seen as an extraordinary picture, western states, so many of them EU members and therefore supposed 'values-actors', relying on military intervention while one of the supposedly most interest-driven actors of them all, Russia, relied on soft-power diplomatic interventions.
8.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS

It is in this latter context, that Values, Marginality, and the Post-modern perspective fit most clearly together and between them highlight the problems that face analysts. For the EU states involved, as the post-modern met the modern, it was not always the rules and values of the post-modern era that prevailed, just as Cooper's (2004) analysis led us to expect. The extension of the centre saw a dispersal of power in that it could no longer, despite its protestations, be seen as unequivocally relying on its value-basis. This would have an inevitable effect on its legitimacy in the eyes of third parties, as has already been established. It also, crucially, gave room for Russia to move to occupy the values-vacuum, and reveal that it too could claim to be a values-actor. More than this, in the context of earlier discussions about what Russia is actually marginal to, the Kosovo Crisis gave it an opportunity to act with other Europeans to solve a European problem. It allowed it too to adopt the very mantle of Europeanness. In Chapter 7, I said that Russia is marginal to a Europe that claims a major part of its identity as being based on such 'things' as norms and principles. In Kosovo, however, Russia laid claim to that tradition. More than that, it brought the question of the NATO's and EU Member States' claim to be values-actors into question, as the section above on Values has demonstrated.

In summary, Kosovo made clear that a new European security architecture had been established with NATO sitting at the top of the hierarchy. With the UN sidelined and the OSCE restricted to missions of a very particular type, this hierarchy did not seem to leave room for Russian input and influence. Notwithstanding the special NATO-Russia relationship, Russia had no power to effect change within the organisation. This sent Russia a very clear message about the constraints within which it would now have to work but it also created new opportunities for Russian influence. Diplomacy was the platform for Russian successes in Kosovo, a different role for this former superpower but one which, if followed by similar
successes, could have caused a shift in outside perceptions of Russia, especially as it is combined with evidence of military weakness (notwithstanding the Pristina airport incident).

The 1999 Kosovo crisis provided plenty of moments for international actors to fear that a return to Cold War tensions was possible between European actors. Despite disagreements between Russia, the EU and the USA throughout the 1990 Balkan conflicts, it was not until the end of the century that it seemed possible that a larger over-arching conflict would spill over into other states in Europe. That this did not happen is due in large measure to the foreign policy of Russia which skilfully walked the fine line between peace and war, winning, in the process, a prime, but more importantly, a new, role for itself as a peace negotiator. However, with recent events the strong possibility that Russia walked this line so carefully precisely because it was weak to begin with cannot be ruled out. The intervention in Georgia in August 2008 would seem to give the lie to the notion that Russia can be treated as a marginal state for much longer. The reassertion of Russian foreign policy, since 2008 particularly, is founded on an economically stronger, and politically more coherent state than the Russia of the 1990s. Opportunities to bring a weak Russian state round to western European ways of thinking were certainly missed. But, there is still, despite Georgia, evidence to believe that Russia will continue along the route of establishing good, cooperative relations. Recent posturing may well be based on a calculation that this is necessary in order to ensure Russia is dealt with equitably. Once an equitable relationship has been established, I do not rule out the possibility that Russia will return to its pragmatic tightrope-walking act. It is possible, however, that Russia may already feel it was pushed too far to the margins and give fodder to the Realists and their arguments about the effects upon actors of suspicion, distrust and uncertainty.
CONCLUSIONS

The objective of the thesis was to discover whether grounds exist for considering Russia as a values actor. The research question is all the more salient in the context of the New Cold War discourse, where Russia's new-found confidence in international relations was interpreted negatively and seen as evidence of the persistence of Cold War attitudes. The thesis sought to deepen our understandings of Russian behaviour, seeking to account for the perceived shift in Russian attitudes to the West and to understand why the hopes of the 1990s had been replaced with the doubts of the 2000s.

The scope of the project was a wide one: Russia's foreign policy behaviour from 1991. The extensive task was a consequence of my assertion that a contextual examination was fundamental if understanding of Russia was to be achieved, but the broad nature of the task was also occasioned by the lessons of the Foreign Policy Analysis literature. The belief that analysis in the Cold War period had proved deficient, that after the Cold War FPA entered a new generation, and that important lessons had to be learned and acted upon, resulted in a metatheoretical debate that continues to capture FP analysts' attention. The primary lesson applied from that body of literature to my own research was that scholarship has to be responsive to events. To that extent, a good understanding of events and developments in the international arena has to precede any attempt to analyse an actor's FP. On these grounds alone, a contextual analysis was called for. The other lesson was that FPA must do more to position itself at the nexus between the domestic and international environments. While many analysts had previously focused on international level structures, the need to locate actors and agency within the (in this case) state, was also emphasised. As such, my own research had to encompass not only the international environment, in respect of which Russia makes its FP, but
the domestic context from which the FP emerges as well.

The need for an emphasis on context was therefore plain. But ensuring that the analysis was appropriate to the time involved much more subjective decisions. The literature was again of help here. The arguments for a 'multi-level, multi-faceted' approach to the analysis of foreign policy were widespread, as was the judgment that the search for a grand theory of foreign policy had rightly been abandoned, that FPA needed to be directed at the mid range. While such arguments have arisen out of criticisms of what has been called the first generation of FP study, they also reflect the increasing impact of reflectivist approaches in IR where rationalist approaches have been deemed reductionist and limited in their explanatory power. This behaviouralist tradition, with its emphasis on the methods of 'normal science' had arisen in the context of the nuclear and space age, characterised by what amounted to a faith in the explanatory power of science. In the post-Cold War period, the limits of such accounts had been made plain. Instead, actors were conducting their relations in a globalising and interdependent world where human rights saw a steady rise up the political agenda as a consequence of the civil wars and inter-ethnic conflicts that dominated the media airwaves. In this age of uncertainty following the collapse of the Cold War bipolar structure and certain associated entities such as the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, and with events such as 9/11 demonstrating the depth of feeling against perceived injustices, the reflectivist tradition has laid bare the necessity of understanding behaviour from the perspective of the actor. The tradition is not without its critics, not least because of the methodological problems that are presented. But nevertheless, the preoccupations of the second generation reveal FPA as rooted in the problems of the era. The second generation of FPA is distinguished by a rejection of the search for a grand theory and positivist methodologies. Not everything has been lost from the first generation, of course. The emphasis on context, on psycho-milieu, on the role of values at all levels of analysis – all this is highly reliant on the pioneering work of Sprout and Sprout.
(1962) and Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954, 1962). It is only in more recent times, however, that FPA, IR and the international environment have coincided in such a way as to make these variables unquestionably fundamental to our understandings.

The direction in which FPA has moved has proved problematic in methodological terms. Even as Modelski (1962) in the first generation revealed the scope of the task to be Herculean so too did Hill's seminal 2003 work. Both works presented as many difficulties as they did insights. Both show that there is very little that does not feed into policy. Take the levels of analysis problem, for instance. Depending on where you look, the individual, the bureaucracy, the state and the system can all, simultaneously, be vital foci for analysis. But how can theory account for everything and provide a framework for analysis that allows us to do so? There is a reason for the continued popularity of rational choice theory, i.e. precisely its lack of complexity and its capacity to find 'answers', no matter how reductionist they may be. In, rightly, tackling this reductionism and in trying to address the criticisms levelled at it for its lack of distinctiveness in terms of what it sought and managed to explain, FPA runs the risk of becoming so generalised as to become redundant. In its defence, FPA directs the analysts to areas of enquiry that other fields do not. It provides insights that others do not. Its multi-disciplinary-informed approaches mean analysis is forced to contend with and combine a variety of variables that other fields are not. The risk of being all things to all people can be overcome by reducing the extent of what needs to be studied as much as possible. At bottom, the focus on mid range theory means that FPA does not have to provide answers to all things at all times, hence Hermann's (1995) admonition to be clear about what is attempting to be understood and to clarify the nature of the dependent and independent variables.

With all this in mind, I undertook my research from a post-positivist perspective and a
phenomenological stance, even while accepting that as an observer I could never wholly replicate the Russian actor's position. As part of this attempt to see things from the Russian perspective, a starting assumption was that Russia's more recent self-assertiveness in its international relations was an indication not of an entrenched authoritarian attitude on the part of Russia but a failure of the West a) to understand Russia and b) to exploit opportunities to 'socialise' Russia. With the dependent variable established, the independent variables had to be located at both the domestic and international levels. Through the discussion of actors in Russia's foreign policy, I concluded, for a number of reasons, that the state, versus the individual or government, for instance, was the most appropriate level of analysis. In adopting Wendt's (2004, 2005) thinking on the state as 'person' I was able to attribute the state with personality characteristics that represented the range of views within Russia and so meant I did not have to look at multiple levels of analysis within the state. Identity was established as a key variable and here too the extent of the task was reduced since, as the discussion revealed, a host of separate elements can be incorporated within this one variable. Thus, the question of which conception of nationhood Russia operates is subsumed under the wider issue of identity but itself encompasses questions (and answers) about the role of multiculturalism, for instance. This discussion was vital to what followed. By showing that Russia's very identity was affected so profoundly by the actions of external actors, I showed the susceptibility of Russia's foreign policy to outside influences. As argued consistently throughout the thesis, the nature of the international system after 1991 was such that the role of the international 'constitutional' structure had to be treated as pivotal to understanding Russia's FP behaviour.

In looking at Russia's own domestic context, on the basis of the extant body of literature, I considered those elements which were seen by most analysts to be defining variables. Russia's geographical vulnerability, its perception that the West treated it as an enemy, the increasing militarisation, combined with the already established actorness of the military – all these meant
that security had to figure highly in my analysis. Thus, I considered the resources that Russia had at its disposal, in other words to try and establish its 'power-output'. The recent nuclearisation debate also occasioned some examination of the state and role of nuclear weapons in Russia's international relations. The economy was naturally another focus for attention as were Russia's natural resources, which led inevitably to the question of energy. Other variables considered related to demographic trends and Russia's relations with its neighbouring states. While Russia is undoubtedly resource-rich, it is not wholly unconstrained in respect of these resources. Nuclearisation is interpreted by some as a response not only to the USA's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty but Russia's own weakened conventional forces. But the literature from the earlier part of the period under discussion had already shown that Russia's nuclear arsenal was in extremely poor condition, nothing in the 2000s suggests it can stay the course with the USA in this regard. The story of its ailing population is another telling one. If analysts (Brooks & Wohlforth 2002, Modelski 1962) are right to see the population of a state as resources that can build the economy, defend the territory militarily, and help construct positive images of the state within the wider world, Russia faces difficult times in ensuring these objectives are met in the long term. Its economic recovery after the 1998 financial crash was speedy and impressive but Russia, like other countries, has proved vulnerable to recent global economic circumstances. Even in respect of energy, Russia is not without problems and, while not dependent on external finance and knowledge, has already recognised it can benefit from it. The picture presented was of a Russia that is weak in places and which, even where strong, can be made stronger by building cooperative relationships with other actors.

The question was then of where Russia could and would seek to build such relationships. The Russian foreign policy literature revealed a Russia that suffers from either a lack of or a disputed identity, depending on one's point of view. In the context of a changing world, Russia's identity problems meant the West had an incomparable opportunity to bring Russia
into its orbit and to help it 'learn' the values asserted by the West. Instead, a series of neglectful or ill-informed foreign policy decisions that disadvantaged Russia forced it into making concessions to its nationalist, sometimes anti-western, forces at home. Given Putnam's (1988) famous two level game theory's insights, that this was not foreseen is extraordinary. According to this theory, agreement at Level I (the international) is more likely if both sides are mindful of the fact that each is subject to 'Level II preferences and coalitions' (Putnam, 1988) and that there is therefore a minimum 'win-set size' if agreement is to be sold at home. Russia was never going to be able to sell NATO enlargement to the Baltic States back home and so that was an action calculated to send Russia into a retreat from western policies.

In discussing Russia's FP phases, therefore, I demonstrated the linked effect of other states' foreign policy upon developments within Russia itself. Russia's turn away from its early westward orientation into more focus on its 'near abroad' is attributable to a perception of 'betrayal' by the West. However, Russia's improved economic situation, coupled with a more assertive FP that was directed particularly at those of its neighbours that Russia saw as recalcitrant, brought about a New Cold War discourse that I attributed, notwithstanding Russia's behaviour, to a 'prejudiced and prejudicial' attitude on the part of the West. Scholarship may have seen the limits of rationalism, other actors had not, and little or no effort was made to see that Russia's behaviour was a response to what it perceived to be an attempt to marginalise it even in respect of its near neighbours. As such, motivations for Russian actions were all too seen as negative and other interpretations rarely considered.

It was also in the literature on 'phases' that Russia was revealed as making adjustments in response to external conditions. Considering its claim to be a part of Europe, the changes in the New Europe and associated questions about what constituted Europe and where its boundaries lay took on an unlooked-for urgency. As the territory of the EU enlarged and as the EU sought
to project its identity further and further beyond its boundaries the question of where Russia fitted, and if it did, took on added importance. In the New Europe, Russia became increasingly marginalised. At the same time, and despite more recent events, I argued that Russia continues to have opportunities here to improve its position in relation to the centre. As the EU expanded, its borders became more precarious and its knowledge-base more limited. Russia has knowledge and experience of the EU's new eastern borders that the core of the EU does not. More than this, Russia is a crucial strategic partner for the EU in addressing common challenges and threats. Whether Russia will, like the West, fail to realise the opportunity it has to create a properly cooperative relationship, and in so doing to overcome its poor historical legacy, remains to be seen. In seeing Russia as operating its foreign policy in a post-modern world, where it wants to be seen as European but is seen instead as a relic of the backward modern era, pursuing interests and not values, I concluded that Russia had been marginalised within the European space. Vitally though, I did not treat marginality as an indication solely of weakness, but rather as presenting manifold opportunities for favourable manoeuvring. The recent New Cold War discourse shows that Europe is now at a critical juncture and the future peace of the continent and beyond is contingent not simply on Russia but on the range of actors with which it does business.

The research here has shown that there can be little question but that Russia desires to be perceived as European, that it attaches a strong value to being European and being seen to be so. This offers hope that it can adopt and adhere to the image that the New Europe projects of itself, i.e. as a post-modern and therefore values actor. Foreign Policy cannot be constructed solely on the basis of hope, however. While I have hypothesised that Russia is a values actor, I also assert that its operational values have to be understood within the particularities of the Russian case and that they are not necessarily the same as 'European', post-modern values. To an extent, as suggested in the marginality chapter, this does not matter. Russia sits at the
margins, not at such a remove from the EU that the two cannot learn from each other. The international situation is such that Russia may have little choice but to make accommodations to the post-modern era. This is not least because Russia has had few successes when shifting its gaze eastwards. The CIS has been a mere shell for the deeper aspirations that motivated its creation. While the CSTO, BRIC and SCO offer more substantial hope for the achievement of goals they are unlikely to compensate sufficiently for losses within Europe and will mean Russia sacrificing its European credentials.

Most importantly, it is difficult to see what any actor can gain from pushing Russia to the furthest confines of the European space. It is difficult too to see what can be achieved by a new Cold War. If ever the paucity of rational choice theory has been visible it is in the current international situation. Where is the rationality in a refusal to understand Russia's position when the consequences of that decision might be, at the very least, a renewal of old antagonisms and so little scope for cooperative partnership? As I concluded at the end of Chapter 5, it is the EU that has the scope to socialise Russia and to teach it the value of, well, values – and post-modern values especially. Those who call for the EU to recognise that Russia is not a values but an interests-actor fail to acknowledge the applicability of Constructivist arguments about the possibilities for learning and the methods by which this can be achieved. At bottom, Russia and the EU share threats and challenges and early motivations for cooperation may well be rooted in the desire to secure interests – for both actors – but successful cooperation can overcome such motivations and the socialisation process crystallise cooperative impulses.

The case study on Kosovo questioned the extent not solely to which we can consider Russia to be post-modern but western European states too. Here, as with the New Cold War discourse,
the limits of Europe's post-modern credentials were laid bare. Even if European credentials in this respect were accepted, Russia too could lay claim to some aspects of post-modernity. Russia's calls for debate about the relative priorities that the international community should support were calls more consonant with post-modern values than the NATO airstrikes of which so many EU states were a part. Russia has been accused of instrumentalism here but this is a disingenuous argument. Values cannot be imposed – by their very nature they must be conceived of as desirable. Kosovo was the best example there is to date of how Russia can act as honest broker. That it acted so only because it had no other choice except outright confrontation with NATO or complete marginalisation to the outside rather than inside of Europe is neither here nor there. Russia's behaviour in the Kosovo Crisis showed that it could walk the fine line between accommodating nationalist interests at home and post-modern values abroad. It showed also that Russia could be a useful, cost-reducing partner within Europe.

In conclusion, this thesis makes a contribution to the Russian FP literature by showing that new thinking in FPA is entirely applicable to the Russian case. I have argued a more accurate understanding of how Russia began at a) but got to d) will arise only once Russia is seen as operating a set of values that is formulated according to local and wider circumstances but which is still constrained by domestic conditions. This thesis has therefore sought to provide an antidote to the entrenched Cold War thinking applied to Russia, while at the same time adding substance to claims about the effects of interdependence and globalisation by showing the extent to which even a relatively powerful (if not a superpower) state is constrained in its foreign policy behaviour. It is by applying thinking on the psycho-milieu (Sprout and Sprout, 1964) and salient environment (Mouritzen, 1996), as well as by seeking to understand where Russia really desires its place in the world to be that I was able also to give some insight into which international actor, i.e. the EU, is most likely to be able to effect a socialisation process in respect of the Russian state.
The largest contribution lies in the work done on Values. Forming an increasingly important part of analysis generally, what was missing from the literature was a proper, coherent understanding of what a value is and how and where it was formulated. I have addressed each of these gaps. Additionally, by bringing values so firmly into the foreign policy field, I not only disassociate FPA from the accusation that it is far too Realist-driven, but I demonstrate the continued significance of the study of Foreign Policy and how it borrows from but moves beyond both Political Theory and International Relations Theory. I had three starting hypotheses, the first of which was that Russia is a values actor. By showing the interconnectedness of interests and values, I was able to show that Russia's foreign policy behaviour is, indeed, underpinned by a values set. The second hypothesis was that Russia's values would only be evident through reference to context. It was important to decide what that context was and I argued that, in light of Russia's desire to be seen as European, debate about the existence or otherwise of a post-modern era was the necessary prism. This is because the post-modern discourse is the biggest constraint upon Russia being able to achieve its foreign policy objectives and the biggest obstacle to it being seen as anything other than an interests-actor. As a result, and relevant to the final hypothesis about the ability to forecast Russia's foreign policy, I showed that opportunities would continue to be missed to 'make' Russia European and post-modern unless the idea was entertained that it too has values.
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