The Ministry of the Interior: Public policy in Thailand with specific reference to the issue of whether or not it is suitable to have provincial governors elected

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Abstract

Thailand is administratively divided into 75 provinces. Each is headed by a provincial governor, an appointed government official working under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior.

There is a debate on whether the provincial governors should carry on working as the appointed government officials or whether they should be elected. A demand for a policy on election of provincial governors has been made on the grounds that public administration at provincial level should be decentralised. It is believed that the local government would be run more effectively under the elected governor. The research investigates public opinion including the views of local residents, government officials, senior public administrators, and politicians. Investigation was also made to find out what the outcomes would be if there were election of provincial governors.

Following the theoretical framework and the hypothetical assumption, the research findings indicate that the policy on election of provincial governors is unlikely to benefit the whole nation. The present socio-economic situation regarding social and cultural values, educational and economic development is shown not to be conducive to the positive outcomes of the policy. The social and cultural values associated with the traditional way of thinking and the attitude of the people towards politics, electoral process on the one hand, and political groups on the other hand are proved to be influential to the policy. Such values have caused the delay of political development which do not help to produce stable and efficient local government. Besides, the economic development regarding standards of education and income level of the population have affected political factors including the strength of the party
system, and democratic stability. Additionally, the levels of economic development do not help to create strong pressure groups to keep a balance of power among the ruling parties.

The outcome of the exploration of support for the policy on governorship election indicate almost no positive outlook for the future of local government. The majority of the respondents (on the part of local residents, government officials, and senior public administrators) show their disagreement with the policy. They believe that the introduction of such a policy would not create better provincial public administration. Neither would it be run more effectively under the control of elected governors. Nevertheless, the remaining respondents, the politicians, believe the opposite.

However, even though the majority are unfavourable to the adoption of the policy they believed, on the other hand, that the election of provincial governors would strengthen the party system since local government might be able to produce a fundamental base for a national party.
Project Topic: The Ministry of the Interior: Public policy in Thailand with specific reference to the issue of whether or not it is suitable to have provincial governors elected

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Chapter I
Introduction

In Thailand, recently, politicians have shown so much interest in the role of provincial governors that there has been debate among politicians on this issue. Questions have been raised such as, should provincial governors be appointed to continue working under the Ministry of the Interior, or should they become politicians and have themselves judged by popular vote through election so that provincial administration can be free from the control of bureaucratic authority? Strengths and weaknesses of the issue have been indicated to support the different points of view. This is because the provincial governor is an executive administrator of the province, and thus has a key role in any developmental functions as head of all public officials who are representatives at provincial and lower level of most ministries, as well as acting as chairman of local government units. Moreover, the governors take part in general elections within the province, acting as a chairman of the election polls in compliance with the Ministry of the Interior, which is authorised by the government to become a central body in organising and launching campaigns for elections throughout the country.

Since the provincial governor supervises a number of government bodies and local government units at many levels, his good relationships and personal performance could easily be of benefit to any politician who he might take sides with. Further, it is argued that his influence could lead to either advantages or disadvantages for political parties because his official performance is important and close to the people's every day life.
Besides, politicians often complain that their political activities or developmental programmes are stalled within the province. They believe that some provincial governors have not played a neutral role but have run provincial affairs so as to favour the political parties with which they sympathise. Furthermore, they also blame the highly centralised process and bureaucratic red tape for the delay in public administration. In contrast, public administrators report much interference concerning public administration and personnel management from politicians.

However, it is believed that with the election of provincial governors, political parties which would form to win these offices would be able to organise the local government units as part of their political party which can support them to win the general election. The demand for election of provincial governors was thus believed to be generated from the politicians.

Nevertheless, politicians and public administrators can by no means be separate from each other. In this case, it is important to mention Ira Sharkansky’s idea that a complete view of politics must include public administration as there is little formulation of policy goals and no implementation of policy without administrators. He also points out that in a democratic government, even if all politicians acted in concert, they would still need professional administrators. Nonetheless, public administrators have to learn to understand the nature of politicians although it is not simple to follow the orders that come from them. (1)

To analyse this issue, it is vital to consider whether it is necessary to have all the top public administrators elected only when it is found that they do not fulfil their political purpose; or if it
is much more suitable to elect them so that the public can choose the appropriate candidate; or if there is any way to compromise in order that public administrators and politicians can work in cooperation with less conflict.

1.1 Objectives and Scope of the Study

The objectives of this study are to survey public opinion including the general public, government officials and politicians as to its assessment of public administration under the currently appointed provincial governors. Furthermore, this study will be carried out in accordance with theories concerning policy analysis and public administration in order that the administrative change at provincial level will be made on a theoretical basis. The research, therefore, has to be conducted so as to underline any weak points or constraints that need to be modified or reformed in political and administrative functions.

In general, the aims of this study are to examine the policy framework. With reference to the specific objectives of this research, it is necessary to examine public opinion responding to the policy on governorship election. Further, it will investigate the question of whether the current socio-economic situation is suitable for the election of provincial governors. Besides, if the elections take place, will it be useful for the political development of Thai democracy, or help to produce improvements in public administration? In addition to that, the matter concerning what political factors have affected the possibility of governorship elections is examined.
Accordingly, the study is designed to cover four major topics. Firstly, social and cultural values which impact upon public administration; secondly, the significant political context and political influence upon provincial administration; thirdly, provincial government under the Ministry of the Interior and the administrative problems; and finally, functions and responsibilities of provincial governors.

1.2 The Structure of the study

The research consists of eight chapters. The contents and scope of the presentation in each chapter are outlined as follows.

In the first chapter, in addition to an introduction, and objectives and scope of the study, the main hypotheses along with models for policy analysis, and the political problems in Thailand are presented.

Chapter 2 concerns methodologies for testing the hypotheses which serve as a guideline for the inquiry. Subsequently, the methods of discussion including units of population for analysis and sampling, sources, and data collection are offered in this chapter.

Chapter 3 discusses the theory and conceptual framework which support this study, including the theory of public policy and policy analysis, conceptual application, and the characteristics of the elements involved in the conceptual framework.

Chapter 4 deals with subjects concerning such general information as the historical background of the public administration of the
Ministry of the Interior, which was transformed during the period of modernisation, factors affecting public administration, for example, social, cultural, and political values and religion.

Chapter 5 and 6 are concerned with an overview of public units and public administration based at provincial level, the roles and responsibilities assigned to provincial governors; review of literature on the debate on public attitudes towards provincial governors, the Ministry of the Interior and provincial administration, and public attitudes towards appointed governors, and politics.

In chapter 7, the focus is on data analysis and findings. The analysis of the policy on governorship election associated with political system and its environments is explained. The behaviour of socio-economic environments and political elements as well as the conclusion which is based on the hypotheses are discussed.

Finally, in chapter 8, conclusions and recommendations are made arising from the research.

1.3 The Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are designed on the basis of the objectives and the scope of the study, and the conceptual frameworks which will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.

Hypothesis 1. People of lower education are not aware that vote-buying would lead to ineffective government.
Hypothesis 2 The majority of rural residents who have a low level of education tend to vote for individual candidates rather than a party system and this would bring about unstable local governments.

Hypothesis 3 The majority of rural residents who have low standards of income react positively toward vote-buying in which it would cause inefficient local governments.

Hypothesis 4 Vote-buying is the main obstacle to political development and will affect the policy on election of provincial governors.

Hypothesis 5 Public are in favour of appointed governors rather than elected governors.

Hypothesis 6 The policy on election of provincial governors would be beneficial to the public and would create more effective provincial administration.

Hypothesis 7 National and local politicians are the main groups who demand the election of provincial governors.

Hypothesis 8 Senior public administrators including provincial governors have not performed their duties neutrally which would result in the demand for election of provincial governors.
Hypothesis 9 Military power could be a main obstacle to provincial election.

The methods of assessing the credibility of each hypothesis has been obtained through interviews and questionnaires responded to by such participants as the general public, government officials both inside and outside the Ministry of the Interior, senior public administrators of the Ministry of the Interior, and politicians.

1.4 Models for Policy Analysis

Thomas Dye argues that modern behavioural political science has focussed its attention primarily on the processes and behaviour associated with government. Formerly, political science used to involve the study of individual and group political behaviour, the determinants of voting and political activities, and the functioning of interest groups and political parties. Nevertheless, the attention of political science is, presently, centred on the description of the causes and consequences of the government policy. Therefore, policy analysis is done to simplify the government activities and to identify important political forces in society. Moreover, it is designed to communicate relevant knowledge about political life; to investigate agencies involved in politics; and to suggest explanations for political events and outcomes.

In examining the public policy at later stages, it is worth studying models for policy analysis. Thomas Dye states that the models, which will be studied shortly, are not derived especially to study public policy but they can support a way of thinking about or helping to set up a policy.
(1) Systems Theory

David Easton explains systems theory by thinking of public policy as an output of the political system. In the meantime, Thomas Dye describes the concept of "system" as an identifiable set of institutions and activities in society which operate to convert demands into authoritative decisions requiring the support of society. Nonetheless, the components of the system are interrelated. The demands or support formed to affect the political system are referred to as the environmental conditions. After being influenced by the environmental conditions, the political system will perform to transform such conditions to affect the policy outcomes concerning decisions or actions to be made.

In order to analyse public policy which is focussed on systems theory, it is important to understand social, economic, and political situations where the policy is generated. Moreover, it is necessary to understand the characteristics of social groups and the persons involved in policy-making including government officials, interest and ruling groups, and organisational structure.

(2) Rationalism

A rational policy is designed to maximise the value of achievement. In rational theory, it is argued that the necessity of organisation is to function with goal-directed behaviour for the achievement of its objectives. A policy can be rational when it is most efficient in term of having positive effects on all social, political, and economic values.
The rational policy is based on a clear set of objectives and activities, delegation of authority and responsibility, standardisation of work, performance appraisal mechanisms, and information about alternative policies and capability to foresee the consequences of the alternate policies. These requirements enable policy-makers to have a good understanding of value preferences of the society so that they can select and formulate the most efficient policy.

(3) Elite Theory

In Thomas Dye's view, public policy can be considered as the preference and values of a ruling elite. Normally, people are not sufficiently informed about public policy, but the ruling elite are supposed to be the ones who play an important role in policy-making. They actually shape public opinion on policy questions rather than the public influencing the policy outcomes. However, Thomas Dye points out that elitism does not mean the public policy will necessarily be against any welfare given to the public, but the responsibility of public welfare is only vested in the elite. In this theory, Thomas Dye believes that public support or demands can not influence the direction of policy as much as the elite's interests.

Since policies are political issues, in many developing countries, like Thailand, where ruling parties play politics as the most dominant groups, only those elites who hold political power can gain much benefit. Hence, policy-making is, normally, shaped by the decision of ruling groups.
(4) Group theory

David Truman states that group theory is concerned with the proposition that interaction among groups is the central fact of politics. Individuals seem to be important when they act on behalf of interest groups. They can press their demands on ruling parties. A scholar like Thomas Dye believes that politics can be a real problem when they are played by large groups so as to influence public policy. However, conflicts among groups can be managed by: establishing rules for the group activities; arranging and balancing interests, enacting compromises in the form of public policy; and enforcing these compromises. Dye is convinced that the influence of interest groups is due to the financial power of their members, strength of their organisation, strength of leadership, and internal relations among group members.

The effectiveness of political groups is determined by the distinctive points mentioned above. Additionally, the capability to coordinate, control, and integrate the decisions within the group are conducive to the creation of strong political groups. Further, public support is also a great determinant contributing to the success of political groups.

(5) Institutionalism

Governmental structure and institutions have long been a central focus of political science. Thomas Dye simplifies the concept of political science by thinking of it as the study of governmental institutions. Within governmental institutions, there are political activities concerned. In addition, the interests of individuals and groups, and their activities play a direct part within the
institutions. Public policy is authoritatively determined, implemented, and enforced by governmental organisations. Therefore, the relationship between public policy and governmental organisations is close. A policy can be an idea of a governmental institution concerning any particular topic. However, a policy does not become a public policy until it is adopted, implemented and enforced by the governmental institutions. (10)

Therefore, the theory implies that the possibility of establishing a policy depends largely on the interaction and coordination of a number of organisations and the participants involved at different level of governmental organisations. Thus, the policy on governorship election will not take effect unless it is accepted, adopted, and enforced by all parties and organisations concerned.

1.5 Prospects and Problems in the Thai Political System

The struggle for political development in Thailand is concerned with the ruling parties both military and civil, and the political culture. With regard to the political culture, Michael Moran states that political culture refers to the pattern of beliefs and practices which governs social life in a community. It thus covers an immense range: the character of religion and morality, the conventions and customs governing everyday social life, and beliefs and practices concerning the conduct of politics. He states that political culture contains beliefs about the nature of political leadership and authority, about the proper and improper way to settle political differences and about the proper and improper functions of government. (11) This can be entirely applied to Thai politics as the political system has a great impact on the continuity of its
political culture. Since Thai administration, for many decades, was influenced by the absolute monarchy, traditionally, change has mainly originated from the political leaders and from within the culture. Therefore, the Thai tradition is characterised by change from the top by leaders who make absolute decisions.

According to Fred Riggs, the culture of superior-subordinate orientation becomes more obvious in Thai politics. It is dominated or ruled by the official class in the military and civilian bureaucracy.(12) James Mosel also comments on this attitude stating that the tradition of decisions from above implies obedience from below. Compliance with authority is not only a matter of regulations, it is an expression of respect for the dignity of rank. Submission to a higher rank is seen as a matter of respect and etiquette.(13) Therefore, the military and civilians who play the dominant role in politics seem to have significantly absolute power.

Problems within the Thai Political System

As the political system in Thailand is rather complex, it is quite difficult to give accurate information concerning its problems. The problems arising within one group are related to others. As far as the Thai political system is concerned, Tinapan Nakata comments that there have been no historical events to break the continuity between socialisation processes and the existing political culture.(14) In addition, he argues that there has been considerable personal circulation among the ruling groups with very little social circulation.

Studying the past, many Thai scholars believe that the revolution of 1932 was only a change in personnel who were a small group of the
revolution party. Traditional attitudes and practices have hardly changed. They comment that the power which formerly rested with the monarchy has fallen into the hands of certain groups comprising leaders of the military and politicians, who then took turns to rule the country. No serious attempt has been made to change the philosophy, structure, or functions of the Thai bureaucracy to make it compatible with the new principles of government.(15)

Besides, according to James Mosel, the political situation in Thailand is different from that of many other countries where high political status is dependent on high economic status. But in Thailand, high economic status comes from holding high political status as it is the principal route to wealth.(16) He thus believes that that is why corruption has been widely practised by those who take part in politics. Mosel also underlines that in the Thai political system, there is no real threat from people outside the formal structure of the government. Any division which may arise is bound to occur from within the system. In addition, he remarks that political conflicts in Thailand do not centre around ideological issues but largely around the distribution of power, status and material rewards within the system. They are not really affected by outside groups.

In order to understand the delay in political development, it is important to categorise the political problems into three areas: one concerns the intervention by military groups which stemmed from the early years of the democratic regime; the second deals with political parties and their members who are regarded as politicians; and the third focuses on the problems of political culture which are affected by socio-cultural values.
(1) The Intervention of the Military

The experience in the long series of wars in the past has led to the military's ability to gain considerable power over government affairs. From studying the political history, one can see that there are different military leaders who took turns to monopolise political power over a long period. Tinapan Nakata mentions that from the military's viewpoint they had advantages over the other groups since the civilians were seen as relatively weak and indecisive. (17) Therefore, the military, due to their strength, staged periodic coups to modify the political structure and adjust constitutions.

The strength and the continual interventions of the military has meant that there has been a considerable obstruction concerning political socialisation and the growth of political parties. Such opposition has taken the form of seizing power, forbidding political participation of political groups and gatherings, monopoly of leadership, and restricting the information and direct expression of thought. The result is that there have not been sufficient political mechanisms which would help to protect the public interest. This is one of the reasons why genuine parliamentary democracy has not yet developed. Neither has the ideal of popular sovereignty and representative government taken root in Thailand. In this regard, Tinapan Nakata comments that the military has caused the limitation of political activities, which prevents the development of the political institutions so necessary for democratic government. (18)

As a result, such important political functions as dissemination of democratic ideals, legitimate selection of political leaders, development of political communications, distributing knowledge of elections, and encouraging popular participation in the processes of
government have not developed in the interests of the majority of the population.

(2) Problems concerning Political Parties and their Members

As far as political parties are concerned, Tinapan Nakata argues that there is no political party with either mass support or having a clear political philosophy. He believes that ideology has played little role in Thai politics, and the electorate has typically been unconcerned about it. Strong beliefs of political ideology have not been apparent among politicians either. Since the philosophical principles of democracy meant different things to individuals, they constitute a weak force incapable of binding party members together and inspiring them to take group action to achieve their common ideal on a sustained basis. As political groups consist of dominant individuals, Tinapan Nakata believes that most members of political groups are loyal to an individual leader and his financial power rather than to a system, ideology, principle, or reason.(19)

Suchit Bunbongkarn mentions the problems regarding the lack of political participation and associations that can explain the weakness of political parties. On the other hand, the lack of political participation and association can be explained by the loose structure of the social setting, a strong degree of individuality, and the general political culture (20) (this will be discussed in chapter 4). Such social and traditional values have contributed to the lack of regimentation and group discipline which cause major problems for political parties concerning the behaviour of their members. Chaianan Samudhavanija comments in regard to the lack of strong discipline that political parties may fall apart easily.
Politicians can walk out of the party and break away when they perceive differences of individual goal-achievement.(21)

(3) Political Culture

In liberal democratic theory, it is believed that a democratic political culture is a prerequisite for any stable democratic system. Certain values and attitudes conducive to the operation of the political system need to be taken into account by all citizens. The majority of the people are expected to believe in such basic principles of democracy as the democracy itself, majority rule and minority rights, freedom of speech and opinion, and equality.(22) However, the influence of traditional political culture may have hindered political development in Thailand where it is difficult to push politics into the front line of the democratic system.

It is important in this regard to focus attention on the problem concerning political culture. The political culture in Thailand reflects the socio-cultural heritage of traditional rule. Thinapan Nakata describes the main characteristics of the Thai political culture as consisting of authoritarianism, personalism, hierarchical relationships, patron-client relationships, individualism, traditionalism, and passivity.(23) He observes that people tend to delegate all powers and responsibilities to their leaders since they are obedient and submissive to the power holders. On the other hand, the attitude towards authoritarianism has an effect on social values in the hierarchical relationships. In relation to that, people tend to yield power and responsibility to their leaders. Besides, the attitude towards personalism presents a problem for political parties in terms of voting behaviour which can be influenced by charismatic
individuals. For discipline problems within political parties, they may have been influenced by the value of individualism as well. Meanwhile, the attitude of traditionalism and passivity may affect political development since people tend to be conservative and do not engage themselves in politics as they view it as a matter for other groups who have been traditionally involved in politics over a long period.

In addition, social structure and cultural values have an effect on the development of the party system. David Wilson argues that in Thai social organisation, personal relations are fundamental in social relations. Consequently, it can be seen in Thai politics that the strength of a political party depends on the strength of its leadership. In this regard, Suchit Bunbongkarn is convinced that the political parties, which rest with the projection of individual personalities, do not seem to stabilise but disintegrate easily after the absence of such strong leadership. He also believes that such attitudes can diminish party expansion and deter political development. Besides, it cannot promote any political party to become a dominant party or a party with mass support.
Footnotes


4. Thomas Dye, op.cit, p.19

5. Thomas Dye, op.cit, p.27

6. Thomas Dye, op.cit, p.20

7. David B Truman, quoted in Understanding Public Policy, by Thomas Dye, p.23

8. Thomas Dye, op.cit, p.23


10. Thomas Dye, Ibid., p.24


17. Tinapan Nakata, op.cit., p.175

18. Tinapan Nakata, op.cit., p.185


20. Suchit Bunbongkarn, op.cit., p.42


Chapter II
Research Methodology

2.1 Methodology

The methodology adopted in this study employs interviews and basic statistical techniques for two sets of questionnaires. It is designed to analyse the responses of participants to policy on elections of provincial governors as well as their reactions to the elements of the environment and the political system. These analyses are based on the hypotheses which have been constructed to guide the design of questions in both the interviews and questionnaires. Furthermore, information obtained from documentary sources also plays an important role in supporting or giving guidance to the above-mentioned methods.

2.2 Units of Analysis

As the subject under consideration is the performance and functions of provincial governors, the matter of analysis therefore concerns the participants who present their views with regard to the governors and the provincial administration. The selection of provinces has been done according to geographic areas and economic differences. There are eight target provinces chosen from four parts of the country. Two provinces have been taken from each region. These provinces vary in size, and economic status. The provinces selected for the sample represent the northern, central, northeastern, and southern parts. They are Chiangmai and Lumphoon, Nonthaburi and Srakaew, Khon-kaen and Chaiyapum, and Surajthanee and Chumporn respectively. The map of Thailand displayed below is to illustrate the identified provinces.
2.3 Population and Sampling Frame

The population from which the samples are selected is the aggregation of the elements of government officials, politicians, and local residents. Additionally, the study population are the elements who may take part directly or indirectly in the policy on the election of provincial governors. They can be defined as four different groups.

The first group of respondents to this study are the senior public administrators attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The second group consists of local and national politicians (MPs in particular). The third group are the public officials who are the representatives of central units under both the Ministry of the Interior and the other ministries working within the provinces. The fourth group is the local residents living in these provinces.

With regard to the sampling frame, the set of senior public administrators considered for selection are governors or deputy governors from the selected provinces. It also includes other senior officials who are or used to be in charge of provincial public administration so that their views concerning provincial administration can be given constructively. Moreover, they are capable of presenting their points of view concerning national and local politics more precisely, since they have to deal directly with national and local politicians.

Regarding the group of politicians, some are local politicians from the selected provinces who are members of provincial councils, so that the matter pertaining to conflict across the administration between provincial government and provincial administration organisations can be identified. The
others are national politicians who are members of Parliament. However, these samples do not take account of gender or age.

In relation to the different set of government officials considered for sample selection, they are chosen from the officials who work within the target provinces. In these provinces, officials grade 4 or higher who are under the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) are selected from the Provincial Offices which are involved in the Provincial Plan. The significance of such officials is that they are under the direct control of provincial governors. The non-MOI officials (the other subjects to be questioned in this regard) are selected from the other five main ministries that are relevant to the projects under the Provincial Plan. As the team administering the Provincial Plan, these officials are likely to have close contact with provincial governors.

In connection with the selection of local residents, they must be 18 years old or over, as this is the legal age for voting. In order to obtain different opinions towards voting behaviour and the other topics concerned, residents are selected from households registration of the identified provinces where social and economic factors are varied. The variables of education, and economic status are considered so as to point out the various attitudes towards the issues involved in such variables.

2.4 Sample Size

The respondents who were acquired through the method of interview were a group of senior government officials and a set of local and national politicians. The collection of data could
not be conducted randomly due to the time limitations of both the researcher and the respondents. This means that any of the designated respondents who were available during the field work period would be interviewed. The number of senior officials in the target provinces was approximately 30, while the number of members of provincial councils (local politicians) and MPs (national politicians), in the identified provinces, were approximately 100, and 60 respectively. Owing to the limited availability of this population, sample sizes of 12, 15, and 10 from each study population were selected.

The respondents to the questionnaires were systematically selected on a random basis. In order to obtain a 50% random sample of the selected government officials, every second person was selected from lists of names in official records maintained at provincial offices. The numbers of government officials working under the Ministry of the Interior and the non-MOI officials are about 20 and 30 in each province. Therefore, 10 and 15 MOI and non-MOI officials were selected in each province. Thus, the total number of officials chosen as samples from the eight provinces would be about 200.

The random selection technique was also employed for the local residents. Due to the large number of the study population of this element, the households were chosen from the selected districts (displayed in appendix 1). Within a target province, two districts out of about eight districts were selected. In order to gain 5% random selection, one in twenty of the first 300 households was picked up from name lists of households registered. Thus, there were about 15 households selected from each district. In other words, the two selected districts in each province consisted of about 30 selected samples. Accordingly, the total number of local residents chosen from the identified provinces was approximately 240.
2.5 Sources and Data Collection

As was mentioned earlier, the methods of data collection for this research are based on documentary sources, interviews, and questionnaires.

Method of Analysis

(1) Documentary sources The documents used in this study are composed of those in the field of law, regulations, official papers and official records of provincial governor conferences, and several volumes of publications and journals of political science, and sociology. In addition, Siam Rath Weekly Review, Matichon Weekly Magazine, and such daily newspapers as Siam Rath, Bangkok Post, the Nation, the Far East Economic Review, and the Economist are also used as informative references to support various issues in different sections of the study. They are also used as a means to ascertain how the public present their views on political issues and how political groups are perceived by the public.

(2) Interviews Secondly, the interview is an important method of investigating the possibility of governorship elections. It involves two groups of study population: senior public administrators, and local politicians and MPs. Since the participants have limited time which is mostly occupied by their daily public functions, formal appointments are required. Moreover, all interviews have to be carried out in a formal climate. Therefore, personal interviews by the researcher are necessary in order to obtain not only facts and specific data on such issues, but to gain insights and personal reactions as well.
As this approach takes a lot of time, the number of interviews has to be limited. Besides, this kind of method will not help to produce data collection by any sort of probability sampling because of the limited availability of interviewees. In addition to this, for some interviewees in-depth interviews might not be achievable. However, a set of questions has been prepared as a guideline for discussion. (see questions in interview A for senior administrators, interview B for MPs, and interview C for local politicians displayed in appendices 4, 5, and 6 respectively).

Nonetheless, more important is that the subjects of the interviews concerning corruption, political power, and political opinions are so sensitive that the interviewer may not be able to obtain precise answers or may not be able to put questions in such a direct manner.

However, a pilot project is carried out in order to determine whether the guideline questions are suitable for the interviewees. If not, then the questions are adjusted to an approach more fitting to the respondents.

(3) Questionnaires Finally, the questionnaire also plays a key role. It is used to gain information concerning the suitability of the election of provincial governors. The population targeted for research by this method are the government officials, who are representatives of the central units in the provinces, and the local residents who have reached the legal age for voting.

Due to the limitations of funds and time, the field research for collecting questionnaires has to be conducted through assistant researchers who are the researcher's colleagues. Most of the assistant researchers work in the areas which have been
selected as the units of analysis. In carrying out such an exercise, all assistant researchers are given detailed instructions so that they are able to explain to the local residents correctly.

The questionnaires are specially constructed to acquire information from these two groups of respondents. Questionnaire A is designed for the sample of government officials, while questionnaire B for the local residents. Each questionnaire comprises two parts. The first part is designed to obtain data with regard to the personal backgrounds of the participants. The second part is planned to gather personal opinions of the respondents towards administrative functions performed by the appointed governors, and other points of view in connection with the possibility of governorship election.

The characteristics of the questionnaires in the first part are open questions subject to various answers while the questions in the second part are mostly provided with scores assigned which show the respondents' opinions towards the above-mentioned issue. Nevertheless, a pilot project is also conducted in order to test if there are any shortcomings within the questionnaires. Some of the questions asked in the pilot project were adjusted to an approach more fitting to the respondents.
Chapter III
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The aim of this chapter is to develop a conceptual framework which can be used to analyse the policy concerning the election of provincial governors. The intellectual underpinning will be provided with guidelines for the analysis of such a policy. The model of policy analysis is also designed in this part in order to give an understanding of the impact of the policy in relation to the other elements. In designing the model for policy analysis, all theories mentioned in chapter 1 are taken into account.

One explanation given by Ira Sharkansky is that one factor that links public administration to public policy is their common concern. "Policy" refers to a proposal, an ongoing programme, the goals of a programme and a decision on implementing programmes. Within the policy process, this includes the formulation, approval, and implementation of government programmes. Consequently, the policy process joins public administrators to the other participants, who are involved in the process, including other officials across the public administration concerned, political parties, interest groups, and the public. Moreover, within the policy process, there are ideas, stimuli, and constraints that influence both participants and the policy. Therefore, in policy analysis, it is important to understand public administration as the problems arising within the administrative units are mutually affected by the policy process. In the meantime, it is also essential to analyse where the constraints are generated and how they will affect the policy.

According to Sharkansky, the policy process is dynamic and is affected by intense controversies. Accordingly, when politicians regarded as one group of participants in the policy process, complain about the performance of provincial governors, the argument concerns public administration run by these administrators as to whether it is
suitable for achieving the goal. They also argue about the impact of the programmes, implemented by public officials, on the majority of the population. In other words, they focus their attention on the way in which the provincial administrators perform their duties concerning public administration and they cast doubt that such administrators have acted neutrally.

In this regard, the politicians, therefore, act on behalf of the public to express their demand to the Ministry of the Interior to establish a policy regarding the election of provincial governors so that the appointed governors will be replaced by the elected officials. They then believe that the alterations concerning provincial administration will be made. In addition, the public administration under elected local government may be run more effectively.

3.1 Public Policy

In this context, it is necessary to analyse the policy on election of provincial governors of how and what impacts may occur. Therefore, theories concerning public policy and policy analysis have to be studied so that the research design can be done constructively.

To many writers such as Ira Sharkansky, Thomas Dye, and Carl Friedrich, public policy is labelled as a substantive programme or actions taken by government. In government actions, there are goals, objectives or purposes that need to be achieved. (2) According to David Easton, public policy is the authoritative allocation of values for the whole society. (3) Meanwhile, Thomas Dye is convinced that public policy is a main concern of political science in which it emphasises the institutional structure including constitutional arrangements such as power and duties of government organisations. It was already explained that political science used to concentrate on the process and behaviour related to the government. This involved
individuals and group political behaviour, the determinants of other political activities, the functioning of interest groups, and political parties. However, political science shifts to concentrate on the causes and consequences of government activity in relation to the above-mentioned features. On the other hand, public policy involves the assessment of the impact of environmental forces on its content; an analysis of the effect of various institutional arrangements and political process; and an evaluation of its impact upon society.

In this study of public policy, Thomas Dye states that the causes and consequences of various policies are not equivalent to prescribing what policies government ought to pursue. He states in his additional analysis that learning why governments do what they do and what the consequences of their actions are is not the same as saying what governments ought to do, or bringing about changes in what they do. This means government policies need to be analysed in order that the best products will be provided to society according to public needs, rather than focusing on the judgement of the government. Hence, in this connection, the main focus of this study will emphasise the outcome of the policy which has reciprocal effect on the environment involved so as to guide the appropriate approaches of the government such that the demands of the public will be responded to correctly.

Furthermore, Dye explains that public policy can either be studied for scientific reasons so as to gain an understanding of the causes and consequences of policy-making; or for professional reasons in which the knowledge of the causes and consequences can bring about the solution of practical problems in terms of individuals, groups and governments that act to achieve goals; or for political purposes which have to be sure that the nation will lead the right policy to real achievement. However, for whatever reason it is studied, Thomas Dye notes that public policy can be viewed as a dependent variable
which is influenced by environmental forces and the political system; or as an independent variable that impacts on the environmental and political system. (5) As far as this study is concerned, the policy on governorship election will be considered on both aspects.

Meanwhile, James Coleman underlines disciplined research in the way that public policy is formed; the way it is implemented; and the impacts of policy when it is carried out. (6) Giandomenico Majone clarifies further in this connection that policy analysis must proceed in a disciplined way. Therefore, the structure of policy analysis serves as a model in order to discover what may happen in the given circumstances. (7) Accordingly, disciplined structure for policy analysis consists of four elements: identifying policy purposes; evaluating the ways to achieve them; designing a model for the analysis; and analysing what may affect the policy. Hence, in this study, such disciplined structure regarding the policy purposes has already been clarified. From this standpoint, it is a significant stage to design a model for study in order to find ways to analyse the policy and to speculate concerning the policy outcome.

In analysing policy, there is the important conceptual framework of David Easton which is regarded as a model of the political system. Easton gives an explanation concerning policy analysis stating that it is simpler to think of it as a response of a political system to forces which are brought to bear upon it from the environment. (8) Thus, in his view, public policies are considered to be the function of two major variables: The political system and its environment. The political system is identified as the group of interrelated structures and processes which function authoritatively to allocate values for society, while the environment represents the condition or circumstances defined as external to the boundaries of the political system. The relationship between these two variables is viewed in terms of inputs and outputs of the political system. David Easton
explains more in order to clarify this matter stating that when the political demands or supports from the environment which are political inputs are sent into the political system, they are then converted into authoritative allocations of values as outputs for the environment.(9)

In the meantime, with particular regard to the environment, Thomas Dye notes that the forces that are generated in the environment which have an effect on the political system are viewed as inputs. Inputs can be received into the political system in the form of both demands, which occur when individuals or groups act to affect public policy in response to environmental conditions; and support, which is rendered when individuals or groups conform to policy decisions.(10)

On the other hand, in studying the systems theory of Thomas Dye, he gives his thoughts regarding public policy stating that he views it as the output of the political system which is compatible with Easton's model. Dye also describes output as the authoritative values allocations of the political system that constitute public policy. From this viewpoint, it is understood that public policy regarded as political output is engaged in connection to environmental forces, and the political features which are closely related. Further to that, in many developing countries especially like the case of Thailand, public policy is connected with such political groups as the ruling elite. However, interest groups, and the participants associated within the governmental organisations as mentioned earlier also take part in policy-making to some extent.

3.2 Conceptual Framework

Following the demand for a policy on the election of provincial governors, political demand in this context is regarded as the input that is transmitted from the environment of the bureaucracy into the political system in order to shape the policy on election of
provincial governors. In the policy analysis which is the major focus of this study, E.S Quade emphasises the fact that policy analysis is a discipline which contains the question of whether we have a distinctive methodology to search for a paradigm. From Quade's point of view, it can be further analysed that policy analysis bring descriptive studies and analytical techniques to improve public policy so that it can explain the causes and consequences of the policy. Therefore, this chapter is designed to survey and examine the intellectual underpinning on which this study is based in order to describe the causes and consequences of the demand for the policy.

The discussion is centred on the analytical scheme of the policy in question of the Ministry of the Interior concerning the election of the provincial governors. The attempt primarily emphasises the study of the elements of environment, concerning both socio-economic and political conditions which will affect the policy output. Furthermore, the way in which the policy outputs may affect the environmental and political variables is also investigated.

In this context, the conceptual framework for the analysis of the policy on the election of provincial governors is based on the policy analysis models of David Easton and Thomas Dye. However, other significant ideas concerning policy analysis by other scholars who have already been referred to are also applied here so as to set forth a number of analytical schemes intended for the completion of this study.

In the policy analysis, Thomas Dye indicates the crucial points that the forces shaping public policy and the consequences of the policy designed are relevant to social activity. In analysing the policy, Thomas Dye suggests that public policy may be viewed either as a dependent variable which means its value varies according to environmental forces and political characteristics, or as an
independent variable in that it has impacts on the environment and the political system.

Therefore, this analysis will focus on the variables of the environment and the political system. The model for the policy analysis consists of the outcome of the policy on the governorship election. The outcome of the policy designed to be an independent variable which impacts on the environment and the political process within the sphere of the bureaucracy of the Ministry of the Interior and the provincial administration.

3.3 Conceptual Application

Following the above-mentioned conceptual framework, on the basis of the intellectual foundations about the analytical process of this study, the conceptual framework which can be formed into a model based on the above-mentioned scholars' views will be outlined in this part. The concepts and variables employed in this model will be specified and operated so that the collection and analysis of data required for the study can be facilitated.

In the designed model, the value of this model to policy analysis lies in such questions posed by Thomas Dye as: what are the important dimensions of the environment of the bureaucracy that generate such demand? what are the important components of the political system that enable it to transform demand into policy? how do the environmental inputs affect the characters of the political system? how do the components of the political system affect the content of such policy? how do the environmental inputs affect the content of the policy? and how does the policy affect the environment and the character of the political system? (12) According to Elizabeth O'Sullivan and Gary R. Rassel, the independent variable is used to explain the variation in the characteristics or event of interest. It is sometimes referred to as an "input" or "cause". The dependent
variable represents or measures the characteristics or event being explained. It is also referred to as an "outcome" or an "effect". Thus, when the policy is regarded to be tested as a dependent variable, it is important to study what effects the environment and political features have on it. For instance, the vote-buying, which is partly the consequences of the national economic and political problems, will certainly have an effect on such policy in one way or another.

In defining the variables, it is important to work out from the elements identified by the scholars who have studied this matter. For Sharkansky, there are numerous factors that influence the policy-making process. Such influences are demands, political support from the public, resources, political parties, interest groups, and government units involved in the activities. Further, social and economic backgrounds as well as the organisational structure, and rules and procedures of the government units concerned also affect public policy.

In a separate statement, Sharkansky describes the environmental variables as the representation of the social, economic, and political surroundings of the government units which not only supply the impetus for public policy but also feel its impact. In this context, it not only implies the component of the environmental variables but it also supports Thomas Dye's theory that public policy can be both the "cause" and the "effect" of the systems theory.

In the political system concerning the process of policy-making, there are a series of interrelated stages or actions through which policy decisions are assessed and formulated. Kenneth Gergen states that the policy process is a set of interactions among individuals and groups in a community that results in policy decisions. Thus in this regard, it is important to examine the effect of
associational groups, who are the significant elements of both environmental and political features.

Regarding the policy process of the Ministry of the Interior, it involves not only the formal decision-makers including the chief executives - ministers and the public administrators but it also concerns itself with other influential groups who generate either direct or indirect power both inside and outside the Ministry. In the policy-making process, John Rehfuss points out that public policy is the linkage circle of the political system including bureaucracy, the government, political parties, power structure, interest groups, and environmental forces. In addition, Sharkansky indicates that the economy, political context, and popular demand are among the factors that influence public policy. Furthermore, Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro share the view concerning the policy decisions of officials that they often have important political implications. Thus, indeed, political elements both outside and inside the bureaucracy of the Ministry of the Interior and the provinces are influential to the decisions of policy-making.

Therefore, from the above-mentioned context, it can be summarised and stated that the conceptual framework of the policy on the election of provincial governors is composed of three groups of variables: 1) the environments, 2) the political context, and 3) the policy outcome. Each element which will be identified shortly is based on the description given by most scholars referred to above.

1) The environments The environmental features can be further analysed in order to apply to the circumstances of the Ministry of the Interior and the provincial government where the policy is put forward and taken into consideration so as to become effective, in terms of various components - social, economic, and cultural.
(2) **The political context** To many writers, it can be analysed that the fundamental concepts concerning the political features related to the Ministry of the Interior and the provincial administration consist of a number of variables. Such political variables are the elections, political parties, interest groups, the power structure, the public opinion, and the organisational structure and bureaucracy. In this regard, the political elements can be further analytically viewed as two groups which are composed of extrabureaucratic politics, and bureaucratic politics.

According to Fred Riggs, extrabureaucratic politics refers to the political activities that are practised outside public bureaucracy. Therefore, the bureaucracy in this context means the public administration under the provinces and the Ministry of the Interior. Fred Riggs notes that, basically, the organs engaged in the extrabureaucratic politics, which have an influence on both the policy process of the Ministry of the Interior, include elections, political parties, interest groups, the power structure, and public opinion. Regarding the concept of bureaucratic politics, it recognises the political elements of bureaucracy and organisational units.

(3) **Policy output** The perspective outcome of the policy is employed as a principal indicator of the policy output variable that is influenced by environmental forces and political elements.

However, in connection to the above group of elements, all variables mentioned will not be treated similarly and equally in terms of approaches, analytical methods, clarity, and depth. This is because the importance of each variable is varied. In most parts, the examination of all variables is descriptive and analytical. A great number of qualitative and quantitative accounts are collected and reported in order to enhance objectivity and validity. The investigation includes: the impacts of socio-economic and cultural
conditions in relation to the policy on the governorship election; and the impacts of political values on the policy. The speculation with regard to each variable is previously hypothesised as the guidelines of the study.

These categories cover the most important variables central to the interest of this particular topic as discussed above and shown below in diagram 3.1. The theoretical concepts in the diagram have been simplified to indicate the relationship of each concept which is displayed in the group of its variables. The relationship A. is the input sent from the environment to supply the political system, while the relationships B. and C. are the conversion of political demand into the policy output, and the effect of environmental forces on the shape of the policy. On the other hand, the broken lines D. and E. show the feedback of the policy outcome to the former features.
Diagram 3.1

- the elections
- political parties
- interest groups
- military power
- public opinion
- bureaucracy

- social and cultural characteristics
- social and economic features

- the outcome of the policy on the election of provincial governors
3.4 The Importance of Each Variable

Discussion and analysis of the problems relating to provincial public administration under the appointed governors will be referred to in the next chapters. It is necessary at this stage to underline them as the hypotheses that are linked to the designed model in order to show the relationships among the variables. In addition, it aims to study the role of each variable with particular regard to how they affect the policy on the election of provincial governors. The investigation will be made in connection with the hypotheses set forth earlier.

(1) Environmental Variables

1.1 Social and Cultural Values It is believed that social and cultural values have a great influence on public administration. The hierarchical attitudes towards authority patterns which stress superior-subordinate relationships have shaped the socialisation process. Such a process provides for the people from the early age throughout their continuing role in society. According to Fred Riggs, the socialisation process of Thailand is connected with the bureaucratic society and the bureaucratic ideology. He states further that it produces an overwhelming tolerance of and preference for hierarchical elitism, superior-subordinate relationships, and non-participant paternalistic politics.(21)

Tinapan Nakata believes that if the ideal social characteristic is bonding between superior and subordinate within organisations, this could minimise the individual's sense of involvement in the bureaucratic administration.(22) He also comments that, by way of contrast, when it bears among members of the society, it creates a sense of submissiveness and passivity. In this regard, Nakata believes that this kind of attitude not only forces people to be humble and respectful to others who are of higher status but it also
drives them into the indifferent feelings regarding the state affairs. This has led to behaviour of lacking political accountability.

Thinapan Nakata notes that most Thai people seem to prefer the use of absolute power. As has been explained, due to the obedient and submissive attitude, people tend to delegate all power and responsibilities to their leaders. Thai people have been very close to bureaucracy for decades, and they have contact with government officials from a very early age. Therefore, there is no doubt that they prefer being governed by bureaucrats to the politicians. Thus, the public attitude that is in favour of government officials does not seem to be productively conducive to the election of provincial governors.

With regard to the social setting, it has been stated by James Mosel that Thai social structure is loose. (23) There are considerable variations in individual behaviour and great latitude for personal ways of thinking and behaving. It is stated that the loose social structure is linked to the lack of social organisation and the weakness and lack of discipline and regimentation. The weak point of such social behaviour caused by both social values and social setting can cause failure in group participation such as interest groups and political members.

For the interest groups, this characteristic deters them from working in a team. As a result, they are not strong enough to put pressure on undesirable governments. Hence, if there is wrongdoing during election campaigns, there will not be any strong group to check the abuse by those who have committed the misconduct. Undoubtedly, whichever level of election takes place it would still not be of use, unless the social values have been changed to the extent that they can create the sense of responsibilities among the public towards politics.
1.2 Social and Economic Characteristics

Thomas Dye explains in his study that the association among socio-economic variables, political variables, and policy outcomes indicates the findings that socio-economic variables are more important in explaining policy outcome than political variables. Thus, the socio-economic characteristics have a lot of impact upon the political system. Therefore, the examination in this regard is designed to focus on such important features as income and education which are believed to affect the political variables particularly the elections.

From the early 1980s, the Thai economy began to be dominated by the private sector. This results in creating greater differences between urban and rural areas. The subordination of the rural residents to the urban ones has been clearly marked. The discrepancy in level of development between Bangkok and the rural areas is reflected in the per capita income and gross domestic product statistics. Although the national plans have been set up to raise the people's standard of living and to eradicate social and economic inequalities by focusing on rural development, measures to achieve these goals have not actually been taken by the government. Even though the national income and income per capita have been increased, the problems of poverty and inequality still remain. Moreover, the disproportion of development by pushing the rapid move toward high technological industries had a considerable impact on agricultural development. In fact, the promotion of industrial development penalises the agricultural sector, particularly rice cultivation, severely.

According to the Thai magazine, Matichon, the 1994 income of the residents across the country was with the average per capita income of 74,264 Baht (£1,897). In Table 3.1, it shows that Northeastern residents have the lowest income of 20,235 Baht (£530), compared to other parts of the country particularly with the highest
per capita income of Bangkok residents of 186,167 Baht (£4876). (26)

Table 3.1

The average per capita income of people across the country

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern</td>
<td>13,481</td>
<td>15,208</td>
<td>16,792</td>
<td>17,501</td>
<td>20,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>20,434</td>
<td>23,159</td>
<td>25,919</td>
<td>27,690</td>
<td>31,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>25,640</td>
<td>28,974</td>
<td>32,347</td>
<td>34,291</td>
<td>39,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>56,695</td>
<td>68,597</td>
<td>73,981</td>
<td>87,426</td>
<td>100,321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>30,822</td>
<td>38,206</td>
<td>41,952</td>
<td>47,244</td>
<td>57,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>125,790</td>
<td>138,123</td>
<td>153,099</td>
<td>170,558</td>
<td>186,167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Report Division, National Statistics Office, Office of the Prime Minister

In the report of the Economist of April 13th 1996, while Bangkok and other big cities have accumulated the wealth, the poorest farmers in the northeast region are in distress by poverty. The incomes of northern and northeastern residents are relatively low.

However, following the above-mentioned average income, it does not always show the real income of individual residents. This is because the figure shown above has been worked out throughout the country from the rich who earn approximately 400 mBaht (£10.4m) yearly in contrast with the poor who earn around 6,200 Baht (£155). (27)

According to Matichon Thai Magazine dated April 23 1996, the gap between the rich and the poor has become much wider as the former have greater opportunity to enlarge their economic power, whereas the latter are still passive and find it harder to make a living. The
rural people have been hit so severely by the poverty that many of them have to migrate. It then contributes to the sharp reduction of rural labour forces while the rapid increase of population in the cities especially Bangkok has left it far beyond its ability to accommodate the increased population.

This links to the problem of the shortage of labour in the agricultural sector which is the main area of employment in Thailand. The importance is that the seniors and children are left behind without sufficient basic necessities, while those who have moved away have to take insecure jobs with low levels of income. The high cost of living in big cities does not help them save money for their families. Such problems then result in a vicious circle, as the poverty may cause such social problems as lack of education, unemployment, crime etc.. Eventually, it will deter political development and undoubtedly cause a deterioration in vote-buying behaviour which recently has become a serious problem in the political process.

With regard to education, a survey conducted in 1994 indicated that 96.3 percent out of 18.596m of the population were able to read.(28) However, the 1992 survey showed that, from the total population of 56.662m, there were 14.29 percent attending elementary school, 4.76 per cent completed secondary school, and 1.76 per cent had higher education or college level background.(29)

The socio-economic features mentioned above indicate that the problems characterised by such conditions are considered not to be conducive to the success of the policy on the governorship election. It is evident that socio-economic characteristics (particularly the levels of income and education) are associated with either the success or failure of democratic governments. (30) Such economic problems and low standards of education will continue to negatively affect the elections since they are supposed to take place in every
province, with the exception of Bangkok, where people are poorer and less educated. This means the percentage of people voting appears to be inversely proportional to the standards of education and their economic situation. Besides, those with higher education seem better equipped to analyse the promises made by the politicians whereas those with a lower educational standards are more easily swayed. Moreover, those with low education and economic status tend not to be aware of the effectiveness of the public administration.

In consequence, a great concern about the low income of residents, who mostly live in such areas, is that bribes will have more effect. It can be hypothesised that vote-buying will remain influential in any election. Thus, under the current social-economic circumstances, it might not be a worthwhile policy to have provincial governors elected.

With reference to table 3.2, it shows the statistics of voting turnout from the years 1969 to 1992. The turnout of voters exceed more than 50 percent since 1983. Focusing on the highest point of voting are in the northeastern areas where people have low income. In contrast, an area like Bangkok where the residents are provided with better technology and education as well as more opportunity to earn their income, the number of voters seems to be very low.
Table 3.2
Percentage of voting turnouts of national general elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Average No.</th>
<th>Highest No.</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Lowest No.</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>49.16</td>
<td>73.94</td>
<td>Ranong</td>
<td>34.66</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>47.17</td>
<td>67.87</td>
<td>Puket</td>
<td>32.18</td>
<td>Petchabun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>43.99</td>
<td>63.53</td>
<td>Nakornpanom</td>
<td>26.64</td>
<td>Petchabun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>44.53</td>
<td>77.11</td>
<td>Yasothon</td>
<td>22.56</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>50.76</td>
<td>79.62</td>
<td>Yasothon</td>
<td>32.57</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>61.43</td>
<td>85.15</td>
<td>Chaiyapum</td>
<td>38.13</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>63.56</td>
<td>90.42</td>
<td>Yasothon</td>
<td>35.92</td>
<td>Samuj-songkarm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>59.27</td>
<td>87.11</td>
<td>Mukdaharn</td>
<td>42.56</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>61.59</td>
<td>90.43</td>
<td>Mukdaharn</td>
<td>47.40</td>
<td>Bangkok</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Department of Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior

(2) Political Values

2.1 Extrabureaucratic Politics An explanation has been given concerning the extrabureaucratic politics where it refers to general political activities exercised outside the provincial government and the bureaucracy of the Ministry of the Interior. The significant institutions that are involved in this element include the elections, the political parties, the interest groups, the power structure, and public opinion.
2.1.1 The elections

According to Ira Sharkansky, elections are frequently cited as the principal device for citizens to enforce their will on politicians. The politicians who want to become chief executives in ministerial posts are subject to election. (31) The campaigns that precede elections are an opportunity for voters to learn about government activities. Nonetheless, the elections in Thailand do not seem to link the public with the government. There are many political problems that lead to the failure of the political process.

According to a columnist of The Financial Times, dated December 3, 1996, there is growing concern over the problems of vote-buying in Thailand where money has been distributed in most constituencies in large amounts during the election campaigns. Such conduct has been widely practised by politicians where people are limited to voting for a person rather than a party without acknowledging the main policies of political parties. Such behaviour seems to have become worse in the last ten years. Thus, without the strong pressure groups and serious attempts to improve political development, there are fears that the political system might deteriorate through the increase of vote-buying.

In the last twenty years, there was vote-buying behaviour in connection only with general elections. But now the penetration of such behaviour has been increasingly influential in every single electoral function both at national and local levels with no apparent way of controlling it. Such behaviour has had a great impact on the delay of political development in terms of political etiquette among politicians, the growth of party system, and voting behaviour. Moreover, it is linked to the effectiveness of public administration since the elected members will be chief executives and members of the legislature at all levels. Subsequently, bribery and corruption will
be inevitable because they are the only way to get money back to cover the substantial expenses they have incurred during the election campaign. In so doing, the elected politicians will limit the usefulness of elections as a means of control over administrative agencies.

Table 3.3 below shows the distribution of members of political parties that were elected in the general election of 1996. It also shows no single party won a majority of parliamentary seats. These statistics also support the statement concerning unstable government which is due to the multi-party coalition government.

Table 3.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of political party</th>
<th>number of MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. New Aspiration</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Democrat</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chat Pattana</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Chat Thai</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social Action</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Prachakorn Thai</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Akaparp</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Seree Thum</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Moun Chon</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Pralung Thum</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Tai</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 393

2.1.2 Political Parties

In Thai social organisation, personal relations and individual popularity are fundamental in social relations, and the personal clique has been fundamental in parliamentary and election activity. Additionally, leadership is the binding element of political parties or parliamentary groups. (32) The political socialisation has emerged into socio-political groups characterised by the elements that generate to an authoritarian bureaucratic polity. These elements, as discussed earlier, include a loosely structured social system; a strong degree of individuality and lack of discipline; submissive and passive characteristics; and a limited and an intermittent experience of a representative democratic political system interrupted by military coups and long standing authoritarian regimes. Such elements are certainly not conducive to a successful competitive party system.

With regard particularly to politicians, according to Pricha Hongkrailerts, the Thai political parties are not the result of the gathering of people who generally share common political and socio-economic policies, but rather seek political power by using the party as a platform to authority. On the other hand, the parties are a collection of people who support any individual personality or groups of people to pursue political power. He additionally points out with regard to the disparity among politicians that although the general policies of the parties are similar, they do not seem to merge with other parties so easily because the key party members cannot compromise over the incumbency of the top position. (33)

In this connection, it is analysed that the failure of the party system at national level may have impacts on the elections at provincial level since the party's members confine themselves to their own interests rather than the public's. On the other hand, in relation to the demand for the election of provincial governors, the
politicians argue that if a province is headed by the elected official, then the provincial administration would be organised without the control of bureaucrats. Analysing the combination of political elements, it is still not certain that the provincial administration under the elected officials will be more effective than it has been since the great extent of administrative constraints have already been generated by the politicians such as corruption, and factionalism among public staff etc.

However, the outcome of the policy can be hypothesised into two dimensions. Firstly, the election of provincial governors may contribute to the disruptive manner of provincial administration rather than productive creation. Secondly, by way of contrast, the election at provincial level may produce the strengthening of the party system.

2.1.3 Interest Groups

Bill Jones and Denis Kavanagh define interest groups as the groups that are formed by people to protect or advance a shared interest.(34) In analysing this definition, if the interest or pressure groups mean the massive groups who provide essential freedom for the majority of the people so that their views can be heard by the government, and to provide important checks against the overpowerful executives or legislatures, then these cases do not apply in Thailand.

Fred Riggs notes that the concept of interest groups is serviceable in western representative political systems which contain a relatively high degree of structural differentiation and functional specificity, in contrast to the less developed bureaucratic political system whose public interest is normally articulated or put forward through such organs as primary, informal, and non-associational groups.(35)
This supportive statement can refer to the case in Thailand where the interest groups are formed informally. As mentioned earlier, these groups cannot form themselves into pressure groups or be strong enough to exert themselves to stop the ruling class from misconduct. Generally, political participation in terms of group activity exists mainly in Bangkok where more highly educated and economically better off urban residents exercise their rights in comparison with people in other parts of the country.

Accordingly, the interest groups have not grown enough to be an important primary agency or associational type of organisation so as to be able to take the initiative in public policy or to have influence on public policy. It is supportive, according to Donald Hindley, that Thai people do not seem to demand a voice in either governmental decision-making or the selection of those who decide.(36) It can, therefore, be said that the demand for the election of provincial governors was not initiated by any pressure groups but by the politicians themselves. Besides, this will not help to promote the betterment of governorship elections because it will be taking place in other areas which are not so prepared, in terms of public participation, as Bangkok.

Kramol Tongdhammachat and Twatchai Yongkittikul remark that, due to economic changes in the early 1980s, the group of people with financial power began to be influential in Thai society as a whole. The gap between the Bangkok-centre place and the rural areas became wider, as already mentioned. The rural poverty concerning the lack of land for livelihood, and the indebtedness of the peasants are raised as issues for politicians to propagandise their slogans. Meanwhile the capitalists, including traders and tycoon businessmen, became better organised and began to take active roles in politics. In this connection, Tinapan Nakata mentions that once they have taken part in politics they play a very influential role to initiate any change in order to protect their interests.(37) The voice they
present they regard as the public voice. This includes the action taken to demand the policy on the election of provincial governors. It is important, therefore, to examine in this study the hypothesis as to whether these associational groups are the key organs behind the demand for such policy.

Hypothesis: The local and national politicians are the key associational group for the initiation of electing provincial governors.

2.1.4 Military Power

In the history of Thai politics, Chaianan Samudhavaja comments that power and prestige were mainly located in the bureaucracy, the armed forces, police, and civil servants, with some periods operating under parliamentary rules. As the structure of economic development has changed, more powerful businessmen are able to take more active roles in politics. This has reduced the traditionally strong power of the bureaucrats and the military in political affairs and has had a great impact on public administration.

Nevertheless, despite the absence of the military in politics, there is a significant indication of the strength and popularity of the military among the people. With regard to Thinapan Nakata, as already cited, the majority of Thai people do not entirely rule out the tradition of absolute power.

Apart from the traditional authority where the assumption of superiority emphasising the confidence of the ruling elites has its necessary equivalent to the acceptance of inferiority by those of lower status, the lack of power of extrabureaucratic forces, particularly the weakness of pressure groups is conducive to the active political military. In this regard, the analysis will be made
in connection with the authoritative value that public have toward the military.

However, the military power needs to be permanently replaced by democracy. As far as the presence of the military is concerned, this definitely hinders the policy on the election of provincial governors. This is because, after the military have come to power through coups, the parliamentary system has to be abolished. This, of course, has a great effect on the election of provincial governors unless it is written into the law that such elections will not be nullified in the case of successful coups.

2.1.5 Public Opinion

The discussion concerning public opinion towards both provincial governors and politics will be detailed in the following chapter. However, it is believed that the public have had strong loyalty towards the king and his government for centuries. It is analysed that the reasons for this may be linked in; the Thai culture where the people were ruled under the absolute power of government officials who they regard as highly respectable persons; the social values of traditional superiority are still too important for them to symbolise the public administrators, particularly the governors, as the heads of the provinces; and the reputation of corrupt and powerful behaviour of the politicians. According to Arsa Mekswan, a Thai scholar and a former provincial governor, the public have a more positive attitude towards the appointed governors than the politicians. Besides, the public trust the appointed governors in running the public administration. (39)

In addition, according to a critic in Matichon Magazine, dated 24 October, 1995, elections are still not pragmatic in Thai society. It is argued that the idea of decentralisation does not require elections at every level of public administration since the socio-
economic situation is the main obstacle to Thai democracy. Importantly, Thai society needs a considerable change especially in term of social values and political system. Consequently, standards of social morality among people of all classes can be encouraged along side political development. Otherwise the election of provincial governors will not be worthwhile.

However, due to the long term familiarity with civil servants, public opinion may negatively affect the policy on the election of provincial governors. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the public do not agree with such a policy.

2.2) Bureaucratic Politics

According to Ira Sharkanksy and many other writers, there is no clear separation between administration and politics. Confirmation has also been given that the exercise of discretionary power is a characteristic and increasing function of administrators and bureaucrats. Sharkansky also notes that there is politics within government organisations and this relates to public servants. He says that politics arises when differences affect interests and administration necessarily has political implications because it raises issues which affect interested parties.(40) Therefore, the politics can be found in the administrative process where public administrators associate with each other. The evidence can be seen when a debate about administrative organisation erupts over the transfer of a programme from one agency to another. This matter will be discussed in the fifth chapter.

In this attempt, it is, then, necessary to study whether there is any conflict among the organisations concerned. In addition, it is also necessary to examine whether the appointed governors have performed their duties neutrally and fairly to politicians; if not,
then whether their performance has led to the demand for such policy. Therefore, the hypothesis below is made on the basis of the elements mentioned above.

Hypothesis: Senior public administrators including provincial governors have not performed their duties neutrally which would result in the demand for election of provincial governors.

(3) The Policy Outcome

In considering another side of the policy outcome as an independent variable, assuming that the policy on election of provincial governors will be brought into effect, the study will be carried out concerning such questions as: whether the election of provincial governors will strengthen the political parties; and on the other hand, whether the election will cause deterioration in the local political situation in term of vote-buying.

With regard to the characteristics of the environment and political factors explained earlier, it can be further simplified by the model in diagram 3.2 leading to the analysis of the policy on the election of provincial governors.
Diagram 3.2

voting behaviour
vote-buying
public opinion
interest groups

level of education

economic status

election of provincial governors

bureaucracy
military
politicians
Footnotes


4. Thomas Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*, *op.cit.*, pp.5-6


32. Kramol Tongdhammachat, *Toward a political party theory*. Bangkok, Krungsayarm Press, 1972, p.32
40. Ira Sharkansky, "Public Administration: Agencies......." *op.cit*
Chapter IV
Historical Background of Public Administration
in Thailand and its Impact

4.1 A Historical Background to the Public Administration
of the Ministry of the Interior

The purpose of this topic is to examine the way in which the aspect of the bureaucratic system including provincial administration under the Ministry of the Interior were transformed during the process of modernisation. Furthermore, the aspects of bureaucracy in terms of the identity of the institution, the characteristic patterning of its role and functions will be mentioned. The process of modernisation in the bureaucratic system of the Ministry of the Interior is concerned with the history. The historical orientation will be helpful in understanding how the present system was derived. In order to analyse the process of bureaucracy within the Ministry of the Interior, it will be necessary to clarify the scheme of historical periodisation to show the stages by which the transformation was accomplished.

(1) The Period of King Rama IV (1851-1868)

The period of King Rama IV (King Mongkut) was called "the reformation" as the basic formal organisation was developed. King Mongkut was the first to modify public services. He also softened the master-servant concept of kingship and revived the old paternal concept.

The structure of the Thai Government of that time was the distinction between territorial and functional orientation in organisational practice. It appeared that an orderly four-court organisation of government had been set up, known as the Klang, Wang,
Muang and Na. These four courts (departments) had functional responsibilities for both military and civil services. The Klang was apparently in charge of the royal treasury; the Wang became identified with royal household affairs; the Muang with the administration of the city; and the Na with overall charge of the countryside. Each of these was administered by an appointed royal prince. (1)

In 1855, Thailand started opening its country to expanding trade, and abolishing Thai control over customs duties with Great Britain and other European countries. The most significant action of the king in that year was the signing of the Bowring Treaty of Commerce and Friendship with Great Britain. This resulted in Thailand's linking with the world economy and beginning to move from a subsistence and barter economy to one of money specialisation and exchange based on world markets.

This period was essentially considered an era of westernisation motivated by the desire for protection against the threat of British and French colonialism. The basic formal organisation was then developed in order to bear upon colonial pressure. For such pressure, King Mongkut realised that Thailand could not maintain its independence, nor could the rulers retain their power unless modern standards of government were adopted. Therefore, he acted to deprive foreign powers of any excuse for intervening in Thai domestic affairs. Importantly, in this period, policy-making had been decided by the king in order to loosen up traditional norms which were long-standing, influential and had a fundamental impact upon the administrative bureaucracy. As a result of the king's policy in modernising the country, Thailand was the only country in South East Asia not to be colonised.

However, when talking about bureaucracy, the bureaucratic form of government was not identified clearly in terms of administration as
it was organised partly along territorial and partly on functional lines. This led to the overlap of functional and territorial responsibilities of the hereditary feudal princes who had had almost absolute authority in their territories.

(2) The Period of King Rama V (1868 - 1910)

The trend toward modernisation was continued quickly by King Rama V (King Chulalongkorn), son of King Mongkut. This reign was seen as a striking sequence of social and political firsts. He introduced the abolition of slavery by a gradual series of decrees and opened government schools for the sake of his people. The public services were further modified by bringing in an effective administration. Socially speaking, the living standards of the people were improved. Public welfare became a policy of the government for the first time. To implement this policy, a new government body for a public health and welfare programme known as "sanitary district" was first introduced.

Nevertheless, the King's absolutism drew strength from the fact that many of his administrative changes actually produced an increase in autocracy. In his attempt to centralise control over the irresponsible provinces, he was forced to curb local authority. He then assumed the new function of legislator as well as chief executive. He transformed royal officials into civil servants and started placing officials on fixed salaries and regular work hours. Officials were selected by the king and were recruited from among the princes and sons of noblemen.

King Chulalongkorn earlier created two more departments named Kalahom and Mahadthai. These departments were given authority by taking control of the significant movement towards military and civil distinction respectively. It was clear that Kalahom was a kind of defence department whereas Mahadthai was an interior department.
two departments had been and are still regarded as strong and powerful organisations. The four older departments (Klang, Wang, Muang and Na), as already referred to, had now been made responsible to Mahadthai in all matters concerning the public administration of war, justice, finance and the registration and the control of the population in the northern territories and to Kalahom in the south. (2)

In this period, the administrative policy was made by the king who also supervised all public matters personally through his assigned administrators including both princes and commoners. The organisational structure in this period was subclassified into "outer lands" and "inner lands". The "inner lands" referred to the areas near the capital where the king could directly administer the people. By way of contrast, the "outer lands" were the detached areas and those annexed to the capital. The governing of the "outer lands" was formed into first, second, third, and forth class provinces. (3) Each province in different classes was ruled by a governor who was granted a certain area of land according to his provincial class and was called a lord of the land. (4) Later on the king had brought these lords under greater central control.

The Establishment of the Ministry of the Interior

Previously, there had been no uniformity of provincial administrative practices, each semi-hereditary provincial chief being practically autonomous. This independence, particularly in the remote provinces, seriously compromised the king's ability to deal with them. Therefore, he set up the Ministry of the Interior and named Prince Damrong, his half-brother, who is known today in Thailand as a great historian and a famous administrator, as the first Minister. (5)
Under Prince Damrong's administration, the imposition of an effective system of local territorial administration was made. He also restructured the entire ministerial bureaucracy which led to the foundation of the present system. The main organisation was combined with the overall territorial administrative and governing function. On his advice, the king placed all the provinces, which before were under the jurisdiction of three ministries, Defence, Interior, and Finance, under the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, the local rulers were replaced with centrally appointed governors. The provincial governors were made accountable under a reporting system of the "Circle"(6). This means that the king had combined a certain number of provinces into a "Circle" beginning with the central provinces and working out to the more remote areas.

The provinces were reorganised into a new structure and grouped together to form the "Circles". Many third and fourth class provinces were degraded to the status of districts. Consequently, the country was divided into circles which was the largest local government at that time. The province was divided into districts, sub-district and villages. After the establishment of the Ministry of the Interior, the four old courts, which were mentioned earlier, were abolished. Mahadthai and Kalahom were subsequently made responsible to the Ministry of the Interior and the Defence respectively. The Ministry of the Interior had the role of public administration while the Ministry of Defence was responsible for military services.

According to the study carried out by Arsa Mekswan, under the direction of Prince Damrong, the Ministry of the Interior had been provided with effective guidance and control. The creation of a network of officials in charge of territorial administration, called local state government administration(or provincial administration), was also set up. With regard to the creation of the "Circles", a dozen provinces combined in one and the provincial governor had been
made to report to the head of the "Circle" called the "Lord Lieutenant" who was the royal representative. (7) Therefore, once the policy-making had been decided by the Ministry together with rules and orders sent out to the governors, the "Lord Lieutenant" had a duty to follow and supervise the instructions being carried out.

Arsa Mekswan states that the appointment of the "Lord Lieutenant" was with the aim of reducing the traditional power of the provincial governors. Instead, the governor was made to be responsible for the well-being of the people. Likewise the hierarchy subordinates at district and lower levels were accountable to the people in their territories. In addition, Arsa Mekswan notes that under this system, the relationship between the central government and the province was believed to be tightened by the "Lord Lieutenant".

(3) The period after the revolution (1932 - Now)

The innovations of King Chulalongkorn provided for a systematic introduction of western ideas by adopting a system of western advisers and the creation of the King's scholarship whereby numerous skilled young men regardless of family background were sent abroad to study. Nevertheless, according to Arsa Mekswan, such innovations contributed to the downfall of the absolute monarchy. Eventually, about thirty years later, there was a number of able young men, imbued with western liberal thinking. This group was able to carry out the first successful non-royal rebellion against the absolute monarchy. The 1932 revolution was executed by a group of western-educated middle-class civilian intellectuals and military officers. Arsa Mekswan comments that, subsequently, the history of Thai politics has been chiefly a power contest between the military elite and civilian politicians. This also caused decision-making from a handful of royal princes to be transferred to these powerful groups.
The organisational reforms set up by Prince Damrong were inevitably affected by the revolution of 1932. After the replacement of the constitutional government, politicians and military groups exercised power over the administration of the Ministry. The administration and regulations of the Ministry of the Interior were amended.

The impact on the local state government was that the democratic government had diminished the traditions of monarchical supervision and controls by abolishing the powerful "Circles". Subsequently, the government which was in favour of local autonomy had transferred all the power once vested in the "Lord Lieutenants" to the provincial governors.

Prior to the reorganisation of the provincial government, it was claimed that the central government had achieved a satisfactory degree of westernisation in its administrative patterns. The present government then planned to improve provincial administration by proposing the decentralisation concept. Decentralisation envisaged two steps: one was the province which should be regarded as the local state government headed by an appointed governor who play two significant roles; one as an agent of the Ministry of the Interior and the other as executive public official of local state government; second was the creation of local self-government units where people were supposed to practise political activity through the election of each unit. Regarding the role of provincial governor, it will be explained in chapter 6.

4.2 Factors which may Influence the Development of Political Bureaucracy

Carl J. Bellone, an American writer, states that administrative behaviour in bureaucracy is understood as political behaviour because administrative behaviour has a great impact on political decision-
making. In other words, it can be said that public administration and bureaucratic politics cannot be separated. One developmental process is mutually affected by the other. It is beyond doubt that such a philosophy can be applied to Thai bureaucracy as the public policy is politically involved at every level.

Studying the history, it is evident that the development of formal administration along with the bureaucratic processes which operate in the bureaucracy has been influenced by the administrative direction of the kings as already mentioned in the previous issues. Moreover, other forces, for example, social, economic and political conditions of the nation also have direct impact upon the bureaucratic system. The interactions and the effects of these forces upon the evolution of bureaucratic administration are very important.

In addition to the impact of kingship on bureaucracy, traditional value orientations within the society could be included. The bureaucratic administration was important a part-value orientations to some extent supported by and identified with a religious institution which were internalised within the bureaucracy and its participants. Furthermore, social values in terms of family behaviour and living conditions can also affect the bureaucratic political atmosphere. Therefore, in order to study the formal structure of the administration and the behaviour which occurs within the structure, it is worth examining social culture, religious values and political interests so that one can better understand the nature of Thai bureaucracy.

(1) Social Values

In Thai society, there are various values such as tradition, culture, family, politics etc. which have been influential in the development of bureaucracy as a whole. Social culture in Thailand is mostly regarded as conservative. David Wilson mentions that the
widely respected symbols are nation, religion, King and constitution. In his further statement, religion is a symbol of cultural conservation and unity, and as well as the King being a symbol of national unity. The Constitution relies on a representative government ruling for the happiness and the prosperity of the people, so characteristic of the traditional system, combined in one symbol in a sense of duty and responsibility. The values explained below are related to the national symbols mentioned above.

1.1 Family Structure

As a major and original source of social culture, it is important to analyse family values. It is said, according to Thai sociologists, that the family attitude of Thais is influenced by the traditional concept of the absolute monarchy. The king, who was the owner of the kingdom, was considered the father of all families to whom the people had to pay their full respect and loyalty.

By the same token, the father, mainly, is regarded as the centre of authority. Within the family, unquestionable deference is due in terms of relative age; outside a family, it is due in terms of age, nobility, morality, wisdom, power, knowledge and religious or governmental position. Therefore, the Thai family stresses respect, obedience, politeness and individual responsibility in personal relations among family members. Within the confines of the family, apart from responsibility and the hierarchical and reciprocal relationships, children are taught about authority, discipline, and the combination of individualism and subordination.

In Thai tradition, attitudes toward family values are different in the various social classes. Lower and middle class children are given the responsibility of caring for younger children while parents work, or they even have to help parents in many kinds of work. On the other hand, upper class children, who are more sheltered, and
protected from unpleasantness, learn to exercise certain privileges of their status.

However, relationships within the Thai family are fairly close and strong. Children of all classes are willing to look after the older generation and help them and protect them against harm. Such strong relationships within the family affect the socialisation process and have an impact on numerous bureaucratic activities. William Siffin notes that, according to the family value, any promotion can be a reflection of their fathers or relatives who work in high positions in the organisation. (10) Family attitudes oblige that parents or older people are expected to care for their young.

1.2 Social Values

With regard to the whole society, patterns of personal relationships have assumed a hierarchical characteristic, and people have tended to be classified into numerous groups according to their social status. In social life, the emphasis on deferential relationships and obedience has continued from the family level.

Due to the long experience of Thai people which has been marked by their loyalty to the king and his government, people, in general, are still obedient to the government officials and do not challenge government authority. Beyond the family, in the community as well as in school, children are indoctrinated from the earliest years with habits of respect and conformity to parents, elders, priests, teachers, government officials, and those of higher status.

Tinapan Nakata notes that closely related to the prevailing deferential or submissive orientation is the hierarchical attitude toward authority patterns, stressing superior - subordinate relationships shaped by the socialisation process. Such a process provides considerable role continuity in that the child is
effectively prepared to play these roles. He argues that the
socialisation connected with the bureaucratic society and the
bureaucratic ideology, on the other hand, produces an overwhelming
tolerance and preference for hierarchical superior - subordinate
relationships. He believes that, within the bureaucracy, the good
superior is paternalistic, and the effective subordinate is one with
good personal relationships. The ideal relationship bond between
superior and subordinate is strongly valued. Consequently, the
general effect of these social characteristics can minimise the
individual's sense of involvement in the bureaucratic organisation.

In analysing the type of hierarchical characteristics, they can be
good on one hand, however, they can impede and discourage the
development of public administration on the other, as subordinates
might be afraid of taking initiative or expressing opinions. A Thai
scholar like Tinapan Nakata believes that such deferential and
uncritical behaviour of Thai people is influenced at very early stage
of life starting from family up to schooling level. At schooling
level, the relationships between teacher and student normally rest on
obedience and discipline. This could partly result in submissive
behaviour in adults both in the bureaucratic and political atmosphere.

In other respects, as described by James Mosel that the Thai
social structure is generally seen as a loose structure. This
implies that there are considerable variations in individual
behaviour and great latitude for a personal way of thinking and
behaving. Another characteristic of loose structure is that there
might be lack of social organisation. Regarding social life, it is
guided by the most general rules from the culture. In this regard,
James Mosel believes that Thais generally are considered
individualists. He comments further that such an attitude may
sometimes cause problems in a large group as people seem to ignore
rules and regulations. This could many times cause the lack of
discipline among political groups.
When looking at social values at village level, Thailand remains a rural country. The majority still live in rural communities. Thais have been dominated by cultivation and rural culture revolves around this occupation. The major patterns of social interaction within a village are based on kinship and membership in the few groups that exist beyond the family. Formerly, farmers traditionally joined forces when they harvested crops or built new houses. In recent years, this tradition seems to have gradually disappeared. Instead, the introduction of paid labour and contractors has been used. With communities becoming larger and society more sophisticated, the labour force is not often seen either in villages or in towns. One other reason for the lack of labour force in the villages is economic crisis because drought has spread and hit rural villages. Most farmers, especially those who work in paddy fields, are forced to leave the land and move into the capital or big cities in order to get paid jobs.

(2) Buddhism

The Buddhist religion is culturally conservative and the centre of the Thai lifestyle. Over 80 percent of the population in Thailand are Buddhists. Buddhist temples are apparently very important institutions to people's every day life because social activities as well as religious affairs are conducted in the temples. In saying this, because Buddhist monks are important to the communities, they usually direct their efforts toward peace and harmony.

William Siffin notes that Thai Buddhism is one of the most significant sources of the perspectives and attitudes of the bureaucracy. According to this scholar, the root concept of Buddhism is to escape from self, from suffering and conscious existence, and Thai postures toward temporal reality have not been uninfluenced by this statement. With this concept, Thai Buddhists
are prepared to conform, and to share sympathy with people who are underprivileged and not to be selfish. The meaning of the sensed, differentiated and transitory aspects of existence are essentially incidental to a more basic reality, but practical Buddhism has not ignored questions of virtuous conduct in the real world.

The crucial Buddhist philosophy is to forgive. Peacefulness will last eternally as long as forgiveness exists. Buddhist scriptures always stress traditional values to pay respect to a person who has seniority associated with age, morality and virtue. This could deter people from behaving with aggression or by showing lack of self-respect. Buddhist teaching always emphasises conflict avoidance. Moreover, the Buddhist teaching stresses moderation which results in a tendency to compromise rather than to be aggressive. In addition to that, the Buddhist teaching stresses the action of giving support and help to any needed persons as much as they could, never act against any others.

Thai Buddhism has encouraged important traditional values in Thai society, including values which have been reflected within the bureaucracy because its narrative and symbolic content is tolerant and supportive of performance-oriented public administration. It is quite clear that Buddhist teaching explains Thai social behaviour regarding individualism. This can be described in terms of religious values, in that it encourages Thai Buddhists to be non-violent, uninvolved, non-committed. However, nowadays people seem to distort Buddhist philosophy to other meaning. The words "individualism" and "uninvolved" can be a double-edged sword for people who do not have a clear understanding of Buddhist philosophy. Some may think of the philosophy that makes people too nonchalant or negligent of others. Many people have felt that the loose structure of a vague social system, with no clear-cut demarcation of rights and duties, may have come from confusion about Buddhist philosophy in the sense of individualism as a lack of social participation or staying aloof.
This could minimise the individual's sense of involvement in the bureaucratic organisation of which they are members.

With regard to attitudes towards a certain group, it is useful to concentrate on the people of higher classes who are those it might not be wrong to think of as materialistic and influenced by modernisation. They are only a small percentage but are powerful, with either occupational or economic status. According to Buddhist philosophy, Thais are taught not to work and be materially gain oriented but be contented with oneself. In explanation of this philosophy, Thai Buddhists are expected not to be too ambitious in achieving either high status or economic power. However Buddhist philosophy is no longer so influential with those who are too ambitious as Thai society has become more complicated and people become more materialistically oriented, as already said.

Recently, when the tendency of people becoming materialistically oriented is higher, Ajahn Sumedho, a venerable American Buddhist monk, comments that, in Thailand, Buddhism is an extremely tolerant kind of religion; moralistic attitudes do not seem to be developed there.(14) It can be seen that corruption is widely practised within the sphere of government administration. However, Ajahn Sumedho remarks that although Thai society may be loose on some levels, at least there is not the kind of militant cruelty, that can be found in other countries where they kill the prostitutes and the criminals with capital punishment. However, the conclusion can be drawn that, because of the religious matter, severe punishment does not take into effect in Thailand. That is why politicians who commit massive corruption have never been condemned and made public so that they would be penalised and would not be able to commit further misconduct.
(3) Political Interests

Formerly, the ultimate responsibilities of the Ministry rested with the king or authorised princes. Civil servants had a duty to assist and support the king. They were charged with control and overseeing of the king's subjects throughout the kingdom. Consequently, they were authorised to occupy, on behalf of the king, a status superior to common people. As the public administration affairs expanded, officials were given opportunities to expose themselves to more sophisticated training and development programmes in order to cope with their increasingly specialised administrative responsibilities. Many Thai scholars believe that the 1932 revolution only transferred sovereignty from an absolute monarch and nobles to a group of military and civilians. Since then the bureaucracy has had the influence of different ruling groups.

In order to understand the political surroundings of the Ministry of the Interior and the provinces, it is important to focus on three interrelated issues concerning Thai politics which include: political development in which it attempts to identify politics starting from the early 1930s; the parties involved in Thai politics; and the political parties.

3.1 Political development

In order to comprehend Thai politics it is important to study political development starting from the early 1930s. In Thailand, the political system is characterised by an authoritarian regime in which formal autonomy has been transferred to non-royal groups. The political system is concerned with many different groups and political parties. The authoritarian regime is characterised by the dominance of ruling groups centred with power and authority. However, this type of regime does not seem to be permanent as it is
ineffective and inefficient in achieving the goals of modernisation.(15)

When talking about political development, it is defined as the process of increasing the capability of the political system to promote popular participation in the political process and to generate support to maintain itself. Kramol Tongdhammachat analyses that if political parties enable the political system to promote popular participation in the political process and to generate support for the system to maintain itself, it implies that they have a positive impact on political development. In contrast, if political parties fail to perform representative and system maintenance functions, this means that they have little impact on the country's development.(16)

As far as Thai political parties are concerned, Kramol Tongdhammachat believes that they have little impact on political development. He is also convinced that they could not provide good representation to gain the political sympathy of the public let alone be able to seek ways of overcoming conflicts in the society when needed. On the other hand, they, in many times, did not have sufficient power and popular support to stop other powerful groups - the military from taking power through non-democratic mechanisms.

According to Fred Riggs, political development in Thailand involves the increased differentiation of governmental functions and performance. There has been bureaucratic dominance over Thai politics which Riggs has called a bureaucratic polity.(17) Regarding his statement, it is agreed that the Thai political system has been dominated by the bureaucratic military who periodically intervene directly to seize power from civilians. Suchit Bunbongkarn notes that, since 1932, Thai political parties have been able to emerge and operate freely in the democratic system for a short time due to the considerable obstacles conducted by the military groups. Before
1932, the political control was in the hands of the monarchy. The institutions such as the legislature and political parties were tightly constrained. Moreover, there was lack of any variable constituency outside the bureaucracy. Accordingly, after the revolution of 1932, there were no institutions available to replace the effective monarchical power as the centre of political legitimacy and of effective political power.(18)

In order to understand current and future politics of Thailand, it is worth looking back at political history. Actually, the military became actively involved in politics at the beginning of the democratic regime. Many Thai scholars say that, at first, when the combination of the Armed Forces, and the civil service launched the coup to end the absolute monarchy, they promised to modernise the political system on the basis of democracy including the terms of constitutionism, equality and representative government. But it turned out that the military were involved in 12 changes of government by the coups rather than by making political change through the democratic process.(19)

In the period between 1932-1991, after the revolution, there have been 9 successful coups. Thailand, in 1958-1963, was under the absolute ruling power of the military. Stringent controls and harsh penalty against disorder and offensive conduct were used in this period. Moreover, the parliamentary form of government which had been adopted in 1932 was abandoned.(20) From 1963 to 1973, the country continued to be ruled with discretionary power by other military groups. By the end of this period the political crisis reached its peak of chaos when the mass could no longer stand the government ineffectiveness and the corruption prevailing in this ruling group. It was the first time that great demand was made by the public for the acceleration of promulgating the Constitution. The increase in the political movement of the students such as the organisation of a series of demonstrations became forceful to the
military ruling group at that time. Such demonstrations contributed to political unrest in 1973 and the downfall of the military government.

However, after the downfall of the military government in 1973, Suchit Bunbongkarn analyses that the political situation was extremely critical and complicated. The civilian governments were not able to cope with the great division within the country which moved between the conservatives and the left wing political activists including student organisations, labour unions and farmer groups. Suchit Bunbongkarn observes that, due to the instability of the civilian governments partly caused by the minority victory in parliamentary seats and the unsettlement of political agreement among the parties, the general elections had to be held three times within two years. Anyhow, the civilian governments were able to hold office only from 1975-1976. From then until 1980, the country was again ruled by the military groups.

In the years between 1980-1988, although the country had a parliamentary system, because no political party won majority seats, the military leader was invited to play as an important role as prime minister for almost 8 years. From then, not until the military Prime Minister decided to step down in 1988 did the civilian politician become the next prime minister until the latest coup was staged in 1989. It can be seen that Thailand has been periodically under military dominance since 1932. Since then, Thailand has had 8 prime ministers who came from the armed forces and 13 civilian prime ministers. However, between 1932-1996, the prime ministers who came from the military were in power for almost 46 years, whereas civilian governments were in office for only 18 years.(21)
3.2 The concern regarding the parties involved in Thai politics

In this connection, the analysis is focussed on the associated groups which have influence on Thai politics - the military, the political parties, and the interest groups. The roles of these groups vary according to their powerful status in society.

As far as democracy is concerned, it means that the people can decide the government and exercise influence over the decisions taken by government.(22) Ira Sharskansky also says that the people are the ultimate reference point of the government in a democracy.(23) Following the above definition, Thailand is by no means a democratic country since the country has never been guided by the people either in the regimes of military or civilian rule.

In fact, Thai politics has not been democratic in character since the early years of the regime. This can be seen by the introduction of the first constitution which established only one single House of Parliament. Chaianan Samudhavanija comments that, within the House, the military-led government appointed its loyal supporters in half the number of members in order to control the elected members. However, Suchit Bunbongkarn notes that after the Senate House was introduced into the bicameral parliamentary system in 1946, the continuing control of the military over the legislature still exists.(24) The above-mentioned scholars believe that the military played an important role in legislation, through their membership in the legislature in which they made a considerable number of the military officers appointed as members of the Senate House. It is also said that whenever the military took over the power and dominated the country, the constitution was then abolished. All parliamentary systems were blocked. Politicians who came through elections were all nullified. All government offices were under the control of the military.
However, when looking at another point of view with regard to the constitutional periods when politicians are in office, the above scholars believe that the politicians also play as dominant a role as the military ruling groups. Especially in recent years, politics has deteriorated as the performance of politicians has detered the public from participating in political activities. Therefore, it is noted that the political parties which emerged during the coup-free periods did not have real power or were unable to put themselves to be significant participants in the political system. The basic functions of political parties such as giving political knowledge, expanding political philosophy etc, have not been carried out properly such that they can draw attention and bring the interest of the public into politics.

With regard to the interest groups, Budhhsan Jumbala says that the growth of popular control over the government can be an important part of political development which is seen in the process of gradual democratisation. Then, the interest groups are regarded as communicators of special interests to decision-making centres and as participants in policy implementation. In a developing country like Thailand, where there is a strong bureaucratic polity, the creation of interest groups often follows a bureaucratic initiative. They are rarely spontaneous products of citizen demands in response to felt needs.(25)

As a result, there are not many occasions that interest groups such as trade unions, farmers, or students are able to take the initiative to put pressure on the political performance and the character of the ruling class. Neither can they form mass movements against undesirable governments. Moreover, they are not able to inform the ruling groups about what they wish in government activities. With the awareness of political development and the strength of the ideal interest groups, it could help them build
public support to exert pressure on the ruling parties to stop unfavourable consequences.

3.3 Political Parties

Suchit Bunbongkarn makes an analysis of the political system by stating that the strength of the House of Representatives depends largely on the strength of political parties. From his point of view, the weak and fragmented political party system in Thailand has led to a weak legislature, which has not been able to challenge the military's political dominance. (26)

With reference to the functions of political parties, according to the dominant pluralist theory of democracy, they should perform such important functions as to reconcile conflicting interests among different groups in society, to provide opportunities for people to participate in politics, and to recruit and train their members for a political role. (27) Such statement is not yet practicable in Thai politics. This could be one of the reasons why party system has not developed productively.

At the present time, there are 20 political parties in Thailand. They can be analysed according to gender, age, occupation, and qualifications. 93 per cent of them are men. Their age distribution is 20-29, 1.2%; 30-39, 20%; 40-49, 34.5%; 50-59, 29.2%; 60 and over, 15.1%. Regarding their occupations, most of the MPs are professional politicians. The rest are businessmen, lawyers, and former government officials. The majority of them have educational qualifications at first degree while about 15%, 17%, and 6% hold high school certificate, master degree level, and doctorates respectively. (28)

In the British system, it has been dominated for well over a century by two major parties (Conservative, and Labour), partly
because the electoral system favour the larger parties and discriminates against the smaller ones. (29) Besides, the major parties are parties of mass membership, having branches throughout the country and collecting monthly or annual subscriptions from their members. It is obvious that local branches are encouraged to discuss questions of policy and they send in resolutions for debate at the annual conference. Moreover, British political parties are active in publishing, producing a steady stream of policy proposals or pamphlets for discussion.

Regarding the party system in Thailand, no political party has developed strongly enough to form a stable government. No single party can win a majority of parliamentary seats. After a general election, there is always a coalition government formed with the combination of at least five political parties. This can be seen from the distribution of members of political parties who were elected in the general election of 1996 displayed in chapter 3.
Footnotes

13. William J. Siffin, *op.cit*, p.131
16. Kramol Tongdhammachat, Toward a political Party theory, Bangkok, Krungsayarm Press, 1972, p.25
20. David Wilson, 1962, op.cit/ Suchit BunBongkarn, op.cit
24. Suchit Bunbongkarn, op.cit, p.46
26. Suchit Bunbongkarn, op.cit, p.68


Chapter V
Overview of Public Units and Public Administration based at Provincial Level

This chapter deals with the general public administration of the Ministry of the Interior and certain functions at provincial level. It begins with an overview of administrative structure and functions of the Ministry of the Interior, public units within a province and then focusses on the duties of the governor. The ministerial budget as well as provincial plan are discussed in this chapter.

5.1 Administrative Structure and functions of the Ministry of the Interior

The Ministry of the Interior is one of the most important ministries of the Thai government. There are more than 200,000 personnel working throughout the country, with the exclusion of its state enterprise staff, and the annual estimated expenditure is 160,975.68 mBaht (£4,085.67m).(1)

The Minister of the Interior is appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. He is aided by at least three deputy ministers who normally belong to various political parties of the coalition government. Directly below the top political leadership, there is the permanent secretary for the Ministry who is also assisted by six deputies who are in charge of different administrative branches. The operating level of the Ministry begins with the central administration in which there are departments, each headed by a director-general, and then divided into divisions and further subdivided into sections and subsections respectively.
At provincial level, there is a governor in each province who is assisted by one or two deputy governors. Below this there is a number of districts, each administered by the district officer and his staff. Below the districts are Tambons and villages headed by Tambon headmen and village headmen who are under the direct supervision of the district officers.

Local self government units which are under the Ministry of the Interior include the Provincial Administrative Organisation, the municipality, the sanitary district, and the Tambon Administrative Organisation and the Tambon Council.

The Minister of the Interior usually exercises legal power over the policies and personnel of the provincial administration, especially the appointment of provincial governors. Below the authority of the Minister, the permanent secretary, the head of ministerial civil servants, also plays a crucial part in the appointment, removal, transfer, promotion and punishment of provincial governors and the directors-general of various departments.

According to the Ministerial Regulations of 1992, the Ministry of the Interior consists of 11 departments and seven state enterprises. Each department is in charge of public services and mostly each has its network throughout the country in order to improve the prosperity and well-being of the people living within the country. Many departments have functional officers at district and Tambon levels so that they can carry out the developmental programmes of the departments to local people. In order to create understanding about the structure of the Ministry of the Interior through its network of departments at central level and the lower levels which relate mainly
to the provincial administration, this study will describe only the public functions and responsibilities of the ministerial departments. Despite being under the Ministry of the Interior, the state enterprises' administration is not concerned directly with the provincial government. Thus the details of state enterprises will not be included.

Corresponding to the regulations, the functional responsibilities of each department are described as follows.

1) **Bangkok Metropolis**  According to The Bangkok Administration Act of 1980, the Bangkok Metropolis is a kind of local government organising its affairs by groups of elected members headed by the Lord Mayor. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the administration of the Bangkok Metropolis in accordance with the rules and regulations imposed by the government.

2) **The Office of Permanent Secretary**  The office is equivalent to the status of department. It is the central routing point for all communications regarding coordination of activities within the Office and other departments. It is composed of many divisions which are responsible for: the ministerial formulation of plans and the analysis of the provincial plan; research study for the improvement of the administration of the Ministry; the organisation of finance and personnel; internal telecommunications; legal consultancy; data compilation; political party cooperation; and public relations concerning the creation of public understanding of the ministerial administration. Importantly, it is in charge of the administration of the provincial governors. There is an inspecting unit where the inspectors work on behalf of the Ministry in order to inspect and supervise the provincial administration. They also give advice on
administrative matters to the governors as well as investigate matters pertaining to their misconduct.

3) The Office of Secretaries to the Minister  The status of this office is also paralleled to a department. It is responsible for: the coordination between the Ministry and the Parliament in relation to parliamentary issues; submitting recommendations and suggestions to the Minister according to the political analysis involving current topics required by the Minister or Deputy Ministers; reporting political movements and issues concerning politics.

4) The Department of Local Administration  It is responsible for studying and planning ways and means of protecting people against natural disasters and giving aid to the disaster victims. Moreover, it supervises investigation procedures and also deals with problems in frontier provinces caused by the activity of foreign nationals. Furthermore, it carries out training programmes for the governing public servants of the local state government and public servants under local self-government units. In this respect, it organises the District Officer Academy which is responsible for training officials of the Department prior to their appointment as district officers. The Department has duties to give such public services as household registration, issuing identification cards and preparation for elections as well as to supervise the administration of municipalities and sanitary districts together with the allocation of funds for those units.

5) The Department of Community Development  The responsibilities of the Department are; to promote community development programmes concerning giving advice on matter pertaining to programme formulation and programme implementation; to encourage people to
participate in democratic procedures at provincial, district and Tambon levels.

6) Police Department The Department forms a major part of the Ministry of the Interior as it is one of the largest government departments. It is divided into three forces and a number of smaller units. The Metropolitan Police Force is concerned with crime prevention and suppression, traffic control and through the Police Fire Brigade, with firefighting in the Bangkok Metropolis. The Provincial Police Force is operated throughout the rest of the country. The third force is the Border Patrol Police, which has a duty to prevent insurgent infiltration and maintain peace and security in border areas. The Police Department also includes the division responsible for matters concerning immigration and visas.

7) Lands Department The department has its network throughout the country. It is accountable not only for the control over private land development but also for the protection of reserved and public lands. Land development in terms of making use of lands, land reform and protecting people from being taken advantage of by land dealers are among the responsibilities of the Department.

8) The Department of Public Works This Department works as a consultant body for those who need legal advice concerning building architecture and construction. It also takes responsibility for public safety owing to the high buildings in areas where security is necessary. With regard to the law concerning the control of buildings, the Department is authorised to stop the continuance of building constructions which they determine to be a danger for public safety. In addition, the Department supervises the administration of rural and urban development. It is in charge of the construction
of country roads, bridges, wells and reservoirs. Its responsibilities also include the public services regarding the maintenance of such infrastructures.

9) **The Department of Rural Development Acceleration** This Department is the third biggest department following the Department of Police and Local Administration in terms of public spending. It has duties of carrying out the programmes for improvement of rural and vocational activities. Moreover, it conducts the maintenance and construction of, for example, basic infrastructures and water supplies, asphalt roads, shallow and deep wells, and the recreation of local parks.

10) **The Department of Penitentiary** It is responsible for the retaining of prisoners and young offenders who are convicted according to the national justice. In order to prevent the offenders convicted with light sentences from repeating the same crime, and to encourage them to improve their vocational skills so as to be able to find better jobs after being released from jail, the Department has launched recreational and rehabilitation programmes for them during their prison period.

11) **The Office of Town And Country Planning** The Office's main duties relate to the overall town and country planning, land reorganisation and town development. According to the law, the Office is legalised with the authority to restore unsuitable public areas and issue warrants for land expedition if necessary.
5.2 Provincial Administration and the Local Self-government System

Corresponding to the Ministerial Act of 1933 and the amendments of 1972 and 1992, the present administrative structure of the Ministry of the Interior has been formulated and divided into three parts: central, provincial and local. In order to understand the administrative functions of provincial governors, the study will focus mainly on provincial administration and local self-government.

The present structure of the contemporary Thai provincial administration descends from the period of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910). After gaining experience of western impacts due to the threat of European colonialism in the nineteenth century, the large-scale reform programmes were then set out. The entire system of the Ministry, particularly the territorial administration was restructured, including circle, provincial, district, sub-district (Tambon) and village.

Thus, it can be said that, within the contemporary Thai local government system, there are two separate subsystems. These subsystems are the provincial administration (or local state government) and local self-government. In the framework of administrative law, provincial administration is organised on the basis of power decentralisation. The idea is that the Ministry of the Interior provides provincial governors with its main policies, then the governors put the policies into practice by implementing their individual developmental programmes which have already been planned in their provinces. Furthermore, the interrelated local self-government is organised on the basis of decentralisation concepts. This means that the setup of local self-government units
was, and still is, politically oriented and mostly ruled by elected officials.

The details of the structure and the operation of the two subsystems is as follows.

(1) Provincial Administration

The primary unit of this system, with only the exception of the Bangkok Metropolis which is ruled by a Lord Mayor who is elected through local election and regarded as local government, is the province. The province is organised to be the main unit of local state government headed by the appointed governor. It is virtually a multi-functional subdivision of the central authority which is organised on a geographical basis. The provincial administration is composed of 75 provinces, each of which has its own governors. The Ministry of the Interior appoints a provincial governor together with one or two deputy governors for each province. The governor's staff consists of public officials representing most central ministries or departments such as Education, Public Health, Social Welfare, Police, Public Works, Agriculture, Transportation, Revenue and Treasury.

The province is further subdivided for administrative purposes into districts, each of which is administered by a district officer assisted by a number of assistant district officers and with numerous public officials who are also representatives of most ministries but assigned to work at district level. This structural arrangement of the district administration duplicates the provincial administration. The chief district officer is appointed directly by the Department of Local Administration which is attached to the Ministry of the Interior. Other functional officers who are members of the district
administration staff share, in both technical and administrative terms, characteristics similar to their superior counterparts at provincial level.

Below the districts are sub-districts which in Thai are called Tambons. Each Tambon is headed by a Tambon headman called a Kamnan and consists of a group of villages, each of which is headed by a village headman. The district officer is the direct superior of the Kamnan, who in turn supervises the work of the village headman. The pattern of authority in the two lower levels at the grass roots of the territorial administration differs substantially from that of the upper levels. The provincial and district administrators are characterised by the central organisations based on legal authority, full-time service, functional specialisation etc. On the other hand, the structure of the Tambon and village organisation is based on such traditional systems as personal communication, and part-time service.

According to the Ministerial Act of 1994, Kamnans and village headmen who were elected before the Act came into effect can enjoy a life-time career, but the newly elected have to retire at the age of sixty.(2)

(2) **Local Self-Government**

Local self-government units are the third level of the national administrative system. They are unlike the provincial administration because they are treated as self-government in which they have a degree of autonomy through a separate corporation status, revenue-raising and budget power, local legislative councils, and personnel management.(3) The units have a degree of local autonomy which varies among different types. Even though they are self-governing
bodies, they have to be supplemented by grants and loans from the central government through the Department of Local Administration, the Ministry of the Interior.

The units of local self-government include provincial administrative organisations, municipalities, sanitary districts and Tambon administrative organisations. In general, these four types of local self-government can be distinguished by their socio-economic characteristics as follows.

2.1 Provincial Administrative Organisation (PAO)

The differentiation between "Provincial Administration" and "the Provincial Administrative Organisation" (PAO) is that a provincial administration is a non-autonomous subdivision under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior which is organised on a territorial basis. Meanwhile, the PAO, which has been raised to the status of local self-government by the promulgation of the Provincial Government Act of 1955, is an autonomous local self-government with its own legislative assembly, locally raised revenue, budgeting power, locally staffed personnel who are outside the national civil service system. (4) This unit emerged in accordance with the national policy of decentralisation to people at provincial level in order that people can govern themselves by their own legislation separate from other local self-government units. It is regarded as an institution of political process and as an organ for controlling the administration of the province within the scope of its power and duties according to the laws and regulations set forth by the government.
The territorial jurisdiction of the PAO covers the rural areas outside the limits of the municipalities and the sanitary districts in the province. The PAO structure consists of both legislative and executive systems. In the legislative branch the PAO assembly, or provincial council, is composed of popularly elected members who are in five year terms. After the election, the council will elect its president and vice president from among the members, then it will normally meet annually to pass a yearly budget and to audit the previous year's expenditure.

As a watchdog body, Arsa Mekswan notes that the provincial council acts to review the administration of the province and determine whether the policies are carried out in the proposed directions.(5) The decisions of the council are not dependent on the governor. The debate is restricted to the details of implementation rather than policy formation. During the session, members of the council may question the governor concerning the execution of council business or provincial work.

On the other hand, for the executive branch, the demarcation between the two aspects of provincial administration and the PAO is somewhat complicated by the provision in the Provincial Government Act 1955. Practically, the provincial governor is authorised to chair the executive branch of the PAO which is staffed by public officials under his supervision. This provision again curbs the authority of the PAO. Whilst the provincial administration is overseen by the provincial council, in the same manner the governor has the right to direct action in a principal policy decision and executive capacity.
The PAO is responsible for a wide range of activities such as maintenance of peace and order, education, social welfare, public health and hospitals, garbage collection, water works, electricity etc. The PAO is legally entitled to an income from, for instance, duties, services, issue of permits etc. Nevertheless, it cannot fulfil its functions as required by law, due to the financial limitations. All the budget comes from provincial revenues which are limited and must be supplemented by grants and loans from central government through the provincial budget.

2.2 Municipality

Municipalities are divided into three types on the basis of differences in the degree of urbanisation of the area as measured by such criteria as population density and population size, revenue capacities, the ability to provide services and also political considerations. For city municipalities, they must have at least 50,000 people and an average population density of 3,000 per square kilometre, whilst town municipalities must have at least 10,000 people with the same density as a city municipality.(6) In contrast, Tambon municipalities may be created at the will of the central authority of the Ministry of the Interior. However, each province is automatically entitled to have at least one town municipality whether or not it meets population or financial criteria.

The structure of municipal administration is paralleled to that of the PAO, and also duplicates the form of national government. It is composed of both the municipal assembly and the executive council. Assemblemen are popularly elected. The size of the assemblies varies according to the types of municipalities, being at least 12 and at most 24 members.(7) The elected members are the ones who make
policies and decisions for the public officials who work for the municipality under the supervision of the Mayor. The Mayor presides over the executive council, which consists of two or four councillors depending on the types of municipality. Councillors are usually selected from the municipal assembly by the assembly members.

The provincial governor's supervision and control over the municipalities are carried out only in accordance with the limit of rules and regulations of the Ministry of the Interior.

The responsibilities of the municipality are to provide a variety of urban services such as public safety, road and waterways, refuse and garbage disposal, prevention of disease, fire protection, elementary education, water works, slaughter houses, medical care, and so on. The municipal functions are carried out in the areas outside the PAO's.

2.3 Sanitary District

During the movement of the policy of decentralisation in 1955, the sanitary district was revived after being abolished in 1903. The creation of this unit was to provide the people in remote areas with health and welfare programmes and also to give the opportunity for self governing to some extent prior to this being granted in municipal areas.

A sanitary district is created where there is a concentration of population and an expectation of revenue that will support limited governmental activities, but not yet reach the capacity to finance a small municipality. It occupies an intermediate position between the smallest municipality and the Tambon council.
The structure of a sanitary district differs from that of the PAO and a municipality. It composes of a single committee without any separate legislative body. The committee is composed of both ex-officio and four elected members. Ex-officio members include five public officials from the district administrative staff and a number of locally elected officials (the village headmen and the Kamnans in the jurisdiction). The chief district officer, who is the chairman of the ex-officio members, presides over committee members who are involved in such matters as regulation, budget approval and various policy decisions. It is regarded as an almost non-autonomous unit. Without a legislative body, the only channel through which the local interest in the sanitary district can be represented and protected is the elected members.(8)

The functions of the sanitary district are similar to those of small municipalities including such items as maintenance of waterways and streets, cleanliness of streets and market areas, taking measures against the spread of disease, providing clean water, market places, fire protection, refuse and garbage disposal, public works and hospital facilities.

2.4 Tambon Administrative Organisation (TAO) and Tambon Council

According to the Tambon Council Act 1955 and the Act of Tambon Council and Tambon Administrative Organisation of 1994, the Tambon councils which have the capacity to collect their own annual income revenue of at least 150,000 Baht (apx £ 3,800) are able to upgrade themselves as TAOS.(9)
Following the Acts, the members of a Tambon council consist of the (elected) Kamnan, who serves as a chairman of the council, all village headmen of that Tambon and the Tambon doctor plus one member from each village selected by the people. The term in office of the members of the Tambon council is four years. A Tambon council receives financial support from the Department of Local Administration through the budget of the provincial council in relation to the capacity of each council in collecting revenue from such things as house and land taxes, slaughtering fees, licence fees and fines etc. Furthermore, there is another source of Tambon income which may derive from donations or local developmental taxes, and from the Department of Community Development.(10)

With regard to the organisation of the TAO, it is divided into two groups; the TAO executive committee and the TAO council. The TAO council is staffed similarly to the Tambon council but its term of office is two years. On the other hand, the TAO executive committee is composed of the members appointed by the district officer, and is normally the Kamnan, along with two village headmen and four others selected from the TAO council. Whereas the Tambon council is chaired by the elected Kamnan, the chairman of the TAO executive committee is selected from among members of its committee.

The functions assigned by law to the Tambon council and the TAO council are similar to those of the Tambon municipality and sanitary district, except that the former two organs have to work in cooperation with the public officials from the Department of Community Development, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Agriculture in order to formulate the Tambon Developmental plan before proposing to the respective organisations for budget approval.
5.3 Background of provincial governor

The provincial governorship existed long before the reign of King Chulalongkorn. The status roles and titles of the provincial governor varied in different periods. However, beyond doubt what is common in all periods is that the governor's role is the most important force in the administration of the province. To understand the present position of the governor, it is important to study the historical background of the governor starting from the beginning of the absolute monarchy through the democratic regime. The study will highlight the evolution of governorship in four periods.

(1) In the study carried out by Arsa Mekswan, during the very first period of absolutism before the 14th century, where the capital was mainly located in the north of Thailand, the king governed and treated people as his own family members. In this period, the Thai state was under the individual chief of the province. The chief of the province was regarded as the father of the province. Each provincial chief governed his own dependent territory state but paid tribute to the king and followed the central policy of the king. As the central administrative policy was liberal, it could, therefore, be seen that the people were treated by the provincial chief in the same way as the king did to his people. In consequence, people lived peacefully for many years in uncomplicated societies without severe punishment, but instead were taught to behave in a better way if they committed wrong doing.

(2) The years before King Chulalongkorn, this was the period of the real absolute monarchy. Arsa Mekswan notes that, accordingly, the paternalistic role of father ruler disappeared and was replaced by the pattern of autocracy. The provincial governor became a member
of the monarch's bureaucracy working under the absolutism of the
king. These governors were either local noblemen, who occupied great
areas of land and had absolute power over the province, or royal
pages who served the king for some years in the capital. Such
governors had already received administrative training concerning the
king's policy in order to tighten the loose administration and bring
the outer provinces under the direct control of the government.

In this period, it is stated that the provincial governor enforced
absolute authority over the people under his jurisdiction. The fate
of the people was in the hands of the governors. In the remote
areas, the central government played almost no part in matters
pertaining to people's daily life. It was said that complaints about
the wrongdoing and the misconduct of the governor were rarely acted
upon by the central government, due to the inefficient
communications. Each governor carried out the policies of the
government differently. Severe laws and punishment began to come into
effect. During this period, the provincial governors were not paid a
salary but were permitted to administer the province as absolute
rulers with unlimited power and made a living from officialdom by
collecting taxes and fees from the people.

(3) In the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868 - 1910), Prince
Damrong, who was named the first Minister of the Interior, was
authorised to reform the old administration system. In order to cope
with western influences during this period, such measures as
strengthening the power of the central government, development of
the unity of the nation, and provision of a more effective means of
provincial control were introduced into practice. Additionally,
extensive alterations to the existing governmental and administrative
system as well as to the provincial administration were made.
In the reorganisation, it is noted by Arsa Mekswan that the tributary provinces were abolished. All hereditary governors who used to possess the status and power of absolute authority and lived in distant provinces far beyond the control of the king were now made public servants with a fixed salary under the strict system of the newly established ministry called "the Ministry of the Interior". (11)

The provincial governor was entrusted with the administration of the province, and worked under the rules and regulations of the Ministry of the Interior. Due to the introduction of monitoring and evaluation of the provincial administration, the governors were placed under the sub-supervision and control of "Lord-Lieutenants", the supreme chiefs of the "Circles", who in turn became immediate subordinates to the Ministry of the Interior. The "Lord Lieutenants" were mostly royal family members who were entrusted to work on behalf of the king or the royal Thai government. The creation of the "Circles" was to bring a certain number of provinces under the sub control and supervision of the "Lord Lieutenants" so that the administrative advice and guidance sought by provincial governors could be fulfilled and the administrative report of the provinces could be screened before being put forward for further action by the central government. (12)

The reorganisation of the provincial administration made the provincial governor head of the province and made him work with the cooperation and in consultation with the provincial Board, junior officials and a number of clerks. The Board included senior officials as regular Board members and local nobles as Honorary. The Board was appointed by the Ministry of the Interior on the recommendation of the governor.
The provincial governors during this period were appointed with classes and royal titles. According to the Provincial Administration Act of 1898, the official positions appointed by the king could be removed by royal proclamation. It is important to mention in this context that the provincial governors at that time were authorised to have administrative power to supervise and control all officials within the province. As far as the law was concerned, Arsa Mekswan observes that although the power to appoint and remove provincial staff was in the hands of the "Lord Lieutenant" of the "Circle" and the ministries involved, the provincial governor still had the power to dismiss or suspend officials for misconduct and inefficiency at work. Arsa Mekswan notes in this particular connection that the governors at that time had the power to reward or punish his staff for the reasons of working efficiency, or incompetence, and for severe disobedience. It is contrary to the current administration in which provincial governors have limited authority over personnel management.

(4) The governorship under the constitutional regime (from 1932 until now) has been under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior. Since democracy was introduced in 1932, the new ideas of reform and the reorganisation of the government system were brought into the country by a group of western-educated rulers. The power of the monarch such as the "Circle of Lord Lieutenants" was abolished.

At the beginning of this period, it is said that the governor played the most important role in the province with a great degree of independence, as previously stated, all the power and functions which once belong to the royal representative of the "Circle" were transferred to the governor. Moreover, the governors were
constituted more responsibilities by being given decentralised power.(13)

5.4 Status and Qualifications of Governorship

The status of the provincial governor is important in that he has great power as supreme chief executive in the province. In practice, he is by no means free to abuse his authority or to harm the will and liberty of the people, nor can he misuse the power to enrich himself. One reason is that the provincial governors are civil servants under the close supervision of the Ministry of the Interior which has full power to reward, discipline, or punish the governors at all times.

To support this idea, despite the fact that he is the most important public servant in the province, he must abide by law and regulations according to the Ministerial Act. He has to work under the strict discipline of the Ministry. In general, the governor has to lead his provincial administration in the direction which may bring most happiness to the people, as his performance is subject to the Ministry of the Interior where there are ministers who are politicians, and the Permanent Secretary as the top superior to whom he is finally answerable.

Formerly, the status of the provincial governors was determined by the classes of the provinces and the land granted to them by the kings. Starting almost at the end of King Chulalongkorn's (1908) up to the very beginning of the democratic regime (1940), the status of provincial governors was classified by rank and title of nobility. Not until the introduction of the ranking classification in 1941, was the governor regarded as a civil servant of special class. The ranking classification divided public servants into five different
classes; special class official - director-general, provincial
governor or equivalent, and secretariat for the Ministry; first class
official - division head or equivalent; second - section head, third
-junior officer or official of the section; and fourth - those who
work as clerks. This was used not only to distinguish the posts of
public officials for some decades, but also to classify the scale of
monthly salary for civil servants. (14) In 1975, the new system of
"Position Classification" (PC) was brought about and has been applied
to the Thai bureaucratic office ever since.

The public administrative PC divides public officials by their
qualifications and abilities, with different scales of salary. It
ranks from grade 1 to 11. Every government unit similarly classifies
public staff into three groups of echelons namely officials graded
between 1-6 stated as very junior clerks to high class practitioners,
7-8 regarded as middle class administrators who hold the positions of
section chiefs and office division heads respectively, and finally
high executive administrators. The latter includes the permanent
secretary for the ministry who is the only top post grade 11, the
director-general of ministerial departments, chief of the bureau and
provincial governor are considered as civil servants grade 10, and
the deputy director-general as well as deputy governor at grade 9.
The governorship status among provincial governors regarding the PC
is not different but sometimes implicitly distinguishes itself by the
size of the provinces as the larger ones are more important in terms
of administrative responsibilities and budgeting.

With regard to the important status of provincial governors, they,
like all other senior administrators, are appointed, removed or
dismissed by Royal Command in accordance with the recommendation of
the Ministry of the Interior. Once the nomination of governorship
candidates is made by the Ministry of the Interior, it will be forwarded to the government cabinet for approval before being submitted to the king for announcement as a Royal Proclamation. However, in general practice, the Minister of the Interior himself plays a key role in appointing, rewarding or punishing provincial governors.

Usually, the provincial governors, in the same manner as other public officials, who perform their duties without misbehaviour or receiving severe punishment during their term of public services, receive pensions and retire at the age of sixty.

As far as the qualifications of the governor are concerned, Arsa Mekswan notes that in general the candidates to be nominated as provincial governors must have long experience as chief administrative officials after having joined the government service to work through various positions, such as district officer, deputy governor or other echelon positions in the Ministry of the Interior; have good characteristics of leadership; have good morals and ability in public administration skills etc. He states in addition that the nominee must be a permanent public civil servant and have administrative qualifications especially required by the Ministry of the Interior, for example the qualification of executive administration training, and already be attending the School of Executive Governing.

It has been recognised that most of the officials who tend to be promoted to the post of governorship have already served as deputy governor or gained experience in provincial administration for at least twenty years. According to Pramoon Chanchammong, a former governor and former director-general of the Office of Policy and
Planning, the directors-general of departments under the Ministry of the Interior and deputy governors, who are in office for at least four years, are highly likely to be appointed as provincial governors. (16) Nevertheless, there may be some cases of those who have less seniority or experience etc. becoming governors as this is acceptable without denying that there is political influence within the bureaucracy.

However, there is no candidate from outside the Ministry of the Interior who stands a chance in the nominations. The only exception is officials from other ministries who have transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and worked there for a number of years, and officially climbed up to the same rank for the wanted position as the insiders. With regard to provincial governors entering to political career after retirement, actually, there is no survey that has been done either what objectives they would achieve or how many of them have been registered as party candidates.

In relation to female staff promotion, it was regarded as an important revision when General Chavalit Yongchaiyut, the Interior Minister (between 1991 -1993), promoted and appointed Mrs. Charussri Predeecharus, the chief executive of the Bureau of Country Planning, as the first female governor to Nakorn Nayok province in 1992. The idea of appointing a female governor was to promote women's rights and equal opportunity within Thai society as has been practised internationally.

5.5 Duties of the Provincial Governor

The revolution of 1932 not only brought about the changes to absolutism of the monarch, but led to great alterations of the
governorship as well. The provincial governors who were familiar with the old tradition of using absolute power were now made to become public servants responsible for provincial affairs under a democratic system.

Arsa Mekswan, a former provincial governor, comments that, at first, it was not easy for them to follow suit because after being royal representatives and masters of the provincial people, they suddenly had to abide by democratic decision-making of the provincial board with the principle of majority rule enforced, and they could no longer exercise their authority as supreme chief executives of the provincial government to administer the province according to their own judgement. (17)

However, since it became clear that the procedures of the board committee was not successful, the provincial administration was, therefore, reconstructed. It was in 1952 that the Administration of the Kingdom Act, which invested the provincial governors with more significant status, authority and responsibility, was promulgated. In the meantime, the importance of provincial board was diminished to an ordinary advisory body to the governor. Later in 1955, the central government launched a policy of decentralisation of the public administration by setting forth local self-government units according to the Provincial Government Act of 1955. Nevertheless, Arsa Mekswan comments that this has contributed to the complexity of provincial administration.

With regard to the Provincial Government Act 1955, the governor's roles are; as the head of provincial staff, that of agent of the central government; and as the head of local government units being the representative of the provincial people by working through the
organ of the people, the provincial council. Arsa Mekswan remarks about this matter that it is not easy for the governor to keep a balance between his duties in the two roles to fulfil both the task given by the central government and the needs and demands of the local people. Also, it is difficult for them to work closely with locally elected members unless the governor has reached the required ability to enable that local demands can be met satisfactorily. If not he will not be able to maintain stability.\(^{(18)}\)

In this respect, it is important to examine further the separate roles of the provincial governor so that a clear understanding concerning his duties can be gained.

(1) The role as provincial governor

(1.1) As the head of provincial staff, the governor represents not only the Ministry of the Interior but also other ministries which carry their network throughout the country. The governor has to deal with various matters of policy and public services launched by the central departments to be conducted in his areas of responsibility. With this great authority, he is always expected to be capable of dealing with all provincial affairs in a very efficient way. He also has a duty to integrate and coordinate the public services of various government agencies at provincial level. In carrying out these functions, the governor has to make use of all the powers and resources of the provincial government. In this connection, he has to act in accordance with the law and regulations not only concerning the Ministry of the Interior but also the other departments and ministries involved. In addition, the governor has to give proper guidance, instruction and advice to the officials related to provincial administration.
(1.2) On behalf of the people, the governor has the primary functions of maintaining public peace and safety and the promotion of the well-being of the people. In doing this, he needs to prepare socio-economic development programmes so that the living standards of the people can be raised effectively. Furthermore, internal security and the suppression of crime along with the promotion of the civil rights and liberties of provincial people are among his major responsibilities. In carrying out this job, the governor has to utilize his power and personnel efficiently. In the event of serious crime such as murder, he has to conduct the investigation himself along with his police staff.

Additionally, the function of keeping peace and maintaining order requires the provincial governor to have a good understanding and long experience of crime investigation. Therefore, he has the authority to control the police force and work in close cooperation with the provincial police in a way which other officials, who have no training or experience in the internal peace process, do not have that ability. This also distinguishes the status of governorship from that of other civil servants who have not been trained for this specific post.

In order to promote the well-being of the people, Arsa Mekswan notes that the governor is not only supposed to use legal power but his other abilities as well. Expertise, experience, skills and charismatic leadership are also needed in some way to develop the socio-economic growth of the province. Community development is also his significant goal so as to strengthen and improve the socio-economic situation since it is one of the most important policies of the government.
(1.3) Being head of the province, the governor has to deal with public services as well as to engage himself in public ceremonies. It is necessary for the governor to maintain good relationships with the public so that his ceremonial duties can contribute toward his official tasks. Furthermore, the governor is always considered with great respect by the people and they are willing to give him full cooperation provided his performance is acceptable. This is because his role as the chief executive administrator is already a main focus of public attention.

Besides, Arsa Mekswan states in this regard that as a chief public official in the province, he has a duty to be a good representative of the government in order that he can defend the government so as to make the public satisfied with the administration. Mekswan says that all efforts have to be made by the governor to correct any misunderstanding of local people which may arise regarding government policies and the outcome of policy implementation. Therefore, a good personality and good tactics in public relations can help him reach the goal.

(2) The role as chairman of election

According to the law, the role as chairman of the election is given to the provincial governor to ensure proper conduct of elections and election procedures held in the province. Each province is a constituency for the election of one or more members of the National House of Parliament, according to the size of the population of that province. During elections, the governor plays an important role in the electoral process from the time when the candidates begin their campaign until the ballots have taken place.
and been finalised by the announcement of the result. The entire procedure is under the close supervision of the governor.

It is believed that the concept of the governor's role as chairman of election has been one of the reasons contributing to the call for governorship election which has been demanded by politicians. The problem of such a role will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter.

(3) The role as head of local self-government units

As previously stated, the national policy of decentralisation (at the beginning of the revolutionary period) was to create and establish local self-government units. The aim was to encourage local people to take part in democratic activities and also to decentralise responsibilities of public bodies to local units - provincial council, municipality, sanitary district and Tambon council. With the exception of the provincial council, the governor is authorised to exercise his entire power over all local government units. He is also vested with authority to supervise and control sanitary districts and TAO through his respective subordinates at those levels.

5.6 Ministerial Budget

The policy-making process specifically relevant to budget formulation for the administration both of the province's macro projects and rural development programmes is examined here. The
effects of government officials and politicians in the process of budget planning is also outlined and analysed.

"In the day-to-day work of administration, superiors employ their control over essential resources to assure themselves of compliance with official norms. At stated intervals, administrators must justify their activities so that they can get the resources they need to continue their work. The most continuous control over resources is money." (19)

In this sense of traditional control, most administrators have long recognised the value of money as a control over their administration and they have developed elaborate procedures to regulate the flow of funds. They organise their funds in an annual budget exercise, and at quarterly periods throughout the year. They regard money as a measure of support given to individual agencies, and within agencies, to each of their programmes. Consequently, administrators demand much money and measure their success by how much of it they receive. As a result, chief executives, both politicians and public administrators, pay great attention to budget requests and spending reports. According to Aaron Wildavsky, budgets determine what programmes and policies are to be increased, decreased, lapsed, initiated or renewed. The budget lies at the heart of public policy. (20) This is particularly true in recent years when the Thai government has placed more emphasis on the management of resources and the delivery of departmental services. Concern about government expenditures has increased, and politicians (especially the ones in power) and public officials have become much more active in managing resource allocation and the cost profiles of their departments. Many ministries, including the Ministry of the Interior, have created many new major projects.
As has been practised, there are two types of budget that have been used for provincial administration. Firstly, there is the national budget which presents the total money spent by agencies based in every province. This budget includes the amount used for rural development programmes through the process of rural development planning, and the budget utilised for macro and other projects organised by each individual ministry. The governing agencies representing each ministry and acting as separate entities in every province determine how much money will be needed for their operating functions during the year. To arrive at this decision, the provincial section chiefs, with representatives at district level consult with the district section chiefs concerning their needs. The section's requests are then forwarded to the respective ministry where the final decisions are made. The budget planned by this field staff will be used as a primary source for central agencies to draw up their budget formulation.

The second type of budget, which will not be studied in detail, is the local government budget. This is funded to PAOs, municipalities, sanitary districts, and TAOs. Like the former type, local unit expenditure is divided between revenue, which refers to matters of a short lived nature (salaries, office supplies, etc.) and capital, which relates to long-term projects. To fund their current expenditures, the local self-government units have to rely on local taxes and grants-in-aid from the central government since the tax structure for local self-government units is not broad enough for these units to organise their public services. Thus, the government has to subsidise them with these grants through the organs of the Ministry of the Interior. As far as the budget for the PAO is concerned, it has been used to cover the whole areas of the province except for municipal and sanitary district areas. The administration
across the organisation of the provincial office and the provincial council will be identified in the next chapter.

In the Ministry of the Interior, like other ministries, the budget cycle consists of budget formulation and budget execution. In the stage of budget preparation, most departments formulate their budget in relation to the Master Plan. The activities are grouped into a number of functional programmes under 5 different branches of development. These are: Politics, Governing, and Administration; Internal Peace and Security; Social and Economic; Environment and Natural Resources; and the Development of 5 Frontier Provinces. The expenditures are then classified according to the objectives of the development. The functions of each department are also divided according to their objectives. For instance, the Police Department may have its functions covering the areas of Internal Peace and Security, and the Development of 5 Frontier Provinces while the Department of Local Administration may cover all five areas. However, within the same branch many departments may share the responsibility over programme implementation. For example in the branch of Social and Economic Development, in rural development programmes for the construction of deep wells, the Department of Public Works may carry out its function through its field staff who are then in charge of construction of a number of deep wells in certain areas while the Department of Rural Development Acceleration may be responsible for the rest and the Department of Local Administration looks after the cost of maintenance.
The Action Plan for 1994

There are a composition of 5 development branches in the overall administration of the Ministry of the Interior. It consists of 342 projects / programmes with a total budget for implementation of 115,733.8 mB (approx. £ 3,045.62m). The breakdown plan, programmes, and budget are shown in Table 5.1(21)

Table 5.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development Branch</th>
<th>No.of Operating Units</th>
<th>No.of Projects / Programmes</th>
<th>Budget mB / £m</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Politics, Governing and Administration</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>23,440.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Internal Peace and Security</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>32,805.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Peace and Order</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(863.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Internal and Frontier Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prevention of Disaster</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Social and Economic</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>37,886.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rural Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(997.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Social and Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Environment and Natural Resources</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>19,982.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Urban Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(525.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Environment &amp; Natural Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Five Frontier Province</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,619.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Security Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(42.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Social &amp; Economic Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Special Training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

116
Estimating the budget is a significant role for each department. However, budget-making decisions are made according to a given set of criteria - instructions and guidelines for preparing agencies by the Bureau of Budget. The guidelines indicate the tentative ceiling of each department's expenditure estimates. The Bureau of Budget has the key responsibility for budget preparation, estimating revenues, forecasting expenditures, and issuing instructions and guidelines for the preparing agencies. All departments are busy with their budget preparation which runs from June to December each year.

Since there is not enough money for all departments to do everything that is desirable, it is necessary to choose and prioritise among the important programmes. It is noted by Ira Sharkansky that the conflict in budgeting centres not only on the allocated sums for each programme, but also on the power to be granted to them in budgeting.

In Thailand, the debates on financial Bills are the occasion for a vigorous attempt by the opposition parties to reduce taxation or to cut the expenditures authorised for government departments. This is unlike Britain, where technical revision of Bills levying taxation are often urged, but there is no general attempt by the opposition party to reduce taxes and no attempt to cut government expenditures.

Anthony Birch comments on this matter that the principle adopted is that it is better to give the government enough rope to hang itself with, and the oppositions hope that an extravagant administration will be punished by loss of popularity with the voters. (22)
5.7 Rural Development Planning

As far as the rural development in certain parts of a province is concerned, the operation of PAO and the provincial office share the same purpose in the development. Since most executive administrators pay attention to budget spending instead of quality of programme implementation, a duplication of work between the two organisations is difficult to avoid. Due to the political issues, politicians always raise rural development to propagandise their political ideology. Therefore, many elected members of the provincial council have applied power through their political parties or their allied politicians at central offices in order that their development programmes can remain in the plan and that their constituencies will benefit.

Rural development planning is regarded as micro planning and consists of a five-year and annual development plans. In preparing both plans, the executive committee of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) works in collaboration with the five main ministries. They initiate action by setting up guidelines concerning the plan objectives, strategies and other instructions with regard to the functions of these ministries related to their rural policies.

In order to facilitate a systematic approach toward decentralisation of planning at provincial level, the Government promulgated a Provincial Development Planning Regulation in 1977. (23) According to the Regulation, every province, with the exception of Bangkok Metropolis Authority, must form a five-year development plan. It includes the analysis of present socio-economic conditions and problems in the development of the province, as well as annual rural
development planning in order to meet the basic requirements of the province. The process of planning has been done by the organisations at provincial, district and Tambon levels through the Provincial Development Committee (PDC), District Development Committee (DDC) and Tambon Council respectively.

Individual districts and the province are at different stages in their experience with the planning process. At district level, the DDC may review and screen the projects requested by TAOs or Tambon Councils before submitting them to the Sub-Committee of Provincial Rural Development for final check, then forward a completed annual rural development planning to the PDC for primary approval before proposing budget endorsement by the ministries concerned. At central level, the decisive role in financial allocation actually rests with central departments involved.

Previous studies illustrate many factors or constraints which have led to the ineffectiveness of rural development planning. These will be clarified in the next chapter regarding policies and problems arising in provincial administration.
Footnotes


2. Department of Local Administration, the Ministry of the Interior, *the Ministerial Act of 1994* p. 14


4. Patom Manirojana, *op. cit.* pp. 112-113


8. Patom Manirojana, *op. cit.* pp. 119-121


of Permanent Secretary, the Ministry of the Interior, Bangkok, 1986


17. Arsa Mekswan, *op.cit*, pp.159-163


Chapter VI
A Review of Literature on the Debate on Public Attitudes towards Provincial Governors

The presentation of this chapter concerns the ideas of Thai academic scholars pertaining to the election of provincial governors. Additionally, policies regarding provincial administration as well as public attitudes towards civil servants and politics are included.

6.1 Previous Studies on Election of Provincial Governors

There has been a study concerning the role of provincial governors carried out by a Thai scholar and a former provincial governor, Arsa Meksawan. However, no attempt has been made in the study pertaining to the suitability of governorship election. So far, there has been only a discussion relative to this issue by the scholar and in a summary report on the provincial governors conferences held by Prince Damrong Rachanuparb Institute for Research and Development, the Ministry of the Interior.(1)

According to Arsa Meksawan, there was a group of members of the House of Parliament proposing the bill to the House in 1953 saying that the provincial governors should come through the channel of election rather than appointment. The aim of the proposal was to make the governors free from the administrative bureaucracy of the Ministry of the Interior so that they could become more responsive to local needs. Nevertheless, the bill was rejected on the grounds that it was too idealistic. In this connection, Arsa Mekswan comments that under the governorship election, it could be more dangerous than advantageous to the public administration and to the people. He states in addition that the people could be misled and exploited by the ambitious politicians.(2)
In the same study, Arsa Mekswan notes that Thailand, like other developing countries, is facing a false acceptance of democracy. Politicians tend to exploit democratic opportunities by misleading and deceiving the people. On the other hand, in the summary of the governorship conference, many speakers who are mostly former governors unanimously agreed that it is much better for the governors to be appointed. This is because public administration is within the confinement of rules and regulations that the appointed governors are more likely to follow than those in an elective position. With regard to the election of provincial governors, they are of the opinions that unless the sense of political responsibility has to be established and exercised creatively by both politicians and the people, the election will remain unnecessary to local administration. (3)

Therefore, it is important at this stage to study further in order to find out whether it is advantageous to elect provincial governors. Under the difficulties mentioned above - the sense of responsibility towards politics, behaviour of politicians, and other conditions, the question is whether it would be possible to establish a policy for governorship election.

6.2 The Ministry and the Policies toward Provincial Administration

As far as public administration is concerned, it is related to a country's administration with respect to the organisation of its institutions and procedures and it operates in the particular sphere of government. It is also the machinery for implementing government policy. Administration is concerned with the most efficient means of implementing the policy decided by policy-makers. At the same time, administration is concerned with serving and assisting the policy-making process. (4)
In order to understand public administration, it is important to identify the administrative system and its organisational and political elements, and to see how different interests can be played out in the organisations and can affect the relationships between chief executives, ministers and public servants.

In the Ministry of the Interior, there are many departments and offices which have the equivalent of departmental status as mentioned earlier. Each is responsible for providing services or functions. Through them policies are formulated, decisions taken, programmes and services implemented.

Regarding public administrators, the Permanent Secretary along with other senior administrators (his Deputies, Assistants, Directors-General etc.) work directly in response to the ministers (politicians or military rulers in different periods). This is because government organisations are designed to serve ministers and their authority. This legal authority, which complements the politicians, comes from their position within the government and in turn from Parliament. Thus one of the main tasks of these public servants is to assist the ministers and advise on policy.

However, as already cited, Ira Sharkansky explains that there is politics within government organisations and this relates to public servants. Thus politics can be found not only at ministerial or parliamentary level, but also within the administrative process itself including the relations between ministers and public servants, and among public servants themselves. This can be seen in every process of policy-making and public administration when ministers or senior executive administrators interfere with personnel management in the selective method of appointment by moving other public administrators (governors in particular) from one post to another or from province to province, or from province back to an inactive post in the Ministry.
When it comes to "public policy", Ira Sharkansky says that policies are actions taken by governments including the provision of public services such as education, public welfare etc. and the control of the policy-making process or other political actions. He describes further that the government's actions may be more or less important depending upon the activities that affect people. (5) In addition, Thomas R. Dye states that public policy is the decision of the government regarding what to do or not to do, why they do it, and laying down broad objectives of what is to be done while the administration is getting it done. (6)

It was already referred to the statement of John Rehfuss concerning the linkage circle of the political system. It includes bureaucracy, party system, power structure, pattern of participation, interest groups and environmental forces. Similarly, Ira Sharkansky indicates that there are several factors; among these are the economy, the political context and popular demand, and the traits of institutions and the participants including politicians and public servants in the policy-making process, that influence public policies. (7) Learning throughout the budget-making and provincial government, it is accepted that there are the causes and consequences of government activity and they are affected by the impact from environmental forces and the political process as mentioned. Therefore, this study examines the public policies made as the Ministry's actions toward public units and programme of practices which have affected administrative development within provinces. Subsequently, problems concerning public administration that hinder the provincial development are presented.

Focussing on the functions of the Ministry of the Interior, it has responsibilities in a wide range of areas for the promotion of the general welfare of the people and improving and developing amenities, especially for rural people. In so doing, the Ministry has carried out policies for provincial development programmes through
administrative departments. However, some of the programme implementation is successful, but much needs to be remedied. It is important at this stage to refer to public policies toward provincial administration in relation to local self-government units and other aspects of administration within a province.

6.2.1 Policies toward local self-government units

The establishment of local self-government units was set up with a degree of autonomy through a separate corporation status, revenue-raising and budget power, local legislative councils and personnel management. However, some of them seem to be confused in terms of the autonomy, the status, the area of responsibilities, and the pattern of management. Examples are: the vague demarcation of legal authority between the executive branch of PAO, which is chaired by the provincial governor, and the provincial council; the area of rural development conducted by both the provincial government and PAO is complicated in terms of budget allocation and implementing responsible units. Moreover, according to the study carried out by Arsa Mekswan, it is analysed that the sanitary district has been structured as almost a non-autonomous entity with a vaguely defined status and jurisdiction of authority that can hardly be distinguished from the district administration.

In this context, it is contended that national policy toward the decentralisation of local units, which has been practised over long periods, is not pragmatic because, according to the critics, the central government (the Ministry of the Interior) still controls their administration. Conflicts arise in the day-to-day administration within these units, the PAO in particular, which then has caused the demand for the election of provincial governors.
The degree of control over these units, which is exercised by the Ministry of the Interior through provincial governors and the respective officers at appropriate levels, is different among the types of organisations and can be classified into three areas. Firstly, it is concerned with personnel. The Ministry of the Interior has maintained its power over the elected members of the PAO. Other controls are the supervision of municipal civil service officials, and the direct control exercised by the governor and his authorised staff over the dismissal and removal of municipal government personnel, the elected village and Tambon leadership if their conduct is not in accordance with law.

Secondly, decision-making in some levels concerning the administration of the local self-government units still remain with the Ministry of the Interior. With regard to authority, the territorial agents of the central government, the governor and the district officers have power at different levels to advise and inspect the affairs of these units.

Finally, further to the above mentioned issue, the Ministry of the Interior also has the right to control local self-government units over the aspects of finance including budget, revenue, grants and auditing. Nevertheless, taxes and revenues collected within the authority of each unit are insufficient for their running functional programmes. They have to rely on the grants-in-aid from the Ministry of the Interior through the provincial budget for the administration of PAO and sanitary districts, and through the Department of Local Administration for the municipalities.

6.2.2 Policies toward the Provincial Government

Rural development has been described as one of the most important policies of the government and the Ministry of the Interior. Moreover, it has been formulated in the Ministry's plan for decades.
In practice, the implementation of rural development has not been successful in terms of authoritative decentralisation despite the introduction of rural development planning. At first, such planning was the idea of a decentralised process with which the central agencies were supposed to transfer responsibility for development planning and administration to provincial authorities, field agencies, and others concerned at provincial and lower levels. In the planning process, it was expected to be a way to achieve the delineated goals and objectives of the rural people. It also aimed to mobilise more active popular participation. Moreover, it was hoped that relevant data and information generated by such a process would contribute the most valuable feedback to the planning process at central level. However, the idea has not been practised productively in the provincial administration.

6.3 Debates with regard to provincial administration

Having analysed programme implementation at provincial level, it is said that, within the policy process, there are many influences including politics, politicians, and public servants which affect the ways in which policies are made and implemented.

The debates in connection with the impacts of the mentioned policies are primarily based on the information from previous studies. Such debates can be identified into three main issues.

(1) It is argued that provincial administration is only a kind of deconcentration in which all subordinate levels of executive branches are located. Such subordinate units as provinces, and districts are supervised by the chief executive who is appointed and responsible to the central government. The field staff working in the units may be either under the direction of the chief executive of that unit or responsible to their own central departments or ministries. A system of field administration implies the transfer of some decision-making
discretion to field staff; they are allowed some latitude to plan, make routine decisions and adjust the implementation of central directives to local conditions within guidelines set by the central ministries. Under this system, even though these government officials work within provincial jurisdictions, they are staff of central ministries and remain under their control.

Additionally, with regard to local self-government units, the administration was, firstly, considered to be devolutionary in which they would be autonomous, independent and clearly perceived as separate levels of government where central government exercises no direct control. Besides, the local units have a clear demarcation of performing public functions. In addition, such an ideal administration is an arrangement in which there are reciprocal beneficial and co-ordinated relationships between central and local government.

Analysing its practices along provincial administration, the decentralisation idea of provincial administration can be seen as deconcentration because only workload is passed down from a central department to its own field staff in the provinces without giving them the authority to make decisions. The central units still not delegate decision-making and responsibility to the lower echelons. Neither do they transfer significant powers and resources to autonomous local authorities. Regarding the local self-government units, the ideal decentralisation has not been practised there either. Power for decision-making in some levels concerning certain issues remain with the Ministry of the Interior.

It is believed that delays and other inefficiencies in programme implementation and performance are part of the consequences. In the study, the relevant organisations are claimed to be too cautious, such that the devolution of authority could result in the concentration of work. Many protests have been made against the
construction of main projects such as dams and reservoirs which have been built regardless of the needs of the public. Furthermore, the centralised top-down projects of programme development have been designed and implemented without the full participation of the local people.(9)

Studying this issue and the budgetary process, the underlying reality of the administration and implementation of development programmes at provincial level is concerned with power structure related to a political and value-laden process. Power and values are key variables in the interacting system of the intended programmes' beneficiaries, both the politicians, and the ruling groups or government officials. Therefore, programme development does not seem to affect local demand.

(2) Secondly, it concerns with the administration across provincial units which will be viewed into two separate topics.

2.1 With reference to rural development planning, even though the government has launched the policy of decentralisation by introducing such a bottom-up development process in which public bodies at lower levels as well as private sectors are supposed to participate, it can be said that it is still not successful because the government activities do not reach the goal. This analysis has been done with reference to the policy definition described by Ira Sharkansky mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, where he measures the success of programmes by their effect on the public. Not only do the development programmes not affect or meet the very needs of local people, the participation and cooperation among public and private sectors are also insufficient. The survey regarding the follow-up of rural development plan shows that the problems of rural development planning have arisen because the important stages of planning such as the setting up of programme guidelines, linking of
information, and approving of the budget have been done without the organisations involved paying attention to them.

In contrast, programme planning and goal setting within provincial development planning have been more responsive to the central directives and bureaucratic needs than to the actual situational needs at local levels. The research into rural development planning states that 50% of the programmes implemented in each province are not related to the programmes planned by lower levels.(10) In other words, the majority of the project implementation in the provinces does not match the programmes required by the local people. Many development programmes or services initiated and implemented within the provinces by technical officials fail to reach their targets and are underutilised, misused or even aborted mid-course. Furthermore, due to the lack of programme integration, different related activities, such as construction of wells, have been done repeatedly by different agencies.

In addition, the research indicates further that, 'in actual practice, programme coordination and integration have not always been effective. Due to the large number of organisations responsible for rural development, the government red tape inevitably causes a delay within both planning and programme implementation. Furthermore, the coordination of multiple interdependent services provided through vertical administrative departments continues to prove most difficult because there has been no clear cut functional responsibility of the units concerned. It is stated that departmental loyalties sometimes impede coordination at the provincial and lower levels since many government officials tend to differentiate between projects which are the responsibility of their departments and those in which they are merely providing support assistance.

Additionally, it is studied that the failure of the rural development process is concerned with political and institutional
factors since the organisations are not willing to release their authority pertaining to budget approval. At the same time, political interference, both from public servants and politicians, in terms of policy setting, programme alterations, and programme implementation still remains within the institutions. Accordingly, the confusion and complication of provincial administration which results in delays in public work could be a cause of the demand to decentralising authority to local units.

2.2 With regard to the roles of provincial governor, there are several factors which have placed limitations on him in implementing provincial administration.

2.2.1 According to the provision of the Provincial Government Act 1955, Arsa Mekswan notes that the governor is made to comply with the provincial council's decisions. Within the province, the governor has to act in two significant roles, one as government agent and the other as head of the PAO. Studying its practices, Arsa Mekswan does not believe that the governor has authority to control this unit; instead he is required to act in accordance with the decision of the council. According to the principle of local self-government, which is supposed to be an organ of the people, the provincial council can oversee and control executive actions. Meanwhile, the governor still has the right to approve or veto any draft law passed by the council before it can come into effect by transmitting it to the Ministry of the Interior for reconsideration. Accordingly, Arsa Mekswan is convinced that the supervision and control over local self-government units, especially the provincial council, has turned out to be complicated and difficult.

As far as the provincial budget is concerned, it is rather confused in terms of the role of the governor regarding the proposals of making use of financial resources for provincial development which have to be approved by the provincial council. Initially the aim of
the council was to monitor executive actions and to ensure that the developmental programmes are carried out in the proposal's directions. Arsa Mekswan points out in this regard that this unclear definition of the governor's role in this respect has often sparked off conflict when the members of the council and the governor do not share the same view. In this context, Arsa Mekswan comments that such disagreement could also give rise to the downfall of the governor if unanswered questions asked by individual members of the provincial council have been put forward for further action by the political party in power. (11)

In this connection, Fred Riggs points out that provincial governors can retain their career stability by three means. Firstly, they may use their legal powers to control the provincial budget and to suspend the provincial council. Secondly, they may allow the council members to engage in business ventures that serve the provincial government so that they can derive some private profits. Finally, they may establish close personal relations with the council members to produce a degree of cooperation. (12)

It is understood that the long traditional practice of bureaucracy and the balance of two parties has caused the failure of the committee form of government units. Arsa Meksawan assumes that the concept of democracy concerning joint-leadership or group responsibility still cannot work effectively and results in a delay within the provincial administration. (13)

2.2.2 Considering the role of the governor as chairman of election, Arsa Meksawan notes that it can destabilise the career position of provincial governor as it concerns many political groups. He observes that even though the governor decides not to get involved in political campaigns, soon after the result of the election or later after the government has been formed he could become a political victim. His career could be harmed by the political
parties which have gained the most votes and have not received his support.(14) This concept of the governor's role has also been one of the reasons which has contributed to the following debate.

In addition, being the head of the province has forced the governor to be accountable for public services not only to the Ministry of the Interior but also to other ministries concerned. From this standpoint, he must deal with public officials who are representatives of various organisations pertaining to a wide range of public matters including policy implementation, coordination of public services, supervision of administration and budgetary responsibility etc. Arsa Mekswan analyses that it looks as though the governor had been delegated to administer the province with great power. As a matter of fact, the central departments (including the ones attached to the Ministry of the Interior) still hold authority over their own personnel. There are far too many activities conducted by field representatives. Some of the field units of public services are not a part of provincial activities under the administration of the governor, so the governor has no direct control over them. The mentioned scholar also notes that these officials also feel that they are responsible for the performance of their duties to their superiors in the central government. This has led to ineffectiveness in cooperation between provincial public bodies.

In the study of Arsa Mekswan, it is analysed that provincial governors have no real authority as the chief executive should have. Working with a number of staff without authority in line of control over personnel and provincial expenditure can suppress the progress of provincial administration substantially. By way of contrast, it is believed that having authority to control personnel management could bring absolute power to chief executives since these personnel are the persons who could bring either success or failure to public administration. As they are the ones who formulate budget programmes, not many chief executives are willing to hand over this kind of power to other units.
In this respect, there is great concern regarding politics within the bureaucracy. Norton Long states that agency behaviour is regarded as activities that officials play within agencies to acquire, apply, seek, and retain power. These activities with bureaucratic politics are part of the ongoing administrative and political process which accounts for the life, rise and fall of agencies, programmes, and individual careers. (15) Accordingly, studying thoroughly, it is clear that the staff control has been influenced by both public servants and politicians.

(3) Finally, there is a political debate and it is the most important issue which has made it possible to conduct this research. There has been a point when pressure groups respond to the public administration of the Ministry of the Interior. It began with the submission of a political motion which originated in the House of Parliament concerning the demand for decentralisation of power to lower authorities and has gone as far as calling for the election of provincial governors. Such an issue has influenced the directions of public policies made by the Ministry of the Interior. According to the Bangkok Post dated 12th March, 1989, such a topic was (again) raised in public by politicians, particularly the ones who were the members of Palungtum Party. The Palungtum Party at that time was the largest political party which had occupied the majority of MP seats in Bangkok and also the Party which had won the local election to govern the Bangkok Metropolis for 11 years (between 1985-1996). (16)

However, the idea of electing provincial governors was substantially welcomed by other politicians from different parties. It is said that these politicians find it difficult making contact with public officials when they are sent from one office to the next without getting the solution they need. They claim that it is not a good idea in dealing the same issue at both central and provincial levels since the decision cannot be made and completed at local level. As a result, they have made a demand for decentralisation of
authority to provincial and lower levels, especially to the local self-government units where they use some of them as their base for gaining popular votes in general elections. According to the newspaper, they strongly feel that it is time the Ministry of the Interior delegated the entire power to these units. They believe that these units would be able to conduct the local affairs under the administration of elected members rather than the appointees in order that provincial administration can be run without the interference of government officials.

By way of contrast, there is growing concern about political interference in public administration at every level of government units. In the last ten years, politicians have increasingly become influential in public services. It is confirmed by Mr Thaksin Shinawatra, a former deputy prime minister in the administration of Mr Banharn Silpa-archa (quoted in the Financial Times dated December 3 1996) that politicians installed in government have exerted their power in government organisations. Furthermore, he believes that many of them abuse their power after they have taken the job.

With regard to the policy-making decisions of the Ministry of the Interior, it has great influence on the network of territorial administration. The policies are passed down from the central office, and must be followed by all provinces. According to the bureaucratic structure, at the top are the minister and deputy ministers who are political appointees and play the key role in policy-making. When different political parties hold ministerial office, public administration has to be changed in one way or another. The tasks of personnel administration can be affected by politics in terms of transferring, disciplining, promoting, or gaining rewards. From one period to another, governorship and other key posts have been swayed by politicians. Arsa Mekswan comments on this connection that, in the case of not having committed wrongdoings, the senior administrators may be able to remain in their
office. If there is evidence shown that provincial governors have taken part in political activities which can favour or damage politicians, they may be transferred to inactive posts at ministerial level. Frequently, the others may be transferred from one province to another which is regarded as less important. Often it is also seen that the political justification for removing provincial governors is that the politicians want to replace them with other governors who can give them full cooperation.

Such political intervention has inevitably brought about the manner of seeking political support by public officials within the civil services. The current situation has destabilised the professional career of these administrators to a considerable extent. Arsa Mekswan observes that some governors who have good tactics regarding public or private relations in dealing with these politicians may be able to handle the task smoothly. But the others who are only efficient at operating the day-to-day functions may find it hard to fulfil their duties in their post of governorship.

At provincial level, it is believed that many activities of the governor corresponding to public relations are regarded as significant to anyone who would like to play a political role in a province. They believe that good public relations are essential for the accomplishment of their political aims. Arsa Mekswan is convinced that that is why the governorship is the target of most politicians as a way of controlling the provincial administration and the other way of helping them become elected politicians.

6.4 Reaction of the Ministry of the Interior

Due to the above-mentioned debates, there have been growing efforts within the Ministry of the Interior to review the authority of the administration of the province and local units. In the
meantime, the Ministry has carried out studies on the improvement of rural development planning so that the problems arising within the process of planning may be solved in an appropriate way. As a consequence of the administration review and the outcome of the studies, it has become clear that central growth-oriented planning can not ensure the spread of benefits to the local people. It is contended that while the development of overall national policies and plans are necessary at the centre, the centralisation of the development of programme administration which determines standard schemes for action cannot respond effectively to local situations and needs.

Even though the government realises that a wider participation in programme planning of all sectors in the determination, provision and generation of the needed services and resources would better achieve the goals of development, there has been only one tangible alteration made corresponding to solving the current crisis. The clear-cut effort which has been made by the Ministry of the Interior is a significant approach to decentralising both administrative and special functions of the TAO by equipping it with legal status. This effort is with the aim of strengthening the capacities of the unit which is regarded as a grassrooted organ mostly working close to the local people and to help encourage leadership participation in government decision-making at that level so that the efficiency of programme implementation can be enhanced to some certain extent.

Formerly, TAO did not have the status of a legal entity; it could only incur debts through application of specific regulations or orders. Therefore, legal reform to the TAO's structural administration have been made so that the financial measures are instituted for the organisation to cooperate in making available credit, input, and services for their communities. It is believed that the legal reform of this unit is a practical stage of delegating authority to a certain degree of decentralisation which would meet to
some extent the pressure demands of decentralisation. Furthermore, the TAO itself may, in one way or another, feels that from now on it has to improve its own management since the financial administration is free from the interference of government officials.

Besides, the Ministry has made a great attempt in holding conferences among relevant departments and ministries so as to establish a clear delineation of the action system of each organisation and its functions in relation to the development programme process within the provinces. The significant concern regarding the outcome was the recommendations and suggestions which have been made about matters of encouraging public sectors to take more responsibility for rural development planning. Furthermore, it includes the concept of bottom-up decision-making so as to authorise provinces to make their own decisions on programme development; and to reinforce programme planning and implementation within and across the public sectors and at each level of administration. In addition, the suggestion has been made for organisations to integrate public resources, capacities and potential in terms of finance, personnel and time etc.

However, the aftermath of the conferences never results in the changes in order to facilitate the province with its administration. In addition, no serious attempt from any government agency has been made to release such power. A single organisation alone cannot possibly sort out the provincial problems, instead concerted efforts from all government bodies concerned are needed to remedy the provincial issues.

In this regard, it must concede that politics within the Ministry of the Interior have great impact on most directions of provincial administration - policy process, programme planning, programme implementation, and personnel management. Therefore, the problems
lie in the policy-making process and provincial administration needs to be seriously solved one after another.

In this context, the organisational theory in some models should be introduced to bring the most useful view of each theory to one practice. According to Thomas R. Dye, most policies are a combination of rational planning, interest group activity, elite preference, systemic forces and institutional influences. (17) It is necessary at this stage to study factors which have influenced the policy process from some useful theories. It may be worth repeating some theories concerning policy-making which were mentioned in the first chapter.

With regard to the elite theory, Thomas Dye explains that public policy is viewed as the preferences and values of governing elites. Therefore, the public policy does not reflect the demands of the people so much as it does the interests and values of elites. Thus, changes and innovation in public policy come about as the result of the redefinition of the power holders.

In addition, Bill Jones describes this model as being of the ruling class. He indicates that those who are empowered with taking key decisions in the government - public servants and politicians - subscribe consciously or subconsciously to the values of the dominant economic class. According to this view most policy outputs will have the effect of protecting dominant group interests. (18) Moreover, in a theory of bureaucratic allocation, Fred W. Riggs states that despite complete formal procedures, the decisions about the budgetary allocation reflect substantially not the relative priority of programme needs so much as the relative power position of bureaucratic elites. (19)

Studying the above text, with regard to rural development, the programmes implemented in such areas are set up, in terms of
guidelines, by the policy-makers at the top of the hierarchical pyramid. It can be summarised that policy-making and decision-making are concerned directly with chief executives whether they be ministers (politicians) or senior administrators.

Meanwhile Bryan T. Downes observes that the policy-making process can be viewed as a series of interrelated stages of actions through which policy decisions are rationally assessed and formulated. The emphasis tends to be on the process or logically arranged phases of action which should be taken to reach a rational or better decision. Empirically, the policy-making process is a set of interactions among individuals and groups in a community that results in governmental decisions. (20) Similarly, Kenneth J. Gergen states that a thorough understanding of public policy will ultimately depend on knowledge of individual participants. (21) In the context of provincial administration, the participants in the policy-making process consist of both public administrators and politicians referred as ministers.

As far as Thai public administration is concerned, a rational policy should be the one which is correctly designed to maximise the value achievement. In this connection, Yehezkel Dror states that in selecting a rational policy, the policy-makers must know all of the society's value preferences and their relative weights, the policy alternatives available, and the consequences of each policy alternative. He also describes that the policy-makers must select the most efficient policy alternatives. Finally, rational policy-making requires information about the above matter so that decision-making can be made on the basis of rationality. (22)

Therefore, this study is carried out to find appropriate ways for the policy-makers before the decision on the governorship election will be made. Thus the greatest effectiveness of the provincial public administration can be achieved.
6.5 Public Attitudes towards Provincial Governors

Tinapan Nakata mentions that the culture of absolute monarchical rule under which Thai government officials have been familiar with prestige, privileges and power has existed for so long that neither they nor the people can quickly modify their traditional attitude towards each other.(23) The people have been loyal to the kings and their government for centuries, and this aspect of loyalty still remains. Although today this traditional belief may be not as strong as before, He is convinced that the influence of such a belief still makes it impossible to question any action of government authorities.

Looking back to the period of the absolute monarchy, public opinion towards provincial governors was different from the present. It may be worth explaining the public attitude of the two different periods so that the public reaction toward the provincial governor can be underlined.

(1) The absolute authority period

Owing to the autocratic government and the paternalism of absolute control, the provincial governor always enforced absolute authority over the people under his jurisdiction. The governor administered the province with absolute power. It is noted by Arsa Mekswan that in those days, people felt that the governor was the royal representative to whom they had to pay full respect and loyalty. Besides, they felt that the provincial governor was a high ranking official whom nobody should challenge. It is believed that disobedience to the governor meant severe laws and penalties because of the power and the strength of the governor. Moreover, it is said that the administration of justice in the province rested with the governor, including the power of life and death. The governor was regarded as the most important in the province.
In that period, it is noted that each governor carried out his duties according to his own judgement and benefits. He could conduct public administration with only rare monitoring and evaluation by the central government or the public. The welfare and security of the people entirely depended upon the will of the provincial governor. He also had the power to decide all matters as well as to issue rules and regulations without having to request orders from the central government. Furthermore, the system of governing by officialdom and collecting taxes and revenues from people made the people even more subservient.(24)

(2) The democratic regime

Mention has already been made of the issue that Thai government officials have inherited a long tradition of absolute power especially prestige and status. Arsa Mekswan states that the present Thai government, the Ministry of the Interior in particular, is deeply rooted in and has evolved from the bureaucracy of absolute authority. Under this system, the public servants hold a certain set of administrative values. The dominant role of executives still remains under the democratic regime. This tradition can also be widely seen at local level. The idea of democracy in the new political climate is different from that under the old administration. The new development of democratic administration emphasises that people are supposed to be the masters. From this point of view, government officials including the provincial governors have to perform as public servants. Additionally, they have to abide by the new policy that modifies their official and personal characters to meet the current situation.

Nonetheless, the influence of traditional feudalism has caused Thais to respect individual personality and status at the expense of organisational disciplines. Such influence has caused favouritism. The behaviour of favouritism is linked to the inequality within the
bureaucracy concerning many processes of administration for example, the method of recruitment, placement, transfer, and promotion. William J. Siffin says that management in Thai government services is personal to a far greater degree than in America and European countries. He also states that the immediate source of authority is hierarchical status. The substantive concerns of the parties to relationship are to some extent status-centred rather than achievement-oriented and authority based upon personal status. (25) The control of government administration is believed to be exercised by both politicians and public servants. The society as a whole does not have a concept of popular control over the administration. Accordingly, decisions as well as the initiative changes in government essentially at provincial level come from the top.

In this regard Arsa Meksawan views that, in comparison with politicians, most people have a more positive attitude towards appointed governors and trust them more to conduct the mandate over public administration. In this connection, Chaianan Samudavaniya also believes that Thais are in favour of government officials rather than elected officials. (26) This leads to the hypothesis as stated below.

Hypothesis: The public still have a positive attitude towards the appointed governor and trust him to work as the head of the provinces.

6.6 Public Opinion towards Politics

Opinion surveys, mass media, elections, interest groups and political parties can be the mechanism to get to know popular expression. Some of these mechanisms, like elections, formally link people with the government. However, in Thailand, these mechanisms have not been sufficient to keep the government accountable to the
people. Taking the view of a large number of people who indicate no interest in politics and the government, it can be said that the political process has not yet been effective. Moreover, the institutions involved, including the government and political parties continue to do much that is against the popular will.

Surveys taken by a Thai newspaper in 1993 in order to gauge the relations between public opinion and the government's performance show that the public have a negative attitude toward politicians. This is because of corruption which has been widely committed among the politicians. Regarding the main projects which have costed a substantial amount, people find that such projects are not administered in a way which delivers benefits to public but is probably to the benefit of the politicians and their supporters, instead. There is a study showing public expression of distrust to the civilian government. The public's individual feelings of powerlessness, and feelings of the meaningless nature of political activity have shown a steady increase. Such attitudes are represented in all social groups. (27)

Analysing the valuable information from surveys and the mass media, there are reasons why the political process has not been developed successfully in the political system. Among them are reasons which lie in the traditional basic attitudes of the people and the attitude toward the ruling groups. Such attitudes have tremendously affected Thai political development.

There are two reasons for this. Firstly, it is because of the long familiarity of social and cultural values. It has already been mentioned that public attitudes toward politics are partly influenced by a long history of social and cultural values. The public attitude seems to have continued to be influenced by the socialisation process whose characteristic inclination seems to favour authoritarianism due to long term governing by the absolute monarchy. (28) It is analysed
that such control has made it relatively easy for Thais to accommodate themselves to the gradual process of change with modest expectations of development.

It is apparent that political socialisation never encourages people to a commitment to democratic values at any stage of life. It is supported by the statement of David Wilson indicating that the Thai people are free from political and social pressures. They are relatively secure in their property rights. They may go about their vital activities in security, such as the cultivation of their fields, the promotion of their religion, and the enjoyment of leisure rather than engage themselves in politics. (29)

The second issue is the political experience with regard to the ruling class, which is composed of the military in one group and politicians in another, has considerably discouraged the public from taking part in politics. One of the main problems is the limited political legitimacy which can be attributed primarily to the military's unwillingness to accept modern principles of political legitimacy. The military's interventions in politics have repeatedly interrupted the public's opportunity to take part in the democratic process.

Another problem which discourages political development is the negative attitude of the public towards politicians. Chaianan Samudhavanija comments that this is because the image of Thai politics is of dirty, immoral, manipulative, corrupt, and chaotic activity. Moreover, politicians are seen as power-hungry, abusive, self-seeking, and quarrelsome. In addition to that, the public attitude towards politics describes it as a state nuisance that always leads to confusion, instability, and disorder. (30)

In the recent constitutional regime, cabinet members seem to be the most important centres of government power. The degree of authority of the cabinet ministers derives from the historic
monarchical government when the king's royal princes administered the
government. They were fully provided with pride and prestige
together with authority and status. Such privileges still continue
to exist in these days. That is why the attainment of the position
of cabinet ministers is desirable. Chaianan Samudhavanija also
comments that cabinet members enjoy unlimited authority in government
which it confers on the incumbents as well as the status quo which is
affirmed by the public.

In this connection, Arsa Meksawan underlines that elections cannot
be applied to every situation especially in Thailand where many
politicians exploit the democratic system to deceive people. Further
to the above comments he says that the experience of the past
Constitutional regime has demonstrated that an imposition of
democracy cannot work by a one-way wish, but has to be reciprocal;
there must be a popular desire to accept it.(31) The people
themselves must have enthusiasm and a desire for such concepts.
Hence, it is hypothesised that not only do the public not agree with
the election of provincial governors but the election will also have
negative impacts on public administration rather than advantages.
Footnotes


3. Arsa Mekswan, *op. cit*, /Prince Damrong Raganuparb Institute for Research and Development, *op. cit*


7. Ira Sharkansky, *op. cit*, pp.11-12


13. Arsa Mekswan, *op. cit*, p.159


Chapter VII
Results and Interpretation

As the subject involves the performance and functions of provincial governors, the analysis therefore concerns the participants who present their views with regard to the governors and the provincial administration. Additionally, the study population are the elements who may take part directly or indirectly in the policy on the election of provincial governors. The population from which the samples are selected is the aggregation of the elements of government officials including provincial governors and other senior public administrators, politicians, and local residents.

Regarding the target provinces, there are eight target provinces chosen from four parts of the country. Two provinces have been taken from each region. The provinces selected for the sample represent the northern, central, northeastern, and southern parts. The selected provinces were identified and illustrated in chapter 2.

The data produced in this chapter is derived from questionnaires filled in by 505 respondents, 218 of them are the government officials of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and non-MOI who are under the supervision of provincial governors. The remaining 287 are the general public. In addition to the mentioned data, information received from interviews with the government public administrators, national and local politicians also contributes to the data analysis.

7.1 Data Analysis and Findings

Early research in the United States revealed that the political system was very much affected by the environmental variables. (1)
Moreover, in the findings of Thomas Dye's research, socio-economic factors are more important determinants of policy than political factors.(2) With regard to the political system (consisting of public opinion, interest groups, and political parties) described by Thomas Dye, its functions are to transform demands generated in the environment into public policy.(3)

It means the political elements which have been affected by the socio-economic factors would perform to reflect the outcomes of the public policy. Therefore, this chapter deals with the analysis of economic status and educational backgrounds that affect the political system. Then, it is important to study whether the policy on election of provincial governors is suitable to be adopted. In this regard, the way in which the relationships between the environmental variables and the political system, and the outcomes of the policy are analysed and treated is different in the degree of significance of each variable.

Since the respondents are divided into two groups (government officials and general public), the testing of some hypotheses may have to be done through one individual group or both groups. Moreover, in testing some hypotheses, informative data collected through interviews from other sample groups (politicians and public administrators) may have to be necessarily added.

The respondents group A = The government officials

The respondents group B = The general public
Table 7.1A
Classification of the respondents groups A (government officials) by age distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>43</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-55</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56-60</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respondents range in age between 31-35, 36-40, and 41-45 are 19.7, 29.8, and 21.6 percent respectively. The rest are 46-50, and 51-55 which are 11.5, and 5 percent. There is only 0.5 percent of the participants in the range of age of 56-60 years responded to this questionnaire. The median age of this group is 39 years.

Table 7.1B
Classification of the respondents groups B (general public) by age distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>105</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>86.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-60</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61-70</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 70</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

152
The classification of the respondents group B by age distribution, the largest group of the respondents are among those who are between 18-40 years old. The median age of this group is 34.

Social and Economic Features

Social and economic features are represented by educational backgrounds and income levels of the respondents.

Education

It has been hypothesised that the residents who have a low level of education are in favour of selecting individual candidates. Moreover, the low educated residents are believed not to be aware of the far-reaching effects of vote-buying. In this respect, the levels of education of the respondents thus serve as an important indicator in determining public attitude towards political system and the policy outcomes.

Likhit Dhiravegin finds that different levels of education among individuals may lead to differences in attitude.(4) Accordingly, in order to make a judgement on the policy of governorship election, it is important to analyse the educational background of the population whether or not it is a significant factor affecting certain attitudes.
### Table 7.2 A

**Educational Distribution of Respondents group A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Degree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Degree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 218 100.0 100.0

With regard to the levels of education of the government officials the survey shows that the largest part of the participants (63.8) are first degree holders, 17.9 percent have master's degree, while 9.2, and 7.8 percent have some type of diploma and high school certificates. The other 1.4 percent do not indicate their levels of education.

### Table 7.2 B

**Educational Distribution of Respondents group B**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic literacy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>75.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's degree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master's degree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 287 100.0 100.0
The figures in Table 7.2 B show that the respondents who have basic literacy, primary school, secondary school, high school, and diploma are regarded as "non-degree" holders, which are 74.6 percent, while the others who hold first degree, master's degree and PhD, regarded as "degree" holders are 24.1 percent. The rest who do not indicate their level of education are 0.7 percent.

The other following tables will show the relationships between levels of education of the respondents and the attitude toward the elements of political system, namely, voting behaviour, -vote-buying, political participation, politicians, senior administrators, and military groups. The relationship to the policy outcome concerning the effectiveness of the policy on the administration will also be analysed.
Table 7.3 A

Relationship between educational background of the respondents group A (government officials) and voting behaviour

Q27T In the ballot, do you cast your vote for a party system or an individual?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-degr</th>
<th>others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Col Pct</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tot Pct</strong></td>
<td>non-degr</td>
<td>others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party system</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individuals</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both ways</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chi-Square**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.67028</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.01300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 7.3 A, it indicates that 11 percent of the population regardless of educational background are in favour of the party system, while 66.8 percent of them prefer loyal partisanship.

Classification by education levels shows that of the "non-degree" group - 19.4% choose the party system and 77.8 % choose individual candidates. The "degree" group shown figures of 9.5% are in favour of
the party system and 63.9% choose the individual candidates. The others use both methods.

Although most of the respondents seem to cast their votes for individual candidates rather than party system, the figures show that the relationship between levels of education and voting behaviour is statistically significant. Both variables are not independent but related to each other.

Table 7.3 B
Relationship between educational background of the respondents group B (general public) and voting behaviour

Q17T In the ballot, do you cast your vote for a party system or an individual?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATN2</th>
<th>Page 1 of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot Pot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Pot</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party system</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>individual candi</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both ways</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value | DF | Significance
------------------|----|-------------
Pearson 10.49428  | 4  | .01288
With regard to the respondents in group B, the survey showed in Table 7.3B also indicates that the relationship between levels of education and voting behaviour is still significant.

Regardless of educational backgrounds, the respondents of this group reflect a similar attitude to the group of government officials. There are 63.3 percent of them that cast votes for individual candidates rather than party system which is about 26 percent. The remaining 10.7 percent choose to vote by considering both methods.

Despite the fact that Thailand has been affected by western culture including the political system Thai traditional culture still has a greater impact on voting behaviour. According to William Siffin, personal relationships among Thais are very close(5). Good personality has become a popular consideration in selecting political candidates rather than relying upon the substance of party's ideology or the policies which each party has offered to the public. However, as has been mentioned most of Thai political parties do not present such clear policies and ideology, the public cannot distinguish the policy of one party from another. Additionally, according to the critics in Bangkok Post dated 18 April, 1997, the public cannot see the potential differences between each political party in running the country.

The data shown in Tables 7.3A and 7.3B indicate the significant relationship between levels of education and voting behaviour. Nevertheless, the respondents with higher education do not take electoral participation in a more modern way (party system) than the lower educated. In fact, fewer highly educated respondents in both groups select the party system than the lower educated respondents. Meanwhile, the number of the higher educated respondents who choose
loyal partisanship is less than those with lower education in both groups.

Although the relationship between the two variables is significant, it can be inferred that the variable of education is not a crucial factor affecting voting behaviour since education does not help to generate the modern attitude (in selecting party system) among the respondents. The political culture concerning personal relationships mentioned above may have an effect on the electorate. It can also be concluded that such findings are not congruent with the hypothesis 2. However, it can be summarised that such voting behaviour would not result in having productive local governments.

The following Tables 7.4A and 7.4B show the relationship between levels of education and the attitude towards the role of interest groups.
Table 7.4 A
Relationship between educational background of the respondents group A and the attitude toward interest groups

Q25T: Do you agree that interest groups should play a stronger role in keeping the balance with the ruling groups?

Table 7.4 A shows that 58.3 percent of the "non degree" group and 82.9 percent of the "degree" group of the government officials have a positive attitude towards the role of interest group.
Table 7.4 B
relationship between educational background of the respondents group B and the attitude toward interest groups

Q15T Do you agree that interest groups should play a stronger role in keeping the balance with the ruling groups?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>EDUCATN2</th>
<th>Page 1 of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Col Pct</td>
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<td>degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot Pct</td>
<td>ee</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>106</td>
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<td></td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Column</td>
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<td>146</td>
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<td>DF</td>
<td>Significance</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson 1.13347</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.888893</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 7.4 B 71.5 percent of the "non-degree" group and 72.6 percent of the "degree" group of the general public react positively to interest groups.

The statistics shown in both tables concerning the relationship between levels of education and the attitude toward the role of interest groups indicate different significant levels. The figures in Table 7.4A depict that the relationship between the two variables
is significant, but the statistics are no longer significant in Table 7.4B. It can be inferred that levels of education may affect the attitude regarding political interest groups of certain groups in certain areas but may not be at all related to the other in the same level of education in other parts of the country. Thus, it may be right to point out that the variable of education has insufficient effect on such attitude.

Accordingly, the role that interest groups, such as labour union of Thailand, farmers, student activists, play in Thai politics only take effect in such particular areas as major cities. The interest groups are not often able to exert pressure on the government or lead to the change of the government. In this connection, it can be concluded that political role of the interest groups has not been supported by all public although they enjoy the same level of education.

In this regard, if there were elections of provincial governors, in the areas where interest groups could combine to play a strong role, the elected local government might not be able to abuse and exploit public resources. That could bring in effective local government. On the other hand, in other areas where interest groups were weaker, exploitation by local government could occur.

Tables 7.5A and 7.5B displayed below show the relationship between levels of education and voting participation of the respondents grouped as government officials and general public.
Table 7.5 A
Relationship between educational background of the respondents group A (government officials) and the frequency of voting participation

Q30T How often do you take part in elections?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EDUCATN2</th>
<th>Page 1 of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ee)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>frequently</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sometimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>rarely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>never</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Column</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Value</td>
<td>6.36951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.5 B
Relationship between educational background of the respondents group B (general public) and the frequency of voting participation

Q20T How often do you take part in elections?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Tot Pct</th>
<th>non-degr degree</th>
<th>others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>frequently</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sometimes</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rarely</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>never</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value DF Significance
---------------------------------- ---- -----------------
Pearson  5.62829  6   .46609

The figures in Tables 7.5A and 7.5B indicate that the relationship between levels of education and the frequency of voting participation is not statistically significant.
In Table 7.5 A the "non-degree" respondents participate less in the elections than the "degree" respondents (66.6% v 71.9%). Meanwhile in Table 7.5 B the "non-degree" respondents show a greater level of participation (85.5% v 79.7%).

Regardless of educational backgrounds, a much higher proportion of both groups actually participate in elections (group A -71%, and group B - 84.2%). Since the relationship between the two variables is not significant, it can be inferred that level of education is not an important factor to indicate level of voting participation in Thailand. In this connection, high level of voter turnouts in many part of the country do not always represent the highly educated population in those areas. In relation to the statistics shown in chapter 3, a big city like Bangkok, where the residents are more educated, does not show the high record of voter turnouts. In fact, it has produced the lowest records of number of its residents turning up in electoral participation.

With regard to the attitude towards the policy on governorship election, the statistics shown in Tables 7.6A and 7.6B indicate the relationship between such attitude and levels of education.
Table 7.6A
Relationship between educational background of the respondents group A and the attitude toward the policy on governorship election

Q22 Do you agree with the idea of having provincial governors elected?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>non-degr</th>
<th>degree</th>
<th>others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLUM</th>
<th>36</th>
<th>178</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>217</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value: 10.82870, DF: 4, Significance: .02856
Table 7.6B

Relationship between educational background of the respondents group B and the attitude toward the policy on governorship election

Q11T Do you agree with the idea of having provincial governors elected?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>non-degr</th>
<th>degree</th>
<th>others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tot Pct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value DF Significance
------------------------------- ---- ---------------
Pearson 16.34546 4 .00271

It is hypothesised in hypothesis 5 that the public are in favour of appointed governors. With regard to the findings in Table 7.6A and 7.6B, they indicate that the population in group A and B who take a positive attitude on the establishment of the policy on the election of provincial governors are 33.6, and 36.5 percent. In the mean time, those who are unfavourable to the policy are 62.7 percent in group A, and 59.6 percent in group B. It means there are more
respondents in both groups who are still in favour of appointed governors.

The figures in Tables 7.6A and 7.6B indicate that the relationship between levels of education and the attitude toward the establishment of the policy is at a significant level. In group A (government officials), 61.1 percent of the "non-degree" holders and 63.5 percent of the "degree" holders are not in favour of the idea of electing governors. Only 30.6 percent of the "non-degree" and 34.3 percent of the "degree" holders would be in agreement of the policy. This indicates that when the level of education is higher the proportion of the people with definite positive or negative views increases.

The figures shown in Table 7.6B are different from the former table as the number of those who are favourable to the establishment of the policy decreases when level of education is higher (43%---17.4%). The number of those who are unfavourable to the policy, meanwhile, increase when the educational levels is higher (53.3% --- 78.3%). That is the reason why the relationship between the two variables in the latter table is more significant than the ones in the former table.

It can be inferred that the two variables are not independent. As the subject of the policy is sophisticated and important to the benefits of the people, the variable of education then becomes significant to the reaction of the respondents. Subsequently, it can be concluded that, in establishing the policy on election of provincial governors, levels of education should be considered as a significant factor. It can also be inferred that the findings are congruent with the hypothesis.
The figures displayed in the next tables (7.7A and 7.7B) show the relationship between levels of education and the attitude towards the outcome of the policy on election of provincial governors.

Table 7.7 A
Relationship between educational background of the respondents group A and the attitude toward the effectiveness of the policy

Q23T Should there be governorship elections, the provincial administration will be run more efficiently by those of elected?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>non-deg</th>
<th>degree</th>
<th>others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>14 (37.8)</td>
<td>35 (19.7)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 (16.2)</td>
<td>16 (9.0)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>17 (45.9)</td>
<td>127 (71.3)</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>17 (7.8)</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value DF Significance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>11.15020</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.02493</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.7 B

Relationship between educational background of the respondents group B and the attitude toward the effectiveness of the policy

Q12T Should there be governorship elections, the provincial administration will be run more efficiently by those of elected?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Col Pot</th>
<th>non-degr</th>
<th>degree</th>
<th>others</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tot Pot</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>30.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>159</td>
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<td>disagree</td>
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<td>49.5</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>55.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>37.2</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Column</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>285</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value | DF | Significance
----- | ---- | -----------
Pearson | 19.21671 | 4 | .00071

The results in Tables 7.7A and 7.7B show that the relationship between levels of education and the attitude toward the effectiveness of the outcomes of the policy of electing provincial governors is statistically significant. The data in Tables 7.7A and 7.7B show that in both the government officials and the general public there
are far higher proportions of the "non-degree" respondents who believe that the election of provincial governors would be effective. Meanwhile, the more highly educated "degree" holders show the opposite view.

In conclusion, over half of the number of the population in both groups (A: 67%, B: 55.8%) have a negative attitude toward the effectiveness of the policy outcomes. That means over half of the respondents do not think that if there were election of provincial governors, the provincial administration would be run more effectively. With regard to the significant relationship between the two variables, it can be inferred that the variable of education is an important factor determining the outcome of the policy. Additionally, according to reaction of the public, it can be concluded that the hypothetical assumption, concerning the policy on election of provincial governors that would be useful for the public, and the administration would be run more effectively, is unlikely to be true.

The next table is concerned with the commitment to vote-buying of the people. The survey concerning this issue is only conducted through the group of the general public.
Table 7.8
Relationship between educational background of the general public and the attitude towards vote-buying

Q19T During election campaigns, have you ever received rewards from candidates or political parties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATN2</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tot Pct</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in Table 7.8 indicate a direct relative association between levels of education and the commitment to vote-buying of the respondents. The population with higher education seem to react to
vote-buying less than those with lower education. The relation of
the two variables indicate that when the levels of education increase
the degree of commitment to vote-buying decreases. Therefore, it is
concluded that the more educated the population are, the more likely
they are to refuse to commit to vote-buying. It can be inferred that
levels of education have an impact upon the attitude toward vote-
buying.

The next figures shown in Tables 7.9A and 7.9B indicate the
relationship between levels of education and the attitude of the
respondents towards the impact of vote-buying.

Table 7.9 A
Relationship between educational background of the
respondents group A and the attitude toward the
negative effect of vote-buying

Q20T Do you agree that vote-buying has led to bribery and
corruption among politicians, particularly the members
of the ruling parties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Col Pct</th>
<th>non-degr degree</th>
<th>others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tot Pct</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>agree</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value DF Significance
-----------------------------------
Pearson 9.32650 4 .05344
The statistics in Table 7.9A reveal that there is a weak relationship between levels of education and the attitude toward the
negative effect of vote-buying among the group of the government officials. The proportion distribution indicates that the population with high education are more likely to agree that vote-buying has negative impact on political development. However, the number of the respondents who disagree with this seem to be less among the higher educated officials.

Although the statistics in Table 7.9A indicate almost no relationship between the two variables, it points out that, regardless of educational backgrounds, 90.7 percent of the respondents agree that vote-buying has affected political development in the negative way.

Pertaining to the Table 7.9B, it shows similar results to the findings in Table 7.9A. The exception is that the respondents who agree to this matter is less (86.6%) than the ones who have the same opinion in the former group. It is concluded that the variable of education might not be an important factor affecting the attitude of such a particular group as the government officials since they are well aware of the negative effect of vote-buying regardless of educational backgrounds. Therefore, regardless of their educational backgrounds, the statistics do not show any great difference in their attitude on this matter. However, considering the fact that the majority of the population are lower educated, the variable of education is a significant factor in determining the public attitude to vote-buying.

In the interviews given by both national and local politicians, none of the politicians admit having committed vote-buying. However, all of them are convinced that vote-buying has taken place in their provinces. They are all aware that vote-buying has a negative impact on political development in terms of encouraging inefficient
government, factionism, and corruption among cabinet ministers. Meanwhile, the senior public administrators including provincial governors, another group of the interviewees, show that 90% agree that there is vote-buying taking place in their areas. The remaining 10% do not believe there is vote-buying during the political campaign. One public administrator said that "even in more developed societies like UK., and the United States inducements are offered such as: tax reduction; housing benefits etc. to the public during the period of political campaigns in order to gain more votes". Therefore, he does not accept that the practice of offering favours is in fact vote-buying since Thai social values have a typical culture of giving support to those who offer help.

Reaction to the question whether the behaviour of vote-buying should be stopped, 86.5% percent of the respondents say that vote-buying must be stopped. In the open-ended questionnaires, they are convinced that an increase in economic status and living standards among the population would lead eventually to the elimination of vote-buying. However, among the interviewees - over 70 percent believe that vote-buying would gradually disappear if the public were given political education including the knowledge concerning the positive and negative aspects of democratic government. Such education should be given to enable the public to be more aware of political influences on their daily life.

Nevertheless, according to suggestions given by the participants in the open-ended questionnaires, there are a small number of the respondents including public administrators who believe that there is no way to stop vote-buying unless there is a change concerning the political system in the constitution through political reform. Above all, most of the respondents of all groups think that Thailand is in real need of political reform. With such reform the country might be
prevented from political exploitation by all sorts of power groups. One other point brought up by the groups of government officials, general public, and senior government administrators is to adopt the system of election under a single-MP constituency method. That means that an individual candidate would have to deal with a much larger area within a province. This would also mean that if the candidates were considering buying votes they would have to spend a lot more money than ever before. However, this idea has been banned by all the politicians.

The below table show the reaction of the government officials towards the existence of vote-buying in Thailand.

Table 7.10
Q16T Do you agree that vote-buying has taken place in your province?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.</td>
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<td>.5</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>218</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corresponding to the issue of vote-buying, Table 7.10 proves that vote-buying still exists in Thailand. The statistics show the number of the respondents (83.9%) accept that vote-buying has widely taken place in their areas. The remaining 6.9 percent disagree, and 8.7 percent are undecided.

**Economic Factor**

Economic condition is another significant factor affecting the behaviour of vote-buying, an important element of the political
system, that has a great effect upon the present political situation in Thailand. Economic status can also affect the outcomes of the policy on election of provincial governors. Early economic research in the United States suggested that government policies were closely related to the level of economic development in a society. In this regard, apart from education, economic status should be treated as an independent variable that might have an effect on such policy.

Since it has been hypothesised that those who have low income react toward vote-buying positively, the next analysis will be based on economic levels of the respondents. The emphasis will be focussed on the relationships between the levels of income and the impact of the political system with particular reference to vote-buying, and interest groups and voting behaviour.

In order to give clear results, the respondents reacting to such matters are grouped according to economic areas, as well as income status. In testing this hypothesis, only the general public who responded to questionnaire B are concerned.

A = large provinces with more economic status
B = small provinces with less economic status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Valid</th>
<th>Cum</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>up to 14,999 Baht</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 to 39,999 Baht</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000 to 59,999 Baht</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,000 Baht and over</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 151 100.0 100.0
The respondents in areas A can be ranged by their salary which they earn in Thai currency per month (40 Baht is approximately equal £1). Table 7.11A shows the highest number of the respondents who earn up to 14,999 Baht are 49 percent, and those are the smallest number who earn from 60,000 Baht upwards (4.6%). The rest are between the ones who have the income levels of 15,000 to 59,999 Baht per month.

Table 7.11B
Distribution of Salary of respondents group B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALARY2</th>
<th>The levels of income of the respondents in areas B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value Label</td>
<td>Value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>up to 14,999 Baht</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 to 39,999 Baht</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000 to 59,999 Baht</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,000 Baht and over</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in Table 7.11B also show the highest number of the respondents who earn less than 15,000 Baht per month. The smallest number of the respondents are still among the ones who earn from 60,000 Baht which is slightly less than the ones who earn between 40,000 to 59,999 Baht per month. The remaining 21 percent are those who earn between 15,000 to 39,999 Baht.

The next tables (Table 7.12 and 7.13) show the relationships between income status and vote-buying, and the income status and the attitude towards the policy on governorship election of the respondents respectively.
Table 7.12 A
Relationship between levels of income and vote-buying
of the respondents in areas A

Q18T During election campaigns, have you ever received rewards
from candidates or political parties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALARY2</th>
<th>Page 1 of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Pct</td>
<td>up to 14 15,000 t 40,000 t 60,000 a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot Pct</td>
<td>&lt;999 &gt;39,999 &gt;59,999 nd over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>often</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
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<td>sometmes</td>
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<tr>
<td>rarely</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>never</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value DF Significance
-------------------------- ---- ----------
Pearson        6.76373   9  .45936

With the economic impact as an independent variable, the
statistics show that the relationship between levels of income and
the commitment to vote-buying is not significant in areas A. The
variable of income is not related to vote-buying in the larger
provinces. The number of the respondents in the lowest income level who react positively to vote-buying (38.3%) is less than the ones that refuse vote-buying (50.7%). Nevertheless, the high percentage of the ones who refuse vote-buying are those who earn between 40,000 to 59,999 Baht per month.

Table 7.12 B

Relationship between levels of income and vote-buying of the respondents in areas B

Q18T During election campaigns, have you ever received rewards from candidates or political parties?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALARY2</th>
<th>Page 1 of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Pct up to 14 15,000 t 40,000 t 60,000 a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot Pct 999 59,999 &gt; 59,999 and over</td>
<td>Row</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 2 3 4 Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>often</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sometimes</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rarely</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>never</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column 91 29 3 2 125</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 72.8 23.2 2.4 1.6 100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value DF Significance
--------------------------- ------ -------------------
Pearson 19.10364 9 .02433
In Table 7.12B, the variable of income represented in the smaller areas seem to be significant to vote-buying. Over half of the respondents in the lowest level of income accept vote-buying (57.2%). However, many of the respondents who are in the same level of income say "no" to vote-buying (42.9%). It may be reasonable to conclude that low income status has caused the increase in vote-buying. It can be seen in the Table 7.12B that the higher the level of income is, the fewer the respondents accept vote-buying.

The relationship between levels of income and the behaviour of committing vote-buying is significant in some areas but not significant in the others. However, the statistics reveal that the proportion of the respondents classified in the lowest level of income commit to vote-buying much more than other groups. Since the subject of vote-buying is so delicate to discuss in public, many people were reluctant to accept that they commit vote-buying. Moreover, committing vote-buying is against the law. Therefore, such a sensitive topic of vote-buying may have an effect upon the reaction of the respondents. The results showed in Tables 7.12A and 7.12B may thus have been affected by the above discussion.
Table 7.13 A
Relationship between levels of income and the attitude toward the establishment of the policy of the respondents in areas A

Q11T Do you agree with the idea the provincial governors should be elected?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALARY2</th>
<th>Page 1 of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Pot</td>
<td>up to 14 15,000 t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot Pot</td>
<td>.999</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>undecided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Column</strong></td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value | DF | Significance
------------------|----|------------------
Pearson | 26.56730 | 6 | .00017
Table 7.13 B
Relationship between levels of income and the attitude toward the establishment of the policy of the respondents in areas B

Q11T Do you agree with the idea the provincial governors should be elected?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>up to 14</th>
<th>15,000 t 40,000</th>
<th>40,000 t 60,000</th>
<th>60,000 a</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tot</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>39,999</td>
<td>59,999</td>
<td>Row</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>50.0</td>
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<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>24.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|        | Column   | 74            | 39           | 16        | 7       | 136   |
| Total  |          | 54.4          | 28.7         | 11.8      | 5.1     | 100.0 |

Chi-Square Value DF Significance
--------------------------------- ------- ---------------
Pearson 30.63646 6 .00003

The figures in Tables 7.13A and 7.13B show the significant relationship between income levels and public attitude toward the establishment of the policy on election of provincial governors. The respondents in the higher level of income seem to disagree rather than agree with the idea of electing provincial governors.
question. The findings imply that the majority of respondents in the lowest income levels of both areas would welcome the election of governors. It means the majority of the people would continue to commit vote-buying. It can also be inferred that the hypothesis that the majority of low income rural residents react positively towards vote-buying is true.

The tables below will show the relationships between the levels of income and such political issues as the role of interest groups and voting behaviour.

**Table 7.14 A**

Relationship between levels of income and the attitude toward interest groups of the respondents in areas A

Q15T Do you agree that interest groups should play a stronger role in keeping the balance with the ruling party?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SALARY2</th>
<th>Page 1 of 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Col Pct</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>15,000 t</td>
<td>40,000 t</td>
<td>60,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>3.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Column | 91 | 29 | 3 | 2 | 125 |
| Total | 72.8 | 23.2 | 2.4 | 1.6 | 100.0 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Value</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>Significance</th>
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185
Q15T Do you agree that interest groups should play a stronger role in keeping the balance with the ruling party?

### Table 7.14 B
Relationship between levels of income and the attitude toward interest groups of the respondents in areas B

<table>
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</thead>
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<td>68.6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>22.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<td>.7</td>
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<td>.7</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>54.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value DF Significance
----------------------------- ---- ----------
Pearson                       2.27217 6  .89304

The relationship between the levels of income and the attitude towards the role of interest groups is not significant in both areas. However, the statistics show in Table 7.14A that the percentage of the population agreeing with the role of interest groups is higher when the level of income increases. On the other hand, the number of the respondents who disagree with this topic decreases when the level of income is higher. In areas B, the
figures in Table 7.14 B reveal that over 70% of the respondents agree with the role of interest groups regardless of income status. On the contrary, less than 16% of them disagree with this issue. It can be concluded that the income status is not a significant factor to differentiate the attitude towards the role of interest groups of the respondents in areas B. Nevertheless, it can indicate that people in areas A which are better off are more concerned with the role of interest groups than the ones in less well off areas. It also confirms the fact people in big cities, such as Bangkok, have a tendency to support interest groups more than people in smaller areas.
Table 7.15 A
Relationship between levels of income and voting behaviour of the respondents in areas A

Q17T In the ballot, do you cast your vote for a party system or an individual?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Row</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>party system</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>individual candi</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>both ways</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Column | 71 | 39 | 16 | 7 | 133 |
| Total | 53.4 | 29.3 | 12.0 | 5.3 | 100.0 |

Chi-Square Value DF Significance
----------------------------------------
Pearson 9.24716 6 .16015
Table 7.15 B

Relationship between levels of income and voting behaviour of the respondents in areas B

Q17: In the ballot, do you cast your vote for a party system or an individual?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Tot Pct</th>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Party System</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Both Ways</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up to 14</td>
<td>15,000 t</td>
<td>40,000 t</td>
<td>60,000 a</td>
<td>up to 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col Pct</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Value DF Significance

The degree of relationship between levels of income of the respondents and their voting behaviour in areas A and areas B is not significant. The levels of income are not related to the way the respondents cast their votes as most of the respondents (areas A = 66.2%, areas B = 59.7%) seem to prefer loyal partisanship regardless of their income status. Regardless of income status, the respondents in areas A who choose party system are slightly different in number with the average of 22.6%. Besides, there is
no respondent in areas B who earns more than 40,000 Baht choose party system.

This shows that income status cannot clearly indicate much difference in the way the respondents vote for individual candidates or party system, especially in areas B. It can also be concluded that the population are rooted in traditional way of casting votes by selecting individual candidates rather than party system no matter what levels of income they are.

**Political Issues**

**Public Opinion**

V.O Key comments that public opinion toward public policy has been a great influence on democratic government.(7) Evidence reveals that there is an increase in the public negative attitude toward the inefficiency in the administrative performances of the government officials that led the public to make demand for administrative change.(8) It is, therefore, important to examine public opinion toward the policy on the election of provincial governors by surveying their attitude toward the political aspects and the outcomes of the policy.

In testing public opinion toward the continuity of governors under the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the capability of provincial governors, the sample population who are government officials are divided into the MOI and the non-MOI officials so that their views can be clearly differentiated.
Table 7.16 A
Distribution of public opinion towards the continuation of provincial governors under the Ministry of the Interior

Q4 Do you agree that provincial governors should continue working under the Ministry of the Interior?

responded by the MOI officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 88 100.0 100.0

Table 7.16 B
Distribution of public opinion towards the continuity of provincial governors under the Ministry of the Interior

Q4 Do you agree that provincial governors should continue working under the Ministry of the Interior?

responded by the non-MOI officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S agree</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 130 100.0 100.0
Q2 Do you agree that provincial governors should continue working under the Ministry of the Interior?

responded by the general public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>93.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 287 100.0 100.0

Corresponding to the matter concerning the continuity of appointed governors under the Ministry of the Interior, the majority of the MOI officials (69.3%) are in agreement. 21.6 percent disagree and 9.1 percent do not show opinion (see Table 7.16A).

The non-MOI officials show a slightly different result (Table 7.16B). The number of those who support appointed governors to carry on working under the Ministry of the Interior decrease to 50 percent, while the number of those who disagree on this matter increase to 37 percent. However, more than half of the population of both groups are in favour of the continuity of appointed governors under the MOI.

With regard to the opinion of the general public, the results displayed in Table 7.16 C still show the majority of the population (64.8%) that support appointed governors to continue working under the MOI. The number of those who do not agree are 22.7 percent.
Table 7.17A
Public attitude toward appointed governors regarding their capability of carrying out duties

Q1 Do you agree that the provincial governor performs his duties efficiently?
responded by the MOI officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 88 100.0 100.0

Table 7.17B
Public attitude toward appointed governors regarding their capability of carrying out duties

Q1 Do you agree that the provincial governor performs his duties efficiently?
responded by the non-MOI officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 130 100.0 100.0
Table 7.17C
Public attitude toward appointed governors regarding their capability of carrying out duties

Q1 Do you agree that the provincial governor performs his duties efficiently?

responded by the general public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S disagree</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The statistics in Table 7.17 A and 7.17 B present the reaction of the MOI and non-MOI government officials to the efficiency of the present appointed governors. There are a large number of MOI (79.5%) and non-MOI officials (60%) who agree that the appointed governors carry out their public functions effectively. The number of those (the MOI and non-MOI) who do not agree are 11.3, and 20.7 percent respectively.

Regarding the general public attitude toward the same issue, the results showed in Table 7.17C that 54.7% of the public have a positive attitude towards the effectiveness of public administration carried out by appointed governors. The percentage of the participants who show negative attitude toward the same issue are 22.3, while there are 23 percent of them do not present their opinion.

However, through the interview method, all the politicians welcome the idea of election of provincial governors. Most of them
believe that provincial administration will be more effective under the control of elected governors. Public needs will be responded to promptly. Regarding the reaction to the question how well they work in cooperation with the appointed governors, over 80 percent of the local politicians think that procedures and red tape within provincial administration impede the efficiency of provincial development. Corresponding to the Provincial Administrative Organisations, the local politicians agree unanimously that they should not be chaired by provincial governors. They should be free from the control of government officials and organised by local politicians in terms of programme planning, and budget spending.

In reaction to the same topics, the public administrators respond differently. There are 9 out of 12 (or 75 %) do not take a positive attitude toward the idea of election of provincial governors. Their views regarding the idea of electing provincial governors is that provincial governors are the civil servants who carry out public works at provincial level and implement public policies on behalf of central government. Since provinces are not independent states, they still depend on financial support, policy-making decisions, and so on from the central government. One of the public administrators said that should there be elections of provincial governors he believed that the provincial administration as a whole would be abused by local tycoon businessmen or the powerful entrepreneurs who may then become elected governors. Nonetheless, some of the administrators believed that election of provincial governors would come into effect eventually. One of them was optimistic on this issue. He believed that such policy might bring in useful and effective provincial administration and the improvement of political development.
Because the government officials are close to provincial governors and have to serve public duties under the supervision of provincial governors, the survey concerning the performance of provincial governors was conducted with only one sample of the population who are the government officials. Additionally, the survey regarding the actions of local and national politicians to provincial administration is also conducted through the group of government officials as they sometimes have to communicate with the politicians. Therefore, the next figures displayed in Tables 7.18, 7.19, 7.20, 7.21, 7.22, and 7.23 show the reaction of the respondents on the matters pertaining to the above groups.

Table 7.18
The attitude toward the performance of governors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 218 100.0 100.0

In Table 7.18, the observed participants reacted to the question whether provincial governors perform their duties neutrally towards political parties in different degrees as follows. The findings indicate that there are 44.1 percent of the government officials who are favourable to the neutral performance of provincial governors. On the other hand, about 23 percent of the officials
show an unfavourable attitude toward the performance of appointed governors. However, there is quite high percentage of the participants (31.2) who cannot decide whether the appointed governors have performed their duties neutrally.

The percentage of the respondents who agree that provincial governors play the same role to every political party does not reach half the number of the population. It is difficult to conclude that all provincial governors perform their functions toward every party neutrally.

However, data collected through the method of interview reveals that 22 out of 25 politicians (or 88%) think that provincial governors do not act neutrally. In addition to that, the same number of the politicians do not believe that appointed governors have carried out their duties efficiently. Reaction to the question whether or not provincial governors should come through elections, all the politicians (100%) agree. Some politicians commented on the capability of appointed governors that they do not believe that the appointed governors run public administration effectively. One of the politicians said that the appointed governors have to follow every single regulation of the Ministry which is sometimes difficult to meet to the satisfaction of the public. Further to that he thinks most of appointed governors spend their time on adjusting their performance in order to serve the policy given by different superior ministers who might have to be in office for only short period of time.

The findings imply that some public administrators do not react toward politicians neutrally. It can be concluded that the hypothesis indicating the unneutral action of the senior
administrators including provincial governors may have caused the demand for the election of governors is true.

Table 7.19
The attitude toward local politicians

Do you agree that local politicians, particularly the members of provincial council, cause trouble to provincial governor?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Cum Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.19 shows the results of the survey concerning the conflicts between politicians and public administrators, especially provincial governors. 48.6 percent of the population believe that local politicians cause some trouble to provincial administrators. 20.6 percent disagree, and a high figure of 29.8 percent are undecided.
Table 7.20
The attitude toward national politicians

Q7T Do you agree that national politicians cause trouble to provincial governor?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>25.0</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 7.20, 46.8 percent of the participants agree that national politicians also cause some trouble to provincial administrators. Whilst 27.5 percent disagree, and 24.8 percent do not decide to agree or disagree on the matter.

Table 7.21
The attitude toward national politicians

Q8T Do you agree that national politicians always use their power to influence public matter?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>agree</td>
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<td>67.0</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14.9</td>
<td>82.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The statistics in Table 7.21 shows the majority of respondents (67%) believe that national politicians use their power to influence public matters. On the other hand, 17 percent of them do not believe so, while 14.7 percent are undecided.

Table 7.22
The attitude toward politicians concerning public spending

Q15T Within the process of budgeting, do you believe that politicians at both levels use their power in order to have their planned development programmes endorsed in their constituencies?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>167</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>23</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>88.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With 2.9 Missing

Total 218 100.0 100.0

With regard to budget spending influenced by politicians, 76.6 percent of the government officials respond that politicians at both levels use their power in order to have their planned development programmes endorsed within their constituencies. There are only 11.9 percent who do not believe that politicians interfere within the process of budgeting.

In the interview given by senior administrators, it is confirmed by 83.3 percent of the administrators that they have difficulty working in cooperation with local and national politicians. Five of the public administrators (or 41.67%) agreed that conflicts caused by politicians within the sphere of provincial
administration are mostly concerned with programme development that link to public spending of a province.

Table 7.23
The attitude toward senior administrators concerning public spending

Q14T Within the process of budgeting, do you believe that senior public administrators use their influence in order to gain more of the budget?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows a similar result to Table 7.22. 74.8 percent of the respondents react in agreement that within the process of budgeting senior administrators use their influence to increase the budget.

It is concluded that, the results showed in Tables 7.22, and 7.23, indicate that there are conflicts within budgeting process caused by both politicians as well as bureaucrats.

In order to gain general knowledge concerning the performance of senior public administrators, military role, and the outcome of the policy on governorship election, both groups of the respondents (government officials, and the general public) are asked to give reactions to this matter. The statistics shown in Tables 7.24 -
7.30 indicate the reactions of the respondents on the above matters.

Table 7.24 A
The attitude toward the general performance of senior public administrators

Q21t It is said that government officials, including senior administrators, also commit fraud. Do you agree or disagree?

responded by the government officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>59.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.24 B
The attitude toward the general performance of senior public administrators

Q10t It is said that government officials, including senior administrators, also commit fraud. Do you agree or disagree?

responded by the general public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>79.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In testing whether or not that the senior public administrators are thought to have committed fraud, the survey (responded by the government officials and the general public) reveals in Tables 7.24A, and 7.24B that a high percentage of the general public (79.8%) believe that fraud has taken place and 59.2% of the government officials think the same.

Regarding the figures shown earlier, the number of the general public, who react negatively to the policy on election of provincial governors, is much less than the group of the government officials who have the same opinion. The reason why the public's support for the government administrators is declining may be explained by the results shown in Tables 7.24B that a high percentage of the public believe that corruption is committed by the government administrators as well.

Table 7.25A
The attitude toward the outcome of the policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q29T</th>
<th>Elected governors, who will be under various political parties, might cause disciplinary problems concerning provincial administration with the superior who are from different party. Do you agree or disagree? responded by the government officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Value Label</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>undecided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.25B
The attitude toward the outcome of the policy

Q23T  Elected governors, who will be under various political parties, might cause disciplinary problems concerning provincial administration with the superior who are from different party. Do you agree or disagree?

responded by the general public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In testing the attitude toward the the effectiveness of provincial administration under elected governors, the survey responded to by two groups of respondents reveal that there are 80.7 percent of the government officials (see Table 7.25A) who agree that elected governors will face conflicts that might arise across the provincial administration. This is because they may have to work under the supervision of the minister who might be a member of a different political party. In reaction to the same question, a high percentage of the general public (72.1%) showed in Table 7.25B also agree on that issue. There are less than 5 percent of the government officials, and about 14 percent of the general public that do not believe as the others.
Table 7.26A
The attitude toward military groups

Q26T  Do you prefer democratic government to military government?
responded by the government officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>democratic governmen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military governmen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.26B
The attitude toward military groups

Q16T  Do you prefer democratic government to military government?
responded by the general public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>democratic governmen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>87.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military governmen</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q12T Should there be governorship elections, do you think that successful military coups would have a negative impact on the election?

responded by the government officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>69.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 218 100.0 100.0

Q5T Should there be governorship elections, do you think that successful military coups would have a negative impact on the election?

responded by the general public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 287 100.0 100.
In testing the hypothesis 9 concerning the military power which might affect election of provincial governors if the policy was established, the responses show that over 90 percent in one group and 87 percent in the other (see Table 7.26A and 7.26B) say that they prefer democratic to military government. It can be inferred that a military return to political power would not be welcomed by the public.

Nevertheless, reaction to the question whether or not military coups will affect elections of provincial governors, 44.5% of the government officials and 45.6% of the general public believe that military coups will obstruct the elections of provincial governors (see Tables 7.27A and 7.27B).

The statistics shown above suggest that although the respondents would strongly prefer democratic government, there are fears among them that military coups may have an effect on election of provincial governors. Further, reaction to what effect the military group would have caused to the policy on election of provincial governors shows that there are about 30 percent of the respondents who are convinced that public funds which have been used for electoral procedures would have been wasted. The survey also reveals that the remaining respondents fear that public administration might be less efficient under military rule since they are merely good at military functions. Additionally, according to Chaianan Samudhavanija, Thailand has moved toward industrial society and the country needs professionals who have experience in dealing with socio-economic dimensions. The skill and knowledge concerning such a topic might have not been built in the military group. Besides, general administration might be limited
under rules and regulations imposed by the military. In addition to that, Chaianan Samudhavanija comments that the military rule seems to be limiting decentralisation.(9)

Table 7.28A

The attitude toward the democratic government

Q2T Do you agree that democratic government has run the country effectively?

responded by the government officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 218 100.0 100.0

Table 7.28B

The attitude toward the democratic government

Q4T Do you agree that democratic government has run the country effectively?

responded by the general public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 287 100.0 100.0
Table 7.29A
The attitude toward the strength of party system due to election of provincial governors

Q10T Do you agree that the election of provincial governors would help to strengthen national political party?
responded by the government officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 218 100.0 100.0

Table 7.29B
The attitude toward the strength of party system due to election of provincial governors

Q13T Do you agree that the election of provincial governors would help to strengthen national political party?
responded by the general public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 287 100.0 100.0

209
With regard to Tables 7.28, and 7.29 they indicate the general attitude of the respondents. Tables 7.28A, and 7.28B show the proportion of government officials and the general public who have favourable and nonfavourable attitude toward the state administration run by civilian government. They are about 69 percent among the government officials and about 59 percent among the general public who believe that a civilian democratic government would not run the country efficiently.

Table 7.29A and 7.29B show the belief of the respondents that the party system would be strengthened by the election of provincial governors. About 72 % of both the government officials and the general public believe that a local government which had been elected would be supportive of the national political parties.

Table 7.30A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Label</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

210
The research results concerning the impact of vote-buying (Table 7.30A, and 7.30B) show that over 63% of both groups believe that vote-buying would have a negative effect on the election of provincial governors.

The hypotheses mentioned in the previous chapter are concerned with the hypothetical assumption about the possibility of establishing the policy on election of provincial governors. The adoption of the policy means there is massive change in the government administrative system. The process of administrative change requires new rules and regulations as the new system would become more decentralised. Such administrative change also means the central government would continue rendering financial subsidies to local governments but would not interfere with the day-today
administration. The local governments then would make their own decisions on policies and programme development.

As already mentioned in the introduction that the desire of the party leader to improve the bureaucratic system, the outcomes of the change would, however, have impacts upon social and economic conditions of the country. La Pierre believes that society, by nature is resistent to change or reform.(10) He comments that most of its arrangements are designed to preserve the status quo as much as possible. Nevertheless, Tinapan Nakata is convinced that the tendency to encourage or discourage change can only be determined from the attitudes, beliefs, and values which prevail in the culture.(11)

Therefore, the following discussion is relative to the hypotheses set forth in the foregoing chapters. It is based on the findings resulted from the survey of public attitudes and beliefs.

Hypothesis 1. People of lower education are not aware that vote-buying would lead to ineffective government.

The findings revealed earlier might not be entirely compatible with the hypothesis as the respondents regardless of educational background realise the negative effect of vote-buying on government administration. However, the data showed that the general public with higher education who disagree on this matter are less than those with lower education. It means that the lower educated residents seem to be unaware of the consequence of vot-buying. Regarding the sub-classified "non-degree" group of the general
public, it comprises 24.8 percent of the respondents who have education up to secondary school level. Many of them show no sign of awareness of the consequences of vote-buying to political development. The recent survey displayed in chapter 3 reveals that only 1.76 percent out of 56.6 million of the population have had higher education or college level background.

It implies that the majority of the population are under high school level. Thus, the low level of education would have an influence upon the public attitude toward the political issue. The ignorance about vote-buying of those who have low education coincident with the economic factor, which will be discussed later on, would not help to improve politics even if there were elections of provincial governors. The issue of vote-buying is considered as an important political factor which is a significant element in bringing about the down fall of government. It also leads to unstable administrative government organisations. Some of the public administrators said that most of the politicians are selected owing to the commitment of vote-buying. Such politicians cannot be considered to be public representatives. People select them on the basis of their financial power rather than on the grounds of policies of the political party. One public administrator said that those MPs who are selected because of vote-buying are not genuine public representatives and run the country only to meet their interests. Accordingly, the national administration is not effectively implemented by these MPs. Consequently, the public are not protected from the abuse of power by the elected government.
Since the majority of Thais are not provided with sufficient standards of education, the limited knowledge in politics would not help to clean up the politics. Neither would it help to make a fairer and more democratic situation. Therefore, the election of provincial governors would not result in productive local governments.

Hypothesis 2 The majority of rural residents who have a low level of education tend to vote for individual candidates not for a party system and that would bring about unstable local governments.

Voting behaviour is another significant element of the political factors that can determine the stability of democratic government. Regarding the record of the general election (1996) shown in chapter 3, the number of politicians elected into the House of Parliament are spread among political parties. After the general elections, the result never bring in the consolidation of government. The party that wins a majority of parliamentary seats never contains more than half the number of the total MPs. The structure of insecure coalition government is, hence, caused by the popular voting behaviour. Although the findings are not completely congruent with the hypothesis, it confirms that most of the public at all levels of education are favourable to traditional voting behaviour. Individual candidates are likely to be selected rather than party list system.
Accordingly, such voting behaviour remains one of the major obstacles to political development which leads to inefficient and unstable government. It is commented by David Wilson that the voting behaviour of Thai people becomes attached to the strong personality or personal leadership of individual candidates. Thus, the effect of cultural values would extend the continuity of such behaviour and that would not produce better politics at both local and national levels. The election of provincial governors will inevitably be affected by the voting behaviour. Neither would it bring about strong local governments, nor effective local government administration.

Hypothesis 3 The majority of rural residents who have low standards of income react positively toward vote-buying in which it would cause inefficient local government.

An analysis of the reaction of the public to such a political element as vote-buying is important to the study on the adoption of the policy on election of provincial governors. Since the findings are congruent with the hypothesis and the majority of the rural poor respond favourably to vote-buying, then it is unlikely to be a good sign for the establishment of the policy on governorship election. The figures shown in chapter 3 concerning the average income per capita of the residents in most parts of the country is comparatively low. When look into the real fact of the poor residents who earn less than the income in the lowest level shown in Table 7.11, the conclusion can be drawn that the majority of the population across the country on low incomes undoubtedly react positively to vote-buying. The long standing problem of vote-buying
will remain the major barrier to political development unless severe punishment is given to the persons who commit vote-buying, as suggested by the respondents.

In addition to that, living standards and the economic status of the majority must be improved quickly otherwise vote-buying will not disappear. Moreover, the consequences of practising vote-buying in terms of corruption, inefficiency at work, and instability of government administration will need to be eliminated and remedied. It is acknowledged widely that vote-buying has taken place in every single election in Thailand. This is already supported by the research findings. As long as vote-buying still exists, election of provincial governors would not be useful for the local people who might be exploited by the powerful elected assembly.

Hypothesis 4 Vote-buying is the main obstacle to political development and will affect the policy on election of provincial governors.

Discussion on the issue of vote-buying has been made in a sufficient degree to indicate that the vote-buying has been the main obstacle to political development at all levels of government administration. All findings on the issue of vote-buying can be a significant factor which has a direct effect upon the establishment of the policy. The findings reveal the overwhelming number of the respondents who accept the widespread existence of vote-buying as well as the high tendency of the rural poor committed to vote-
buying. It is confirmed that the idea of running local government through the election would not be more successful. This is because such problematic circumstances as low standards of education and economic status of the people, which is conducive to the increase of vote-buying, have not been rooted out.

One of the public administrators said that vote-buying is the major cause of corruption among politicians. He believed that Thai politics has become a vicious circle in which the vote-buying produces commitment to corruption which intensifies the original cause of vote-buying to have an effect on every election. Thus, election of provincial governors would not avoid being under the vicious circle as long as vote-buying still exists.

Hypothesis 5 Public are in favour of appointed governors rather than elected governors.

The research findings in this category is consistent with the hypothetical assumption. The findings revealed earlier regarding the public attitude toward the policy on the election of provincial governors confirm that the general public are still favourable to government officials who act as provincial governors. Although the number of the respondents who have a favourable attitude to appointed governors is less among the general public than the government officials, it can indicate that the hypothesis is substantiated. The findings relating to the continuity of appointed governors under the Ministry of the Interior can also be confirmed by the sufficient number of the respondents who give support. However, such a positive attitude toward appointed
governors might not be endurable, as the findings show that the public believe that government administrators also commit fraud. Besides, the strong views of politicians shown in the interviews may become a significant influence upon the change of the administrative system unless public administrators can preserve the status quo by increasing public confidence in the implementation of public administration.

Hypothesis 6 The policy on election of provincial governors would be beneficial to the public and would create more effective provincial administration.

The conclusion can be drawn from research findings indicated by the survey data and the interviews given by the politicians and the public administrators that as long as such political factors as voting behaviour, and vote-buying continue to be the main problems of political development the policy would not be successful. Although all the politicians give their full support to the outcomes of the policy, substantial efforts are also made by the public administrators and the other respondents concerning the weak points of the policy. The influence of politicians on public administration, exploiting public resources, and running the administration for the benefits of their groups are among the issues that are raised by the respondents in open-ended questionnaires, and by the public administrators.

However, the policy on election of provincial governors may seem to be more suitable for the administration in more advanced
democratic societies. Under such political circumstances as Thailand has suffered, the election of governors would not be workable. Besides, the adoption of the policy would not be useful for the public and would not create productive administration.

Hypothesis 7 National and local politicians are the main groups who demand the election of provincial governors

The research findings in this category seem to be compatible with the hypothesis. The findings reveal that there are conflicts between politicians and public administrators over provincial administration. Many public officials believe that some politicians wrongly use their power to influence provincial administration.

The findings also focus on the performances of public administrators. Both the politicians and the respondents (the government officials) believe that public administrators act towards political parties and their members differently. The respondents grouped as the government officials are convinced that public administrators also exert their authority in the process of budgeting. On the other hand, the local politicians complain about the interference of provincial governors in the administration of provincial councils. In addition, most of the politicians responded that procedures and red tape within public administration have hindered the efficiency of provincial development. Consequently, these kinds of administrative anomalies could
encourage the politicians to make a demand for election of provincial governors.

Hypothesis 8 Senior public administrators including provincial governors have not performed their duties neutrally which would result in the demand for election of provincial governors.

This hypothesis confirmed by the findings is partly true. As head of government officials in a province, a governor is an important image to the public. His performances are likely to be acceptable to the people. The political performance of provincial governors then become a significant factor in the political future of any candidate as his executive role is the main focus of public attention. His performance could make some politicians feel ill at ease if the provincial governors take sides with any other political party.

Nevertheless, one of the public administrators who was interviewed accepted that some provincial governors work in support of some politicians. In addition to that, the government officials who responded to the questionnaire also confirm that provincial governors do not act neutrally to every politician. In this regard, the politicians also responded that provincial governors do not act toward political parties neutrally. The behaviour of giving support to one group and acting against the others can bring about conflicts to the politicians. Therefore, it can be a reason why the policians call for the administrative change at provincial
level as they believe local governments would be free from bureaucratic authority.

Hypothesis 9 Military power could be a main obstacle to provincial election.

Thailand has long suffered instability not only caused by inefficient civilian government but also caused by military groups. The imbalanced political features have impeded democratic political development to a large extent. The political power used to be largely in the hands of the military. At present, the military seem to be politically inactive as they have been replaced by civilian government. Even though the findings reveal that the overwhelming number of the respondents prefer the democratic government to the military, there are fears among public that there might be a return of the military power. Thus, it is possible that there may be a military comeback in the future. The military coups would then have an effect on the election of governors as democratic government is made null whenever there is a successful coup. Otherwise, laws have to be adjusted to protect the status of the would-be local governments in case they would come under military rule. If not, the election of provincial governors would be a waste of public spending as suggested by some of the respondents.

7.3 Conclusion

With regard to social and cultural conditions, it has been mentioned earlier that the relationship in Thai society places great emphasises on status and hierarchical differences. The
reaction of ordinary Thais towards public officials especially the
top ranking bureaucrats is considered a highly respected
relationship. Such an attitude leads to the deferential and
respectful manner of ordinary Thais towards public officials.

Although William Siffin confirms that the process of social
change such as urban growth and increase in literacy in Thailand
would lead to the reform,(13) the findings show that the majority
of the respondents are still in favour of appointed governors.
According to Arsa Mekawan as quoted in the forgoing chapter, the
public in general remain in favour of government officials rather
than politicians. Even though the public's support of government
officials is declining as the public believes that senior
administrators also have influence on the budgeting process as well
as committing fraud, the respondents are still in favour of
appointed governors rather than elected governors.

On the other hand, John Embree observes the characteristic of
the culture and says that Thai people lack regularity, discipline,
and regimentation.(14) He comments further that Thai people carry
the burden of social responsibility lightly. In addition, David
Wilson says that a large part of Thai adult population is
politically indifferent or inarticulate.(15) It is supported by
the research findings that the public with the same level of
education pay attention to political groups differently. For those
who may favour interest groups to playing a stronger role in
politics, it is apparent that there are not many events that they
make efforts to support the interest groups to keep balance with
the ruling party.
Besides, the findings show a great number of people taking part in elections, but this does not always imply a high degree of popular participation in politics. High voter turnout at provincial level alone does not mean Thailand has reached a high degree of democratic political development since there are other factors that have an influence on it. On the other hand, the Bangkok residents who are higher in economic status and more highly educated participate in electoral voting much less than those in provincial areas. One of the reasons for the low record of voter turnout in Bangkok might be that they are less affected by vote-buying than those based outside the capital.

However, many Thai scholars believe that political control still remain in the hands of the ruling groups, politicians at one time and the military at another. They argue that Thai political parties have little extraparliamentary organisation. This point of view can be linked to other political setbacks which have pulled Thailand politically backwards. Voting behaviour is one of the political problems. Political parties never represent substantial social issues so that each candidate has to get elected through his own individual efforts in the province and through the respect in which he is held by the people. This is why the tendency to select individual candidates rather than party representatives is high. The individual candidates who have succeeded in winning election then become powerful members of the House of Parliament. All kind of things can be linked to the instability of civilian government, as well as to the low standards of politics to a large extent. Despite the fact that Thai politics has been developed for over 60 years, the country and its people still need protection from political abuse and exploitation.
It may be difficult to change the public attitude toward politics. However, the provision of civic education which can show people how to compare the values and policies of various groups might help to produce the right party to rule the country. It would give the feeling of legitimate government which would have the support of the people and thus it would be more stable and efficient.

However, it is of utmost importance to encourage the public to accept their responsibility to the country. Moreover, the constitution concerning political aspects needs to be reformed to the particular extent that those who administer the country at all levels will not be able to take advantage of the people but run the administration for the sake of the whole country. Then, the election of provincial governors or any kind of election for particular purposes can be useful to the democratic political development of the country.
Footnotes


6. Thomas Dye, *Understanding Public Policy*, op.cit, p.244


15. David Wilson, *Politics in Thailand: Economic and Social Setting*, op.cit. p.70
Chapter VIII
Summary and Recommendations

8.1 Research summary

The intention of this chapter is to summarise the effects that all the factors involved have on the policy on election of provincial governors. The hypotheses concerning this policy have already been tested by the methods of questionnaire and interview. In this respect, the following examination of the concept of governorship election is made in relation to the theoretical framework conceptualised in chapter 3. The causes of the demand for the governorship election, the questions such as why social and cultural values have affected the policy on election of provincial governors, why education and economic status are important to the possibility of administrative change at provincial level, and what are the political factors that influence the outcomes of such policy are all the concern of this chapter.

Following the demand for electing provincial governors, it is claimed to be generated from the characteristics of administrative centralisation, bureaucratic red tape, and the political performance of government officials. When one of the political leaders (from Pralungtham Party) made it public and started to call for a change in government administration at provincial level by introducing a policy on election of governors, most politicians were in agreement.

Corresponding to the theoretical framework of the study, there are three sets of variables involved in the conceptualised operation. They are environmental forces (socio-economic conditions), political factors, and policy outcome. The first two variables are identified
as having impacts on the policy outcome. However, it has been confirmed by the research findings of Thomas Dye (as cited before) that socio-economic conditions are more important to the direction of the policy outcomes than the political factors.

In this respect, the explanation pertaining to all the conceptualised variables is made on the basis of the research findings.

8.1.1 The environmental conditions

(1) Social and cultural values. According to Gabriel Almond, the process of political development is affected by the character of political culture in a society. Samuel Beer defines the term political culture as social values, beliefs, and emotional attitude. (1) Thus, the administrative change at provincial level is caused by the social and cultural values of the society. In this regard, the respondents were questioned concerning their reaction to public administration and the people participating in the administrative system. Accordingly, the results were analysed into social and cultural values according to the beliefs of the respondents.

The administrative system and its characteristics have long been influenced by the traditional and political culture. According to William Siffin, the Thai bureaucracy has both functional and social significance. It performs functions essential to the continuation of the kingdom. Additionally, it serves as the framework of the society between the government and its people. (2) He remarks that the Thai bureaucracy is the basic instrument for providing continuing social
order and coherence. Accordingly, the favourable attitude people attach to appointed government officials still remain.

Regarding the view point of many scholars, it is true that the traditional society resists any kind of change. (3) According to the research findings, people are in doubt whether the administrative change at provincial level can bring about the effectiveness of provincial administration. In addition to that, they are suspicious that provincial administration under elected governors may not benefit the interests of the local people. That is why the findings confirm that the high percentage of respondents are not in favour of the idea of electing provincial governors.

However, the social and cultural values can be the cause of the failure in political development. Firstly, the public beliefs and attitudes that still cling to the traditional administration have made people reluctant to accept the new change. Secondly, the political culture concerning political behaviour, which will be explained more in the section of political issue, has caused much delay in political development. Finally, the social behaviour as described by David Wilson as political indifference, toward politics leaving it to the hands of the ruling groups has not progressed political development. Neither, does it generate an initiative approach to solve political problems.

The products of social and cultural values will be referred to in the following issues concerning the economic development and political factors that have an effect on the outcome of the policy on governorship election.

(2) Economic Development. According to the economic research which was produced in the United States, as already mentioned, it
suggested that government policies were closely related to the level
of economic development in a society.(4) Moreover, it is also
mentioned (with regard to Thomas Dye's description) that the economic
development that helps to shape the character of a political system
and policy outcomes are economic situations and education.(5)

In relation to the research findings, low standards of education
have a large effect on the continuity of such a particular political
factor as vote-buying, and so do the low incomes of the people. In
the meantime such aspects of political culture as voting behaviour
and political participation, have also been influenced by the
economic development. In this regard, such economic situations do
not help to improve the current political situations, to support a
stronger role of interest groups in wide areas, or to encourage
people in participating in politics. More important is that it
influences voting practices of the people which will inevitably lead
to less efficient local governments. The political behaviour
concerning the significant aspect of vote-buying, which has been
widely confirmed by the research findings in Thailand, has damaged
the political process and caused the decline of democratic
government, in terms of instability and inefficiency.

Although the economy of the country appears to have changed
considerably, the fact is that this change has not improved the
economic status of the majority of the population. It is said in
Matichon, a weekly magazine that, on balance, the living standards of
the majority of the people remain in 1997 as they were twenty years
ago. The critic in Matichon confirms that the majority of the rural
population are in an insolvent condition (particularly those who work
in the paddy fields) despite increased commercialisation. The
products of the rapid economic expansion have hit the poor harshly
with the high cost of living. They are even in poorer condition than
before. The critics also remark that the poverty of the population is neglected by the elected government. That is why they continue to have a way of life rooted in tradition and characterised by a low standard of living. (6)

Despite the fact that education is the key to all types of development, only the people who have financial support or a high social status obtain access to further education beyond high school level. Education is not regarded as a right by the majority of the population nor is the quality of life in the society. The low standard of education among the majority of Thais precludes political development, since their lack of knowledge makes them unable to judge the right party to run the country. The lack of knowledge also makes them disregard such political problems as vote-buying, and the method of casting votes. James Coleman also confirms that education is the crucial determinant for effective adaptation and for changing attitudes toward a new system. Education also helps to reduce the gap between the ruling elite and the less modernised mass. (7)

By way of contrast, the low economic status of the majority does not help to stop the practice of taking rewards or receiving money from the political candidates either. The practice of vote-buying among the politicians has destroyed public administration to a large extent because it is linked to the problematic behaviour of corruption, bribery and cheating the public in various ways.

Since economic development has not improved to the extent that the long standing political anomaly of vote-buying can be eliminated, the idea of changing the administrative system at provincial level would not be of any benefit to Thai society. From the perspective of economic development, the steady increase in economic status and political education would bring a substantial improvement in
administration, since such a change would depend largely upon the degree of economic development, and the understanding of politics among the people.(8)

8.1.2 Political Factors

In many countries, the political system is different with regard to inter-party competition, strength and functions of the party organisation that can bring in a high degree of political development. In some countries, there might be conflicts between rural and urban interests that dominate national politics, while in other countries, conflicts might occur between politicians and public administrators that dominate the political scene. Such types of conflict can sometimes cause delays in public administration. On the other hand, such conflicts can bring about major changes and encourage political development.

However, according to the critic in Matichon Magazine, dated 11 April 1997, political conflicts taking place in the sphere of public administration in Thailand are mostly based on private interests rather than public concern. As commented earlier, within the sphere of public bureaucracy, politics takes place not only at departmental level but also at ministerial level where politicians are in charge.

Thailand like many developing countries, suffers from political instability. The political instability is carried over from the first period of political foundation. This poorly founded political system has resulted in an imbalance in Thai politics. Corruption, a product of the political imbalance, is pervasive in the sphere of public administration. It affects both local and national organisations, and involves proportionately minor and major
resources. Clark Neher believes that, in the sphere of public administration in Thailand, the corruption ranges from low ranking officials to the chief executive. It includes bribes from small to massive sums. (9)

The inefficiency of civilian government is another product of political imbalance. It is due to a long period of military government and the formality in administrative procedures. Such formality of administrative procedures is regarded by Fred Riggs as formalism. (10) He describes this as being impracticable since it cannot be reliable or bring in productive administration. Furthermore, it can be a barrier to the development of public administration.

In this context, it is important to study each element of the political system that may affect the outcomes of the policy on the governorship election.

(1) Political party and its members. It has been mentioned in the foregoing chapters that Thai political parties are not institutions where political members combine to share a common interest in political and socio-economic policies. Comments are also made by James Mosel and William Siffin that a loosely structured social system, a strong degree of individuality, and lack of regimentation of the people are the great determinants that do not lead to strength and unity in political parties. (11) Such social values have deterred the growth of political parties. They also lead to the instability of the democratic government which then causes a change of government within a short period of time.

The weakness of political parties in Thailand which is due to lack of popular support and lack of unity of its members then makes it
difficult to form a stable and permanent national party. The failure of this party system is also the result of social and political organisation. Cultural traditions have played a great role in the political process which has caused the weakness of the party system. David Wilson comments (as already mentioned) that social organisation, personal relationships and client-patronage are fundamental in Thai society. This is also reflected in parliamentary and election activity. As has been described by Chaianan Samudhavanija that political parties remain personal parliamentary groups rather than a binding element of political ideology. Moreover, political campaigns are not concerned so much on details of policies. Regarding the weaknesses of a political party in terms of lack of popular support and lack of unity among the politicians, it is, often, not conducive to the effectiveness of government administration. The instability and weakness of central government which has negative impacts from political party and politicians at national level can reflect the failure of politics at local level. That would, certainly, affect the election of provincial governors.

In the countries where political parties are strong, the party system can be represented by several aspects such as level of inter-party competition, popular participation, and popular support. The inter-party competition may start with conflicts which then lead to party development. The conflicts among political parties over policies can, sometimes, mean the best choice for the public. Thomas Dye also confirms that party conflicts over policy occur when there are issues that affect a large number of the voters such as taxation or welfare services. By way of contrast, party conflicts seem to be much less frequent on the policies that have less effect on the electorate. (12)
Following the policy on the election of provincial governors the Palungtham Party, which used to be a member of the coalition government at that time, took an initiative action in order to bring the policy into effect. However, it is apparent that no other political parties gave any support to the initiative of the Palungtham Party, although there were a large number of individual politicians who welcomed such an idea. The research findings support the fact that political parties do not have a direct effect on the policy of governorship election as such policy does not seem to benefit their voters.

(2) Elections. Elections are a mechanism by which the public select representatives to hold office in order to carry out public functions. In the electoral process, people cast their votes to choose the representatives. The process of election is concerned not only with political parties and politicians but also reflects socio-economic values and political culture.

An electoral system can be represented by several factors such as level of voter turnout, voting behaviour and party system. The level of political participation, particularly voter turnout, is an interesting characteristic of the electoral system. Voting and non-voting have important meanings for the electoral system. They represent levels of public confidence in politics and the degree of support for political institutions. In the developed countries, high voter turnout can depend on economic situation and educational backgrounds. There is evidence from the United States showing that non-voting is most common among lower income, lower status, poorly educated groups. High voter participation is a characteristic of higher status, higher income, and well-educated groups.(13)
However, not all of this statement can be applied to the political situation in Thailand as Thai democracy differs from western democratic societies in terms of less economic power, a weaker party system, multiple political parties, and inefficient representatives. The fact is that democratic development in Thailand has been impaired by the long period of military rule, and the political culture which has been practised by political power groups. This has been the cause of political imbalance which does not lead Thai democracy in the same direction as other stable democratic governments. Hence, the level of voter turnout in Thailand cannot entirely reflect the degree of political participation. According to the research findings, the economic conditions have a great influence on voting level. In Thailand, people with a lower income tend to have higher voting turnout when compared with the above-mentioned information regarding the United States.

Evidence was given earlier in chapter 3 that the level of voter turnout in Bangkok, which includes a higher proportion of higher educated residents who earn more income, is much lower than other parts of the country. It has achieved the lowest level of electoral turnout in many general elections. The record of low voter turnout of Bangkok residents is a good example of higher educated and higher income residents who are not affected very much by vote-buying. However, it may prove the comment of David Wilson in saying that a large part of adult population of Thailand is politically indifferent. By way of contrast, it might also be because Bangkok residents have more experience of inefficient government and so reject the next elections.

The findings reveal that the high voter turnout in particular parts has been affected by the practice of vote-buying. Pramoon Chanchammong, a former senior government administrator, says that it looks as though the vote-buying which has been practised over long
periods had become a characteristic of Thai political culture. (14) It has been a serious factor affecting the political situation in Thailand recently. Elections taking place in Thailand are affected very much by the political behaviour of vote-buying. Such political behaviour has been practised by most politicians and occurs in every election.

Vote-buying behaviour in Thai society is not only because of the financial power of the political players but also because of the social values and the traditional beliefs of the people. James Scott and Prudhisan Jumbala describe the Thai social structure and the patron-client relationships as interpersonal ties, which resemble friendships, and result in their members co-operating with the hope of receiving mutual benefit. (15) With regard to the social tradition, Prudhisan mentions that the patron-client relationship is asymmetrical, involving persons with unequal opportunity over resources of wealth, social prestige, or political power. He also says that once the relationship has started, reciprocal debts bind the persons in a series of exchanges across a number of actions, from the economic to the social and political.

In this context, as already mentioned before, it is believed that the religious impact on traditional beliefs is another reason that encourages people to give positive response in return to the persons who have offered help. Besides, one other social practice which leads to the continuity of vote-buying behaviour is the emphasis in social life on prestige and hierarchy. Pramoon Chanchamnong observes that, in Thailand, the special privileges are always given to those who have administrative power. Such privileges have made politicians, or broadly speaking the ruling groups, hold on to power no matter whether they have to get to power by buying votes or offering rewards.
to voters. (16) That is the reason why vote-buying behaviour is widely practised and has existed over a long period.

Voting behaviour is another feature of political culture that has an impact on the electoral system and is linked to the instability of democratic government in Thailand. The fact is that many people cast their vote for individual candidates rather than particular parties. The aspects of social organisation and personal relationships, mentioned above can influence people to support a particular individual. Another factor discussed by David Wilson is the informal communication processes in Thai society which encourage rumour and gossip. These rumours, which are very political and partisan, are then reflected in the variety of newspapers. They can have a great influence on the public. (17) This may explain why voting for loyal partisanship is popular among the people.

Such political culture as is mentioned above would neither bring clean elections nor efficient local governments. It is, therefore, suggested by most Thai academics that unless Thailand has its politics reformed any single election would not be of use and would not bring an improvement in political development. Moreover, in the political reform, political philosophy has to be changed so that the ruling groups must run the country to serve only the interests of the people. In addition to that it has to be made clear that politics is not only the affair of politicians or the ruling groups but it is the whole responsibility of all Thais. Otherwise reform or change at any administrative level would not bring more effective administration of governmental organisations.

(3) Public opinion Generally speaking, public opinion toward public policy has been an influence on democratic government. It is believed that representatives from democratic process should serve
the interest of the people but not necessarily comply with their will in deciding questions of public policy. However, there is a question of whether public opinion should be an important independent influence over public policy. V.O. Key clarifies that "government attempts to mold public opinion toward support of the programs and policies it espouses, given that endeavour, perfect congruence between public policy and public opinion could be government of public opinion rather than government by public opinion".(18)

Thomas Dye comments on this matter that public policy may accord with public opinion but it is not certain whether public opinion shapes public policy or public policy shapes public opinion.(19) He says further that there is very little direct evidence in the existing research literature to support the notion that public opinion is an important influence over public policy. In addition to that, many surveys reveal that mass opinion has little influence on the content of public policy. Moreover, studies also indicate that public opinion is unstable and inconsistent. It also implies that public opinion has little policy impact. However, David Wilson argues that public opinion is a political force of some consequence.(20) From that scholars' point of view, it is known that public opinion can be an important element in policy-making only if it attracts the interests of the ruling group as an important political issue.

As has been discussed concerning the issue of governorship election, it does not seem to affect social life so much as the issue of tax reduction or the increase of paddy price. Therefore, the public do not exert any pressure in order to influence the direction of the policy. Although the findings reveal that the public is still in favour of appointed governors, the election of provincial governors may or may not take place. The outcome would rather rest
with the government to take whatever direction would be of benefit to their political parties. If the government believed that provincial administration were the focus of public attention, then politics might become an essential element at provincial level. It means if the election of governors would take place it would be certainly related to political values and power.

(4) Interest groups. Activity by interest groups provides a linkage between environmental forces and public policy. The interest group structure of a society clearly reflects its socio-economic composition. Interest group activity is also linked to party competition, which in turn is related to economic development. (21)

There is evidence in the more developed societies showed that an interest group can determine policy-making in many working areas. On the other hand, in the less developed countries where the majority are poor, and backward, do not produce many activities played by interest groups and not often do the interest groups have an effect on public policy. However, it is argued by Ira Sharkansky and Thomas Dye that interest groups are more directly influential in policy making in the society where the party system is weak and not well developed. In societies where political parties are not strong and cohesive, interest groups play a direct role in legislative matters by intervening and influencing party affairs. In contrast, where political parties are strong and cohesive, interest groups may be more numerous and active but their influence is weakened and moderated by party affairs. (22)

Nevertheless, the above statement is not entirely realistic when it is applied to political situations in Thailand. In the case like Thailand, although the party system is not strong and cohesive, the interest groups have limited opportunity to dominate policy making.
In the past, they did not play a direct role in influencing political affairs. It was only since the mid 90's there are a group of academics who are university lecturers, and researchers at social and political institutes that began to have effect on government movement. The research studies produced by these academics have been used to support their views on political issues. It is obvious that their opinions have affected the government policy making.

Pudhisan Jumbala notes that the limited experience of interest groups is due to the prevention of political activities prohibited by the military ruling groups over a long period. Apart from that, social and economic values are also the main reason for the weak role of interest groups in Thailand. The criticism of David Wilson concerning political groups may be correct that Thailand does not have a well-formed social structure. Neither has there been a complete social organisation. It is also coincident that poorly founded democratic development does not create a sense of political participation among the people. Besides, Wilson comments that Thai democracy is only a slogan accepted by the ruling class. He points out that Thais of all classes resist regimentation, and systematisation. Although the social system requires respect for authority, people including the ruling groups always find room to move. (23) It is, therefore, believed that the failure of interest groups is the result of the social practices and beliefs that prevent people from forming cohesive groups.

In addition to the traditional values mentioned above, the impact of economic development is another main reason for causing people to react politically indifferently. The rapid expansion of economic development, which has changed Thai peasant society into a more industrialised society, has caused social problems in terms of high migration to big cities. In Bangkok for instance, this has resulted
in town congestion, an increase in crime, poverty and illiteracy among school leavers, who choose to leave long before the end of schooling in order to get employment. As a result of social problems, there is indifferent attitude towards politics among people in some parts of the country.

In this respect, the research findings show that the economic development regarding standards of education has a great effect on the attitude toward interest groups. The public gives strong support to the political groups in some respects but feels indifferent to them in many other areas. The insufficient popular support has limited the political role of the interest groups to some extent. Because of the weakness of the interest groups, the ruling parties can continue to abuse the country without strong pressure from them. Without strong pressure groups to keep political balance in the public administration, administrative change at provincial level may not yet be worthwhile.

(5) Military power. Many Thai scholars like Chaianan Samudhavanija, Tinapan Nakata, and Prudhisan Jumbala believe that Thai people are obedient and submissive to those who hold power. Tinapan as cited earlier says that most Thais prefer the use of absolute power.

The above statement concerning the public favourability toward absolute power was right when the country was facing wars. The country at that time needed protection by the Army. It was also correct to say that people are submissive to the ruling class. This might be because the social values and traditional attitudes encouraged people to obey the military's command. In addition, Tinapan Nakata makes a comment on this matter that political and social groups are mainly based on a leader's personality and
individual personality. This makes it possible for people to accept the strong personality of military leaders. (24)

Tinapan Nakata analyses that the traditional social organisation and cultural values made the military become so powerful in politics. He states that the characteristic of social organisation in term of hierarchical setting is the main focus of the Army organisation. Its outstanding hierarchical principle is emphasised on superior-subordinate terms. Such organisation has developed the military into solidarity. The strength of the Army's hierarchical organisation has brought along disciplines of loyalty, respect, and deference to superiors. In addition to that, the military has built up the attitude of nationalism among the soldiers. Besides, the Army has a function of maintaining domestic security. The most important character of the military which is pointed out by Tinapan Nakata is that they are oriented for leadership. Such kind of function and attitudes may have made the military interfere in politics and exercise political control over the democratic government.

Although the research findings reveal that the public is no longer in favour of absolute power, the strength of the Army and the strong relationships in the hierarchical line of superior-subordinate among the military remain an important factor for the military to return to power. In that case, the election of provincial governors would inevitably be affected by the activities of military rule.

(6) **Bureaucratic politics.** The dominant characteristic of the Thai bureaucracy including the Ministry of the Interior is centralisation. The administrative role of governmental organisations was already discussed in detail in chapter 4. In principle, the Ministry of the Interior has decentralised its authority to local administration at provincial level so as to meet the demand for the
decentralisation of power. However, it is claimed to be a
distribution of workload from the central office to local office.
This is not a question of decentralised power between the central
office and provincial government as the two organisations are the
location of subordinate and executive branches. They are, at
provincial level, supervised by the appointed governor who is
responsible to the Ministry of the Interior. By way of contrast, the
autonomous units of local self-government especially the Provincial
Administrative Organisation (PAO) is in a separate level where the
Ministry of the Interior exercises no direct control over them.
However, in particular administration of provincial council, a unit
of PAO, the Ministry of the Interior still maintains its power over
decision-making, personnel, and finance. The kind of centralisation
of power has been one of the causes that has sparked off conflicts
between government officials particularly provincial governors and
local politicians, the elected members of provincial councils.

The research findings reveal that both sides (public
administrators and politicians at local and national level) are the
cause of conflicts concerning provincial administration. David Wilson
and Clark Neher confirm that the Thai civil service as a whole is a
centre of conflicts for power. (25) The civil service of the ministry
of the Interior is organised on functional lines in many departments.
Within the Ministry, Wilson comments that it lacks the unity and
hierarchy of public services which would be necessary for it to take
a dynamic part as a single organisation. Many scholars such as David
Wilson, William Siffin, James Mosel, and Fred Riggs as discussed
earlier confirm that there is politics in any level of administrative
organisations. From their views, it is said that, in the sphere of
public administration, it happens that a government official can rise
to a position of prominence and power. In the meantime, because the
co-operation of the public administration is important to the
politicians who are in office, it is most important for a political party to get mutual support from the government officials. In this regard, Chaianan Samudhavanija mentions that either government officials or politicians seek support from each other so as to hold office for power. As a result, the findings indicate that many public administrators do not perform their functions in serving politicians of different political parties neutrally. Therefore, the complaints made by the politicians not only concern the centralisation of public administration but also the non-neutral functions carried out by the public administrators.

Chaianan Samudhavanija also views his opinion about the influence of public administrators and politicians in the budgeting process. In his comment, he mentions that a budget is not simply a document containing government revenue and expenditure estimates, but basically a political document expressing the government's philosophy and goals. He remarks as well that since Thailand is a bureaucratic polity in which the bureaucrats as well as the politicians who hold the executive power are the dominant political elite, government expenditure is very much influenced by both the public administrators and the politicians.

It can be inferred that politics within bureaucracy is not supportive to political situation at local level unless the overall political reform has been made to upgrade politics to the extent that it benefits the majority of people.

8.1.3 The policy outcomes

In testing the policy on governorship elections as a dependent variable by measuring the attitude of the respondents, it is found that over half (59.6 %) of the general public, 62.7 % of the
government officials, and 85% of the public administrators show an unfavourable attitude toward the idea of electing provincial governors. Only the politicians who were interviewed agree with the policy. The research result is consistent with the hypothesis concerning the favourable attitude of the public toward appointed governors.

When the respondents' attitudes are measured in depth, the findings reveal that socio-economic conditions affect wide areas of the political system. Such effects can reflect the negative outcomes of the governorship election to a large extent. Considering the theoretical framework and research findings, social values have been an important factor influencing many aspects of the political culture. Such aspects of the political culture have been identified as behaviour of vote-buying and the method of casting votes, and political participation. According to Samuel Beer (mentioned at the beginning of this chapter), values, beliefs, and emotional attitudes enable the political culture to affect political action. Due to the social values and political culture, political parties at any level cannot be developed to the degree that they can form a stable and efficient administrative assembly. Therefore, administrative change at provincial level would not yet be effective.

Regarding economic development, the findings indicate that educational background and low income status of the respondents encourage the existence of vote-buying behaviour which would be a major obstacle to the election of provincial governors. Educational background of the population also limits the growth of the party system as the findings show that high numbers of the people are in favour of partisanship. The secondary documents concerning the level of education in Thailand (displayed in chapter 3) show a small number of the population attending advanced education. Due to the lack of
education of the mass population, it can be inferred that the tendency to choose individual candidates among the Thai people would be high. Should there be election of provincial governors such findings would not bring out an effective provincial administration. Neither would it bring a solidarity of local governments.

With regard to the political influence of particular interest groups on the ruling party, the findings show that the educational backgrounds of the people still deter the interest groups from taking part in political activities. Following the findings, without strong pressure from the interest groups, the ruling party would be able to continue exploiting national resources and abusing public administration. That would also bring discredit on the administration at provincial level.

Another factor that seems not to support the possibility of governorship election is the bureaucratic organisation. It concerns organisational structure, procedures and government officials participating in the bureaucracy. The characteristic of administrative centralisation revealed in the study is one of the reasons that made the politicians agree to the election of governors. From the perspective of the governorship election, the politicians believe that the decentralisation of government authority would be made to the provincial councils. Furthermore, the organisations would be free from the interference of government officials. Regarding the performance of public administrators, the findings indicate that the way in which public administrators carry out their functions and react to political parties is not neutral. In addition to that the findings also show the strong belief among the general public and the government officials that corruption and fraud have been committed by the public administrators as well.
The only element which is confirmed by the research findings which might not affect the policy on election of governors is the public attitude toward the military. The findings show that a large number of the respondents are in favour of democratic government rather than military rule. However, they believe that the democratic government is not so efficient, because corruption is widely practised among politicians.

In testing the respondents' attitude concerning the impact of the policy toward socio-economic situation and some elements of the political system, over 50% of the respondents are convinced that the policy would not be useful. The majority of the respondents believe that vote-buying which exists would have an influence on the local election. That is why more than 60% of them do not agree that provincial administration would be run more effectively by elected members. These findings are also confirmed by the majority of public administrators. However, the findings show a positive impact of governorship election that might strengthen party system because local governments might be able to create fundamental base for a national political party.

In conclusion, the policy on election of provincial governors affects a wide range of politics. It involves the social and cultural setting of the society. Since the political culture continues to be reinforced through the social life in Thai society, it does not seem to be supportive to the development of the political process. Thus, the results of the research findings concerning the conceptualised variables reveal almost no positive outlook for the election of provincial governors.

However, comment has been made by Tinapan Nakata that, in Thai tradition, change has been mainly initiated from within the culture.
and by its own political leadership.(27) Even though the findings show indirect support for the election of governors by political parties, the latest news from the Bangkok Post dated April 27, 1997 revealed that General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, the Prime Minister of Thailand and the leader of the main coalition government party, plans to have the bureaucracy reformed. According to the Bangkok Post, after the nation's Eighth Plan (from 1997-2001) the central government sectors will be reduced to small units. The central units will have to cede some responsibility to local bodies or private sectors. This can be seen as a first step in the administrative change, although the policy on election of governors has not been adopted. The idea to have a gradual change is in response to the attitude towards the centralised bureaucracy which has long been identified as the core element to be changed. It also supports Nakata's statement that administrative change is normally initiated by leadership attitude.

With regard to the discussion in the foregoing chapter concerning the provincial governor acting as head of all government officials in a province, it is difficult to run effective administration without authority rendered by the central offices. He has no direct control over personnel who are the representatives of the central units. This is an example of the centralised manner of the bureaucracy which has been called to change.

In this context, as a recommendation on public administration, it would be useful to bring about Weber's ideal type of bureaucracy cited by Ira Sharkansky, where he refers to the principles of managing a large organisation. He also regards this as the archetypal or pure manifestation of bureaucracy. He says that it may not be the best system but can be best applied to many government
bureaucracies. Therefore, it could be applied to Thai public administration.

In the provinces, according to his idea, there should be clear lines of control from superiors to subordinates through a system of hierarchy; several units should be grouped under the control of the provincial governor. Thus there will be a clear chain of command and communication so that the governor can take direct control over his subordinates and be assured that his directives will control his subordinates in order that he can organise the public administration more effectively. Besides, provincial governors should have sufficient authority to appoint and remove subordinates for the reasons of organisational discipline and efficiency of personnel at work. Sharkansky also agrees with Weber's type of bureaucracy. In his opinion it is supposed to be one of the best ways to organise administrative personnel to maintain control over subordinates so that appropriate decisions can be made on the basis of leadership. In his support of Weber's views, he states that personnel appointments and promotion should be made on the basis of competence, with no interference from politicians seeking to reward fellow partisans.

On the other hand, Sharkansky refers to Roberto Michel's idea which also supports superior power. In his reference, Michels accepts that there is an iron law of oligarchy in organisations in which members of the organisation do not wield equal power; some may have more time to devote to the organisation and others may be more skilful in working and using information and persuading colleagues to accept them in leadership. His explanation implies that formal organisation is provided with a hierarchical structure of leadership. Therefore, as a chief executive of the province, the governor should become an actual leader who has power to control staff management and budget expenditure like other chiefs at central level.
In this regard, the line control of the Ministry of the Interior over local self-government units should also be reviewed. In the context of administrative decentralisation, power should be given to local administration including municipal, tambon, and provincial organisations. Thus, they can be independent units having greater control in the management of revenue, personnel, and decision-making.

In the future, election of provincial governors may happen. However, by that time the political process, including the political culture and social organisation, may have been reformed by the Committee for Political Reform. People will have learned to practise and understand more about democratic process. The political system and leaders may have been seen to exercise moral authority effectively to govern and to control political and social change. Then, the Thai society may be ready to accept the radical change at provincial level. It should also be appropriate to adopt the policy on election of provincial governors.

8.2 Suggestions and Recommendations

Thailand is among the developing countries in Southeast Asia that experience severe problems in finding a stable legitimate political party to rule the country. The notion of legitimacy across the board in countries like Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand is different but contains every shade of regime including military and personal dictatorships, and quasi democracies.(28)

Besides, Thailand and many other developing countries confront the long standing issues of state elite and mass political culture. Chaianan Samudhavanija believes that the political pattern designed
and used in western countries is inappropriate for political systems in Southeast Asia. This is because the relationship between state and society is more complicated and multi-dimensional than in western countries where the original democratic system has been applied. Besides, in Asian societies, change largely involves adjustment through force. Conflict concerning ideology of political groups, or socio-economic and political issues might be solved violently rather than through talks among the parties involved. In addition, Chaianan Samudhavanija describes Thailand as a semidemocratic state. (29) He explains that rapid socio-economic changes have not transformed the Thai bureaucratic polity into a democracy but rather into a liberal technocratic state which is not democratic. In this system Chaianan mentions that the politics of liberalisation takes place at the upper level of state society relations, making the bureaucratic authoritarian polity utilise its political and economic controls in order to accelerate the rapid economic growth and utilise considerable resources. Hence, he does not believe that this liberalising process should be identified as the democratisation of the society since this process is not in the interests of the whole nation. It only circulates political power within certain groups without benefiting the mass of the population.

The major problems confronting many developing countries including Thailand are economic and social obstacles. Therefore, much of what goes on in politics in these countries is aimed at removing the obstacles by reforming the social, economic, and political structure. However, not many countries can make significant progress toward this goal. This is because the difficulty lies in the features of values, attitudes, modes of thinking, and forms of interpersonal relationships which are not supportive of political and economic reform. Additionally, these countries also suffer from being "multiple societies". (30) The multiple society is described as a
divided social order consisting of two separate social systems that are bound together by a single set of economic, political, and legal limitations. The two divided segments of the multiple society are urban and rural areas. These two segments are wide apart and exhibit discrepancy in terms of socio-economic and political functions.

In consequence, the characteristics of multiple societies have caused tension and difficulties to these countries for their political modernisation entailing political stability, development, and participation. The political institutions which are used as a social form to modernise these countries are also influenced by the multiple societies. The formation of political institutions is to do with social modernisation of a country. Therefore, when political parties emerge from a society that is affected by the forces of modernisation - communications, economic development, the disruption of traditional social forms and attitudes, it could lead to the lack of an organisational framework to discipline itself.

With reference to the case of Thailand regarding the research findings, educational and economic conditions are important factors that have a large effect on politics in terms of causing political instability. Meanwhile, as noted by many scholars, social and cultural values also have some negative effects on political development. The weakness of the socio-economic situations in Thailand is partly the result of the debilitating political problems caused by such regimes as those mentioned above.

In relation to socio-economic situations, suggestions and recommendations were made by most respondents that the standard of living among Thais should be upgraded to enable people to have a good quality of life and well-being. Such economic status could reflect the quality of the government and could be a great influence on the
political system in terms of party organisation, voting behaviour, and the organisation of social groups. To many scholars, elections and the way people vote are influenced by their economic status.

On the other hand, a suggestion concerning the provision of political education was also made by the respondents. Hence, the political culture practised in Thai society such as vote-buying or voting in return for favours could be eliminated or diminished through political education. Such education would also encourage a political move into a modern democratic society. Moreover, social and cultural values which are not advantageous to Thai democracy would be learned and recognised by the people through political education.

Political education is essential for every pupil in school and young adult in further education. This is because political education is seen primarily in terms of developing the knowledge, skill, personality and disposition of political literacy. With political literacy, a pupil, student or young citizen should be able to cope with the political issues and problems in everyday life that come to them either direct or through newspapers or broadcasting media. Thus, political education is fundamental to the process of developing young men and women into a politically literate society. Particularly, in the case of Thailand where the majority of people are politically passive and exploited by the ruling party of the day, political knowledge should be a key determining factor that could solve many of the current political problems.

Furthermore, training in good citizenship for a democratic society and for the future prosperity and progress of the country can be achieved through political education. However, it is understood that democracy, in order to succeed and be sustained, requires a high
degree of education for its young citizens. Accordingly, free education should be compulsory and provided to all Thais up to at least high school level so that the people could obtain a reasonable level of literacy.

Additionally, it has been noted that social and cultural values have affected the political socialisation and political process. Hence, one of the significant aspects of education for individuals is their adaptation to the system of political socialisation in the country. Since culture is an important value to politics, it should be considered carefully to what extent it should be preserved, spread, or promoted. Therefore, politics could be developed without being hindered by particular cultural values.

However, by understanding politics, children should perceive other aspects of education appertaining to their own background. To Thai society, moral and religious education are among the most important aspects of education for individuals. As such, young children must be instructed wider in the teaching of Buddhism or other religions. Therefore, good behaviour such as mercy, honesty, generosity and so on could be fundamental to the people's daily life. People would act loyally and behave with responsibility as they value loyalty and duty. Furthermore, morals and good behaviour could be regarded as the guiding principles for our society. Thus, when the young become adults and engage themselves in any occupation, morality, good values and attitudes would be built in to them so that they would be aware of any consequences that may occur from their actions.

When teaching politics, it is important to apply political socialisation as it involves the creation of citizens with a commitment to the country. R.E. Dawson defines political socialisation as one type of relationship the individuals have with
the political system in which they live. They form political outlooks as a result of relationships they have with that political system and with various groups and individuals that are part of it. At the individual level political socialisation may be defined very simply as the process through which an individual acquires his or her particular political orientations—knowledge, feelings, and evaluations regarding the political world.(33)

Accordingly, the socialisation process tends to be gradual and to extend from early childhood into adulthood. It appears that basic political attitudes are acquired first: loyalty toward the society. Secondly, it comes to more specific attitudes such as broad identification with a political party, then attitudes that may be as specific as a stance on some particular policy or programme. In that way, students will learn to adjust themselves to political participation.

However, as far as Thai politics is concerned, people do not have a clear concept of what justifies the right to rule. Equally, other political concepts such as political philosophy and ideology, the political roles played by all parties concerned, and so on have not been well presented. Reference to the problems of Thai politics that have caused the delay in political development has already been made. These are not good signs for the election of provincial governors. Thus, whatever approaches are used for political education, the principle of political involvement should be made apparent. It is important in this regard to introduce the political concepts stated by Derek Heater which should be learned in order to improve political development of the country. According to Derek Heater, the subject matter of politics that should be taught can be analysed into six primary concepts.
1) **Ideas.** The primary concept of ideas may be analysed into three subordinate concepts which are labelled as philosophy, historical background, and practical effects. A system of political ideas may be based on the Thai fundamental philosophy of belief in the quality of life. In studying the philosophy, it is necessary to study not only the original doctrine but also to understand its evolution, and perhaps distortion through time. The time factor is crucial to historical background, by which is meant the original circumstances in which the doctrine was first formulated as well as the historical framework within which it evolved. Finally, ideas have practical effects. For example, people may study the adoption of ideas by groups or political parties and the importance of their acceptance. This concept can be taught through political education.

2) **Administration.** Embodied ideas are powerful only with an administrative network to bring them to realisation. The term administration is used to embrace within this concept both the institutions and the personnel who operate them. In analysing institutions, it is clearly necessary to differentiate between those that operate on national and local levels. At the national level, it is important to distinguish between federal and unitary systems of government as different techniques of arranging the exercise of authority. At local level, the demarcation of administrative responsibility as well as decentralised or centralised ideas should be differentiated. In both subordinate concepts, the issues of personnel, the functions of both politicians and civil servants as well as the relationship between them in the formulation and execution of policy must be studied.

3) **Leadership and Decision-making.** An analysis of the concept of leadership and decision-making requires a slightly more complex process. However, in studying the concept of leadership, it is
necessary to look at the rise of the leader, which in turn involves a study of his or her social origins and the process of their rise to power. Additionally, it is necessary to understand the activity of the leader in power, the nature of his or her personal authority over their colleagues and subordinates, the nature of their control over or support by the mass population, and the way in which they utilise the machinery of power. Leaders may keep for themselves all important powers for decision-making. On the other hand, in an effective democracy their decisions would be influenced by the corporate opinion of the members of constitutional bodies, for instance parliament, and interest groups.

4) Role of the individual. The importance of this concept in the study of a society is basically dependent upon the degree of participation allowed for in the political system. In a society like Thailand where the citizen is comparatively passive, this condition must be clearly understood. The concept of the role of the individual is particularly important because it includes not only the subordinate concepts of voting and activism, but of socialisation as well. However, a consciousness of the nature and process of socialisation is the important part in any programme of political education.

In this connection, people must understand the process of socialisation as well as the sources of information which are open to the individual and which can help to formulate attitudes. For "voting" to be effective, it is necessary to understand the philosophy and ideology of the political parties involved. Under "activism" one must note the operation of the individual as a part of individual through the constitutional machinery, the organisation, and the activity of interest groups.
5) Techniques of change. Political or administrative change can be brought about either peacefully or violently. There are three ways of achieving change peacefully. Firstly, there is the control of opinion. This can be affected either by the government itself or by independent information media. Secondly, it can be made through interest groups, and here it is important to distinguish between their organisation and their techniques. And finally, change may be brought about by new laws.

On the other hand, violent means of change may be subdivided into two categories: the change of policy by a government in the face of violence, and the change of government as the result of violent action. In the first category, the violence may take the form of a demonstration, or more seriously a rebellion. In the second, a government may be changed by coup d'etat or by revolution.

In Thai historical events, changes which were made by means of violence did not produce stable or successful political products. Nevertheless, Thai people should be aware of this kind of change so as to avoid its repetition.

6) Conflict Conflicts may conveniently be viewed either from the point of view of cause or of their nature. Four type of causes may be identified as ideological, social, economic, and political. In its nature, a conflict may be peaceful or violent. If violent, it may take the form of civil war, revolution, coup d'etat, rebellion or demonstration.

Thai history shows to great effect that political conflict results in political instability. Most of the time the conflict concerns the sharing of benefits among the ruling party, both civilian and military groups. In this regard, in order to improve the political
development, the parties involved must understand that political conflict should be made only to affect the interests of the population.

However, understanding of the above-mentioned political concepts as well as social and political changes needs the understanding of a complicated network of decisions and events in the past society. This is because political history can be a meaningful subject that teaches children how the country fared under different political situations. Moreover, such history would teach them to make fewer political mistakes.

Admittedly, politics is concerned with history. The word "politics" refers to both an activity and to the study of that activity. As an activity, politics is a social system not necessarily confined to the level of the national state by which the goals of the system are selected, ordered in priority concerning resource allocation, and implemented. It thus involves co-operation and the resolution of conflicts, by means of the exercise of political authority, and if necessary, coercion. Politics usually involves the activities of groups of various kinds including political parties, and interest groups. The roles played by these political groups will not be a benefit to the country unless they are well-developed through the record of the past. Meanwhile, political ideas will be set up and implemented productively and the rise to power of political groups will be permanent if the parties involved understand the values long existing in Thai society.

Derek Heater states that politics is the present of history. The political historian's prime concern is with the political events of the past, and that present political activity is history in the making. Thus, politics are said to be lacking in refinement when
they are not viewed favourably by history, and history transferred into mere literature when it loses sight of its relation to practical politics. (34) 

Therefore, in order to operate effectively as a citizen of a stable democratic society, it is necessary for Thai people to have a basic knowledge of how the system works by learning through civic culture and the political events of the past. From that, the norm of interpersonal relationships in the social environment which penetrates political attitudes is a necessary feature of the country's democratic stabilisation. However, a stable government, secure society, and national unity need discipline, and social responsibility lies close to the hearts of all people. The uniformity in various aspects of organisational systems will help to promote the sense of belonging to Thailand, sharing a common identity, and values as Thais.

In consequence, the notion of legitimacy, which is supposed to play a large part in justifying effective government and how the government can develop strategies for managing political change, will be recognised by the ruling parties and the people. Further, people of all classes will respect rules or regulations which would lead to a good quality of Thai social system. The legitimacy then would be recognised by all parties under the specific historical and political circumstances so that political and economic situations would be stable long-term. Subsequently, the performance of both political and economic aspects would appear to be sufficient criteria in terms of the claim to the right to rule. Besides, the political aspects concerning the behaviour of voting, vote-buying, and corruption which are prevalent, leading to the highly ineffective political system and inefficient government, would be eliminated.
8.3 Conclusion

It can be summarised that Thailand needs permanent and stable democratic politics. A stable democratic government needs to be established and maintained so that it could strengthen the economic situation as well as smooth the public administration. To establish an effective democratic government, one must be perceived to be acting in the public interest and not reject the studies of social reformers and the processes affecting the prospect for formally instituting democracy. In this regard, Paul Burstein explains that in sociological studies of politics, political activities of voters, political parties and the others involved, who have an influence on political situations must be considered, so that they can have an impact on government policies. (35) Therefore, the positive effects in wide areas of social life would be accurately responded to by the government.

With regard to the stability of democracy, Seymour Martin Lipset believes that it has to be institutionalised, and consolidated, to become legitimate. (36) Nevertheless, he is convinced that such democracy requires an appropriate culture that is supportive to stable democracy, the acceptance by the citizens, human rights, and stable economic development. The analysis of Alexis de Tocqueville also supports the idea that social equality in terms of status and respect for individuals regardless of economic conditions contributes to democratic stability. (37)

Regarding the institutionalisation of democracy in Thailand, the view points of the above mentioned scholars must be considered by the establishment. Furthermore, such important elements as legitimacy, electoral system, popular participation, political parties, rules and
laws, which are relevant to the current political situation should be perceived.

Legitimacy of effective democratic government needs the citizens to obey rules and respect the symbol of authority. Even though they do not like the ruling groups who enforce the rules, such a democratic authority can be changed through electoral procedures. Opposing and disobeying rules to fragile democratic governments, including Thailand, may partly affect the political instability. Actually, these countries seem likely to be less legitimate since the actual performances of the governments do not satisfy the basic needs of the population and key power groups. They are likely to collapse in the face of a crisis regardless of their power and rapid economic success. Their low acceptance by the citizens are also due to the inefficient and corrupt behaviour of the ruling groups.

Concerning the corrupt regime of the powerful ruling party, it is believed that it not only leads to the ineffectiveness of public administration but of the breakdown of state economy. For the societal development, such a regime should be removed completely. Lipset suggests that in order to limit the power of the ruling elite, standards of propriety have to be increased in poor regimes, although it may be facilitated by an efficient civil service selected by meritocratic standards. It also takes time for the civil service reforms to take hold in those countries. In addition to the aforementioned points, these countries suffer from autocratic regimes which take hold of power intermittently. However, authoritarian regimes that come to power through force are less stable than democratic ones. Additionally, the autocrats are less powerful than those with democratic ideas. They do not have as much popular support as democratic rulers since the latter group focus more attention on public needs. Nevertheless, the democratic governments
of these developing countries, especially Thailand, have to create stronger public confidence by establishing legitimacy. Consequently, the autocratic regimes would be replaced permanently.

Democratic systems benefit because the people have the opportunity to take part in politics, as well as those in power. Thus the electorate become part of the legitimating structure. In a developing country like Thailand, people may not gain as much benefit from the system as the ruling party, but the electorate are still able to work for change in government. Such a privilege is not given to them in a period of military regime. In this system, the electorate are also able to choose the more efficient party. However, they must be prepared to accept political participation and not ignore political affairs. Therefore, they must stand up as strong political interest groups so that no ruling party could abuse the power and politically dominate the country for their own interests. According to Lipset, a strong civil society encourages a stable system of democracy. In this connection, the citizens then must belong to the politically relevant groups in order that their activities could affect the government policies. Besides, the citizens must be encouraged to increase education of individuals for innovative activities so that modern civil society would become an effective political group.

In order to produce a strong and stable political party to become a vital device for facilitating a formation of popular will, the people, or in other words, the citizens must become the foundation of support for political parties. In consequence, the citizens could have their wishes recognised by the government through the political parties as they are part of them. On the other hand, the political parties themselves should be regarded as effective mediating bodies between the people and the government. They should consider themselves as genuine popular representatives of the public,
representing their needs to the government. Furthermore, they must create clear political ideology and policies so as to attract a significant base of popular support because it is an important condition for a stable democratic government. Otherwise, the country would continue to have a multi-party system forming a coalition government which is always destabilised by policies that only pay lip-service to democracy.

Nonetheless, it is of the utmost significance in democratic societies, especially Thailand, that the rules of law must be obeyed by all parties. It has been discussed that most parties seem to avoid rules and regulations. Many scholars have also commented that the social structure of Thailand is loose and regimentation is absent among its people. Therefore, the enforcement of laws need to be implemented and maintained. In doing so, the rules of law can be a key element of predictability and stability of not only the politics but also of economic development and popular well-being. Lipset comments that the reinforcement of laws results in the tightening of loose structured social systems with the effect that people of all classes would be treated by government administration as equals.
Footnotes


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Appendix 1

Names of selected provinces and districts

Chiengmai - Muang, and Sameng
Lumpoon - Muang, and Ban-hong
Surajathanee - Muang, and Koa-Paknan
Chumporn - Muang, and Samae
Srakaew - Muang, and Wangnamyen
Nonthaburi - Muang, and Sainoi
Khonken - Muang, and Banpai
Chaiyapum - Muang, and Puddeechumpon
Apendice 2

Questionnaire A

Note 1. This questionnaire is constructed in order to obtain facts and opinions with regard to the public administration under the appointed governors and political issue from the government officials working in the province. All answers will be extremely useful to the study of governorship election. All replies to the following questions are confidential.

Note 2. Please fill in or mark a tick ( ) in the appropriate space.

Part 1

1. Sex: ( ) male ( ) female
2. Age: ......... years
3. Education ( ) High School
   ( ) Diploma
   ( ) Bachelor's Degree
   ( ) Master's Degree
   ( ) PhD
   ( ) Others Please indicate.................
4. What agency do you work for? ..................
5. How long have you worked in the civil service?............years
6. How long have you been working in this province?.......years
7. What is your position classification?

( ) grade 1  ( ) grade 6
( ) grade 2  ( ) grade 7
( ) grade 3  ( ) grade 8
( ) grade 4
( ) grade 5

8. Please indicate the name of the province where the respondent is living. ..................

Part 2

1. Generally, the provincial governor performs his duties efficiently. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

2. Generally, do you agree that democratic government has run the country effectively?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

3. Generally, provincial governor performs his duties neutrally towards political parties during or between elections. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

4. Provincial governor should continue working under the Ministry of the Interior. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
5. Local politicians, particularly the members of provincial council, understand the procedures of public administration well. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

6. Local politicians, particularly the members of provincial council, cause trouble to government officials especially provincial governor. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

7. National politicians cause trouble for government officials especially provincial governor. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

8. National politicians always use their power to influence public matters. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

9. When there is a row between public administrators and politicians, what is the motive behind the conflicts?

( ) Public spending

( ) Misuse of political authority

( ) Factionalism

( ) Others please indicate ........................................

10. Should there be election of provincial governors, it would help to strengthen national political party. Do you agree
11. Provincial administration will be run more effectively by elected governors. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

12. Should there be governorship elections, do you think that successful military coups will have a negative impact on the election?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

13. What do you think the effect would be?
- Using a lot of public funds
- The public might lose interest in repeating election
- Public administration might be less efficient under military rule
- Other effect, please specify ..........................

14. Within the process of budgeting, senior public administrators always use their influence in order to gain more of the budget. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

15. Within the process of budgeting, politicians at both levels use their power in order to have their planned development programmes endorsed in their constituencies. Do you agree or disagree?
16. Do you agree that vote-buying has taken place in your province?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

17. Do you agree that vote-buying affects political development in Thailand?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

18. Do you agree that vote-buying should be stopped?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

19. What method should be used to stop vote-buying?

..............................................

20. Do you agree that vote-buying has led to bribery and corruption among politicians, particularly the members of the ruling parties?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

21. It is said that government officials, including senior public administrators, also commit fraud. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22. Do you agree with the idea of having provincial governors elected?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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23. Should there be governorship elections, the provincial administration will be run more efficiently by those elected. Do you agree or disagree?

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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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24. Having governorship elections will help to improve politics in terms of creating a sense of political participation among people. Do you agree or disagree?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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25. If yes, do you agree that interest groups should play a stronger role in keeping the balance with the ruling groups?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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26. Do you prefer democratic government to military government?

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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
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<th>Disagree</th>
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</table>

27. In the ballot, do you cast your vote for a party system or an individual?

( ) party system ( ) individual candidate
( ) either of the above

28. Do you agree that vote-buying would affect the election of provincial governors?
29. Elected governors, who will be under various political parties, might cause disciplinary problems concerning provincial administration with the superior who are attached to different party. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

30. How often do you take part in the elections?

Frequently sometimes rarely never

( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

Thank you for your cooperation
Appendice 3

Questionnaire B

Note 1. This questionnaire is constructed in order to obtain facts and opinions with regard to the public administration under the appointed governors and political issue from the local residents living in the province. All answers will be extremely useful to the study of governorship election. All replies to the following questions are confidential.

Note 2. Please fill in or mark a tick ( ) in the appropriate space.

Part 1

1. Sex: ( ) male    ( ) female
2. Age: ...... years
3. Education   ( ) Basic literacy
   ( ) Primary school
   ( ) Secondary School
   ( ) High School
   ( ) Diploma
   ( ) Bachelor's Degree
   ( ) Master's Degree
   ( ) PhD
   ( ) Others Please indicate.................
4. Location: Province............ ( ) live in town
   ( ) live in district area
5. Occupation: ( ) civil servant
   ( ) armed forces
Part 1

6. Marital status: (  ) single (  ) married
   (  ) divorced (  ) widowed

7. Income of the family ............ Baht (per month)

8. How many people are there in your household? ........

Part 2

1. Generally, the provincial governor performs his duties efficiently. Do you agree or disagree?
   Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
   (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  )

2. Provincial governor should continue working under the Ministry of the Interior. Do you agree or disagree?
   Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
   (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  )

3. Should there be election of provincial governors, provincial administration may run more effectively? Do you agree or disagree?
   Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
   (  ) (  ) (  ) (  ) (  )
4. Generally, Do you agree that democratic government has run the country effectively?

<table>
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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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5. Should there be governorship elections, successful military coups will have a negative impact on the election and may shorten the office term of the elected governors. Do you agree or disagree?

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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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6. Do you agree that vote-buying has affected political development in Thailand?

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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<th>Undecided</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
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7. Do you agree that vote-buying should be stopped?

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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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8. Do you agree that vote-buying has led to bribery and corruption among politicians, particularly the members of the ruling parties?

<table>
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<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
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9. Do you agree that vote-buying leads to the inefficiency in a democratic government?

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<thead>
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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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<th>Undecided</th>
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10. It is said that government officials, including senior public administrators, also commit fraud. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

11. Do you agree with the idea that provincial governors should be elected?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

12. Should there be governorship elections, the provincial administration will be run more efficiently by those of elected. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

13. Should there be election of provincial governors, it would help to strengthen national political party as people would gain more understanding concerning political affairs. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

14. Having governorship elections will help to improve politics in terms of creating a sense of political participation among people. Do you agree or disagree?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

15. Do you agree that interest groups should play a stronger role in keeping the balance with the ruling groups?

Strongly Agree Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly Disagree
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
16. Do you prefer democratic government to military government?  
<table>
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17. In the ballot, do you cast your vote for a party system or an individual?  
( ) party system ( ) individual candidate ( ) others, please indicate

18. During election campaigns, have you ever receive reward from candidates or political parties.  
<table>
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<th>Often</th>
<th>sometimes</th>
<th>rarely</th>
<th>never</th>
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19. During election campaigns, have the candidates or political parties offered you money or gifts in return from your vote?  
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Often</th>
<th>sometimes</th>
<th>rarely</th>
<th>never</th>
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20. How often do you take part in the elections?  
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<tr>
<th>Frequently</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>rarely</th>
<th>never</th>
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21. What method do you think that could be used to stop vote-buying? ..................................................

22. Do you agree that vote-buying would affect the election of provincial governors?  
<table>
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<th>Strongly Agree</th>
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</table>
23. Elected governors, who are be under various political parties, might cause disciplinary problems concerning provincial administration with the superior who are attached to different party. Do you agree?

Strongly Agree  Agree  Undecided  Disagree  Strongly Disagree

(  )  (  )  (  )  (  )  (  )

Thank you for your cooperation
Interview A
(A guideline to question public administrators)

1. Sex: (  ) male   (  ) female
2. Age: ............years
3. position classification .............
4. Education ..........................
5. This question concerns provincial governors. Do you have any difficulty dealing with local politicians with regard to programme development concerning provincial administration organisation?
6. This question concerns provincial governors. Do the local politicians or MPs exert power over provincial administration?
7. Would you agree with the demand for governorship election?
8. Would you think that provincial administration would be more achievable under the supervision of an elected governor.
9. Has any vote-buying taken place in your area during election campaigns?
10. Would you think that vote-buying has damaged political development to any degree?
11. Vote-buying seems to be on the increase. What do you think would stop such behaviour?
12. Are you interested in being a politician yourself after retirement?
Appendix 5

Interview B
(A guideline to question MPs)

1. Sex: ( ) male ( ) female
2. Age: .............years
3. Name of constituency .................
4. Education .........................
5. The political party to which affiliated ............
6. Do you think that the provincial governor of your province has performed his duties efficiently?
7. Do you think that the provincial governor of your province has acted towards political parties or individual politicians equally?
8. Do you think that provincial administration under the management of the appointed governors has been implemented effectively?
9. Do you agree with the demand for governorship election?
10. Do you think that provincial administration would be more achievable under the supervision of an elected governor.
11. Do you think that senior administrators have too much control over budget spending especially at provincial level?
12. Have you experienced vote-buying?
13. Do you think that vote-buying has damaged political development in a large degree?
14. What action do you think would stop such behaviour?
Appendix 6

Interview C
(A guideline to question local politicians)

1. Sex: ( ) male ( ) female
2. Age: ..............years
3. Name of constituency .................
4. Education ............................
5. The political party to which affiliated............... 
6. Do you think that the provincial governor of your province has performed his duties efficiently?
7. Do you think that the provincial governor of your province has acted towards political parties or individual politicians equally?
8. Do you think that provincial administration under the management of the appointed governors has been implemented effectively?
9. Do you agree with the demand for governorship election?
10. Do you think that the current rules and regulations concerning provincial council are appropriate?
11. Do you think that it is appropriate for the provincial council to be chaired by the governor?
12. Do you think that provincial administration would be more achievable under the supervision of an elected governor?
13. Do you think that senior administrators have too much control over budget spending especially at provincial level?
14. Have you ever been involved with vote-buying?
15. Do you think that vote-buying has damaged political development in a large degree?
16. What action do you think would stop such behaviour?