An Enquiry on the Morality and the Self of Managers Through a Jungian Perspective

Cécile Rozuel

School of Management
University of Surrey

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« We only need morality out of a lack of love, let’s repeat it, and that is why, of morality, we need so much! It is love that commands, but love is lacking: love commands in its absence, and by its very absence. »

André Comte-Sponville
*Petit traité des grandes vertus*

« It’s all a question of imagination. Our responsibility begins with the power to imagine. It’s just as Yeats said: In dreams begin responsibility. Turn this on its head and you could say that where there’s no power to imagine, no responsibility can arise. »

Haruki Murakami
*Kafka on the shore*
ABSTRACT

Business ethics research has developed along three main lines: the ethics of the business institution and the economic laws from which it derives; the ethics of the business organisation, and the issue of ascribing moral responsibility to a non-physical entity; and the ethics of the business actor (Wood, 1991a). Focusing on the latter level of enquiry, we argue that understanding the ethics of business actors requires to articulate why and how ethical people sometimes do unethical things, and why and how sometimes they abstain from doing so.

In order to investigate this “grey zone” (Levi, 1989), we focused on the moral perception and moral experiences of managers. Managers often occupy a key position in organisations, acting as an interface with various organisational and external stakeholders. Furthermore, managers face issues of a moral dimension almost everyday (Carroll, 2002). Moral philosophers and business ethicists have both endeavoured to define the moral character of management. In particular, Virtue Ethics in the tradition of Aristotle (1992), or interpreted by MacIntyre (1985) or Solomon (1992; 2002), has challenged the traditional approach to the issue of personal morality and emphasizes individual reflection on, and practice of, the virtues and of phronesis (practical wisdom). This important moral element remains ill-defined however. Psychology-based studies have attempted to decipher the process of ethical decision-making, but they have failed to consider the individual as a whole, rather than as an essentially cognitive or emotional being. Carl Jung’s view of the psyche (1977; 2001b) is characteristically opposed to such approach. The archetypal self, representing the essence of the individual, is construed as the centre of the psyche, itself constituted by the conscious, the personal unconscious and a collective unconscious. In a Jungian perspective, achieving one’s individuality, that is becoming “individuated”, enables the person to relate to an ethical conscience, which is connected to the self and transcends the moral rules set up by customs and social habits (Jung, 1978b; 2002).

Adopting an interpretivist perspective, a study was designed to explore the relevance of this conceptual framework and provide new elements to better understand the moral experiences of managers. Twenty-five managers were interviewed, and seven cases were analysed in depth. The findings suggest that the self occupies a central role in managers’ morality, and that being connected to one’s self and acting as an individual, freed from the collective persona we often play, fosters moral strength and moral courage, and enhances phronesis.
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Writing this thesis has been a long process. Besides learning about managers, self, Jung and morality, this almost-four-year-long research has taught me much about people and about myself. This, alone, is an invaluable achievement.

My thanks go to Professor Colin Hales and Dr. Doug Foster, my supervisors, for offering me the opportunity to do a PhD, and for bearing with me in spite of my changes of focus. Their comments and advices have been helpful throughout, and I thank them for allowing me the time and the digressions I needed to bring all the pieces together.

I would like to thank Professor Nada Kakabadse for pushing me towards the PhD road. Although I was not enthusiastic at first, I appreciate how these years have been a great learning experience in many ways.

Thanks to my friends and fellow researchers for the support and chats that made it far more enjoyable; to my proof-readers for their suggestions; to the bookshop team for the reality checks in between two brainstorming sessions; and to those people who crossed my path and gave me food for thought.

My greatest thanks go to my family, who have supported me and encouraged me all the way. I am most grateful to my parents for always being there when the times were hard and the morale low. In particular, I wish to thank my mum for the long discussions we had that helped me understand what I wanted to do, what I needed to say and what really matters. Finally, thanks to Futé, Looping and Bastet who are my true inspiration.
A great part of education is to inculcate people with a certain sense of morals, of what is good or right, and what is not acceptable, from the community point of view. I grew up with notions of universal rights every human being was entitled to, and the importance to try to be and do good. But there started the problem. Why is it so hard to be good (at least that is my personal experience)? And why do people seem to have different notions of what it is to be a good person? If we could agree on thirty fundamental rights no one should be deprived of (and that is the meaning of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948), why is it so difficult to actually implement these? Is it all a utopia or are we just experiencing some ‘normal’ hurdles on the way to a peaceful and happy world? If so, then what will it take for people to be universally good? Or rather, can we be ‘just’ good, and get rid of the devils, evil and all that is associated with negativity, destruction and violence? Is it something we can pursue? Is it something we should pursue?

I did not formulate these questions all at once, but they ultimately constitute the core of my personal research today and they inevitably pervade my PhD research. Reflexivity, which requires the researcher to make the reader aware of his or her personal train of thought, is an important aspect of interpretive research. I believe it is neither possible nor desirable to separate my personal questioning from my academic research, which does not mean I am unable to be critical and self-critical. On the contrary, my readings nourish my reflection and enable it to test itself against a variety of arguments and counter-arguments, evolving cohesively.

This PhD research started with Virtue Ethics and first-line management, which were the two main themes of research laid out by Prof. Colin Hales and Dr. Doug Foster. I came on board because my interest in business ethics had driven me to consider the issue at the level of the individual, the person who acts as a manager. I had questions, curiosity and passion, but I did not know where to start.

Guided by my knowledgeable supervisors, I delved into moral philosophy and a mix of other more or less (in my opinion) relevant texts, with high hopes and an eagerness to develop my knowledge and comprehension of the subject matter. I should have known the road would not be straightforward. Notwithstanding the complexity of some philosophical opuses, I started to feel that Virtue Ethics was not providing me with satisfying answers to my questions, although it was undoubtedly an interesting track to pursue. I grew both frustrated and anxious. Frustrated because it did not seem to make sense to me in the way it seemed to make sense to others; anxious because I felt time was flying and I was maybe wasting time on an otherwise perfectly acceptable theoretical framework in which to locate my research. But I just couldn’t work it out.

In parallel with my research, or maybe because I felt stuck, I came across some more ‘spiritual’ literature. I came to meet people, discover some alternative modes of therapy and read about their underpinning philosophy. These made sense to me, in that I could relate my own experience, my own thinking and my own questions to what they had to offer. It did not provide me with answers, but it allowed me to
understand better, more clearly, what I was struggling with. It helped me reflect differently on myself and my expectations. It helped me reframe and actually start my personal quest for the good with just that level of confidence, faith and hope that I believe is necessary to ask the right questions and avoid the numerous traps of nihilism, cynicism, or blind credulity. Ultimately, it helped me regain interest in my research, and provided that kick-off I needed to find a framework I was comfortable with, that I understood and that offered promising elements to examine the questions I wanted to ask. That is how the notion of self emerged as part of the research question.

I embraced a more spiritual approach, even though my supervisors felt caution was needed to contain my research question. I soon discovered they were right to some extent when I came across the various sub-fields of research attached to the concept of work and spirituality. But when I discovered Carl Jung's work, I knew I had found my framework. Not a perfect, 'ultimate truth' framework, but a framework that would allow my questions to be asked and to mean what I intended them to mean. I was enthusiastic (and I still am) for his numerous ideas and insights on society and humanity. I was impressed by his reflections on the modern world, and stunned that nearly eighty years later, they remain so topical and accurate. I did not know whether his view of the psyche, the centrality of self and individuation would allow me to understand entirely how managers experience moral issues, but I was sure it was worth asking the question. I had observed people and myself, and I was inclined to believe that we always are a mix of black and white, of good and evil; the point is to find the balance that is neither detrimental to us nor to the world, and learn to sustain it. Jung, as I understand his theory, explains this clearly. I thus began to develop a working framework to use for my research, centred around the notion of 'self' in a Jungian sense (detailed in Chapter 3), and later used this framework to see whether it could tell us something new about managers, ethics and 'trying to be a good person'. This thesis is the result of this enquiry.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.1. RESEARCH RATIONALE

Ethical reflection has accompanied the development of trade as an activity since the very early ages. Rules had to be set in order to sustain good commercial relationships. Trust and equity are basic values upon which any economic system needs to be founded. If moral philosophy at first did not particularly address the ethics of business, the growth of commercial exchanges and the industrialization of economies in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries raised some significant moral and social issues that neither philosophers nor economists could ignore. Actually some business people understood and responded to the needs of their workers initiating social involvement of business into the community (Smith, 2003). The early twentieth century saw the expansion of the corporate model and the beginning of the golden era of a capitalist economy, although stock market crashes, bankruptcies and scandals have regularly called into question its effectiveness and its validity ever since. The contemporary debate that examines the ethics of business lies within the scope of this history.

The past fifty years have seen a tremendous increase of interest in the “business ethics problem”. However this tag uncovers various aspects of the relationships between business and society. Generally the terms and conditions of business responsibilities towards society are dependent upon one’s viewpoint. From a “shareholder model” perspective, corporations are only accountable to the owners of the capital whilst proponents of the “stakeholder model” argue that companies should also account for their actions to a wide range of constituents who affect and are affected by them (Hummels, 1998; Carroll, 1999; Lantos, 2001; Weiss, 2003; Freeman, 2005). The concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) heads a fast-developing research area that is composed of a variety of business ethics-related themes which include Corporate Social Responsiveness, Corporate Social Performance, Stakeholder Management, Corporate Governance, Business in or and
Society (Carroll, 1991 and 1999; Webley, 1997; Smith, 2003). The aims pursued are slightly different, yet almost all of these concepts tackle the ethical question at the organisational or institutional level and leave the issue of personal responsibility of business people as incidental.

The pressure to make a short-term compelling business case for CSR contributed to shaping the research field, which then on favoured the macro-level of analysis over the analysis of the individuals who comprise the organisation. However Davis and Blomstrom’s early definition of social responsibility tells a different story (1966:2 as quoted in Carroll, 1999): “social responsibility [...] refers to a person’s obligation to consider the effects of his decisions and actions on the whole social system”. The emphasis is not being put on either the role of a corporate entity or the collective responsibility of a group of managers but on the responsibility each person has in the organisational structure. Consequently, the ethics of any organisation or corporation are function of the ethics of the individual human actors that work in it or for it (Wood, 1991:699). The “business ethics problem” at that particular level targets the morality of managers as key decision-makers and of employees as organisational actors. A variety of often multi-disciplinary research projects have purported to explore the ethics of business people yet one central question remains unanswered: “What makes [relatively] ethical people do unethical things?” (Willcock, 2008). The fact is that most of us are neither cold-hearted monsters nor pure altruists, but rather belong to the grey zone in between these two extremes. This grey area is filled with numerous characters which we ought to understand if we are to understand human nature, argues Levi (1989:40). The issue raised is that of the readiness of a person to accept what she would otherwise condemn. In particular, how is it that despite having strong moral values, we remain able to act wrongly or to witness a wrong act without intervening? Or more simply how is it that we so easily accept that “there is nothing we can do to change that”? Besides, what is the price to pay at the level of our conscience for accepting something we know we should not accept from our moral point of view? This issue is central to the larger business ethics debate. Indeed, the choices we make set the tone of our morality, as well as the moral climate and moral standards of the organisations and communities we belong to. Morality does
not begin with codes of conduct or principles, but rather with the individual\(^1\) and his experience of moral matters (Sekerka and Bagozzi, 2007).

This thesis thus aims to explore the individual's experience of morality, especially his perception of the grey area. This topic so far has only been partially examined. The business ethics literature has shown the tendency to consider managers as mere business actors and to forget about the people they are once they leave the office. Consequently, the focus has been directed to the technicalities of the job or the responsibility levels instead of the more emotional reactions to moral dilemmas. Psychology or social psychology have attempted to address this gap, but they have failed to provide a working framework that can inform the personal experience of the manager facing moral issues. Emphasis has been put on describing stages of ethical decision-making (Treviño and Brown, 2004), or the context of management action from an ethical perspective (Victor and Cullen, 1987). Economics and business institutions have been accused of creating an amoral playground, which makes managers adopt different rules from the traditional values that guide them (Korhonen, 2002; Allinson, 2004). Yet the moral nature of business and corporations still is the object of a heated debate, suggesting that we might need to turn elsewhere to find elements of an answer. Context does not seem able to explain just by itself why people behave the way they morally do.

Moral philosophy offers valuable clues to apprehend moral experiences, yet it is often too normative and, thus, limited. Moral philosophers have approached the question of ethics from various perspectives and at different levels, starting with the nature of the Good down to the conditions defining one's moral responsibility to society. One's attachment to a specific tradition actually determines one's view of the Good and how one can implement it. Deontology, Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics tend to be presented as the three main alternatives to choose from, but they differ widely on the importance the individual is granted in their respective moral framework. Virtue Ethics defends the view that morality is a matter of character rather than of formal rules or of processes of maximization. Its proponents have

\(^1\) In an effort to avoid repetitions or confusion, the following convention has been adopted: the "individual" is referred to as "he" and "him", the "person" and the "researcher" are referred to as "she" and "her". This is purely anecdotal however.
participated in bringing the attention back to the person who performs the actions (e.g. Solomon, 1992). However, confusion remains on the nature of the person who performs these actions, especially when Virtue ethicists explore the sphere of business. Managers are often assimilated with actors who enact their managerial part, so that ethics is discussed within the boundaries of their managerial role. Yet Aristotle (1992) argued that the pursuit of the good life implies the unity of body and soul within a self who develops a virtuous, rightly balanced character. Hence, the centrepiece of Aristotle’s moral vision is the self, that is the person taken as a whole instead of a collection of distinctive roles. The relationships between the self and the morality of the person have not been systematically explored with a focus on business people. This research aims to address this gap by identifying a conceptual framework that would articulate self and morality in a comprehensive manner, so as to gain a greater knowledge of the relationships between these two central concepts.

1.2. Research Question and Objectives

The research aims to provide a better understanding of the morality of individual managers. Our purpose is to depict in a comprehensive manner the inner constitutive moral elements of individuals who work as managers.

In order to achieve this goal, we will focus on the personal experiences managers have of morality. Indeed moral issues tend to be perceived differently by different people. Equally, different people experience similar situations in different ways, reacting sometimes unexpectedly to a moral dilemma. In order to truly understand managers’ viewpoint of morality, it is thus essential to capture their personal moral experiences. The question guiding the research can therefore be formulated as follow:

“How do managers personally experience morality?”

If we look closely at the implications of the main research question, we notice that the term “how” announces an exploratory study. The term “managers” identifies the focus of the research whilst “personally” implies that we are interested in managers
as individual people and not just as organisational actors. The verb “experience” means that we will investigate the various aspects of the phenomenon without restricting the analysis to a particular area (for example the emotional aspect or the rational aspect of it). Finally, the research examines “morality” that is the values, standards, codes or intuitive reactions that directly or indirectly refer to some definition of Good and Evil. Although one can argue that we cannot literally “experience morality” the expression is meant to bring focus on the individual who experiences the moral dilemma rather than on the content of the moral values. This research does not purport to discuss at length the nature of Good and Evil, but to provide an understanding of how one’s morality unfolds and operates within oneself.

The concept of self is proposed as a guiding notion to undertake the investigation. The self represents the most intimate element that defines who a person is. In fact it epitomises the person as a whole individual without social masks or enacted roles. Since we aim to capture the personal experiences of managers, we need to consider the self of those managers. The self is central to the conceptual framework used in this study and will be discussed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless we can highlight how consideration of the self fits within the main research question. In particular the following questions will help structure the research:

(1) Morality
- How do managers experience their personal morality?
- How do managers define and know their moral boundaries?

(2) Self
- How do managers perceive their self?
- What is the role of the self in the moral decision-making, moral action and overall moral experience of managers?

The objectives of the research are therefore threefold. The purpose of the study is to gain a greater knowledge of the inner constitutive moral elements of managers. In particular we will examine how important the self is within the personal moral
experiences of managers. It is expected that upon completion of the research study, conclusions will inform on:

(1) whether managers consider their self when making decisions of a moral nature;
(2) the relative importance of the self in managers' moral experiences;
(3) other elements of importance in managers' moral experiences.

1.3. METHODOLOGY AND METHOD

The research aims to capture personal interpretations of moral experiences. Doing so, we also intend to investigate the significance of the phenomenon of self within the context of personal moral experiences. The research thus adopts an interpretivist perspective, and the methodological assumptions are grounded in the belief that reality is subjective and uncovered through participants' reflections and interpretations of the world (Saunders et al., 2003). The researcher wants to understand, and she acknowledges her subjectivity in order to generate a deeper appreciation of the phenomenon. The value and credibility of the interpretation are assessed by an extensive contextualisation of the data analysed.

Methodologically, the research adopts a case study approach. Since the focus of the study is the personal experience of various individuals, each participant is considered a single case to be analysed. Case studies encourage contextualised data and fit well with an exploratory scope. They favour theory development and welcome the subjectivity of the researcher as yet another learning opportunity (Donmoyer, 2000).

Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews, which were later transcribed. Interviews are commonly used in qualitative studies because they allow for greater flexibility and authenticity in the data collected (Silverman, 1993). Twenty-five managers were interviewed, although six interviews were later discarded for various reasons at the time of analysis (see Chapter 4). The interviews were analysed and coded. The findings were then interpreted in relation to the conceptual framework that emerged from the literature review, and the various accounts were contrasted
with one another in order to picture the relative significance of the identified inner constituent moral elements of managers.

1.4. Outline of the Thesis

The first chapters will review the literature informing the two central concepts of self and morality. Chapter 2 attempts to define the meaning of “ethics” and “morality”, and ponders on the contribution of various philosophers on the question of individual morality. The chapter then turns to defining what “management” is and who “managers” are, before critically reviewing the inputs of past and current business ethics literature on the theme of the moral manager and moral management.

Chapter 3 focuses on the contribution of psychology to the understanding of moral experiences. In particular, the chapter discusses various studies that have enquired about the moral behaviour of individuals, and the advantages and shortcomings of their respective methodologies. The chapter then reviews the meaning of the concept of “self” and its most distinctive features. Finally, the chapter introduces a Jungian framework as a promising framework to understand people’s moral experiences. The core concepts are defined and the relationships between self and morality, as described by Jung, are highlighted.

Chapter 4 introduces the research methodology and the methods selected for collecting and analysing data. As stipulated earlier, the study adopts an interpretivist perspective but the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying the various ‘rival’ paradigms are explained. The relevance of a case study approach and the methods for data collection are then assessed, before presenting in detail the interpretive process used to analyse the data. Ethical considerations are addressed next, in particular the issue of credibility and objectivity of the analysis. Finally, the pilot study implemented prior to the main study is briefly presented.

The next two chapters are concerned with examining the cases of managers’ moral experiences. Chapter 5 first introduces the study participants and explains how seven cases were selected for an in-depth analysis. Then, the chapter proceeds with
analysing four cases according to elements drawn from the Jungian framework. These cases are highlighted as illustrating the influence of the persona and the phenomenon of compartmentalisation on the way these managers approach moral dilemmas. Chapter 6 focuses on three other cases which are discussed extensively. These cases are identified as examples of how connectedness to self and self-integrity shape these managers' moral behaviour and overall moral experience. Chapter 6 finally proposes a summary of each of the remaining twelve cases whose interpretation equally relies on the Jungian framework.

Chapter 7 offers an interpretation of the cases and confronts the various findings. The relevance of the Jungian framework is addressed whilst drawing linkages with other studies and models that integrate the self within a moral perspective. The relation between *phronesis* and individuation is clarified, and its implications for managers are addressed. The chapter then proceeds with examining the importance of the self in one's moral strength and moral courage, whilst the issue of freedom to act and the question of authority are discussed and located within the existing literature.

Chapter 8 offers some conclusions. It reviews the research question and research objectives, and critically assesses the scope of the study and the findings. Future opportunities for research on these questions are also discussed.
CHAPTER 2 – MORALITY, ETHICS AND MANAGEMENT

“What is a good man like? How can we make ourselves morally better? Can we make ourselves morally better? These are the questions the philosopher should try to answer.”

Iris Murdoch
On “God” and “Good”

2.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims at discussing ethics in management. It will be demonstrated that the significance of ethics in the business world is not new and that the implications are wide-ranging. The role of the manager, whatever the level and scope of his or her responsibility, makes him or her accountable towards the organisation and towards society. Because they are habilitated to make decisions that have implications for the running of the organisation and the work of other employees, managers are morally engaged in their decisions and actions. They may be role-models, they may be leaders, or they may just be supervisors; in any case their behaviour and their actions have moral implications for others (Carroll, 2002). They are therefore directly concerned with ethical matters, as the growing research field on ethics in management demonstrates.

In preamble, we will define and discuss some of the traditions that have shaped our understanding of morality today (part 2.2). In particular, we will examine the philosophies that investigate the moral person rather than moral principles or moral actions per se. Indeed, since our concern is to explore the morality of individual managers, we are more likely to learn from perspectives that favour the individual level of analysis. Part 2.3 proposes a review of the meaning of the terms ‘management’ and ‘manager’. Finally, part 2.4 offers a conceptual overview of the main issues in business ethics in general, and management and ethics in particular.
2.2. ETHICS AND MORALITY

2.2.1. DEFINITIONS

Ethics and morality are terms that are not easy to define. Ethics generally consists in “The moral principles that govern a person’s behaviour or how an activity is conducted” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). When we say something is ethical, we either mean that it is concerned with moral principles (descriptively) or that it is “morally correct” (normatively). Morality is more closely associated with a sense of right and wrong, with “standards of good behaviour” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2002). We could argue that there is not much difference between ethics and morality, except for the fact that ethics sounds more ‘practical’ whereas morality may be viewed as more ‘conceptual’. Piercey (2001) believes that differentiating ethics from morality has become a common habit amongst contemporary philosophers who tend to privilege one concept over the other. For Piercey (2001:53), morality is associated with “practical reasoning” articulated around rights and duties, whereas ethics is “an older and fluzzier-edged kind of practical thinking”.

More often than not, however, the two terms and their derivatives are used interchangeably (Fischer, 2004) and this thesis will adopt this position. The preference given to one term over the other very much depends on the context and the common linguistic usage: we will speak of ‘applied ethics’ but rarely of ‘applied morality’; on the other hand, we will examine ‘moral development’ rather than ‘ethical development’. To summarise, ethics appears to be more practice-oriented and more dynamic, whereas morality is more concerned with the philosophical, psychological or metaphysical grounds of what is right and wrong. Also, some prefer one term over another, judging ethics either more or less noble than morality; others clearly distinguish between the concepts, like Carl Jung who differentiates what he names “moral conscience” from “ethical conscience” (Robinson, 2005). But these are more relevant when it comes to examine the details of a given theory. To discuss the general matter of the right and the good, it is possible to consider ethics and morality are synonymous, albeit each might have its peculiar flavour. Both concepts
are probably essential, and somehow indissociable, to understand and assess human behaviour.

A distinction is often made between descriptive and normative ethics. Broadly, it separates 'what is' from 'what ought to be'. Descriptive ethics aims to describe and list the behaviours, beliefs, values or standards that constitute or inform the morality of individuals. Somehow, descriptive ethics is almost morally neutral, in that it does not judge but provides facts to understand what is. On the other hand, normative ethics is clearly prescriptive and concerns itself with what morality should be, that is what should be considered good behaviour, good principles. Moral philosophers usually talk about normative ethics, whereas researchers in applied ethics work around both descriptive and normative elements.

There are still discussions to determine whether moral principles are or can be objective, and if what is right and wrong, true and false can be decided upon once and for all. Equally, arguments about ancient texts and how they should be interpreted are still on-going (see Singer, 1993). Kaler (1999) even suggests that we should dispense from studying moral philosophies because they are too reductionist and useless in solving practical moral dilemmas. Conveniently, Morton (2003) suggests that we can know that such act is wrong or such person is morally good without having to choose between various moral philosophies. According to him, there exists ‘thick’ moral beliefs for which evidence is strong and non-misleading, as well as ‘thin’ moral beliefs for which justification and evidence is more delicate to find, but which are ‘real’ and at least as objective as some other beliefs that we tend to take for granted (Morton, 2003). Sometimes we often know what is right to do without knowing that we know, and the current lack of agreement on the origin, nature and content of our moral knowledge does not mean that we do not possess moral knowledge at all (Morton, 2003).

Nevertheless, this common, almost intuitive knowledge of the good we are supposed to have must take its roots somewhere. Intuitionists would argue that moral facts and moral values are in some sense objective and we can enter in a causal relation with them to know what is good and to act upon that (Dancy, 1993). Yet, if moral facts
are real and 'out there' (providing we have the ability to perceive them), intuitionists
do not actually explain the origin of these moral facts. We would argue that any
intuitive knowledge of the good must somehow be present in everyone and
sufficiently compelling to inform our thinking and influence our behaviour. It may
well be that the notion of others is the essential basis upon which to develop
universally guiding moral principles. Vine (1983:30) claims that “commitment to a
moral code involves affirmative recognition of one’s shared humanity with those to
whom it is applied.” This concept of “shared humanity” should be acceptable to both
atheists and believers, since it can be either taken as it is, or understood as the
reflection of God in each and every one of us.

Kaler (1999:211) roots morality in the common good and argues that “as a
combination of social needs along with the avoidance of harm and the promotion of
benefits, morality is very clearly all about establishing the common good”. He later
defines the common good as an “assemblage of all those very different things that
are and are not good for human beings.” Yet, even Kaler’s rather pragmatic take on
morality suits the concept of “shared humanity”. Indeed, despite Kaler’s arguments,
the common good implicitly searches for the universal, for what human beings can
agree is good and not good for them as a whole. In order to reach such agreement,
there must necessarily be an acknowledgment of the other as deserving the very same
treatment as oneself, and the reason for that is because the other is like oneself. We
are the same in that shared humanity, and morality is rooted and imbued with it. If
morality is rooted in a shared humanity, how does it express and how do we come to
know it? These are questions moral philosophy is concerned with.

2.2.2. Learning From Moral Philosophy

Many philosophers have pondered on moral matters, and two positions seem to have
been established: on the one hand are those who have tried to define what morality is
or should be; on the other hand are those who seek to determine how we can know
what morality is, or how we can know that morality is indeed moral. Many modern
moral philosophers, who follow the footsteps of Kant or Mill, would belong to the
first category. In this category, since the revived interest in Virtue Ethics, we can
further distinguish moral philosophies according to the question which they tackle. Broadly, Deontology and Utilitarianism propose answers to the question ‘What ought we to do?’, whereas Virtue Ethics is concerned with ‘What sort of person ought we to be?’. Our focus here is to examine how these theories contribute to an understanding of the morality of the person, in particular how a person experiences and gives meaning to her moral behaviour. Since our goal is to understand how averagely moral people can nevertheless fail to act morally well, we will look for perspectives that place the person at its core and that attends to her internal deliberations. Because Virtue Ethics has received much attention from moral philosophers and business ethicists recently, it will be discussed separately. We turn first to duty-based and utility-based ethics.

Immanuel Kant is credited with deontological ethics and the idea that moral duties are dictated by reason, but as O’Neill (1993) explains, there exists a considerable difference between Kant’s ethics as it appears in his writings, Kant’s ethics as interpreted by its critics, and Kantian ethics which includes the modern branch of Deontology-based philosophy. Kant’s central proposition was to rely solely on reason – rather than on a pre-established belief in God or human laws – to develop moral principles, which would then bear a natural authority on everyone because of their universality. The Categorical Imperative thus takes the form of “Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law” (O’Neill, 1993:177). The action that derives from a “morally worthy maxim” is said to be “in accordance with duty”. People must endeavour to endorse a morally worthy maxim through their whole life and act out of duty, but even if they don’t do so, they have to try to perform those indispensable actions that duty demands (O’Neill, 1993:178).

O’Neill insists that most of the criticisms made against Kant’s ethics are based on a loose interpretation of Kant or target Kantian ethics rather than Kant’s original view. In particular, she insists that Kant did not view principles of duty as a guide to make moral decisions, but rather as a constraint one should bear in mind when thinking rationally about different possible courses of action (O’Neill, 1993:182). To that extent, Kant’s contribution to moral philosophy is valuable and it encouraged a
serious questioning of the methodology and assumptions on which other moral theories are based. Nevertheless, on what grounds should we feel concerned about others? To render maxims universal implies a certain concern for other people as well as oneself. But it is not made clear why, besides what reason dictates, we should feel compelled to care for others.

Duty-based theories are usually contrasted with utility-based perspectives such as Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, commonly held as the fore-runner of consequentialist theories, is attributed to Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. The doctrine focuses on the concept of utility and roots moral choices in the consideration of people’s preferences. The theory can be sketched out as follow: amongst the possible outcomes, the right (hence the moral) choice should be the one that provides the greatest utility to the greatest number of people – i.e. according to Bentham, utility means maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain (Goodin, 1993). Nowadays, utility has been replaced by beauty or truth, but the rationale remains the same.

Utilitarianism is divided into two versions, rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism. Act-utilitarianism is what many know as utilitarianism, i.e. a maximization calculation that serves as a basis to make moral judgments. Decisions are made based on the consequences each act has on the general happiness. Rule-utilitarianism, however, defends the necessity of rules aside from the consequentialist mode of reasoning, because obedience to some rules would maximize the general happiness more than would pure act-utilitarianism (Benn, 1998:72-73). Rule-utilitarianism stands as an attempt to bridge the universality of deontological principles with the pragmatism of act-utilitarianism, but it fails to justify convincingly how it remains faithful to the spirit of consequentialism (Benn, 1998).

Popular in the field of economics, utilitarianism is most distinctly practical (at least it appears to be so) and is often referred to in public policy, because of its engagement with the themes of equality and property rights. However, as Hare (1989) argues, our limited cognitive capabilities make us unable to contemplate all the possible outcomes of a situation, hence utility maximization is always only relative, and relative to our capabilities. Therefore, Hare proposes to combine thinking and feeling
Richard Hare’s universal prescriptivism (1989) considers that the matter of ethics is essentially logical and that moral propositions can be assessed only on their logical properties, i.e. their logical consistency and, hence, their logical truth. Moral judgments or principles are validated as long as they are not tainted by moral convictions. As a consequence, moral judgments ought to possess the following core features: that they are prescriptive (i.e. that they induce action and not just intellectual speculation) and universal (i.e. that everyone be subjected to the same treatment in similar situations); that we have to possess knowledge of facts; and that if we are not in possession of that knowledge, we should be able to imagine how it is like and share the same preferences with other individuals should we be in their place (Hare, 1989:179-184).

Ideally, according to Hare, we would possess the moral capabilities of an “archangel”, a superhuman being freed from human limitations and “other human weaknesses”. As such, the archangel “could think in an act-utilitarian way. But it would often be disastrous if we humans try to do it, for obvious reasons” which include our limited capacity for empathy, knowledge, information gathering and clear-thinking (Hare, 1989:188). At our level, we shall be expected to pursue the optimal preference-satisfaction whilst also cultivating our intuitions to guide us on a daily basis. Hare alludes here to a somewhat intuitive moral capability similar to what Morton proposed, but he does not explain what the qualities of these intuitions are, nor where they come from. Although he attempts to bring a more pragmatic stance on morality, acknowledging the place of reasoning and intuiting in moral decision making and accounting for human fallibility, according to Iris Murdoch (2001a) his insistence upon a morality based on logic only deprives it of its moral value.
Murdoch (2001b:76) is concerned with “how we can make ourselves better”. However, for Murdoch human beings are “naturally selfish and that human life has no external point or τέλος [telos]”; she also insists that we ought not to expect any transcendent meaning or belief regarding ourselves, because: “We are what we seem to be, transient mortal creatures subject to necessity and chance.” (Murdoch, 2001b:76-77). Only the Good possesses that quality of transcendence and untouchable perfection (2001b:91). Murdoch therefore suggests a realist quest for the Good, where love, embedded in attention to nature and reality, acts as a guide towards an ideal of perfection which, given nothing else is real and we are not guided by a Supreme Guide towards some earthly or other-worldly achievement, is the only thing that matters. In other words, efforts should be made to try and see the world as it really is, beyond our fantasies and self-obsessions that only prevent us from getting closer to the Good. Moral endeavour consists in breaking the illusionary veil that prevents us from perceiving the Good as the ultimate, transcendent source of moral matter (Murdoch, 1983:86). Virtue is evident because everything else is pointless (2001b:96).

Murdoch therefore calls for a practice on self to break the veil of illusions and false beliefs, and aspire to the only valuable transcendent concept of the Good. Yet Murdoch doubts we should trust our ability to critically uncover our self-deception, suggesting the self may never find the path of virtue because of its inability to dismiss its fantasies. Doing so, she fails to provide us with a means to actually work towards living the moral life, despite her view that man is “a unified being […] who has some continual slight control over the direction and focus of his [moral] vision.” (2001a:39). Her ideal of the perfect Good resonates with Platonic Ideal forms, and her virtue-based ethics differ from an Aristotelian perspective on that ground. A virtue-based approach reintegrates the individual as a whole within the ethical frame, and acknowledges the complexity of articulating both reason and feelings or intuitions in moral practice, as Hare and Murdoch both suggested in different ways. However, Aristotle’s take on the virtuous life provides a more structured account of the various moral mechanisms that inform our decisions and behaviour.
2.2.3. **VIRTUE ETHICS**

Virtue Ethics occupies a particular place in moral philosophy because it has been around for much longer than its apparent ‘rivals’, dating back to Plato and Aristotle, and because it is primarily interested in characters instead of actions. Hence the good person is someone who has developed a good character, that is who has understood the virtues and who, by habit and education, has fostered a state of balance of their character which makes them do the good action ‘naturally’ (Solomon, 2002). This is not to say, however, that the concept of virtue in the context of ethics is unproblematic. For instance MacIntyre, who is often associated with Virtue Ethics, is himself critical of the use of the concept.

Aristotle’s contribution to Virtue Ethics as a moral philosophy is acknowledged by most as more substantial and especially more systematic than that of Plato, although Thomas Aquinas’s Christian interpretation of the virtue-based approach is probably the second most important contribution to the Virtue Ethics tradition. In spite of his sometimes elitist, if not frankly questionable views, Aristotle remains the major reference for virtue-based morality.

2.2.3.1. **ARISTOTELIAN VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE SELF**

In his *Nicomachean Ethics*², Aristotle defines the virtues as the moral and intellectual characteristics that have been fashioned by habit and education. Because every human being, as opposed to other living beings, is granted the capacity to reason, everyone has the potential to develop the virtues, although Aristotle concedes that only a few of us will effectively master them fully (Vardy and Grosch, 1999:34). The virtues are developed and practiced according to the doctrine of the Mean. Each virtue is described as a state of balance between two extremes; for instance the virtue of courage is the mean between the opposed vices of rashness and cowardice. To possess a virtue implies that one is neither deficient in nor in excess of that quality (Aristotle, II, VI-20). It is not that one can be excessively virtuous, however; for

² All the Aristotle references are from his *Nicomachean Ethics* (Ethique de Nicomaque, 1992, Paris: Flammarion) and follows the format: Book number, Chapter number – Paragraph number.
instance, if one is said to be excessively courageous, then one shall be called rash instead of courageous, because if one was truly courageous (that is if one truly possessed the virtue of courage) then one could not be in excess of the virtue, for then it would imply that a virtue can be a vice. Similarly, the doctrine of the Mean does not imply that virtue is a middle-way between two extreme states, so that one can be virtuous if one acts ‘mildly well’ (Benn, 1998:175). It solely means that each virtue can be determined as a just balance between two vices.

To practice and master the virtues allows one to lead the good life. The chief good is *eudaimonia*, which usually translates as happiness, flourishing or well-being (Hursthouse, 2001:9). To lead the good life means that one can achieve *eudaimonia* (Aristotle, I, XI-14). Practice is essential for Aristotle. It is through practice that the individual can train and develop good habits and good dispositions, which allows him to become more naturally inclined towards the virtues. We should do so because else we would not be able to achieve happiness. Virtues are indeed constitutive of the good life (Benn, 1998:178).

Besides, human beings are directed towards the completion of a *telos*, the realisation of which gives sense to the development of the virtues. According to Aristotle, everything in nature has a function, according to which it can be judged. If it performs its function well, then it can be judged good. Aristotle argues that human beings, just like everything else, have a function. Their ultimate function, i.e. the *telos*, consists in rational thinking. Therefore the good life, which is also the virtuous life, is the life of sound rational deliberation. The individual achieves his purpose through practical wisdom and moral virtue, the latter providing one with a sense of direction whilst the former equips one with the appropriate means to attain one’s *telos* (Aristotle, VI, XIII-6).

Aristotle would argue that virtuous friends are mirrors on which we can rely in order to know ourselves truly and sincerely (Simpson, 2001:319). For Aristotle, friendship *(agape)* is an essential virtue without which life lacks any value, and he devotes two chapters of his *Nicomachean Ethics* to discuss its various forms (Aristotle, VIII, I-1). Perfect friendship can exist amongst two virtuous people, but friendship is itself a
virtue one should cultivate. Friendship is a basis for social interaction and community-building, therefore Aristotle uses this virtue as a regulator of community life and relationships. To the virtuous person, friendship is the ultimate external good. To deprive her from agape is to make her less virtuous because the truly virtuous person would like to share her happiness and richness with others, especially other virtuous friends (Aristotle, IX, IX-3). This is so because happiness implies being apt to act, and virtuousness finds its meaning in the practice of the virtues. So in friendship, the virtuous person cultivates the virtues further more. (Aristotle, IX, IX-4).

Leading the virtuous life implies that the person as a whole commits to enacting the virtues. She shall not pretend to act virtuously but bring her whole self into the pursuit of the virtues. This is all the more significant as Aristotle insists on the unity of the self. Indeed, the self is deemed essential in so far as “the soul is the source of being for the body and the ground of all the acts of the body in growing, moving, sensing, desiring, or thinking” (Simpson, 2001:315). Self-awareness is intrinsically linked with the awareness of the physical, biological body, but as such only allows us to grasp the basic level of selfhood. Somehow, self-awareness is necessary but not sufficient in establishing a complete sense of self. What one also needs is self-knowledge, which is otherwise harder to gain and which demands reflexivity.

Simpson (2001) thus summarises Aristotle’s view of the self as follow: the self is partly animal in nature, but also moral in the voluntary, thoughtful practice of the virtues. The unity of the self implies both the unity of body and soul, and also the unity of actions, of desires and pleasures within the soul. Only the good person experiences unity within herself, as informed by practical reason, whereas the non-virtuous person suffers from “dissonance” as if she was parted between conflicting desires. Therefore “virtue is what brings our soul to unity and makes us into single selves”. Yet, in order to be truly virtuous, that is to cultivate those qualities essential to the good life in accordance with our natural talents, we need to know our self and not simply be aware of our self. Self-knowledge consists in “widening and deepening” our awareness to uncover the “mysterious and divine” aspect of the self.
who subsequently becomes “both the source and goal of human life” (Brooke, 1991:18).

We shall distinguish moral virtues from intellectual virtues. The list of the virtues tends to vary according to the translation and interpretation, but generally moral virtues include courage, temperance (or self-mastery), benevolence (also known as generosity or liberality), magnificence, magnanimity, friendliness, patience, modesty, as well as proper ambition, truthfulness, wittiness and righteous indignation. Intellectual virtues, on the other hand, include art, knowledge (intelligence), practical wisdom (or prudence), science and intuition. A major argument in the theory of the virtues is that of the unity of virtues. In other words, should the virtuous person possess all the virtues to be called virtuous? Another formulation would be: is virtuousness defined as the mastery of all the virtues? This point has been debated by Foot (2002) and Kent (1999), amongst others, with a view to examining whether there can be relative virtuousness alongside absolute virtuousness, with the latter representing the person who has mastered and who practices all the virtues. What emerges from the discussion is the importance of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom (or phronesis).

2.2.3.2. PHRONESIS

Practical wisdom is a disposition based on just reason, action-focused and having as its object what is good and bad for humans (Aristotle VI, V-4). Practical wisdom is essential in preserving oneself from viciousness, and reflects the ability to deliberate appropriately upon human matters. It is close enough to possessing a sound common sense. The practically wise person needs to be acquainted with the details of the situation as well as with general principles that intend to the good, but then makes her judgment from what she perceives the mean to be “in the here and now”, as if an intuitive knowledge of the appropriate reaction came naturally to her (Simpson, 1997:249). To put it differently: “Prudence, the finding of the virtuous mean, is reason finding what accords with reason. As and when each situation arises, a finely attuned reason, unclouded by the distractions of passion, will simply sense what is right, what goes too far and what does not go far enough.” (Simpson, 1997:251).
In modern Virtue Ethics, *phronesis* remains a central tenet, attached to a sense of excellence and appropriate balance in whatever is being pursued (Hursthouse, 1999; see also Foot, 1978; MacIntyre, 1979 and 1985; Solomon, 1992, 2002 and 2003; Maguire, 1997; Megone, 2002). The concept of *phronesis* aims to bridge moral philosophy and moral psychology, although not always convincingly (Doris, 1998). It also illustrates how Aristotle accounts for emotions as well as reason. The virtuous person controls and directs her emotions (through habit – moral virtues), and understands why she is to act as such (through education – intellectual virtues) (Vardy and Grosch, 1999). Therefore, as Simpson (1997:252) remarks: “Aristotle’s psychology and ethics are closely tied together. Both are closely tied to observation: the observation of human souls in action, in particular the observation of how passion and reason interact, and of how passion will dominate reason if nothing is done early in life to prevent it.” For that reason, education from an early age is essential to develop knowledge and awareness of the virtues, but equally essential is knowledge and awareness of oneself and one’s inner mechanisms. There is a need to develop an ability to detect the respective roles and influence of passion and reason in oneself, yet Aristotle does not develop his theory in this direction any further.

Doris (1998) argues that Aristotle’s character-based ethics is challenged by the influence of the situation. Doris (1998:508) believes that “behavioural variation among individuals often owes more to distinct circumstances than distinct personalities. [...] We have little assurance that a person to whom we attributed a trait will consistently behave in a trait-relevant fashion across a run of trait-relevant situations with variable pressures to such behavior”. Hence even the virtuous man might, under given circumstances, fail to act virtuously because his actions are at least as much function of the situation characteristics as of his own character. In this purview, *phronesis* is reduced to a merely intellectual quality which does not necessarily affect one’s moral behaviour.

If we go back to Aristotle, though, *phronesis* is defined loosely. Practical wisdom is clearly different from knowledge and wisdom (*sophia*). It has as its object the individual and spells out one’s knowledge of oneself (Aristotle, VI, VIII-3 and 4).
Yet Aristotle does not really explain how one is expected to develop *phronesis*. He assumes that the ‘gentlemen’ are already acquainted with the good and with what virtues are and require, so that the recognition of an intuitive knowledge of the good should be self-evident for them. But this is not supposed to be self-evident for everyone else, and there is no guarantee that some of our intuitions are not directed by passion, or that even our practice of wise reasoning will necessarily guide us towards the most appropriate virtuous action. On that aspect, psychology might offer some more detailed accounts of moral deliberation, and solutions to help us nurture and develop practical wisdom.

*Phronesis* is prompted as the central component of moral knowledge and moral practice in so far as it enables us to know what virtue is and to behave accordingly. It does not summarise what morality is, nor is it sufficient to possess it to be called a moral person; however *phronesis* emerges as a necessary foundation for moral knowledge and moral practice. The person deprived of a sound common sense can hardly enhance her moral knowledge because her motivations are erratic instead of consistent with her values. So what does *phronesis* consist in? As we already suggest, Aristotle does not provide much explanation about this key virtue; instead he tends to assume that it is something we can acquire through practice too. But how can we cultivate practical wisdom? If everyone should indeed endeavour to lead the good life, then everyone should first and foremost concentrate on cultivating *phronesis*. In her virtue-based perspective, Murdoch does not provide any insights into the concept of practical wisdom either. She focuses on the process of reality unveiling rather than on the factors that allow it to happen. For instance, she insists that we must beware our illusions and self-pity tendencies but she does not explain how we are supposed to achieve this goal, except urging us to pay attention to the beauty of art and nature. Certainly, then, something must happen within us that makes us realise that we are mistaken, that what we thought was real is not, and that the Good is what we should commit to. But nothing is said about that ‘something’ although that is where moral deliberation takes place.

The great achievement of Virtue Ethics as compared with action-based theories is that it allows for a systematic questioning of the moral motives for action. Benn
(1998:174) stresses that motives are "what gives our actions their moral complexion". Practical wisdom should enable us to discern our true motives. However, Aristotle concedes that not everyone can achieve perfect virtue, but everyone should do their best. Although Doris (1998) agrees with this statement, he stresses that this concession actually relativizes the relevance of Virtue Ethics as a more comprehensive normative moral framework. Furthermore, Virtue Ethics does not provide a clearly articulated account of *phronesis*, which prevents us from examining how moral choices are formulated and what influence our understanding of a moral situation. Phronesis remains an important element of morality, but its explanatory power is limited. We can nevertheless conclude that morality is essentially a matter of the inner, and that the process of knowing oneself is key to developing the aptitude for just moral deliberation and virtuousness. With that in mind, we will turn to the moral agents we aim to examine, that is managers.

2.3. MANAGEMENT AND MANAGERS

Many different people compose an organisation but almost every organisation has managers, albeit they might not wear the title. Managers are sanctioned by a greater degree of responsibility, even when they operate at the first-line level, because they are in charge of making a part of the organisation work well, be it a three-people team working on a machine or a whole department with hundreds of employees. Because, as will be discussed below, they occupy a key position in the company and since they are present in most organisations, the enquiry on the ethics of the individual organisational actor will be circumscribed to managers. Besides, as Carroll (2002:141) or Cadbury (2002:11) affirm, managers face ethical issues everyday and in every dimension of their work.

2.3.1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MANAGEMENT THOUGHT

Although Christopher Grey (1999) declares that "We are all managers [and] we always were", it is surprisingly difficult to define what a manager is and, subsequently, what management is. Managers and management probably fall into the category of those terms everyone understands but no one can define. At best, the
average citizen will be able to describe some of the activities a manager does but that usually does not reflect the whole picture. Similarly, despite an impressive literature examining the whereabouts of management and managers, there appears to be no clear working definition of the terms (Thomas, 1993; Stewart, 1997; Hales, 2001b).

This is so partly because research has not examined in a consistent way the issues of management, in particular what is specific to managers, and how managers should be defined (Hales, 2001a). It is also possibly linked to the ideological framework in which researchers posit themselves and from where they define and reflect on management (du Gay, 1994; Grey, 1999). On this particular point, it is not ascertained that the bureaucratic manager has been dethroned by a more entrepreneurial type of manager, but it is clear that organisational forms and actors pertain more than ever to the grey area as opposed to a black and white vision opposing formal bureaucracy to flexible enterprise (see du Gay, 1994; du Gay et al., 1996; Fournier and Grey, 1999).

Although the activity of management, understood as co-ordinating and controlling the work of others, is almost as old as mankind (Thomas, 1993) only since the Industrial Revolution has management gained such a prominent status in society, and only since the beginning of the twentieth century has it been the object of extensive academic research. Kreitner (2001) retraces the history of management thought by highlighting the different successive approaches to management:

- The “Universal process approach” focuses on the commonalities of the functions necessary to manage any organisation. French engineer turned administrator Henri Fayol, whose Administration Industrielle et Générale remains a landmark in management theory, best represents this approach. In his opus, Fayol introduced his fourteen principles of management that still are considered a useful way to classify managerial functions. They also illustrate a fair apprehension of the human factor whereby employees are expected to be obedient and productive but equally ought to be treated fairly almost as a moral obligation (Kreitner, 2001:43)
The “Operational approach” brings attention to the production process and assesses its efficiency and quality. American self-made man and father of Scientific Management Frederick W. Taylor laid the foundations of this approach and developed a systematic chase against time and effort waste. Other contributors to this quest include the Gilbreths and Henry Gantt on the efficiency side, and Deming or Feigenbaum on the quality side (Kreitner, 2001:47-48). Although often considered at the root of the dehumanisation of work, this approach brought at the time significant improvements to the working conditions of employees, in particular less fatigue and wage incentives. What needs to be acknowledged is that economic and social contexts have changed, thus this approach cannot be transposed literally to today’s organisations, although it sometimes is, which creates a moral problem.

The “Behavioural approach” is more humanistic and brings attention to the people within the organisation. Elton Mayo, Mary Parker Follett and Douglas McGregor contributed to putting the workers’ emotional needs and motivation system on the management agenda. The field of organisational behaviour that gathers sociologists, psychologists and management theorists, is a direct heir of this approach, which more than any others place the human being at the core of the organisation and of the production system (Kreitner, 2001:51-52). In the search for efficiency, there is a risk that such concern for what motivates people ends up becoming purely instrumental to achieve greater productivity and profitability. Yet, it is rightly suggested that people are the key resource upon which organisational success ultimately depends. If it is to be sustainable, caring about people cannot be purely instrumental; it has to bear a moral dimension too.

The “Systems approach” views the organisation as a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts. This approach, initiated by the work of Chester Barnard, is interested in the organisational dynamics and borrows its metaphors from natural sciences. Organisational learning and Chaos theories are two follow-ups of the Systems approach, which requires managers to
broaden their view of the 'running of the operations' and somehow assumes that the organisational entity can learn (Kreitner, 2001:54-57). It is in this purview that the issue of the moral agency of the organisation as such is the most acute. If organisations are indeed living things, capable of learning and thinking, then they ought to bear the responsibility for what they learn, think and do. Yet how can we make a non-physical and non-emotional entity morally accountable for what it does (this is discussed later in part 2.4.1)? Besides, despite the emphasis on the systems, this approach actually tends to welcome the human ability to evolve, adapt and 'sense' the change and engage with it—almost a consecration of intuition along with a necessary intelligent and respectful cooperation.

The "Contingency approach" is a new, relativist perspective that believes that the most appropriate management theories and practices very much depend on the situational context. It is a wide-ranging, enquiring view concerned with the organisational environment—maybe too much according to its critics (Kreitner, 2001:58-60). From the business ethics viewpoint, the contingency approach does not sit well with deontology, which supports universal laws notwithstanding the circumstances. Even if one is not deontologist, there is a certain difficulty in accepting the idea that 'it all depends— including ethics'. Of course, ethical principles or moral values provide general guidance and our moral responsibility lies in our ability to implement these principles or values within a given situation, without betraying the spirit of the principles or the values. However, there is only so much adaptation to the context, and it is never entirely the fault of external circumstances.

Finally, Kreitner (2001:60-63) mentions the "Excellence approach" as proposed by Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman, through which the authors attack conventional management and claim a quick-fix, anecdote-based approach instead. The interest of this new proposition is that by shaking the conventional approaches, the authors brought the focus back on the 'basics', e.g. customers, employees and innovation. Yet, the study lacks empirical support and does not reflect the complexity of management as it really is.
This approach somehow emphasizes the learning-by-doing, which is compatible with the view of moral development through personal experience. What matters here then is what we do with what we learn.

2.3.2. DEFINING MANAGEMENT AND MANAGER

Having reviewed the schools of thought that have shaped the concept, let’s try to define what management and manager mean. Management is generally understood as “deciding what to do and then getting it done through people” (Armstrong, 1999:2). Managers’ expertise does not lie in a specialist or technical knowledge, but in the ability to oversee the activities, coordinate the people and draw a general plan of progress (Hannagan, 2005:5). As quite a few people may experience, not everyone is suited for such a role. Equally, most people are familiar with the experience of management, but not everyone has experienced what it is to be a manager. Enteman (1993) speaks of “managerialism” to illustrate how nowadays everybody manages their life, from the family household to the workplace. Nevertheless, the manager-job (i.e. the job content and responsibilities) is quite different from the manager-mindset (i.e. the need to organise, plan, manage all aspects of one’s life and relationships). A more detailed definition of management can be proposed:

“...A process which exists to get results by making the best use of the human, financial and material resources available to the organization and to individual managers. It is very much concerned with adding value to these resources, and this added value depends on the expertise and commitment of the people who are responsible for managing the business.” (Armstrong, 1999:3)

Management is not equivalent to managerial role however. Actually, confusion reigns over what management really designates. Indeed, “managerial work, jobs, behaviour, tasks or functions” have been used interchangeably to represent management in research studies (Hales and Tamangani, 1996). Yet the implications of ‘management as a process’ as opposed to ‘management as a list of tasks’ are, for example, very different. Hales (2001b:5) illustrates this complexity:
"...the key point is that ‘management’ as a process is shaped by the forms of organization through which it is conducted and is the outcome of a complex system of interdependent activities carried out by a variety of different individuals whose common designation as ‘managers’ disguise the fact that they are responsible for distinctly different specialized elements of that process."

Furthermore, management can refer to the process of managing, but might also refer to ‘the management’ (team) of an organisation (Stewart, 1997; Grey, 1999). In the latter case, questions about who to include in ‘the management’ and whether the management possesses a distinctive dimension and responsibility need to be addressed (see Tsahuridu, 2004). Do we or should we anthropomorphise ‘the management’ as we do with ‘the organisation’? Intuitively, management seems to encompass more than a job description or more than the characteristics of the managers. In fact, it is often ‘the management’ rather than individual managers that is accused of being responsible for the adversities triggered by the activities of the corporation. As Hales (2001a:56 – italics original) puts it: “individual managers may not make a difference because no-one does: organisational outcomes emerge, without evident authorship, from complex negotiated interactions – even if, after the event, participants and observers may try to make sense of these outcomes by attributing them to the actions of specific individuals.”

Nonetheless, that no one makes a real difference at the organisational level is not a strong enough argument to relieve organisational actors from their moral responsibilities (Boatright, 1988:306). Managers, as coordinators, supervisors or planners, have a clear role in the actions of ‘the management’ and ‘the organisation’ for which they are at least partly accountable. Furthermore, managers may do “what everyone does in managing themselves and their lives” but “they are paid to do it – and they are paid to do it because they manage other people (employees) as well as themselves and do so on behalf of others (employers)” (Hales, 2001b:11 – italics original).

The general typology that describes what a manager does is inspired by Fayol and Mintzberg’s works, and is centred on the tasks of planning, organising, motivating and controlling (Stewart, 1997). Hales (2001b:10) lists the following as dimensions...
of the managerial job: acting as figurehead; monitoring and disseminating information; negotiating; handling disturbances; allocating resources; directing, monitoring and controlling; liaising, networking; innovating; planning and scheduling; and managing human resources. It is important to notice that leadership represents just one aspect of what managers do. Although managers are often expected to act as team-leaders, they are not reducible to this role, and neither should they. In fact, leaders and managers are equally important in promoting good ethics in the organisation, the former because of their charisma and ability to inspire others, and the latter because of the level of authority and exemplarity they are granted (Carroll, 2002). Other researchers have tried to capture the meaning of management and manager through the ‘role’ approach (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancik, 1975; Boatright, 1988; Kraut et al., 1989; Fondas and Stewart, 1994). The role perspective includes not only the functions, tasks or responsibilities but also the covert behaviours and implicit social and moral expectations related to the manager status or position. When the concept of role is discussed in an organisational context, two broad levels of enquiry co-exist (e.g. see Bassett and Carr, 1996).

One level focuses on the organisation as a unit of analysis, and views roles in terms of different individuals assigned to a given task, who have to interact with one another to achieve the organisational goal. The roles may be constraining and interaction of the different roles may cause conflict, in so far as the objectives of the financial manager may conflict with the objectives of the marketing manager. But the very existence of roles is understood as the pursuit of organisational effectiveness and there is ample room for developing ‘liaison and conflict management roles’ or ‘buffer roles’ if appropriate (Bassett and Carr, 1996). Importantly, the system is based on the “one person-one role” principle, which implies that problems and conflicts can only occur between two roles, that is between two distinct people. The second level focuses on the individual and analyses the relationships between the role and the self. Drawing mainly from psychology and sociology, that level ‘allows’ one individual to have several roles and defines conflict as the tension between the self and a role, or between different roles amongst which an individual has to choose or by which an individual is influenced in a given situation. The role perspective has been used in several studies with a view to frame moral dilemmas (see part 2.4.2).
Because societies and economies change, managers are in charge of making the organisation adapt and evolve accordingly. As Hannagan (2005:6) declares:

"The management challenge is to maintain control over the processes of an organisation while at the same time leading, inspiring, directing and making decisions on all sorts of matter. The challenge for modern managers is to deal with this tension between operating the present systems, structures and processes and the need to change in order to survive."

Successful modern managers seem to blend the traditional theories of management with the various inputs of researchers and practitioners over the past fifty years. They need to be able to adapt both from experience and from a knowledge-database to respond effectively and efficiently to the issues and the prospects of the business (Hannagan, 2005). Ultimately, though, should management be considered an art or a science? It probably is both, because managers make their decisions based on a mix of intuition and rational calculation through ‘scientific’ models of planning and decision-making. Indeed, for Kreitner (2001:16), “Management is a complex and dynamic mixture of systematic techniques and common sense”; whilst Hannagan (2005:13) declares that “There is mass of information available to most managers in terms of costs, prices and market conditions, but in the end decisions may be based on ‘hunch’ or intuition.” Management is “reflection in action” (Hannagan, 2005:14), which implies that managers must be alert, focused and fully conscious if they are to be successful.

2.4. MANAGEMENT AND ETHICS

The previous discussion has established that managers are in charge of a variety of tasks that often involve other people, either subordinates or other managers; that they are accountable for the efficient running of the organisation at different levels; that they are submitted to a certain degree of tension due to conflicting duties, situations or demands; that they make their decisions both rationally and intuitively; and that they tend to be defined by what they do or what they achieve. Several ethical implications can be drawn from this description: first, managers deal with people
therefore they have an obvious moral duty to respect them as such and to act fairly. Second, the tension inherent to the performance expectation managers are submitted to, especially as agents for the organisation’s owners, bring them closer to the ethical/unethical borderline (Carroll, 2002). This suggests that moral dilemmas are part of the manager’s life, that they might be more or less acute, and that consequently “moral thinking” is an “essential capability” for managers (Paine, 1996). Finally, we can notice that rationality and intuition both come into play in decision-making. We made a similar conclusion from our previous discussion on ethics. Using this commonality as a starting point for the enquiry, the next part scans the business ethics literature with a view to identifying elements that can shed new light on the morality of the individual manager and his internal conflicts of conscience.

2.4.1. LOCATING MANAGEMENT AND ETHICS IN THE BUSINESS ETHICS LITERATURE

A concern for ethics in transactions has been present ever since the early ages (Treviño and Brown, 2004:77). As the Code of Hammurabi illustrates, codes of conduct emerged as trade took off. In Ancient societies, trade was a non-negligible source of economic wealth even when exchanges were entrenched in social customs. Hammurabi’s Code remains a strikingly modern legislative work adapted to what seemed to be a society of merchants and traders around 1700BC (Encyclopedia Universalis, 1995:189-190). Yet, along with economic growth and wealth, disputes over disloyal competition or fair return on investment, not to mention issues of employees’ rights and wages, were already fairly common issues. Indeed, concern over the fairness of business transactions has been present for centuries and has grown in importance with the size of the markets and corporations. The Industrial Revolution marked the beginning of world-scale capitalism and the rise of large organisations where anonymity reigns, and the trend has not stopped ever since. Today, because of (or thanks to?) their enormous power – both economic, social and political – business organisations are at the heart of the discussion on the role and responsibilities of economic actors towards the future of the planet and those who inhabit it. Consequently, those who manage business organisations are at the forefront of the ethical debate.
The ‘corporation’ has become, for the discontented, the epitome of short-term profit-oriented capitalism (e.g. Bakan, 2004). Each wave of corporate scandals and collapses due to fraudulent or irresponsible behaviour seems to encourage scholars and practitioners to rethink the fundamentals of the business system and to lay sounder foundations for better practice. Yet, we may have to admit we are short of progress. Maybe this is due to the disproportionate coverage of unethical behaviour as opposed to good business practices that makes us expect business to be the realm of poor ethics to the point of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy (Halbesleben et al., 2004). It may also be that the way the ‘problems’ are approached is not appropriate (and has never been) because corporate scandals are no contemporary phenomena and business-related adversities seem endless (Vogel, 1991; Korhonen, 2006). The rise of the industrial society is usually associated with the loss of community solidarity, the growth of individualism and the perfecting of an amoral business context (Shepard et al., 1995). Furthermore, the advent of the limited liability status gave their chance to both ingenious entrepreneurs and unscrupulous crooks (Metzger and Dalton, 1996; Davies, 1997; Bakan, 2004).

In this context, it is heart-warming that the question of the ethics of business has become a central issue in business and management studies and praxis – at least in theory. There are encouraging signs, for instance the fact that a greater number of people are willing to accept a somewhat radical questioning of institutionalised practices, symbols, values and behaviours, if not a paradigm shift (Shepard et al., 1995). However, there is no agreement on the direction towards which business ethics should move, partly because the question rebounds on a variety of sub-questions that are multi-disciplinary in scope – from the nature of human motives to the definition of ‘what is good’ and for whom; and from the ontology of business organisations to the definition and value of business goals (Vogel, 1991).

The ‘business ethics research agenda’ should ideally integrate the various levels of concern on ethical behaviour, which are: “the person’s internal awareness of ethical
principles; the organizational contexts of thought and action; and the realities of combining ideals and work demands” (Kahn, 1990:319). In an attempt to organise the debate, Wood (1991a) suggests that the literature on the responsibilities of business can be divided into three interrelated rather than competing levels that she names institutional, organisational and individual. In her view, moral expectations on business are threefold: one can distinguish the “expectations placed on all businesses because of their roles as economic institutions, expectations placed on particular firms because of what they are and what they do, and expectations placed on managers (and others) as moral actors within the firm” (Wood, 1991a:695). The following is an examination of what has shaped our understanding of management and ethics so far, amongst the larger business ethics research field.

The institutional level, as identified by Wood, addresses the very nature of business. It examines the relationships between society and business, and defines what business is and, most importantly, what business is for. The legitimacy of business as a social institution, and its relationships, rights and responsibilities towards society, is fundamentally called into question (Wood, 1991a). The organisational level questions the role of the business organisation. Society offers a wide range of organisations, whose best-known example probably is the corporation. Legally, the debate has examined the extent to which business organisations were moral agents, and as such what their rights and responsibilities were. Practically, efforts have concentrated on what the corporation was expected to do by society and the stakeholders, from which concepts of Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Social Performance or Sustainability have emerged and grown. Although each level influences one another, the individual level is of particular interest to this enquiry, and the following discussion highlights the elements relevant to the individual manager facing ethical issues.

The past forty years or so have been dominated by the neo-classical, ‘Friedmanite’ approach which defines ‘business’ in a narrow way – that is to make profits to guarantee a fair return on the capital owners’ investment (Friedman, 1970; Davies, 1997). However, an increasing number of scholars have called for a re-reading of Adam Smith’s theory, arguing that the economist’s writings have been mistakenly
interpreted as the justification for the free-market argument (Farmer, 1964; Wilson, 1989; Kline, 2006). Solomon (2006) as well as Werhane (1999 and 2002) call to mind Adam Smith’s other major work, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Although Smith himself viewed this work as a necessary complement to his most famous *Wealth of Nations*, the former has been rather ignored. Actually, Smith’s argument has been fragmented to eventually generate a bulk of isolated concepts that are used variably in economic theories. Thus, the model of the ‘economic man’, who acts on a purely rational, self-interested basis, or that of the pure and perfect market competition are the stepping stone of many theories; yet, they are just theoretical and have no descriptive value – a point too often forgotten when it comes to regulate business transactions. Allinson (2004) illustrates how someone’s view of the economic system depends on how such theoretical models are understood and integrated. He tags the rational economic man an “incomplete” picture and argues that the deepest nature of man is to be “driven by Eros to be a creator and producer of goods and services that serve the whole of mankind by providing a better and more beautiful way of life.” (2004:64)

Likewise, Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton (2005) denounce the “fallacy of economic science” by explaining how economic theories tend to become self-fulfilling. They argue that institutions are set up and modelled according to the theories, and that theories carry an implicit normative value that influences individual behaviour and individual comprehension of social reality through language. Theoretical assumptions become beliefs which shape institutions and behaviours so as to create a social reality that is indeed a reflection of the theories. As the beliefs are reinforced by their apparent ‘truthfulness’, they are “diffused as normative rules of behavior” which in turn create behaviours in accordance with the primary assumptions (Ferraro et al., 2005; Morrell and Anderson, 2006).

Besides, because theories provide a language to describe and explain social reality or social phenomena, they implicitly but necessarily constrain people’s interpretation of the reality or phenomena, since no word is innocent (Korhonen, 2002). For instance, economists’ rationale for placing self-interest at the core of human behaviour is confused and arguments grounded in psychological egoism, ethical egoism or self-
interest as a mere heuristic assumption prove to be inconsistent, tautological or self-defeating, according to Bowie (1991). Yet, however artificial the self-interest motive really is in human character, it is so entrenched in people's psyche that it has become a real fact (Maitland, 1997; Ferraro et al., 2005). The same could be said of the competition ideal and the market efficiency assumption, to some extent. Awareness of such mechanisms might seriously challenge the conceptions we hold of the social obligations of business organisations towards society (Shepard et al., 1995).

Some have perceived such a shift as a threat to the legitimacy of profit-making in favour of an 'ethics first, profits second' type of approach. For instance, Vallance (1993) counter-argues that business's role is not to favour people's self-fulfilment anyway, and that business and economics are not all there is in society and in life, implying that other institutions exist to take care of social and ethical issues. Coming from a very different perspective, Kline (2006) also attempts to defend the goodness of profit-making and identifies intrinsic rules of trade that encompass both profit-making and moral duties. However, none of these arguments seem convincing enough, because business is very much present in many aspects of society (the fact that some multinational corporations are worth more than some national economies illustrates the power of business today); and because it remains doubtful that all business actors will abide by the rules if they can get away with socially damaging self-interested actions at little cost.

As explained above, several business ethicists including Etzioni (1988) or Bowie (1991) have articulated their arguments around the contestation of the rational, self-interested economic man, which they see as too perverted a model on which to base the economic system. A system centred on self-interest and selfishness rather than self-love and consideration for the community's welfare is deemed to be eventually counter-productive (Berthouzoz, 2000; Doomen, 2005). A business system where people are allowed, or even expected to lie when it is in their interest would equally be sub-optimal and short-lived (Bowie, 1991). Therefore, minimal rules and virtues such as honesty and trust, seem necessary for the good conduct, and indeed the survival, of any economic system based on exchange and transactions. Of course, societies have not grown secularly and the traditions of dominant religions have
shaped the moral understanding of business and trade we have held in the past and we hold today. Vogel (1991) suggests that the business ethics debate is inherently contradictory because of the radically different Catholic and Protestant approaches to business and profit-making: the former condemned business and usury as immoral, whereas the latter reconciled material wealth with moral goodness.

Perhaps this explains why business ethicists feel torn by an apparently impossible choice to make between the pursuit of moral excellence and that of material prosperity, a dilemma that is reflected in the difficulty to maintain coherence within the research field (Kahn, 1990). To make the choice furthermore Cornelian, suffice to consider how business provides both good things to society, for instance enough growth to sustain social well-being, and not-so-good things in the forms of scandalously high golden parachutes for incompetent CEOs, arms trade and the like. However, it is perhaps excessive to take business ethics as an oxymoron. Maitland (1997) for example believes that business and ethics can be reconciled if the market is viewed as "a school of the virtues". Although at first people would act virtuously because it is in their self-interest, after some time they would acquire the virtues and practice moral business for its intrinsic reward (Maitland, 1997). Nonetheless, this appealing theory, mixing elements from Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics, presupposes there exists a community that binds social actors together in the pursuit of a common good. Yet, as Maitland points out, acting as a free-rider (i.e. being selfish whilst everyone else acts virtuously) offers even greater benefits that being virtuous for the sake of virtue or of the community, which leads us to conclude that the market alone cannot be the safeguard of morality.

2.4.1.2. ETHICS AND THE ORGANISATION

To examine the organisational actor, we might first need to examine what an organisation is and what its relations with its members are. Both in legal and social terms, what an organisation is in actual fact remains blurry. If it is more than the sum of the individuals that compose it, then the idea of granting the organisation a responsibility of its own and a morality of its own, that would be distinct from the responsibility and morality of its agents, is a priori acceptable. On the contrary, if any
organisation is just the product of the actions and decisions of the individuals who comprise it, then whatever the organisation does is the responsibility of these people (Nesteruk, 1992).

Some take the cynical view that referring to those ‘organisational beings’ as commonly as we do today is pernicious and has “the potential to distract attention from the real decision-makers, perhaps enabling them to evade responsibility for their actions” (Ashman, 2005). A dual and reverse process is thus implemented, whereby we humanise abstract entities (for example talking about organisational values is misleading because an organisation is a non-human construction that does not and cannot possess conscience or values) whilst we dehumanise ‘real human beings’ whose decisions and actions are no longer accounted for but transferred to the organisation as such (McKenna and Tsahuridu, 2001; Bakan, 2004; Ashman, 2005). Furthermore, as managers endorse the role of representative agents of the organisation, they are as such expected to act only in the organisation’s best interests, which means to be driven by profitability and growth (Ewin, 1991).

A more gentle view poses that the organisation, as more than the sum of the individuals that comprise it, becomes the locus for “a shared community of purpose” (Warren, 1996), or alternatively is a member of a wider community and “inconceivable without that community” (Ewin, 1995). In any case, the possible responsibility of the organisational entity does not alleviate organisational members from their accountability and moral responsibilities (Paine, 1996; Berthouzoz, 2000). In particular, the ties between organisational and individual responsibility require attention (Dobson, 1999). Of course, the systemic process that turns organisational outcomes into something more than the sum of individual acts renders impractical the unambiguous pinning of the responsibility on one specific link of the chain (Hales and Tamangani, 1996; Tsahuridu, 2004). Nonetheless, it is too simple to conclude that the acts of one individual do not make any difference in the final outcome. No matter the circumstances, no matter the roles of others, individuals are actors, active or passive, and that is usually enough in the eyes of the law and social custom to hold each one of us responsible for what we do or do not do. For the social machine to keep going, each screw must hold tight; we equally live in a social
system made up of organisations and each element defines and is defined by the whole (Hoffman, 1986).

Another moral problem is raised when we grant organisations an identity of their own. To what extent can an organisation know and reason about the appropriateness of its actions? Moral judgments can be rendered only for those who possess the ‘mens rea’, that is the propensity to reflect on facts and concepts (Velasquez, 1983 quoted in Metzger and Dalton, 1996). Because it is not possible to impute act intentionality to an organisation (as differentiated from its members and leaders), it ensues that organisations cannot really be said to possess moral agency. Likewise, an organisation is deprived from emotions, hence its incapability to demonstrate compassion or generosity by itself. Because of its nature, an organisation thus cannot be virtuous. It is equally not selfish, in so far as selfishness is a character trait that would require conscience of self and emotional capacity (Ewin, 1991). Emotions are a non-negligible aspect of morality, as demonstrated recent progress made in the field of artificial intelligence. Allen et al. (2000) mention that although computers are more consistent in applying moral rules and principles, they lack the ability to empathise with other sentient beings – an ability that does make a clear difference. Locke (1983:116) points out that: “moral reasoning is the exception, not the rule, something we engage in only when faced with difficult problems, or in our more philosophical moments: the majority of moral behaviour is unaccompanied by any conscious moral calculation”. Somehow, moral reasons are more relevant than moral reasoning.

Traditionally, bureaucratic organisations have epitomised the ‘impersonal machine’ in which detached and interchangeable actors perform their tasks rationally and withdraw their personality (Ladd, 1970 quoted by Metzger and Dalton, 1996). This model, sometimes caricatured but other times very real, has been extensively criticised on the grounds that it allows for immoral behaviour to occur because of the culture of impersonality amongst other things (see for instance Jackall’s depiction of the roots of American bureaucracies, 1988:11). Popularised by Max Weber, the bureaucratic model is usually characterised by a hierarchical structure, a strict division of labour that separate different professional experts, and an extensive
reliance on rules and procedures (Buchanan, 1996). The bureaucratic structure is by
excellence a structure in which roles are set and personal characteristics are not
allowed so that agents can be easily replaceable and interchangeable. Eventually, of
course, one becomes an expert in their role, but they do not do so by making the role
theirs; rather it is the role that formats the person into a stereotypical character, which
reflects and defines the position, the tasks and the organisation itself (Merton, 1940).

Personality, individuality and creativity are absent from bureaucracy to the extent
that they impede the efficiency of the management and production process. In his
analysis of French bureaucracies, Crozier (1964) concludes that impersonal rules,
centralised decisions, isolation and subsequent group pressure, and power
relationships regarding the control of “areas of uncertainty” create a “vicious circle”
that leads organisational members to solve problems by elaborating more rules and
engendering greater isolation. This ultimately contributes to reinforcing the
bureaucratic characteristics that might have initiated the problem in the first place.
Actually, bureaucracy reproduces itself as well as its members according to a similar,
constant profile (Dugger, 1980). It is therefore unsurprising that Johnson (1981:56)
insists on the need to review bureaucracies’ organisational structures and processes
“in order to reduce the anonymity of decision making”, whilst Buchanan (1996)
contends that strengthening the ethical commitments of bureaucratic actors would
limit the agency problem and offer a better outcome than alternative models of
corporate responsibility or bureaucratic roles. Paradoxically, this confirms that
emotions (of which bureaucratic actors are deprived de facto) are of significance in
moral behaviour (Hine, 2004).

Dyck and Schroeder (2005) take even more distance with the bureaucratic model.
Inspired by Weber’s ideal-types, they propose that managers shift their moral-point-
of-view from the conventional to a radical model characterized by compassion,
stewardship and critical approaches to practice and thinking. It is probable that
altering the conditions of moral perception by modifying the context (that is the
organisational structure, the moral climate and culture and so on) or the social
expectations attached to defined roles is likely to affect people’s moral behaviour.
The key to this programme, though, is to make people aware of the changes and
willing to implement them, because it is people who initiate the basic structures of
the social world. Yet, why would people do so?

In spite of the numerous talks about ethics in business and its relevance to develop
sustainable growth, in spite of much active lobbying to integrate stakeholders’
concern into strategic management, and to prioritise good management practice over
profitable practice, ethical misbehaviour still occurs in organisations and corporate
scandals seem to reproduce (a recent example is the French bank Société Générale’s
trader fraud amounting to nearly €5 billion). It is not that business people are morally
insensitive, or unwilling to merge their personal morality with their work ethic.
There may be impediments at the institutional level, which falls within the
competence of politics. There may also be impediments at the individual level, and
these have been insufficiently examined. The next part addresses this issue.

2.4.2. Practicing Ethics: Corporate Social Responsibility and Moral
management

Although everyone should be ethically sensitive, managers are often expected to be
role models and to set the tone in the organisation (Kantor and Weisberg, 2002;
Morrell and Anderson, 2006). In fact, the higher the manager’s position within the
company, the higher the expectations imposed on him or her to be a role model.
Studies in leadership have highlighted that top executives and leaders should play a
key part in encouraging particular behaviours and attitudes towards ethical standards
(see for instance Thomas and Simerly, 1995; Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Minkes et
al., 1999; Kantor and Weisberg, 2002; Rendtorff, 2003; Treviño and Brown, 2004).
Effective ethical leadership goes beyond the ‘do as I say, do not do as I do’ and
leaders are expected to embody the values they preach and inspire others to act as
well (Wheststone, 1997; Treviño et al., 2000). But a role model in a business
environment is not necessarily someone who would be considered a moral exemplar
in another context. In fact, people tend to have different conceptions of moral
exemplarity (Walker and Hennig, 2004). In practice, the pressure to achieve business
(as opposed to ‘social’) objectives is usually identified as a cause for moral failure
(Bird and Waters, 1989), although Solomon (2005:111) argues that the problem is
not so clear-cut and that opposing virtuous conduct to business performance is a mistake because “ethics is a way of life, a seemingly delicate but in fact very strong tissue of endless adjustments and compromises.”

Because it apprehends how the organisation as a whole can perform better in both financial and non-financial (i.e. social, environmental) areas, the CSR approach provides a framework for good practice and pragmatic policies. It appeals to business practitioners and political leaders alike. It also seems to bridge the ‘gap’ between academics and practitioners, granting the former hard-earned recognition and providing the latter with ‘ready-made’ tools to perform better on the social scale. However, the vast majority of the CSR literature (and alike) relies on the neo-classical assumptions and does not address the question of the purpose of business organisations in a capitalist economy. Consequently, CSR research has been targeted as either too compromised, that is submissive to the profit-maximisation imperative, or too constraining and ill-adapted to the realities of the business world, as if putting moral and social demands on businesses would impede their development, if not their survival (see Webley, 1997; van Marrewijk, 2003).

Several reviews have examined the history and the development of the CSR concept, yet it remains quite vague, and the CSR field is for the most part varied (Garriga and Melé, 2004; Kakabadse et al., 2005). First mentioned by Bowen in the 1950s, the concept of CSR has been extensively discussed, refined and developed over the past fifty to sixty years (see Jones, 1980; Carroll, 1991 and 1999; Fischer, 2004). The CSR perspective now stretches from a Friedmanite apprehension of the corporate responsibilities towards society (according to which CSR is strategic in the pursuit of the best economic outcomes which are assumed to be similar to the best social outcomes) to a challenging, all-encompassing, almost spiritual view of the business organisation as part of the cosmos (see Lantos, 2001; Frederick, 1986, 1994 and 1998). The CSR field may not have reached critical mass but several themes have emerged to offer alternative foci of enquiry, notably Corporate Social Performance (Carroll, 1979; Wood, 1991b and 1991c; Roman et al., 1999) and Stakeholder Approach (Jones, 1995; Hummels, 1998; Szwajkowski, 2000; Freeman, 2005).
Although it is more often centred on the organisation, CSR research has started to examine the role managers play in the ethics of corporations.

For example, Athanasopoulou (2004) led a qualitative study amongst managers’ role conflicts at work. Using the role theory, she distinguishes inter-role from person-role conflicts and explains that inter-role conflicts (which is when the person experiences conflicting demands from different roles, for instance ‘as a manager’ versus ‘as a community member’) are more frequent than person-role conflicts (that is when the role expectations conflict with the person’s values). She then lists the “rationalisation mechanisms” managers implement to cope with such conflicts, which consist in: (1) distancing oneself from the situation (“it is part of the job”); (2) hoping that it is for the best (“I am protecting the jobs of other people”); or (3) taking a “deterministic approach” which implies that what happens is inevitable because “it is not entirely up to me to decide” (Athanasopoulou, 2004:18). Overall, however, justifications (1) and (3) illustrate a tendency to mitigate one’s responsibility by annihilating ‘the human’ under ‘the manager’, ‘the business’ or ‘the organisational machine’. Justification (2) is more engaging but is a plain example of utilitarian rationalisation. It is not wrong in itself, but it nevertheless weakens the value of the human in so far as one person’s well-being is balanced against other people’s well-being. It is not certain under these circumstances that the decision is purely motivated by a desire to protect others rather than one’s own interests and well-being first and foremost.

Athanasopoulou’s study is interesting but remains insufficient with regards to analysing the rationalisation mechanisms and the conditions under which decisions are made. Indeed, she describes how managers justify their behaviour but she does not dig into the rationale behind these claims. Yet in order to improve our moral behaviour, we need to understand what makes us act the way we do. A greater degree of self-knowledge is required to uncover the meaning and significance of moral experiences. Sundman’s argument about excellent managers who work for companies that produce harmful goods equally falls short of explanation regarding the mechanisms and factors of influence in the process of moral deliberation.
Sundman (2000) examines from a Virtue Ethics perspective whether a good manager is also a moral manager, and suggests that the demands of morality are external to the business practice so that a good manager ought not to be a moral manager. Yet, as Dawson and Bartholomew (2003:135) rightly point out, a virtuous manager would still be concerned with what produces the organisation he works for. Hence, working for an arm manufacturer would raise serious moral issues that contravene the ideal of the good life and human happiness. Besides, pleading ignorance would not obliterate one’s responsibility because the virtuous manager would be wise enough to know what he participates in. “Virtuous business people have the interest of society in mind and knowledge of the human goods to which their work contributes” (Dawson and Bartholomew, 2003:135-136). To word it differently, neither Athanasopoulou nor Sundman examine the self behind the manager, and how this self relates to other selves.

Actually, virtue ethicists have been prominent in the management ethics research field recently, either to support Virtue Ethics as a comprehensive moral framework for managers or to argue that management cannot be virtuous (Dawson and Bartholomew, 2003). Some researchers focus on the concept of practice. For instance, Brewer (1997) proposes that management be called a practice on the grounds that management qualifies in each three categories of internal goods. Yet Moore (2002) argues that management is rather a “feature of institution or organisation” and that only business, if conceived holistically, can be properly considered a practice because it is effectively contributing to society.

For our enquiry, however, the most interesting contribution of Virtue Ethics to business studies is the notion of character. What character means is not uncontroversial and some virtue ethicists do not even refer to the concept (Statman, 1997). Watson’s outline of the concept illustrates some of the misunderstandings that occur in the field. Watson (1997) argues that the character-based virtue approach shall not be confused with character utilitarianism (i.e. developing a virtuous character in order to achieve happiness) nor with perfectionism (which remains consequentialist in essence). For Watson, it actually embraces a non-consequentialist view without necessarily implying a purpose to which human actions be directed.
Yet, for Aristotle, the development of character with good dispositions towards the virtues fully participates in the achievement of the good life. A character-based ethics in the spirit of Virtue Ethics is teleological, thus somewhat consequentialist too.

MacIntyre’s depiction of the manager is probably the most famous application of the character concept to business. As interpreted by MacIntyre (1985) a character is more than a social role. It demands that role and personality be fused so that the distinction between what is specific to one individual and what is specific to his social role disappears. Therefore, the character stands for the moral representation of the culture to which it belongs. Besides, “the requirements of a character are imposed from the outside, from the way in which others regard and use characters to understand and to evaluate themselves” so that ultimately “the character morally legitimates a mode of social existence” (MacIntyre, 1985:29). MacIntyre identifies three characters representative of modern society but his depiction of the bureaucratic manager has been particularly commented (see Deetz, 1995; Mangham, 1995a and 1995b; Nash, 1995; Dawson and Bartholomew, 2003). The bureaucratic manager is “manipulating others and manipulated by the system he has created” and “his area of expertise is efficient management which, for him, has no moral dimension” (Vardy and Grosch, 1999:103-104) and indeed may itself be illusory (MacIntyre, 1985). A controversial picture of manager, the character depicted by MacIntyre is an ideal-type, although it is unclear how much MacIntyre himself believes it mirrors reality. This likely participated in boosting the debate of the moral status of management and managers.

We might need to recall at this point that our enquiry is not concerned with moral management as such. Indeed, moral management is prescriptive and aims to promote a strategic model of management that combines organisational profitability with concern for stakeholders and social well-being. Carroll (2002:151) explains that: “If the moral management model is to be achieved, managers need to integrate ethical wisdom with their managerial wisdom and to take steps to create and sustain an ethical climate in their organizations.” On the contrary, our examination of managers’ morality is set to be mainly exploratory, and to examine the content of the moral thinking, feeling and acting of managers as individuals. The purpose is first to
understand the inner mechanisms and sources of influence. In order to do so, we can review how management and managers have been examined from the moral point of view, both descriptively and normatively.

Carroll (2002) categorisation of models of management aims to be descriptive. He lists the characteristics of immoral, moral and amoral managers. First, immoral management highlights “a style that not only is devoid of ethical principles or precepts, but also implies a positive and active opposition to what is ethical” (Carroll, 2002:145). Immoral managers are only concerned with their interests and make profit-based decisions regardless of the moral and legal obligations they have. Moral management on the other hand “conforms to high standards of ethical behavior and professional standards of conduct” in the pursuit of profit (Carroll, 2002:246). Moral managers are attentive to the letter and the spirit of the law, and their strategy encompasses moral standards. Finally, Carroll identifies two types of amoral managers. Unintentional amoral managers are not conscious of, or sensitive to the implications their decisions have on stakeholders, whereas intentional amoral managers adopt a conservative view that ethics and business ought not to be mixed. Intentional amoral managers consciously avoid thinking about ethics when at work, whereas unintentional amoral managers are simply ignorant of the fact that what they do has moral consequences.

Carroll (2002) suggests that the vast majority of managers might fall within the amoral management category, and that at the individual level, each manager goes into phases that range from the immoral to the moral management model, depending on the circumstances. But overall, organisations are likely to be filled with amoral managers who “are basically good people, but they essentially see the competitive business world as ethically neutral” (Carroll, 2002:148). The conclusion is that more efforts should be made to raise managers’ awareness of the ethical challenges in the business environment and to explain to them how they can benefit from being ethically proactive.

The most interesting element in this picture of morality in management is the notion that a manager is mostly amoral, but at times falls into the immoral or moral
category. Carroll (2002) specifies that this conclusion is speculative and requires empirical support. We are not concerned with this point, however. What is significant is that at least some managers tend to lack awareness of the moral dimension of their job, and that when they sense the moral implications of a situation, they have as much a tendency to act wrongly as they have to act rightly from the moral point of view. The same individual can be moral one day and immoral another day because the circumstances changed his perception of the situation.

We can draw two conclusions from this: first, most people are dual, that is equally capable of goodness as badness; second, the key to understand why people behave as they do (rightly or badly) lies in their internal deliberations that reflect the perception they have of the situation and the peculiar circumstances, as we already suggested. This concurs what Treviño and Brown (2004:70) underlines as a lack of “moral awareness, ethical recognition, or ethical sensitivity”. Basically, managers are not necessarily able to detect the moral component of a situation, hence to act in a morally considerate way. But, as Treviño and Brown (2004) specify, moral awareness is just the first stage in the wider process of decision-making. The authors add that when it comes to ethics, people are likely to be equally good and bad depending on their environment. They question the autonomy of moral agents by arguing that most adults are followers and reproduce what they observe amongst their peers. There is no denying that the culture and the personal qualities of leaders and managers set the tone within the organisation, and that ethics must be practiced, not just hanged on the wall, if it is to be meaningful. Yet individuals are rarely coerced into doing something they disagree with. Certainly, examples exist where people are threatened with being fired if they do not follow the orders, and the fear of unemployment can count as a mitigating circumstance. But it cannot be accepted as an excuse for denying one’s moral agency nonetheless, because it is always a matter of choice. To make the decision in agreement with one’s conscience represents a challenge which announces the critical importance of self-knowledge.
2.5. SUMMARY

This chapter has introduced and discussed elements from moral philosophies that could inform the understanding of individual morality. In particular Virtue Ethics in the Aristotelian tradition was identified as promising, although incomplete, because of its interest in the character of the individual. The significance of the virtue of phronesis was acknowledged, but its definition was judged too imprecise for an in-depth understanding of people’s moral deliberation process. We noticed that the proposition of an intuitive knowledge of the Good, rooted in a “shared humanity” and allied with a just ability to reason and to act upon one’s decisions is appropriate to explore individual morality, yet it fails to provide sufficient details to set to the exploration. The chapter then provided a review of the concepts of management and managers, and examined more precisely the business ethics literature that has investigated morality and management. We concluded that more needed to be known about the inner mechanisms of moral deliberation and self knowledge. The following chapter will examine this question in greater detail.
CHAPTER 3 – MORALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL SELF

“We can only work towards perfecting ourselves if there is a struggle, if there is opposition to be overcome. A soul can only become perfect when it has travelled the path leading to perfection and come to understand, to know everything there is in creation. We cannot be near God if we know nothing of unhappiness and sin, if we do not ‘feel’ and truly understand the other creatures, and in order to really know them we have to have been in direct contact with them.”

Bahram Elahi
The Path of Perfection

3.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with exploring the internal elements of moral deliberation which leads to moral action, and to identify a framework that would allow us to understand the mechanisms and constitutive elements inherent to phronesis or practical wisdom. Because of the nature of this enquiry, we need to turn to psychology and moral psychology to look for some answers. Thus the chapter begins with a critical examination of the internal moral process, more particularly moral development and the stages of ethical decision-making (part 3.2). Part 3.3 discusses the relations between the self and morality. We will examine the importance of the self in our moral understanding and moral endeavours. This will relate to the concept of shared humanity introduced in the previous chapter.

Finally, part 3.4 introduces Carl Jung’s self-centred psychology and summarises the framework that will be used for the study. Jung’s psychology is self-centred in the sense that it places the self at the centre of the psyche in a dynamic and transcendent relation. After the main elements of Jung’s view of the psyche are introduced, it will be argued that a Jungian framework offers a promising solution to apprehend and actually develop phronesis, in so far as self-knowledge constitutes the basis for moral knowledge.
3.2. U NWRAPPING MORALITY

Psychology has been keen to look into the mechanisms of moral behaviour, moral thinking and moral reasoning of individuals. A greater number of researchers acknowledge how moral enquiry can benefit from psychological as well as philosophical inputs. For instance Kaler (1999:212) states: "Abandoning ethical theory does not mean sole reliance on common sense. [...] Instead of looking to a separate realm of ethical theory, ethical investigation looks to theories drawn from the social and natural sciences: theories that help the ethical investigation determine what is and is not good for human beings by illuminating the nature of human nature and the effects of particular sorts of social arrangements upon human beings."

Ebrahimi et al. (2005) concur, as well as Bartlett (2003:225) who relates some business ethicists' claims that too much emphasis was put on philosophy and not enough on "the more psychological aspects of business ethics, such as behavioural intentions and the beliefs that shape those intentions." However, psychology can contribute in many different ways to ethical enquiries, as we shall now see.

3.2.1. M ORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MANAGERS

Moral psychologists have concentrated their efforts on a few concepts that inform moral development and ethical decision-making. Applied to management, studies have investigated the interaction, integration or conflict between managers' personal values and business obligations (e.g. Finegan, 1994; Fritzsche, 1995; Fisher, 1999; Oliver, 1999; Nonis and Swift, 2001; Cadbury, 2002; Bartlett, 2003; Napal, 2003). To a large extent the purpose is to assess whether and how managers' background, personal values or moral philosophies influence the way they make decisions, handle ethical dilemmas and reflect on their and others' actions (Forsyth, 1992). Religious beliefs have received particular attention, with a view to determining whether and how religious values affect one's behaviour and self-expectations (e.g. Colby and Damon, 1995; Weaver and Agle, 2002; Maclean et al., 2004). Alternatively, Gilligan's assertion of a gender difference in the view of ethics (women's care versus men's justice) has led to enquiries about whether men and women are ethically different (White, 1992; Luthar et al., 1997; Kreie and Cronan, 1998). The question of
age is sometimes mentioned but it is unclear whether being older implies being wiser, hence having greater moral sophistication (Siku la and Costa, 1994).

If some managers find a way to integrate their beliefs to their work, others find a way to cope with sometimes contradictory duties (for instance by compartmentalising their life) whilst some feel the constant tension between what they want to be and what they have to do (Lovell, 2002). This 'grey' area has been looked at through the concept of ethical climate, introduced by Victor and Cullen (1987) but developed and used in several studies (e.g. Cullen et al., 1989; Luthar et al., 1997; Wimbush et al., 1997; Barnett and Vaics, 2000; Fritzsche, 2000). The ‘perception’ view has also proved popular and a few studies have examined how managers (or business students or other practitioners) perceive moral dilemmas, and in some cases how they judge, make decisions on and respond to an issue (e.g. Ibrahim and Angelidis, 1993; Singhapakdi et al., 1996; Dukerich et al., 2000; Mattison, 2000; Malone, 2006). Usually, perception of moral issues is closely linked to personal moral standards and contextual characteristics (Baack et al., 2000; Jaffe and Pasternak, 2006).

These studies are statistically rich but they generally omit to consider managers as human beings and, as a correlate, as individual selves. Managers are taken as organisational actors or defined in relation to their environment and their relations. However, the self is the core of our morality. Knobe (2005) suggests there exists an “ideal of being yourself” that accounts for a significant part of our moral systems. From the perspective of developmental psychology, Bergman (2002) reviews major contributions to moral development theory and highlights how the self participates in the articulation and implementation of moral judgments. Blasi (1984 and 1993) in particular grants the self a central role in the morality of a person, in so far as the person will be motivated to act according to her ideals that constitute her sense of moral self or her self-identity. People aspire to consistency between their actions and their aspirations because their self is key to who they are. Colby and Damon’s (1993 and 1995) studies of moral exemplars’ personality emphasize the importance of cohesion between one’s moral judgments and one’s sense of self in fostering moral behaviour. In fact, “when there is perceived unity between self and morality, judgment and conduct are directly and predictably linked and action choices are
made with great certainty. [...] Thus, when moral and personal goals are a central component of self, moral goals are central to the self.” (Colby and Damon, 1993:150 _italics original_). Conscience, to that extent, might be viewed as the self’s tool to remind us of who we really are, to recall the personal autonomy that seems to suffer in situations of moral dilemma (Killen and Nucci, 1995; Lovell, 2002). To begin our enquiry about the self and its relation to morality, the following part examines the relevance of a moral development approach.

### 3.2.2. MORAL DEVELOPMENT

The nature and content of moral development has been extensively researched by Piaget, Kohlberg and many followers and critics. Kohlberg’s work established a solid though debatable theory of moral development (Weinreich-Haste, 1983; Colby and Kohlberg, 1984). Kohlberg’s theory of moral development clearly focuses on rationality. Emel (1983:55 _italics original_) summarises it as follow: “Moral development is seen as essentially a cognitive process with cognitive products. Development consists of the successive emergence of increasingly complex and adequate forms of moral reasoning. Moral action is compelled by moral thought and thought generates decisions or conclusions that are morally compelling because they are logically compelling.”

Kohlberg identified six distinct stages of moral reasoning, through which each person progresses incrementally with no regressing. The higher the stage, the more sophisticated the moral reasoning and the more metaphysical the object of concern of the person. Ishida (2006:65) lists the characteristics of each stage:

- **Stage 1:** Orientation to punishment, obedience, and physical and material power. Rules are obeyed to avoid punishment.
- **Stage 2:** Naïve instrumental hedonistic orientation. The individual conforms to obtain rewards.
- **Stage 3:** “Good boy/girl” orientation designed to win approval and maintain expectations of one’s immediate group. The individual conforms to avoid disapproval. One earns approval by being “nice”.

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Stage 4: Orientation to authority, law, and duty, to maintain a fixed order, whether social or religious. Right behaviour consists of doing one’s duty and abiding by the social order.

Stage 5: Social contract orientation, in which duties are defined in terms of contract and the respect of other’s rights. Emphasis is upon equality and mutual obligation within a democratic order.

Stage 6: The morality of individual principles of conscience that have logical comprehensiveness and universality. Rightness of acts is determined by conscience in accord with ethical principles that appeal to comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency.

People start from the pre-conventional level (stage 1 and 2), where they are only concerned about themselves, up to the conventional (stage 3 and 4) then post-conventional (stage 5 and 6) levels, yet they do so at various pace. Also, not everyone reaches the post-conventional level.

This Cognitive Moral Development (CMD) approach has proved popular amongst researchers on ethical decision-making and behaviour. In particular, Rest’s Defining Issues Test or DIT, that measures the stage preference, and Lind’s Moral Judgment Test or MJT, which focuses on stage consistency, are two measurement tools developed from Kohlberg’s theory (Ishida, 2006). As such, they share the implications and limitations of the theory. Indeed, a major criticism of Kohlberg’s model and of the many follow-up studies based on it (for instance Treviño, 1986 or Forte, 2004), is its strong reliance on reasoning to measure people’s degree of moral development, including the capacity to take others’ perspective as part of one’s mental processing of a moral puzzle (Bergman, 2002). Within the CMD perspective, morality is about the cognitive ability to reason, which is taken as the necessary and sufficient condition for moral action. Yet morality is more likely a matter of rational reasoning and emotional response, or at least experienced-based intuition (MacLagan, 1998). A former collaborator of Kohlberg, Carol Gilligan has particularly targeted the male-oriented prejudices of the model and proposed that women develop morally according to a sense of care rather than a sense of justice (Putman, 1996). We alluded in the previous chapter to the fact that emotions have been neglected and rationality has been overstated in the study of morality (e.g.
Greenspan, 2000; Bos and Willmott, 2001; Haidt, 2001; Hine, 2004). Also, several studies on moral exemplarity (e.g. Monroe et al., 1990; Colby and Damon, 1993 and 1995; Matsuba and Walker, 2005) or investigating empathetic and sympathetic characteristics in close link to imagination (e.g. Piper, 1991; Deigh, 1995; Gordon, 1995; Magai and McFadden, 1995) provide evidence that call into question the predominance of rational reasoning in morality.

Another problem with the CMD model is that it does not allow for regression, so that once a stage has been reached, there is supposedly no turning back to more selfish concerns when making a decision. However, experience could demonstrate that it is not just so straightforward (Maclean et al., 2004). If it were, then post-conventional people would never act motivated by their own self-interest or just because 'the law says so'. In other words, once stage 6 is reached we would not commit 'moral mistakes', that is we would not ignore other people's well-being no matter the circumstances or the incentives to do so. ‘Once virtuous, always virtuous’ does not seem an accurate picture of human beings if we look at people and at ourselves, as was discussed in the previous chapter (part 2.4.2). Furthermore, the pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional stages are assumed to be hermetic and sufficient to classify everyone, although in reality they fall short in doing so (see for example Knobe's discussion of the 'Raskolnikovs', 2005).

3.2.3. ROLES

The final major contribution of Kohlberg's theory is the importance given to role-taking abilities as an integrative part of moral development (Walker, 1980). People progress upwards in their moral development depending on their capacity to take the perspective of other people when they assess and account for a moral situation. The concept of role has been widely used in the literature, although often with varied preconceptions and implications (Neiman and Hughes, 1951; Biddle, 1986). Role theory is appreciated because it locates the individual within his social context and it discusses the shaping and enactment of role expectations (Katz and Kahn, 1978). These expectations usually define the content of role obligations (Hardimon, 1994). Goffinan (1959) provided a classic framework for understanding the extent and
nature of role-playing in our lives. Drawing constant comparisons with dramaturgical features, in the tradition of psychodrama (Moreno, 1977), Goffman (1959) describes how we perform our roles, and work through and with various groups and props in front of an audience, how we deal with disturbances and disruptions, how we manage the transition from backstage to frontstage, and how we learn to hide our ‘self’ effectively. Role theory thus enunciated actually faces some serious moral questions.

Roles encompass both social and moral expectations although to varying degrees (Downie, 1968; Boatright, 1988). In this perspective, moral tensions result from the perception of a contradiction or a conflict between various moral expectations either within the boundaries of a single role (intra-role moral conflict), between the expectations of separate roles (inter-role moral conflict), or between role expectations and self aspirations (Athanasopoulou’s study illustrates this viewpoint – see Chapter 2, part 2.4.2). Actually, moral dilemmas are not just the result of role conflict. Tensions in role enactment can originate from role ambiguity, role malintegration, role discontinuity, role overload as much as role conflict (Miles, 1977; Biddle, 1986). However, the point role theory puts forward is that life is a play, people are actors and morality is a matter of expectations regulated by interaction with others. Such theory has undeniable descriptive qualities, but its moral qualities are a different matter. Indeed, the very concept of the virtues is seriously challenged, in so far as a person cannot be truly virtuous, but only acts as a virtuous person. Let’s consider for example the virtue of benevolence. The virtuous person is benevolent because it is in her character, that is it defines her as a person. If life is a play, however, a person might very well be benevolent but only through enactment. In other words, she can enact benevolence, but she is not benevolent per se. If the social or moral expectations bearing upon a specific role include acting with benevolence, then the person who is benevolent simply is a ‘good’ actress in the sense that she enacts what is expected of her (or what she perceives is expected of her). If the next role she enacts does not require acting with benevolence, she might choose not to be benevolent without it being immoral, wrong or non-virtuous.

Of course, one could argue that there might exist global rules that expect benevolence in each role people enact. In which case, being virtuous would be
considered a global moral expectation against which everyone is assessed. Yet again, virtuousness would be addressed as the feature of a role rather than of a character. Virtuousness is significant only because thus are designed the rules of the play. In fact, virtuousness loses its intrinsic value. It might also be argued that a person can decide to enact her role in a virtuous manner, in which case she chooses to act virtuously. Yet, this is far from obvious. Indeed, if she chooses to enact her role virtuously, say with benevolence, then her benevolence is relevant to what she enacts, not necessarily to who she is as a person. Furthermore, if we were to accept that she is what she enacts, we need to identify a permanent feature that links all roles and all enactments together, which serves as a unity of character that bears the moral responsibility. Otherwise the person is just a puppet lacking moral strength to assert her convictions when pressured by social expectations attached to her role, as Goffman (1959:87) illustrates. Morally, the risk is high for individual autonomy and responsibility. As Vice (2003:105 - italics original) notices: “If we see ourselves purely in terms of roles, we both risk bad faith in the Sartrean sense – mauvaise foi – as well as losing sight of the individuality of persons.[...] And it is arguably a sign of maturity to outgrow ‘role-playing’, to stop defining ourselves essentially with any role we may happen to take on and to become comfortable with or resigned to the kind of person we broadly are and to our inescapable limitations.”

We thus need to turn to the concept of self. In role theory, however, the self is an ambiguous concept. The self refers essentially to the sense of our own identity (Layder, 2004). However, opinions diverge on its nature. Some believe that it is constructed from our roles (e.g. Goffman, 1959) whilst others adopt a narrative point of view, arguing that “we grow up on stories” (Vice, 2003:98). The real problem is to decide whether the self is stable or changing; that is, if the self constitutes an anchor to which the person comes back and which, therefore, can be held as the core identity of the person; or rather if the self is yet another passing state that can be erased or called back at will. In the latter case, the self does not constitute a reliable moral framework in so far as it can be disposed of temporarily. In the former case, the self is necessarily of a different nature from roles. Practical wisdom requires consistency to be truly meaningful; therefore it is bound to be connected to a self that is present no matter what we want or what we think. The self appears in charge of building up
the foundations for moral deliberation. The self should thus be perceptible at each stage of the process of ethical decision-making. Managers spend much of their time making decisions whose moral implications are more or less significant. The following part examines how research into ethical decision-making addresses the role of the self.

3.2.4. STAGES OF ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING

Treviño and Brown (2004:70) describe ethical decision-making as a “multiple-stage [...] process that moves from moral awareness to moral judgment (deciding that a specific action is morally justifiable), to moral motivation (the commitment or intention to take the moral action), and finally to moral character (persistence or follow-through to take the action despite challenges).” Being moral thus necessitates that one is capable of sensing that a situation bears moral implications, of defining the appropriate response to the situation, of committing one’s will to that response and then of acting upon one’s will. From the Virtue Ethics point of view, moral motivation and moral character are fostered by the possession and the practice of the virtues. They do not require an effort for the virtuous person because she is naturally inclined to be committed to the appropriate response and to act accordingly. Similarly, the person who strives for virtuousness should be familiar with good motivation and moral character, else she does not really strive for virtuousness. Moral awareness and moral judgment are more difficult qualities to master, because they appeal to both rational and ‘irrational’, sensitive (hence subjective) qualities. Nevertheless, the morally responsible person is expected to possess all four capabilities.

Indeed, the person who is sensitive to a moral issue and thinks about an appropriate response to the issue but fails to act accordingly is responsible for her lack of action despite her good moral judgment. The person who acts appropriately but who has not grasped the moral implications of the situation equally fails to be morally responsible and fully virtuous. Morality is a complex phenomenon, which involves various levels of apprehension and understanding. It seems therefore necessary to pay attention to the individual self that “carries out reflection and that is the object of such reflection”
(Vice, 2003:2). Louden (1988:377) similarly points out that “morality ‘begins with the self’ […] in the sense that self-directed, reflective behavior constitutes the basic data of ethics”. Yet, the self is generally absent from moral discourses, at least in its human quality. Murdoch (1983:69) claims that: “Philosophy, on its other fronts, has been busy dismantling the old substantial picture of the ‘self’, and ethics has not proved able to rethink this concept for moral purposes.” Nevertheless the self is the “starting-point to an inquiry about how to live” because it is the root of our knowledge of the world, both inner and outer (Vice, 2003:3).

A majority of research into ethical decision-making applied to management targets the external factors that help or impede the decision-making process. In particular, the influence of codes (Cadbury, 2002; Coughlan, 2005), organisational culture or leadership (Bowen, 2004), or organisational structure (White, 1999) has been discussed, whereas O’Neill and Hern (1991) have argued that decision-making equals a collective negotiation between individuals within the organisational system. What interests us, however, is to examine how the stages of ethical decision-making relate to the self, self-knowledge and practical wisdom. First, moral awareness, or moral perception, is the ability to detect the moral aspect of a given situation. It supposedly precedes any other form of moral activity. As such, it relies on personal values and principles (Blum, 1991) but also on the quality and sensitivity of the self. To that extent, moral perception is a function of the self and reveals what the self cares for; yet moral perception is also shaped by the moral education received by the individual in the sense of the community’s moral system and what the person perceives is expected of her (Sparks and Shepherd, 2002). That the individual is influenced by the community he lives in, as well as by the rules and norms that regulate the community, is certainly true. However, it is the individual who perceives and not the community. Perception and awareness are individual faculties, abilities of a self. The community can help the self cultivate or on the contrary disengage from acute moral awareness, but the decision lies with the self.

Moral judgment is about assessing the appropriateness of an action from the moral point of view. The perceived moral intensity of the situation is supposed to determine people’s cognitive process and evaluation of ‘the appropriate course of action’.
McMahon and Harvey (2007:337) examine the concept of moral intensity, first introduced by Thomas Jones, and explain that it is composed of six elements: “magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity, and concentration of effect.” The underlying assumption is that these factors can be measured and are indicative of how a person makes a decision when she faces a moral issue. Findings suggest that the greater the distance between the person and the moral issue (i.e. distance is understood as both physical and emotional) and the less impact the issue is anticipated to have, the more likely the person is to bypass the issue without contemplating it (Dukerich et al., 2000; Mellema, 2003; Jaffe and Pasternak, 2006). Similarly, Krebs and Laird (1998) conclude that the degree of self-implication, either real or hypothetical, in moral dilemma examined by the subjects, influences the judgment they pass on the transgressor. Yet we are here again confronted with an apparently objective measurement of a concept that is really subjective. Indeed, the intensity of the perceived moral conflict will be function of the distance the person maintains between the situation and herself. Here, distance is best understood as the degree of emotional separation between the self on the one hand, and the situation, the role or the people affected on the other hand. What I feel is important might not be what someone else feels important, from the moral point of view. Equally, what I judge important is not necessarily similar to what someone else will judge important. Although the concept of moral intensity is informative, it does not account for the emotional response that necessarily accompanies the moral decision and action. This does not imply that ethics is all relative but rather that our perception and consecutive reaction to a moral issue will be influenced by emotions that are necessarily subjective, in the sense that they are specific to us.

Moral motivation and moral character are both acts of will. Indeed, they imply a choice (i.e. to be willing to do something rather than something else) and the effort necessary to concretise it (i.e. the will-power to implement the choice). Roberto Assagioli, founder of the psychosynthesis movement, centred his psychology on the will. According to him: “the will’s function [consists] in deciding what is to be done, in applying all the necessary means for its realization and in persisting in the task in the face of all obstacles and difficulties.” (Assagioli, 2002:6). Essential to our actions
in life, the will is however not easily assimilated, and it requires training to fully master it. The training occurs in three phases, argues Assagioli (2002:7 – *italics original*): “first is the recognition that *the will exists*; the second concerns the realization of *having a will*. The third phase of the discovery, which renders it complete and effective, is that of *being a will* (this is different from “having” a will).” In any case, the will is located at the “central core of our being”, so that “the self and the will are intimately connected” (Assagioli, 2002:9). The willing self appears therefore as the ultimate source of moral decision and moral action. It is the self who practices wisdom and we rely on our self, and not just on rational thinking, to assess the choices we have and to choose our course of action. We will now explore in greater details the characteristics of this self.

### 3.3. Perspectives on the Self and Morality

It springs from the previous discussion the idea that the self is a core concept in the moral process of individuals. We suggested that the self plays a significant part in the moral decision-making process, and that the self demands some degree of stability to provide a reliable basis for moral deliberation and moral enactment. However, we did not provide a clear definition of the concept of self, which is what the following part aims to do.

#### 3.3.1. Defining and Capturing the Self

The meaning of self is manifold. Colloquially, the notion of self is used to distinguish one person from the others, and it identifies one’s personality or most essential character. Psychologically, the self is given different meanings according to the school of thought to which one belongs. Thus American ego-psychology associates ‘self’ with a construction of the ego (the ‘I’, the subject) whereas the English tradition is inclined to consider the self as the locus of the whole psychic activity and the product of dynamic processes that foster the unity of the person (Doron and Parot, 1991:670-671). Jones (2004) confirms that the approach one adopts of the self relates to one’s ontological position, especially in psychology, so that the concept is hard to define.
Layder (2004:7) assimilates self with “personal identity” and contends that the self is “how a person regards themselves and how they, and others, relate to or behave towards themselves.” For Layder, the self is both sociological (i.e. part of a social context) and psychological (i.e. independent of the social world). The self is also essentially though not exclusively emotional, as well as flexible and capable of evolution over a life-span. Furthermore, Layder (2004) depicts the self as the centre of awareness but also a bearer of something of a spiritual nature (what people refer to as “the higher self”). The self is therefore a complex entity, both stable and dynamic.

Colman describes the self as “the overall process of the organism as a whole” and stresses that “the totality of our being is made up of the totality of our action in the world” (2008:353 and 355 – italics original). He distinguishes between being a self, knowing we are a self and having a self. If every living being can be said to be a self, only creatures capable of self-reflexivity can develop a sense of self and then claim that they have a self (that is a soul). The sense of self is in Colman’s view the result of our knowledge that we are a self. The fact of having a self, however, depends on the others first attributing a self to us in their mind. In other words, according to Colman (2008:359), we come to have a self by the recognition others make that we are just like them, which leads them to treat us “as beings” like themselves, and vice-versa. In that respect, Colman defines the self as partly personal and partly collective. Although the self refers to one’s personality and identity, it is commonly associated with its more spiritual aspect of “the higher self”, which alludes to a transcendent state of realisation. Hubback (1998:283) uses the metaphor of “layers of insight” to explain how “the personal self is potentially in touch with the healing energy of the greater self.”

The self is a rather ambiguous term but so is its counterpart the ego. The ego usually identifies the person as an entity but its unity and permanence are ambiguous (Doron and Parot, 1991:462). In everyday life, the self is associated with selfishness (or equally with selflessness), whereas in psychology selfishness (i.e. egoism) would tend to be concerned with the ego rather than the self. The self, however, is primarily involved in self-awareness, self-knowledge, self-realisation and so on. Self-mastery or self-control, on the other hand, is really about mastering the ego in so far as it is
about controlling the expression of our personality, and not the essence of our being. To avoid such confusion, some use a capital letter (Self) when they refer to the “essential being” and a small letter (self) when they refer to ego-like concepts, but this is not a convention.

Aïssel (2005:284) lists the meanings attributed to ego and self. He starts with explaining that “personality is composed of a multitude of pieces called the small egos ("les petits moi") whose gathering constitutes the self.” Personality is influenced by these small egos that occasionally act in contradiction with one another. Importantly, we identify with these pieces and think of us as a whole whilst in reality we are fragmented (Chakraborty, 2004:41). In White’s terms, the self is split into “interacting subsystems” which have “their own beliefs, goals, plans, and strategies” and which induce self-deception (White, 1991:193). Aïssel (2005:285) brings our attention to three types of ego: the imaginary ego (“moi imaginaire”) who fools us into believing we are conscious and free whilst we are in fact disconnected from reality; the material ego (“moi matériel”) who is active when we act automatically, for instance out of habit, without being conscious of what we are doing; since this ego acts “like a machine” he is little concerned with emotions and feelings; finally the reactive ego (“ego réactif”) only operates with regards to emotions and feelings, hence cultivating excessive subjectivity and prejudices without the mitigating support of rational thinking. As it appears, the person cannot be complete nor act in a morally appropriate manner if she is dominated by one of the egos. These small egos, however, are complementary. The self is the sum of these egos and the “true nature of human being” (Aïssel, 2005:285). According to Aïssel (2005:280) the self unwraps from the essence of the being, which is “the internal structure the individual possesses at birth and that is quickly covered up by the personality”. In that sense, the essence represents who the person truly is, and the self is the perfect manifestation of the essence.

Other researchers have attempted to study the moral significance of the self, although they did not necessarily adopt the same definitions nor approaches to capture the self. Most research in this field, as was previously noted, focused on moral exemplarity. The subjects examined were different, from young adults held as exemplars by their
organisation’s director (Matsuba and Walker, 2005), to teachers and community members (McAdams et al., 1997), to actors and witnesses of the Second World War (Monroe et al., 1990; Monroe, 2001). The common point of these studies, besides the finding that moral values and self-identity were particularly intertwined in moral exemplars, is their methodology. All undertook a narrative research on the life of those outstanding individuals and aimed to identify elements constitutive of self-identity that made these individuals different from the ‘indifferent lot’. Somehow, the conclusions resemble one another but remain sufficiently different to prevent us from concluding that we can identify one model whose characteristics would somewhat guarantee moral exemplarity. Walker and Hennig’s (2004) questionnaire-based studies demonstrated that different people have different understanding of what moral exemplarity consists in: it is either regarded as being just, brave or caring. Maybe this suggests that one model does not and cannot fit all.

Tappan (1999) and Monroe (2001) appeal to linguistics to analyse the significance of the self’s relation to others, especially to suffering others. For instance, Tappan (1999:123 – *italics original*) argues that: “One finds one’s moral identity, therefore, primarily in the ideologically mediated dialogue in which one engages, not in the process of reflection on one’s ‘inner’ moral self. And the development of moral identity, on this view, entails a process of *ideological becoming* whereby one selectively assimilates the words, language, and forms of discourse of others with whom one is in dialogue.” The problem with morality viewed as generated by language, under whichever form, is that it suggests the self is not fully independent but rather exists because of, thanks to or through others. The moral aspect of the self is taken to be necessarily constructed through a “narrative structure” (Crowther, 2002:437) instead of being derivative and constitutive of the essence of beingness. In that case, to what extent is the self responsible for her morality? Indeed, if morality is socially constructed through a dialogue and embedded in the “universals of human language” (Monroe, 2001:502), is the self entirely responsible for what she holds as moral standards? Could not we view the universality of morality as rooted in the “shared humanity” of various independent selves instead? This is discussed in the next part.
3.3.2. THE SELF AND OTHERS

Two main questions are attached to the concept of self as introduced above. The first one relates to the unity or wholeness of the self, whilst the second concerns the ontology of the self, in particular whether the self is independent and how the self relates to others. We will first turn to the second question and leave the issue of a whole self for part 3.3.3. The matter of the independence of the self — that is its independence from the community, society, others’ expectations, roles and so on — is important because it informs the way the self relates to others. We noticed that linguistic-based morality challenged the possibility of a self independent from others. It could indeed be argued that the self does not live in a void, and that the community participates in shaping the moral frame of reference the self uses and lives by. We also acknowledged earlier that the self can be influenced by social norms and develop some predispositions that make her more susceptible to some issues and not others (Colby and Damon, 1995:344). Yet we also concluded that this did not call into question the independence of the self nor her moral significance. Relating the story of one of their moral exemplars, Virginia Durr, aristocratic Southern white girl who joined in the civil rights movement in the United States, Colby and Damon (1995:350) underline that: “although Virginia’s emerging new values were not entirely self-initiated, they do reflect what we might call an ‘active receptiveness’ to social influence of particular sorts.” What this quote suggests is that the self is reactive to a moral stimulus which indeed originates from some external locus; yet the self possesses the capacity to react to this stimulus, that is to perceive it, understand it and act upon it. If the self were entirely dependent upon others for her moral behaviour, she would not know how to respond in a morally appropriate way to a social stimulus. The self might have undergone a ‘social training’ into moral behaviour, but this theory would seriously undermine the moral significance of a self in so far as the self would be likened to yet another puppet, albeit a smart one, that reproduces what she has been taught.

The idea that the self needs others to become fully realised has been advanced for example by Hadfield (1964). The argument builds on both narrative and role perspectives. It states that “each person is always acting upon others and acted upon
by others" so that interpersonal relationships are characterised by spirals through which one self would react and respond to the ‘stories’ others define for that self, until the self endorses the story (i.e. the role) composed by others (Laing, 1969; Ruddock, 1969). In brief, “we learn to be whom we are told we are” (Laing, 1969).

Yet the nature of morality demands that our moral reactions be not dictated by others, but experienced both internally and independently of what others think or feel. Rules and norms of the moral community must be internalised by the self whose autonomy, maturity and quality will determine her reaction. The self might indeed need a social community to fully grasp who she is, but she is not obliged to comply with whatever the community demands and she might present aspects of morality out of any moral community. It ensues that there exists a possibility for a moral self to develop outside the referential of a given, bounded community.

With a view to examining automatism in moral behaviour, Hibben (1895:464) already noticed that a person’s morality develops through “continual conflict between social and individual impulses”. Because major social and moral progress often has its origin in a few voices raising against existing conditions, Hibben (1895) concluded that the individual self has a dimension of her own, besides her social environment, a viewpoint supported by the very concept of moral exemplarity. He thus explains that “the social forces have play in the field of personality, modifying and influencing character in manifold way; and yet the character is active as well as passive, and reacts upon the social forces themselves” (Hibben, 1895:465). This argument does not contravene Colman’s (2008) or Layder’s (2004) stand on the nature of the self as both personal and social, as well as both stable and actively and reactively changing. In fact, we do not need others to be a self, but others help us grasp a sense of self and grow in our consciousness of self. Consequently, moral conduct must have some value for the self beside the social values attached to life in the community, else the self would be diluted in society in the pursuit of altruism. Hibben (1895) proposes that the self’s boundaries are determined by the significance of an ‘ideal’ upon which moral ideas and actions are reflected. If we relate this ‘ideal’ with the idea of a shared humanity, as mentioned in Chapter 2, part 2.2, then the argument is indeed convincing. The self feels morally concerned with others because they all share the same nature. Notwithstanding social norms, the self is
intrinsically linked to other selves, and the moral imperatives derive from this relationship that Chakraborty (2004:35) words as “the Spirit-Self in an individual [being] identical with the Spirit-Self of All”. It is not to suggest however, unlike Kant, that this imperative is based on reason alone. It is rather a matter of essence, in that the self and other selves are of the same essence in the first place, and moral education and social expectations just come on top of this to form our moral framework. The primal impetus is located in the essence, not in the social norms.

Frankfurt (1993) argues in that direction. In particular, he stresses that the will is somehow necessarily self-constrained in order for the person to know what she really cares about. The will directs the person among the “various impulses and desires by which [s]he is moved” and actually sets her moral boundaries and aspirations (Frankfurt, 1993:23). In return, the person is bound to her ideals and aspirations by love, so that the commitment to achieve this ideal just imposes itself and provides a self-fulfilling rather than constraining framework of action and personal growth (Frankfurt, 1993). It is, suggests Frankfurt, as if we were enlightened by the constraints of our will and the ideals it reflects. This argument is reminiscent of the nature of Assagioli's will which is, as we said, closely connected to the self. The will becomes the privileged connection to the full consciousness and realisation of the self, the perfect essence of the being.

Having discussed the independence of the self and the strength of her will in the moral engagement with others, we can now turn to the relation of the self with others, that is with other selves. The self can be genuinely concerned for other selves, and we will argue that it even constitutes her nature. To relate and be concerned with others, the self ought not to be selfish, that is uniquely centred on herself. We explained earlier that such attitude was more characteristic of the ego (i.e. being egoistic) than of the self given how we defined it. We suggested that the ego tends to 'take over' the personality and impair our understanding of the world and of ourselves. So should we explain selfishness purely on the basis of a dominating ego? Or does the self demonstrate selfish tendencies as well? Terestchenko (2004) addresses this point when he asks which one of egoism and altruism can best describe human behaviour and human nature. He rightly points out that there exists
other modes in between the two extremes of pure egoism and pure altruism. Pure egoism expects every person to seek her own good, and her own good only; on the other hand, pure altruism proclaims self-sacrifice for the good of others, and the good of others only. In real life, the majority of people make a preferential choice where egoistic concerns will either win over or be discarded by altruistic concerns. Terestchenko (2004:318) then argues that contrary to egoism, altruism is a pluralist concept which allows for a wider range of attitudes more or less tainted with self-concerns. It would be unreasonable to demand a complete ignorance of one’s own needs to be called altruistic, or compassionate according to Piper (1991:745). As long as the ends pursued are primarily, if not only, the good of others, then the fact that the person also receives personal gratification of some sort for her action does not discard her altruism. And this, argues Terestchenko (2004), is what best describes human behaviour. In other words, the will to be good to others is morally worthy, even if at the same time one personally benefits from the action, an argument that Adam Smith would not have rejected (Doomen, 2005:114-115).

Altruism, then, originates in some sort of empathetic or sympathetic connection with the other (Magai and McFadden, 1995:195). Empathy, sympathy and compassion are closely related terms, which are often used interchangeably to refer to the propensity or capability of one person to relate either cognitively or affectively to another person’s emotional state. Magai and McFadden (1995:196) explain that empathy can be conceived as “feeling with” whereas sympathy can be assimilated with “feeling for”. Compassion (or compassionate love as worded by Sprecher and Fehr, 2005) from Latin *compassio*, literally ‘suffering with’ (CNRTL, 2008) has a meaning similar to empathy. Magai and McFadden (1995) insist on what empathy-sympathy is not, for instance a feeling of personal distress (which is egoistic) or a phenomenon of projection (which is cognitive rather than affective). Gordon (1995) uses role-taking, imagination and simulation to differentiate empathy as emotional contagion from empathy as behavioural prediction. Consequently, his approach is highly cognitive, based on the ability to “transform [oneself] mentally into a given character” (Gordon, 1995:736). Morally, this practice can prove hazardous for the self, whenever “pretense and reality get blurred in the counteridentical pretending, or role taking” (Gordon, 1995:739). Magai and McFadden (1995:198) also insist that
empathy must be handled carefully and thoughtfully because it involves a range of feelings that can be destructive (e.g. sadness or violence) besides the fact that the self might lose its sense of individuality (Piper, 1991:734). To prevent this, Deigh (1995:759) distinguishes emotional identification from empathy as follows: “Both involve one’s taking another’s perspective and imaginatively participating in this other person’s life. But it is distinctive of empathy that it entails imaginative participation in the other’s life without forgetting oneself. The same is not true of emotional identification.”

Imagination indeed occupies a central place in Piper’s (1991) and Werhane’s (1999) models of moral interaction with others. Piper (1991:726) talks about “modal imagination” as “our capacity to envision what is possible in addition to what is actual”; Werhane (1999:93) defines moral imagination more comprehensively: “the ability in particular circumstances to discover and evaluate possibilities not merely determined by that circumstance, or limited by its operative mental models, or merely framed by a set of rules or rule-governed concerns.” When applied to managerial decision-making, “developing moral imagination involves heightened awareness of contextual moral dilemmas and their mental models, the ability to envision and evaluate new mental models that create new possibilities, and the capability to reframe the dilemma and create new solutions in ways that are novel, economically viable, and morally justifiable.” (Werhane, 1999:93). Yet the moral and social ‘quality’ of my imagination is necessarily rooted in my own experience as a person. As such, my interpretation, basis for my empathetic participation in the other’s life, is necessarily limited in scope. However, if we base the imaginative projection on the idea of a shared humanity, then it becomes more significant. My interpretation might be relevant to the other because we share the same essence at some level, hence I am truly able to relate to the other and to feel with and feel for because I and the other are somehow the same. The “psychological boundaries” of myself and the other (Piper, 1991:734) are not trespassed because I remain conscious of the physical and psychological difference between me and the other; but at a more existential level, I am conscious that the difference blurs into a shared essence, in such a way that by hurting others I hurt myself (Zsolnai, 2004:4). In that respect, some religious teachings can be apprehended on another level. For example, ‘Love
thy neighbour like thyself" appears more obvious in so far as the other and I are 'one'. Equally, the Golden Rule 'Do not do unto others that which you would not wish be done unto thee' (whose formulation varies according to the tradition but whose meaning remains similar – see Dawes et al., 2005:86) reflects a 'natural' moral expectation based on a shared humanity, a shared essence between others and I.

3.3.3. WHOLE SELF AND COMPARTMENTALISED SELF

We noted how the ego can actually be parted into small egos. We can wonder whether the self is equally parted or can be parted. A central concept in spirituality-based research, the self is often associated with a sense of wholeness (Guillory, 2001; Ashar and Lane-Maher, 2004; Forman, 2004). Indeed, the spiritual quest involves the connection to the inner self, locus of the spiritual in human beings, which incidentally brings about a growing perception of an inter-relatedness of everything and a striving towards wholeness (Guillory, 2001; Zsolnai, 2004). In fact, although we are fragmented by the small egos, the purpose seems to be the coming-to-consciousness of our fragmented nature and the working towards the state of a whole self, given that the self contains the totality of our being. Expression of the self is the necessary path to follow in so far as repression of the self by holding on to the ego (or the egos) can lead, according to King and Nicol (1999), to extreme or adverse emotional states through which individuals project onto others their own repressed personality. To alleviate the ego-self tension, individuals should then acknowledge and confront particular aspects of their personality involved in the conflict through an effort of consciousness. Terestchenko (2008:15) implies a similar idea that salutes the moral significance of consciousness and knowledge of self ("présence à soi"):

"In brief, unconnectedness to the self (absence à soi) is peculiar to the individual who contents himself with doing what he is asked to do, both passively and with zeal, and who sets aside the disapproval of his moral conscience by refusing to bear the responsibility of his actions. He claims to be just an agent within a system, and loses what constitutes his distinctive identity. The subject who resists or rebels, the dissident, on the contrary acts from a connectedness to the self (présence à soi) that
makes him act with deep loyalty to his feelings, his beliefs, his ethical principles and, even more important, that makes him always conscious of the humanity of the other."

Being unconnected to the self implies that one is dominated by his ego, under whichever form. The person is somehow compartmentalised, in so far as the self is bracketed off whilst other aspects of the personality take over. Compartmentalisation is probably the greatest threat to the realisation of a whole self (Gotsis and Koitezi, 2008). The compartmentalised person may, consciously or not, cut off the moral values, aspirations, feelings and emotions that are deemed inappropriate and irrelevant to a certain context (e.g. the workplace). However compartmentalisation can also happen by simply distancing oneself from values, aspirations and feelings one holds but does not wish to or cannot confront. Through this process, individuals actually become unconscious of parts of themselves and lose sight of their self as a unified whole. Ultimately, people can develop psycho-pathologies (Cottingham, 2005) although more generally the symptoms take the form of the general unrest of organisational members that can be observed in Western economies (Gotsis and Koitezi, 2008).

A few studies have examined the relevance of spirituality in the workplace and they tend to suggest that allowing the whole person at work, that is a person who expresses emotions, feelings, aspirations alongside rationality, fosters greater intuition and creativity, and reinforces trust, honesty and organisational commitment (Guillory, 2001; Krishnakumar and Neck, 2002). In parallel, Mitroff and Denton’s (1999) study on spirituality in organisations highlights how managers do not wish to part themselves according to the demands of the context, or even pretend that it is possible to do so. Yet compartmentalisation is often perceived as a necessity for success, especially business success (Lovell, 2002). Ashar and Lane-Maher (2004) argue that this is symptomatic of the old business paradigm, as opposed to a more integrative, holistic model we would be developing now, although we probably are at the early stages. Figler and Hanlon (2008:619) also denounce this “psychological fragmentation” resulting from an excessive attention to rationality and logic, and the subsequent demise of subjectivity and the unconscious sources that inform human relationships. According to these authors, acknowledging and accepting that the
unconscious has a strong influence on our behaviour paves the way for more fruitful, psychologically smarter and more mature work relationships (Figler and Hanlon, 2008). Psychosynthesis, on the other hand, focuses on the individual as a whole. It purports to help the individual to become “a meaningfully harmonized whole around a center: the self” rather than to remain “a disordered collection of clashing tendencies” (Ferrucci, 2004:46). Whilst role-playing, excessive rationalisation, extreme empathy, compartmentalisation or self-delusion widen the gap between our perception of who we are and our self, the ability to bring one’s consciousness back to one’s being (physical, emotional, mental, spiritual) constitutes an essential step towards self-completion in a holistic perspective. As Ferruci (2004) explains, by identifying our subpersonalities (one might say the small egos, “les petits moi”) we allow the self to be and express at her full potential, that is to live our full potential (Ferrucci, 2004).

So far, we have identified the self as an essential element in the morality of a person, and we have reviewed various psychological perspectives to assess whether they could help define and apprehend the place of the self within the moral deliberations of individuals. We have concluded that the self impregnates the rational and emotional space for moral deliberation and moral behaviour; that the self has a dimension of her own, and contributes more fully to the community when she has claimed her independence from it; that the apprehension of the self is somewhat purposeful; and that the self is about unity as opposed to the fragmentation and compartmentalisation we usually live by, which is, besides, morally impairing. However, none of the perspectives reviewed provided a framework encompassing these characteristics of the self and articulating them in a clear, practical way so as to allow the exploration of managers’ experience of morality. The next part argues that Carl Jung’s psychology offers such framework.
3.4. SELF-KNOWLEDGE AS MORAL KNOWLEDGE: A JUNGIAN FRAMEWORK

Howard and Welbourn (2004:49) underline that psychologists in general, and Carl Jung in particular, help bring a brand new perspective on the self, on the significance of the conscious and the unconscious, and on the spiritual dimension of the self and self-discovery. This part introduces Carl Jung’s psychology and argues that his conceptualisation of the psyche around the ego-consciousness on the one hand and the archetypal self on the other hand, provides a clear, useful and practical framework to explore the morality of managers. In particular, the process of individuation symbolising the conscious realisation of self can be likened to an inner expression of the pursuit of the virtuous life achieved in the realisation of one’s telos. Developing self-knowledge (in the sense of a knowledge of the spiritual self) enlightens phronesis, thus self-knowledge becomes a vehicle for moral knowledge. Equally, the individuation process becomes both morally tainted and a moral achievement in itself.

3.4.1. JUNG AND HIS PSYCHOLOGY

3.4.1.1. CARL GUSTAV JUNG

Swiss-born Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) is most famous for laying the foundations of analytical psychology and describing the psychological types “extravert” and “introvert”. His theories are very much linked to and inspired by his own experiences and his understanding of himself. At first a disciple of Freud, he later parted and went to explore many different disciplines. In particular, he showed a great interest in esoteric phenomena and experiences, which sets his psychology apart from others. His approach is very much spiritual, although he endeavoured his whole life to demonstrate how his psychology was ‘scientific’ and empirically-based (Cottingham, 2005). After his doctoral dissertation that examined cases of spiritualism, he explored topics as varied as mythology and symbolism, alchemy, Eastern spirituality, African and Indian traditions and practices, the I-Ching and Teilhard de Chardin’s works (Jung, 1995; Crowley, 1998; Robinson, 2005). All of these informed his thoughts.
and helped shape what has become a complex yet complete view of our relation to the world and to ourselves. The historical events that marked Europe in the first half of the twentieth century certainly affected Jung’s thoughts as well, although he claimed that his insights did not address the social but the individual level. Whilst in Switzerland, Jung witnessed two world wars, the rise and excesses of fascism and communism, and the beginning of the Cold war. His defiance against ‘the masses’ and ‘mass movements’ is very likely correlated to what he experienced in his lifetime (Jung, 2002).

Jung’s analytical psychology is still not considered mainstream, yet his influence has spread beyond the field of psychology. Jung is often considered a man ahead of his time, and his writing style and his positions have brought him undeterred supporters as well as rash critics (Pauchant, 2000:42-43). Hence Jung had the feeling he was misunderstood and relentlessly explained he was neither a Gnostic nor an other-worldly mystic (Robinson, 2005). He was not a saint (an image his most fervent disciples tend to put forward) but neither was he a self-obsessed, obsequious thinker (as would argue his most fervent detractors). Jung demonstrated a strong sense of vocation, and he dedicated his life to finding out what he felt was there but could not be grasped immediately. His psychology possesses an inherent and distinctive moral flavour. What shall be argued in the following paragraphs is that a Jungian framework provides a comprehensive, practical and inspirational basis to understand and develop practical wisdom that integrates the various elements reviewed earlier in this chapter.

3.4.1.2. Elements of the Psyche

It would be neither possible nor relevant to provide a full account of Jung’s psychology. Therefore, we will only introduce the central elements that are necessary to understand how Jungian psychology relates to moral knowledge and morality in general. According to Jung, the psyche is central to our life and our perception of the external world. As he emphatically explains: “The psyche is the greatest of all cosmic wonders and the sine qua non of the world as an object.” (Jung, 2001b:93). Jung believed the psyche is composed of two parts, the conscious and the
unconscious. The conscious part is the domain of the ego (or ego-consciousness). The unconscious part is twofold: the personal unconscious, composed of our hidden memories or ideas we rejected and that remain on the edge of consciousness but rarely cross over; and the collective unconscious, which contains the footprint of humanity and emerges in the form, amongst other things, of archetypes. The study of the personal unconscious would allow the identification of complexes that are nothing but personal representation of archetypes. An archetype is an image, "an unlearned tendency to experience things in a certain way" (Boeree, 2006) or "a fundamental and universal matrix" (Sédillot, 2005:336). It is worth noticing that the existence of a collective unconscious constitutes one of the main disagreements between Jung and Freud, in that Freud did not acknowledge the existence of a collective unconscious, or at least perceived it merely as a dump for undesirable emotions (Robinson, 2005).

Stevens (2001:49) schematises Jung’s model of the psyche as shown in Figure 1. Another way to represent it is proposed in Figure 2, which reverses the schema. In brief, if what is ‘inside’ is our consciousness and what is ‘outside’ is the collective unconscious, then Figure 1 represents the psyche from inside-out whereas Figure 2 represents the psyche viewed from outside-in. However, our psyche contains both the very personal ego-consciousness and the collective archetypes, and both participate in defining who we are. Whereas Figure 1 illustrates how self-knowledge requires to take on an inner journey towards the self, Figure 2 depicts how small consciousness is as compared with the wide and overwhelming collective unconscious.
The Persona

Jung (2005:464) had noticed that people tend to display “traces of character-splitting” through which they adopt a particular attitude to suit a particular milieu. What we earlier referred to as compartmentalisation is expressed by Jung as character-splitting whose strength varies depending on the degree to which the ego identifies with “the attitude of the moment”. Jung (2005:465) argues that the split person is not an individual but rather is collective, “the plaything of circumstance and general expectations.” The mask we present to suit the societal expectations is called the persona. The persona is who we pretend to be and how we want to be perceived by others, just like a “false self” (Hill, 2000:211) or an outer personality as opposed to the anima/animus which represents our inner personality (Jung, 2005:467). Identification with the persona actually constrains the expression of our true individuality and personality, therefore the ego must disengage from the persona to allow for individuation (Hill, 2000:211). The persona is by essence collective, the personal interpretation of collective expectations, hence alien to the expression of one’s individuality.

The Ego

Jung (2005:425) defines the ego as “a complex of ideas which constitutes the centre of [the] field of consciousness and appears to possess a high degree of continuity and
identity. [...] It is] the subject of [one’s] consciousness.” The ego is actually a complex (i.e. an associated group of ideas – Hill, 2000:38) that emerges during childhood and is key to the development of one’s personality especially since one needs first to familiarise with the collective rules before one differentiates from them (Jung, 2005:449). It is the ego that gives us (and helps us maintain) the sense of who we are through our life changes and experiences. Chakraborty (2004:34) defines the ego as “a sort of initial nucleus around which a distinctive individual personality can form.” Sédillot (2005:113) stresses that ego-consciousness is necessary for our mental health and the manifestation of our will. It is also the ego who can connect to the unconscious and little by little uncover what remains to be known about ourselves. The ego is thus essential, yet only secondary to the self who is the subject of the whole psyche (Jung, 2005) and actually prefigures the ego (Jung, 1973:259).

The Self

The self is “the archetype of wholeness and the regulating center of the psyche; a transpersonal power that transcends the ego.” (Sharp, 1991). Jung (2005:460) explains that “the self designates the whole range of psychic phenomena in man. It expresses the unity of the personality as a whole.” The self is a postulate in that it is “potentially empirical” but consists in “the experienceable and the inexperienceable (or the not yet experienced)”, that is conscious elements as well as unconscious (therefore unknown) factors (Jung, 2005:460). The self is also transcendental in so far as it unites opposites or dualities and “represents the integration of all the disparate parts of ourselves [...so that] in accepting all the different aspects that make up our personality, we become who and what we really are” (Crowley, 1998:38). Crowley (1998:37) further notices that Jung derived his concept of self from the Hindu idea of “Atman – the divine Self within”; therefore the self may be likened to a divine presence in us. Self-knowledge, consequently, consists in “widening and deepening” our awareness to uncover the “mysterious and divine” aspect of the self so that “the self can be understood as both the source and goal of human life” (Brooke, 1991:18). Wholeness is attained when self and ego (that is consciousness and unconscious) work together in harmony (Sharp, 1991). The self should not ‘assimilate’ the ego, just like the ego should not ‘assimilate’ the self, for both situations would lead to an inflated ego and a state of serious psychic imbalance.
(Jung, 1978a:24-25). Rather, self and ego are complementary, reflecting one another in some way. Colman (2008:356) summarises this clearly: “It is not the ego that is the agent of our lives but the self – the agency of free will is initiated by something that is beyond our conscious awareness, albeit our conscious awareness is a crucial element in the process.”

Individuation

The process through which we become closer to our self, uncovering little by little pieces of our unconscious and gaining greater knowledge of the self is called ‘individuation’. Sharp (1991) defines it as: “[... ] a process informed by the archetypal ideal of wholeness, which in turn depends on a vital relationship between ego and unconscious. [... ] Individuation involves an increasing awareness of one’s unique psychological reality, including personal strengths and limitations, and at the same time a deeper appreciation of humanity in general.” The process of individuation is key to personal development; yet to become distinct one must have grown up out of the collective. Jung (2005:449) insists that: “Under no circumstances can individuation be the sole aim of psychological education. Before it can be taken as a goal, the educational aim of adaptation to the necessary minimum of collective norms must first be attained. If a plant is to unfold its specific nature to the full, it must first be able to grow in the soil in which it is planted.” Thus individuation is clearly different from individualism, in that there exists in the former a moral dimension and a respect for the community, even when the individual has drifted apart from it (Sharp, 1991). In Jung’s terms (2005:449): “Individuation, therefore, leads to a natural esteem for the collective norm, but if the orientation is exclusively collective the norm becomes increasingly superfluous and morality goes to pieces. The more a man’s life is shaped by the collective norms, the greater is his individual immorality.” This would be so because the individual somehow has not confronted his own moral responsibility but relies on and hides behind the collective instead. Von Franz (1968:169-170) also insists that individuation requires a “coming-to-terms” with one’s individuality which may be a great hardship and necessitates the moral courage to see it as it is, and to see oneself as one is:
"The actual processes of individuation – the conscious coming-to-terms with one’s own inner center (psychic nucleus) or Self – generally begins with a wounding of the personality and the suffering that accompanies it. This initial shock amounts to a sort of ‘call’, although it is not often recognized as such. On the contrary, the ego feels hampered in its will or its desire and usually projects the obstruction onto something external. That is, the ego accuses God or the economic situation or the boss or the marriage partner of being responsible for whatever is obstructing it. Or perhaps everything seems outwardly all right, but beneath the surface a person is suffering from a deadly boredom that makes everything seem meaningless and empty. [...] Thus it seems as if the initial encounter with the Self casts a dark shadow ahead of time, or as if the ‘inner friend’ comes at first like a trapper to catch the helplessly struggling ego in his snare."

3.4.2. Moral Implications of Jung’s Psychology

Robinson (2005:91 – italics original) summarises how morality is inherently a matter of the Jungian psyche: “For Jung, the psyche, as the locus of conscious agency, was the necessary and essential factor for actualizing ethical goods. The entirety of the moral life – dependent as it is on a sense of freedom and responsibility, capacities for creative and critical reflection, and sustained commitment of the self – is simply inconceivable apart from the human psyche. Yet the psyche is itself the locus for the realization of the individual personality – an ethical good, for Jung, second to none. Psyche is thus both means and, often, the end for the realization of moral goods.” Hence most of his concepts and propositions are not only psychological but also morally engaged, as we will see below.

3.4.2.1. Principles of Psychic Energy

Jung, as we said, endeavoured to approach psychology as a science and to base his conclusions on empirical observations. He borrowed the concept of ‘energy’ from physics in an attempt to word his view of libido (that is psychic energy) in ‘scientific’ terms. The psyche construed as energy implies a finality instead of a relation of causality, which means that the psychic activity tends towards a purpose which is not necessarily known (Sharp, 1991). Two interrelated principles play a role in the dynamics of the psyche: the principle of opposites (or “enantiodromia”) and the principle of equivalence. The principle of opposites implies that every thought,
every wish comes along with its opposite; for instance, whenever we have a ‘good’ thought, its opposite ‘bad’ thought has also crossed our mind even if so slightly. The psychic energy thus originates from the opposition of these two thoughts. Hill (2000:174) explains that “opposites are the extreme states in any event and form a potential. The psyche is even built upon processes where energy springs from the equilibration of opposites.” The principle of equivalence is closely related to the concept of opposition. Whilst the opposition generates psychic energy, the principle of equivalence asserts that both sides receive the same amount of energy (Boeree, 2006). In our example, this would mean that the ‘bad’ thought receives as much energy as the ‘good’ thought.

In fact, the whole psychology of Jung is based on opposition (which is not necessarily conflicting but rather conceptual), with the conscious opposed to the unconscious, the ego to the self, and so on. Yet, given the law of entropy, everything tends towards a state of balance, thus the psyche necessitates a system of compensation which Jung (2005:419) conceived as a “functional adjustment in general, an inherent self-regulation of the psychic apparatus.” He specifies his viewpoint:

“In this sense, I regard the activity of the unconscious as a balancing of the one-sidedness of the general attitude produced by the function of consciousness. [...] The activity of consciousness is selective. Selection demands direction. But direction requires the exclusion of everything irrelevant. This is bound to make the conscious orientation one-sided. The contents that are excluded and inhibited by the chosen direction sink into the unconscious, where they form a counterweight to the conscious orientation. The strengthening of this counterposition keeps pace with the increase of conscious one-sidedness until finally a noticeable tension is produced. [...] The more one-sided the conscious attitude, the more antagonistic are the contents arising from the unconscious, so that we may speak of a real opposition between the two.” (Jung, 2005:419 – *italics original*).

Hill (2000:174) points out that when the conscious mind is too one-sided, it becomes rigid by refusing to acknowledge the compensatory opposite unconscious thought, which increases the tension and a feeling of uneasiness within the individual. In practice, this has a serious moral implication. For example, let’s say we have chosen
to tell the truth to a colleague about a work issue. According to the principle of opposites, when the time came for us to decide on a course of action, we thought about telling the truth but at the same time the possibility to lie crossed our mind, although we rejected it straight away in our unconscious. Nevertheless, the thought of lying to our colleague received as much psychic energy as the thought of telling the truth, and the fact that we rejected this option did not suppress the energy it received in the first place. It is thus imperative to deal with this energy, by acknowledging we had that thought and allowing it to become conscious and contribute through its energy to the overall development of the psyche. If we fail to do so, then the energy is captured by the relevant archetype under the form of a complex, and it remains unassimilated and potentially blocks our development and well-being. As Boeree (2006) explains: “if you pretend that you never had that evil wish, if you deny and suppress it, the energy will go towards the development of a complex. A complex is a pattern of suppressed thoughts and feelings that cluster – constellate – around a theme provided by some archetype [...] That complex will begin to develop a life of its own, and it will haunt you.” During his years of clinical practice, Jung met a variety of neurotic patients whose stories illustrated how an act, a thought, a desire repressed into the unconscious nevertheless had strong repercussions on the person’s life, sanity and well-being: “In my practice I was constantly impressed by the way the human psyche reacts to a crime committed unconsciously. [...] If someone has committed a crime and is caught, he suffers judicial punishment. If he has done it secretly, without moral consciousness of it, and remains undiscovered, the punishment can nevertheless be visited upon him” (Jung, 1995:143-144).

3.4.2.2. ARCHETYPES AND PROJECTION

Many archetypes populate the collective unconscious including the shadow, the anima/animus, and so on. However the shadow is the archetype most of us confront first. The shadow can be likened to our dark side, which we should acknowledge and confront rather than reject or ignore. Jung (1973:76) explains clearly the importance of such recognition: “Unfortunately there can be no doubt that man is, on the whole, less good than he imagines himself or wants to be. Everyone carries a shadow, and
the less it is embodied in the individual’s conscious life, the blacker and denser it is. If an inferiority is conscious, one always has a chance to correct it. Furthermore, it is constantly in contact with other interests, so that it is continually subjected to modifications. But if it is repressed and isolated from consciousness, it never gets corrected, and is liable to burst suddenly in a moment of unawareness. At all events, it forms an unconscious snag, thwarting our most well-meant intentions.” King and Nicol (1999:137) concur that we should embrace “the opportunity to confront and eventually find a healthy way to integrate the dark side of our personalities into our lives. Through the integration of one’s shadow, an individual develops an awareness of his/her connection to other human beings, providing a basis for communication, understanding and respect.” Recognition of the shadow means acknowledging our imperfection; it also authorises a more conscious relationship with others to develop (Jung, 2002:73).

The shadow is not bad in itself since our instincts, insights and impulses also originate from it. In fact, it appears dark in contrast with the bright image we project of ourselves in the persona, so that “shadow and persona stand in a compensatory relationship” (Sharp, 1991). If persona and ego become assimilated, then the shadow becomes the compensation of the conscious ego itself. Again, the more one-sided the conscious ego, the greater the shadow per the principle of equivalence and compensation (Hill, 2000:234). The persona/ego thus inhibits the coming-to-consciousness of the shadow, which in itself is a moral task. Jung (1978a:8) makes this point explicit: “The shadow is a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort. To become conscious of it involves recognizing the dark aspects of the personality as present and real. This act is the essential condition for any kind of self-knowledge, and it therefore, as a rule, meets with considerable resistance.” Recognising the shadow is thus a moral action that requires courage, but it is also the first and necessary step towards self-knowledge and greater moral knowledge and moral strength.

If we fail to acknowledge our shadow, however, the energy is absorbed by the shadow nevertheless and nourishes our hidden violence, our primitive animal nature
inherited from and carried within the collective unconscious. Jung (2002:68) stresses that: “None of us stands outside humanity’s black collective shadow. Whether the crime lies many generations back or happens today, it remains the symptom of a disposition that is always and everywhere present – and one would therefore do well to possess some ‘imagination in evil’ for only the fool can permanently neglect the conditions of his own nature. In fact, this negligence is the best means of making him an instrument of evil.” That ignoring our dark side can make us “an instrument of evil” is a consequence of the phenomenon of projection. If we neglect to acknowledge the potential for evil within us, we are likely to project that evil onto other people. Projection is “an automatic process whereby contents of one’s own unconscious are perceived to be in others” (Sharp, 1991). It is subjective in that the subject projects onto the object (be it a material object or a person) his own unconscious features (Sédillot, 2005:345). Yet it is not a conscious process; projections happen but we do not consciously make them. They nevertheless play an important role in both facilitating and withdrawing from social relationships.

We can illustrate the phenomenon of projection as follow: Mr A is a very conscientious person, very meticulous in his work. He will consciously work towards reinforcing his conscientiousness and presenting a persona that corresponds to his desire to be perceived as conscientious and meticulous. He might very well believe that he is genuinely conscientious, at least undoubtedly more conscientious than Mr B, his colleague whom he would qualify as a very messy and undisciplined person. In fact, Mr B’s messiness usually makes Mr A very angry at his colleague. But what Mr A may realise if he takes a step back from his emotions (that is the anger he feels against Mr B and the pride he feels at being very conscientious in comparison) is that his anger is the result of the projection of his own messy shadow onto his colleague. Mr A believes he is genuinely conscientious and meticulous but his overt conscientiousness is compensated by a very strong indiscipline and messiness that pertains to his shadow. Yet, because Mr A is not aware of this aspect of himself – because he is not conscious of it or because he refuses to acknowledge it – the energy it received every time Mr A proudly declares himself ‘the most conscientious person in the department’ finds its expression in the projection of this unacknowledged part of him onto his colleague Mr B. Once Mr A becomes conscious of that, he might
very well discover that Mr B is no less conscientious than he is, or maybe Mr B is not as meticulous as he is but Mr A would not feel so angry at him because the projection would have ceased. Becoming conscious of a projection helps us ‘regulate’ our relationships with others in a saner way, at least in a more honest way from our point of view. And this, in actual fact, morally empowers us. We traditionally fear our shadow, “our own evil” so that often the emotion or the image we project onto others gains even more control when it comes back to us, as if the tension and the threat escalated and eventually reduced our “capacity to deal with evil” (Jung, 2002:68). Jung (1978a:10 – *italics original*) highlights how much being trapped in projections is a difficult experience which requires a formidable effort of consciousness to be overcome:

“It is often tragic to see how blatantly a man bungles his own life and the lives of others yet remains totally incapable of seeing how much the whole tragedy originates in himself, and how he continually feeds it and keeps it going. Not *consciously*, of course – for consciously he is engaged in bewailing and cursing a faithless world that recedes further and further into the distance. Rather, it is an unconscious factor which spins the illusions that veil his world. And what is being spun is a cocoon, which in the end will completely envelop him.”

3.4.2.3. CONSCIENCE

Jung articulated his moral vision around the concept of conscience. Conscience is viewed as “a knowledge of, or certainty about, the emotional value of the ideas we have concerning the motives of our actions. According to this definition, conscience is a complex phenomenon consisting on the one hand in an elementary act of the will, or in an impulse to act for which no conscious reason can be given, and on the other hand in a judgment grounded on rational feeling.” (Jung, 1978b:437). Robinson (2005:19) explains that: “Jung recognized three aspects of, or ways of seeing conscience: as an inner agency outside of the ego’s sphere, as an intrapsychic dialectic between the ego and this unconscious agency, and as the form of knowledge that results from this dialogue.” Conscience as an inner agency is similar to a “numinous archetype” that puts moral demands on individuals in spite of them (Robinson, 2005:18). Jung (1978b:445) affirms that: “Conscience – no matter on what it is based – commands the individual to obey his inner voice even at the risk of
going astray. We can refuse to obey this command by an appeal to the moral code and the moral views on which it is founded, though with an uncomfortable feeling of having been disloyal.” This unconscious agency (the “vox Dei”) brings forward its moral judgments to the ego (the centre of consciousness) and engages in a dialogue with it in order to determine a final moral judgment, which constitutes the moral knowledge we work with (Jung, 1978b).

Individuals are influenced by the moral codes en vigueur in the community in which they have grown up and live. But the content of the moral codes is assumed to have emerged throughout time from an initial and fundamental “moral reaction” that arises from the unconscious and constitutes “a universal factor of the human psyche” (Robinson, 2005:20). Conscience is anterior to the moral codes, and if in general we feel happy to abide by the moral codes, it is because they partly reflect the conscience, the “inner voice” in every individual. Instances when we experiment a conflict between what dictates our conscience and what customary moral or social codes claim we should do, are evidence that codes are not essentially formative of our moral values. When this happens – that is when we feel uncomfortable with what the moral code we usually abide to prescribes – we experience a “conflict of duty” (Jung, 1978b:454). For this reason, Jung distinguishes between “moral conscience” and “ethical conscience”. Whereas the former is concerned with conformity to the social norms (the “mores”), the latter emerges when the individual is experiencing a conflict of duty and involves consciousness of the inner voice.

As we said, conflicts of duty refer to situations where, after rational examination of moral reactions, the individual still has doubts regarding which course of action to take because both reactions seem acceptable, and invocation of the moral code does not provide any help in deciding which way to go. Because the “mores” are of little assistance, “the deciding factor appears to be something else: it proceeds not from the traditional moral code but from the unconscious foundation of the personality” which will eventually lead to “a creative solution [...] which is produced by the constellated archetype and possesses that compelling authority not unjustly characterized as the voice of God. The nature of the solution is in accord with the deepest foundations of the personality as well as with its wholeness; it embraces
conscious and unconscious and therefore transcends the ego.” (Jung, 1978b:454-455). In other words, whereas moral conscience is about conformity to moral codes, ethical conscience is concerned with establishing a dialogue between the unconscious and the conscious ego, in order to produce a “creative (moral) solution” that will be in accordance with the personality and the self of the individual. Developing the ability to listen and trust that inner voice is thus essential for moral practice, even more so that it would enhance one’s practical wisdom. A schematic representation of the structure of conscience is proposed in Figure 3 below. Ethical conscience is the dialogue between the archetypal inner agency located in the collective unconscious, whilst moral conscience represents the reliance on moral codes endorsed by the community though they ultimately consist in a formalisation of an initial moral impulse originating from the archetypal inner agency. Our conscious moral judgments, especially in case of dilemma, result from the ego’s assimilation of the dictates of the inner agency through ethical conscience and the demands of the moral codes.

**Figure 3. The structure of Conscience**

![Diagram of the structure of conscience](source: Compiled by author)

Ethical conscience resembles the moral imagination proposed by Werhane (1999) and the modal imagination of Piper (1991) in that morality appeals to some creativity, a ‘third way’ solution that broadens the choices. However, ethical
conscience avoids the necessary limitation of personal imagination (discussed in part 3.3.2) since it is not rooted in the personal but rather the archetypal level. Located in the collective unconscious, the inner agency is accessible to all and the same to all. Hence we potentially have the same morality, though our actual morality will depend on our degree of consciousness and self-knowledge. We pointed out that unless there existed a shared humanity amongst individuals that would give meaning to subjective interpretations, moral imagination was seriously limited as a tool for moral practice. Ethical conscience does not require this pre-condition since it itself reflects a shared essence, the collective unconscious. To obey ethical conscience is to be connected to our collective heritage, hence to other human beings. Similarly, the impulse one feels towards obeying ethical conscience is at the source of our striving for the ideal of being ourselves (Knobe, 2005), and it may also explain the nature of the actions of moral exemplars (Colby and Damon, 1993 and 1995).

Importantly, though, conscience is dual in nature. We are all endowed with a right and a wrong (or false) conscience, the angel and the devil who more often than not have an equal power of influence (Jung, 1978b:447). Consequently, “the ambivalence of conscience radically complexifies the task of discernment and raises basic questions about the meaningfulness – the very intelligibility – of the concept of conscience.” (Robinson, 2005:24). Strength of character, faith and consciousness become determining factors in our ability to make moral decisions. Jung (1978b:442) explains: “Were it not for this paradox the question of conscience would present no problem; we could then rely wholly on its decisions so far as morality is concerned. But since there is great and justified uncertainty in this regard, it needs unusual courage or – what mounts to the same thing – unshakable faith for a person simply to follow the dictates of his own conscience.” Self-knowledge through awareness of the ego’s tricks and conscious integration of the contents of our shadow participate in equipping us with such courage to follow the right call of our conscience. Achieving wholeness is a moral endeavour, as Cottingham remarks (2005:76):

“The psychoanalytic project, correctly construed, is a deeply moral project, since it involves nothing less than a radical transformation of the self, a kind of re-birthing or re-education process, where the harsh imperatives of the superego on one side, and the raw urgency of our
instinctual impulses on the other, are systematically scrutinized, and brought together into an integrated whole where they lose their threatening and destructive character."

3.4.3. INDIVIDUATION AS MORAL ACTION

Individuation is the overall process of coming to terms with one’s self, and becoming a true individual. It is commonly held as a life enlightening purpose not only for oneself but for others too, since individuated people have a more acute apprehension of the common good (Hart and Brady, 2005). This is again very clearly stated by Jung (2002:76): “anyone who has insight into his own actions, and has thus found access to the unconscious, involuntarily exercises an influence on his environment.” Figure 4 proposes a summary of a Jungian framework of morality through self-knowledge. The persona is at the forefront of ego-consciousness and interacts with society. The ego is influenced by moral conscience, itself partly a by-product of social norms. To become individuated, the person must become consciously aware of her personal unconscious. The images attached to her personal unconscious will direct her towards the relevant archetypes they refer to, in particular the shadow, and maybe later the animus/animus as well as other archetypes that are located in the fuzziness of the collective unconscious. Once the archetypes are consciously integrated, then the person has established a connection to her self. Ethical conscience follows a similar yet reversed path. When the ego experiences a conflict of duty originating from the insufficiencies of moral conscience, it appeals to the inner agency (which we can assimilate to the archetypal self since the self is also recipient of God – ‘vox Dei’) which then produces moral knowledge true to the self.
Self-knowledge, and more generally individuation, represent the essential groundwork to establish a more solid, more complete knowledge of the Good. Self-knowledge through greater consciousness of the inner voice and confrontation and integration of one’s shadow could be, in practical terms, what will enable the individual to practice *phronesis* and to know the appropriate balance of the virtues. This requires detaching oneself from the stifling security of the community’s norms and reaching for a transcendent principle, reflected in the self, which Jung refers to as God, but which we can construe “as representing the sum of psychical energy” (Thorburn, 1925:135).

“Just as man, as a social being, cannot in the long run exist without a tie to the community, so the individual will never find the real justification for his existence, and his own spiritual and moral autonomy, anywhere except in an extra-mundane principle capable of relativizing the overpowering influence of external factors. The individual who is not anchored in God can offer no resistance on his own resources to the
physical and moral blandishments of the world. For this he needs the evidence of inner, transcendent experience which alone can protect him from the otherwise inevitable submersion in the mass. Merely intellectual or even moral insight into the stultification and moral irresponsibility of the mass man is a negative recognition only and amounts to not much more than a wavering on the road to the atomization of the individual.” (Jung, 2002:16-17)

Jung’s moral vision is spiritual in that the important element is to acknowledge the relativity of our existence as an individual human being, to become conscious of our inner complex personality, and to perceive through it those elements that reflect a universal history and a common ground that both define beingness. Individuals must exist as individuals instead of standing as products of the mass liable to poor ethics because of a lack of consciousness. The process can be painful, warns Jung (1978b:447): “A more developed consciousness brings the latent moral conflict to light, or else sharpens those opposites which are already conscious.” Yet it is the best and only way to get closer to the Good, by achieving our full potential as individuals whilst contributing more fully to humanity. Robinson (2005:106) thus summarises the moral value of individuation:

“The point Jung was making is that the inwardly directed individual is more likely to be creative and energetic in his contribution to society, ultimately benefiting it more, than the person governed solely by external factors. [...] Yet Jung believed that individuation was conducive to the betterment of society not simply for practical reasons regarding social performance, but rather because individuation leads to a strengthened sense of identification with others, which in turn benefits the collective. This identification with others would, presumably, make one less inclined to dehumanize them, to project upon them one’s own shadow, and to place them outside one’s moral community. A self-identity grounded on the conviction of a shared nature with others is, according to Jung, the basis of harmonious relations with oneself and others.”

A Jungian framework of morality through self-knowledge and individuation is relevant to explore managers’ moral experiences. It points in the direction of self-reflection to assess the degree of consciousness of the individuals. It highlights the moral significance of projections in the relationships with others, and provides a practical way to deal with them. As Hart and Brady (2005:419) explain: “By contrast, the best managers confront their managerial shadow. They realize there is a
tension between managing and simply being a person, a friend, a neighbor, etc. Confronting the shadow is the first step in backing away from inhumane control and moving toward a perspective that balances organizational and individual interests. It balances production with meaning. [...] Motives are often as complex as the matters that confront us, yet that realization empowers the individual to become more realistic and less cynical.” Having established that the self is central to any ‘true’ moral endeavour, we will explore how managers perceive their self in their moral experiences, and we will examine our findings in the light of the Jungian framework exposed in this chapter.

3.5. SUMMARY

This chapter aimed to determine more precisely how we can develop and use phronesis, that is the virtue of practical wisdom that itself articulates our knowledge of the other virtues. We turned to psychology to review what the theory of moral development, the role theory and studies in ethical decision-making could offer. We concluded that these approaches put too much emphasis on rationality and thus did not take into account the whole individual, or rather the individual as a whole self. We identified the self as a key concept in an individual’s morality, and we discussed the definition and implications of the concept of self. We stated that being compartmentalised is morally dangerous and that the self should be conceived as a whole.

We then introduced Carl Jung’s psychology and demonstrated how his perspective encompassed a concern for wholeness through the conscious integration of the various and dual aspects of the personality in order to become individuated, that is to be a true individual freed from the collective mass. We exposed the various elements of the process of individuation and highlighted how they constitute a practical framework to explore managers’ morality. The following chapter reviews the methodological choices that will guide the study.
CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY

"We should always adopt a view that accords with the facts. If upon investigation we find that there is reason and proof for a point, then we should accept it. However, a clear distinction should be made between what is not found by science and what is found to be nonexistent by science. What science finds to be nonexistent we should all accept as nonexistent, but what science merely does not find is a completely different matter. An example is consciousness itself. Although sentient beings, including humans, have experienced consciousness for centuries, we still do not know what consciousness actually is: its complete nature and how it functions."

The Dalai Lama
Destructive Emotions and How We Can Overcome Them

4.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the methodological choices that will guide the study with a view to providing elements to answer the research question "How do managers personally experience morality?". This research question will be examined in relation with the Jungian conceptual framework introduced in the previous chapter. Thus the methodological choices will be made in accordance with the assumptions underlying the conceptual framework to ensure logic and coherence.

This chapter starts with an exploration of the philosophical perspectives on the nature of the social world (ontological and epistemological assumptions) in part 4.2, with a particular focus on the interpretivist view (part 4.3). Part 4.4 summarises the chosen methodology. We will then introduce in part 4.5 the methods selected for the data collection and data analysis stages, and explain how we will analyse the data through the conceptual framework. The relevance of using an interpretive research method to analyse individual case studies will be more particularly discussed. Part 4.6 assesses the ethics and reliability of the research methodology and methods, whilst part 4.7 introduces the pilot study and examines its outcomes.
4.2. Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions

According to Easterby-Smith et al. (2002:27), addressing philosophical issues is a necessary step in the research design because it clarifies the research objectives and the most appropriate way to achieve them whilst also presenting the limits and opportunities of the chosen research approach. In that, they disagree with Patton (2002) who believes that too much focus on the philosophical stance may restrict the research’s contribution rather than enhance it, and with Seale (1999:27) who acknowledges the “insecurity of philosophical conceptual divisions”. Knowing where one stands certainly helps identifying one’s assumptions about reality (Mason, 2002). Yet, it might at the same time commit researchers to a certain set of research practices that are ‘compatible’ with their position, so that the distinction becomes self-reinforcing (Miller and Brewer, 2003). As Hughes (1990) suggests, in the end choices of research design are more a matter of preferences than of objective assessment, and “it all depends upon what you are trying to do” (Silverman, 1993:22). Seale (1999:26) agrees and views research as a craft skill: “This is founded on a pragmatic acceptance of social research as a collection of craft skills, driven by local, practical concerns such as the expectations which particular audiences may have.” He concludes that “a good study should reflect underlying methodological awareness, without this awareness being continually made explicit so that it is a screen obscuring the artifact itself.” (Seale, 1999:31). How to ‘label’ and define philosophical approaches is also rather confusing (see Willis, 2007:20). Some like to start with an enquiry of the existing paradigms in social sciences (e.g. Corbetta, 2003), yet there is no formal way to present the philosophical underpinnings of research. The following discussion will examine the most common ontological and epistemological positions, so as to make an “informed choice” on the “paradigmatic stance” eventually adopted (Symon and Cassell, 2006:312).
4.2.1. MAPPING AND HISTORY OF THE MAIN ONTOLOGICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

Historically, social research has been influenced by two main philosophical perspectives: one strongly linked to natural sciences (objectivism), the other developing as a reaction to the former, mainly in the social sciences (constructionism) (Silverman, 1993). It illustrates a dichotomy recurrent in research design. Actually, ontologies and epistemologies can be pictured through a continuum ranging from objectivism-positivism to constructionism-interpretivism (see Figure 5).

**Figure 5. Mapping of Main Ontological and Epistemological Perspectives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ontology</th>
<th>Epistemology</th>
<th>Purpose of research</th>
<th>Meaning of data</th>
<th>Nature of reality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objectivism</td>
<td>Empiricism</td>
<td>Find universal laws</td>
<td>Mirror reality to develop theory</td>
<td>External to the mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Postpositivism</td>
<td>Find universal laws</td>
<td>Falsification criterion to test theory</td>
<td>External to the mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructionism</td>
<td>Critical Theory</td>
<td>Uncover instances of power relationships, empower the oppressed</td>
<td>Ideologic interpretation to enlighten and emancipate</td>
<td>Material and external to the mind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretivism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Socially constructed</td>
<td>Socially constructed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled and adapted from Willis (2007)

Ontology is concerned with the nature or essence of reality. It is a statement of what it is that is out there, and defines what we can know as ‘reality’ (Willis, 2007). Epistemology, on the other hand, addresses the nature of knowledge and provides assumptions about the best way to capture that knowledge of the world (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). It also defines the relation between the researcher and the reality observed, i.e. whether the researcher is detached from or part of what is being researched (Blaikie, 1993). Ontological and epistemological assumptions are used to
identify what is acceptable as knowledge, as well as which methods are acceptable to uncover this knowledge.

Willis (2007:21) identifies three major paradigms that currently occupy the field of research philosophy: postpositivism, interpretivism and critical theory. He believes these three perspectives differ on several levels:

- They differ on the question of the nature of reality.
- They offer different reasons or purposes for doing research.
- They point us to quite different types of data and methods as being valuable and worthwhile.
- They have different ways of deriving meaning from the data gathered.
- They vary with regard to the relationship between research and practice.”

The rationale behind the assumptions of each perspective is partly linked to the historical circumstances during which they emerged and developed. Recalling the development of qualitative research, Denzin and Lincoln (2000) identify seven moments or phases during which research methods and the ‘spirit’ of research had a very different focus. For instance, during the “traditional period” spreading from the early twentieth century until the Second World War, objectivity was the dominant criterion for good and reliable research. Then, historical, social and cultural changes contributed to challenging this particular understanding of social research, which led to the introduction of a variety of new approaches and techniques deemed to be better-suited to study social life in context, in particular more participative and interactive approaches. The seventh moment, which we should be living right now, is distinctively cross-disciplinary and experimental (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).

Willis (2007) looks further back and examines in which context the main research paradigms have emerged through time. He tells how the founders of (post)positivism (Francis Bacon and empiricism, later René Descartes and rationalism, and Auguste Comte and positivism) aimed at providing “a response to [the] metaphysical and magical explanations” that prevailed up to that point, especially through the Middle Ages. Postpositivism has inherited most of the rules laid by Bacon regarding the way research should be conducted, particularly the use of experimentation and
quantitative evaluations of facts. However, criticism of “naïve positivism” led by Popper and others prompted some scientists to call into question their ability to prove anything with unconditional certainty, and to introduce the concept of “falsification” instead. It is believed that most positivists/postpositivists have now rejected naïve positivism and align themselves with Popper’s word of caution. They nonetheless hold that mind and body can be studied separately and that scientific enquiry can and should be value-free (Willis, 2007:44).

Both critical theory and interpretivism emerged from the history of positivism, although they pursue a different purpose. Critical theorists have been firstly influenced by Marxism, at a time when the downsides of industrialisation became obvious in an increasingly dual society. Critical theory considers it necessary to analyse the ideological character of an issue, and often articulates the debate around the theme of class conflict (Willis, 2007:48). As such, it does not aim nor claim to be value-free. On the contrary, research in this perspective aspires to free oppressed groups by revealing the mechanisms of domination to which they are subjected. Feminist studies, to a certain extent, come within the scope of critical theory; nonetheless, they are often considered a philosophical perspective in its own right.

Interpretivism, on the other hand, addresses the “excesses of ‘scientific’ social science” by combining rationalist and relativist arguments (Willis, 2007:48). Interpretivists tend to be rationalist, that is they consider that knowledge of reality cannot be acquired through the senses alone (an empiricist argument) but also necessitates thinking and reflection. They also tend to be relativist, which implies that different communities have different knowledge of reality, each being specific to the community. This claim discards the possibility of universal truths or laws, in that truths only ever make sense within the community that construct them. However, it is important to notice that some interpretivists position themselves as idealists, in line with Plato’s tradition of Ideal forms existing as such, regardless of the imperfect and relative representation of these forms in the perceptible reality (Willis, 2007:50). Interpretivism will be discussed in detail in part 4.3.
4.2.2. Ontological Choices: Objectivism and Constructionism

If we adopt Willis’s classification, we notice that postpositivism aligns with an objectivist ontology, whereas interpretivism makes sense within a constructionist view of reality and critical theory lies somehow in between. Before examining further the particularities of each epistemological position, let’s consider the implications of each ontological perspective.

On the one hand, objectivism posits that social reality is independent of human consciousness, and that “social phenomena confront us as external facts that are beyond our reach or influence” (Bryman, 2004:16). In other words, the reality exists out there, irrespective of who we are or what we do, think, feel or perceive. On the other hand, constructionism (sometimes referred to as constructivism, although there might be more subtlety in the distinction than usually thought – see Crotty, 1998) denies the existence of an objective reality, or reality as an object. It rather holds that reality and social phenomena are constructed by social actors who attribute meanings to them usually through interaction (Bryman, 2004).

Both ontological positions have their own definition of ‘truth’. Whilst truth for objectivists implies an exact definition of what reality is, constructionists define truth as “that most informed and sophisticated construction on which there is consensus among individuals most competent (not necessarily most powerful) to form such construction” (Guba and Lincoln, 1989:86). This means that there exist multiple realities as multiple constructions, and that none of these constructions can be said to be truer than the others. These multiple realities can only be assessed on the basis of the information one possesses about them, yet not even in a normative manner.

The conceptual framework on which the study is based glimpses at a constructionist ontology. Indeed, although Jung was anxious to be accepted as a scientist, he grounded his psychology on the idea that the psyche is and remains mostly unknown and unknowable (see Chapter 3, part 3.4.1). Therefore, reality is not ‘out there’ and ready to be discovered; rather, it expresses in various forms and is not reducible to what either our senses or our mind can grasp. On the contrary, the psyche we come
to know has a personal quality. Furthermore, the purpose of this research is to examine a diversity of managers' personal experiences. It is believed that each manager will have a specific experience of the moral phenomenon, so that there will be multiple accounts of the same experience, or multiple instances of what Bannister calls "internal reality" (2005:14). What each manager experiences is true and real for them, thus we need to respect this plurality of views of reality in order to make sense of the phenomenon. Consequently, the constructionist ontology appears the most suitable for the enquiry we propose to lead. We thus adopt the assumption that "social reality is produced and reproduced by social actors; it is a preinterpreted, intersubjective world of cultural objects, meanings and social institutions" (Blaikie, 1993:203).

4.2.3. **EPistemOLOGICAL CHOICES**

4.2.3.1. **Postpositivism**

Postpositivism is firmly associated with objectivism, and is an attempt "to replicate the success of the natural scientists in controlling the natural world" (Seale, 1999:21). Postpositivism differs from strict positivism in that it takes into account the possibility that data may be falsified, whilst positivists tend to believe that data collected and examined through the scientific method reflect reality. The majority of social scientists in this tradition today adopt the more 'cautious' approach laid by postpositivism, therefore we can refer to postpositivism as the exemplar of an epistemology that logically works within an objectivist ontology (Willis, 2007).

Postpositivists believe that things in the world can be uncovered through scientific research methods. Although they admit there may be external elements that contradict the 'truth' of a theory, they argue that following the scientific method provides sufficient support to either validate or reject a theory. Postpositivists work from theory, then collect data to assess the theory. Theories need not be based on data, but their testing should follow the rigour of the scientific method, which aligns with the standards of research in the natural sciences. The goal pursued is to achieve an objective measurement and analysis of data which will allow researchers to
confidently describe and explain real phenomena. It is therefore paramount that the researcher be detached from what they study. Objectivity is deemed essential to claim knowledge that is value-free (Bryman, 2004).

Postpositivists tend to rely on quantifiable data. Because they are interested in the establishment of universal laws from testable hypotheses, they have imported techniques of experiments and observations from the natural sciences. Consequently, quantitative research is often linked to postpositivism. However, this is so because quantitative studies share most of the assumptions of a postpositivist perspective, and not because they are restricted to postpositivist research studies. In other words, it makes sense to use quantitative methods within a postpositivist paradigm because it maintains the cohesion within the foundational assumptions of the approaches.

Given we have adopted a constructionist ontology, it would be incoherent to choose a postpositivist epistemology. Besides, the purpose of the research is not to find universals but to explore the particular. Jung (2002b:6) distinguishes ‘understanding’ from ‘knowledge’ of the human, and views the latter as a scientific project prone to statistical generalisations whilst the former is a contextual exploration of the individual. If our aim was to get to know individual managers, we could adopt a traditional scientific approach. But the focus of the study is to understand the particular meaning each manager attributes to his or her moral experience and perception of the world. The central concepts of self and moral experiences are, furthermore, not easily definable nor quantifiable, just like not all relations between variables are logico-deductive and mathematically translatable. It ensues that a postpositivist epistemology would not relate to the ontological assumptions, and proves inappropriate.

4.2.3.2. CRITICAL THEORY

Critical theorists combine “a loose collection of scholars and practitioners who tend to focus on the impact of power relationships in human cultures” (Willis, 2007:81). Distinct from but inspired by Marxism, its purpose is, as mentioned before, to denounce particular beliefs, values and assumptions that engender oppression.
Critical theory is proactive in setting up the changes necessary to free oppressed minorities from the power struggle uncovered by the researchers. Because change is continual, the critique of the assumptions held in research also has to be continual. Research that adopts the critical theory perspective aims to change how things are, therefore it is closely linked to practice.

Critical theory is subjective (albeit it can be collectively subjective) in so far as it reads reality through the filter of a particular ideology, be it Marxism, feminism, and so on. Although critical theorists may very well admit there exists an external reality, they claim that our knowledge of the world is pervaded by power struggles, and they aim first and foremost to identify and denounce instances of these (Willis, 2007). Critical theorists’ reality differs from that of positivists because it is not value-free; rather it is a distorted reality maintaining the veil of freedom over the eyes of the oppressed groups. Both quantitative and qualitative methods are accepted in critical theory.

The main characteristic of critical theory lies in the way data is interpreted. For instance, where interpretivism would search for elements that help the researcher grasp the specific, contextual meaning of a phenomenon, critical theory aims to stimulate reflection and self-reflection on falsely held beliefs about the structures of the world. It thus has “an explicit value-based and interventionist orientation” (Symon and Cassell, 2006:308). Similarly, where postpositivists would view data as a reflection of how things are, critical theorists would interpret the same figures as evidence of the power relations that hinder our perception of how things really are (Willis, 2007).

Willis (2007:87) also highlights an important element of critical theory. He explains that critical theory research generates knowledge that is “superior to the knowledge of people the researcher studies”, so that the goal is “thus to get the subjects to believe as the researcher does.” This is understandable given the assumption of critical theory that our perception of the world is distorted by existing power relationships we are not necessarily conscious of. However, given the focus of this research, adopting such a stance would be ill-conceived. Jung’s deep appreciation of
the individual prevents us from adopting a critical theory perspective, for it would imply that the researcher ‘knows best’ and can see what the research participants cannot see. The significance of self-knowledge as moral knowledge lies in the fact that it originates from the individual himself, providing all individuals are granted an equal status. A variety of voices constitutes the richness of the data, and our purpose is to allow these voices to express their personal understanding of the world, and then to explore the meaning of the self and moral phenomena in context. That is why an interpretivist epistemology provides a better framework for this research than critical theory.

4.2.3.3. REALISM

Realism stands more or less in the middle of the ontology-epistemology debate, which is why it is represented slightly out of the ontology and epistemology lines on Figure 5. Realism takes from objectivism the belief that there exists a reality independent from one’s beliefs, and from constructionism the importance of capturing people’s perceptions to uncover reality (Saunders et al., 2003). There exist several degrees of realism: naïve realism is close to postpositivism, whilst critical realism, developed notably by Bhaskar and Miles and Huberman, adopt a more relativist stand (Patton, 2002).

Realism is described by Blaikie (1993) as one of the contemporary responses to the key question “What kind of science is social science?”. Blaikie (1993) reviews what he qualifies as various responses which address in different ways the nature of social reality and the way(s) to capture meaning of the social world. Starting from the ‘classical responses’ that established the grounds of the debate and that include positivism and interpretivism, he highlights the issues on which ‘contemporary’ approaches (notably realism, structuration theory and feminism) differ from the assumptions of the two grounding positions. Bhaskar’s realism, for instance, aims to bridge the positivist-interpretivist gap by acknowledging the specific nature of social science (as opposed to natural science) and yet stating that the world consists in “generative mechanisms” that are “independent of the events which they generate” (Blaikie, 1993:59). Thus, there exist three domains of reality: “The empirical domain
consists of events which can be observed [experienced], the actual domain consists of events whether or not they are observed, and the real domain consists of the structures and mechanisms which produce these events” (Blaikie, 1993:60, italics original). Realists therefore concern themselves with making sense of their experiences to identify the underlying mechanisms of social reality through their personal constructions.

Although the realist position seems, at first, to offer an alternative to the apparent dichotomy of the positivist-interpretivist perspectives, it does not seem to successfully transcend the natural-versus-social-world issue. Bhaskar’s view in particular draws on the interpretivist argument that social reality is mediated by human action and interaction to the extent of “conceding too much” to this view and becoming a shaky form of anti-naturalism (Blaikie, 1993:118). Furthermore, as Willis (2007) explains, interpretivists do not deny that an external, physical reality may exist. What they argue is that it is not possible to objectively learn about that reality, or to put it differently, that there is no objective knowledge possible. Communication and understanding is possible because “making meaning is a group or social process” (Willis, 2007:97), but the reality thus uncovered is only contextual or culturally tainted. Interpretivists would reject the possibility of learning about the universally real mechanisms that lie behind the phenomena experienced, because unlike realists they argue that the expression of these mechanisms would itself be socially constructed, rather than universal or ‘out there’.

4.2.3.4. INTERPRETIVISM

Interpretivism fits within the ontological position of social constructionism. It therefore considers that social reality has a specific nature, which cannot be explored in traditionally scientific ways. Interpretivism acknowledges a multiple-voice approach, and accepts subjectivity as a necessary, even useful component of social research. Interpretivists want to understand social reality through the experiences of its actors. They do not focus on one ‘objective’ social reality, unlike postpositivists or some realists; neither do they focus on the effect a social reality has on its members, unlike critical theorists. Rather, interpretivists focus on capturing the
meaning people give to social reality as they perceive it. Their purpose is sense-making, and they “aim to represent others’ life-worlds as fairly as possible” (Symon and Cassell, 2006:308).

It is important to highlight that ‘soft’ realism and ‘soft’ interpretivism have much in common. By ‘soft’ realism we imply the realist position that grants the utmost importance to the fact that reality can only be approached through the filter of social interaction and meaning-making. By ‘soft’ interpretivism we refer to the perspective that concedes there might be an external reality, a world ‘out there’, although our perception of this reality is only relative and subjective. Evanoff’s (2005) tentative to reconcile realism and constructivism to form a “realist’ version of constructivism”, or Krausz’s (2000) proposal of a constructive realism illustrate how blurred the boundary tends to be. Nevertheless, even though a majority of people may agree on a given aspect of their perceived reality, this shared understanding of the real world cannot lead us to conclude this is reality. We will now turn to the specificities of the interpretivist viewpoint.

4.3. THE INTERPRETIVIST PARADIGM

4.3.1. FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS OF INTERPRETIVISM

The interpretivist epistemology considers that social sciences cannot be the object of detached enquiry. Its basic premise is that the nature of social sciences (i.e. the study of “people and their institutions”) is distinct from the natural sciences, that the purpose of enquiry is to grasp or understand meanings rather than capture facts, and that the researcher is part of the observed social reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Bryman, 2004). The grounding assumptions of interpretivism imply that reality is subjective and that knowledge is situated and should be gained by capturing the research participants’ own interpretations of the world (Saunders et al., 2003). It is believed that human action is meaningful as people give meanings to their acts and to those of others, which thereafter constitute their social reality (Bryman, 2004).
The purpose of interpretivism is to achieve 'Verstehen', that is to understand or interpret people's actions in order to uncover meaning (Schwandt, 2003). 'Verstehen' translates from German as 'understanding'. It differs clearly from the goal, pursued by postpositivists, of 'explaining' reality, or from what Jung identified as 'knowing men' (2002b). It also marks the distinction between natural sciences or naturwissenschaft, and cultural (or human) sciences, geisteswissenschaft. The emphasis is on the fact that knowledge is not value-free and research is not, and should not aim to remain, objective for fear of not capturing the meaning of the data.

The interpretivist position can be defined by its “empathic identification with the actor”, by its endeavour to provide an understanding of how the everyday world is constituted (i.e. ‘phenomenological sociology’), or by its analogy of human actions with language games (Schwandt, 2003). The most important element, however, is what Schwandt (2003:299) summarises as the second dimension of ‘Verstehen’:

“Hence interpretivists aim to reconstruct the self-understandings of actors engaged in particular actions. And in so doing, they assume that the inquirer cannot claim that the ways actors make sense of their experience are irrelevant to social scientific understanding because actors’ ways of making sense of their actions are constitutive of that action.”

Many perspectives have emerged from interpretivism, but they all share the rejection of a causal, hypothetical, purely objective way of gaining knowledge of social phenomena. These include phenomenology, symbolic interactionism, hermeneutics, semiotics and ethnography to name a few. Most research studies in these perspectives adopt qualitative methods because they are more appropriate to collect and analyse data that will provide elements to answer the research questions. Interpretivists tend to be more lenient than postpositivists regarding the choice of methods available to researchers. Because for them standards for 'good research' are subjective, what matters most to interpretivists is the research process and a rich description of the context, rather than a standardised quantification. Stories and reflections are prized because they provide valuable elements to understand the reality explored (Willis, 2007).

Interpretive research is not remote from practice. Kessels and Korthagen’s (1996) discuss the Greek conceptions of knowledge, ‘episteme’ and ‘phronesis’, in relation
to research. 'Episteme' lies within the scope of the postposivist search for abstract, procedural and universal knowledge, whilst 'phronesis' (i.e. practical wisdom, as we saw in Chapter 2, part 2.2.3.1) affirms the primacy of a contextual knowledge, directed towards the particulars. To that extent, interpretivism is in the spirit of 'phronesis', and emphasizes the relevance of local knowledge and understanding-in-context.

4.3.2. CRITICAL VIEWS OF INTERPRETIVISM

Interpretivism has been criticised by realists and positivists alike. A realist, Bhaskar denounces the “linguistic fallacy” that social actors’ interpretations are not corrigible, which contributes to an “epistemic fallacy” by which social reality is reduced to what social actors interpret (Blaikie, 1993:111). In other words, interpretivism is accused of reducing ‘what-is-there’ to ‘what-we-know-is-there’. However, this criticism is only valid with regards to the realist assumption that there exists a reality beyond what can be linguistically constructed, and that we can access this reality. It has already been pointed out that interpretivists do not object to the existence of a reality out there, but rather object to the realists’ belief that our necessarily subjective perceptions of reality can be almost ‘transcended’ to discover the objective mechanisms behind such perceptions.

Indeed, realists claim they can start from individual, hence subjective, accounts of reality, and study these accounts to go beyond their subjectivity and achieve an understanding of their generative mechanisms. Yet, how can they know that their interpretation of people’s subjectivity is more real, or more realistic? Could not their own interpretations of people’s interpretations be as subjective as those very same interpretations they denounce as fallacious at worst, incomplete at best? Realism thus induces its knowledge of the mechanisms of social world from an interpretation, albeit uttered by a researcher instead of a social actor. It is not clear either why or how the researcher’s interpretation may be more objective than other people’s, and therefore would lead to the sphere of the more stable, generative structures of reality. Furthermore, even if we were to take this interpretation as a starting point to enquire further on the generative structures of reality, the need will be felt at some point to
define criteria upon which to judge what should be considered a generative structure from what is an abortive interpretation. In so far as the generative structures are stable and universal, those criteria ought to be of a similar kind, that is stable and universal. Yet, this means another step towards a postpositivist perspective, bringing up the necessity to establish universals.

Interpretivism does not concern itself with such dilemma. Indeed, interpretivists hold everyone’s account of reality as equally real. Subjectivity is not a problem because all our knowledge is based upon subjectivities and individual interpretations. Realism often ends up being obliged to choose to rejoin either the foundational assumptions of postpositivism or those of interpretivism, which makes its ‘middle-way’ or ‘third way’ position untenable. This is not to deny that realists have brought valuable elements of discussion to the previously antagonistic debate about research philosophy. However, it does not seem to have established its grounds clearly enough quite yet. Having discarded the realist objection, let’s turn to what postpositivism would argue.

As proud heirs to the natural scientists, postpositivists in the social sciences disregard research studies that do not adopt a scientific, objective, detached and value-free method of enquiry. They claim that the fruits of their research reflect the true reality of the world, providing data have not been falsified (something which can be easily checked, they say). Their claims are grounded in the concepts of validity, reliability and objectivity, which constitute the core criteria upon which one can assess the quality of - essentially quantitative - research (Seale, 1999). Social scientists coming from a constructionist perspective were anxious to apply those positivist criteria to their own studies, so that their findings may also be considered ‘good science’.

Yet, one cannot just transpose one set of criteria from one ontology to another, if anything because constructionism accepts the existence of multiple realities, hence multiple truths. The traditional, positivist meaning of ‘good quality research’ loses its relevance in a constructionist world. Not taken aback, constructionists have adapted the scope of validity and reliability criteria to fit qualitative research better. Of course, it is important to ensure that research is being made in ‘good’ conditions,
notwithstanding its quantitative or qualitative scope. But it is questionable whether we should be so desperate to reproduce the strict standards of the natural sciences in the very different and varied field of human sciences. For both practical and ethical reasons, we could argue that the study of the human should be approached differently from the study of the natural world on the grounds of human consciousness. We do not argue that human beings are necessarily superior to other sentient beings, hence should be studied differently. Rather we notice that consciousness is a shared characteristic of human beings, and that the self-reflexivity it allows is a distinctive feature of humanity that generates understanding of the world. The subjective insights consciousness allows should be taken into account in our study of the human, for to ignore them would characterise both a subjective choice and a non-systematic approach to science. If we take our ontological assumptions seriously, then we should leave the door open for criteria that embrace difference, multiple voices and personal engagement with the research topic. Alternative standards for credible qualitative research are discussed further in part 4.6.2.

Interpretivism has been accused of lacking rigour and objectivity, thereby implying that interpretivists cannot claim to knowledge creation in the same way positivists can. Yet there exists several criteria to assess the rigour of a methodology, so that different methods might well be judged equally rigorous albeit on different grounds. In that respect, interpretivist research is rigorous in so far as it implements an interpretation procedure in a systematic manner. It offers heavy contextualisation and thick descriptions to enhance faithfulness to the text or data, whereas positivist studies are rigorous through their “unyielding and inflexible stiffness” (Yanow, 2005:70). Rigorous interpretive studies also demonstrate internal cohesion and a logical flow in a meaning-making perspective rather than a number-based approach to social reality.

Furthermore, interpretivist researchers do not go for an interview unprepared, but carefully think through and assess their questions as if constituting a repertoire of probes to better cope with necessarily uncontrollable human responses. In that sense, interpretivism differs clearly from amateurism but resembles thoughtful and considerate improvisation. This is sustained by the fact that: “Researchers see and
name patterns in other human actions because we are human ourselves, and it is our humanity, first and foremost, that enables such empathetic recognition of human reaction to human experience. But that means that these patterns exist as much in our habits and practices of sight itself [...] as in what we are seeing.” (Yanow, 2005:75). This in turn claims that there cannot be detached knowledge; rather, “the certainty of knowledge about the social world being observed and judgments about the ‘goodness’ of that knowledge rest within the community that has established procedural rules for generating interpretations.” Knowledge claims are validated by the interpretive community through the reporting of observations “in the rhetorical style developed and accepted by that community” (Yanow, 2005:79). This is all the more legitimate in so far as research into human action or human motivations often require a subjective reading rather than an objective counting to make sense (Yanow, 2005:79).

4.3.3. INTERPRETIVISM OR PHENOMENOLOGY?

Phenomenology belongs to the interpretivist epistemology, but is just one form of interpretivist enquiry. Phenomenology is concerned with finding out the essence of the things or the phenomena examined. Patton (2002:482) states that: “Phenomenological analysis seeks to grasp and elucidate the meaning, structure and essence of the lived experience of a phenomenon for a person or group of people.” Willis (2007:172) specifies that “phenomenological psychology focuses on consciousness and perceptions. There is no effort to equate perceptions with external reality.” Phenomenologists are interested in the experiences lived by people and aim to retrieve the essence of these experiences through a method of thick description and reduction (1991).

Jung is not estranged from phenomenology. Indeed, the subtitle of his work Aion (1978a) reads as “Researches into the phenomenology of the self” and his writings reflect an interest for the phenomena as such. Besides, Jungian psychology is truly centred around the phenomenon of consciousness. Yet, Jung can be equally considered a phenomenologist or a non-phenomenologist. Brooke (1991) reviews Jung’s works and tries to identify those aspects that would qualify him as a
phenomenologist and those that would discard him. He concludes that although Jung's method is similar to a phenomenological enquiry, Jung's practice does not qualify as rigorous enough against the phenomenological criteria. Because "Jung had a limited understanding of phenomenology", he never followed the "methodological guidelines in a systematic and disciplined way." (Brooke, 1991:34 and 50). He understood the significance of immediate experience to uncover the meaning of a phenomenon, but he did not practice the phenomenological reduction to a sufficient degree to qualify as a phenomenologist. Brooke (1991:31) clearly summarises the interest Jung found in phenomenology: "When Jung identifies his method with phenomenology, as he does frequently, he is arguing the case for an essentially descriptive approach that avoids nineteenth-century philosophical assumptions and psychoanalytic reductionism."

To that extent, Jung is undoubtedly inclined to interpretivism, but not necessarily to phenomenological enquiry. His endeavour to understand experiences and his recognition of the primacy of interpretation in the task of understanding qualify him as an interpretivist, but not as a true phenomenologist. Thus we will opt for an interpretivist approach which shares elements with phenomenology but is less constraining. This approach is detailed in the next part.

**4.4. Research Methodology**

Ontology and epistemology inform the methodological choices, that is the practical way social reality will be researched. As Guba and Lincoln (1989:83) phrase it, methodology provides answer to the question "How can we go about finding out things?". Saunders et al. (2003:83) refer to this process as an "onion" starting with the research philosophy down to the data collection methods. Each "layer" of the research design influences the one that follows, as well as the results of the research enquiry (Hughes, 1990). Corbetta (2003:13) underlines the importance of having clarified one's position on ontology, epistemology and methodology, and explains that: "The three questions are [...] interrelated, not only because the answers to each are greatly influenced by the answers to the other two, but also because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the boundaries between them."
Corbetta (2003) also highlights the imperative of coherence within the research strategy. Indeed, social or human sciences remain ‘scientific’ in so far as there exists an imperative of logical sense-making in the way knowledge and understanding is created or acquired. No matter whether one’s position is postpositivism or interpretivism, no matter whether the world is thought to obey natural laws or whether the meaning of social things is constructed, one’s approach to knowledge of the social reality must make sense. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, there must be coherence and logical links between the philosophy of research and the methods employed to generate knowledge. Since the research has adopted a constructionist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology, the methodology and methods elected must fit this paradigm.

Research methodology and research methods are often confused and used interchangeably, whilst they stand for two different aspects of a research project design (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Methodology refers to the approach the researcher takes when exploring a topic. It summarises the researcher’s view of the world, her understanding and underlying assumptions of the social reality she investigates. Research methods, however, consist in the tools and processes the researcher will use to attempt to uncover that part of social reality she has set herself to explore.

The methodology adopted here is an interpretive enquiry aiming towards “an understanding of the meanings human attach to events” (Saunders et al., 2003:89). The research is set to be exploratory to clarify our understanding of managers’ lived and reflective experience of the moral phenomenon and the significance of the self. Exploratory studies have the advantage of flexibility, so that if a new theme emerges from the data, it allows the research design to be altered so as to integrate the new theme from this moment on (Saunders et al., 2003:97). Such approach is accepted by interpretivists since they admit new elements may emerge during the research process, and they de-emphasize the need to begin research with hypotheses. In the present study, the research focus is the manager and the phenomenon explored is the manager’s personal experience of morality.
Willis (2007) provides a list of general guidelines for implementing interpretive qualitative research. These summarise the practical dimensions of an interpretive enquiry and include: the pursuit of contextual understanding, the acceptance of cross-disciplinary influences, the deliberate search for multiple perspectives, a greater focus on the foundational rather than the technical assumptions of research methodology, the practice of iterative and emergent analysis, the use of multiple sources of data, the primacy of reflection and self-reflection, encouragement for a participatory research, an openness to changes and its influence on data and analysis, an open acknowledgement of bias and subjectivity, and a holistic approach to research. These elements have been addressed in the choice of research methods to which we now turn.

4.5. RESEARCH METHODS

4.5.1. A CASE STUDY APPROACH

Willis (2007:239) depicts the peculiarity of case study research when he says that "[it] has been one of the most criticized and most used forms of social science research." Case studies are neglected or disregarded by postpositivists, but particularly appreciated by interpretivists and critical theorists because of their ability to capture "authentic data" in context, and to allow themes to emerge along the way without having to predetermine hypotheses. Case studies can prove particularly useful in achieving "verstehen" because they are, per se, focused on the particulars. They search for elements about complex, situated and problematic issues around which they are organised by the researcher (Stake, 2000a:439).

Case studies have been associated with many things, but Berg (2004:251) proposes a general and interesting definition that summarises the case study approach in qualitative research: "Case study methods involve systematically gathering enough information about a particular person, social setting, event, or group to permit the researcher to effectively understand how the subject operates or functions." Case study is close to storytelling, although the reported story is necessarily limited by the
researcher’s choices (Stake, 2000a). Willis (2007:239) describes case studies as being particularistic, naturalistic, thickly descriptive, inductive and heuristic; whilst according to Willig (2001:70-71) the defining features of case study research are an idiographic perspective, attention to contextual data, triangulation of collection or analysis methods, a temporal element, and a concern with theory development. What is most noticeable is that case studies put focus on a greatly-detailed particular. To that extent, they are “not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied” (Stake, 2000a:435). The way to go about the case is almost a different matter.

Case study research is found in many disciplines and takes a wide range of forms: either single-case or multiple cases, intrinsic or instrumental, descriptive, explanatory or interpretive. They have in common to face the objection that case study research is not generalisable. This has often been discussed (see Gomm et al, 2000), and if no definitive agreement has been reached yet, we can at least assert that case studies do not aim at generalisability in the positivist sense (that is over a large population) but contribute to what researchers call either theoretical, “analytical” (Yin, 1994), “logical” (Mitchell, 2000) or “naturalistic” generalisation (Willig, 2001). Stake (2000a) defends the value of single-case research and argues that instrumental case research is too often confused with intrinsic case research. In the instrumental approach, the case study is just there to validate or provide support to the theory. It is partly similar to a scientific approach in the postpositivist tradition, in that there exists a working hypothesis at the start of the research and the case is used to ‘test’ this hypothesis. However, in the intrinsic perspective, the case itself is at the core of the study. Generalisation is not a goal because the aim is the comprehension of the particular. What actually happens is that:

“In intrinsic case study, researchers do not avoid generalization – they cannot. Certainly they generalize to happenings of their cases at times yet to come and in other situations. They expect readers to comprehend the reported interpretations but to modify their (the readers’) own. Thus researchers use the methods for case-work that they actually use to learn enough about their cases to encapsulate complex meanings into finite reports – and thus to describe the cases in sufficient descriptive narrative so that readers can vicariously experience these happenings and draw
conclusions (which may differ from those of the researchers).” (Stake, 2000a:439)

Lincoln and Guba (2000:36) mention this difference between a “rationalistic, propositional, law-like” type of generalisation (which is how postpositivists understand the concept) and a “more intuitive, empirical, based on personal direct and vicarious experience” generalisation. Yet, they go on suggesting the use of “transferability” as a criterion for case study generalisation, implying that case study findings are generalisable as long as the contexts are similar, which is in itself a serious limitation to the generalisability of case-based research (Donmoyer, 2000). Williams (2000:220) proposes that interpretivists generate “moderate generalisations” on the grounds of “cultural consistency”. He explains that generalising from the interpretation of a case study is possible, albeit only relative, because the interpretation reveals aspects of a shared culture which bears meaning for its members. In a similar vein, Donmoyer (2000) joins Stake (2000a; 2000b) to view case studies as opportunities for experiential knowledge. Drawing from his experience as a school teacher in various geographical areas and with students from different social backgrounds, he insists that most of experiential knowledge, which is the knowledge we gain from experience, occurs tacitly. To attempt to transfer this knowledge implies to reduce it to its propositional form, which actually leaves aside a significant portion of the tacit elements. The power of personal stories is greater than what we can learn from pre-structured working hypotheses, not least because it includes the emotional aspects of the experience, something hard to translate in rational terms.

Consequently, Donmoyer (2000) defends case study-based knowledge and explains its advantages by using the elements of Piaget’s Schema theory according to which new knowledge follows the process of assimilation, accommodation, integration and differentiation when it becomes part of our cognitive structures. First, Donmoyer believes that case study research allows us to discover worlds and places we would not be able to go to otherwise. This is obvious for exotic or remote cultures, but it also possesses a much wider scope. Indeed, case studies enable us to witness “vicariously” the experience of unique individuals within our own culture and to learn from what we see, read or feel. It almost does not matter whether the reader
agrees with the researcher’s interpretation of the case, because “from the schema theory view of generalizability, the purpose of research is simply to expand the range of interpretations available to the research consumer” (Donmoyer, 2000:63).

A second, and related, advantage of case studies is that they “allow us to look at the world through the researcher’s eyes and, in the process, to see things we otherwise might not have seen” (Donmoyer, 2000:63). Not that the researcher’s interpretation is fully subjective (i.e. personal), rather it is likely to reflect a particular shared theoretical viewpoint. Therefore the case study may serve as an introduction to this viewpoint, as well as a refinement of existing theory. Besides, case study research is not devoid of theoretical contribution, in so far as “a case study is essentially heuristic; it reflects in the events portrayed features which may be construed as a manifestation of some general, abstract theoretical principle” (Mitchell, 2000:170). Case studies are actually great vehicles for theory development, highlighting elements and relationships that might have been overlooked through less contextualised methods (Saunders et al., 2003:93). In a similar vein, Mitchell (2000:180) also states that “the extent to which generalization may be made from case studies depends upon the adequacy of the underlying theory and the whole corpus of related knowledge of which the case is analysed rather than on the particular instance itself.” Finally, the readers may feel less threatened, hence more inclined to change, if they are presented with an account of an experience than if they are requested to directly participate in the experience. In other words, case study learning decreases the defensiveness and resistance we naturally feel against change in our cognitive structures (Donmoyer, 2000:65). Ultimately, generalisability is no longer an issue if we adopt this perspective.

Interpretive case studies are richly descriptive, but also aim to validate or challenge theoretical assumptions identified before data was collected. In Willis’s terms: “The focus is on understanding the intricacies of a particular situation, setting, organizations, culture or individual, but that local understanding may be related to prevailing theories or models” (2007:243). In the present research, the focus is on understanding the lived experience of various individuals who work as managers, and to relate their experience of morality and their perception of self to a Jungian
framework of self-knowledge and individuation. Each manager will be considered a case within which their experience of morality and self will be explored.

4.5.2. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

4.5.2.1. COLLECTING REAL-LIFE STORIES

The purpose of the research is to explore how managers experience moral issues and how significant the self is in such instances. The need to collect real experiences is therefore central to the study. We have explained how important contextualised accounts are; in that regard, real-life experiences provide richer cases than responses to hypothetical scripts. Actually, many studies on moral development, moral autonomy, moral behaviour and so on have resorted to psychology-inspired techniques, notably the use of hypothetical situations or scripts on which respondents have to express their views (McMahon and Harvey, 2007). It is assumed that their answers will reveal their deep feelings, characteristics, personality traits and so on. Some of these tests have a clear purpose of measuring a certain variable, for instance the level of moral reasoning (more or less mature) in Kohlberg’s model (see the discussion in Chapter 3, part 3.2.2). These tests do provide some interesting insights into people’s approach and apprehension of moral issues, and have been validated and widely used in subsequent studies, for example using Rest’s Defining Issues Test (Colby and Kohlberg, 1984). However, it is not clear whether the data obtained actually reflect how the person really is, feels and acts. It is possible that the use of hypothetical dilemmas tells us how the respondent would like to be perceived by others in such situations, but it does not reveal how the respondent would actually react in these situations. In other words, there remains a possibility that hypothetical scripts reveal elements of a ‘consciously constructed social self’ rather than of the real self, a phenomenon known as the socially desirable response (Denzin, 1970). Indeed, the Jungian persona is more likely to show than the conscious ego.

Furthermore, Knobe (2005:337) targets research in the line of Kohlberg’s study of moral development, and denounces the use of pre-set dilemmas, arguing that “the whole experimental design seems to force the subject into a certain type of thinking.”
As a consequence, researchers have tended to dismiss as outliers those subjects (for instance the ‘Raskolnikovs’) whose responses did not fit into the hypothetical typology of moral motivation or moral decision-making (Knobe, 2005). Pre-set circumstances, scripts or behavioural options necessarily obstruct a more instinctive response. The present research aims to capture elements of the self-knowledge behind the social mask of the politically, socially or morally correct persona. It is believed that people’s complexity is more likely to be evidenced in more ‘spontaneous’ situations such as real experiences than in pre-defined scripts.

It is clear that people are affected by external circumstances and the level of personal involvement in a moral issue. This is evidenced by research led on people’s behaviour in Nazi Europe (Monroe et al., 1990). As the authors point out, some people who under other circumstances would not have acted bravely actually did demonstrate bravery (and vice-versa). They also highlight that people, who had a priori no particular interest nor sympathy for any side and who could have turned either way, got involved and made choices because they felt personally touched or implicated by the issues at stake. It becomes obvious that people may not respond the same way to a hypothetical dilemma than to a real-life personal situation (Silverman, 1993).

In real-life occurrences, people experience and interpret the specific circumstances their own way, and this strongly influences their actual behaviour; similarly, in real-life instances people tend to have a personal stake in the dilemma, which probably affects their decisions and actions. Hypothetical situations, no matter how well designed, cannot challenge someone’s beliefs as deeply as personal experience can. Of course, people can always present an artificial account of their real experiences, consciously or unconsciously altering the narrative in order to show themselves in a better light. Nonetheless, even ‘inflated tales of self’ based on personal experience are more likely to reveal the nature of the conscious ego and its knowledge of self than a well-rehearsed answer to an hypothetical script. It is easier to remain emotionally detached when being presented a script than when one actually lives the situation (MacLagan, 1998:41).
4.5.2.2. INTERVIEWS: COLLECTING PERSONAL ACCOUNTS

Interviews are often used in, but are not restricted to, qualitative studies. They are considered relevant when the research aims at “studying people’s understanding of the meanings in their lived world, describing their experiences and self-understanding, and clarifying and elaborating their own perspective on their lived world” (Kvale, 1996:105). Interviews in an interpretivist perspective aim to achieve authenticity in collecting accounts from the participants (Silverman, 1993:91), to produce a picture of the interviewee and of their representation of the world (Gomm, 2004).

There exist three main types of interview: structured, semi-structured and in-depth interview (Saunders et al., 2003). Exploratory studies usually require a greater degree of flexibility in the process of data collection; therefore they favour either semi-structured or in-depth formats of interviewing (Denzin, 1970:127). The less structured the interview, the more flexible it is but also the less reliable the data might be considered (Silverman, 1993). Yet, for interpretivism, interviews are a form of social interaction between interviewer and interviewee, an “inter-view” as emphasised by Kvale (1996), and the reliability and validity of data are measured not in terms of structure but in terms of depth and richness of the account, in terms of how sincere and spontaneous the respondent was. Breakwell’s (2006) advice on interviewing shares similarities with Fontana and Frey’s (2000:660) description of the general format of unstructured interviews:

“Traditionally, the researcher is involved in an informal conversation with the respondent, thus he or she must maintain a tone of ‘friendly’ chat while trying to remain close to the guidelines of the topic of inquiry he or she has in mind. The researcher begins by ‘breaking the ice’ with general questions and gradually moves on to more specific ones, while also – as inconspicuously as possible – asking questions intended to check the veracity of the respondent’s statements.”

Another very helpful and realistic guiding framework to lead unstructured interviews is suggested by Fontana and Frey (2000) and commented by Willis (2007). Fontana and Frey (2000:649) provide the following guidelines for structured interviews:
Never get involved in long explanations of the study; use the standard explanation provided by the supervisor.

Never deviate from the study introduction, sequence of questions, or question wording.

Never let another person interrupt the interview; do not let another person answer for the respondent or offer his or her opinion on the question.

Never suggest an answer or agree or disagree with an answer. Do not give the respondent any idea of your personal views on the topic of the question or the survey.

Never interpret the meaning of a question; just repeat the question and give instructions or clarifications that are provided in training or by the supervisors.

Never improvise, such as by adding answer categories or making wording changes.”

Willis (2007:246) explains that “It is a valuable list that describes what interpretivist research is not. Simply delete the nevers and don’ts and you get the essence of interviewing in the interpretivist world.” This actually reflects my own experience of unstructured interviewing, and serves as a good reminder to help prepare oneself for interviews.

For the purpose of the research, a loosely semi-structured interview strategy was considered the best option, because it is believed that having a pre-set series of questions might help the respondents feel more at ease in starting the conversation. However, the interview protocols (attached as appendix I, II and III) were only used as a template to guide the respondent towards discussing the themes researched. The initial questions are more focused in order to provide a starting point to the participant and help launch the narration (Wengraf, 2001:122). Whenever deemed appropriate, the sequence of questions was altered in order to follow the respondent’s thoughts, illustrating the “intuitive data processing” suggested by Gomm (2004:185) and also mentioned by Willis (2007:246). This procedure aligns with the assumption that allowing space for the respondent to answer in a sequence of their choice provides the best outcome (Denzin, 1970). The questions aimed to facilitate a discussion around the concepts central to the research, but also to bring forward elements that would inform the case and help understand the participant’s answers.
The interview protocol used for the main study is enclosed as Appendix III. The questions were translated from English to French as accurately as possible, although some necessary linguistic adaptations were made. The interview was split into four main parts, but the order was of little importance and served to guide the discussion. Part A was concerned with introducing the participant’s job and background, as well as his view on being a manager. It aimed to help the participant relax, whilst gathering information on his work and his responsibilities. Part B of the interview protocol focused on the specific content of the participant’s job and his personal expectations at work. The purpose for these questions was to uncover how the participant assessed himself. Part C introduced a discussion on a moral conflict the participant had experienced at work, and aimed to explore how he analysed his moral experience. Finally, in part D the participants were asked to comment three statements. The purpose was to grasp some aspects of the participants’ personal aspirations.

4.5.2.3. SAMPLING STRATEGY

Participants were selected according to a case study strategy. As Mitchell (2000:180) says, the researcher tends to select a case to study “in terms of its explanatory power rather than for its typicality.” Whilst postpositivists are very much attached to statistically representative samples, qualitative researchers are more open to purposeful sampling or convenience sampling methods (Maxwell, 1996). These suggest a selection of participants based on the degree to which they will provide rich information relevant to the research question (Patton, 2002). The size of the sample is not an issue, since all depends on what the researcher wants to investigate. Cost-related issues should also be considered, and sometimes influence the decision to choose convenience sampling over more time-consuming methods of probability sampling (Breakwell, 2006:234). However, what should guide the final decision is the purpose of the research. If the research study aims to validate an hypothesis or a theory, then quantitative approaches and representative samples make sense. On the other hand, if the purpose of research is exploratory, open to emergent meanings and intrinsic case value, then the selection criteria ought to be content-based. Stake (2000a:447) sums up the guiding principle: “Balance and variety are important;
opportunity to learn is of primary importance.” Redundancy or data saturation often serve as criteria to determine the appropriate sample size; nevertheless, Patton (2002:246) insists that the ultimate criterion should be a quality discussion of the sampling procedures and decisions, and how the sample’s characteristics might affect the findings.

For this research, twenty-five managers were interviewed, each of them offering a basis for an individual case study. Three more people were interviewed for the pilot study (introduced in part 4.7). The criterion “manager” was given a loose definition to include staff managers, system managers as well as entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, a key determinant in the selection of participants was that they had to supervise at least two people, indicating that they hold a distinct authority and responsibility towards the organisation as well as other employees. The human aspect of management was judged important for the study, thus the opportunity to work in and coordinate teams of people, as well as being accountable for the work direction and outputs are central elements of managerial responsibilities (see Chapter 2, part 2.3.2). A table summarising the profile of each participant is attached as Appendix VII. Out of the twenty-five participants, six were female managers. Being French, I had access to both French and British managers, so that fourteen participants are British (or at least work in Britain and were interviewed in English), whereas the other eleven are French and were interviewed in French. Since the chosen approach is to consider each participant as an individual case, the nationality of the participants is not being considered for the analysis, except if comparison can be justified based on strong similarities or discrepancies, albeit only in a conceptual rather than a statistical viewpoint.

I first contacted managers from local companies in the U.K. that had taken part in a previous research project led by my supervisor, but they all declined to participate in this study. I then searched amongst my personal contacts for potential participants, who then recommended other managers they knew who might be willing to take part in the study. This technique, known as the “snowball” effect, is useful in identifying information-rich informants, but may also broaden the profile of the cases studied (Patton, 2002). Interestingly, I believe participants felt more at ease talking with me
as I had been introduced by one of their friends or colleagues. Indeed, I was less perceived as an intruder with a hidden agenda, and the trust barrier was quickly dismissed.

### 4.5.3. Methods of Data Analysis: The Interpretive Process

Analysing qualitative data is a challenge because there are no straightforward methods to uncover meaning and findings from raw data such as interview transcripts. As Patton (2002:434) indicates, the purpose of the enquiry serves as a guidance for the direction of analysis. Breakwell (2006:250) illustrates the process saying that:

"You are trying to generate slices of meaningful information and knowing where to cut into the flow of information is tricky. It may be necessary to try out several cutting positions before you find one which reveals relevant results for your research question. Also, remember that some of the best researchers rely on spotting what is omitted from what the respondent says in order to draw conclusions."

In the case of applied qualitative research with a purpose of theoretical contribution, the philosophical perspective partly defines what can be done with the data collected. Interpretivism is attached to individual meaning, perception and sense-making. What matters is the account people make of their experience and reflection. Rubin and Rubin (2005:201) describe the process through which they analyse interviews as follow: after transcribing the interviews, concepts and themes are identified and coded, with inputs from the literature. Themes can then be either cross-compared or used to build a description of the setting. For the study we will adopt this data analysis process.

The task of transcribing the interviews is very time-consuming, but essential in interpretive studies. The level of precision of the transcripts, for instance the choice to mark hesitations or to transcribe grammatical mistakes as they have been uttered, can be important in the stage of analysis. Each interview was audio-recorded and stored as computer files, before being transcribed. All transcriptions were made by myself, to ensure consistency in the way data was reported from oral to written form.
In a few instances, only a partial transcription was made, leaving aside the data that was considered irrelevant to the research question (for instance the detailed description of a specific work process the participant uses). I decided to report the hesitations and repetitions the participants made during the interview, because they inform the case and help build the participant's profile (Rubin and Rubin, 2005:204). Those non-verbal cues are not always indicative of a character trait, but sometimes the tone of the voice, a change in the vocabulary or a long pause or hesitation offer significant information on the participant's reactions and what he or she really feels. Furthermore, notes were taken alongside the interview recording. They include reflections I had during the interviews, as well as comments on the respondent's attitude during the interview. These notes complement the transcripts to provide a picture of each respondent and form the basis of each case study. Although not as extensive as a research diary, these notes serve a similar purpose and help identify the researcher's assumptions and preconceptions whilst offering new perspectives of analysis (Kelliher, 2005). Each case is then summarised according to what Rubin and Rubin (2005:206) prescribe, that is it includes the date, place and length of the interview and a general and brief overview of the discussion.

Denzin (2001:70) proposes six steps that take place in the interpretive process, although his approach applies specifically to interpretive interactionism and is very similar to a phenomenological analysis. The steps start with framing the research question to surveying the literature, then capturing the phenomenon in context before "bracketing" it in a phenomenological reduction manner, then reconstructing the phenomenon and recontextualising it. Some elements highlighted by Denzin (2001) are relevant to the study undertaken here, but the strong focus on social issues and policy-making of interpretive interactionism makes the overall approach slightly inappropriate with regards to our research objectives.

We will therefore adopt the analytical process Rubin and Rubin (2005) recommend. As such, we will follow a rather holistic content analysis, where we will focus on interpreting the data and exploring patterns rather than counting down the number of instances such and such themes or words appear. This is in line with Patton's (2002:453) finding that "content analysis is used to refer to any qualitative data
reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings. Case studies, for instance, can be content-analyzed." Each interview represents a case in itself, therefore interviews are treated as case material, contextual and with intrinsic value.

The analytical process thus proceeds as follow:

- Interviews are read carefully several times, with note-taking at each stage. The first readings are made without referring to the conceptual framework, whereas the subsequent readings are informed by the Jungian concepts in an attempt to make sense of the data. This is inspired by the "eyeballing" approach described by Willis (2007:298) as becoming familiar with the data and writing about what the data says to you. Eyeballing is not entirely opposed to more structured approaches such as content-analysis, but it allows the research to not be restricted by categories. The important thing is to maintain "the wholeness and [...] the meaningfulness of the data" (Willis, 2007:298).

- Once themes, concepts or events are recognised, the researcher clarifies their meanings and eventually synthesize and elaborate her understanding of the case material.

- Concepts and themes are then coded, that is categorised although this is not necessarily systematic. The coding is essentially derived from the Jungian conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 3. It helps sorting out the data and synthesising it further. Coding is not an end in itself, but rather can help sense-making and interpretation through the identification of patterns of meanings. The emphasis is on contextual understanding, not on the structuring of the cases as such.

- Finally, the literature reviewed previously is brought about to make sense of the concepts and themes identified through the coding process.

It is important to bear in mind that what has been said is as important as what has not been mentioned explicitly by research participants (Rubin and Rubin, 2005:210). Concepts that were expected to be found but did not emerge from the interviews are nevertheless meaningful and should be highlighted and discussed. Concepts and
themes must be consistently defined in order to help make sense and interpret the
data (Rubin and Rubin, 2005:216-217). We will rely on the conceptual framework to help us determine the boundaries of the concepts and themes whenever appropriate, so that the interpretation of the cases and the interviews be as much Jungian as possible to allow for a critical examination of the findings and of the framework itself. In particular, the following themes will be used as a backbone for analysis and interpretation: the persona as illustrated by one’s sense of identity and self-image; the quality of the relationship to others (for example, if one establishes friendly-professional or affective-personal relations with work colleagues); the perception of choice in the moral decision, which also characterises elements of moral conscience as opposed to ethical conscience; and finally, evidence of the degree of connectedness to self and, on the contrary, of compartmentalisation of the individual. Other concepts such as the ego or the shadow will also be discussed if they appear relevant to the case content.

Denzin (2001) insists that the interpretation is valid only when it relies on thick description. He strongly emphasises that the original voices of the participants (or the subjects, in his terms) be heard and presented to the reader so that the latter can experience vicariously the phenomenon and understand the elements of interpretation. In that he concurs with Donmoyer (2000) who explains how important presenting the reader with sufficient “medium-rare data” is, for instance direct quotes from interview transcripts. Donmoyer (2000:64) argues: “There should be sufficient medium-rare data so that the reader does not simply assimilate the case being described into a theoretical ideal type; rather the reader should have an opportunity to enrich his or her understanding of an ideal type by accommodating the novelty of the particular case.” The quality of the interpretation therefore consists in thick description, a coherent and meaningful understanding of the phenomenon, and the acknowledgement that it always remains unfinished, amongst other things (Denzin, 2001:81).
4.6. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND EVALUATIVE CRITERIA

4.6.1. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethical considerations in research are particularly important when exploring 'sensitive' or personal issues, and they pervade the whole process of research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Although moral issues in management do not seem to pertain to the closet anymore, it was envisaged that managers might feel uncomfortable talking freely about this theme, as well as opening up their personal aspirations and life stories to an unknown researcher. Therefore, informed consent as well as guarantees of confidentiality and anonymity in handling data were identified as significant points to address. Furthermore, ethical considerations ought to be central to the case study researcher because of the personal relation established with the participant, and consequently the personal character of the data collected (Stake, 2000a). Willig (2001:82) stresses the responsibility researchers in psychology have regarding the effects the study may have on participants, especially when it focuses on highly personal or sensitive topics or experiences. It was considered possible that the managers interviewed would perceive questions about ethics as deeply personal and potentially traumatic. The level of trust and comfort during the interview were conceived as two important elements to elicit personal accounts from the respondents. In preparing the interviews, these issues were addressed and I endeavoured to establish a relaxed and open discussion with the participants. The potentially stressful questions were carefully worded. Demonstrating sensitivity and empathy (within limits) was also considered important to make participants feel at ease and to encourage them to open up.

Informed consent implies that participants fully understand what they are set to participate in, and do so voluntarily (Kvale, 1996). In the case of this research, when potential participants were contacted, a brief description of what the research was about was included, in order for the participants to make an informed decision (see Appendix IV). Additionally, preceding the first interview, the overall research purpose and themes were explained again, and the participants were offered the possibility to withdraw from the research if they wished to do so. A consent form,
Confidentiality implies the need to protect the identity of the interviewees at two levels: to make sure that they cannot be identified by name or other characteristics (including job title or position), and to make sure that they cannot be traced by the quotes used in the data analysis. It is sometimes acknowledged by research participants themselves (Arksey and Knight, 1999) that complete confidentiality and anonymity is impossible to achieve, especially in the case of loosely structured interviews. The best researchers can do, then, is to change names and places as much as possible without altering too much the quality of the data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In the present research, all participants have been given aliases, and the name of the organisations they work for is not mentioned. Whenever required, elements that could help identify the organisation were altered or deleted in direct quotations in order to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of the participants, providing the meaning of the quote was not altered by such procedure (Arksey and Knight, 1999:134). Integrity during the research process and at the stage of reporting the conclusions is critical in ensuring the quality of the study, and requires the researcher to be self-reflective, self-critical, and aware of the limits of her approach and her control over the research elements.

4.6.2. **CREDIBILITY OF THE RESEARCH: CRITERIA OF EVALUATION**

This study follows the tenets of interpretivism in aiming to understand people’s view of the social world in order to make sense of the phenomenon researched. It welcomes interpretation and acknowledges that social reality is the product of multiple accounts. Research value derives from the internal coherence and systematic process of data collection and interpretation, and generalisation is sought at the theoretical rather than statistical level. The purpose is not to achieve objectivity in a positivist sense, but to uncover the meaning which research participants attribute to the phenomenon and articulate this meaning within a theoretical framework which further enriches the interpretation and understanding. In this study, the purpose is to uncover the meaning research participants attribute to the self in their moral
experiences, and articulate this meaning within the Jungian framework of morality introduced in Chapter 3. The findings will possess contextual value which in turn bears theoretical value because of a systematic, in-depth questioning of the participants' meaning-making processes – systematic in the sense that it was guided by a clear theoretical framework, and in-depth because it entailed sensitive and consistent probing of participants' responses.

Qualitative researchers in general, and interpretivists in particular, do not assess research in terms of validity and reliability in so far as these concepts are positivist. Yet, these concepts still constitute the definitive evaluation criteria for many researchers, including interpretivists. Symon and Cassell (2006:311) insist that criticism only makes sense providing “the critic realizes and acknowledges that they simply do not share the same ontological and epistemological beliefs as the research being criticized”. Criteria to assess the quality of research are important, but the questions and items should be relevant to the research orientation and its epistemic position. Validity and reliability have therefore been adapted to suit qualitative enquiries better (Willig, 2001). Validity is principally about ensuring that what is being measured or explored is indeed what is aimed to be measured or explored. Reliability in qualitative research reflects concerns about consistency, trustworthiness of the interpretations and conclusions, and authenticity of the data (Arksey and Knight, 1999). Consistency entails an endeavour of transparency in providing account of how the researcher conducted the study, including the findings and analysis stages. Trustworthiness is about ensuring that what is being presented is “a fair representation of things as informants see them” (Arksey and Knight, 1999:54). If inconsistency arises, this should be acknowledged and dealt with openly. Finally, authenticity addresses the question of the implication of the researcher in what is being researched.

Maxwell (1996:88) describes validity as “consist[ing] of the strategies you use to rule out these threats [to the credibility of your conclusions and propositions].” He identifies three types of threat to the validity of qualitative research: threat to valid description of data; threat to interpretation; and threat to the theoretical validity of the research. The last two points are usually addressed under the notion of reliability of
the research findings. Validity at the level of data collection implies that the researcher must ensure that the questions she asks are indeed targeting the research question. Many things can alter the validity of the research prior, during and after the interview process, hence it is necessary to be aware of these risks and try to prevent them or at least reduce their liability.

Arksey and Knight (1999:52) list several tips whereby validity in interviewing can be enhanced. These include the “rapport” established between researcher and participant, the completion of pilot studies testing out the interview questions and format, relevant prompts to encourage participants to clarify their thoughts, and the interview setting and timing. In this particular study, the completion of pilot interviews constituted an attempt to increase the validity of the findings. The adjustments made afterwards are explained in detail in part 4.7.2. The interview prompts were carefully prepared and efforts were made during the interviews to encourage participants to be as precise and thorough in their comments as possible. Besides, all interviews were audio-recorded in order to have an accurate transcription of what the participants said. If doubt arises regarding a particular element or statement of an interview, the recording can easily clarify it.

The issue of reliability is more complex, especially in interpretivist research studies, because it questions the relation between the researcher, the research process and the interpretation of the data collected. A major threat in interview-based studies is the issue of bias. Saunders et al. (2003) stress the threat of bias on the part of the interviewer (for example imposing their views and words onto the participant) as well as the participant (for instance the socially desirable responses). They propose several ways to limit such occurrences, including the preparation and schedule of the interview even in cases of unstructured interviewing; the presentation, appearance and attitude of the researcher during the interview; and the options available in terms of data recording. Breakwell (2006:248) also points out the risks associated with “interviewer effects”. It may consist in slight changes of interviewing style or interpretation of the questions from part of the interviewer, which can seriously alter the reliability of the findings. It can be limited by having the same researcher lead all the interviews, for there is less deviation and more consistency in the way interviews
are led. Additionally, Breakwell (2006:249) suggests that audio-taping is a cheap and easy way to “exclude interviewer bias from the recording of responses” as opposed to simple note-taking for example.

Gomm (2004:177-180) associates accountability with credibility of the research interview, and considers that enough material and information needs to be shown in order to demonstrate how the data was produced and how ‘accurately’ the reality was reflected. He shares with Denzin (2001), Donmoyer (2000) and Maxwell (1996) the belief that providing rich excerpts from the data collected is necessary to assess the reliability of the researcher’s interpretation. Member checks is a favourite in qualitative research to enhance the validity of the research. It is designed to rule out possible misinterpretation of data, but it is often overstated because participants’ feedback is just another interpretation and not a truth-revealing assessment (Maxwell, 1996:94). They can be taken in as further data, and they certainly can inform the researcher’s own analysis of the data, but they are not ‘more objective’ than the researcher’s interpretation. This illustrates how the issue of accuracy is problematic in interpretivist research using loosely structured interviews. Indeed, interpretation takes place at many instances during the interview itself. Since an interpretivist perspective recognises that the researcher participates in shaping the research, the search for authenticity consists in the researcher’s critical reflection on her role, prejudices, expectations, and influence on the research outcomes.

Triangulation is another all-time favourite method supposed to make fuzzy qualitative research more valid and reliable. It consists in combining methods to collect or analyse data, in order to limit the threat of bias. Patton (2002:247) summarises where triangulation stands: “Triangulation is ideal. It can also be expensive.” Complementing interviews with participants observation and document analysis is an example of triangulation. However, this is not always possible, especially when the topic of the enquiry is as personal as moral experiences and self-knowledge. There is no public document that could inform on the personal experiences of managers and their rational and emotional responses to moral issues, not to mention their understanding of self. Observation seems more adequate, yet Maxwell (1996:94) quotes Fielding and Fielding (1986) who question the validity of
triangulation on the basis that complementary methods can themselves be similarly biased. Patton (2002:248) points out that the purpose of triangulation is not to prove consistency but to test for consistency. Consequently, what matters is the recognition of apparently contradictory or odd findings, and their careful examination. Being open to contradiction and ready to discuss it is an equally effective way to improve the validity of the enquiry.

Eisner (1997 in Willis, 2007:166-167) proposes to replace traditional concepts of validity and reliability with three criteria more adapted to interpretive enquiries: coherence, consensus and instrumental utility. Coherence is the extent to which the research makes sense as a whole. Consensus refers to how other researchers and readers believe the research findings and interpretations are consistent with their own experience or their own reading of the material presented. This does not imply that the conclusions are true, but rather that it illustrates a certain social phenomenon experienced by a group of people. Finally, instrumental utility implies that the research should help our understanding of a situation or an experience. In any case, research should be assessed insightfully. Efforts should be made to provide sufficient information alongside the researcher’s interpretation, out of respect for both the research participants and the readers. Nevertheless, it is equally necessary to be modest as to the possibility to lead completely valid and reliable research. Stake (2000a:441) reminds us of the reality of case research: “Even when empathic and respectful of each person’s realities, the researcher decides what the case’s own story is, or at least what will be included in the report. More will be pursued than was volunteered. Less will be reported than was learned.”

4.6.3. REFLEXIVITY

Reflexivity refers to the degree to which the researcher is aware and conscious of how her beliefs might be projected onto the research itself, that is through the questions, the methods, the interpretation, the conclusions drawn (Langdridge, 2007). Phenomenology tries to limit, if not avoid, such inference by recommending a “bracketing off” of the researcher’s preconceptions, however this is not entirely achievable, not least because we are not necessarily aware of all our preconceptions
(else we would all be individuated people in the Jungian sense). Furthermore, interpretation makes sense within the cultural, social context of the researcher, therefore to cut off the interpretation from its context, its roots, would seriously reduce its richness and meaningfulness (see Donmoyer, 2000).

Fontana and Frey (2000:661) insist that reflexivity is not given enough consideration by researchers using interviews. They denounce a common belief that:

“the researcher is neutral, unbiased, and ‘invisible’. The data reported tend to flow nicely, there are no contradictory data and no mention of what data were excluded and/or why. Improprieties never happen and the main concern seems to be the proper, if unreflexive, filing, analysing, and reporting of events.”

They thus welcome what van Maanen calls the “confessional style”, and explain that: “Although perhaps somewhat overdone at time, these ‘confessions’ are very valuable, as they make the readers aware of the complex and cumbersome nature of interviewing people in their natural settings and lend a tone of realism and veracity to studies” (Fontana and Frey, 2000:661). Their concern echoes that of Eisner (1997 in Willis, 2007:164) who encourages qualitative researchers to affirm their ‘I’ and “display [their] signatures” in enquiry reports. Maxwell (1996:91) refers to integrity, as opposed to indifference, as the key component of validity in qualitative research.

Some consider that affirmation of the self of the researcher constitutes a political act, whereas others believe it all depends on the subject and warn researchers not to drown the participants’ voice in their own subjectivity (Fine et al., 2000). However, if one is careful to respect the respondents, reflexivity can contribute to the integrity of the research and interpretation. It may actually allow the researcher to provide the reader with an honest account of her preconceptions and her ‘path’ so far. In order for the reader to understand and assess the researcher’s interpretation, it is important for the reader to know where the researcher comes from. The researcher should endeavour to disclose those elements that led her to make those choices of interpretation, and to explain what her interpretation of herself is according to the phenomenon examined.
I shall therefore stress that my reading of the interviews collected is rooted in a personal understanding and interpretation of Jungian concepts and thoughts, informed by a reading of Jung’s work and that of commentators of his work. I am aware that my interpretation takes as given some of Jung’s concepts, in particular his view of the psyche as divided between conscious and unconscious, and the importance of the process of individuation and the quest for wholeness through the archetype of the self. Therefore my suggestions and conclusions are meaningful providing the reader accepts to read them within the Jungian framework I work in and that I have exposed in details in the previous chapter.

4.7. THE PILOT STUDY

4.7.1. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

The main purpose of a pilot study is to test the data collection strategy in relation to the research question (Breakwell, 2006:240). It also enables the researcher to identify emergent concepts that may not have been brought up by the literature review but that are significant to the participants. In line with an iterative process, the researcher can at this stage re-work the research protocol and the interview protocol to include those emerging themes that may elicit further elements to understand the phenomenon.

The pilot study was scheduled to take place over June and July 2006. Its format consisted in two successive one-hour-long semi-structured interviews with three first-line or middle managers working in retail organisations. Two participants, Beth and Chris, were personally known by the researcher, and the third person interviewed, Adam, was contacted after being recommended by Chris. As explained in part 4.6.1, the names of the participants have been changed to respect their confidentiality. As specified in Table 1 below, all three participants are in their mid-30s, with a relatively stable personal situation. All of them have had previous managerial experience in the same sector (i.e. catering and retail respectively) before their current job, but Beth has a much more varied background doing other jobs, notably teaching and recruitment consultancy.
Table 1. Participants’ profile – Pilot Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date/Place of interview</th>
<th>Profile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adam</td>
<td>System Manager - Catering Industry</td>
<td>Part 1: June 2006 in coffee shop</td>
<td>Studied catering management, worked in several pubs as a manager before starting his current job. Has been working there for 7 years. Ambitious, relatively self-confident in his abilities, career is important but so is his social network. In a relationship, no children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beth</td>
<td>Assistant Manager - Retail</td>
<td>Part 1: June 2006 in office</td>
<td>Studied literature, then first went into book selling before becoming an English teacher. Worked abroad for a few years, then became a recruitment consultant. Went back to book selling to gain more knowledge of the industry. Sensitive, quiet, she wants her job and her other activities to be meaningful. Married, no children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris</td>
<td>Executive Manager - Retail</td>
<td>Part 1: June 2006 in coffee shop</td>
<td>Left school early, worked in book selling and climbed the ladder to become manager whilst studying management part-time. Ambitious, rather anxious and impatient, focused on what he wants to achieve, personally and socially. Married with children.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was decided to interview each manager twice to test whether the attitude of the participants differed from one interview to the other. Narrative research explains how important it may be to establish a relationship with the participant to encourage spontaneity, honesty and personal stories (Wengraf, 2001; Murray, 2003). Because the research focuses on moral issues, a theme usually considered ‘sensitive’, it was thought that it might take more time for the researcher to gain the trust of the participants. Hence, during the second meeting, it was expected that participants might be more willing to speak openly about personal issues. However, such precaution proved somehow irrelevant, in so far as participants were quite happy to discuss the issue of ethics and their personal development and aspirations during the first interview. Therefore, the two-stage interview process was abandoned and the main study consisted in single interviews. The two pilot interview protocols were merged to form a single interview protocol for the main study, keeping the questions and prompts that worked ‘best’ and elicited the most interesting accounts from participants (see Appendix I, II and III). Both interview protocols were designed in
accordance with the sub-themes underlying the main research question (see Chapter 1, part 1.2).

All interviews were scheduled during working hours, and the respondents allocated time to participate in the interview. Although it is recommended to interview participants in a quiet room that allows for comfort and confidentiality, as well as a good quality recording, this is not always possible in practice. Often, researchers are in a position where they have to accommodate the needs of the participants rather than the participants being at the disposal of the researcher. Hence, when the respondents were unable to receive me in their office, the interview took place in a coffee shop, which allowed for relative confidentiality yet also provided a rather noisy background which made the recording unclear at times. Minor interruptions occurred a couple of times, which also might have prevented the respondent from feeling totally relaxed.

Each interview was tape-recorded, and was later fully transcribed by myself to provide the basis for analysis, bearing in mind that a transcript is itself an interpretation of the participant’s account (Arksey and Knight, 1999). Audio-taping is a popular method for recording interviews (Breakwell, 2006) because it frees the researcher from taking extensive notes, and it allows conversation to flow better and the researcher to be more alert to what the respondent says. Also, audio-taping facilitates the recording of rhythm, tone of voice and hesitations that might add richness to the data at the stage of analysis (Arksey and Knight, 1999). The respondents were explicitly asked if they agreed to be recorded, and were offered the possibility to pause the recording at any time, were they to feel uncomfortable. However, none of the respondents seemed overly nervous about the tape-recorder, and all talked seemingly openly and honestly. The transcripts were examined to decide whether further adjustments were necessary before the start of the main study. These adjustments, already alluded to, are detailed below.
4.7.2. METHODOLOGICAL FINDINGS AND ADJUSTMENTS

The main problem identified after the series of pilot interviews related to the 'critical incident' type of question or prompt. More precisely, the participants found it hard to think about an example of a moral dilemma they experienced, either at work or outside work. Because the participants were otherwise open to discuss matters relating to ethics and their moral sense, it was concluded that the problem came from either the wording of the question or insufficient time for respondents to reflect on the question. Consequently, the question was reworded to be much more straightforward, and participants to the main study were clearly informed prior to the interview that one topic of discussion would be a moral dilemma they experienced at work.

A second, rather interesting finding was the fact that managers did not feel uncomfortable discussing personal issues relating to their view of ethics and their personal expectations at work and in life. It was therefore decided that over-caution was not necessary, and that in the main study, the key concepts that articulate the research question, in particular morality and self, could be introduced in the discussion more directly than they were in the pilot study. The respondents proved quite self-reflective and were surprisingly honest about their thoughts and their behaviour. They did not seem to provide “tales of self” but rather described how they perceive themselves and what matters to them work-wise and in their personal life. I already knew two respondents prior to the interview, which may have helped establish a higher degree of trust during the interview (see Fontana and Frey, 2000:655). Yet, I did not personally know Adam, but he seemed as relaxed and open as Beth and Chris during the discussion. The selection of participants for the main study was similarly based on personal contacts and snowballing recommendation. The fact that I could introduce myself to potential participants through the recommendation of one of their acquaintances or colleagues certainly helped ease the anxiety generally felt at first meetings and before interviews. They also were more inclined to contribute to the research as best as they could and tell their stories than if I had been entirely external to their social or personal network. This choice proved beneficial overall, especially because I nonetheless managed to meet people with different backgrounds and different profiles.
As explained before, the two-stage interview process was abandoned. A strategy based on a single but longer interview proved both as efficient and less time-consuming. Besides, the time constraints of the potential main study participants would have seriously limited the final number of people available for two consecutive interviews. The interview protocol was reworked and three statements were added for comments at the end of the interview. This aimed to break the monotony of a semi-directive interview format, and was designed to stimulate the participants’ reflection on the concepts of self and personal aspirations in life. This change of style proved valuable in revealing personal aspects of the respondents. Most of them were surprised by the format and curious about the statements. Their comments were sometimes unexpected and surprising, and they opened up further at this stage, providing a greater insight into their perception of the world.

4.8. Summary

This chapter described the ontological and epistemological traditions adopted for the research, and introduced the methodological choices for the collection and analysis of data. We highlighted the characteristics of interpretivism and discussed the rationale for adopting an interpretive strategy of analysis in relation to the conceptual framework introduced in the previous chapter. We also addressed the potential ethical issues attached to this type of research, before discussing the various criteria of ‘good quality’ research. Finally, the pilot study was described to illustrate and justify the methodological choices. The following chapter introduces the main study and proceeds with analysing its findings.
“Because, in last resort, it is always singular *individualities* that make a society; it is always singular individualities that act and not collective abstractions, even though men argue they simply obeyed orders because they were caught in the system.”

Michel Terestchenko
*Un Si Fragile Vernis d’Humanité*

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the context of the main study and discusses cases of moral experiences collected from managers. The purpose of the analysis is to examine the extent to which the sense of self is relevant in understanding how managers experience moral issues, in relation to the Jungian framework presented earlier. Seven participants have been selected and examined as case material. This chapter focuses on four participants who are characterised by a strong persona, which affect their sense of self. In different ways, these participants demonstrate a volatile connection to their self, and at most a partial sensitivity to ethical conscience. As a consequence, their ability to know what they should do and to act upon this knowledge is inconsistent. This is discussed in details in part 5.3 whilst part 5.2 provides a general introduction to the overall cases and the selection process. The remaining three cases are presented in the next chapter.

5.2. MAIN STUDY PARTICIPANTS

The list of all interviewed participants is included as Appendix VII. Fourteen participants, including five women, were based in England and interviewed in English, whereas eleven participants, including one woman, worked in France and were interviewed in French. Most participants worked in different companies, but six of them belonged to the same company but worked in different departments. All interviews took place between the end of November 2006 and mid-April 2007. Due
to the participants’ time constraints, most interviews took place at their workplace, although in a few instances we met at their house or in a public place. The latter choice was unfortunate in so far as the recording conditions were relatively poor and, as a consequence, I discarded these interviews because too many passages were inaudible and the transcription was too incomplete. This was the case for Brian, Gillian and Helena. In other instances, the interview took place in conditions that seriously lacked the confidentiality expected to elicit honest answers from the respondents. Thus in Fiona, Kyle and Quentin’s cases, the interview took place in too public a place so that the discussion was often disrupted and the respondents could not focus on the questions and take time to reflect on the themes discussed. These interviews were also discarded.

Out of the nineteen remaining interviews, seven were selected to be analysed and discussed in depth. The cases were selected based on their greater richness of data, their relevance in terms of the themes explored, and their typicality as compared with the other cases. The remaining twelve interviews are only briefly presented at the end of the next chapter. The extent to which some of the participants could be considered “managers” was also debatable. For instance, John, Nick or Oliver are first and foremost entrepreneurs or craftsmen, and only incidentally do they manage a team of employees. Their roles certainly possess distinctive managerial aspects, but their primary interest is technical achievement rather than the management of the team per se. Similarly, Ryan or Xavier are primarily concerned with the technical aspects of their work and only secondly are they managers. Teamwork is an important part of their job, therefore they are expected to know how to manage the people who work with them and whom they supervise. However, their discretion in managing the resources is somewhat bound to the technical aspects. This is not to say that their experiences are of a lesser value than those of the participants whose case is discussed in details. Rather, we have chosen to present at length those interviewees whose job offers a wider perspective on management. Finally the analysis of the cases of Charlie, Tim, Louis, Samuel, Yohann, Will and Zack is only summarised because other participants provided fuller accounts and more complete illustrations of their experiences. The next part examines the first four selected cases.
5.3. CASES OF MORAL EXPERIENCE I

5.3.1. AMY

Amy works as a Senior account manager for a company that provides direct marketing services. Although she studied business along with Japanese at university, she was not at first interested in a business career as such and worked as an assistant to a Personal Assistant for a while, before stepping into the direct marketing industry following the advice of a colleague who had worked in this industry. At the time of the interview, she had been working for the company for about six years. She is married and has one daughter.

Persona and Self-Image

Amy is direct and ‘tells it as it is’. She claims she knows herself very well and that she does not change her behaviour or her ways of doing things along with the circumstances:

I'm always true to myself. I know exactly what my problems are, I know where my downfalls are, I also know what I'm very good at. Hem, and I think it's really important actually for your self-confidence to be true to yourself. I think if you're not true to yourself, then you don't know what you're good or bad at, or know what you need to be aware of with other people. Like I can be very blunt and very frank, and I would tell you like it is. There's certain things I wouldn't tell you, that I wouldn't say, but most of the time I am, and...I'm like that with myself. [...]...I think people always know, they always know deep down actually what's real. It's just that they choose to believe it or not.

I'm always myself. I don't think I could work somewhere where I'm not naturally me. Hem...I'm more me at home than work, obviously. But because I've been at my company for such a long time, I can just - I do and I shouldn't, I can get really angry and I'd just tell - I just get angry for the very worst...only because I feel comfortable with the people I work with - if I didn't feel comfortable, of course I wouldn't, and I probably wouldn't get so
angry. It's because I know that I can get angry that I let myself...so I'm pretty much whoever I am wherever I go.

Yet despite her claims that she is always herself, she admits that she "changes" her behaviour when she meets with clients or more senior managers in the company, but this is because, in her view, she 'has to' change, implying that it is a business requirement.

The way that I speak...you know, when you're natural, you might have stupid thoughts or stupid questions which you kinda think "oh...I probably should know the answer to this but I'll ask it anyway", or you know, you're not worried about looking or embarrassing yourself. But when I'm with people I'm not comfortable with, then it becomes hem..."I really don't want that person to think less of me or think that I'm a stupid, you know, account manager". So, you know, you have to -- you pick your words so that you make yourself seem more intelligent than you maybe are, or to give that oral confidence...and that even though you're not really sure what you're talking about, the way that you communicate makes you seem like you do. Whereas if I'm with my clients, my friends whom I'm speaking with, I could go "hem, I don't understand that, what do you mean?" -- you know, like, you can do that. But with more senior account managers, you'd never do that. You'd probably say "could you expand on that a bit more?", you know.

In fact, Amy is very much concerned with her image, at least professionally, but she justifies this concern as if it was a business need rather than a personal need. Yet, it is rather about what gives her the confidence to perform and establish good working relationships with the many people she interacts with.

[...] it's all about perception. Even if, even if I don't know, because I'm representing my company, if I don't know something, you have to appear as if to the other people that you do, because, you know, just that impression -- cause then you can go out and come back home and find out about it. But you have to give them the confidence that they can trust you and you know what you're talking about. Cause if you go "well, oh, I'm not quite sure" then obviously it's "gosh, she works from what, for my company, and she doesn't even know what she's talking about!" -- so then it looks badly on the company. Cause you are the company representative at the end of the day.
Ultimately, her career is very important to her, but she seems to have an ambiguous relationship to her job and to work in general, suggesting some contradictory feelings on what she wants and who she wants to be. For example, she describes herself as a "glorified secretary" but at the same time she complains that she lacks junior staff to take care of the administrative part of her job.

I think that the skills that I have, anyone else could do. There's not like a specialised skill - for example you work in computing you have to know how they work, or you know, if you were a doctor or a lawyer or something. This is just like general stuff that if you were taught how to do it, I would just tell you "this is what you have to do", you could do it. If you have initiative and common sense, then you could do it too. [...] it's not a specialised thing. And often I just think - sometimes I do think I'm like a glorified secretary. Apart from that, yes, I will contribute, like I say 'I don't think you should talk to these people; you should be talking to these people in this way or that way'. Yes, I'll do that. But actually, all I do is make things happen. You know, and that's what secretaries do, right? They organise, make, book meetings, you know. I do all of that, and I'll do the other bits, which is...and maybe it's because I don't have enough junior support, cause really what I should be doing is getting the people who are more junior to actually organise the meetings and do all the day to day things that I don't have to, but because on the account I work on it's so hands-on, you have to do everything yourself, you know, you don't have time to get other people to do things for you. We have secretaries that can help us, but by the time I tell them how to do it and what to do, I'd do it myself, I would have done it.

She is equally irritated when her manager actually treats her as a secretary in spite of her claims that her job is closer to that of a secretary than of an account manager. Her reaction underlines her strong feeling about this behaviour.

[...] if I'm really busy, and then my boss says to me "Amy can you do this?" and that's something I know he can do himself, that pisses me off. And I look at him and I go "But you know where that is, you know where that is on the drawer, why are you asking me to find it for you whilst I have all those other things to do?", and I do talk to him like that. Not quite in that tone, but I say something like that. And he says to me "But you know, it's so much quicker if you do it", you know, whatever! [laugh]
Another example of a contradiction in her self-perception relates to motherhood. She explains that having her child made her realise that work was not so important after all, but she nevertheless felt eager to start working again so as to have a status of her own. The way people perceive her is very important to her self-confidence and self-esteem, which in Jungian terms illustrates a greater focus on the persona than the self.

Working, yes, it's very important that I have my sort of own identity, my own life. And after having my daughter, you know, for that first year I had just become the mother of this child, and then ever since I came back to work, this – in March this year, I am much happier because I kinda – I have my life with her, and then I go out and I do my thing and I'm me, and I'm working. And, you know, it's two separate things. And that's quite important to, to have that, because you know, you're not viewed as just that child's mother, or a housewife or something. You're actually viewed as quite an important person or quite a key member of a team or, you know – I know that my client relies on me to get things done, she trusts me, she knows that I'll do it for her, so that's quite important I think for your self-confidence, hem, yeah, your self-esteem.

[...]. I've been for so long at the company I know what or how the things are, but then that comes with being more mature and since I've had my daughter, I've gone back to work, I know that I have been very different. And I'm much more confident, and I don't really scare if I look stupid sometimes. I just ask the questions anyway, because I think, maybe, you realise that actually work isn't the most important thing. Actually my daughter is the most important thing. So you kinda – it's almost like, I feel like it's opened me up a bit more, I'm not so like "okay, I talk bloody silly things" – that wouldn't matter assuredly.

These excerpts suggest that Amy is maybe not as clear-cut as she believes herself to be. On the contrary, she contradicts herself on several occasions in terms of her behaviour, her expectations or the significance of what others think about her. We could say that Amy may confuse who she is with who she wants to be. In fact, she seems to confuse the self with the persona, whilst the latter becomes predominant in her relation to the world.
Relationship to Others

Like many other managers interviewed, Amy is extremely attentive to her clients' needs and feedback. She appraises herself mainly out of the feedback she receives from her clients and colleagues. Besides her colleagues at the company she works for, she also tends to develop close relationships with the people working at other companies whose account she manages. She actually feels like she is "an extension of their team" and feels comfortable enough to communicate in a non-formal manner with them. It is unclear whether her relationships to her colleagues, both within and outside her company, is friendly in a purely professional manner or whether she develops some affective bond with them. What is significant, however, is the importance others have in Amy's construction of her self-image.

I think as you just mature, you become more confident, I think you become more like that. I know that I'm definitely more true in the last 2 or 3 years, but that's maybe because I'm comfortable with who I am, you know... you know, I'm married, my family are nearby, you know, I'm very confident in my relation with my husband and in the relation we have with his family, all of that, which means that all the other people that live out there, it doesn't really matter to me, so I can be completely, hem... I know who I am, and therefore it doesn't matter what other people think as long as I'm true to myself, then that's fine. And if I disagree with something, well it doesn't really matter whether you disagree or not, or whether you agree with me or, you know, whatever...

Yeah, I think if you're, you're comfortable with yourself, or with your life or other people that you're with give you confidence, then I think you can be more true.

We already stressed how the perception others had of her gave Amy confidence and helped her build her self-esteem. In the excerpt above, she once again displays some level of inconsistency when it comes to the importance of others in her life. She acknowledges that she has matured and feels more confident in herself than before, and that having a family has contributed to this change. In fact, she does not care that
much about other people's opinions anymore because she is surrounded by people who help her feel confident. Yet, if the content of the relationship to others has changed, moving from a dependency on a larger group of others to a smaller group of closed ones, Amy still relies on others to find the confidence and comfort to be who she feels she is.

**Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience**

Contradiction equally characterizes Amy's moral perception. She seems *a priori* conscious that her job is partly manipulative and not always "morally right".

Some of the people in my company have to work with them, but they just want to say 'no, I won't work with this company', because they know they are so awful. You know, but obviously, it's their job, they can't really say no. If you're high enough, and you've been with the company for long then you can probably say 'sorry, no'. So there are things like this. There's this guy who came in and as soon as he joined, he had to work on that account. And he didn't really want to but he couldn't really say no, he was only just new.

In this excerpt, Amy was discussing the case of a client financial company involved in barely legal activities consisting in lending money to people with a poor credit history at very high interest rates. Although she is not involved with that particular company ("For me, on a work basis, I don't really have any moral judgments to make, you know, balance to make, because I don't work on anything that's of that nature."), she feels it raises some serious moral issues. However Amy somehow justifies working on this "awful" account by the absence of a choice. Yet is this a moral justification for contributing to something one condemns?

If I had – there's one client that we have to work on, that does that financial thing I was saying...I would have to find out more about it first, but what I hear is that it's really, it's obviously hardly moral what they do. I would try my best to get out of it, and make myself seem like I'm just the worst possible account manager that could work on it, because "I don't have a financial background, you know, what would I do, you know, dadadada" or "I hate flying, you know" – I would have to make my way out of it, cause you have to
fly to Prague all the time for meetings – "I have a fear of flying, I can't do it". I'd lie and...and ultimately I suppose if I have to...I probably would refuse to do it. But then, because I'm so far removed with these people, I know what they're doing. But because I don't see the actual effects it has on these poor people, it probably doesn't actually amass that much to me. Unless I can actually see what's happening, then it doesn't matter. [...] it's this kind of "it's money, yeah, well, those people should work harder". I'm that kind of person that thinks "those people should work harder and earn more money, they shouldn't have gone into this situation anyway. If this is what they have to resort to, in order to get more money, well, that's their own fault" – a part of me is like that. So, yeah, I feel sorry for them "you shouldn't be doing this", but actually I own that company, I would too.

In fact, as can be seen in this quote, Amy finds herself in a delicate situation when it comes to deciding on a course of action were she confronted with this dilemma. Her attitude is fundamentally ambivalent. The following excerpt illustrates this moral ambivalence even more clearly.

Cause I was saying "yes, I wouldn't, I'd probably, I'd like to say no to working on a client that just makes, takes advantage of these poor people who haven't got money", but ultimately, you know what? These fucking people, these people shouldn't be in that situation in the first place, they put themselves in that situation. So, you know, why should we, why shouldn't we take advantage of them? Why shouldn't the company take advantage of them? They are taking all the risks to give these people the money, and I don't know what the chances are of them getting it back, but they have taken that risk, so you know, make as much money as possible out of them. And if they're clever enough, and they know that they're already in this bad situation, then they shouldn't be taking on more debts. And if they want to, it's their problem, they're the stupid ones.

In her own words, Amy is "a capitalist – you make your own money, you look out for yourself, and everybody should do that". Because she argues that money is important as a means to sustain the living standards that keep her and her family happy, she virulently criticizes those indebted people who apply for credit cards on the basis that they should do just like she does and manage their budget realistically ("They're just silly", "It's their problem, they're the stupid ones"). Yet she does not
feel entirely comfortable judging them that way. She actually reacts to the situation at two levels: the 'rational' part of her puts the blame on them, whereas a softer part of her empathises with their distress as she shows in the first part of the quote below.

So part of me feels like that, then I think "okay, yes, some of these people — they really can't live on a day-to-day or a monthly paid wage, they do need that extra money every month just to help them", and that's why — I mean I worked for another client account for a little while, and that's what happened, so...but you know, they do, they just need £200 every month just to help them give in the credit card, just to help them, and then the next month they pay off, and then it goes on, and on and on. But you know, then they're just living...they're just spending more than they have. So that's not right, surely? You're encouraging them to do that. But then what? They're grown-ups, if they want to do that, let them do that! They're just silly! [laugh]

Morally, Amy applies to the situation the rules she lives by and which could be summed up as “make your own money and look out for yourself”. Her moral judgment thus mainly reflects what we might call the material aspect of her moral conscience. Ethical conscience barely plays a role in Amy’s moral deliberation, except maybe when she feels that it is not quite right to take advantage of those people in trouble financially.

**Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation**

Amy does not seem much connected to her self, but rather focuses the ego’s attention on the persona. She cannot seem to find confidence in herself without needing others to validate her character, her actions, and her decisions. Although she believes she has reached a state of balance in her life, she demonstrates significant contradictions in her attitude and her aspirations. However she might not be conscious of them. She makes many references to her company and to their profit-making ‘at all costs’ mindset. As can be seen below, she admits it affects her.

If you’re used to always saving money for the client, watching it, then you become like that. But if you’ve worked on — like I used to work on healthcare clients, I used to double what I got charged to them, and I knew that my
client would never look at it and say "oh, why is that?" cause I knew that they
wouldn't look into the details, so I used to double it, triple it. Get whatever I
could get away with, and make an income. And then, you know, it doesn't -- I
don't think it -- it doesn't matter to me how much we make, but it does to the
company, my company. And so it always kinda -- they always get you to try
and make as much money as possible, always always always, and it
becomes ingrained in you.

In fact, the imperative to make money that she claims pervades the company she
works for often serves as a justification for her own morally questionable behaviour.
As the following quote shows, she becomes the “company representative” whenever
she has to make a decision, with or without moral implications. She thus willingly
endorses actions that part of her conscience disapproves of.

When we do, when I do these mailings for my client, you have to put insight
into your briefs, so you say "what do these customers or who -- what do
these people think that you're writing to?". And it's supposed to be truthful,
it's supposed to be actual reflection of them. But my client doesn't spend the
money to research to find out what these people are actually thinking. So
then, actually, what I'm putting into it is just what I think, it's false. So
everything that we send them is just what I make up. It's not true, it's not
based on anything, it's not based on any qualitative research or you know,
quantitative, nothing. It's just based on me going "hum, I think they think
this..." and the client goes "yeah, yeah, I agree, that's it". You know, that's
like "well, should we really be doing that?" If I didn't do that, if we didn't do
that, then we would have no work coming out of the clients.

Amy, as a consequence, compartmentalises a very large portion of herself, which she
may not recognise as being herself, as in the example where her ethical conscience
glimpses but is quickly discarded by her individualistic “capitalist” moral rule. She
does not feel compartmentalised, but her behaviour tends to indicate this is not the
case.

I should be saying "you're wasting your money, because you're not sure this
is gonna work because you don't know what these people think, so you're
just throwing your money away". I couldn't do that, of course, because that
would not be making money for my company. So, I could say "yeah, yeah,
we could test it and make sure, you know, next time we can look at the
results and we can change it for next month", but I wouldn't be making as much money for my company if I did that.

5.3.2. ETHAN

For the past four years, Ethan has been working as a Human Resources (HR) divisional manager in a recruitment company specialising in the engineering construction sector. Ever since he left university, he has been working in recruitment agencies after a brief experience in banking and risk analysis, which he did not like. He recently studied part-time for a Master whilst working full-time.

Persona and Self-Image

Ethan is a clearly ambitious individual who strives to be “the best” as he himself admits.

- What do you expect from yourself when you come to work? What do you set yourself to be?

Well, successful, the best. Hem...[laugh]. The company icon, i.e. not the model but like “everybody knows Ethan” type of situation. Hem, busy, I think that the main thing, is to be kept busy, to be hem...what was I gonna say, yeah, to be used as the resource. You know, I think if people ask me a question, I can answer the question; if I don't, I can refer them to the right person, things like that, you know, be resourceful for them. And also with my team, in particular, because they've grown with me, etc., both with or without experience, that has me successful as a result of my input to them, yeah? So I can see how they've grown, and I can see their success as the result of what I've given them, if that makes sense. That would in turn make me successful as well, as a whole team.

Ethan is objective-driven and his satisfaction depends on what he feels he has achieved. He enjoys the challenges because they constitute opportunities for him to shine even further.

I get easily bored! [laugh] So, because it's not just one thing, it's not just — I don't know how to say it without belittling accounting, for example, or
banking – it's not just one thing, it's, you have to do a little bit of everything – it's like running your own business within the business, isn't it? Hem...and plus, because I've now done it for what – 7 or 8 years now – even more challenging that I enjoy now is I look after various different locations, so I travel a lot and look at other people. And the challenge that I get is remote managing, also, because I get people who I can't see that I need to manage without seeing them, you know. So that's obviously another challenge, and getting them to be engaged, you know, so.

He is very attached to his image, and his ego-consciousness seems overwhelmed by a need to be recognised in society. Whilst Amy needs others to give her confidence, Ethan needs others to feel like he exists. He demonstrates a constant habit of measuring himself against others, of checking up where he stands as compared with his colleagues, his friends, people in the industry and so on, so as to know how he is doing, whether he is living up to his expectations. It is worth quoting Ethan at length here because this excerpt exemplifies his need for multiple levels of recognition.

Hum, various, I think, benchmarks. One is the recognition from the company – where I am, what level I get to, so that's promotion [...]. I've been here 4 years and I've been moved 4 times; people have been here 10 years and are still doing the same job, you know, that kind of thing. So, you measure it from that respect. But also, in recognition and engagement from people in the business, you know. Some people in the business, on other teams have their own DM (divisional manager) that they report to, yet they come to me with their concerns, or they talk to me about their concerns, that they couldn't talk to their direct line-managers. So, I don't manage these people so how is it possible that they can come to me? I must do something right in that respect. Advise on non-operational sectors like support functions. When I, I involve a lot of people in my work, or I make myself known to many people, and all these people know me as well, so – I don't know whether it's called being popular, but it's more being, being well nice, it's a good measure for me as well. Then you go in terms of like, “how much bonus you get?” you know, that's the other thing, cause we're very much high on bonus, and that's the ultimate bottom-line, you know. The more money I get, okay I must be doing something right, you know, and things like that. [...] So people I went to university with the first time round, I'm still in contact with them, so I measure myself against them potentially, you know. We all do different things, we all did the same degrees clearly, but we all went to
different lifestyles, and we’re also the same age. So “where are they right now?” And the recruiters I know, what roughly kind of salary do they make, what kind of life they lead, etc? And if you measure those things, you know, are we on par? Then we look at other things in social science, you know, they may be on par with where I am, but are they happy? — this sort of things.

We could speculate that his expectations are also a reflection of what other people define as ‘being successful’ because being the best or the most is necessarily defined in relation to some others.

But yeah, I would say that I look at initially the materialistic side of things first, just to see where I am today, because at the end of the day, these things will pay you and allow you to live, if you think about it. And then you, I look at how happy I am, am I sick? Have I got a family? And not just that, have I got a house or generally things that are not related to work?

Relationship to Others

Although Ethan declares he likes his own company, he nevertheless entertains a network of contacts and relationships. His social life almost sounds like a field of potential business opportunities. Besides measuring himself to others, he also examines what he could learn from others. Though this is not an issue in itself, it is characteristic of Ethan to make this learning experience a competition, so that he seems to perceive other people as resources rather than people. Again, the following quote highlights Ethan’s tendency to perceive others as comparative standards.

— And your own standards, how would you define them?

Ethical...[laugh] I suppose. Well, you know, I don’t know whether the word is proud or, or very high standard, [...] but I measure myself and everybody — people in my team do the same, maybe I recruit the same type of people or personalities — but I measure, within the business, I would say, you know, in terms of — not business specifically, but personal strengths, you know, actually things like that — would that be ethical standards, professional or moral kind of stuff — I would rate myself highly superior against my peers and the rest of the business, you know. Hem, and why do I say that? I don’t know why I would say that. Other people tell me that. People in my team tell me
this, maybe. I know it myself that I – I don’t know, I’ve got this, when you walk into a room, and you get to know people, you measure yourself against these people saying “what do they do?” – no, it’s “what is it that they do very well that I want to be like them, or to learn from them?” – and after a while you go “no, there’s nothing I can learn from these because there’s nothing they do that I can’t do anyway”. Very rarely do I find somebody – I mean outside here, you know, and obviously the senior managers you see, “oooh, I like that kind of style […]” and you learn from that – and after a while, 3 or 4 years, you know “okay, I’ve got that style, etc, I know what they’re doing, they’re not good for me anymore”, in that sort of respect, you know. And this is why I like to network, you know. The more people I see, then I’m not stale. A lot of people say “you can be the best that you will be in this office”, but there’s no point because there’s 1,001 people outside that are best equipped and have been better exposed, so you can never ever measure yourself against the...the average, because there isn’t an average. You’d have to see every single person in the world to meet the average, you know. So, yeah, I measure myself against other people. I go: “Can I do it? Do I like what they do? No, yes?” – that kind of stuff. And if I like what I see, then I get closer in terms of learning from them. Not saying “how do you do that?” but you learn their behaviours, don’t you? You know, and see what’s their worth.

To that extent, it is likely that Ethan establishes only friendly-professional relationships with his colleagues, clients or the people he supervises. His relationships seem never remote from some degree of self-interest or utility that supports his great need for recognition. Yet this may well disguise a lack of ‘substance’ of his individuality rather than a Machiavellian mind.

Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience

Ethan describes himself as “ethical” and believes the key values that guide him are trust and honesty.

It’s trust, honesty, you know, hem...I can’t back up my staff in anything if they don’t tell me the truth, because I look after them, in the sense of whatever they say goes, and if I have to step in, then I will defend them. But if they don’t tell me the truth, even if they screwed up and did their own mess, you know, if they don’t tell me that part, I cannot – I will still defend
them, not knowing that they've been lying to me, and then, then if it transpires that they have lied, then I will never support them again. There's only one chance, you know. Because, you know, people working in my team or anybody that I am trying to defend etc, need to be able to give me the right information for me to defend them, you know. So I think trust – trust and honesty is the most important thing.

He thus attaches an extremely high importance to these values, and bears grudges if he feels others do not act upon these values, both in the professional sphere (as he explains above) and in the personal sphere, as we notice in the following quote.

I assume people who are my friends and my circular, that they are open and trustworthy. And again, if I find out that they're not, they're not in my books anymore [laugh].

On the other hand, Ethan considers that people do have different standards, including ethical standards, depending on their upbringing and their cultural background, so that he avoids bearing judgments upon other people’s actions.

So you weight the pros and cons. If it's a real big impact, of course I'll say something, you know, so yes, I think regardless of whatever happens, I think you'll weight – or I would weight the yeah, the issues and see what's most important at that time. Hem...like, for example, if I go to family side, you know, [...] my parents [...] are all very "you must be from the same race, you must be that" whatever – but my sister married with an Irish guy, so do I think – what's important: my sister, whether she's happy, or family values? So, you know, of course I can see beyond that, so I'll say "that's happy for her", you know, things like that. So, you weight the issues. And I think the issues – what I think the weight of issues depends on the way the person thinks in terms of their perception, their education, what their exposure is. [...] So I would say it's up to the individual and how they, how they think it is. You know, it's not a wrong way, but it's just the way they think, or the way I think. For me, I would say that I'm quite – I don't know what the word is, but you know, it's just looking at, looking at the facts and then seeing, based on that information, is it worth jeopardizing X for Y?
We could classify Ethan’s approach as relativist in so far as he argues ‘it all depends’ as can be seen below.

I mean, yeah...in this job, it helps you slightly because you know there is more and more employment law, you know, thrown at you everyday, so that’s the, like a default that you use. But generally, you know, I would say that there’s...again, individual people have different conscience levels, isn’t it? However nice they are – some people think it’s fine to be rude to people and not being very nice. What I consider ethical maybe is unethical for somebody else, you know? So...hum, what’s the measure? It’s, it’s - the measure depends on what you’ve been given, and how much you’ve been told and how much are things, if that makes sense.

When it comes to making a decision whilst confronted with a dilemma of a moral nature, Ethan would think rationally about the pros and cons and make the decision based on what is in his best interest.

...in a work context, say that there is one person that I really detest, and any opportunity that I have to say bad things about her, I will. But generally in the work context, it’s again how severe is the offence, yeah? Is it a – if it is truly illegal and could cost the company to go – it could risk the company to be, you know, being taken to court or being turned down, all that kind of stuff, then [...] no matter what level that person is, or whatever, I would make sure that – not in a bad way, but that behaviour actually or that action stops, you know. [...] But if it is just one of those things that doesn’t impact me necessarily, and it is not illegal necessarily, and it is not emotionally distressing [...] Then I just ignore it – not ignore it, I just don’t involve myself with it.

Actually, Ethan remains relatively detached from the human aspect of the situation (“I don’t involve myself with it...if that doesn’t impact me”). His reliance on what is legal as a default mode to make his moral decisions, which is apparent in the following excerpt, suggests that he is more inclined to listen to his moral conscience than his ethical conscience.

And in some ways – because some things are unethical – not a lot of things anymore, but a lot of things that are not ethical are actually illegal. But if
there is things that are not ethical but not so illegal, but they are still unethical in the personal context, then you say “okay, this is not really nice, don't do it”, you know? And I may come and – because we're quite open here – anybody can just say anything about it, you know, just say “stop it” or, you know.

Ethan nevertheless expresses something that could be likened to ethical conscience, although ethical conscience is in fact not so much automatic as intuitive.

[...] you know, you've been brought up or you've learnt the default good and the default bad. And you're doing something that's not right, you already feel uncomfortable about it or “I know it is wrong” – “this is not what I'm supposed to do” or “this is not the right way of doing it” or, yeah – so I think it's like an automatic thing. How do you know when you're walking on the street to put the next leg in front of the other? It's an automatic thing, you know, this is called walking. As a baby, you know that you've learnt to put one feet in front of the other -- and when you're driving as well -- how do you know that you have to put the clutch down to change the gear stick, you know? It becomes automatic, you know...

The fact that his morality is “automatic” in his own words does not imply he is connected to others, but might illustrate a smooth rational thinking process. Ultimately, his criteria for choosing a direction for action reflect his interests, or what will benefit him.

How it will benefit me. Yeah, so, whenever there is – whether it’s, whether it’s, you know, if it’s a work decision or a personal decision – is this a good route for me? Would this be good for me? You know...

- And being good for you – how do you define it?

Okay – being good for me would be whether it’s – it depends on the decision or the situation. You know, it’s “would it make my life easier?”, “would it give me more satisfaction?”, “would it give me more money?” if it’s a work context, “would it give me more experience?” if it’s a work context – even in the personal context. Would it be something new that I haven't done before, would it be challenging, would it be, would it be…an idea that would make somebody else happy? You know, that kind of things. Hem...yeah, would it be…what else can I think of? – hem...would I have to pay for it? - things like that, you know. But generally those kind of things, you know. When I say pay
for, I don't necessarily mean monetary, but other ways, like consequences, etc., yeah.

**Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation**

Interestingly, Ethan thinks he does not change his behaviour from home to work, or at least ever so slightly.

I do a lot of – do you know the PPA – Personal profile analysis? [...] Whenever I do these tests, my mask-work – my work-mask and self-mask are the same, you know. And no matter how often I do it, they are always the same. And so, I know I’m – maybe in decision-making, because I do decisions all the time at work, and people know that generally for stupid decisions like going for dinner or “what are you gonna choose?” and I haven’t got time to decide – but I would say that I am exactly the same at work as I am at home, or outside work, you know. So I don’t act any differently – perhaps a bit more commercially-aware – not commercially-aware, more professionally aware at work, but other than that, I’m still the same individual, I don’t feel the need that I have to change the way I am.

*What do you mean by more professionally aware?*

Hem, maybe language use and hem – not just language use but hem...not to offend other people, you know, i.e. in terms of, like when you’re being critical, things like that.

Ethan actually believes that if he changed, he would not give his best hence he would not have the chance to be the best. His rationale is again centred on his performance.

Would I enjoy working in an environment where I’d have to suppress myself for it? No, because I don’t think you get the best out of me. I don’t know if you get the best out of people in general, but from where I stand, I don’t think, you don’t get the best of me, I don’t think so.

Ethan also declares he gets “easily bored” and appreciates fast-paced activities, “doing more than one thing at a time”, being “always busy”. To him, this is a natural way to be, although we could interpret this behaviour as reflecting an inability to take time to confront oneself, as if being always busy would make up for one’s existence.
So while I shut off, you're always thinking "okay, how else - where else can I make opportunities?" you know. I'm on the train, I'm thinking about figure or merger reports - if I do this, what will I get? If they do this, what will they get? I'm always thinking about strategies for like next month or whatever, you know, so...yes, I can switch off, yes I can try not to think about it, but to be honest - and not just to be honest - just to be frank, just generally, you can...whenever you sit against things - "what else can I do to do things right?", but it's, it's in the mixture. I can think of one right now, and the next minute I can say "what do I need from Tesco's?", you know? And to mix it together. But I don't think I'll ultimately switch off, because when I'm going on holiday or whatever, I'm thinking "oh, this is a good opportunity, can I use this in my business?" you know. So you're always - I don't think anybody switches off completely, don't think about work full stop at all. Maybe doing that consciously, but subconsciously they're collecting things. I think so.

We could suggest that his reliance on other people to put him on the social ladder, if not on the social map, along with his need to be busy all the time reveal a void. It seems as if Ethan wants to keep up a whirl of activity to fill in the void created by his lack of connection to his self.

5.3.3. IRENE

Irene is the Human Resources director for an international construction materials trading company, for which she’s been working the past five years. She studied arts, trained as an administrative assistant, then worked as an assistant for a HR director in a company, and really liked the field. She then re-trained in HR management through distance learning, and has been working in HR for more than twenty years. She is married with no children.

Persona and Self-Image

Irene enjoys her work but suffers from the "negative" image associated with HR management, in particular when HR directors are depicted as the ‘head-hunters’ and the ‘downsizers’. She feels that this image is false and comes from the fact that people do not see the other tasks HR directors do in organisations.
People in organisations have a rather negative image of HR directors, which is completely false, because we actually tend to protect the employee from managers who go wild rather than...but it is true we get to make people redundant.

- So you think there is a negative perception of HR directors?
  Yeah.
  - Why so?
Because it's the HR director who - when on the telly they explain that 10,000 employees are made redundant, or whatever, it's usually the HR director who speaks. And it's true we get to make this sort of decision, and that's this sort of decision that comes first. We are the ones who cut the staff.

Although she declares she does not care about the image of Human Resources as much now as before, she still is affected by it as she explains in the following excerpt.

- Does this image affects you in your work?
  Hem, yeah, because actually it's false, and I didn't realise that - in between the previous company and this one, I was unemployed for about a year. And here, when I said I was a HR director - that's when I came to know the image. While during my first 15 years of experience I never even thought about it, because I had not had the opportunity to talk about my work. But when I was unemployed, and people asked me "oh yeah, what do you do? What kind of job are you looking for?" "A HR director position" "Aahhh...". And it was really weird. Especially since I was looking for a job, I was still mourning my, well, my work. Well, now, I'm back on track, I don't really care. But I think it's a pity and I would militate fully to help regain the prestige of HR directors.

Consequently, especially during her first HR management experience, she felt she had to make a choice and choose whose side she would be on. She felt that she needed to accept to be on the management's side and that some decisions she would make would be unpopular, yet necessary. Somehow, having made that choice eased her conscience. The following quote explains this apparently necessary shift:
My first big moral conflict— and I was young at that time, cause it was in 86, so I had...one and a half years of experience, it was my first economic downsizing programme. So this, at 24-25 years old, it's hard, cause...I wouldn't do it the same way at all if it was now, but we let go the oldest employees, so it was the guy who had worked for 40 years, who was illiterate and who we fired...oh, I cried at nights really. And also, at the time I was sort of anarchist and all that, just like you can be when you’re young, and it was...I really had a guilty conscience...I had talked about this to a friend of mine who was even more anarchist than I was, he was truly an activist, and we—we have fallen out ever since, really. Because he could not admit that I would fire people, that I had fallen in the hands of the employers who make people redundant. And it is actually true that it’s what we did, we fired them, hem...I think they signed on the dole but some died quickly after that...

[...]
This, this has been my first big moral...and that's when I think I decided that, okay, whatever, that was hard, but it was kind of my path, and that I—I positioned myself on the side...yeah, on the employer’s side, really. It was—I was gonna be part of the company’s decision-makers, and make decisions that are not necessarily easy but that are nevertheless for the common good—we know it’s for the shareholder’s good, but it is nevertheless for the common good. And from then on, there was hardly any moral issues, really, because you choose a line of conduct, you hem...yeah, you work towards the company's good.

It seems that Irene could not live up to her personal standards while doing her job, and the only way she managed to cope was to draw boxes and choose one viewpoint exclusively. She thus opted for a sort of ‘HR persona’ because it suited the job and the context best. The company’s dress code probably contributes to delineating the role she feels she has to endorse at work (“what’s expected of my status”). She accepts it as part of the game, probably just like she felt she had to choose a side in order to live her work well. She literally dresses up and ‘wears’ the expected persona when she leaves for the office, as we note in the excerpt below.

I could not go to work dressed like that. I wish I could...and I cannot because that is not what’s expected of my status. And I can see that the higher the status, the more efforts you have to make to dress. No one says it, but it’s in other people’s glance, and that’s what you think yourself when
someone...someone who would be on the board of directors and who would come in wearing jeans and trainers, well somehow I would be uncomfortable.

-SO HOW DO YOU FEEL TOWARDS IT SINCE THIS IS NOT THE STYLE YOU WOULD NATURALLY ADOPT?

Hem...I don't like it, but it's part of the game really – it's almost like the compensation for the wages, really. Since they give me money, I'll make minimum efforts to present myself.

**Relationship to Others**

Irene has a complex relationship to others, in so far as she enjoys the contact with people but dislikes managing a team of people. She does not like to be personally involved in managing people, but she likes to interact with and confront people.

What I enjoy the least, it's obviously to fire people. Hem, it's...maybe it's also team management, because it's not at the heart of the HR director role, it's the manager role, which I have not chosen, and it's not easy. I mean managing a team, well, it takes time, it takes a lot of energy, because you spend your time motivating people, refocusing them, telling them things that are not so nice. I mean, she screwed up, how do I tell her without her starting to cry...it's...if I could do without it, that would be just as well really!

[laugh]

- THAT'S INTERESTING BECAUSE, AT THE SAME TIME, HR IS ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS, ISN'T IT?

Yes, but you see: I'm happy to do it for others, or advise others on how to do it and all that. But when I have to do it myself, then it's, then it bothers me. Because, because it's me in front of my employee, and it's up to me to tell him. While on the other hand, I would say "okay, so you tell your employee to do that". Very easy...

- IS IT THE DISTANCE THAT MAKES IT EASY?

Yeah. Yeah, yeah. I don't have to get involved.

In fact, what she enjoys most in human relations is the challenge of the novelty, which enables her to develop her resources.
So what excites me now, it's the relation with the person, because there will always be something new and you always have – you always have to be better. You always have to excel yourself a little...

It actually seems as if Irene is personally detached from the relationships she has with other employees, that she plays the role and represents, even incarnates, the company in the business “game”.

I like to be in a meeting and meet people, hem...I like to visit the branches...yes, visiting the branches I quite like. [...] You become more available for people, and besides, when I'm in a branch and I meet with the employees, often at one point or another, an employee will say what's wrong. [...] And so visiting a branch, it means being ready to actually face the employee who will say these sort of things. It's funny, it's like a game, because – especially when you know the branches, you know that well, you will meet Mr what's-his-name, he will systematically say whatever just like he does each time, and what am I going to tell him this time? And then it becomes a game: how am I going to convince him that what he says is not right? And hem, I pick up on that to say something too...

Irene depicts her relationships as essentially strategic, yet she admits that the main factor in her success or failure is the very human factor of being in great or not-so-great form.

What I do also enjoy, it's the works council meeting, actually. Or the meetings to negotiate the wages with the union reps. Because — but that is not nice all the time. Sometimes it's nice, because we, you are in a strong position, because you are in good shape, because this particular day, intellectually, you catch it quickly, so you know you can confront the delegate what's-his-name who will...and then other times, I'm in a lesser good shape, I know that I'm gonna fail and that...

Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience

Values are important for Irene, and she claims she wears them upfront when she goes to work. She views this as a way of checking whether the organisational culture can accommodate her values. To her, her values are part of who she is so that she'd
rather state them loud and clear. The following excerpt is worth being quoted integrally as it shows how Irene gives a great importance to values that reflect what she personally cares for.

- How do you set your limits on what you can and cannot accept?
Based on my convictions. I mean...I believe in respecting human beings, so when you don't respect a human being, I can't stand it...I can't stand for instance when I hear someone who - a manager moaning because a woman gets pregnant. It's not normal, really, it's - I won't fire the guy, but I'll tell him, you know. Hem, racism is something I can't stand. So the first person who does it, he gets a warning immediately, the law backs me up. Yeah, I mean, it's respect for human beings, really. Someone who bullies an employee, it's the same, I'll tell him.

- Does it go beyond what the law says?
Yeah, yeah, exactly. Because it's my...it's me. It's my education, it's my beliefs.

- And these values, do you consciously bring them with you at work?
Oh yeah! Yes, yes. When I leave for work, I actually announce them. In a job interview, I spell them out.

- Do you feel the need to? Is it a choice you make?
That, I don't know. To speak about them, you mean? It's a choice for people to - so that I don't, hem...if I put myself back to when I was looking for a job, I didn't want to work for a company which didn't agree with my choices.

- Why so?
Because I wouldn't be able to work with them. Because maybe I could be hired, but at the first, at the first disagreement, I would have to quit, so better to tell things upfront and say "here's what I believe in" - and sometimes it's too much, I mean. Well, it's too much - it's not always necessary to always talk about your convictions, but at least things are clear.

Despite the significance of her values in her life and sense of self, Irene still seems cautious when it comes to take action. Actually, she tends to rely on formal rules, in particular the law, even if the situation still makes her uncomfortable. It seems as if Irene needed the law to act, even though she felt a moral discomfort with the situation very early as the example below illustrates.
[...] I can let an employee suffer in the hands of someone who's almost harassing him for example. We do have a case like that right now, where I know I should fire the director, but at the moment I haven't had an instance of true harassment, you know. It's close to it, the guy isn't nice with his subordinate, he really bugs him, he's gonna piss him off with the most trivial thing, but at the same time we're not quite yet in the situation of true moral harassment when you're pushed to one side, you're being humiliated and all that. But if this happened, I know it would be difficult for me to have people accept the guy being fired because it's not quite in people's mindset. And I don't know how I would react then.

It is possible that the nature of HR management makes her careful of the legal consequences of any action. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that she does not seem to dare to act upon her gut reactions only. She prefers to wait until she can justify a legal action, even if in the meantime she does not live up to her values. In that respect, she seems to rely more on her moral conscience even though she is aware that this might not be satisfying.

Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation

Irene admits to consciously compartmentalise her life. For her, it's a matter of maintaining a healthy balance; otherwise she would overwork and lose on an important aspect of her life.

I completely dissociate, because when I'm at work, I'm at work. And it doesn't show through anywhere else. When people meet me outside work, some can't imagine I'm a HR director for example. Because I don't look like a HR director or I don't dress like a HR director, or...at work I'm totally - not different, but it's true I dress up, you could say - at work, I'll wear nice trousers, nice whatever, hem...but then I also enjoy it very much, you know.

As the following excerpt shows, Irene gets into character at work and feels uneasy when both 'worlds' happen to collide, probably because her work persona differs from her 'real self' so that she needs to adjust.
- Do you force yourself to be different?
No! Actually it's totally natural, you know. The moment I get in the car and leave — well, sometimes even in the morning I think, from the breakfast I start thinking about work, my husband notices it, he says "okay, here we go, she's already left". And when I come back — besides there's an advantage of working in the metropolis cause it's a 40 minutes drive — it helps me enter another world, wholly...— well, not wholly different, but different, you know.

[...]
And in fact, at work, when my husband calls, or someone, or my sister or whatever, I don't like it, you know, because it's two different worlds, and when I'm at work, I'm not at all in my private sphere. It pisses me off when I talk to people who don't belong to my professional sphere.

Yet, Irene does not really compartmentalise in so far as she keeps working from home, though "only exceptionally". It is interesting that, as in the excerpt below, Irene does not seem to realise that she contradicts herself by explaining that she refuses to work at week-ends but nevertheless happens to work some week-ends.

When I started working, the first few years, I worked a lot — I mean, I still work a lot but I needed more energy to do it at the time, and I would bring some work home at week-ends and spend, I don't know, my Sunday working or something like that. And at some point I realised I was mixing up the two worlds, and I would not be able to cut myself off sometime, yet I needed to cut myself off. [...] so, I willingly refused to work the weekends for example. Actually I have started to do it again because I am conscious of it, so I have just tried to do it only exceptionally, within a limited period of time.

We could argue that Irene's ego is strong in making her believe she can preserve a clear-cut separation between the two worlds, although this separation is blurry, almost illusory. Even though Irene tries to be herself, she tends to give up when the pressure gets too strong so she accommodates by forgetting easily.

[...] being true to myself is something I try to do as much as possible. [...] it would be really hard for me to be untrue to myself. To make a decision that goes against what I think. I mean, my convictions, really. Maybe I'm too much with my convictions — I mean, for me, respecting your convictions is being true to yourself. Betraying, pfff...but also I have a rather, rather
significant ability to forget, hopefully, else I would have taken too many things on board. So eventually, even if there's a failure, even if there's a conviction that can't be fully respected, I can forget and bounce back or whatever, and move on. I'm not the sort of person who gets depressed or whatever, I'm more positive. But I try as much as possible to be true to myself.

Her persona wins over because Irene's connection to herself may be too weak to enable her to stand by her personal values.

I don't like escaping. Yet I'm sometimes obliged to, but I...in that case, it's really not self-fulfilling, you know. Because besides you don't solve anything - I mean escaping, really, it doesn't solve the problem, you just avoid it, really - and at one point or another it'll come back. [...] sometimes it's not easy at all because it means you'll expose yourself, or that it's gonna be very difficult and you don't really know how to handle it. But on the other hand, the harder, the more pleasure you feel in succeeding, it's...but sometimes it's really difficult.

*What do you mean by 'exposing yourself'?*

To expose yourself is to put yourself at risk of failing. Hence to be unsatisfied with yourself. Moreover, besides self-satisfaction, it can be difficult for the company or the colleague or whatever...

However, Irene demonstrated a genuine interest in the topics discussed because they addressed issues she reckons are important but that she does not fully grasp. The following excerpt suggests that despite her anxiety of and resistance towards asserting her self, Irene feels a need to develop in that direction, albeit she finds excuses not to do it quite yet.

*It's interesting to ponder on these issues. Because actually you're far too often focused on the operational aspect, and you don't take time to reflect, to say "wait a minute, what are my values?". Obviously you live by them, but you don't think about them. It would be necessary to think a bit, it'd be good to rise a bit from time to time.*

*Would it be to better perform at work or to feel better personally?*

Hem...not work-wise, because I already do this. To feel better...no, but it would be, yeah, to understand better. To use a part of your brain you don't
work with in your private life, nor...this intellectual side, you know. Researching, reflecting – it can lead you somewhere else. You also need to foster some intellectual curiosity to evolve, because you can easily lock yourself up in the daily routine, and forget to look around you, to see the world changing. You see it, but you notice it only afterwards. When you get a case, for example a case of harassment like we talked about earlier, this is a notion that did not cross your mind 20 years ago. It was – yet it occurred then... - so people had to start talking about it and all that. And this is normally, it's something I should have, I should have thought about it, I should have noticed cases and I would have liked to be a pioneer on this topic. But you don't have time, in everyday life, you don't have time to reflect, to see how things evolve.

5.3.4. Martin

Martin works as Regional Director for Real estate operations for a bank. He has been working for about five years at this position. He trained in business and worked for a couple of banking institutions prior to his current position. During his first work experience, the bank he was working for was severely hit by a property market crisis, which seems to have made a lasting impression on him. He is married with children.

Persona and Self-Image

Martin's self-image seems tormented. It looks like Martin is constantly in contradiction with himself, which shows in his perception of a persona. Indeed, Martin likens his job to that of a merchant, and as such describes himself as a comedian. He believes he has to wear the banker’s uniform, and seems to accept it as a means to detach himself from his job.

You know, here, you do wear the banker's uniform, you know, whether you like it or not, hem. I would have received you wearing a tee-shirt, with no tie, wearing light trousers or a short, you would have thought “he's not a banker”...so, you know, we have to respect the uniform...

- This uniform, is it something you accept easily?
Yes, it’s my overalls! I think we take to...the art of commerce at one point or another lies in being a comedian. You ought not to lose your soul – when I say soul, conscience, I know what I mean...

- How do you manage not to lose your soul?

Reasoning, some introspection...to know yourself better. To know yourself. The better you know yourself, the less you lose – you know very well when, at some point you need to tell a guy “goodbye, thank you, we will no longer work with you” – which was the case recently – it’s not me who says that, I say that because it’s my job, because ultimately I don’t care whether he works with us or not, really, ultimately. I mean it’s non-sense. [...] 

Yet, Martin pays great attention to his relationships with his clients, not just because it is good for business but also because he might come to personally appreciate the client as a person. Hence, Martin is not as detached as he wants to believe he is. Rather, we could say that Martin wishes to be a ‘banker persona’ when at work because somehow he feels he does not play a part, he is his actual self, and this worries him. This shows in the following quote:

I always try to maintain a barrier between me and my clients. I know very well that some clients would like to go further, I would like so too, some clients – these are clients, at some point, you feel you really get on well, but there’s a time when a signal lights up and says "no, you shouldn't go too far because if you do, you won't be able to tell the difference between professional and personal matters"...and this, there's nothing worse than that. [...] Similarly, from a strictly familial viewpoint, you come home in the evening, you close the door, you don't expect a client to phone you on the grounds that he's a friend. What will he talk about -- do you think he will talk about the 'friend stuff' or the 'work stuff'? The work stuff, right! No, to be careful, it's better not, hem, as much as possible, this is something -- if we should meet up, have a drink and all that, there are cafés, restaurants to do that. Better to stay within a 'purely business' relationship.

Consciously constructing a persona appears to be Martin’s means of defence against his own self. Yet he believes in the unity of his character despite the fact that he admits he acts up.
You can be a comedian, the only difference is to know that you are a comedian. That is, you know, I am a merchant, sometimes I exaggerate a bit, I emphasise some details, but fundamentally, I would never go beyond, even within the scope of my ability to act, never beyond what I myself am. By the way, just like I'm joking with you and so on, that's a side of me, but I wouldn't say, I wouldn't go beyond the proprieties or some things...Yes, we are true to ourselves, I think, we are ourselves.

Actually, we could say that Martin's persona does not seem to be so much of an issue, which is not the case of his shadow. Indeed, Martin appears to be conscious of all his games, his acting, and his pretending, as we noticed in the quote above. What he seems to struggle with is getting a clear sense of direction. Although he sounds like he knows himself fairly well because he is introspective, Martin often says something, then makes a contradictory statement right after. For example, he explains that he could never be nasty, yet he could act nasty. He also states that in his opinion being honest is not very good to advance one's career, yet one can reach the top of the ladder whilst being honest. The two excerpts that follow point this out in a clear manner:

- What about your values at work? Your deontology, how would you define it?

Good question...To be serious without taking yourself seriously...but still be serious! But what does being serious mean? You'd have to be me to know that! No, I think it's about honesty, hem, with capital H. To be genuinely honest is not the best guarantee to make a career, clearly, hem, that is honesty drives to tell the truth, I mean - let's be clear, when I tell the truth to a client, I use the correct forms, or whatever you want, but it's not necessarily - integrity is not - independence, honesty are not necessarily guarantees for being promoted. Hem...but at some point, my values are to accept myself as I am...anyway, I will never be a crook, I will never walk on someone to bypass them...but I must admit that not many would actually try to do that to me either. But like I often say, what you are not, you can become. Acting dumb, I can do it too, and acting dumb and letting the situation get worse and hem, or being nasty, I can do that too. You don't know, but...no, I'm not sure I would do anything to, hem...to succeed. Anyway, what does succeeding mean?
Human beings, what makes them strong now – for how long, I don't know – is their ability to adapt. Ability to adapt, the faster you adapt, the more you can ensure you'll last long. That's also why sometimes you need to be strong. The higher you'll be on the social ladder, either you'll consider it's a guarantee for power and so on, or if you're honest and upright, you'll be able to "impose yourself" but, nevertheless, you'll be able to let people know – you can really get to that level whilst being honest and upright.

Below is another example of Martin's inconsistency in his self-knowledge, where he explains how he was not interested in partying as a teenager, yet he did enjoy partying with his friends at that age. Besides, he explains that he can live by himself but still needs others to reassure himself on the fact that he is not that bad a person.

My father used to say this about me: "Martin, one day, people will say he's always been 30!". Hmm, that's how it is, when I was 14 or 13, sometimes it's hard when the friends go out, including the girls, I stayed at home to read, I wasn't interested...

[...] I quite liked – maybe because I was stay-at-home – although, believe me, I had times where when I partied, I did party, where I enjoyed being with my friends and going out and drinking one too many – well, I wasn't far from the bed – so, no, I knew how to have fun. But it was, but indeed even when I was young – and yet I was a nice fellow, people liked me, I mean I wasn't the romantic one in his ivory tower, but I quite liked – how did I say, what did I say at that time, at 17, 18 years old, I used to say: first, I'm not afraid of the truth, or of my truth, and I'm not afraid of solitude. I'm not afraid of facing myself. And still today I'm not afraid of facing myself. It's not - I know of worse company... Yes, because I'm true to myself, I am not ashamed to look at myself in the mirror.

- Is it about accepting who you are?
Yes, but with no pretence. I mean it's not a definitive acceptance and I'm not... I've got progress to make, I reassure myself by saying that others probably have even more to make than me, and up to them to progress or not. Anyway, I'm not here to make myself a model either, and then tell everyone they have to look like me. I'm not God, I haven't made man.

These contradictions in Martin's view of himself suggest that he does not really know who he is, what he wants, or even which image he wants to present to others.
We argue that this ambivalence pinpoints at Martin’s inability to integrate his shadow, his darker motives.

**Relationship to Others**

Martin likes to depict his relationships to others as a game of negotiation. This seems to reveal an attachment to his merchant character, which prevents him from being too personally involved in the relationship. The quote below shows this tendency, which we already noticed in the first excerpts.

> Besides, you know, being a merchant, I can't help it, I have to bargain. I don't bring my wife, generally, she hates that. But you have to bargain, the detail is not what I'm interested in. It's like with my clients, when I tell them instead of being at 3 I'm at 2.75, I just show goodwill. The real bargaining is when you're below 2, there you actually negotiate. It's a real thing, I quite like it, and it's fun, you know...when you're used to bargaining, it becomes a game, yes, that's it...

Risk and risk management are concepts Martin often uses, not just in his job but also regarding his personal and professional relationships. Trust appears to be a core element of Martin's job, yet it seems as if Martin fears all the unethical things he knows he could possibly do. In order to preserve his integrity, he seems to have set up strict rules to manage his relationships in and out of work. Nevertheless, these rules do not seem waterproof, and Martin implicitly stresses, as in the following quote, how great the temptation can be, which could suggest he anticipates experiencing this situation without knowing for sure how he would actually react.

> So, on these types of market we have two different approaches: one where I'm there to get market shares with low rates, and the other where I'm there to manage risk with a high margin. Thirdly, there is also on that second aspect of my job the client's gratefulness because to allow him to get a 15 to 20% margin when you’re dealing with 5 or 6 millions – do the maths, 20% of 5 millions it's one million euros. To earn one million euros he must be willing to pay 100,000 to the bank...but a one million margin, he tells himself “I'm going to earn one million, I'll pay 100,000 to the bank which means that the bank leaves me with 900,000. [...] That's why I'm telling you that I'm here to
make my clients richer...and where you have an important deontological and values-based issue, it's when you look at what you earn at the end of the month, and when you look at what you allow your clients to earn, it's not to fall on the other side of the fence. When I say falling on the other side of the fence, it's about not thinking about the rules, because when a project is not very good, there is what's on the table, there is what's under the table...right? And it's particularly resisting what's under the table.

- Does this occur often?

No, and when it occurs you think either you've sent the wrong message, or you are being tested, or the guy you've got in front of you is someone you should throw out. Often you should strongly beware the people who offer you these sorts of things, you should strongly beware them...but they try their luck, after all, if you don't try you don't get. You know, the one day - it can happen to anyone to have financial difficulties or things like that, and that day you have someone who by some miracle come and offer you...and you'll pay it back, even much dearer...yes, it occurs, unfortunately yes, it occurs.

Martin seems to view the industry as an open door for corruption and misappropriation of funds, which maybe reveals how weak he feels towards the pressure. His concern emerges as strong in these excerpts.

Money! Yeah, I mean...like I said earlier, if you want someone, if you want someone to remain independent, you've got to give them the means to do so. The more, the more money you handle -- imagine traders at the stock exchange who have commissions that seem to you astronomical, some guys can earn 10, 15, 20 million euros in a year, but they handle for 2,000 billion dollars. They might make 2 or 300 million dollars margin, if you don't give them these 20 millions, either they leave for the competition -- that's the best option -- or they'll manipulate the rates or whatever...at some point, you must consider -- I mean, you must border, waterproof the risk, the risk that -- how can I say -- the risk of corruption. That's what it is, basically....

[...]

Banking is an industry based on trust. That is the bank will prefer keeping quiet, reimbursing the client but keeping quiet so that no one knows, because at some point in your pyramid, in your house of cards -- the element that joints everything, the element that holds all the cards together, it's the trust the client has towards you. [...]) So we get to notions of laundering, things like that. But you'll be caught not necessarily because you got paid,
it's not corruption, it's rather because you were not careful in applying the safety rules concerning the funds' origin. Another thing, when your job is becoming difficult from the legal point of view, when it's not necessarily well-paid, that your job is no longer guaranteed, but you keep on having, you still have more and more unrealistic objectives to achieve...when you add all that, hem...you aren't necessarily acknowledged, and I think that, strictly from this viewpoint, from a deontological viewpoint — I think that's what we're talking about — I think we're facing some pretty difficult years ahead.

Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience

Martin shows contradiction in his own approach to morality. His view of ethics, heavily based on a respect for the law, evokes a moral conscience rather than an ethical conscience, yet this is not clear-cut. We noticed that trust and honesty are core values for him. In fact, although he states that his honesty goes even beyond what the law requires, he later insists that his acting honestly is not so much a matter of ethics as a matter of personal interest. In fact, Martin suggests he does not doubt his personal integrity, however he does not really act out of personal integrity but out of personal interest instead. The long excerpt that follows illustrates Martin's state of mind about ethical matters.

So first of all, I got to tell you, I don't know how long it will last but I hope it will last for a long time, if there is something that doesn't match what I believe in, I don't do it, clearly. So I would find a way, believe me, to let the situation deteriorate — which in itself is not very moral — to return the favour to whoever is concerned. And also, if I am confronted with a problem, it's because within the scale of the decision-makers, there is someone somewhere who didn't do their job. If that reaches my desk, there is someone who at some point should have said "stop, it's up to me to make the decision, it's not something that should be forwarded to Martin." And this, generally, makes up for 99.99% of the cases.

- So how do you define there is a problem? That it goes against your values?

I'll be completely honest, either it goes against my values, or it goes against my interests. Hem, I didn't tell you that tomorrow, accepting a bribe would go against my values. You're the one who concluded that. At the moment, it actually also goes against my interests. It's clear that for the time being it's
more in my interest to keep doing my job than accepting a sum of money. Let's be clear. It's not, it's not because we are talking about deontology that those people who tell you they would not accept a bribe do it for deontological reasons. It's maybe only because they calculate faster than others and say "it is not in my interest to do so." And personally, I didn't tell you -- and you've got evidence -- I didn't tell you it would go against my values. I only said it would go against -- now, I tell you maybe it would also go against my interests. What's the significance of both? I won't answer you for I don't know. Honestly, I don't know whether it's a question of values or of interest. Isn't it the same eventually? And, in the end, the fact that I say 'no', we call it deontology and it reassures everyone. But in fact, if you go back, you will find that same deontology, that is: notion of values or notion of interest?

- So what would go against your values, what sort of issue?

Hem, it's more...what would go against my values, it's relative to respecting the law, it's -- so let's be clear, it's ultimately, it's hem...it's intention. Someone who doesn't know, who is mistaken and gets round the law, people -- and there are many more than you think, and that's how it is, and for these people you hope the patrol won't catch them. But when there's intention, yes, then it goes against because I would say it's a matter of rule, the rule of the community, to live in community it's the law, it's the constitution, earlier it's the declaration of human rights and citizen duties, it's indeed the people who speak through the laws that govern each and every individual.

In this excerpt, Martin mentions a need to be reassured that one's actions are indeed moral whilst one doubts they are ("notion of values or notion of interest?"). We argue that this might point towards a daunting shadow that makes him sense his dark side, his potential for "falling on the other side of the fence" in his own words. This in turn makes him frantically question his own motivations and his ability to do the right thing. Martin's reliance on rules or the law to analyse moral issues emphasises his need to cling to a non-personal framework, so as to avoid confronting his own feelings. However, in as much as he wishes decisions be made on objective facts, he seems to regret that more personal factors of decision-making are nowadays discarded. It could be that his attachment to intuition, which is evident in the quote below, reflects some aspect of ethical conscience which Martin nevertheless does not investigate.
You've got to understand, in my job when you handle millions of euros, when you lend millions of euros, you mustn't shake when you sign the contract. You tell a guy "I trust you, I've checked your file, okay, I lend you 5, 6, 15 million euros" — you mustn't shake. And then, I lend that guy 15 million euros, whereas I wouldn't lend them to myself, this guy will get 2 to 3 million euros of profits, yes, you mustn't be emotional. Emotion must be left aside and all that, you have to say "okay, right". It's like that, you respect a few objective criteria, then comes the subjective aspect for about 0.1% - at some point there's a doubt, right — then for another 0.1% there's intuition, but all the rest is objective, it's facts. If you begin to add emotions, I'm afraid the subjective/emotional side amounts to 99% and the facts only make 1%, and then you — you head straight for the wall.

What is intuition then?

Intuition then is...experience that makes you, makes you feel things, if I dare say — on the condition you haven't caught a cold! But that's it, it's experience which makes you remember "oh, well, this or this type of project, careful, tac tac tac, okay, even that small thing is worth being taken into account, but if it wasn't, it would only account for 0.1%". So you have got to, hem...now, I would tend to say, maybe in the perspective of standardisation, maybe that's a shame, in the perspective of standardisation all the subjective and intuitive aspects are being less taken into account than 10 or 15 years ago.

Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation

Unsurprisingly Martin eagerly compartmentalises his life. He justifies his behaviour arguing, as in the following quote, that it is as much self-preservation as a way of ensuring he does his job well.

I don't want, here...it might sound crazy what I'm gonna say — I don't want to feel here at home, hem...I don't want here to have — how could I say — to have the same pleasure as I have when I'm at home. Here, I'm at work. Hem...people say: "we're here to earn a living". So, first of all, personally, it's something I can't stand, because to me, I already earned my living by being born — I'm the only one thinking like that. So, yes, to me, this is just an extra, what I do here is an extra. And don't come and tell me it's to earn my living! Life is already earned. So, now, it's, I don't know, it's to keep you busy, but that's not what it is either...I think, it's not a hobby either, or pleasure...why? Because, hem, I'm also here because at the end of the month, I wish to earn
something. So the more pleasure you get doing something, the less worried
you are about what you’ll get at the end of the month.

To him, the private must remain private and the professional must remain
professional. He compartmentalises his life so well that his family actually finds it
hard that he does not talk about his work at all.

In my personal life, they criticize me a little for the fact that I never talk about
my work. But I don't, firstly I don't feel the need to do so, and secondly I
almost find that indecent to now — after all these years of, of — to be at home
and talk about what I did at work, it's...yes...it's like splitting your personality.

Yet Martin could talk about work at home, if only for the fact that he is so used to
compartmentalising that he would see it as a betrayal. In his view, it would not be
natural to do it because he hasn’t done it for so long, and he became so accustomed
to it that he cannot seem to envision doing otherwise without “splitting”.

We could argue that Martin wants to prevent his personal life from being
contaminated by his work and his work persona, although he does enjoy his work
(“it’s not quite a hobby but almost…”). What Martin’s statements also suggest is that
he deeply wants to feel confident in himself and affirms his right to exist as an
individual (“I already earned my living by being born”) yet he fails to acknowledge
what he stands for. In fact, Martin seems to be ‘running away from’ rather than
‘running towards’ something. It appears that Martin has a sense of his shadow, his
shortcomings, his weaknesses, but that he has not managed to accept them and
integrate them, so that he does not dare to trust himself.

I'm not afraid of emergency, I'm — stress yes, because stress takes much
from you, but I'm not afraid of emergency. [...] I don't manage stress well at
all. I don't manage it very well, because stress is more — how would I say —
permanent. It's sort of hidden, you know it's there but you don't see it. It's
sort of nagging, it's like cancer — actually I probably should be wary about
that. No, I don't manage stress very well. I thought I did but in fact I don't
manage stress very well.

And does it spread to the personal sphere?
Sometimes, yes, that’s when, I didn’t shut the hatchway. I didn’t shut the hatchway [...]

- You said that you hadn’t realised you didn’t manage stress well, does it mean you weren’t aware of it before?

No, I wasn’t stressed! [laugh] I wasn’t stressed. You know, I’m close to 40 – I’m not there yet, fortunately, or unfortunately – who cares? But you don’t see things the same way, you don’t see things the same way. I mean, like I said earlier regarding anticipating the future, a few things, working more for others instead of myself and so on, obviously all that means you’re getting older and you tell yourself “okay, but...but tomorrow will I be able to achieve my objectives?” These objectives are no less ambitious because I’m 40 than when I was 20, nor older, it’s not true. On the other hand, I know that, some elements make me think that it will be harder to achieve them, and so on.

Nevertheless, as we notice when he talks about how he copes with stress, Martin seems to have reached a turning point which makes him realise he does not compartmentalise as well as he thought, and brings him to question his aspirations. Maybe his stress partly reflects his great uncertainty about his self.

5.4. SUMMARY

This chapter introduced the study participants and examined examples of the importance of the sense of self in moral perception and moral experience. We analysed the transcripts of four selected interview participants in relation to the Jungian framework and the themes identified in previous chapters. We illustrated how a strong persona and the phenomenon of compartmentalisation tend to contravene the perception that one is an individual, and consequently impede the perception of one’s ethical conscience. The following chapter examines three more cases of managers whose relationship to self is set differently. It also offers a summary of the cases of the remaining participants.
CHAPTER 6 – ANALYSING CASES OF MORAL EXPERIENCE II

"It is, however, true that much of the evil in the world is due to the fact that man in general is hopelessly unconscious, as it is also true that with increasing insight we can combat this evil at its source in ourselves."

Carl G. Jung
The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man

6.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the experiences of three other participants selected as case material. The analysis in part 6.2 adopts the same Jungian concepts to assess the importance of the self in the moral experiences of these managers. We suggest, through the analysis of the interviews, that these respondents seem to show greater awareness of their self. In particular, as opposed to the cases discussed in the previous chapter, the respondents examined here have developed a greater sense of unity of self with which their moral values are intricate. Part 6.3 proposes a summary of the analysis of the remaining twelve participants whose cases have not been retained for an extensive case discussion. The analysis is also based on the Jungian concepts, but simply offers the main conclusions which characterise each case.

6.2. CASES OF MORAL EXPERIENCE II

6.2.1. DEBORAH

Deborah works for an IT engineering company as a lead technical architect and staff manager. Her background is in computing, but besides her technical role she acts as a career counsellor and Human Resources manager for twelve employees, mainly engineers or technical people. She has been working at her current company for more than fifteen years, and had no prior managerial experience before that. She is in a relationship and has children in their twenties.
Persona and Self-Image

Deborah is not very concerned with her image, and her persona does not appear to be significant. She says she usually is herself and she seems to have clear ideas of what she can do and what she cannot do, what she is good and bad at.

I find it very difficult to not be true to myself, to what I believe and what I think is right and all of that.

She also admits she is a perfectionist and dislikes “being wrong”, elements that may pinpoint to her persona.

No, I seldom do things that I don't believe I can do. So I do, I am a bit of a perfectionist, I don't like doing things that I know I can do better. I don't like submitting something that I know I can do better, so yes I would take time as in that, but because I don't agree to do things that I don't think I can do, usually it's something that comes relatively easily. [...] And I'm quite happy to admit that I've made a mistake or something like that, that's not a problem, I just have - it's just when I have, I guess there, when I know somebody's waiting for me to make a mistake, then I try not to, cause I don't like being wrong.

However she is very critical of the politics in her organisation and of the acting (“the pretending”) that is required at work. As the quote below demonstrates, she feels strongly about the persona other people project, and even if she has learnt to adapt to it, she remains frustrated by it.

Politics. I hate having to say the right thing to the right person to achieve what you want. I don't like pretending, I don't like acting. I like - in my perfect world, everybody would just be themselves, and I would say what I think, and he would say what he thinks, and we would understand each other, but it's not like that.

[...] Because...people expect you to behave in certain ways and they react differently to different things. So I know now how I need to approach certain people, I know what I have to say to them, I know how I have to say it to them. But I just think it's wrong that I should have to do that - they should
just know what I mean when I say something [laugh]. And they shouldn't have to act the part for me either. I'd like to know what they really think, I don't care what veneer they have to put on it, you know, how they should say something...you know, if somebody says "yes", I would like them to mean "yes"; or if they say to me "no" I just want them to mean "no". I don't want them to mean "yes, but", "no maybe" and...you know, If I say "Cécile, is this pen blue?" and you say "well, it's a little bit greenish" that's what I hate, okay? I just want you to say "yes, it's blue" [laugh]

- And how does that affect you, the fact that there are lots of circumvolutions in the company?

I find that very frustrating, very frustrating. I don't handle it well. Hem...and nowadays I tend to just withdraw. At one time I used to confront, I'd try and...not force but sort of push what I believed in, but maybe now because I'm just getting old or something I just think "oh, I'm never gonna succeed so I'm just not gonna fight anymore" [laugh]. So now my attitude is more that I would say what I think. I might say it twice, I might say it three times but by three times if you don't believe me or you don't understand or you don't accept that this is what I think, I'm not gonna say it anymore cause there's no point - why do I just say it a hundred times, still at the hundred and one times it would be the same as three times, so I might as well stop at three!

Relationship to Others

People are important for Deborah and she says she cannot but treat people nicely.

And I would also not consciously treat people badly. I, I can't - however much I dislike somebody I can't treat them unprofessionally, or whenever I have to - I always have to make them, give them the chance to prove that I'm wrong or that they have a view that I don't understand or something like that.

She enjoys her staff manager role in so far as it enables her to help "people to grow" which gives her "a huge amount of satisfaction".

[...] watching people grow, or helping people to grow. So that's one reason why I'm very interested and keen on staff management because I get a huge, hem, amount of satisfaction from seeing somebody whose functions are quite, a very low level to start with and suddenly he realises "hey whoa", 
it's like opening his eyes and suddenly he can do something which he didn't even - sometimes they don't even know that they can do it. But if you can encourage them to think and to work in a certain way, then suddenly this big world opens up for them, [...] and that's what I find very very satisfying.

Besides the fact that she seems genuinely interested in people, Deborah appears to be a good judge of character, which helps her decide quickly whether she wants to pursue something or not, as we can see in the following excerpt.

I have a pretty good bullshit detector, so if somebody is trying to bullshit me, I know. And I can't tell you how I know that but I do know. Hem...and I think I'm quite a good judge of people, which does help as well. Hem...yeah, but I would say I do know fairly quickly what, whether it's right or wrong. I might not know all the details, I might want to investigate further the details, but I can quite quickly look at something and say "yeah, that's worth investigating" or "you got that completely wrong" or "you have to work really hard to convince me that this is the right thing to do."

**Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience**

Deborah has a very strong ethos, which her behaviour seems to reflect quite clearly. She has set clear boundaries to guide her conduct, so that making decisions is not a problem. Her values represent who she is, and truthfulness is central to all her actions and decisions because she cannot do otherwise. The two quotes below reflect how much her values are intertwined with her sense of identity and integrity of self.

I suppose I never say I would do something if I won't. I don't say I can do something if I can't. And I won't agree with something if I don't. You know, if I disagree with something I won't hem...say that I agree with it. I won't say that sort of "it looks a bit like the sky", I would say "it's blue".

Because for me values have to do with how you are, so I don't -- you know, I would say the same things about out of work. I don't commit to something I can't do. I don't say I'll do something if I can't. I don't say I can do something if I can't.
However, Deborah seems to lack the confidence to trust her sense of right and wrong when it comes to making the decision. Although she does not doubt her “gut feeling” and she is confident there are things she cannot make herself do, she is eager to give a chance to be proved wrong. Indeed, she explains that she cannot make herself agree with the majority if she believes the majority is wrong.

For me, it's something that I have to do, to be me, to be honest with myself. That's not the case with a lot of people. A lot of people can just go with everything - you know, if 90% of the people say “yes” then yes must be the right answer so I'm gonna say yes too. But I can't do that. I'm very bad at doing that. I never do that, I can't do it. Because if yes is the wrong answer then I'll say no anyway. Because you know, if inside you feel no, then how can you say yes? You don't believe it, you can't work with it.

Yet she also confesses in the quote below that she needs reassurance that she is right to follow her intuition and act on what she believes is the right thing to do.

In a difficult situation I always check that, I'll check it with different people for different circumstances, but I would always...I would feel uncomfortable if I have - in some cases - if I had to take the decision just myself. [...] I need somebody to tell me "it's okay, don't worry!"...

Actually it seems as if she wanted to convince herself that she is not making the right decision, although ultimately she has already made the decision and does not really question it as we noticed (“I can’t do it, I can’t say yes if it’s the wrong answer”).

So if something is wrong, if I think something is wrong or not good, I will almost give the guy too much time to prove that I'm wrong, because I don't have - it might sound to you that I'm quite confident, but I'm not. And I always expect to be wrong, or that somebody can prove me wrong. So I would never - that's another thing I can't look at something and say "it's wrong, stick it in the bin". I'm very very bad at that. I always give people too much, I think, of the benefit of the doubt.
Deborah seems to rely not on codes or rules of conduct established by society, but rather by what she feels capable of doing or what she feels confident doing. She probably relies on her ethical conscience to make decisions that are in accordance with who she feels she is, though she is also aware that she can benefit from this.

I was working with this bid, a proposal to a company. And I was just responsible for creating the solution that would resolve, solve the problem that the company has. We had a team and we put together a proposal, and everything like that. And it came to – everything was written, and it was written fine, and we gave it to the customer and that was fine. Then it came to a point when we had to make a presentation to summarize what we had written, and the sales guy wanted to say something that I knew was wrong, was false. But it sounded good, and it would have made the customer think that we were clever, we're good and all that. And I couldn't do it. So I said "no". And he said "you have to". And I said "no. I can't. You'll see when I say something that I don't believe, you'll see it in my face. You'll hear it in my voice. I cannot do that." And we had a discussion for 2 or 3 days. And in the end [...] somebody else had to do that.

*How did you feel about the whole situation?*

Very uncomfortable. I knew that that was probably wrong. I don't know if it was the right thing to do. I could see why he wanted to say that. But I think for me, I knew I couldn't say that with any credibility, so it was quite an easy decision for me, cause I would have been letting the company down even if I agreed to say that. Because I'm 100% sure that I would have, something would have given it away in the way that I'd have said it, because – I think that my strength in presenting something, standing up in front of an audience is that people believe me because I don't do the bullshit thing, I don't lie, I don't, you know, make things flowery or anything like that, I'll say what I think. And I think it would become very obvious to someone if so 90% of the time you're saying one thing, and then suddenly you change your words, your style and – because I would not be confident about saying that, your voice would change and I'm sure that my face would change, and I thought "well, if you want to say that, then I'm not the person to say that". I won't say "hey, look, you've got that wrong" to the customer, right, but I can't say that myself. And then it's accepted in the end, and he said that himself. I just had to sit there and listened to it.
This long excerpt demonstrates how Deborah seems to have managed to build a business credibility from her very personal sense of morality. The fact that she cannot blatantly lie “because you see it in her face” could be considered an unconscious defence system to prevent her from being entangled into a situation that makes her feel uncomfortable from her values perspective.

**Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation**

Actually, Deborah makes a distinction between acting for a customer and acting to get a bid.

To me that's false, that's a veneer, that's acting, and I'm not good at acting. Well, I'm not good at that kind of acting, I can do the customer kind of acting. And yes, I like talking to customers, I think I'm quite good at talking to customers. I can convince them, I'm quite convincing, I'm quite credible if I talk to a customer.

For her, the “customer kind of acting” is about finding the appropriate arguments to convince the customer whereas acting to get a bid implies moving away from the truth in order to achieve an objective.

[...] it's creating a situation or a... how can I describe it... it's being somebody that I'm not, that kind of acting I find difficult. But using what is natural to me, being straightforward with somebody, being credible in front of somebody and presenting the company, you know, with my yellow hat and my black whatever, it's... because I believe in the company and I believe I can deliver something, that's not so, that's not out of character, that's not creating, you know, that's something real.

Thus, for Deborah, lying is out of the question because she cannot do it, because she would give it away, as she insists in the following excerpt.

I know that if I did something like this [i.e. acting], then life would be a lot easier. But I can't make myself do something that I don't believe in. And from that perspective life would be more difficult because, you know, I make today
easier but tomorrow will be more difficult, the future would be a bigger problem. So for example if we had a project – like today we have a project that has a major problem, and we can't deliver, and I predicted this problem two years ago. [...] Politically the right thing to say at the time would have been “yes, of course, we can do this, and we will do this and this and this” but I knew that that was the wrong thing to say. And I couldn't say it, I couldn't agree that this was a viable project. So when, when it became obvious that nobody wanted to listen, the only thing I could do was to – well I felt that the only thing I could do was to withdraw and to go and work somewhere else. And that's actually what I did. And two years later we now find we're losing out the money.

We could argue that Deborah exemplifies a person who does not compartmentalise but rather brings her values to her work, cultivates and takes advantage of her moral strengths, and acts so as not to compromise her sense of self. In fact, compromising is not an option because it would damage her professional image and capabilities, which would in turn damage the company’s image and interests.

- How do you know what's right and what's wrong?
I don't know! Hem...where does it come from? Some of it comes from experience, where I've seen it before, where I've seen it done wrong before...I don't know, actually. I suppose it might be from background and upbringing...maybe what you learn at home, maybe, what you learn at school...I think it all, it all comes together, I don't...maybe you think of it as like a gut reaction to something, a gut feeling. But it must have some basis, it's only unconscious, you know, it doesn't come from nowhere. But I mean for example, treating people as human beings – where does that come from? Nobody told me that, I don't think, but I would never consider doing, you know. I've seen people doing just – in fact we have a manager here who, if you are useful to him, you're his best friend and he will do anything for you. But the minute you become not useful, he doesn't even acknowledge you, you know, he could be walking in the corridor and you could be walking towards him and he wouldn't even say “hello” to you or acknowledge that you could. And I don't think – certainly consciously, I couldn't do that. Hem...I hope subconsciously I don't do that either, I'm not aware of doing that. But that doesn't – that's not something that you're taught, I don't think...well, I don't know. I can't answer a question like that, I don't know. But I know I do feel very strongly that something is right. Usually
I have a very very good idea that something is right or wrong. And that's...even from the technical and delivery, not just from the people perspective. And obviously, if you know something is wrong, then you will investigate to see why it's wrong. Maybe I don't do enough investigation when it's right, or when I think it's right.

What this quote shows is that Deborah appears very confident in affirming her individuality, which suggests she is connected to herself and able to listen and act upon these “gut feelings” that tell her what to do. However, her self-knowledge could be developed further in so far as she still does not entirely trust her initial judgment and needs other people's reassurance to confirm she is right, as we saw earlier. Yet, it is important to stress that Deborah does not really call her judgment into question. Rather she calls into question her confidence in her judgment. Indeed, she does not think she is wrong, but she tends to wonder whether it is right that she feels something is wrong. Discussing an experience she had where she allowed an employee to train and change his career path although his choice proved inadequate for his abilities, Deborah expresses confidence in her decisions no matter what.

- Do you regret the decisions you made?

No, because they're right decisions. It was the right decision. Hem...should I have taken this decision earlier?...hem, I don't think I regret that either. It's possible that someone else might say "you should not have given him such a big chance" if you like but I think I was right. Yeah, I think that was right!

6.2.2. Paul

Paul directs a children's home he founded fifteen years ago. The home welcomes relatively young children who have suffered various abuses and who are placed there either temporarily or for a few years. Paul studied law and initially aimed to become a police superintendent, until one summer he worked as an instructor within an organised holiday scheme for children (colonie de vacances) and met people who encouraged him to work in this sector. He then trained to become an executive, then a director of social structures for children. He is married with grown-up children.
Persona and Self-Image

Paul identifies three different roles within his job, each with specific demands and requirements. In the following quote, he explains that the nature of his responsibilities makes him shift from one role to another very quickly, and that overall he enjoys this diversity of contacts and issues. Yet this implies that his work occupies a very large part of his life, especially because he founded the organisation and feels very keen on its development.

I jump from one subject to another. [...] Personally, what I like in this job, it's that it is very rich and very varied, that you do a bit of everything, really. Even now, for example, I have this work to do: we are building a new unit. The buildings belong to the Conseil Général [the local supervisory authorities] but their architecture and property service does not have time, because they have got too much work, to manage the building of a new unit. So, in order not to delay, they delegated the project management to me. I don't know a thing about this! Now, I'm actually doing...- here, these are the bids, since it is in the public domain, that I have to manage by myself. So it means this: last week, a meeting with the supervisory authorities, we started the stuff; I plan a board meeting to vote the decisions, and after that, we still have [he points to a pile of various documents] — it's gonna take a lot of time. But, well, I can also take some time if a vehicle needs to be replaced and so I'll have to order one and find the best price for it. And then, five minutes later, a teacher will send me a child who's got into some mischief and I'll need to see him. Then I have a whole planning when I meet with the families as part of the follow-up process. So, you see, I constantly shift from one role to another, really. But — well, right, some days it's exhausting, but at the same time, I personally find it very rich and very thrilling. And then, well, I could not picture myself — yeah, I'm at ease in this...but that means that well, I don't really have a work schedule, I don't...- my life is shaped around my work more than anything else, to be honest. Really. It is alright because my wife works here to, I live here, but well, it is true that at night, there are night guardians, I'm personally on call one every two weeks, so after 10.30PM, the last teacher leaves, the night guardian has arrived: if there is a problem of educative or technical nature at night, I'm the one intervening.
Nevertheless, Paul does not seem to pretend to be each role he has to endorse. The difference between the roles is palpable in terms of content, but nothing suggests Paul adopts a different persona when he meets with different people. It may be because Paul has clearly defined the organisation’s mission and prioritised the roles he has. Indeed, for him the financial side is there to serve the educative system, so that when he manages resources his purpose remains the children’s benefit. This shows in the excerpt below.

[...] well, often people say “educating children with special needs, educating children, that must work just the same, whether there’s one or 20 children, anyway the wages are paid and the funding is obtained”, no. If I don’t fill in my beds, that is if we deliver poor services and if the network within which we operate, well, considers that the performance of the organisation is not good, tomorrow we would have less children left in our care, and we could have to let some staff go. So we are really within a commercial dynamic. From that point of view...but – then, if you talk about, to talk about, to mention the ethical side of it, knowing that for me, the financial aspect serves the educative aspect of it, and not the reverse, that is that you should not be mistaken, right. We have some aspect of commercial management but we are not a commercial organisation, so everything that is undertaken is undertaken to serve the children in need...and not to – that is why I was saying manager, yeah, but for me, there’s something else behind it.

The clearly-defined objective of “serving the children” probably guides Paul’s decisions and actions to form a unity of character, which itself seems close to Paul’s personality. Therefore Paul does not seem to have a strong persona. Rather he is mission-driven and he makes sure that his various activities contribute to achieving this mission as best as possible.

Relationship to Others

Paul explains he favours a participative management style so as to ensure the staff feels involved in their work and works well as a team.

We have, well as far as I’m concerned, here my management style is based on consensus or participation which allows the teams to be – how would I
say - there is a real team dynamic both in terms of daily management and the follow-up on the kids, but also in, in our ability to get together and create new tools.

His concern is, again, driven by the mission of taking the best possible care of the children. It seems that he adopts the approach which will best benefit the staff so that they provide the best service to the children and contribute to the development and good performance of the organisation. This is evident in the following quote.

We have set up the quality control system, which has been implemented for a year. [...] This means, well this means refocusing the organisation's functioning, it also means implementing training plans that will allow people to complement their training even if the staff here are all very much trained, but hem, it is sometimes necessary to - so, each year, I have a training plan which actually is - you know, we don't have one penny left unspent on the training plan. And also, you know, it's a good way of investing in the future because the more trained people are, the greater their competencies and the more efficient the organisation is. So, in that respect we somehow join maybe the, some companies also play that card, because it seems important to me. And it also allows you to establish staff loyalty, because it's true we're at the border of the county, and it's true the young teachers or young psychologists or psychiatrists, they prefer to live in the metropolis than here, people don't fight over coming to work in the southern county area, so to keep them or make them come here, you have to offer interesting work conditions and, hem - how can I say - not a promotion because in our profession, promotion does not exist, you get a diploma, there are wage scales - but anyway, some opportunities to progress in their work which will be interesting in terms of research, reflection, and...right? And then, in terms of management - if I were behind my desk playing at the big jerk of director, I don't think I would have the team I have now, you know. After all, there's...yeah, there's all this management which is important.

Paul's behaviour is purposeful yet he is not necessarily instrumental in his relationships with his staff. It seems that Paul does not distinguish the organisational performance requirement from the children's care, but views them as intrinsically linked. He allows autonomy and tries to break off the hierarchical barriers to be perceived as part of the team.
Personally, I am convinced – well, you know, my way of doing things is very humanist – but I am convinced that the head should not be cut from the body, and so – personally, the teachers who come to see me, we chat about things, right…I am just a team member with just a special status. But, you know…my view is like that.

- Is it something you have willingly set up?
Yes, yes, because I believe in it. I believe in this type of management. So it’s true that it’s more – it’s more complicated than to be the director-rector behind his desk who…obviously, since you’re more involved, it necessarily makes things more complicated. But, you know, it is also so rich on the other hand that really…now, each activity sector is accountable here: the kitchen staff are responsible for their budget, the cleaning staff are responsible for their budget, we meet every month to check up the expenditures, etc…but if I’m not there, they can spend whatever is necessary for the good running of the organisation. I mean it’s not because I’m not here that everything will stop working.

- Do you delegate trust?
Oh, yes, this is fundamental. So, right, a good delegation should…involve a fair control in the good sense, not being a control-freak, but hem, yes, people are very autonomous in their work, that’s important.

In fact, for Paul the staff’s well-being and the children’s well-being go hand in hand, and his view of staff management reflects this perspective: the more competent and the happier the staff, the better the care they provide to the children.

[...] the right barometer, in the end, is the relationships – you know, I can see, it’s the staff satisfaction when you ask them – because the problem, the problem in an organisation such as this one, you have to be – the issue of management is nevertheless critical, in so far as if the staff are not happy in their job, the one who takes the rap is always the one at the bottom of the pyramid, which means the kid. And so it’s critical that people be comfortable with their work. So personally I am very very careful, but while being, being present on the ground, in contact with people, available, and I try to solve, every time something is wrong, we talk and we try to solve the problem quickly. It’s rather this way I try to…because, because I wouldn’t want that, well, the kid suffers on account of organisational malfunctions which – you
know, they already have a lot to deal with, these poor kids, that if we add to it. And obviously, it’s always the one at the bottom who suffers the most.

Logically, Paul enjoys the contact with the children and is genuinely concerned with their progress and well-being. He encourages the children’s participation in making decisions that concern them, and he finds that being in contact with them helps remember more basic things one might tend to forget because of all the other psychosocial issues the staff has to care for, as he explains in this excerpt.

We are so involved in dramatic, complicated cases about which we already have some trouble calming the children, implementing things and finding appropriate guidance so that they can be best cared for tomorrow – I mean that they be in the right place. We are so, we are so absorbed by this that we may forget about basic needs – well, not forget the children’s basic needs but forget to take into account things which are more basic, you know. So it’s true that the fact we have all these opportunities where the kids – and that they have the opportunities to talk, where I am there or my co-director is there, we have meetings regularly – you know, it helps you get your feet back on the ground, not really the ground but to think “oh, yeah, this is what the kid said, it needs to be taken into account, because it’s important, we did not see that really”.

We could argue that Paul views the contact with other people as a learning experience, a “humbling” experience that implies he establishes a real connection with the other as another person.

Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience

Paul describes his values as “humanist” and founded on a respect for the other. Because of the nature of the organisation, Paul feels that these values are essential to his work and tries to include them in the daily care of the children. He feels very much in line with the values of the non-profit organisation to which his organisation belongs in so far as he has written the charter himself. It seems that for Paul, without these values little work can be done. He insists on this point in the following excerpt.
Oh, well, the values are humanism, it's respect for the other, it's all those values which for me - I mean without which you can't live in a community outside, and without which you cannot live in an organisation, because after all we are here to make the kids learn these values, really. We work a lot on the question of rights, of duties. We work a lot on the question of respecting the other, on respecting - we have kids from various backgrounds, various colours, we work a lot on those issues, cause for me it's essential, really. It's, it's - yeah, you can't - you can't have - you can't disconnect from real life, no... These core values are also my professional values. And I happen to be lucky enough to work - I mean I'm lucky - I work for an organisation that has the same values as me - by the way we put them on paper, we have an organisational charter. If I had been hired by an organisation that did not champion these values, I wouldn't have stayed, it's very clear. I mean there are things on which I'm personally not prepared to compromise, really. [...] - Do feel like you have a duty to be an exemplar for the children?

Oh, yes, yes, completely. And I ask that from everyone who works here, whatever their role, even if you're a cook, you still are in contact with the children, therefore you need to behave. [...] so here is our philosophy, it goes like that - but, I mean, it's essentially mine. 'To respect the user, his singularity and intimacy' - so this means the children; 'To restore the social and familial link' - so this is like I said earlier, we work a lot with the families; 'To promote the citizenship and social unity of the youngster with emotional difficulties'; 'To acknowledge the cultural and religious backgrounds' - allow them to be expressed if the kids we receive and their family wish so; 'Allow each youngster, legal subject, to be represented in front of the representatives' - so we do have bodies, we try to make the kids... - personally I make them vote for lots of things: we buy a car for the home... - and actually they bring - not necessarily the youngest ones - but they bring much food for thought.

Paul's sense of responsibility towards the children is what informs his behaviour and how he actually translates his values into acts. He seems to have a clear view of what he should do in a given situation because his focus is on the articulation of his values for the benefit of the children. Paul spoke about an experience he had in another organisation he worked for, where the director used to drink and hit the teenagers who lived in the home. He decided not to leave but to stay and try to limit the contacts the teenagers under his care had with the director, and lobbied to change the situation. For him, to quit would not have solved the problem because not everyone
was able to quit, and the teenagers would have stayed anyway. Therefore he probably felt a moral responsibility to stay and try to act from within. The following excerpt is quoted at length because it exemplifies the internal deliberation process which led Paul to his final decision not to quit.

[...] it's true I found myself in situations where...yeah, it was - even situations where you feel you're a coward somehow, you know. You tell yourself "okay, we're here to protect the kids. At the same time, we are in an organisation in which the director hits the bottle and sometimes can hit the kids, hem...and how do I tell him I can't stand that?" So it's true there are times, with occurrences where it was difficult to position yourself because the person in question was - hem, I mean it was impossible to make him understand anything at that time, so it meant take care of kids that were initially placed in our care because they were abused at home - yes I found myself in situations...so later, I tried to deal with them backwards, and it's true I had managed to not have that director intervening in the boarding unit I personally managed. But you know it did not happen without clashes, without...you know. We eventually - he told me "if you're not happy, go and work somewhere else"; so...well there, I had a team behind me, with whom I personally was on the same wavelength, we knew where we wanted to go, we particularly knew what we did not want, so we were able to put some pressure, I wasn't alone. But it lasted several months, this stuff, so it wasn't, it wasn't very comfortable.

- And how did you feel all this time?
I felt bad, because it's true it was clearly contravening my values - both my personal values and my professional values, I mean, really. If, things that for me are unbearable, really. But at the same time, at the same time when you're married, and you've got children, you cannot quit a job just like that - and also, I mean, to quit a job because you disagree, it doesn't solve anything. Because the kids, well they'll still be there, and facing - so sometimes hem...I do have motto, I always say "it's urgent not to be in a hurry". And in that case, it's the same. If you storm out and leave, well you have stormed out, you feel relieved in the instant, but you haven't solved anything because you have left the burden to others who cannot, don't have the possibility to storm out. So sometimes I think that you need to find out expedients to get to where you want. I mean, it's true it can be frustrating, it makes you unsatisfied, morally it's not so great, you don't feel great, but...but you know, I prefer this way to storming out, because in the end, I personally can storm out but others, they cannot storm out, so...
This responsibility you felt towards the children, did it make up for the fact you had to compromise to get where you wanted?

Yes, because, you know, the compromises were made for the children's best interests -- maybe not those ones but the ones who would be coming the year after or the following months. So, I think it was important to be able to work in depth to stop this sort of behaviour bearing in mind that, you know, we couldn't stop it really -- even if we all had resigned, what would it have solved? He would have kept his job and he would have continued. So, there, it was urgent to think, to gather the people who shared the same values and same means to try and make it stop, and to put him away when it came to these issues. So it's true that sometimes, you have to sit upon your initial visceral reaction if you want to achieve sustainable results, because if you don't, yes, okay, you tell yourself "I storm out, right, I did not compromise", except that what did you solve? In this particular example, what would I have solved? Nothing at all really. A job, I would have found another one, but the kids, they would have continued to be slapped all day long, so... and my substitute might not have had the same attitude as me, he could have thought "well, right...". So, sometimes it's necessary to make -- hem, not really to compromise, but you just have to postpone, you know.

Paul's decision was reasoned, in so far as it was for him 'logical' to stay, yet his emotional link to the teenagers in his care seems to have played a significant role in his decision too. This suggests he probably made his decision out of a duty call from his ethical conscience rather than purely and only following the rules set up by his values. It could be argued that Paul simply avoided to make a difficult decision and walk out of a job he needed to support his family. Nevertheless, the pressures he felt whilst lobbying against the director suggest he did not act cowardly but he actually chose what he felt was the best option for all stakeholders from the moral point of view, which was incidentally what he felt was the right thing to do. His focus was the best solution over the long-term.

Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation

Unsurprisingly, Paul does not compartmentalise his life. Ever since he set up the organisation, he felt naturally very concerned with its good running and with the
level of care of the children. The pleasure his job gives him seems to compensate for the demanding workload that comes with the director's position.

Actually, I cannot do things half way, and hem... and you know, when you create something — and I had the luck to create, and to create other services and to develop them — you are actually necessarily very much involved in it. So, well, personally I like when things work, function well, that the kid can get the most out of what we can offer them. So obviously you go to a lot of trouble to make it work, you don't count the hours, really.

The nature of the work is also emotionally demanding, and if Paul has learnt to manage this pressure, he admits it isn't possible to withdraw himself from the situation anyway, as in the examples given below.

Personally, I'm not an anxious person or whatever, so you know... and I can... I'm able to jump from one topic to another without too much... but, you know, when you work on the human, anyway, I mean obviously — because I meet with parents but when I see the parents — when you have parents who have abused their kid and with whom you have to work, and you have the kid around you everyday, I mean, I can't tell you it's easy. Then, there are psychologists in the house with whom you can talk as colleagues and say "pff, this is complicated, can you do the follow-up cause I can't do it anymore...", you know. On that work aspect, we are relatively — you know, and we are trained to help us be prepared to distance ourselves from a very distressing or difficult situation, you know.

[...]

If I leave for the weekend, if I have worries of some sort, I leave with my worries. But, I mean, I manage, it's true... experience, age, habit make it that — I'm not saying you actually detach yourself, when I walk through the door I don't stop thinking about it [...]. Also, some kids come in so distressed, I mean, no one can be indifferent, so you know... it's true I think about it, but you know, it doesn't prevent you from living, really.

Paul seems connected to his self in so far as his relationships with others, both his colleagues and the children, are open and pervaded with respect for the other as an individual. He seems to know himself fairly well and has clear guiding values that determine his actions. We could argue that the strength of his decisions comes for his
authentic commitment to a purpose which he pursues. Paul seems to be a ‘one-piece man’, focused on his core values and committed to living them out in every aspect of his life. Paul, like Deborah, appears to have managed to shape his work environment around his values rather than adapting his values to fit the organisational culture.

[...] I mean, I try to hire people who have roughly similar values to me, even if in the end, everyone has his own way of living them out, but we all have a common core in this organisation, I believe...if I’ve succeeded in something, it’s in doing this, I think. I’m actually rather proud of it. It’s that people here have humanist values, they try to live them out with the children, they live them out in the daily activities, in the inter-personal relations. It does not mean we always agree, and I mean, really, it would be terrible to have a team full of yes-men, because then you can't progress. But you can disagree whilst respecting each other. You know, so I’m very attached to this.

6.2.3. VINCENT

Vincent has worked as a field application-engineering manager for an IT company since 2002. He studied electronic engineering as an apprentice and worked for a few companies in the IT field, where he gradually began to manage a greater number of people. He has also been working as a reservist for the army since he was a teenager, and now occupies a rank where he manages people too. He is married.

Persona and Self-Image

Vincent does not seem much concerned with his image as such, but appears to be objective-driven. He enjoys his work, he cares about his performance and that of his team members, but he does not seem too worried about how he is perceived by others. His experience of the “lonely manager” is the main aspect that relates to his persona. Nevertheless, the rationale behind Vincent’s attitude demonstrates as much a concern for others as a concern for his own interests. Talking about the ranking system in use in the organisation, Vincent illustrates his viewpoint:

And I certainly had this year a guy who’s actually very good, works very hard for me, he is placed significantly far down the list. The moral part is — how do
you explain that to someone when you don’t have any negative things to say, that their performance isn’t necessarily bad. And that’s what I would call the loneliness of management, because it’s something that...

- Is it like being caught in the middle of a structure that you cannot change... And how much are you prepared to be honest, how much are you prepared to use along some of that management skills of not entirely telling the truth?

[lough]

- Is that part of management, not telling entirely the truth?

I think there’s certainly a requirement for it. I think also, and I’ve said it before, there’s loneliness in management in so far as there are times when you realise that being close to your team members is actually probably not the best thing, because you may actually be delivering some pretty bad news to them which they may not entirely want to hear. And if the relationship you have with your team is a very friendly one, i.e. they all conceive you their friend, they struggle even more personally to understand how you could have placed them in such a position.

Vincent explains how some actions are personally difficult to perform, in which case removing himself and wearing a “manager persona” comes as a necessity for him.

I think I started with a very friendly-friendly approach, and it’s only as you gain experience and probably face some of the tougher issues of management – making people redundant, having to sack people – both of which I’ve done not in this company but in previous ones, where you begin to realise that there has to be a distance level between you upfront, between yourself and the team. Because you may have to make decisions that aren’t initially, that aren’t actually pleasant, and you may have to follow them through and act upon.

However, Vincent stresses that it does not prevent him from being affected by what he does. Vincent seems to have clearly identified his “manager persona” as something that might come in handy as part of the job, but which is not him eventually.

Telling somebody they no longer have a job [is difficult][...] You begin to think about do they have a wife? Do they have children? Do they have, you know, large mortgage and bills to pay? Even if you try to remove yourself
completely, that will still go across your mind at some point cause losing your job is a major life changing thing for most people. So from a morality perspective, you certainly think about it. Anybody who says they don't I would say is probably a liar.

[...]  
- And removing yourself, is it something you find easy to do?  
Hem...I would say...personally you need to - or I certainly need to kind of sit and take a little bit of time before I actually get through with the action, and that bit of time is actually that time to sort of remove all the thoughts of "concern and why" out of my mind to actually focus on what needs to be done. So it's taking time to sort of reflect and be quite conscious of pushing some thoughts out of the way. Because it's clearly a function of "this must be done and you need to execute that", albeit someone might say.

Relationship to Others

Vincent seems genuinely concerned with others, not just as employees but also as individuals. It could be argued that Vincent's friendliness towards his team members is instrumental in so far as it allows him to achieve good results.

- And spontaneously, you would go for the friendly approach?  
Hem...it certainly is a way of getting a good result from people. In terms of management styles, I would have a military background as well, so some would say they would expect me to have a military style to my management and in fact I don't, cause to get the best out of people it's better not to dictate what they should do but to actually use some of the other skills like coaching, mentoring etc, a bit of a friendly approach ultimately, pretty much getting people to really want to do what you want them to do as opposed to telling them what they should do.

However, the importance of teamwork and team spirit in his approach to management suggests that his concern might be more than mere pragmatism or utilitarianism. Vincent does not seem to pretend to be a friendly manager, rather he acts friendly because he feels it is the right thing to do for everyone to work well and feel at ease, for example to “smile and laugh once in a while”.
I guess one of the biggest things that contributes to happiness is don't ever always focus on the negatives, particularly when you do it with your people. Even if you've got someone who is hopelessly bad, and everything he does is wrong, you have to find a way to make him smile and laugh once in a while. Because morale, individual people's morale will go down rapidly and stay down. And someone whose morale is very low isn't efficient to you or to the company at all. So, find a way, whatever way, to make people smile and laugh once in a while.

Vincent seems to care for the people who works with him. However he explains that things differ depending on how well he knows the person. In the following quote, Vincent mentions how firing people he did not personally know was much easier than firing people he worked with for several years. In the first instance, Vincent seems to find it easier to wear the "manager persona" and execute his task because there is less personal connection between him and the others; whereas in the second instance, Vincent feels personally involved in the relationship and does not seem to be able to remove himself.

In my last company, because they laid lots of staff off, I actually ended up doing that in several countries and in countries where I didn't know people it was getting easy because you have no relationship to the individual. So I was really the axed man that comes along and shops pieces of the company apart. Where you're in a position of a relationship with an individual, it's where it gets a lot more difficult.

- And you find it really easier that if you don't know the person, then you don't have the same problems?

Well, that's your actual business, isn't it? I've been sent to this country to tell 5 people they no longer have a job - okay. I can do that. I get to fly out to the country tomorrow morning and throw in the news. I guess, I don't want to sound really cold in that respect, but it is very easy if you don't know people. If you actually know people and you have known them for a long time, I'm thinking in particular of one individual in France who I had to lay off but whom I worked with for 8 years - if you do it the right manner, you never know how life will turn around. He now works for me again, and I went and hired him last year after a 5-year break.
Vincent’s apparent coldness however does not necessarily imply he does not care for people he does not personally know. Equally, he does not necessarily calculate his interests in the relationship. Rather, Vincent seems to act out of decency, bearing in mind that people have lives outside work and that they deserve consideration. Actually, Vincent seems to naturally empathise with others, which requires a significant connection with other people in the sense of perceiving that they are similar to him. It is remarkable that he shows great concern for the people he fires despite the fact he personally never was laid off. He demonstrates a personal responsibility about the way his actions affect other people’s lives. The following quotation relates experiences he has had of people being fired and clearly shows how he is concerned at a deeply personal level by the implications of such a decision.

No one likes to hear bad news, no one likes to be told bad news in a conflicting style if you like, or in an argumentative style or a very stern, you know “your performance is absolutely terrible. Get out” — you know, you clearly can’t say that from an HR perspective, but — in those terms, you know, very very negative. Hem...again, you know, if I — in the story where I have to lay off people, or let people go, the worst thing in the world is to literally take someone’s morale down to a very very low level. It’s a very very depressing thing losing your job. Thankfully I’ve never lost one but talking to friends who have, you know, there are huge things that go through people’s minds. You know, how would I feel as a manager if I told someone that they didn’t have their job and hours later they commit suicide that night? I would think about every word I said to that individual, and whether the words I said contributed to the action that they took. It sounds drastic but you kind of have to think about that... Clearly there are reasons why someone has to leave the company, whether be it financial or be it performance issue, etc. But there are ways you can break the news to them in a [...] more gentle fashion so that doesn’t leave someone terribly depressed with the possible bad consequence.

- So you think it’s almost a moral responsibility that you have in trying to be as nice as possible?

Yes. Would you fire somebody on a Friday? No, for then they have the weekend to think about it before they can talk to you about it again. You would fire them on a Monday or tell them they don’t have a job on a Monday. But they have four weeks of notice to work, which means on Tuesday they can actually come and talk to you. The time of the week is important, you
know. Do you know enough about your employee to say it's his birthday this week-end or his wedding anniversary or you know — if you know enough about that and there's something consequential coming along, you'd actually say "d'you know what, I'm not going to do it then, I'm gonna push to try to do it a few days later." Don't ruin a particular special occasion. Sounds maybe a little bit oversensitive but at the same time you just try to think "don't ruin something completely for somebody".

- And when you don't know the people?

It's a lot easier to fire them, you don't need necessarily to think about that, it's less hard cause you don't know the details. In my last company, we — I was involved, but ultimately we laid off 20 staff on the last day before Christmas. Personally, I think it was a really nasty thing to do. I think if it was me and I was able to make the decision, I would have all let them have a nice Christmas and on the first day back in January, given them the news. Because what's worse way to spend Christmas than to hear you have no job, you just spent all your money on presents and everything else for the kids and the family, and you probably end up worrying the entire Christmas. And trying to find a job at Christmas time is not that easy, everyone's gone on holiday, so...that's me!

**Choice, Decision and Moral & Ethical Conscience**

Vincent appreciates discussing issues and taking advices when it comes to making a decision, especially when it has moral implications. He explains below that everyone should be aware that one's action could have wider implications for both oneself and the organisation, so that one might be well advised to ask for a second opinion.

There can be consequences for things you say and do for the company and you need to be — clearly we get training in all this kind of stuff but clearly you need to be aware of the fact that your actions as an individual could place the company in a compromised position. And in those cases, yes there are decisions you come to where you'll actually say "I'm not prepared to call this. I've got to go up to the appropriate level of management to explain the situation and say: I'm not prepared to call this because I believe this could be an issue for us, it could go both ways, etc."
For Vincent, this reflects “moral courage” in acknowledging one’s limits and pursuing more than just one’s own interest.

Talking is a good thing. A talk would quite often get you around to the decision point of what needs to be done or etc, etc. Keeping everything inside, it just kind of bubbles around in your mind. You may come up with a solution but it may not be the best one. That’s the other thing, what’s to say that if you make a decision completely on your own that it is exactly the best one to do? So when the occasion arises, actually get another opinion on things. It may not change your initial approach, or it may change it slightly, [...] but eventually in people situation I think that’s quite important. Cause you may not see it, someone may see it completely differently from you.

In that respect, Vincent is not always confident in his analysis of a situation, but he is confident in his ability to seek advice if he feels unsure, and to sense his limits if he is unable to do something. It is as if he has managed to set up a process that enables him to make sure he is doing the right thing, both within or outside the moral domain. This shows for example in the following excerpt.

I would say definitely looking at something and realising that it’s, it’s not within your capability, maybe – I don’t know, a job opportunity – you know, it might pay £500,000 a year but you actually look at it and say “do you know what? There’s no way I can actually do this” – that’s being true to yourself. [...] Understanding if you’ve reached your limits on something...and your self-confidence or your pride might have to give way to the fact that you need to go and seek assistance or help with something. Having the humility sometimes to deal with the situation cause not everybody likes to admit that – yeah, they might call it failure sometimes. It may not be failure, it may just be that you actually... maybe you don’t know the way out, but you may see that as a failure in yourself because you weren’t able to deal with something.

- Is that something that you feel?
No, not really. The humility one – I think that humility, to be able to put your hands up on occasions and say “yeah, I screwed up” – I’ve certainly done that one! – and having the confidence to say “do you know what? Yeah, I messed up here, but you know I’m prepared to learn from it, I’m prepared to take the input, help, etc” – that’s a great quality and a great skill. Hem, it’s also something that I think is essential in anybody, because otherwise, if you
don't – if you cannot do something like that, you find that inevitably you have
to lie on occasions.

Vincent thus seems to have an acute sense of his responsibility in the chain of
actions. This in turn appears to bring him confidence in his ability to manage his
resources and his “inner strength” in order to bypass his pride and achieve the best
outcome. Vincent has established what looks like a structured, logical way of
approaching an issue. Yet Vincent seems more in line with an ethical conscience
than a moral conscience, in so far as he does not rely on existing rules or customs to
make up his mind. Rather he acts on how he feels like acting with “enough
consciousness in his mind”.

I think some of it’s because you might start trying to do something and you
find you’ve reached your limit, so there’s this sort of trial-and-error approach.
Hem... it may well be that you try to analyse it, and so from an analytical
perspective you look at it and say “can’t see how I would deal with this” and
at that point you’re going to seek advice. Hem... with the trial-and-error
approach I would say it’s also having the confidence to say “hum, I’m gonna
have a go at this and see where it takes me” [laugh], but with enough
consciousness in your mind that says “if I reach a certain point when this
isn’t working I know I’m gonna have to go and seek assistance or whatever
to actually get it to term.”

- So how do you put the limit “okay, at that point, if I haven’t succeeded, it’s
  because I can’t do it and I have to seek assistance?”

[...] I think it always depends on the circumstance. You kind of need to – you
need to identify what I would call the control measures, the yardsticks with
which you say “it’s this, this and this in order to actually make that happen”.

Connectedness to Self and Compartmentalisation

Vincent does not try to compartmentalise his life, but acknowledges how other
aspects of his life can help him deal with a work-related issue. He does not deny that
he becomes emotionally involved in his job, but he seems to have learnt to manage
the importance it bears, especially as time passes by.

Time is a great healer. You’ll get to a point where – after a period of time
where something else takes a more emotionally significant importance. And
that might be a matter of hours, it might be days, it might be a few weeks, but eventually it will move into the background in your own mind. You'll still remember it, as I was talking I was thinking of the scenarios I've been through, but I don't think about them everyday. They might come back into my mind if I'm presented with a situation of having to do the same things in this company, and you begin to think "how did I deal with it last time? What happened? Elo".

Vincent does not consciously try to forget about how he feels, because it would not be possible ("You'll still remember it"). Instead, he accepts that the issue is on his mind and takes the opportunity to discuss problems with other people to identify new solutions.

[...]

I certainly go home with work issues on my mind. My wife says "what's up?", I try explain with a lot of technical speech terms, she stares very blankly and says "I don't understand a word you said". Hem, but particularly on the people's front, you do take issues home, you do think about it, you probably discuss some things in a slightly different light to it but...[...]

-is that something you do willingly or you can't help it?

Hem...I would say it's probably because you can't help it because from a body language perspective it's very clear that things aren't normal. You know, you look a bit depressed, you look like you've had a hard day at the office, which naturally brings the question "have you had a hard day? What's up? Do you want to talk about it?" at which point you make a decision yes or no to talk about it.

[...]

Well until very recently, my wife was equally a manager in a local government, so completely different institute doing completely different things, but that is quite interesting, you know, to be able to come home and talk to someone else who manages people about a particular problem that they are totally removed from any familiarity of the staff etc, and can to some extent give you an unbiased opinion of what they think and how they would handle it.

We could argue that Vincent has some sense of his self, although he may not be consciously aware of it. He seems to acknowledge the humanity in other people, and he tries to act not out of duty but more out of a sense of personal responsibility for the other person. Even when he argues he finds it easy to fire people he does not
personally know, or when he states that there is not much he can do when someone is being laid off, he still demonstrates a tendency to behave in a decent manner, to do what he can to respect the other person, as this quote illustrates.

Well, the reality is that there's nothing you can normally - there's nothing you can do to actually change the fact that they are going. Hem...personally, if I can, you know, I offer to help them by way of "if you need a job reference" if you want, those kind of things. Clearly, in some circumstances that might not be appropriate if they're a bad performer, but for example, someone being made redundant you can offer to help them in the perspective of you know "if you want someone to write you job references". And also finding from a company side whether there's help and assistance, particularly to people who are being laid off, that the company can provide to help them find a new job. But there isn't that much you can do. [laugh]

To that extent, Vincent seems to have accepted the challenges of his job but he nevertheless brings his whole self at work, which maybe gives him greater confidence in managing his team and making fair decisions.

I think I probably carry things from my personal life into work. Hem, the military bit I referred to earlier, [...] I carry a lot of that into the workplace with me, [...] some of the values that you get taught there in terms of managing people albeit in a clearly far more disciplined fashion. And you apply some of those and you don't apply others. For that reason I'd say I carry more from the inside to the outside than in the other way round.

6.3. SUMMARY OF OTHER CASES OF MORAL EXPERIENCE

The following cases introduce both managers whose persona is very strong and overwhelming, managers who are more or less conscious of their persona but nevertheless are affected by it, and managers who seem to have found a sense of moral balance between their work and their self. They show the large range of attitudes in the way different managers experience morality and they highlight how each case tends to be unique. The cases are presented in alphabetical order and take up, as in the extensive analysis presented above as well as in the previous chapter,
the themes of the persona, the self, the shadow, compartmentalisation, and moral and ethical conscience.

6.3.1. CHARLIE

Charlie works for a Telecom company as Director of a regional product centre. He used to work as an engineer, then a product and project manager before starting to manage teams about five years ago. He is married with children.

Charlie's self seems to have been taken over by a persona that has been built from what Charlie perceives to be society’s expectations. Charlie appears to have adopted a “well-performing, efficient and committed manager”-type of persona, both in his professional and personal life. To him, being true to oneself means being interested in what one does and enjoying one’s achievements. Hence, professionally, Charlie is objective-driven, and personally, he cares for his family, as if he thus responded to what society expects of a manager and family man. He is clearly guided by a moral conscience, in that he believes in fairness within the frame of good business relationships. Charlie actually does not seem to display any awareness or discomfort in being so cut off from his self, although we could argue this potentially makes him morally “weaker”.

6.3.2. JOHN

John directs the transport company he established twenty years ago. He had experience in transportation, working for a big company, but grew interested in the wine market and decided to create his own enterprise to be independent. He trained in management by distance learning. He is married with children.

John seems desperate to find his self, but he does not really trust himself. He has complex relationships with others, in so far as he declares he needs time to know someone, yet he tends to trust a person based on their amiability. Furthermore, he needs others to validate him, and his image and the way his employees perceive him are extremely important to him. The various parts of his life overlap, but in all
aspects, John seems to seek to determine what he stands for, to realise himself somehow, although he does not really know what this entails. John tries hard to adopt a “boss” persona at work because “he has to” so that the staff respects him as such, yet he suffers from the distance he thus creates. Actually, John relies on others rather than himself to find answers about who he is and who he wants to be. He is open to his gut feelings, but his intuition is scrambled by his need to be connected to others, so that he fails to enact his ethical conscience.

6.3.3. LOUIS

Louis directs a testing and maintenance centre for aircraft engines, mainly dealing with the Army. Trained as a technician, he worked in the nuclear sector first, before studying to become an engineer when he joined his current employer some thirty years ago. He is married with grown-up children.

Louis appears to have a strong persona which he uses as a façade or a shield because it reassures him. Image is central to him, and he pays much more attention to what others seem to think of him than to what he thinks of himself. His front is bright, colourful as if to demonstrate he exists, he is there. Yet, his apparent unshakable self-confidence, core element of his persona, seems to conceal his uneasiness when he faces the apparent lack of substance of his self. It looks like Louis lives for the pretence and has shut off most of his self to favour what he sees as a brilliant, honest and confident image, but which really is an illusion which covers up his shortcomings. Indeed, his rationale for being honest is not moral per se, since he worries that people may find out the truth from someone else, and this might discredit him if he lied. His relationships to others are essentially instrumental, and his ethos seems directed towards his self-interest, although he argues his actions are guided by the organisation’s interest.
6.3.4. **Nick**

Nick is a joiner-cabinetmaker who has set up his own company six years ago to implement his creativity. He remains a craftsman although he had some management experience in his previous company, and he now supervises a small team of people. He is married.

Nick personifies the craftsman, and his morality is pervaded by his view of his craft. He is passionate about his work and the ability to create high quality furniture for customers. He seems to view his staff as resources, as tools that contribute to the creation of a product. Nick does not seem to compartmentalise his life (his work takes much of his life), nor does he distinguish productivity from his staff’s well-being. To him, these two aspects are linked, in so far as you must take care of the production tools (including the employees) so that you achieve a high quality product, which provides the satisfaction of mastering a craft. He thus invests a lot of money and a lot of himself into ensuring good working conditions to his employees. Yet this does not appear to be purely motivated by profit, rather it epitomises his love of the craft and his willingness to perfect it. Nick does not seem to calculate or overthink too much, yet being his own boss, he seems to have managed to find a balance which enables him to express himself through creativity, and his ethics directly derives from that.

6.3.5. **Oliver**

Oliver trained in design and worked in various architecture practices. A serial entrepreneur, he currently oversees three small enterprises covering various aspects of the building industry. He used to be an associate in architecture firms, before founding his first own firm two years ago. He is married with grown-up children.

Oliver’s main obstacle appears to be his persona which disguises an uncertainty about himself. Indeed, Oliver seems full of contradictions, and somehow lacks a clear sense of direction. He has had quite a few failures and disappointments in his professional life, which he argues has made him adopt a less risky attitude nowadays;
yet he still gets involved in projects with maybe too much enthusiasm and not enough reflection. Oliver also argues that he makes his decisions mainly through rational thinking, but also depending on his intuition and the “affective” component; although later he explains that he does not rely on his intuition nor emotions that much. Actually, Oliver seems anxious to build an image that would give him some sense of direction, yet he seems unable to decide on an appropriate image to cultivate. His persona is not quite defined, and he seems focused on it rather than on his self. His morality is equally unstable, although it tends to be self-interested in so far it is based on meritocracy, i.e. one gets the reward one deserves thanks to one’s efforts.

6.3.6. **RYAN**

For the past seven years, Ryan has been working as team leader and project manager for a civil engineering company doing mainly road-works. He studied plant-biology and came to work in this industry by chance. He is married with children.

Ryan tends to feel the need to prove himself, maybe because he lacks confidence in his self. He has a good contact with various sort of people, and he actually enjoys the relational aspect of his job. Ryan is also very demanding both of others and himself, and he cares about achieving his objectives. Ryan seems to have set a strong and personal rule of conduct, which is based on fairness and exemplarity. Hence, he will not accept of someone that they refuse to do something he himself does. Thus, his ethical conscience is entangled in an excessive concern for being an exemplar. Actually, Ryan does not seem to try and adopt a persona which conveys great work dedication; rather, it looks like his ethos of exemplarity reassures him on his behaviour and his fair retribution. It is as if Ryan wanted to be his self, but does not think that what he does, or what he is, is enough or good enough. He thus creates a behaviour to enact what he thinks is appropriate.
6.3.7. SAMUEL

Samuel spent most of his career working in the automotive industry. He started as a technician and climbed the ladder to become a manager. He currently works as a franchisee and manages two car servicing concessions. Prior to this, he worked as a director of a car servicing unit for a supermarket company for about five years, before deciding to become independent four years ago. He is married with grown-up children.

Samuel seems to present a softer persona than who he really is. For instance, he claims he doubts himself although he rarely questions his decisions once they are made. He also argues that you can really know what you are made of through the image others have of you, and yet he tends to self-reflect a lot and thus uncovers his shortcomings and strengths. Actually, Samuel is ambitious and has a clear need to be independent, although he does not appear to feel entirely comfortable with being perceived as such. Hence, it looks like he creates a persona to soften his character. Samuel demonstrates some sense of ethical conscience and is clearly ill-at-ease when he feels he has gone too far, yet he does not fundamentally question his behaviour. This suggests that Samuel's ambition is nurtured by some aspect of his shadow, which in turn prevents him from coming to terms with his self and which drives his need of a persona that balances his sense of self.

6.3.8. TIM

Tim works as a European business manager for an IT company. He has been part of the company since 1979 and has held various sales management positions. He first trained and worked as an engineer before moving into marketing and sales. He is married with children.

Tim seems to have found a satisfactory balance in his life, although his drive is in winning challenges in both his professional and personal life. Although he states he “naturally” compartmentalises his life, he can think about a work issue at home until he has found a solution. He is quite open to various cultures, but he seems anxious to
locate himself amongst others, as if he felt unsure of his own identity and of what he stands for. Values are important for him, yet Tim does not reflect much on his actions, but rather acts out of a sense of pride and self-motivation. Tim seems to display a need to prove to himself that he is indeed as he wants to be, suggesting a hidden influence of the shadow. Tim probably uses a mix of moral conscience and ethical conscience, backing the latter with the former when feeling insecure.

6.3.9. **WILL**

Will is a director of operator marketing for an IT company. He has been working for the same company for about twenty-five years, although the company he started with was purchased by another company a few years ago. He trained as an engineer but then moved on to sales, and later marketing, quickly after having figured out he would not make a great career as an engineer. He is married with children.

Will seems to have a strong “business-like” persona, although he endeavours to demonstrate he is unlike many other “business-focused” managers. Will considers himself a good leader, but an equally good manipulator. He states he cares for his team because they then work better, and he seems rather anxious to illustrate how considerate he is in his relationships to others. Yet, Will appears to be extremely proud of himself, and his need to be perceived as different from others suggests that his shadow sustains this aspect of himself. Will seems to seek recognition and his behaviour towards others, although partly genuine, may also be pervaded with a sense of instrumentality, i.e. what others will think of him if he acts in such or such way. His decisions seem to rely on a mix of moral conscience and ethical conscience, in so far as he clearly separates the business aspect of a decision (i.e. this action is justified for economic reasons) from the relational aspect of the decision (i.e. how do I tell this person about so and so?). This maybe creates some tension which he alleviates by focusing on the perception others have of him.
6.3.10. **XAVIER**

Xavier is a technical staff engineer for an IT company in which he's been working for twenty-three years in various technical roles. He punctually managed teams throughout his career, though his job remains mainly technology-oriented. He is married with grown-up children.

Xavier tends to rely on clear guidelines and boundaries to make decisions regarding his job and more generally in his life. He seems anxious to remain within the lines of what is acceptable and what is not. Although he argues that he has pretty strong ethical values, he admits that there is a significant grey area in which compromises are necessary. He explains that for the important things, one should not compromise; however, this does not seem to reflect an ethical conscience but rather a moral conscience. Indeed, Xavier seems to find rules and codes reassuring, in so far as it helps him justify his decisions “objectively”. It seems like Xavier finds it difficult to rely on his self, so that he prefers finding support through written texts or customs.

**6.3.11. YOHANN**

Yohann has been an advanced technology director for an IT company for one year, although he has had various managing positions in the same company over the past fourteen years. Trained as an engineer, he went into management by choice. He is married with children.

Yohann tends to be very self-reflective. He questions his decisions a lot because he wants to ensure it is the right one and he is not misleading himself. In fact, Yohann seems to be sensitive to his ethical conscience, but at the same time he demonstrates some awareness of his shadow, in so far as he is conscious that he might make a decision that makes things easy for him, although it might not be the best solution for everyone else. However, his shadow seems to lead him to doubt his ethical intuitions, in which case Yohann adopts a more formal, “moral conscience” framework based on codes of conduct. Yohann does not really compartmentalise, although he feels the need to stop thinking about his work in order to enjoy the time spent with his family.
Others’ well-being is important for him, both because people are key resources and because he believes people should feel comfortable at work. Although this might look instrumental, it seems that Yohann does not aim to use others, but rather to ensure they work in the best conditions for the best results.

6.3.12. ZACK

Zack has worked as European director of strategy and business development for an IT company since 2005. He has worked for that company for fourteen years, holding various positions. He trained as an engineer, then moved into sales and sales management “for the money”. He is married.

Zack admits that he is “a completely different person at work”. However, his business persona appears to help him protect himself from the emotional strain of a job he does not seem entirely comfortable with. He claims he can compartmentalise his life, yet he does think about business issues when he’s at home. Zack seems able to empathise with other people, yet he argues that the business decision “has to” win over. In that situation, he tends to rationalise and wearing his persona helps him keep his distance with the person in front of him. Zack states he finds it easier to be true to himself at work than in his personal life. Actually, this rather means that at work, his moral conscience prevails, especially a business rationale, which makes him feel confident. Yet, he does not seem comfortable with this acting, in so far he wants to escape as much as possible from it in his personal life. Zack seems to fear being “uncovered” as he really is by his work colleagues, which could explain why he adopts a persona which tends to toughen him, although it is illusory.

6.4. SUMMARY

This chapter analysed extensively three more cases of moral experiences, and discussed the interviews against the Jungian framework. In this in-depth analysis, we highlighted how knowledge and connectedness to self seems to play a significant role in the way one reacts to a moral issue. We also suggested that those managers who shape their work around their values seem more confident in their ability to deal
with morally difficult issues than their counterparts, whose cases were analysed in the previous chapter. The chapter also provided an overview of the remaining cases, which were not presented at length, to illustrate the uniqueness of each case and the significance of these managers' moral experiences as made apparent through a Jungian conceptualisation. The following chapter critically discusses the meaning and implications of these findings.
CHAPTER 7 – DISCUSSION

“A million zeros joined together do not, unfortunately, add up to one. Ultimately everything depends on the quality of the individual, but the fatally shortsighted habit of our age is to think only in terms of large numbers and mass organizations, though one would think that the world has seen more than enough of what a well-disciplined mob can do in the hands of a single madman.”

Carl G. Jung
The Undiscovered Self

7.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the main findings and compares them with the literature. The discussion examines the implications of being an individual to foster moral perception, deliberation and action. Part 7.2 discusses the findings to assess the relevance of the Jungian framework in understanding how managers experience morality, as well as the importance of the self in this process. The following part, part 7.3, addresses the relation between individuation and phronesis, and considers the implications of this relation for managers. Finally part 7.4 considers other factors that potentially influence the process of moral deliberation and moral action, in particular the issue of free choice. It also discusses the implications they have for the self.

7.2. PERSONA AND SELF IN MORAL EXPERIENCES

The two previous chapters introduced the cases and analysed their characteristics with regards to the issue of morality. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the significance of these characteristics in developing a better understanding of managers’ moral experiences.
7.2.1. **MAKING SENSE OF MORAL EXPERIENCES**

The analysis of the cases showed how various Jungian concepts could be used to interpret managers' moral experiences. This part will briefly sum up the significance of these concepts. The persona and its correlate, the self-image, proved to be primary in apprehending and making sense of the moral experiences narrated by the study participants. The persona often seemed to be at the root of a person's relationship to the world, and more specifically to her perceived obligations as a manager. Some of the respondents clearly evinced a 'business persona' or a 'manager persona' which, in their view, carries out the features necessary to perform well in a somewhat ruthless and result-centred world. In this respect, the persona plays up a stereotypical view of what a good business person is expected to be: ambitious, results-oriented, pragmatic, rational instead of emotional, able to favour the organisation's interests over the individuals' interests. Yet for many respondents the persona seemed to occupy the major part of consciousness so that the ego could not turn its attention to the richness of the psyche. Indeed, when the ego-consciousness is busy fostering a persona, it does not have the resources to uncover the contents of the unconscious and to gain knowledge of the self at the same time. The apparent confidence or the obvious contradictions that were evident in some interviews illustrate how the persona has a direct effect on the perception of who one is as a person, and consequently on the actions of that person.

The persona also influences the quality of people's relationship to others. Indeed, the respondents with a relatively weak persona seemed to establish a link with other people based on an appreciation of these people as deserving the same respect as anyone else. However a strong persona can more easily influence one's projections and confuse the perception one has of the other person in terms of what she stands for or what she represents. In fact, when a person directs, either consciously or unconsciously, her psychic energy towards creating an image she wants to project in society, her perception of reality might equally be filtered by her persona. Thus instead of seeing others 'as they really are', that person is partly blinded by her persona and perceives others in a deformed way, although she might be certain her judgments about them are accurate. The type of relationship one has with others,
especially with one’s colleagues, employees or customers to a lesser extent, also shows the degree of compartmentalisation of the individual. Indeed it proves difficult to delineate when professional friendliness slips into personal friendliness. Yet a few respondents were keen on separating the professional from the social sphere, only to later admit that it is a difficult and relative boundary to maintain.

Jung’s conceptualisation of two various types of conscience is an important device in helping make sense of the moral deliberation of managers. In the analysis, moral conscience and ethical conscience, which respectively stands for the social norms on the one hand, and the inner voice that reflects the self on the other hand, were linked to the perception of having or not having a choice in the moral matter. The respondents who seemed to rely mainly on their moral conscience tended to feel more constrained by the context (for example the short-term profitability imperative) than the respondents who had a stronger sense of self and could rely on ethical conscience as well. This is because moral conscience is necessarily limited by the rules and customs of a social group, whilst ethical conscience draws from an archetypal source of knowledge. Indeed, as Jung explains, ethical conscience enables us to find “creative solutions” when we face a dilemma which we cannot solve by calling upon the moral rules and customs we usually use. Ethical conscience can be viewed as a way to free oneself from the bounds of customary morality in order to find a new path of moral action.

Finally, the contrast between compartmentalised and non-compartmentalised study participants is particularly interesting, in so far as it most clearly demonstrates the significance of connectedness to self in the enactment of one’s morality. Non-compartmentalised participants, who do not split their personality between work and home, are much more able to bring their values to work and to shape their environment according to these values, so that they can be ‘whole’ and they can be themselves at work as well as outside work. Their moral choices tend to be less compromised as a consequence. On the other hand, compartmentalisation, that is when a person dissociates depending on the context she is in, has the opposite effect on that person’s morality. The next part discusses in greater detail the meaning of these findings and provides illustrations drawn from the cases.
7.2.2. TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF MANAGERS’ MORAL CHARACTER?

Since we insisted on the intrinsic value of each individual case, it would be incongruous to override the specificity of each participant interviewed by collating them into collective types. It is however possible to compare the cases, bearing in mind that our knowledge of each case is only relative and necessarily constrained by the amount of data collected. The typology proposed is therefore relative to the cases studied, and should be viewed as a tentative way of interpreting the conclusions of the findings and relocating them within the literature. Jung (2001a:86) himself called for lenience when considering the accuracy or pertinence of a classification, and I make his position mine: “The list of possibilities seems both endless and useless for purposes of classification. I do not know how other people would set about the task. I can therefore only tell you how I myself have approached the matter, and I must submit to the reproach that my way of solving the problem is the outcome of my individual prejudice. Indeed, this objection is so entirely true, that I should not know how to meet it.”

As was suggested above, the persona occupies an important place in the overall moral character of the study participants. In many cases we could identify some level of a persona. The extent to which the persona prevails, as well as the reasons behind the persona’s strength, are varied. Nevertheless, the presence of a persona usually directs the attention of ego-consciousness away from the self to more collective matters, weakening the individuality of the person. On the contrary, some cases did not seem to show the existence of such a persona. Instead, the connection to the self seemed stronger in so far as these participants embraced their individuality more fully and seemingly more comfortably than others. We could thus tentatively classify the respondents according to their persona-self characteristics. Three broad categories could be identified: the cases where a strong persona prevails, the cases where the persona is used as a protection, and the cases where the participants are connected to the self to a greater or lesser degree. Each category is discussed below.
In the first category, we could argue that the respondents provide two main reasons that could explain the significance of the persona. For Charlie, Ethan and Louis, the persona tends to "fill in" for something else. In Ethan and Louis's cases, the persona seems to make up for an unsubstantial self, whereas for Charlie, the persona seems to have completely replaced the self. For these three respondents, the persona is the essential point of contact with the world, and the ego-consciousness seems fully directed towards fostering the persona rather than questioning it. Morally, we noticed that these respondents tended to adopt a self-interested approach, although they do not frame it in those terms. For Amy, Oliver and Will, things are slightly different. Their persona prevails, but its function seems attached to a sense of existence. Indeed, Amy and Oliver characteristically present a front because it reassures them, it gives them the impression that they exist. In other words, they seem so unsure of the value of their self that they rely on a constructed image to claim their place in society. The brighter this image, the more they feel their existence is confirmed. Rather than filling in a void as the respondents mentioned above, these respondents use the persona to disguise a deep uncertainty or insecurity about themselves. Will would fit into this category in so far as his need for recognition seems to reflect an insecurity about his real capabilities, and his ability to stand out. Yet, again, the ego-consciousness seems completely dedicated to nurturing the persona rather than questioning it.

The second category subsumes the respondents whose persona is present but to some extent is weaker than in the first category. A common factor is that they tend to use the persona as a protection, but they are not as comfortable with this situation as the respondents who belong to the first category. Somehow, they seem to have a more spontaneous relationship with others, which suggests they feel or yearn for something more than just the persona. Establishing 'fake' relationships with people based on their persona does not appear to satisfy them. Yet, they seem to neither understand the nature of this dissatisfaction nor to know how to challenge it. Within this group, two types of attitude can be distinguished: some of the respondents appear to use the persona as a protection almost deliberately, whilst others seem less aware of acting in such a way. Using the persona deliberately does not imply some manipulative behaviour; rather it means that the respondents tend to demonstrate a
certain awareness that they display a front to others, which somehow does not fully correspond to who they actually are, and they feel an uneasiness about it. Samuel’s and Yohann’s use of a persona as a deliberate protection seems under some degree of control. Both participants are very reflective and display some sensitivity to their self and to their ethical conscience. Yet it seems as if they hide their self behind a business persona because it seems to them the most appropriate behaviour given the circumstances, that is managing a profitable business. Although different, Samuel and Yohann both appear to be affected by their shadow, and they seem conscious of their capacity to act in a way they would judge morally wrong. Yet, instead of integrating the shadow and asserting the self, as the process of individuation would require, they appear to focus on the persona to help them cope with their shadow. Actually, acting a part is perceived as a safeguard against their own dark motives, in so far as the part they act is under control whilst the influence of the shadow is far less controllable. Should they accept to confront the shadow and to integrate their dark motives in a conscious effort to achieve their individuality, Samuel and Yohann would no longer need the illusory protection of a persona for they would embody their self, that is their true nature.

The cases of Irene, Martin and Zack are slightly different, in so far as they do not seem to control the use of their persona so much as they need their persona to protect them. It is almost a matter of survival because the gap between their self, their values and their job requirements is too wide to be managed consciously. Interestingly, these three respondents consciously try to compartmentalise their life tightly, although they do not really succeed in doing so. It is as if they need to convince themselves that ‘being the persona’ will prevent them from feeling ill-at-ease when they have to make difficult work decisions. Thus, it seems as if they have deliberately built a character which they wish to be different from who they really are, but whose features are adapted to the business environment. Yet, the pain, especially the moral pain, remains, in so far as they nevertheless have the feeling of having betrayed their core values despite having done what their jobs asked them to do. They want to find a comfortable moral space, which is why they try to convince themselves they can cope with adopting different moral behaviours when acting in different settings.
Other respondents, as we said, use the persona as a form of protection, yet they seem completely unaware of doing it. To this category would belong John, Ryan, Tim and Xavier, although the reasons for which they use their persona vary greatly. All of them share (along with the other respondents of this group) the commonality of being connected to their self to some degree. However, they do not seem to trust their self entirely. John feels he “has to” put some distance in his relationships with others, yet he suffers from this because it does not correspond to his personality. Ryan wants to do too much as if being himself was not sufficient, whilst Tim wants to win and learn from others as if to distinguish himself from the crowd and to be able to define who he is. Xavier doubts his ability to make the best moral decisions, hence he prefers to hide behind the formal codes attached to his business responsibilities rather than to engage himself with the issue. None of these four respondents seems to have established this protective persona deliberately; rather it seems that it has developed through time, without them being aware of it. Nevertheless, they display some instances of dissatisfaction with the existing status quo, and their otherwise open relationships with others may entice them to aspire for something different, that is for a more spontaneous, true-to-self behaviour.

The third category includes the respondents who seem to be more acquainted with their self. We cannot state whether they are fully individuated or not, but they nevertheless seem to display the most direct connection to their self, compared with the other respondents. Within this category, we can highlight two paths: Nick and Paul seem closer to their self by way of the passion they can express in their work. Nick is an authentic craftsman, and his enterprise is more a means to serve his art than a business organisation. Paul is genuinely dedicated to the children’s well-being, and his work is ingrained in his dedication. Neither Nick nor Paul care to count the hours they spend working, because their work is almost an extension of who they are. They express their nature in what they do, so that they do not need to pretend to be someone they are not; instead, their actions echo the concerns and aptitudes of the self. In other words, Nick or Paul appear to actually ‘realise’ their self. They ‘naturally’ celebrate the virtues of perfection because their purpose is the perfect realisation of their art or their mission. Deborah and Vincent are also closer to their
self than the other respondents, but their rationale lies more in the strong values they carry than in the love of their job, although they do enjoy their work. Actually, Deborah and Vincent both act out of a strong consideration for others, which takes a different form. Deborah believes in honesty and fairness, and her values are so strong that she acts as if they were constitutive of her being. To not act according to her values would be like betraying herself. Vincent has a strong connection to others, so that to not act in full consideration of the other person as a person would be morally wrong. To consider the other person as a person means that we acknowledge the self in the other person, so that the connection is actually made between two selves who acknowledge one another. In fact, Vincent would not be true to himself if he did not act in a considerate way towards others. Hence, for Deborah and Vincent, their values are central to their sense of self, to who they are, so that betraying their values would mean betraying themselves, something they are not readily capable of. Neither of them manage to control the circumstances in which they work, so that they sometimes face situations they morally disapprove of, but which they cannot change. Yet, in those cases, they either feel a strong uneasiness, or they disengage themselves so as not to compromise their values. Table 2 below provides an overview of the respondents classified according to these three main categories.

Table 2. Summarised Typology of Participants’ Moral Character

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charlie</td>
<td>Strong persona prevails and &quot;fills in&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethan</td>
<td>Strong persona prevails and claims to &quot;exist&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel</td>
<td>Persona is a deliberate but &quot;controlled&quot; protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yohann</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin</td>
<td>Persona is a deliberate but necessary protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zack</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ryan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xavier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nick</td>
<td>Connectedness to self through enacting a passion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deborah</td>
<td>Connectedness to self through enacting strong values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vincent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7.2.3. Relevance of the Jungian Framework

It is possible to link this typology with the Jungian framework of morality. As Figure 6 shows, the different types are located in different areas of the framework. The respondents whose persona prevails (coded as yellow) have their ego-consciousness mainly orientated towards the persona and the social world as in a representation. The respondents whose persona is used as some sort of protection (coded as green) might have some sense of their persona but tend to avoid exploring their personal unconscious. They are mostly concerned with conflicts of duty which they do not always solve by appealing to their ethical conscience, and which they rarely experience with comfort. Finally, the respondents who are closer to their self (coded as violet) have stepped in the dynamics of ethical conscience and the realisation of self. They are therefore more capable of resolving conflicts of duty and intuiting into ethical conscience and the archetypal knowledge of the self.

Figure 6. Participants located within the Jungian framework of morality

Source: Compiled by author
We shall discuss in more detail the characteristics of each type. For the respondents whose persona prevails, the significance of the moral rules and customs tends to be relative, in particular to their own interests. This means that they refer to the moral rules and customs that best foster their personal goals. Of course, these six respondents have different motivations and we do not argue that they act immorally. However, their actions are guided by values which emerge from a collective image rather than an individual will. Being selfish does not necessarily imply that one person expresses her individuality in the Jungian sense. The persona is “a mask of the collective psyche. Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be” (Jung, 1977:158). Thus the respondents subjected to the influence of a strong persona remain the object a collective and do not exist as true individuals. The persona prevents them from breaking off the dominating influence of the collective to assert their individuality. Morally, they are enslaved by an image which they take as deeply personal, but which really is just the expression of collective archetypes. Again this does not mean these respondents are morally bad, but rather that they seem unable to use that **libre arbitre** so constitutive of moral responsibility, hence unable to decide to act according to the highest degree of conscience, the ethical conscience. Jung (1977:153) stresses that “every man is, in a certain sense, unconsciously a worse man when he is in society than when acting alone; for he is carried by society and to that extent relieved of his individual responsibility.”

The respondents who seem more connected to their self appear to be sensitive to their ethical conscience. Even if they are not individuated as yet, they have a strong enough sense of self to act as individuals and extricate themselves from the collective. They seem to have sensed that “[f]ar too much of our common humanity has to be sacrificed in the interests of an ideal image into which one tries to mould oneself” (Jung, 1977:157). By rejecting the persona society wants them to wear, and by enacting instead what they feel is right, they get closer to that “shared humanity” that is embodied in the archetypal self. They react to that humanity in their relationships with others, whom they recognise as being of the same nature as they are. Since ethical conscience goes beyond the rules and customs of a society limited in time and space, drawing from the collective history of humanity, it potentially
attracts more innovative solutions to moral dilemmas, or at least it gives the strength or the impetus to act “as one should act” according to the vox Dei, albeit one can never be sure of the real nature of this inner voice (Jung, 1978a:26).

In between are the respondents who live through a persona but show signs of discomfort with it. They might glimpse into the self and get some sense of an intuitive moral call that echoes ethical conscience, but they feel more comfortable with the “formality” of moral conscience. They experience sometimes painful conflicts of duty, they may be sufficiently reflective to feel that they are not who they pretend to be in society, but they remain attached to this image, deliberately or not. Their position is morally difficult, because they tend to be constantly unsure of what the right thing to do is, given that they are torn between what the moral customs say (which tends to align with the persona) and what they perceive as another, perhaps more radical but no less imperious, voice representing the vox Dei, the expression of the self. For Jung, the only way out is to pursue the process of assimilation of unconscious contents, both personal and collective, in order to build up the individual personality: “In the last resort it is a man’s moral qualities which force him, either through direct recognition of the need or indirectly through a painful neurosis, to assimilate his unconscious self and to keep himself fully conscious. Whoever progresses along this road of self-realization must inevitably bring into consciousness the contents of the personal unconscious, thus enlarging the scope of his personality” (Jung, 1977:136). It is all the more important to obey “the will of God” as controlling it is not entirely possible, and resisting it leaves one with “a resentment that makes the otherwise harmless natural impulse our enemy” (Jung, 1978a:27).

The proposed typology of the moral character of the study participants is not unlike existing developmental models. In particular, Gozdz and Frager’s model (2003), inspired notably by Wilber’s work and transpersonal psychology, is articulated around characteristics similar to those of our findings. Their four-stage model is designed for both organisations and individuals, but we shall focus on the individual level. Stage 1 people are considered “narcissistic and egocentric”, lacking conscience, consciousness and compassion, rationalising their “own selfish
behavior”. In addition, “their learning process is distorted by an ego-centered lens”. Stage 2 people are called conventional, “characterized by self-doubt. They seek the comfort of external rules and authoritarian structure because they are afraid to rely on themselves and their own judgment. [...] Others cover their self-doubt with a façade of certainty and superiority.” (Gozdz and Frager, 2003:486). They are afraid of questioning the system and don't question their motives either. Stage 3 groups the self-actualizing people who are “present-centered; they experience the world more fully than most people. [...] they have managed to reduce their ego defences and have become more capable of relating to others and perceiving the world around them with minimal distortion.” (Gozdz and Frager, 2003:487). Yet, they are also ambitious and in need of recognition for pursuing excellence. Finally, stage 4 people are “integral”, in so far as they are more fully connected to the world and to others through experiences which have tended “to increase humility and compassion and decrease self-concern and self-importance” and to aspire for “a sense of inner and outer unity” (Gozdz and Frager, 2003:489).

On comparing the two typologies, respondents submitted to their persona could fit into stage 1 or 2, whereas stage 3 and 4 would include participants who show a greater connectedness to their self. In particular, the process of reducing the “ego defenses” suggests the abandonment of the persona and the endeavour to bring the ego-consciousness’s focus onto the content of the collective unconscious. Integral people are seemingly individuated people. However, the Jungian framework enables us to grasp the specificities behind each case whereas Gozdz and Frager’s model remains descriptive or didactic at best. It does not provide tools to understand why stage 1 people are enmeshed into narcissism and egocentrism, nor does it offer more than general observations about how stage 1 people can move up to the higher stages. It is possible, or even likely, that the cases are so specific that no detailed advice can be formulated. Nevertheless, the Jungian approach brings forward concepts that allow for a more complete analysis of the particular reasons that make an individual belong to a given stage, and suggests that disassociation of the ego-consciousness from the persona and integration of the shadow and other archetypes are part of people’s progression.
Since the ultimate goal is to become a complete individual, the process to achieve this goal should naturally respect individual needs and aspirations. Jung's conceptualisation of the unconscious as partly personal and partly collective offers the possibility of using a general method to achieve a specifically individual outcome. Archetypes are by their essence collective, but their expression is influenced by our personal history. The persona is equally a reflection of the collective, but it is tainted with the memories and experiences the individual has had. The self is an archetype, thus it is collective; but at the same time, its expression and realisation is very specific to the individual. Ethical conscience, which echoes the self, is by nature both collective in spirit and peculiar in its expression. Understanding that we are all different and yet made of the same essence is a challenge that underlies every model of moral development, because we shall acknowledge that all models are potentially regressive as well as progressive. To guarantee a more solid progression and avoid a possible regression, it seems necessary to fully understand the context and content of the stages, the obstacles that prevent an individual from evolving and the challenges of progressing. For Jung, consciousness was central to any work of self-development because, without it, some issues remain unsolved and will need to be dealt with at a later stage (Jung, 1977). Colman (2008:360) emphasizes that knowledge of self and self-perception are necessary to direct one's behaviour: “actions of the self become increasingly conditioned by the self-reflexive sense of the self we feel ourselves to have. This is why it matters so much who we think we are and whether our image of the self is in accord with our basic nature, our personal way of being-in-the-world.”

7.3. INDIVIDUATION AND PHRONESIS IN MANAGERS’ MORALITY

Bankwala (2004:162) states that “In understanding behavior it is important to see that I behave the way I do depending on what I value in life. [...] If I lack clarity [of my values], any method will do.” We have attempted to clarify the relationships between values and behaviour. The findings have pointed out the significance of the self as the central component within one’s morality and moral system. We could thus reformulate Bankwala’s statement as follow: In understanding moral behaviour it is important to see that I behave the way I do depending on how I value myself, if I
lack clarity of my self, any moral attitude will do (whether right or wrong). Besides, if I lack clarity of my self, the virtue of *phronesis* will not prevent me from making the wrong choices. Individuation and *phronesis* are thus entangled as necessary conditions for sound moral deliberation and moral practice. Persona, shadow or other archetypes can alter our perception of what good common sense is. Indeed, the wise man sometimes ignores in good faith that he is unwise, because his perception of himself is blurred by some archetype whose influence he has not become aware of. In good faith, he believes he acts guided by the self whilst he actually responds to the influence of another, perhaps darker archetype. Thus, unless we have managed to free ourselves from the pervasive influence of social roles and expectations to become a true individual, standing on our self-inspired values, we cannot be sure that we practice the virtues according to the appropriate mean. Connectedness to the archetypal self appears to be a more solid safeguard against the possible illusion of virtuousness.

We stated in Chapter 2 that *phronesis* was an important element of morality, which nevertheless lacked clarity. When read along the Jungian framework, *phronesis* gains clarity. Actually, *phronesis* enables the person to make just moral judgments, which are themselves inspired by ethical conscience. Ethical conscience is itself fostered by the achievement of an individuated state of being. Individuation therefore provides a necessary background to connect with ethical conscience and to apply its moral imperatives with the adequate sense of balance that *phronesis* offers. When faced with an ethical challenge, the individuated person who possesses the virtue of *phronesis* should be able to make sense of the choices she is presented with and to choose amongst them the morally appropriate behaviour (we called this process 'moral deliberation'). Furthermore, she also possesses the moral courage to listen to her inner voice and integrates it within her moral deliberation, as well as the moral strength to act in confidence that she does the right thing for others and for herself. On the other hand, the person who is not individuated because she is compartmentalised or because her consciousness is dominated by her persona should find it much more difficult to practice *phronesis* because she would lack a necessary sense of cohesion and direction of her actions. Indeed, we noticed that individuation brings a sense of realisation, implying that the individuated person actually realises
what she is meant to be (similar to her telos). But this realisation is one and unique, which is why it carries with it a dimension of wholeness. If the person has split herself or if she lives through an image that does not reflect who she actually is, her behaviour will lack cohesion and unity of direction. Whatever she aims to achieve tends to be multiple (hence losing some of its strength and meaningfulness) or fake (hence contradictory with the essence of beingness). Therefore she would experience difficulties in identifying the course of action which would lead her to the Good, to eudaimonia and to self-fulfilment. Becoming an individual in the truest and most essential sense, by connecting to one's self, constitutes a safe moral anchor from which phronesis can properly proceed. Individuation is not a pre-condition for phronesis, though; rather it provides the most favourable setting for phronesis to develop consistently. The person who is not individuated can practice the virtues and judge the appropriate balance of virtues in a given situation; however her ability to sense this appropriate balance of virtues could be disrupted by a persona or an archetype whose influence would not be recognised. On the other hand, the person who is also capable of identifying the disruptions of unconscious elements other than the archetypal self can sustain her sense of appropriate balance of virtues much longer. Besides, virtues for Aristotle aimed to unite the soul, just like the self claims the unity of the whole person. It is thus logical that the process of individuation echoes the purpose of Virtue Ethics, whilst clarifying its practical implications.

Berthouzoz (2000:250) insists that the process of individualisation (that is recognising each person as an individual), which characterized the development of society since the Middle Ages and especially since the second half of the eighteenth century, is "the expression of human being's dignity as a distinctive and primary value within every society." Consequently, ethical thinking ought to be founded on "an anthropology which accounts for the person in each and every dimension of her existence and in her dignity." (Berthouzoz, 2000:256). Bankwala (2004) concurs that the individual is the focal element of morality in society and in organisations, even before bringing one's attention to more universal purposes. If the person has a clear sense of who she is and what she stands for, as well as what she is capable of, she is more likely to unleash her potential and contribute to strengthening "higher aspirations about the outer world" (Bankwala, 2004:166). As we explained in
previous chapters (see especially Chapter 2, part 2.4), a comprehensive moral
enquiry ought to consider the people who enact particular moral behaviours. The
individual level of business ethics research remains primary to understand moral
experiences and improve moral behaviour. As a consequence, managers should not
forget that morality begins with the individuals who comprise the organisation.
Working on the organisational culture or the organisational ethos is not sufficient
because it fails to acknowledge the intrinsic value of the organisational members

We mentioned in Chapter 2 that successful modern managers should be able to adapt
both from experience and from a knowledge-database to respond effectively and
efficiently to the issues and the prospects of the business (Hannagan, 2005). On the
moral front, successful managers appear to need to develop a propensity to self-
reflect; they equally need to adapt less to the circumstances so as to favour the
expression of their self. Failure to do so does not make managers necessarily wrong
in ethical terms, but it certainly makes them much more susceptible to fail morally in
the course of their job. In the meantime, if the pressure gets too strong, they would
develop defence mechanisms, which include compartmentalisation and endorsement
of a ‘business-like persona’ as exemplified in some of the cases studied. Being and
acting as an individual, capable of discerning the appropriate virtues and values to
further one’s good as well as the common good, cannot possibly prevent moral
mistakes. However, it could encourage the development of a more comprehensive
approach to moral issues, which would eventually lead to a more human and more
fulfilling management style, that is a management style which is based on common
human values and which respects individualities. In Losoncz’s terms (2004:81): “To
exist as a self is for management to be situated in the spiritual and moral space of the
organization” which is viewed as “a communal structure for the personal identity.”
Managers in this purview are expected to adopt a “holistic frame of thinking”,
meaning that they ought to accept to expose their being to the community if they
want to contribute (Losoncz, 2004:83). Managers also need to acknowledge that they
are not detached from their work but rather project much of themselves into
management.
To that extent, management becomes more closely related with leadership, and even more with exemplarity. Because of the extensive decision-making and liaising in managerial jobs, managers have an opportunity to encourage change, providing they embody a changed attitude towards the morality of their actions. Individuated managers can potentially become moral exemplars in their organisations without sacrificing profitability. However, management must endorse a more fundamental moral responsibility towards the organisational members which accords with the implications of individuation and implies that: “An individual’s desire and right to be treated with dignity at work, to be able to grow and learn, to be connected to others, and to be a whole, integrated person cannot simply be sacrificed for economic expediency.” (Pfeffer, 2003:42).

This is not to deny that individuals live amongst other people, and interact within social structures that tend to have some degree of influence on them. These external circumstances certainly affect the process of self-reflection and individuation, as the cases analysed have suggested. In particular, we mentioned that participants sometimes felt they did not have the choice but to behave in a certain way, however painful or immoral they felt it was. This issue of choice, or lack of choice, needs to be explored further, because it calls into question the moral authority and responsibility of the self.

7.4. THE ISSUE OF CHOICE AND AUTHORITY

7.4.1. FREEDOM TO ACT AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

Many study participants argued that their discretionary power was limited by the nature of the ‘system’. They declared that they enjoy their work and accept that the organisation puts demands on them in terms of performance, growth or even profitability. Actually, the case of Deborah or Vincent, who both work in rather large companies and within a very competitive industry, indicates that it is possible to combine strong values and organisational commitment, as Guillory (2001) or Krishnakumar and Neck (2002) suggested. Being ‘whole’ at work means being a complete individual, having realised one’s self and embodying its ethics.
Nevertheless, both participants also felt constrained by the imperatives of the business and the politics of the organisation. Vincent dislikes firing people, yet he concedes that sometimes there is no other option because the company has a good reason for firing these people. He adds that these decisions are not always in his hands, so that there is little he can actually do, except to try and deliver the news in the 'best' possible manner. He wants his organisation and his team to be successful, and he aims to achieve a good performance, yet he suffers from the ruthless mindset of the business. Deborah equally cares for her work and is deeply committed to performing well and satisfying the customers. She thus does not have an anti-business or naively altruistic viewpoint, and she firmly believes in the company and participates in its success. However, she feels uneasy with the organisational “politics” and the undue business claims made for marketing purposes. She wants to do business by the rules, but not at all costs. Yet, both Deborah and Vincent feel that they cannot change the rules and they cannot influence the decisions made by the top level management.

This feeling of powerlessness, or lack of choice, is even greater amongst respondents who compartmentalise their lives. Irene typically epitomises managers who feel they have to adopt a certain character that is appropriate to the business context, because else they would not be able to do the work. Like other respondents, she disapproves of some aspects of the profit-seeking business ethos, but she feels she does not have the choice but to accept them. We can recall that Athanasopoulou’s managers used similar mechanisms to cope with conflicting situations (2004 – see Chapter 2, part 2.4.2). However, we can wonder to what extent resorting to this “systemic effect” argument exonerates managers of their moral responsibility, as we already pointed out (see Chapter 2, part 2.3.2). The question can be asked at the organisational level (i.e. “I do not have the power to influence nor make the final decision”) or at the institutional level (i.e. “The business world is like that, this is what is expected of me”). The implications for the individual are nevertheless the same, and target his moral authority. The ultimate question becomes: is it true that comes a time when one does not have a choice? Thus, do people have mitigating circumstances for behaving in a morally questionable manner because they were operating within a morally questionable (or worse) context? Are we ever free to act as we wish or are
we always constrained by the circumstances one way or another? These questions are particularly relevant for managers as well as for the field of Business Ethics in light of the on-going enquiry about the morality of business organisations and of business practice. If business is an amoral or an immoral playground, which creates conditions to sustain this amorality or immorality, then business actors might not have the choice but to operate under corrupting circumstances. Their degree of moral discretion could be bound to the morality of the business context as well as to the spirit of management (that is acting as servant or agent on behalf of capital owners).

Terestchenko (2007) refers to studies on obedience to authority, in particular Milgram’s studies, as well as studies on assistance to a stranger in need. He highlights that people tend to alter their perception of the facts to justify their behaviour. For example, people witnessing an assault might declare that they did not think it was “for real” to conceal their lack of courage to intervene directly or even indirectly by just calling the police. People appeal to various mitigating circumstances to vindicate their decisions not to act and to exculpate themselves from the moral judgment of their weakness or cowardice (Terestchenko, 2007:171). Yet, Terestchenko suggests that this type of behaviour can be better understood if we account for the influence others have on our self-identity. Indeed, the persona is a product of the collective, so that others play a significant role in shaping the main traits of our persona. Others inhibit our self but reinforce our persona, so that when we feel the presence of others, we more easily slip back into our persona to make decisions. Out of fear or out of a sense of camaraderie, the latter differing from the essential quality of the ‘shared humanity’ we mentioned earlier, the person eventually acts for the group rather than for herself. Organisations where emphasis is put on a collective spirit of some sort, either positive or negative such as extreme competition between organisational members, nurture the conditions that favour the emergence of persona-led characters. The bottom-line question thus becomes more subtle, because the persona is naturally influenced by the circumstances given that it is a product of the collective. The persona is thus partly shaped by the social context, by the expectations carried out in the collective, which can change along with time. Indeed, the persona may rightly feel that it does not have a choice but to act in a
certain way, since the expectations upon which it has been elaborated points in that direction.

However, it does not mean that the person is not free to act otherwise, especially if her self, through her ethical conscience, points her in another direction. The person is eventually responsible for making the choice to do what the collective expects of her or what her self (which is also collective but of a different quality) impels her to do. John, Samuel and Yohann are good examples of individuals who are clearly confronted with making this choice everyday, although they are not always conscious of the nature of the choice. John, for instance, feels that he has to juggle with the various expectations of his employees, his clients and himself. This situation is difficult for him because he does not feel free to act as he feels like acting. Yet, he participated in creating this persona because he believed it was necessary to maintain the level of respect employees should have towards their director, or to establish the cordial but respectfully distant relationships with wine growers (his clients). John reproduces a collective image of SME director because he sees it as the only accepted way of behaving, although he would intuitively prefer acting differently to manage his company.

The structure of the social institution may equally exert pressure on people to give up their individuality and to adopt the role they are expected to fulfil. Bureaucratic organisations are concerned with directing individuals to fulfil a common good or to achieve a common performance by way of an anonymous structure. Any system organised around a central authority which imposes its will over that of its individual members creates conditions of alienation. Compartmentalisation is the first step of a gradual process that aims to disengage people from their sense of self and their individuality to create a mass of obedient workers. Extreme examples of this phenomenon are Nazi Germany or the USSR under Stalin’s ruling, whose excesses are not comparable with any existing organisation. However, the process of de-individuation is essentially the same, and proceeds sufficiently slowly for people not to feel that they are changing, or rather that they are losing their identity (Terestchenko, 2007:93).
Consequently, organisational culture should encourage rather than discourage the search for, and expression of, individuality, like Johnson (1981) suggested, without this shift being necessarily detrimental to organisational goals such as profitability. Although Kahn (1990) believes that ideals must accommodate work demands, we could argue that, notwithstanding the legitimacy of these work demands, individuated people would naturally work for the good of others as well as themselves. Therefore, individual aspirations and organisational goals would eventually adjust, but the moral standards thus obtained might change. Individuated employees might redefine organisational priorities, and challenge the acceptable minima of moral standards to support objectives that sustain respect for the shared humanity. The phenomenon of the persona, as illustrated by the cases examined, confirms how hypothetical models can shape real-life behaviours as Ferraro et al. (2005) noticed. The respondents who used their persona as a protection enacted what they perceived to be the managerial model, and endeavoured to remove their feelings and emotions from their decisions because there is no place for such things in business transactions. By acting in that manner, sometimes against their own feelings and emotions, they fulfilled the fallacious prophecy that people are rational decision-makers. On the contrary, they literally acted against the interest of their self even if their behaviour is labelled ‘self-interested’. Indeed, the interests of the self lie in the realisation of one’s individuality, the integration of the various emotions and rational capabilities to form a whole individual. Fragmentation or compartmentalisation thus go against the interests of the self. This stresses further how significant connectedness to self (the “présence à soi” underlined by Terestchenko) is in the making of moral decisions. Reinforcing moral rules or holding bureaucratic actors responsible for their role does not suffice to foster better ethics if people are not complete individuals, fully conscious of their moral authority.

In fact, granting a collective body the right to design the content of good ethics may strengthen the dominance of the persona even further. MacIntyre’s characters, in the end, are nothing but extremely strong and pervasive personas that overtake the personality and identity of the individual. The individual thus becomes the persona. In that purview, the individual self surrenders to the collective image of the “legitimate[d] mode of social existence” which the character represents; this
collective image stands for an ideal which is imposed on the individual, although he then begins to act as a moral and cultural referent for this same collective (MacIntyre, 1985:29). The responsibility to resist lies, again, in the hands of the individual, and constitutes the stepping stone of morality informed by ethical conscience, rather than just moral conscience. Actually, “it is up to each one to guard oneself against one’s own propensity to obey so as to be ready to act, under the circumstances where a ‘destructive’ authority exerts its commands, in accordance with the principles to which one adheres but which he is requested to leave aside” (Terestchenko, 2007:293).

7.4.2. **Moral Strength and the Authority of the Self**

The capability to act from the self rather than from an external source of authority becomes the most essential element to nurture moral strength. Moral strength has a significant influence with regards to each element of ethical decision-making discussed earlier (see Chapter 3, part 3.2.4). Moral strength is indeed necessary to enact our moral motivation and to develop our moral character (Treviño and Brown, 2004). Thus a person connected to her self is likely to be more able to follow her initial moral motivation and to display the necessary moral strength to act according to her ethical conscience. Connectedness to self also influences moral awareness and moral sensitivity, in so far as the persona may hinder the initial gut reaction a person might have felt towards a moral dilemma. The less a person is connected to her self, the less she is able to perceive when a decision goes against her moral values. However, if the person is connected to her self, she is more likely to have developed the awareness and sensitivity to assess a moral issue. Finally, moral judgment also depends on our degree of connection to the self. The more people are individuated and closely connected to their self, the more sensitive they are to the collective humanity of which every one has arguably inherited. The more sensitive to their self, the more concern for others they will tend to show, yet without sacrificing concern for themselves as well. Indeed, Nick or Paul care for their own interest and their well-being, but they do not separate it from the interest of the other people involved in their projects. These two respondents exemplify Terestchenko’s (2004) argument that altruistic people can also be self-concerned. The quality of altruism lies in the
fair combination of self-concern and concern for others. Terestchenko insists that self-sacrifice is not, and has never really been an altruistic requirement. Sometimes circumstances make self-sacrifice an altruistic necessity, but other times they do not.

Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007) asked a similar question. They felt the need to investigate further “how people determine whether or not they will act in a morally courageous way when faced with an ethical challenge” and articulated their study around the concept of moral courage (2007:132). They identified a path people follow when they have to make a moral decision: faced with an ethical challenge, a person will spontaneously have an emotional reaction that will lead her to a desire to act in a certain way. She then experiences a process of “self-regulation of the desire to act”, which is influenced by social norms and pressure, her perceived self-identity, contextual factors, as well as her character in the Aristotelian sense (i.e. her virtues, her values). Only then emerges the decision to act, which is necessary but not sufficient to generate an action. Indeed, the action is equally triggered by the automatic and conscious self-regulation process, that is the character traits on one hand, and the consciousness of one’s emotions and social factors of influence on the other hand. Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007:133) conclude that “this self-regulatory process is governed by an appraisal of whether acting (or not acting) is consistent with the type of person the individual is or wants to be.” This view confirms the centrality of the sense of self in any moral action, and provides a similar logic of decision-making and decision enactment to the Jungian framework we proposed.

The significance of ethical conscience as a reflection of the self to guide one’s action shows clearly in cases of potential “weakness-of-will” that the authors discuss. Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007:144) notice three cases in which the individual can lack moral courage. Firstly, he may be aware of a desire to do evil, so that he will need to be aware of his sense of right and wrong and commits to do the right thing; lacking moral courage would mean that he fails to connect to his sense of right and wrong. Secondly, the individual may know he could do evil but does not feel a desire to do so, in which case he should know what is right for him, be committed to do the right thing and be aware that he can indeed achieve the right thing; if he either ignores what is right for him, fails to commit to do the right thing or fails to believe he can
achieve the right thing, the individual would have lacked moral courage. Thirdly, the individual may have the spontaneous, “first-order” desire to act in a morally right way, in which case he still needs to consider whether this is how the sort of person he is would act, and commits to his “personal standards of conduct”; failure to question his aspirations and failure to commit to his own standards of conduct would equally imply a lack of moral courage. Moral courage thus appears to be essential in each and every aspect of moral deliberation, because the individual can potentially fail to act morally well at any stage of the process and in any circumstances. From a Jungian perspective, each case requires a strong connection to the self and some progress towards being an individual, if the individual is to actually choose the morally right action. Knowledge of self, in particular knowledge of the “sort of person” one wants to be, is critical; however it is even more critical to determine whether the sort of person one is or one wants to be, which contributes to regulating one’s moral behaviour, is indeed a reflection of the self, or remains an object of the collective under the form of a persona or other archetypes.

Actually, Sekerka and Bagozzi (2007:145) rightly insist that “the multiple points of self-reflection, self-evaluation and self-regulation that the individual faces along the way to action are like ‘little mental acts’ of moral courage”; yet they fail to underline how deceiving the mental process of reflection can be. They perceive that individuals are vulnerable throughout the process, and they understand that organisational context can stimulate or undermine our moral courage. Yet, they do not notice that the authority of the self lies in the complete expression of one’s individuality, outside the scope of what others expect of oneself. Moral strength could be described as the propensity to act with moral courage. If moral courage represents the ability to listen to the inner voice that tells right from wrong, moral strength would represent the quality of the connection to that inner voice. A person may well be capable of listening to her self, but if she is prisoner of a collective image, the quality of the communication will be poor. On the contrary, a fully individuated person has established a solid basis with her self, so that she can more readily capture the inner voice and focus her efforts on understanding its meaning, rather than pondering on whether it reflects ethical conscience or the ego-persona, for example. In this regard, Jung (2002:39) warned that the source of one’s actions must be individual and self-
led instead of collectively-bound, for the moral implications for the person and the community are clearly different:

"By that time, the patient [the individual] should have acquired enough certainty of judgment to enable him to act on his own insight and decision and not from the mere wish to copy convention – even if he happens to agree with collective opinion. Unless he stands firmly on his own feet, the so-called objective values profit him nothing, since they then only serve as a substitute for character and so help to suppress the individuality. Naturally, society has an indisputable right to protect itself against arrant subjectivisms, but, in so far as society itself is composed of de-individualized persons, it is completely at the mercy of ruthless individualists."

Terestchenko (2007:290) subscribes to this view and explains that those individuals who resist giving in the domination of the collective have in them certain qualities: "the irreducible consistency of a singular individuality, the sense of personal responsibility and of the absolute value of the principles on which it is based, the lucidity to tell truth from lies at once, the ability to see the world through one's own eyes and to act in accordance, the incontestable certainty to be within one's rights ("son bon droit"), the consciousness that preserving life is undoubtedly for every being a legitimate end, but not all cost." The decision-making and decision enactment stages are a subtle mix of emotions, reason and intuition, along with a sense of the relativity of our existence and the irreducibility of our humanity. These elements appear necessary to save morality from becoming subject to mechanistic or automatic modes of behaviour.

7.5. SUMMARY

This chapter has reviewed the findings from the cases analysed and confronted them with the literature. We discussed how the Jungian framework provides useful insights to understand how individuals experience moral issues, and we highlighted that connectedness to self and individuation appeared essential to lay the basis of one's moral authority, the authority of the self. We clarified how individuation contributes to fostering phronesis, and we discussed the implications this has for managers' moral practice. We questioned the constraints managers identify to justify
their behaviour, and we concluded that the ultimate moral responsibility of a person is to live as an individual rather than as the reflection of a collective. In particular, we argued that being an individual would equip one with the necessary moral strength to act in a morally good and consistent manner, in full consciousness of one's actions.
CHAPTER 8 – CONCLUSION

8.1. REVISITING RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

This study aimed to provide elements to better understand the way managers experience morality, thereby establishing the significance of the self in morality. The questions raised at the beginning of the thesis have guided the discussion, and we can now turn to them again to review our findings.

The main research question was concerned with how managers personally experience morality. From the cases examined, we first need to stress that each experience is unique to the individual and his circumstances. Amongst the study participants, some demonstrated a clear sense of self shaped by their personal values, whereas others were more inclined to act the part, out of fear, lack of confidence or ignorance of their self. Nevertheless, the self emerged as a core element influencing the decision-making and the enactment of the decision made. The self affects the person not merely in a rational way, in so far as its influence goes beyond asking oneself “Is this how the person I am, or the person I aspire to be, would act in this situation?” The spiritual aspect of the self, what some psychologists call the “higher self”, plays a great part in apprehending the morally appropriate behaviour, which accords with the self we are. It provides coherence, a sense of unity of identity and of direction. The self provides *phronesis* with a safe anchorage to develop moral practice.

The sub-questions we raised regarding morality have been addressed in the course of the literature review as well as the main study. Our aim was to investigate how managers experience their personal morality and their moral boundaries. Although the data collection and analysis were conducted systematically and with acknowledgement of contextual factors, the findings discussed in the previous chapter remain the researcher’s interpretation of the participants’ views articulated within the Jungian theoretical framework. As such they do not claim to be
categorical statements about management ethics, but they invite managers to envision their self and their moral experiences in a different manner.

We can conclude that morality tends to hold both a personal and a universal dimension. Many respondents referred to similar values such as honesty, integrity and respect when they defined what they believe morality entails. However their understanding of morality seemed influenced by their connectedness to their self, that is the relative significance of their persona, and to some extent of their shadow. The cases tend to suggest that the stronger the persona, the more self-interested the person tends to be; whilst the weaker the persona, the more sensitive the person is to the shared humanity in every one. As a consequence, the way the respondents apprehend their moral boundaries is also function of the extent to which they are connected to their self and of their degree of consciousness. Some respondents seemed certain that they had a clear code of conduct to which they easily conform, whereas the rest felt unsure about their reactions should they be confronted with a moral dilemma. Yet the apparent self-confidence of the former seemed to reflect an attachment to the persona and a reliance on collective rules and moral conscience, rather than a profound faith in oneself and a sensitivity to ethical conscience. Some other respondents seemed to illustrate how consciousness of self strengthens one’s moral knowledge and integrity of actions, although they showed the tendency to question the legitimacy of their moral intuitions.

These findings thus confirmed that the self occupies a central place in the practice of morality. In particular, consciousness and knowledge of self determine how managers experience their own morality. At the beginning of the thesis, we asked the two following questions: ‘How do managers perceive their self?’ and ‘What is the role of the self in the moral decision-making, moral action and overall moral experience of managers?’ We can now provide some elements of an answer.

It is the contention of this thesis that the Jungian view of the self offers a particularly insightful conceptualisation to apprehend individuals’ moral experiences. For Jung, the self stands for the essence of the individual person. Jung defines the self as the archetype of wholeness and both the centre and the totality of the personality. It
comprises our reflective and affective abilities, but also possesses a distinctive spiritual dimension. As such it is recipient of the vox Dei which directly informs the more creative ethical conscience, and an anchor for our moral decisions and moral behaviour. For Jung (1995:224) the self lays out our life orientation and meaning. It is therefore the central element of our psyche, our personality and our life endeavour, as it transcends duality to enable our potential to unfold completely. The Jungian conception of the self is unique from other definitions of self and selfhood. In fact: “Jung’s idea of the self is different from ordinary feelings of selfhood or the psychoanalytic concept of personal identity; these important qualities Jung locates in the ego. [...] There is a sense in which a definition of the self emphasising wholeness and totality can be seen as a conceptual hypothesis (ideal), whereas feelings of having a central self-core express the experience of the self.” (Samuels, 1985:91).

The role of the self in the overall moral experience appears to be primary. In terms of decision-making, we identified the self as a key factor to enhance the practice of phronesis, and a trigger to develop moral strength necessary to nurture moral courage. The ability to reflect on the various options available, to sense the appropriate “mean” and to intuit that “it is the right thing to do”, along with the capacity to enact one’s decision, are all affected by one’s degree of connectedness to self. The scope of moral deliberation and moral action is also influenced by the place of self within one’s consciousness. An individuated person, that is a person who is connected to her self and reflects this connection in her behaviour, tends to consider other people, be they colleagues, subordinates, customers or friends and family, as deserving respect because they participate in the shared humanity. The idea of shared humanity is best represented by the archetypal self in which ethical conscience is grounded. Being an individual, free to create and express what makes him unique, can contribute on a greater scale than being a person whose peculiar identity has been drowned by the forces of the collective. Organisations provide many examples, both good and bad, of this phenomenon (Ouimet, 2000; Pfeffer, 2003:37)

The study participants often declared that being true to their self was important, if not essential to their lives. Nevertheless most of them had a blurred perception of their self, defining it as an image closer to a persona-phenomenon, either ‘freely’ endorsed
or imposed on them by society. However, as we already noticed throughout the discussion, some respondents demonstrated an ability to integrate their most fundamental values into their work. This did not necessarily mean that the decisions became easier to make; rather it suggested that those managers were able to show greater consistency in their moral behaviour especially with regards to their sense of self and their aspirations to behave without betraying what they stand for, nor what they believe in. Morality and self are therefore closely intertwined, so that perception of the self, understood in a Jungian sense, determines perception of one's moral boundaries. The respondents who seemed more closely connected to their self than the others tended to identify their self with the essential values that inspire their actions and define who they are. More than an image, the self was perceived as the most essential dimension of their identity as individuals. *A contrario*, the respondents with a strong persona tended to project a constructed image in lieu of their self, an image which did not shed the same moral imperative as the real self. These participants generally found ways to accommodate with the context more or less easily.

We therefore established that a Jungian framework of analysis, and particularly the concept of the archetypal self, provides some interesting insights into the moral experiences of managers. The framework particularly clarifies the role of phronesis by integrating it within the larger process of individuation. The concepts of the persona, the self as well as the distinction between moral and ethical conscience proved relevant to depict the way managers responded to and felt towards a moral issue.

The research objectives set at the beginning of the research study aimed to elicit knowledge on:

1. whether managers consider their self when making decisions of a moral nature;
2. the relative importance of the self in managers' moral system;
3. other elements of importance in managers' moral system.
In response to these objectives, we can state that the interviewed managers generally consider their self when they make decisions of a moral nature, although they do not necessarily perceive their self in the same way. We understand the self in a Jungian sense, as an archetypal representation of the individuality of the person. In this respect, only some study participants had a sense of self. Others had uncomfortable, sometimes conflicting relationships with their self, as they did not seem to fully grasp the extent to which they were constrained by a persona. In any case, the self appeared to be primary in nurturing moral strength. More generally, we can state that lack of connectedness to self implies that the person does not live up to her individuality, which makes her much more susceptible to give in to the values of the mass. The values of the collective may be judged morally good; yet even in this case, accepting the dominance of the values of the collective would potentially threaten the well-being of the individuals who would have surrendered their ethical conscience to a collectively-inspired moral conscience.

We can also suggest that the authority of the self, although challenging, provides a better and more consistent moral ground than the authority of the collective. This argument has direct implications for the practice of business ethics. The existence of collective codes of ethics would actually carry less importance than the actual moral views of the individuals who comprise the organisation. Morality is distinctively inner, so that the moral choices are and remain those of a distinct individual. What a manager does both influences and reflects the person he or she is because it is impossible to separate the manager from the person. In fact, this study argues that prior to considering the manager, efforts should be made to consider the person because the quality of the person will determine the moral quality of the manager. Individuated managers embody their moral values under any circumstances, illustrating a case of moral exemplarity that could influence others, and gently but firmly challenge the organisational culture and dynamics that commonly entertain a questionable approach to ethics and to people management.

We highlighted in the discussion the relative importance of external factors to moral practice. In particular, we examined the role of mitigating circumstances to which the respondents appealed in order to justify their behaviour. Although we should
acknowledge that the context partly influences the extent to which one is encouraged to express one’s self, we argued that accepting that a person does not have a choice already suggests that she has given up her individuality. Ultimately, we have the choice to not have a choice. The issue of choice is particularly relevant in the business ethics field because of the recurring argument that business is what it is and managers cannot but accept the rules of the game. We demonstrated in this thesis how such attitude characterises a detachment from the self and a surrender to the collective by compartmentalising or endorsing an appropriate persona. Our doubts or lack of confidence regarding our moral capabilities also affect our decisions. Yet the study suggests that these doubts might simply reflect some aspects of the shadow that have not been dealt with. As a consequence, extensive self-reflection, work on consciousness and vigilance are needed to cope with the challenge of individual morality.

8.2. PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT

The findings of this study suggest that business organisations should think of their employees not as human resources, but rather as human beings. Indeed, casting employees merely in their professional role is highly restrictive and prevents the employees from expressing their full potential. Organisations, as we stressed, are made of individuals who ought to be treated as such. Individuation, the Jungian process of realisation of self, is a lifetime process, so that one is ‘in becoming’ rather than ‘in being’. However, organisations should and can allow their members the time to become more aware of their self, and the possibility to express their self. Context can indeed stimulate or discourage self-expression. Companies have been using psychological tools for several years, but often in an instrumental way. A Jungian framework of self-development would require a different approach. The path and pace of development are necessarily personal and individual, but they can be integrated within a collective contribution. The study provided examples of managers who had successfully brought their values at the core of their job, without prejudicing the profitability of the company. Their moral standards were high, but so seemed to be their performance.
This has a direct incidence of the performance review processes. Formal criteria that aim to assess how close an employee is to an ideal actually reinforce the dominance of a ‘business persona’ and discourage the expression of the individual self. Initiatives that purport to instil ‘spirit’ into the workplace point in the opposite direction, and stress that people who feel happy and fulfilled by the work they do tend to be more productive and committed towards the organisation. Expressing one’s individuality does not imply that there can be no rules. However, the rules should be based on a concerted discussion and should respect the basic values ingrained in the expression of humanity. Managers have a key role to play in setting up this discussion. However, it will only be beneficial if managers are willing to engage with their self so as to sense what is truly right for them and for others in the respect of the shared humanity.

This study’s approach echoes concerns expressed by the growing research field of spirituality in the workplace. Indeed, recent studies and experiences in business and management have embraced the view that organisational beings were also spiritual beings. People’s life disenchantment and disarray have been identified as the result of their spiritually empty, thereby unfulfilling lives (Gotsis and Kortezi, 2008). Work as a vocation urges people to seek meaning in their workplace (Howard and Welbourn, 2004). If management is primary rooted in action, and ethics in reflection, then spirituality is associated with transcendence; however all three constitute necessary pillars for a successful and sustainable collective practice (Pauchant, 2000:60).

The concept of spirituality is nevertheless rather fuzzy, in spite of the renewed interest in the field (Hicks, 2002). Typically contrasted with religion, spirituality is perceived as informal, non-rational, loose and personal, whereas religion is perceived as a more formal, rational, dogmatic form of institutionalised spiritual expression (Forman 2004; Collins and Kakabadse 2005). Pruzan (quoted in Zsolnai 2004:3) holds that spirituality focuses on ‘basic, deep-rooted human values, and a relationship with a universal source, power, or divinity’ and that religion is an institutionalised form of this relationship. Guillory (2001:33) defines spirituality as “our inner consciousness...the source of inspiration, creativity, and wisdom”. The
spiritual quest involves the connection to the inner self, locus of the spiritual in human beings, which incidentally brings about a growing perception of an interrelatedness of everything and a striving towards wholeness (Guillory 2001; Zsolnai 2004). This view is clearly reminiscent of Jung’s archetypal self and process of individuation which both frees the individual from the mass and allows for a more fundamental feeling of belonging to grow.

A Jungian framework nevertheless offers a more structured alternative to investigating ethics in a spiritual perspective than existing literature on spirituality in the workplace (e.g. Giacalone and Woodhead, 2003; Heelas and Woodhead, 2005; see also Ketola, 2008). The latter too often overlooks the fact that not all managers or organisational people readily accept that spirituality be an intrinsic part of our existence. By taking for granted the spiritual aspirations of managers, management spirituality, for example, may miss a critical audience of spiritual-skeptics who will not feel persuaded by the arguments put forward. Whilst the Jungian framework we propose comprises clearly defined concepts that can be articulated at both a theoretical and practical level, the spirituality in the workplace movement has yet to establish a working frame of reference to guide further contextual and conceptual research. Besides, research into spirituality does not focus on ethics as such, but rather considers it a secondary issue naturally solved by an increased spiritual awareness. Although we agree that growth in self-consciousness is likely to positively affect our ability to make morally good decisions, we stress that it is equally important to make these mechanisms explicit and to clearly delineate the linkages between spiritual self and morality. In that purview, the Jungian framework appears more appropriate to the study of individual ethics.

Jungian thought has been introduced in management and organisational behaviour studies most significantly through the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. However this approach does not account for the complexity and depth of Jung’s theories, but rather simplifies them by synthesizing his personality types to create a measurement instrument (O’Roark, 1990). For example, Myers-Briggs and Myers (1993) argue that Jung focused mainly on the dominant function to the detriment of secondary, or auxiliary, function which is yet almost as significant. However Jung’s statements
ought to be read in the perspective of his overall theory (Pittenger, 1993). Thereby, the role of the secondary function is not detailed in so far as the individual is evidently dual – for example necessarily compensating conscious extraversion with unconscious introversion. Myers-Briggs and Myers (1993:24) also notice that "Jung saw his theory as an aid to self-understanding, but the application of the theory (like the theory itself) extends beyond the point where Jung was content to stop. The type concepts shed light on the way individuals perceive and judge and on the things that they value most [...]". In that respect, Myers-Briggs and Myers overlook that for Jung, self-understanding was the task of a lifetime. Rather, they seem to favour an instrumental approach to managing one's relationships and one's life choices, or more pragmatically to finding the most suitable job according to one's personality. In contrast, Jungian individuation aims to achieve a similar goal but in a more comprehensive, in-depth, albeit occasionally painful manner.

The research findings of this thesis also resonate with developments in positive psychology. Positive psychology shares roots with humanistic psychology, in the tradition of Maslow, and argues that psychology has historically favoured the cure of psychological pain rather than the identification of the factors allowing happiness and well-being (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Robbins, 2008). Emphasis is put on training consciousness to live in the present moment by enhancing self-determination, subjective perception of well-being and furthering optimism (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Boyd-Wilson et al., 2002). Achieving happiness is the optimal goal, in the spirit of Aristotle's *eudaimonia*. On the moral front, the good life is seen as embodying the following six "core virtues": courage, justice, humanity, temperance, wisdom and transcendence (Dahlsgaard et al, 2005). In management practice, positive psychology has found its place in the organisational behaviour field (Crowell, 2005; Martin, 2005). However, despite apparent similarities, Jung's agenda differs significantly from that of the positive psychologists.

Positive psychology focuses on directing consciousness by trained attention and control of the bodily reactions such as pain, wants and drives (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). For Jung, however, consciousness must enlarge to integrate the unconscious.
To achieve this, we need to consciously turn our attention to the unconscious, but this endeavour does not compare with the self-programming methods proposed by positive psychologists to generate the “flow” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). Furthermore, the ontological assumptions of the Jungian self are different from those of the self as viewed by Csikszentmihalyi (1990:34), for example. For the latter, the self is a construct of consciousness, whereas for Jung, the self is an archetype at the centre of the collective unconscious. Finally, Jungian psychology embraces a quest for symbolic meaning through the various messages of the unconscious, whilst the concept of flow arguably adopts a more pragmatic goal. This is not to belittle the significance of positive psychology, however. Indeed, both perspectives pay great attention to a concept of self characterized by both individual uniqueness and a shared bond with fellow human beings. Rather, we suggest that the perspectives differ in their perspective on happiness. Whilst Csikszentmihalyi (1990:20) argues that “the control of consciousness determines the quality of life”, Jung would argue that the key determining factor is really the understanding of the unconscious.

8.3. CRITICAL REFLECTION AND LIMITATIONS

Research is on-going by nature, therefore this study could be improved. Firstly, the analysis of the findings is based on my personal understanding of Jungian concepts. I cannot but acknowledge that someone may disagree with my interpretation, although in the interpretivist paradigm such criticism would be considered an opportunity to expand our knowledge rather than a piece of evidence that the framework is erroneous. Nevertheless, readers should appreciate that the analysis and the discussion of the findings draw heavily on Jung’s ideas, hence they do make sense within this conceptual framework. The definition of the self, the persona, or the existence of a collective unconscious are peculiar to Jung’s view of the psyche, and they naturally limit the scope of application of the proposed framework.

Methodologically, we can recognise that a more extensive account from the study participants would strongly enhance the quality and depth of the analysis. We should bear in mind that Jung worked as an analytical psychologist, and he applied his concepts to clinical cases. His work on dream analysis was very important to the
overall psychoanalysis. Its purpose was to enable the patient to understand the roots of the psychic problem. Our goal was not to psychoanalyse the research participants, but to understand their moral experiences. Nevertheless, we needed to understand the person in order to make sense of her experiences, especially within the Jungian framework we defined. A one-off interview may not have been sufficient to really apprehend the person; however we may wonder how many additional hours of interview would be needed to fully apprehend the person. If the study could be replicated, the use of personal journals along with interviews could be used to gain a deeper understanding of the individual and his view of the world.

The sample size and profile could be considered a serious limitation within a postpositivist perspective. Since we postulated that the research was designed from an interpretivist epistemology, the characteristics of the sample are not assessed in a similar way. We could argue that the range of the managerial profiles was very wide, which puts some restriction on the comparativeness of the findings. The expectations and pressures that a small enterprise director faces are indeed different from those of an IT manager; nevertheless, the analytical process remains the same. The discretion of the director may differ from that of the manager, in so far as the director can make global decisions whilst the manager has to apply the directives that come from the top level. However, both can choose to set their work standards according to what their self dictates or to what their perceived social roles dictate. The Jungian framework hence applies to a great variety of profiles and professions.

8.4. FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES

This research study has attempted to show that the self is an essential element of morality. We have proposed a framework to investigate the relationships between moral decision, moral action and self, and we have illustrated how this framework could be used to understand and make sense of the moral experiences of some individual managers. We suggest that this framework could be perfected and tested with other professions. Future studies could aim to collect more extensive data, through journals and interviews as suggested above, and analyse in greater details the experiences narrated. Indeed, a narrative approach could be envisaged, since it would
locate the experience in the life story of the individual, and it would provide interesting insights into the perception the individual has of himself. The proposed typology could also be refined and expanded, with a view to map out the possible psychological obstacles to an enlightened moral practice.

Within organisations, studies designed in an action-research perspective could provide interesting information on the lived experience of self-knowledge and self-realisation. This approach would call for a multi-disciplinary approach, bringing psychology further into the research framework. We could propose that a longitudinal study in which managers would work alongside Jungian psychologists could determine the practicality of the approach as well as the long-term benefits for both the organisation and the individuals. Managers should not be expected to engage in a psychoanalysis; instead they should be invited to reflect on certain themes and on their own experiences, and to discuss their reflections with 'experts'. Ultimately, only the managers would know what is relevant to them and what is not, providing they accept the challenge of their persona by their own self.

This research study has addressed the gap of individual morality in a management context. By integrating Aristotle's *phronesis* within Jung’s process of individuation and self-realisation, we have tried to demonstrate the importance of understanding how a person views and experiences her self. We have argued that morality is essentially a matter of individuals and that the self is the most significant element that influences moral behaviour and moral practice. Connectedness to self and individuation pave the way to ethical conscience. As a consequence, the individual’s actions are reflective of his self and of the values attached to a sense of shared humanity. We have attempted to demonstrate how this Jungian framework of morality is relevant to understand the moral experiences of managers, and we have concluded that managers and organisations could learn from this approach. In particular, we draw attention to the fact that managers cannot cut off from the other aspects of their lives, and that the extent to which they connect to their self influences their moral deliberation, their moral courage and their moral strength.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX I – INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR PILOT STUDY (I)

Introduction to the research – looking at self-perception and moral issues, focusing on managers
The interview process – recorded (agreement), data treated with confidentiality and analysed anonymously. I am interested in your experience and personal account, so please mention what you think is relevant even if I didn’t ask the question specifically. If at any point you wish me to clarify a point, or feel uncomfortable with a question, please let me know.

Part A – Current position and background

1- Can you tell me your exact job title and briefly describe what your responsibilities are
   Prompt: What do you do on a regular basis
   How many people do you supervise
   To whom do you report
   With whom do you work
2- How long have you been in that position/company?
3- Was your previous job a managerial one as well – briefly describe what it consisted in
4- How did you decide to become a manager – what interested you most in it
   Link to formal business/management education

Transition: the questions I’m going to ask now relate to your experience as a manager, so it is not restricted to your current job, and if relevant you are welcome to refer to previous experiences.

Part B – Expectations

1- How would you describe your personal expectations as a manager
   Prompt: What expectations do you set yourself in your job as a manager (by expectations, I mean the standards of conduct and behaviour that would be attached to a role or a position)
   How do you assess yourself against your expectations
2- How would you describe the expectations people (at work or outside work) have of you as a manager
   Prompt: What do you feel people expect you to do/to be
   How do you feel expect you to act as a manager
   How does this affect the way you work + the way you feel about your work
3- Can you tell me about an instance/a situation when your expectations conflicted with other people’s expectations
   Prompt: What was it about, what did you do
   How did you feel about the situation/your action/the others’ actions
   If it happened today, how would you react (the same or differently – why)
4- Can you tell me about an instance/a situation when you felt your expectations and other people’s expectations of you perfectly matched

Prompt: What was it about
What did you do
How did you feel about the situation/your action/the others’ actions
If it happened today, how would you react (the same or differently – why)

5- How typical of your work experience are the examples you described

Part C – Aspirations

1- What would be your depiction of an ‘ideal’ manager

Prompt: What is in your view the characteristics managers should aspire to possess, not only work-related criteria but also personality traits
If there was a manager you would look up to, what would that person be like

2- How close to this ideal do you feel you are
   → How important is it for you to be close to this ideal (esp. for the way you perceive yourself to be)
   → What do you feel comes into the way of this ideal

3- How does this aspiring picture relate to the person you want to be in life in general (i.e. not only at work but also in your social and personal life)

Prompt: Can you identify a similar ideal of the person (instead of the manager) you would like to be
What would you like to achieve in your life

4- How would you describe the relation between your job and your aspirations in life

Prompt: What is the place / role of your job in your life
How does it relate to self-development
How does this satisfy/dissatisfy you

5- How do you view the place of morality and ethics in management today
   → How does this affect you and at what levels

Conclusion and reminder about a possible second interview
APPENDIX II – INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR PILOT STUDY (II)

Introduction – Thank you for accepting to meet again, I would like now to expand on some of the points raised during the first interview. This interview focuses on your experience and your perception of the issues, so please be as spontaneous as you feel comfortable being.

Part A – Life narrative on moral values

I’m going to start with general question about yourself and your personal history.

1- Tell me what values/principles are most important for you
   Prompt: How would you describe your personal ethos

2- How did you ‘acquire’ these values
   Prompt: Who played a significant role in the construction of your moral system (did you have any role model to whom you aspired)
   What played a significant role in the construction of your moral system (any significant event that played a role in shaping/challenging your moral values/ethos and conduct)

3- How important are these values and beliefs in your life/everyday life
   Prompt: How often do you think about them
   (How) do you ‘use’ / refer to them when making a decision
   (How) do you re-evaluate them

Part B – Moral tension – incidents

Give personal example to lead if necessary

1- Could you describe an example of a moral conflict you experienced
   Prompt: What was it about
   Who was involved
   What did you do (and why)
   How did you feel about the situation/your action/others’ actions
   If it happened again today, how would you react (would you do things differently - why)

2- Could you describe an example of a moral conflict you experienced at work specifically (in this job)
   Prompt: What was it about
   Who was involved
   What did you do (and why)
   How did you feel about the situation/your action/others’ actions
   If it happened again today, how would you react (would you do things differently - why)
3- Why did you describe those particular instances
Prompt: Are these instances typical/recent/particularly strong conflict

Part C – Life purpose

1- What would the ideal work environment be like for you?
Prompt: If you could ‘fix’ or get rid of the constraints you feel restrain you and your well-being/self-development, what would you do to feel good in the workplace?

2- What do you feel participate most in your self-development/personal development
Prompt: What or who plays a part in making you feel good about yourself?

3- How would define happiness and completeness
Prompt: What would be the characteristics of a state where you feel happy / complete / in harmony

Anything you wish to add or comment on

Conclusion
APPENDIX III – INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR MAIN STUDY

Part A – Current position and background

*Occupation actuelle et historique*

Can you tell me your exact job title and briefly describe what your responsibilities are?
*Pourriez-vous m’indiquer l’intitulé exact de votre poste et décrire brièvement vos responsabilités ?*

**Prompt:**
- How many people do you supervise?
  *
  - *Combien de personnes supervisez-vous ?*
  *
- To whom do you report?
  *
  - *A qui rapports-vous / qui sont vos supérieurs ?*
  *
- With whom do you work?
  *
  - *Avec qui travaillez-vous / qui sont vos collègues ?*

How long have you been in that position/company?
*Depuis combien de temps occupez-vous ce poste / travaillez-vous dans cette entreprise ?*

Was your previous job a managerial one as well – briefly describe what it consisted in?
*Quelle était votre occupation avant cela ?*

How did you decide to become a manager – what interested you most in it?
*Pourquoi et comment avez-vous décidé de devenir manager / chef d’équipe ?*

Part B – You and your job

*Vous et votre travail*

Tell me about your tasks, role, responsibilities.
*Décrivez-moi vos tâches, votre rôle, vos responsabilités.*

E.g. What do you do on a regular basis?
*Que faites-vous normalement ?*

What is a typical day at work?
*A quoi ressemble une journée de travail typique ?*

In this typical day, what tasks do you enjoy most? What tasks make you feel discontent, unhappy?
*Dans cette journée typique, quelles tâches appréciez-vous le plus ? Le moins ?*

Please describe what your expectations (e.g. your standards) about your job are.
*Décrivez-moi vos attentes personnelles, vos standards en ce qui concerne votre travail (c’est ce que vous attendez de vous-même et qui constitue pour vous ‘un travail bien fait ’).*

What to you is important or significant at work?
*Quels éléments sont les plus importants pour vous dans votre travail ?*

What are your expectations of yourself when you are at work?
*Qu’exigez-vous de vous-même au travail ?*
Part C – Moral conflict

Think about a moral conflict you experienced (e.g. when a particular set of expectations didn’t coincide with what was expected of you to do). Please describe in as many details as possible the situation (what was it about, who was involved, what was the outcome).

Réfléchissez à un conflit moral vous avez connu (par exemple lorsque l’on attendait de vous certaines choses mais vous ne vous sentiez pas à l’aise de faire ces choses). Décrivez avec autant de détails possibles la situation (de quoi s’agissait-il, qui était impliqué, comment cela s’est terminé).

How did you feel? How did you sort it out?

Comment vous êtes-vous senti ? Comment avez-vous résolu ce conflit ? Comment avez-vous réagi ?

Why did you choose this particular example?

Pourquoi avez-vous choisi cet exemple-là?

Part D – Life purpose

What guides you in life (i.e. in making decisions and choices in life)?

Qu’est-ce qui vous guide dans la vie (par exemple lorsque vous prenez des décisions ou faites des choix) ?

Is it any different (and how) from what guides you when you are in the workplace?

Est-ce différent (et comment) de ce qui vous guide lorsque vous êtes au travail ?

What do these statements evoke to you:

Qu’évoquent ces phrases pour vous :

“Happiness is a state of mind”

« Le bonheur est un état d’esprit »

“Being true to your Self”

« Etre fidèle à Soi-même »

“To be complete, one needs others; to feel complete, one needs only one’s Self”

« Pour être complet, on a besoin des autres; pour se sentir complet, on a seulement besoin de Soi-même »
APPENDIX IV – RESEARCH PURPOSE & LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Introduction to research project

I am a final year PhD student researching on managers’ sense of self and morality. For that, I am interested in interviewing managers on their experience and view on the topic. The interview focuses on themes such as work expectations, personal standards, personal aspirations and drives, plus a discussion about a moral dilemma (work-related) that you experienced.

I understand some possible restriction on that latter question due to confidentiality issue, but I am more interested in how you dealt with the situation (e.g. emotionally, psychologically) rather than in the particular details of the dilemma. The interview would last approximately 1 hour, maximum 1:30 hour. It is aimed at being conversational, loose and informal, although I have some questions prepared to get the discussion going. The interview will be treated anonymously and in a non-imputable manner.

Contact details:
Cécile Rozuel

Projet de Recherche
Sens du Soi et éthique chez les managers
Université du Surrey, Guildford, UK

Etudiante en dernière année de doctorat, je mène un projet de recherche centré sur le sens du soi et l’éthique chez les managers. Ce projet examine la relation des managers avec leur Soi et l’éthique. Il s’agit d’étudier comment les managers comprennent, définissent et perçoivent la notion d’éthique ou de moralité. Il s’agit également d’examiner le rôle que joue l’éthique dans la définition et la perception des attentes et exigences personnelles des managers.

Les thèmes centraux examinés lors de cette étude touchent aux attentes et exigences personnelles et professionnelles, à la perception de soi, et aux motivations et aspirations qui guident autant les choix dans la vie quotidienne que les choix de vie. Pour cela, je souhaite interviewer des managers (par exemple chef d’équipe, superviseur, chef de projet, dirigeant) de tout horizon et secteur d’activité.

L’interview dure approximativement une heure et quart, maximum une heure et demie. Le format d’interview est déstructuré et relativement informel, car il s’agit de parler de votre expérience et votre point de vue sur les thèmes mentionnés précédemment, notamment comment vous voyez, percevez et interprétez ces éléments. Entre autre, une partie de l’interview est centrée sur l’analyse d’un dilemme moral vécu dans le cadre professionnel – il ne s’agit pas de fournir des détails potentiellement confidentiels sur une situation, mais plutôt de recueillir votre réaction et ressenti face à ce conflit.

Si vous souhaitez des détails supplémentaires sur ma recherche, n’hésitez pas à me contacter par e-mail. Merci d’avance.
C. Rozuel
APPENDIX V – CONSENT FORM

Consent Form
Formulaire de Consentement

Research Project on Managers’ Sense of Self and Morality
Projet de Recherche sur le Sens du Soi et l'éthique chez les managers

By

Mêné par
Cécile Rozuel
School of Management
University of Surrey

☐ I confirm that I have agreed to take part to the above research project and that I have had the opportunity to ask questions.
Je confirme que j'ai donné mon accord pour participer à l'étude mentionnée ci-dessus, et que j'ai eu l'opportunité de poser des questions par avance.

☐ I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to withdraw at any time. I understand that I can ask for any sensitive remarks to be removed from the record and that I am free to withhold information which I regard to be of a sensitive nature.
Je reconnais que ma participation est volontaire et que je suis libre de me retirer de l'étude à tout moment. Je comprends que j'ai le droit de demander que les remarques sur des sujets sensibles soient supprimées de l'étude et que j'ai le droit de ne pas révéler des informations que je juge être de nature sensible.

☐ I understand that interview records and transcripts will be anonymised and rendered non imputable to me or to my organisation if/when referred to or quoted in the project report and other eventual publications.
Je comprends que les enregistrements et scripts issus de l'interview seront traités de manière anonyme et qu'ils ne pourront être imputables à moi-même ou à mon organisation si ou lorsqu'ils seront mentionnés dans le rapport d'étude final ou dans d'éventuelles publications futures.

☐ I confirm that I have / have not* agreed for the interview to be tape-recorded as part of the above study.
Je confirme que j'ai / je n'ai pas* accepté que l'interview soit enregistrée dans le cadre de l'étude mentionnée ci-dessus.

* Please delete as appropriate / Merci de biffer la mention appropriée

Date and Signature:
(Please print name)
APPENDIX VI – SAMPLE OF INTERVIEW TRANSCRIPT (VINCENT)

To start with, there are some general questions about your job. So can you tell me your exact job title and a bit about what you’re doing?

Okay. My job title is the Software geographic and distribution field application engineering manager. That’s a very long one. Essentially, I look after a team of field engineers, eight in total, spread all across Europe, who have responsibilities either for software tools, or geographic and distribution customers.

So it’s mainly distance management?

There’s only one employee who works in the same office as me. Everybody else is in France, Germany, Israel, Scandinavia – spread all over the place. So it’s a very much remote management role.

Okay. And how long have you been working here?

Since 2002, although the current team was only structured from the beginning of this year, so prior to this year I only had four people, and then I got an extra four in January.

And before that, what were you doing?

Hem, a similar role in a company that just made software tools and that was purchased by Company W.

And before that?

[laugh] Hem...A similar role in another company that made software tools, hem...and that was for about a year.

And what is your background? Did you study engineering or management?

I’m actually – when I left school, I did what is called an apprenticeship, which essentially is four years of attending college and at the same time attending a training school and touring the company effectively that I worked for, working in every department for a couple of weeks to sometimes a few months basically to understand how the whole company functions, at the end of which you’ve got a choice of “what would you like to do?” And I chose essentially given that my coursework was electronic-based, I chose to actually work in the service and customer support division.

And it was a company dealing with electronics?

Yes. It was called Company X.

And you chose that company?
The apprenticeship that I got was with this company. So ultimately the aim of an apprenticeship – they’re not so common nowadays, but the aim normally is to – they invest and train someone who hopefully will be around in the future for them. And actually most people who have been trained through that channel will stick around for a short while and then realise that they can get more money from somebody else, so they leave. [laugh]

So you went into support because of your technical training.

Yes.

And what motivated you to become a manager of a team?

That would be in a company called Company Y where I moved to following my apprenticeship. Quite a small company, forty people, with a growing business. I was initially a one-man show, and then groomed a small team of people from that. So I was given the responsibility, having been the initial staff within the support part, to actually hire the staff. And that was really my first foot onto the management ladder.

So it was on-the-job training?

Essentially yes. Hem, when I moved on companies from there to a company called Company Z, I effectively step backward for a short period. So I became what we would call an individual contributor. But when the manager some 18 months later subsequently left, I took on that role and the responsibility for eight staff.

Was it something you were interested in doing?

Yes, definitely. It was a matter there of waiting for the right opportunity. Or “dead man shoes” as some people call it.

What do you like most in managing teams?

Personally for me, I don’t like being a completely administrative manager. And the role that I’m in today actually allows me to do – 50% of my time I’m actually doing the same function as everyone in my team members do. So I still maintain an element of what I call “hands-on” [unclear], and the other 50% clearly is sort of personnel administration, etc. Being in a technical role, maintaining the “hands-on” part is actually extremely useful because it keeps you [unclear], it means you can interface with your team in a more [unclear], because you truly understand their issues because you equally work on some of the very rational things. You also know, for example, if a member of your staff is not entirely being truthful if in a bid or something, you’re in a better position to challenge that for example. So, hem, I enjoy managing, I enjoy – I enjoy the decision-making side I think, allocating tools, resources to issues, being able to, presented with an issue cause clearly we’re in a customer [unclear] world, and actually being able to bring about resources to [unclear] to resolve that as quickly as possible. Keeping the customer happy, cause in our business the customer is king.
And the customers are who in this respect?

Customers are anyone who buys [Video] products. So, everything from very large companies, you know, the Nokias and Ericssons of the world all the way down to some fairly small customers who probably make, you know, five or ten of a particular product that they think is the best product in the world a year. So it's a very wide customer base that we have to interest, so...

And how are you in contact with them - is that on a technical basis?

Hem, basically, clearly it is in the technical aspect. The team, each member of the team, myself included, has a role - we have a pre-sales role which is really technical presentation and demonstration and we have a post-sales role in helping to troubleshoot. We clearly, particularly in the post-sales role, there is an infrastructure behind us to actually accommodate most of that, with the customer having built a technical relationship with us in the pre-sales domain, will typically use us as their initial interface. So, we will take issues on initially, if necessary we will then pass them on to the organisation but we resolve them ourselves.

Did you find it easy at first to lead a team?

Hem...yes, to a certain extent. When you grow from nothing and you hire your first person, it's really a two-person team more than a manager and a subordinate. I think the challenge tends to come as the team grows bigger than that. So you grow from 3 or 4 staff to 8 staff where you cannot maintain that same level of relationship very easily.

So how do you handle that, if you handle that?

[laugh] That's the same system with the remote-team today, because clearly most of my team don't actually see any of their peers very often. We interact clearly via telephone, we interact via email. But we're in our own country, or own regions. They probably feel very much that they're still a one or two person shot. Hem, so that - the amount of competition is probably not there as much as it would be if everyone was all based in the same place. Although it does become evident particularly at the time of year when we do performance reviews, cause everybody likes to see where they are [unclear].

Does that make your job more difficult, the distance, to create a team spirit?

Yeah. And I try very hard at that mainly by insuring that everyone comes together at least once a week on Monday on a team call. We encourage, or I encourage the use of an e-mail address list where there's all of us which is very informal, if you have a problem or an issue, put on there, send it out because someone else in the team may well have had the issue already. So it's a very quick and easy way of saying "I am stuck with issue X Y and Z. Has anyone seen this?" and probably 90% of cases, someone else already has the answer. We don't need to go into the organisation or anything. So there's a lot of encouragements to say it [unclear] and collaborate, in
that respect. And whenever the opportunity arises – it may be only two or three times a year – I think of getting the team together in marketing for instance almost all of the team will be at a large event in Vienna next week, where I will ultimately take the time to grab everyone for one or two hours probably in the evening over some sort of social function, so to sort of get people together and help build that team spirit a bit more.

*Is that important for you?*

It is. I think people within the team really do need to feel part of the team. One of reasons I was given four extra staff was essentially – that was a reorganisation of the overall structure in Europe because a couple of the teams that we have – and there are 6 or 7 teams pretty much similar to mine, a couple of them were very fragmented. People couldn’t identify, they couldn’t identify with anyone else in the team because they deal with things that are so vast and different. They couldn’t problem-share because another guy in their team dealt with a completely different product, so there was no commonality. So in the reorganisation, the people I inherited all have a commonality with one another and with my existing team. So that helps to sort of foster and build a team spirit.

*You said you try to maintain a 50-50 balance between admin or management role and hands-on role. Is that a personal choice or is it just how the job is designed?*

No, that is the way the team is structured today. There are approximately 70 field engineers in Europe, and underneath the top-level management there are – I should really count them – there are eight managers. So the team effective from that number are divided by eight. So that kind of gives you an idea that there are sublevels of management, cause managing 70 people for a single manager is an impossibility. But in doing that, there are effectively 8 managers, but if we just did administration, that’s actually put off resources that could be available to the customers, so it’s a choice really at the management level to say “we should be able to manage our people in 50% of our time” and ultimately, then, to utilise our other 50%. So if you look at our numbers, 8 managers half of 8, or half of their time is four more field engineers that the company has on the ground. It works for most the time. There are times of the year when that split doesn’t work. Particularly at the performance review time. It takes a lot of time and a lot of cycles, and in my case with 4 new members coming into the team I’ve spent quite a lot of more time since January just at the beginning to build that team spirit a bit more. But that should well it will return to normal pretty much from pretty much next quarter.

*And that suits you in terms of allocation of time?*

Yeah.

*So your colleagues are basically the other managers, the eight that you mentioned?*

Yes.

*And these ones are also spread over Europe?*
Yes.

*And how regularly are you in contact with them?*

We have a bi-monthly meeting off-site where we all get together. We also have a weekly conference call.

*And to whom do you report?*

I report to the European FAE director, so the European field application engineering director who is based in Munich.

*So it’s not an every week meeting?*

No, the often I meet him is like I said, so that’s why it’s bi-monthly because again the managers are located in France, Germany, Scandinavia, UK. So bringing that team together from a cost consideration perspective is not something that you can do regularly. But we do make an effort every two months, we actually everybody goes off site to actually discuss issues and work on plans and strategy, etc.

*What do you enjoy most in your work? And what so you enjoy the least?*

[laugh] Million dollar question. Well I think I already said, I enjoy the ability to have some hands-on, and I think that’s very important for me. I’d be quite bored if I just dealt with administration and projects. What do I enjoy least? Probably the performance management side, not because I don’t like praising someone or telling someone they’re not performing very well, but because the system through which the company manages performance management, there is a very thick system involved which presents some issues.

[Deleted passage for confidentiality reasons at the request of Vincent]

And I certainly had this year a guy who’s actually very good, works very hard for me, he is placed significantly far down the list. The moral part is – how do you explain that to someone when you don’t have any negative things to say, that their performance isn’t necessarily bad. And that’s what I would call the loneliness of management, because it’s something that...

*Is it like being caught in the middle of a structure that you cannot change...*

And how much are you prepared to be honest, how much are you prepared to use along some of that management skills of not entirely telling the truth? [laugh]

*Is that part of management, not telling entirely the truth?*

I think there’s certainly a requirement for it. I think also, and I’ve said it before, there’s loneliness in management in so far as there are times when you realise that being close to your team members is actually probably not the best thing, because
you may actually be delivering some pretty bad news to them which they may not entirely want to hear. And if the relationship you have with your team is a very friendly one, i.e. they all conceive you their friend, they struggle even more personally to understand how you could have placed them in such a position.

So when it becomes too personal then. So how do you live it from your perspective?

Well interestingly, I mean the approach that I took in this particular instance - I realised this [unclear] was probably not the best approach but I still approached it with a flaggy more friendly angle to it. And it's actually come back to haunt me, and my manager at this point in time, because I clearly didn't probably explain it very well in the first place and as I said tried to talk too much of a friendly approach, as a result we were kind of going to a second cycle of that particular individual's performance review to be able to explain in a better light to him. So, as I said, sometimes the friendly-friendly approach isn't the best way.

And spontaneously, you would go for the friendly approach?

Hem...It certainly is a way of getting a good result from people. In terms of management styles, I would have a military background as well, so some would say they would expect me to have a military style to my management and in fact I don't, cause to get the best out of people it's better not to dictate what they should do but to actually use some of the other skills like coaching, mentoring etc, a bit of a friendly approach ultimately, pretty much getting people to really want to do what you want them to do as opposed to telling them what they should do. Hem...so, yeah.

Is that something you've always done or is it something that came with the time or experience?

I think it's come with challenges. We did a set of - with some of other managers - we did a set of management training which is to do with leading, "making great leaders" it is called, which is basically based on 360° feedback where all your team participate in it, so do your peers and so does your manager. And then you sit down and over two or three days you work through the results. The interesting part is my team - which was my original team of last year's 4 people was that it actually demonstrated that we're very, very well in line, i.e. their opinions and my opinions are sort of 2% different and which says a very well aligned team, a team that works very well with their manager. Clearly expanding the team now, I imagine if we redid the test the results would currently look quite different as you begin to integrate the new people. But that's really the goal, in my perspective, to have a team which is very well aligned, where we all think the same, we all share the same opinions, and you get the most out of people in that respect.

How come? How alignment works in getting the best results?

Hem...Because if there's no conflict, say if there isn't any real conflict in the team, then people are always working toward a common goal. If people are sharing problems, getting help from others, no one will feel that they're the only guy doing all the work and everybody else is having a coffee break. [laugh] Hem...
It's just a sense of team-work. Probably – I mean the event I've already mentioned next week in Vienna, my team, my software team, which is effectively 5 people, with myself included, have a very, very active part to play in that whole event, so while we are presenting like many others we are completely involved in the whole infrastructure behind it and we have been for the last couple of months but every single person in the team has put really good effort into making that happen. There's not a single person who hasn't participated in the preparation work requirement. Every single member of the team is deliberately flying in to the event early to make sure that everything is ready in advance. And in quite a few cases, people in the team have come forward to offer help in areas they hadn't been offered since they wanted to make sure that the whole thing is a success, because there's pride in the team and the team's name is against the event.

It seems it's very much a small team within the bigger team. How does this articulate?

That's interesting because, yes, it does today feel like a team within a bigger team doing the same. One of the challenges of me as a manager and my peers is actually to get these small sub-teams to interact better. Now again, not all of them have the same commonalities, so it doesn't make sense in some areas but certainly for my team there are two other teams where they share great commonality, albeit their customers are slightly different, but all their subject matter and product detail is exactly the same. So again, we're beginning to get some initiatives going where the collaboration within these three team is building. For example, people are now involved in design reviews every quarter and they're very large groups. So my team actually gets to hear what the others are doing, and again this is all about information sharing it's all about "I have a problem with this customer or this issue" and somebody else in one of the other sub-teams has already witnessed that and they can help one another. They're fairly early initiatives, we've really only just started in this quarter, but already the early feedback is for everybody that it is very useful and very good. So we're trying to build up a bigger spirit, with the overall aim of the management above me that having built that spirit within Europe, you can then spread that spirit across the world because there clearly are similar teams to ours in America and in Asia. Knowledge sharing and information sharing and collaboration is a big focus for the company this year.

Do you think it's something easy to do, it goes smoothly or it's hard?

No, it's full of challenges. Some would tell you that everything is different in America, everything is different in Asia, and everything is different in Europe. And then even within Europe, they'd say well, the issues we have in Germany aren't the same as what we have in the UK. You can accept degrees of that, maybe that particular parts of the world have a specialisation. Automotive electronics, for example, Germany is probably one of the strongest places for that. But at the same time there's still a large amount of common issues, where teamwork and collaboration is probably one of the best thing.
You mentioned that you developed from experience the management style. How did you evolve or grow into this style?

No, I think I started with a very friendly-friendly approach, and it's only as you gain experience and probably face some of the tougher issues of management - making people redundant, having to sack people - both of which I've done not in this company but in previous ones, where you begin to realise that there has to be a distance level between you upfront, between yourself and the team. Because you may have to make decisions that aren't initially, that aren't actually pleasant, and you may have to follow them through and act upon. Making somebody redundant is not a pleasant experience. Sacking somebody for a bad performance isn't a pleasant experience, but it's necessary in so far as it's good for the benefit of the company in terms of [underline]profitability.

Is that what you tell yourself to help with the process?

Well, you need to, to some extent. One of the companies I worked for, we went through financial difficulty, which to some extent was slightly easier because everybody knew the finances were bad, everybody knew the business wasn't good. So when it comes to the bad news that some people will have to leave, everyone already understands the reason why. There's still the "why me and not him?" question that comes up, but there's a general understanding that "okay, the company has to licence people off simply because there isn't enough money to pay everybody". The more unpleasant one comes when you have someone who is a poor performer, who you try your hardest to turn around, invest time and effort in, but ultimately if their performance does not increase to a level that you would deem acceptable, you reach the decision point and says "it's not worth spending anymore time, we'd better get rid of this person and look for somebody else". And certainly, in those scenarios, there are a lot of legal implications so that things have to be done correctly and be done properly.

And what makes it not so nice in that case?

Telling somebody they no longer have a job.

So it's the consequence for the person?

Yeah. You begin to think about do they have a wife? Do they have children? Do they have, you know, large mortgage and bills to pay? Even if you try to remove yourself completely, that will still go across your mind at some point cause losing your job is a major life changing thing for most people. So from a morality perspective, you certainly think about it. Anybody who says they don't I would say is probably a liar.

What do you actually do with it?

Well, the reality is that there's nothing you can normally - there's nothing you can do to actually change the fact that they are going. Hem... personally, if I can, you know, I offer to help them by way of "if you need a job reference" if you want, those
kind of things. Clearly, in some circumstances that might not be appropriate if
they’re a bad performer, but for example, someone being made redundant you can
offer to help them in the perspective of you know “if you want someone to write you
job references”. And also finding from a company side whether there’s help and
assistance, particularly to people who are being laid off, that the company can
provide to help them find a new job. But there isn’t that much you can do. [laugh]

So at the end of the day, you say you can try to remove yourself as much as possible
but you can’t totally. How do you cope with it?

Time is a great healer. You’ll get to a point where – after a period of time where
something else takes a more emotionally significant importance. And that might be a
matter of hours, it might be days, it might be a few weeks, but eventually it will
move into the background in your own mind. You’ll still remember it, as I was
talking I was thinking of the scenarios I’ve been through, but I don’t think about
them everyday. They might come back into my mind if I’m presented with a
situation of having to do the same things in this company, and you begin to think
“How did I deal with it last time? What happened? Etc”.

And removing yourself, is it something you find easy to do?

Hem...I would say...personally you need to - or I certainly need to kind of sit and
take a little bit of time before I actually get through with the action, and that bit of
time is actually that time to sort of remove all the thoughts of “concern and why” out
of my mind to actually focus on what needs to be done. So it’s taking time to sort of
reflect and be quite conscious of pushing some thoughts out of the way. Because it’s
clearly a function of “this must be done and you need to execute that”, albeit
someone might say.

So it’s ‘wearing a manager suit’ type of action?

Yeah, or put on some blinkers so everything else sits up here, and you have a very
structured vision that says “I need to do this task, albeit unpleasant”, you know, let’s
deal with the task and leave everything else up here that you can’t [unclear] and try
not to think about.

Yeah, I mean when you remove, you still think about it. I think the hardest part of
that, in telling someone they no longer have a job, is saying the physical words.
Hem...and, you know, thinking about exactly how you’re gonna say these words.
When saying these physical words you know...do you apologize when you say it, for
example “I’m very sorry you know but we’re gonna have to make you redundant” or
“I’m very sorry but due to performance, you no longer have a job.” Is it appropriate
to apologize when you actually say it? So, you know, there’re probably things that
are the hardest part, that’s the biggest hurdle to go over. Cause having said it, you put
it in the open – this is what’s going to happen. Everything else becomes slightly
more set to a format, almost.
What informs how you do it? What influences you?

[laugh] I think a lot depends on the character and the relationship you have with it. In my last company, because they laid lots of staff off, I actually ended up doing that in several countries and in countries where I didn’t know people it was getting easy because you have no relationship to the individual. So I was really the axed man that comes along and shops pieces of the company apart. Where you’re in a position of a relationship with an individual it’s where it gets a lot more difficult.

And you find it really easier that if you don’t know the person, then you don’t have the same problems?

Well, that’s your actual business, isn’t it? I’ve been sent to this country to tell 5 people they no longer have a job – okay. I can do that. I get to fly out to the country tomorrow morning and throw in the news. I guess, I don’t want to sound really cold in that respect, but it is very easy if you don’t know people. If you actually know people and you have known them for a long time, I’m thinking in particular of one individual in France who I had to lay off but whom I worked with for 8 years – if you do it the right manner, you never know how life will turn around. He now works for me again, and I went and hired him last year after a 5 year break. And I went and find him and said “I have a job opportunity, would you be interested?” and he never even hesitated and he said yes immediately and went for an interview. But I had to let that guy go five years previously, so if you do it in the right manner you can do it to such an extent that there is no room for hard feelings. And he was more than willing to actually lose the job he was in and come for an opportunity to work for an old manager that he, in his own words, “liked and respected”, and couldn’t wait.

So what motivates you in choosing the nice manner? Is that because there might be another opportunity later on?

You never know. It’s a small world, particularly in the business we’re in. It’s not particularly big. Business-wise it’s big but in terms of the people in it, it’s not particularly big. You know, go to any of our trade shows and you will see the same people every year. Sometimes they’ve moved companies but the faces are the same. So, maybe there’s an element of that. I don’t consciously sit and think that that may happen. I just gave you that example of the way the world is a small place and you know it may turn around and come back from you. And in that particular individual case, yes, I went and rehired him, cause I needed his ideas for the job I was trying to do.

So what counts – the business side or the human perspective, that is try to be nice because being laid off is not nice?

I would say put yourself in those shoes. No one likes to hear bad news, no one likes to be told bad news in a conflicting style if you like, or in an argumentative style or a very stern, you know “Your performance is absolutely terrible. Get out” – you know, you clearly can’t say that from an HR perspective, but – in those terms, you know, very, very negative. Hem... again, you know, if I – in the story where I have to lay off people, or let people go, the worst thing in the world is to literally take someone’s
morale down to a very, very low level. It's a very, very depressing thing losing your job. Thankfully I've never lost one but talking to friends who have, you know, there are huge things that go through people's minds. You know, how would I feel as a manager if I told someone that they didn't have their job and hours later they commit suicide that night? I would think about every word I said to that individual, and whether the words I said contributed to the action that they took. It sounds drastic but you kind of have to think about that... Clearly there are reasons why someone has to leave the company, whether be it financial or be it performance issue, etc. But there are ways you can break the news to them in a more gentle fashion so that doesn't leave someone terribly depressed with the possible bad consequence.

So you think it's almost a moral responsibility that you have in trying to be as nice as possible?

Yes. Would you fire somebody on a Friday? No, for then they have the week-end to think about it before they can talk to you about it again. You would fire them on a Monday or tell them they don't have a job on a Monday. But they have four weeks of notice to work, which means on Tuesday they can actually come and talk to you. The time of the week is important, you know. Do you know enough about your employee to say it's his birthday this week-end or his wedding anniversary or you know — if you know enough about that and there's something consequential coming along, you'd actually say "D'you know what, I'm not going to do it then, I'm gonna push to try to do it a few days later." Don't ruin a particular special occasion. Sounds maybe a little bit oversensitive but at the same time you just try to think "Don't ruin something completely for somebody".

And when you don't know the people?

It's a lot easier to fire them, you don't need necessarily to think about that, it's less hard cause you don't know the details. In my last company, we — I was involved, but ultimately we laid off 20 staff on the last day before Christmas. Personally, I think it was a really nasty thing to do. I think if it was me and I was able to make the decision, I would have let all them have a nice Christmas and on the first day back in January, given them the news. Because what's worse way to spend Christmas than to hear you have no job, you just spent all your money on presents and everything else for the kids and the family, and you probably end up worrying the entire Christmas. And trying to find a job at Christmas time is not that easy, everyone's gone on holiday, so...that's me!

And the experience of having said to someone you're being laid off, do you carry that outside work like when you go home? Or do you manage to split work from home?

Do I take my work issues home — is that what you're saying? Yes, of course I do. Hem...I think gone are the days where a lot of people can identify that they work from 9 until 5 and then when they walk out the office, work is left behind them. Certainly in the role that we're in, in a customer-focused role, you will even find that customer contact you after hours if it's really important, so you're kinda in a work [unclear] anyway that says if an interruption comes in, you weight up — what am I doing here? Is this an interruption to me and my family? Can I deal with this now?
You know, do I just answer the phone or whatever the interruption is and say “can’t do this now, I’ll do it on Monday”. But yes, I certainly go home with work issues on my mind. My wife says “What’s up?”, I try explain with technical speech terms, she stares very blankly and says “I don’t understand a word you said”. Hem, but particularly on the people’s front, you do take issues home, you do think about it, you probably discuss some things in a slightly different light to it but...

*What do you mean by people’s front? When people are involved in the issue?*

Yes.

*Is that something you do willingly or you can’t help it?*

Hem...I would say it’s probably because you can’t help it because from a body language perspective it’s very clear that things aren’t normal. You know, you look a bit depressed, you look like you’ve had a hard day at the office which naturally brings the question “Have you had a hard day? What’s up? Do you want to talk about it?” at which point you make a decision yes or no to talk about it.

*And how do you deal with it when it’s not work time, when it’s social time or family time and those issues are at the back of your mind?*

Well until very recently, my wife was equally a manager in a local government, so completely different institute doing completely different things, but that is quite interesting, you know, to be able to come home and talk to someone else who manages people about a particular problem that they are totally removed from any familiarity of the staff etc, and can to some extent give you an unbiased opinion of what they think and how they would handle it and it works both ways, I talk to my wife about somebody she has had in her workplace etc. In a very formal environment – local government is very formal in terms of the rules and regulations, far more than public companies, so – then again, I find that and my wife finds that quite useful. Yes, I don’t go home with an agenda of “I’m gonna talk to my wife about this problem, this problem, this problem”. It just kinda comes up in the conversation or you know, the other half doesn’t look particularly happy and you say “Is there something you want to talk about?”

*So the ability to discuss it helps relieve the pressure?*

Yeah, and I mean it’s not, you know, as if I can’t talk to other managers here. Even though there is no one else in this office that manages similar staff to me, there are numerous managers. So particularly if you’ve got personnel issues or things like that, when you want to talk about how you might deal with a particular strategy there are at least different other people in the building, and I have gone and used them, and gone and talked to them, and just said “Listen, have you got ten minutes? I want to chat about something, get your opinion on what you might think or what you might do?” Because again, some of the managers here have been managers a lot longer than I have and have a lot more experience. And it’s useful to be able to do that. And really I get the third leg of the stall if you like, so it’s kind of talk to your own manager, be it locally or my own peers, there’s possibly a bit of talking on the
upfront and the third leg of the stall is the fact that you have got HR help who are there for you as a manager. Yes, you’re an employee to them but you’re also a manager to them, so if you go to them with a manager-related issue, they all clearly talk to you and get you all the help you need, although it’s a very formal HR-style...[laugh] because it has to be. But they can be an extremely useful resource. And our HR team is actually based in Scotland, this is where our big facility is, there are about 1,200 employees there. We’re probably fortunate in that there is one particular HR person – there’s always one assigned to this office, but this particular one has actually proactively been here quite a lot, so he’s built a relationship with people. You can pick up the phone and talk to him and gain a better understanding of who he is and where he comes from because he comes to the staff meetings down here, he deliberately comes early to them and makes himself available for anyone who wants to chat and talk about issues. He’s a UK HR specialist, his background is in UK HR but he doesn’t have a problem with me walking in and talking about one of my Israeli staff or one of my German staff. He may not know the local HR laws, but if he doesn’t know he will find out or maybe it is not something that involves employee’s law so he can give me just general advice. That’s kind of the third leg of the stall of chilling things out by talking about it.

Is that how you manage to evacuate the tension, by talking things through?

Yeah. Talking is a good thing. A talk would quite often get you around to the decision point of what needs to be done or etc, etc. Keeping everything inside, it just kind of bubbles around in your mind. You may come up with a solution but it may not be the best one. That’s the other thing, what’s to say that if you make a decision completely on your own that it is exactly the best one to do? So when the occasion arises, actually get another opinion on things. It may not change your initial approach, or it may change it slightly, but getting a second opinion I think – [unclear] but eventually in people situation I think that’s quite important. Cause you may not see it, someone may see it completely differently from you.

So that’s for all the management-related issues. And for the purely moral issues you might have, the personal values-based issues, is that the same process? Do you need to talk about it to help you get through them?

Yeah, I think so. I think from the perspective of – again because you may have an opinion that you think is correct but is it the right more, is it the right thing to do? If there’s any doubt in your mind – probably that’s the biggest thing – if there’s any doubt in your mind, certainly you can seek advice from someone else, whether it’s someone completely independent to the whole thing, or someone who know sufficiently more details [unclear]. But that moral, yeah, that moral component, you could be extremely wrong about something and just not be able to see it, because it’s like this in your thoughts, and someone else near by can say “Hang on, what about this and that?” [unclear]. Talking to someone is a good way of ascertaining whether or not you’re in the right track.

And does that happen to you? Or has that happened to you?
[laugh] Hem...I’m just trying to think...I guess it has in a way, and again around problems of employees. It really - you know you need to do something, you’re not entirely sure of, certainly from a moral perspective whether it’s appropriate or correct to do something and you’re really seeking another opinion that says “yes, the tactic you’re taking or the approach you’re taking is appropriate or certainly is right for the problem you’re trying to address”. So...

And where does the doubt come from?

Well, if everyone in the world walked around believing that everything they did was right, the world would be a strange place, wouldn’t it? Because, you know, nobody’s perfect, nobody can be right 100% of the time, and anyone who believe they are I would say is a liar. [laugh] It may be that you know, you feel strongly that, you know, this is the right thing to do and this is the way to do it. It’s interesting because the company actually invests quite a bit in terms of...morality training and that kind of thing, and tries to certainly teach people the rights and wrongs of - with examples of how you could do something that morally is unacceptable without having even realised that it was. And I witnessed again something similar there with a colleague in the US who was a busy guy, a very busy guy, who needed to do some update to parts of the company’s website. At that particular time we were in a very competitive situation with two competitors, and he was actually short of time and couldn’t really get his creative thinking so he didn’t bothered and utilised their websites, cut from their websites and put it into ours, etc. And he got spotted, and he got spotted by a competitor who probably read the text and said “Oh, that looks remarkably similar to our own text” and, you know, at very, very top level, he looked into it and he said “Yeah, sorry, I did it”. Now morally, he knew at the time what he was doing was wrong. But he was a busy guy, trying to attend to a lot of issues. And the moral patch would have been to go and talk to somebody “You know, I am actually swamped that this had to be done, and the only way I can see doing it is to actual go and cut from there”. You can be sure people would have said “Don’t be stupid!”. Ultimately, he lost his job, and he lost his job immediately because it goes against our code of conduct within the company.

So talking about it, even if it doesn’t solve the issue, can make you avoid mistakes?

It avoids getting you into a situation where you could put yourself in trouble as well. I mean in that particular case like the guy did.

So how do you set the separation between what is acceptable to you and what’s not?

[laugh] A million dollar question! What’s acceptable for me – in what sense?

What you feel comfortable doing as compared to what you feel unprepared to do?

Hem...I think the situations that certainly you’ve experienced at least once before, you find a level of comfort with. Something that is completely new, never even had dealt with it before, which could be anything is where your comfort zone – you’re immediately outside your comfort zone, you start to look at it and think “Okay, can I do this on my own? Do I take the right approach? If I’m not sure, who do I ask?”
And that could be anything from a technical customer problem where it's completely outside your domain but you happen to be the only person available who has picked this thing up and you're looking at it thinking "My God! How can I do this? Who do I turn to?" all the way round to anything, a staff-related issue. But you need to do it.

So, everything you've experienced so far you feel you could do it again?

Yeah. You may not go the same again, cause everyone learns by mistakes. Hem...you know, no job is done perfectly every time, so it may be that you approached it in a particular way, and with hindsight afterwards you realise "You know what, if I had done it differently or if I had done it this way I think it would have worked better". But that knowing experience of I've been through this once and I was able to deal with it, yes I know I can deal with a similar situation again. It may be or it may not be exactly the same in terms of how I deal with the problem.

And what about situations where you felt very uncomfortable with the outcomes, in terms of your values? Would you do it again and try to find another way to do it?

Hem, yeah. Personally I might seek slightly more advice, particularly if I couldn't think of another way of dealing with it. So you know if I was very uncomfortable the first time and I couldn't really find another [unclear], so it looks like it's gonna be the same thing again, that's the scenario where I think I would dig around harder to see if anyone else had a better idea or a better approach to help with it.

Are there things you know you're not willing to do?

[laugh] Well if you know you're not ready to do it – it's a bit of an interesting question. Something you know you're not ready to do...hem...I guess in the day-to-day running of business, no. Those kind of thoughts are probably more reserved to the fact "Could I do my boss's job today?" No, cause I don't have enough experience – that's my opinion. Those kind of things are quite easy to separate out. But if you sort of said "Okay, from a manager's perspective, of people administration, is there anything there that you couldn't do?" Not that I could think of. From a customer perspective and the product, the stuff that we do and all that side, is there anything there I wouldn't do? Hem, yes, hem...and I say that in so far as we deal with fairly sizable deals in some customer cases, significant amount of money, and you need to be conscious sometimes that companies have legal responsibilities. There can be consequences for things you say and do for the company and you need to be – clearly we get training in all this kind of stuff but clearly you need to be aware of the fact that your actions as an individual could place the company in a compromised position. And in those cases, yes there are decisions you come to where you'll actually say "I'm not prepared to call this. I've got to go up to the appropriate level of management to explain the situation and say; I'm not prepared to call this because I believe this could be an issue for us, it could go both ways, etc." I had recently a bit like that, customer perspective-wise, and effectively took the issue to the vice-president of sales for Europe, explained it to him, explained what the issue was because I was greatly concerned that the situation could go one of two ways, and if it was in the negative fashion we could effectively lose a massive amount of business, not just this year but over the next four years. And I certainly wasn't gonna be the
one to put my neck on the line, without backing from above at least, that said “you’re right”. In particular case, the VP said – interestingly enough, he was having a meeting with that very same customer that week, he said “Let me pick it up, let me run with this, and I’ll come back to you about how we’ve discussed it” cause clearly he can have conversations at a far higher level than me. So, well, there was a resolution in the end, they took – well I don’t know, I think it took moral courage for me to actually say “I’m on the verge of saying pretty much to the customer ‘everything we’ve got doesn’t work, we know it doesn’t work, we don’t know why we’d given it to you at this point in time, we prefer to give it to you in six months time when it will be ready, but that would be too late for you’.” The effect of saying all those things could be massively damaging to us. The big boss here will sit down with the big boss there and they could have a gentlemen’s conversation which is “How do things go? How’s in the organisation you are?” “Here’s what we do, here’s what we’re trying to do because you want all this right now. You know we’ve got X, Y and Z people working on it right now, you know. Yes there are problems, yes there are issues, but you know we’re there to help you, we’re there to give you everything you need. And work with us and we’ll work with you.” And suddenly the whole relationship grows stronger, and that’s because of that intervention at the top. Whereas the way it was looking we were about to say “too bad”...

So it’s about your ability to deliver and perform?

It’s deliver, it’s perform, it’s being conscious of, if you like, the responsibilities in the world. You know, large corporations do like to see one another. Contracts can have penalties. If you think that a lot of our products end up in cars, imagine the consequences that a whole car production stops for even one day because of something that we can’t do or haven’t done. You know, pick up the Ford, BMW, everyone, think of how many cars they make in a single day in the world. If they all stop because of the actions of an individual, that implication is massive.

Is it something you have in mind in your day-to-day job?

You certainly do depending on the customer you’re talking to. But ultimately yes, you’re acutely aware. Hem...so, you know, you are sort of certainly thinking about “What’s the problem, what’s the issue, what’s the consequence of this to the customer?” It’s not just a question of saying, you know, how do I simplify – you know, oh, you’ve got a flat tire on your car, bad luck. You know, what are the consequences of having a flat tire – well it means you can’t drive to where you’re meant to be. So yes you are, as well as trying to troubleshoot when there’s an issue, you do have something in your mind particularly in high volume areas – car is a classic one, or any commercial product, anything in this kind of consumer industry where there are thousand of them made very quickly, the consequences of something stopping has huge financial considerations.

Does that affect how you approach your job?

It affects the way you approach the customer, yes. So it’s a very customer-focused attitude if you like. The guy who makes ten things a year in the shed at the end of his garden, we probably don’t have the same level of thought process as to a major car
maker who has a problem. Because the guy who only makes ten a year, the consequences financially are not talking at the billions of dollars level. [unclear]

So the customer is a very important thing in the business. What about the values that you use? You mentioned that honesty was important, at least trying to do it, to be fair with the customer as well as having in mind his and your best interests, so what other values do you think you use in making decisions?

[laugh]...Hem, what other values...hem...well cause honesty may not always be the one that you’d lead with, or that you use initially. I think certainly there are considerations made from a commercial perspective to business impact, that kind of things, so there’s a financial consideration to it. I think the other thing – and I can’t think of the right word, but there’s certainly an element to the relationship you have and how your relationship works with the customer. And the reason I say that is it’s more easier to keep existing customers and repeat business than it is to find new ones, you know. If you look into any sales book it says that, pretty much at the beginning of all of them. So maintenance of that relationship you have with the customer is actually really quite important. You don’t really want to do anything that really upsets the customer because when they wanna go and buy something new, if you’ve upset them, chances are they’re gonna buy it elsewhere. So to every situation, even if your answer has to be negative, it’s really how you approach that, how you deliver that, that says have you saved enough face so this customer will continue to come back to you. And that’s quite a consideration to make. You quite often find in business relationships you know, the guy at the bottom threatening that they’ll never ever buy your product again because that’s his opinion and the whole thing is around how you manage that account relationship. It may be that one particular guy has ended up unhappy due to a particular incident but if you’ve actually managed to manage the account, his more senior managers, etc in a very good fashion it may be that as a company you’ll get away with that with that guy being upset for a while. You can’t please everyone all the time, that’s for sure.

And maintaining a good relationship with the client, is that something you find easy to do?

Yes. It’s probably really come with time.

What does it take? Do you have to get to know the people?

Yes, you – I guess you need to be comfortable with people you’ve potentially never met before. You need to be confident so as to be able to stand up in front of a strange audience and present or even discuss a topic or an issue. You probably need to be – well, yeah, you do – you need the confidence that if you meet someone in a more senior position you don’t suddenly start worrying “Oh my God, what is he going to ask me?”. So you need to be confident to sort of be able to hold the conservation to at least two levels above where you are. Because there are certainly people around who – you know, if you said, if you’re gonna meet the general manager of company X Y Z, would go “Oh no, what am I gonna say, what am I gonna do!” and they would basically fall into pieces. Whereas the guy, you know, might actually ask you a couple of things and they’re all completely a walk in the park. There is no harm to
say you don’t know the answer to something, I guess that’s one of the biggest lessons, but you will get back to him with an answer. And in fact it’s having the inner strength to say “No, I don’t know the answer to that, but I’ll get you one.” And at the time you say that, you may not even know how to get the answer, but just make the commitment that you’ll get to him. And be confident enough to say you don’t know – it’s better to say you don’t know than give a very poor answer.

And is that something you developed through time or was it something you were always able to do?

Hem...I think to be honest I probably learnt some of that on the early crash sales courses that I’ve been on. I’ve been on a few sales courses. And yes, some of it comes with experience, but it’s certainly one of the things that sitting talking to the team, I say to them, you know “don’t lie to a customer, that’s the worst thing in the world. At least don’t certainly lie to a customer I there’s any chance he finds out.” [laugh] That’s probably the better way to qualify. But equally “don’t give an answer that is kind of a half-answer, maybe plainly wrong. If you don’t know, say so”. And that’s very much, you know, in a pre-sales lie that has quite often will come up. You’ll get questions coming, there’s always development to [unclear] but it’s still relevant to the company product. [unclear]

And the attitude of taking care of the relationship with the customer, is that something you also adopt in your social life, personal life? the sense of inner confidence, saying things in a straight way, acknowledging when you don’t know, commitment to getting back – these kinds of things, are they also?

I guess in a way. I guess the one thing you can’t say that carries on in your social life is you haven’t got the confidence in a product so you’re not told to that [unclear]. So, you know, yes, I would say, largely the same values etc. carry over. Hem...[unclear]

And do you think you change from work to home?

No, I carry...I think I probably carry things from my personal life into work. Hem, the military bit I referred to earlier, which is actually something, hem...I’ll explain it briefly. In the UK you have something called the territorial army which is part-time, [unclear] so it’s something you do as a hobby. And so my military stuff is something I’ve always done since I was 17 years old as a hobby. And I carry a lot of that into the workplace with me, some of the fun, some of the [unclear], some of the values that you get taught there in terms of managing people albeit in a clearly far more disciplined fashion. And you apply some of those and you don’t apply others. For that reason I’d say I carry more from the inside to the outside than in the other way round.

And why do you do it? Is it a balancing element in your life?

Hem, yes, I would guess so. Hem...you come across a very diverse audience from the military side in terms of people, quality of people, skills of people, and you get to deal with a very diverse array of themes and issues. This teaches you a lot about not everyone is the same and not everyone works the same. I guess the other core value
that the military side of me brings is that you can nearly always find a solution to everything even with very limited resources. Giving up is not an option that you would normally do from a military perspective, hem...

So some kind of resilience?

Yeah. Pull the rabbit out of the hat...[laugh] The old magician’s trick [laugh]

Was it a choice you made, was it something you were looking for?

I joined in 20 years ago because the father of my friends joined in, and it seemed like a fun thing to do. None of them are in it anymore while I’m still there cause I enjoy it clearly. I’ve worked my way through the system now, but...

So how important is it to you now?

Hem...I would say very. I’m actually consciously within my last year of doing it, and that’s my own choice. I’ve actually reached a ceiling there, which was an ambition ceiling that I set probably only five or six years ago. I manage more people there than I do here, I have 110 soldiers who work for me, so [unclear]. And yet, it does provide some interesting challenges, and I do enjoy it, and I do feel that there are elements of that I have used very frequently at work.

Having reached that ceiling, what are you gonna do after?

Come and play golf!

So a completely new activity?

A complete change, yeah.

Do you feel you’ve learnt everything you could from that?

No, I could go further. But to go further I would go from a role where I command my - that’s the wrong word, in the military sense having command means that you actually have real people who work for you, okay? To go further, you go into a staff role, and in the staff role you’re more process, you’re more sort of, you’re desk jockey actually. So, hem, but you can still climb the ladder higher. And that doesn’t really appeal to me as much as where I am now, there are real people, there are real things to deal with, you’re playing around with real assets as well as doing some of the staff work. So if you like it’s kind of like my current role today, hands-on partly, partly administrative. So right now, certainly in the military, I doubt I’ll go higher.

The final part consists in three statements and I just want you to tell me what it tells you, whatever comes to your mind. So here’s the first.

What do you want me to say?
Whatever it evokes you.

Happiness is a state of mind...yeah, I agree with that.

So is it something you choose to do?

Well, yeah I mean. If somebody is on your conscience and bugging you and bringing you down, you won't feel happy, and that's what I mean — happiness is a state of mind, you've got — you know, if there are bad things going on, you won't feel happy.

So it's a matter of circumstances?

Hum hum.

Okay. How do you manage to be happy if things are on your mind?

Don't think and do something else. [laugh]

Escape?

Switch off for a while. [unclear]

Is it something you find easy to do?

Not always. It depends on the circumstances...[laugh]

Anything else you want to add on that?

Hem...no, I don't think so, no. Well, no, there's something I would. Smiling is infectious which is a thing with happiness. If you start smiling and other people will start smiling they won't stay unhappy, so one of the ways of changing a state of mind is, you know, smile, make a joke, [unclear].

And is being happy or happiness something important for you?

Hem, yeah. It's important for everybody. If somebody's happy, they work better.

So it's something you're trying to do?

Hum.

And how do you manage to do it? Do you start smiling?

Oh God! [laugh] Hem...I guess one of the biggest things that contributes to happiness is don't ever always focus on the negatives, particularly when you do it with your people. Even if you've got someone who is hopelessly bad, and everything he does is wrong, you have to find a way to make him smile and laugh once in a while. Because morale, individual people's morale will go down rapidly and stay down. And someone whose morale is very low isn't efficient to you or to the
company at all. So, find a way, whatever way, to make people smile and laugh once in a while.

Okay. Here’s the second one.

Being true to yourself...in what respect...hem...I’m not entirely sure of what you mean by being true to yourself...

How do you understand it?

I don’t know...don’t live a lie. Hem...be honest if it’s not something within your capability I guess, being true to yourself, yeah. Looking at something and, hem...yeah, hem...I would say definitely looking at something and realising that it’s, it’s not within your capability, maybe - I don’t know, a job opportunity - you know, it might pay £500,000 a year but you actually look at it and say “do you know what? There’s no way I can actually do this” - that’s being true to yourself. That’s actually about making a decision that is well beyond your capability, or even potential capability. Understanding if you’ve reached your limits on something...and your self-confidence or your pride might have to give way to the fact that you need to go and seek assistance or help with something. Having the humility sometimes to deal with the situation cause not everybody likes to admit that - yeah, they might call it failure sometimes. It may not be failure, it may just be that you actually... maybe you don’t know the way out, but you may see that as a failure in yourself because you weren’t able to deal with something.

Is that something that you feel?

No, not really. The humility one - I think that humility, to be able to put your hands up on occasions and say “Yeah, I screwed up” - I’ve certainly done that one! - and having the confidence to say “Do you know what? Yeah, I messed up here, but you know I’m prepared to learn from it, I’m prepared to take the input, help, etc” - that’s a great quality and a great skill. Hem, it’s also something that I think is essential in anybody, because otherwise, if you don’t - if you cannot do something like that, you find that inevitably you have to lie on occasions.

So it’s a manner of keeping your integrity?

Yeah.

And to actually know yourself, your limits, your capability, you have to know fairly well what you’re capable of, and also your potential and how you can progress. How do you know that?

[laugh] Yet another million dollar question! Are you planning to write a book - “How to get to the optimum level”? I don’t know, I think some of it’s because you might start trying to do something and you find you’ve reached your limit, so there’s this sort of trial-and-error approach. Hem... it may well be that you try to analyse it, and so from an analytical perspective you look at it and say “can’t see how I would deal with this” and at that point you’re going to seek advice. Hem...with the trial-
and-error approach I would say it’s also having the confidence to say “Hum, I’m gonna have a go at this and see where it takes me” [laugh], but with enough consciousness in your mind that says “If I reach a certain point when this isn’t working I know I’m gonna have to go and seek assistance or whatever to actually get it to term.”

So how do you put the limit “Okay, at that point, if I haven’t succeeded, it’s because I can’t do it and I have to seek assistance?”

It depends on what it is you’re dealing with. Pride might be a limit to you, in terms of being able to deliver something at a certain time. Hem... it could be that, you know, in a commercial sense, it could be, you know, truly monetary from a transaction perspective that kind of defines the limit you put in. I think it always depends on the circumstance. You kind of need to -- you need to identify what I would call the control measures, the yardsticks with which you say “It’s this, this and this in order to actually make that happen”.

Is it something you practice?

Yeah. Breaking something down into control measures is something, yes, I definitely use.

In your personal life as well?

Yeah, and the military. That’s where it comes from, actually. Because if you can do three [three] of something, you’ve almost certainly started to undertake it, and the other 25% may develop along the way.

So it makes it easier to manage all in all?

Yeah.

Okay, and the final one.

To be complete one needs others. To feel, one only needs oneself – that’s a very selfish attitude at the bottom. [laugh]. One needs only oneself – it’s only myself and I. No. I think the proper statement -- if you asked me which one of those were the trues statement, I would say yes, to me certainly the top one. There are always things that other people can do. Make things complete...[unlegible]

So, completeness, how would you define it?

Hem... pfff... hem...[laugh]... How would I define completeness? I don’t know because completeness is a personal thing. I would say essentially, I liken it more to being content with yourself, content with life, hem... content pretty much with everything around you. Hem... and it may be that you’re the kind of person that, you know, you are completely content and that everyone else around you envy, etc, etc. That said, in the personal sense, I mean, in life, to be complete or be content with everything around you -- typically there is a relationship involved, typically there’s
clearly is around and they’re all together and, you know, without reflection one needs others, he needs family, he needs an infrastructure, and that’s what makes life – by and large in society as everyone gets older that’s what happens. [laugh] You know, at 19 years old you probably feel complete cause you only need yourself, because it’s “me and myself and I”, and you know, you’ve got your own place but you’re only [indistinct] to yourself. It’s a phase in life to go through because if you think about it, when you live at home with your mum, to be complete you need the others around to hold that whole infrastructure that’s around you. You then move out and find when you’ve got a flat, young, free, single, you can drink and do whatever you want every week-end, pretty much you’re into a sort of wild anyway in your life, it’s me and I’m totally in control of my life. But inevitably, life takes that turn when you meet someone you begin a relationship you begin to settle down and you’re becoming more sort of two, where others are a great part of life and a great part of your completeness.

So it’s the ability to be content with what you have at a particular time?

Hum, yeah.

Okay. Again, is that something you practice or find easy to do?

Not consciously. I wouldn’t say I go and say I consciously practice that. If it’s a situation where I find myself in, yeah, but it’s not something I kinda – it’s not on my tick list “On Monday morning, I must go and do”.

Is that an objective in your mind – trying to be complete to try and be happy?

Hem, I wouldn’t describe it as complete. Cause, clearly, you know, within your own mind, you’ve got in your mind that you want to be happy, you want to feel content. Whether you would describe that as complete...to me, to say something is complete it’s almost like you’ve reached the end game, there’s nothing else to do. Hem...perhaps in my military speaking sense, I feel complete because I’ve made the decision I’m gonna leave in a year. So I’ve reached the stage where you know, I’ve reached where I want to go with that, the situation is complete so I will finish it and move on. But I think in most things in life to me to feel complete says “That’s it, there’s nothing else”. That’s a boring place to be. You need to have challenges in life.

So is it like an idea of achievement?

Yeah. Win the deal. Close the business. That’s completion. And you need others to do that cause you can’t do this on your own.

Okay. Well that’s all I have to ask you. Do you have any comments before closing?

No.

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## APPENDIX VII – TABLE OF PARTICIPANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Industry or Activity Sector</th>
<th>Work Location</th>
<th>Date/Place of interview</th>
<th>Length of interview (mn)</th>
<th>Age</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amy</td>
<td>Senior account manager</td>
<td>Direct Marketing</td>
<td>London (UK)</td>
<td>26/11/2006 at her home</td>
<td>77</td>
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<td>Brian</td>
<td>Shop manager</td>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>London (UK)</td>
<td>13/12/2006 in coffee shop</td>
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<td>Charlie</td>
<td>Director of regional product centre</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Reading (UK)</td>
<td>15/12/2006 in office</td>
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<td>Deborah</td>
<td>Staff manager / Technical architect</td>
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<td>London (UK)</td>
<td>12/01/2007 in office</td>
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<td>Ethan</td>
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<td>HR Consultancy &amp; Recruitment</td>
<td>London (UK)</td>
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<td>Fiona</td>
<td>Concession manager</td>
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<td>Guildford (UK)</td>
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<td>Gillian</td>
<td>Senior HR advisor</td>
<td>Culture &amp; Arts</td>
<td>London (UK)</td>
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<td>Helena</td>
<td>Project manager</td>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>London (UK)</td>
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<td>Irene</td>
<td>HR Director</td>
<td>Trade of Building Material</td>
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<td>John</td>
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<td>Kyle</td>
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<td>Langon (F)</td>
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<td>Louis</td>
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<td>Martin</td>
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<td>Paul</td>
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<td>Work Location</td>
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<td>Lenght of interview (mn)</td>
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<td>Team manager</td>
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<td>Langon (F)</td>
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<td>Samuel</td>
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<td>Car Servicing</td>
<td>Pau (F)</td>
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<td>Yohann</td>
<td>Advanced Technology Director</td>
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<td>Zack</td>
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