Globalization and Ideology:
Challenging the Case for Realignment

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis engages with the ideological implications of the concept of globalization. Working with a neutral, inclusive definition of ideology, it takes ideologies to be constellations of mutually defining political concepts. The analysis centres on the question of whether longstanding ideological currents have been capable of absorbing the idea of globalization in ways that do not undermine their integrity or whether, as some scholars have argued, they have been disrupted by the force of a new entrant to the extent that they no longer make sense. On the basis of conceptual analysis applied in five chapters to six ideologies or ideological families: classical liberalism, socialism (in three variants), national populism and fascism (as two members of the so-called 'extreme right'), and anarchism and ecologism (comparatively), I conclude that no such ideological rupture has occurred. While conceptual shifts are to a greater or lesser extent identifiable in each of the cases analyzed, the changes have occurred within existing ideological configurations and according to their logical or functional requirements. The idea of globalization has not destabilized any of those conventional clusters sufficiently to render them incoherent. On the contrary, they remain meaningful as distinct sets of political beliefs and as such play an important part in the debate on globalization.
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Responsibility for the content, including any inconsistencies and errors, remains mine.
INTRODUCTION

GLOBALIZATION: THE BUZZWORD

In this short introduction I situate the subject of the present study – broadly definable as the effect of the concept of globalization on ideology – within wider debates surrounding the reality of globalization as a process and its impact (or lack of it) on social life and inquiry. I also offer a preliminary explanation of the key assumptions of this thesis and I signal more specific arguments to be developed in subsequent chapters.

Background: the globalization controversy

"Globalization is an idea whose time has come." (Held et al. 1999, p. 1)

"[G]lobalization is everything and its opposite." (Friedman 2000, p. 406)

The analysis presented in the following chapters is not concerned directly with the vast controversies regarding the existence, the chronology, the causes, and the outcomes of globalization understood as an aggregate of economic and political developments. Instead, the questions that this study addresses refer to the meanings of globalization that circulate in the 'noosphere', to how they are generated and mobilized in political argument, and to the extent to which their mobilization results in shifts and tensions within conventional ideological structures and families. Yet, while this thesis focuses on globalization as a political concept, the question needs to be contextualized against the
backdrop of broader debates which have surrounded globalization as a process since the end of the Cold War.

The last two decades have been marked by important, interconnected technological, political and economic changes. Technologically, this period has witnessed rapid developments in the means of communication, including satellite-based mobile phone systems, transoceanic television transmissions and, most important of all, the internet. This technological innovation has played a major role in political events, from the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and its Central and Eastern European satellites to the meteoric rise of international organizations worldwide. Economically, the disintegration of the model that had for seventy years posed a challenge to capitalism has left the latter triumphant, at least for the time being. At the same time, the capitalist system itself has also been altered in comparison with the social-democratic type dominant in most of the post-Second World War period in Europe and, to some degree at least, also in the United States. The possibility of cheap communication in real time across any distance in combination with the reduction of trade barriers enabled outsourcing of significant segments of production. The resulting extension of economic operations to worldwide scales has facilitated a more effective externalization of the costs of capitalist production. The increased mobility of capital, along with the assumed weakening of state-managed regulatory mechanisms, has given capitalism a more unapologetic face, leading – as numerous critics have argued – to grave socio-economic problems, such as rising inequality on intra- and inter-national scales, growing
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unprecedented environmental degradation worldwide. The opposition to these outcomes of the capitalist economy has in turn been expressed with unparalleled emphasis on world-wide solidarities while the organization of the protest has been mediated by new technologies which have proved able, now and then, to circumvent control by the authorities.

Journalists, politicians and business gurus have rushed to explain this set of diverse political and economic developments while social science has become 'full of enthusiasts claiming that a new form of human society is emerging’ (Mann 2000, p. 1467). In the quest to find a common denominator to explain the transformation the concept of globalization has been turned into the buzzword of both public discourse and social inquiry, an idea allegedly capable of capturing the meaning of the new realities. In relation to technological developments, globalization has thus become linked to what Manuel Castells (2001) conceptualized as the ‘space of flows’. In the words of Felix Stadler this ‘emerged when it became necessary and possible to integrate entities that are physically far apart into the single units than can work in real time’ (Stadler 2001). The process of ‘respatialization’ (Scholte 2005), it has been professed, has undermined the conventional Euclidean logic and with it the territorial ‘space of places’ (Castells 2001) marking ‘a new ontology of place/space relations’ (Amin 2002, p. 385) or even ‘the end of geography’ (O’Brien 1992). Consequently upon these metaphysical claims, political globalization has been defined as a process which turns territorial states into ‘unnatural, even impossible, business units in a global economy’ (Ohmae 1996, p. 5) and a large
body of literature has amassed either celebrating or mourning the ‘decline’, ‘obsolescence’, ‘extinction’, or ‘retreat’ of the state (van Creveld 1999, pp. 336-414; Hudson 1999; Khan 1996; Strange 1996). The ‘end of the state’ thesis pointed to ‘global civil society’ as a new ‘transnational’ political actor to fill the vacuum left (Falk 1995; Kaldor 2003, p. 1) as well as entailing warnings of the dangers of the suspected global rule of ‘transnational’ corporations (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994; Korten 1998). In turn, in the economic sphere globalization has been credited, for better or worse according to the leanings of particular commentators, with the creation of a single global capitalist economy in which those corporations operate (Dicken 1998; Greider 1997; Luttwak 1999; Scholte 1997), while from a different (but equally sweeping) point of view it has been dubbed the harbinger of the end of capitalism itself (Drucker 1993).

In combination, the claims identifying globalization-induced change in various areas of social life amounted to the suggestion of a major paradigm shift with globalization in the very centre of this transformation:

1 Inevitably, some theorists went further than others in claiming that an epochal rupture has taken place. Thus while some, like Giddens, saw globalization as ‘the expansion of modernity’s internally referential systems’ (Giddens 1991, p. 225) or ‘heightened’, ‘super’ or ‘reflexive’ modernity, others announced the end of the modern era. Martin Albrow for example proclaimed that ‘modern age has been supplanted’. Accordingly, globalization ‘is the termination of modern ways of organizing life’ for it ‘has altered the framework of human action’ and ‘usher[ed] in a new age’ (Albrow 1996, pp. 20, 100, 85, 106).
[A] new century begins at a moment when everything seems in question. What gives contemporary change its power and momentum is the economic, political and cultural change summed up by the term “globalisation”. It is the interaction of extraordinary technological innovation combined with world-wide reach, driven by global capitalism that gives today’s change its particular complexion. It has now the speed, inevitability and force that it has not had before. (Hutton and Giddens 2000, p. vii)

Wide-ranging postulates that ‘the world we live “in” today is different from that of previous ages’ (Giddens 1991, p. 225) have led to wholesale metatheoretical claims concerning human sciences themselves. Globalization has been declared ‘the central thematic for social theory’ (Featherstone and Lash 1995, p. 1) and the stress on its novelty has entailed the assumption that existing ways of conceptualizing social realities are inadequate in new circumstances. Roger Burbach thus followed his assertion that ‘globalization marks an entirely new epoch in the world’s economic history’ with the claim that ‘it requires a shift in our weltanschauung, the very way we view the world, its politics, societies and economies’ (Burbach 2001, p. 21). Such opinions were widespread. For example, in the first issue of the Globalizations journal it is stated: ‘[w]e cannot make sense of globalizations through conventional analytical and disciplinary frameworks’ (Petersen 2004, p. 50). A similar position was taken by Martin Shaw who called for ‘the global transformation of the social sciences’ (Shaw 2003), while another well-known globalization theorist, Jan Aart Scholte declared:

Globalisation calls into question the adequacy of comparative politics and international relations as methods to understand the organisation and exercise of power in social life. The growth of a global dimension of social relations can even cast doubt on the very project of political science and the academy’s practice of disciplinary divisions more
generally. Contemporary accelerated globalisation gives ample cause for a paradigmatic shift in social analysis. (Scholte 1999, p. 9; and see Scholte 2005 for his own attempt to make this shift with the use of new vocabulary of 'supraterritoriality')

The radical nature of the pronouncements alleging the eroding impact of globalization on governance, economy and social inquiry provoked an equally staunch reaction from commentators sceptical about the reality, or novelty, or depth of the transition and therefore unconvinced about the explanatory power of the concept of globalization. Justin Rosenberg’s declaration ‘that the “age of globalization” is over’ (Rosenberg 2005, p. 3) and that it is now appropriate to write its ‘post-mortem’ exemplifies an unequivocal rebuttal of the validity of globalization-based explanations. Other theorists suggested ‘overselling’ or ‘sinking’ of globalization, or the ‘collapse of globalism’ (Stieglitz 2006; Ferguson 2005; Saul 2005).

The sceptical argument highlighted continuity from two overlapping but analytically distinct perspectives. On the one hand, it placed emphasis on the continuing significance of the institutions or ideas that the postulations of a new paradigm condemned to the dustbin of history. On the question of the allegedly qualitative spatial change, the sceptical position maintained that ‘globalization is a reconfiguration of existing understandings rather than the radical break’ and that ‘territory remains of paramount importance’ (Elden 2004, p. 8). Consequently, the case has been made for the lasting necessity of territorial statehood, state-managed welfare programmes and nationally-based partisan politics (see for example Garrett 1998; Hay 2006; Weiss 1998; and
contributions to Boyer and Drache 1996). Complementing this emphasis on continuity of established political and economic arrangements, another sceptical approach has aimed to identify in the past processes analogous to those shaping the world today and by doing so to put in doubt the qualitative nature of the change purported by the other side of the debate. Rosenberg thus maintained that deterritorialization is not a new process and reminded his readers that Marx had already written of ‘the annihilation of space by time’ (Rosenberg 2005, p. 12). With regard to international relations, Stephen Krasner dismissed the claim that globalization is the factor which erodes the sovereignty of the nation state. State sovereignty, Krasner contended, ‘has always been problematic and could never be taken for granted’ (Krasner 1999, p. 34). In another widely-cited sceptical contribution, Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson argued that ‘globalization’ is merely an intensified, but not unprecedented, internationalization (Hirst and Thompson 1999). The same authors insisted that trade openness (a crucial point in the globalization thesis) was ‘not much different in the mid-1990s than it was at the end of the belle époque’ (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 62).

A similarly sceptical position has also been voiced in reaction to the demand of ‘a newly conceptualized global social science’ (Riggs 2001). As with other aspects of this debate, so also in this case, the emphasis has been placed both on the continuing relevance of the existing models of social inquiry, as well as on the precedents of the ‘eurekas’ of today’s globalization theory in long-established analytical models, for example, as I have already noted, in Marxism’s deep-seated appreciation of the significance of
deterritorialization and other spatial phenomena induced by modern capitalism (Rosenberg 2005). In keeping with the sceptical account, the notion that a paradigm shift is now necessary is flawed at its root for it takes the process of globalization for granted and so depoliticizes the concept. Consequently, according to Rosenberg, theorists of globalization became its ‘ideological amplifiers’: ‘[i]nstead of deconstructing the popular Zeitgeist, they elevated it to the role of an intellectual Weltgeist’ (Rosenberg 2005, p. 7). At the same time, in line with the sceptical position, the metatheoretical reorientation which has taken place in connection with the assumption of globalization has been not just unnecessary and unconvincing, but also beneficial to the dominant neoliberal policy, whose parameters it has unwittingly accepted (Kiely 2005).

The globalization question has also reached the theory of ideology, that is to say, the area to which the present study contributes. The aim of the cursory remarks above concerning the state of the globalization debate at large has been to situate the hitherto less developed literature on the impact of globalization on ideology against the background of the broader controversy and to demonstrate that claims analogous to

\[2\] Allan Scott elaborated on this allegation and asked a series of questions suggesting not only the inflated nature of some metatheoretical claims of globalization theory but also their problematic political implications: ‘Is social science as prone as political punditry to interpreting globalization as historically inevitable and unstoppable? [...] have the social sciences in their diagnosis of late- or post-modernity, of which the theory of globalization is a key element, been sufficiently aware of the extent to which globalization is a political project? [...] are we assisting the process of globalization by providing people with persuasive arguments to the effect that little can be done in the face of these enormous economic, political and social developments?’ (Scott 1997, pp. 2-3)
those examined in the present thesis have been articulated in other areas of human sciences. While discussion of the different views concerning the interplay between globalization and ideology is left to the next chapter, I want to use the remainder of this introduction to explain my broad orientation on the question and especially the fact that my position does not necessitate a sceptical turn (if the latter is to be understood as the denial of globalization) even though it does oppose inflated claims postulating a radical ideological break with the past.

Ideology: continuity or change?
The ideological impact of globalization has not been discussed as extensively as its other implications, but the limited debate which has taken place occurred amid the widespread zeal for conceptual innovation that has permeated large sectors of social sciences. Consequently, the dominant view has been that globalization is a fundamentally destabilizing factor in relation to the patterns of ideology. This opinion was expressed for example by two well-known theorists, David Held and Anthony McGrew, when they complemented their observation that ‘the very idea of globalization appears to disrupt established paradigms and political orthodoxies’ with the claim that ‘the dominant ideological traditions of conservatism, liberalism or socialism [do not] offer coherent readings of, or responses to, a globalizing era’ (Held and McGrew 2000, p. 2). Roger Burbach similarly linked his assessment that ‘modern political systems fail us in every major region of the world’ to the end of ideology as we know it (Burbach 2001, p. 71). Similar arguments are discussed throughout this thesis in greater detail but for the
present it is worth noting the parallels between these claims and the contentions that have often been made in relation to globalization's impact on other areas of social life and thought.

Binary conceptualizing is one element that has been as common in assessments of the implications of globalization for ideology as it has been in evaluations of globalization's effects on economics, governance or identity. Thus, whereas the supposedly global markets of today have been opposed to the previous, nationally-managed, economies and the allegedly globalized politics of today has been contrasted with the former era of statism, so, likewise, ideology has been conceived as now drawing on a completely novel context of global ideas in contradistinction to the nationalist concepts of the past. The national orientation of ideology – it has been maintained – is now destabilized by the ‘global imaginary’ which, in a colourful description, ‘erupts with increasing frequency within and onto the familiar framework of the national, spewing its fiery lava across all geographical scales’ (Steger 2008, p. viii). Consequently, and in parallel to previously discussed claims that international politics can no longer be conceived in terms of interstate relations, or that national management of the operations of capitalism is no longer feasible, it likewise no longer makes sense to speak of ‘liberalism’ or ‘socialism’ as meaningful belief systems. In place of those archaic categories a novel vocabulary is needed in order to ‘translate the dawning global imaginary’ (Steger 2008, p. 12) and capture the ideological debates of the new era.
In the present study I take issue with the strong claim of globalization-induced ideological rupture and consequent irrelevance of the ideological currents with which modern societies have been conversant for decades if not centuries. Just as the assertion of an ideological break repeats the logic permeating other areas of the all-change thesis, so the opposite case that I make here may be elaborated in a way reminiscent of the structure of the sceptical argument. My defence of the significance of conventional ideological clusters in the following chapters is thus twofold. On the one hand, I demonstrate the enduring presence in today’s political discourse of ideological interpretations that have long been seen as defining the major ideological currents. On the other hand, I show that allegedly new globalist commitments had their precedents in past expressions of some major ideologies while the rejection of global universalism has had an equally long history in other ideological currents. It is not the case that in the past all ideologies were uniformly imbued with the “imaginary” of the national and it likewise does not make sense to view them as equally conditioned by the processes that are nowadays associated with globalization. The long genealogy of ideological interpretations now linked to globalization would also suggest that even if the process of globalization, or its current scale or pace, is unprecedented, globalization as an idea or project has been around for a long time, albeit under different names, such as ‘world society’, ‘humanity’ or ‘humankind’ (Kilminster 1997, p. 262).

It should be emphasized, however, that in spite of those stylistic parallels between my argument and the sceptical position, the case I make for the continuing relevance of
traditional political ideologies does not automatically imply a sceptical viewpoint on the reality or import of globalization. My line of reasoning is different. Instead of rendering a hypothetical epochal transformation (or a hypothetical lack of such transformation) to be the starting point of my analysis, I examine a selection of representative types of interpretations of globalization which are articulated in a diverse range of ideological forms, from the most momentous instances of political theory to the most ephemeral piece of online journalism. What I see as my objective here is to identify how major conventional ideologies have reacted to the rise of the new concept and to explain why some of them have found it easier than others to absorb it and so to position themselves on the new conceptual framework.

It is already clear, on the basis of what I have said so far, that this study adopts an ‘inclusive’ approach to ideology where, in keeping with Martin Seliger’s classic formulation, ideology is defined as ‘set of ideas by which men [sic] posit, explain and justify ends and means of organized social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order’ (Seliger 1976, p. 14). As I explain in Chapter I, the inclusive understanding of ideology dissolves the link between ideology and domination or/and distortion that is of key importance in restrictive, critical conceptions articulated especially from a Marxist perspective. The inclusive model is neutral as between ideologies (such as liberalism, socialism or fascism) as specific exemplifications of the generic term, and it does not ‘ privilege’ any system of beliefs as being of a different, non-ideological, kind.
The neutral position thus assumes, in the words of one critic, that 'politics and ideology are inseparable. All political action is ultimately oriented towards the preservation, reform, destruction or reconstruction of a given order, and hence all political action is necessarily guided by an ideological system of beliefs' (Thompson 1984, p. 79). In accordance with the neutral approach, my discussion is focused on a broad range of belief systems, all of which are classified as ideologies, even though they position themselves in radically different ways vis-à-vis the present political and economic order.

Employing the terminology of Michael Freeden (1996), the method of inquiry which is used in this thesis can also be described as 'morphological' in that it takes ideologies to be constituted by sets of mutually defining concepts. In other words, to anticipate the clarification which I provide in Chapter I, this way of thinking posits that combinations of concepts form morphologies, or organic conceptual structures, where the interpretation of any concept determines the interpretations of other concepts, and where therefore no concept takes on its full meaning in isolation. Consequently, to take hold of the possible connotations of globalization and their impact on ideological systems, the concept needs to be studied in relation to broader ideational contexts where it is anchored in distinct sets of normative beliefs, concerns and priorities, whether clearly formulated or merely implicit. But, while the analytical starting point in each of the ideological cases discussed is therefore a particular ideology-laden reading of globalization, the objective, as I have already indicated, is not primarily a comparative exploration of the meanings of globalization within different idea environments but an
assessment of the contemporary relevance of long-established ideological categories. Subsequent chapters thus discuss a selection of instances of major ideological families — liberalism, socialism, national populism, fascism, anarchism and ecologism — in each case evaluating the ability of these time-honoured belief systems to integrate the concept of globalization into their overall morphologies while maintaining recognizable ideological profiles.

The liberal family is represented here by the current that is commonly held to be the hegemonic interpretation of globalization. In Chapter II I demonstrate that this ideological cluster — usually described as ‘neoliberalism’ — has a long history: its core ideas feature in major examples of nineteenth century classical liberalism and continuities are evident not just in specific socio-economic proposals but also in the general view of human nature informing those more detailed concepts. By postulating that classical liberalism is the category which describes in the most accurate way the mainstream political interpretation of globalization, my analysis clashes with the notion that new-fangled ideological labels are needed to capture the logic of today’s dominant political discourse. In the course of my discussion of classical liberalism I elaborate the case against one attempt at conceptual innovation, namely, Manfred Steger’s proposal of reconfiguration of political positions centred on the category of ‘globalism’. According to the morphological perspective, which is adopted here, to speak of a specific ideology — such as liberalism or socialism — as a separate belief system, a particular constellation of concepts must be identified as distinct from other constellations, as relatively
comprehensive, that is to say, making some sense of all key political concepts, and as displaying some degree of staying power and pervasiveness in time and space (Freeden 1998, pp. 749–750). I demonstrate in that chapter that ‘globalism’ fails as a candidate ideology when tested against these three criteria and therefore does not qualify as a political ideology in its own right. Instead, I argue, ‘globalism’ classes as a set of interpretations located within the wider conceptual structure of classical liberalism and is imbued with meaning by its ideological host.

Liberal globalism has been challenged by other models of globalization. Socialism is often taken to be a coherent, alternative but equally globalist, vision. This is a problematic assumption. Socialism is, generally speaking, a universalist ideology, but the extent of its globalist commitments will differ between (as well as within) particular socialist currents. Chapter III reduces the diversity of socialist positions to three ideal types of Marxism, democratic socialism, and social democracy and demonstrates that their understandings of globalization are divergent. This should not be surprising, I maintain, for these currents have broader concerns, the articulation of which will in each case depend on socio-political circumstances. Globalization is merely one concept which they need to take into account in their reading of political realities, and one that is inevitably affected by specific interpretations of other concepts. For this reason, globalization on its own is not reliable as a core on which an ideology might depend. This is further evidence that ‘globalism’ is unlikely to make sense as a separate ideological category.
Liberalism and socialism both have their origins in the modernizing dynamic of the Enlightenment and its turn against the feudal period with its rigid and hierarchical structures. This genealogy determines the broadly globalist course taken by the two belief systems, even though the respective variants of globalization that they endorse are radically different. The globalist projects of liberalism and socialism have not remained unchallenged, however. The antiuniversalist and anti-Enlightenment position is exemplified in Chapter IV by national populism and fascism as ideologies that deny meaning to concepts such as humankind and consequently oppose economic, social and political projects concerned with global objectives. Yet, while these positions are radically antiglobalist, an interesting development has recently taken place within fascist ideology, at least in its European variants. The conceptual framework of fascism – an ideology which has usually been associated with ultranationalism – has ‘moved upwards’ to the continental level so that European fascism now defines itself as a defender of European identity. This case might be used to vindicate the claim that the national is no longer privileged as a reference point in constructing ideas and identities. However, at the same time, the fascist example shows that the modifications that ideologies are now undergoing are not necessarily disruptive to their more central features. ‘International fascism’ operates on a new scale but remains as exclusionary as fascism has always been. In other words, while its ideological patterns have been ‘stretched’ in reaction to the perceived irrelevance of the national scale, fascism’s distinct ideological identity has not been undermined in the process.
The hegemonic liberal concept of globalization is thus challenged by the alternative
global vision of socialism as well as by ideologies arising from an opposite movement
towards exclusion based on particularities of culture or race. The dominant model is also
opposed from a third direction, which is localist and in important respects situated
beyond the concerns typical of conventional partisan politics. Anarchism and ecologism
both reject the versions of modernity, and now of globalization, promoted by liberals
and socialists. Their vision is one of small-scale, autonomous communities as the
remedy to mechanization, alienation and social and environmental degradation brought
about by structures and institutions operating on large scales. Anarchism and ecologism
are often seen as ideological partners in the vanguard of the anti-globalization
movement. However, while the similarities between them are significant, I am sceptical
about the possibility of anarchism’s and ecologism’s long-term ideological convergence
on the question of globalization. As I demonstrate in Chapter V, the concept of
globalization is understood within its host ideologies in ways which depend on their core
concepts and long-term priorities. In the case of ecologism, the core idea of ecocentrism,
namely, a postulate that the interests of the whole of nature should be placed above those
of humanity, contributes to the strength of the ecologist version of localism. On the other
hand, the anarchist insistence on individual freedom acts as a conceptual constraint in
this respect. The resulting models of localization may overlap in certain respects but
they will also inevitably collide, not just on the question of a required degree of
localization, but also with regard to the values that are to guide localized communities.
Thus, analogously to ‘globalism’, which in isolation from additional qualifiers is a
relatively 'empty' term, 'localism' also fails to make sense when detached from values and ideas to steer enactment.

The thesis thus focuses on a wide range of established ideologies. The case studies include both pro- and antiglobalist positions as well as currents scattered all along the conventional ideological spectrum. Nevertheless, in the interest of coherence judicious decisions had to be made and some interesting cases have been left out. The most substantial omission refers to conservatism which is not discussed in its own right. The explanation of this exclusion lies in the fact that traditional conservative ideology has not generated the volume of interpretations of globalization that would be comparable to the relevant outputs by the currents discussed in this thesis. Therefore, were it to be included, the discussion of conservatism would have been disproportionate in relation to other chapters. Conservative threads are nevertheless identified within the dominant form of classical liberalism with which outgrowths of conservatism have combined to produce a contentious ideological field sometimes called neo-conservatism. On the other hand, the traditional conservative critique of the Enlightenment has common characteristics with national populist and fascist positions discussed in Chapter IV and the historical sketch offered in the opening sections of that chapter covers conservative nationalist ideas. The analysis of ecologism in Chapter V also points out the conservative aspects of this ideology and examines their implications for the type of localism that ecologists advocate. In other words, while conservatism as such is not analyzed in a separate chapter, a distinctly right-wing version of antiglobalism, to which
conservatism contributes its acclamation of particularistic organic attachments, is not left out.

The second exclusion concerns my discussion of social democracy. This discussion is limited to traditional variants of social democratic ideology which accentuate the continuing primacy of the state as a locus of political action and identity and so overlap with the positions that I have defined above as 'sceptical'. I do not engage at length with the current of ideas often labelled as global social democracy, a novel ideological adjustment within social democratic ideology which expands the notion of a social democratic ideal by proposing its extension on a global scale. This global rearticulation of policies that were formerly applied to just the national dimension is undoubtedly an important development, but similar shifts are discussed in this thesis in relation to other ideological constellations, for example fascism or anarchism. Elaborating on the advance from national to global social democracy would have made my tripartite comparative analysis of socialist currents excessively complex, while contributing little new substance, other than reinforcing the point made in other chapters.

Ultimately, a justification for these and other exclusions\(^3\) lies in the already emphasized purpose of this study, which has not been designed as an inventory of ideological

\(^3\) Cases could also be made for the inclusion of ideologies which are partial or issue-focused, such as feminism. However, the thesis is focused predominantly on the question of relevance of the major comprehensive ideologies, since most of the claims which suggest ideological rupture are made in relation to these established currents.
decontestations of globalization but as a voice in the discussion of the nature of ideology and its condition at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The ideologies included in this thesis as case studies are examined in order to test my key hypothesis, that is to say, the continuing presence of major ideological families in political conflicts and debates of today, including those ranging over the meaning, the implications, and the future of globalization. Developments in the sphere of ideology will verify or refute my claim that the conventional ideological morphologies remain functional as broad and flexible templates that help draw the battle lines in contests over the concept of globalization. But even if aspects of my assessment are disproved in the course of time, I hope that this study will still have made a contribution to the contemporary debate on the state of ideology at the alleged dawn of a new era.
CHAPTER 1
GLOBALIZATION AND IDEOLOGY: EPISTEMOLOGY, METHOD, AND A PRELIMINARY MAPPING OF THE DEBATE

The purpose of the present chapter is to explain the epistemological premises of this thesis and its methodology in relation to relevant theoretical debates. In the first part of the chapter I explain my approach to political concepts and my understanding of political ideology. The question of sources used in the thesis is also addressed alongside the criteria and tools employed for the purpose of classifying the research material. In the second part I provide a preliminary mapping of literature concerned with ideological implications of globalization.

PART 1. POLITICAL CONCEPTS AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES

In the course of this thesis I examine globalization as a political concept acquiring distinctive meanings within political ideologies and I evaluate its impact on those systems of beliefs. It is therefore necessary to explain how the broad theoretical approach adopted in this thesis affects how political concepts and political ideologies are understood and analyzed. Broadly speaking, there are two rival epistemological perspectives as far as political concepts, such as liberty, equality, justice or globalization, are concerned. The position of essentialism aspires to define any political
concept in a way that is valid for all instances of the concept in question. On the other hand, the approach of relationism is that political concepts do not have definite meanings, but that they acquire them contingently on the linguistic, conceptual, axiological and social contexts in which they are employed. I am now going to discuss the implications of the two perspectives in order to point out the advantages of relationism as a broad epistemological framework adopted in the present inquiry.

Approaches to political concepts (1): essentialism

Essentialism goes back to the philosophy of Plato. The Platonic ontology assumed the existence of two realms: the temporal world hosting mutable and temporary objects as well as imperfect conceptions and the eternal world of permanent ideal forms of things and concepts. The relationship between the two realms was understood by Platonism as one between a perfect model and an inadequate copy. Reconstruction of pure forms (or concepts) from imperfect conceptions was however deemed to be possible. It was attainable through establishing what the imperfect conceptions shared, that is to say, through discovering the essences that reflected the originals (Gaus 2000, p. 7). The differences between conceptions, on the other hand, were to be discarded as distortions of the ideal forms. This essentialist method is well exemplified in a Platonic dialogue on justice recalled by Gerald Gaus. The dialogue is between Socrates and three other Athenians, each of whom comes from a different social milieu and therefore has different, socially conditioned, opinions about justice. Socrates refutes one by one his interlocutors' views of justice by pointing out logical problems that are evident just
under the surface of their arguments. While Socrates demonstrates the flaws of those conceptions, he also uses them to reconstruct what he considers to be a definitive model of justice, that is to say, one that transcends class-based or interest-driven views and hence identifies the essence present in all possible examples and interpretations of justice (Gaus 2000, pp. 7–8).

Contemporary essentialism likewise sees the role of scholarly investigation in terms of 'tidying up' confused interpretations that surround political concepts and providing clear understandings for effective scientific communication. Essentialist approaches are manifest for example in John Rawls’s argument supporting one conception of justice as ultimately rational, Felix Oppenheim’s endeavour to identify the parameters of social freedom, Norberto Bobbio’s distinction between the concepts of the left and the right or Ruth Zimmerling’s undertaking to provide conceptual clarity with regard to power (Rawls 1971; Oppenheim 1995; Bobbio 1997; Zimmerling 2005). These theorists maintain that it is possible, and also highly desirable, to arrive at a consensus on theoretically constructive, if perhaps never ultimately conclusive, definitions of any political concept: 'problems arising from a lack of conceptual precision can [...] be solved through proper analysis in every particular case' (Zimmerling 2005, p. 20). Lack of clarity is on the other hand perceived as a problem, as is evident for example in Zimmerling’s discontent with the absence of consensus on the meaning of the concept of globalization as having ‘necessarily detrimental consequences for the possibility to compare and assess empirical statements about the actual state of globalization, not to
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speak of the formulation of well-founded conclusions about causes and effects' (Zimmerling 2003, p. 63).

Generally speaking, the essentialist method applied to an examination of the concept of globalization would proceed from a scrupulous investigation of the existing notions of globalization to the construction of the definition against which propositions concerning causality and effects would be evaluated. As such, I do not see the essentialist framework as helpful in achieving my objectives in this thesis. I do not think that the concept of globalization is most usefully approached in abstracto, as a paradigmatic model alienated from its role in political discourse. Such a representation of globalization would be bound to be too arid and too general to provide an in-depth understanding of the reasons for the heated debate that the concept of globalization provokes and for the concept's importance at the intersection of political thought and political action. My discussion is focused on globalization as an ideological controversy and not globalization as an empirical phenomenon in need of a clear definition. I therefore side with the currently prevalent relationist way of thinking about political concepts which maintains that the way to an optimal understanding of those concepts does not lead through defining their essences but through analysing them in their social and ideational contexts as well as in the mutual relationships that they form.
Approaches to political concepts (2): relationism

The term relationism is generally associated with Karl Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. Mannheim, whose theory provided a spur to the development of a neutral understanding of ideology, asserted that "there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing independently of the values and position of the subject and unrelated to the social context" (Mannheim 1985 [1936], p. 79). While thus rejecting essentialist epistemology, Mannheim did not preach relativism; on the contrary, he hoped that his relationist approach was a means of emancipation from the self-defeating scepticism of relativism as well as from the 'older static ideal of eternal, unperspectivistic truth' (Mannheim 1985 [1936], p. 300). By postulating that 'truths' — including those that pertain to political concepts — must be examined in connection with the frames of reference in which they are set, Mannheim implied that it is possible to scrutinize them, if only within their inevitably particular contexts constituted, on the one hand, by the values and positions of the subjects formulating the 'truths' and, on the other hand, by the social situations in which those 'truths' are produced.

The relationist methodology has been elucidated further, albeit not necessarily under this very name, in several theoretical contributions pertaining specifically to the question of political concepts and cumulatively expanding the parameters of what is understood as the context that imbues those concepts with meaning. The question of the impact of an individual's values on his or her readings of political concepts has been taken up by the
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The notion of essential contestability. The thesis was coined by W.B. Gallie in 1956 and since then has been widely referred to in political theory (see for example Connolly 1983; Gray 1977; Lukes 1974; MacIntyre 1973). Gallie maintained that political concepts have 'no clearly definable general use which can be set up as a correct or standard use' (Gallie 1955–1956, p. 168) but are essentially contestable due to their normative character. As John Gray, representing at one time a version of the essential contestability thesis, explains: ‘the major part of what makes a concept essentially contestable is that criteria for its correct application embody normative standards, and that disputes about the propriety of these standards cannot be settled by rational argument alone’ (Gray 1977, p. 339). The origin of essential contestability is thus located at the interface between concepts and their producers-cum-consumers. In other words, political concepts ‘involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ (Gallie 1955–1956, p. 123) because the users are inevitably committed to different normative positions.

While duly concerned with the impact of individuals’ axiological views on their readings of political concepts, Gallie does not accentuate the contestation resulting from interaction between the concepts themselves. This question is addressed by a later exponent of essential contestability, William Connolly, who introduces a more dynamic perspective into this debate by insisting that political concepts are ‘cluster concepts’ with ‘open connections to other political concepts’ (Connolly 1983, p. 14). Connolly maintains that ‘to define a concept is necessarily to connect it with several others that
need clarification if the first is to be clear, and those others in turn are connected to a still wider network of concepts deserving equally close attention' (Connolly 1983, p. 1).

This assumption also guides the adherents of the paradigm of ideological morphology who focus on the relationships between political concepts within political ideologies as their most typical host structures. Michael Freeden, the leading articulator of this position, examines ideology as first and foremost a creation consisting of political concepts that ‘acquire meaning […] by means of their particular structural position within a configuration of other political concepts’ (Freeden 1996, p. 4). Thus understood, ideology may be analytically disaggregated into core concepts, namely ‘ineliminable key concepts that it is deemed to have in actual political usage’, adjacent concepts, which ‘flesh out the core […] restrict its capacity for multiple interpretations and pull it in a more defined direction’, and ‘more specific and detailed’ peripheral concepts (Freeden 2003a, p. 61).

While this is a structuralist perspective, it is also a dynamic one: it does not present ideology as an inert aggregate of interdependent concepts but as a fluctuating system where ‘each component interacts with all the others and is changed when any one of the other components alters’ (Freeden 1996, p. 67), and where patterns of inter-conceptual relations do not necessarily follow a predictable or consistent logic (Freeden 2003b, pp. 4–5). Moreover, while accentuating the morphological dimension, Freeden recognizes that the conceptual arrangements within political ideologies are not just patterned by the
internal logic of the given ideological system but are also synchronically and diachronically contingent on the social milieus in which these systems are operational. Accordingly, whereas political concepts cannot be defined conclusively, the range of meanings that can legitimately be linked to any of them is limited (Freeden 1996, pp. 66–67). Concepts form configurations with other concepts within political ideologies, but they also need to make sense for their target audiences. It follows that the variety of senses that may be meaningfully conveyed by political concepts or ideologies is constrained by social conventions. Those conventions are themselves determined by historical circumstances and so by linking political concepts to their socio-cultural environments, Freeden situates them in a diachronic, historical perspective.

Taken as a whole, relationism is a useful framework for studying political concepts. Reference to morphological, cultural and historical dimensions enables examination of concepts within their empirical contexts while at the same time avoiding the claim that the concepts themselves are empirically given. While the quest for their essences is thus

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4 The interaction between social contexts and linguistic meanings was earlier explored within the tradition of analytical philosophy (Austin 1962). Inspired by the ideas of the late Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1963) analytical philosophy considers language to be socially embedded. Accordingly, words obtain distinct meanings not merely in relation to the networks of relationships that they form with other words within language as has been accepted since the establishment of structuralist linguistics by Ferdinand de Saussure (de Saussure 1986) but also with reference to everyday contexts in which they are employed. Words make sense as long as they are used a propos, that is to say, on appropriate occasions and according to public, socially constructed, conventions. Just as ‘moving a bishop’ has a particular meaning in the context of rules of chess, a meaning that would not be relevantly encoded by someone not familiar with the game, so all linguistic utterances acquire sense within what Wittgenstein called ‘language games’, namely, the situations in which they are produced and consumed.
the study of concepts within both intra-ideological, i.e., morphological, as well as socio-historical, contexts provides vital insights into the patterns of political thinking at different levels of articulation.

The epistemological model that I adopt in this thesis relies on the cumulative contributions of relationist thinkers from Mannheim to Freeden. The relationist approach is applied to the study of the concept of globalization in the diversity of forms it assumes within different ideological environments as well as to the analysis of the impact of this concept on identifiable ideological clusters. My aim in the following chapters is to capture a number of broad types of reasoning involved in several distinct ideological interpretations of the question of globalization. I will thus be referring to sets of related ideas, values, beliefs and attitudes but I am not going to attempt a systematic or precise ordering of all the concepts involved. Accordingly, my analysis will not proceed in the manner adopted by Freeden in his own work, namely, from core to adjacent to peripheral concepts. Instead, I will analyze decontestations of the concept of globalization in connection with only the most relevant core concepts of the discussed ideologies and my argument in each of the discussed cases will be focused on the most representative ways of reasoning about globalization.

Elements of diachronic analysis will also be included in the study. Unlike age-old concepts such as liberty, equality or justice, globalization is a recent invention that has not accumulated diverse usages across time. It would have seemed therefore that there is
neither need nor possibility to complement the morphological analysis of the concept of globalization with a broader historical dimension. However, as I explained in the Introduction, while globalization is a new idea, it is related to longer-established political concepts which have been equally potent in inciting ideologies to formulate relevant normative judgements as well as policy solutions. Modernity is one example of a concept antecedent to globalization and there is marked continuity between reactions to modernity formulated by political ideologies a century ago and policies advocated by the same ideologies in the face of globalization today. The diachronic aspect of my study will consist in uncovering such continuities.

The morphological approach is particularly useful when analyzing theoretical arguments. In this form of ideological discourse concepts are defined more or less clearly and are employed deliberately to defend a set of relatively precise claims. The structure of theoretical argument can be analyzed in a systematic way as connections between concepts are relatively explicit. But theoretical argument is not the only form of ideological communication. Any political controversy, and especially one as important as globalization, becomes a subject of narratives that tell stories about events and processes, as well as individuals or groups participating in them, in ways that carry imprints of particular values and beliefs. As Christopher Flood points out, some of these narratives are perceived as valid in the eyes of their receivers and may consequently acquire the status of political myths (Flood 2001, 2002). Globalization has been the focus of many competing ‘mythopoetic’ and ‘ideologically marked’ narratives (Flood
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1996, p. 43) and these will also be discussed when they provide useful illustrations of the logic of a given ideological position.

Delineating the ideological decontestations of globalization

As already stated, the hypothesis that I intend to substantiate in the present study posits that in exploring the ideology-laden readings of the concept of globalization it is illuminating to use existing ideological structures as operative categories. In other words, the assumption that I explore in this thesis is that conventionally delineated ideological families are still helpful, if inevitably approximate, indicators of distinct sets of political worldviews that are likely to be reflected in specific instances of positions that individuals or groups take on the question of globalization.

Consequently, in the successive chapters of this thesis I operate with the established categories of classical liberalism, socialism, national populism and fascism, and ecologism and anarchism, and in each case evaluate the degree of relevance and coherence of those currents in relation to the problems posed by the new and pervasive concept. The problem with which I am consequently confronted is one of how to draw the lines between those ideological families, what criteria to use to separate out a set of discourses under one of those key labels, and how to use such broad and generalized categories as tools in researching the politics of the idea of globalization – an immensely diverse ideational territory that has proved capable of hosting exotic alliances which have temporarily masked ideological contradictions.
Ideological typologies are normally mapped on the basis of three criteria that are employed in this thesis in different proportions. The first two measures are self-definition and other-definition. Accordingly, a preliminary way to define the ideological gestalt of a given reading of globalization is to identify the self-understanding of the group or the individual that has produced that interpretation as well as establish whether it is recognized by others as in fact representing that ideological tradition (Manning 1976, pp. 139–140). This method is helpful in attempts to draw the approximate boundaries of a given ideology: ideological peripheries, or outer limits, are marked out by those interpretations that are regularly claimed by more than one ideological tradition (Flood 2001, p. 23).

The two criteria of self-definition and other-definition must always be considered but they also need to be treated with caution. They are susceptible to the limitations of human judgment as well as to political fashions producing ideological neologisms and recurrently pronounced ‘ends of ideology’. The latter trends cannot be ignored altogether as they themselves make up an ideological signum temporis by manifesting, at a given point in time, the common perceptions of a relative weight and relevance of particular ideologies. However, neither should ideological fashions be seen as automatically conclusive for they may have a propensity to cause excessive proliferation of overly narrow or extremely broad, overlapping, and usually ephemeral categories. The category of ‘globalism’, whose various incarnations will be discussed in this thesis, provides an evocative illustration of how these problems may limit the viability of a new
vocabulary. In addition to the criteria of self- and other-definition any ideological classification would therefore also need to pass a morphological test. However, due to the highly malleable nature of ideological morphology, the conceptual arrangement of any ideology cannot be specified in a precise way. An analyst is thus forced to dispense with hope for a clear-cut template applicable to a variety of ideological interpretations and capable of compartmentalizing them into instantly recognizable categories. The process of classification is instead one of estimation and approximation and uses an apparatus of soft methodology. It has become commonplace in the morphological approach to rely on two methodological tools to vindicate categories as broad as the main ideologies. One instrument is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘family resemblances’, the other – Max Weber’s ‘ideal type’.

The idea of ‘family resemblances’ helps to group infinitely diverse interpretations of political concepts into broad classes. Family resemblances occur when different readings of a concept have sufficient overlaps to be recognizable as a constellation. Consequently, ‘the interest in conceptual investigations is not to see what all members of [a] constellation share, but to chart out the relationships among them and to see precisely how the constellation hangs together’ (Gaus 2000, p. 19). Family resemblances prove to be a useful tool in the classification of responses to globalization given by traditional ideologies. Ideologies are not monolithic doctrines but umbrella terms for potentially

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5 For some useful insights concerning the question of classification see Freeden 1996, pp. 6, 87, 88 and Freeden 2005, pp. 132, 133, 142.
unlimited numbers of variants and interpretations. Family resemblances 'allow both for the shading off of one family into another and for a loose range of occupants of each family' (Freeden 2003b, p. 3). The Marxist conception of globalization, to take one example, is itself a generalization from manifold Marxian, classical Marxist, and neo-Marxist notions. The generalization is, however, legitimate for the Marxist concepts of globalization display noticeable family resemblances that make them distinct from rival conceptions, even though the difference may be one of degree rather than of kind.

The notion of an ideal type is another practical means of imposing some nominal limits on a fluid territory that defies crude classifications. Ideal types were introduced to social sciences by Max Weber. Weber accepted that scholarly analysis is unable to reflect the infinite variety of social phenomena and has to limit itself to a provision of general, abstract, and approximate models. Weber's ideal type neither conforms to its referent in great detail nor stands for an average exemplar. Rather, an ideal type is constructed on the basis of the most typical features, none of which has to be present in all instances of a referent to which an ideal type refers. In the words of Lewis Coser:

An ideal type is an analytical construct that serves the investigator as a measuring rod to ascertain similarities as well as deviations in concrete cases. [...] An ideal type never corresponds to concrete reality but always moves at least one step away from it. [...] It is constructed out of certain elements of reality and forms a logically precise and coherent whole, which can never be found as such in that reality. (Coser 1977, pp. 223–224)
This thesis turns to ideal types and family resemblances whenever it needs to categorize and make comparisons. It tries to avoid offering ideational constructions that are oversimplified, while at the same time it is wary of converse problems caused by a rampant multiplication of categories which leads to detail-overload and thus prevents any meaningful comparison or distinction. Ideal types and family resemblances are helpful in this respect in that while they imply that it is not practical to search for essences of ideological categories, they at the same time make it possible to weight the relative proportions of distinct ideological influences in any argument or narrative about globalization, and so they pave the way to legitimate conclusions.

Sources
The theoretical model that I employ can be described as inclusive, morphological and, for lack of a better word, ecumenical in its approach to the forms of ideological communication. The threefold characteristics of the model determine the selection of sources that substantiate my key claims with regard to the case studies of major political ideologies.

An inclusive understanding of ideology is usually set against restrictive conceptions, notably Marxian and Marxist, but also conservative. An inclusive, neutral definition of

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6 An informative account of Marx’s theory of ideology is available in a book by John Thompson (Thompson 1990, pp. 33-44). This book also offers a contemporary critical conceptualization of ideology from a post-Marxist perspective. It can be complemented by an earlier contribution by the same author (Thompson 1984). An example of a
ideology by Seliger has already been cited in the introduction to this study. There are plenty of definitions by other theorists that follow broadly the same logic (for example Christenson 1972, p. 1; Goodwin 2007, pp. 28–29; Heywood 2007, pp. 11–12; Vincent 1995, p. 16). An inclusive approach, in a minimal formulation, applies the term ideology to any system of political beliefs that is comprehensive and coherent enough to give an adequately full account of a given political reality, either existing or anticipated, and to offer a strategy to preserve or attain its preferred political arrangements. Any such system will be considered an ideology regardless of whether it is perceived as being right or wrong, fair or unjust, realistic or incongruent with reality. What this means for the present study is that any ideological system is equally worth the analysis. This thesis thus considers at least one representative of five major ideological families, each of them offering a vast supply of textual sources that have some bearing on the question of globalization.

In its turn, a morphological perspective on ideology assumes that all forms of political discourse, from the most sophisticated to the most primitive can be analysed as ideology-laden. This morphological stance contradicts the essentialist distinction between political philosophy and ideology whereby philosophy is characterized as conservative account is available in an article by Kenneth Minogue (Minogue 1993). A synthetic discussion of 'inclusive' and 'restrictive' definitions is provided by Mathew Humphrey (Humphrey 2005).
‘wholly synchronic, reflective, self-critical’ while ideology is identified with the sphere of superstition and myth (understood as distortion) and dismissed as ‘crude, unreflective, and irrational’ (Vincent 2004, p. 72). From the morphological point of view, political philosophy, like ideology, is built of inter-reliant political concepts and is dependent on cultural and historical contexts (Freeden 1996, pp. 41 and 44; Freeden 2005, pp. 12 and 19; Freeden 2006, p. 15). Political philosophy therefore cannot claim to be value-free: while they may deny an ideological bias, political philosophers are affected both by particular ideologies as well as by the ‘total ideology’, i.e., the dominant vision of the world, what Mannheim called *Weltanschauung* (Mannheim 1952). In other words, ‘even when engaged in professional political thinking political philosophers also contribute to the construction of ideologies’ (Freeden 1996, p. 45) and so both types of sources – ‘philosophical’ and ‘ideological’ – may be subjected to the same type of examination.⁷

The implication of this assumption for the present thesis is that a distinction between primary and secondary sources of information is futile as well as unjustified (Freeden 2005, p. 12). Accordingly, the contributions examined in the following chapters include, next to one another, articulations in the form of sophisticated theoretical analyses as well

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⁷ The uttermost concession that can be made on this question from a morphological point of view is to accept that ideology may take different forms – ‘esoteric’, where it requires study and meditation, and ‘exoteric’, where ‘a certain measure of simplification, translation (faithful or otherwise), omission, and addition is necessary’ (Hagopian 1978, p. 401). However, in those different appearances political communication remains committed to particular ways of reading political reality and to given sets of values and priorities and so is susceptible to ‘ideological infection’ (Goodwin 2007, p. 15).
as a more diffuse partisan literature typified by bald and emotional terms of political activism and contained in a variety of manifestoes, pamphlets and other miscellaneous documents produced by political movements, think-tanks, networks and fellow-travelling intellectuals.

Finally, the third aspect of my approach – its ‘ecumenism’ – implies that narratives in the form of stories offering accounts of processes, events or actions may provide effective vehicles for the diffusion of ideological meanings and so are as worthy of the analytical effort as is theoretical argument (see Flood 1996, 2002). It follows that mythopoeic narratives add a further dimension (and further volume) to the miscellany of sources examined in this study.

The combined inclusive, morphological and ecumenical stance suggests a potentially unlimited reservoir of sources when applied to the analysis of the meanings of the concept of globalization within major ideological families. It thus poses the question of manageability. Indeed, even excluding the seemingly most transient interpretations, the corpus of literature on globalization that has been generated from within the diversity of ideological positions, by ‘political philosophers’ as well as ‘ideologues’, and in the form of both theoretical arguments and mythopoeic narratives, has expanded dramatically in the last decade or so, thus putting an even approximately comprehensive overview of this literature beyond the capacity of any single study if not single lifetime. In this situation, the fact that my linguistic competencies limit the sources discussed here to
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those available in English could be seen as a blessing in disguise but that limitation does
not solve the problem of overabundance.8

Yet, while the immense volume of the debate exceeds what can be discussed in one
place, it is not impossible to examine a representative sample of the most typical
arguments and stories contributed by the contestants, either individuals or groups,
who/which are generally recognized as prominent articulators of the major ideological
positions. The underlying assumption that guided my attempts to render the outcomes of
this research both representative and manageable has been that the findings about the
ideological readings of globalization could be legitimately concluded once data
saturation became evident, that is to say once it was possible to identify a repertoire of
ideas and arguments reproduced time and again within each of the ideologies discussed
in this thesis. It follows that while several interesting but peculiar readings of
globalization in the ideological traditions under discussion might not have been
scrutinized the most typical interpretations have been mapped.

The method of analysis and the question of objectivity

An increasingly dominant tendency in political science is to study ideology by using
quantitative methods. While appreciating the merits of quantitative analysis – especially
the fact that it allows for processing of large bodies of material and thereby makes some

8 The contributions in my native language, Polish, have not been sufficiently significant
or distinct to merit their inclusion just on the basis of their accessibility.
types of extensive statistical and comparative analysis possible — I posit that the present study requires a qualitative approach. As I explained above, this thesis aims to infer the meanings attached to the concept of globalization on the basis of its connections with other concepts within political ideologies. These connections are sometimes made in an explicit way, but may also be intertwined with other ideas in disparate arguments only partially related to global issues. The quantitative method — effective as it is in relation to the types of questions which can be answered in terms of for example word and collocation frequencies — is less suitable for the purpose of uncovering such implicit, often hidden, conceptual associations.

What is more, this study takes account of both complex articulations of political theory as well as of exoteric, possibly 'primitive', and ephemeral political propaganda. Quantitative methodology is highly efficient in analyses concerned with policy-related aspects of political discourse that are usually stated in election manifestos and other programmatic documents (see for example Harrison and Bruter 2008 or Petry and Pennings 2006) but its application is more problematic in studies which examine ideological production across a wide range of types of material and which aim to convey not just the logic but also the tone of ideological argument. In cases where the focus of the analysis is on ideological nuance as expressed in a diversity of forms quantitative analysis may produce an impoverished image of ideology.
Ideological material in this thesis is thus subjected to a qualitative analysis which consists in close reading and conceptual examination. Attention is paid to the structure of argument concerned with globalization, to conceptual morphology, i.e., the connections that the concept of globalization forms with the core concepts of the main ideologies, and to historical continuity with the concepts which in the past caused ideological reactions anticipating those triggered by the idea of globalization. The texture of the ideological communication is also noted, when appropriate.

The adoption of a qualitative method poses a question of objectivity. Qualitative research inevitably involves judgements by the researcher in the selection of sources and depends on the interpretation by the researcher subject to the eventual appraisal by others. If all political thought is susceptible to ideological bias then the interpretations contained in this thesis cannot claim to be exceptions. Following the relationist perspective that I adopt, I do not claim to occupy a neutral position outside the so-called hermeneutical circle. But although I do not see it as my task at this point to delve into the question of the objectivity of cognition, I posit, following Heidegger, that ‘what is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way’ (Heidegger 1962, p. 195). The right way in this case is to abandon an intentional advocacy of a given position and refrain, as far as possible, from making normative judgements about the value or fairness of the ideological positions examined. If in the process of such ostensibly impartial analysis my claims happen to privilege a particular view, whether on isolated occasions or more consistently, this should be considered an unintentional
deviation from the epistemological ideal and a by-product of perhaps inevitable ideological bias, but not a deliberate ideological involvement with a given standpoint.

PART 2. GLOBALIZATION AND IDEOLOGY: STATE OF THE ART

In the second part of this chapter, I offer a brief review of the hitherto limited literature that has a bearing on the question of ideology and globalization, and on that background I formulate my preliminary claims on the subject. It should be noted that, due to the highly contested nature of globalization and the more or less explicitly normative goals of globalization studies, the boundaries between primary and secondary sources are blurred. Consequently, some of the contributions considered below are treated as primary literature in the course of later discussion.

From globalization as an idea to the ideology of globalization – a preliminary mapping of the key debates

This thesis benefits from the insights of three strands of literature. The first current offers a broad recognition of globalization as an ideational phenomenon and has therefore prepared the ground for the conceptual analysis of the idea of globalization. While similar contributions are discussed later as primary sources (see section on social democracy in Chapter III), the overall logic of this scholarship is briefly summarized below. The second literature engages with the issue of the desirable response to globalization. It is concerned with globalization mainly as a process, as against
globalization as an idea, but it pertains to the subject of ideology in that it considers the question of whether conventional political ideologies, or indeed any ideology, provide adequate means for effectively managing or confronting globalization or some aspects of it. This literature has a partisan edge and is usually generated from within the arena of political activism. It would normally be classified as comprising primary sources but since the conclusions of this thesis clash with the major claims featuring in that literature it is also discussed in the present section. Finally, the third range of interpretations embarks on a territory most akin to the interests of this thesis in that it addresses the impact of the concept of globalization on traditional ideological morphologies and either defends or questions the relevance of conventional ideological constellations. The most important of these contributions, that is to say, the one articulated by Manfred Steger, is scrutinized in Chapter II in relation to classical liberalism. The more general remarks presented here provide a preliminary justification for the employment of established ideological types as markers suitable for mapping the diversity of conceptions of globalization.

*Literature #1: Globalization as a process and a concept*

The semantics of the concept of globalization have hitherto been far less debated than the causes, effects and dynamics of globalization as a purportedly factual process. However, while the field is thus far relatively underpopulated, the need to make a distinction between globalization as a structural process and globalization as a concept has already been put forward by several authors. Particularly important in this respect is
Roland Robertson’s now classic introduction to the subject (Robertson 1992). It stands out among major early contributions to globalization studies as one emphasizing both ‘the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole’ (Robertson 1992, p. 8) and as thus offering a framework for understanding the history of globalization in its twofold trajectory: as a material development and as a social awareness of the existence of this process. The explicit recognition of the mental side of globalization has subsequently been upheld by other studies and the field continues to grow (see for example Ágh 2000; Amoore and Dodgson 1997; Dirlik 2000; Fiss and Hirsch 2005; Hay and Marsh 2000; Hay 2006; Hirst and Thompson 1999; Kayatekin and Ruccio 1998). In the words of its adherents, this line of inquiry focuses on ‘discursive and ideational processes in the mediation of globalizing tendencies’ (Hay and Marsh 2000, p. 7), on ‘how the material process and symbolic construction of globalization are related’ (Fiss and Hirsch 2005, p. 32) or, to put it emphatically, on how ‘globalisation as epistemology leads to globalisation as epoch’ (Amoore and Dodgson 1997, p. 179).

The most influential genre in this literature is typified by its critical intent to lay bare the hegemonic discourse of globalization as one generating predictable negative outcomes. Elements of critical discourse analysis are thus frequently adopted in this current in order to reveal the ‘framing’, ‘sense-making’ (Fiss and Hirsch 2005) or, more characteristically, dissimulative functions of the concept of globalization. This literature has a polemical, if not outright partisan nature. Analysts associated with social
democratic politics have been particularly prominent in this vein of theorizing about globalization (this literature is therefore discussed in greater detail in connection with social democratic readings of globalization). They have been anxious to challenge what they perceive as the paralysing impact of the discourse of globalization on policies of redistribution and to reaffirm the continuing capacity of the welfare state to alleviate the externalities of the market. In other words, the concern of this strand of thinking has been with ‘the ways in which the discourses of globalization [...] create or, alternatively, obscure the possibility of intervening to shape contemporary economic and social events’ (Kayatekin and Ruccio 1998, p. 76). Some of those critiques have rejected the reality of globalization, presenting it instead as a sort of myth (in the conventional sense of a false, illusionary account of reality), rhetoric, or ‘teleology that tends to produce the idea of the “death of politics” as well as the demise of the nation-state’ (Amoore and Dodgson 1997, p. 179; see also Hirst and Thompson 1999 and Wade 1996).

This literature is undoubtedly valuable but its perspective differs from one adopted here in two important ways. Firstly, as I already explained, the intentions of this thesis are not critical even if the outcomes of the analysis may potentially have some such implications. I analyze the conceptions of globalization which are located within the parameters of the ‘hegemonic’ discourses in the same way as I approach the rival conceptions and counterclaims made by the critics of that hegemony. Secondly, my discussion differs from the studies concerned with the role of a particular discourse of globalization in producing a certain set of tangible political outcomes in that my
argument is not intended to be structured upon a parallel analysis of the meaning of the concept and its implications for political developments. Instead, I use a predominantly semantic rather than functional analysis: I focus on the conceptions of globalization in their own right and not in order to expose their role in determining the choices made by political actors in the real world. Where this thesis includes elements of analysis of the relationship between material and ideational realms it is interested in the inverse direction of impact, namely, in how social contexts affect the concept, and not vice versa.

Literature #2: Globalization as the (New) End of Ideology

The second range of literature does not usually doubt the reality of globalization, or at least of a systemic change under possibly a different name, and it aims to engage with the process either in order to manage or (more often) to challenge it. This literature has been growing largely in response to a series of protest events – most notably in Seattle (1999), Prague (2000), and Genoa (2001) – which assembled a huge diversity of groups, from trade unions to anarchist and ecologist movements, to elements of the extreme right (Sakai 2003; Berlet and Lyons 2000, pp. 342–343) and stood up to institutional representatives of the global free-market agenda in the form of the World Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. World Social Forums, which met annually since 2001 as gatherings of diverse non-governmental organizations and social movements critical of the neoliberal consensus provided
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another spur for the expansion of academic, as well as partisan, interest in alternatives to the globalization of free-market capitalism.

Inspired by expressions of political activism, this literature has tended to focus on the forms of antineoliberal movements and on their strategies of organizing protest (see for example Della Porta 2007; Dissent 2005; Kingsnorth 2003; Klein 2000; Klein 2002; McDonald 2006; Mertes 2004; Notes from Nowhere 2003; One-Off Press 2001; Shepard and Hayduke 2002; Starr 2000 and 2005). However, while sociological aspects of this politics of resistance have been thoroughly and insightfully discussed, the ideological premises guiding the movements in question have been either neglected or conceptualized in ways that are problematic as far as the model of ideology adopted here is concerned. More specifically, where the question of ideology has been addressed at all, this has usually been on the occasion of putting its relevance into doubt, of claiming that ‘the movement’ has somehow become ‘post-ideological’.9 Benjamin Shepard and

9 This critical understanding of the concept of ideology displays elements of the logic of the recurring ‘end of ideology’ thesis. The original assertion of the death of ideology was put forward in the 1960s by Raymond Aron, Seymour Martin Lipset, Daniel Bell and others in the context of a broad convergence of mainstream politics on the principles of the welfare state (Aron 1962; Lipset 1960; Bell 1960). The end of ideology claim enjoyed a heyday again in the early 1990s owing especially to the impact of Francis Fukuyama who declared ‘an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’ and thus the end of ideological debate (Fukuyama 1989, p. 1; see also Minogue 1993). Contrary to those two instances, the most recent verdict of the end of ideology that has been made in connection with globalization does not assume the exhaustion of ‘utopian’ or ‘radical’ politics. But it bears a resemblance to the previous obituaries of ideology in that it postulates the irrelevance of ideology in the sphere of political practice; in this case the practice being defined as a widespread resistance to capitalist globalization (that
Ronald Hayduk, the editors of a collection of reports on ‘urban protest and community building in the era of globalization’, illustrate the dismissal of ideology when asserting that ‘the movement’ ‘has no ideology, just many points of view’ (Shepard and Hayduk 2002, p. 262). Simon Tormey develops a similar opinion in his *Anti-capitalism: A Beginner’s Guide*:

> [M]any groupings within the anti-capitalist movement are evidently either *non-ideological* or *post-ideological*. This is to say that there are groupings that are quite explicitly opposed to the idea that what the movement needs is an alternative vision of how the world should look. (Tormey 2004, p. 75)

Post-ideology claims have also been made in relation to specific political positions engaged in the contestation of globalization. Thus, for example, Giorel Curran has devoted a whole book to the idea that anarchism – one of the key influences in Seattle and on other ‘anti-globalization’ occasions – has now become post-ideological (Curran 2006). Post-ideological anarchists – we are told – ‘reject doctrinaire positions and sectarian politics preferring to mix their anarchism with an eclectic assortment of other political ideas and traditions’ (Curran 2006, p. 2). In suggesting that post-ideological anarchism has been able to free itself from ‘ideological conformity’ (Curran 2006, p. 6), Curran’s argument illustrates the reasoning which is common in the literature preoccupied with popular challenges to neoliberal globalization. In that literature its adversaries also categorize as ‘neoliberal’ or ‘corporate’ to distinguish it from potential alternative variants).
ideology is identified with rigidity. Adjectives such as ‘doctrinaire’, ‘sectarian’, ‘conformist’, ‘vanguardist’, and ‘orthodox’ are used to describe politics that is ‘ideological’. On the other hand, ‘general spirit’ and ‘inspiration’ are said to characterize the ‘vibrant’ ‘post-ideological’ positions that are credited with the ability to challenge global capitalism (Curran 2006, pp. 1–16).

What is usually posited as a unifier of different ideologies into one ‘anti-globalization’ front is not commonality of a positive vision but either single concepts isolated from wider interpretations or, more typically, methodological similarities and shared targets. Curran once again provides a relevant example by putting forward a construction that builds upon an isolated concept to vindicate the affinity of anarchist and radical ecologist interpretations and their ability to form a united front against globalization. To discuss this construction in detail would form too long a digression but a brief comment is in place.

The pertinent argument opens as follows:

While deep ecology does not claim any direct anarchist roots, it identifies hierarchy as culprit in environmental ruin. Its conception of hierarchy may be novel and applied relatively exclusively, but it highlights a hierarchy of value wielded by the powerful over the powerless – with inert nature as the most subjugated. (Curran 2006, p. 114)

Having established that a radical current of ecologism declares a form of hierarchy to be a problem, Curran then assumes that this current partakes in, or at least comes very near
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to ‘post-ideological’ anarchism. The problem is that the critique of hierarchy that is present in this variant of ecologism is at odds with anarchist interpretations in that it is concerned with relations between species, not within any of them. In fact, as I am going to show in detail in Chapter V, hierarchy between human beings may be postulated in ecologism as necessary to prevent humans from oppressing nature. The idea is of course incompatible with the anarchist belief that hierarchical arrangements in society inevitably generate human domination of other species. In other words, as this example shows, the mere presence of a concept within a given ideological structure is not a measure of that structure’s kinship with other morphologies that also include the concept.

Curran actually acknowledges those nuanced differences: ‘while deep ecology may rail against the operation of hierarchy against nature, it can overlook its operation within humanity’ (Curran 2006, p. 114), and yet she does not see them as preventing deep ecology’s membership in ‘anarchist politics’. By ‘politics’ Curran means the sphere of political strategy; this makes Curran’s argument particularly useful as an illustration of the practice, common in the literature on the alternatives to globalization, of elevating operative components of ideologies (explanations of the optimal ways to achieve political goals) to the status of classificatory tools to the neglect of more fundamental conceptual discontinuities. In view of that, Curran posits that what constitutes post-ideological anarchism is its ‘temperament’ which ‘rejects “roadmaps” of prescribed
visions in favor of “toolkits” for discovering them’ (Curran 2006, p. 231). As a result, she places a hotchpotch of diverse positions in the ‘post-ideological’ anarchist territory.

In a broadly similar way – that is to say, by way of elevating political strategies to the status of markers of political positions – other authors explain the move ‘beyond ideology’, that they believe to have occurred, by pointing to new forms of network-based organization. Accordingly, networks are the means to transcend ideological discrepancies by converging on one ‘no’ (Kingsnorth 2003) that unites otherwise heterogeneous expressions of resistance to the neoliberal form of globalization within the ‘movement of movements’ (Mertes 2004) or ‘coalition of coalitions’ (Klein 2001, p. 81):

One of the basic characteristics of the network form is that no two nodes face each other in contradiction; rather, they are always triangulated by a third, and then a fourth, and then by an indefinite number of others in the web. [...] They displace contradictions and operate instead a kind of alchemy, or rather a sea change, the flow of the movements transforming the traditional fixed positions; networks imposing their force through a kind of irresistible undertow. (Hardt 2002, p. 117)

Overlaps in organization, methodology, and tactics have thus been used as evidence that there is room for a unified movement against the neoliberal model of globalization. Yet, while the postulate of liberation from the ideological straightjacket was intended to be politically empowering, the classificatory problems that it has posed continue to cause concern not just to scholars but also to activists themselves. From the conceptualization of the miscellaneous range of political projects offered by enemies of globalization in
terms of one broad movement of opposition, or ‘one world with many worlds in it’ (Klein 2001, p. 89), resulted political as well as terminological controversies that now permeate ‘the movement’. On some occasions all opponents of the neoliberal form of globalization have been labelled as ‘antiglobalists’ causing unease among Marxist and other internationalist critics who define themselves as anticapitalist or, at least, antineoliberal, but who reject the label of ‘anti-globalization’ as rendering them vulnerable to charges of isolationism (for example Callinicos 2003; Hardt and Negri 2000; Klein 2001). Conversely, appellations such as ‘globalization-from-below’ or the ‘global justice movement’ have been applied indiscriminately to a huge variety of positions, some of which do not identify with any global project (see for example Esteva and Prakash 1998).

These controversies demonstrate that ideological identities are not just a matter of academic interest. Ideological labels may be empowering when they are seen as linked with momentous intellectual achievements or decisive, positively valued, political events. Alternatively, they may be disabling when they are associated with negative contexts. How those contexts are interpreted in any given instance will of course depend on the ideological perspective in question. What is empowering for one ideology – for example its progressive history embodied in a series of revolutions – may be seen as delegitimizing from a different ideological angle – for instance from the point of view of a belief system that prides itself on its persistent defence of established institutions. Legitimizations that will serve one ideology well may thus be harmful to another system
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of beliefs. From this truism follows an equally obvious conclusion, namely, that alliances between ideologies may not be in the interest of one or more parties involved, and so are likely to be volatile, even if the ideologies in question happen to have the same enemy, such as, in the cases discussed, the globalization of neoliberalism.

In this thesis I thus take issue with the claim that the currents of opposition to neoliberal globalization may forgo the differences that divide them for the sake of abolishing the process. Any instance of contestation of globalization is dependent on the broader and competing ideologies that such discourse inevitably inhabits. Thus, while not necessarily combined with open admission of ideological adherence, heated and bitter divisions on the issue of globalization have been abundantly expressed along recognizable lines separating major ideological territories.\(^{10}\) I return to this question in Chapter V where I

\(^{10}\) See for example Albertani 2002; De Angelis 2001, pp. 109 and 124; K 2001, pp. 32–33; Tommy 2001, p. 105 and Katsiaficas 2001 for an anarchist perspective; Callinicos and Gonzales 2002 and Sakai 2003 for a revolutionary socialist stance; George 2004 for a democratic socialist view; Fabel van den illegal 2000 for a critique of the strategy of ecologism. The continuity of contention between distinct ideological positions in ‘the movement’ against neoliberal globalization has also been noted by several academic commentators. For example, Mark Rupert notes that ‘[l]ong-standing questions between anarchism and other forms of left politics now echo through the global justice movement [...] the movement has been divided by disagreements that center on the question of reforming, reconstructing, or abolishing global economic institutions in the course of constructing future possible worlds’ (Rupert 2004, p. 127). Similarly Curran – somewhat inconsistently in the context of her insistence on ‘post-ideological’ politics – acknowledges that ‘old ideological battles, fought under the rubric of new forms, are still clearly visible’ (Curran 2006, p. 32). Curran explains: ‘[a]n embrace of diversity and a shared aversion to globalization does not deter a vigorous internal contest on the best way forward [...]’. More recently, the questions of political direction, strategy and relationship to the state [...] have led to a sharper division [...]’. While they may not specifically describe it this way, the tension resonates a contest for the forum’s
present a comparison of the ecologist and anarchist positions on globalization. The fact that these positions are divergent and on several accounts practically incompatible provides a pungent exemplification of the fact that even close ideological currents may find it difficult to establish a common interpretative framework on which to construct a cohesive alternative to the hegemonic form of globalization (Soborski 2006 and 2007).

**Literature #3: Globalization and traditional political ideologies**

The angle and the objectives of this thesis situate it within an as yet narrow literature concerned more specifically with the impact of globalization on the perturbed bifurcation lines separating ideological families and on the coherence and relevance of thus delineated types. The question on which this debate is focused is one of the extent to which the categories that we have become accustomed to when thinking about ideology – liberalism, conservatism, socialism and so on, as well as their key internal currents – still have any heuristic power, whether they are able to accurately map the political reality or characterize responses to political problems. There are two primary, opposing considerations here. On the one hand, it is important to discern new ideological configurations where they materialize and to be prepared in light of their emergence to reconsider the topography of the ideological landscape. On the other hand, it is also crucial not to go to extremes in the quest to challenge conventional categories. A reckless abandonment of familiar labels and a hasty granting of the status of ideology to anarchical heart – framed in terms of autonomy (space) and institutionalization (movement) and resonating old Marxist/anarchist debates about strategy (Curran 2006, p. 71).
new and not yet eligible pretenders is likely to infringe upon the broadly accepted and satisfactorily functional understanding of ideology as an ideational construct with a considerable degree of staying power and influence. Consequently, it may affect our ability to map the political world and to respond to the challenges that it poses (Soborski 2009).

Among contributions concerned with the impact of globalization on conventional ideological distinctions, Roger Burbach’s and Manfred Steger’s exemplify the position that emphasizes rupture and destabilization to the effect that ‘fixed zombie categories’ (Steger 2008, p. 14) need to be replaced with concepts able to ‘capture the contours of a profoundly altered ideological landscape’ (Steger 2008, p. 248). In his tellingly entitled book ‘Globalization and Postmodern Politics’, Burbach asserts that ‘there has been a fundamental shift with globalization and [...] the very conceits of modernity need to be questioned’ (Burbach 2001, p. 10). He pronounces the advent of ‘a postmodern political age’ in which ‘the political ideologies, or metanarratives, that drove the politics of the twentieth century [are] largely irrelevant’ (Burbach 2001, p. 2):

[T]he three main political ideologies that have driven the Western world since the French revolution – liberalism, conservatism and then socialism – are in disarray or no longer functional. They are unable to explain or incorporate the tremendous complexity and diverse realities of the contemporary world. (Burbach 2001, p. 71)

Steger makes a similar (but more systematically argued) plea for discarding traditional ideological labels such as ‘socialism’ or ‘liberalism’ as ‘outdated’ and condemned ‘to
political and theoretical irrelevance' (Steger 2005b, pp. 27, 28). While Burbach emphasizes the transition from modernity to post-modernity as produced by the rise of globalization and allegedly compromising the validity of modern ideological narratives, Steger focuses on the ‘transformation of the ideological landscape as a result of a shifting mode of understanding community and people’s place in it’ (Steger 2008, p. 194). This transformation is said to be caused by a decline of the nation-state and nationalism that are nowadays purportedly supplanted by global structures and identities. Since the key ideologies ‘were all “nationalist” in the sense of performing the same fundamental process of translating the overarching national imaginary into concrete political doctrines, agendas and spatial arrangements’ (Steger 2008, p. 10) so, according to Steger, they are no longer germane nowadays when the nation-state-based ways of thinking about political reality are withering. The position that the established vocabulary has lost its explanatory potential entails reporting or postulating a realignment of traditional ideological positions. The claim that a new ‘ideological imaginary’ is needed to make sense of novel circumstances thus brings about newly-coined categories – ‘globalism’ in Steger’s case – that purport to be more effectual in imbuing the concept of globalization with meaning and consequently in elucidating and contextualizing analytical and normative debates on the process of globalization.

In opposition to this ‘all-change’ thesis, the continuity position asserts the relevance of the familiar political concepts and ideologies and challenges the far-reaching claims to novelty put forward by the forecasters of the allegedly new political paradigm:
The theory of globalization is advertised as being distinct from preceding theories, and yet its complexity, its incorporation of a range of normative standpoints and its links with preceding theories are often unacknowledged. [...] Theorists of globalization run together interpretive conceptual readings of globalization with strong causal claims and normative commitments on its behalf that tend to essentialise the notion of globalization and magnify its supposed novelty. In so doing they advertise a break with preceding theories and theorists while holding theoretical and normative ambitions that harmonise with the classic grand narratives of modernity. (Browning 2006, pp. 87–88, 89)

An affirmative response to the question of whether the traditional ways of conceiving of political reality based on conventional political concepts and ideologies are adequate in today’s circumstances implies that the concept of globalization may be usefully mapped by using the established ideological categories. John Schwarzmantel, while referring to postmodernism, makes claims that could be used against the ‘all change’ thesis put forward by the advocates of an ideological shift due to globalization. Schwarzmantel asserts that ‘the tradition of modernity and the ideologies that developed from it are still relevant and important to contemporary politics’ (Schwarzmantel 1998, p. 194). He explains:

The ideologies necessary to make sense of the contemporary world remain those that originated with modernity. The tradition represented by the Left-Right spectrum is still significant, and new ideologies such as feminism and environmentalism are necessary correctives or additions to this spectrum, not replacements for it. Ideas of emancipation and social transformation, the critical evaluation of social realities and discussion of alternatives to the existing structure of society are all made possible by ideological discourse and the ideas of
critique, agency and goal that these modernist ideologies proclaim. (Schwarzmantel 1998, p. 198)  

The continuity thesis does not assume the conservation of ideologies in fixed forms or a static picture of society in which they are operational. But it claims that the flexible durability of the key ideological configurations – conservatism, liberalism and socialism – is assured by the fact that they fulfil the functional prerequisites of any society, post-modern as well as modern: ‘the need to create a social order that combines the separateness and distinctiveness of individuals and groups with a shared tradition of citizenship and community’ (Schwarzmantel 1998, p. 194).

In his most recent book, *Ideology and Politics* (2008) Schwarzmantel puts more emphasis on change in patterns of ideology but he remains convinced that major belief systems continue to play an important role amid new, so-called ‘mini’ ideologies. Schwarzmantel suggests that the ‘mini’ ideologies are in mutually enriching relationship with the ‘traditional’ belief systems. The ‘mini’ ideologies benefit from this interaction by having their immature and issue-based structures imbued with more general meanings deriving from comprehensive political visions offered by the established currents. Traditional ideologies, on the other hand, become updated to new circumstances by having to deal with new concerns brought into play by partial ideological clusters. Schwarzmantel’s conceptualization assumes a possibility of fusion of old and new ideologies into a counter-ideology able to challenge the hegemony of neoliberalism. As I have explained in the previous section, I am sceptical with regard to the possibility of an integration of distinct ideological positions against the dominant ideology. It should be noted that Schwarzmantel himself puts this idea forward as a normative, rather than empirical argument (Schwarzmantel 2008, p. 172). Nevertheless, while I am doubtful about this aspect of his proposition, I share Schwarzmantel’s view that major ideologies need to keep pace with new developments, and that their engagement, or interaction, with ‘molecular’ ideologies is one way through which this ‘updating’ may occur (Schwarzmantel 2008, p. 168).
In this thesis I offer a conceptual analysis of ideological arguments about globalization that sheds light on whether ‘an alternative conceptual morphology has greater illuminating power’ (Freeden 2003b, p. 9) than the vocabulary with which we are familiar. While it would be naïve to expect this type of analysis to provide a once and for all resolution of the controversy, its advantage is that it engages with ideological discourse itself, prior to making assumptions about the socio-political circumstances – such as the end (or continuity) of statism and nationalism or the rise (or otherwise) of postmodernism – allegedly shaping ideological morphologies. In other words, I do not need to engage here with, for example, the soundness of the claim that the ‘national imaginary’ is in decline or that humankind has entered a new, radically distinct epoch of its development. As I argued in the Introduction, many authors argue to the contrary, but from my perspective, even if the state and state-based forms of identity are dead, this does not mean that ideologies developed at the climax of statism and nationalism must be out of date today. It is perfectly possible that they have been able to evolve to match the new set of circumstances by – to use Freeden’s terminology – updating their morphologies and refocusing them on new ‘adjacent’ concepts or even by moving some concepts from their ‘peripheries’ to their ‘cores’ and vice versa. There is no necessary reason why ideologies such as liberalism or socialism should be unable to reinvent themselves in new circumstances. Whether they will indeed survive will depend on their morphological features. As Freeden puts it:

Ideologies are capable of bending under pressure, and of hosting a number of variations on each of their concepts without collapsing.
However, if completely alien meanings of concepts are hastily injected into a particular ideology, its structure may snap. (Freeden 1996, p. 82)

It follows that the task of my analysis is to identify those ideologies, or those areas within ideological configurations that have been struggling to convey a coherent message in the face of new conceptual constraints, as well as to nominate those that remain robust or have even become reconsolidated in the novel ideational milieu. The inquiry into whether the categories that used to map the terrain of ideology are still intelligible when applied to the varied interpretations of the concept of globalization is pursued throughout this thesis in relation to leading contributions to the globalization debate. These contributions are scrutinized to establish the degree of match or mismatch between the decontestations of globalization that they offer and the conventional ideological morphologies. This implies, in each case, an engagement with the question of the extent to which a particular decontestation of globalization fits within the parameters of a given ideology and an identification of the areas of actual or potential tension. At the same time, the effectiveness of alternative clusters — such as 'globalism' — is tested by relating them to the same exemplary accounts of globalization. The question to be answered is whether new criteria organize the existing positions in ways that are meaningful, namely, that collate related interpretations together in plausible, discernibly distinct and, potentially at least, durable categories, or whether what we are offered as alternatives to the established types are merely flash in the pan categories likely to pass away when a new instance of hip political jargon or a new ideological fad takes their place.
As I made explicit from the outset, the study of a variety of ideological interpretations of globalization has led me to side with the continuity position. The following chapters thus emphasize, in the words of Freeden, "the durability of ideological segments that have seemingly been vanquished or become obsolete" (Freeden 2005, p. 139). This is not to imply an inert picture of ideology or to deny change but merely to argue that so far change has been discernible within traditional ideological formations while not as yet destabilizing those very formations to the extent that would render them no longer useful as analytical categories. The emergence of the concept of globalization has replicated traditional ideological controversies in the context of the new debate according to a reconfigured but recognizable pattern. It has not necessitated a radical reshuffling of the terms of ideology although it has undeniably encouraged some fine-tuning of routine categories. In the words of Rod Bantjes: "[w]e are still playing out the same projects and engaged in the same debates as our "modern" forebears" (Bantjes 2005, p. 14). Consequently, the established ideologies have not become irrelevant: they remain the key to the understanding of the ideas as well as policies that pertain to the contemporary purportedly global circumstance. The following four chapters aim to substantiate this case.
CHAPTER II
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM:
GLOBALIZATION AS THE LOGIC OF FREEDOM

The remainder of this thesis is devoted to the study of the meanings of globalization that can be identified within conceptual morphologies of major ideological families. The analysis takes off by advancing an argument according to which the currently hegemonic discourse of globalization can be unpacked as integral to a long-established logic of liberal ideology.

Defining and delineating the dominant ideology

What is emerging victorious, in other words, is not so much liberal practice, as the liberal idea. That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy. (Fukuyama 1992, p. 45, emphasis in original)

We are all liberals now. (Bellamy 1999, p. 23)

That liberalism is today’s dominant ideology is a commonplace assumption shared by liberals and their adversaries, although neither the former nor, naturally, the latter automatically perceive liberal dominance in as far-reaching terms as does Fukuyama: to affirm that liberalism is the dominant ideology is not necessarily to declare its ultimate victory or the definitive elimination of its rivals. More controversy surrounds the
questions of what this dominant position entails for liberalism itself and of what it means for the enterprise of an analyst of this ideology. In response to the first concern, particular attention has been focused on the relationship between liberalism and other ideologies – this relationship has been captured in terms of intensified interactions, including both clashes and blending. To be sure, conflicts and cross-pollinations take place between competitors along the whole ideological spectrum. Yet, it is indeed the case that interactions are particularly concentrated around the fraction occupied by liberal ideology. The liberal hegemony means that liberalism’s contenders are compelled to articulate their standing on the liberal ideology itself, as well as on the questions that the liberal agenda defines as imperative. The fact that liberal beliefs permeate so-called common-sense thinking (Bellamy 1999, p. 23; Goodwin 2007, p. 35) may also mean that other ideologies find it expedient to adopt liberal ideas and modify them according to their own needs, while liberalism may in turn be attracted to these offshoot ideological variations.12

12 The interactions between liberalism and other political ideologies have been discussed either in terms of the emanation of ideas from within the liberal centre, that is to say, liberalism ‘spilling over into other ideological domains’ (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, p. 52), or as the process of liberalism absorbing external influences. Both situations have worried some commentators. In the former case, liberalism has been presented as somehow robbed of its identity, with liberal ideas being supposedly deformed in alien milieus. Norman Barry, who calls himself a classical liberal, describes the state of liberalism as ‘precarious’ due to the fact that ‘much of its theoretical armoury […] has been subtly appropriated by exponents of doctrines whose aims are very different’ (Barry 1996, p. 1). In the latter type of assessment liberalism has been presented as unable to ‘protect itself because its “immune system” is too weak’ due to it being ‘rather loose, tolerant of heterogeneous components, easy to influence, easy to infiltrate by alien ideas that are in fact inconsistent with any coherent version of it’ (Jasay 2004–2007). On the other hand, commendations of intense cross-fertilization between liberalism and
The mutual fertilization between liberalism and other ideologies has equally important implications for the study of liberal thought. As noted in a recent political ideologies reader, liberalism's tendency to spill over to other ideologies makes it 'a notoriously tricky business [...] to police its boundaries' (Festenstein and Kenny 2005, p. 52). Philip Cerny puts this bluntly: liberalism 'means what contrasting traditions say it means' (Cerny 2008, p. 6). When viewed from a very broad perspective two such traditions can be identified within the liberal ideology. On the one hand, 'classical' liberalism is a belief system that emerged on the wave of political and economic revolutions of the late eighteenth century. Its most recent expressions are often grouped under the heading of neoliberalism. On the other hand, the development of 'social' or 'modern' liberalism took off with a series of contributions by thinkers such as Thomas Hill Green (1836–1882), Leonard Hobhouse (1864–1929) or John Hobson (1858–1940) from the 1880s onwards.

The controversy pertaining to these two ideological traditions is whether they represent two different faces of liberalism or whether only one of them can legitimately claim a liberal identity. Modern liberalism overlaps with social democratic ideas and it has been argued that modern liberals are not distinct from social democrats and thus are out of other ideologies are also widespread. Liberalism's own malleability may then be defined as the key to its success: '[o]nly by blending classical liberalism with inconsistent doctrines could liberalism become a ruling ideology' (Gaus 2001, p. 30; see also Gaus 1990, p. 465).
place within liberalism (Barry 1996; Hayek 1991, p. 110; Cohen 1986, p. 79). More usual, however, are approaches that define modern liberalism as located within the liberal domain but spilling over to the socialist area. On the other hand, some classical liberal ideas and their contemporary outgrowths share common ground with conservatism and a case has been made for the exclusion of what is known as neoliberalism from the liberal territory. The intruder has then been denigrated as:

[N]o more than the capitalist shell of that drive to expansion, in which the qualitative civilizing force of liberalism, with all its blindness to some forms of exclusion of women, non-white societies and the abjectly poor, is replaced with a reductive and quantitative economic individualism in which constitutional constraints are directed at maximizing a personal liberty that cashes out as entrepreneurship. The advent of that approach within the conservative New Right attests to its more comfortable classification as a form of conservatism, even though many of its themes feature in older versions of classical liberalism. (Freeden 2001, p. 200; see also Freeden 1996, pp. 276–314)

That disputes arise with regard to the parameters of liberalism is of course an unsurprising exemplification of the fact that ideological morphologies are volatile. But in the case of liberalism the question of definition is complicated further by differences based on distinct geographical conventions. In the United States the term is understood as denoting a belief system that — to use the crude spatial metaphor — is located to the left in relation to what passes for liberalism in continental Europe. The American way of thinking about liberalism may imply an unusual view represented by, for example, Noam Chomsky: ‘[i]f you take the ideals of classical liberalism seriously […] it leads to opposition to corporate capitalism’ (Chomsky and Otero 2003, p. 398). This position clashes with claims presenting the liberal ideology as inextricably linked to the priorities
Classical liberalism of the capitalist system (see for example Arblaster 1984, p. 7; Goodwin 2007, p. 42). As Philip Cerny explains, the latter opinion squares with how liberalism is understood in most of Europe:

In continental Europe, where the notion of liberalism has tended to retain much of this fundamentally anti-statist meaning, it is seen mainly as a political philosophy of the capitalist Right [...]. In the US in particular, such liberalism is often referred to as "19th century liberalism" or "classical liberalism," and indeed has much in common with what is called "conservatism" in the Anglo-Saxon world. [...] American-style liberalism came to be somewhat analogous to moderate social democratic views in continental Europe; however, in Europe the development of social democratic ideology and party identification was sufficiently strong to resist being subsumed into liberalism, which as a label was applied mainly to small European parties of the centre-right. (Cerny 2008, pp. 5–6)

Neoliberalism as a contemporary adaptation of classical liberalism

Bearing in mind that no definition or taxonomy of the liberal ideology will evade being approximate and contentious, I limit the following discussion to classical liberalism. Contemporary mutations of classical liberal ideas are conventionally captured by the term 'neoliberalism.' In the present account I use 'neoliberalism' as a convenient shorthand to indicate chronology but I remain sceptical with regard to claims purporting its ideological distinctiveness. While I concede that neoliberalism reinterprets some of the classical liberal ideas (Turner 2007), I argue that differences between classical liberalism and neoliberalism stem from the natural process of classical liberalism, or at least some of its currents, adapting to new political circumstances rather than from it producing an offspring subsequently evolving into a distinct ideological framework.
The nomination of classical liberalism in its contemporary neoliberal form as an adequate representation of the liberal concept of globalization may cause two objections. Firstly, the neoliberal incarnation of classical liberalism is situated in a precarious proximity to conservatism and, as pointed out earlier, some have denigrated it as an intruder in the liberal territory (Freeden 1996, pp. 276–314; Freeden 2001, p. 200). Secondly, neoliberalism is also often held to be unsophisticated in comparison with the complexity of other expressions of the ‘liberal mind’ and therefore incompatible with a full-blown liberal morphology. In relation to the first point, I acknowledge that neoliberalism contains a fusion of classical liberal and conservative beliefs. Therefore, while operating with an ideal type that locates neoliberalism within the liberal ambit, I highlight the moments when it drifts more decisively towards a conservative way of thinking. On the other hand, the conceptualcrudeness of neoliberalism is not problematic from the perspective of the present account. The debunkers of neoliberalism make an undoubtedly valid point when they maintain that it is extremely reductionist, focused on market-related matters to a relative neglect of non-economic questions. Adam Smith, so often brought up for pejorative comparisons between the past classical liberal thought and contemporary neoliberal contributions, wrote in certainly much more nuanced and less reductionist terms than do contemporary neoliberals (Houseman 2003; Meeropol 2004; Nolan 2003). But this fact alone neither leaves neoliberalism outside the orbit of classical liberal ideology nor renders it undeserving of a morphological examination.13

13 It should also be noted that neoliberalism is undergoing a process of transformation
Liberalism, like any other ideology, has a place for both refined philosophical insights as well as more pragmatically orientated positions engaged with the routine of day-to-day politics. That neoliberals are not concerned with the totality of issues that the founders of classical liberalism took into account may in some measure result from the fact that many of the liberal goals that were imperative in the nineteenth century, specifically those implicit in the concept of negative freedom, have by and large been fulfilled (in the Western world in any case) and so ceased to resonate with a wider public. At the same time, the remaining neoliberal preoccupation, namely the theodicy of the free market, is formulated in terms that have plenty of common characteristics with the argumentation of some strands of classical liberal economics while the neoliberal outlook is deep-seated in a broader liberal metaphysics that highlights universalism and individualism. For the present purpose it is enlightening to analyze the neoliberal ‘global imaginary’ as providing some indication of how more established liberal interpretations narrow down the range of concepts of globalization operative within the parameters of the neoliberal fragment of the broader liberal spectrum. At the same time, the unsophisticated morphology of neoliberalism may offer an advantage from a whereby it increasingly adopts more complex and nuanced positions. Some analysts insist that it is important to discern this internal variety. Cerny thus suggests a distinction between ‘regulatory’, ‘managed’, and ‘social’ neoliberalism (Cerny 2008). Moreover, neoliberalism intermingles with other liberal positions enriching its own morphology and influencing other conceptual configurations in the process. This is evident for example in the views of the recent Nobel Price winning economist Paul Krugman. Krugman defines himself as a neo-Keynesian but his acceptance of sweatshop practices in developing countries as the path leading these countries to economic progress shares ground with some emblematic, as well as notorious, neoliberal convictions (Krugman 1997).
methodological point of view for it enables pinpointing of the key directions in which neoliberal understandings of globalization unfold, while keeping the present chapter in a manageable shape. In any case, it needs to be kept in mind that other liberal morphologies may produce different interpretations.\textsuperscript{14}

Globalism or classical liberalism?

While there is an ongoing debate on whether the interpretations of globalization that I discuss in the present chapter exemplify the liberal mode of thinking rather than a conservative inclination, claims have also been made that labels altogether alternative to such conventional categories as liberalism or conservatism are more effective in capturing the nature of this ideological field. For example, according to Manfred Steger, traditional ideologies are now ‘destabilized by the global imaginary’ and hence no longer functional (Steger 2008, p. viii). Instead, Steger suggests that the interpretations that I discuss in this chapter are best encapsulated by the category of ‘globalism’ which,\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14} That liberal territory accommodates divergent, and on some accounts potentially conflicting, concepts of globalization should not be taken as attesting to the obsolescence of liberalism as an ideological category. Any interpretation of globalization depends on broader paths of ideological argumentation and these are diverse and multidirectional not just between, but also within ideologies, and especially within the ideologies that have been evolving for long enough to have generated an abundance of mutations and subcurrents. Consequently, while liberal notions of globalization may clash, this fact on its own neither divests them of their place within the liberal canon nor undermines the overall coherence of the liberal family. The potential liberal identity of a given conception of globalization should instead be gauged on the basis of the range and intensity of its logical and functional connections with other concepts located within recognizably liberal chains of ideological reasoning.

he argues, ‘is sufficiently systematic to add up to a comprehensive political ideology’ (Steger 2005a, p. 89) and potentially capable of achieving ‘a level of ideological dominance unprecedented in modern history’ (Steger 2005c, p. 41). Since Steger’s research interests come very close to the subject of my own analysis, the discrepancies between our approaches have already been discussed, in general terms, in Chapter 1. Here, I focus on the disagreements that pertain specifically to the current chapter, using classical liberalism as the case study to demonstrate the different implications of respectively Steger’s and my own perspective.

To reiterate, Steger’s key claim, which he elaborates in a series of articles and books, is that there has emerged a new political ideology of ‘globalism’ (see for example Steger 2000, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2008). Not only does Steger believe that globalism ‘represents a set of political ideas and beliefs coherent enough to warrant it the status of a new ideology’, but he also asserts that globalism ‘constitutes the dominant political belief system of our time against which all of its challengers must define themselves’ (Steger 2005b, p. 12; see also Steger 2005a, p. 6). Steger believes — incorrectly as I am going to show — that his proposal can be substantiated by listing what he argues are the ‘six claims of globalism’. Accordingly, the first claim of globalism is that ‘globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 52–60). This is followed by the second claim, which suggests that ‘globalization is inevitable and irreversible’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 60–66). Claim number three holds in turn that ‘nobody is in charge of globalization’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 66–71). According to claim
four, ‘globalization benefits everyone’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 71–77). Claim five complements the latter opinion with the assertion that ‘globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 78–85). Finally, the sixth claim maintains that ‘globalization requires a war on terror’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 85–89). Steger argues that the six claims of globalism determine its status as a full-blown political ideology according to the criteria endorsed by Freeden, that is to say, as an ideology combining ‘a degree of uniqueness and morphological sophistication’ with ‘responsiveness to a broad range of political issues’ and ‘ability to produce effective conceptual decontestation chains’ (Steger 2005b, p. 15). The claims will be frequently referred to in the course of the discussion presented in this chapter and so, for the purpose of convenience, they are listed in Fig. 1 below.

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**Fig 1. Core claims of globalism according to Manfred Steger (2005a, pp. 52–89)**

**Claim one:** Globalization is about the liberalization and global integration of markets.

**Claim two:** Globalization is inevitable and irreversible.

**Claim three:** Nobody is in charge of globalization.

**Claim four:** Globalization benefits everyone.

**Claim five:** Globalization furthers the spread of democracy in the world.

**Claim six:** Globalization requires a war on terror.
There is much to commend in Steger’s work. He pinpoints narratives of globalization that have wide currency and disentangles them into their logical components. His argumentation is based on the analysis of primary material derived from journalism, corporate publications, political manifestoes and some bestselling acclamations of globalization. However, while appreciating Steger’s contribution to systematizing a body of influential accounts of globalization, I take issue with his key conclusion, namely, that these interpretations add up to a new political ideology in the full sense of the word. From my perspective, the ‘six claims of globalism’ are better captured as conceptions that belong to the contentious ideological crossbreed of liberalism and conservatism, with most of the discursive examples cited by Steger falling within the contemporary (neoliberal) outgrowth of classical liberalism.

It should be noted that Steger acknowledges that the six claims ‘absorb and rearrange bits and pieces of several established ideologies’ (Steger 2005b, p. 11; see also Steger 2005c, p. 41 and Steger 2008, p. 12). He suggests, for example, that there is a link between ‘globalism’ and classical liberalism but he does not develop this notion further. On several occasions Steger also invokes neoliberalism and neoconservatism as playing a role but, again, his view on the nature of the relationship between the two currents and ‘globalism’ is not clear. Sometimes Steger presents neoliberalism and neoconservatism as giving rise to the two faces of ‘globalism’, that is to say, its respective ‘market’ and ‘imperial’ variants (see for example Steger 2005a, pp. 15-17). This does not solve the problem of the status of neoliberalism and neoconservatism outside of ‘globalism’ or of
whether it is possible for neoliberalism and neoconservatism to lead mutually independent existences. Steger seems to be suggesting that they are inexorably connected (see for example Steger 2005a, p. 16). If this is the case, then a question arises as to the point at which the combination of neoliberalism and neoconservatism makes up the new ideology and as to the element(s) in the blend that are idiosyncratic enough to merit distinguishing it as a separate ideological system. After all, the fellow-feeling between some currents of neoliberalism and neoconservatism is not new and, furthermore, neither is ‘comradeship’ between several variants of more traditional classical liberalism and Anglo-American conservatism. In fact, market-orientated, laissez-faire currents of classical liberalism have long enjoyed the warm sympathy of some conservatives. Moreover, many prominent thinkers – Hume, Burke, Spencer, Hayek, Berlin or Oakeshott, to mention just the most important among them – combined liberal and conservative ideas. Consequently, to present ‘globalism’ as an amalgam of neoliberalism and neoconservatism is not to deliver a convincing proof of its ideological uniqueness.15

15 On other occasions Steger suggests that ‘market globalism’ combines liberalism, conservatism and nationalism (Steger 2005c, p. 43) while elsewhere he adds elements of Marxism and social democracy to his ideological brew (Steger 2008, p. 187). It seems that he is unable to escape the categories whose irrelevance he professes. They are let in through the back door, testifying to the fact that the ideological chimera that Steger offers in their stead is not coherent enough to stand on its own feet or be effectively analyzed in its own terms.
Steger has a further answer as to what is the yardstick of the new ideology that makes it a distinctive conceptual entity: ‘what distinguishes globalism in the twenty-first century from previous free-market ideologies is the skilful attempt of its believers to utilize “globalization” as the master concept’ (Steger 2005a, p. 18). Here lies the most important disagreement between our approaches in that I do not accept, at least as things stand now, that it is legitimate to attribute the power to form new ideologies to the concept of globalization. If ideology is to be understood as a conceptual structure that is established, distinct and full (Freeden 1998, pp. 749–750) then globalization is not an adequate foundation for a new ideological current. The concept of globalization is, first of all, too broad and too malleable. There is a potentially unlimited number of interpretations of what globalization is, for example whether it is the globalization of liberal democracy, class war, or welfare state. Consequently, in isolation from additional qualifiers, ‘globalism’ is a hopelessly vague term while to assign it to just one ideology is arbitrary in the light of the competing claims to the concept made by ideologies as diverse as liberalism, Marxism, democratic socialism and some currents of anarchism. In a nutshell, ‘globalism’ is a bendy term, applicable to a range of otherwise different positions and as such it does not suffice for a demarcation of a distinct belief system.

What Steger captures under the heading of ‘globalism’ is in my view not a new ideology but merely an update of classical liberalism to new circumstances, even if among those circumstances globalization – both as an allegedly real process and as a particular form of social consciousness – features as the most consequential. The evidence available to
counter the viability of the claim that a new ‘globalist’ ideology has materialized draws on both the self-understandings formulated by the discourses thus classified as well as on their morphological features. With regard to the first criterion, that of self-definition, the so-called ‘globalists’ are, for the most part, extremely keen on emphasizing their classical liberal lineage as well as the fact that their interpretations of globalization fit very well within the classical liberal way of thinking. An American economist Jeffrey Sachs, known for his ‘shock therapy’ theory that was applied in the early 1990s in several countries, notably Poland and Bolivia, as the method of their economic transition to free market capitalism, thus exalts ‘our breathtaking opportunity to be able to advance the Enlightenment vision of Jefferson, Smith, Kant, and Condorcet’ (Sachs 2005, p. 351). A more conservatively-orientated economist Deepak Lal puts forward ‘the case for classical liberalism in the twenty-first century’ (Lal 2006). Two renowned correspondents of The Economist, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, are even more explicit. In their bestselling acclamation of the global economy, A Future Perfect,

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16 The same authors emphasize the affinity between globalization and the liberal ideology when narrating the history of classical liberalism. The classical liberal genealogy is then formulated in palingenetic terms whereby the decline of this ideology (subsequent to its successes in the nineteenth century, especially until around the 1870s) is followed by the renaissance in the late 1970s and the rapid rise to ideological domination in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet system in the 1990s (for example Henderson 2001; Lal 2000; Lindsey 2000; Wolf 2005). Thus presented, the peregrination of classical liberalism in the twentieth century matches the state of the global system: liberalism is on the rise in periods of intensified globalization and it declines when globalization is in retreat. In other words, classical liberalism interprets the history of globalization as its own autobiography.
they declare their indebtedness to classical liberalism and locate their own interpretation of globalization firmly within the ambit of this ideology:

Globalization offers the chance to fulfill (or at least come considerably closer to fulfilling) the goals that classical liberal philosophers first identified several centuries ago [...g]lobalization is not just an economic process that can be more or less mashed into the mold of classical liberal political theory; it marks a significant articulation of it. (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000, p. xxvi)

The fact that the currently hegemonic discourse of globalization defines its own ideological identity in terms of classical liberalism does not, of its own accord, dispel all definitional doubts. But it provides one criterion (self-definition) that can be complemented by morphological analysis and the latter confirms regular ideological continuities between this set of interpretations of globalization and the arguments of classical liberalism, disproving Steger's claim as to the conceptual distinctiveness and durability of 'globalism'. Thus, on thorough examination, 'the six claims of globalization', intended to vindicate Steger's argument that 'globalism' is an ideology in its own right (see Fig. 1 above) are frequently contradicted by opposite standpoints regularly asserted by authors whom Steger would certainly have classified as 'globalists'. Claim number two, namely, that globalization is inevitable and irreversible, and claim number three, that nobody is in charge of globalization, are particularly problematic in this respect in that they are actually less common in the so-called 'globalist ideology' than the contrary assertions. The thesis of inevitability and irreversibility of globalization is contradicted by, for example, Henderson 2001; Lindsey 2000; Llosa 2000, p. 19; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000, p. ix; Norberg 2003, p. 273; Owen 2001; and Wolf 2005, while
globalization's uncontrollability is challenged by Bhagwati 2004, p. 34; Crook 2001; Llosa 2000; Sachs 2005 and Wolf 2005.

Considering first the idea of globalization's inevitability and irreversibility, a glance at the contributions listed above reveals that the claim is rejected due to the constraints imposed by broader interpretations operative within this current of thought and ensuing from characteristic classical liberal concerns. More precisely, the thesis of the irreversibility of globalization has not entrenched itself in this way of thinking because it contradicts the liberal emphasis on human agency and freedom of choice, the ideas that do not go well together with historical determinism. Thus, for example, Mario Vargas Llosa, a Peruvian novelist and a staunch neoliberal politician, rejects the idea of an economic destiny by arguing that "as nothing in human history is fated or permanent, the progress obtained in the last decades by the culture of liberty is not irreversible" (Llosa 2000, p. 17). What is more, Llosa strives to legitimize his assertion by locating it firmly in the context of liberalism:

[O]ne of the most refined (and rare) certainties of liberalism is that historical determinism does not exist. History has not been written so as to negate any further appeal. History is the work of men, and just as men can act rightly with measures that push history in the direction of progress and civilization, they can also err, and by conviction, apathy, or cowardice, allow history to slide into anarchy, impoverishment, obscurantism, and barbarism. (Llosa 2000, p. 19)
A similar view is upheld by Sachs who maintains that ‘[p]rogress is possible, but not inevitable. Reason can be mobilized to promote social well-being, but it can also be overtaken by destructive passions’ (Sachs 2005, p. 353).

While these are broad assertions, the liberal rejection of determinism in favour of voluntarism is often argued specifically in the context of globalization. Martin Wolf, the chief economics commentator at the Financial Times and the author of a well-known neoliberal account, Why Globalization Works, concedes that ‘[i]n the very long run, where the long run consists of many centuries, the trend towards globalization [...] is almost certainly irreversible.’ But at the same time he insists that ‘in the “short” run – where that run may be a century, or even more – it is not inevitable at all’ (Wolf 2005, p. 60). Similarly, Brink Lindsey, the vice president of Cato Institute, a free-market think tank based in Washington DC, avows that ‘[g]lobalization is [...] an uncertain and uneven process and subject to sudden and traumatic reverses and dislocations’ (Lindsey 2000, p. 49). The possibility of the ‘end of globalization’ may also be supported with a historical argumentation referring to previous retreats of globalization where the process is understood as unfolding in several phases, notably in the belle époque that ended abruptly in 1914. ‘Can it happen again’ is the question asked, and answered affirmatively – if cautiously – by Harold James, an economic historian celebrated in classical liberal circles (James 2002).
Another set of arguments has been mobilized within the so-called ‘globalist’ camp to reject the claim of globalization’s uncontrollability (Steger’s ‘claim three of globalism’). Clive Crook, formerly associated with The Economist and nowadays the Financial Times’ chief correspondent in Washington, attacks the idea that nobody controls globalization:

The crucial point is that international economic integration widens choices [...] When governments claim that globalisation ties their hands, because politically it makes their lives easier, they are conning voters and undermining support for economic freedom. Whatever else that may be, it is not good governance. Whenever governments use globalisation to deny responsibility, democracy suffers another blow and prospects for growth in the developing countries are set back a little further. (Crook 2001)

There are plenty of other examples of arguments that are put forward by contributors who would without doubt fall into Steger’s category of ‘globalism’ but who directly contradict the uncontrollability thesis. For instance, Wolf, commenting on Crook’s assessment, rebuts the view that governments are helpless in the face of globalization. He calls this claim ‘an economic swindle’ (Wolf 2005, p. 3). Similarly, a free trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati asserts the necessity of control: ‘globalization must be managed so that its fundamentally benign effects are ensured and reinforced. Without this wise management, it is imperiled’ (Bhagwati 2004, p. 35).

The assertions contradicting what are allegedly ‘globalist claims’ from within ‘globalist’ territory put Steger’s conceptualization in doubt. Interestingly, while asserting that the irreversibility and uncontrollability of globalization are the defining claims of
'globalism', Steger acknowledges – although only in passing – that these beliefs are contradicted even in *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (Steger 2005a, p. 79). This neoliberal bestseller by Thomas Friedman is nominated by Steger to the status of a paradigmatic globalist interpretation and it is the only ‘market globalist’ narrative that Steger examines in detail in his latest book (Steger 2008). The fact that the claims of globalization’s irreversibility and uncontrollability, which Steger offers as a key element in the foundational structure of ‘globalism’, are not consistently upheld in the very contribution that he puts forward as the epitome of this ‘ideology’, leaves Steger’s proposal open to question.

The remaining claims, save the contention that globalization will eventually benefit everyone (claim four), have not gone unchallenged either within what Steger would have called ‘globalism’. For example, the link between globalization and democracy (claim five) is opposed by Lal from a somewhat conservative point of view that entails some reservations about the applicability of Western principles to other cultural contexts (Lal 2000), while Sachs warns against overly economistic interpretations (claim one) thus embarking on what is a more ‘socialized’ variant of neoliberalism (Sachs 2005). The peculiarities concerning claim six, i.e., that globalization requires a war on terror, are admittedly explicable in terms of the sudden change of political circumstances following the attacks on the United States in September 2001. This is where Steger himself locates the origin of the inconsistencies pertaining to this claim. But the deviations from the
other four claims are not adequately explained by 9/11 since most of the contributions that I have referred to above had been published prior to that event.

Except for their patchy occurrence, another problem pertaining to the ‘claims of globalism’ is their structural function in this hypothetical ideological construction. On several occasions, Steger implies that the ‘globalist claims’ are used instrumentally in political mobilization efforts and partisan strategy. Accordingly, the idea that globalization is inevitable and uncontrollable ‘has the potential to produce an immense political payoff’ (Steger 2008, p. 187). Steger develops this opinion on the occasion of addressing the question of an ideological tension that is generated by the dogma of inevitability that allegedly permeates the ‘globalist’ territory:

But isn’t the belief in the inevitability of globalization a poor fit for a market globalism rooted in Hayekian principles? After all, throughout the twentieth century, liberals and conservatives of all stripes and shades criticized Marxism for its devaluation of the power of ideas and other non-economic factors. In particular, they attacked Marx and Engels’s materialist conception of history as a deterministic doctrine that predicted the demise of capitalism in the name of economic inevitability. So, why would influential market globalists like Friedman link their projected path of globalization to such an economistic narrative of historical inexorability? (Steger 2008, p. 187)

Steger’s explanation of this unexpected ideological assertion of ‘globalism’ is offered in the following terms:

[The presentation of globalization as some sort of natural force, like an earthquake or gravity, makes it easier for globalists to convince people that they must adapt to the “discipline of the market” if they are to survive and prosper. Thus, the notion of inexorably integrating}
markets functions as a suppressant to dissenting discourses. Public policy based on economic inevitability appears to be above politics; elites simply carry out what is ordained by the logic of globalization. Resistance would be unnatural, irrational, and ineffective. (Steger 2008, p. 187)

This rationalization puts Steger's model into further doubt. While political strategy is a reasonable explanation for a deterministic interpretation of globalization (where such an interpretation is indeed present!), a question remains as to whether an interpretation motivated in that way provides an adequate criterion for delineating a distinct ideology. On closer inspection, and along with Steger's understanding of their function, as cited above, the inevitability and uncontrollability claims (and arguably the remaining 'globalist claims' as well) amount to what Martin Seliger termed 'operative ideology' (Seliger 1970) or, using the vocabulary of Freeden, the 'perimeter'. This is the area of ideological morphology that hosts conceptions mediating the adjustment of ideology's core principles to a given political reality. If this is the case, then Steger's 'claims' are not adequate as the criteria for delineating an ideological system. The 'operative level' is of course indispensable to any ideological construction. It provides the platform on which core ideas acquire a more precise import in the light of specific political developments. However, any particular instance of a conceptual interpretation involved in the translation of general principles into concrete policies is not a necessary element of its ideological host. Indeed, any such interpretation is potentially subject to modification, marginalization, or even elimination in the course of political changes as well as in connection with the evolution of the ideological structure in which it has developed.
This vulnerability of operative concepts to political change and ideological transformation is well exemplified by the arguments that Steger attempts to amass in the ‘globalist’ cluster. The provisional character of the claims of globalization’s inevitability or uncontrollability – to stick to just these two claims – has been attested by the fact that they have been disrupted by ideological priorities of a more fundamental significance, as well as having been affected by positions formulated on the same level of articulation, that is to say, on the interface between political thought and political action. Thus, as I have demonstrated, the pressure of more salient ideological assumptions referring to human agency and free will has blocked the notion that globalization is inevitable and uncontrollable from acquiring a more durable place in this current of thinking. At the same time, the claims concerning the alleged inevitability and uncontrollability of globalization have been denigrated by many ‘globalist’ ideologists as counterproductive also in relation to political action. Most characteristically, these ideas have been blamed for the spread of political complacency and passivity. David Henderson, a frequent contributor to the polemical publishing of the British free-market think-tank, Institute of Economic Affairs, has for example argued that to maintain the robustness of the case for globalization, an ideological mobilization is needed to defend the process against its enemies. ‘The celebrations are overdone’ – he declares – ‘the new collectivists’ are at the gates with the potential to stop the process (Henderson 2001, p. 8). In other words, the irreversibility and uncontrollability theses may be ideologically useful at a given place and time but they bend or even break under pressure of more durable ideological
Classical liberalism

beliefs framing a given interpretation or in confrontation with a different set of political priorities emerging at a given time.

In light of this, Steger’s attempt to construct an ideological entity starts from conceptual components that are not reliable as fundamental building blocs. While ideologies are by definition action-orientated, their identities are constituted by ideas that have more durable meanings than would be determined by any set of actual political circumstances. What is more, ideological cores consist of broader concepts which, in combination, are capable of providing conceptual scaffolding for a distinctive vision of human nature and of the most optimal social environment for nurturing its best aspects. The ‘six claims of globalism’ fail also on this account. Besides its volatility, this cluster of interpretations does not include huge swathes of what ideologies, by definition, are able to offer, that is to say, a comprehensive, and more or less explicitly formulated, anthropology, metaphysics and ethics.

The ‘six claims of globalism’ – were they consistently present – would therefore not have provided a basis for a full political ideology. Even in combination they have a narrow scope and do not offer an adequate basis for a distinct view of human nature and other equally fundamental issues. At most, they might meet the criteria of what Freeden calls a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Freeden 1998, pp. 750–751). But if, as I demonstrated earlier, there are reasons to doubt the regular occurrence of most of these claims in
paradigmatic exemplifications of what Steger seems to have in mind as 'globalism', then the existence of even a thin ideology is put into doubt.

Pulling together the threads of my critique of Steger’s model thus far, the suggestion that ‘globalism’ constitutes a new ideology is unsustainable for reasons that pertain to the criteria provided by Freeden to the effect that an ideology must be ‘established’, ‘distinct’, and ‘full’ (Freeden 1998, pp. 749-750). So far, I have argued that ‘globalism’ is neither established nor full. This cluster of interpretations is not established in that most of the ‘claims’ that Steger suggests as its core building blocks are not consistently upheld even in what Steger himself nominates as key ‘globalist’ interpretations. Moreover, what Steger distinguishes as ‘globalism’ is not a full ideology in that it fails to offer a comprehensive socio-political vision. ‘Globalism’ classes more convincingly as a set of rhetorical devices opportune in the given political context but contingent on a broader worldview and on their own unable to offer relevant answers to a wide range of social and political problems.

This does not mean that the currents that Steger places under the umbrella of ‘globalism’ do not partake in a common ideological identity. The problem is rather that the criteria that Steger selects to group these interpretations in one class are too narrow to provide a functional and durable distinction. Distinctiveness is the third criterion of an ideology according to Freeden’s model that Steger claims to follow (Steger 2005b). Accordingly, a distinct ideology adopts conceptual patterns ‘unique to itself alone’ (Freeden 1998, p.
Classical liberalism: liberty, markets and globalization

The broad characteristics of the classical liberal understanding of what liberty is, and why it could, and should, be universalized, derive from the socio-historical milieu in which classical liberalism came into being. As a comprehensive political doctrine classical liberalism emerged in the late eighteenth century. It was an expression of the
aspirations of the bourgeoisie, the class that had rejected the rule of absolute monarchs and the unearned privileges of the aristocracy and that was in the process of giving rise to full-blown capitalism. Accordingly, the classical strand of liberalism understands the core component of liberty to be freedom from undue constraints imposed by all overtly non-meritocratic systems of social stratification. This classical liberal concept of liberty has been made to work on behalf of the economic and political priorities of the bourgeoisie and has thus become associated with the functioning of an economic system freed from arbitrary feudal obligations.

Liberalism’s tribute to the free market economy contains several interconnected threads. Markets are presented as relentlessly efficient and, by implication, as the only reliable way to eliminate poverty and destitution. In the course of this utilitarian argument, markets are elevated to the status of a paradigmatic arrangement of a free society, a perfect mechanism not just for the running of the economy but also for the modelling of other spheres of social life. Markets are believed to promote vital moral qualities that are conducive to the ‘good life’ in society. Economic freedom is conceptualized as underpinning political freedom and economic liberalization is said to entail democratization although, as I pointed out earlier, it is important to note that this view tends to be compromised either on the more ‘social’ edge of classical liberalism where emphasis may be shifted towards a different set of prerequisites of democracy (Sachs 2005) as well as on liberalism’s somewhat ‘conservative’ periphery where the objective of democratization may be de-emphasized altogether (Lal 2000 and Lal 2006). What
applies to domestic affairs is also valid on the international stage. Here, the expansion of free markets is posited by classical liberals as the most reliable guarantee of international peace and of the stability of the international system.

The tone employed by leading contemporary classical liberals (or ‘neoliberals’) in making the case for free markets has been confident and straightforward: ‘The market is the most powerful institution for raising living standards ever invented; indeed there are no rivals’ (Wolf 2005, p. xvii); ‘No other path toward full economic modernity has been proved to be viable’ (Fukuyama 1992, p. 97); ‘More open and competitive markets are the only sustainable vehicle for growing a nation out of poverty’ (Friedman 2006, p. 399; see also Dollar and Kraay 2001 and 2002 for a widely debated articulation of this claim). As I showed in the previous section, one variant of this optimistic teleology of the free market / free trade economy, that is to say, an unwavering belief that globalization will eventually benefit everyone, has been elevated by Steger to the status of a claim constitutive of a new ideology (‘claim four’; see Steger 2005a, pp. 71–77). Steger is certainly right that an assertion of the perfection of the market and consequently an ardent promotion of a worldwide expansion of its principles have featured jubilantly in neoliberal publications abundant in the wake of the Cold War. Yet, what Steger fails to appreciate or, more specifically, what he admits but does not take anything like a full account of, is that the claim which he pinpoints as distinctively ‘globalist’ has a much longer history. The arguments of contemporary eulogists of the virtues of free trade are not original but draw on a pool of theories, assertions and
prescriptions that have been accumulated in the liberal tradition over at least the last two centuries.

A prime example of such market-zealous argumentation is provided by the doctrine of so-called ‘Manchesterism’, a loose name for economic and political movements that originated in Manchester in the nineteenth century. The key protagonists of this current, Richard Cobden (1804—1865) and John Bright (1811–1889), were persistent campaigners against the mercantilist protectionism that the British Empire pursued at that time as well as prolific writers (McCord 1993 [1958]). Their work prefigures the profound devotion to free trade demonstrated by contemporary neoliberals. Bright, for example, found it apt to define himself as a representative of those people ‘into whose hearts free-trade principles had sunk, and become, verily, a religious question’ (Bright, in Semmel 2004, p. 162). Cobden in turn insisted, in similarly ‘pious’ terms, on ‘the sacredness of the principle’ (of free trade) and declared that he could ‘never agree to tamper with it’ (Cobden 1903 [1846]). Cobden characterized the ultimate aim of his campaign as making others ‘conform to truth’ (Cobden 1903 [1843]) and maintained that ‘the truth’ had an epochal significance: ‘there is no event that has ever happened in the world’s history [...] more calculated to promote the enduring interests of humanity than the establishment of the principle of Free Trade’ (Cobden 1903 [1852]). While examples of nineteenth century eulogies of the market could be multiplied, the point has been made: the ‘globalist’ claim that globalization is good for everyone is not as idiosyncratic as is suggested by Steger. Rather, the claim is an integral component of the
classical liberal equation, a new term for what has always been an explicit aspiration of this ideology, that is to say, the creation of a free-market economy on a worldwide scale.

Globalization is thus defined in the ambit of neoliberalism in emphatically economistic terms: its universal benevolence is said to be the result of the fact that it embodies the logic of the market. An example of this identification of globalization with the market is provided by David Henderson who describes globalization as ‘free movement of goods, services, labour and capital, thereby creating a single market in inputs and outputs; and full national treatment for foreign investors (and nationals working abroad) so that, economically speaking, there are no foreigners’ (Henderson, in Wolf 2005, p. 14). In a similar vein, Thomas Friedman equates globalization with ‘the spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world’ (Friedman 2000, p. 9) and points it out as the reason for ‘erasing borders and uniting the world into a single, lucrative, but brutally competitive marketplace’ (Friedman 1996). In even more unequivocal, if also rather self-centred terms, is globalization described by Percy Barnevik, then President of the ABB Industrial Group:

I would define globalization as the freedom for my group of companies to invest where it wants when it wants, to produce what it wants, to buy and sell where it wants, and support the fewest restrictions possible coming from labour laws and social conventions. (Barnevik, in Dayton 2004, p. 25)

In Steger’s account, this identification of globalization with ‘the liberalization and global integration of markets’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 52–60) that is ubiquitous in the currently
hegemonic discourses of globalization stands for another claim in a set that purportedly
gives rise to a new ideological construction (claim one of ‘globalism’ in Steger’s
conceptualization). Conversely, I suggest that the market-focused reading of
globalization represents an incorporation of a new concept into an established classical
liberal logic and an example of how ideologies interpret any new political phenomenon
or development in such a way that it coheres with their overall profiles, reinforces their
objectives, and legitimizes their means.

The universalization of free markets and the removal of any obstacles to trade has been a
purpose of classical liberalism since its outset and the claims that are made with
reference to globalization in the present-day free-marketeer camp are far from original.
Naturally, the classical liberal logic, like any other ideologic, cannot dispense with being
up to date with both new socio-political developments and new vocabulary. For
example, classical liberals may feel compelled to take account of new technologies as
having an impact on the ease with which the classical liberal goals can be achieved, or
they may find it expedient to make appropriate use of the ‘global talk’. But in broader
terms their arguments are decipherable as drawing on classical liberal contributions
generated in the last two centuries or so. In the classical liberal account, free market and
free trade – I assume that in a global context the former implies the latter – are
unsurpassed in producing material prosperity, social stability and international peace.
Those whom Steger labels as globalists reiterate not just the general appraisal of the
market but also point out the same causes, mechanisms and spheres of market benevolence.

Markets, globalization and the good polity

That the market is a realm of liberty in which the individual pursuit of selfish goals serves the common good has been a constitutive claim of liberalism, articulated already by Adam Smith (1723–1790), himself influenced by the writings of a Dutch economist and philosopher active in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Bernard de Mandeville (1670–1733) (Hundert 2008). But while the liberal endorsement of free markets takes off from the acclamation of their supreme economic outcomes, the social and political spheres are also said to benefit from the freedom of the economy.

On the most basic level, free markets are said to provide the necessary conditions for a well-functioning society in that they generate the type of morality and character that are conducive to social cohesion. Thus, to use a recent example of this argumentation, Martin Wolf has credited the markets with a power to produce a certain type of personality as they ‘require, reward and reinforce valuable moral qualities: trustworthiness, reliability, effort, civility, self-reliance and self-restraint’ (Wolf 2005, p. 55). This belief has persisted throughout the development of classical liberalism and it is to be found in both foundational liberal theories as well as in most recent neoliberal constructions. With regard to early liberal contributions, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) illustrated the case in point when he argued that ‘the economical advantages of
commerce are surpassed in importance by those of its effects, which are intellectual and moral’ (Mill 1909, pp. III, 17, 14). Émile Durkheim’s theory of organic solidarity which suggests that the mechanism of modern social integration consists in economic interdependence springs to mind as a later expression of this way of thinking. Durkheim (1858–1917) insisted that the members of modern societies do not need to know one another, nor are required to adhere to the same morality, in order to form a well-integrated social order. Rather, in complex economies based on high levels of professional specialization, individuals are held together by what Durkheim saw as more sophisticated and reliable means, namely, the fact that they depend on one another for the fulfilment of their needs (Durkheim 1997 [1933]). An equivalent of Durkheim’s argument has nowadays been employed by Thomas Friedman to praise the integrative impact of the global economy:

In the flat world, the division of labor is steadily becoming more and more complex, with a lot more people interacting with a lot of other people they don’t know and may never meet. If you want to have a modern complex division of labor, you have to be able to put more trust in strangers. (Friedman 2006, p. 412)

The classical liberal belief in the socially integrative impact of the free market resonates with the laissez-faire-styled rejection, or at least marginalization, of institutions perceived as less competent or, what is worse, getting in the way of free market efficiency. Most typically, the subject of critique has been the nation-state, but international institutions, such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund, also got their bit of criticism as purported obstacles to economic
freedom and, by implication, to the spread of what classical liberalism defines as the right social values (Vasquez 2000, p. 9; Lal 2000, p. 33). In the context of globalization, statements that make the case for limiting the role of the nation-state have become truly commonplace. To use just two examples, Thomas Friedman has advised states to ‘accept the verdicts of the global markets’ and ‘be ready to take punishment’ (Friedman, 2000, p. 363) while Kenichi Ohmae, a Japanese business guru, has made an illustrious case for the elimination of the state as ‘increasingly a nostalgic fiction.’ (Ohmae 1996, p. 12):

The uncomfortable truth is that, in terms of the global economy, nation states have become little more than bit actors. They may originally have been, in their mercantilist phase, independent, powerfully efficient engines of wealth creation. More recently [...] they have become – first and foremost – remarkably inefficient engines of wealth distribution. (Ohmae 1996, p. 12)

Much has been made of this contemporary neoliberal assertion of the ‘markets good, states bad’ thesis; indeed, it has become one of the key areas of focus in readers and introductions for undergraduate globalization courses (see for example Beynon and Dunkerley 2000, or Lechner and Boli 2007). As I showed earlier, Steger has put a related view in terms of ‘claim three of globalism’ according to which globalization is

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17 But some evolution of positions as regards the state has taken place even within the hard core of neoliberalism. For example, Francis Fukuyama has recently called for ‘state building’ (Fukuyama 2004) and even Milton Friedman expressed some reservations à propos privatization (Saul 2005, p. 251). Nevertheless, the acceptance of the state remains qualified and its competencies are usually defined as delimited to guaranteeing social stability as a prerequisite for a business-friendly environment.
Classical liberalism

not controlled by anyone (Steger 2005a, pp. 66–71). Accordingly, state intervention is not just undesirable; it is also futile. Again, however, this is not a new thread. As is widely known, the key thesis of Hayek’s *The Road to Serfdom* was that even apparently benign state intervention is destined with time to transmogrify into a totalitarian tyranny (Hayek 2001 [1944]; see also Wolf 2005, p. xiii), while Milton Friedman put the same claim in positive terms:

> The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, namely competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other. (Friedman 1962, p. 9)

But the idea of positing states as obstacles to political freedoms as well as economic efficiency features prominently also in much earlier liberal statements, for example in the argumentation submitted in the early nineteenth century by a French liberal publicist and philosopher Benjamin Constant (1767–1830):

> Commerce inspires in men a vivid love of individual independence. Commerce supplies their needs, satisfies their desires, without the intervention of the authorities. This intervention is almost always—and I do not know why I say almost—this intervention is indeed always a trouble and an embarrassment. Every time collective power wishes to meddle with private speculations, it harasses the speculators. Every time governments pretend to do our own business, they do it more incompetently and expensively than we would. (Constant 2007 [1819], pp. 18–19)

It is worth noting, however, that while classical liberalism has had a long history of claiming that the expansion of markets is most conducive to the good polity, classical liberals have not been single-minded with regard to specific political arrangements to
frame free market economies. According to Steger, ‘globalist’ slogans concerning the political effects of globalization amount to exultant proclamations of worldwide democratization. Steger puts this position in terms of ‘claim five of globalism’ (Steger 2005a, pp. 78–85). It is unquestionable that in recent decades the connection between free market economy and democracy has been widely acclaimed in the neoliberal camp. Numerous neoliberals have presented the ‘free economy’ as ‘a necessary condition for a stable and enduring democracy’ (for example Wolf 2005, p. xiii) and some, like Micklethwait and Wooldridge, have emphasized the connection between globalization and democratization in explicit terms:

It is not coincidental that the pace of globalization has picked up with the spread of democratic rights; the two are symbiotic. Yet globalization also widens the concept of what the maximum degree of individual freedom could be. (Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2000, p. xxvi)

However, the case for democracy is not unequivocal within the ideological area demarcated by Steger as globalism. Commitment to democracy is weak at the ‘right’ end of this delineated spectrum, i.e., nearer a more conservatively inclined set of interpretations (Lal 2000, pp. 38 and 40; see also Lal 2006). My understanding of the various deviations from any ‘typical’ classical liberal approach (like the question of democracy) is that the divergences reflect the continuous diversity of opinions within the classical liberal spectrum. The emphasis on democratization was not a primary or an inevitable feature of early classical liberalism. Indeed, some analysts maintain that there was ‘dichotomy between liberalism and democracy’ (Samet and Schmeidler 2003, p. 
214; see also Gottfried 2001, pp. 30–48). While this view is in my opinion overstated, the fact remains that there is a potential of tension between democracy and liberty in that democratic regimes may be perceived as suppressing individual differences (vide John Stuart Mill). Whatever ambiguity on the subject of democracy remains within the ambit of classical liberalism, the current classical liberal interpretations of democracy unfold along trajectories that have a long history within liberalism, even though some may be closer than others to the mainstream of classical liberal reasoning.

Globalization of markets and the pacification of international relations

While the globalization of liberalism is presented by classical liberals as conducive to an optimal arrangement of domestic political affairs, it is also elevated to the status of a guarantor of international peace: ‘[I]liberal democracy does not only have domestic virtues. It is also the only system of governance for which harmonious and co-operative inter-state relations are a natural outcome’ (Wolf 2005, p. 33). Exemplifying this way of thinking about the role of markets in international relations (and somewhat anticipating ‘globalism’s claim five’ which postulates that globalization furthers the spread of democracy), Adam Smith wrote in The Wealth of Nations:

[Commerce and manufactures gradually introduced order and good government, and with them, the liberty and security of individuals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a continual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors. This, though it has been the least observed, is by far the most important of all their effects. (Smith 1998 [1796], p. 260)
That the argument in favour of the pacifying potential of free trade was really ‘the least observed’ when the Scottish economist was writing his *magnum opus* is questionable, at least on the basis of even a cursory reading of some of the towering European philosophers of the Enlightenment. The case was put forward earlier by the Frenchman, Charles-Louis de Montesquieu (1689–1755): ‘the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade with each other become reciprocally dependent’ (Montesquieu, in Manent 2004, p. 38) as well as by David Hume (1711–1776), another Scot who argued that ‘benevolent sympathies’ between nations are based on trade (Hume, in Lippmann and Best 2004, p. 194) and also by the Prussian Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) in his tract *Perpetual Peace*:

> The spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later this spirit dominates every people. For among all those powers (or means) that belong to a nation, financial power may be the most reliable in forcing nations to pursue the noble cause of peace (though not from moral motives); and wherever in the world war threatens to break out, they will try to head it off through mediation, just as if they were permanently leagued for this purpose. (Kant 2003 [1795], p. 25)

The idea was then taken up by later generations of classical liberal thinkers, beginning with ones like Claude Frédéric Bastiat (1801–1850) in France who put the notion of the pacifying effect of trade in terms of warning rather than fulfilled promise: ‘[w]hen goods cannot cross borders, armies will’ (Bastiat, in Griswold 1998). In England, it was Richard Cobden who proclaimed: ‘Free Trade is God’s diplomacy. There is no other certain way of uniting people in the bonds of peace’ (Cobden, in Friedman 2006, p. 515; see also Cobden 1903, p. 222). A bit later (ironically in 1913!), a British liberal pundit
Norman Angell (1872–1967) argued this point in his book *The Great Illusion* in which he claimed that national economies had become so interdependent that war no longer made sense:

[W]ealth in the economically civilized world is founded upon credit and commercial contract (these being the outgrowth of an economic interdependence due to the increasing division of labor and greatly developed communication). If credit and commercial contract are tampered with in an attempt at confiscation, the credit-dependent wealth is undermined, and its collapse involves that of the conqueror; so that if conquest is not to be self-injurious it must respect the enemy's property, in which case it becomes economically futile. Thus the wealth of conquered territory remains in the hands of the population of such territory. (Angell 1913, pp. x–xi)

Nowadays the same set of claims is made with regard to globalization. The style of argumentation wherein a warring past is contrasted with the pacified present also remains unchanged. What is typical of those classical liberal arguments is their certainty that the peaceful state of affairs has already been achieved. This, again, is as true of the unequivocal conclusions of Constant in his *The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns* — ‘an age must come in which commerce replaces war. We have reached this age’ (Constant 2007 [1819], p. 17) — as it is of the claims made from the vantage point of globalization and contrasting it with the circumstances of the Cold War when ‘arms races and deepening antagonisms […] made sense [because] political control over territory was necessary to gain access to its raw materials and markets’ (Lindsey 2000, p. 46).
This claim of Brink Lindsey attests to another thread of continuity in classical liberal reasoning. As in early liberal theories so also in neoliberal arguments the notion of economic integration as a pacifying force is based on the belief that the establishment of worldwide economic freedom guarantees international peace by eliminating war as a means of achieving economic advantage. This view is also expressed in the flagship contribution of Fukuyama: ‘given the fact that access to those same resources can be obtained peacefully through a global system of free trade, war makes much less economic sense than it did two or three hundred years ago’ (Fukuyama 1992, p. 262), as well as in an account by Wolf who asserts that ‘harmonious international relations’ occur when ‘the prosperity of a nation derives not from the size of the territory or population under its direct control, but from the combination of internal economic development with international exchange’ (Wolf 2005, p. 33; for similar claims see also Mueller 1989 and Rosecrance 1999).

But the most emblematic argument regarding the economic foundation of the international peace is to be found in two books by Thomas Friedman. In his passionate acclamation of the technology-generated global age entitled suggestively The Lexus and the Olive Tree, Friedman offers the so-called ‘golden arches theory of conflict prevention’ (Friedman 2000, pp. 248–275) raising McDonald’s corporation, the archetype of a global organization, to the status of a guarantor of peace: ‘[n]o two countries that both had McDonald’s had fought a war against each other since each got its McDonald’s’ (Friedman 2000, p. 248). This is how Friedman explains his verdict:
[W]hen a country reached a level of economic development where it had a middle class big enough to support a McDonald’s network, it became a McDonald’s country. And people in McDonald’s countries didn’t like to fight wars anymore, they preferred to wait in line for burgers. (Friedman 2000, p. 249)

More recently, this *New York Times* columnist updated his theory of international peace, now under the heading of ‘The Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention’ (Friedman 2006, pp. 515–539):

[T]he advent and spread of just-in-time global supply chains in the flat world are an even greater restraint on geopolitical adventurism than the more general rising standard of living that McDonald’s symbolized. [...] The Dell theory stipulates: No two countries that are both part of a major global supply chain, like Dell’s, will ever fight a war against each other as long as they are both part of the same supply chain. Because people embedded in major supply chains don’t want to fight old-time wars anymore. They want to make just-in-time deliveries of goods and services – and enjoy the rising standards of living that come with that. (Friedman 2006, p. 522)

Friedman’s light-heartedly formulated position brings up a notion of commerce being sufficiently engaging to put people off war:

Countries whose workers and industries are woven into a major global supply chain know that they cannot take an hour, a week, or a month off for war without disrupting industries and economies around the world and thereby risking the loss of their place in that supply chain for a long time, which could be extremely costly. (Friedman 2006, p. 522)

The latter argument is, once again, nothing new. It harks back to the long-established notion that tradesmen do not have time to spare for wars. Following the First World War, a similar position was argued by a liberal economist Joseph Schumpeter (1883–
1950): ‘The competitive system absorbs the full energies of most of the people at all economic levels [...] There is much less excess energy to be vented in war and conquest than in any precapitalist society’ (Schumpeter 1951 [1919], p. 69). Going another century back reveals other examples of this claim in liberal thought. They are available, for example, in the work of Constant: ‘commerce does not, like war, leave in men’s lives intervals of inactivity. [...] individual, occupied with his speculations, his enterprises, the pleasures he obtains or hopes for, does not wish to be distracted from them’ (Constant 2007 [1819], p. 18). This is just another evidence of the continuity of classical liberalism: the substitution of McDonald’s customers or international chain supply employees for Constant’s ‘men of commerce’ is not enough to claim — as Manfred Steger does — the status of a vanguard of a new ideology for Friedman’s theodicy of global markets as relentless pacifiers of international relations.

The liberal (de)ontology: individualism, universalism and progress

Classical liberal prescriptions employed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to defend the bourgeois economic system thus foreshadow an analogous range of arguments that are mobilized today to make the case for the globalization of this order. The enduring logic of this theodicy of a seamless global economy provides ample evidence for the relevance of classical liberalism as an ideological category. But the continuity claim can be substantiated yet more conclusively by demonstrating the dependence of this economic model on broader liberal principles. The belief in the possibility and benevolence of the globalization of free markets is articulated by this
cluster of interpretations in connection with ideas that are of fundamental significance in the ambit of classical liberalism, notably individualism, universalism and an unwavering belief in progress. A few examples of their continuous influence are provided below to show how embedded the liberal concept of globalization is in the broader and long-lasting liberal worldview.

That classical liberalism is an individualist philosophy is a definitional truism as well as a paradigmatic proclamation of classical liberals themselves, and a charge repeated by their critics from Marx to contemporary communitarians (Machan 1998, p. 1). Liberal individualism implies that, to cite Robert Eccleshall's succinct description, 'what is essential to human existence does not depend upon social relations' (Eccleshall 2003a, p. 27). The liberal notion of social contract means that individuals enter social relations because they find it convenient to do so. At the same time, the individual self is 'independent of and logically prior to the community in which it resides' (Eccleshall 2003a, p. 28) and social structures and relations that result from voluntary contracts are maintained by a sum of individual actions rather than some higher holistic principle.

The idea of individuals unencumbered in social relations leads liberalism to a conception emphasizing the unity of human nature. Accordingly, individual selves, whatever specific culture they happen to inhabit, share the features that are constitutive of their humanity. The characteristics common to all people are the only ones that really matter and so it is to them that liberalism refers in its anthropology. On the other hand, the
differences that are observable between human beings result from arbitrary and superfluous cultural impositions rather than being innate or essential to the true character of any individual. In short, human nature is the same at all times and in all places; liberalism proclaims itself capable of discovering its qualities, responding to its most fundamental needs and releasing its full potential.

As with more specific liberal proposals discussed in preceding sections, liberal universalism can be traced several centuries back. In the case of Kant’s essay *Idea of a Universal History with a Common Purpose* (1794), the title is suggestive enough. A cosmopolitan thinker and traveller, Charles de Montesquieu was equally unequivocal when exclaiming ‘the heart is a native of any country’ (Montesquieu 1993 [1758], p. 135). In his turn, the liberal philosopher and revolutionary Thomas Paine (1737–1809) declared famously ‘my country is the world’ while the French writer and reformer Denis Diderot (1713–1784) wrote to David Hume in 1768: ‘you belong to all nations and you’ll never ask an unhappy man for his birth certificate. I flatter myself that I am, like you, the citizen of the great city of the world’ (Diderot, in Hamilton 1996, p. 26). A similar cosmopolitan logic permeates today the entire liberal territory, including philosophical liberalism and modern liberal ideas, with Fukuyama offering an example of the claim to universality formulated from within classical liberalism:

[T]he principles of liberty and equality [...] are not accidents or the results of ethnocentric prejudice, but are in fact discoveries about the nature of man as man, whose truth does not diminish but grows more evident as one’s point of view becomes more cosmopolitan.

(Fukuyama 1992, p. 51)
The liberal arguments in favour of globalization make especially clear sense in connection with this liberal universalism – the possibility and desirability of a global liberal order is claimed on the basis of the belief that what works well in the (already) liberal world will work well elsewhere. The hope that accompanies this project is that, as John Gray puts it in his critical account of liberalism, ‘human beings will shed their traditional allegiances and their local identities and unite in a universal civilization grounded in generic humanity and a rational morality’ (Gray 1995, p. 1).

The classical liberal argument that this ‘universal civilization’ is optimally advanced by following the logic of the free market has been demonstrated in earlier sections of this chapter. Again, what should be added here is that in the forefront of classical liberal theorizing about the reasons for which the markets work is an explanation pointing out that economic freedom is ‘natural’, squaring with the most fundamental qualities of human character:

I have always known that the only economic system that works is a market economy. [...] This is the only natural economy, the only kind that makes sense, the only one that can lead to prosperity, because it is the only one that reflects the nature of life itself. (Havel 1992, p. 62)

Classical liberals would have agreed on this question with Vaclav Havel’s unequivocal declaration but – to once more emphasize a strong ideological link with the past of liberalism – the claim is not original. A reminder of continuity is available for example in the writings of John Bright who embarked on the defence of the principle of free trade by insisting that it was not solely ‘a principle applied to England, but a principle
established now which is eternal in its truth and universal in its application, and must be
applied in all nations and throughout all times' (Cobden 1903 [1852]).

This way of thinking inevitably brings in the question of the deviations from the liberal
course of development. Sometimes, in a manner resembling the explanations given by
the modernization theory in the 1960s (see for example Rostow 1960 or McClelland
1961), classical liberals suggest the impact of culture as the major obstacle. This, for
example, is the view of Wolf: ‘some cultures are more readily adapted to making a
success of a free economy and society than others’ (Wolf 2005, pp. 24–25). But
pessimism is not a liberal trait:

What look like immutable social values turn out to be highly malleable
to economic circumstances and opportunities. Although not all cultural
values change so easily, values deemed to be inimical to economic
development are rarely, if ever, unalterable features of a society.
(Sachs 2005, p. 317)

Yet again, the reason given for why classical liberal ideology ultimately triumphs in its
clash with traditional cultures is that it squares with human nature. Classical liberals
claim to know what ‘the rest of the world’ really needs and wants, again implying not
just the unity of humankind but also the definitive match between human nature and the
economic model promoted by classical liberalism:

[T]he “wretched of the earth” want to go to Disney World – not to the
barricades. They want the Magic Kingdom, not Les Misérables. And if
you construct an economic and political environment that gives them
that half a sense that with hard work and sacrifice they will get to
Disney World and get to enjoy the Magic Kingdom, most of them will
These optimistic evaluations link globalization to progress, the possibility of which is another of the broad beliefs defining the liberal territory. The idea of universal progress along one (liberal) pathway was the leitmotif of social evolutionism in the nineteenth century. The ‘law of three stages’, an idea developed by Auguste Comte (1798–1857), provides a prominent example of this way of thinking, in which ‘Westernness constitutes only a final preparation for true humanity’ (Comte, in Todorov 1993, p. 30). But the most eminent example of the classical liberal interpretation of the history of human civilization in terms of universal progress was presented earlier by the French philosopher, Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794):

The aim of the work that I have undertaken, and its results will be to show by appeal to reason and fact that nature has set no term to the perfection of human faculties; that the perfectibility of man is truly indefinite; and that the progress of this perfectibility, from now onwards independent of any power that might wish to halt it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has cast us. This progress will doubtless vary in speed, but it will never be reversed as long as the earth occupies its present place in the system of the universe, and as long as the general laws of the system produce neither a general cataclysm nor such changes as will deprive the human race of its present faculties and its present resources. (Condorcet 1955 [1794], pp. 9–10)

Also on this account, not much has changed in liberal thought. A picturesque description of global development towards liberalism presented by Fukuyama captures the same logic – if in slightly more cautious terms – as that endorsed by Comte and Condorcet and sums up liberal universalism and its progressive teleology. The discussion of the
classical liberal interpretation of globalization may be brought to a close by citing at length:

Rather than a thousand shoots blossoming into as many different flowering plants, mankind will come to seem like a long wagon train strung out along a road. Some wagons will be pulling into town sharply and crisply, while others will be bivouacked back in the desert, or else stuck in ruts in the final pass over the mountains. Several wagons, attacked by Indians, will have been set aflame and abandoned along the way. There will be a few wagoners who, stunned by the battle, will have lost their sense of direction and are temporarily heading in the wrong direction, while one or two wagons will get tired of the journey and decide to set up permanent camps at particular points back along the road, though they will discover that to get through the final mountain range they all must make the same pass. But the great majority of wagons will be making the slow journey into town, and most will eventually arrive there. The wagons are all similar to one another: while they are painted different colors and are constructed of varied materials, each has four wheels and is drawn by horses, while inside sits a family hoping and praying that their journey will be a safe one. The apparent differences in the situations of the wagons will not be seen as reflecting permanent and necessary differences between the people riding the wagons, but simply a product of their different positions along the road. (Fukuyama 1992, p. 339)

From ‘market globalism’ to ‘justice globalism’: a summary and a move forward

In this chapter I have demonstrated that the concept of globalization has been absorbed into the morphology of classical liberalism with considerable ease, while the broad idea of a universal civilization seems to have always been an identifier of the liberal mind. The evidence that I have provided and analyzed in this chapter consequently disproves the originality or ideological autonomy of the cluster of interpretations that Manfred Steger classifies as ‘globalism’. The persistence of typically classical liberal arguments
in this set of positions suggests that ‘globalism’ does not form an ideological reality *sui generis*, but that it is located within a recognizably liberal territory.

When this is acknowledged, that is to say, when classical liberalism is accepted as the analytical matrix on which these decontestations of globalization depend, then their diversity, a rather narrow focus, and not-so-sporadic inconsistencies, cease to be problematic. The ideas grouped under the name of classical liberalism hang together by virtue of a shared view on more fundamental questions including distinctive anthropology and ethics. Within this well-established conceptual framework there is room for a wide, if still inevitably limited, range of decontestations of globalization which occupy a less critical location in the overall ideological structure. On the other hand, when claims referring to globalization are defined as ideological fundamentals then ideological constructions built upon them are susceptible to even minor contradictions in how the concept of globalization is understood and responded to. That such contradictions are indeed pervasive puts in serious doubt the solidity and durability of ‘globalism’ and consequently disqualifies it as a political ideology in its own right.

In parallel to this discussion of classical liberal understandings of globalization, the following chapter examines several representative socialist readings of the process. By suggesting the persistence of the category of socialism, I find myself again at odds with the position of Steger whose work purports the need for a reshuffling of conventional ideological types. This time, the case in point is Steger’s most recent book *The Rise of*
Global Imaginary (2008). This work integrates Steger’s previous analyses of the ideological combination of ‘market’ and ‘imperial’ globalism within a more complex framework that takes account of two further currents, namely ‘justice globalism’ and ‘jihadist globalism’. Steger presents the two ideological perspectives as the challengers of the dominant ideology and implies that, taken together, the four positions accurately map the ideological spectrum of the global era.

The category of ‘justice globalism’, whose instances overlap with positions discussed in the next chapter, is highly problematic. Whereas, as I have shown, the idea of ‘market globalism’ isolates a set of interpretations of globalization from their classical liberal context and claims for them the status of a comprehensive ideological system, ‘justice globalism’ combines several distinct ideological positions in a brew that is on many grounds incongruous. ‘Justice globalism’, as described by Steger, contains an excessive diversity of currents – radical and reformist, Marxist and social democratic, unequivocally globalist as well as more protectionist – that do not add up to a coherent category. That ‘justice globalism’ as delineated by Steger is disjointed and internally extremely divided is evident from a brief analysis of the two examples that Steger uses as his only illustrations of this alleged ideology, namely the contributions of Susan George on the one hand, and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, on the other. As I will show in the next chapter, the positions represented by these authors do not belong together. It is true that various interpretations covered under the umbrella of justice globalism may cooperate when they find it expedient to coalesce on certain issues and to
aggregate their political effectiveness vis-à-vis their common enemies. But this does not mean that their differences evaporate or that they in effect form a new ideology. To claim so would amount to restating the logic of Daniel Bell’s end of ideology thesis according to which the post-war convergence of different political positions on the question of welfare state was supposed to demonstrate the disappearance of ideological distinctions (Bell 1962). In short, ‘justice globalism’ and Steger’s overall triadic categorization of the politics of globalization are not reflective of the complexity of ideological divisions on the question. Steger’s categories might be used as descriptions of broad normative attitudes attachable to established ideologies and imbued with specific meanings in the light of the structural arrangements of their hosts. But if treated as distinct ideologies the three types of globalism fail to map the spectrum of the debate on globalization.

Before I move on, I should mention one more problem with Steger’s classification. By suggesting that the ideological propositions that are relevant today can be limited to four types of globalism, Steger effectively ignores the existence of antiglobalist positions. The more or less unequivocal versions of antiglobalism can be identified within the discourses of national populism, fascism, ecologism, and to some degree also anarchism. But elements of antiglobalist thinking also find expression within some socialist discourses that Steger classifies together with radically globalist Marxist currents. In fact, to anticipate the discussion that I will offer in the next chapter, Susan George, whom Steger presents as the key exponent of justice globalism, has on occasion
expressed considerable reservations about genuinely globalist goals and methods (George 2004). This is not to claim that George effectively belongs together with localist positions. It is rather to suggest that the fluctuations of her argument might be determined by more general concerns within a broader ideological morphology of socialism. Such a variation would not compromise the overarching socialist identity of her discourse. If, on the other hand, Susan George is to be seen primarily as a 'justice globalist' then localist implications of her stance are obviously problematic.

Dispensing with ambitions to coin new vocabulary, my argument in the next chapter is based on the assumption that the category of socialism may help enlighten a set of interpretations of the concept of globalization. This is not to imply an unqualified adoption of 'socialism' as a single operative criterion satisfactorily explaining the whole diversity of positions 'to the left of liberalism'. Instead, I suggest a broad matrix of socialist principles that may develop in quite different directions in any instance of political argument, but that nevertheless are intersubjectively recognizable as forming a constellation. This, I believe, is a sufficient reason to keep 'socialism' as a tool of general orientation in the minefield of political ideas.
CHAPTER III
SOCIALISM:
GLOBALIZATION AS THE FULFILMENT OF HISTORY

This chapter examines the way in which different meanings are bestowed on the concept of globalization depending on the variations in interpretations of the concepts located in its proximity within the three main socialist currents of Marxism, democratic socialism, and social democracy. The fact that their respective concepts of globalization are diverse and on several accounts incompatible serves as a pungent reminder that the analysis of the ideological readings of globalization requires attention not just to differences between broad ideological families but also to the conceptual shifts within the ambit of any family as having a potentially significant influence on the resultant understandings of globalization.

Socialism: a case of unity in diversity?
Several introductions to the study of ideologies point out that the socialist tradition contains an even greater diversity of currents than other major ideologies and that therefore socialism is extremely difficult to pinpoint. Ian Adams suggests, for example, that there are many socialisms and no clear criterion to nominate the orthodox version (Adams 2001, p. 84), while Andrew Vincent draws attention to the fact that socialism fails to provide a consistent view on such fundamental matters as democracy, the state,
and the market (Vincent 1995, pp. 104–112). In his turn, Michael Freeden explains the fact that 'socialist ideology ranges freely over an unusually large spectrum' (Freeden 1996, p. 419) by referring to several factors, including lesser significance, when compared with other major ideologies, of concerns 'with feasibility and costs of ideological configurations' (Freeden 1996, p. 418). According to Freeden, socialists may afford a greater (than is the case with liberals or conservatives) disregard for the pragmatic constraints of whichever actual political reality they find themselves acting in. This is due to the socialist ideology's orientation towards the potentialities hidden beyond the horizon of an empirically given existence, that is to say, towards the future socialist society. The shape of that society remains not, or at least not fully, determined before the time when it is, in the words of one contemporary socialist, constructed 'in circumstances we cannot know until we are part of that active process' (Barker 2001, p. 331).

Some textbooks in the study of ideologies take the variety of socialisms into account by privileging socialism with two separate chapters, one dealing with Marxism and the other focusing on the rest of the socialist ideology (Adams 2001; Femia 1999; Goodwin 2007; Wright 1999). Conversely, other scholars discuss various socialist currents under one heading (Geoghegan 2003 or Heywood 2003). I combine the two approaches. I use the term ‘socialism’ as an overarching category which includes a wide spectrum of tendencies and I cover this entire spectrum in one chapter. At the same time, I acknowledge the usual distinction between revolutionary socialism and the rest of the
socialist family and I divide the chapter into two parts, simplifying the diversity of socialisms to three conventional categories of (1) Marxism, which is discussed in the first part of the chapter, and (2) democratic socialism, examined in the second part together with (3) social democracy, located at the reformist end of the socialist continuum and spilling over to the liberal territory.

From the perspective employed here there are at least two good reasons for discussing the whole of socialism *en masse*. On the one hand, the variety of socialisms entails a broad range of socialist positions on globalization. The following discussion thus illustrates the way in which different meanings are bestowed on the concept of globalization depending on modifications in the concepts located in its proximity. On the other hand, in spite of the diversity of socialist interpretations, socialism should be seen as a meaningful category because there is a distinct, if very flexible, set of core concepts that define the various socialist streams as tributaries of one ideological matrix.

For the purposes of the present investigation, the most important among the core concepts that unite socialism into a discernible ideological tradition are *history*, understood in teleological terms ‘as the arena of (ultimately) beneficial change’ (Freeden 1996, p. 426), and *equality*.\(^{18}\) History and equality are capacious concepts with room for...
considerable shifts in emphasis and connotation. The directions of these shifts depend on variations in socialist preferences regarding a number of vital choices, for instance between structure and agency, revolution and reform, or populism and elitism. Under the influence of thus shaped decontestations of history and equality, different socialisms offer different evaluations of major institutions, such as the state and the market. In turn, the understanding of these institutions in any exemplification of socialism may impinge on the structural import of the concept of globalization. Of course, at each of these, somewhat artificially separated, levels of idea-formation the influences are reciprocal, so that a particular understanding of globalization influences the role attributed to the state, while the latter impacts back on the shape of the core idea of equality or on the interpretation of the past and the vision of the future. Despite the fact that the core socialist concepts are broad and therefore have diverse consequences for the construction of the idea of globalization within socialism, some patterns of influence are discernible. For example, the concern with equality has an unequivocal effect on the socialist evaluations of the current, capitalist, globalization. From an egalitarian perspective which, despite its different angles and intensities, is characteristic of all forms of socialism, the capitalist globalization is seen in a consistently pejorative light. The socialist preoccupation with history affects the assessment of globalization in a more nuanced way. In this context, globalization, even in its capitalist form, is perceived by some socialists, notably Marxists, as both necessary and progressive.19

19 This amounts to a range of political mythologies (where 'mythology' and 'myth-making' are understood as normal modes of ideological argument, see Flood 2001)
PART 1. MARXISM

The Marxist account of capitalism and globalization

The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilised nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal interdependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature. (Marx and Engels 1848)

The presentation of the realities of capitalism contained in the *Communist Manifesto*, written by Karl Marx (1818–1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) and exemplified above, sounds very familiar today. Themes such as organization of capitalism on a worldwide scale, global interconnectedness and interdependence, or cultural

which are more or less deterministic and teleological, depending on tradition and source. Marxist mythology is particularly illustrative in this respect as it has the capacity to interpret negative as positive through the dialectical nature of the developmental process.
homogenization, engaged the authors of the *Manifesto* in the mid-nineteenth century as much as they are on everyone’s lips today, particularly in the context of the globalization debate (Bromley 1999; Burnham 1998). The enduring relevance of Marx’s analysis of capitalism has encouraged several contemporary Marxist scholars to take a sceptical standpoint on the novelty of the process of globalization (for example Rosenberg 2000 and 2005; Saad-Filho 2003). Conversely, other thinkers assert the distinctiveness of the current economic regime and praise Marx and Engels as two great forecasters of the present global form of capitalism: ‘Marx and Engels did not describe the world as it had already been transformed by capitalism in 1848; they predicted how it was logically destined to be transformed’ (Hobsbawm 1998, p. 17). Whether the works of Marx and Engels were concerned with the actual workings of nineteenth century capitalism or whether they should be seen as impressively accurate predictions of the capitalist system’s future transformation is perhaps not that vital a question for my analysis of the Marxist interpretation of globalization. The assumption, endorsed today by most Marxists, that globalization is the current pattern in the development of the capitalist world remains valid irrespective of whether it is maintained that capitalism had embarked on its present stage already in the belle époque or only later. On the other hand, the continuity in Marxist thought of the analytical approach that envisages capitalism in global terms, combined with the fact that Marxism, unlike other political ideologies, has one (or two) uncontested founder(s), makes it necessary for any discussion of the Marxist paradigm of globalization to go back to the account of capitalism offered by Marx. That is why I begin my discussion by reminding the reader
of those threads in Marx’s thinking about capitalism which are particularly relevant to
the globalization debate. Examples of contemporary Marxist interventions are discussed
in the context of Marx’s original contribution.

**Marxism as an egalitarian critique of the capitalist system**

Two paths in Marx’s examination of capitalism need to be analytically distinguished
even if in the writings of Marx they are closely intertwined. The two threads originate
from two core socialist concepts of equality and history: while the first path evaluates
capitalism in conjunction with Marx’s central concern with unequal relationships
between human beings, the second path defines capitalism as a stage in the development
of humankind and diagnoses its long-term consequences. As is well-known, the first,
‘ethical’, stream of thinking about the capitalist system condemns capitalism for having
no precedence as far as the scale of inequality and oppression is concerned. According to
Marx, capitalism reduces the proletarians, the members of the subordinated class, to
mere cogs in the process of industrial production, at the same time reducing the
bourgeois, the members of the dominant class, to the status of economic competitors.
Capitalism deprives factory workers of access to the fruits of their work; in Marx’s
terminology it ‘alienates’ them from their labour. Simultaneously, capitalism renders
factory owners incapable of regarding the subordinated masses as their fellow human
beings. In this way capitalism does not benefit anyone; by distorting the relationships
between individuals it deprives human beings, the exploiters as much as the exploited of
their humanity.
Marx’s indignation with the realities of life under capitalism and his principled attack on that system have served as a spur for political action while his analysis of the pervasive condition of alienation produced by capitalism has inspired several critical studies both within and without the Marxist ‘orthodoxy’, for example in existentialism and the Frankfurt school (Sartre 2004 [1960], pp. 153–220; Marcuse 2002 [1964]). The mainstream of Marxism meanwhile has kept on updating Marx’s critique of capitalism in relation to twentieth century developments, especially the so-called ‘Rhineland capitalism’, highly regulated by the state and prevalent in the Cold War period. Contra social democrats, Marxists refuse to accept that the statist form of capitalism is qualitatively distinct from the predatory capitalism of the nineteenth century or the neoliberal capitalism that took the lead in the 1970s. Marxism perceives the capitalist system as ‘covered in blood and mud’ (Cliff 2000) and inevitably generating inequality and injustice; these might have been occasionally mitigated within the capitalist framework, but then only partially and always with the ultimate advantage of capitalism in mind (Budd 2001; Callinicos 2001a; Callinicos 2001b; Cliff 2000; Harman 2000). Capitalism therefore remains the enemy: ‘What connects all the different evils we find ourselves fighting is the nature of the system we live under. Its name is capitalism. Its core characteristics generate all the major problems we find ourselves contesting’. (Barker 2001, p. 330; see also Burkett 2003; Callinicos 2001a, pp. 119–120; Callinicos 2003, p. 26; Hardt 2002; Saad-Filho 2003 and Wood 2003).
Whereas Marxism refuses to see the welfarist type of capitalism as qualitatively different from the neoliberal form, the offensive of neoliberalism, with the consequent swift increase in economic inequality, has enhanced the reception of the Marxist sweeping critique of the capitalist system. At the same time, according to Marxists, the accelerating globalization of neoliberal capitalism has extended the implications of that system on an unprecedented scale and has provided the structural conditions for further intensification and expansion of exploitation (Beams 1997, pp. 6–8; Cliff 2000; Fourth International 1998, p. 34; Workers League 1993, p. 8). For Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, two leading theorists of the contemporary transformation of capitalism, the more globalized that system becomes, the more brutal will be the impact of its ‘enormous powers of oppression and destruction’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. xv):

Today nearly all of humanity is to some degree absorbed within or subordinated to the networks of capitalist exploitation. We see now an ever more extreme separation of a small minority that controls enormous wealth from multitudes that live in poverty at the limit of powerlessness. (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 43)

In this way, the globalization of capitalism, by expanding and intensifying inequality and injustice, contributes even more of the sense of urgency with which the Marxist critique has always been associated. At the same time, however, as the next section explains, globalization reinforces the unfailing optimism of Marxism.
The historical role of capitalism according to the developmental strand of Marxism

While an uncompromising ethical critique of capitalism has always been the defining feature of Marxism, Marx also provided what could be dubbed a ‘developmental’ stream of thinking about capitalism. This is the aspect of Marx’s theory of capitalism on which are based the central tenets of the present-day Marxist analysis of globalization. Both Marx’s original reflection as well as contemporary Marxist interventions reveal a great deal of enthusiasm for the technological achievements of the capitalist system and attribute to it an unequivocally progressive role in the overall logic of development.

The position of capitalism, and by implication of capitalist globalization, is in Marxist thought determined by Marxism’s largely structuralist, teleological and optimistic vision of history. There is no consensus among the commentators about exactly how comprehensive Marx’s own structuralism was. Marx occasionally deviated from the structuralist way of reasoning, for instance when he famously insisted, in a markedly non-structuralist and non-deterministic way, on the political engagement of social theory: ‘[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it’ (Marx 1845). But on the whole Marx leaned towards the belief in an inexorable logic of history, so while he accepted that ‘men make their own history’, he nevertheless emphasized that ‘they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past’ (Marx 1852). Marx believed in the necessary and logical character of historical changes and maintained that subsequent social formations generate problems that
intensify to the point where these formations disintegrate under the weight of internal contradictions.

While to Marx this mechanism was particularly clear with reference to capitalism, Marxists today identify it in the workings of capitalist globalization. The contradictions of capitalism are intrinsic in its competitive impulse, its technological ingenuity and its irresistible tendency to expand. These three aspects of capitalism, as well as the contradictions that they produce, are seen by Marxists as interdependent. Competition, the most fundamental principle of capitalism, entails technological progress and territorial expansion that subsequently amount to the global spread of the capitalist system. Global expansion in turn intensifies competition and so by means of globalization capitalism reaches the climax of its contradictions. In the following three subsections I discuss those major contradictions of capitalism, as they were understood by Marx himself and also as they are elaborated in contemporary Marxist theories of globalization. The reader will of course be aware of what are the basic tenets of Marx's theory but they are worth rehearsing here because they fit the Marxist thesis of globalization remarkably well and so illustrate the continuity and relevance of Marxism in today's ideological debates.

The contradictions of capitalism (I): competition

Marx's analysis of capitalist competition is well-known. In summary, competition has two aspects: while the owners compete for profits, the workers, having no other means
of survival, compete for jobs. In the capitalist system profits derive from decreasing the wages of workers and increasing their labour output. This form of competition between the owners is structurally built-in within the system and not a question of morality of individual capitalists. Capitalism allows no way out of the race to the bottom; any humanitarian restraint would eventually catapult the hypothetical compassionate capitalist out of the capitalist class and into the ranks of the proletariat. This competition introduces fundamental contradictions into the workings of capitalism. The system’s structural necessity to extract from production an ever growing surplus value conflicts with the market’s need for consumers able to purchase its products. The logical outcome of competition is the progressive pauperization of workers ergo their decreasing ability to consume. This fact is coupled with rapid inflation in the numbers of the poor since among capitalists there is inevitably a number of less ruthless (or less effective) individuals who sooner or later end up as proletarians. By removing increasing numbers of the bourgeois from their top positions in capitalist society, the mechanism of competition leads to its own negation, namely, to the state of monopoly. But the monopoly situation does not save the system from regular and escalating crises of overproduction. Overproduction, in turn, causes unemployment and hence more poverty, and so on, until deprivation reaches its apogee and the masses are faced with no other option but to overthrow the system. It follows that capitalism is inherently suicidal: competition, while being the *élan vital* at the source of capitalism’s enormous dynamism, at the same time makes its collapse unavoidable.
**The contradictions of capitalism (2): technology**

According to Marx, capitalist competition brings about an unprecedented progress in the development of the means of production. An ever-increasing surplus value, the key to success in the capitalist system, derives not just from extracting from workers a 'maximum of labour' for a 'minimum of wages' (Marx 1857); technological innovation and, where this is cost-effective, the substitution of machines for workers are other means of increasing profits, and other reasons for internal contradictions within the system. Marx was aware that in the short term the development of industrial machinery contributed to the misery of workers by making them increasingly redundant but he nonetheless appreciated the long-term consequences of the technological advances of capitalism and never felt nostalgic about the simplicity or 'cosiness' of the way of life typical of feudalism. Quite the reverse, Marx commended the bourgeoisie for rescuing the masses 'from the idiocy of rural life' (Marx and Engels 1848). In the *Communist Manifesto* (further referred to as the *Manifesto*) Marx and Engels did not conceal their admiration for the technological triumphs of the bourgeoisie:

The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together [...]. It has been the first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals. (Marx and Engels 1848)

Marx considered technological innovations of capitalism admirable for what they were, namely the expressions of the capabilities of the human mind, but he was especially enthusiastic about the potential for social liberation that he saw as inadvertently intrinsic
to capitalist technologies. The liberation was to be facilitated by the contradictions that the technologies of capitalism instil in the very system that had brought them into being.

The epochal role of technology, as seen from the Marxist point of view, is not just a trait of the capitalist period and needs to be explained in a wider perspective. Marx tended to envisage the history of humanity in terms of technological determinism, according to which the material 'base' (means and relations of production, that is to say, technologies and regimes organizing their employment) determines the ideational 'superstructure' (ideology, religion, law, custom, etc). The sequence of stages in history is decided by major technological transitions, that is, transformations in the base. Changes in people's ideas about the world, namely, adjustments in the superstructure, follow as merely an offshoot. In each epoch its characteristic technologies expand and with them their 'derivatives' in the form of social classes and corresponding institutions and ideas. At some point the emerging classes no longer fit within the structural confines of the existing social formation and consequently they feel compelled to overcome it. The development of the era of feudalism, for example, provided the initial conditions for the expansion of trade and merchandise, creating the new class of the bourgeoisie. With time, the emerging bourgeois social structures became intolerably constrained by the circumstances inherent in the feudal system and thus the epochal step towards capitalism was made. In the same way, the capitalist society is bound to be brought to an end because its achievements will inevitably exceed its capacities:
Modern bourgeois society, with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells [...] there is too much civilization, too much means of subsistence, too much industry, too much commerce. [...] The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. (Marx and Engels 1848)

The capitalist system is on course to self-destruction for it provides workers with the tools to abolish it. The technologies which give rise to industrial capitalism at the same time offer leverage for the liberation of the proletariat. The capitalist mode of production involves industrialization, urbanization and massification and pushes masses from the land to the cities increasingly concentrated around factories. The sheer numbers and close physical proximity of workers in factory and urban realities promote the emergence of awareness of shared fate and common interests. In Marxist terminology, the workers begin to form ‘a class for itself’, a prerequisite for the struggle against exploitation and for the abolition of capitalism: ‘What the bourgeoisie therefore produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers. Its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally inevitable’ (Marx and Engels 1848).

Contemporary Marxists continue to support the global spread of industrialization and urbanization as a structural precondition for socialism (Beams 1997, pp. 20–21; Fourth International 1998; Lombardi 2005; Workers League 1993). They absolve the industrial mode of production from the responsibility for the problems it is normally associated with and argue that it is not industrialism itself but its current capitalist guise that is to
blame: 'the Industrial Revolution created poverty and misery not because it was an industrial revolution, but because it was a capitalist revolution: a mobilization of industrial technology in the interests of the few at the expense of the many' (Myers 2002, p. 28). Therefore, Marxists oppose the claim put forward by ecologists that industrialism is bound to cause environmental problems regardless of its political framework. Instead, 'it is capitalism that is at the root of contemporary environmental crisis' (Burkett 2003). Likewise, Marxism does not oppose the major implications of industrialism such as massification and large-scale structures. With reference to transnational corporations, that notorious object of various anti- and alter-globalist critiques, the main problem for Marxists, is not the volume of their operations, but the fact that they are 'vehicles for capitalists' (Greenfield, in Wood 2003, p. 131). Accordingly, '[t]he outrageous behaviour of large corporations [...] is not primarily due to their size [but] is ultimately rooted in the dominance of a system of production geared towards private profit rather than collective need' (Saad-Filho 2003, p. 15). Moreover, contemporary Marxists evaluate the impact of the corporate form of capitalism in a way reminiscent of Marx's analysis of classical industrialism, that is to say, with equal appreciation of its involuntarily revolutionary potential: 'because of the multinationals, the impact of an individual group of workers can be much greater than ever before' (Cliff 2000). In the same way, Marxists today echo Marx's rejection of previous economic structures. Whereas Marx was resolutely opposed to any reactionary turn to feudalism, contemporary Marxists emphasize that small-scale businesses are usually more repressive than transnational corporations and that global corporate capitalism
Socialism provides incomparably greater opportunities for the workers’ revolt than any localized capitalist regime (Beams 1997, pp. 21–22; Fourth International 1998, p. 6; Saad-Filho 2003, p. 12).

Marxists are also keen to highlight the revolutionary potential of the infrastructure of contemporary capitalism in the form of global informational technologies. Again, the stress on the developments in the means of communication has its precedent in Marx:

[T]he ever expanding union of the workers [...] is helped by the improved means of communication that are created by Modern Industry, and that place the workers of different localities in contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to centralize the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one national struggle between classes. (Marx and Engels 1848)

Marx expected that the formation of class consciousness would be accelerated as a result of capitalist technology: ‘that union, to attain which the burghers of the Middle Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the modern proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years’ (Marx and Engels 1848). Likewise, today’s Marxists resolutely reject the ‘luddite’ perspective of some currents of anarchism (Albert 2001, pp. 321–322) and admit that the movements challenging capitalism could not exist ‘without technologies like the web and the cell phone, things that were only recently the stuff of capitalist triumphalism’ (Henwood 2002, p. 43).

20 On the other hand, Marxists note and grieve the accelerating encroachment of the internet by the interests of capital in the form of privatization, compared by some to the great enclosure of the commons (Hardt and Negri 2005, pp. 85–86, 301).
The contradictions of capitalism (3): expansion and globalization

That the technologies of capitalism may serve subversive ends in the hands of the enemies of that system is not the only rationale to earn these technologies an important place in the Marxist scheme. Most importantly, they allow for global communication and coordination and thus promote another feature of capitalism, inseparable from competition, namely its irresistible drive to expansion, which is the fundamental reason for the existence of these technologies in the first place. Marx and Engels admired the relentless globalization of capitalism. In the Communist Manifesto they noted: ‘[t]he need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere’ (Marx and Engels 1848). Moreover, in the Grundrisse Marx reflected on the theme that features in much of the contemporary globalization debate, namely, capitalism’s deterritorializing potential: ‘[c]apital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the creation of the physical conditions of exchange – of the means of communication and transport – the annihilation of space by time – becomes an extraordinary necessity for it’ (Marx 1858). The drive to expansion (or globalization) becomes particularly pressing when exploitation of any given socio-economic system (for example one confined within a nation-state) reaches its limits so that capitalists must look elsewhere to compete for profits, or when it is no longer practical to exploit the workforce in a particular location. In this latter case the outward expansion proves essential to mitigate the contradiction between the demand for consumers and the principle of increasing profits by paying the workers ever smaller wages. The workforce
But this logic — which matches so well the globalizing drive of contemporary capitalist corporations — entails a further important contradiction whose essence is clarified by Hardt and Negri in the following way: ‘once a segment of the environment has been “civilized,” once it has been organically incorporated into the newly expanded boundaries of the domain of capitalist production, it can no longer be the outside necessary to realize capital’s surplus value’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 227). In other words, if expansion is a structural prerequisite of capitalism then the capitalist system cannot exist without its outside. In such a case capitalist energy would be unable to turn outwards and the spiral of competition, exploitation, overproduction and crisis would follow with immediate effect. The ultimate success of the capitalist system, its universal implementation, the inclusion of all societies within its orbit and the elimination of all alternative economic systems — in brief, its globalization — thus entails the collapse of capitalism.

This point is implicit in Marx’s model, but Rosa Luxemburg (1871—1919), a Polish-born Marxist political theorist, formulated it in an explicit way with reference to the nineteenth century mode of capitalist globalism, namely, imperialism:
The more violently, ruthlessly and thoroughly imperialism brings about the decline of non-capitalist civilisations, the more rapidly it cuts the ground from under the feet of capitalist accumulation. Though imperialism is the historical method for prolonging the career of capitalism, it is also the sure means of bringing it to a swift conclusion. (Luxemburg, in Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 228)

This sort of logic is ubiquitous both in the traditional Marxist explanations of imperialism and in the present day Marxist theorizing about globalization. According to the latter, capitalism cannot survive the completion of its own globalization. In this context, the breathtaking expansion of capitalism during the post-cold war period is yet another sign of its imminent crash.

The perception of capitalism as an indispensable stage in humanity's march to communism sufficed for Marx to identify the capitalist system as progressive when juxtaposed with earlier, feudal and ancient, social formations. But if the significance of capitalism derives from the fact that it brings humanity closer to its destiny, then

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21 There is an important exception to this way of thinking within a broadly conceived Marxist paradigm, namely in dependency theories of, for example, Frank (1996) and Wallerstein (1974). As Anthony Brewer explains, while mainstream Marxism maintains that capitalism introduces modernization and industrialism to underdeveloped countries and so 'creates the material preconditions for a better (socialist) society as well as the class forces that will bring it about', dependency theories suggest that capitalism prevents progress and produces 'development of underdevelopment' (Brewer 1990, pp. 16, 18). On the other hand, Barbara Goodwin points out another exception by arguing, with the use of several examples of African socialisms, that socialists in countries that have never experienced capitalism may challenge the necessity of the capitalist stage (Goodwin 2007, pp. 115–117).
globalization has an especially important place in history, marking — when it fulfils itself — as the condition of globality — the end of the capitalist epoch and the beginning of the next stage in history (Negri, in Coco and Lazzarato 2002, p. 133). Whatever injustices the ‘Empire’ (another name for the contemporary organization of capitalism) entails, and however urgent its abolition, it is a step forward when compared with previous socio-economic arrangements, including earlier (bourgeois, imperialist, even welfarist) incarnations of the capitalist system itself:

[W]e insist on asserting that the construction of Empire is a step forward in order to do away with any nostalgia for the power structures that preceded it and refuse any political strategy that involves returning to that old arrangement [...]. We claim that Empire is better in the same way that Marx insists that capitalism is better than the forms of society and modes of production that came before it. (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 43)

Naturally, the present form of capitalism is ‘better’ than imperialism or Keynesianism, or pre-capitalist regimes, not because its mechanisms of exploitation are less inhumane. On the contrary, as already noted, capitalism today ‘constructs its own relationships of power based on exploitation that are in many respects more brutal than those it destroyed’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, p. 43). However, because that system is bound to become global, it will not fail to collapse, and so its ultimate success will be a structural prerequisite of its fall. In this way, Marxism may define the historical role of the capitalist globalization as progressive while denunciating the actual abhorrent practices of that process.
Marxism’s normative and instrumental globalism

The Marxist vision of history is dialectical: new epochs do not negate the achievements of the preceding stages but preserve what is most valuable in them. Accordingly, capitalism has qualities that are to be appreciated as the preconditions of the future state of affairs and among them globalization has an especially revolutionary potential. As I have observed, an oft-repeated Marxist catchphrase proclaims that the problem with capitalist globalization is not that it is global but that it is capitalist. While capitalism is to be eradicated, its global technology and imagination are to be harnessed for the advantage of all.

Marxism itself has always been a determinedly globalist ideology, both normatively and instrumentally. In normative terms, Marxism has consistently espoused universalist philosophy positing itself contra all particularistic, nationalistic currents. Marx perceived nationalism as a bourgeois ideology serving to divide the world proletariat along national lines and countered nationalist ideologies with the idea of the proletariat as one class which has no country, and with the vision of history that brings all of humanity to its natural state of universal equality. Borders, boundaries and separate national

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22 Some commentators have suggested that Marx’s globalism was not without reservations for Marx supported the nationalistic aspirations of Poles and Hungarians (for example Ree 2003). In my view this stance of Marx should be seen as an encouragement for peoples struggling against particularly reactionary and absolutist monarchies and therefore it does not invalidate Marx’s overall radically globalist stance. Later ideas claiming to adhere to the thought of Marx but refuting Marx’s globalism, such as Stalin’s ‘revolution in one country’, should be seen as deviations from the Marxist mainstream.
identities are viewed by Marxists as the products of regimes working in the interest of capital (Hardt and Negri 2000, pp. 44-46). Marxists share the universalist spirit with other socialists who normally see themselves as, to quote the Renaissance poet John Donne, ‘involved in mankind’ (Donne, in Heywood 2003, p. 108) and not as any particular ethnic or national group but in Marxism the sense of universal comradeship is adhered to with exceptional passion and consistency.

Complementing the normative globalism of Marxism is its instrumental globalism and its concomitant pro-technological zeal. Marx and Engels emphasized that the way to abolish capitalism led through the internationalization of the working class politics: ‘workers of the world unite’ (Marx and Engels 1848) and hoped that industrialism with its technological conditions and capacities could promote working class consciousness on a global scale and integrate the proletariat into a worldwide ‘class for itself’. In the same way, for contemporary Marxists new technologies are to unite people globally (see for example Workers League 1993). Global forms of communication, organization and mobility – Marxists are in favour of migration and demand the abolition of border controls (Heyter 2000) – are to be the mode of resistance, valuable in itself but also necessitated by the character of the very system that Marxism wants to see brought to its end:

We believe that toward the end of challenging and resisting Empire and its world market, it is necessary to pose any alternative at an equally global level. Any proposition of a particular community in isolation, defined in racial, religious, or regional terms, “delinked” from Empire, shielded from its powers by fixed boundaries, is destined
to end up as a kind of ghetto. Empire cannot be resisted by a project aimed at a limited, local autonomy. We cannot move back to any previous social form, nor move forward in isolation. Rather, we must push through Empire to come out the other side [...]. We have to accept that challenge and learn to think globally and act globally. Globalization must be met with a counter-globalization, Empire with a counter-Empire. (Hardt and Negri 2000, pp. 206–207)

The concept of globalization and the continuity of Marxism

Building on the theoretical opus of Marx, Marxism today keeps on analyzing capitalism as a system based on the competitive impulse which in turn generates capitalism’s technological advancement and drive to expansion. Contemporary Marxists have linked these dynamics of capitalism to the concept of globalization, understood as both the triumph of capitalism as well as the ultimate trigger of an impending upsurge of problems within that system. Accordingly, while in the classical Marxist account industrial capitalism was to be the last among the divided and exploitative social formations, in the contemporary Marxist thought there is equal confidence: the current globalization of capitalism will bring about the transition towards a global society of equals. Moreover, while globalization is certain to cause the collapse of capitalism, it also provides the foundation for the construction of the post-capitalist society, which is to benefit from the technological legacy of its predecessor. Therefore, the role that Marxism claims for itself is both to assist the inevitable fall of global capitalism, as well as to reclaim its globalizing dynamism for the future.

It is clear that the concept of globalization has not presented Marxism with the challenge of radical reconfiguration of its main ideas. Conversely, it has consolidated the Marxist
way of thinking and served to confirm and strengthen the main Marxist theses. Marxism has decontexted globalization according to its vision of history as possessing an inherent logic, a linear direction and an inevitable end culminating in the accomplishment of the universal human inclination to equality, cooperation and sharing. The determinant function of the concepts of history and equality in relation to the different approaches to globalization in the socialist ideology is exemplified further in the second part of this chapter where democratic socialism and social democracy are examined. While democratic socialism and social democracy differ, both are more reformist and evolutionary than Marxism in their understanding of history and equality. Consequently, their respective attitudes to globalization diverge from Marxist approaches: democratic socialism endorses a weaker version of globalism whereas some currents of social democracy may even take an antiglobalist course.

PART 2. DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Democratic socialism and social democracy are confusing terms. This is due to historically variable conventions of usage and the imprecise criteria of distinction between the two currents and, in turn, between them and Marxism. While social democracy is now part of the political mainstream, in the past the term invoked different associations. Before 1919, for example, the revolutionary party of Bolsheviks was known as the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Goodwin 2007, p. 111). Similarly, the early German Social Democratic Party was, declaratively at least, a
Marxist party. In fact, as Heywood points out, 'social democracy' was a Marxist term employed to contrast comprehensive democracy with merely 'political' democratization (Heywood 2003, p. 139). Later, in the early twentieth century, there emerged a rift between Marxism and social democratic parties. The cleavage was especially apparent with reference to their respective principles of action, namely, what they postulated as the optimal means to get to the socialist society. Whereas Marxists stood by the necessity of a revolutionary transformation, those who then called themselves social democrats opted for a change managed within the institutional framework of liberal democracy. At the same time, the understanding of the goal of the transformation itself was not principally different in the two camps which both partook in the broad socialist vision of an equal society.

The idea of the socialist end striven for with the use of democratic means is nowadays accepted as the chief characterization of the ideology of democratic socialism. Social democracy, on the other hand, now has a different meaning, which it acquired in the second half of the twentieth century. The sustained economic growth in the wake of the Second World War, coupled with the narrowing down of wealth disparities and some mitigation of social divisions in western societies, convinced a large section of socialists, now known as social democrats, that it was not necessary, and perhaps not even expedient, to bring the capitalist system to its end. Capitalism appeared to be very efficient in providing economic prosperity and social democrats assumed that instead of abolishing the capitalist mode of production, they could harness it to the aim of social
Socialism, a key component of the so-called politics of consensus which dominated the western world's political and ideological landscape until well into the 1970s, should thus be understood as the standpoint that accepts capitalism while using democratic institutions, especially the welfare state, to mitigate its adverse effects.

In a nutshell then, the difference between democratic socialists and social democrats is that while the former encourage the pursuit of socialism by the means available in the democratic system, the latter limit themselves to the promotion of democracy that takes responsibility for the provision of social welfare in a capitalist setting. Of course, while in theory the borderline separating democratic socialism and social democracy may be delineated in this way, it is usually problematic to pigeonhole ideological texts as unequivocally belonging to one or other of the two categories. But while unambiguous examples of democratic socialism and social democracy are scarce, the ideal types may be used to establish the ideological proportions of any particular discourse. Moreover, and most importantly, these two ideal-typical positions on capitalism are reflected in the resulting concepts of globalization and so the conventional distinction between democratic socialism and social democracy is convenient for the purpose of mapping out two broad approaches to globalization within the tradition of non-Marxist socialism.  

23 While I account for the distinction between the two currents that came into being, and now coexist, as a result of two historical split-ups within socialism, I do not see this chapter as the place where I should examine the ideological constellation resulting from the shift that took place within social democracy in the 1990s. The so-called Third Way politics was endorsed to some extent by most western social democratic parties as a response to the offensive of neo-conservatism. But while some interpretations suggest
State-centred concepts of history, equality and globalization

As I have illustrated using the case of Marxism, socialist analytical and normative approaches to globalization are usefully interpreted in connection with the meanings attached to the core socialist concepts of equality and history. Equality and history permeate the entire socialist ideology but, as already noted, these are very capacious concepts and they may be defined in a bewildering variety of ways even within one ideological family. For instance, socialist concepts of equality may be centred on the elimination of poverty, or the reduction of inequality, rather than on economic equality (equality of outcome) as demanded by Marxism. In the same way, socialist understandings of history as unfolding in a propitious direction may differ from the Marxist concept in that they may conceive progress in evolutionary and gradualist terms. Whatever their particular emphasis, the socialist decontestations of equality and history are constructed contingently. For any socialist current this means that the more its reading of history diverges from the Marxist paradigm, the farther from Marxism will also be its understanding of equality. Ditto the idea of globalization; a socialist interpretation of globalization will adopt a non-Marxist flavour when influenced by a concept of history that envisages a non-Marxist (i.e., gradual and peaceful) course of progress or by an idea of equality stopping short of the radical Marxist goal.

that the Third Way should not be excluded from the social democratic tradition (Stammers 2001), I believe that William Hutton is right when he points out that social democratic identity of the Third Way is problematic in that the current ‘operates within the same political economy as the right’ (Hutton 1999, pp. 98–99).
While history and equality are, in their different variants, central to all currents of socialism, it is the notion of the state, and in particular of state economic intervention, that has come to the forefront of the democratic socialist and, especially, social democratic interpretations and has a heavy bearing on how the two currents understand and respond to globalization. Socialist positions can be ranked according to how much importance they give to the state in the process of transition to socialism and what durability they envisage for the state once that transition has been accomplished. In this respect, and provided that the extreme positions of anarchism and Soviet totalitarianism are not taken into account, Marxism would represent the least statist option while social democracy would occupy the place at the other end of the continuum; democratic socialism would then be located 'between' Marxism and social democracy.

This continuum overlaps with the scale of globalism, with Marxism representing the position which is most supportive of globalization, and social democracy remaining the most ambivalent. The degree of importance attached to the concept of the state thus influences the ideas of, and pertaining to, globalization. The state, at least when understood along Westphalian lines, is generally defined as a territorial unit that claims authority over a separate fraction of the globe's territory, and hence over its inhabitants whose particular identity, understood as superior to their potential global affiliations, it thereby aims to ascribe. When it is put forward as the optimal arrangement of political, economic and social life, now or in the envisaged future, the state inevitably compromises globalism. In the case of democratic socialism, where the state, for the
most part, is accentuated on the way towards and at the moment of transition, it is mainly instrumental globalism that is compromised. In other words, in opposition to Marxism, the means of action employed in the pursuit of socialist aims may not be conceived in unequivocally global terms. In the case of traditional social democracy, normative as well as instrumental globalism may be compromised; if it is imputed that the state remains in place as the administrator of national economies on behalf of national societies, then globalist aims tend to give way to implementations of social democratic principles on merely national scales. The rest of this chapter focuses on the concepts of globalization that are constructed by democratic socialism and social democracy contingently on their respective understandings of the present and the future role and import of the state.

The equivocal globalism of democratic socialism: ideas versus implementations

Democratic socialism is not a fashionable term at the moment and political commentators and activists whose ideas I discuss here may not define themselves as democratic socialists. For example, the British campaigner George Monbiot, to whose recent book *The Age of Consent* (2003) I refer extensively, does not see himself as a socialist, or even as a green socialist (that would have seemed appropriate in the context of his long-standing engagement with environmental issues) but as an adherent of the ‘global justice movement’, a term which aims to invoke diverse and inclusive political identity. Likewise, the author of the manifesto *Another world is possible if*... (2004), Susan George opts for simply ‘the movement’ that, she insists, has an ecumenical, all-
inclusive nature. Yet, while the label may not be enjoying its heyday at present, the
positions analyzed here display the logic that situates them within the broad tradition of
democratic socialism. And it is for the reason of their recognizable ideological identity
that the ostensible inclusiveness purported by these proposals is easily impaired in
encounters with rival ideologies. The confrontation is especially intense in relation to
Marxism, which is seen as totally misguided in the course of action that it has adopted.
The allegations are formulated in terms that echo the traditional charges of democratic
socialism against its Marxist competitor but, while continuity is identifiable, novel
circumstances have forced the democratic socialist standing in the debate to take account
of new concerns and concepts.

'Globalization' is perhaps the most important of the concepts that have recently entered
the democratic socialist territory. The concept has been problematic for the overall logic
of the conceptual paths criss-crossing the democratic socialist morphology. On the one
hand, consistently with its egalitarian idea that people deserve equal concern regardless
of their location and culture, democratic socialism has adopted a broadly globalist
outlook. On the other hand, this form of globalization has been prevented from taking a
consistent course due to the democratic socialist endorsement of the state as a major
instrument of progress. In other words, the challenge confronting democratic socialism
in its attempts to decontest globalization consists in the tension between its globalist goal
and its statist method of pursuing it. In the occasional instances where the concept of
globalization has been accommodated within democratic socialism in a way which
coherently reinforces and updates the overall democratic socialist logic, this has been achieved by weakening, though not altogether abandoning, instrumental statism. An instance of a democratic socialist position where statism is undermined allowing for a more consistent globalist outlook is discussed below in juxtaposition with several exemplifications of widespread contradictions between the global aspirations of democratic socialism and its statist methodology.

Democratic socialism lays a lot of emphasis on its self-professed globalist identity. Accordingly, with reference to the ends they strive for, democratic socialists are adamant in their rejection of the ‘anti-globalization’ appellation that the mainstream media as well as some analysts have applied indiscriminately to all critics of neoliberalism. Susan George for example asserts that ‘the movement is internationalist and deeply engaged with the world as a whole and the fate of everyone who shares the planet’ (George 2004, p. ix). She conveys this globalist identity in simple and appealing terms ‘[w]e are “pro-globalization” for we are in favour of sharing friendship, culture, cooking, solidarity, wealth and resources’ (George, in Callinicos 2003, pp. 13–14). The endorsement of normative globalism by democratic socialism may also be based on a pragmatic evaluation of the existing state of affairs. Globalization may then be seen as ‘too widely accepted and embedded to be reversible in its essential integrative impact’ (Falk 2000, p. 166). Therefore, ‘demands to return to a simpler, more rural or communal era’ may be rejected ‘as utopian’ (George 2004, p. 154).
While rejecting localization as a project which is not viable, democratic socialists are also vigilant about the likelihood of the association of localist ideas with ‘dangerous chauvinistic and extremist social energies’ (Falk 2000, p. 163). Richard Falk argues for example that the localist response to globalization:

[T]akes the form of backlash politics that looks either to some pre-modern traditional framework as viable and virtuous [...] or to ultra-territorialists that seek to keep capital at home and exclude foreigners to the extent possible. These responses [...] have a rightist flavor, because of their emphasis on the sacred religious or nationalist community of the saved that is at war with an evil “other”, either secularist or outsider. (Falk 1999, p. 142)

The task that democratic socialism defines for itself is thus not to reverse globalization, which would be both unfeasible and undesirable, but ‘to alter the guiding ideas that are shaping enactment’ (Falk 2000, p. 165). In this way, through reform rather than eradication, it is possible to accomplish ‘disconnection from globalization in its current form so as to allow for the construction of a new form of globalization on a different basis’ (Houtart 2001b, p. 53). In a still more explicit democratic socialist formulation, ‘globalization-from-above’ should be captured and used ‘as a vehicle for humanity’s first global democratic revolution’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 23), or – in the vocabulary of Falk – for the construction of ‘globalization-from-below’.

On a declarative level also the method of democratic socialism is defined as resolutely globalist. The globalist approach is preached as a matter of strategic necessity: ‘proposed alternatives will be effective only if they are global in scale’ (Monbiot 2003, pp. 10–
This belief is supported by referring to the nature of the adversary, usually defined as corporate, financial, neoliberal or, less frequently, capitalist globalization. Thus, for example, François Houtart, the Belgian Catholic priest-cum-sociologist and one of the founding fathers of the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre, identifies the major shortcoming in the present strategy of action against global capitalism to be the fact that ‘while capital [...] reproduces itself on a global scale, resistance is still mainly local’. He explains that this state of affairs is ‘extremely useful to the hegemony of the market and its political expression, since it is much easier to develop piecemeal responses and repressions than to confront a coherent whole’ (Houtart 2001a, p. vii). By the same token, Richard Falk argues that the response to what he calls ‘globalization-from-above’ must be both global and comprehensive; localized ‘reactions to symptomatic disorders associated with globalization [...] do little more than influence entrepreneurial forces to be more prudent or to make more of a public relations effort’ (Falk 1999, p. 143).

However, as has already been noted, while democratic socialism boasts a globalist identity, it remains attached to the state and this attachment is evident in many instances of democratic socialist reasoning, including the argumentation of the authors quoted above. Thus, for example, while Susan George claims to be ‘pro-globalization’, she is unconvinced about the possibility of transferring the prerogatives of the state to a supranational level: ‘we’re often asked if we want a world government. Personally, I don’t, or, rather, I think it’s far too early’ (George 2004, p. 159). George insists that ‘[a]cting directly at the international level [...] is clearly impossible’ (George 2004, p.
102) and that the movement should ‘hang on’ to the state, as ‘one of the only significant targets we can actually reach through democratic channels’ (George 2004, p. 104). Similarly, Houtart combines the aspiration to accomplish ‘the construction of a new form of globalization’ with an appeal ‘to give back to the states more real power vis-à-vis the transnational economic powers, which are destroying their sovereignty’ (Houtart 2001b, pp. 53 and 54). Likewise, Samir Amin argues that a different globalization should be worked out in ‘the framework [...] defined by the need to defend the sovereignty of nations’ (Amin 2001, p. 61) and Falk, in his turn, insists that globalization-from-below ‘accepts the unchallengeable persistence of state’ (Falk 1999, p. 146).

In all these cases, lip service is paid to the idea of globalism but, as George’s rejection of the idea of global governance aptly illustrates, the concept of the state prevents notions of genuinely globalist implementations from developing. Nevertheless, there exist examples of democratic socialist thinking which prove that the state may be pushed to a more peripheral position in the democratic socialist equation, allowing for a more consistent globalist outlook without adverse effects for ideological consistency. George Monbiot epitomizes a democratic socialist way of thinking in his interest in a competent organizational management of a radical social change. He insists that ‘[d]emocracy is unattainable unless it is brokered by institutions’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 41) and that ‘[t]he absence of government [...] is unworkable and ultimately intolerable’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 40). But, at the same time, contrary to the authors discussed above, Monbiot identifies
the lack of governance on the scale suitable to match economic globalization as the main problem of contemporary politics: ‘Everything has been globalized except our consent. Democracy alone has been confined to the nation state. It stands at the national border, suitcase in hand, without a passport’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 1). Consequently, Monbiot offers several specific solutions to ensure democracy on the supranational level and in some respects he manages to escape thinking in statist terms. For example, his key scheme is the creation of the world parliament in which the MPs would ‘have no connection to the governments of the nations from which they come’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 88), thus making it ‘not an assembly formed by nation states, but an assembly formed by the world’s people’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 88). In order for that parliament to be ‘global, not international’ (Monbiot 2003, p. 88) it would consist of six hundred representatives, each representing a constituency of ten million people, each of whom possesses one vote:

> If we are to establish 600 constituencies of even size, many of them will have to straddle national borders [...] The less our representatives are bound to the demands of nationhood, the less parochial their outlook is likely to be. The more we, as constituents, are forced to share our political destiny with the people of other nations, the more we are forced to understand and engage with their concerns. (Monbiot 2003, pp. 87–88)

While Monbiot does not go as far as to advocate the full-scale elimination of states, he puts forward proposals that weaken their sovereignty and hold them to account. In other words, Monbiot offers an update of democratic socialism within a new context defined by the centrality of the concept of globalization. He reconciles new circumstances with
the democratic socialist insistence on the institutionalization of democracy by transferring institutions of governance to a higher level.

Monbiot’s willingness to substitute global for national governance results from the fact that his views fit in within democratic socialist territory where the state is seen as an instrument to achieve, in a democratic way, the goal of a socialist society. On the contrary, in the case of traditional social democratic thinking this manoeuvre may be prevented by the fact that the state is not just the principle of action that may be replaced by a more adequate one in new circumstances. For social democracy statism is an important concept with potentially weighty consequences for its understandings of equality and history and for its concept of globalization. As I demonstrate below, the traditional social democratic vision is so firmly anchored in the idea of the state that in their defence of statism some social democrats do not hesitate to put the very existence of globalization into question.

Social democracy: the impossibility of disembedded markets and the myth of globalization

Social democracy assumes moderation in terms of both the method of change, which is to be gradual, democratic and institutionalized, as well as its objective, which amounts to the retention of capitalism as a reliable generator of economic prosperity but with measures to prevent it from causing social distress. Contingently on its understanding of history in terms of evolution and reform, social democracy endorses a weak concept of
equality, which gravitates towards the idea of prevention of excessive economic disproportions between individuals. Traditionally, social democratic positions have linked equality to the welfare state, a benign administrator which, through progressive taxation and nationalization of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, ensures universal access to services and hence not just civil and political but also, crucially, social rights of the citizens (Marshall 1950). The social democratic vision thus combines the productivity of the capitalist market with state-regulated ‘universal welfare regime’ (Esping Andersen 1990). Consequently, the social democratic concept of globalization is also constructed in an inevitable conjunction with the state in its close background.

Statism, formulated as both an operative and a fundamental component of traditional social democracy, prevents it from joining the globalist positions of its fellow socialist ideologies. The contemporary social democratic way of thinking about globalization is

24 As I explained in the Introduction, this thesis is not intended as a comprehensive overview of ideology-laden interpretations of globalization. Rather, the cases discussed are employed as examples of how the concept of globalization may impact on existing ideological configurations. This explains why, in the interest of coherence of the present comparative chapter, I limit my discussion of social democracy to a ‘traditional’ current which displays a strongly statist orientation and therefore may adopt a sceptical stance on the question of the reality of globalization. It should be noted that this is not the only type of view of globalization within social democratic ideology. An alternative social democratic position has been articulated, which could be dubbed ‘global’ social democracy, and which postulates enactment of social democratic principles on a supranational level. The fundamental assumption of the ‘global’ social democracy is that globalization is a real process with crucial political, economic and social consequences and that therefore social democratic arguments now need ‘to be theorized in relation to new global concerns’ (Olssen 2009, p. xi). According to this current, globalization should be governed by some sort of ‘global covenant’ (Held 2004) with capacities to
particularly indebted to the Hungarian critic of economic *laissez-faire*, Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) (Ancelovici 2002; Block 2001; Munck 2006; Palacios 2001; Rodrik 1997; Ruggie 2003 and Stiglitz 2001). Polanyi’s most important book, *The Great Transformation* (2001 [1944]), focuses on what he calls the ‘disembedding’ of markets, that is to say, on the notion of *laissez-faire* as a setting where markets are fully self-regulating and function independently of other social institutions, only according to the dictates of the ‘invisible hand’. Polanyi attempts to discredit this idea by demonstrating that in traditional societies markets are always interlocked in a complex system of social, political and religious institutions and that economic activities are inexorably intertwined with, and overshadowed by, the overlapping dimensions of prestige, power and kinship. Polanyi is convinced that the inclination of traditional societies to keep the markets on the leash of tradition and convention, that is to say, within a system of non-economic meanings and institutions, is not just an idiosyncrasy typical of the past, and doomed to disappear in the course of human development. Armed with historical and anthropological arguments, he embarks on a devastating critique of the free-market

‘regulate globalised capitalism, explore new modes of redistribution and protect those excluded from the labour market internationally’ (Martell 2001, p. 218; see also Stammers 2001). Global social democracy thus tends to work ‘by analogy’ – it relies, in the words of Simon Tormey, ‘on transferring an argument that has enjoyed widespread validity at the national level to the global level’ (Tormey 2004, p. 102). Instead of analyzing this relatively straightforward transition, I focus my attention on a more peculiar ideological shift whereby a social democratic current denies the existence of globalization in order to save the logical integrity of its overall message.
dogma and reproaches the liberal venture of ‘disembedding’ as a project bound to destroy society:

To allow the market mechanism to be sole director of the fate of human beings and their natural environment [...] would result in the demolition of society. [...] Robbed of the protective covering of cultural institutions, human beings would perish from the effects of social exposure; they would die as the victims of acute social dislocation through vice, perversion, crime, and starvation. Nature would be reduced to its elements, neighborhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers polluted, military safety jeopardized, the power to produce food and raw materials destroyed. (Polanyi 2001 [1944], p. 76)

The picture of society dominated by a disembedded market is thus presented in extremely catastrophic terms but this disastrous vision is, paradoxically, the ground for Polanyi’s optimism. Since any economic system is inevitably ‘absorbed in the social system’ (Polanyi 2001, p. 71), the domination of society by the economy is not just unnatural; it is a sheer impossibility:

Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness. (Polanyi 2001 [1944], p. 3)

Polanyi’s vision of history is thus, appropriately for a socialist, positive. He is confident that society will take precedence over market and will re-embed it in the social tissue and he gives socialism an important function in the process: ‘[s]ocialism is, essentially, the tendency inherent in an industrial civilization to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a democratic society’ (Polanyi 2001 [1944], p. 242).
The idea of transcending the market by subordinating it to a democratic society sounds like a succinct social democratic credo. Social democracy aims to embed the market or, in other words, to mitigate its ‘antisocial’ tendencies by the means available in the modern welfare state, the regulator and dispenser of resources ensuring that no member of society falls below the poverty line.

The enduring centrality of the state in social democracy is reflected in the fact that much of contemporary social democratic reasoning about globalization is centred firmly on the defence of statism. In the traditional social democratic evaluation of globalization two major threads may be distinguished. Firstly, globalization is seen as undermining ‘the privileged resort of civilization’, i.e., the state, in favour of markets, which are identified with ‘anarchy, that is, the war of all against all’ (Ancelovici 2002, p. 433). Secondly, while the present political developments are seen in very pejorative terms, social democracy has not abandoned its standard optimistic belief in the future of regulated capitalism and it continues to see the state as a potent political, economic and social player: ‘it is not true that national governments have lost their capacity to pursue domestic strategies to promote economic and social goals’ (Vandenbroucke 1998, p. 57), big government remains ‘viable both politically (in terms of winning elections) and economically (by promoting strong macroeconomic performance)’ (Garrett 1998, p. 4; see also Berger 2000, p. 58).
The two notions – that, due to globalization, the state is in crisis, and that, despite globalization, it is still capable of fulfilling its role – contain an obvious tension. The confidence that the state is still fit to play its role in the reconciliation of capitalism with social justice makes it necessary to explain the reasons for the involution of the social functions of the state and the resulting escalation of inequality. Social democracy copes with this deplorable situation, and with the consequent rupture in the logic of its concept of history, by seeing it as an outcome of a delusion. Globalization, which serves free-marketeteers as an explanation of, and an argument for, the dismantling of the state, is interpreted by traditional social democrats not as a real process but rather as ‘a key term in a minority rhetoric aimed at silencing voices that are in favour of regulating markets rather than regulating for greater market freedom’ (Hirst 1999, p. 95; see also Hay 2001).

While reasoning along these lines is widespread in social democracy, one intervention has become emblematic of the social democratic argument sceptical of the reality of globalization. The case in point is Paul Hirst’s and Grahame Thompson’s book *Globalization in Question* (1999) which nominates globalization to be:

[A] myth suitable for a world without illusions, but [...] also one that robs us of hope. [...] The old rationalist explanation for primitive myths was that they were a way of masking and compensating for humanity’s helplessness in the face of the power of nature. In this case we have a myth that exaggerates the degree of our helplessness in the face of contemporary economic forces. (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 6)
Hirst and Thompson submit five substantial claims with reference to globalization. Firstly, they set off to provide evidence that the considerable extent of internationalization of capitalism, which they acknowledge, is not unprecedented and that ‘in some respects, the current international economy is less open and integrated than the regime that prevailed from 1870 to 1914.’ Secondly, with reference to capitalist corporations, they maintain that ‘there seems to be no major tendency towards the growth of truly international companies.’ Thirdly, they dispute the thesis that there is transfer of investment to the developing countries, and point out the enduring economic marginality of the ‘Third World’. Fourthly, they challenge the claim that the world economy has become global, suggesting instead that economic activity is concentrated in the main economic powers, namely, Europe, Japan, and North America. Finally, the fifth point of Hirst and Thompson serves as their conclusion – ‘global markets are thus by no means beyond regulation and control’ – as well as providing the rationale of their advocacy of the political action aiming to institute anew the mechanisms of regulation and control of the market by the state (Hirst and Thompson 1999, p. 2; see also Thompson 2005, p. 54).

The assumption that globalization is an artificial construct and ‘can thus be deconstructed by society’ (Munck 2006, p. 175, emphasis deleted) is the key to the social democratic interpretations discussed in this chapter. If, along socialist lines, human nature is naturally sociable (Polanyi 2001, p. 48) then historical development cannot carry on defying innate human propensities by ‘desocializing’ one of the most
important social institutions, that is to say, the market. History cannot continue to unfold in reverse; it will inevitably retake its proper course as it did following the equally 'aberrant' belle époque period, on which Polanyi’s analysis focuses. The excesses of the market will always be accompanied by opposite tendencies, in the process that Polanyi called the ‘double movement’. In other words, the laissez-faire drive to disembed the market from society, to leave it to self-regulate, and to subject the social world to its imperatives will inevitably face a societal correction, which will aim to re-embed the market within a system of socially negotiated rules.

The societal side of the ‘double movement’ today takes the form of state intervention and the state remains one of the most important social democratic concepts, both as a means of action facilitating the formation of the social democratic society, and as a key element of the final picture determining the social democratic shape of the core socialist concepts of history and equality. Therefore, also in its response to globalization, social democracy remains ‘largely a political doctrine within national parameters’ (Shaw 2001, p. 23). Even though a more globally orientated current of global democracy is on the rise, in large sectors of social democracy the belief remains that states alone are able to hold markets to account, and that the move towards implementing social democratic principles is to take place primarily at the national level. Accordingly, the demystification of the idea of globalization should be the first step on the way to abolishing its pernicious effects and returning to the natural course of social evolution towards benign state interventionism in the service of social inclusion.
The socialist concept of globalization?

The diversity of currents within the socialist family is reflected in the globalization debate. By simplifying the variations of socialism to three ideal types of Marxism, democratic socialism and 'national' social democracy, it is possible to distinguish analytically between three broad socialist understandings of globalization. In each of these cases two core ideas of history and equality exert a broad influence on the conceptualizations of globalization, while the role allocated to the state further specifies the approaches to the new concept. Thus, to begin with Marxism, its radical idea of equality and its revolutionary vision of history exclude the state from playing a crucial role. The state's relative insignificance in Marxism allows in turn for the development of a confident globalist approach. In the case of democratic socialism, a full-blown globalism is constrained by this current's insistence on employing the state as the tool in the historical progress towards equality. Still, among democratic socialists some have begun displaying a considerable extent of globalist imagination and advocated means to transfer politics to supranational levels. This moderate globalism has been made possible by the fact that in democratic socialism the state has the function of an operative concept and as such is subject to change. Conversely, in social democracy the concept of the state has acquired more importance as not merely a means of transition but as the key distributive mechanism. As such, the concept of the state is located in direct adjacency to the core ideas of history and equality. The social democratic belief in statism is therefore more entrenched rendering social democracy, or at least the more traditional
social democratic currents that I have discussed here, less inclined to frame its vision in globalist terms.

The diversity of socialist interpretations of globalization demonstrates that the concept is decontexted within its host ideologies in ways which depend on the already existing conceptual morphologies. These conceptual connections may be relatively uncomplicated, as with the Marxist perception of globalization as the final step towards the fulfilment of history, or the outright rejection of globalization as a myth by some social democratic currents, or they may be more problematic, as with the ambiguities concerning the possibility of enacting the democratic socialist vision on a global scale. But ultimately the concept of globalization is shaped according to long-term priorities of its host ideologies, such as, in the respectively discussed cases, the revolutionary abolition of capitalism, its gradual transcendence, or its retention in an improved form. In any of these cases, the new concept is interpreted so as to confirm the rightness of its host's purpose and the optimality of its method.

The differences between the three currents suggest that there might be no such thing as the socialist understanding of globalization. However, such a possibility does not devalue the present attempt to trace the existing conceptual paths as they develop from within the 'socialist matrix'. This matrix consists of a set of core concepts that limit somehow the range of conceptual choices available to its 'effluxes' in making sense of the idea of globalization. While the remaining options may still amount to a breathtaking
diversity, they are recognizable, at least in their key aspects, as 'socialist' and thus as
distinct from other such broad categories.
CHAPTER IV
NATIONAL POPULISM AND FASCISM:
BLOOD AND SOIL AGAINST GLOBALIZATION

Parallel to the globalist visions of liberalism and Marxism, the rejection of the global has a long history. This chapter examines anti-globalization positions articulated on the right end of the political spectrum. It traces their development from the long tradition of antiuniversalism while also identifying new conceptual and rhetorical shifts espoused by parties, movements and intellectuals representing national populist and fascist thought.

Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment
The ideologies that I have discussed so far, namely liberalism and socialism, sprang from the same source: the Enlightenment. Thus, even though many important differences divide the two worldviews, they coalesce on the fundamental assumption that human beings are of equal value and essentially of the same nature regardless of time and place. Consequently, both liberals and socialists are committed to universalism, taking for granted the possibility of one law to guide all peoples and to thus unite humankind in one peaceful global civilization. While liberalism and socialism elevated universalism to the status of one of the key organizing principles of Western civilization (and thus prepared ground for the contemporary accelerated globalization) this universalist outlook has not been left unchallenged. The rise of the Enlightenment provoked an intellectual reaction that Zeev Sternhell described in suggestive terms: 'the
man of the Enlightenment wanted no less than to recreate the myth of Prometheus. His immediate enemies replied by appealing to Providence, to destiny, to history and to the profound roots of the collective subconscious' (Sternhell 2000, p. 143).

In this chapter my focus is on the right-wing antiglobalism which developed from the early denunciations of the Enlightenment. More specifically, my analysis engages with antiglobalist interpretations articulated within the territory of what is conventionally termed the extreme right, and in particular within two ideological currents which belong there: national populism and fascism. To make sure that ideological continuity between early antiumiversalist ideas and the contemporary extreme right is clearly shown, I begin with a brief historical summary of relevant, mostly nineteenth and early twentieth century, contributions. Subsequently, I explain the meaning of the concept of the extreme right, shed light on several differences between national populism and fascism, and discuss, in a comparative way, their antiglobalist arguments. The last section provides an account of conceptual changes that have taken place in this ideological area and that have followed a shift from traditional nationalism to a new post-nationalist orientation. The objective of this part is to demonstrate that whereas the shift is indeed significant, its consequences for the values and the logic of extreme right ideologies are not as fundamental as is sometimes suggested. While hopes, aspirations and identities that in the past were articulated primarily in national contexts are no longer restricted to the national level, they are still recognizable as integral to particular ideological
traditions thus demonstrating that the change of the territorial referent does not have to cause an evaporation of ideological distinctions.

The anti-Enlightenment tradition of the right: a historical sketch

The French Revolution of 1789 is a useful symbolic marker of both the Enlightenment as well as of the reaction against it that saw counterrevolutionaries striving to find ways to restore absolute monarchy and its concomitant aristocratic social order. While the counter-revolutionary reaction was in this instance provoked by a specific set of circumstances, it can also be seen as an expression of a more durable, conceivably eternal, disposition that emphasizes organicism, tradition and particularity, and that clashes with equally long-lasting tendencies towards emancipation, innovation and universalism. The particularistic and defensive reactions to globalization that I discuss in the present chapter are merely new expressions of the same intellectual movement that highlights rootedness and history, and thus incomparability of different local perspectives, against what it sees as a 'view from nowhere': an abstract cosmopolitan perspective detached from local beliefs and practices and thus devoid of genuine legitimization. The discussion presented in this section is not intended as a systematic or comprehensive historical account but aims to highlight some of the key moments of anti-Enlightenment reaction in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe’s most important intellectual centres: France, Germany and Britain.
Not unexpectedly, the reaction to the turmoil of the Revolution was particularly strong in France and the French have since remained the trendsetters of the anti-Enlightenment tradition. French counterrevolutionary intellectuals such as Louis de Bonald (1754–1840) or Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821) were outraged by what they saw as the disastrous consequences of the Revolution for monarchical and papal authority and for social order and stability. While their primary concern was with the conservation of group privileges and social hierarchies, they framed their view in broad philosophical terms opposed to the combination of individualism and universalism which was typical of the Enlightenment and which featured in revolutionary slogans. In nineteenth century counterrevolutionary thought in France the defence of monarchy against the revolutionary upheaval was understood as the defence of the tested, the known, and the traditional against the pretensions of speculative rationalism. The monarch was presented as a quintessential representation of the kingdom, a form of totem in which the values, traditions and customs of the community were deposited. De Bonald’s distinction between the old and the new political orders was formulated in terms that emphasized the contrast between the deep-rooted and the unencumbered: ‘monarchy considers man in his ties with society; a republic considers man independently of his relations to society’ (De Bonald, in Boudon et al. 1997, vol. 1, p. 264). Thus, while the defence of monarchy was in the centre of early nineteenth century counter-revolutionary reaction in France, the logic used in pro-monarchical arguments may be employed in favour of any political arrangement which is considered as organically evolved from a
given place and thus as innate there. Indeed, as I am going to show in later parts of this chapter, acclamations of rootedness and cultural particularity similar to those of the French counterrevolutionaries feature in contemporary right-wing diatribes against globalization.

Particularly relevant from the point of view of the contemporary antiglobalist right is the anthropological theory of the anti-Enlightenment, as formulated for example by De Maistre, who is considered to be the most important among French authoritarian conservatives. De Maistre attacked the individualistic and universalistic anthropology of liberalism when he famously denied the possibility of the existence of an individual abstracted from national culture:

There is no such thing as man in the world. In the course of my life I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, Russians etc.; I know, too, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be a Persian. But as for man, I declare that I have never met him in my life; if he exists, he is unknown to me. (De Maistre, in Etzioni 2003, p. 40, emphasis deleted)

De Maistre's rebuttal of universalist anthropology fits well within contemporary right-wing critiques of the globalist aspirations of liberalism and socialism. Ernest Renan (1823–1892) and Maurice Barrès (1862–1923) are other French authors whose contributions resonate in today's antiglobalist theory. Both wrote in a later period when anti-Enlightenment sentiments continued to run high and both emphasized the idea of organic development and rootedness. Renan's statements embodied the essence of nationalist ontology: 'The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of
efforts, and sacrifices, and devotions' (Renan 1970 [1882], p. 81) and combined with his refusal to accept the utilitarian conception of the nation as merely a matter of economic convenience:

Community of interests is assuredly a powerful bond between men. But nevertheless can interests suffice to make a nation? I do not believe it. Community of interests makes commercial treaties. There is a sentimental side to nationality; it is at one body and soul; a Zollverein is not a fatherland. (Renan 1970 [1882], p. 79)

This holistic nationalism culminated in the thought of Barrès. His philosophy was opposed to what he saw as the offspring of universalism: déracinement or rootlessness. Barrès's most important book, *Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme*, can be read as a manifesto postulating an unequivocal rejection of liberal anthropology: '[t]he sovereign individual with his intelligence and his ability to seize the laws of the universe! This idea must be destroyed' (Barrès, in Steiner 1970, p. 162). What Barrès offered in its stead was an unashamedly deterministic and irrationalist theory of the individual and the nation: '[w]e are not in control of our thinking [...] Human reason is in such bondage that we all follow the path of our ancestors' (Barrès, in Steiner 1970, p. 162). From Barrès's perspective there is no universal truth or justice, merely 'French truth and French justice', meaningful only from the point formed by the past centuries, 'from which everything is seen through the eyes of a Frenchman' (Barrès, in Steiner 1970, pp. 161–162). Nationalism, asserts Barrès, 'is simply the discovery of that point, searching for it, and when it is found, holding to it and receiving from it our art, our politics and the manner of living our life' (Barrès, in Steiner 1970, pp. 161–162).
The nationalism of Barrès is an extreme exemplification of the sense of an organic
rootedness in nation, and hence of a categorically localist attachment where the soil of
the country as well as its dead command the people to a particular way of life. In other
words, it is localism centred on *la terre et les morts*:

> The soil speaks to us and works with the nation’s consciousness quite as much as it cooperates with the dead. The soil gives the active life of the dead its efficacy. Our ancestors pass on as a whole the heritage accumulated in their souls only by the immutable vital activity of the soil. (Barrès, in Steiner 1970, p. 192)

From this view followed Barrès’s more specific political ideas. For example, while he
saw himself as a French nationalist, he was also very strongly attached to his native
region, Lorraine. He contrasted Lorraine with the cosmopolitanism of Paris (his novel,
entitled suggestively *Les Déracinés*, portrayed the lives of his fellow Lorrainers in
Paris). He stated his regionalist position clearly: ‘[t]he view that we have of the soil
compels us to envisage an organization of the country by regions’ (Barrès, in Steiner
1970, p. 192), and he was convinced that the future of France lay in decentralization.
But Barrès was not alone in advocating decentralist ideas: Georges Sorel (1844–1922)
and Charles Maurras (1868–1952), two thinkers whose work continues to influence the
extreme right, likewise wished for decentralization of France that they hoped would
revive its local and provincial life (Spektorowski 2003a, p. 115). This two-tiered
nationalism – related on the one hand to the nation and on the other hand to specific
regions within it – remains a characteristic feature of some currents of extreme right
localism today.
A particular conception of inequality is one of the crucial conceptual concomitants of this radical form of nationalism. If, as declared Barrès, '[i]t is my sense of descent which provides me with the axis around which my total, self-contained idea of life revolves' (Barrès, in Steiner 1970, p. 160), then ways of life evolved from different roots are not compatible. In this way, the commitment to inequality does not need to follow from the notion of innately different levels of intelligence or talent. Instead, inequality is understood as resulting from an arbitrary fact of one's organic belonging. A devoted anti-Semite for most of his life, Barrès did not advocate the idea of a racial or even cultural inferiority of the French Jews. His hostility was based purely on their alleged lack of roots in the French soil—a characteristic that, Barrès believed, necessarily implied their disloyalty to France:

The Jews have no native land in the sense that we understand it. For us, a homeland implies the soil, our ancestors, the land of our dead. For them it is only the place where they find the greatest profits [...]. Does it follow that you should call them "dirty Jews" or the highest aristocracy in the world? You can do what you like, according to your own inclinations and your circumstances. It does not matter. But do not deny that the Jew is a creature apart. (Barrès, in Steiner 1970, p. 181)

This idea of the fundamental inequality between those who belong and those who do not has been passed on from Barrès and other nineteenth century thinkers of nationalist orientation to the contemporary extreme right. It now assists right-wing antiglobalists in their attempts to articulate a new form of racism, one which does not refer to biology but to culture. I discuss this culturalist racism, or differentialism, as it is also known, later in the present chapter.
In Germany, a reaction set in against the rationalist and mechanistic worldview of the Aufklärung in the form of the Romantic movement. While German Romanticism had a more ambivalent view about universalism and particularism than the extremely dichotomist thinking of the French countermovementaries (Sayre and Löwy 1984), its prevalent conception of the community was still one of an organic Volk attached to a particular place and expressing itself through local habits, traditions, mythology and folklore. Zeev Sternhell explains the antiglobalist implications of German romantic nationalism in an evocative way:

[O]ne cannot enter a family in the way in which one buys a share on the stock exchange. [...] people who are the product of the same geographical environment, the same climate, and who heard the same tales and legends at their mother’s knee possess a mentality which is unique of its kind. (Sternhell 2000, p. 144)

Nationality was thus from the romantic perspective a matter of nature rather than a civil or political fact. In elaborating this view, romantic nationalism drew in particular on the contributions of thinkers such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814). Herder asserted that providence ‘has wonderfully separated nationalities not only by woods and mountains, seas and deserts, rivers and climates, but more particularly by languages, inclinations and characters’ (Herder, in Knop 2002, p. 55). Accordingly, since nations are distinct by virtue of natural features, individuals naturally belong to, and are constituted by, their particular nationalities. It follows that the nation is not a mere collection of individuals but a Volksstum (or
folkhood), an organic, indivisible and unique being that generates particular ways of thinking and living. An individual who is devoid of patriotism is therefore seen as one who ‘has lost himself and the whole world about himself’ (Herder, in Viroli 1995, p. 118).

Among national attributes, language was particularly important to Romanticism. Herder believed that language determined thought. Likewise, Fichte saw language as a natural phenomenon. He expressed the unity of language and nation in his thirteenth address ‘To the German Nation’ in 1806:

> Those who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, long before any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make themselves understood more and more clearly; they belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole. Such a whole, if it wishes to absorb and mingle with itself any other people of different descent and language, cannot do so without itself becoming confused [...] and violently disturbing the even progress of its culture. (Fichte 1968 [1807-1808], pp. 190-191)

As I am going to show later, Fichte’s belief that ‘absorption’ of different cultural influences into an ostensibly homogenous group leads to ‘confusion’ and ‘violent disturbance’ has been popular among contemporary antiglobalists on the extreme right who have used the idea in their assertions of the necessity of cultural and political barriers to globalization and multiculturalism. The logic of this particular antiglobalist argument owes a lot to thinkers such as Fichte and Herder.
The criticism of the Enlightenment in Germany was later associated with several outstanding thinkers such as the first German sociologists: Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936) and Max Weber (1864–1920). Tönnies defined the essence of modernization as a progressive loss of community (*Gemeinschaft*) and he described the emergence in its place of the impersonal social aggregate (*Gesellschaft*) which generates no real sense of roots or belonging (Tönnies 2003 [1887]). While Tönnies did not intend his distinction between ‘community’ and ‘society’ to serve as a critique of modernity, his ideas, and in particular his terminology, have been appropriated by antimodernist, and now antiglobalist, thought (see for example Benoist 1994). Weber was more unequivocally pessimistic in his evaluations of modernity and in his prognosis for the future. He identified rationality as the driving force of modernization but in his evaluation the most important outcome of the process was an alienating disenchantment that empties the world of meaning. Weber did not hide his loathing of the modern era that he associated with spiritual futility and purposelessness:

[M]echanized ossification, embellished with a sort of rigidly compelled sense of self-importance [...] narrow specialists without mind, pleasure-seekers without heart; in its conceit, this nothingness imagines it has climbed to a level of humanity never before attained. (Weber 2002 [1905], p. 124)\(^{25}\)

The antimodernist reaction in Germany reached its zenith with the conservative revolution movement which was particularly prominent in the Weimar Republic but

\(^{25}\) For more on Weber’s diagnosis of modernity and especially on his view of capitalism, see Löwy 2002.
exerted influence all over Europe. Conservative revolutionaries, such as Ernst Jünger (1895–1998), Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), or Carl Schmitt (1888–1985), formulated a forceful rejection of humanism, egalitarianism, universalism, and globalism. The profound pessimism about modernity featured also in the thought of Martin Heidegger whose reflection (in 1935) captures the spirit of the epoch while also anticipating recent debates surrounding the deterritorializing impact of globalization:

Once the furthermost corner of the globe has been technologically conquered and opened up to economic exploitation, when every possible event in every possible place at every possible time has become as accessible as quickly as possible, when people can “experience” an attempt on the life of a king in France and a symphony concert in Tokyo simultaneously, when time has become only speed, instantaneousness, and simultaneity, and time as History has disappeared from the existence of all peoples, when the boxer is seen as the great man of a people, when mass gatherings running into millions are regarded as a triumph — then, yes, then, the questions which hover over this whole grotesque charade like ghosts are: for what? — where to? — and what then? (Heidegger, in Griffin 1995, p. 151)

A more specifically localist expression of the same intellectual zeitgeist was given by the most important codifier of left-wing (that is to say, antiimperialist and anticapitalist) Nazism, Otto Strasser (1897–1974). In 1936 Strasser declared “[t]he resolute repudiation of any form of imperialism’ to be ‘a core feature of the völkisch idea’ (Strasser, in Griffin 1995, p. 114). Insisting that “[e]very people should pursue happiness in its own way” (Strasser, in Griffin 1995, p. 114), Strasser affirmed an antiglobalist tendency in Nazism, which acknowledged ‘the right of every nation to national independence, to its autonomous control of the forms taken by its political, economic and cultural life’
National populism and fascism

(Strasser, in Griffin 1995, p. 114). The antiglobalist inclination of left-wing Nazism is nowadays thriving in various ‘Third Positionist’ movements such as the English National Revolutionary Faction led by Troy Southgate (Macklin 2005).

Britain

In Britain, the reaction against modernity was more moderate and more pragmatic. The dominant current of British conservatism remained under the influence of Edmund Burke (1729–1797) who, while famous for his critique of the French Revolution, did not want to respond by going back to the status quo ante. Assuming that ‘[a] state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation’ (Burke 1868, p. 29), Burke opened British conservatism to penetration by liberal ideas and led it to a qualified reconciliation with new socio-political realities. But next to Burke’s liberal conservatism, the British also developed an organic strand, often called Toryism to highlight its pre-industrial roots. This current drew attention to the disruptive effects of modernity and insisted on preserving strong social bonds that were to prevent society from descending into chaos. It was built on an idyllic vision of an organic feudal community, ‘a mythical Merrie England in which the propertied classes had benevolently discharged their custodial responsibilities to the poor, who had reciprocated with affectionate deference’ (Eccleshall 2003b, p. 53). This Tory paternalism was rooted in an organic and localist cosmology. The paternalistic social ideal of a benevolent hierarchical structure integrated by the bonds of charity and obedience could only be maintained in a society which remained relatively closed and
immobile, both in the social and in the geographical sense: both vertically and horizontally. In this model it was not only the subordinate classes that ‘knew their place’ and lived localized lives. The land-owning aristocracy was also embedded in its place: it was attached to the land it owned and it disdained the uprooted lifestyle of the bourgeoisie. Moreover, the genteel ideology of Tory conservatives was scornful of an economistic zeal of the bourgeoisie and scoffed at the economics and ethics of liberalism. The Tories posed as sceptical about abstract principles, drawing instead on historical experience and local traditions.

Some later antiliberal ideas in Britain took the form of distributism, a current which was particularly popular in traditionalist Roman Catholic circles and theorized by thinkers such as Hillaire Belloc (1870–1953) and G. K. Chesterton (1874–1936), who were influenced in turn by some French traditionalists (Griffiths 2004). The distributist movement postulated an alternative to both capitalism and socialism in the form of a guild-based system of small property-owners. Smallness was an important element of the distributist worldview and the connection between distributism and localization was most clearly made by an English Dominican monk Vincent McNabb (1868–1943). Commenting on the massification implied by capitalism, McNabb asserted that the savings afforded by ‘mass production’ are offset by the costs incurred by the necessary ‘mass distribution’ (McNabb, in Cooney 2002, p. 18). Anthony Cooney recapitulates McNabb’s ‘Distributist Law’ in the following way:
The area of production should be as far as possible coterminous with the area of consumption. The utilitarians were wrong in saying things should be produced where they can be most economically produced. The true principle is things should be produced where they can most economically be consumed. (Cooney 2002, p. 18)

Some of the ideas of distributism were later adopted by the emblematic exponent of localism, E. F. Schumacher, while on the contemporary British extreme right the distributist standpoint is claimed by several national populists (including members of the British National Party) as well as assorted fascists, such as Patrick Harrington (Harrington 2002; see also Médaille 2002 for an example of contemporary distributist argumentation).

* * *

There is no space here for a more comprehensive historical summary. While similar ideas surfaced elsewhere in Europe, France, Germany and Britain provide sufficiently revealing illustrations of the key directions in the development of anti-Enlightenment thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The idea of rootedness has been running through anti-Enlightenment thought since then and has gained new momentum in reaction to the recent ascendancy of globalist ideologies. The following section provides a general account of antiglobalist ideas formulated within the extreme right as well as a broad classification of relevant ideological currents. The analysis of differences between the perspectives that those currents take on the question of scale is left to the final part of this chapter.
Contemporary right-wing antiglobalism

Roots, identities: These are the new absolutes. (Taguieff 1993)

Globalisation = pluralism = diversity = disunity = conflict (England First, n.d.a)

Key categories: extreme right, national populism and fascism

The category of the extreme right has for some time been the subject of scrupulous scholarly attention and I am not going to attempt to add another contribution to the variety of definitions and conceptualizations that have resulted from this analytical effort. Instead, I am going to rely on a basic characterization. Of the range of existing definitions of the extreme right twenty-six were examined by Cas Mudde. In those twenty-six conceptualizations Mudde identified fifty-eight different characteristics postulated as either essential to, or at least typical of, the extreme right. Among them only five features – nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democracy and a call for a strong state – were to be found in over half the definitions (Mudde 2000, p. 11). Commenting on the findings of Mudde, Elisabeth Carter concluded that nationalism, xenophobia, racism and ethnocentrism ‘are mere manifestations of the principle of fundamental human inequality, which lies at the heart of right-wing extremism’ (Carter 2005, p. 17; see also Saalfeld 1993, p. 181). I posit that a simple but useful conceptualization of the extreme right can be had by accepting Carter’s suggestion that it combines commitment to the fundamental belief in human inequality with the rejection of ‘the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional
state’ (Carter 2005, p. 15). According to Carter, while the extreme right owes the first part of its name to its rejection of democracy, rejection of human equality is what ‘makes right-wing extremism right-wing’ (Carter 2005, p. 17). Indeed, in the present analysis I am going to show that denunciation of equality is a major explanans of the antiglobalist stance of the extreme right while antidemocratic sentiment determines the radical nature of the alternatives that it offers.

As stated earlier, my focus in this chapter is on two ideological forms articulated within the parameters of the extreme right, i.e., on fascism and national populism. At this point, things get more complicated. That fascism fulfils the criteria of belonging to the extreme right is not a controversial thesis (Berlet and Lyons 2000, pp. 16-17; Billig 1989, p. 146; Carter 2005, p. 21; Ebata 1997, p. 21; Hainsworth 2000; Ignazi 2002). However, the association between national populism and the extreme right is less clear and so is the relationship between national populism and fascism. Describing the characteristics of national populist ideology, Roger Griffin used the concept of ‘ethnocratic liberalism’ (Griffin 2000, p. 173). This notion captures the fact that national populists do not see themselves as opposed to the rudiments of modern western society and may even claim to be exemplary democrats. Nevertheless, their understanding of democracy is peculiar – it assumes that democratic rights are enjoyed by members of just one group (usually an ethnic majority) and it claims to represent the will of this majority while refusing to take account of the competing claims of other groups (especially ethnic minorities and immigrants). Mudde offered a similar interpretation of national populism by focusing on
its ‘economic nationalism and welfare chauvinism’ (Mudde 2004, pp. 5–6). Accordingly, in national populist ideology a broad acceptance of managed capitalism and welfare state[^26] is coupled with the rejection of the idea of universal entitlements to social and economic security, the latter being denied to immigrants who are presented as parasites and benefit cheats abusing the ‘native’ population. In other words while the policies of national populists are often packaged in a way that is meant to convey an impression of respect for democratic principles, when explored in greater detail, the implications of national populist ideas contradict democracy and it turns out that national populists self-style as democrats only when this is likely to boost their electoral performance. This selective commitment to democracy, combined with an antiegalitarian position (finding its expression especially in sharply and systematically unequal valuations and standards applied respectively to the ‘natives’ and the immigrants), determines national populism’s membership in the extreme right.

The distinction between national populism and fascism is not clear-cut either. National populist ideology characterizes the platforms of some relatively successful parties, such as, to take European examples, the British National Party, the French Front National, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord, the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs or the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei. In the United States national populism has

[^26]: But it should be noted that national populists do not hold one view of capitalism and that ideological evolution in this area is always possible. For example, Flood notes a transition from a broadly neoliberal orientation to an economic model claiming a welfarist identity which took place in the ideas of Front National in the early 1990s (Flood 1997, p. 124).
been articulated by groups such as the John Birch Society, founded in 1958 and the Liberty Lobby (active between 1955 and 2001) and reached the mainstream of American politics in 1992 with the presidential candidacy in republican primaries of a paleoconservative Patrick Buchanan and with Ross Perot’s 1992 independent candidacy. On the other hand, due to the lack of wider appeal, fascist positions tend to be represented by a plethora of minute and ephemeral so-called groupuscules (Griffin 2003b). Some of those groups have been examined in detail. For example, Jeffrey Bale analyzed Nouvelle Résistance created in 1991 by Christian Bouchet as an offshoot of Troisième Voie (Third Way) and then transformed into Unité Radicale, which in turn split up into Bloc Identitaire and a ‘study group’ Réseau radical (Bale 2002). Steve Bastow devoted an article on a neo-fascist Third Way to similar groups, and especially the Belgian Partie Communautaire National-Européen (Bastow 2002). The Russian case of the Arctogaia group and its charismatic leader Aleksandr Dugin was also analyzed in two separate studies by Marlene Laruelle and Markus Mathyl (Laruelle n.d.; Mathyl 2002). And the ideas of a British fascist, Troy Southgate and of his National Revolutionary Faction were discussed in a piece by Graham Macklin (Macklin 2005).

Fascism may also find articulation in think-tanks and networks which are characterized by relatively low levels of institutionalization but significant intellectual output. The analysis of fascist antiglobalism presented in this section draws primarily on the contributions of one such international network, known as the New Right.  

27 It should be noted however that the question of the New Right’s fascist identity has been a subject of a considerable debate, both within and without the movement. Without
In spite of the fact that differences in respective national populist and fascist organizational forms are evident, this criterion should not be treated as perfectly reliable in delineating the two ideological territories. While national populism and fascism will typically have different institutional vehicles, the distinction is not sharp for, as Flood demonstrates with reference to the French national populist party Front National and a neo-Nazi groupuscule Terre et Peuple, the connections and overlaps between national populists and fascists are not unusual, with the latter often establishing themselves either within or close to national populist parties (Flood 2004 [2000]). Furthermore, in a trade-off between influence and ideological purity, fascists have also been known to act from within recognized national populist parties (with the proviso that they mitigated their more extreme opinions).

Moving on to the level of ideas, one fairly reliable criterion that distinguishes fascism from national populism is fascism’s revolutionary and totalitarian orientation (Passmore 2004 [1995], p. 205) although even in this respect it is always a question of degree rather engaging directly in this debate, I suggest that if Griffin’s description of the fascist vision as ‘palingenetic’ (Griffin 2003c) is accepted, then the New Right meets the fascist criteria. As I am going to demonstrate, the realization of the New Right’s vision would require a total transformation of the global order and the abandonment of the key principles that lay at its basis, including Christianity, rationalism, universalism and the idea of human rights. My analysis therefore concurs with Griffin’s demystification of the efforts of some New Right theorists to distance themselves from fascism and with the emphasis that he puts on the New Right’s ‘profound continuity with the fascist epoch’ (Griffin 2003a).
than kind. National populism is generally a more conservative current in that it does not include the idea of palingenesis, which is typical of fascism and which envisions an act of dramatic rebirth of a people after a period defined as decline (Griffin 1993, p. 26). While fascism demands a comprehensive paradigm shift, including radical changes in the sphere of religious, philosophical and civilizational principles, national populists do not advocate such sweeping transformation either in philosophical, or in economic terms. Nor are national populists interested in exerting as total an influence on the populace as is the ambition of fascists.

The more radical, transformative character of fascism, has contributed to its capacity to move beyond traditional nationalism and it is on this question that the differences between fascism and national populism are most interesting from the perspective of this study. As I demonstrate in the final section of this chapter, the majority of fascists have nowadays abandoned the conventionally understood concept of the nation and extended the scale on which they project their ideas. On the other hand, as the term itself suggests, the political imagination of national populism on the whole continues to have national parameters: the majority of national populists still associate themselves with nations which they aim to defend against the forces of globalization. The qualifications inserted in these sentences are meant to suggest that the demarcation according to scale is not entirely reliable. Indeed, a minority of fascists remain traditionally nationalist, while some national populists have (under influence of fascist theories) combined loyalty to nations with a more international orientation. Nevertheless, while I do not claim that it
works in every case, I believe that the criterion of spatial orientation can broadly map some general tendencies and I find it useful in pursuing my principal aim in this chapter, which is to demonstrate a definite continuity in the ideas that are at play in the process of constructing exclusionary territorial identities whether on national or supranational levels.

**National populism: globalization as swamping**

The most typical characteristic of national populism is its hostility to immigration and cultural pluralism and to the institutions and ideologies perceived as promoters of these phenomena. The anti-immigration stance is in national populist publications associated with resentment towards the so-called ‘establishment’ (major political parties, mainstream politicians, business figures, the church, the media, etc.). This combination of enmity to both immigrants and the ‘establishment’ makes up what Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons termed ‘producerism’, that is to say, a particular type of rhetoric that champions “the so-called producers in society against both “unproductive” elites and subordinate groups defined as lazy or immoral” (Berlet and Lyons 2000, p. 6).

The concept of globalization has been integrated in this framework with considerable ease. Denunciations of the ‘establishment’ and panicked warnings against immigrants are now articulated in connection with opposition to the process of globalization. The impression of the sinister ‘globalization link’ is amplified by presenting the two groups as acting in collusion, with the establishment conspiring on the global level to ‘swamp’
the major countries with immigrants. The objective of this promotion of immigration is to undermine social cohesion and weaken the patriotism of the real ‘natives’, to in turn promote a further globalization in the form of more immigration and ‘export of jobs to the Third World’, thus bringing ‘ruin and unemployment’ to native industries and communities (BNP n.d.). The picture thus fits together: ‘the enemy within’, i.e., the ‘establishment’ and the ‘aliens’, is linked with ‘the enemy without’ (Flood 1997, p. 110) and globalization is presented as a ‘New World Order’, a new geopolitical system coordinated by either foreign powers or transnational institutions according to the principles of ‘globalism’ (the word has been substituted for the notion of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in national populist discourse; on this rhetorical change see Simmons 2003).

While national populist theories of this globalist New World Order will differ on the question of whether humankind has already reached this stage or whether the new system is still under construction, the idea itself reiterates the logic of the various conspiracy theories, going back to Auguste Barruel (1741–1820) who claimed to have uncovered the conspiratorial plot of the order of the Illuminati against the ancien régime dominated by the monarchy and the church (Hofman 1993). Contemporary theories of the New World Order can take very suggestive forms28 and continue to have strong antisemitic, antimasonic and apocalyptic undertones (for example Robertson 1991).29

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28 For example, in the United States, the Militia men and Patriot movement, whose opposition to globalization has gained them a mass following of several million, were
National populists portray the alleged conspiracists as deadly enemies of the sovereignty of nations but the specificity of those revelations varies. For example, the leader of the French Front National Jean-Marie Le Pen linked the New World Order in rather abstract terms with the global market by asserting that it ‘works tenaciously to dismantle nations in order to assure its authority over a world without frontiers, without opposition and without values except those of the “stock market”’ (Le Pen, in Simmons 2003). On the other hand, Nick Griffin, Le Pen’s counterpart in the British National Party, was more specific. In his account of globalization entitled ‘Cults, jets and greed – the frantic rush to “One World”’, Griffin identified three elements in the conspiracy that he claimed to have exposed: ‘the Zionist movement’, Marxism and Liberalism with its ‘absurd superstition of egalitarianism’ (Griffin 2004–2005). According to Griffin’s denunciation, the ideologists of the New World Order – and he named, among others, Rupert Murdoch, Michael Lerner and George Soros as the main conspirators – aim to achieve ‘the total destruction of all independent sovereign states’ as ‘a prerequisite for the establishment of their various dreams of a single world government’ (Griffin 2004–

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keen to prophesy an imminent enslavement of the American nation by the UN in various apocalyptic stories involving ‘surveillance from hidden cameras, and black helicopters, and implanting biochips in the newborn’ (Castells 2004, p. 89; see also Rupert 2000, pp. 94–118).

29 But while the continuity of claims of antisemitic conspiracy in extreme right interpretations of globalization is evident in references to the ‘Zionist occupied governments’ or the ‘East Coast’ (Sommer 2008, p. 314), some scholars note a shift away from antisemitism to Islamophobia (Zuquete 2008, p. 329).
More generally, in European variants of national populist ideology one fairly common element is the portrayal of the United States as the main culprit of globalization. Thus, for the Northern Italian Lega Nord, globalization stands for a plot to construct an 'anglophone and totalitarian Global Village on the ruins of the peoples' (in Mudde 2004, p. 11). The party put the following slogan on its propaganda posters: ‘The process of globalization is controlled by American bankers and will turn the whole world into a “melting pot”’ (in Woods 2009, p. 162). Likewise, according to one of the main ideologues of the Front National, Samuel Maréchal, ‘mondialisme’ bears another name, less abstract, that is, American financial interests and those of the boards of directors of the trusts and the lobbies. Such a system is absolutely opposed to even the vaguest desire for national independence’ (Maréchal, in Simmons 2003; see also Flood 1997, p. 134).

Whatever the specific focus of these critiques they all share the assumption that globalization is engineered by identifiable agents: states or organizations usually manipulated by powerful individuals or special interests. In other words, globalization is not an outcome of random or uncontrollable developments but a carefully managed process unfolding in a thoroughly planned direction and on various levels from geopolitics to everyday social life. Consequently, the responses that national populists

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30 For example, Flood documents the Front National's extensive critique of the globalist curriculum purportedly imposed on the French educational systems and of the cultural colonialism supposedly perpetrated by bodies such as UNESCO, the Council of Europe or the European Commission (Flood 2004 [2000], pp. 168–170).
suggest also need to be enacted on different levels and these are discussed later in this chapter.

Fascism: the palingenetic perspective on globalization

Alongside national populist parties the extreme right is populated by more radical, fascist and Nazi groups distinguished by their readiness to engage in revolutionary struggle and a vision of palingenesis according to which ‘through the intervention of a heroic élite the whole national community is capable of resurrecting itself Phoenix-like from the ashes of the decadent old order’ (Griffin 2000, p. 165). In other words, the postulate here is a total annihilation of the corrupt global liberal society and the construction, on its ruins, of the ‘pluriverse’ of communities defined as völkisch, whose members are to partake in a common heritage of their own ‘blood and soil’. The fascist ideological family includes a diversity of tendencies such as national-bolshevism, national-anarchism, third positionism, and others. In this chapter I am going to focus predominantly on the New Right which provides the most sophisticated articulation of contemporary fascist thought.

The New Right (to be distinguished from the neoconservative right in Britain and the United States that also used to be called New Right) is a pan-European network with the most significant base in France, where the Nouvelle Droite emerged in the 1970s in reaction to the events of 1968 and styling itself as a counterforce to the politics of the New Left with which some of the New Right’s intellectuals had earlier been associated
The influence of *Nouvelle Droite* and its erudite guru, Alain de Benoist, has been important, if diffuse and exerted in usually diluted forms via national populist parties. The network's think-tank, GRECE, standing for *Le Groupement de Recherches et d'Études pour la Civilisation Européene* (The Centre for the Research and Study for European Civilisation), has also played a role, as have its journals: *Éléments* and *Krisis*. Outside France, the New Right has been influential in Germany (where its main advocate is the French leader of the *Thule Seminar* group, Pierre Krebs), Italy (Marco Tarchi) and Russia (*Arctogaia* group and Aleksandr Dugin). In Britain — as Ruth Levitas shows in her book on neoconservatism — New Right ideas were propagated by Michael Walker's journal *Scorpion* and for a time enjoyed some sympathy among the members of the neoconservative *Salisbury Review* group (Levitas 1986).

The New Right is a metapolitical and elitist current. The discourse of the New Right is metapolitical in that it addresses directly the fundamental themes of culture, identity, modernity and progress in their interdependence and long historical perspective. The New Right styles itself as a radical critique of the cosmological and anthropological rudiments of the dominant paradigm, and as a wide-ranging project for the localized, decentralized and communitarian tomorrow. This critique draws on a rich conglomerate of diverse influences, including authoritarian conservatives (e.g., Joseph de Maistre), nationalists (e.g., Maurice Barrès) and fascists (e.g., Julius Evola and the Conservative Revolution movement). The promiscuity of the New Right in appropriating miscellaneous ideological influences is exemplified in the fact that it does not limit itself
to just the right-wing arsenal of intellectual sources and tools and also strives to appropriate selected left-wing ideas. It used to call itself a ‘Gramscisme de droite’ and borrowed from the Italian thinker his emphasis on the culturalist strategy of attaining ideological hegemony. In its quest for this hegemony the New Right has aimed to form a distinct cultural paradigm whose premises have been elaborated by New Right ideologues in books and articles as well as in more ephemeral publicist interventions.

The New Right’s orientation is also elitist in that it has refrained from direct participation in party politics. Yet, to stick with the example of the French Nouvelle Droite, regardless of its abstention from electoral contest and in spite of the insignificant size of its membership, the group influenced the most important national populist party in France, Front National (Flood 1997, p. 105; see also Simmons 2003) and supplied it with discursive strategies, such as the substitution of the culturalist ‘right to difference’ for biological racism (similar influences of the New Right on national populist parties can be indentified in other European countries thus demonstrating the fact that fascism and national populism are not always easily separable). Its intellectual complexity as well as considerable, even if indirect, political impact, make the New Right a fitting case

31 But it should be noted that De Benoist distances himself from Front National: ‘As for my position concerning the National Front, it is quite simple, I see in it no ideas which are my own and give meaning to my life’ (Benoist, in Bar-On 2007, p. 166). Some authors claim that the New Right’s association with national populism is somewhat inadvertent. For instance, Ignazi argues that the Nouvelle Droite ‘produced a series of interpretations and intellectual tools that, beyond the intentions of the Nouvelle Droite itself, have been reframed and adopted by the extreme right parties’ (Ignazi 2003, p. 24, emphasis in original).
to be analyzed as an example of contemporary fascist antiglobalism which has absorbed a diversity of antiuniversalist ideas while giving them a distinctly fascist shape.

Anthropology is the starting point of the discourse of the New Right. In important respects New Right anthropological ideas mirror those of De Maistre, Renan or Barrès. Alain de Benoist for example makes an obvious allusion to De Maistre when declaring, tongue in cheek: ‘I see a horse but I do not see a horsekind’ (Benoist, in Sunic 1990, p. 109). In ‘The French New Right in the Year 2000’, a manifesto-like document co-authored with Charles Champetier, De Benoist – again like De Maistre – proclaims that he has never met a man (always in masculine), that ‘humanity is irreducibly plural’, and that ‘human life is necessarily rooted in a given context, prior to the way individuals and groups see the world’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). Elsewhere he elaborates on this point in greater detail:

The category of “people” cannot be confounded with language, race, class, territory or nation alone. A people is not a transitory sum of individuals. It is not a chance aggregate. It is a reunion of inheritors of a specific fraction of human history, who, on the basis of the sense of common adherence, develop the will to pursue their own history and give themselves a common destiny. (Benoist, in Sunic 1990, p. 47)

Similar assertions abound in publications by other New Rightists such as Michael O’Meara who makes an analogous point in his insider account of the movement. Citing Protagoras’s motto that ‘Man is the measure of all things’, O’Meara affirms the diversity of cultures: ‘[g]iven the world’s different cultures, there are necessarily a plethora of different measures in the world’, and sums up their impact: ‘an individual is never
distinguishable from his culture: never independent of the "measures" he applies' (O'Meara 2004, p. 48).

This embedded anthropology positions the New Right against the ideologies of the Enlightenment. Liberalism and socialism are accordingly denounced as the enemies of cultural diversity that aim at 'annihilating deculturation' (O'Meara 2004, p. 51), and as perpetuators of what those critics see as universalistic pretensions of contemporary Western civilization. The French ideologue of the German New Right, Pierre Krebs, thus laments what he sees as the dominant tendency of our times resulting from the impact of the ideologies of universalism: '[t]he tragedy of the contemporary world is the tragedy of disloyalty: the uprooting of every culture, estrangement from our true natures, the atomization of man, the levelling of values, the uniformity of life' (Krebs, in Griffin 1995, p. 349). Tomislav Sunic, a Croatian diplomat, academic and translator with a major input to propagating New Right ideas worldwide, exemplifies the tendency to reject both liberalism and socialism as part of one ideological package when he accuses them of 'the same globalistic design to erase the plurality of nations and supplant diverse national consciousness with the universal belief in "generic man" and one humanity' (Sunic 1990, p. 106). Likewise, another New Rightist, Guillaume Faye, interprets the two currents in terms of one 'egalitarian ideology' that from the seventeenth century onwards 'sets forth the premises for a political science which no longer conceives of a people as a specific historical reality' (Faye, in Sunic 1990, p. 117).
From manifold critiques offered by codifiers of the New Right emerges a very clear anthropological assumption: if cultural distinctions are what define individuals as human beings, then all the rest, that is to say, qualities that are common to humankind, are features of the human species understood in animalistic terms, namely, as biological needs and instincts. Universalistic ideologies are thus presented more or less explicitly as promoting dehumanization, the levelling of ‘man’ to his animal side: ‘whenever it unhinges man from the immense chain of generations, liberalism inevitably ends up privileging the elemental and subindividual in man, for it sweeps away all that is human in him’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 64). Consequently, living a human life outside one’s immediate cultural context is unfeasible: ‘consider man in abstraction from these or reduce him to his elementary animal desires and you deprive him not just of what makes his life possible, but of those qualifications that make him who he is’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 64).

The belief that people are determined by their cultural and historical heritage implies that individuals in any culture will share the same values and be in fundamental respects similar while being different and unequal from others. Importantly, individuals are allocated to communities ‘by virtue of their organic adherence’ (Benoist 1994) determined by birth. Cultures are not voluntary creations of free and rational agents but ‘organic hierarchies bound by time, place, and common purpose’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 64), preexisting realities into which we are born and which therefore demand our conformity. The implications of this philosophy are thus twofold. Firstly, if ‘people do not exist in
National populism and fascism

the real world other than as concretely rooted people’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000), then any society that detaches itself from its roots and transgresses borders between cultures — for example by allowing alien cultural elements to enter its realm — represents a deviation from the natural, that is to say, territorially determined and closed mode of human existence where multiplicity of cultures implies ‘diverse, if not incommensurable cultural perspectives’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 48). Secondly, closed, biologically and culturally endogamous, communities naturally impose uniform beliefs on their members. Individualism in such conditions is out of the question. Its absence does not result from a visible repression ‘from above’ but is due to the repression coming ‘from within’ and to a natural internalization of the preordained biological and cultural heritage with its values and obligations. In this context individualism is seen as a ‘pernicious’ consequence of undermining the separate homogeneity of distinct cultures and societies. Globalization is a primary factor in this process.

New Rightists typically interpret globalization as a process founded on a set of interrelated ideas of individualism, universalism, rationalism, progressivism and egalitarianism, all of them rejected in the anti-Enlightenment thought. While individualism posits the idea of the human being abstracted from his/her community, universalism stands for a belief that people are essentially the same and thus that there exists one truth that suits all. Rationalism in turn asserts that this universal truth may be discovered while progress comes to its global spread leading to the assumption of equality of all human beings through the discovery of their alleged sameness. The New
Right employs a longue durée perspective and identifies the roots of these components of globalism in the metaphysics of Christianity against which it defines itself as pagan (Benoist and Champetier 2000). According to New Right intellectuals, the globalist mission of Christianity has always aimed to eradicate the diversity of cults that compose the richness of pagan polytheism. In this respect, socialism and liberalism, that are said to drive globalization forwards, are presented as closely related with Christian theology: while Christian monotheism supersedes ‘a subtle form of plural, polytheistic, and contradictory totality, that is inherent in organic interdependency’ (Benoist 1996a), modern universalism suppresses the diversity of cultures and gives birth ‘to the most empty civilization mankind has ever known’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). Just as Christianity cannot stand the plurality of gods, so – argues De Benoist – from the globalist perspective ‘the diversity of the world becomes an obstacle and all that differentiates men is thought to be incidental or contingent, outmoded or even dangerous’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000).

One consequence of seeing people as inescapably rooted in their communities determined by biological and cultural ties, is a view that globalization is a fraud that has disturbed the ‘natural order’ without fulfilling any of its promises:

[It] has not liberated man from his original familial belonging or from local, tribal, cooperative or religious attachments. It has only submitted him to other constraints, which are harsher, because they are further away, more impersonal, and more demanding: a mechanistic, abstract, and homogenous subjugation has replaced multiform organic modes. (Benoist and Champetier 2000)
From the perspective of the New Right, the process of globalization is far from offering some hypothetical common worldview that would fit communities worldwide equally well. Such a worldview is impossible and at any rate in reality, as the New Right sees it, it is not the case. Instead, according to the New Right, the world is ‘subject to the cultural imperatives of Washington’s “cosmo-capitalism”’, the whole of the planet now forming ‘zone d’occupation américaine’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 51). The view identifying globalization as ‘progressive colonization of the whole of the planet by Yankee interests’ (in Bastow 2002, p. 356) is also popular in publications by groupuscules inspired by the New Right. For example, the Belgian national-Bolshevik Partie Communautaire National-Européen asserts: ‘the American power has become the sole global superpower and attempts to impose its “New World Order” everywhere, with its cortège of wars and inequalities’ (in Bastow 2002, p. 356).

The global American culture carries with it the ‘values of merchants’ and produces a material, speculative and instrumental civilization described in terms never too remote from antisemitic rhetoric with which right-wing theories of culture have always been, to a greater or lesser extent, impregnated. At the same time, the identification of American capitalism as the agent of globalization may serve as a rhetorically mobilizing factor. In the face of McDonaldization, ‘Coca-McDeath’ (in Macklin 2005, p. 321), or what the French group Terre et Peuple calls ‘le cauchemar américain’ (in Flood 2004 [2000], p. 175), the New Right believes it is only primordial identities that may offer a real shelter:
‘blood alone is able to prevail against the rapacious forces of money’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 210).32

The New Right’s advocacy of ‘a heterogeneous world of homogeneous peoples, each rooted in their own culture and soil’ (O’Meara 2004, p. 77) has also a more specific implication for the New Right’s policy as well as ideology. The insistence on global segregation and local homogeneity leads to a formulation of the ‘right to difference’ principle that has replaced biological racism as an expression of xenophobia of the extreme right. According to New Right culturalism, fundamental differences between communities result from culture rather than race and ‘the term racism cannot be defined as a preference for endogamy’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). This idea of cultural differences rooted in territorial places borrows from Barrès’s notion of *enracinement*. In Barrès – as we have seen – the concept had a sinister translation into a culturalist argument for antisemitism. Likewise in the discourse of the New Right the notion of rootedness helps in articulating a type of prejudice, which is as exclusionary as biological racism and yet can be put forward as a discourse that remains acceptable within the parameters of liberal democracy (Levitas 1986, p. 127). While avoiding biological racism, culturalism leads to the same preference for segregation and rejection

32 This hatred of the United States took an anecdotal form in the declaration of Alain de Benoist (still in the period of the Cold War) ‘that it was preferable to wear the helmet of the Red army than to live under the yoke of American imperialism by eating a steady diet of hamburgers in Brooklyn’ (in Bar-On 2001, p. 343).
of multiculturalism as allegedly jeopardising separate cultural identities. The possibility of intra-cultural diversity is accepted conditionally on circumstances that are vague to the point of providing an effective barrier, as in the assertion of O’Meara:

[I]nusions of “difference” are sources of wealth to a society only if there is a firm cultural core to assimilate them. To destroy this core by imposing a variety of cultural models, each with a different order of valuation, inevitably leads to the dissolution of established norms and values. (O’Meara 2004, p. 76; for more on culturalism see Barker 1981, p. 23; Hossay and Zolberg 2002, p. 307; Mudde 1995, p. 211)

In practical terms, this position translates into a fierce opposition to immigration, and hence to any global connections that may be held responsible for the recent rise in the volume of international flows of people, even though in the discourse of the New Right the immigrants are cautiously portrayed as the casualties and not the villains: ‘responsibility for current immigration lies primarily, not with the immigrants, but with the industrialized nations which have reduced man to the level of merchandise that can be relocated anywhere’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000).

While fascist positions (exemplified here by the New Right) thus concur with national populists in identifying the same problems (i.e., Americanization and immigration) at the source of what they understand to be a deep-seated economic, political and cultural crisis, the means that they suggest as an effective barrier to this process are different or at least the scale on which they are to be enacted has changed. It is to the variation in scales on which the respective national populist and fascist ideas are played out that I turn in the final part of this chapter.
Different ethno-scales: from traditional nationalism to supranational identities

The globalists see an oak tree and wonder how much the wood is worth or how many new houses they could put in its place [...] We nationalists see an oak tree and remember Drake and Nelson, Purple Emperor butterflies, and how we want to see our grandchildren playing under it. (BNP Land and People n.d.a)

Nations, at least as you knew and loved them, are dead. We live today in a post-nationalist, globalized world. What you call your nation is now a mere administrative district of the New World Order. Never mind its 'proud and ancient history'! Never mind its 'wonderful accomplishments'! Never mind how many of your ancestors fought and died for it! Those things were in the past. (National anarchist publication Voice of the Resistance, in Preston 2003)

I have demonstrated that there has been a marked continuity between antiuniversalist and antiliberal ideas of nineteenth century opponents of the 'great transition' brought about by the French Revolution, later fin-de-siècle promotion of rootedness as a remedy to civilizational disenchantment, and the advocacy of extreme right localism which voices the virtues of small-scale particularisms in reaction to the process of intensified globalization in recent decades. Antiglobalism of the extreme right is interlocked with other concepts — rootedness, inequality, etc. — whose particular interpretations depend on specific tendencies within a broader national populist or fascist stream but which hang together as a recognizable constellation. Consequently, the durability of this form of antiglobalism (or antiuniversalism, as this is the right word for the form in which this tendency expressed itself in the past) is no more surprising than the durability of pro-globalist ideas in ideological currents that originate from the universalism of the Enlightenment.
At the same time however, specific forms that antiglobalism of the extreme right has recently taken make obvious that ideological continuity does not mean conservation in fixed structures but rather a state of a dynamic interplay in which highly flexible concepts are able to adapt to and combine with new ideas to meet novel political challenges. With regard to the range of topics discussed here, the most important change that has taken place in right-wing antiglobalism consists in the crystallization of a new referent, that is to say, the new spatial unit, and the related new ethnos, that are to be defended against the homogenizing and universalizing tendencies at play. In the theories of French counterrevolutionaries, German romantics or British Tories, it was the nation that mattered. De Maistre thus spoke of the nationalities of Europe (as well as Persians) when contrasting them with the idea of an abstract individual. Likewise, Fichte’s and Herder’s celebration of nationalism referred to European nations, and Barrès defined himself as French even when emphasizing that his roots were especially in Lorraine. This form of antiglobalism – nationalism in the traditional sense of the word, i.e., referring to state-nations delineated by linguistic criteria and defined by their possession of statehood or at least by aspiration to one – is still alive and well. However, alongside national loyalties, new, more extensive, supranational types of attachments are given voice. The remainder of this chapter discusses these two forms of extreme right antiglobalism (national and supranational) as they are articulated today and explains what the differences and similarities between them tell us not just about the ideological currents in question but also about ideology as a generic phenomenon.
The defenders of nations

National populist responses to globalization are articulated in terms of a necessity of national struggle for liberation from external political, economic and cultural impositions. In the United States, a national populist form of antiglobalism is represented by former presidential candidate, Patrick J. Buchanan, who has on many occasions made nationalist statements like: ‘[w]e don’t want to be citizens of the world because we have been granted a higher honor – we are citizens of the United States’ (Buchanan, in Gardell 2003, p. 10). Buchanan is keen to situate himself in a broad historical and civilizational context: ‘nationalists are in rancorous conflict with the globalists [...] this is the new conflict of the age that succeeds the Cold War’ (Buchanan 1998, p. 265). In Europe, the Italian Lega Nord similarly describes the conflict between nationalists and globalists in terms of a battle between two incommensurable sets of values: ‘[t]hose who fight for the survival of their nations represent the camp of the diversity of cultures, true tolerance, and freedom whereas the America-like multiculturalism [...] represents the camp of uniformity, deracination, and enslavement’ (in Betz and Johnson 2004, p. 317).

These Manichean pronouncements are complemented by more specific ideas and policy proposals. These are concerned with the questions of economic autonomy and cultural integrity where the former is to be promoted by protectionist measures (in Buchanan’s case the postulated dissolution of NAFTA) while the latter can only be achieved by stopping immigration and possibly expatriating ethnic minorities. The insistence on
economic protection may be combined with xenophobic undertones, where economic competitors are defined as cultural ‘others’ as in the following declaration of the leader of the *Lega Nord*, Umberto Bossi:

> [T]he truth is that the people have realized we need to protect our local economy from the fast food of McDonald’s, Chinese cooking and couscous [...] The same realization is needed to stop the negative effect of democratic globalization on our factories and jobs before it is too late [...] Italy must mitigate the impact of Chinese competition*. (in Woods 2009, p. 166)

The ideas of economic self-reliance may also take more dramatic forms. Land and People, the environmentalist section of the British National Party puts the case for economic nationalism in the context of its catastrophist anticipation of a worldwide collapse of trade:

> The supply of cheap imported food could be cut off at any moment, and as the state of the world becomes increasingly chaotic and perilous we would be prudent to assume that the day of no imports is not long to be awaited. [...] By supporting our local growers we are doing more than just helping the planet and our local economies. We are taking out insurance, so that when the day of no imports inevitably comes we will be sure to have a farmer nearby who has a few acres of spuds in the ground, and there will be allotment holders, smallholders and local producers able to supply the fruit and vegetables that will otherwise be unavailable. (BNP Land and People n.d.b)

Economic protection is high on the national populist agenda but it is the question of immigration that engages most of national populism’s political energy. Anti-immigration positions may take extraordinarily hostile forms, as exemplified by the suggestion of Bossi that the illegal immigrants should be stopped with ‘a few cannon
shots at the boats bringing them’ (Bossi, in Woods 2009, p. 172). While one set of measures is suggested in order to stop immigration, another set of policy proposals refers to how to deal with those already present. At the most extreme, it may be suggested that immigrants be repatriated. Indeed, in its 1995 presidential campaign Front National suggested a compulsory repatriation from France of three million immigrants in seven years (Flood 1997, p. 119). Other policies are typically variants of the Flemish Vlaams Blok’s notion of being ‘boss in one’s own country’ (in Betz and Johnson 2004, p. 322). Le Pen’s ‘national alternative’ thus suggests re-establishing ‘a strict policy of “national preference” with respect to citizenship, social rights and access to work’ (Betz and Johnson 2004, p. 322). While such policies are aimed at immigrants, they may also express, more or less explicitly, a critique of globalization and a demand of ‘the re-establishment of the supremacy of national law over supranational laws, treaties and directives’ (Betz and Johnson 2004, p. 322).

Alternative scales: race and civilization

Some of the groups that classify as fascist (due to their palingenetic conceptual makeup) are still imbued with national imaginary. The English Movement is a radical group with an apocalyptic vision: ‘we can already see signs of great changes and of a fast-growing tension within this country, the signs are that in the not too distant future the whole thing will quickly fall apart’. At the same time it retains nationalist rhetoric encapsulated in a series of unequivocal slogans: ‘English Culture – English Tradition – English Identity – One Folk – One Soil – Think National – Act Local!’ (English Movement n.d.).
Likewise, another group, the British People's Party opposes to 'International Cosmopolitanism' its ideal of 'White Nationalism', which — while based on a racial criterion — is formulated in nationalist terms where the ultimate objective is 'a healthy, clean and energetic folk state' (BPP n.d.). Similarly, England First sees itself mainly as a defender of England against 'ventures, such as the E.U., N.A.T.O. and the U.N. [as well as] Big Business, Freemasonry and other N.W.O. vested interests' all of them allegedly intending to turn England into 'an impoverished province in the New World Order' (England First n.d.b). But while it is possible to identify conventional nationalism in organizations which are otherwise located in the fascist, rather than national populist, category, the territory of fascism is nowadays populated predominantly by positions that reject thinking in nationalistic terms.

The necessity to move beyond the nation-state has sometimes been articulated in the form of a 'realistic assessment' of the globalizing world, as in the declaration of a representative of 'national anarchism', Keith Preston to the effect that 'traditional ideological, cultural and even national boundaries are irrelevant in the current world order' (Preston 2003) or as in the rhetorical question posed by another national anarchist, David Michael:

In a world where Britain, France, Austria no longer exist, can we really expect future generations to feel national loyalty towards Britain, France and Austria? Isn’t this rather like expecting the young people of today to feel national loyalty towards Wessex, Mercia, Gaul or the Roman Empire? (Michael n.d.)
In cases where supranational orientation is a matter of strategy and political ‘realism’ rather than firm principles, the national level can be integrated within a multiscalar structure. For example, the French group Terre et Peuple combines national references with identification with Europe based on common Indo-European descent (Flood 2004 [2000], p. 175) while also complementing those two tiers – national and supranational – with subnational and transnational regionalism, i.e., emphasizing regions within France as well as ‘solidarity with ethno-identitarian movements throughout the continent’ (Flood 2004 [2000], p. 176). In such cases a supranational orientation serves to anchor the national point of reference in a broader perspective. This is explained by Griffin with regards to developments within Nazism:

[T]he national or ethnic dimension of the struggle for regeneration was not abandoned, but subsumed within a wider context, so that Swedish or American Nazis can feel that the struggle for the rebirth of their nation or homeland is but one theatre in an international race war. (Griffin 2000, p. 167)

In other cases national identification has been rejected outright and contrasted unfavourably with other levels. One example of the shift from national to supranational orientation is to be found in the ideology of White racialism. By choosing race as the main point of reference, the White supremacy movements and Aryan revolutionaries have backed off from nationality as a criterion of identification. In other words, they oppose globalization not as a process threatening a particular nation, but as ‘an antiwhite conspiracy that ultimately aims at exterminating the Aryan race’ (Gardell 2003, p. 11).
The rejection by White racialists in the United States of patriotic nationalism was expressed clearly following 11 September 2001. As Gardell explains:

> While many mainstream Americans were swept away with patriotic feelings in reaction to the terrorist attack against the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, Aryan revolutionaries were among the few Americans to openly applaud the event. (Gardell 2003, p. 324)

Racially motivated and structured geopolitical schemes are also articulated by European fascists. For example, Troy Southgate's 'ethno-pluralism' is essentially a project for racial apartheid, to be achieved by means of "humane" repatriation and the reordering of the globe according to racially segregated colour blocs' (Macklin 2005, p. 306).  

More complex models of antiglobalist but explicitly post-nationalist future have been conceived by groups and intellectuals associated with the New Right. In keeping with the New Right's ostensible rejection of biological racism, these projects focus on large civilizational units and essentialize cultural differences. In this case Europe is in the centre of attention. The idea of Europe as a counterforce against the West (i.e., against America) crystallized most powerfully with the collapse of communism when there

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33 Usually however, racialism is not antiglobalist but 'counterglobalist', or simply imperialist. For example, the founder of the White supremacist Church of the Creator, Ben Klassen declares the 'Church's goal in globalist terms: '[w]e must again, in a planned and deliberate program, resume the colonization of the world which the White Race has pursued for the last several centuries in a more or less haphazard, but vigorous manner. Like the American pioneers, we, the White Race, must now make it our Manifest Destiny to win the world, and populate all the good lands thereof' (Klassen 1973).
remained, from the fascist perspective, only one enemy: the homogenizing, consumerist and debilitating American-led globalization. With attention now shifted to a continental dimension, the idea of the nation has been opposed in unequivocal terms. It has become associated with values and concepts deemed antithetical to fascism. An illustration of this antinational position is available in the writing of De Benoist who denounces the concept of the nation by integrating it in his broader opposition to the individualistic worldview:

The nation, in the modern sense of the word, and nationalism as a distinguished form of patriotism are historically linked with the value of individualism. The nation is precisely the type of global society that corresponds to the kingdom of individualism. (Benoist, in Spektorowski 2003b, p. 58)

Featuring in those unequivocal critiques is the assumption that traditional nationalisms 'are chimerical and noxious to the European cause' (in Bastow 2002, p. 359) and that meaningful cultural identities are most clearly expressed in connection with large political and civilizational entities. Evident here is the impact of Samuel Huntington's

34 But in pursuing this pan-continental form of post-nationalist orientation the New Right can draw on a long tradition of fascist thought. Thus, to give a brief list of influences, in France the European course of fascism was associated with ideas of Pierre Drieu La Rochelle (1883–1945) and Maurice Bardèche (1907–1998). In Germany, the key role in its articulation was played by national bolshevism of Ernst Nickisch (1889–1967) and by left-wing Nazism of Otto Strasser who insisted that the 'Federation of the Peoples of Europe is the vital precondition for the spiritual recovery of the European nations and for the preservation of the civilization and culture of the West' (Strasser 1936, in Griffin 1995, p. 114). In Britain, the conception of Euro-Africa was put forward by Oswald Mosley (1896–1980). Perhaps most influential of all Europeanist fascists was an Italian philosopher and esoterist Julius Evola (1898–1974) who blamed nationalism for European disunity (see Spektorowski 2003a, pp. 123–124) and offered a vision of a spiritually united European imperium as an antidote.
National populism and fascism

The 'clash of civilizations' thesis (Huntington 1993 and 1996), which has been widely discussed in New Right circles (see for example Benoist 2001, pp 130–131 and 1996b, p. 134, footnote). Echoes of Huntington are to be found for example in a piece by De Benoist and Champetier, where the two authors assert that '[t]he 21st century will be characterized by the development of a multipolar world of emerging civilizations: European, North American, South American, Arabic-Muslim, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, etc.' (Benoist and Champetier 2000). Yet, while they may have drawn inspiration from Huntington, De Benoist and Champetier repeat the clash of civilizations thesis with very significant modifications, among which two are most symptomatic: the splitting up of Huntington's 'Western' civilization into European and North American blocs and the incorporation into Europe of what Huntington calls 'Orthodox' civilization. The former change does not require explanation in light of the already discussed New Right resentment of the United States. On the other hand, the incorporation into Europe of the Orthodox culture has become something of a trade mark of New Right geopolitics. Accordingly, the European identity encompasses the whole of Eurasia 'from Galway to Vladivostok' (Bale 2002, p. 45) and a 'Eurosiberian imperium' (O'Meara 2004, p. 196) is an appropriate political form to match this identity (for more on the question of New Right Eurasianism, see for example Laruelle n.d., Mathyl 2002).

35 It was already in the period of the Cold War that some fascists adopted an unusual idea of allying Europe with the Soviet bloc against the West. Anti-Western Europeanists included Alain de Benoist, who believed that the Soviet Union was more Russian than communist and that it could have been co-opted in the struggle against America (Bar-On 2001, p. 343). Others preferred to cast their geopolitical ideas in terms of so-called third positionism rejecting both capitalism and communism and postulating a 'third way' to
In spite of conceiving their political ideas on such large scales, the New Right understands itself in antiglobalist terms as is apparent in the declaration of its key intellectuals: ‘it is only at [a] local level that one can create a standard of living worthy of human beings’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). Indeed, the most renowned Russian New Rightist Aleksandr Dugin makes an unequivocal connection between antiglobalism and the civilization-orientated paradigm: ‘all anti-globalization tendencies are “Eurasianist” by definition’ (Dugin, in Laruelle n.d., p. 14). The reconciliation of vast regionalism with anti-globalization takes place through federalism where belonging in a civilization is complemented by micronationalist loyalties: ‘[t]hese civilizations will not supplant the ancient local, tribal, provincial or national roots, but will be constituted as the ultimate collective form with which individuals are able to identify’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). This federalist vision of Europe is described in suggestive terms as the ‘appearance of thousands of auroras, i.e., the birth of sovereign spaces liberated from being developed in ‘solidarity’ with the Third World (more recent expressions of this ‘Third World solidarity’ claim are discussed in Bale 2002; Spektorowski 2003a, pp. 115 and 118; and Spektorowski 2003b, p. 59). Nevertheless, the majority of fascists were anticommunist and pro-Western (Bale 2002, p. 29) as exemplified by a supranationalist, but resolutely pro-Western orientation of the founder of the BNP, John Tyndall: ‘Over and above the rivalries of nations, there is the transcendent interest of Western Civilisation, Western Culture and – as the creator of these things – the White European Race. Here we must see “The West”, not in the form currently fashionable: as a coalition of nations organised in mutual defence of the dubious blessings of “liberal democracy” and “capitalism,” but as a cultural and above all racial entity’ (Tyndall, in Griffin 1995, p. 370). Only with the end of the Cold War could the idea of opposition to the West in unity with Russia become entrenched in fascist ideology.
the domination of the modern’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000), ‘Europe of One Hundred Flags’ wherein ‘each historic nation can assert its own political, social and economic freedom within the ancestral boundaries of its racial and cultural heritage’ (Southgate, in Macklin 2005, p. 321) or, in most evocative formulation, as:

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\text{Eurosiberian imperium as a sovereign democratic federation made up of various self-governing communities, representing both the } \text{ethos and the ethnos of the different European families. This makes it identifiable not with the modern demos, understood in the liberal sense as congeries of faceless unrelated individuals but rather with those transcendent affiliations implicit in the existence of un people or ein Volk. (O’Meara 2004, p. 196)}
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In emphasizing the völkisch element, the fascist vision of Europe provides ground for an effective mechanism of cultural exclusion. Indeed, as we learn from De Benoist and Champetier – the federations that they envisage are closed and capable of ‘organizing themselves into autonomous entities and acquiring enough power to resist outside interference’ (Benoist and Champetier 2000). In practice, this means their ability to provide an effective blockade to immigration. As Alberto Spektorowski notes, Europe as envisaged by the New Right ‘does not expel foreigners through draconian laws, but rather raises impenetrable cultural barriers against them’ (Spektorowski 2003a, p. 122). Thus formulated, the fascist conception of Europe reveals its exclusionary purpose. As a unit of identification it is far more extensive than a nation but remains as, if not more, effective in emphasizing cultural differences and raising barriers against those who are defined as aliens.
Old logic in new scales

The conceptual change discussed above is significant: while national populism on the whole continues to speak on behalf of nations, fascism has abandoned what once was one of its central features, i.e., ultra-nationalism, and now defines itself as a defender of civilization and actually rejects nationalist orientation as noxious to this mission. At play here is thus the abandonment of what Steger calls the ‘national imaginary’ (Steger 2008), but while Steger’s claim that the national is in the twenty-first century no longer a useful point of reference is in this particular instance vindicated, the conclusion that Steger draws from his claim, namely a total redrawing of the ideological map and irrelevance of conventional ideological categories, cannot be sustained.

Fascism provides yet another example contradicting the ideology rupture thesis in that the spatial shift that has occurred in fascist interpretations has not fundamentally affected its ideologic or its potential political implications. The self-identification of fascism is, in most cases, no longer national, but its raison d’être remains as antiuniversalist and exclusionary as it has always been while its style and rhetoric are as radical as ever. In short, like other ideologies discussed in this thesis, while fascism has changed, the change has not been disruptive enough to deny its recognizable identity or deprive analysts of ideology of a meaningful analytical category.
CHAPTER V
ANARCHISM AND ECOLOGISM:
ALTERNATIVE LOCALIZATIONS
IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The final chapter continues the examination of antiglobalist politics by providing a comparative analysis of some representative anarchist and ecologist critiques of globalization. By revealing that deep-seated differences remain between the alternatives that the two ideologies have to offer the chapter demonstrates that antiglobalism is a thin category that becomes meaningful only in the specific ideological environments in which its particular instances are to be found.

Anarchism and ecologism: preliminary remarks

That anarchism and ecologism display close conceptual affinities is a fact that has been acknowledged by both exponents as well as analysts of the two ideologies (see for example Bookchin 1971; Carter 1999, pp. 198–199; Goodwin 2007, pp. 249–250; Jennings 1999, pp. 144–145; Morris 1996, p. 132; O’Riordan 1981, p. 307; Pepper 1993, pp. 152–203; Purchase 1993, p. 25; Sonn 1992, pp. 107–113). Anarchism has long been an established political ideology. Its founding fathers – Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), Michael Bakunin (1814–1876), and Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921, to name just the most renowned – were active in the nineteenth and, in the case of Kropotkin, also in
the early twentieth century. Thus, when ecologism emerged in its current form in the
1960s and 1970s, it could draw inspiration from anarchist thought (Carter 1999, p. 199)
and in particular from the anarchist ideal of a decentralized society that had displayed
‘green’ features long before the colour acquired its current political connotation
(Woodcock 1992; Pepper 1993, p. 117). At the same time however, anarchism and
ecologism are evidently distinct. With respect to the subject of the present study, while
the two ideologies share a strong inclination to political autonomy and economic self-
reliance, a closer look at their motivations reveals several significant differences
between their respective positions on the question of the desirable scale of human
interaction.

This chapter begins by identifying some key conceptual connections between
antiglobalism or, in more positive terms that I prefer to use, localism and the overall
conceptual morphologies of anarchism and ecologism. This general discussion paves the
way to a more detailed comparison which demonstrates that the broadly similar
positions adopted by the two ideologies on the question of globalization clash on critical
details that ultimately break them up into discrete streams of thought. The analysis of the
two models of localization demonstrates the ideological thinness of antiglobalism,

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36 It is possible to identify the roots of ecologism in much earlier theories of
romanticism, Malthusianism and traditional conservatism, as well as in works of
naturalist writers and wilderness activists such as Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862),
John Muir (1838–1914), Aldo Leopold (1887–1948), or Bob Marshal (1901–1939), but
— as Andrew Dobson points out — it is only with the more recent acceleration and
globalization of environmental decay that ecologism developed in its current full-blown
form (Dobson 1999, pp. 231–234).
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namely, that it is unable on its own to convey a clear meaning and that therefore any of its particular expressions depends on a mature ideological host and thus remains different from and potentially irreconcilable with others.

Antiglobalism in the orbit of ecologism and anarchism: major conceptual connections

While this section is concerned with conceptual paths that are identifiable in ecologist and anarchist interpretations and that determine their respective identities as broadly antiglobalist, I should begin by demarcating ecologism from what is known as environmentalism and by drawing attention to ecologism's attempt to define itself against globalist ideas articulated in its conceptual vicinity.

Ecologism and environmentalism

The distinction between ecologism and environmentalism has a wide currency both among ecologists themselves – already in 1972 The Ecologist published an editorial entitled Down with Environmentalism! (Allen 1972) – and in the scholarship on the subject (see for example Dobson 2007; Goodwin 2007, p. 237; Patterson 2001, pp. 277–278). Accordingly, the term 'ecologism' applies to positions that are both more radical and more complex. As Jonathon Porritt and David Winner argued at the time when the term was gaining wider recognition, ecologism is radical for it:

[S]eeks nothing less than a non-violent revolution to overthrow our whole polluting, plundering and materialistic industrial society and, in its place, to create a new economic and social order which will allow
human beings to live in harmony with the planet. (Porritt and Winner 1988, p. 9)

The ambitions of environmentalism are in contrast limited to seeking ‘a cleaner service economy sustained by cleaner technology and producing cleaner conspicuous consumption’ (Dobson 2007, p. 7). Environmentalism does not go anywhere as far as to question the fundamental values of the society that has brought about the current ecological disaster. From the perspective of ecologism, environmentalism is no more than technocratic ‘managerialism’ (Sachs 1993, p. 11) that belongs to the dominant ‘majority tradition’ (Sessions 1987, pp. 18–19) and is ‘characterized by a narrow definition of community along with centralization of power [and] the perception of nature as an accumulation of natural resources’ (Manes 1990, p. 141). Ecologism is also more complex in that its radical view on the relationship between humankind and nature is articulated as a central part of an elaborate system of beliefs. Environmentalism, on the other hand, amounts merely to a set of policies concerned with an optimal management of environmental resources and falls short of expressing a distinct worldview.  

It should be noted that the ideological status of ecologism is also a subject of an ongoing controversy in political theory. On the one side there are the analysts who are sceptical about ecologism’s ability to offer a distinctive and/or comprehensive ideological worldview. Barbara Goodwin thus denies ecologism’s membership in the family of established ideological traditions: ‘no single or clear vision of the Good Life emerges from deep Green assumptions […] so] even the deepest Green doctrine falls short of being an ideology’ (Goodwin 2007, pp. 259–260). Michael Freedman similarly emphasizes the thinness of the green theory by arguing that its ‘core concepts are insufficient on their own to conjure up a vision or interpretation of human and social interaction or purpose’ (Freedman 1996, p. 527). On the other side are the proponents of
The differentiation between ecologism and environmentalism is useful not merely for the purpose of delineating the area under discussion. What is particularly important from the perspective adopted here is that the distinction between the two currents is reflected in their different positions on the question of globalization. Whereas environmentalism opts for global solutions to global problems, ecologism seeks alternatives through local measures undertaken by local communities and questions the capacity of any form of 'globalization from below' to provide a real way out of the current turmoil.

The clash between the localist assumption that 'global thinking is impossible' as well as impractical (Esteva and Prakash 1998, p. 22) and the globalist stance of environmentalism intensified particularly after the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Environmentalists won at the Summit the support of the world’s major policy-makers according to ecologism’s ideological maturity. Andrew Dobson argues accordingly that it is possible to identify ecologism’s ‘key tenets, myths and so on that distinguish it from other ideologies’ (Dobson 2007, p. 4). Dobson also maintains – in opposition to Freeden and Goodwin – that ecologism is adequately deep in that it couches its ‘analyses and prescriptions [...] in terms of fundamental “truths” about the human condition’ and is not issue-based but has ‘some principled vision of the Good Life’ (Dobson 2007, pp. 3–4; for similar opinions see Baxter 1999, p. 1 and Humphrey 2002). I refrain here from defending an unequivocal position on the question of ecologism’s claim to being an ideology but in practice I treat it as one. What is important from my point of view is that while the scope of ecologism is indeed rather narrow, it is, in any case, a distinctive current in that its defining ideas are absent from other ideologies. That it is consequently possible to study ecologism in its own right is a rationale for the present analysis which seeks to prove that the concept of globalization is interpreted within the ambit of ecologism in connection with its particular conceptual traits and in ways that provide a meaningful distinction from other ideologies. But while the ideological status of ecologism is a contentious matter, environmentalism is obviously neither comprehensive nor distinct and is therefore unequivocally disqualified as an ideology in its own right.
for limited and, according to ecologists, absolutely insufficient measures: ‘[e]nvironmentalists were given a seat at the table but the talk was not of nature but of compromise, techno-fix and corporate greenwash’ (Do or Die Editorial Collective 2003, p. 3). A collection of articles entitled Global Ecology (Sachs 1993) was one of the critical ecologist responses to the Summit and to the Brundtland Report, a document that laid down its conclusions (WCED 1987). Running through these contributions is not merely a rejection of reformism but also a denunciation of the belief that there exists any ‘neutral global matrix’ containing all ‘languages, theories, cultures’ (Lohmann 1993, p. 161). Instead, the dominant discourse and practice of globalization are presented as mere extensions of Western imperialism:

The global in the dominant discourse is the political space in which a particular dominant local seeks global control, and frees itself of local, national and international restraints. The global does not represent the universal human interest, it represents a particular local and parochial interest which has been globalized through the scope of its reach. (Shiva 1993, pp. 149–150)

While environmentalism is not included in the following analysis, this brief reminder of its differences in relation to ecologism provides another substantiation of the fact that globalization is far from eradicating conceptual distinctions between different political standpoints. The positions that the two currents take on globalization are enlightening as indicators of ideological identity (of ecologism in this case, since environmentalism does not qualify as an ideology) with the localist approach to environmental problems providing a reliable criterion of an ecologist territory. Below I provide a general summary of the ideas that compel ecologism to take the localist path.
Key concepts: ecocentrism, limits to growth and localization

To become dwellers in the land, to relearn the laws of Gaea, to come to know the earth fully and honestly, the crucial and perhaps only and all-encompassing task is to understand place, the immediate specific boundaries where we live. (Sale 1991, p. 42)

The ideological distinctiveness of ecologism arises out of its particular attitude to nature, which has typically been captured in terms of ecocentrism. Ecocentrism attaches moral value to all of nature, in opposition to anthropocentrism which is based on 'the exclusive moral considerability of humans' (Eckersley 1992, p. 50). The conceptual weight of ecocentrism can only be appreciated if it is acknowledged that its adversary, anthropocentrism, is defined by ecologists as encompassing the entire detrimental heritage in which the currently dominant mentality is rooted: 'a cherished principle of the Enlightenment, the raison d'être of capitalism and socialism, the pretensions of the major religions of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and institutional Buddhism, the central myth of civilization' (Manes 1990, p. 142). Elements of ecocentrism resonate through early theories that inspired ecologism; they are present for example in Aldo Leopold's land ethic which 'changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it’ (Leopold 1989 [1949], p. 204) but the ecocentric assertions have become particularly uncompromised with the crystallization of ecologism in recent decades. Thus, for example, the contributors to a radical ecologist journal Do or Die 'reject even the notion of benevolent stewardship as that implies dominance' (Do or Die Editorial Collective 2003, p. 3) while Dave Foreman, a co-founder of the militant group Earth First! with which this journal is associated,
Anarchism and ecologism

formulated the first principle of the movement as ‘placing of Earth first in all decisions, even ahead of human welfare if necessary’ (Foreman 1991, p. 26) and asserted that from an ecocentric perspective: ‘[a]n individual human life has no more intrinsic value than does an individual Grizzly Bear life’ (Foreman 1991, p. 26).

The specific implications of ecocentrism for some of the positions taken by ecologists will become apparent in the course of a more detailed discussion in the final section of this chapter. More generally, it is important to note that ecocentrism entails a deeply antimodern position rejecting the instrumental, domineering and exploitative approach to nature that it perceives as inherent in the modern mindset. While thriving on and promoting anthropocentrism, modernity – and globalization in particular, as modernity’s extension and escalation – also encourages progress (along one path for all) and an obsession with speed and size. The modern, originally Western, and nowadays increasingly global, belief in, and practice of, unlimited economic growth is for ecologism the most important of the causes of the current ecological crisis. The limits to growth thesis, originally formulated in 1972 in a report by the Club of Rome, a prominent think-tank consisting of intellectuals as well as political, and - intriguingly - industry figures, entails rethinking the questions of scale (Meadows 1972). In the face of the limited capacity of the Earth it is necessary to halt demographic and economic growth and - according to ecologism - this is not going to happen in a society with

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38 For more on the question of the modern attitude to nature see Fritjof Capra’s summary of the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm (Capra 1983).
global connections. The ‘global environment’ is too distant and too abstract to awake genuine respect, loyalty and care. Global political and economic arrangements imply disconnection between the centres of decision-making and places affected by those decisions as well as between the sites of production and the sites of consumption. Large-scale structures therefore diffuse ecological and social responsibility of rulers and planners and contribute to the public’s ignorance about ecological costs of economic practices.

The overriding policy principle of ecologism is thus radical localization. Arne Naess, a Norwegian ecocentric philosopher summarizes the reasons for localism in the form of a concise formulae: ‘[t]he vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the weight of influences from afar, from outside the local region in which that form has obtained an ecological equilibrium’ (Naess 1973, p. 98). In a similarly technical way another zealous localist Kirkpatrick Sale eulogizes local scale as one in which ‘the sensors of the society are most receptive, the feedback system and information loops most effective, the decision-making mechanisms most adaptive and competent’ (Sale 1991, p. 65). Sale is a key exponent of an influential version of ecologist theory known as bioregionalism. The ideational makeup of bioregionalism has a decisively localist slant. Sale defines bioregion as:

[A] part of the earth’s surface whose rough boundaries are determined by natural rather than human dictates, distinguishable from other areas by attributes of flora, fauna, water, climate soils and landforms, and the human settlements and cultures those attributes have given rise to. (Sale 1974, p. 225; compare with Dodge 1981)
All of the core ideas of bioregionalism - 'place, reinhabitation, bioregion, home, and community' (Carr 2004, p. 73) - emphasize local attachments, loyalties and identities against the abstract universalism of the global. Peter Berg and Raymond Dasmann (who are credited with the coinage of the term) associate the purpose of bioregionalism with 'becoming native to a place through becoming aware of the particular relationships that operate within and around it' (Dasmann and Berg 1978, pp. 217–218), and Sale puts this same view in the form of an imperative: 'we must somehow live as close to it as possible, be in touch with its particular soils, its waters, its winds; we must learn its ways, its capacities, its limits; we must make its rhythms our patterns, its laws our guide, its fruits our bounty' (Sale 1974, p. 224). As is evident from these examples the bioregional perspective suggests nature to be a mould in which social structures should set. Rather than assuming that human efforts should modify nature, bioregionalism suggests that the natural forms determine social patterns while natural borderlines impose limits on human interactions. As John Barry puts this, the bioregional process of becoming 'native' to a place, is to be 'an identity constituting ecological condition. Who you are is a question of where you are' (Barry 1999, p. 85, emphasis in original).

Importantly, and contrary to social patterns typically imposed by globalization, ecologism implies recognising one's own place, for example one's bioregion, as a naturally closed area (Goldsmith 1988, p. 203). Mobility and associations with the outside world are rejected as implying instability. Ernst Friedrich Schumacher (1911–1977), a German economist celebrated by ecologists and immortalized by his 'small is
beautiful’ slogan, made this point in the early 1970s: ‘now everything and everybody
has become mobile. All structures are threatened, and all structures are vulnerable to an
extent that they had never been before’ (Schumacher 1973, p. 57). More specifically, the
ecological community should preserve its own character by avoiding any economic and
political dependency. Self-sufficiency, that is to say, the practice of subsisting within
one’s ecological niche and with what it provides, is therefore the main principle of
economic organization in an ideal ecological community and an article of faith of the
depth green ideology. Sale gives strong reasons for this ‘most elemental and most elegant
principle of the natural world’:

Just as nature does not depend on trade, does not create elaborate
networks of continental dependency, so the bioregion would find all its
needed resources — for energy, food, shelter, clothing, craft,
manufacture, luxury — within its own environment. And far from being
deprived, far from being thus impoverished, it would gain in every
measure of economic health. It would be more stable, free from boom-
and-bust cycles and distant political crises; it would be able to plan, to
allocate its resources, to develop what it wants to develop at the safest
pace, in the most ecological manner. It would not be at the mercy of
distant and uncontrollable national bureaucracies and transnational
governments, and thus it would be more self-regarding, more cohesive,
developing a sense of place, of community, of comradeship, and the
pride that comes from stability, control, competence and
independence. (Sale 1974, p. 230)

Edward Goldsmith, probably the most influential British ecologist, provides another far-
reaching naturalist argument for self-sufficiency by declaring it a principle of evolution:
‘as evolution proceeds, so do natural systems become increasingly self-sufficient,
reducing their dependence on forces outside their control’. Self-sufficiency is here
ranked as ‘an essential strategy [...] for increasing their capacity for homeostasis and
hence their stability’ (Goldsmith 1996, p. 381). Trade, on the other hand, is charged by ecologists with being not just wasteful of resources and environmentally harmful but also with rendering communities dependent on the global market (Morris 2001) and, contra classical liberal theories of trade as global pacifier, with causing international conflicts: ‘people who live in highly self-sufficient local communities are less likely to get involved in large-scale violence than people whose existence depends on world-wide systems of trade’ (Schumacher 1974, p. 49). 39

The multiple implications of the localist orientation of ecologism will be discussed in comparison with anarchism later in this chapter. So far, I have made the basic point: that ecologism advocates a far-reaching localization based on its radical conceptual makeup centred on the notion of ecocentrism and the resulting rejection of modernity and its concomitant principle of growth. I will now embark on an analogous presentation of the anarchist case for localism in the light of its own core concepts. The section introduces general characteristics of the anarchist theory of scale, leaving the examination of its specific implications to the last (comparative) section. As with other ideologies discussed in this thesis, I demonstrate significant historical continuities in anarchist

39 Ecologists acknowledge that self-sufficiency, understood as ‘a state of absolute economic independence’ (Dobson 2007, p. 82), may in practice be unattainable. Therefore, they usually accept some degree of exchange when ‘local conditions inadequately satisfy local needs’ (Mander 2001, pp. 14–15), but even then they envisage at least self-reliance, a ‘relative independence’ (Dobson 2007, p. 82) which assumes that ‘everything that could be produced within a nation or region should be’ (Hines 2000, p. viii).
interpretations (due to its relative novelty less emphasis has been placed on the historical identity of ecologism) and I maintain that the ways of thinking about globalization that have been offered by anarchism and ecologism continue to unfold along two distinct, if related and at times overlapping, trajectories.

Against the expansion of governance: anarchist responses to globalization

The fascinating secret of a well-functioning social organism seems thus to lie not in its overall unity but its structure, maintained in health by the life-preserving mechanism of division operating through myriads of cell-splittings and rejuvenations taking place under the smooth skin of an apparently unchanging body. Wherever, because of age or bad design, this rejuvenating process of subdivision gives way to the calcifying process of cell unification, the cells, now growing behind the protection of their hardened frames beyond their divinely allotted limits, begin, as in cancer, to develop those hostile, arrogant great-power complexes which cannot be brought to an end until the infested organism is either devoured, or a forceful operation succeeds in restoring the small-cell pattern. (Kohr 2001 [1957], pp. 190-191)

The anarchist position on globalization is determined especially by the central anarchist preoccupation with the questions of authority and power. Less interested in debating anthropocentrism or the idea of progress, the anarchist critique of modernity focuses instead on its paradigmatic institution: the state, the ‘enemy of all human love’ (Woodcock 1977, p. 331). The anarchist denunciation of the government has had myriad

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40 By anarchism I mean here the egalitarian and communal position to be distinguished from the so-called ‘anarcho-liberalism’ or ‘libertarian capitalism’ associated with authors such as Murray Rothbard (2006 [1973]), Robert Nozick (1974) or David Friedman (1989).
expressions in anarchist thought, but it was the Frenchman, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who gave it the most famous formulation:

To be governed is to be kept in sight, inspected, spied on, directed, law-driven, numbered, enrolled, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, estimated, valued, censured, commanded, by creatures who have neither the right, nor the wisdom, nor the virtue to do so [...] to be governed is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, corrected, punished [...] That is government. (Proudhon, in Jennings 1999, p. 132)

It is in the context of this principled anarchist rejection of government that the anarchist model of localization becomes understandable. In political terms, anarchism opposes globalization as a dynamic that replicates on a much larger scale the flaws inherent in the state. One of the reasons why the state is infinitely oppressive is the fact that it is far too big to be controlled by the people. Large-scale institutions are associated with lack of accountability and accumulation of power: ‘[b]igness is attractive to anyone in pursuit of power, for one is the hand-maiden of the other’ (Body 2001, p. 18). But while the state is too large to be held responsible to the community, globalization brings about an even greater concentration of authority – for example in the form of global governance institutions – to which ever growing numbers of people are subjected all over the world. Globalization thus expands and multiplies the problems associated with the state: it prevents an individual’s control over decisions which ‘come from agencies which he [sic] never constituted, business interests which have no roots in his community, and political figures who are unresponsive to his needs’ (Bookchin 1974, p. 86). From this
perspective, localization is necessary to bring a sense of freedom and empowerment to both individuals and communities.

The explanation of the possibility and praxis of local autonomy has always been a major preoccupation of exponents of the anarchist thought. Kropotkin’s belief that the future belonged to small-scale cooperative communities had lasting influence on utopian urban planners such as Ebenezer Howard (1850–1928), Patrick Geddes (1854–1932) and Lewis Mumford (1895–1990), as well as on contemporary anarchism but, as Woodcock notes, even in his own times the Russian anarchist was not original:

Kropotkin was only refining on tendencies that were evident in anarchism ever since William Godwin [...] Godwin called the local units parishes; Proudhon and Bakunin were more interested in self-governing workshops and communes [...] and Kropotkin reinforced this concept in Mutual Aid. (Woodcock 1992, p. 118)

Whenever it was formulated, the anarchist defence of localization took off from a particular set of explicit or implicit assumptions about human nature. Central to anarchism has always been the confidence that people are inherently sociable and cooperative and that their natural tendency is towards egalitarianism. Anarchist anthropology draws especially on Kropotkin’s doctrine of evolution postulating the ‘survival of the most cooperative’ and the associated principle of ‘mutual aid’ (Kropotkin 1902). Individuals are thus able to fulfil their social and economic needs in communities, in this way making ‘the services of the state redundant by performing them themselves’ (Sonn 1993, p. 7):
In the absence of the State, the deep-rooted need for peace and socially stabilizing tendencies of human community would, after a brief period of readjustment, quickly reassert itself. Many, if not all vital social functions and practices – which through laziness, we have foolishly left in the hands of bureaucrats and State officials – would again be performed by the internally self-regulating community in an infinitely more humane way. (Purchase 1997, p. 76)

The abolition of the institutions of authority is conceivable only in small communities where strong bonds of sympathy and loyalty between individuals allow for social cohesion to emanate from below. Anarchist objectives would be far more difficult to realize in large and fragmented social agglomerates that form only ‘imagined’ communities. The remedy to the increasing concentration of global power is thus decentralization and localization of political life. Localized decision-making is deemed an effective way of managing communities, as ‘nobody can assess [people’s] needs better than those who experience them’ (Woodcock 1977, p. 22) as well as having positive social and psychological consequences, bringing a sense of empowerment to both communities and individuals:

By inducing people to co-operate regularly in decisions relating to their own lives, decentralization will in fact eliminate the alarming atomization of modern communities into lonely individuals dependent on authority personified by the policeman and the social worker. (Woodcock 1977, p. 22)

More technical aspects of localized anarchist politics are discussed by Murray Bookchin, who is usually credited with the formation of ‘social ecology’, a current which has influenced anarchism at large with its ecologically-minded but also distinctly anarchist, and more specifically Kropotkinesque, plans for democratic decentralization. Bookchin
believes that only in the conditions of localization is it possible to put into practice the principles of anarchist direct democracy. He emphasises the significance of a physical proximity among people who make decisions affecting themselves and thus reinforces the imperative for localization:

[...] In making collective decisions [...] all members of the community should have an opportunity to acquire in full the measure of anyone who addresses the assembly. They should be in a position to absorb his attitudes, study his expressions, and weigh his motives as well as his ideas in a direct personal encounter and through face-to-face discussion. (Bookchin 1971, p. 79, emphasis removed)

The anarchist reasons for localization are not confined to political ones. Political decentralization has for a long time been linked by anarchists to the decentralization of the anarchist economy (Berkman 1964, p. 92). In anarchist communities, production takes place ‘where people live, in small factories and workshops in each village and neighbourhood’ (Pepper 1993, p. 178). Work is ‘meaningful and fulfilling’ aimed at providing ‘socially useful goods and services’ (Pepper 1993, p. 178). The ideological durability of anarchist ideas is again undeniable. Just as there has been continuity in free-market argumentation so similarly the anarchist response to classical liberalism is nowadays formulated along with the logic that would have been recognized a century ago: already in 1901 Kropotkin in his *Fields, Factories and Workshops* had called for economic self-reliance, ‘return to a state of affairs where corn is grown, and manufactured goods are fabricated, *for the use of those very people who grow and produce them*’ and for ‘each nation [to have] her own agriculturalist and manufacturer’ (Kropotkin 1968 [1901], pp. 77, 24–25; emphasis in original). Analogous arguments can
be identified in Mumford’s *Technics and Civilization* (1934) and throughout the contemporary works of Colin Ward, Murray Bookchin, and Graham Purchase (see for example Ward 1973; Bookchin 2005; Purchase 1993).

While anarchists reject national economic specialization, they also abhor professional specialization of individuals as preventing a versatile experience of life and leading to an elitist culture of experts that contradicts the ideal of individual and communal autonomy. Again, the argument linking economic self-reliance with the core concept of freedom is well-established in anarchist ideology. Just as in 1901 Kropotkin affirmed that ‘the present tendency of civilized nations [is] each individual working in the field and in some industrial art; each individual combining scientific knowledge with the knowledge of handicraft’ (Kropotkin 1968 [1901], pp. 24–25) so, seventy years later, Bookchin warned that ‘[t]o separate the engineer from the soil, the thinker from the spade, and the farmer from the industrial plant promotes a degree of vocational overspecialization that leads to a dangerous measure of social control by specialists’ (Bookchin 1971, p. 80).

More generally, in its social philosophy, anarchism insists on the need for diversity and differentiation: ‘If the individual is a unit in a corporate mass, his life will be limited, dull and mechanical. If the individual is a unit on his own, with space and potentiality for separate action, then [...] he can expand and express himself’ (Read, in Bookchin 1971, p. 77). The anarchist ideology emphasizes that individuals need a variety of life-experiences. The routine of everyday existence and labour under the capitalist system is repulsive to anarchism. This loathing of the sickening regularity of the industrial society
is exemplified in George Woodcock’s brilliant description of ‘the tyranny of the clock’ (Woodcock 1972).

On the whole, according to the anarchist vision, decentralization is likely to create harmonious, sustainable and rounded communities in which politics is decided directly by the affected individuals, economic activities are based on cooperation and autonomy (so admired by Kropotkin among nineteenth century Swiss watchmakers) and individuals are satisfied with the experience of the wholeness and diversity of life. The following section focuses more specifically on how the more detailed interpretations relating to the question of scale separate ecologism and anarchism into two distinct entities. I will argue that far from undermining ideological distinctions or — as some have argued — making anarchism or ecologism post-ideological (Curran 2006), positions taken on ‘globalization’ combine with recognizable morphologies and are reliable as indicators of broader ideological worldviews.

Ecologism and anarchism on globalization: a comparison

Different cultures could be expected to have quite different views about what political forms could best accomplish their bioregional goals, and (especially as we imagine this system on a global scale) those forms could be at quite some variance from the Western Enlightenment-inspired ideal. And however much one might find the thought unpleasant, the divergence must be expected and — if diversity is desirable — respected. It is quite possible that an extraordinary variety of political systems would evolve within the bioregional constraints, and there is no reason to think that they would necessarily be compatible — or even, from someone else’s point of view, good. (Sale 1991, p. 108)
Our anarchist communism aims at the overthrow of global industrial capitalism and the creation of a world human community [...] with human scale communities organising social reproduction in such a way that everyone has the opportunity to develop their creativity [...] yet also maintaining a real, conscious, global unity to ensure that people can travel and communicate as they please, that knowledge, ideas, insights and pleasures can be widely shared and that problems of a global nature can be discussed and resolved. (Anarchist Federation n.d., p. 40)

While ecologism and anarchism share a number of features, including their localist inclination, their respective motivations are different. A crucial distinction between anarchism and ecologism is the difference between the emphasis that the former places on society and the latter on nature. In other words, to borrow a succinct phrase of David Pepper, ‘while anarchism does have positions on human and non-human “nature” it is not principally a philosophy of nature’ (Pepper 1993, p. 152). Consequently, while ecologism adjusts the idea of localization to its guiding principle of ecocentrism, the well-being of nature is for anarchists secondary to free, harmonious and egalitarian social relations. This does not imply that anarchism represents an arrogant technocratic version of anthropocentrism characteristic of other political ideologies. Anarchism is ecologically sensitive but, and this is of major significance, it formulates this sensitivity in anthropocentric terms, in a belief that ecological harmony is instrumental in providing for social well-being and vice-versa, that harmonious, egalitarian social relations generate respect for the rights of other species. This fundamental discrepancy between anarchism and ecologism determines their different views on other broad issues, such as modernity and globalization, and explains their different motivations and degrees of radicalism in advancing the case for localization.
Hierarchy is the prism through which anarchists understand the current social as well as ecological problems. Their analysis is built upon an ontological postulation that nature cannot be interpreted ‘from a hierarchical viewpoint’ (Bookchin 1980, pp. 270–271). From this metaphysical assumption stem more specific explanations, such as the following: ‘mass pollution and environmental destruction are inevitable consequences of a system based on dominating the rest of nature […] This domination has its roots in the domination of people – class society’ (Anarchist Federation n.d., p. 35). Analogously, the anarchist suggestion of the way out of the current ecological predicament takes off from the principles that inform anarchist solutions to other social problems: ‘as long as hierarchy persists, as long as humanity organizes itself around a system of elites, the project of dominating nature will continue to exist and inevitably lead our planet to ecological extinction’ (Bookchin, in Antliff 2005, p. 266).

Anarchism’s ‘soft anthropocentrism’ determines its view on other fundamental issues – like modernity and progress – that put it at odds with ecologism. I have shown that in the case of ecologism modernity and progress are by definition responsible for the current ecological disaster. As will become apparent as my argument proceeds, some currents of ecologism are unashamedly backward looking in their advocacy of “refeudalization” […] of the world into ecologically defined political and economic units’ (Barry 1999, p. 87) that they hope will thwart the modern project. The anarchist attitude to modernity is not as straightforward. Colin Ward maintains that there is no contradiction between modernity and community (Ward 1995, pp. 299–300) but it is a modernity that is
understood in a particular way — as one devoid of hierarchy and domination. The anarchist interpretation of the idea of progress is also harder to pin down than in the case of ecologism. Richard Sonn, in his introduction to the subject, explains the position of anarchism as follows:

[T]hey were not reactionaries seeking to turn back the clock. Although they rejected the present, they were also critical about much of the past [...]. They therefore looked to the future, not to the past — but their vision of the future resembled the past more than the present: a past shorn of elites, domination, and religion, composed of free peasants and artisans reaping the fruits of their own labors. [...They] wished to “revolve” back to a more harmonious society and although their rejection of the contemporary society was nearly total, their proposed alternative fused elements of a remembered past with a vision of a utopian future. (Sonn 1992, pp. 2–3)

While anarchism does not display a wholesale antimodern stance, it is of course defined by its critique of the state, perhaps the most emblematic of all modern institutions. But here lies another distinction between anarchism and ecologism. On the one hand, the anarchist rejection of the state is congenial to most of ecologism. Usually, ecologists regard the state as representing ‘materialism, institutionalized violence, centralization and hierarchy’ (Porrit 1984, pp. 216–217) and thus as inimical to their vision. A typical ecologist would probably endorse a position which has been described, somewhat disrespectfully, as ‘naïve naturalism’ (Barry 1999, p. 79) and which asserts that communities are naturally superior to other social arrangements in that they follow the patterns of nature. However, on the other hand, arguments in favour of the state are occasionally present in ecologist thought and some commentators have argued that the logic of green politics requires ‘the transformation rather than the abolition of the state’
(Barry 1999, p. 79, emphasis in original). Thus, although for most ecologists the ‘green state’ is an oxymoron (Barry 1999, p. 78), the acceptance of the state does not provide a criterion of disqualification from the territory of ecologism.

An ecologist model: radical localization and political relativism

What is perhaps more telling from the perspective of the present comparative analysis is that while the majority of ecologists subscribe to the principal anarchist belief that statism should be replaced by a decentralized communal structure, the two ideologies are at variance when they embark on a more specific vindication of the benefits of the communal life, and especially when they debate the details of the political organization that they prescribe for their ideal communities. The ecologist rejection of the state consists primarily in an objection to its size as defying natural limits. At the same time a critique of authority per se does not have to be an ingredient of ecologist antistatism. Goldsmith’s antistatist declarations, for example, are not motivated by his desire to question the need for control as such; he opposes power only when it is exercised on a large scale over a necessarily heterogeneous social environment: ‘only an elaborate bureaucracy run by a shameless autocrat can hope to control a mass of people deprived of a common culture and a sense of duty to their society’ (Goldsmith, in Barry 1999, p. 83). Furthermore, it seems that some ecologist interpretations cohere quite well with conservative, paternalistic, or even authoritarian ideas.¹ Sale exemplifies this

¹ Ecologism’s conservative aspects have been noted and discussed by a number of commentators. William Tucker provided an extensive analysis of ecologism’s
unequivocally conservative tone in his reflection about the desired features of a bioregional society:

It is not change, then, and it is not novelty or rapidity that the bioregional society works toward but rather stability and adjustment; not revolution but evolution; not cataclysm but gradualism. The new is to be treated more with suspicion than, as in our time, instant acclaim and approbation – the mutant being always more likely to cause problems than solve them – and no particular virtue would adhere to originality or “modernity,” as it does in a society with no fixed and accepted standards, no repository of values from the past, to measure by. (Sale 1991, p. 119)

A possible explanation of the potentiality for a conservative, authoritarian tendency within ecologism may proceed from ecocentrism and the consequent overwhelming importance of localization in this way of thinking. Small-scale living is defined in ecologism as the way to accomplish the ultimate objective of pushing the evolution of conservative leanings in his Progress and Privilege. According to Tucker: ‘the impulse to slow growth, to suspect invention, and to place natural or agrarian values above material progress has been the consistent pattern of aristocratic politics wherever and whenever it has asserted itself’ (Tucker 1982, p. 42). In Tucker’s view, ecologism amounts to ‘the ideas of aristocratic conservatism translated onto a popular scale’ (Tucker 1982, p. 32). That conservative strains run through some areas of ecologism is a fact emphasized also by Anna Bramwell, who identified the first expressions of ecologism in the traditional Tory attitude combining nationalism with a rejection of industrialism (Bramwell 1989, pp. 104–105). In a similar vein David Pepper suggested that ecocentrism ‘may be a (middle) class response to contradictions in capitalism, essentially conservative, reactionary, “bourgeois” to the core and very much involving traditional political concerns’ (Pepper 1986, p. 187) while also noting elsewhere: ‘aspects of the appeal to a “natural”, “organic” order, where people must model their society on “nature” have distinctly reactionary implications’ (Pepper 1993, p. 190). More recently, Derek Wall pointed out that localization may have oppressive upshots. From Wall’s left-wing perspective; ‘small may be necessary but it is not enough’ (Wall 2005, pp. 67 and 82; see also Saward 1993).
civilization away from its course of self-destruction in the direction of ecocentric values. In the context of the project for changing the whole civilizational model traditional political questions may seem to be of lesser significance. Political and economic arrangements of communities are evaluated mostly in terms of their conduciveness to the advancement of ecocentric attitudes and practices. Since localization is believed to be the certain way towards ecocentrism, ecologism refrains from guiding communities beyond that point. Such guidance would stand for a violation of the autonomy of localized communities which – like natural systems – regulate themselves optimally according to local circumstances. Ecologism is thus committed to the principle of plurality of political options within the wide orbit of localism:

Bioregional diversity [...] does not mean that every community [...] would construct itself along the same lines, evolve the same political forms. Most particularly it does not mean that every bioregion would be likely to heed the values of democracy, equality, liberty, freedom, justice, and the like [...] Truly autonomous bioregions would inevitably go in separate and not necessarily complementary ways, creating their own political systems according to their own environmental settings and their own ecological needs. (Sale 1991, p. 108)

It follows that while ecologism emphasizes the ideal of diversity between local communities by accepting an unlimited number of political choices for individual groups, it may deny the diversity within some of them by maintaining that communities may choose to be run in an authoritarian manner. But while in the ecologist perspective democracy is but one option in a variety of alternatives, some ecologists go beyond relativism and display openly authoritarian predilections. Doubts have been expressed...
within ecologism as to whether democracy is actually an appropriate platform for the realization of ecocentric priorities and several ecologist thinkers have in its place advocated tightly integrated communities run on hierarchical lines according to the principle of ‘mutual coercion mutually agreed upon’ (Hardin 1968, p. 1247). Edward Goldsmith suggested despotic measures at least in the process of transition to the ecological society:

[T]he long transitional stage that we and our children must go through will impose a heavy burden on our moral courage and will require great restraint. Legislation and the operation of police forces and the courts will be necessary to reinforce this restraint. (Goldsmith et al. 1972, p. 50)

Another ecologist thinker, William Ophuls went further down the authoritarian path and suggested that an ecological society would necessarily need ‘a class of ecological mandarins who possess the esoteric knowledge needed to run it well’ (Ophuls 1977, p. 163). In Ophuls’s opinion such a society:

[W]ill not only be more authoritarian and less democratic than the industrial society of today [...] it will also in all likelihood be much more oligarchic as well, with only those possessing the ecological and other competences to make prudent decisions allowed full participation in the political process. (Ophuls 1977, p. 163)

42 Ecologism may also interpret religion in a way that would not be possible to integrate within anarchism. Ecologism would typically place emphasis on immanent spirituality where the sacred is located in nature (for example Dodge 1981; Goldsmith 1988; Sessions 1987; Spretnack 1986). These mystical tendencies of ecologism are frowned upon by anarchists – ‘the extent to which a society devolves into mysticism and eclecticism can be regarded as a measure of its cultural decline’ (Bookchin 2007, p. 72). Furthermore, some ecologists have a much more ‘pragmatic’ – and at the same time objectionable from an anarchist point of view – use for religion as a stabilizing factor
Anarchism and ecologism

To reiterate, all this is not to suggest that ecologism is inherently conservative, authoritarian or reactionary, but merely to argue that the very possibility of conservative or authoritarian ideas within the morphology of ecologism is a feature that requires attention as it places ecologism on a position that is distinct from that occupied by anarchism. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that in cases where localization becomes a primary method of realization of such an unconventional (in the sense of not featuring in the conceptual dictionaries of other ideologies) goal as an ecocentric society, this may encourage a flirtatious relationship with radically different positions at the same time. As Pepper puts it: ‘ecocentrism is politically most ambiguous and [...] has [...] distinctive and opposite political wings’ (Pepper 1986, p. 213).

An anarchist model: a confederation of confederations

Anarchists reject the reactionary implications of some variants of green thought. From their point of view the idea of defending nature by authoritarian means is of course an anathema. Whereas for the ecologist decentralization along the lines of natural bioregions is to subdue humanity’s chaotic proliferation and to subject society to the laws and limits of nature, the anarchist endorses localization only as long as it and a tool in exercising power. Robert Heilbroner, for example, insisted on the necessity of a regime combining ‘religious orientation with military discipline’ (Heilbroner 1991, pp. 176-177; see also discussion of the views of a German ecologist Rudolph Bahro in Biehl 1996). Governments are to be ‘monastic’; religion is to keep people in line and thus stop them from abusing the environment. In another notoriously authoritarian interpretation, Goldsmith approved of the Hindus’ caste system of stratification as ‘ecologically friendly’ (Goldsmith 1978).
contributes to a free and democratic society. From the anarchist perspective, the problem of the territorial scope of governance is important but derivative: the typical scale of the modern state increases the remoteness of the centre of authority and thus diminishes the possibility of public control over its exercise (Woodcock 1977, p. 21), but anarchists believe that ‘any power corrupts absolutely’ regardless of the distance between the rulers and the ruled. Therefore, anarchism rejects all forms of authority, whether it is, to borrow Max Weber’s categories, ‘rational legal’ authority of the nation-state backed by a remote and faceless bureaucracy, a ‘traditional’ authority of a king, or even a local, ‘charismatic’ power typical of small pre-industrial societies: ‘the Palaeolithic shaman in reindeer skin and horns is the predecessor of the Pharaoh and the Buddha and, in more recent times, of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini’ (Bookchin, in Sonn 1992, p. 273).

In other words, while from an anarchist perspective, localization is a necessary prerequisite of freedom and democracy, there remains a question as to whether it is also a sufficient condition. Some anarchists conceptualize democracy as natural and thus dismiss any possibility of tension between localization and democracy. They assert that decentralized communities would automatically embrace the democratic perspective (Kropotkin 1902; Purchase 1997, p. 76). But others assume that although democracy requires localization, not all localized political arrangements would necessarily turn democratic. While the sceptics consent to the ecologist conviction that democracy is just one among many political paths that the communities may want to follow, they resolutely reject the relativist conclusion of ecologism to the effect that communities
should be allowed to organize themselves in any, possibly authoritarian, way they choose.

Murray Bookchin exemplifies this strong anarchist insistence on local democracy. He emphasizes that diversity ‘never should be celebrated in a nationalistic sense of “apartness” from the general interests of humanity as a whole or else it will regress into the parochialism of folkdom and tribalism’ (Bookchin 2007, p. 50). He is concerned ‘that neither decentralization nor self-sufficiency in itself is necessarily democratic’ and so he calls on anarchists to ‘counteract the tendency of decentralized communities to drift toward exclusivity and parochialism’ (Bookchin 1989a). Bookchin’s method ‘to foster a healthy interdependence, rather than an introverted, stultifying independence’ (Bookchin 2007, p. 49) consists in opening communities to cooperation within confederal structures whose various forms he discusses in his book *The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship* (1987).^

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Confederation, according to the *Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics*, ‘is less binding in its character than a federation. In principle, the states in a confederation would not lose their separate identity through confederation, and would retain the right of secession’ (McLean 1996, p. 98; see also Holterman 1995, p. 286 for an anarchist explanation along these lines). Thus, while anarchists tend to use the terms ‘confederation’ and ‘federation’ interchangeably, the notion of confederation (in this case, of communities, not of states) is closer to the anarchist spirit and thus I will use this term in the following discussion.
Confederalism renders anarchist localism less extreme than its ecologist counterpart.

The green doctrine of bioregionalism is reluctant to accept cooperation between bioregions, and although Kirkpatrick Sale does contemplate the idea of morphoregions it is mostly for the organization of cultural enterprises, in other words, in areas that are not deemed essential for community survival. Furthermore, with reference to the transfer of knowledge and ideas, Sale assumes the irrelevance of any universal knowledge and limits the possibility of mutual openness and influence to only similar units:

[T]he flow of ideas possible in a bioregional world would be quite different from the sort that is regularized today. All that speaks of the global, or monocultural, or hemispheric would be really irrelevant to any self-regarding bioregion; what it would want would be information and experience specific to the kind of environment it inhabited. This is not likely to come from the bioregion next door, which would have different characteristics, and it may not even come from any other bioregion on that continent. But there are bound to be any number of places somewhere else in the world that have enough of the same ecological conditions to be ideal partners with which to share ideas. (Sale 1991, p. 79)

In contrast to these ecologist reservations, the profoundly humanist ideology of anarchism protests against imposing any barriers on the possibilities of cooperation and ‘mutual aid’ between communities. Anarchism is thus forced to reconcile two of its main ideals: internationalism (or perhaps ‘intercommunalism’ is a more appropriate word) and local autonomy based on decentralization: while anarchists encourage cooperation on all levels, up to the global level, they have, always been at pains to emphasize their commitment to localism.
Models of confederation have been debated by anarchists in ways that provide another example of continuity. Proudhon had already insisted that ‘loose federations [...] would coordinate activities without usurping local autonomy’ (Sonn 1992, p. 27). Proudhon maintained that in ‘a federative contract [...] each commune, canton, province and region retains more power than it surrenders to the higher level’ (Carter 1971, p. 62). Proudhon’s ideal consisted of ‘a confederation of confederations, in which the interest of the smallest province would have as much expression as that of the largest, and in which all affairs would be settled by mutual agreement, contract and arbitration’ (Woodcock 2004, p. 119). In a similar vein but a less distant past, Woodcock described a confederal society as one:

[I]n which responsibility begins in the vital nuclei of social life, the workplace and the neighbourhoods where people live. In such a vision all matters of purely local concern – matters by which no outside interests are affected – should be decided locally by the people most directly involved [...]. Where neighbourhoods have interests in common, they should federate loosely to discuss co-operation and arbitrate differences, and so upwards, through provinces to larger geographical entities, until, with all frontiers abolished, the whole world becomes a federation of federations of federations, bringing together every small community in a kind of symbiotic unity like a great structure of coral. (Woodcock 1977, pp. 25–26)

The anarchist notion of decentralization is thus anthropocentric and anthropocentrism impacts on the radicalism of the anarchist version of localism. Nevertheless, confederalism does not disqualify anarchism from its claim to being a philosophy of decentralization and autonomy. Anarchists intend to begin ‘every kind of human activity [...] from what is local and immediate’ (Ward 1996 [1973], p. 58) and insist that ‘a
federal body should be run from the bottom up, not from the top down' (Pepper 1993, p. 159) and that 'the flow of power from the bottom up [should diminish] with the scope of the federal council ranging territorially from localities to regions and from regions to ever-broader territorial areas' (Bookchin 1989b). In other words, in a confederal network no community is subjected to laws and regulations that it has had no share in deciding. In the context of what anarchists believe to be the central tendency of globalization, namely, the extension of the distance between the centres of decision making and the communities that are affected by those decisions, it is reasonable to agree with the assertion of Leopold Kohr, a prominent economist who considered himself an anarchist and who is still widely read in anarchist circles, that the principle defining any federation 'is one of division, not of union' (Kohr 2001 [1957], p. 34) and thus anarchist confederalism can be treated as an antiglobalist project.

Ecologist and anarchist models of economic localization

A demarcation line can also be drawn between ecologist and anarchist models of local economy and again the distinction between ecocentrism and anthropocentrism is the most consequential factor that distinguishes between the two variants. As noted earlier, from the ecologist perspective localization contributes crucially to the awareness of economic limits. A community which depends exclusively on its own resources is by necessity conscious of their scarcity. It would therefore use them frugally and in a sustainable manner, fulfilling the genuine needs of its members but ostracizing unnecessary consumption. What is more, in case even the basic needs exceeded the
productive possibilities of nature, ecologism would have chosen to sacrifice human interests rather than compromise the principle of sustainability.

The impact of ecocentrism is clear with reference to the demographic aspect of the limits to growth thesis. In light of what Garrett Hardin declared to be the ‘Eleventh Commandment of the ecologist’ – ‘Thou shalt not transgress the carrying capacity’ (Hardin 1995, p. 211) – ecologism claims that the human population has already surpassed all limits and that ‘the cancerous growth of population’ (Peccei 1981, p. 30) must be reversed.44 What is more, in putting forward the case for demographic downsizing, some ecologists have asserted their indifference to the fate of humankind. Dave Foreman, for example, declared ‘the human race could go extinct, and I for one would not shed any tears’ (Foreman, in Bradford 1989, p. 1). Equally controversial are the more specific measures that have been put forward in some corners of ecologism. The suggestion of the Voluntary Human Extinction Movement that humankind should ‘live long and die out’ (in Thiele 1999, p. 175) sounds restrained in comparison with other so-called ‘natural solutions’ that have been endorsed by some ecologists:

If radical environmentalists were to invent a disease to bring human populations back to sanity, it would probably be something like AIDS. As radical environmentalists, we can see AIDS not as a problem but as a necessary solution. (Miss Ann Throp 1987, p. 32)

44 The cancer metaphor to describe human population growth can also be found in the works of other so-called ‘survivalists’, for example in Ehrlich 1968, p. xi.
The claim that the whole human population must scale down is consistent with ecocentric ontology and ethics. If it is assumed that growing population numbers threaten the well-being or even the survival of nature, then humankind must be ready to make ultimate sacrifices. At the end of the day, ecologism asserts, localism, scaling down and depopulation are the conditions of the continued existence of humanity itself. If the ‘boat’ on which humankind floats remains overcrowded, it will sink, drowning all its ‘passengers’ (Hardin 1974). It is this reasoning that, according to some ecologists, justifies enacting authoritarian, oppressive measures: ‘We must have population control at home, hopefully through a system of incentives and penalties, but by compulsion if voluntary methods fail’ (Ehrlich 1968, p. 11).

Anarchists reject such neo-Malthusian conclusions outright and articulate their concern with limits in the context of their analysis of domination and inequality. Accordingly, ‘fewer people do not necessarily consume fewer resources’ (Anarchist Federation n.d., p. 10). Instead, ‘[t]he main cause of the ecological crisis is not “the population explosion” […] but gross under-use of the world’s land resources’ (Hart 1993, p. 12).

This debate continues an established controversy: the opposition to predictions of an imminent transgression of demographic limits was in the centre of the attack that Kropotkin launched on Malthus. Kropotkin identified the reason for malnutrition in

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45 A Finnish eco-radical, Pentti Linkola, also employed lifeboat metaphor to suggest culling humankind: ‘Those who hate life try to pull more people on board and drown everybody. Those who love and respect life use axes to chop off the extra hands hanging on the gunwale’ (in Huber 1999, p. 160).
private land ownership that prevented maximization of agricultural output. He was convinced that a combination of land redistribution and technological progress would solve the problem of famine (Pepper 1986, p. 189). Kropotkin thus advocated systemic and institutional change. This way of thinking is often absent from ecologism, in which ‘capitalist institutions are barely looked at as the major perpetrators of environmental devastation’ (Bradford 1989, p. 12).

Anarchists concur with ecologists in their advocacy of self-reliance as promoting ecologically-sound attitudes: ‘a relatively self-sufficient community, visibly dependent on its environment for the means of life, would gain a new respect for the organic interrelationships that sustain it’ (Bookchin 1971, pp. 80-81). However, anarchists are unable to include wholesale localism among their conceptual options. While the most radical currents of ecologism may ignore human needs altogether or, at least, may define them in a narrow sense, dismissing the ‘wants’ of today’s societies as aberrations, anarchists are not as willing to accept all corollaries of a localized life. Despite their commitment to the breaking down of large-scale economic organisms and their promotion of self-reliant economies, anarchists compromise self-sufficiency in the name of social well-being:

[S]elf-sustaining communities cannot produce all the things they need unless it involves a return to a back-breaking way of village life that historically often prematurely aged its men and women with hard work and allowed them very little time for political life beyond the immediate confines of the community itself. (Bookchin 1989b)
Anarchist localism tends to be moderated in the name of adequately fulfilling human needs at the present stage of civilizational development. From the anarchist perspective, an uncompromising insistence on self-sufficiency would inevitably imply neglecting vital human needs thus contradicting the freedom of individuals and limiting their ability to run community life in a responsible and democratic way.

The principle of self-sufficiency is also challenged by the inclination of some sections of anarchism to urban values and lifestyles. Not all of anarchism is urban; indeed some anarchist currents lean towards an anti-urban utopia of peasant community inspired by Lev Tolstoy, Gustav Landauer or Mohandas Gandhi. However the urban predilection of anarchism occurs regularly enough to justify treating it as one of the main distinctions between anarchism and ecologism, where the latter typically objects to the modern city as 'an ecological parasite as it extracts its lifeblood from elsewhere and an ecological pathogen as it sends back its wastes' (Sale 1991, p. 65).

The urban current of anarchism can be traced back to Kropotkin who was influenced by the ideal of the medieval urban community and who took the view that experiments in communal living should take place close to cities. Bookchin similarly argued that 'some kind of urban community is not only the environment of humanity: it is its destiny' (Bookchin 1974, p. 2). The main proponent of contemporary urban anarchism, Graham Purchase, celebrates the city-based community as an optimal framework of social and economic life, 'a midway point between the isolated nuclear family and the Nation-State...
avoiding the drawbacks of tribal or small-scale communal lifestyles of old’ (Purchase 1997, pp. 76–77). But Purchase’s claim that ‘small communities cannot, in our modern and complex world, ever hope to contain a sufficiently diverse skillbase’ (Purchase 1997, p. 85) contradicts the ‘small is beautiful’ principle. Further inconsistencies between urbanism and self-sufficiency are exemplified by Purchase’s difficulties in reconciling the idea of self-sufficiency with the anarchist pledge to deliver opportunities expected by modern individuals. Thus, on the one hand, Purchase asserts:

>T]he ideal conception of city-life would be one that has achieved total self-sufficiency. The goal would be to create a city that would function as a living entity, growing its own food, providing its own energy and recycling its wastes so efficiently that it effectively becomes an ecosystem in its own right. (Purchase 1997, p. 77)

While this statement is consistent with radical ecologist localism, the same does not apply to the concession that Purchase formulates just a few pages later:

Although cities must become considerably more integrated and economically self-sufficient than they are today, the need to maintain transport and communication links between cities [...] and the unequal distribution of universally scarce resources [...] requires powerful and extensive industrial and economic structures whose proper and efficient functioning are of interregional and global interest and importance. (Purchase 1997, pp. 88–89)

This middle-ground, and somewhat inconsistent, perspective of Purchase has a long history in anarchist theory: the British anarchist philosopher Herbert Read insisted that ‘there is no contradiction between anarchism and electric power, anarchism and air transport, anarchism and the division of labour, anarchism and industrial efficiency’
In fact, efforts to reconcile decentralization with the requirements and benefits of modern civilization are already present in the writings of Kropotkin who advocated a situation where:

> every member of the community can enjoy the many benefits of civilization [...] and every member who is discontented with communal life can at any given moment return to the individualist life of the present society. One can, in such case, enjoy the intellectual, scientific, and artistic life of our civilization without necessarily abandoning the community. (Kropotkin 1895, p. 4)

From the radically antiglobalist perspective of ecologism, this position is a kind of 'have your cake and eat it' wishful thinking but it is inevitable in an ideology for which the well-being of humankind is the highest priority. This position is also logical in the context of anarchism's core concept of freedom: anarchism compromises economic localism in the name of economic welfare, a prerequisite for freedom and for the responsible and democratic running of the community life.

**Real implications of conceptual distinctions**

George Woodcock, an anarchist himself but also a historian of anarchism, once illustrated the continuity of this ideology by summing up new anarchist contributions as 'little more than Kropotkin plus electricity' (Woodcock 1992, p. 118). It seems reasonable to say that examples given in this chapter demonstrate that contemporary anarchist ideas are, to paraphrase Woodcock, 'little more than Kropotkin plus the internet'. In other words, this means that new theories and concepts, and notably the concept of globalization, have been integrated within the anarchist territory according to
a predictable pattern, in ways contingent on the overall anarchist worldview. This is not to suggest that anarchist decontestations of globalization are always straightforward in their tone or logic. The point is rather that the potential areas of conceptual tension or incongruity between pre-existing conceptual patterns of anarchism and the new concept of globalization are solved, masked or evaded in ways that convey anarchist identity and temperament.

Whereas, in the words of Purchase, the ‘vision [of] diversity, decentralisation, complementarity, alternative technology, municipal socialism, self-sufficiency, direct democracy [was] fully elaborated in the works of the great anarchist thinkers of the past’ (Purchase 1993, p. 35), ecologism as a self-aware ideology is new. Nevertheless, ecologism has proven itself capable of constructing a worldview which in important respects is distinct from the ideological environments from which it originally developed. While anarchist ideas of decentralization played an important role in the crystallization of ecologism’s localist outlook, this outlook has now matured into a recognizable conceptual composite. Consequently, as this chapter has demonstrated, the anarchist and ecologist versions of localism are now distinct and the differences between them are rooted in the core concepts of the two currents.

To summarize: what counts for ecologism is conduciveness of a given form of society to the protection of nature and to the creation and maintenance of ecocentric communities. Ecologists are convinced that small-scale structures will fulfil these objectives. While
ecologists demand localization of communities, they are not necessarily fussy about their political forms: a scaled-down autocracy guided by the principles of ecocentrism may be as legitimate a choice as democracy. Ecocentrism also dominates in the ecologist idea of economic localism. In the face of imminent threats to the very existence of the planet, human needs may be defined very narrowly, while in extreme cases humankind may be required to let some of its members perish in order to reverse demographic growth. The priorities of anarchism are different. The anarchist notion of political localization is anthropocentric and anthropocentrism is its limit. The anarchist ideology is particularly determined by its close attachment to the concept of freedom. The centrality of freedom in its conceptual structure prevents anarchism from interpreting localization in terms matching the radicalism of ecologism. Anarchists are supportive of localization because, and as long as, local arrangements allow freedom and its concomitants: direct democracy and the fulfilment of human needs at the present stage of civilizational development. As a result, anarchism encourages communities to cooperate within confederations that are expected to mitigate the problems of localism – especially those that might thwart individual autonomy and social wellbeing – while at the same time guaranteeing local autonomy against usurpations of control from above.

Ecologism and anarchism are neighbours on the ideological platform of radical opposition to globalization but they are sometimes thought to share more ground than they actually do. While ideologies do not have sharp borders and the outgrowths of ecologism and anarchism may overlap and crossbreed, the core concepts of ecologism
and anarchism separate them into two distinct visions. The descriptions presented in this chapter amount, inevitably, to ideal types, but the effects of the differences between the two options have been felt in the sphere of political action. The anarchist idea of freedom, and its concomitant concept of direct democracy, renders anarchism the main ideological framework for progressive antiglobalist movements (Epstein 2001; Goaman 2003; Graber 2002; Graeber 2004, p. 77; Rupert 2004, p. 132; Sheehan 2003; Starr 2005, p. 117; Wall 2005, p. 124). At the same time, the attempts of a number of ecologists to come nearer to the anarchists have failed. The reactionary implications of some forms of ecologist localism sparked the opposition of several anarchist groups which have widely publicized their withdrawal from actions sponsored by ecologists such as Edward Goldsmith (Fabel van den illegal 2000; see also Biehl and Staudenmaier 1996). The case I have tried to make here is that the reasons for the tensions that are noticeable between ecologist and anarchist interpretations of globalization are not based solely on strategic or short-term priorities but are rooted deeply in the conceptual structures that constitute the two ideologies.
CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis has been to examine the impact of the concept of globalization on the patterns of political ideology. The dominant view in the debate surrounding this question asserts that traditional ideological structures have been thoroughly disrupted by the emergence of the new conceptual framework of what could be termed 'the global imaginary'. From this perspective, it is no longer useful to think in conventional ideological terms, which were coined for the bygone era of national consciousness, and in their place a new typology is needed to make sense of a radically different 'globalist' reality. The analysis of selected representative variants of interpretations of globalization has led me to oppose this claim. The argument that I have tried to substantiate throughout this study is therefore that established political ideologies are still meaningful categories with which to map the political world. In making the case for the relevance of conventional ideological structures I have demonstrated the continuity of their traditional interpretations while at the same time identifying in their earlier expressions ideas anticipating concerns that are nowadays herded together under the conceptual umbrella of 'globalization'. But while my discussion has been emphatic of continuity, it should not have left an impression of ideology as a static construct. Indeed, I have identified within major ideologies important conceptual shifts that resulted from the rise of the idea of globalization. Yet, the argument that I have made posits that so far those changes have been internal to conventional belief systems and that the latter have therefore proved capable of rearticulating their tenets in light of the new circumstances.
Not unexpectedly, the patterns of conceptual reconfigurations which have occurred under pressure of a new and all-pervasive concept were in the ideologies under discussion determined by their prior conceptual arrangements. Accordingly, it should not be surprising that traditionally universalist ideologies, such as classical liberalism or Marxism, have embraced globalization either in its present shape or, in the Marxist case, in principle, by postulating that while today's world is unjust and oppressive, a fairer future will necessarily be global as well. From the point of view represented by neoliberals, the current form of globalization fulfills the long-term aspiration of classical liberalism, namely, the creation of worldwide market civilization with all that this achievement allegedly implies: the promotion of prosperity, peace and democracy. Marxists, on the other hand, have seen the progressing expansion of the capitalist system as integral in their teleological vision of history moving ahead towards the inevitable revolutionary transformation.

Other ideological systems have challenged globalization more or less forcefully. Again, their opposing positions have been articulated in terms contingent on broader conceptual outlooks. In other words, the enemies of globalization have identified the process as synonymous with, or resulting from, or aggravating, the ills that they have always opposed. In national populism and fascism, for example, the emphasis on the right to one's place, the acclamation of place-bound identities, and the insistence on the racial and/or cultural isolation that the preservation of identity allegedly necessitates, have combined to convey a consistently antiglobalist message. Ecologism has put equally
strong emphasis on the territorial place but with different priorities in mind. From ecologism’s point of view, globalization is the culmination of the Western heritage of anthropocentrism, industrialism and modernity. Globalization therefore exacerbates the problems that have always been inherent in this civilizational paradigm and leaves humankind unable to see that there are limits to production, consumption and pollution. The path to an ecological recovery leads through radical relocalization of social life.

Other currents have been more unequivocal about globalization. Traditional social democracy, to take just one example, has been disinclined to accept the reality of globalization for it saw the idea as contradicting specific social democratic objectives and prescriptions focused on the concept of the state as mitigating the instabilities produced by the markets. But in this case, too, the concept of globalization has been integrated into the structure of social democratic ideology in a way that reinforces its overall implications: the crisis of the welfare state has been explained as the outcome of the paralyzing impact of the powerful myth of globalization and ideological mobilization has centred on the task of ‘demythologizing’ the concept. But alongside this traditional interpretation, alternative strands of social democratic ideology acknowledged the reality of globalization and insisted that it is precisely due to this process that the welfare state is necessary, while another, increasingly influential current, has put emphasis on raising social democratic principles to the global level.
This telegraphic summary of some of the case studies points to a key assumption of this thesis, namely that the legacy of past conceptual arrangements is reflected in how the conventional clusters of interpretations have positioned themselves vis-à-vis globalization. While conceptual shifts have certainly occurred, new developments have not undermined the overall impression of ideological continuity. Wittgenstein’s metaphor of a rope is useful to explain the nature of this ideological change. A rope is made of multiple strands of which none runs from its one end to the other. Consequently, it is not any single thread but rather the overlapping of fibres that gives the rope its unity and strength (Glock 1996, p. 121). Ideological structures are like ropes: they do not usually disintegrate when one, or even several, of their conceptual strands break, or when a new configuration of conceptual ‘fibres’ materializes to absorb the impact of a specific issue emerging in political debate. This point is illustrated by the survival of ideologies which underwent periods of sweeping changes in the past. For example, the reform of capitalism and the emergence of the welfare state in the early twentieth century had a major impact on socialism within which there developed a new current of social democracy. Similarly, the evaporation of some traditional socio-political forms, first of feudalism and then, arguably, of industrial capitalism, forced a new direction in the evolution within conservatism. Yet, conceptual developments have taken place within ideologies which have adjusted them to new ideational constraints and opportunities by eliminating or marginalizing the concepts that had become cumbersome, or by allowing new threads to complement prior conceptual sets, or by splitting some conceptual ‘ropes’ into distinct strands. To stick with the example of
social democracy, its materialization did not mean that the longer-established tendencies within socialism (Marxism or democratic socialism) ceased to exist even though it forced them to take account of the challenge posed by the new relative. Likewise, the development of new forms of conservatism, such as Christian democracy or neo-conservatism, did not mean that continuity of conservative thought was broken altogether. In fact the two new conservative currents developed distinct tendencies — paternalistic 'one nation' conservatism and liberal conservatism — that had been present in this ideology before (Eccleshall 2003b). Similarly, as I have argued in this thesis, the post-Cold War historical transition has not (as yet) necessitated the abandonment of conventional categories, at least when they are taken for what they are from the perspective that I have adopted here, namely, constellations of concepts held together by overlapping ideas combining into flexible but recognizably distinct conceptual entities.

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No study in social sciences can claim to be complete. Some questions are inevitably left unanswered. I would like to briefly point out two research areas which could fruitfully complement the analysis presented in this thesis. The first research avenue relates to the diachronic aspect of ideology and the possibility of updating the analysis presented here in the light of new developments. The thesis has provided an account of the state of ideology (or at least of some ideologies) at a particular point in time, that is to say, at the apparent climax of the changes following the Cold War era and grouped together under the term 'globalization'. But I have not been able to catch up with the pace of new and dramatic developments that are taking place at the time of writing. The global crisis,
which began in 2007, has variously affected the key ideological positions. Most importantly, the crisis has apparently shaken the neoliberal hegemony and numerous commentators have debated 'the end of neoliberalism' (see for example Glinavos 2008; Harvey 2009; Stiglitz 2008). The key figures of the foregoing economic orthodoxy had to move to more defensive positions, with the former chairman of the Federal Reserve of the United States, and neoliberal 'oracle', Alan Greenspan, admitting that he had found 'a flaw' in his free market doctrine (Lanman and Matthews 2008). Meanwhile, the reaction of the majority of governments has been interventionist to an extent unheard of in the two decades preceding the credit crunch. It suggested a more social democratic, Keynesian turn in economic policy and thus put the invisible hand of the market in doubt (Startton and Seager 2008). Marxism and socialism may have also begun to gain greater currency and the rise in their popularity has been noted by the press. For example, on 13 June 2008, The Times announced that 'the credit crunch is bringing Marxism back into fashion' (Landesman 2008) while the BBC reported anecdotally that in Germany Das Kapital sold almost eight times better in 2008 than in previous years (BBC 2008). In a more tangible dimension of partisan politics, the far left German party Die Linke is expected (at the time of writing), to receive up to 14 per cent of the vote in the elections to take place at the end of September 2009 and thus to shake the political scene in Germany (Connolly 2009). The Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste in France also appears to be gaining ground (Reed 2008). While this may mark a revival of left-wing politics in two major EU states, the development is matched by a further rise of popularity of
extreme right parties in several European countries, including the Netherlands, Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Traynor 2009).

Clearly, we do not live in a post-ideological age, as some have wrongly asserted. But from the point of view of the present study it would be interesting to see more precisely how the sudden disruption has affected the ideologies discussed here. While this is something that I intend to do in future, when the passage of time allows a little more critical distance, here I can only suggest that at first glance the debate has so far continued along familiar trajectories. For example, while the neoliberal voices have not been as confident as in the ‘roaring nineties’ (Stiglitz 2004) their diagnosis of the crisis as well as response to it mirror the claims that were made in the past (see for example Rosenbleeth 2009, p. 2). The reactions of the enemies of neoliberalism were articulated in similarly familiar terms.

To reiterate, the key assertion of this thesis is that conventional ideological currents have managed to absorb globalization rather than having been absorbed by it. The understanding of ideology-laden readings of globalization is consequently advanced when they are tested, at first instance at least, against those established, albeit continually evolving, ideological systems. Yet, while my objective here has been to defend the effectiveness of established categories, this does not mean that the number of ideological currents has to be limited to these time-honoured traditions. New additions, generated by particular circumstances and conveying fresh ideas, are always possible.
Conclusion

and their claim to the status of ideology is best arbitrated through a morphological scrutiny. Consequently, next to the question of the impact exerted on established ideological patterns by the most recent developments within the capitalist system, another issue that could be fruitfully addressed refers to the occurrence of new ideologies and their potential role in shaping the debate on globalization. I have dealt at length with one proposition of a new ideological category and I deemed it unsatisfactory. But my rejection of ‘globalism’ as a candidate for the status of ideology does not entail that I assume the list of ideologies to be closed. The case I have been trying to make does not contradict the fact that there is always room for new ideologies to rise to prominence alongside the more entrenched ones, or conversely for particular ideologies to fall into decline and eventually disappear. Instead, what I have challenged are proposals of sweeping ideological realignments motivated by the rise of the concept of globalization.

There is, I believe, an important reason to oppose such claims: if each new buzzword was to bring about a reorganization of ideological categories then those categories would have become too ephemeral to provide the lenses through which individuals view themselves and their socio-political environments. They would have turned instead into a mere subject of scholastic exercise and conceptual hair-splitting with little relevance to social consciousness. I hope that this thesis has made a contribution to advancing a more generous view of the role of ideology in political life.


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