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Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law

Ehrenberg, Kenneth (2009) Defending the Possibility of a Neutral Functional Theory of Law Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 29 (1). pp. 91-113.

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Abstract

I argue that there is methodological space for a functional explanation of the nature of law that does not commit the theorist to a view about the value of that function for society, nor whether law is the best means of accomplishing it. A functional explanation will nonetheless provide a conceptual framework for a better understanding of the nature of law. First I examine the proper role for function in a theory of law and then argue for the possibility of a neutral functional theory, addressing issues raised by Leslie Green, Stephen Perry, Michael Moore and John Finnis.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Law
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Ehrenberg, Kennethk.ehrenberg@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Date : 2009
Identification Number : 10.1093/ojls/gqp001
Copyright Disclaimer : Copyright The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Depositing User : Melanie Hughes
Date Deposited : 15 Aug 2017 13:30
Last Modified : 15 Aug 2017 13:30
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/841925

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