"IT'S NOT A MAN THING IS IT?" A CRITICAL DISCURSIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF MASCULINITY AND EMOTIONS

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This thesis is dedicated to George Arthur Walton, Peter Kenneth Bryant and Joseph Walton, the three men who most warrant my love and respect.
Abstract

This thesis was conceived around a single aim, to critically engage with the concept of the 'unemotional male'. The 'unemotional male' represents the embodiment of contemporary constructions of men's relationship with emotions as at least limited and at worst detrimental both to men and to those around them.

Existing psychological and sociological literatures on masculinities and on sex and gender differences were submitted to critical review. These reviews provided overviews of the discursive resources that were commonly invoked to account for men's relationship with emotions. Adopting a critical discursive psychological approach, three types of data – men's talk about men and emotions, a male speaker's autobiographical narratives of humiliation and episodes of anger within heterosexual relationships – were subjected to analysis. Across the first two types of data, the relationship between masculinity and emotions was identified as contingent upon the functions served by emotions in the constitution of social relationships and systems of power relations. In these two analyses, masculine subjectivities were demonstrably constituted relative to a 'hegemonic' masculine ideal. With regard to the final type of data, 'anger' was demonstrated to be a resource available to members of both genders. Specifically, anger was done by members of both genders in response to unwarranted acts or accusations.
Anger demonstrably functioned in the negotiation of individuals' rights and entitlements and in the constitution of local structures of power relations. The thesis finishes with an overview of the findings of the research in light of the literature reviewed. Future directions for critical discursive psychological engagements with emotions, as discourses and as performative acts, and the contribution that these might make to a social psychological understanding of the relationship between gender and emotion are outlined.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 One little pig!

This is just a thought but it’s one that seems relevant to this thesis. It concerns a line from a film, which, in a recent conversation with a male friend, was decided to be one of the most powerful expressions of emotion by a man in recent cinema history. Delivered by the wonderful James Cromwell, the line seemed to us to be the most perfect expression of pride (in an other), gratefulness (to an other) and love (for that other) – three emotions we might not expect to be expressed by a man of such reserved dignity as Farmer Arthur Hoggett. Indeed, on first hearing, the line may sound like no such thing, but, as I think about it now, I feel tears well in my eyes. The line comes at the end of the film after Farmer Hoggett’s apprentice has saved the day and earned the respect, admiration and awe of all those who witnessed his remarkable achievement, the perfection of the art of the sheepdog trial. The line is simply, ‘That'll do, pig’.

It may be that the interpretation and valuing of this line is something peculiar to my friend and me. It may be argued that the line reflects the inability of men who do masculinity in the way so eloquently portrayed by James Cromwell to express emotion in all but the most limited terms. Certainly the expression of emotion, if any is to be argued to be there at all, is not explicit; it is not done through the use of emotion words. It is not effusive or ebullient. It is, I contend,
modest and understated, but none the less meaningful. The meaning of the line, that is to say the interpretation I have offered, makes sense within the context of the film (if you doubt me, watch 'Babe'). Perhaps its power and significance are more apparent to those individuals with experience of this or other similar forms of masculinity. The value of the line is certainly appreciable by those who realize, or are, at least, willing to accept, that expressions of emotion are not absent from this and other versions of masculinity, but that the forms they take may be more subtle than could possibly be constituted through the use of emotion terms alone. The line is a masculine expression of emotion.

As well as the three emotions already listed, the line evokes senses of satisfaction, approval and acceptance. I do not wish to imply that the valuing of these sentiments is peculiar only to those who 'do' masculinity. Nor do I wish to imply that masculine individuals are necessarily best placed to appreciate 'That'll do, pig'. However, as one such masculine individual, I am offended by any suggestion that a subscription to masculinity, in one form or another, necessarily precludes being able to appreciate or able to express such sentiments.

This thesis is an argument for an increased appreciation of the richness and subtlety of the relationship between men, masculinity and emotion. It is written through a masculine subjectivity (quite what that means will be discussed later) but it assuredly does not mean that this account is anti-feminist. Further, it is written through a poststructuralist subjectivity (again this will be developed
later) where masculinity, if it is to be assumed to exist at all, is assumed to be found in the details of everyday life, in what is said and what is done.

The primary consequence of a 'masculine poststructuralist subjectivity' is a resistance towards assuming the status of material relations, i.e., a resistance to the imposition of patriarchy as an interpretative framework. As will be demonstrated, contemporary accounts of the relationship between men, masculinity and emotion are based upon a limited range of discourses and repertoires and most are based upon the assumption that the structures of power and material relations between men and women are already known and that these relations are constitutive of what are termed the 'genders'. The direction of the flow of power is assumed. This thesis resists assuming the direction of the flow of power and attempts to identify how positions of power are negotiated by male speakers through the use of or relative to the concepts of emotions.

This thesis also represents an attempt to map the discourses that are constitutive of these power relations and to determine their arrangement. The effects of discourses are therefore assumed to be contingent upon both the occasion of their invocation and upon their locations within structures of value. As will be demonstrated, discourses are ordered according to their 'moral' or 'cultural' value; certain discourses are valued over others but all discourses are assumed to be in constant competition through the power relations that they constitute when invoked. Consequently, power is not assumed to reside solely in the locations of these discourses within those structures of value.
'Masculine' discourses, that is to say discourses that are gendered as typically constitutive of masculinity, are not assumed to be hegemonic; they are not assumed to bestow automatically positions of power on those who use them. Power would then simply be a synonym for 'masculinity' and, within the most basic level of theorising, for 'men'. This would be a gross over simplification of men's relationships with each other, with women, with their 'selves' and with their 'emotions'.

1.2 A brief note on poststructuralism

The rationale for a move towards a critical, language-centred approach to the topics of social psychology has been advanced elsewhere (Gergen, 1985; Henriques, et al., 1984; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). A poststructuralist, social constructionist approach to the topics of men, masculinity and emotion provides an account of these topics and the relationships between them that is sensitive to variability between speakers and across contexts. A poststructuralist, social constructionist approach is necessarily critical of the assumptions that underlie 'positivist' approaches to these topics and of the ontological status that is ascribed to 'objects' and 'concepts', such as men and emotions, within such approaches. Consequently, a poststructuralist approach cannot engage with the 'objects' and 'concepts' of more traditional approaches without reflexively acknowledging that their ontological status is not assumed. For this reason, poststructuralist works, and this one will be no exception, are characterized by the use of single quotation marks to imply that the ontological status of an 'object' or 'concept' is not assumed. Thus, this thesis is concerned with the relationship between 'men' and 'emotion'.
A number of significant consequences of the adoption of a poststructuralist approach warrant mention before proceeding. The first is the implication of the structuralist assumption that the relationship between the sign (the word) and the signified (to object to which it refers) is both conventional and arbitrary (Saussure, 1974). Any word, any speech sound other than 'man' could signify 'adult male human'; the meaning of 'man' is not inherent to the word 'man'. The various words that signify 'adult male human' across different languages (homme, uomo and hombre) are evidence of this. That 'man' is socially understood to mean 'adult male human' is argued to be a consequence of its establishment as a linguistic convention. Further, within structuralism, once the relationship between a signifier and its signified has become a convention that relationship is fixed. The intelligibility of the relationship between a signifier and its signified is therefore contingent upon their location within a history of language use.

The important consequence of the assumption that the relationship between the signifier and signified is arbitrary is that any other form of signifier could be used to signal the same object, assuming that the relationship could be adequately reified through convention. That an 'oak' is a 'tree' or that a 'table' is a piece of 'furniture' is not, therefore, self-evidently ontologically 'true', but, rather, is a consequence of social linguistic convention. Concepts of 'truth' and 'objectivity' are amongst the first casualties of a move towards poststructuralism and social constructionism. Importantly, both are revealed to be dependent upon relations of reference for meaning and are in no way
attainable, meaningful or even conceivable outside of language. Consequently, a poststructuralist engagement with 'men', 'masculinity' and 'emotions' is by necessity a subjective one.

From the work of Derrida (1974) two implications of fundamental importance have emerged. The first is that all attempts to make sense, to arrive at rational accounts and conclusions, are contingent upon the suppression of meaning. The second is that under sufficiently close scrutiny such rational accounts and conclusions will collapse.

Both of these implications are derived from Derrida's conceptualisation of language as a system of differences. Language is theorized as composed of discrete units (words) each of which is different from any other. Derrida invoked the idea of binaries to describe the simplest level of distinctiveness of words; there is 'the word' and there is 'not the word'. Within this framework the meaning of 'man' is contingent upon its differentiation from 'not man'. The use of any particular word can therefore be interpreted as a presence set against a backdrop of absences (plural because there are a good many more things that are 'not man' than there are things that are 'man'). Further, although talk is, on the surface, comprised only of presences they gain meaning from the 'backdrop of absences' against which they are set. The most fundamental consequence a theory of presences and absences is that the presences must be viewed as privileged at the expense of the absences; absences or 'that which is absent' is marginalized. If a discussion of gender is constituted in
terms of femininity then not-femininity or masculinity is marginalized and vice versa.

The second implication of the idea of language as a closed system, where the meaning of a word is dependent upon its relation to others, is the collapse of rational accounts. Within a deconstructionist approach the determination of meaning is dependent upon two components, difference and deferral (conjugated in the term différance). Any one word differs from any other; 'man' differs from 'boy' and from 'woman' but this difference alone does not bestow meaning on 'man'. In order to begin to arrive at the meaning of 'man' we must defer to other terms to determine the meanings of those words with which 'man' might be contrasted; terms such as 'young male human' could be deferred to determine the meaning of 'boy' and 'adult female human' to do likewise for 'woman'. Through the process of différance the meaning of 'man' could be understood to be not both these things. However, the process of deferral would need to continue in order to determine the meanings of terms such as 'young', 'adult', 'male', 'female' and 'human'. As Gergen (1999) concludes: 'once you have entered the process of différance...there is no principled exit. ... To understand them [terms] we must again defer to still other terms. We search for traces, and we find only further traces.' (p.28).

The final important implications of the adoption of a poststructuralist approach follow from the work of Michel Foucault. The prominence of Foucault within the social sciences is in no small measuring owing to the increasing ubiquity of the word 'discourse'. Within Foucauldian theory, discourse is not solely a linguistic
concept referring to tranches of text or talk. Discourse makes the link between language and social practice. The meaning of a particular social practice, including talk, is understood as a consequence of its location within a historically and culturally constrained system of knowledge (episteme), which is itself a discursively constituted system for talking about, making sense of and assigning meaning to any particular object, person or practice. Discourse 'defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about' (Hall, 2001, p.72).

Foucault was also concerned with the conceptualisation of mundane, everyday instantiations of power relations. The conceptualisation of mundane forms of power requires a radical re-conceptualisation of power. Preconceived notions of the possession of power and the direction of its action – for example as possessed and exercised by a dominant middle class over a working class or by men over women – are challenged. Instead, power is theorized as intrinsic to every site of social interaction, to every social context. Most importantly, power is theorized as not exclusively negative in its effects; within the contemporary view power is often still theorized as apparent only through its negative oppressive effects. Foucault (1980) theorised power as a productive force, constituting discourses, subjects and practices that can be positively valued.

Arguably, the single most important implication of the adoption of a poststructuralist, Foucauldian approach is the idea that subjects are constituted through discourse. Though subjects may speak and be identified
by what appear to be their own discursive formations, those formations and the subjects that they identify, and indeed constitute, are necessarily limited by the contemporaneous historical and cultural systems of knowledge. Simply, the 'subject' is produced within discourse. This conceptualisation is an inevitable consequence of the poststructuralist episteme, within which no meaning exists outside discourse. In order for there to be a meaningful 'subject' it must be subjected to discourse.

While some of the concepts outlined above will be returned to throughout the thesis, this brief overview of the implications of a poststructuralist approach is intended only to prepare the reader for the discursive practices of the following chapters.

1.3 Overview of the thesis

Chapter 2 presents a critical overview of the contemporary psychological and sociological literature on men, masculinity and emotions. The first part is concerned with establishing the character of the 'unemotional man' as a focus of contemporary analytic concern. Through the literature on masculinities the predominant accounts of men's relationship with emotion are discussed, with a particular focus on the work of Victor Seidler. An alternative, poststructuralist approach to the study of masculinity is then advanced. This approach draws upon the work of Judith Butler and existing discursive analyses of masculinity. The second part of chapter 2 presents a critical overview of the positivist literature on sex and gender differences in emotions. The discourses of men's relationship with emotions that are reproduced within this literature and the
methods by which they are reified are identified. An alternative poststructuralist account of emotions as both discursive resources and of emotional 'expressions' as means of interpersonal communication is subsequently outlined. The research questions that inform the empirical chapters are also outlined.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of the discourse analytic approaches and methods that inform the empirical chapters of the research. Three of the predominant discourse analytic approaches within British social psychology - discursive psychology, Foucauldian discourse analysis and critical discursive psychology - are reviewed. In light of the aims of the research and the research questions, a critical discursive psychological approach, with a focus on the constitution of subject positions, is identified as the analytic approach adopted in this thesis.

Chapter 4 contains the critical discursive psychological analysis of men’s talk about men and emotions. Generated through the use of focus group discussions, the prevalence of gendered terms within the data set provides ample evidence for an engagement with constructions of men’s relationship with emotions and for a discussion of the implications of that relationship for the constitution of masculine subjectivities.

Chapter 5 is concerned with an analysis of a single male speaker’s construction of the ‘self’ in emotion terms, within the context of a therapy session. Specifically, the analysis is concerned with the speaker’s construction
of autobiographical narratives of humiliation and the implications that these have for the constitution of a masculine subjectivity.

Chapter 6 represents a departure from the preceding two chapters in terms of the type of data taken for analysis. Drawing on 'naturalistic' data taken from 'reality' TV programmes, the analysis is concerned with the interactional functions served by episodes of anger within heterosexual relationships and with the implications that these functions might have for the constitution of gendered subjectivities.

Chapter 7 is simply a discussion of the main themes and findings of the empirical chapters in light of the literature reviewed in chapter 2. Directions and methods for future discursive research into men's relationship with emotions are outlined.
Chapter 2

Challenging the unemotional man: Contemporary accounts of the relationship between men and emotion and their social constructionist alternatives

2.1 The unemotional man: His history and character

The emotional life of men has come to occupy centre stage in contemporary sexual politics. It is widely believed that by paying greater attention to their emotions and by talking "openly and honestly" about their relationships, men can change both themselves and society.

(Petersen, 1998, p.89)

In the literature on masculinity and in the literature on sex or gender differences in emotion, a range of discourses is apparent and these are recursively drawn upon in constructions of men's relationship with emotions. Arguably the most prominent of these discourses is that of the 'unemotional man', though it may be apparent in more specific or more clinical terms as 'the inexpressive male' (Shields, 2002), 'restrictive emotionality' (Jansz, 2000; Levant, 1995) and 'normative male alexithymia' (Levant, 1998). All these discourses serve broadly the same function: the perpetuation of the representation of men's lives as emotionally impoverished and as potentially individually and socially problematic.
As identified above, there are two significant bodies of literature that address men's relationship with emotions. There is the positivist psychological literature on sex or gender differences in emotions and there is the literature on men and masculinity. The former body of literature would claim to be apolitical, owing to its location within a paradigm of positivist science. However, its findings are often drawn upon as evidence in the latter body of literature. The literature on men and masculinity emerged as a result of the feminist movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Through the questioning of the established status of gender power relations, masculinity was subjected to social scientific analysis and theory. It is to the literature on masculinity and gender power relations that I would first like to turn to identify the character of the unemotional or inexpressive male and particularly the implications that he is argued to have for men as individuals and as a generic category and for gender relations, including gender power relations. I will return to the literature on sex or gender differences in emotions in the second part of this chapter to flesh out fully this particular representation of the modern male and his relationship with emotions.

2.1.1 The appearance of the ‘unemotional man’ in the literature on men and masculinity

Apparent throughout the literature on men and masculinity is the representation of men’s relationship with emotions as troubled and problematic. This representation is embodied by the discourse of the ‘inexpressive male’. The representation of the ‘inexpressive male’ came to
prominence in the sex role literature of the 1970s and 80s (Balswick, 1988; Balswick & Peek, 1971; Goldberg, 1976; Jourard, 1974; Sattel, 1976), though precursors can be found in earlier work – for example, Parson and Bales' (1956) categorization of masculine and feminine sex roles as 'instrumental' and 'expressive' respectively. While 'instrumental' is not interpreted as a synonym of 'inexpressive', if masculinity is argued to be constituted by being not feminine then it would imply that to be not 'expressive' would be to be 'masculine'. Though the precise age of the representation of the 'inexpressive male' is impossible to ascertain, one of its greatest strengths may be its ability to appear older than it is. Certainly, historical analyses provide very different accounts of men's relationship with emotion as recently as the nineteenth century, particularly during the rise of Romanticism (Richards, 1987; Yacovone, 1990).

What is perhaps most important to consider with regard to the representation of the 'inexpressive male' is the context in which it emerged and the function that it served. The 'inexpressive male' emerged in a context of heightened interest in and concern with the material and power relations between men and women, themselves consequences of the emergence of second-wave feminism in the late 1960s. Sex role theory and the emergent focus on 'gender' (Stoller, 1968) represented attempts to account for the problematic relations between men and women, in particular for men's dominance and women's

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1 The assumptions that underlie the argument that masculinity is constituted by opposition or, at least, relative to femininity, their basis and their implications will be returned to below.
subordination. 'Gender' provided the means of differentiating between any essential or biological characteristics of men and women (sex) and the part played by culture (gender) in the constitution of the material and power relations between men and women. Male and female sex roles were theorised as normative patterns of behaviour, characteristics and traits into which boys and girls were socialized. Successful socialization into the appropriate sex role resulted in individuals who behaved as and embodied the characteristics and traits of men and women. In Parson and Bales' (1956) original formulation of male and female sex roles, men were socialized into being competitive, ambitious and rational, whilst women were socialized into being nurturing, caring and expressive. Male and female sex roles represented the reification of gender, of masculinity and femininity as what men and women, respectively, ought to be.

The conceptualisation of masculinity and femininity within the sociological sex role literature contrasts with an earlier psychological tradition. Masculinity and femininity had been conceptualized in essentialist terms, as what men and women really were. This approach originated in the development of masculinity/femininity (M/F) scales by Terman and Miles (1936) and culminated in the generation of arguably the most famous M/F scale, the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) (Bem, 1974) (see Lewin (1984a, 1984b) and Morawski (1985) for historical accounts of the development of these scales and Constantinople (1973) for a critique of M/F scales). It is perhaps worth noting that Terman and Miles' (ibid.) scale was argued to allow the identification of 'sexual invert', that is to say, male and female homosexuals.
Homosexual men were assumed to be psychologically feminine and lesbian women were assumed to be psychologically masculine. Thus, the essentialist assumptions that underlie Terman and Miles' scales included the assumption of normative heterosexuality; being a 'real man' and being a 'real woman' meant being heterosexual.

Both sex role theory and M/F scales draw heavily upon gendered beliefs about emotions in the codifying of behaviours, characteristics and traits as constitutive of socialized or as indicative of essential masculinity and femininity. For example, on the BSRI, approximately half of the items supposed to be indicative of femininity are emotion-related and include being cheerful, warm, tender and eager to soothe hurt feelings. Of the items supposed to indicate masculinity, only two are emotion-related — assertiveness and aggressiveness (Bem, 1974). The management or control of particular emotions but the free expression of others is implicit in Brannon's (1976) four core models of masculinity. 2 Through sex role theories and M/F scales, cultural gendered emotion stereotypes were reified as what men and women ought to be, both culturally and naturally. That emotions constituted one of the primary dimensions along which men and women were supposed to differ, at both cultural and academic levels, may, to an extent, account for the emergence of emotions as one of the primary dimensions in the critiquing and challenging of men's privileged position in gender relations and consequently for the

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2 The four core models of masculinity, according to Brannon (1976), are 'No Sissy Stuff', 'Be a Sturdy Oak', 'Give 'em Hell' and 'Be a Big Wheel'.

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emergence of the 'inexpressive' or 'unemotional' man within the masculinity literature. Also, emotions, owing to their being intrinsic to everyday interpersonal relations, might be argued to be a dimension along which the political project of feminism and the renegotiation of gender relations could be made personal.

However, even a cursory glance at the above-listed, male-authored literature on the 'inexpressive male' reveals that, though it is broadly located within or at least aligned with the political project of second-wave feminism, its alignment takes the form of an analogous movement towards 'Men's Liberation' (see Connell (1995) and Messner (1997) for discussions of the 'Men's Liberation' movement). Men, like women, were argued to be the victims of the existent sex roles and their status as victims was based upon claims of their enforced detachment from their emotions and the deleterious effects that this inflicted on men and on men's relationships with those around them — their wives, girlfriends, children and other men. Nowhere are the negative consequences of male emotional inexpression more comprehensively listed than in Goldberg (1976). The litany of destructive consequences that follow from men's continuous management, censoring and suppression of emotions reportedly includes: a vulnerability to 'sudden unpredictable behaviour', including 'drinking binges, wild driving, a blatantly destructive affair, or a violent outburst' — all of which Goldberg poetically describes as 'spoutings of the inner, hidden vocano [sic.]'; a propensity to 'drive those closely involved with him "crazy"' and to distance himself from others, becoming 'increasingly lonely alienated, numb and with a deepening sense of futility about relationships', so that when 'he's
caught in his own turmoil, confusion, pain, and conflict his only alternative is to withdraw even more or to numb himself with alcohol or drugs'; a proneness to 'emotional upsets and disturbances such as depression, withdrawal, anxiety, pseudo-euphoria, etc.' and to 'countless psychophysiological disorders' such as 'backaches, fatigue, headaches, bowel problems and ulcers' (p.59).

There is, potentially, another and much older account for the emergence of the 'inexpressive male' which can be seen to be embedded in the assumptions underlying both sex role theory and M/F scales. Since the Enlightenment and the emergence of Modernism, men have been associated with the exercise of reason and its privileging over nature (Seidler, 1997). Reason, rather than 'natural' phenomena, such as the passions, became privileged as the basis for authority and the exercise of power. The subjugation and subordination of 'nature' to 'reason', embodied in the emerging natural sciences, was the ultimate project of Modernism. Thus, women's association with nature, arguably a result of their being constructed as closer to nature through their more involved role as mothers, constituted a basis for their devaluation (Merchant, 1980; Ruether, 1995). Modernism, Seidler argues, is the basis for men's subordination of women and men's subordination of their own 'natural' emotions. The discourse of the 'emotional female', argued to be an instrument of women's marginalization by men, finally found its partner in the emergence of the 'unemotional' or 'inexpressive' male.

However, as was alluded to above, there exists a healthy degree of scepticism as to the extent to which male authors' accounts of men as victims within the
sex role literature really represented an engagement with feminism and more particularly an acceptance of responsibility on the part of men for the gender relations that feminism sought to redress (Shields, 2002). It could be argued that the emergence of the discourse of the ‘inexpressive male’, supposed to be as much a victim as women were of the dominant cultural norms that constituted patriarchy, simply represented attempts by self-flagellating authors to disavow responsibility on the part of men for the roles that they played in the maintenance of patriarchy and the denial of the material and power dividends that they received in return.

What is beyond doubt in discussions of the relationship between men, masculinity and emotion is the status that is accorded to emotion. Emotions are consistently conceptualized in essentialist terms, as naturally occurring, ontologically existent psychological and physiological phenomena.³ Nowhere is this more apparent than in work of Victor Seidler (1989, 1994, 1995, 1997). Seidler is, perhaps, the most prolific author of commentaries on men’s relationship with emotions; his work epitomises the extent to which representations of the ‘inexpressive’ male are reified through accounts of individual experience and therapeutic practice within academic literature. Further, his work exemplifies attempts to make the political project of feminism

³ Alternative, critical conceptualisations of and approaches to the study of emotions and the implications that these might have for the theorizing of relationships between men, masculinity and emotion will be discussed in greater depth below.
and the questioning of masculinity personal to the lives of individual men through a focus on the relative statuses of ‘reason’ and ‘emotion’.

2.1.2 A brief critical analysis of the work of Victor Seidler

As one of the most prolific writers on the topic, the contribution of Victor Seidler to contemporary theories of men, masculinity and emotion should not be underestimated. That said, as will be shown in the following discussion, Seidler’s work is hardly contemporary in terms of its complexity or sophistication (see Petersen, 1998). Simply, Seidler’s approach combines an essentialist view of emotions with an account of masculinity that is, in equal measure, both essentialist and normative. This approach and the discourses that constitute it are apparent in the following quotation:

There is something misguided about a theoretical position which asserts that there is something "wrong", "defective" or "inadequate" in masculinity itself, thereby leaving no space for men to change their experience as men. A rationalist construction of masculinity, whereby men see themselves as having to prove their masculinity constantly against some kind of an ideal, is given a new form when men are attempting to squeeze themselves into a new mould, even one provided by feminism, of what "a man is to be like". This continues in a new form an old Protestant tradition that says that men are unacceptable as they are, that men’s natures are somehow evil. This fosters the notion that men can only be acceptable if they forsake their masculinity. (Seidler, 1994, p.114)
As is evident above, Seidler’s approach to the ‘problem of the unemotional male’ is to frame it as resulting from men being compelled to ‘squeeze’ their essentially masculine selves, theorised as having an essential emotional component, into socially prescribed sex roles, either of ‘traditional masculinity’ or of feminist-‘provided’ or feminist-inspired masculinity. The ‘crisis of masculinity’, for Seidler, springs from the tension between essential masculine emotional selves and the expectations, demands and requirements for men to ‘be masculine’, in one form or another, in contemporary Western cultures.

The crisis that heterosexual men are feeling about what it means to be a man responsive to the challenges of feminism is tied up with a pervasive cultural crisis to do with meaning and value. (Seidler, 1997, p.157)

To account for the tension theorised as existing between essential and normative masculinity, Seidler (1994, 1997) invokes the Enlightenment, Modernity and the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Normative masculinity is in tension with essential masculinity, so Seidler argues, because it is based upon a set of related dualisms that follow from the reason/emotion dualism and which include the Cartesian dualism of mind/body. A brief list of these related dualisms might include: reason/emotion, mind/body, men/women, masculinity/femininity, objective/subjective, dominant/subordinate, independent/dependent, invulnerable/vulnerable and strong/weak. The cultural
valorization of the first parts of these dualisms and vilification of the second parts lie at the heart of Seidler's theory of men, masculinity and emotion.

It is precisely the cultural valorization of the first parts of the above listed dualisms that Seidler identifies as the cause of the 'crisis of masculinity' and 'the problem of the unemotional male'. The first parts of these dualisms, that is to say the discourses which constitute the first parts of these dualisms are, are constitutive of the privileged epistemology of Western culture. Within Seidler's theory, contemporary men are represented as trapped by and torn between two competing epistemologies - the dominant epistemology of masculinism, reason, the mind and objectivity and the marginalized, but nonetheless challenging, epistemology of feminism, emotion, the body and subjectivity. Owing to the cultural and ideological dominance of the former, Seidler argues that, as boys, men learn to deny their emotional experiences, to the extent that men 'lose the capacity to discern different emotions' and as a consequence they 'weaken a connection with significant aspects of our experience' (1997, p.138). Seidler goes on to argue that, for men, the dissociation of emotion words from emotional experiences becomes manifest at a somatic level, to such an extent that '[n]o longer do we choose not to express a fear [but] we begin not to experience the fear itself because we do not want to be reminded of emotions which can compromise a sense of male identity' (1997, p.138). The net result of this is said to be that as men 'we lose connection with our inner selves' (1997, p.172).
For Seidler, the implications of men's disconnection from their essential masculine emotional selves are much the same as those reported by Goldberg (1976) and Jourard (1974):

We fear showing ourselves as vulnerable and dependent human beings... [w]e feel terrified of losing the only kind of control we know [and] we barely know what we feel and desire. But, rather than face the pain and reality of this impoverishment, we will withdraw into ourselves. We will refuse to talk about feelings, nagged by a terrible desperation of an inner vacuum. We might get angry at a partner who is insisting that we say what we feel is going on. It is easy to feel cornered and just hit back. (1989, pp.50-51)

Further, Seidler argues, the cultural vilification of the epistemology of emotions, the body and subjectivity supports the instantiation of power relations, at an interpersonal level, on the basis of emotion:

In everyday relationships...men can silence the challenges of women by refusing to listen to their emotional "outbursts" until they "calm down" and learn to "talk rationally". ... It is only if women learn to "talk rationally" that they will be listened to, otherwise what they say will be denigrated – it will be treated as noise rather than speech. It is as if
language becomes "rational" if it is deprived of its emotional intensity and power. (1994, p.28)

Thus, Seidler argues, men's compulsory subscription to the epistemology of reason, the mind and objectivity results in their estrangement from their own emotional lives and from the emotional lives of others. Power relations at intrapsychic and interpersonal levels, the exercise of self-control and of control over others, are based upon the devaluing and marginalization of the epistemology of emotions, the body and subjectivity.

Seidler's proposed solution to the 'crisis of masculinity' and to 'the problem of the unemotional male' is unsurprising and disappointing. Despite claiming the need to challenge the Cartesian dualism of mind/body previously implicated in the constitution of 'the unemotional male', he reproduces it in his advocacy of 'men learning to take greater responsibility for their emotional lives' (1994, p.41) and in the benefits that, he claims, would follow if men expressed emotion more freely:

When we let some of these emotions go we are often struck by just how much energy has been taken up in suppressing them. If there is a clearance, as opposed simply to a movement of energy, we are often

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4 The issue of the functions served by the paralinguistic qualities of speech in constituting an utterance or an interaction as 'emotional' will be attended to in chapter 6. As Seidler goes on to argue, 'It is not simply a matter of what we say but also of how we speak.' (1994, p.28)
left with a greater sense of freedom. We can recognize just how much
tension we have been carrying around and how this tension was also
lived out in the ways we are often blocked in our intimate relationships.

(1997, p.147)

Seidler's invocation of the 'hydraulic conception of emotions', credited to
Foucault (1980) – though it is a general feature of many metaphors for
emotional experience and expression (Lakoff, 1987) – evidences the
contention that, for Seidler, emotions are essential, ontologically existent and
physiologically manifest phenomena.

The ultimate project for men with regard to emotions, as Seidler sees it, is for
men to recognise the violence done by their adherence to the ideology of
masculinism and then to reconnect with their essentially masculine and
emotional 'self':5 'There is a growing sense that men with diverse
masculinities have to recover an inner relationship to self which allows them to
recognize what particular nourishments they are getting from different
relationships and activities' (1997, p.218.) For Seidler, the most important
lesson that men need to learn is that their identities are not 'located in [their]
minds alone' (1997, p.156) but in their bodies as well.

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5 Although Seidler (1997) is at pains to point out that he advocates this reconnection be
achieved in a different manner to that advocated by Bly (1990) in his well-known but often
As can be seen in the above quotations, Seidler consistently conceptualises emotion, gender and the self in essentialist terms in an attempt to relate social theory to the lives and experiences of individual men. Therein lie the two most substantial problems with Seidler’s theories. The first is that, in retaining the essentialist category of ‘men’, he assumes a commonality of men’s experiences and men’s bodies, which is apparent in his recursive use of first person plural pronouns. In common with many other writers on masculinity, particularly within the psychoanalytic tradition (Biddulph, 1995; Cohen, 1990, Keen, 1992; Jackson, 1992), Seidler adopts a confessional style of writing, in which his own experiences are drawn upon to illustrate emotional phenomena that are argued to be general to all men (see his discussion on the effects of attending boarding school in Seidler (1997). At best, Seidler’s own experiences and consequently his accounts of masculinity and emotion may sound familiar to other white, middle-class, heterosexual, Jewish, educated men, but they may sound alien and unfamiliar to men of different generations, classes, ethnicities and sexualities. In emphasising the effects of the cultural dominance of the masculinist epistemology of reason, the mind and objectivity and by assuming an essential commonality between men, Seidler elides the uniqueness of men’s individual experiences of ‘being men’.

The second major problem lies in Seidler’s essentialist and humanistic conceptualisation of emotions. Emotions are conceptualised as reflections of the status and the needs of the ‘true’ inner self. Consequently, by proposing that men need to reconnect with emotion, Seidler advocates, at an individual level, a reduction in adherence to the masculinist epistemology of reason and
the mind and a reappraisal and revaluing of the feminist epistemology of emotions and the body. For Seidler, emotions represent the source of knowledge that should be privileged if ‘the problem of the unemotional male’ is to be solved and if men are to stop doing damage both to themselves and to those around them. As Petersen puts it, Seidler’s theories are ‘based on the premise that there is a stable, gender-specific, emotional realm, unmediated by history, culture and the specificities of situation, and that the self operates as a fully autonomous, rational ego’ (1998, p.91).

Seidler’s theories of the relationship between men, masculinity and emotions are, therefore, uninformed by the contemporary movements of poststructuralism and social constructionism. Indeed, Seidler actively resists poststructuralist and postmodernist conceptualisations of the subject. He criticizes postmodern discussions within feminism as having ‘focused upon whether feminism assumes a unified notion of “woman” and so of a subject who is oppressed and can be liberated. Sadly some postmodern feminism misses the point in its rejection of a discourse of oppression’ (1997, p.4). Further, he claims that recourse to experience should not be ‘dismissed as a form of humanism and essentialism’ and argues that it provides a ‘grounding [for] what we have to say’ and does not constitute ‘a lack of theoretical sophistication’ (1997, p.4). He is similarly dismissive of social constructionist conceptualisations of emotions as providing ‘no handle with which to work with ourselves. It makes it hard to recognize that acknowledging feelings of jealousy and possessiveness might help us start dealing with these feelings in ourselves’ (1989, p. 36). With regard to masculinity, Seidler attacks those
contemporary approaches that have attempted 'to treat masculinity as a set of social practices and to theorize a hegemonic masculinity' – an approach, which he argues, 'was not open to the contradictory nature of men's lives and their complex relationships with diverse masculinities' (1997, p.4, emphasis in original). For Seidler, masculinities, whether essential or normative, are things with which men have relationships. Seidler's male subject is an autonomous and rational agent. Consequently, at this most basic level, Seidler's work will always be in conflict with the poststructuralist and social constructionist approaches to gender and emotion mentioned briefly above, which will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

2.1.3 Social structural theories of masculinity

It is self-evident that within the psychological and sociological literature, discourses of masculinity are intrinsic to accounts of such varied phenomena as men's relationships with their emotions, their bodies and their 'selves', as well as their relationships with women and with other men. Yet, as Connell states, '[t]he definition of the basic term in the discussion has never been wonderfully clear' (1995, p.67). Masculinity can be defined in essentialist, positivist, normative and semiotic terms, as, respectively, the central essence of maleness, as 'what men actually are', as 'what men ought to be' and as the product of symbolic difference, i.e. not femininity (Connell, 1995). Frequently, in texts on men and masculinity, these differing definitions of masculinity may not be acknowledged and may even be conflated (see the above discussion of the work of Victor Seidler).
An alternative and contemporarily prominent alternative is to conceive of 'masculinity' at a sociological level, as a part of a structure of social relations. As Connell defines it, masculinity is 'simultaneously a place in gender relations, the practices through which men and women engage that place in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experience, personality and culture' (1995, p.71). The fundamental premise upon which Connell’s social structural theory of gender and, consequently, of masculinity and femininity is built is 'the single structural fact [of] the global dominance of men over women' (Connell, 1987, p.183). Through the development of the concept of 'hegemonic' masculinity (Carrigan, Connell & Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987, 1995), social structures, particularly of power relations, are made central to the concept of gender.

As the above definitions of masculinity demonstrate, the proximity of 'masculinity' to the lives of 'men' is entirely dependent upon the level at which it is theorised. Across the various definitions, the lives of 'men' are constitutive of 'masculinity' but are constrained by it. Similarly, in their day-to-day lives, 'men' are argued to benefit from 'masculinity', though it constitutes power relations that benefit some 'men' at the expense of other 'men'. The obvious complexities of the relationship between 'men' and 'masculinity', engendered by the use of singular categories, have inevitably given rise to pluralism. Thus, following Connell (1995), it is typical to talk of 'masculinities' and to identify possible 'masculinities' with relatively discrete categories of 'men', organised through the use of familiar social categories such as age, sexuality, class and ethnicity or through reference to the particular cultural ideals or political
projects with which they are aligned, e.g. 'pro-feminist', 'new' or 'unreconstructed' (Connell, 1995; Marriott, 1996; Segal, 1997; Whitehead, 2002).

From a social constructionist perspective, and though it is undeniably theoretically useful, the move toward multiple masculinities seems to speak of a level of essentialism. The categories that are used to construct differences between men at a 'material' level, e.g. of sexuality, class and/or ethnicity, are reproduced uncritically in the plurality of 'masculinities'. Thus, the theorised power relations between white and black 'masculinities' or between straight and gay 'masculinities' are predicated on the relative locations of 'white' and 'black', 'straight' and 'gay' 'men' respectively, in historical, cultural and social structures of 'materially enacted' power relations. This approach appears to assume that 'essential' or 'material' differences between 'men' are determinate of 'men's' individual relationships with the possibilities that are available within a plurality of masculinities, i.e., 'gay men' do 'gay masculinity’, 'black men' do ‘black masculinity’. Connell is aware of this possibility and cautions against ‘the acknowledgement of multiple masculinities collapsing into a character

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I use 'straight' reflexively. Given that 'straight' is a part of a pair of terms (gay and straight) that are used by 'gay' men, I am not convinced by the argument that the use of 'straight' to refer to 'heterosexual' men implies, through antonyms, a pejorative construction of 'gay' or 'homosexual' men as 'bent'. The context of a discussion of sexualities subverts the meanings of these words and changes their antonyms. Further, as a consequence of my objection to the use of the clinical and pathologizing term 'homosexual' in relation to 'gay' men, I reject the use of 'heterosexual' in relation to 'straight' men.
typology' (Connell, 1995, p.76). This possibility can be avoided, so Connell argues, by maintaining a necessary 'focus on the gender relations between men' (Connell, 1995, p.76). It is not, therefore, assumed that it is the characteristics of the men who subscribe to particular masculinities that determine the relationships between masculinities. Rather, it is the organisation of 'masculinities' in a social structure of power relations that is assumed to determine the relative values of the men who subscribe to them and, therefore, to constitute men's relationships with each other.

Connell accomplishes the maintenance of this necessary focus on the gender relations between men through his focus on and development of the concept of 'hegemonic' masculinity (see Demetriou (2001) and Donaldson (1993) for critical engagements with the concept of 'hegemonic masculinity):

'Hegemonic masculinity' is not a fixed character type, always and everywhere the same. It is, rather, the masculinity that occupies the hegemonic position in a given pattern of gender relations, a position always contestable. (Connell, 1995, p.76)\(^7\)

\(^7\) The concept of 'hegemony' is derived from Gramsci (1971) and is taken by Connell to mean 'a social ascendancy achieved in a play of social forces that extends beyond contests of brute power into the organization of private life and cultural processes' (1987, p.184). Importantly, it is claimed that 'though "hegemony" does not refer to an ascendancy based on brute force, it is not incompatible with ascendancy based on brute force' and that '"hegemony" does not mean total cultural dominance, the obliteration of alternatives. It means ascendancy achieved within
Again, it is worth stating that Connell's theorising of gender as a social structure is based upon one structural fact: 'the global dominance of men over women' (Connell, 1987, p.183). Thus, hegemonic masculinity is also defined as 'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women' (Connell, 1995, p.77). Between masculinities, sexuality is advanced as the primary dimension along which power relations are constituted: 'The most important case [of gender relations between groups of men] in contemporary European/American society is the dominance of heterosexual men and the subordination of homosexual men' (1995, p.78). Gay masculinity is argued to be 'the repository of whatever is symbolically expelled from hegemonic masculinity, the items ranging from fastidious taste in home decoration to receptive anal pleasure' (1995, p.78). As a consequence of the definition of hegemonic masculinity by opposition, both as not feminine and not gay, gay masculinity becomes symbolically allied to femininity and a further dimension of subordination is opened up for men who, though not necessarily gay themselves, display effeminate characteristics.

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...a balance of forces, that is, a state of play' (1987, p.184). Hegemonic masculinity, therefore, is conceptualized as a contested location in a dynamic system of gender power relations.
However reluctant Connell may be to identify the characteristics that might constitute hegemonic masculinity, focusing instead on its defining feature as the dominant location in a structure of power relations, he does go so far as to suggest the existence of a relatively stable pattern. Comparing it to the male sex role, Connell states that '[t]he number of men rigorously practising the hegemonic pattern in its entirety may be quite small' (1995, p.79). Whilst this concession can be interpreted as an attempt to relate hegemonic masculinity to the lives of 'real' men, it is perhaps best interpreted as an indication of the number and range of practices that are potentially constitutive of hegemonic masculinity. Whilst hegemonic masculinity, through an analysis of those men who seem to wield power, e.g. President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, may appear to be constituted by the practices of white, heterosexual, middle-aged and middle-class men, this would be a gross oversimplification. As a system of practices, hegemonic masculinity will elude definition in abstract theoretical discussions. Hegemonic masculinity, defined as a location in gender power relations, can only be identified on those occasions and in those contexts where one masculinity demonstrably occupies a position of dominance relative to other genders, masculine and feminine. What is necessary, therefore, is an interpretative framework and analytic technique that will support an empirical engagement with the constitution of masculinity in practice. Such an interpretative framework and analytic technique can be found within poststructuralism.
2.2 Poststructuralist accounts of masculinity

As stated in chapter 1, this thesis operates from a poststructuralist perspective, i.e. it operates from a perspective within which language is assumed to be constitutive of subjects and objects and the meaning of any word or phrase is interpretable only by its relation to others. 'Traditional' approaches to gender and masculinity, where the ontological 'reality' of sexed bodies is assumed and from which terms like 'man' and 'masculine' might be assumed to derive their meaning, are wholly incompatible with such an approach. Therefore, both a poststructuralist theory of gender and a poststructuralist approach to the topic of masculinity are required.

2.2.1 Poststructuralist theory

Arguably the most prominent poststructuralist theory of gender is that developed by Judith Butler. For all the complexity of Butler's style of writing (see Salih, 2002, for a discussion of Butler's writing style) and without wishing to oversimplify what are undeniably complex texts, both in terms of their topics and the style in which they are written, the central themes of Butler's main works Gender Trouble (1999; 2nd edition) and Bodies that Matter: On the discursive limits of sex (1993) are quite straightforward. Located as these texts are within poststructuralist and postmodernist thinking, they emphasize the constitutive role of language. Broadly speaking, language is theorized as constitutive not only of the social categories and concepts that govern day-to-day life, such as 'men' and 'women', 'gender' and 'sexuality', and 'masculinity' and 'femininity', but also of the 'ontological' status of objects, in particular of 'sexed' and 'gendered' bodies. In this regard, Butler's work has a unique
appeal. It inverts, from the very outset, one of the obdurate problems of the literature on gender: that of how theories of gender, of 'masculinity' and of 'femininity' relate to the day-to-day lives of supposedly 'ontologically' existent 'men' and 'women' (Butler, 1999).

For Butler, the categories of gender are products of compulsory heterosexuality. Consequently, identities are constituted by and located within the heterosexual matrix: 'The heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between 'feminine' and 'masculine', where these are understood as expressive attributes 'male' and 'female' (Butler, 1999, p.23). Further, in constituting gender categories and gendered and sexed bodies within an 'oppositional, binary gender system' (1999, p.30), compulsory heterosexuality is implicated in constituting the 'limits of gendered possibilities' (ibid.). The social and cultural intelligibility of the categories of 'sex' and of 'gender' and of 'sexed' and 'gendered' bodies is argued to be determined by compulsory heterosexuality.

This constitutive force of language has huge implications for the functions served by particular speech acts within particular systems of language.

Following from a discussion of Wittig's *The Mark of Gender* —

[A]s far as the categories of the person are concerned, both [English and French] are bearers of gender to the same extent. Both indeed give way to a primitive ontological concept the enforces in language a division of beings into sexes (Wittig, 1985, p.4)
Butler (1999) argues that Wittig's view is corroborated by that popular discourse on gender identity that uncritically employs the inflectual attribution of "being" to genders and to "sexualities". The unproblematic claim to "be" a woman and "be" heterosexual would be symptomatic of that metaphysics of gender substance (p.29). Thus, a discursive act whereby a speaker makes such a claim — Butler gives the example of Aretha Franklin singing 'You make me feel like a natural woman' (1999, p.30) — presupposes and reinforces the idea of gender as a binary system and calls into being, within the restrictions of the presupposed system of social and cultural intelligibility, a simultaneously sexed and gendered being and body. As Butler argues, 'one is one's gender to the extent that one is not the other gender' (1999, p.30).

Of course the discursive constitution of gendered and sexed identities is rarely as explicit as that sung by Aretha Franklin. Consequently, gender, referring jointly to what is elsewhere conceived of separately as 'sex' and 'gender', is argued to be constituted through a system of highly stylised and regulated acts. The idea of gender performativity is arguably Butler's most significant contribution to the theorizing of gender:

[A]cts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means. That the gendered body is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the
various acts which constitute its reality. (1999, p.173, emphasis in original)

The compatibility of the theory of gender performativity – in which gendered acts and attributes are interpretable not as expressing an identity but as constitutive of it – with the epistemological approach that informs this thesis – in which language is interpreted not as reflecting a reality but as constitutive of it – makes the concept of gender performativity highly appealing as an interpretative lens.

The theory of gender performativity, with its emphasis on the constitutive force of acts, including discursive acts and attributes, may create the impression that gender is highly malleable and amenable to change simply through subversive acts. Indeed Butler (1999) highlights the possibilities for multiplicity and for change that are constituted by a theory of gender performativity. However, to conclude that gender, its categories, practices and institutions, can simply be undone by subversive acts is to succumb to an illusion. The categories, practices, institutions and power relations of gender, constituted through signifying acts and, for the most part, constrained within an oppositional, binary system, have a temporal dimension; gender in its present form has a social

8 My use of ‘illusion’ is not intended to imply that there is a ‘material reality’ of gendered categories, practices and institutions that is resistant to change. Rather it is intended to imply that the suggestion that change can be brought about by subversive acts woefully underestimates the weight of culture and history that can be brought to bear in the maintenance of gendered categories, practices and institutions.
and cultural history that cannot be so easily undone. The relationship between language and gender performativity is self-perpetuating over time. The attention to the temporality of gender performativity, expressed through the emphasis that is placed upon reiteration, repetition and re-production, is one of the great strengths of Butler's theories. Importantly, repetition and reiteration are not conceived of as effects of agency — I will orient to Butler's discussion of agency shortly — but as effects of discourse. According to Butler, performativity should not be understood as 'the act by which a subject brings into being what she/he names, but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains' (1993, p.2).

In an attempt to answer some the criticisms raised by the theory of gender performativity, specifically, that it negated the materiality of the body, Butler develops a theory of 'materiality' in specific relation to sexed and gendered bodies. In this theory, materiality is 'rethought as the effect of power, as power's most productive effect' (1993, p.2). Drawing upon the notion of the 'regulatory ideal', Butler argues that 'sex', here interpreted as referring to male and female bodies — themselves theorised as a consequence of gender — is normative but that it functions not only as a norm but as 'part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies that it governs' (1993, p.1). The materialization of 'sex', it is argued, is compelled by its status as a 'regulatory ideal' and is accomplished (or not) through 'certain highly regulated practices' (1993, p.1):
In other words, 'sex' is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through time. It is not a simple fact or static condition of a body, but a process whereby regulatory norms materialize sex and achieve this materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms. (ibid.)

As with gender or, rather, as an effect of gender, the materiality of sex is theorised as a consequence of compulsory heterosexuality; 'the regulatory norms of "sex" work in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of bodies and, more specifically, to materialize the body's sex, to materialize sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexual imperative' (1993, p.2).

One further issue requires elucidation, the issue of power. Power is central to many feminist theories of gender. In these theories, it is typically conceived as manifest in the institutions and practices of patriarchy but as contingent upon the uncritically presupposed material relations between men and women. Given Butler's critical take on the materiality of sexed and gendered bodies, it is important to identify how she theorises the mechanism by which the substantive 'content' or 'qualities' of sexed and gendered bodies and the relationships between them are determined. Drawing upon the work of Foucault and upon Discipline and Punish (1977) in particular, Butler argues that the grammar of the relationship between subjects and objects imposes upon 'power' a 'metaphysics of external relations' (p.30) that is misleading. Power, it is argued, is not a 'subject' that acts upon bodies as 'objects': 'the body is not an independent materiality that is invested by power relations
external to it, but it is that for which materialization and investiture [with power relations] are coextensive' (1993, p.34). Consequently, to attempt to theorise a structure or system that is determinate of power, such as patriarchy, which results both in bodies being sexed and gendered and in their relative positions in structures of power relations, is to be misled by the metaphysical effects of grammar. As Butler reiterates, "[m]ateriality" designates a certain effect of power or, rather, is power in its formative and constituting effects' (1993, p.34; emphasis in original). Power, then, must be oriented to and understood at the level of 'materiality', in the constituted 'materiality' of sexed and gendered bodies and the constructed 'material' relations between them.

One of the aims of this thesis is to examine the utility of Butler's concept of 'gender performativity' and the assumptions upon which it is based as a framework for the interpretation of the discursive acts and accomplishments of sexed – 'male' – and gendered – 'masculine' – speakers. While Butler's poststructuralist theories of gender have not previously been subjected to empirical examination, poststructuralist theory has previously informed engagements with the topic of masculinity. It is to these existing examples of poststructuralist practice that I will now turn.

2.2.2 Poststructuralist practice

The relatively small body of literature with which this thesis is most closely aligned is dominated by the work of Margaret Wetherell and Nigel Edley (Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1998, 1999); but see also Coyle and Morgan-Sykes (1998),
Phoenix, Frosh and Pattman (2003), Gough (1998, 2001), Gough and Edwards (1998), Speer (2001a, 2001b), Toerien and Durrheim (2001), Walton (2003), Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2003, 2004) and Willott and Griffin (1997). Within and across these works, the central concern has been to identify the ways that male speakers negotiate masculine identities. In the studies that draw upon empirical evidence, this has been done, almost without exception, through the use of focus group or interview data (Edley & Wetherell, 1997, 1999, 2001; Gough, 1998a, 1998b, 2001; Speer, 2001a; Walton, Coyle & Lyons, 2003, 2004; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1999; Willott & Griffin, 1997). The two exceptions are Coyle and Morgan-Sykes (1998) and Toerien and Durrheim (2001), which draw respectively upon newspaper and magazine articles on the topic of men and masculinity.

In the majority of studies in this literature, men are interviewed or participate in focus group discussions on the topics of men and masculinity, though these topics may be approached from a number of different angles, for example through discussions of ‘fatherhood’ (Edley & Wetherell, 1997) or ‘feminism’ (Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Gough, 2001). However, across these works, there is a tension between the particular analytic approaches adopted and the implications that these have for the arguments that can be advanced about men’s relationships with masculinity (Edley, 2001; Speer, 2001a, 2001b; Wetherell & Edley, 1999). This debate, specifically concerned with the topic of masculinity, reflects the much broader debate about the theoretical and practical utility of various discourse-based approaches and the potential usefulness of their combination (see the debates between Schegloff (1997,
1998) and Wetherell (1998) and between Billig (1999a, 1999b) and Schegloff (1999a, 1999b)). Whilst, this debate is of undeniable importance, it will not be discussed at length here, though it will recur in the outlining of the analytic approach adopted within this thesis in the following chapter. In this review, with its specific focus on masculinity, only one aspect of this debate will be oriented to, that being the implications that differing approaches have for the theorised relationship between discourse and the speaking subject.

At its most simple, this issue is reducible to the tension between the theorising of speakers as the producers or as the products of discourse. In this literature, at the heart of this debate lies the issue of the purpose for which masculinity might be argued to be constituted. From the ethnomethodology and conversation analysis-inspired discursive psychological perspective (Speer, 2001a, 2001b), speakers, including men in focus group discussions on the topic of men and masculinity, are argued to negotiate their identities relative to the discursive topics as a means of managing certain local concerns, i.e. concerns that are specific to that interactional context. From the Foucauldian poststructuralist discourse analytic perspective (Edley & Wetherell, 1997, 1999, 2001; Wetherell & Edley, 1999), speakers are argued to be constituted by the discursive resources invoked in the negotiation of less local, more macro-level concerns, such as the negotiation of ideological dilemmas (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988), one of which might be argued to be the performance of gender. Thus, whilst the former is open to the criticism of failing to acknowledge the ideological and political power of
discourse, the latter can be criticised as advancing a theory of 'discourse
determinism' and an inattention to the local details of social interaction.

It is, however, important to note that the resulting conceptualisations of the
subject, as they are apparent in discursive psychology (Edwards, 1997;
Edwards & Potter, 1992; Speer, 2001a, 2001b) and in Foucauldian discourse
Willig, 2003), are not incompatible. The former may focus on the speakers’
orientations or their negotiation of accountability, both of which could be read
as implying a conscious agentic subject, but theorists working within this
approach remain determinedly agnostic on such possibilities and look only to
the data, the collected talk or texts, for such features; a speaker's orientation to
a particular local concern is only talked about as such if it is identifiable in the
text. The subject that emerges within discursive psychology is not, therefore,
incompatible with the above identified poststructuralist, discursively constituted
subject. It is perhaps not surprising that the argument has been made for the
compatibility and integration of these two approaches and, indeed, for the
inexpediency of the conceptualisation of them as two separate approaches
(Coyle, 2000; Wetherell, 1998). As far as the performance of analysis is
concerned, this whole issue is largely reducible to the question of where the
analysts should look, i.e. to micro- or macro-textual contexts, when trying to
answer the classic question 'Why this utterance now?'

It is precisely this consideration that can be used to differentiate between the
above listed discourse-based studies. They can, for the most part, be identified
by their focus on the constitution of masculinity as an orientation to some local interactional concern, such as the negotiation of accountability, or as relative to a more macro-textual cultural or ideological concern, such as the maintenance of hetero-patriarchal privilege. There is also a further subtle distinction between these two approaches, which is related to the issue of speakers as either the producers or the products of discourse. The latter approach, the Foucauldian poststructuralist perspective, sees speakers as the products of discourse, determined and organised by identifiable and categorical discursive resources and the relations that are assumed to exist between them. The range of discursive resources that could be argued to be contemporarily and culturally existent and through which speakers might be constituted as masculine is huge – though some effort will be made to map these resources throughout this review. Sufficient to illustrate this point for the time being is the concept of hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan, Connell & Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987, 1995). Perhaps as a consequence of Connell's rather intangible definition of hegemonic masculinity, as 'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women' (1995, p. 77), analysts adopting discursive approaches to masculinity have attempted to identify what it might look like in practice. However, in doing so its defining feature, its conceptualisation as the configuration that normalizes or naturalizes the dominance of men in gender power relations, has been obscured by a focus on the particular resources or characteristics that might account for that dominance. The analytic lens focuses upon resources such as 'control'.
‘discipline’ and ‘rationality’ and their role in the constitution of forms of masculinity such as ‘heroic’, ‘ordinary’ and ‘rebellious’ (Wetherell & Edley, 1999), which, though they are not argued to be synonymous with hegemonic masculinity, are at least argued to be complicit in its maintenance. Within analyses adopting a more Foucauldian form of discourse analysis, hegemonic masculinity is argued to be constituted by the discursive resources or strategies identified by the analysts as functioning in the maintenance of men’s dominance and privilege in gender relations.

In contrast, the discursive psychological approach, inspired by ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, does not ascribe to discourse the status of ‘an extra-discursive, constraining influence on talk’ (Speer, 2001a, pp.111-112). Rather, within this approach, topics such as masculinity are treated as ‘worked up and made relevant in the interaction, not as external determinants’ (Speer, 2001a, p.113). Consequently, ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is treated within this approach as very much an analysts’ resource; an unnecessary and unwarranted imposition of a concept taken from feminist social theory, which, most importantly, does not appear explicitly in the talk of the participants themselves. That said, if, in discursive psychological analyses, the effort were made to identify resources that constituted hegemonic masculinity, it could only be done through the identification of those resources that functioned in the maintenance of male speakers’ positions of power and privilege within the local interactional context.
Whether it is theorised as accomplished through a negotiation of 'imaginary positions' (Wetherell & Edley, 1999) or through a negotiation of more local interactional concerns (Speer, 2001a), the most important question that can be asked of this literature is, what accounts of masculinity emerge from it? That is to say, when men talk about being men or negotiate their identities relative to topics such as fatherhood, feminism or homosexuality, what resources are interpreted and advanced as constituting the accomplishment of masculinity? Essentially, within this literature, what is taken to count as the constitution of a masculine identity?

The first qualification that must be made is that it would be misleading to attempt to answer such a question with a concept of a singular masculinity 'in mind'. Again, one of the most productive and important effects of Connell's concept of hegemonic masculinity and the emphasis on gender as a structure of power relations is that it created the space for plurality within the concept of masculinity (Connell, 1995); intuitively, there would be no need for the concept of hegemonic masculinity if masculinity were only theorised relative to femininity. Consequently, it is masculinities that are sought in discursive analyses and, therefore, the space is also created for potentially conflicting or apparently contradictory resources and accounts to be interpreted as constituting masculinity, in one form or another.

It should also be noted that the studies, from which the following list of features is generated, drew upon the talk of men of different ages, from 17 to 64 years of age, with differing employment histories and hailing from a range of differing,
but still British, locations. Further, the talk was generated in differing social contexts, from 'in and around the sixth-form common room of a UK-based independent boys' school' (Edley & Wetherell, 1997, 1999, 2001) to the flat of one of the researchers during a drinking session (Gough & Edwards, 1998). Similarly, the substantive focus of the various studies, e.g. an attention to talk about fatherhood (Edley & Wetherell, 1999), about feminism (Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Gough, 2001) or, seemingly, about anything at all (Gough & Edwards, 1998), determines the excerpts drawn upon and consequently the concepts relative to which masculinity might be argued to be constructed or accomplished.

Thus, in the following list of features interpreted as constituting masculinities, drawn from a range of discursive analyses of the topic, it should not be surprising to note that while there is a high level of coherence and consistency about what constitutes masculinity, there is also a great deal of variability and contradiction. Masculinity is reported as variously constituted by discourses of strength, both physical and mental, control over the self and others, intelligence and the capability for aggressive action. Further, these features are constructed as common to both the dispreferred and preferred versions of masculinity, those versions that speakers position themselves in opposition to or in resistance of and those that are consequently constituted and occupied (Edley & Wetherell, 1997). In relation to the topic of feminism, masculinity is 'both “pro” and “anti”, in favour and against, both supportive and at the same time, critical of feminists' (Edley & Wetherell, 2001, p.451; see also Gough, 2001). Also, masculinity is both magnanimous in supporting the dissolution of
patriarchal power and privilege and invested in its maintenance; it promotes equality in principle but it accedes responsibility for the maintenance of inequality in practice to extraneous factors, such as the free market and nature (Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Gough, 1998). It is sexist, racist, anti-feminist, homophobic, invested in the cultural significance of the male body and particularly of the phallus (Gough & Edwards, 1998). It is complementary to and, therefore, in part determined by the discursive production of female or feminine identities, both in public and in more private contexts, such as heterosexual relationships (Gough, 1998, 2001). Across all the studies listed here it is avowedly heterosexual. It is self-confidence, it is inauthentic, it is pretence, a mask, it is a prescribed 'mind-set', and it is a collectively determined way of being male, a 'hive mind' (Speer, 2001a). It is 'heroic', it is performance- and achievement-related, it is risk-taking and courageous. It is 'ordinary' and 'rebellious'; it is independent, autonomous and resistant to social expectations and stereotypes. It is a rational, authoritative, agentic, self-determining subject (Edley & Wetherell, 1999). It is hegemonic when 'what is most hegemonic is to be non-hegemonic' (Edley & Wetherell, 1999, p.351) It is, quite simply, all things to all men, and a lot of things to discourse analysts.

To date, the only discursive analyses to attend specifically to the relationship between constructions of masculinity and of emotions are those of Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2003, 2004) (but see also Coyle and Morgan-Sykes (1998) for a discussion of the implication of men's relationship with emotions in an analysis of newspaper representations of the 'crisis' in male mental health). In their analysis of men's talk about emotions, Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2004)
argued that the speakers simultaneously negotiated subject positions as both emotional beings and as masculine, through their alignments with constructions of the social acceptability of men's emotional expression as highly event- or context-specific. The experience of emotion in response to an event of a sufficiently high order of magnitude — the specific example given was the death of one's mother — was constructed as entirely warranted and appropriate for a man. However, they aligned themselves with an account in which the expression of that emotion through tears would only be socially acceptable for a man in a private context, e.g. in the home, and, in doing so, positioned themselves as masculine. To express emotion through tears in a public context, e.g. at work, was constructed as socially unacceptable for a man and therefore contradictory to the accomplishment of a masculine identity. However, variability again sneaks into these constructions of the relative social acceptability of public male emotional expression. The expression of emotion through tears and the expression of extreme joy were both constructed as socially acceptable for men if the event and context were sufficiently masculinized, e.g. if the emotions were expressed in relation to and in the context of a football match.

The above list of features is perhaps an inevitable consequence of the conceptualisation of masculinities, including hegemonic masculinity, as existent cultural resources and as constituted through combinations of particular interpretative repertoires and discourses. The variability in constructions of and the meanings ascribed to masculinity across contexts and between speakers has led theorists, working from both the identified camps, to
conclude that the idea of discrete, categorical masculinities is misleading and over-simplistic. 'What we can’t accept, however, is the common assumption that hegemonic masculinity is just one style or there is just one set of ruling ideas (most often understood as macho masculinity). Rather, there is a multiplicity of hegemonic sense-making relevant to the construction of masculinity identities' (Wetherell and Edley, 1999, p.351). This proposition is echoed by Speer: 'masculinity is not a mapping notion. There are a range of rhetorically effective constructions and reconstructions of masculinity that can be applied and reworked to include or exclude the self, and that are tailored to the local business at hand' (2001a, p.126). The effectiveness or the hegemony of the various resources identified above as potentially constitutive of masculinity is arguably highly dependent upon the interactional context, both as endogenously produced by the speakers in that context and as exogenously determined by the analysts.

2.3 Review of the literature on sex and gender differences in emotional experience and expression

2.3.1 Introduction

The empirical positivist literature on sex or gender differences in emotions may not, at first glance, be an obvious canon to engage with within a discourse analytic thesis on the relationships between men, masculinity and emotions. Indeed, a review of this literature within the context of this thesis is a difficult beast to manage. The review must engage with the terms, concepts and assumptions that are constitutive of this literature from a consistently social constructionist perspective. Particularly, this review is written from a
perspective that resists engaging with this literature, its complexities and its tensions in its own terms. That is to say, the authorial voice adopted in the review consistently locates the content of this literature within a social constructionist, discourse analytic framework. The most straightforward method of doing this is to focus on the predominant interpretative repertoires within this body of literature, i.e., the discursive resources that constitute the objects of 'sex', 'gender' and 'emotions', and the discursive resources that constitute the 'theoretical frameworks' that are invoked to make sense of or to account for the posited relationships between 'sex', 'gender' and 'emotions'.

Further, the review orients to the ways by which the predominant interpretative repertoires of this literature are both reproduced and reified through the various positivist methodologies employed. The review is attentive to the ways by which positivist methodologies, as discursive practices, are 'onto-formative'

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9 'Interpretative repertoires' are defined by Potter and Wetherell (1987) as 'recurrently used systems of terms used for characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena. A repertoire [ ] is constituted through a limited range of terms used in particular stylistic and grammatical constructions. Often a repertoire will be organized around specific metaphors and figures of speech (tropes)' (p.149). There are two reasons why the term 'interpretative repertoire' is used here in preference to 'discourse', which, as will be seen in the following section, carries similar meanings. Firstly, 'repertoire' implies a broad collection of 'resources' and secondly, what will be glossed as 'resources' in this broad-stroke analysis might, in a more detailed analysis, be readily categorised as 'discourses'.

10 The conceptualisation of 'interpretative repertoires' and 'discourses' as 'constitutive' of 'subjects' and 'objects' is grounded in social constructionist theory and will be expanded upon in the following chapter on discourse analytic methodologies.
and actively 'materialize' subjects and objects\textsuperscript{11}. That is to say, the review is concerned not only with mapping the predominant repertoires in this literature and the reproduction of that predominance through positivist methodologies but also with how the 'objects' and 'subjects' of those repertoires are made 'real'.

There is, of course, a huge body of literature on emotions upon which the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions depends for the various discourses that are constitutive of psychological engagements with 'emotions'. However, that literature is far too large to be reviewed in its entirety here (for existing reviews on emotions see Parkinson (1995), Ekman and Davidson (1994) and Oatley and Jenkins (1996)) and, indeed, such a review would be superfluous to the aims of this thesis. This review is limited only to the repertoires invoked in the literature on 'sex' and 'gender' differences in 'emotion', though the interpretation of those repertoires is informed by an understanding of the broader emotion literature. The rationale for the restriction of this review and for the engagement with this literature as a whole is:

- the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions reproduces the discursive resources that are available to and which might be drawn

\textsuperscript{11} See Edley and Wetherell's (1999) invocation of the concept of discourses of masculinity as 'onto-formative', which draws upon Rose (1996). See also Butler (1993) for an extended discussion of Foucault's (1977) conceptualisation of the relationship between discourse, power and materiality; 'Foucault traces the process of materialization as an investiture of discourse and power' (Butler, 1993, p.35).
upon by members of Western cultures in the construction of sexed or
gendered accounts of emotions

- the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions produces and
  reifies accounts of men's relationship with emotions and the relationship
  between masculinity and emotions

Consequently, engagement with this literature provides an overview of the
range of discursive resources that are culturally available for the construction
of accounts of the relationships between 'sex', 'gender' and 'emotions'.
Further, it provides a second account of men's relationship with emotions. It is
a curious feature of the masculinity literature that, in its construction of the
inexpressive or unemotional male, it does not commonly draw upon this body
of literature to warrant its claims, preferring to warrant claims for the existence
of such a character with references to therapeutic practice (Gratch, 2001) or
through confessional styles of writing (Seidler, 1997). Whilst men's relationship
with emotions may not be its singular focus, an inevitable consequence of the
literature on sex and gender differences in emotions is that it does produce
accounts of men's relationships with emotion, the relationships between
masculinity and emotions and even men's relationships with masculinity
mediated through emotions. For a social psychological thesis on the
relationships between men, masculinity and emotions, even one operating
from a discourse analytic perspective, the literature on sex and gender
differences in emotions cannot and should not be ignored or glossed over.
The following review is structured in accordance with the above-outlined rationale. In the first section, the predominant repertoires of the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions are identified. This includes the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' and the various repertoires that are invoked in the construction of 'emotions', e.g. emotions as 'experiences' and as 'expressions'. The analysis is not a fine-grained discursive psychological analysis\textsuperscript{12}. Rather, it is a 'broad-stroke' identification of the repertoires invoked in the literature. The warrant for such an approach is one of utility. The identification of these repertoires and their identification as repertoires highlight their taken-for-granted status. Simply, what are here identified as 'repertoires' are the concepts that are, within the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, taken to be self-evidently 'real'. One of the purposes of this review is to call that status into question.

The second section of the review consists of two parts. The first part focuses on the repertoires of 'aetiology', i.e., the repertoires that are invoked in the prediction of or in accounting for 'sex' or 'gender' differences in 'emotions'. These are argued to constitute the bases for the reification of any observed relationships between 'sex', 'gender' and 'emotions'. The second part involves an engagement with the processes by which these repertoires are reproduced and reified. Briefly, those processes are the methodologies employed in

\textsuperscript{12} See the following chapter on the discourse analytic methodologies for an account of what constitutes a 'fine-grained discursive psychological analysis'.

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positivist examinations of the veracity of the axiom that men and women differ with regard to emotions.

The third and final section of the review is a brief outlining of the relationships between men, masculinity and emotions that are reproduced and reified through positivist examinations of sex and gender differences in emotions. That is to say, the representations of men's relationships with emotions and the accounts that are offered for them, which are reproduced and reified as 'actual material facts' through the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, will be outlined.

Following the review of the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, the conceptualisation of 'emotions' within this thesis is outlined. Briefly, the approach to emotions adopted in this thesis combines a social constructionist, discursive psychological concern with the functions served by emotion discourses (Edwards, 1997, 1999) with a social functionalist view of emotions as interpersonal communication and as fundamentally constitutive of social relationships (de Rivera, 1984; Fridlund, 1991, 1994; Parkinson, 1995; Smith & Lazarus, 1993).

2.3.2 The discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' and the repertoires of 'emotion'

In their outlining of a discourse analytic approach to categories and categorization, Potter and Wetherell (1987) argued against the cognitive account of categories (Wilder, 1986) as constraining potential determinants of
'bias and stereotyping' (p.118). I am of course in agreement with Potter and Wetherell's (1987) conceptualisation of categories as flexible and contextually occasioned resources that are drawn upon in everyday talk. However, Wilder's observation regarding the potentially deterministic effects of categories (see also Hamilton, 1979; Taylor, 1981) is particularly apposite when considering the repertoires, discourses and discursive resources that constitute and constrain the established psychological literature on sex and gender differences in emotion.

What are outlined below as repertoires and discourses are, within the positivist paradigm, simply the terms of the debate; they are the straightforward representations of ontologically existent objects, such as the male and female sexes, masculine and feminine personalities and emotional experiences and expressions. However, the view taken of language within the positivist paradigm is not the view of language that is taken within this thesis. Hence, in this thesis, the repertoires and discourses outlined below are taken to be constitutive of the objects with which positivist examinations are concerned. As such, these repertoires and discourses are viewed as directly determinate of the methodologies that are employed. This first part of this section attends to the discourses\textsuperscript{13} of sex and gender. The second part attends to the various interrelated repertoires of emotion.

\textsuperscript{13} The term 'discourses' is used here in preference to 'repertoires' because there is a comparatively small range of discursive resources that are constitutive of 'sex' and 'gender'. Thus, whilst 'sex' and 'gender' can clearly be identified as discrete discourses, as will be seen
2.3.2.1 Discourses of sex and gender

It is self-evident that two of the predominant discourses in the psychological literature on sex and gender differences are the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender'. Briefly, the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' are most obviously constituted by the terms 'male' and 'female', 'masculine' and 'feminine' respectively (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988). To regard the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' as straightforward and unproblematic is to seriously underestimate their power. Arguably the most important effects of these discourses are that they confer ontological status on the objects that they purport to represent and in so doing are determinate of those repertoires of 'aetiology' that can be brought to bear to predict or account for differences.

Following Unger (1979), the 'sex' discourse confers upon the categories 'male' and 'female' an ontological status that is grounded in the 'materiality' of human bodies and consequently creates the possibility of 'evolutionary', 'biological' and 'genetic' repertoires of 'aetiology' being invoked to predict and account for any differences between 'males' and 'females'. In contrast, the 'gender' discourse confers upon the categories of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' an

in the following section, 'emotional expression' and 'emotional experience' are best conceived of as repertoires because they are constituted by a large range of discursive resources, some of which can be categorized as 'discourses' and some of which are shared. For example, the 'physiological' discourse is a resource that occurs in both the 'experience' repertoire and in the 'expression' repertoire. The use of 'repertoires' is perhaps therefore best understood as a means of managing the location of concepts and avoiding the confusing possibilities of having 'discourses' within 'discourses'.
ontological status that is grounded in the 'psychologies' or 'personalities' of individuals and, given that the 'gender' discourse is advanced as an alternative to the 'sex' discourse and therefore resists implying inherent 'biological' differences between individuals, creates the possibility of the 'socio-cultural' repertoire of aetiology of any observable differences.

However, the inconsistent use of the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' (Parlee, 1998; see also the papers edited by Kitzinger, 1994) and of the categories that constitute them, 'male' and 'female' and 'masculine' and 'feminine', make opaque the ontological status that they confer and conflate the repertoires of 'aetiology' that might be invoked to account for any observed differences. This issue is particularly apposite when considering occasions on which the terms 'men' and 'women' are used.

Men and women do not differ dramatically in their immediate reports of emotional experience (Feldman Barrett, Robin, Pietromonaco & Eyssell, 1998, p.575)

I contend that the use of the terms 'men' and 'women' in statements such as the above quotation is a rhetorical move. It conflates the ontological status conferred by the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender'. 'Men' and 'women' are simultaneously 'sexed embodied beings' and 'beings with gendered psychologies or personalities'. Consequently, the use of the terms 'men' and 'women' makes available the fullest possible range of repertoires of 'aetiology' to account for either the presence or absence of any differences. That is to
say, any observed difference between ‘men’ and ‘women’ can be accounted for by appeals to either repertoires of their differing ‘physiologies’ or differences in ‘gender socialization’.

The complex implications that the discourses of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ have for the ontological status of the objects they purport to describe and, particularly, for the repertoires of ‘aetiology’ that they make available have led some authors to suggest the possibility of dissociating the repertoires of ‘aetiology’ from the discourses of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ (Deaux, 1993). Within this framework ‘sex’ would refer to comparisons ‘in which people are selected on the basis of the demographic categories of male and female’ and ‘gender’ would refer to comparisons based upon ‘the nature of femaleness and maleness, of masculinity and femininity’ (Deaux, 1993, p.125). Rather than providing a set of less encumbered terms, Deaux’s proposal, in particular the equating of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ with the seemingly essentialist ‘nature of maleness and femaleness’, seems only to further confuse the ontological status that they confer upon the objects of ‘male’ and ‘female’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ and to mire them more firmly in repertoires of ‘aetiology’. It is acknowledged that there is a paucity of terms through which the discourses of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ can be constituted (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988) and that more complex and explicit sets of terms are cumbersome and seem laboured (Gentile, 1993). However, it is futile to try to dissociate discourses of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ from the repertoires of ‘aetiology’ given that the applicability of those repertoires is contingent upon the ontological status of the object, which is conferred by the discourses of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’.
Any discussion of 'sex' and 'gender' differences in 'emotions' is, from the outset, bound up in repertoires of 'aetiology' to which categories, such as 'female', 'male', 'masculine', 'feminine', 'women', 'men' and all the emotion categories are inextricably linked. A failure to engage adequately with the repertoires of 'aetiologies' and the ontological assumptions upon which they rely, conferred by the use of particular categories, is a failure to appreciate adequately and represent the constitutive social and cultural force of the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' (see Eagly, 1995; Eagly & Wood, 1999). Whilst the importance of the repertoires of 'aetiology' should not be underestimated, they will be returned to below.

Briefly, I would like to draw the reader's attention to the ongoing debate as to whether or not the questions that underlie the 'sex' and 'gender' differences literature – "how are men and women different/the same?" (Kitzinger, 1994, p.501) – are really the questions that should concern psychologists. This debate is of particular relevance to those working within field of the 'psychology of women' (see the papers edited by Kitzinger, 1994). Whilst there is insufficient space to engage with this debate at length, it is sufficient to observe that the questions that underlie the sex/gender differences literature result in the development of two complementary but conflicting bodies of studies and researchers: those that seek evidence to maximize claims of 'sex' and 'gender' differences and those that seek evidence to minimize claims of 'sex' and 'gender' differences. Within the feminist literature, the political functions of
these two positions warrant, respectively, claims for a particular and valuable version of femininity and claims for fundamental equality (Wilkinson, 1994).

'The tendency to exaggerate differences' and 'the tendency to minimize or ignore differences' have been labeled, respectively, 'alpha bias' and 'beta bias' (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1988, p.457). Though they are likened respectively to Type I and Type II errors, alpha and beta biases are conceptualized as referring not to the 'probability of “error” (which would imply that there is a “correct” position), but rather to a systematic inclination to emphasize certain aspects of experiences and overlook other aspects' (ibid. 1988, p.457). In feminist literature a tendency towards alpha or beta bias may be purposive and politically motivated. However, their prevalence in the positivist literature on sex and gender differences in emotions is much more insidious. The standpoints (Harding, 1986; Hartstock, 1985) taken by the researchers, theorists and authors within the majority of the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions are, in accordance with the positivist/objectivist paradigm, necessarily not acknowledged and, indeed, are purposefully obscured. The propensity for researchers and theorists in this area to invoke the defense of 'objectivity' when producing accounts of differences that are potentially highly problematic will be addressed in the discussion of the 'evolutionary aetiology' repertoire.

The importance of these issues for this thesis will be evident in the final section of this review where the comparative representations of 'men's' and 'women's' relationships with emotions will be reported and their implications discussed.
Now, having identified the resources that constitute the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' and having identified the implications that these discourses have for discussions of difference, I must consider the repertoires that constitute the dimensions along which the 'sexes' and 'genders' are measured as differing, i.e., the repertoires of 'emotion'.

2.3.2.2 Repertoires of emotion
Within the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, there are three clear, predominant 'interpretative repertoires', those of 'emotionality', 'emotional experience' and 'emotional expression'. The following discussion will engage with each of these repertoires in turn and identify their constitutive discursive resources, i.e., the related terms and phrases, and the functions that these repertoires serve in the constitution of the objects of 'emotions'. As was acknowledged above, some of the discursive resources listed below conform to the definition of a 'discourse' and are common across the repertoires. The following review will identify how these three repertoires function and interact in the construction of the objects in relation to which 'males' and 'females', 'masculine' and 'feminine' individuals, 'men' and 'women' are measured as differing. The review will first engage with the generalised concept of 'emotionality'. Then, following the line of argument advanced by Fischer (1993), the structures of many of the reviews of this literature (Brody, 1985; Brody & Hall, 1993; Fischer, 1993; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; Shields, 1991,

14 Parker defines a discourse as 'a system of statements which constructs an object' (1992, p.5). The concept of a discourse will be explored at length in the following chapter on discourse analytic methodology.
1995) and the principle distinction that is commonly drawn between empirical studies in this literature, the review will engage with the repertoires of 'emotional experience' and 'emotional expression'.

...for analytic purposes there is obvious merit in separating the experience of an emotion from its expression (Brody & Hall, 1993, p.448)

The 'obviousness' of the utility of the distinction between 'expression' and 'experience' is taken to be self-evident across the above-listed reviews. In this thesis, the claimed 'obviousness' of such a move is taken as evidence of the predominance of the two discourses. Across the outlining of the resources and strategies that are constitutive of the 'expression' and 'experience' repertoires, within the sex and gender differences literature, one of the most striking features is the extent to which these repertoires are uncritically accepted as reflecting the phenomenological 'reality' of emotions. Emotions are theorised as both 'experiential' and 'expressive' and emotional 'expression' is presupposed to be contingent upon an underlying emotional 'experience'. Within the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, as will be demonstrated, the 'expression' repertoire necessarily implies 'experience'.

**The 'emotionality' repertoire**

It appears that public display plays a large role in affecting judgments of emotionality both by self and by observers, but whether differences in
overt expressivity should be taken as fundamental emotionality
differences is quite another matter. (LaFrance & Banaji, 1992, pp.195-
196)

The 'emotionality' repertoire is the most highly generalised repertoire invoked
in discussions of differences between 'men' and 'women' or between
'masculine' and 'feminine' individuals. It is implicit in discussions and enquiries
where the aim is to identify whether one sex or gender is more 'emotional' than
the other. In such enquiries 'women' are consistently rated as being more
'emotional' than 'men' (Birnbaum, Nosanchuk & Croll, 1980). Similarly, when
participants are asked to think of an 'emotional' person, most report that the
person they thought of was a woman (Shields, 1987).

The 'emotionality' repertoire is constitutive of discussions of whether 'men' are
comparatively more or less 'emotional' than 'women'. The 'emotionality'
repertoire draws upon and conflates all the various discursive resources that
are available for the construction of emotion phenomena and for the
construction of dimensions of judgement along which the 'sexes' or 'genders'
might differ. It conflates the repertoires of 'experience' and 'expression' and it
conflates all the available categories of emotion. As such, 'emotionality' 'is
treated like a unipolar disposition or personality trait, which is stable over time
and largely independent of any social context or past experiences' (Fischer,
1993, p.305; see also Shields, 1987, 2002).
Both Fischer (1993) and Shields (1987, 2002) provide extensive critical engagements with the concept of 'emotionality'. Briefly, Fischer (1993) posits four primary problems with the 'emotionality' repertoire. Firstly, that, owing to 'emotionality' being constructed as a dispositional attribute of individuals or of members of particular groups that is independent of social context and insensitive to the complexity of the differences in 'emotional experiences' and 'expressions' of men and women, it 'neglects a gender perspective towards emotions' (p.305). Secondly, that the 'emotionality' repertoire is often invoked in place of the 'relationality' repertoire, i.e., 'emotionality' is equated with 'relationality' in attempts to construct 'emotionality' as a positively valued disposition or trait. This is particularly true of feminist attempts to reject the devaluing of the 'emotionality' repertoire relative to the 'rationality' repertoire. Thirdly, as stated above, 'emotionality' is aspecific and 'is used to refer to the frequency, the intensity, the expression or the social sharing of emotions' (p.305). Finally, Fischer contends that the 'emotionality' repertoire is too firmly embedded in ideological structures, where it is equated with notions such as 'impulsivity, instability or irrationality' (p.305) and consequently is devalued.

Shields (1987, 2002) expresses similar concerns as Fischer (ibid.) with regard to the 'emotionality' repertoire. However, by historicizing the relationship between 'gender' and 'emotions', Shields (2002) draws the ideological functions served by the 'emotionality' repertoire into sharper focus. Shields' particular concern is with the role that the 'emotionality' repertoire has played in the construction of 'feminine emotionality' and in constructions of the complementarity of the 'sexes' or 'genders'.
To assert that one sex is inferior to the other in any area of competence conveys a sense of impairment or dysfunction in the inferior sex. To assert complementarity is to restore order to the world by allowing for qualitative as well as quantitative differences. In complementarity, kinds or types of emotion may be identified as more typical of one sex than of the other and purported sex-related differences in emotional temperament are automatically documented as natural and functional. (Shields, 2002, p.71)

Whilst Shields rejects 'the binary opposition of male-rational, female-emotional' as 'incompatible with a complementarity model' and 'an inaccurate representation of what was believed to be the ideal and the natural state of gender relations by late Victorian British and American middle- to upper-class scientists and laypersons' (p.72), she does maintain that the 'emotionality' repertoire was and is instrumental in constructions of accounts of the complementarity of the genders. For Shields, the power of the 'emotionality' repertoire lies in it being so 'gendered', specifically so 'feminized', that the possibility of masculine 'emotionality' is elided. What 'men' do and what might be considered 'masculine' are likely to be constructed through resources other than the 'emotionality' repertoire. Indeed, Shields' represents the complementarity of the sexes as between 'female emotionality' and 'male passion'.
For Shields, the important questions with regard to the 'emotionality' repertoire are 'Who gets called "emotional" and what does that mean when it happens?' (2002, p.139). The relationship between the 'emotionality' repertoire and gender is potentially advanced as a constitutive one. The 'emotionality' discourse is invoked in the construction or ascription of gendered identities. More specifically, the invocation of the 'emotionality' repertoire would likely result in the construction or ascription of a 'feminine' gendered identity and the notable absence of the 'emotionality' repertoire, that is to say the invocation of some other resource to account for phenomena that might otherwise be accounted for through the invocation of the 'emotionality' repertoire, would likely result in the construction or ascription of a 'masculine' gendered identity. The analytic project for an engagement with and analysis of the 'emotionality' repertoire therefore becomes one that is concerned with the specific occasions of use and the functions served by the repertoire on the occasions on which it is invoked.

...instead of developing explanations of emotion/emotionality as a trait – that is, a stable attribute of the individual that exists in some quantity – perhaps we should examine the variables that influence how and when emotion, or explicit acknowledgement of emotion, occurs. (Shields, 1987, p.233)
The 'experience' repertoire

More strongly felt and more volatile emotions are therefore characteristic of females over a large portion of the lifespan. (Brody & Hall, 1993, p.449)

The 'experience' repertoire is fundamental to the construction of an episode as 'emotional' and constitutes one of the central dimensions along which constructions of sex and gender differences in emotions are accomplished. As a repertoire, it is constituted by a range of resources that may be examined singularly, as one 'part' of emotional 'experience', or in combination as a means of identifying variability within 'experience', across and within the sexes and genders. Briefly, these resources can be categorised according to the functions they serve either in the construction of 'experience' as having a temporal dimension or in the construction of the 'content' of emotional 'experience'. The resources that are constitutive of the 'temporal' dimension of emotional 'experience' include, 'frequency' (Allen & Haccoun, 1976; Averill, 1983; Fabes & Martin, 1991; Stapley & Haviland, 1989), 'duration' (simply the length of an emotional 'experience') and 'hedonic level' (the percentage of time spent in an 'affective state') (Fujita, Diener & Sandvik, 1991; Larsen & Diener, 1987). The primary resource for the constitution of the 'content' of emotional

The resources that are constitutive of the 'experience' repertoire are reproduced in positivist experimental contexts and research reports through a variety of means. The primary methods employed in the examination of sex and gender differences in emotional 'experience' are 'reported beliefs', 'self-report' and 'physiological measures'. Briefly, 'reported beliefs' are taken as a measure of the existent social stereotypes of sex and gender differences, while 'self-report' and 'physiological measures' are taken as indices for 'emotional experience' within individual respondents or participants. The ways that these differing methodologies function in the reproduction and reification of the predominant interpretative repertoires will be discussed below. At this point I am concerned with the identification of those resources that are directly constitutive of the object of 'emotional experience'.

15 The 'experience' repertoire as it appears in the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions is evidently informed by the 'appraisal' theory of emotion (see Frijda (2001) and Scherer (1999) for discussions of 'emotional experience' within appraisal theories). Within appraisal theories of emotions, the content of 'emotional experience' is comprised not only of 'intensity' but also of 'appraisal components' and 'action orientations'. These constituents of the 'experience' repertoire are, however, not extensively addressed in the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, though see Hess, Senécal, Kirouac, Herrera, Philippot and Kleck (2000) for a brief discussion of sex differences according to the 'relational' (Lazarus, 1991) functions of emotions.
The various metaphors for 'emotional experience' that are apparent within studies of the physiology of 'emotional experience' include 'heart rate', 'skin conductance', 'electrodermal activity' (EDA) and 'electromyographic activity' (EMG) of the brow, as well as the 'neurological patterns of activity' of the human brain\textsuperscript{16} (for examples of how these metaphors are invoked and the functions they serve in the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions see Buss, Larsen, Weston and Semmelroth (1992), Harris (2000), Kring and Gordon (1998) and Levenson, Ekman and Friesen (1990). These metaphors are the resources that are constitutive of 'emotional experience' as both 'physiologically manifest', i.e., embodied, and as varying in 'magnitude'.

With regard to 'emotional intensity', scales such as the Differential Emotion Scale (DES: Izard, Dougherty, Bloxom, & Kotsch, 1974) and the Affect Intensity Measure (AIM: Larsen and Deiner, 1987) are used to elicit 'reports' of 'emotional experiences'. The AIM scale comprises items such as, 'When I am nervous I get shak... all over', 'When I feel happy it is a strong type of exuberance', 'When I solve a small personal problem, I feel euphoric' and 'My emotions tend to be more intense than those of most people'. The measured 'intensity' with which individuals report 'experiencing' emotions is contingent upon their identification with the construction of emotional 'experience' as a physiologically manifest phenomenon ('I get shak...') that can be ordered along some scale of magnitude ('strong type of exuberance'). Similarly, measures of

\textsuperscript{16} For a more extensive list of all the various metaphors for the 'physiology' of 'emotional experiences' see Stoney, Matthews, McDonald and Johnson (1988).
the self-reported 'frequency' with which individuals 'experience' emotions rely upon respondents positioning themselves, on Likert scales, relative to end-points labelled 'almost never' and 'almost always' (Grossman & Wood, 1993). The important implication of these 'measures' is that they construct 'emotional experience' as a subjective 'experience' upon which individuals can 'reflect' and which they can 'report' on. Within the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, the 'emotional experience' repertoire implies that emotions are distinctive 'states of consciousness' (Shields, 2000).

The above-listed terms and metaphors combine to constitute 'emotional experience' as both 'embodied' and 'felt'. Consequently, the 'emotional experience' repertoire provides for a host of possible accounts for any observed differences between the sexes and the genders. These include but are not limited to any such differences resulting from the differing physiologies of males and females or from the influence of social or cultural factors on the reporting of what is 'felt' by men and women. These possibilities will be returned to below in the discussion of the 'aetiology' repertoires. However, it should be acknowledged that the 'aetiology' repertoires are contingent upon complementary repertoires that are constitutive of 'emotional experience'.
The 'expression' repertoire

One of the most consistent empirical findings in the current literature on sex differences regards emotional expressivity. Differences in emotional expressivity between men and women are found when considering self-reports of emotional expressiveness, when using observational studies, as well as when considering beliefs and stereotypes about emotional expressiveness. (Hess et al., 2000, p. 610)

Within the 'expression' repertoire, it is important to differentiate between the general concept of 'expressivity' and the phenomena that are interpreted as 'modalities' of 'emotional expression' and are consequently measured and reified as 'indices' of 'emotional expression'. The general concept of 'expressivity' operates in much the same way as the 'emotionality' repertoire. It forms the basis for constructions of fundamental, dispositional differences between 'males' and 'females'. Just as 'males' and 'females' may be constructed as more or less 'emotional' so they may also be constructed as more or less 'expressive' (Hess et al., 2000) (see also Shields (2002) for an engagement with 'masculine inexpressivity'). Whilst the concept of 'expressivity' is important to the development of an account of the contemporary status of the relationships that are supposed to exist between 'men', 'masculinity' and 'emotion', owing to its generalised nature it will not be discussed at length here but will be returned to below in the discussion of the representations of the relationships between 'men', 'masculinity' and 'emotion' that emerge from the literature on 'sex' and 'gender differences' in 'emotion'.
This section of the review is more concerned with the identification of discursive resources that are constitutive of the 'expression' repertoire, i.e., those phenomena that are socially and culturally understood as 'modalities' of 'emotional expression'. Arguably, some of these 'modalities', such 'electromyographic (EMG) activity', are specific to the culture of psychology. However, all are reified through positivist methods as 'indices' of 'emotional expression'. These 'indices' are assessed, either by 'self-report', 'observer-report' or 'physiological measures', to determine the extent of 'emotional expression'. 'Self-report's' of 'expressivity' comprise the majority of the existent data and many, though not all, of the below-listed indices are examined through the use of self-report methods. Whilst the methods through which they are reified will be discussed in the following section, the 'modalities/indices' of 'emotional expression' will be listed here. Briefly, they can be categorised as 'verbal' and 'non-verbal', where 'non-verbal' includes both 'facial expressions' and 'behaviours and gestures'.¹⁷ The discursive resources that are constitutive of each of these 'modalities' will be listed in turn, beginning with 'verbal emotional expression'.

In studies of 'verbal emotional expression', individual speakers use of 'emotion words' in reference to their self or others, such as 'I feel sad' or 'I'm happy', are taken as 'indices' of 'emotional expression'. Typically, studies examining this

¹⁷ For a cautionary note on the extent to which any of the listed 'modalities' can be taken as 'indices' of emotional expression see Hall, Carter and Horgan, (2000).
'modality' of 'emotional expression' have relied upon observational or quasi-naturalistic methods, i.e., they have been concerned with identifying the frequency with which 'emotion words' are drawn upon in either 'real-life' situations or in experimental situations that are supposed to provoke 'emotional experiences' (Anderson & Leaper, 1998; Goldshmidt & Weller, 2000; Notarius & Johnson, 1982).

'Non-verbal emotional expression' is constituted through a host of resources that are reified through either 'observer-reports' or 'physiological measures'. Studies applying observer-report methodologies to sex differences in 'facial expressivity' are concerned with the 'accuracy' with which individuals can 'encode' and 'decode' the 'emotional meaning' of particular 'facial expressions' (Buck, 1994; Fujita, Harper, & Wiens, 1980; Kring & Gordon, 1998; Wagner, Buck & Winterbotham, 1993). Similarly, other 'behaviours', such as 'smiling' or 'crying' are invoked as indices of 'emotional expression' (see Hall, Carter and Horgan (2000), Hall and Halberstadt (1986) and Vingerhoets and Scheirs (2000) for extensive reviews and meta-analyses of the studies on 'smiling' and 'crying'). The important implication of these particular constituents of the 'expression' repertoire is that they are supposed to be communicative. 'Facial expressions' and 'behaviours' such as 'smiling', 'crying' or 'gazing' are constructed as having culturally determined meanings and, through observer-report methods, are reified as implicitly 'communicative acts'. The presupposition of a culturally available structure of meaning, in which particular 'facial expressions' or 'non-verbal behaviours' signify particular 'emotions', is
implicit in any assessment of the 'accuracy' with which 'emotional experiences' might be communicated or 'expressed' 'non-verbally'.

Alternatively, some 'indices of emotional expression' are reified as 'physiological indices' through the use of 'physiological measures'. In the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, invocations of this group of resources have been limited to 'electromyographic (EMG) activity' at the zygomaticus and corrugator facial muscle regions (Vrana & Rollock, 2002), which are metaphors for 'smiling' and 'frowning' respectively. As with the 'experience' repertoire, the primary function of these resources is to constitute 'emotional expression' as an embodied phenomenon; 'emotional expression' is constructed as done by and through the body and the 'extent' to which it is done is constructed as objectively measurable. Again, the functions served by the methodologies employed in the studies of sex and gender differences in emotions, particularly with regard to the reification of the objects of interest ('sex', 'gender', 'emotionality' 'emotional experiences' and 'emotional expression') and of measured, reported or observed differences between those objects, will be discussed below and will follow from the discussion of the 'aetiology repertoires', upon which the process of reification is in part contingent.

As was discussed in relation to 'emotional experience', the primary function of 'physiological indices' is the embodiment of 'emotions'. Through the above-identified 'indices', the 'expressive' element of 'emotions' is also embodied and constructed as intrinsic to 'emotional experience'. The effect of this is to
construct the supposed communicative functions of 'emotions' as not necessarily following from any 'conscious' or 'agentic self'. 'Emotions' are constructed as intrinsically communicative. The implications of these 'physiological indices' for the construction of emotions and for the concept of the 'emotional self' will be discussed in greater detail in the following section on the functions of reification served by the use of 'physiological measures'. However, before moving on to discuss the theoretical bases for and the methodologies involved in the reification of the relationships between 'sex', 'gender' and 'emotion', it is just worth noting one further function served by the construction of 'expression' as intrinsic to 'emotional experience'. Such discursive resources are constitutive of any claims that the 'truth' of an individual's subjective 'emotional experience' is accessible to any skilled reader of 'non-verbal' behaviour. Despite whatever may be said or done by the 'conscious' or 'agentic emotional self', the 'true' 'emotional' status may be 'betrayed' by these intrinsic communicative elements. As such, these resources may be the basis of any claims as to the falsity of an 'emotional expression' such as smiling or of any claimed absence of 'emotional experience'.

2.3.3 The reification of relationships between 'sex', 'gender' and 'emotion'

The reification of the relationships between 'sex', 'gender' and 'emotions' within this literature is contingent upon both the positivist analytic methods that are employed and the repertoires of 'aetiology' that are invoked. The first part of this section of the review is concerned with the analytic methods through which
the above-identified repertoires and discourses of 'sex', 'gender' and 'emotion' are reproduced and which are productive of the differences they purport to uncover. The second part is concerned with the repertoires that are invoked to account for these 'observed' differences, i.e., the repertoires of 'aetiology'. Through the analytic methods employed and the invoked repertoires of 'aetiology', the relationships that are produced between the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' and the repertoires of 'emotion' are reified.

2.3.3.1 Methods of reification
The broad range of methodologies employed in studies of sex and gender differences in emotions will, for the purposes of this review, be fairly parsimoniously categorised as: studies employing self-report methods, studies employing observer-report methods, studies employing physiological measures and studies of the stereotypes and beliefs about gender and emotion. Each of these methods will be addressed in turn and the means by which each reproduces the above-identified discourses of sex, gender and emotions will be explicated.

**Self-report**

'Self-reports' of 'emotionality', 'emotional experience' or 'emotional expression' comprise the majority of data within the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions\(^\text{18}\). Within the studies employing 'self-report' methodologies, the distinction can be drawn between those that examine

\(^{18}\) For a more complex breakdown of the various methodologies included under self-report, see LaFrance and Banaji (1992).
'beliefs about the self' (literally, 'self-reports') and those that examine 'beliefs about the relationship between sex or gender and emotion in general' ('stereotypes'). As will be demonstrated, through the reification of participants' responses to closed-ended questions as reflective of individuals' 'beliefs', either about their 'selves' or about contemporary 'culture', the possibility is created by which the latter may be hypothesized as informing or even determining the former.

In studies of individuals' 'beliefs about their selves', participants are asked to indicate the extent of their agreement with statements such as 'almost never' and 'almost always' or 'very mildly' and 'very strongly' on dimensions such as the 'frequency' or 'intensity' with which they might 'experience' or 'express' emotion (Grossman & Wood, 1993). The marks that are made on Likert scales, which may range between 5 and 15 points, are then interpreted as descriptions, albeit highly abbreviated ones, of the relative 'frequency' and 'intensity' with which individuals, or groups of individuals (when collated on the basis of categories of 'sex'), 'experience' or 'express' emotions. It must of course be acknowledged that these scales are not simply concerned with the 'experience' or 'expression' of 'emotion' as a generic category. All the various emotion words, from those categorised as 'basic' ('happiness', 'sadness', 'love', 'anger', 'fear' and 'surprise') to those categorised as 'complex' are assessed individually. Thus, a participant in a self-report study on sex differences in emotions may describe, through Likert scales, the 'frequency' with which they 'express' 'anger', 'grief' or 'resentment' and the 'intensity' with which they 'experience' 'love', 'regret' or 'admiration'. These descriptions are
taken by the researchers as factual representations and are reified as the 'real' frequencies and intensities with which 'real' men and women 'really' experience and express emotions. However, as we will see in the next chapter, it is perhaps worth taking an alternative view of 'descriptions', with specific regard to the work that they might do.

It is also worth considering the subtle effects of the research context and paying particular attention to the potentially deterministic effects of the discursive resources with which participants are furnished. A useful illustration of these concerns and ways that positivist research might simply result in the reproduction of culturally valued but culturally specific masculinities can be found in a cross-cultural repetition of Buss, Larsen, Westen and Semmelroth's (1992) seminal study (Buunk, Angleitner, Oubaid & Buss, 1996). Forced-choice responses and physiological responses, including electrodermal activity (EDA), pulse rate and electromyographic activity (EMG), to two jealousy-provoking scenarios of sexual infidelity and emotional infidelity were recorded for men and women from America, Germany and the Netherlands. The two scenarios used in the study were identical to those used in Buss et al's. original study:

Please think of a serious committed romantic relationship that you have had in the past, that you currently have, or that you would like to have. Imagine that you discover that the person with whom you've been seriously involved became interested in someone else. What would distress or upset you more (please circle only one):
(A) Imagining your partner forming a deep emotional attachment to that person.

(B) Imagining your partner enjoying passionate sexual intercourse with that other person.

A second forced choice item, which followed the same instructional paragraph, presented the alternatives of:

(A) Imagining your partner trying different sexual positions with that other person.

(B) Imagining your partner falling in love with that other person.

(Buss et al., 1992, p.252)

Item A in the first choice pair and item B in the second choice pair are intended to evoke responses to imagined emotional infidelity, whilst item B in the first choice pair and item A in the second choice pair are intended to evoke responses to imagined sexual infidelity. The above scenarios are drawn upon either in their entirety or in an adapted form in many of the replications of this study (see Buunk et al., 1996; DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Harris, 2000; Harris & Christenfeld, 1996; Pietrzak, Laird, Stevens & Thompson, 2002).

As a whole, the empirical evidence generated by the above method, when located in a positivist scientific framework, is interpretable as strongly suggesting that men and women fundamentally differ in their jealous responses to emotional or sexual infidelity. How this difference might be
accounted for through the invocation of the ‘evolutionary’ discourse of ‘aetiology’ will be discussed in the following section. However, an alternative account of these findings can be highlighted through reference to the findings of Buunk et al. (1996). Briefly, they found that whilst 60% of American men reported sexual infidelity as the more distressing scenario, only 27% of German men and approximately 55%19 of Dutch men reported sexual infidelity to be the more distressing scenario. Also of interest is the finding that, whilst approximately 55% of men from the Netherlands self-reported that they would be more distressed by ‘imagining their partner enjoying passionate sexual intercourse with another person’, ostensibly the ‘sexual infidelity’ scenario, this figure fell by approximately half in response to the second form of the ‘sexual infidelity’ scenario, ‘imagining their partner trying different sexual positions with another person’ (Buunk et al., 1996, p.360).

One possible account of this difference lies in the primary difference between the two statements: the presence and absence of any affective component. Contrast the ‘passionate enjoyment’ of the former statement with the ‘dispassionate experimentation’ of the latter. It could be argued that the discursive resources available in the first version of the question provide for the constitution of a more culturally valued masculinity than does the second version, one that is more ‘distressed’ by emotional and sexual infidelity than by

19 The ambiguity in the reporting of the results is a direct result of the ambiguity of their reporting in the original article. The focus on sex difference with regard to sexual infidelity is entirely at the expense of the reporting of the remaining findings.
sexual infidelity alone. Similar arguments, though not quite so social
collectionist, may be found in Desteno and Salovey (1996) and Harris and
Christenfeld (1996). As for the cross-cultural differences, perhaps the denial of
emotional vulnerability, which is implicit in the resistance of a masculinity that
is more distressed by emotional infidelity than by sexual infidelity, may be
assumed to be valued more in American culture than it is in German and Dutch
cultures. It might, therefore, be worth shifting the analytic focus to consider
what the valued versions of masculinity are and what discourses might
constitute them.

An alternative account of what is done through participation in a closed-choice,
positivist analysis of sex or gender differences in emotions would be attentive
to the effects of the research context and of the discursive resources with
which participants' are furnished. Given that the closed-choice items in these
studies are selected because they represent 'modalities' of emotional
experience and expression with regard to which men and women are culturally
'believed' to differ, it is arguably hardly surprising that research participants
reproduce these 'beliefs' when invited to 'describe' their own gendered
emotional 'identity'. Shields (1991) acknowledged that the possibility of beliefs
about gender and emotionality shaping the responses of participants in
psychological studies 'adds horrifying complexity to research design' (p.239).
However, it is a complexity that she does not prescribe shying away from.
Rather, she argues that 'it at least offers a point of origin for the development
of testable explanations of apparently ephemeral effects of gender.
Paradoxically, instead of demonstrating the insignificance of gender effects in
emotions research, it shows how powerfully a tacitly held standard can deploy its effects. It also makes clear the boundaries for generalizing from effects observed in a single measurement context. To infer anything about gender, comparisons of male and female subjects must include consideration of the measurement context as a variable' (Shields, 1991, p.239).

It is at this point that the tautological process of the reproduction of the same discourses through positivist methods as being both 'beliefs about the self' and 'beliefs about contemporary culture' is most explicit. The single most important issue to appreciate is that the reification of 'stereotypes' or 'cultural beliefs' about the gendered character of emotions constitutes the bases for the various components of the 'sociocultural' repertoire of 'aetiology', including such things as 'socialization'. Simply, through reifying the responses of participants as reflecting 'culturally and contemporarily existent beliefs' the discursive resources are constituted through which individuals can be constructed as 'acting', 'behaving' or 'responding' in accordance with the proscriptions and prescriptions of those 'beliefs'.

Psychologists have always had to struggle against a persistent illusion that in such studies as those of emotions there is something there, the emotion, of which the emotion word is a mere representation. (Harré, 1986, p.4; emphasis in original)

Arguably, the search for empirical evidence of sex or gender differences in emotions is a response to the social and cultural prevalence of emotion
discourses in the construction of sex and gender differences. Psychologists are simply engaged in the empirical examination of the veracity of those constructions of difference. However, as stated above, the positivist framework, within which such examinations are located, results in the reification of the discursive resources through which such constructions of difference are constituted. Socially and culturally prevalent constructions of sex and gender differences in emotions are reproduced through closed-ended questionnaires and reified as 'social stereotypes' or 'beliefs'.

The basic ‘stereotype’ of sex or gender differences in emotions or the ‘gender heuristic’, as Robinson, Johnson and Shields (2001, p.158) termed it, is that ‘[m]en are thought to experience and display more socially desirable self-oriented emotions (e.g., pride) and more socially undesirable other-oriented emotions (e.g., anger). Women are thought to experience and display more socially undesirable self-oriented emotions (e.g., guilt and sadness) and more socially desirable other-oriented emotions (e.g., love)’. The other key ‘belief’ concerns the distinction between ‘emotional experience’ and ‘emotional expression’. Johnson and Shulman (1988) examined beliefs about both ‘emotional experience’ and ‘expression’ and reported that women were believed to ‘experience’ and ‘express’ emotions more ‘intensely’ than men, though the difference between the sexes was greater for ‘expression’.

Similarly, in arguably the most extensive examination of social stereotypes of gender and emotion, Fabes and Martin (1991) stated that ‘females (particularly adolescent and adult females) were perceived to express (but not experience)
both basic and non-basic emotions significantly more often than males' (p.538). This led them to conclude that, 'With a few exceptions, it appears that the stereotype that females are more emotional than males is based on a deficit model of male expressiveness (i.e., a belief that males do not express the emotions they feel)' (p.539). The most notable of those 'few exceptions' is anger. Across all five age groups men were believed to 'express', but not 'experience', anger more frequently than women. Similar findings of the extent to which 'men' are constructed as 'expressing anger' more 'frequently' than 'women' can be found in Birnbaum and Croll (1984), Birnbaum, Nosanchuk and Croll (1980) and Hess, Senécal, Kirouac, Herrera, Philippot and Kleck (2000).

The possible effects of the reification of 'stereotypes' and 'beliefs' are most graphically demonstrated by the inclusion of concepts of 'emotionality' or 'emotional behaviour' in those scales intended to measure 'gender', i.e. to measure 'masculinity' and 'femininity' (Shields, 2002). In Spence, Helmreich and Stapp (1975), the scale intended to measure 'femininity' is referred to as 'expressive' while the scale intended to measure 'masculinity' is described as 'instrumental' or 'agentic'. Similarly, the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) (Bem, 1974) includes items that relate to the 'emotional roles' that 'men' and 'women' are reportedly 'stereotypically believed' to fulfil. Items on the 'masculinity' scale emphasize competitiveness and achievement, behaviours linked to the concealment of vulnerabilities and ambitious aggression, while items on the 'femininity' scale emphasize relationality and intimacy, behaviours related to the expression of positive other-oriented emotions such as love.
It is unsurprising therefore to find that studies that have examined the relationships between ‘gender’ and ‘emotions’ have found consistent ‘gender’ differences. Conway (2000), using the short form of the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI-SF; Bem, 1981), reported that ‘male’ and ‘female’ individuals who scored high on ‘masculinity’ produced less complex descriptions of their own and others’ expected emotional reactions to the evocative situations presented in the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS; Lane et al., 1990). Conway was however surprised to note that measured ‘femininity’ of ‘male’ and ‘female’ individuals was not related to their scores on the LEAS. This finding might be taken as evidence in support of Fabes and Martin's (1991) ‘deficit model of male expressiveness’, that the ‘stereotype’ of ‘masculine emotional behaviour’ is characterised by an absence of ‘expression’, or at least by a comparative simplicity of form.

A social constructionist account of the findings of ‘self-report’ studies would contend that the participants in such studies reproduce from the provided resources those discourses that perform valued acts, when invoked in the negotiation of the ‘self’ or in the construction of the ‘sex’ or ‘gender’ with which the respondent might ‘identify’ or to which they might be assigned. The primary ‘valued act’ that might be accomplished through the reproduction of such discourses is the constitution of a ‘positively valued gendered identity’.

Doing gender through doing emotion encompasses not only emotional display, of course, but also emotion values (e.g., real girls value
emotional self-disclosure) and beliefs about emotional experience (e.g., anger is appropriate only when one's rights are violated. (Shields, 2002, p.55)

For men this argument seems reasonable: by doing masculinity, through reproducing the discourses that are constitutive of it, men accrue the benefits that follow from masculinity's supposed place in the structure of gender power relations. There's a good reason why men might do 'masculinity' in the ways that are described by self-report studies. However, according to this hypothesis, there's no good reason why women should reproduce femininity given its supposed position in the structure of gender power relations. It could be argued that women are coerced, that doing anything but reproducing the forms of femininity valued in a culture dominated by masculinity would result in censure or that they are so well socialized in the reproduction of the subordinate gender that coercion need only be implicit. Importantly, such an argument assumes that the structure of power relations and the direction of the flow of power are already known, i.e., are constituted through the institutions and ideology of patriarchy. An alternative account might question those assumptions and consider the possibility that the reproduction of the discourses that are constitutive of femininity, i.e. the constitution of a feminine emotional 'self', also perform valued acts and that, in doing so, women accrue benefits that follow from femininity. Femininity is valued by women?
Observer-report

The use of 'observer-report' methodologies is limited to studies of 'emotional expression' (Birnbaum & Croll, 1984; Hall, 1984; Hall & Halberstadt, 1986; Kring & Gordon, 1998). As stated above in the discussion of the 'expression' repertoire, studies of 'emotional expression' employing observer-report methodologies are, for the most part, concerned with the accuracy with which men and women can communicate (encode) or understand (decode) an emotion through 'facial expressions' (Buck, Miller & Caul, 1974; Fujita, Harper & Wiens, 1980; Hall, 1984; Wagner, MacDonald & Manstead, 1986). However, some, such as Kring and Gordon (1998), are concerned only with the identification of 'sex' or 'gender' differences in the extent of 'expression', i.e., they are concerned with the generalised concept of 'expressivity'. For example, in reporting the 'sex' differences in observer-reported facial expressivity, itself a conflation of the rated 'valence', 'duration' and 'intensity' of 'facial expressions', Kring and Gordon state that '[t]he sex main effect was significant...indicating that women were more expressive than men across all films' (1998, p.690).

The consistency of the findings of studies employing observer-report methodologies that women are more 'non-verbally expressive' and that their 'non-verbal expressions' are more readily understood has not surprisingly led reviewers to suggest that the 'observer-report' methodology is particularly susceptible to the effect of 'stereotype-based bias' (Brody & Hall, 1993). That is to say, 'observers' ratings of women as more expressive are informed by the social stereotype of the more 'emotional' woman.
Physiological measures

In studies employing 'physiological measures' of emotions, it self-evident that emotions are conceptualized as manifest at a biological level, in the activity of the central nervous system, measured through heart rate, skin conductance, electrodermal activity (EDA) and electromyographic activity (EMG) of the brow, or in the neurological patterns of activity of the human brain. The conceptualising of emotions as essentially 'biological' phenomena is implicitly determinate of those discourses that might be invoked to account for any observed differences. By locating 'emotions' in the body, the discourses that might be invoked to account for differences between 'male' and 'female' bodies must therefore also assume the ontological status of 'male' and 'female' bodies. The 'essentializing' and 'naturalizing' of emotions implicit in the use of 'physiological measures' means that only discourses that 'essentialize' or 'naturalize' 'men' and 'women', such as those involved in the 'evolutionary' discourse of 'aetiology', can be invoked to account for observed differences. For example, in all the below-listed studies, discussions of differences in 'physiological measures' are constituted through the 'sex' discourse and consequently assume the ontological status of 'sexed' bodies (Buss, Larsen, Weston & Semmelroth, 1992; Harris, 2000; Kring & Gordon, 1998; Levenson, Ekman & Friesen, 1990).

20 For perhaps the most complete list of physiological measures of emotion, see Stoney, Matthews, McDonald and Johnson (1988).

21 Kring and Gordon (1998) did attempt to measure any potential relationship between gender, as measured on the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) (Bem, 1974), but did not report any findings of any interaction, significant or not.
The 'physiological measures' methodology has a further important implication for the discourses that can be invoked to account for any observed differences between 'men' and 'women'. The embodiment of emotions, implicit in the use of 'physiological measures', imposes a Cartesian distinction on emotions. They are of the 'body' rather than of the 'mind'. The discourses that might be invoked to account for any observed differences are limited to those that assume the ontological status of 'bodies'. Consequently, accounts that might be constructed from discourses based on the presupposition of 'conscious' or 'agentive selves', in which those 'selves' are invoked as determinants of any observed differences, are closed down. Indeed, discourses of an 'emotional self' are alien to accounts of emotions as 'physiologically manifest phenomena' (see Frijda, 2001). Certainly, the above-outlined social constructionist accounts of the differences reported by studies employing 'self-report' methodologies cannot be applied to the findings of studies that employed 'physiological measures' methodologies. Simply, social constructionism cannot offer any alternative account of 'sex' differences in 'emotions' as long as both are theorised as 'ontologically existent, physiologically manifest phenomena'. This may be an admitted limitation of social constructionist theory. However, it is still capable of orienting to the effects of constructing 'emotions' as 'physiologically manifest phenomena' and the eschewing of the assumption of 'conscious' or 'agentive selves'. The effects of constructing emotions as 'physiologically manifest phenomena' will be examined in much greater detail in the analysis sections of this thesis.
2.3.3.2 Repertoires of 'aetiology'

As stated above, there are two broad repertoires of 'aetiology' that are invoked as theoretical and interpretative frameworks in predicting and accounting for observed differences in 'emotionality', 'emotional experience' and 'emotional expression' between 'males', 'females', 'masculine' and 'feminine' individuals, 'men' and 'women'. They are the 'evolutionary' or 'sociobiological' repertoire and the 'sociocultural' repertoire. Each will be discussed in turn as representing the basis for the reification of the relationships between the discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' and the repertoires of 'emotion'. The discourses of 'sex' and 'gender' confer ontological status on the categories of 'males', 'females'. The repertoires of 'emotionality', 'emotional experience' and 'emotional expression' ontologize the categories that are constitutive of 'emotions'. And the repertoires of 'aetiology' ontologize the relationships between discourses of 'sex', 'gender', 'emotional experience' and 'emotional expression' as grounded either in 'evolutionary' or 'sociobiological' principles or in 'sociocultural' structures.

Before engaging with these repertoires it must again be stated that their discussion in this review is limited only to the occasions of their appearance in the literature on 'sex' and 'gender' differences in 'emotions'. I acknowledge that these repertoires have a genealogy and complexity that are greater than is
represented here. However, there is no particular utility, within the context of this thesis, in an engagement with these repertoires that moves beyond the literature on 'sex' and 'gender' differences in 'emotions'. This consideration is particularly relevant to the 'evolutionary' repertoire, the appearance of which, in the literature on 'sex' and 'gender' differences in 'emotions', is largely limited to discussions of 'jealousy'.

The 'evolutionary' or 'sociobiological' repertoire

As a theoretical and interpretative framework, the 'evolutionary' or 'sociobiological' repertoire, here-on referred to only as the 'evolutionary' repertoire, is based on the assumption that 'males' and 'females' have, over periods of evolutionary time, faced different selective pressures. Successful adaptive responses to these differing selective pressures are, within the 'evolutionary' repertoire, assumed to be manifest in the differing physiologies, psychologies and behaviours of modern 'male' and 'female' humans (Buss, 2003). As was stated above, the invocation of the 'evolutionary' repertoire in the literature on 'sex' and 'gender' differences in emotion has largely been limited to discussions of 'jealousy' (Buss, 1995; Buss, Larsen & Westen, 1996; Buss, et al., 1992; Buss, et al., 1999; Buunk, et al., 1996; DeSteno & Salovey, 1996; Harris, 2000; Harris & Christenfeld, 1996; Pietrzak, et al., 2002; Wiederman & Allgeier, 1993; Wiederman & Kendall, 1999). The 'evolutionary'

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22 For more extensive coverage of evolutionary psychology, see Buss (2003) and Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (1996). For a critical engagement with evolutionary psychology, see Rose and Rose (2001).
repertoire can be seen in discussions of ‘sex’ differences in anger (Buss, 1996; Buss & Shackelford, 1997) (see also Fischer and Rodriguez Mosquera’s (2001) critical appraisal of the evolutionary theory of sex differences in aggression).

With regard to jealousy, the ‘evolutionary’ repertoire rests upon and reproduces two basic ontological assumptions. Firstly, for ‘men’, since paternity is never certain\(^{23}\) and since the raising of another man’s child is a threat to a man’s Darwinian fitness, selective pressures are argued to have shaped a ‘specific innate module’ ‘that causes them to be particularly bothered by a mate’s sexual infidelity’ (Harris, 2000: p.1082). Complementary selective pressures, based on the risk to a woman’s Darwinian fitness posed by the potential loss of ‘a mate’s resources and assistance in raising offspring’ (p.1082), are supposed to have functioned to shape ‘a specific innate module in women that causes them to be particularly upset by a mate’s emotional involvement with a rival’ (p.1082). Simply, within the ‘evolutionary’ repertoire, ‘men’ should be more distressed by a mate’s sexual infidelity and ‘women’ should be more distressed by a mate’s emotional infidelity.

Within the ‘evolutionary’ repertoire, ‘emotion’, specifically ‘jealousy’, is constructed as an adaptive response to environmental pressures. As such, \(^{23}\) Allowances must be made for the scale of the temporal dimension over which evolutionary psychological theories operate. Technological advances such as paternity testing are too recent to affect evolutionary timescales.
'emotions', which are successful adaptive responses to selective pressures, are constructed as increasing the Darwinian fitness of individuals. Consequently, these successful adaptive responses, i.e., 'emotions', are theorized as perpetuated through heterosexual reproduction. Within the 'evolutionary' repertoire, 'emotions' are ontologized as not just being 'of the body' but as determinate of it, i.e., 'emotions' are constructed as being 'in the genes'. Consider for example the following quotation:

All people descend from a long line of ancestral men whose adaptations (i.e., psychological mechanisms) led them to behave in ways that increased their likelihood of paternity and decreased the odds of investing in children who were putatively theirs but whose genetic fathers were other men. ... All people are descendents of a long and unbroken line of women who successfully solved this adaptive challenge [the securing of resources during times of pregnancy and lactation] – for example, by preferring mates who showed the ability to accrue resources and the willingness to provide them for particular women. (Buss, 1995, p.164)

The value of a 'scientific account' of 'jealousy' is heavily emphasized in the evolutionary literature (Buss, 1995; Buss, Larsen & Westen, 1996; Buunk, Angleitner, Oubaid & Buss, 1996) through the invocation of problematic and undesirable social phenomena in which jealousy and male jealousy in particular are supposed to be heavily implicated, such as spousal abuse and murder (e.g. Daly & Wilson, 1988; Daly, Wilson & Weghorst, 1982). The value
of the 'evolutionary' repertoire as a truly 'scientific' account of the psychology of 'jealousy' is also heavily emphasized through claims of its ability to both predict and account for 'sex' differences in a host of undesirable social phenomena, e.g. perceptions of the level of distress experienced by victims of sexual aggression (Buss, 1989), men's increased propensity for violent crimes of all types (Daly & Wilson, 1988) and of rape in particular (Thornhill & Palmer, 2000, Symons, 1979; see also Archer & Vaughan (2001) for a brief review of evolutionary theories of rape).

Its status as a 'scientific' theory is further worked up through claims that it is apolitical and objective (Buss, 1995) and therefore not influenced or informed by the political 'standpoints' of evolutionary psychologists, whatever they may be. The 'evolutionary' repertoire is firmly located within objective positivist scientific methods as predicated upon and capable of predicting and accounting for matters of fact.

The 'sociocultural' repertoire

Arguably the most prevalent repertoire of 'aetiology' within the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions can be categorised as the 'sociocultural' repertoire. The predominance of this repertoire is evident in the major reviews of this literature (Brody & Hall, 1993; Fischer, 1993, 2000; LaFrance & Banaji, 1992; Shields, 1987, 1991, 2002). The 'sociocultural' repertoire is constituted by a wide range of discursive resources, including such concepts as 'beliefs', 'stereotypes', 'gender roles' and 'socialization'. Whilst there may be variety in the forms that the repertoire takes, all the resources that constitute it are based
upon the presupposition and function in the perpetuation of the axiom that men and women differ and that two of dimensions along which they differ are their 'experience' and 'expression' of 'emotions'.

The axiomatic status of this particular construction of differences between 'men' and 'women' has led to it being examined in minute detail at a 'cultural' level through studies concerned with mapping the predominant 'stereotypes' and 'beliefs' that people 'hold' about sex and gender differences in emotions. The primary effect of such studies and the methodologies they employ is the reification of the discourses that they reproduce as the existent and predominant 'stereotypes' and 'beliefs' about emotions. Sufficient numbers of marks at similar points on Likert scales indicating the frequencies with which categories of individuals, e.g., 'ADULT WOMEN, INFANT BOYS, ADOLESCENT GIRLS' express' or 'experience' 'basic emotions', such as 'anger' and 'happiness', or 'complex emotions', such as 'guilt' or 'resentment' (Fabes & Martin, 1991, p.534) are reified as representations of the predominant cultural 'stereotypes' and 'beliefs' (see also Birnbaum and Croll (1984) and Johnson and Shulman (1988)).

...subjects' beliefs about sex difference in the expression of these emotions were so pervasive that they believed females expressed emotions more often than males regardless of the primacy or complexity of the emotions. (Fabes & Martin, 1991, p.538)
The reification of participants' responses to closed-choice items on questionnaires as the predominant 'stereotypes' and 'beliefs' about emotions within particular cultures provides the basis for the remaining features of the 'sociocultural' repertoire of 'aetiology'. Specifically it provides for the advancement of 'sex-differentiated socialization' and 'sex- or gender-role consistency' as processes that account for the observed differences between men and women in self-reports and observer-reports of emotional 'experience' and 'expression'. Of these two resources, 'sex-differentiated socialization' is arguably the most prevalent.

As an account of observed differences in emotions between men and women, 'sex-differentiated socialization' relies upon the presupposition of consistent gendered beliefs about emotions. That is to say, it relies upon the notion that people hold and are aware of consistent beliefs and stereotypes about the patterns of 'emotional experience' and 'expression' that are typical of 'men' and of 'women'. These beliefs and stereotypes are then assumed to form the basis for the socialization of individuals, over their lifespan, into 'sex' or 'gender' appropriate ways of behaving emotionally.

There is clear evidence that beliefs about gender and emotionality influence interactions between infants and caregivers and other adults' communication with the infant. (Shields, 1991, p.238)

Simply, boys are 'socialized' into behaving in ways that are consistent with the culturally held beliefs and stereotypes about the relationship that men have

For example, Davis (1999) concluded that sex differences in recall of autobiographical memories for childhood emotional experiences most likely resulted from 'early gender differences in the socialization of emotions and in the nature of parent-child co-constructions of past events, both of which shape the ways in which personal, real-life emotional experiences are processed at the time of occurrence and subsequently encoded and stored as memorial representations' and, therefore, that 'autobiographical memories of emotional events are socially constructed memories' that 'uniquely reflect the effects of gender-differentiate socialization processes' (p.509)\textsuperscript{24}.

Similarly, Brody and Hall's (1993) review of the literature on sex and gender differences in emotions, in particular their 'finding' that '[t]he evidence indicates that females are superior to males both at recognizing feelings in others and at verbally and facially expressing a wide variety of feelings themselves' (p.457), led them to conclude that '[g]ender differences are undoubtedly partly rooted in peer and family socialization patterns [and are] also consistent with (and have

\textsuperscript{24} In the above passage, 'socially constructed' may be understood in its weakest possible sense, that 'memories' are not snapshots of events and experiences as much as they are cognitive phenomena, the form of which was determined by the sociocultural contextual influences at the time of occurrence and subsequent recollections (compare with Edwards & Middleton's (1986, 1988) strongly social constructionist, discursive psychological view of autobiographical memories).
been found to be related to) the differing gender roles that males and females play in this [western] culture.' (p.457)

Alternatively the 'sociocultural' repertoire can be invoked through appeals to the concept of 'sex-' or 'gender-roles'. LaFrance and Banaji (1992), in their reflections on the findings that women both show and report more 'emotional expressivity', imply that the role of social context and the interactional functions of gendered emotion displays should not be underestimated. They identify 'a need to inquire further as to the social functions of observable emotive display' and imply a 'sociocultural' aetiology for the finding that 'one group [women] appears to work harder at being demonstrative while the other [men] appears to expend more energy on dampening such expression' (p.196). Within this view, 'emotional expression' is conceptualised as performing social functions and, consequently, sex differences in 'emotional expression' are accounted for by the 'social roles' that are accorded and afforded to men and women in contemporary Western societies. Individuals are constructed as expressing emotions in ways that are concordant with the roles and functions that 'men' and 'women' are culturally 'believed' or 'expected' to fill and perform. It is clear within this version of the 'sociocultural' repertoire that the structure of gender at a cultural level is already assumed and follows the 'instrumental/expressive' distinction.

The 'sociocultural' repertoire is also constituted by appeals to 'sex-role consistency' to account for observed differences in self-reports of 'emotional experience' and 'emotional expression'. Grossman and Wood (1993) reported
that sex differences were observed in self-reports of the ‘frequency’ and ‘intensity’ of both the ‘experience’ and ‘expression’ of discrete emotions, such as ‘fear’, ‘joy’, ‘sadness’ and ‘love’. Notably, no sex differences were observed in self-reports of the ‘frequency’ and ‘intensity’ of both the ‘experience’ and ‘expression’ of ‘anger’. These observed ‘sex differences’ were found to correlate highly with the participants’ endorsement of cultural ‘stereotypes’ of ‘sex differences’ in the ‘intensity’ and ‘frequency’ of ‘emotional experience’ and ‘expression’.

To the extent that men endorsed stereotypes of greater intensity of feeling and of expression in women than in men, they reported less intensity in their own personal feelings and in their personal expressions.’ (Grossman & Wood, 1993, p.1014)

Grossman and Wood concluded that these findings lent strong support to the idea that ‘sex differences in emotional intensity derive from sex-differentiated normative pressures that specify that women are more emotionally responsive than men (1993, p.1020). In other words, observed differences between men and women in self-reports of emotional behaviour are accounted for by appeals to the ‘internalisation’ of cultural ‘beliefs’ and ‘stereotypes’ about what it means to be a man or a woman with regard to emotions.

A similar ‘sociocultural account’ of differences in emotional expression can be found in Fischer (1993). These differences are argued to result from the gendering of emotions at a sociocultural level, their reification into gendered
'emotion display rules' and the 'socialisation' of male and females into 'sex-appropriate' patterns of 'emotional expressiveness' and the reporting of 'emotional expressiveness'.

'Gender is related to emotions, because gender is intrinsic to the cultural meaning of emotions: it determines their significance, which rules are applied and what the social implications of emotional expressions are. Emotions traditionally are a feminine province, and discourse on emotion is far more inherent in the social lives of women than in that of men.' (Fischer, 1993, p.313)

The gendering of emotions at a cultural level, and particularly the gendering of discrete emotions as consistent or inconsistent with one's 'sex-role' and the 'socialization' of men and women into these 'patterns of gendered emotional expressivity' results, Fischer argues, in the differential reporting of 'emotional expressiveness' between men and women. Fischer gives the example of how, prior to an important exam, a male student may describe himself as nervous, whereas a female student may describe herself as fearful. These differences in description are not, within Fischer's suggested framework, interpreted as reflective of any underlying 'actual' differences in male and female emotional experiences so much as they are interpreted as consistent with the social and cultural prescriptions of sex-typical emotional experiences. Thus, according to Fischer's argument, as long as the Western conception of masculinity implies a cultural approval of qualities such as independence, invulnerability and agency, expressions of emotions that are culturally interpretable as implying
weakness or vulnerability, such as sadness, grief and even love, will be antithetical to a strong masculine identity. In contrast, while the Western conception of masculinity implies a cultural approval of dominance, expressions of emotions such as anger by men will be interpretable as consistent with a strong masculine identity.

Finally, it should be appreciated that the 'evolutionary' and the 'sociocultural' repertoires of the 'aetiology' of any observed sex differences in emotions are not mutually exclusive and indeed can be complementary if a temporal dimension is invoked. While Grossman and Wood advanced the 'sociocultural' repertoire, it was tempered by the qualification that it was 'not inconsistent with other views of sex differences that locate the cause of men's and women's characteristic styles of emotional reaction in inherent, biological differences between the sexes or in sex-differentiated socialization pressures' (1993, p.1020). That these two discourses are complementary is the result of their invocation as either 'proximal' or 'distal determinants'. The 'sociocultural' repertoire can be invoked to account for the more 'proximal' 'immediate contingencies and beliefs surrounding emotional experience' and to reflect a 'social psychological emphasis on immediate contextual predictors of behaviour' (p.1020). In contrast, the 'evolutionary' discourse and to a lesser extent developmentally focused discourses of 'socialization processes', can be represented as concerned with 'more distal predictors' (p.1020). Both discourses can be simultaneously invoked to account for the same observed difference by positing and assuming determinants that occupy different locations along a temporal dimension.
2.3.4 Discourses of men's relationship with emotions

At this stage, it may be worth dispensing with the use of quotation marks to indicate that the ontological reality of a particular subject or object is not assumed. This final section of the review of the literature on sex and gender differences is concerned only with briefly listing the discourses of men's relationships with emotions that are reproduced and reified through the empirical positivist literature. As such, the entire following section should be read as if it were placed in quotation marks. Further, each of the following representations of men's relationship with emotions, and the discursive resources that constitute them, should be considered in the light of the above-identified functions of the discourses and repertoires of 'sex', 'gender', 'emotionality', 'emotional experience' and 'expression', as well as the 'evolutionary' and 'socio-cultural' discourses of aetiology.

Simply, men are believed to be less emotional than women (Birnbaum, Nosanchuk & Croll, 1980) and less likely to be identified as emotional individuals (Shields, 1987). Men are believed to experience and express more socially desirable self-oriented emotions, e.g. pride, more socially undesirable other-oriented emotions, e.g. anger, less socially undesirable self-oriented emotions, e.g. guilt, and less socially desirable other-oriented emotions, e.g. love (Robinson, Johnson and Shields, 2001). In general, men report experiencing emotions less intensely than women do but no less frequently (Allen & Haccoun, 1976; Diener, Sandvich & Larsen, 1985; Fujita, Diener &
Men report experiencing intropunitive emotions, such as guilt, fear, shame or sadness, less often and with lower intensity than women do (Brody, Hay & Vandewater, 1990; Fischer, 1991, 1993; Stapley & Haviland, 1989; Tangney, 1990). Men report experiencing contempt more than women do (Stapley & Haviland, 1989) but men report experiencing anger and joy with the same frequency and intensity as women do (Allen & Haccoun, 1976; Averill, 1982, 1983; Brody, 1993; Brody & Hall, 1993; Scherer, Walbott & Summerfield, 1986). Men report experiencing love more frequently than women do (Dion & Dion, 1985). In studies employing physiological measures of emotional experience, men are either reported as not differing from women (Levenson, Ekman & Friesen, 1990) or as differing only by small degrees on certain measures or in response to certain stimuli (Buss, Larsen, Weston & Semmelroth, 1992; Kring & Gordon, 1998). Men are unable to identify subjective experiences as emotions and are therefore emotionally inexpressive (Levant, 1995, 1998; Levant et al., 2003). Men report experiencing anger with the same frequency as women do and are no more likely than women to describe themselves as dispositionally angry (Deffenbacher, et al., 1996a; Kopper & Epperson, 1991, 1996).

Men report that they are generally less emotionally expressive than women (Gross & John, 1995; Kring, Smith & Neale, 1994). Men reportedly conceal their emotions, i.e. they experience but do not necessarily express emotions (Brody & Hall, 1993; Fischer, 1993; Jansz, 2000). Observers report that men are less emotionally facially expressive than women (Kring & Gordon, 1998), except when expressing anger (Schwartz, Brown & Ahern (1980), Kring &
Gordon (1998) and Wagner, Macdonald & Manstead (1986). The emotional meaning of men’s facial expressions are less accurately identified by observers (Buck, Baron, Goodman & Shapiro, 1980; Fujita, Harper & Weins, 1980; Wagner, Buck & Winterbotham, 1993; Wagner, MacDonald & Manstead, 1986) and men are reported by observers as smiling and gesturing less than women (Barr & Kleck, 1995; Riggio & Friedman, 1986). Men report that they cry less than women do (see the review by Vingerhoets and Schiers, 2000). Men do not report that they express anger more frequently than women (Deffenbacher, et al., 1996a; Deffenbacher et al., 1996b; Faber & Burns, 1996; Kopper, 1991; Kopper & Epperson, 1996; Stoner & Spencer, 1987; Thomas & Williams, 1991). Men report that their expression of anger may take the form of aggression towards others more than women do (Deffenbacher et al., 1996a). Men report crying when angry with much lower frequency than women (Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault & Benton, 1992; Eagly & Steffen, 1986; Timmers, Fischer & Manstead, 1997; Zemmen & Garber, 1996).

On the whole, men and women are reported by observers as not differing in their use of emotion terms in naturalistic talk or in the recounting of emotional experiences (Anderson & Leaper, 1998; Campbell & Muncer, 1987; Lutz, 1990; Shimanoff, 1983; though for a conflicting finding see Goldshmidt & Weller, 2000). Men verbally communicate their feelings less than women do (Dindia & Allen, 1992; Dosser, Balswick & Halverson, 1983).
These are the accounts of the relationship between men, masculinity and emotions that are reproduced and reified through positivist psychological enquiry. The functions that such constructions may serve can be understood in light of the preceding engagement with the discursive resources that are constitutive of these constructions and the explication of epistemological bases and their ideological functions. What I will examine through the analysis is the extent to which these constructions recur in men’s talk about emotions (chapter 4), men’s negotiation of their ‘selves’ relative to emotions (chapter 5) and men’s performance of emotions (chapter 6). Before moving to the outlining of the analytic method employed in the analysis, the conceptualisation of ‘emotions’ that will be employed in this thesis must first be outlined. This is of particular importance to the analysis of chapter 6, which, in contrast to chapters 4 and 5, is concerned not with men’s talk about emotions but with occasions on which men might be argued to be ‘doing emotions’. The analysis of chapter 6 therefore requires an interpretative framework that is capable of dealing with ‘emotions’ as interactional accomplishments. Emotions must be conceptualized at a level that extends beyond the simply discursive, i.e. the analysis of chapter 6 must be attentive not only to how, when and to what ends emotion discourses are invoked but also to how emotions are done and indexed as being done in everyday interactions.

2.4 A poststructuralist approach to emotions

First, it is important to recognise that this thesis is concerned with gender and emotion at two levels, though these levels are not conceptualised as necessarily distinct or discrete. Simply, the two levels are the performative and
the discursive - alternatively, how emotions and gender are ‘done’ and how they are talked about. Given the constitutive functions that are assumed to be served by language, it is relatively easy to appreciate how the former might be related to the latter. It would, however, be overly simplistic to assume that emotion or gender discourses are, in any way, ‘essential’ to the performance of emotion or of gender. ‘Being angry’ can be done without the use of emotion discourses; a person does not need to describe their self as angry in order to be understood to ‘be’ angry. A great many other resources, including facial expressions and the paralinguistic qualities of speech, are constitutive of the performance of emotions. This point is perhaps even easier to understand with regard to gender. The idea of a person proclaiming explicitly that they are engaged in the performance of masculinity – ‘I’m behaving like a man’ – sounds very strange indeed. Particular discursive resources and strategies, as well as behaviours, may be interpreted as gendered and their invocation or enactment may then be interpreted as constituting the performance of gender.

This thesis is, therefore, concerned with identifying the discursive and performative formulations of emotion and of gender, the interactions between them and the functions they serve in social and cultural contexts. At both levels, whether they are conceptualized as particular repertoires of discursive resources or as performative acts, emotions and gender are assumed to serve rhetorical and relational functions, the most obvious of which is the construction and negotiation of a particular self or identity as emotional and/or gendered.
Psychological, and by extension social psychological, research on emotion is dominated by approaches that are based on the presupposition that emotions are ontologically existent, physiologically manifest phenomena (Ekman, 1984, 1992; Frijda, 1993; Izard, 1977; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b; Schacter & Singer, 1962). The hegemony of such approaches is hardly surprising when the history of the study of emotions is considered (Darwin, 1872; James, 1884). Even social constructionist (Averill, 1985; Harré, 1986; Harré & Gillet, 1994) and social functionalist (Armon-Jones, 1986; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999) approaches to emotion, with their respective foci on the social and cultural constitution of emotions and on the functions served by emotions at various social and cultural levels, retain a sense of the ontological reality of emotions. For example, in his outlining of a social constructionist approach to emotion, with specific reference to love, Averill argues that love, and by implication any other theorised discrete emotion, 'is a complex syndrome composed of many component processes. These components may differ in the extent to which they are determined by biological, psychological, and social factors, but no component by itself is a necessary or sufficient condition for the entire syndrome.' (1985; p.94)

To draw a comparison with the previously-reviewed work of Judith Butler, no theory of emotions has gone so far as to argue that one of the functions of the categories of emotions, of the ways that emotions are talked about, is to make the 'bodily experience' of emotions matter. The materiality of emotions, the theorising of them as physiological and biological phenomena, seems in many ways to be sacrosanct; to borrow from Edwards, Ashmore and Potter (1995), it
seems to be a ‘truth’ that cannot or should not be denied. By adopting a strongly social constructionist, poststructuralist perspective, it is, however, possible to engage with the entire range of phenomena that are taken to constitute emotions, including bodily experience, facial expressions and the paralinguistic qualities of speech, at the discursive and performative levels, but to resist engaging in a discussion of the possibility that emotions are ontologically existent. By doing so, the utility and the limits of the assumptions that underlie both existing approaches to emotion and social constructionism can be explored. Simply, we can determine what might be gained or lost by not assuming the ontological existence of emotions.

The dual concern with emotions at the discursive and the performative levels requires two differing, but still social constructionist, approaches. An approach suitable for the analysis of emotions at the discursive level, that is to say in language and in talk, is available off-the-peg in the form of the discursive psychological approach to emotions outlined by Edwards (1997, 1999). The analysis of emotion at the performative level requires an approach that is, in a manner similar to that of discursive psychology, oriented to the functions served by the phenomena traditionally taken to be evidence of the physiological experience and expression of emotions, facial expressions, non-verbal behaviour and the paralinguistic qualities of speech. These extra-discursive but none the less communicative phenomena will be analysed through an approach broadly based upon the interpersonal communicative theory of emotions outlined by Parkinson (1995). However, the interpretation of these extra-discursive communicative phenomena will be contiguous with the
interpretation of discourse. Simply, the analysis at this level will be concerned with the relationship between the phenomena taken to be performative of emotion and the discursive content that they accompany. The use of one approach or the other will, in the analysis, be determined by the type and content of the data. Thus, the discursive approach will be most apparent in the analysis of chapters 4 and 5 and the performance oriented approach will be fore-grounded in chapter 6.

One possible way of avoiding involvement in any debate on the possible ontological reality of emotions (a necessary requirement for a thesis operating from the above outlined strongly social constructionist perspective and for any attempt to marry the above outlined critical approach to gender with an equivalent approach to emotion) is to engage with emotion only in language, with emotion categories and metaphors and the interactional, social and cultural functions they serve, with what Edwards (1997, 1999) categorizes as emotion discourse. As will be demonstrated in the following review of Edwards’ approach, to adopt this position is not entirely to eschew the issue of the bodily experience of emotions, in much the same way that Butler does not eschew the issue of gendered bodies. Indeed, the bodily experience of emotions is opened up to critical enquiry through its conceptualisation as a significant feature of emotion discourse.

Edwards’ approach to emotion discourse is located within the larger project of discursive psychology, which is itself derived from ethnomethodology, linguistic philosophy, conversation analysis, rhetoric and the sociology of knowledge.
(Billig, 1987; Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). Broadly, discursive psychology can be described as concerned with analysing, critiquing, deconstructing and challenging dominant approaches to and conceptualisations of psychological phenomena (see Edwards, Middleton & Potter, 1992) and as concerned with the use of ‘folk’ psychological concepts in everyday life and talk. With regard to ‘folk’ conceptualisations of psychological phenomena, discursive psychology is concerned with the identification of the functions served by particular constructions or resources in particular contexts, what Edwards ‘describes’ as ‘the action-performative nature of everyday accounts’ (1999; p.272) and is particularly attentive to issues and areas of inconsistency, conflict and variability in the uses and functions of psychological concepts in those accounts.

In Edwards’ view, emotions are a prime example of a psychological concept drawn upon, in equal measure, in both sociological and psychological theorizing and in everyday life and talk. Discursive psychology’s interest in emotions is not, however, shaped by traditional conceptions of emotions within academic discourses as ‘natural bodily experiences and expressions, older than language, irrational and subjective, unconscious rather than deliberate, genuine rather than artificial, feelings rather than thoughts’ (Edwards, 1999; p.273), so much as it is by an empirical concern with how such conceptions

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25 The theory and analytic techniques of discursive psychology will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.
and categories are invoked, in what contexts and to what rhetorical or interactional effects. The project of a discursive psychological engagement with emotions is, therefore, to identify the functions served by emotion discourses in the interactional management of a discursively constituted self, including such things as negotiations of social accountability (Shotter, 1985; 1989) and the management of interpersonal relations. In this thesis, the discursive psychological approach to emotions will be extended to include the relationship between emotion discourses and gender discourses. This relationship will be empirically examined at both the rhetorical and ideological level, the relationships between emotion and gender discourses in talk and, at the performative and interactional level, the relationships between the 'doing of emotions' and the 'doing of gender'. Further, the relationship between these levels will also constitute a site of empirical enquiry.

Precedents for discursive psychological engagements with emotions discourses are limited (Bamberg 1997a, 1997b; Edwards, 1997, 1999). The most significant contribution from these works is, perhaps, Edwards' (1997) list of 'rhetorical contrasts'. This 10 item list, whilst not intended to be exhaustive, highlights many of the possible functions that emotion discourses can serve in text and in day-to-day talk. The great strength of the items contained in this list is that they are not intended to be discrete or exclusive. An invocation of one part of one of the rhetorical contrasts does not preclude the simultaneous invocation of another part of one of the other contrasts. For example, three of the rhetorical contrasts on Edwards' list are: 'Emotions as irrational versus rational', 'Emotional behaviour as controllable action or passive reaction',
‘Internal states versus external behaviour: private (‘feelings’) versus public (‘expressions’, ‘displays’)’ (1997, p.194). This list of just three of the items demonstrates some of the possible variability that is afforded by emotion discourses in negotiations of social accountability and in the management of social interactions and relationships. A violent act, constructed through emotion discourses as ‘anger’, could be accounted for as the public expression of an irrational, passive reaction to a particular stimulus or situation. It is the very flexibility of emotion discourses that Edwards identifies as the basis for their utility in social interactions and, consequently, for empirical social psychological analysis.

It is because people’s emotion displays (thus categorized) can be treated either as involuntary reaction, or as under agentive control or rational accountability, as internal states or public displays, reactions or dispositions, that emotion discourse can perform flexible, accountability-oriented, indexically sensitive, rhetorical work. (Edwards, 1999, p.288)

The aim of this thesis is, therefore, to identify the particular configurations of emotion discourses, including invocations of rhetorical contrasts, drawn upon by speakers in negotiations of social accountability, where that negotiation might also be interpreted as simultaneously concerned with the performance of gender, specifically of ‘masculinity’.

26 Alternatively, a violent act, constructed as anger, could be accounted for as a rational, intentional response to perceived slight (see Aristotle).
While a concern with the rhetorical and ideological functions of emotion discourses, particularly in relation to gender discourses, is adequate for the analysis of talk on the topic of emotions, it is insufficiently sophisticated for the analysis of talk in which the speakers might be argued to 'be emotional'. Such interactions require an approach that is also capable of orienting to emotions at a performative level, but which retains the sense that emotional enactments, like emotion discourses, are necessarily functional, communicative and constitutive of 'self' or identity.

However, existing approaches to emotions that are categorised as social constructionist (Averill, 1980, 1982, 1985; Harré, 1986; particularly Sarbin, 1986) are liable to the criticism that they place excessive emphasis on cultural factors as the determinants of emotional behaviour. By conceptualising emotions as prescribed social roles, enacted, experienced and embodied in response to social and cultural requirements, these theories are insufficiently attentive to the subtle effects of local interactional factors in the determination of nuanced emotional behaviours. Social constructionist approaches, in their application of a top-down approach, are therefore liable to the criticism that they elide the complexity of emotions as they occur at the more local level.

27 The emphasizing of cultural factors may also be argued to elide the possibility of global factors as determinants of emotional behaviour, i.e. the existence of basic, essential emotions. However, given the approach adopted within this thesis, this is not a line of criticism that warrants further development here.
Many of the occasions for emotion arise from local negotiations in the course of everyday interpersonal interaction and do not directly reflect societally proscribed norms. The conflicts, disagreements, and commitments that lead to emotion may be based on mutually established rights and obligations in relationships which have only a remote connection with culturally imposed rules and roles (Parkinson, 1995, p.162).

In Parkinson's argument, it is difficult not to hear echoes of Davies and Harré's revised definition of a subject position as incorporating 'both a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights and duties for those who use that repertoire' (Davies & Harré, 1999, p.35; emphasis added). Emotions, as both performative acts and as discursive resources, might therefore be argued to be constitutive of subject positions and, indeed, to be central to the process of their (re)negotiation, including the negotiation of the rights and duties that they afford and ascribe, within day-to-day interactional contexts. Emotions, in Parkinson's view, are central resources in the day-to-day accomplishment of a relational self and the management of interpersonal relationships. Indeed, he explicitly states that an interpersonal communicative theory of emotions is predicated on the assumption that emotions are 'an interpersonal strategy for realigning relative identity positions' (1995, p.275).

In developing an interpersonal communicative theory of emotions, Parkinson questions the emphasis that is placed on individual agency as an explanation
for the adoption of emotion roles in the above listed social constructionist approaches\textsuperscript{28}. An attention to agency in emotional episodes is radical in so far as it is contrary to traditional conceptions of emotions as passions, as events and experiences by which individuals are passively overcome. Indeed, both Averill and Sarbin advance functionalist theories for the existence of the 'myth of the passions'. However, the theory of an agentic subject, who self-consciously takes up emotion roles in interactions, is argued to be as restrictive as the 'myth of the passions'.

\[\text{E\textit{m}otion arises not from within an individual's authorial consciousness but emerges in the dialogue of an ongoing interaction... The acting out of emotion episodes is guided on-line by the affordances offered or denied by other people's ongoing actions, which in turn are mutually coordinated with the actor's own self-presentation. (Parkinson, 1995, p.162-163; cf. Lutz & White, 1986).}\]

The conceptualization of emotions as consequences of social interactions, but as simultaneously constitutive of the speakers, including their rights and duties within those interactions, and the resistance of an agentic subject all accord

\textsuperscript{28} The dramaturgical metaphor of 'role' is central to both theories. It is apparent in Averill's (1980) formulation of emotions as 'transitory social roles' but is more extensively developed by Sarbin (1986) in his differentiation between types of roles, specifically in his development of emotions as a particular set of \textit{dramatistic} roles.
with poststructuralist conceptualisations of the subject and with the theorising of a dialogically and relationally constituted moral self (Lewis, 2003).29

Recent functional accounts of emotion (Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999) are more firmly located within traditional approaches to emotion and are not so concerned with the interactional role played by emotions in the constitution and negotiation of identity.

The advancement of an interpersonal communicative theory of emotion requires the reinterpretation of the phenomena that are argued to be constitutive of emotions and of the findings of existing research on those phenomena, from whatever perspectives that research might operate (Parkinson, 1995). Of particular relevance to this thesis are the reinterpretations of emotional differentiation and amplification. Emotional differentiation, a core implication of the basic emotions thesis (Ekman & Friesen, 1971) is argued to result from the different identity goals served by different emotions, rather than from any intrinsic difference in their patterns of physiological effects, or from differing patterns of cognitive appraisal or from the different functions they might serve as adaptive behaviours. Within the interpersonal communicative theory of emotion, the importance of relatively

29 When considering the relational production of the 'self', it is all too easy to be drawn into thinking of a singular subject. It should therefore be remembered at all times that it is assumed that all speakers in all contexts are, to some degree, engaged in the relational production of 'selves' through their ongoing negotiation of subject positions; from a social constructionist perspective, it is a process in which we are all supposed to be simultaneously involved.
stable of patterns of 'bodily reactions, action impulses, and facial displays' (Parkinson, ibid. p.274), as well as the paralinguistic qualities of speech, is argued to lie not in their constitution of basic emotions, but in their functioning as 'modes of communication...involved in the ongoing delivery of the emotional message' (Parkinson, ibid. p.275). All the phenomena taken to constitute emotional experiences are argued to be communicative components of an identity-oriented performance. One of the more obvious examples of the implications of this theory is the reinterpretation of emotional intensity, typically conceptualised as a dimension of emotional experience (Frijda, Ortony, Sonnemans & Clore, 1992; Reisenzein, 1994) and along which men and women are reported as differing (Averill, 1983), as simply the enactment of the rhetorical strategy of emphasis. Apparent or reported emotional intensity can be reinterpreted as a strategy by which the importance of the identity goal, to which the emotion is related, is worked up.

For an interpersonal communicative theory of emotion, existing theories provide a number of resources through which the performative functions of emotions might be conceptualised. However, these mappings of the functions of emotions, predicated as they are on theories of relatively discrete emotions, are highly generalised. De Rivera (1984) and Smith and Lazarus (1993) both provide a number of dimensions along which emotions can be theorised as functioning in the (re)negotiation of self-other relationships. For example, in a simplification of de Rivera, emotions function, along a proximal dimension, in the management of the distances between the self and the other, where the other is assumed to be the object of the emotion. Though de Rivera was
concerned with non-verbal factors of emotion, bodily response and facial displays, it is perhaps easier to appreciate how discursive enactments of emotions, such as ‘Fuck off’ and ‘I love you’ – interpretable as performative of anger and love respectively – might function as negotiations of, potentially, both the physical and metaphysical distances between the speaker and the addressee. Smith and Lazarus (1993) identify the ‘core relational themes’ of discrete emotions – based upon the amalgamation of the appraisal components that are argued to be characteristic of that emotion – which are further theorised as reflecting relational harms and benefits. Core relational themes are, in effect, the central relational meanings of emotions. Thus, anger is argued to have the core relational theme, or to communicate the relational meaning, of other-blame. This is based upon the amalgamation of the primary cognitive appraisals of motivational relevance and motivational incongruence and the secondary appraisal of other-accountability and reflects the appraisal of the interactional context as potentially harmful to the individual. Simply, anger is argued to occur in interactional contexts where the other is identified as accountable for actions that obstruct aims that are relevant or important to the self, where these aims may be more or less tangible, for example the achievement of practical tasks or some particular identity goal. The communication of the relational meaning of anger, other-blame, is therefore assumed to function in the renegotiation of this potentially harmful self-other relational dynamic.

Whilst these two theories differ with regard to the extent that emotions might be theorised as intrapsychic phenomena – as appraisal theorists, Smith and
Lazarus inevitably regard emotion as primarily an intrapsychic phenomenon, but de Rivera explicitly states that the 'emotional dynamics are not really in the infant' (1984, p. 120; emphasis in original) it is evident that, within both theories, emotions are conceptualised as phenomena that are constituted by and are constitutive of the relationship between the self and the other. Consequently, it is possible to focus on emotions at this level in an analysis and to remain agnostic about the ontological reality of the intrapsychic or physiological components of emotion experiences.

An interpersonal communicative theory of emotions is also able to account for reported disjunctions between emotional experience and expression, through the emphasising of the constraining, if not deterministic, effects of interactional context. For the sake of consistency, between this review and the following analysis, I will employ the term 'subject position' (Davies & Harré, 1980) in the following explanations. Reported disjunctions between emotional experience and expression are argued to occur when the potential for the self to occupy some emotion-based subject position, which by definition would be constituted by some expressive, communicative but not necessarily discursive act, is constrained by the subject positions afforded or ascribed by others or by some other requirement for the constitution of the self, which combine to constitute the interactional context. Consider, for example, the requirement for a police

\[\text{30 De Rivera continues, 'They are not just physiological states with concomitant facial expressions and subjective feelings. Rather, the dynamics are between the infant and the other' (1984, p. 120; emphasis in original).}\]
officer to remain calm and rational even in the face of extreme provocation.

Professional and work contexts may constitute, and indeed be constituted by, subject positions that are incompatible with emotion-based subject positions. That said, of course, we do not need, nor can we, assume that reported disjunctions between emotional experience and expression reflect ontological reality. A claim by a police officer to have been angered by provocation but to have remained externally calm is just that, a claim, one way by which being a professional police officer might be accomplished. Within the analyses, such invocations of ‘emotions’ as accountability-oriented discursive resources will allow meaningful engagement with the research questions.

2.5 The research questions

The research questions as they appear here and in the following chapters are the result of a recursive movement between the above-reviewed literature and the collected data. They represent the points of entry for an engagement with the issues raised in the review regarding existent assumptions about men’s relationship with emotions and with theories of the broader relationship between gender and emotions. Further, they are phrased so that they support engagement with these issues in ways that are consistent with the above-outlined poststructuralist approaches to ‘gender’ and ‘emotions’ and are sensitive to the limits of the data.

Chapter 4 will be concerned with the discursive relationship between concepts of ‘masculinity’ and ‘emotions’ and is intended to answer the following questions:
How do men construct men's relationship with emotions?

In constructing this relationship, what discourses do men draw upon to account for it?

In answering these questions the analysis will be attentive to variability, both in the constructions of men's relationship with emotions and in the discourses that they invoke to account for it.

In accounting for men's constructed relationship with emotions, do men reflexively orient to the implications of the discourses upon which they draw for their own subject positions as 'men'?

Chapter 5 will be concerned with one speaker's negotiation of the discursive relationships between one particular emotion concept – humiliation – and the 'self' and is intended to answer the following research questions:

- How does a male speaker construct accounts of episodes of 'humiliation'?
- Are discourses of 'humiliation' used to construct accounts of the negotiation of subject positions and the constitution of power relations?
- And, based upon the presuppositions that humiliation constitutes episodes of disempowerment and that the performance of masculinity is, in some way, constituted through the negotiation of power relations, does a male speaker, when constructing episodes in which he is the object of humiliation, simultaneously orient to their implications for the constitution of a masculine subjectivity?
Chapter 6 is concerned with the relationships between 'emotions' and 'gender' in practice and is intended to answer the following research questions.

- What functions are served by men's responses to the emotional expressions of others?
- What functions are served by men's 'doing' of emotional expressivity?
- Are these functions synchronous with the performance of masculinities or constitutive of masculine subjectivities?
Chapter 3

Discourse analytic approaches and the turn to language

3.1 Introduction

Since the publication of *Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour* (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) there has been a steady and continuous development of discourse analytic theory and practice in social psychological research. The process of this development has, perhaps inevitably, led to divergence and the emergence of differing forms of analysis, all of which might broadly be categorised as discursive. These divergences centre on attempts to balance the epistemological bases for and limitations of the answers that analysts can give in response to the classic conversation analytic conundrum ‘why that now?’ (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973; though it might also be represented as ‘why this utterance here?’ (Wetherell, 1998, p.388) with more pragmatic or political concerns for the answers that analysts ought to be able to give. The practical and political utility of discourse analytic approaches within social psychology, i.e. their ability to answer the questions that concern social psychology, is entirely dependent upon the epistemological assumptions that underlie them. Debates between researchers and theorists adopting various discursive approaches, including debates between discourse analysts and conversation analysts, have centred on the answers that can be given to the question ‘why that now?’ within particular epistemological frameworks and
the consequent usefulness of those answers (Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Edley, 2001; Schegloff 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Speer, 2001; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1999). The relative values of respective epistemological frameworks and the forms of analysis they support are negotiated with reference to their claimed utility.

It is worth noting at this point that the forms of discourse analysis discussed here are only those forms that are predominant within British social psychology. Other forms of analysis, which might broadly be glossed as discursive, such as conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974) and critical discourse analysis (van Dijk, 1993, 2001) will only be mentioned as reference points in the locating and outlining of the dominant forms of discourse analysis that are found in British social psychology, namely discursive psychology, Foucauldian discourse analysis and critical discursive psychology.

Within the discourse analytic approaches developed and employed in social psychology, two broad types of analysis and two broad groups of allied researchers, authors and theorist have emerged. Briefly, these two approaches and their respective theorists have been represented as concerned either with ‘the social functions of talk and writing and [with] how these functions are achieved through the construction of accounts’ (Coyle, 2000, p.254) or as concerned with ‘issues such as identity, selfhood, social change and power relations’ (Coyle, ibid., p.254) (see also Burr (1995), Widdicombe and Woofitt (1995) and Willig (1999) for discussions of the

Arguably, the divergence of these approaches occurs about the differing conceptualisations of the eponymous focus of their analyses, that is to say, with regard to what 'discourse' is understood to refer. Within ethnomethodology and conversation analysis 'discourse' is understood to refer to 'talk-in-interaction' (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974), whilst in the sociology of scientific knowledge it is understood to refer to all forms of talk and writing (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984). In these approaches 'discourse' refers to the primary object of interest, that is to say, it refers to language in use. A contrasting understanding of 'discourse' emerges from poststructuralism. Here 'discourse' is understood to refer to historically and culturally emergent structures of linguistic practices (Foucault, 1972). Thus, in poststructuralist analyses, the interplay of discourses within 'discourse' (understood in the ethnomethodological and conversational analytic sense) becomes a focus of analysis. As was discussed above in the outlining of a poststructuralist account of gender, one feature of discourses is their ability to constitute objects and subjects; subjectivities are theorised as emerging from and indeed as constituted by discourses.

The analytic techniques that can collectively be grouped as concerned with 'discourse', in either of the above identified senses, the assumptions that
underlie them, their primary interests and the practical or political utility will be addressed in turn. I will maintain the above identified distinction between the two major types of discourse analytic work apparent in contemporary social psychology, firstly addressing the discursive psychological approach, then the more Foucauldian discourse analytic approach, before finally considering their synthesis in critical discursive psychology. However, it should clearly be stated that these approaches differ only by degrees. They share more similarities than differences; they have, on the whole, a common philosophical history and so share many theoretical underpinnings. My concern is simply with identifying the analytic approach that will render the above stated research questions answerable.

3.2 Discursive Psychology

Arguably, the most prominent form of discourse analysis in British psychology, perhaps owing to the concentration of authors who constitute the Loughborough Discourse Analysis and Rhetoric Group (DARG), is that of discursive psychology. The discursive psychological approach of Edwards, (1997), Edwards & Potter, (1992) and Potter, (1996) is grounded in the analytic traditions of ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), the sociology of scientific knowledge (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984) and conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992; Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974). At the simplest level, discursive psychology can be represented as concerned with the identification of features within discourse and the functions that these features might serve for individuals in interactional contexts. In contrast, whilst critical discursive psychology of the type advocated by Edley and Wetherell (Edley, 2001; Edley

At this stage, it is perhaps worth restating the view of language that is adopted within a discursive psychological approach, that language is constructive, rather than simply reflective, of social reality and that language-in-use, i.e. discourse, is a form of social action (Austin, 1962). Thus, the central concerns of the discursive psychological approach are the twinned issues of construction and function. Particularly, it is attentive to the ways by which 'factual accounts' and 'descriptions', which might in other approaches be interpreted as straightforward 'objective' representations of external or internal (psychological) reality, unmediated by personal interest or investment, are made to seem as such. Discursive psychology is concerned with the ways by which an account may be made to seem to be 'a description rather than a

31 The conceptualisation of interpretative repertoires as 'recurrently used systems of terms used for characterizing and evaluating actions, events and other phenomena. A repertoire...is constituted through a limited range of terms used in particular stylistic and grammatical constructions. Often a repertoire will be organized around specific metaphors and figures of speech (tropes)' (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p.149). There is a high degree of similarity between 'interpretative repertoires' and the Foucauldian concept of 'discourses' (Parker, 1992).
claim, a speculation, or indeed a lie. This is the force of saying that people do not description’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p.104). Within the discursive psychological approach descriptions are oriented to as occasioned social acts. The view of descriptions as both occasioned and as social acts opens up two important related lines of debate, which might generally be referred to as the relationship between context and function.

The relationship between context and function, specifically the assumptions that inform its theorisation and the consequent implications for the forms and limits of the analyses that can be offered, is arguably the most contentious issue within discourse analytic, including conversation analytic, theory (see the debates between Billig and Schegloff, Schegloff and Wetherell, and Edley and Speer (Billig, 1999a, 1999b; Edley, 2001; Schegloff 1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Speer, 2001; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1999)). The various conceptualisations of this relationship constitute the basis for the differentiation of analytic techniques that are concerned with ‘discourse’, whether ‘discourse’ is conceptualized as talk or text or in the more Foucauldian sense. The theorised relationship between context and function is also the fundamental basis for claims of the applied or political utility of each technique. Whilst this area of discourse analytic theory is hugely important, I do not intend to enter into a detailed exposition of it here. Rather, as will be seen, the relationship between context and function, the assumptions that underlie it and its delimiting affect on the interpretations of talk that can be offered, will constitute a recursive theme not just of this review but of the thesis as a whole. At this
juncture I will limit my concerns with context and function to the ways that they are conceptualised within the discursive psychological approach.

The issue of context is of paramount concern for analysts concerned with discourse. The context in which a particular feature of talk occurs, whether that feature is a word, a phrase, a change in pitch or emphasis or a whole sentence, stands as a resource upon which analysts can draw to advance interpretations of the functions of that feature. However, context is a highly variable concept. Consider the following exchange (taken from chapter 6):

Speaker A: = no you stress me out (. ) I'm alright (. ) until you come home =
Speaker B: = you just =
Speaker A: = you moan at stupid little things =

Different conceptualisations of the context of this interaction could be advanced based upon the provision of such information as:

Speaker A is male and speaker B female
Speaker A and speaker B share a house and it is in this house that the interaction takes place
Speaker A and speaker B are married
The exchange takes place during a discussion of the cleanliness of the house and the division of domestic duties
The above example is demonstrative of what might be termed an analyst's conceptualization of context. Information known to the analyst is invoked to contextualize the text and then to provide an interpretative framework. For example, the above example could be contextualized as an interaction between a man and woman who are involved in a heterosexual relationship that is ratified through the institution of marriage. From this perspective what the analyst may know or may claim to know about the dynamics of heterosexual relationships and marriages and the division of domestic responsibilities within such relationships may be drawn upon to determine the meaning and function of the utterances. Such an approach may be adopted by analysts working from an explicitly 'feminist' perspective. Such analysts may be concerned with the methods by which the material relations between men and women at a cultural level, such as the unequal division of domestic duties within heterosexual relationships, are interactionally and discursively accomplished at a more local level. It is evident from the preceding sentence that the analytic project in such an example proceeds from the top down. What the analyst knows or may claim to know about the material relations between men and women at a cultural level determines both the features of interest within the interaction and the context that is drawn upon in their interpretation.

An alternative bottom-up feminist conversation analytic approach has been

32 It is not my intention to construct the political project of feminism as a unitary project that is devoid of variance, rather 'feminist' is used reflexively to echo the identifications of analysts who may adopt a range of perspectives and methodologies all of which might commonly be categorised as 'feminist'. For the most extensive overview of the relationship between feminism and discourse analytic approaches see Wilkinson and Kitzinger (1995).

Again, owing to being heavily grounded in ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, the conceptualisation of context and the role that context can play in the interpretation of talk within discursive psychology tends to be limited to the interactional context, as it is evidenced through talk. Schegloff (1997) outlined the conversation analytic conceptualization of context in the following manner:

And because it is the orientations, meanings, interpretations, understandings, etc. of the participants in some sociocultural event on which the course of that event is predicated—and especially if it is constructed interactionally over time, it is those characterizations which are privileged in the constitution of socio-interactional reality, and therefore have a prima facie claim to being privileged in efforts to understand it. (pp.166-167, emphasis in original)

Similarly, in outlining the ethnomethodological approach to language Heritage stated:

Understanding language is not, in the first instance, a matter of understanding sentences but of understanding actions – utterances – which are constructively interpreted in relations to their contexts. This involves viewing an utterance against a background of who said it, where and when, what was being accomplished by saying it and in the
light of what possible *considerations* and in virtue of what *motives* it was
said. (1984, pp.139-140, emphasis in original)

In its orientation to talk and to texts, discursive psychology further draws upon
two related concepts from ethnomethodology, *indexicality* and *reflexivity*.

Like other actions, descriptions are 'indexical' and are to be understood
by reference to where and when etc. they occur. Like other actions too,
descriptions are ‘reflexive’ in maintaining or altering the sense of the
activities and unfolding circumstances in which they occur. (Heritage,
1984, p.140)

The fundamental importance of the concept of indexicality to discursive
psychology is evident in the following statement from Potter:

> The central idea of indexicality is that the meaning of a word or
utterance is dependent on its context of use. This is true whether the
utterance is conventionally thought of as a description, a question, an
order or whatever. Put another way, the study of what an utterance
means will not reach a satisfactory conclusion without some
understanding of the occasion on which that utterance is used. (1996,
p.43)

Reflexivity is the notion that features of talk, such as descriptions, ‘are not just
*about* something but they are also *doing* something; that is, they are not
merely representing some facet of the world, they are also involved in that world in some practical way' (Potter, 1996, p.47, emphasis in original).

Combining these two concepts, discursive psychology can be seen to be concerned with the identification of the meaning of utterances within the contexts in which they occur (indexicality), where those contexts are themselves understood to be constituted by the functions of the those utterances (reflexivity). In the discursive psychological approach, the context within which utterances are taken to have occurred, and upon which they are dependent for their meaning, is limited only to the context that can be seen to be constituted by the utterances themselves. This is perhaps a literal application of the Derridean idiom that 'there is nothing outside of the text' (1976); there is no importing of extra-textual information or knowledge to constitute the interpretative framework of context in discursive psychology.

A focus on the construction of accounts has led discursive psychologist to attend to such features of discourse as the construction of 'facts' and 'descriptions' (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996), the use of categories (Edwards, 1997; Potter, 1996; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) to psychological concepts such as emotions and memory (Edwards, 1997, 1999; Edwards, Middleton & Potter, 1992), are analysed from the perspective that they do things for speakers. Two issues arise from such analyses, the rhetorical work that such features perform, i.e. what those features do for speakers, and the assumed 'nature' of speakers. As discussed above, the focus on speakers' orientations or their negotiation of accountability could be read as implying a conscious agentic subject. However, discursive psychologists remain
determinedly agnostic on such possibilities. Discussions of the ‘nature’ of the ‘subject’, the ‘self’ or ‘identity’ are only entered into if such concepts emerge as participants’ categories within the talk or texts taken as data. This approach has been categorized as ‘blank subjectivity’ (Parker, 1997).

Primary amongst the identified rhetorical functions of discourse is the accomplishment and management of attributions (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). Edwards and Potter’s (1992) development of a discursive psychological account of attribution is accomplished relative to the established social cognition account of attribution theory (Smith, 1994). Whilst there is an acknowledgment of the importance of language in the social cognition approaches (Hewstone, 1989) it is in Edwards and Potter’s view not sufficient, particularly in so far as it maintains the conceptualization of attributions as internally accomplished cognitive phenomena. The discursive approach developed by Edwards and Potter ‘urges that these be studied as social acts performed in discourse, and not merely as cognitions about social acts, which happen to be expressed within conversations’ (1992, p.84).

Within the discursive approach, ‘categorisations’ and ‘descriptions’, as well as invocations of psychological phenomena such as ‘memory’ and ‘emotions’, and the attributional functions that they serve are viewed as occasioned features of talk and that as such they are action-oriented. In short, ‘[p]eople do descriptions and thereby do attributions’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p.103, emphasis in original). Further, the features taken to be constitutive of attribution are, owing to their being situated in interactions between two or
more speakers, designed not only to constitute particular versions of reality or accounts of causality but also to be resistant to alternative versions and accounts.

Within discursive psychology, 'accountability' is oriented to as the primary function of attributions done through description. Shotter (1989) defined 'social accountability' as 'the fact that we must talk only in certain already established ways, in order to meet the demands placed upon us by our need to sustain our status as responsible members of our society — where the “must” involved is a moral must' (p.141). Within discursive psychology 'accountability' is more often conceptualized as a locally determined and discursively occasioned need; it is the way by which speakers construct and negotiate their location and status within and, in doing so constitute, the local interactional context. An orientation to negotiations of accountability, in terms of the management of issues of responsibility and agency, is undoubtedly the first step in the interpretation of discourse and the functions that it serves. However, discursive psychology, with its focus on the local interactional context, is typically reluctant to move beyond this first step and to engage with more macro-textual accounts of the functions served by particular discursive resources. For this reason, discursive psychological analyses may be interpreted as limited in their findings and as unable to contribute significantly to discussions of broader social concerns. Arguably, it is a desire to engage with such concerns that is determinate of more poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse analysis.
3.3 Poststructuralist or Foucauldian Discourse Analysis

Poststructuralist or Foucauldian 'discourse analysis' (Burman, 1992, 1995, 1997; Burman & Parker, 1993; Hollway, 1989; Parker, 1992; Willig, 2003) has been advanced as an alternative to 'discursive psychology'. The need for an alternative has been argued to result from discursive psychology's inability to engage adequately with issues of politics, ideology, power and materiality (Parker, 1992, 2004.) Particularly, discursive psychology has been represented as a move towards linguistic relativism, or what Parker (1992) calls 'idealism' (see the debate between Parker (1999a, 1999b) and Potter, Edwards and Ashmore (1999); see also Edwards, Ashmore and Potter's (1995) classic refutation of the bottom-line realist arguments against relativism.) Relativism in psychology is, Parker argues, 'both progressive and reactionary' (1999a, p.74, emphasis in original) and relativists, he charges, 'reproduce rather than challenge dominant bourgeois conceptions of academic knowledge as in principle separate from the world and as independent of moral-political activity' (1999a, p.74, emphasis in original).

In place of relativism Parker adopts a critical realist perspective which, it is claimed, 'offers a version of materialism which takes account of different sense of reality, and of reality outside sense', is attentive to both 'the material basis for, potentials for, and constraints on action that are rooted in biology' and those 'systems of relationships and positions which make certain actions and accounts possible, and some impossible' (1992, p.36). Further, the critical realist perspective confers 'ontological object status [on] the physical location of bodies in space' (Parker, 1992, p.36). In doing so and in its recognition of
the constructive and constraining force of biology, critical realism also confers ontological status on those bodies as sexed, i.e., that there really are males and females, men and women. This point is of particular relevance to discussions of the differing material realities and power relations that are encountered by men and women.

Of further concern for Parker (1999a) is that, as he sees it, discursive psychology is, at least, complicit in the perpetuation of the ‘psy-complex’. The ‘psy-complex’ is perhaps best conceived of as the total product of psychology as an academic discipline, it is ‘the dense network of theories and practices to do with the mind and behaviour which divide the normal from the abnormal in order to observe and regulate individuals’ (Parker, 1999a, p.62) (see also Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith’s (1995) deconstruction of psychopathology).

Primary amongst the products of psychology, given the paradigmatic dominance of cognitive psychology, is the concept of a highly individuated agentive subject. Parker argues that discursive psychology is, owing to its focus on such individualised concerns as the management of attributions and accountability, again complicit in the perpetuation of this dominant conceptualisation of the ‘subject’. From this perspective, discursive psychologists’ position of agnosticism on issues such as agency and intentionality can simply be dismissed as a failure to engage adequately with the issues before them. Consequently, discursive psychology, in Parker’s view, compounds the possibility of transforming psychology, ‘to [socially] construct it
as something better' (1999a, p.62); it is ‘traditional positivist methods masquerading as discourse analysis’ (Burman & Parker, 1993, p.11). In contrast, the approach proposed by Parker is more firmly located within a critical psychological approach, where the objects of critique are often the texts and practices of psychology itself (Parker, et al., 1995).

The form of discourse analysis promoted by Parker and colleagues (Burman, 1992, 1995, 1997; Burman & Parker, 1993; Parker, 1992, 2004; but see also Hollway (1989) and Willig (2001, 2003)) should not, therefore, be viewed as an alternative to discursive psychology in terms of the analytic process, indeed, as will be demonstrated, in this regard the two approaches purport to be highly similar. However, they diverge in the extent of their engagement with and indeed acceptance of political, ideological and material realities and the power relations that they constitute. The discourse analytic approach advocated by Parker is represented as an alternative, and, indeed, as superior, to discursive psychology on the basis of its claimed potential to allow critical and constructive engagement with political issues (Willig, 1999).

As an analytic process, poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse analysis is consistently represented as a bottom-up approach (Parker, 1992, 2004; Willig, 2003). It is concerned with the identification of 'discourses' within texts. Following Foucault, a discourse may be defined as 'a system of statements
which constructs an object' (Parker, 1992, p.5)\textsuperscript{33}. Whilst discourses are theorised as constitutive of objects within poststructuralist discourse analysis, in Parker’s outlining of the analytic method a peculiar distinction is introduced between ‘layers of reality’.

There are fuzzy borders between the sets of things we know exist outside discourse and the things which may have a reality only within it. The first layer of reality, then, is the reality of the objects of discourse, the things the discourse refers to. (Parker, 1992, p.8)

Thus, ‘[t]he object that a discourse refers to may have an independent reality outside discourse, but is given another reality by discourse’ (Parker, 1992, p.9). At this point, through the separation of the discursive and the extra-discursive, the differing potentials for the importation of interpretative frameworks between relativist and critical realist positions, between discursive psychological and poststructuralist discourse analytic approaches are realised. What the analyst may know about the ‘reality’ of an object outside discourse becomes an analytic resource that can and, indeed, it is recommended that it should be drawn upon in the interpretation of a text. Poststructuralist discourse analysis, thus outlined, boldly crosses the line between participants and analysts concerns.

\textsuperscript{33} This definition was later extended such that discourses may be understood as ‘sets of statements that construct objects and an array of subject positions’ (Parker, 1994, p.245).
We have to bring our own sense of what 'the family' is to this text in order to make it coherent, to string these repeated references to 'the family' together so we recognise it as an object (the family) and with subjects (mothers, fathers, children). ... But we also have to bring a knowledge of discourses from outside, our awareness in this case that this is not the only way of talking about relationships, to bear on any example or fragment of discourse for it to become part of a coherent system in our analysis. (Parker, 1992, p.12)

The coherence of a discourse is not supposed to be inherent in the text, i.e., in the specific occasion of its use, nor is its recognizability as a discourse. Both these qualities of discourses are constructed as emerging from the analyst, from their quality as an interpreter of a text. The quality of an analyst is argued to be contingent upon their 'cultural competence' (Burman & Parker, 1993), that is to say, it depends upon an 'awareness of cultural trends, of allusions to political and social developments [which] is essential for a discourse analysis to work' (Burman & Parker, 1993, p.158). In this formulation of discourse analysis, the analyst, their cultural knowledge, their political and social interests and concerns, their standpoints, their subjectivity, is foregrounded in accounting for the analysis that results from their engagement with and interpretation of a text. Again, a contrast can be drawn between discursive psychology and poststructuralist discourse analysis. On this issue, discursive psychology with its emphasized focus on participants concerns and categories, and the consequent elision of the role of the analyst, could be represented as an appeal to objectivity. In contrast, poststructuralist discourse analysis clearly
and reflexively foregrounds the subjectivity of the analyst as functioning in the constitution of the analytic account. Following this line of argument, which closely accords with the tenor of social constructionism, in the academic discipline of psychology it is poststructuralist discourse analysis that is the more radical approach and perhaps the one that provides more scope for critical analyses.

The role of the analyst is again invoked in poststructuralist discourse analysis in the consideration of the dilemmatic nature of language (Billig, et al., 1988), particularly in the analytic orientation to the possibility that 'discourse can contain its own negations, and these are part of its implicit, rather than explicit, meanings' (Billig, et al., 1988, p.23). Whilst the explicit meaning of a discourse could be taken to refer to its meaning as understood either by participants or by analysts, discussion of the implicit meaning of a discourse is necessarily limited only to analysts, and might therefore be contingent upon the analysts cultural competence or their social and political concerns. Thus, any discussion of what might be suppressed, subordinated or marginalized though the use of a particular discourse is also necessarily an analysts concern, unless of course those possibilities were oriented to by the participants (though this would have the effect of transforming them from implicit to explicit meanings).

Of course, poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse analysis is most readily identified by the view that is taken with regard to the constitutive force of 'discourses', as outlined above, particularly that 'discourses' constitute subjects. A 'discourse', when drawn upon in conversation or in written text,
makes available a 'space' for the user of that discourse. At the same time as constituting a 'space' for the speaker, a discourse is also assumed to provide for that speaker a location within social structures, such as those of rights and responsibilities. The organisation of those rights and responsibilities, relative to rights and responsibilities of other subjects constituted by other 'discourses', is assumed to be determined by the ideological relations between the constituting 'discourses'. For example, the rights and responsibilities of subjects constituted by discourses of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' may be assumed to be structured and organised according to a patriarchal ideology. The 'space' and its concomitant location within social and cultural structures are commonly bound together in the concept of the 'subject position' (Davies & Harré, 1990).

The second characteristic feature of poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse analysis, which follows from the constitution of subjects, is a focus on the organisation of those subjects within structures of power relations, through institutions and ideologies (Parker, 1989, 1992). Introducing the idea of 'discursive practices', which includes 'material practices' that are invested with meaning and which categorizes the activities of speaking and writing as practices, and drawing upon the example of the medical discourse, Parker outlines how "[d]iscursive practices", then, would be those that reproduce institutions, among other things34 (Parker, 1992, p.17). 'Feeling an abdomen,

34 Amongst the 'other things' that are reproduced by discursive practices are subject positions. Consider Davies and Harré's (1990) outlining of the concept of the 'subject position'; 'the constitutive force of each discursive practice lies in its provision of subject positions. A subject
giving an injection or cutting a body' (Parker, 1992, p.17), presumably as well as invoking a host of discursive resources which could be taken to constitute the medical discourse, are taken to be the discursive practices that reproduce and maintain the institution of primary health care.

Discourses, therefore, may be represented as constitutive of both subjects and institutions and, it is contended, of the organisation of the former within the latter: 'Institutions, for example, are structured around and reproduce power relations' (Parker, 1992, p.18). Thus, the organisation of subjects within institutions may be argued to occur along dimensions of power. Again, consider the example given by Parker of the way that the medical discourse constitutes subjects such as 'doctors' and 'patients' as more and less powerful within the institution of primary health care (see also Parker's (1992) second example of the British Psychological Society as an institution, which was subsequently developed in the outlining of the concept of 'discursive complexes' and the proposition of psychoanalysis as an interpretative framework for discourse analysis (Parker, 1994): this analytic possibility will discussed below).

Within the orientation to the relationship between discourse and power, most simply represented by Foucault (1980) as the couplet 'power/knowledge', two position incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those that use that repertoire' (p.46).
positions occur. The first argues against the 'power/knowledge' couplet and argues that there is a need to distinguish discourse from power (Parker, 1992). The second position argues that power and discourse are synonymous, at least in the relational constitution of subjectivities; 'We need, in fact, to ask how the self is implicated moment by moment, through the medium of discourse, in power' (Parker, 1989, p.68). Consider also Burr's claim that:

[D]iscourses offer a framework to people against which they may understand their own experience and behaviour and that of others, and can be seen to be tied to social structures and practices in a way which masks the power relations operating in society (1995, p.71-72)

This form of power, the effectiveness of which is contingent upon its invisibility to those whose subjectivities it constitutes and organizes relative to those of others, is referred to by Foucault (1977) as 'disciplinary power'.

One possible reason for Parker's change in perspective with regard to the ubiquity of power is his evident conceptualisation of power as a necessarily oppressive and negative force. This possibility is most evident in the following quotation:

[W]e should not talk about discourse and power as necessarily entailing one another [because] we would lose a sense of the relationship between power and resistance, lose the distinction between power as
coercive and resistance as a refusal of dominant meanings (Parker, 1992, p.18, emphasis in original)

There is in Parker's theorising an absence of any sense of power as a productive or positive force and, arguably, this may be a consequence of the particular political investments that Parker may bring to the table as an analyst.

The relationship between discourse, power and ideology is more intangible than that between discourse, power and institutions owing to the various definitions and understandings of 'ideology' (Burr, 1995; Parker, 1992; Billig, et al., 1988). Arguably, the most useful understanding of 'ideology', for a social constructionist engagement with masculinity and therefore the one that will be adopted in this thesis, is one that views ideology as both dilemmatic (Billig, et al., 1988) and as knowledge that functions in the service of power (Burr, 1995). Ideology is therefore 'a description of relationships and effects...at a particular place and historical period' (Parker, 1992, p.20) that functions to instantiate and even make transparent structures of power relations. However, it is argued that these descriptions are arrived at and negotiated through a dilemmatic process. Thus any account or description given by an individual is argued to be informed by the negotiation of prevailing cultural ideologies through a dilemmatic process. The concept of ideological dilemmas and its usefulness to discourse analytic research will be discussed in greater detail in the outlining of the critical discursive psychological approach.
A more recent emergence from the poststructuralist or Foucauldian discourse analytic perspective is the possibility of invoking psychoanalysis as an interpretative framework (Frosh, Phoenix & Pattman, 2004; Parker, 1992, 1994, 1997; Wetherell, 2003). The move is warranted by constructions of conceptualisations of subjectivity within discourse analytic approaches as insufficient and as unable to take experience into account without essentializing it. Two forms of subjectivity are identified as existent with contemporary discourse analytic approaches, 'blank subjectivity' and 'uncomplicated subjectivity'.

Briefly, within 'blank subjectivity', experience is viewed only as an effect of language and the 'self' is viewed as a rhetorically occasioned resource; 'blank subjectivity' is represented as apparent within discursive psychological approaches (Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). One particular problem for blank subjectivity is how, if at all, agency can be incorporated in discourse analytic approaches. 'Uncomplicated subjectivity' refers to 'some variety of "core self" which is able to choose which discourse or interpretative repertoires to use in different situations' (Parker, 1997, p.482). This conceptualisation of a rational unitary subject is, however, antithetical to the poststructuralist position (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 1984; Hollway, 1989; Gavey, 1989), within which subjectivities are constituted when the individual is subjected to discourse. This idea will be developed through the following section on positioning theory.
Drawing upon the use of psychoanalysis by others, most notably Frosh, (1987), Henriques et al., (1984) and Hollway, (1989), Parker proposes using psychoanalysis as an interpretative framework for engagement with the 'self' or the 'subject' because of 'how it has been fashioned as part of a particular system of self-talk and self-reference in Western culture' and because 'psychoanalytic knowledge helps structure the dominant culture in the West' (Parker, 1997, p.483). This approach requires that the psychoanalytic vocabulary be regarded as embedded in culture 'as a culturally and locally bounded discourse' and the treatment of 'the psychoanalytic institution as a "regime of truth" with effects of power no less reactionary than those of psychology itself' (Parker, 1997, p.484). The use of psychoanalysis as an interpretative framework, Parker claims, would result in the concept of "complex subjectivity", which 'takes seriously both the intentions and desires of the individual and the operation of social structures and discourse' (1997, p.491). However, in line with the poststructuralist position adopted within this thesis and on the basis of parsimony, psychoanalysis will purposefully not be engaged with in this thesis, either as a theory for the constitution of 'masculinity' or as an interpretative framework within discourse analysis.

3.4 Critical Discursive Psychology

The potential for the combination of the two above outlined approaches has been most extensively developed by Margaret Wetherell and Nigel Edley in their discursive analyses of masculinity (Edley, 2001; Edley & Wetherell, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001; Wetherell, 1996, 1998; Wetherell & Edley, 1998, 1999); see also Coyle (2000) for similar calls for a synthesis of the two approaches. It is
perhaps a happy coincidence that this thesis finds both its method and its topic most extensively developed and explored within the same body of literature.

The issue of topic and its relationship to the development of discourse analytic methods is not, however, one that can be lightly glossed over. Indeed, Wetherell and Edley's development of a discourse analytic approach that draws upon both the above outlined approaches can clearly be seen to be motivated by the topic with which they are engaged and the questions that they want to ask of the data:

How are the norms [of hegemonic masculinity] conveyed, through what routes, and in what ways are they enacted by men in their daily lives? What are the norms? Are they the same in every social situation? … How is hegemony conveyed interactionally and practically in mundane life? How do men conform to an ideal and turn themselves into complicit or resistant types, without anyone ever managing to exactly embody that ideal? (Wetherell & Edley, 1999, p.337)

The questions demonstrate both the imposition of an analytic framework, based upon a feminist sociology of masculinity and drawing upon the concept of hegemonic masculinity (Carrigan, Connell & Lee, 1985; Connell, 1987, 1995), and a concern with the constitutive force of discourse, most particularly with issues of variability within individuals and across contexts.
Broadly, while Wetherell and Edley’s work is concerned specifically with masculinity, the analytic approach that they develop can be seen to be concerned with identities and subjectivities. A concern with identity, and with gendered identities in particular, led Wetherell and Edley to consider not only what functions the micro-textual features of talk might serve for the speakers within a given interaction but also how discourses or interpretative repertoires might be drawn upon, as participants resources, in the management of ideological dilemmas (Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton & Radley, 1988), which are understood to be situated in and constituted by the interactional context. The subject positions and subjectivities of speakers, the standpoints constituted by particular discourses from which speakers might subsequently be heard to speak, are themselves conceived as participants’ resources. They are the ways by which speakers manage concerns that are at once interactional and ideological.

Simply, Wetherell and Edley are concerned with the generation of an analytic technique that will support engagement with ‘the relatively autonomous ideological practices of a culture’ (Wetherell, 1996, p.89). Where ‘the function of an ideology is assumed...to be the elimination of the awareness of contradictions in material circumstances or perception of exploitation; mainly through the presentation of relationships (which seem important only for a particular kind of social arrangement) as natural or common sense’ (Wetherell, 1996, p.89).
The first component of this integrated critical discursive psychology is an emphasis on 'the highly occasioned and situated nature of subject positions and the importance of accountability rather than “discourse” per se in fuelling the take up of positions in talk' (Wetherell, 1998, p.394). Identities are theorized as constituted in interactions, where the process of constitution is accessible as a participants' concern and accomplishment. The emphasizing of the analytic importance of this process successfully heads off criticisms that this is a top-down approach and meets the 'requirement that all analytic claims should be empirically grounded' (Wetherell, 1998, p.394).

The second component of the critical discursive psychology approach is an acknowledgement of 'the forms of institutional intelligibility...which comprise members' methods' (Wetherell, 1998, p.394.) The delimiting of the object of analytic interest to conversation, as proposed by Schegloff – where 'conversation' is limited only to what is available to the analyst – is rejected as 'unhelpful and unproductive' (Wetherell, 1998, p.394). In its place a more poststructuralist conceptualization of discourse is adopted which draws upon Laclau's (1993) notion of the 'vast argumentative texture through which people construct their reality' (p.341), as well as the familiar discursive psychological concepts of variability (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) and interpretative repertoires (Potter & Wetherell, 1987: Wetherell & Potter, 1988). This move represents an attempt to situate the texts that are taken for analysis within the myriad possible contexts. Particularly, the approach developed by Wetherell and Edley, is attentive to the temporal contexts within which conversation may be situated, but which might
empirically be unavailable to the analysts; 'this is a conversation among friends which resonates with and carries forward voices, positions and identities from other contexts and other conversations' (Wetherell & Edley, 1998, p.170). I am in strong agreement with Wetherell and Edley on this point. The temporal dimension of context must be considered, particularly given the relative brevity of the 'conversations' with which we concern ourselves. Many of the contexts that people inhabit are long-lived, they are recursively entered into and suspended over lifetimes. They are our intimate relationships, our friendships and our familial relations; they are our employment and our leisure. They have histories that may not and, indeed, cannot be reworked on every occasion. Consequently, much of the work, such as the accomplishment of identities and subjectivities, that is of interest to discourse analysts is likely to have already occurred outside those contexts that they are fortunate enough to find as data. However, some of that work may be indexed in those the snippets of interaction that we take as data.

The critical discursive psychological approach, in its most extensively developed form (Wetherell, 1998), draws heavily upon the concept of subject positions. Wetherell’s discussion of subject positions draws primarily on the work of Mouffe (1992), which is a strongly poststructuralist conceptualization and which constitutes a de-centred subject:

It is therefore impossible to speak of the social agent as if we were dealing with a unified, homogenous entity. We have rather to approach it as a plurality, dependent on the various subject positions through
which it is constituted within various discursive formations (Mouffe, 1992, p.372)

The concept of subject positions has, however, been most extensively developed by Rom Harré and colleagues (Harré & van Langenhove (1999) and Harré & Moghaddam (2003); though see also the development of the concept of positioning by Bamberg (2000) and it is with this still small body of literature that I will now engage.

3.5 Positioning theory

The writings found in the volumes edited by Harré and colleagues (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003) represent developments of the concepts of positioning theory and of subject positions that follow directly from Davies and Harré (1990) original formulation:

We shall argue that the constitutive force of each discursive practice lies in its provision of subject positions. A subject position incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those that use that repertoire (p.46).

In an amended version this definition reads '...a location for persons within the structure of rights and duties' (Davies & Harré, 1999; p.35, emphasis added). The idea that subject positions ascribe and afford rights and duties to those who occupy them is an important concept. Subject positions are, from the outset, assumed to be located within and constitutive of social and moral
structures. Further, the locations of subject positions within these structures may be known from our understanding of the particular constituting repertoire. This point is readily illustrated by the example of 'humiliation'. 'Humiliation' is broadly understood to be constituted by an unjust act perpetrated against an individual who is disempowered to such an extent that they are unable to resist the consequences of that unjust act. Thus, the repertoire of 'humiliation' may be understood to constitute complimentary subject positions for speakers that are located within a known structure of rights and duties. One evident consequence of the above definition of subject positions is that they are relational.

Where discursive practices are situated in interpersonal conversational contexts they are understood to constitute subject positions not just for the user of that discursive practice but also for other interlocutors to whom the practices may be directed or who might otherwise be located within that practice. Discourse practices afford and ascribe subject positions to speakers and hearers. Furthermore, through the various turns in a conversation subject positions are consistently afforded and ascribed, occupied and accepted, and resisted and renegotiated. The numerous possibilities within this process of positioning were outlined by Harré and van Langenhove (1992). 'First order positioning' refers to the subject positions afforded by an initial utterance, such as 'could you pass me the remote?' 'Second order positioning' refers to occasions on which acts of first order positioning are called into question and have to be negotiated, such as 'what did your last slave die of?' van Langenhove and Harré (1999) also identified 'performativ...
positioning', 'moral and personal positioning', 'self and other positioning' and 'tacit and intentional positioning' but these categories will not be engaged with at this point.

There is, however, a more grammatical conceptualisation of positioning as a simple consequence of the potential provided for by the use of pronouns. Arguably the most extensively developed area of positioning theory and the implications of pronouns concerns the use of first person pronouns, through which a speaker can cast themselves as both subject and object in a single utterance, the classic example being 'I made myself do it'. Instances of the latter are categorised by van Langenhove and Harré (1999) as 'deliberate', 'intentional' or 'reflexive self-positioning' and are a consequence of the anaphoric first person (Urban, 1989). Instances of 'deliberate self-positioning' are a common feature of autobiographical narratives and represent a way by which 'a person expresses his/her personal identity' (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999, p.62). This somewhat traditional description, implying both the existence of an identity and a conscious and agentic subject, belies the potential for a more poststructuralist approach. I would argue the acts of positioning, accomplished through the use of first person pronouns — I would eschew the use of adjectives such as 'deliberate' and 'intentional' — may be represented as the way by which a person makes both their status as a subject and their

35 The implications of deliberate or reflexive self-positioning for the constitution of gendered subjectivities, specifically through the telling of autobiographical narratives, will be developed further in the introduction to Chapter 5.
subjectivity the topics of talk. This particular aspect of positioning theory will be more extensively developed in chapter 5. More subtle, however, are the functions served by second and third person pronouns in the constitution of subject positions relative to particular discursive constructions and accounts. The functions served by second and third person, particularly plural, pronouns will be extensively examined across the analysis of chapter 4 (see Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990) for an extensive engagement with the functions served by pronouns).

Within positioning theory, subjectivity is theorized as a consequence of the occupation of subject positions.

Once having taken up a particular position as one’s own, a person inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in terms of the particular images, metaphors, story lines and concepts which are made relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are positioned. (Davies & Harré, 1990, p.46)

Though I would question the wording of the above definition, in terms of the possible implication of a conscious subject, I find this definition of subjectivity appealing because it implies that subjectivities are constituted and made amenable to analysis in talk, through the use of particular metaphors, images and concepts, and are interpretable in their own terms. This approach to subjectivities contrasts with more recent attempts to marry psychoanalysis and discourse analysis to provide a framework for the interpretation of subjectivities
(cf. Frosh, 1987; Hollway, 1989; Parker, 1997). My preference is for the more parsimonious approach to subjectivities as constituted and interpretable in their own terms; in occupying particular subject positions speakers are discursively constituted as experiencing the world in a particular way, through and relative to certain discursive resources.

The analytic utility of positioning theory within discourse analytic approaches to masculinity is well demonstrated in Wetherell (1998). Through the use of an extended sample of text, the topic of which is one young man's reported 'success' with the opposite sex over one weekend, Wetherell demonstrates how a marriage between a discursive psychological concern with issues of accountability and a poststructuralist concern with the constitutive power of language can be made to work through the concept of subject positions.

In the analysis, individuals are shown to have taken up and resisted numerous subject positions through the course of the interaction. Further, these subject positions or their renegotiation are shown to occur in response local interactional concerns, such as the management of accountability. At this level alone, identities or subjectivities would be seen to be highly dynamic but

36 By 'extended' I simply mean that the sample of text that Wetherell provides is considerably longer than many of the excerpts commonly found in published discourse analytic works. In providing this text Wetherell meets her own call for 'more extended bodies of data, involving larger samples of interaction, such that it becomes possible to identify discursive patterns or regularities' (Wetherell & Edley, 1998, p.163.) The lengths of the excerpts drawn upon in the analyses of this thesis are also a response to this call.
oriented only to local interactional concerns. But, Wetherell argues, an orientation to the patterns of subject positions taken up and resisted apparent across this extend sample of texts reveals 'that they fit within several recognizable broader interpretative repertoires available to young men', including, but not limited to, the repertoires of 'male sexuality as performance and achievement, a repertoire around alcohol and disinhibition, and an ethics of sexuality as legitimated by relationships and reciprocity (Hollway, 1984, calls this the “have and hold” discourse).’ (Wetherell, 1998, p.400.) Further, rather than constituting an imposition of analysts concerns on to a text, these repertoires are argued to 'comprise members' methods for making sense in this context -- they are the common sense which organizes accountability and serves as a back-cloth for the realization of locally managed positions in actual interaction (which are always also indexical constructions and invocations) and from which...accusations and justifications can be launched’ (Wetherell, 1998, pp.400-401).

3.6 Conclusions

Based upon the above listed research questions, it was decided that the aims of this thesis -- to engage with the relationships between men, masculinity and emotions, at discursive, ideological and performative levels and to be sensitive to both the micro- and macro-textual implications and functions of those relationships -- would be best met by the adoption of a critical discursive psychological analytic approach, with a particular focus on the construction and negotiation of gendered subject positions and subjectivities.
Chapter 4

"It's not a man thing is it?" Accounting for men's relationship with emotions

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with constructions of men's relationship with emotions as offered by men. It is intended to provide answers to the following research questions:

- How do men construct men's relationship with emotions?
- In constructing this relationship, what discourses do men draw upon to account for it?

In answering these questions the analysis will be attentive to variability, both in the constructions of men's relationship with emotions and in the discourses that they invoke to account for it.

- In accounting for men's constructed relationship with emotions, do men reflexively orient to the implications of the discourses upon which they draw for their own subject positions as 'men'?

The preceding question is based on the presupposition that speakers recruited to participate in a focus group discussion on the topic of men and emotions on the basis that they are 'men' are already 'gendered', i.e., they are already engaged in, and will therefore account for, their own performance of masculinity, relative to their constructions of what is culturally 'masculine'. The question is also informed by a poststructuralist understanding that speaking
subjects are constituted when they are subjected to discourse (Butler, 1993; Edley & Wetherell, 1999; Foucault, 1977; Rose, 1996).

Further, through the resolution of ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988) – constituted by the speakers' constructions of 'masculinities', the discourses speakers invoke to account for these 'masculinities' and the speakers' negotiation of their own 'masculine' subjectivities relative to these constructions and accounts – the analysis is intended to map the ideological relationships between the discourses that are constitutive of 'masculinities'.

4.2 Data

The data drawn upon in this chapter were generated through the use of focus group discussions on the topic of men and emotions. In all 48 men, aged between 18 and 78 years of age, participated in nine focus group discussions. The demographic information for the participants of each group is provided in appendix A.37 The focus group discussions were informed by an unstructured schedule and were conversational in nature.

4.3 Method

All nine transcripts were read and reread before being subjected to thematic coding, in the manner advocated within grounded theory analysis (e.g. Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Pidgeon & Henwood, 1996). QSR NVivo qualitative research software was used to assist the process of thematic coding (QSR International, 2000).

37 The participant information sheet, consent form and the interview schedule are also included in Appendix A.
The aim of the initial thematic coding was to render manageable a sizable data set; the transcript of each focus group discussion was between 50 and 60 pages in length. The systematic thematic coding of data was used as a means of identifying and grouping those tranches of text that might yield interesting and relevant analyses, i.e. that might support engagement with the above outlined research questions. These tranches of text where subsequently organized according to the particular discourses that were drawn upon to account for the men's constructed relationship with emotions.

These grouped tranches of text were then subjected to a form of critical discursive psychological analysis of the type outlined in chapter 3. This form of analysis advocates a recursive movement between micro- and macro-textual levels (Coyle, 2000). However, moves to the macro-textual level should be firmly grounded in the micro-textual details of the data. In the case of a gender-focussed analysis, this may mean that the move towards a macro-textual analysis is contingent upon the presence of explicitly gendered terms or on the presence of some other resources that can reasonably be argued to be gendered (see Wetherell (1998) for a discussion of this issue). In this instance, given that 'men' and 'emotions' were the predominant topics of talk there was no paucity of gendered terms.

The analysis was also highly attentive to the subject positions afforded to the speakers (Davies & Harré, 1990) by their constructions of gendered emotional behaviour. Specifically, the analysis was attentive to the possibility that these subject positions may be actively negotiated and managed in the negotiation of
ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988). One such dilemma to which the analysis was particular attentive was the potential requirement for speakers to simultaneously construct accounts of men's relationship with emotions and warrant their right to do so through their own performances of 'masculinity' (Butler, 1999) and through the constitution of 'masculine' subjectivities (Hollway, 1984). Thus, the analysis was simultaneously concerned with the participants' construction of men's relationship with emotion and their negotiation of their own positions as 'men'.

4.4 Analysis

The analysis of the data generated by the focus group discussions is divided into two main parts, those excerpts concerned with accounting for masculine emotional inexpressivity and those concerned with accounting for anger, the constructed exception to masculine emotional inexpressivity. The first part is further divided into sections according to the particular discourses drawn upon to account for masculine emotional inexpressivity; they are the 'socialization' discourse, the 'social structures' discourse and the 'evolutionary' discourse'. Those excerpts grouped under the section heading of the 'socialization' discourse are primarily concerned with accounting for the proscription of emotional expression through crying. Those excerpts grouped under the section heading of the 'social structures' discourse are further subdivided according to whether they are concerned with accounting for the proscription of emotional expression through crying or with accounting for the proscription of the expression of emotions such as love. The excerpts grouped under the section heading of the 'evolutionary' discourse are concerned with general
inexpressivity, though there is a particular focus on the proscription of the expression of fear in one excerpt. The second part of this analysis, concerning accounts of anger as the exception to masculine emotional inexpressivity, is divided into two sections. The first section is simply concerned with those excerpts in which 'anger' is constructed as an appropriately masculine form of emotional expression. The second section is concerned with those excerpts in which the 'hydraulic model' discourse is invoked to account for the expression of anger as the exception to masculine emotional inexpressivity. The implications of the various discourses for the subject positions of the speakers who draw on them will be discussed at the end of each section and part and will be drawn together as a whole in the discussion.

4.4.1 Accounting for masculine emotional Inexpressivity

The ‘socialization’ discourse

The following excerpts contain occasions on which the 'socialization' discourse was invoked to account for male emotional inexpression. These excerpts are identified as distinct from those in the following section, which are concerned with the ‘social structures’ discourse, on the grounds that in these excerpts socialization is constructed as an active developmental process in which male children are engaged. They therefore contrast with the 'social structures' discourses, which imply a less active process of acculturation. Importantly, on all the occasions on which the ‘socialization’ discourse was invoked it was to account for men's constructed resistance to expressing emotion through crying. In these excerpts, male resistance to expressing emotion through
crying is constructed as resulting from involvement in the process of socialization, through which such emotional expressions were proscribed.

The first excerpt contains the most extensive and well developed invocation of the 'socialization' discourse to account for men's constructed resistance to expressing emotion through crying. Within the constructed process of socialization, men are positioned as the primary agents of the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying. The 'socialization' discourse has demonstrable implications for the occupation of gendered subject positions by those speakers who invoke it. Within the excerpt, extensive use is made of reported speech to work up the persuasiveness of the 'socialization' discourse. Consequently, the functions served by invocations of reported speech will also be substantively engaged with.

Excerpt 1

1128 Ian: = but like (.) like you said that about emotions if you fall over your
1129 Dad's going to say 'get up that didn't hurt you' (.)
1130 Neil: 'boys don't cry' =
1131 Ian: = whereas if a girl's different if a girl falls she'll get up and she'll cry
1132 and the mother will 'aww' and they'll mollycoddle her [whereas a man] if his
1133 Tony: 'don't be soft'
1134 Ian: son falls over 'get up it didn't hurt you' =
1135 Tony : = yeah 'don't be soft' =
1136 Ian: = it's bred into you that =
1137 Tony: = you get a that as well don't you 'you're not a girl what's up with
1138 you? get up' =
1139 Ian: = yeah it's bred into you =
Graham: = or they (.) when you're first born they slap your arse and you cry
don't you? =
Tony: = yeah it starts straight away ((group laugh)) =
Ian: = that's to make sure you're alive =
Graham: = yeah I know but it's obvious it's obviously a it's like breathing
Innit? =
Ian: = yeah bu- but that is an emotion that =
Colin: = you do it different with your daughters though =
Graham: = it's just something that happens =
Colin: = if your daughter hurts herself and your son hurts himself in exactly
the same accident with your daughter it's 'aww aww' and your son it's 'it's
alright you're alright you son' =
Tony: = 'come here you're ok' =
Colin: = 'you're a lad you you're alright' =
Ian: = 'you're a lad aren't you? girls are' classic is 'girls are soft' =
Tony: = I mean you get compared off your parents don't you 'come on
you're not a girl what's up with you? get up don't be soft' =
Colin: = (h)yeah =
Ian: = and what do you instantly do you go to your Mum and cry on your
Mum ['cause you ] know you'll get that love and attention off your Mum
Rory: if I had a lad
Ian: whereas you wouldn't off your Dad =
Tony: = you get nowt off your Dad 'get off go away' =
Ian: = because it's stemmed from generations where the man has always
been the one 'get up that didn't hurt you' =
Rory: = see if I had a lad and he were crying I'd let him cry =
Neil: = would you be [all sympathetic 'oh you're alright' and all that? =
Rory: = I wouldn't = yeah
I would yeah =
Within the 'socialization' discourse, the effects of gender discourses are observable at a number of levels. Gender is constructed as determining not only the nature of what is said in the process of socialization, but it also constitutes both the agents and the objects of socialization. Consequently, the analysis of this excerpt will be concerned with how the ‘socialization’ discourse, when applied to the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying, interacts with gender discourses to constitute both parents and children as gendered beings.

Before continuing with the analysis, it is necessary to engage with the more technical topic of reported speech, which is a characteristic of this excerpt. Drawing on the work of Bakhtin and Volosinov, Maybin (2001) stated that ‘invoking a voice always also involves invoking an evaluative viewpoint, which may be used by the current speaker as a rhetorical resource to support their own speaking or writing purposes’ (p.68). Further, she argued that:

There are always in fact two layers of evaluation: the reported speech or writing conveys its own evaluative viewpoint, but the current speaker or writer also frames and evaluates this viewpoint in their turn (quite often
in rather subtle ways), through the manner in which they reproduce and recontextualize the words they are quoting or reporting. (p.68)

Though the rhetorical power of instances of reported speech does not derive from an assumption of authorial ‘truth’\(^{38}\), they do represent a powerful and important rhetorical resource for speakers. Following Davies & Harré (1990), part of the power of any ‘discursive practice lies in its provision of subject positions’ (p. 46). Building upon this interpretative framework, if a speech act is assumed to constitute a subject position, then I argue that a reported speech act, i.e. an instance of reported speech or an invocation of voice, also constitutes a subject position. Whilst such ‘conditional’ subject positions\(^{39}\) are ascribed only to the constructed individual or group to whom the reported speech is attributed, they are available as discursive resources for the speakers within an interaction. They provide a means of negotiating, in what would commonly be constructed as ‘hypothetical’ terms, the subject positions that would be constituted by particular speech acts. Consequently, they allow the construction of speech acts, subject positions and contexts, and the

\(^{38}\) What is said as ‘reported speech’ is not uncritically accepted as a description of what was said. Indeed, it does not matter, nor do we assume, that what is reported as ‘reported speech’ may or may not have ‘actually’ been said at all! The reported speech serves indexically sensitive functions, i.e. its functions are contingent upon the context in which it occurs, what is reported as ‘reported speech’ and who is ‘reported’ as having ‘said’ it.

\(^{39}\) I’ve called the subject positions constituted by reported speech ‘conditional’ subject positions because if you were to say what is reported as ‘reported speech’ then you would be positioned by that utterance.
implications and consequences that would follow from them, that lay outside
the immediate interactional context.

Given the above-outlined functions served by instances of reported speech
and given their prevalence within excerpt 1, this part of the analysis is
concerned with the functions served by the instances of reported speech within
the 'socialization' discourse. The instances of reported speech constitute the
subject positions taken up and afforded within the constructed process of
socialization. The instances of reported speech are reported from two different
subject positions. Ian and Tony are consistently aligned with the subject
position of the child, through their constructions of what would likely be heard
from the voices of "your Dad"40 (lines 1128-1129), "the mother" (line 1132), "a
man" (line 1132) and "the man" (line 1163). By contrast, Colin and Rory are
consistently aligned with the subject position of the parent, through their
constructions of what would likely be said to "your daughter" and "your son"
(both on lines 1149 &1150) and to your "lad" (lines 1160 & 1165). While the
alignment of the speakers to the subject positions constituted by their use of
reported speech may differ, the 'voice' that they invoke does not.

The 'voice' is consistently that of the adult, the parent, the agent in the process
of socialization and the provider of gendered subject positions. Further, the

40 Throughout the empirical chapters double quotation marks will be used to indicate
quotations from the excerpts. Single quotation marks will be used to indicate quotations from
published works and constructed entities.
subject position constituted by the 'voice' is primarily a male one, it is either the
'voice' of "your Dad" (lines 1128-1129), "a man" (line 1132) and "the man" (line
1163) or it is the speaker's male 'voice'; the 'voice' of a man when he speaks
to his "daughter" or "son" (both on lines 1149 & 1150). The latter part of the
preceding sentence draws upon the interpretation of the speakers' use of
second person pronouns. The instances of reported speech constitute what
'you' would be likely to hear (from your parents) or say (to your children) *if* you
were male. Consequently, through the use of second person pronouns, all the
speakers in this group are positioned as gendered subjects or objects within
the discourse of parental socialization. All are afforded one or both of the
masculine subject positions – of 'son' and 'father' – constituted by the
discourse. The subject position constituted by the invoked 'masculine' 'voice' is
one that prescribes strength, proscribes vulnerability and is concerned with the
provision, promulgation and policing of gender difference and gender specific
ways of doing and dealing with emotions.

That one of the central tenets of the 'masculine' subject position is the
promulgation and policing of gender differences is based upon the
interpretation of the 'socialization' discourse as determined by the, already
existent, sex of the child. This construction is explicit in Colin's use of contrast
in lines 1149-1151. Colin uses contrast to construct the sex of the child as
determining of the parental socializing response. The contrast relies upon the
manipulation of a single feature. In the utterance, "if your daughter hurts
herself and your son hurts himself in exactly the same accident" (lines 1149-
1150), the masculine subject position ('you') – as in "your daughter" – and the
emotion provoking stimulus – "exactly the same accident" – remain the same; only the sex of the child changes. Socialization into the masculine proscription of emotional expression through crying is constructed as determined by the already existent sex of the child. Gender, understood as the product of socialization within a particular culture, is constructed as mapped onto the 'essential' differences of sex. However, a poststructuralist reading of this construction may contend that the materiality of 'sex' is an effect of gender (Butler, 1993, 1999). 'Gender' does not result from the process of socialization but is determinate of it.

The instances of reported speech and the conditional subject positions that they constitute are highly consistent. Indeed, across the instances of reported speech it seems that a singular subject position is afforded. That subject position is categorised as being "a lad" (lines 1153, 1154, 1160 & 1165) and, perhaps to a greater extent, as being "not a girl" (lines 1137 & 1156). Given the use of gender specific nouns and the explicit invocation of gender difference, it is reasonable to categorise this subject position as a 'masculine' one. The constitution and consequent requirements for the occupation of this subject position are explicitly stated through the numerous instances of reported speech. The prescribed 'masculine' subject position is contingent upon such things as: the denial of pain – "that didn't hurt you" (lines 1129 & 1164) – the denial of vulnerability or weakness – "don't be soft" (lines 1133, 1135 & 1156) and the equating of masculinity with invulnerability – "you're a lad you you're alright" (line 1153). By contrast and by implication, a feminine subject position would be contingent upon weakness, vulnerability – "girls are soft" (line 1154).
and, presumably, not being "alright". Indeed, girls are variously constructed as receiving sympathy — "the mother will 'aww" (line 1132) and "with your daughter it's 'aww aww" (line 1150) — and as being cared for and protected — "they'll mollycoddle her" (line 1132).

Towards the end of the excerpt a turn sequence develops in which the validity of a subject position, occupied by one of the participants, is challenged on the basis of the potential consequences of its occupation. At line 1165, Rory positions himself as willing to transgress the masculine subject position as proscriber of emotional expression through crying in boys — "see if I had a lad and he were crying I'd let him cry". The adoption of this subject position, as unwilling to promote and police gendered ways of doing emotion, is challenged by Neil at line 1166. Neil’s challenge takes the form of a question. Through the question, Neil constructs a generalised three-part list of responses or actions, advanced as those associated with Rory’s 'preferred' subject position. The list involves the explicit invocation of 'sympathy', an instance of reported speech that constitutes a conditional subject position as sympathetic and a final generalisation — "would you be all sympathetic 'oh you're alright' and all that?" (line 1166). The challenge and the subject position that it constitutes are explicitly accepted by Rory — "yeah I would yeah" (lines 1167-1168).

Having positioned Rory in this way, Neil constructs an account of the likely detrimental consequences that would follow from the occupation of such a position. Neil constructs the male object of Rory's turn, his "lad", as liable to encounter violence — "gets beat up" (lines 1169-1171) — upon entering "senior
school" (line 1169). The invocation of a specific context and age as marking the likely onset of violence cannot be assumed arbitrary. However, there is nothing in the excerpt to which the invocation of this context and this age is indexically linked. My own interpretation is that this context and this age are culturally understood as signifying a point in individual and social development at which gender differences gain significantly in importance. Alternatively, they construct a spatio-temporal location at which reactions to transgressions of gendered behaviour are more likely to be met with violence. Within Neil's construction of the consequences of Rory's eschewing of the provision of traditionally gendered ways of doing emotions, there is also no explicit construction of the specific consequences for the gendered behaviour of the "lad". However, we (the hearers and the readers) may assume that the consequences would be manifest in gender atypical emotional expressivity and that this would provoke the constructed violence.

In line 1173, Neil constructs the process of socialization that would occur if the provision of 'traditional' masculine socialization were resisted – "because he's been mollycoddled all his life". On an initial reading, 'mollycoddling' seems to be constructed as directly deterministic of the violence perpetrated against the "lad"; as Neil puts it he "gets beat up [ ] because he's been mollycoddled". However, if we look to an earlier example of the use of "mollycoddle" we get some sense of the indexical work done by Neil's invocation. "Mollycoddle" is use in line 1132 to construct the adult response to an expression of emotion, through tears, by a girl. On this occasion, "mollycoddle" was located within a contrast structure. The contrast was constructed between boys and girls, with
regard to their socialization in gendered ways of doing emotion. 'Mollycoddling' formed part of the socialization in feminine ways of doing emotions and contrasted with the socialization in masculine ways of doing emotions, which involves the admonishment of vulnerability -- "don't be soft" and "get up it didn't hurt you" (lines 1133 & 1134 respectively). Consequently, to mollycoddle a "lad", which Neil positions Rory as advocating, would be to socialize him in the feminine way of doing emotions, in which displays of softness or vulnerability are permissible. It is perhaps this, the raising of a soft, vulnerable and consequently effeminate "lad", that we are to assume would result in his being beat up upon entering senior school.

There are also other potential implications for Rory from his adopted subject position. The constructed responses of mothers and fathers, to emotional expressions by male children, are interpreted as highly gendered. With regard to their sons, Mums are constructed as the providers of "love and attention" (line 1159). Dads are, by contrast, constructed as unsympathetic -- "whereas you wouldn't off your Dad" and "you get nowt off your Dad" (lines 1161 & 1162 respectively). Further, the act of mollycoddling can be interpreted as a gendered act. In its initial instance of use it is located within a contrast between "the mother[\text{[s]}]\" response to a girl and "a man[\text{[s]}]\" response to his son. Consequently, the act of mollycoddling in "they'll mollycoddle her" can be interpreted as attributed to mothers. By accepting a subject position as sympathetic and as mollycoddling, Rory effectively challenges the gendered construction of masculine and feminine parental responses, as well as the provision of gendered ways of doing emotions.
The 'socialization' discourse predominates again in the following excerpt. The turns contained in the excerpt follow from a discussion of the relative freedom to express emotion through crying that the members of the group reported experiencing within the social context of their local church, of which they were all members. In the excerpt, Simon invokes the 'socialization' discourse, and positions "parents" as agents within it, to account for both his own emotional expressivity and his behaviour towards his children.

**Excerpt 2**

388 Simon: = I think a lot of people do I know when if if my when my parents
389 were if my parents were here or came to this church then I know well unless
390 came regularly if they came infrequently then I think I would probably react in
391 a different way to how I would if they weren't here I don't I don't necess-
392 don't necessarily think that's an emotional thing I think it's just (. ) they're your
393 parents and (. ) you react diff- oh well you [act
394 Luke: so your parents do affect =
395 Simon: = your parents do affect you yes (. ) I mean I was you were talking
396 about emotions (as young people) I was thinking about .hh when our
397 children go to school (. ) I mean (. ) I d- I d- whether we intentionally think this
398 or or it's at the back of our mind but I know that there is the pressure not to
399 encourage your children not to show: erm (. ) too much emotion at school
400 because then they might be considered to be weak and then they get
401 persecuted so in a sense you do it as a protective (. ) =
402 Luke: = hmm =
403 Simon: = you encourage them to to hide it to to protect themselves =
404 Luke: = hmm =
405 Simon: = whether that's right or wrong I don't know but certainly I mean
that's I mean we had this problem with Jimmo (. ) that he was very he was
getting very upset for a while didn't really know why on the way to school but
it wasn't something (. ) that we encouraged him (. ) er to continue with in a
sense we discouraged it (. ) er and encouraged him to sort of erm not show it
T5: 388-409

Echoing the previous excerpt, "school" (lines 397, 399 & 407) is invoked as a context within which the performance of gender, through emotional (in)expressivity, is closely monitored. That this is a construction of gendered emotional (in)expressivity is not immediately obvious. Simon initially uses gender non-specific nouns such as "children" (lines 397 & 399) to construct the objects in his invocation of the 'socialization' discourse. It is "children" who are constructed as socialized to manage emotional expression at school. However, Simon subsequently develops the 'socialization' discourse and locates his son "Jimmo" (line 406) as the object and himself and his partner as the agents – the first person plural pronoun "we" reoccurs through lines 406-409. Thus, whilst it is possible to argue that on this occasion the 'socialization' discourse is invoked to account for generalized and gender non-specific proscription of emotional expression, it can also be argued that the constructed proscription of emotional expression is particularly masculine.

There is, in lines 398-399, an ambiguity regarding the direction of the process of socialization, which arises from Simon's use of double-negatives. He constructs a perceptible "pressure not to encourage your children not to show: erm (. ) too much emotion at school" (lines 398-399). If the use of double-negatives is followed logically then this invocation of the 'socialization'
discourse would contrast with all the other occasions in that it would appear to promote emotional expressivity. However, owing to Simon's subsequent development of the 'socialization' discourse, I am inclined to interpret this invocation of the 'socialization' discourse as like the others; parents are constructed as socializing children, particularly their sons, not to be emotionally expressive.

There is also an ambiguity regarding the expression of which emotions are constructed as proscribed within the 'socialization' discourse. It is the expression of "emotion" per se that is constructed as proscribed in line 399 and indexed through the use of "it" in line 403. However, the likely interpretation of such emotional expressions is made explicit – "they might be considered weak" (line 400). Rather than arguing that Simon is constructing all forms of emotional expression as interpretable as signifying weakness, I would argue that the forms of emotional expression constructed as proscribed within the 'socialization' discourse are those that are interpretable as signifying weakness. One example of such an emotion is given in line 407 – "very upset". Public displays of 'upset', a generic term given to a range of emotional expression, are implicitly constructed as signifying weakness.

However, it is not the signification of weakness that is constructed as inherently problematic and therefore the basis for the proscription of such forms of emotional expression. Rather, the argument for the proscription of such emotional expressions, within the 'socialization' discourse, rests on the construction of the social consequences that will inevitably follow from such
emotional expressions that are culturally interpretable as indicative of weakness – "they might be considered weak and then they get persecuted" (line 400-401). Certain forms of emotional expression are constructed as signifying weakness. Any social expressions of weakness are subsequently constructed as inevitably resulting in persecution or exploitation. Thus, 'socialization' and parents' role as 'agents' of socialization are warranted as protective actions; 'socialization', in gender typical forms of emotional expressivity, is the action of any reasonable and caring parent who understands the highly gendered and competitive nature of schools in the UK.

Perhaps the most significant feature of this excerpt is the work that Simon does to negotiate his subject position relative to the 'socialization' discourse. Put simply, Simon's subject position seems to be one of severe ambivalence. He is simultaneously positioned as an agent within the 'socialization' discourse and as promoting the proscription of male emotional expression as "upset" as benefiting (male) children – "you encourage them to hide it to protect themselves" (line 403). These positions potentially conflict with ones that Simon had occupied earlier as 'masculine', 'emotionally expressive' and 'able to cry in public', albeit only in particular contexts, and as questioning the need for men to control or manage their emotional expression. In lines 397-398, line 405 and line 408-409, Simon orients to these potential tensions. He attempts to manage any attributions of 'intention' that could be made to the role of agent within the 'socialization' discourse – "whether we intentionally think this or or it's at the back of our minds" – he explicitly positions himself as uncertain with regard to the moral value of socializing children into gendered ways of doing
emotion — "whether that's right or wrong I don't know" — and couches his position as 'agent' in the process of socialization in the most tentative terms — "it wasn't something (.) that we encouraged him (. ) er to continue with in a sense we discouraged it".

Arguably, Simon’s ambivalence is a response to an ideological dilemma. Within the group, the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying had been roundly rejected as restrictive and unhealthy. 'Crying' had been reframed as signifying strength rather than weakness (see excerpt 15). For these speakers, expressing emotion through crying was constructed as a valued freedom. And yet, through the 'socialization' discourse, Simon is positioned as an agent of the proscription of such forms of masculine emotional expression. Expressing emotion through crying is constructed as a transgression of the performance of masculinity in certain social contexts and these contexts are constructed as stable and unyielding. Socialization into gender specific ways of doing emotions is constructed as a necessary evil, the right and caring response to cultures and contexts within which performances of gender are inflexible and stringently policed.

In the final excerpt in this section the 'socialization' discourse is invoked by the speakers to account for their relationship with emotions. The speakers position themselves as having been subject to a process of socialization in which the public expression of certain emotions was proscribed. Whilst their account is properly constructed in the past tense, as a process they experienced, their use of the past tense seems also to locate the proscription of certain emotional
expression in the past. In this excerpt, the constructed process of socialization is limited temporally and in terms of context and class. It is perhaps worth noting that the speakers in this group were between 61 and 78 years of age.

Excerpt 3

78 James: = of course there are situations where it is necessary and essential indeed that you do actually control your emotions erm road-rage ((sounds of acknowledgement from group)) if somebody does something particularly annoying erm you have to er force yourself sometimes not to react er and the temptation to react is an emotional response and you have to apply your reason to not do it =

84 David: = I mean to some extent you're (.) erm as youngsters told more or less to suppress your emotions I mean for instance 'boy's don't cry' was a common one =

87 James: = that's a thought that occurred to me when this was (.) proposed was that er we or certainly I feel I come from an age where er the stiff upper lip was the thing and er you were not encouraged to be demonstrative in your emotions at all in fact it was hh in some ways considered to be unmanly =

92 John: = yes that was the who::le point of much of the traditional sort of prep and public school education and erm I think as a result one does tend to grow up at least hh externally =

95 Arthur: = yep I was brought up in that =

96 Bob: = we cover our emotions =

97 John: = exactly exactly =

98 Arthur: = I think it's made me more introverted than I might otherwise have been I mean to suppress emotions an- and er cope particularly at boarding school with situations on my own as it were (.)
As can be seen from the excerpt the invocation of the ‘socialization’ discourse follows James’s construction of the occasional need to control emotional expression. Within his turn, the discourses of ‘reason’ and of ‘emotion’ can be seen to be in conflict. While the privileging of ‘reason’ over ‘emotion’ is frequently represented as a central tenet of masculinity (Seidler, 1997) in this specific example it is explicitly constructed as a social necessity. Citing the example of anger in the specific context of driving – "road-rage" (line 79) – the privileging of ‘reason’ over ‘emotion’ is constructed as necessary in order to avoid simply ‘reacting’ – "you have to force yourself sometimes not to react and the temptation to react is an emotional response" (lines 81-82).

Emotions are implicitly constructed as comprising an ‘experience’ and an ‘expression’. The emotional ‘experience’ is constructed as the internalized and cognitive "temptation to react". The emotional ‘expression’ is constructed as the reaction over which agentic control can and should be exercised. The persuasiveness of this account of the necessity for controlling emotional expression depends heavily upon the cultural understanding of the example – "road-rage". Emotional reactions in the context of "road-rage" may be understood to range from verbal and non-verbal expressions of annoyance, e.g. shouting and flicking the V-sign, to acts of violent and occasionally murderous aggression. It is worth noting the emphasis that James places on the second syllable of "react" (line 81) and on the construction of an emotional reaction as something that is done – "you have to apply your reason to not do it" (lines 82-83). What is constructed as necessarily requiring control is not
simply an emotional expression but an emotionally motivated act. The discourse of 'reason' is privileged over that of 'emotion' in accounting for actions.

Over the remaining turns, the 'socialization' discourse is invoked by the speakers to construct the relationship between masculinity and emotions and to account for their own relationship with emotions. The discourse is invoked through the by now familiar trope of "'boy's don't cry'" (line 85). This brief instance of reported speech is a short-hand way of constructing the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying as resulting from a process of socialization. However, in this excerpt, crying seems to stand as just one example of proscribed emotional expression; all forms of emotional expression are constructed as proscribed — "you were not encouraged to be demonstrative in your emotions at all" (lines 89-90). The generality of the proscription of emotional expression is apparent in Bob and Arthur's respective references to "our emotions" (line 96) and "emotions" (line 99). The proscription of generalized emotional expressivity is explicitly gendered. Within this invocation of the 'socialization' discourse, all forms of emotional expression are constructed as conflicting with the performance of masculinity — "to be demonstrative in your emotions at all in fact it was hh in some ways considered to be unmanly" (lines 89-91).

In this excerpt, the process of socialization is limited both temporal and in terms of social contexts. It is constructed as belonging to "an age" (line 88) and to particular social contexts — "the traditional sort of prep and public school
education" (lines 92-93) and "boarding school" (lines 99-100). The invocation of these contexts has the effect of constructing this particular version of the process of socialization as historically and culturally bounded. These discourses are very similar to those in which Seidler (1989, 1997) constructs the 'contemporary' status of the relationship between 'masculinity' and 'emotions'. However, these discourses constitute only one particular version of masculinity; one that is white, middle-class, heterosexual and privately educated. They do not and cannot account of all possible 'masculinities' constituted in myriad discursive ways.

Throughout the excerpt the speakers are positioned by the discourses they draw upon. They take up subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1990). In Foucauldian terms, they are subjected to discourse. For Butler, it is performativity; it is the 'reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains' (1993, p.2). The speakers reflexively orient to the positions afforded by the discourses that they invoke to account for the relationship between men, masculinity and emotions. They engage in the management of accountability, with regard to the implications of those discourses for their own masculine subjectivities.

As stated above, the process of socialization is constructed as temporally bounded. And yet the 'socialization' discourse is invoked by the speakers to account for their own relationships with emotions. They take up subject positions relative to the masculinized proscription of emotional expression and position themselves as subjects of it. A collective masculine identity is
constituted by the proscription of emotional expression – "we cover our emotions" (line 96). Both, John and Arthur take up positions relative to this bounded masculinity. Arthur explicitly invokes the contextually bounded 'socialization' discourse along with more psychoanalytic terms – "introverted" and "suppress" (lines 98 & 99 respectively) – to account for his own contemporary masculinity. But this account of masculinity is reflexively oriented to as only one possible account – "it's made me more introverted than I might otherwise have been" (lines 98-99). The possibility of alternative masculinities depends upon the maintenance of subject positions as emotional beings. The speakers position themselves as 'inexpressive', emotions are covered; they are had and they are suppressed. Alternative prescriptions of what can or should be done with emotional 'experiences' make possible alternative performances of masculinity. What is striking with regard to these speakers is the way that the possibilities of taking up these alternative masculinities, through the renegotiation of the gendered discourses of emotion, are effectively closed down by their use of the 'socialization' discourse. Their masculine subjectivities, constituted by the proscription of emotional expression, are not reflexively oriented to as dynamic and performative. Rather, they are reflexively oriented to as stable and inflexible, constituted and constrained by the 'socialization' discourse and by the proscription of emotional expressivity.
Summary

Across these three excerpts, emotional expression through crying is constructed as antithetical to the performance of masculinity. Such emotional expressions are constructed as culturally interpretable as connoting weakness and vulnerability. Displays of weakness and vulnerability as well as transgressions of hegemonic cultural conceptions of the performance of masculinity are constructed as resulting in social and cultural exploitation or sanction. Emotions are illegitimized as the basis for actions and are subordinated to the exercise of reason. The performance of masculinity is therefore constituted through the concealment of weakness and vulnerability, the exercise of reason and the policing and promulgation of gender typical forms of emotional expression. The 'socialization' discourse not only accounts for these features of the performance of masculinity but frames them as the most expedient response to the cultural status quo. The 'socialization' discourse is highly inflexible in so far as it constitutes only masculine or feminine subjects with no scope for variability within those categories. Consequently, masculinity and femininity are conceptualized as oppositional within the 'socialization' discourse.

The speakers in these excerpts negotiate their own masculine subjectivities relative to this discourse in a range of different ways. Some invoke it to account for their contemporary subjectivity and are subjected to it. Others are demonstrably ambivalent about its restrictive implications for the performance of masculinity and the freedom of emotional expression. Others invoke it to account for the actions of parents, potentially including their 'selves', as
appropriate and caring and are constituted as agents of gender typical socialization. Indeed, occupation of this position is itself interpretable as constitutive of a masculine subjectivity. Arguably the power of the 'socialization' discourse, its subtleties and sophistication are much greater than is evident from more traditional approaches to 'gender and emotions' (Brody, 1985; Brody & Hall, 1993; Davis, 1999; Haviland & Malatesta, 1981; Saamii, 1993; Shields, 1991, 1995, 2002).

The 'social structures' discourse

In contrast to the preceding excerpts, the following excerpts draw upon a more dynamic discourse to account for the proscription of male emotional expression. The performance of masculinity through emotional inexpressivity is constructed as a culturally determined response to context specific social structures. Masculinity is constructed as relationally accomplished in accordance with cultural prescriptions of the locations that males should occupy relative to others in social structures and power relations. In these excerpts, masculinities emerge as the ways by which the occupation of those locations is achieved and maintained. These excerpts closely echo the discourses that predominate in the work of Connell, for whom masculinity is 'simultaneously a place in gender relations, the practices through which men and women engage that place in gender, and the effects of these practices in bodily experience, personality and culture' (1995, p.71).

Across the first three excerpts (excerpts 4, 5 & 6) the 'social structures' discourse is invoked to account for the proscription of men's emotional
expression through crying. Excerpts 7 and 8 are also concerned with the proscription of emotional expression through crying but with specific reference to the context of 'gay spaces’. Most significantly, these two excerpts conflict in the extent to which discourses of sexuality are used to open up alternative forms of masculinity through the construction of emotional expression through crying as more or less proscribed. The final three excerpts in this section (excerpts 9, 10 & 11) are concerned with the construction of other forms of emotional expression as proscribed in accordance with gendered social structures. The 'social structures' discourse is invoked to account for the proscription of expressions of emotions such as love and for the consequent constitution of masculinities.

"Boys don't cry"

The turns contained in excerpt 4 follow from a discussion of the proscription of certain forms of emotional expression in the work place. The turns that constituted that discussion are reproduced below as excerpt 11. As will be seen, James moves from that discussion into an account of the proscription of emotional expression through crying. In the excerpt, the 'social structures' discourse is invoked to account for both that proscription and for the consequent constitution of masculinities.
Excerpt 4

James: I was listening to a radio programme about this chap who went to boarding school now and one of the things that he said was that there was a child that came in at the same time as him and cried the first day and he said for the first three weeks of his school life in boarding school he was persecuted mercilessly and they're not my words they're his words and then his parents took him out of school why? because he showed a vulnerable side and that was taken advantage of now that can't be a pre planned thing it can't be something that we get together and decide or as young children they got together and decide it must be a part of our make up as a male that you seek to be higher or a more dominant person within a group so you would persecute the more vulnerable to make you higher up in that peer group and that way you establish your position and the higher up the position the better you are.

The narrative concerns a boy who cried on the first day at boarding school and, consequently, was bullied to such an extent that his parents removed him from the school three weeks later. Owing to the fact that James is simultaneously managing two narratives – the first about what one "chap" had to say about his observations of bullying in a boarding school and the second about the experience of the "child" who was bullied – there is a lack of clarity in the turn with regard to the use of pronouns. Consequently, some confusion arises as to whom – the "chap" or the "child" – James is referring when he uses the pronouns "he" and "his". Therefore, the analysis that follows and the
representation of the narrative that opens this paragraph are based upon my interpretation of to whom those pronouns refer.

The 'social structures' discourse is initially apparent in James's construction of emotional expression through crying as culturally interpretable as a display of vulnerability. Emotional expressions are explicitly constructed as locating individuals within social structures and power relations. The constructed antecedent of the bullying — that the boy in question "cried" (line 450) — is subsequently reconstructed as a display of vulnerability — "because he showed a vulnerable side" (line 453). It is this display of vulnerability that is invoked to account for the bullying. As will be seen throughout the analysis displays of emotion through crying are unproblematically (re)constructed as displays of vulnerability; tears and crying are equated with weakness and vulnerability.

The relationship between displays of vulnerability and its implications for the performance of masculinity is most substantially developed in James's account of the constructed actions of the antagonists in the narrative. 'Masculinity' is constructed as constituted by the actions of those who bullied or "persecuted mercilessly" (line 451) the child who displayed vulnerability on the first day of school. 'Masculinity' is constructed as essentially related to the occupation of positions of dominance and power — "it must be erm a part of our make up as a male that you seek to be higher or hh a more dominant person within a group" (lines 456-457). That it is the constitution of 'masculinity' that is being accounted for is evident in James's use of pronouns. James moves recursively between accounting for the actions of the antagonists in the narrative and
accounting for the actions of men in general, including the other members of
the group – "it can't be something that we er that we er get together and
decide or as young children they got together and decide it must be erm a part
of ou:r make up as a male" (lines 454-456). Through attempting to manage
these two accounts the original context of the "boarding school" (line 448) is
effectively gendered, it becomes a male-dominated, masculine context. Within
that context, and more generally, dominance and power are constructed as
celebrated masculine achievements – "the higher up the position the bet-
the better you are" (lines 459-460). The achievement of dominance and power, the
constitution of masculinity, is explicitly constructed as accomplished relationally
and at the expense of others – "you would persecute the more vulnerable to
make you higher up in that peer group" (lines 458-459). The performance of
masculinity, constituted by an absence of emotional expressions that may be
interpreted as connoting vulnerability and by the policing and exploitation of
such expressions in others, is constructed as a response to the relational
positioning of individuals within social structures and power relations.

As far as James’s subject position relative to the 'social structures' discourse is
concerned, arguably the most important feature of the turn is his construction
of masculinity, as concerned with the organisation and perpetuation of social
structures and power relations and with the relational achievement of
dominance in those structures, as essentially determined – "it must be erm a
part of ou:r make up as a male" (line 456). Men’s performance of masculinity,
constituted through the maintenance of social structures and power relations,
the relational achievement of dominance within those structures and the
policing and exploitation of emotional expressions, is constructed as resulting from an 'essential biological maleness'.

As such, men are disavowed of responsibility for such performances. They follow from biology rather than individual or collective agency; consider James’s rejection of this very possibility — "that can't be .h a pre planned thing it can't be something that we er that we er get together and decide or as young children they got together and decide" (lines 454-456). Socially undesirable acts that are constitutive of performances of masculinity, such as 'merciless persecution' and the exploitation of vulnerability in the pursuit of power and self-advantage, are accounted for through the invocation of such a distal determinant, which provides for the disavowal of individual or collective agency. The 'social structures' discourse and the socio-biological discourse function in tandem. Evolutionary and biological discourses will be returned to in the final section of this analysis. I would now like to move to those excerpts in which the 'social structures' discourse is invoked to account for masculinity, including the proscription of certain forms of emotional expression, as a more agentically managed and accomplished performance.

The turns contained in excerpt 5 are a continuation of a discussion regarding gendered ways of doing emotion and the expression of emotion through crying as conflicting with the 'masculine' way of doing emotion and consequently with the performance of masculinity. In the course of the excerpt, the 'social structures' discourse is invoked to account for the performance of masculinity through the management of emotional expressivity. Emotional expressivity,
particularly the connotations of vulnerability and, within that, the implicit constitution of power relations, are constructed as intrinsic to the social structures within which gendered subject positions are located.

Excerpt 5

228 Maurice: = sometimes I (.) yeah .hh I remember being somewhere and
229 watching something and it was re::ally touching it was like 'awww' ((Philip laughing)) and I felt like going 'awww' but hell did I ↓HELL DID I
230 ((all laughing)) that's right hell did I sat there↓'man that's
231 Philip: you felt like crying too
232 Maurice: really bad' ((others laugh)) but that wasn't what was going on yeah
233 that wasn't what was going on inside it was something else that was going
234 on inside but I expressed it I mean I =
235 Philip: = expressed it another way =
236 Maurice: = yeah and expressed it differently erm (3)
237 Philip: I think I agree with that =
238 Maurice: = so maybe you know that goes on you know we will touch
239 something we will we'll be aware of something but we'll manage it and
240 suppress it and not let it out =
241 Philip: = hmm =
242 Maurice: = because you know errr mm you don't want to be seen to be
243 unmanly er the woman's there you don't want both of you crying at the same
244 time ((others laugh)) =
245 Philip: = YOU'RE SUPPOSED TO BE SUPPORTING HER [you know
246 Maurice: this kind of
247 myth that goes on [you know and structure yeah ] =
248 Philip: and strong for her and all that

T8: 228-249
In this excerpt, I am concerned only with Maurice’s construction of certain forms of emotional expression as incompatible with the performance of masculinity. These constructions are located in Maurice’s narrative, advanced in lines 228-231 and 233-235. Both the social context and the emotion eliciting stimulus are constructed in non-specific terms — "I remember being somewhere and watching something (lines 228-229). In contrast, the powerful emotive quality of the stimulus is worked up through the use of emphasis, repetition and reported speech — "it was re::ally touching it was like ‘awww’ [ ] and I felt like going ‘awww’" (lines 229-230). This construction of a powerful emotive stimulus and the ‘instinctive’ form of emotional expression — "I felt like going ‘awww’" — is immediately qualified through the equally worked up construction of Maurice’s resistance to this form of expression — "but hell did I ↓HELL DID I" (line 230).

My interpretation of the function served by the decrease in pitch, in Maurice’s repetition of "hell did I", is based on the assumption of a relationship between the tonal qualities of speech and the performance of gender. Simply, ‘masculinity’ is assumed to be characterized by a low pitched voice and femininity by a comparatively high pitched voice. Further, the relationship between the tonal qualities of speech and gender is assumed to be linear, i.e., the lower the pitch the more masculine the voice is heard as being. Consequently, Maurice’s lowered pitch is heard as a figurative invocation of a more masculine voice than would be constituted by his already relatively low pitched voice. The invocation of the figurative masculine voice is interpreted as a reflexive orientation to the resistance of the conditional subject position that
would constituted by saying 'awww' as performative of masculinity. Simply, resisting expressing this particular emotional response is constructed as performative of masculinity.

Overlapping the laughter of the group at line 231, Philip contributes to Maurice's narrative and offers a second possible form of emotional expression - "you felt like crying too" (line 232). Implicit within this elaboration is the construction of Maurice as not alone within the constructed social context of the narrative. Further, the as yet unspecified 'other' is implicitly constructed as expressing emotion through tears. Maurice confirms "felt like crying" as the emotional experience and as the 'dispreferred' form of expression. Further, he immediately qualifies it with the third repetition of his constructed resistance - "that's right hell did I" (line 231). 'Crying' is constructed as a proscribed and/or resisted form of emotional expression in men. Consequently, the resistance of emotional expression through tears is constructed as performative of

41 An alternative interpretation of Philip's turn is possible, in which "too" is interpreted not as referring to a co-present 'other' within the social context of the narrative but as referring to a secondary form of emotional expression, i.e. "I felt like going 'awww', "you felt like crying too". My preference for the former interpretation is informed by the content of the subsequent turns, particularly lines 243-249, in which explicit reference is made to a co-present female 'other'. My interpretation is also informed by earlier analyses (Walton, Coyle and Lyons, 2004) in which the acceptability of male emotional expression through tears is constructed as dependent on it occurring in private and not in public. Men's crying is constructed as acceptable so long as it occurs in private. Consequently, Maurice's tears would perhaps not be regarded as unmasculine if no 'other' was assumed to be present.
masculinity. The expression of emotion through 'crying' when 'others' are present is implicitly constructed as incompatible with the performance of masculinity. In lines 231 and 233 Maurice again invokes the figurative masculine voice to construct the 'preferred' form of emotional expression – "I'm a man that's really bad". Devoid of any emotional terms this invocation of voice could only constitute a subject position of dispassionate evaluative judgement. It is potentially interpretable as the 'voice' of masculine objective reason.

Over the remainder of the excerpt, Maurice and Philip cooperate in the construction of the masculine relationship with emotions. In doing so, they draw heavily on the discourses of emotional 'experience' and emotional 'expression' and ascribe agency to men as actively managing and controlling the latter. Constructions of this type are characteristic of constructions of men's relationship with emotions and will be engaged with further in the next part of this analysis. At this stage, the analysis will focus on the invocation of the 'social structures' discourse to account for the agentic management of emotional 'expression' – "we'll be aware of something but we'll manage it and suppress it and not let it out" (line 240-241) – and the consequent performance of masculinity.

Between lines 243 and 249, Maurice and Philip cooperate in the construction of the social functions served by, and consequent need for, controlling emotional expressions. Masculinity, constituted by the proscription of emotional expression through crying, is constructed as a location in gender power relations that men are relationally compelled to occupy. The social
context of Maurice's narrative is developed, such that the previously unspecified 'other' is explicitly constructed as a female companion – "the woman's there" (line 244). The performance of 'masculinity' is explicitly constructed as relationally accomplished relative to femininity. Further, the expression of emotion through crying is also explicitly constructed as culturally interpretable as antithetical to the performance of masculinity — "you don't want to be seen to be unmanly" (lines 243-244). Maurice's use of the second person plural pronoun in his construction of the performance of masculinity as a concern of men — "you don't want" (lines 243 & 244) – effectively positions both him and any other hearers who might occupy the position of 'the man' in such a context as reflexively managing that performance.

Whilst avoiding being positioned as "unmanly" is interpretable as accounting for the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying, an alternative account is constructed through the invocation of the 'social structures' discourse. The performance of masculinity, constituted by not expressing emotion through crying, is accounted for through the construction of the relative locations occupied by masculinity and femininity within social structures and power relations. Femininity, constituted by women's expression of emotion through crying, is constructed as characterized by the need for support. The prescribed performance of 'masculinity', the absence of emotional expressions such as crying, is constructed as functioning in support of 'femininity' — "YOU'RE SUPPOSED TO BE SUPPORTING HER" (line 246) and "strong for her and all that" (line 249). Masculinity is again constructed as characterized by strength and by the occupation of positions of dominance.
within social structures. However, in this instance masculinity, strength and dominance are constructed as relationally accomplished for the benefit of others.

Arguably, the invocation of the 'social structures' discourse allows the negotiation of the complex ideological dilemma, of accounting for the performance of masculinity through strength and dominance in a way that is not socially or culturally questionable. However, the 'social structures' discourse and the account of masculine emotional expressivity that it constitutes are not unproblematic. Emotionally expressivity is still constructed as both constitutive of femininity and as connoting weakness. Thus, women, through their constructed greater emotional expressivity, are constructed as weak and as requiring masculine support. The 'social structures' discourse does not exactly empower women.

This possibility is reflexively oriented to by Maurice in his final turn – "this kind of myth that goes on" (lines 247-248). Maurice had occupied subject positions constituted by constructions of the proscription of emotional expression through crying as constitutive of masculinity; his use of pronouns firmly located his 'self' as subjected to those discourse. However, he distances himself from the construction of an external, stable structure of gender power relations within which women are explicitly positioned as weak and as requiring masculine support. Maurice may be interpreted as orienting to an ideological dilemma, between constructing a positive account of masculinity as noble and
socially beneficial and the implicit assumption of a stable structure of gender power relations, within which women are disempowered.

The speakers in the following excerpt demonstrate no such reservations about the assumption of gender power relations and the disempowerment of women in their invocation of the ‘social structures’ discourse. In the excerpt, discourses of gendered social structures and the locations of masculinity and femininity within them are again invoked to account for the proscription of men’s expression of emotion through crying in public. The turns in the excerpt follow from and are part of a longer discussion of the acceptability of male emotional expression in public.

**Excerpt 6**

529 Ian: = well but you know you don’t show your emotions do you until you’re
530 on your own and then it hits you =
531 Tony: = well every[one
532 Graham: yeah =
533 Ian: = it’s different when it’s a family (,) dea- a death =
534 Tony: = ‘cause when my granddad died everybody at the funeral were crying
535 like well all the women were crying but none of the men did they sort of
536 stood and looked at each other an’ all the women going ‘oohh’ =
537 Ian: = yeah like that way I think that way is because the woman needs a
538 man for the support =
539 Tony: = yeah =
540 Ian: = so the man’s got to be this hard person [he’s got to ] be this strong
541 Tony: I think a lot
542 Ian: person =
543 Tony: I think a lot of the men did their crying at home when nobody’s there =
The excerpt opens with a construction of masculine emotional expression as typically occurring in private. Within constructions of the men's relationship with emotions the requirement to control expression is often contextually bounded. The most parsimonious distinction that is commonly made is between 'public' and 'private' contexts. The acceptability of male emotional expression is, it seems, highly contingent upon whether or not it is observable. Observable emotional expression, particularly through crying, is proscribed, but crying may be constructed as acceptable so long as no 'other' is there to observe it. Ian's turn draws upon the familiar distinction between 'experience' and 'expression' – "you don't show your emotions until you're on your own" (line 529-530). However, whilst emotional expressions are constructed as controllable in public, in private contexts they are ascribed the force of imperatives – "and then it hits you" (line 530). The masculine ability to control emotional expressions is constructed as context specific. This type of construction is
The public/private distinction in the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying is subsequently developed through reference to the specific context of a family funeral – "when my granddad died" (line 534). This context is initially constructed as characterised by universal emotional expression through crying – "everybody at the funeral were crying" (line 534). However, this extreme case formulation is subsequently qualified through the invocation of gender. In this construction the distinction between masculine and feminine emotional expressivity is worked up as clear cut and absolute – "all the women were crying but none of the men did" (line 535). In contrast to feminine emotional expressivity, masculinity is constructed as characterized by dispassionate appraisal – "they sort of stood and looked at each other an' all the women going 'oohh'" (lines 535-536). Men are constructed as not taking subject positions that are constituted by the expression of emotions.

This sharp distinction between the genders with regard to emotional expressivity is accounted for by the invocation of the 'social structures' discourse. Men and women are assigned complementary locations within a gendered social structure. Women, and by implication femininity, are characterized by public emotional expressivity, weakness and the need for support. Men, and by implication masculinity, are characterized by public emotional inexpressivity, strength and the provision of support. Whether masculinity is 'truly' characterized by the provision of support is, of course,
beyond the epistemological standpoint of this thesis. But it is worth noting, that the requirement for masculine emotional inexpressivity is accounted for by the construction of the needs of women – "the woman needs a man for the support" (line 537-538) and "the man’s got to be this hard person he’s got to be this strong person (lines 540 & 542). Again, the construction of an external determinant of masculine emotional inexpressivity serves important functions for the speakers' negotiation of subject positions. Though they position themselves as inexpressive, their inexpressiveness is constructed as functioning for the benefit of others. This may seem like an adequate solution to the ideological dilemma of accounting for the proscription of masculine emotional expressivity by crying in public; it is constructed as noble and altruistic. However, as it did in excerpt 5, it depends on the assumption of a system of gender power relations within which women are positioned as weaker than men.

The invocation of the 'social structures' discourse to account for the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying in public also potentially accounts for the permissibility of masculine emotional expression in private. However, by constructing the proscription of masculine emotional expressivity in public as functioning solely in the constitution of complementary gendered subject positions, i.e. as for the benefit of 'feminine' others, the 'social structures' discourse does not account for the proscription of masculine emotional expression before an audience of 'masculine' others. Masculine emotional expressivity, particularly through crying is constructed as permissible only in the absence of all others – "I think a lot of the men did their crying at
home when nobody's there" (line 543). Arguably, discourses of vulnerability and social or cultural sanctions could be invoked to account for the proscription of masculine emotional expressivity in ‘masculine’ contexts.

Of course, the construction of men as crying in private is hypothetical; it is not constructed as a known or observed phenomenon, merely as a supposition (but see Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2004) for other accounts of the public/private distinction in masculine emotional expressivity). The important implications of the ‘social structures’ discourse and the proscription of public masculine emotional expressivity are that masculinity is constructed as done relative only to femininity and no allowance is made for men simultaneously to occupy subject positions as masculine and as requiring or receiving support. Masculinity is constructed as independent and publicly invulnerable. These implications of the ‘social structures’ discourse are not reflexively oriented to by the speakers in their negotiation of subject positions.

Over the final few turns the speakers resist the construction of men as unable to cry in public (line 547). The absence of men’s emotional expression through crying in public is constructed as resulting from agency, rather than either inability or external proscription – two possible interpretations of "can’t". Public emotional inexpressivity is constructed as the reflexive performance of masculinity. The construction of crying in public as antithetical to the performance of masculinity is advanced as an adequate account of why it does not reportedly occur – “if you think about it it is not a man thing to do that in public” (lines 551-552).
Throughout the excerpt the speakers consistently talked about men as a generic category and through the use of third person pronouns. At no point did any of the speakers position themselves as members of the category 'men'. While they may be argued to have distanced their 'selves' from their constructions of men and of masculinity through their use of third person pronouns it is worth acknowledging that their constructions were overwhelmingly positive. They constructed an account of men as emotional beings, whose emotional inexpressivity in public was ultimately altruistic and whose performance of masculinity was the result of individual agency. This account of masculine emotional inexpressivity is interpretable as oriented to the possibility of the speakers being positioned within it.

The final two excerpts of this section of the analysis are also concerned with the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying\(^\text{42}\). However, in contrast to the preceding excerpts the (un)acceptability of such expressions of emotion by men in public is accounted for by the invocation of discourses of sexuality, which I contend is subtly linked to the 'social structures' discourse. Both excerpts draw upon the same example to develop their accounts, a man crying in a 'gay' space. Excerpt 7 follows a discussion of the equating of homosexuality with femininity, which I attempted to account for through the invocation of emotion discourses and the category of the "overly emotional gay man stereotype".

\(^{42}\) Extended versions of these excerpts and their analyses can be found in Walton (2003).
Excerpt 7

386 Eric: = I don't think the gay community likes erm men showing emotions so much either 'cause I know occasionally at clubs or something you'll be out with a group and one will like (. ) someone will start to cry and everyone's just like behind their back will be saying "I can't believe he's crying because he's made himself look so stupid" and erm =

389 Chris: = hmm =

390 Eric: = 'cause I well (. ) erm (. ) well I think it's also a gay in the gay community as well quite (. ) erm (4) there there is a (. ) well not everyone is like this but I think I think erm (. ) more masculine gay men are usually seen as more attractive quite often (. ) if that makes I'm trying to choose my words carefully (. )

T1.1: 386-396

Of greatest interest in the excerpt is Eric's construction of the proscription of overt emotional expression by men within, what could be termed 'gay' physical and metaphysical spaces. Eric begins by implicitly aligning the constructed "gay community" with other non-specified social bodies with regard to the general proscription of public male emotional expression (lines 386-387). He then warrants the validity of this construction with a prescriptive narrative (lines 387 to 390). Though the narrative begins cautiously, advanced only as his Eric's own knowledge and concerning events of indeterminate frequency — "'cause I know occasionally" (line 387) — it rapidly gains in certainty. The repeated use of the modal auxiliary "will" — contracted in line 387 but complete in lines 388 and 389 — gives the narrative the form of a prescription of what can be expected of visits to 'gay spaces' such as "clubs or something" (line 387). Briefly, "someone will start to cry" and this emotional expression will be
universally – "everyone's" (line 388) – negatively evaluated by those observing it. Eric's use of reported speech, in the construction of the negative appraisal, works up its rhetorical power and persuasiveness – "I can't believe he's crying because he's made himself look so stupid" (lines 389-390). Men's expression of emotion through crying in 'gay spaces' is constructed as meeting with disbelief and disapproval from the "gay community"; the individual who is crying is constructed as negatively positioned by observers.

Eric accounts for the constructed negative evaluation of public male emotional expression by the "gay community" through the invocation of discourses of attractiveness. In this excerpt, the basis for an individual's location within the social structure of attractiveness is the performance of masculinity. Implicitly equating an absence of or, at least, the control of public emotional expression with the performance of 'masculinity', Eric tentatively constructs the "gay community" as equating 'masculinity' with 'attractiveness' – "more masculine gay men are usually seen as more attractive quite often" (lines 394-395). The proscription of public emotional expression through crying is accounted for by the negatively valued location that such an expression would afford an individual within the social structure of masculine attractiveness.

Throughout the excerpt Eric reflexively manages his subjectivity relative to the construction of male emotional expression through crying as proscribed in 'gay spaces' and his attempt to account for it through the invocation of the attractiveness discourse. His ascription of the negative appraisal of male emotional expression to the "gay community" (lines 386 & 392-393) is
interpreted as a distancing device; the account is not constructed as reflecting Eric's own opinions. The instance of reported speech that constructs the negative appraisal of male emotional expression is ascribed to the collective population of 'gay spaces' — "everyone's just like behind their back will be saying" (lines 388-389). This distancing continues in the remainder of Eric's account between lines 392 and 396. In the opening line, Eric continues to reflect upon the qualities of the "gay community" (lines 392-393). However, following a substantial four second pause in line 393, Eric explicitly orients to possible criticisms regarding over-generalisation; he qualifies his construction as reflecting only his own perceptions of the "gay community" — "well not everyone is like this but I think I think" (lines 393-394). Eric's closing statement — "I'm trying to choose my words carefully (.)" (lines 395-396) — is interpreted as a reflexive orientation to the construction of emotional expression as indicative of a lack of 'masculinity' and the invocation of the attractiveness discourse to account for the proscription of public masculine emotional expression as potentially problematic.

The following excerpt is also concerned with male emotional expression through crying in 'gay spaces'. The speakers in this group all self-identified as 'gay' men, but were on average about fifteen years younger than the speakers whose turns constitute excerpt 7. Though this excerpt is not characterised by the invocation of the 'social structures' discourse, I felt it was worth including because of the contrasting construction of the acceptability of male emotional expression through crying in 'gay spaces' to that apparent in excerpt 7.
Discourses of sexuality and gender are simultaneously invoked to account for male emotional expression through crying.

**Excerpt 8**

475 Chris: = it follows from what Xander said and what you know this idea of mates ( ) do you think that it that it's different ( ) you know we've had this idea that straight men do it in one way do you think it's the case that gay men do it in another (1.5.) do you think that it's the case that gay men do have that resource that gay men can talk about these things? (2.2)

480 Dave: I think we can do yeah =

481 Chris: = yeah =

482 Ben: = in general and a very big generalisation I think ( ) yeah ( ) a lot more sort of comfortable with emotions generally (1.1) I think =

484 Kieran: = yeah 'cause if you were in the Manx Arms ((local gay pub)) and you saw a guy crying in the corner you wouldn't start laughing about him or taking the micky out of him or anything =

487 Dave: = no exactly not whereas if you were in a straight pub =

488 Kieran: = yeah ((group laughs)) he'd never do it =

489 Dave: = everyone's like 'ha ha look at him' ( )

490 Chris: "big space" =

491 Dave: = [hmm]

492 Kieran:  hmm =

493 Lawrence: = I think it's more expected though as well ( ) I think erm society sees it kind of like gay people as the overlap ((group laughs)) =

495 Kieran: = hmm =

496 Lawrence: = do you know what I mean? ((group laughs)) =

497 Chris: = the middle ground =

498 Lawrence: = the middle exactly kind of halfway house thing ( ) I don't know =
500 Chris: = is that something that you would agree with? (2.9)
501 Lawrence: ybe-yes and no (.) I think I don't think you get variance you get some gay men that are you know (1) in all intents and purposes straight they kind of just sleep with other men (.) that's how you kind of define the difference whereas other people kind of like will wear their nice kind of bright pink fluffy things and (.) kind of parade round =
506 Kieran: = crop tops and stuff =
507 Dave: = yeah =
508 Lawrence: = alright OK ((laughs)) (3)
509 Chris: they would be the ones =
510 Lawrence: = they would be the ones that would be crying in that corner =
511 Dave: = yeah ((laughs)) =
512 Kieran: = 'cause they broke a nail or something =
513 Lawrence: = yeah = ((group laughs (9.6)))

Though this is a long excerpt and one within which there is a great deal that is of potential interest, this analysis will be limited only to the construction of male emotional expressivity as not negatively evaluated in 'gay spaces', and consequently as not proscribed, and to the discourses that are invoked to account for the acceptability of such forms of emotional expression.

My opening question, at lines 475-479, represents a summary of an earlier segment of the discussion in which 'straight' men had been constructed as constrained with regard to the extent of their engagement with emotional 'expression'. The question is, therefore, effectively a request for the reciprocal construction of 'gay' men to be made explicit and provides the speakers with
the opportunity to position themselves as 'gay' men. Dave's initial response (line 480) simultaneously offers support for the construction of 'gay men' as able to engage with emotions on a discursive level and, through the use of the first person plural pronoun "we", functions as a negotiation of Dave's subject position as a 'gay' man. Whilst Ben also confirms the construction of 'gay' men's greater affinity for engaging with emotions on a discursive level he does so in a much more cautious and qualified way (lines 482-483). The construction of the generalised greater emotional expressiveness and freedom of emotional expressions of 'gay' men is reflexively oriented to as potentially problematic and undesirable. As will be seen, the construction of generalised greater emotional expressiveness amongst gay men is subsequently qualified through the construction of variability within the category of gay men.

The construction of gay men as afforded a greater freedom of emotional expression is warranted by an invocation of sexualised social contexts and the construction of the freedoms implicit within or absent from them. Drawing upon the social context of a pub, 'gay' and 'straight' pubs are contrasted with regard to both the forms of male emotional expression that might be observed within them and the social consequences that would likely follow from such emotional 'expressions'. The contrast is set up through the example of a man observed to be crying – "you saw a guy crying in the corner" (line 485). As has been established over the preceding excerpts and analyses, crying in a public space is typically constructed as antithetical to the performance of masculinity. Consequently, it provides the ideal resource for the construction of differences between men, in terms of their relative freedom for emotional 'expression'.

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The construction of the freedom of emotional expression afforded to the users of 'gay' pubs is accomplished through the use of contrast with constructions of what would happen in 'straight' pubs. The interpretation that this is a contrast between 'gay' and 'straight' pubs rests on the locally understood meaning of the "the Manx Arms" (line 484). This pub is a local 'gay' pub, indeed it is the pub to which the Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Society, from which these speakers were recruited, adjourns after its weekly meeting. I contend that it is invoked as an exemplar of 'gay' pubs, rather than for any specific qualities that it alone might possess, other than it is the 'gay' pub with which all the speakers are most familiar. The interpretation that the "Manx Arms" is invoked as an exemplar of 'gay' pubs is further strengthened by the invocation of a complementary context of a "straight pub" (line 487).

'Gay' pubs are constructed as characterised by an absence of the strictures governing, and the negative evaluative consequences that would follow from, male emotional expression through tears within 'straight' pubs. The persuasiveness of these constructed differences between 'gay' and 'straight' pubs is worked up through the use of three part lists (lines 485-486), extreme case formulations (lines 488 and 489) and the use of reported speech (line 489). All these features combine to construct 'gay' men and 'gay' pubs as enjoying and affording comparatively higher degrees of freedom of emotional expression than are enjoyed or afforded by 'straight' men and 'straight' pubs. However, it should be noted that through the use of contrast the patrons of 'gay' pubs are constructed only in terms of what they do not do. No alternative
— for want of a better phrase — 'gay' way of dealing with or engaging with public displays of male upset is advanced.

Having warranted the construction of the generalised greater freedom of emotional expression enjoyed by 'gay' men relative to 'straight' men, through the invocation of sexualised social contexts, a more complex account of the relationship between sexuality, gender and emotional expressivity is subsequently developed. Lawrence's turns, from line 493 onwards, are concerned with a renegotiation of 'gay men's' constructed higher level of emotional expressiveness. The discourse of gender is invoked in the construction of difference within the previously unitary category of 'gay men'. This follows from Lawrence's construction of the perception of 'gay men' as more emotional than 'straight men' as a socially and culturally available resource — "society sees it kind of like gay people as the overlap" (lines 493-494). Together Lawrence and I then develop the construction through the use of such metaphors as "the middle ground" (line 497) and "kind of a halfway house thing" (line 498). "Gay people" are constructed as located between two categories, which, I contend, are the binary categories of gender, i.e. "gay people" are constructed as located between 'masculinity' and 'femininity'.

The construction of "gay people" as gender transgressors is well established and documented (Greenberg, 1988; Chauncey, 1994; Edwards, 1994) and psychological research into male homosexuality and gender has promulgated this idea (Hooberman, 1979: Sanders et al., 1985; Pillard, 1991). Discourses of gender represent a resource that can be drawn upon in the construction,
negotiation and performance of sexuality, and vice versa. The ideological relationships between discourses of gender, discourses of sexuality and gendered discourses of emotions support the construction of an openly emotional and emotionally communicative 'gay man' as a culturally available resource. A 'gay man' can persuasively be constructed as emotionally expressive because emotional expression is socially and culturally feminised and so are 'gay men'.

Lawrence goes on to construct variability within the category of 'gay men' with regard to emotional expression, by constructing the characteristics of two 'types' of 'gay men'. The first 'type', constructed in lines 501-504, is 'gay men' who are not openly emotionally expressive — the interpretation is based on the subsequent contrasting construction of a 'type' of 'gay men' who are openly emotionally expressive. These emotionally inexpressive 'gay men' are constructed as "in all intents and purposes straight they kind of just sleep with other men" (lines 502-503). This is a highly gendered construction, despite the fact that gendered terms are not used to describe the particular categories.

"Straight" is interpretable as signifying hegemonic (heterosexual) masculinity. This interpretation is based upon a number of features. The first is the implication that the categories 'gay' and 'straight' do not solely signify homosexual and heterosexual behaviour — "they kind of just sleep with other men" (lines 502-503). The second is that the category of 'straight gay men' is contrasted with a more detailed and more highly gendered second 'type' of 'gay men'.

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The second 'type' is constructed through the use of gender and sexuality non-specific nouns and pronouns — "other people" (line 504), "their" (line 504) and "they" (lines 510 & 512). However, this construction can be interpreted as concerned with 'gay men', since it is advanced within a construction of variability within the category of 'gay men'. Nouns such as 'man' or 'men' may be interpreted as signifying an essential level of 'masculinity'. Consequently, the use of the gender non-specific noun "people" functions to obscure and therefore diminish the potential for the second 'type' to be interpreted as 'masculine'. These 'gay men' are constructed as likely to "wear their nice kind of bright pink fluffy things" (lines 504-505) and "crop tops and stuff" (line 506), to "parade around" (line 505) and, most significantly, to "be the ones that would be crying in that corner" (line 510) — this is a reference to the content of Kieran's earlier turn at line 484-486 — because "they broke a nail or something" (line 512). I contend that all these constructed characteristics are gendered and that they function in the construction of this second type of 'gay men' as 'effeminate'. While the phrase "bright pink fluffy things" is, strictly speaking, used to construct the sort of clothes that 'effeminate gay men' might wear, this constructed characteristic potentially also then functions as a short-hand way of signifying members of the category 'effeminate gay men'; in this instance it can be argued that the clothes do maketh the men.

The interpretation of this is a construction of 'effeminate gay men' is dependent upon the interpretation of the constructed characteristics as signifying 'effeminacy', or at the very least 'not-masculinity'. Within a dyadic conception of gender 'not-masculine' may either be constructed as 'feminine' or
'effeminate', dependent upon the constructed 'sex' of the 'actor'. The above listed characteristics are invoked in the construction of a category of 'gay men' that is intended to contrast with the previous category of 'straight' traditionally masculine emotionally inexpressive gay men. The characteristics might therefore be interpreted as drawn from a particular repertoire of gendered characteristics, which constitute constructions and performances of 'effeminacy'. To qualify an earlier statement, some 'gay men' can persuasively be constructed as openly emotional because male emotional expression is 'effeminate' and so are some 'gay men'.

Ultimately from excerpt 8, we can argue that gendered emotion discourses provide a resource for the construction of variability within the category of 'gay men'. Emotional expression through crying is constructed as constitutive of an 'effeminate' subject rather than a 'masculine' one. While male expression of emotion through crying in 'gay spaces' is not constructed as negatively evaluated and likely to result in social sanctions, as it was in excerpt 7, it is still not constructed as 'masculine'. Even within an account that aims to be progressive, within which 'gay spaces' are constructed as more relaxed about and open to challenges to traditional performances of gender, the construction of emotional expression through crying as antithetical to the performance of masculinity remains.

What of the speakers? What gendered subjectivities do they negotiate relative to the discourses that they invoke? The terms 'masculinity' and 'effeminacy' do not appear in excerpt 8. Yet in order to advance an analysis that does not
simply reproduce the speakers' terms the interpretation of this excerpt is suffused with them, based upon the argued presence of signifiers of 'masculinity' and 'effeminacy'. The question that must be asked is: why is a list of characteristics used to constitute a construction of 'gay men' as gendered? The specific use of gender terms may be problematic for the speakers. To draw upon explicit gender terms such as 'masculine' and 'effeminate' in the construction of categories of 'gay men' may be potentially problematic for speakers who elsewhere position themselves as 'gay men'. If we attend to the subject positions of the speakers, they are positioned only as information or opinion givers, as credible participants in a focus group discussion. Their subject positions, relative to the constructed types of 'gay men', are entirely obscured through their use of broad categorical nouns, such as "gay people" (line 494), "gay men" (line 502) and "other people" (line 504). The speakers are entirely distanced from the constructed categories of 'gay men'. To all intents and purposes, and based only on this excerpt, these speakers might easily be assumed to be 'straight men'.

However, there is one instance within excerpt 8 where the positioning of one of the speakers within one of the categories of 'gay men' is potentially discernable. Lines 506 to 508 seem to constitute a private joke for the speakers. This interpretation is highly contestable, but it makes sense of an otherwise puzzling utterance. Kieran's development of the construction of 'effeminate gay men' is interpreted as directed at Lawrence – "crop tops and stuff" (line 506). This interpretation is primarily based on Lawrence's response – "alright OK (laughs) (3)" (line 508) – to Kieran's utterance, but also on
Dave’s alignment with the content of it (line 507). Kieran’s utterance is interpreted as not only a further development of the construction of ‘effeminate gay men’ but also as an act of first order positioning (van Langenhove and Harré, 1999); Lawrence is effectively positioned as a member of the category of ‘effeminate gay men’. Consequently, Lawrence’s response and subsequent pause – "alright OK ((laughs)) (3)" (line 508) – are interpreted as both acknowledgement and tacit acceptance of this act of positioning. As far as I can see, there is no other interpretation that makes as much sense of Lawrence’s utterance and laughter. The interpretation of these turns as constituting a joke is based only on Lawrence’s laughter. There are at least three possible sources of the apparent humour in these turns: it might be derived from the renegotiation of Lawrence’s subject position, from that of ‘opinion giver’ to that of ‘effeminate gay man’, or from the constructed characteristics of the category to which he is assigned, or, perhaps most likely, from some combination of the two.

Summary

The preceding five excerpts were grouped under the heading of the ‘social structures’ discourse and were concerned with accounting for the proscription of men’s expression of emotion through crying. Across these excerpts the expression of emotion through crying was constructed as connoting vulnerability. The proscription of such displays of vulnerability was accounted for by the invocation of the ‘social structures’ discourse within which men and masculinity were ascribed positions of power and dominance within the social structures of interactional contexts. Displays of vulnerability were therefore
constructed as antithetical to the occupation of those locations and the performance of masculinity. Constructions of masculinities were characterized by public independence and invulnerability and by the absence of the requirement for or receiving of support.

In the first excerpt, masculinity, as a position of dominance in social structures and power relations, was accomplished relative to masculinity, i.e. the occupation of positions of dominance was constructed as accomplished through interactions with other men. In the second two excerpts, masculinity, as a location in gendered power relations, was constructed as relationally accomplished relative to femininity. In the final two excerpts discourses of sexuality were drawn upon to open up multiple masculinities. However, in the first of these, masculinities, constituted through levels of emotional (in)expressivity, were located within a social structure of 'attractiveness' and were consequently ascribed statuses as more or less valued. In the final excerpt, a masculinity constituted through emotional expressivity was constructed, through the use of gendered signifiers, as transgressing the binary conception of gender as either masculine or feminine. Across all the excerpts therefore emotional expressivity, specifically through crying in public, was constructed as antithetical to the performance of masculinity.

Across the excerpts speakers varied in the extent to which they were aligned either with their construction of the relationship between masculinity and emotions or with the 'social structures' discourse that they invoked to account for it. The 'social structures' discourse arguably provided a means of resolving
the ideological dilemma of accounting for the proscription of public masculine emotional expression through crying. The interpretation of this as an ideological dilemma is based on the contemporary cultural importance that is placed on the expression of emotions. In one instance the 'social structures' discourse was explicitly linked to a 'socio-biological' discourse, resulting in the potential for disavowals of responsibility for the constitution of masculinity through the accomplishment of dominance. In another two, the performance of masculinity through the occupation of particular positions in social structures and power relations was constructed as agentically undertaken, albeit in accordance with socio-cultural norms, for benefit of specifically 'feminine' others. The disempowerment of women as an implication of this discourse was only reflexively oriented to by one speaker. Across all the excerpts the speakers maintained the fundamental distinction constituted by the discourses of emotional 'experience' and emotional 'expression' through which they were able to maintain positions as emotional beings.

"The expression of love"

Amongst all the talk of the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying, there were a few constructions of other 'emotions' the masculine expression of which was proscribed. These constructions of the expression of affectionate or tender emotions as proscribed for men seem to echo the 'gender heuristic' of Robinson, Johnson and Shields (2001), with men being constructed as not expressing and as not free to express socially desirable, other-oriented emotions such as 'love'. Again, in these excerpts the 'social structures' discourse and the locations that individuals or groups occupy
within those structures are invoked to account for these particular instances of masculine emotional inexpressivity.

The next excerpt follows from a discussion on the subject of 'coming out' as 'gay'. 'Coming out' was constructed as a highly emotionally charged time for 'gay' men and through their contributions to this discussion many of the speakers negotiated their subject positions as 'gay' men by advancing narratives concerning their own experiences of 'coming out'. The substantive focus of the analysis of this excerpt will be the way in which the 'social structures' discourse is invoked to further qualify the construction of 'gay' men's greater emotional freedom.

Excerpt 9

533 Eric: = because interestingly enough we haven't really talked much about the
534 emotion of love and because before I came here I was thinking about I
535 asked myself ["erm] what's how men and emotions that topic how is it
536 David: yes
537 Eric: different for straight and gay men?" and it I think that being inhibited
538 and not crying in public is true for gay and straight going back to what I said
539 earlier .hh if you're a gay man you don't really want to cry in a club either .hh
540 but what's different I think is the expression of love 'cause that's something
541 that's the definition almost of of being gay .hh and erm and that's something
542 where where all of us have probably have had to inhibit our emotions much
543 more than straight people ever have and err =
544 David: = my god we've been through the mill haven't we? =
545 Eric: = yeah so er =

T1.1: 533-545.
Eric begins the excerpt with the introduction of the emotion category "love" – "we haven't really talked much about the emotion of love" (lines 533-534). The introduction of this category is warranted by a construction of prior consideration and forethought regarding the possible differences between 'gay' and 'straight' men with regard to the topic of emotions (lines 534-535 & 537). Eric then references his earlier construction equivalency between 'gay' and 'straight' men in terms of the proscription of crying in public (see excerpt 7 and its analysis). Eric's referencing of this construction works up the similarity between 'gay' and 'straight' men in terms of the performance of masculinity through gendered ways of doing emotion. Significantly it does so prior to a qualification – "hh but what's different I think is the expression of love" (lines 539-540).

The emotion category of "love" is tentatively constructed as fundamental to the performance of sexualities – "that's the definition almost of being gay" (lines 541). Discourses of affectionate or relational emotions, such as 'love', are constructed as central to the construction of 'gay' sexuality and therefore they are interpretable as in part constitutive of the subject position of a 'gay' man. Consequently, given the comparative social unacceptability of openly occupying the subject position of a 'gay' man, the invocation of discourses that are constitutive of that position can persuasively be constructed as proscribed – "all of us have probably have had to inhibit our emotions much more than
straight people ever have" (lines 542-543). Put simply, owing to the relatively marginalized status of 'gay' identities within contemporary Western cultures the performance of 'gay' identities through such things as the public expression of particular emotions or even the use of particular emotion terms, such as 'love', are at least problematic and at worst proscribed.

Whilst the intersection of discourses of gender and sexuality may provide for constructions of greater freedom of emotional expression for men, as seen in excerpt 8, it is evident that they can also interact in ways that further limit accounts of emotional expressivity. Eric clearly invokes discourses of sexuality as well as gender and locates them in a structure of power relations in order to account for a construction of restricted masculine emotional expression. Further, through his use of pronouns, Eric clearly positions himself and the other members of the group, who all self-identified as gay men, as subjected to the same discourses of sexuality and gender and therefore as subject to the same restrictions of emotional expressivity. This was not a positioning that anyone resisted. Indeed, it is taken up as a badge of honour by David (line 544).

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43 Eric's use of the gender non-specific noun "people" must be acknowledged. Arguably, the use of such a noun functions to make the construction more general. Sexuality is invoked not only as a resource for the construction of difference between men, though it still does this, but as a dimension about which difference can be constructed on a more general level. The privileges of normative heterosexuality, in terms of the freedom to express publicly affectionate or tender emotions to a significant other, are not limited only to men.
The turn contained in excerpt 10 occurred early in group 5’s discussion and was a response to my opening question regarding their expectations of a focus group discussion on the topic of men and emotions.

**Excerpt 10**

50 James: it’s funny that you thought crying ‘cause I thought crying as well but
51 also the sorts of emotions that you feel especially the way I feel about my
52 erm my my young children er er about the feeling of of love that I have erm
53 and those sorts of emotions that don’t ever get expressed in groups of men
54 (.) they’re (.) I think every one of us knows that they’re there we just never
55 express it you never say those sorts of things you never talk about those
56 sorts of things it’s it’s not a man thing is it? well it hasn’t been for me =

James invokes "love" as an example of an emotion that is not commonly expressed by men, relative to specific objects – "the way I feel about my erm my my young children" (lines 51-52) and within specific contexts – "in groups of men" (line 53). It is the verbal expression of these emotions that is constructed as incompatible with the performance of masculinity – "you never say those sorts of things you never talk about those sorts of things" (lines 55-56).

In his turn, James recursively uses first and second person pronouns in relation to the category “men” and in relation to his constructions of emotional (in)expression. Most significant is the three-part list, line 54-56, that constitutes the near universal proscription of male expression of emotions such as "love". Though the list contains second person pronouns it is preceded by the use of
first person plural pronouns “us” and “we” (line 54). James is positioned, and
he positions the other members of the group, within the category “men” and
therefore as not expressing or talking about emotions such as ‘love’. There is, however, a subtle shift in James’s subject position at the very end of his turn.
The utterance “it hasn’t been for me” (line 56) is interpreted as calling the permanence of this subject position into question. I interpret this utterance as, at least, an allusion to the possibility that other forms of masculine emotional expressivity are possible and to the possibility of change on an individual level.

Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that James is positioned outside his construction of the expression of emotions, such as ‘love’, as proscribed for men. This possibly lies in the distinction that can be made between what is said and what is done at lines 51-53. At the same time as warranting a construction of men as experiencing but not expressing emotions, such as their ‘love’ for their children, within all male social contexts James explicitly positions himself relative to his children through the use of the emotion term ‘love’. Despite the extreme case formulation invoked in the construction of this particular feature of male emotional inexpressivity – “that don’t ever get expressed in groups of men” (line 53) – James’s subject position seems to be in conflict with his own account. He could be interpreted as having done precisely the thing that he constructed as absent from all male social interactions. Even though he aligns himself, through his use of first and second person pronouns, with the construction of men as being unable to do or as not doing such things, he is tacitly positioned outside it. His subject position is that
of a man who can and does express feelings such as love for his children within a group of men.

In the next excerpt and in response to my indexing of his earlier construction of 'love' as an emotion that was not commonly expressed amongst men (excerpt 10), James offers a very different account of proscribed masculine emotional expression. Within this excerpt, certain, largely unspecified, but presumably 'relational' forms of male emotional expression are constructed as both politicised and proscribed within the social context of 'work'.

**Excerpt 11**

436 Chris: = I mean you James you mentioned love didn’t you? and =
437 James: = yeah yeah =
438 Chris: = whether or not you were free to express that =
439 James: = hmm =
440 Chris: = is that =
441 James: = er well I work in a strongly er female dominated environment .hh
442 erm and I can’t express emotions to the people that I work with because it’s
443 not seen as the thing to do and in some circumstances it would be seen as er
444 a sexual approach =
445 Chris: = hmm =
446 James: = as opposed to a sharing of emotion and there were a couple of
447 things that I was thinking about erm (. ) []

T5: 436-447

In line 442, James constructs emotional expression within the specific context of 'work' as proscribed – "I can’t express emotions to the people that I work
with". This proscription of emotional expression is accounted for through the invocation of social contexts and the social structures implicit within those contexts as determining the interpretation of emotional expression. James constructs the context within which he works as a "strongly er female-dominated environment" (line 441). The significance of this construction depends upon James's implicit subject position as male. The emotional expression that is subsequently constructed as proscribed may, therefore, be interpreted as emotions expressed by a male towards a female.

Two reasons are then advanced to account for this proscription. The first is highly generalised - "because it's not seen as the thing to do" (lines 442-443). Emotional expression by males towards females within a work context is inherently problematic. However, the second reason invoked to account for the proscription of emotional expression by males towards females is much more specific and much more powerful. An instance of emotional expression by a man towards a woman in the context of work is constructed as potentially interpretable as "a sexual approach" (lines 443-444). I contend that this interpretation of male emotional expression within the context of work depends upon the broader interpretative repertoire of 'sexual harassment' and the 'male sexual drive' discourse (Hollway, 1984). Through discourses of the social and legislative structures of the work place certain forms of male emotional expression are constructed as potentially interpretable as sexually motivated and highly problematic. Further, this account of proscribed male emotional expression involves the implicit attribution of responsibility to women — recall the construction of "a strongly er female dominated environment" (line 441).
Discourses of the social and legislative structures and the power relations that they constitute, through which male emotional expression can be made so problematic, are constructed as primarily the product and concern of women. An alternative interpretation of male emotional expression within the context of work – as "a sharing of emotion" (line 446) – is purposefully innocuous. This contrasting interpretation represents the absence of the 'sexual harassment' and 'male sexual drive' discourses and the subject positions that they constitute. It is a construction of male emotional expression not viewed through a feminist lens. As such, it is the product of a masculine subjectivity.

The implications of gendered contexts as determining interpretations of male emotional expression are worked up through the contrasting of the highly politically loaded repertoire of 'sexual harassment' with the more naïve repertoires of emotional 'expression' or 'relationality'. Thus, on this occasion, the politicisation of male emotional expression and the consequences that that may have for men who might express emotion towards female colleagues, in contexts such as work, are constructed as determinants of male uncertainty over the acceptability of emotional expressions and, ultimately, of male emotional inexpressivity. As such, this construction echoes one of the primary themes of writings on the crisis in masculinity (Coyle & Morgan-Sykes, 1998) and of this data; women and their expectations are constructed as the primary agents of change in the landscape of social interactions and in the (re)gendering of social structures and power relations, and, therefore, as the cause of male vacillation regarding the appropriateness or acceptability of their emotional expressions and of the performance of masculinities.
Summary

In these excerpts, men's expression of emotions such as 'love' is constructed as broadly proscribed. This proscription is accounted for through the invocation of discourses of sexuality and the problematizing of male sexualities, both 'gay' and 'straight', within the contemporary cultural context. Constructions of expressions of love between men as proscribed are accounted for through the invocation of the marginalized status of 'homosexuality'. Constructions of expressions of unspecified 'relational' emotions between men and women as proscribed in particular contexts are accounted for through discourses of the politicised and problematic status of public masculine heterosexuality.

Particular configurations of masculinity, constituted through the public expression of emotions such as 'love', are not permissible within certain social structures. Two of the speakers clearly position themselves as subject to the discourses that they invoke to account for the proscription of masculine expression of emotions such as love. Their 'gay' and 'heterosexual' masculine subjectivities are constituted by the proscription of such emotional expressions.

Again, the important distinction remains, the performance of masculinities is constituted by 'experiencing' emotions such as 'love' and by not 'expressing' them as a consequence of the social structures within which those masculinities are constituted.
The 'evolutionary' discourse

The final two excerpts of this part of chapter 3 represent two examples of the invocation of the evolutionary discourse to account for male emotional inexpressivity. The first, excerpt 12, is arguably the more serious of the two, with the latter, excerpt 13, taking the form of caricature. Within the 'evolutionary' discourse, masculinity is accomplished through the performance of particular behaviours and the occupation of certain subject positions, such as 'provider' and 'protector'. Though these facets of the performance of masculinity are couched in the terms of the 'evolutionary' discourse their invocation in an account of contemporary masculine emotional inexpressivity suggests that the occupation of these positions still remains central to the contemporary cultural understanding and accomplishment of masculinity.

As will be seen, the invocation of such distal determinants to account for contemporary masculinity is not reflexively oriented to. 'Evolutionary' discourses have a currency as accounts of contemporary as well as historical or pre-historical masculinity (see the discussion of the 'evolutionary' or 'sociobiological' repertoire in chapter 2). I acknowledge that there were few invocations of the 'evolutionary' discourse within the data and so their inclusion here should not be interpreted as an indication of their prevalence within contemporary accounts of masculinity. These excerpts are included because they demonstrate the particular functions served by and problems that follow from invocations of 'evolutionary' discourses and that no matter how ridiculous an account may seem it might not be reflexively oriented to as such.
The talk in excerpt 12 follows from a previous construction by Bob of a perceived expectation that men should be without emotions and from my subsequent question - "do you think it's possible and or desirable for men to be you know without emotions?" (lines 412-413).

**Excerpt 12**

412 Chris: well shall we open it up to everybody else I mean do you think it's
413 possible and or desirable for men to be you know without emotions? =
414 Paul: = I think without any negative emotions I think is more 'cause I mean
415 we you know we all laugh we all otherwise you know comedy wouldn't would
416 fall flat wouldn't it if that but I think negative emotions you know we're not
417 supposed to .hh we're not supposed to show out grief we're not .hh we're
418 supposed to remain calm in a crisis that sort of thing so anything that's
419 counter productive to the task in hand I suppose or a situation =
420 Vic: = yeah because erm that task in hand bit I think could in most in lots of
421 societies especially and that's carried on into ours it has been a case of the
422 the man going out or the men going out and er mastering the environment
423 and bringing back home the steaks and you know erm the tasks doing the
424 carrying out the tasks whereas women obviously have an equal amount if not
425 you know I would say an equal amount of tasks to do but (. ) I don't know
426 somehow that got missed ((laughs)) something =
427 Harry: = when you say sort of hunter gather tribes and sort men didn't catch
428 the food by using their emotions (inaudible) ((group laughs)) =
429 Paul: = whereas raising children is all about emotions or a lot of it is isn't it
430 'cause you know the interaction between mother and child is a very emotional
431 one =
432 Vic: = hmm yeah (. )
433 Bob: we're it just seems as though we're erm classifying emotion into a
434 certain understanding of why should it necessarily be mother and child why
should that erm be the source of emotion so let's say in the hunter gather
example when going out to hunt surely is sort of engaged in all sorts of
emotion =
Paul: = yeah true =
Vic: = yeah =
Harry: = fear that's right =
Paul: = but you would that fear would be suppressed because it you know
you're not supposed to show fear when you know confronted by a rhinoceros
or whatever you .hh =
Harry: = or at least maybe it would act in some sense to impair your
performance =

The excerpt begins with Paul's construction of the expression of certain
emotions, categorised as "negative" (line 416), as incompatible with other
requirements of the performance of masculinity, such as 'objectivity', 'agency'
and being 'task-oriented' – "we're supposed to remain calm in a crisis that sort
of thing so anything that's counter productive to the task in hand" (lines 417-
419).

These features of the performance of masculinity are constructed as both
culturally and evolutionarily determined over the next two turns. Through the
historicizing of the location of masculinity within the social structures of
particular cultures – "that task in hand bit I think could in most in lots of
societies especially and that's carried on into ours" (lines 420-421) – the
rhetorical spaces is created for the invocation of a more distal account of
masculine emotional inexpressivity, i.e., the invocation of 'evolutionary'
discourses. Further, appeals to history are established as a legitimate resource for accounting for contemporary gendered social structures and the consequent performances of gender.

Over the course of his turn Vic constructs an account in which the positions occupied by men and women in the social structures of history and prehistory are advanced as distal determinants of contemporary performances of gender and particularly of gendered differences in emotional expressivity. As with ‘evolutionary’ discourses in psychology, such accounts rely on the assumption of a singular fundamental difference between men and women, such as men and women’s contrasting levels of certainty over their position as biological parent (Buss, Larsen, Westen & Semmelroth, 1992) about which a theory of divergent yet complementary gendered ways of doing emotion can be arranged. Vic’s initial attempt to do this is arguably unsuccessful and ultimately breaks down. Men are constructed as occupying the positions of ‘provider’ and ‘agent’ – “bringing back home the steaks and [ ] tasks doing the carrying out the tasks” (lines 423-424). There is also, in lines 422 to 423, a strong sense of a ‘public’/’private’ distinction that men are constructed as required to cross – “the man going out or the men going out and er mastering the environment and bring back home the steaks”. Masculinity is constructed as characterised by ‘agency’ and ‘dominance’ across the ‘public’/’private’ distinction.

It is when Vic attempts to construct a complementary account of the positions occupied by women in history and prehistory, and therefore to account for the constitution of performances of contemporary femininity with particular regard
to emotional expressivity, that Vic's version of the 'evolutionary' discourse runs into trouble. By constructing masculinity, and masculine emotional inexpressivity, as determined by the requirement for men to 'provide' and to be generally 'task-oriented' the reciprocal account of femininity should include a contrasting account of the positions occupied by women. Specifically, the account of femininity cannot include the performance of tasks or the occupation of the position of 'provider', owing to them having been invoked as determinants of masculinity. This constitutes an interesting ideological dilemma for Vic. If he continues his account of gendered emotional expressivity as determined by the relative requirements of men and women to perform tasks in history and prehistory, then the only complementary account of feminine emotional expressivity is that it results from the absence of a requirement to perform tasks.

The construction of generalized task performance as constitutive of masculinity is highly problematic within the contemporary cultural context and it is to this ideological concern that the content of Vic's turn at line 424-426 is oriented. Vic abandons his development of the evolutionary account of gendered emotional expressivity in favour of an attempt to resolve the contemporary ideological dilemma constituted by the construction of task-performance as primarily a male concern. Vic's construction of equality in terms of the number of tasks faced by men and women not only in history and prehistory but also in the present – note the present tense in the following quotation "whereas women obviously have an equal amount if not you know I would say an equal amount of tasks to do" (lines 424-425) – is interpreted as the explicit negotiation of
Vic's subject position. The invocation of discourses of 'equality' in terms of the quantity of 'tasks' faced by men and women in contemporary culture constitutes a preferable subject position to that that would be constituted were Vic to persist in his construction of task-performance as particularly masculine.

That attempting to account for gendered ways of doing emotion through this particular version of the 'evolutionarily' discourse and to maintain the subject position as an enlightened, non-sexist male, results in an unsatisfactory 'evolutionary' account is reflexively oriented to by Vic – "I don't know somehow that got missed ((laughs)) something" (lines 425-426). For Vic, being positioned as non-sexist within the interactional context is, arguably, more important than the production of a coherent 'evolutionary' account of masculine emotional inexpressivity.

However, the 'evolutionary' discourse is subsequently taken up by both Harry and Paul at lines 427-428 and 429-431 respectively. Harry takes up the masculine part of the 'evolutionary' discourse and explicitly constructs engagement with emotions as superfluous to the performance of masculine tasks – "men didn't catch the food by using their emotions" (lines 427-428). The positions of 'provider' or even 'hunter' are constructed as characterised by the absolute lack of any need for engagement with emotions. The humour of this construction functions to increase the rhetorical power of the 'evolutionary' repertoire: the idea of men using their emotions to catch food is laughable. In his turn beginning line 429, Paul develops the complementary feminine part of the 'evolutionary' discourse. In order to do so he invokes the same singular
fundamental distinction between the sexes that is evident in the 'evolutionary' repertoires of psychology, i.e., the 'irrefutable fact' that women bear children and men don't. Thus, gendered ways of doing emotional expressivity, and particularly women's greater emotionally expressivity, are accounted for not by any of the requirements of masculinity in terms of the occupation of certain subject positions but by the constructed absence of any requirement for men, presumably in prehistory, to be involved in parenting or care-giving — "the interaction between mother and child is a very emotional one" (lines 430-431). Masculine emotional inexpressivity is consequently accounted for not by what men in prehistory did, such as 'hunting', 'providing' and 'protecting', so much as by what they didn't do, 'parenting'.

The resilience and appeal of 'evolutionary' discourses is amply demonstrated in the turns that follow Bob's explicit challenge to the persuasiveness of the 'evolutionary account of gendered emotional expressivity. Bob attempts to reframe masculine 'behaviours' and subject positions, such as 'hunter', as suffused with emotions — "going out to hunt surely is sort of engaged in all sorts of emotion" (lines 436-437). Bob's turn echoes Shields' (2002) observation that the 'emotion' components of masculinity or masculine activities tend to be downplayed or at least not constructed in 'emotion' terms. Certainly, this invocation of the 'evolutionary' repertoire relies on the features, 'behaviours', 'activities' and 'subject positions', constructed as constitutive of masculinity being devoid of emotions.
Whilst Bob’s challenge that emotions are inherent in the activities and positions previously constructed as masculine does meet with support from Paul, Vic and Harry (lines 438, 439 and 440 respectively) it is subsequently qualified through the invocation of the discourses of emotional 'experience' and 'expression'. Thus, masculine activities such as hunting are constructed as suffused with emotional 'experience' – the specific example given is 'fear' (lines 440, 441 & 442). However, the distinction between 'experience' and 'expression' provides the basis for the construction of masculinity as characterized by the exercise of control over such emotional 'experiences' and the consequent absence of emotional 'expression' – “that fear would be suppressed because it you know you're not supposed to show fear when you now confronted by a rhinoceros” (lines 441-442). The incompatibility of emotional expressivity and effective performance of task is subsequently restated by Harry in lines 444-445.

As I said at the beginning of this analysis, I felt it was worth including because of the sheer preposterousness of the account of contemporary masculine emotional inexpressivity constituted by “evolutionary’ discourses’ and by the relative absence of any reflexive orientation to its absurdity. Amongst the speakers in the excerpt only Bob orients to the particular assumptions upon which the ‘evolutionary’ repertoire is based. Further, those speakers who are involved in the advancing of the ‘evolutionary’ account do not reflexively orient to their subject positions relative to it – note the tense and the pronouns used in Paul’s utterance “you know you’re not supposed to show fear when you know confronted by a rhinoceros”. From the present tense and the second
person plural pronouns, being confronted by a rhinoceros could be interpreted as a contemporary cultural concern for these speakers and perhaps for other men.

Arguably, the absence of reflexivity results from the scenario of being confronted by a rhinoceros being oriented to as one example of a facet of the performance of masculinity that has as much contemporary currency as it has pre-historical currency. The performance of masculinity within the contemporary cultural context is, for these speakers, constituted by the occupation of such positions as ‘provider’ – from ‘hunter’ to ‘breadwinner’ – by being ‘task-oriented’, by ‘agency’ across ‘private’ and ‘public’ contexts, by the exercise of control over emotional expression, and ultimately by the achievement of dominance within social structures and power relations. That is why they do not reflexively orient to the seeming absurdity of invoking an encounter with a rhino as a determinant of contemporary masculinity. The invocation of the ‘evolutionary’ repertoire makes the constitution of masculinity trans-historical.

The final excerpt of this section and indeed this part of the analysis includes just a brief invocation of the ‘evolutionary’ repertoire to account for the features that are constructed as constitutive of contemporary masculinity. The excerpt and my opening question follow from an invocation of one of the metaphors of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse (see the next part of the analysis), specifically the construction of emotions as things that could be ‘bottled up’. ‘Bottling up’ emotion is interpretable as a construction of emotions as ‘experienced’ but
purposefully not 'expressed' and as such is linked to accounts of the proscription of masculine emotional expressivity.

Excerpt 13

225 Chris: do you think there's an expectation for men to to control their emotions or as you said you know bottle it up =
227 Lawrence: = [it depends on the] emotion (.8) I think to kind of talk about how
228 Ben: to a certain extent
229 Lawrence: they feel and express you know kind of (1.9) more feminine emotion I think is something that society you know (1.6) has up till now kind of quite strongly prohibited I think there's that kind of hh Gillette man image that all men should have and be kind of slightly rugged a bit kind of tough guy (1.0) erm (.9) and you know that has its place and it does 'cause you know kind of going back to kind of like 'ug ug' and the cavemen what have you you're there as a protector (1.0) on one level but I think you need to have another level where you can .hh you know act as like a confidante to your partner or friends or whoever and you need to be able level with people on a very kind of (1.3) inward and emotional level =

T6: 225-238

Within the excerpt, the proscription of emotional expression is constructed as dependent upon the particular type of emotion and the form of expression that it would take. Any form of positioning of the self in terms of 'feminized' emotions, either through 'non-verbal' or 'verbal' 'expression', is constructed as culturally proscribed – “to kind of talk about how they feel and express you know kind of (1.9) more feminine emotion I think is something that society you know (1.6) has up till now kind of quite strongly prohibited” (lines 227-231). The temporal qualification of the cultural proscription of men's expression of
'feminized' emotions – "up till now" – must be acknowledged. The version of masculinity for which Lawrence is accounting is reflexively oriented to as outdated.

The culturally prescribed version of masculinity, for which Lawrence is accounting, bears a strong resemblance to constructions of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995). Lawrence invokes images of idealised contemporary masculinity from advertising – "that kind of hh Gillette man image" (line 231) – and the qualities of being "slightly rugged" and "a bit kind of tough guy" (lines 232-233) in his construction of this culturally prescribed masculinity. Having done this, Lawrence then invokes the 'evolutionary' repertoire to account for the above-identified features of this particular version of masculinity. In the pre-historical context of "the cavemen" (line 234), masculinity is constructed as constituted by the occupation of the position of "protector" (line 235). Presumably, 'toughness', 'ruggedness' and a smooth chin are essential to the occupation of this position. Again, the links between the 'evolutionary' and 'social structures' repertoires are apparent. The 'evolutionary' repertoire historicizes the locations occupied by gendered individuals in social structures and power relations, thus negating the need for more proximal temporal accounts.

That said, the idea of versions of masculinity specific to spatio-temporal locations is very much in evidence in Lawrence's turn, recall "up till now". The potential requirement for and the possibilities of change in the culturally prescribed version of masculinity is developed over the remaining lines of
Lawrence's turn. Lawrence constructs a need for men to engage with the relational functions of emotions. Emotional literacy across a range of social relationships – "your partner or friends or whoever" (line 237) – is constructed as a contemporary requirement of men. Thus, while the 'evolutionary' repertoire is invoked to account for some features of contemporary masculinity, there are others with which the 'evolutionary' discourse is entirely incompatible. The basis of this incompatibility may be that the more contemporary constituents of masculinity do not assume the same social structures and gendered locations within those structures that are implicit in the 'evolutionary' repertoire.

It is worth noting the transition of pronoun use when referring to the category of 'men', from third to second person plural, in Lawrence's turn. His initial use of the third person – "they" (line 229) – is interpretable as following from my use of the third person in line 225. However, his subsequent shift to the potentially self-inclusive second person plural in line 235 is significant. Lawrence is subjected to the discourses of a contemporary, emotionally literate version of masculinity.

**Summary**

The 'evolutionary' repertoire is invoked to account for versions of masculinity that are constituted through the performance of gendered activities and the occupation of gender positions within social structures and power relations, e.g. being the 'breadwinner', the 'provider', the 'protector' and the 'master' of both the environment and subjective experiences. In short, the 'evolutionary'
repertoire accounts for what may be termed hegemonic masculinity. They account for 'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women' (Connell, 1995, p.77). Further, as such distal determinants, where speakers are subjected to the 'evolutionary' repertoire (as in excerpt 12), they provide for the disavowal of responsibility for both the constitution of masculinity and for the status quo of gender power relations. These functions may account for the power and appeal of the 'evolutionary' repertoire and for it being evidently constitutive of contemporary masculine subjectivities. It provides for a way of 'being masculine' and resisting change.

4.4.2 Anger: Accounting for the exception to masculine emotional inexpressivity

This final part of the analysis of the focus group data is concerned with the construction of 'anger' as an acceptable or expected form of masculine emotional expression and with the discourse that is most commonly invoked to account for masculine emotional expression, including the expression of anger. The excerpts drawn upon below share many of the discourses, rely on many of the same distinctions and generate many of the same themes as were identified in the preceding part of the analysis, for example the discourses of emotional 'experience' and 'expression', the distinction between 'public' and 'private' contexts, the discourses of 'vulnerability' and 'strength', the 'social
structures' repertoire and the emphasis on 'agency'. However, on these occasions they are invoked to account for masculine emotional expressivity.

The two excerpts in the first section of the analysis, excerpts 14 and 15, provide accounts of 'anger' as a culturally gendered, masculine emotion. The four excerpts in the second section also engage with constructions of male expressions of anger. However, the analysis of these excerpts will be concerned primarily with the invocation of the 'hydraulic' model discourse to account for masculine emotional expression. The analysis of these excerpts requires the use of two very similar phrases, the 'hydraulic model' discourse and the 'hydraulic model of emotions'. The first of these terms is used to categorize those discursive resources that are constitutive of the 'hydraulic model of emotions'. The 'hydraulic model of emotions' refers to constructions of emotions as ontologically existent, as subjectively experienced, as amenable to control or management and as imperative conditions. The 'imperative' element of the 'hydraulic model of emotions' is the constructed inevitability of expression; within the 'hydraulic model of emotions' emotional experiences are constructed as requiring and ultimately finding expression, in one form or another.
"So anger is seen as strength": Anger and the performance of masculinity

Excerpt 14 provides a construction of the male expression of 'anger' as culturally 'expected' and as not antithetical to the performance of masculinity. In this excerpt, the construction of the expression of anger as culturally expected of men is accounted for through the invocation of the 'social structures' repertoire. The expression of anger is constructed as acceptable for men because it functions in the maintenance of the positions occupied by men in social structures and power relations, i.e., it functions in the maintenance of 'hegemonic masculinity'.

Excerpt 14

356 Harry: = I was going to mention something not necessarily related to men but
357 I think sort of happy emotions are sort of social things and then negative
358 emotions are kind of shut away or that's kind of how it's supposed to work (.)
359 so I think that sort of applies to men and women =
360 Vic: = [I find
361 Chris: equally across the two =
362 Harry: = yeah I think so =
363 Vic: = yeah I mean I would find that to a certain extent even happy emotions
364 are sometimes erm seen as more socially acceptable in this culture in women
365 than in men because if a woman's like generally you know just take a
366 canteen situation if a woman's laughing and everything like that it can often
367 be taken as she's a fun one or whatever whereas if it's a man sometimes it's
368 like you know he's a bit of a girl basically or he's you know he's not erm you
369 know it's taken I think even even that I think there are certain emotions that
370 are negative emotions that are more acceptable in men almost which are
things like anger and stuff and I think you know not acceptable as in if you take it out on everyone but or or more expected of them anyway let's put it that way and you were talking about expectations anyway weren't you?

Chris: = yeah =

Vic: = yeah so I think anger and er what's you know the sort of imposition of dominance and you know confidence and you know that sort of stuff are sort of expected of men =


The turns in the excerpt follow from my asking the group to what extent they thought men were expected to control the expression of emotions. The excerpt opens with Harry's construction of equivalency between the genders in terms of prescribed and proscribed public emotional expressions. This construction of equivalency between the genders — "I think that sort of applies to men and women" (line 359), was exceptional within the data set.

The features that are of particular relevance to this analysis are contained in Vic's turns at lines 363-373 and 375-377. Vic's first turn is primarily a qualification of Harry's previous construction of gender equivalency in the cultural evaluations of male and female public emotional expressions. Vic constructs a scenario within which equivalent expressions of "happy emotions" (line 363) be male and female actors meet with differing evaluative responses. The evaluation of the appropriateness of a particular form of emotional expression is constructed as dependent upon the gender of the 'actor'. Male expressions of "happy emotions", though the form of such an expression is not
specified (line 367), are constructed as likely to be evaluated as conflicting with cultural expectations regarding the performance of masculinity.

In contrast, public expressions of "negative emotions" (lines 357-358), developed so that it includes "anger and stuff" (line 371) are constructed as "more acceptable in men almost" (line 370). However, with regard to men's expression of anger there is an obvious tension between what is constructed as socially 'acceptable' and what is constructed as socially 'expected'. Vic reflexively orients to his construction of the expression of anger as "more acceptable in men" and qualifies it – "not acceptable as in if you take it out on everyone" (lines 371-372). The qualification is, however, a partial one; only one particular form of men's expression of anger is constructed as unacceptable.

The constructed 'dispreferred' form of male expression of anger has two features that work up its problematic status. The first is that it is constructed as object-related. This is, of course, hardly surprising. Within the social-psychological literature, emotional expressions are conceptualised as responses to particular emotion-eliciting objects, persons or things and as constitutive of the relationship between the individual and the object (de Rivera, 1984; Fridlund, 1991, 1994; Parkinson, 1995; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). However, in this instance the 'object' towards which the expression of anger is directed is constructed through the extreme case formulation "everyone". Consequently, the directed expression of anger to "everyone" can be heard as unreasonable since "everyone" could not have feasibly elicited the emotion.
The second feature is the implicit distinction between emotional 'experience' and 'expression' and the possibilities this distinction affords in terms of the construction of agentic control over 'expression'. Men's expression of anger is constructed as unacceptable only when it is intentionally visited upon those who cannot possibly warrant it — "not acceptable as in if you take it out on everyone" (lines 371-371). In making this qualification, Vic manages his own subject position through implicit appeals to repertoires of individual responsibility and fairness.

However, regardless of the cultural acceptability of men's expression of negative emotions, particularly anger, they are constructed as culturally expected — "but or or more expected of them anyway let's put it that way" (lines 372-373). Vic's closing question — "and you were talking about expectations anyway weren't you?" (lines 373-374) — directed to and answered by me, is a rhetorical move. By asking the question, the preceding move from talking about acceptability to talking about expectations is reframed as an orientation to the discursive requirements of the local interactional context. Consequently, Vic is positioned as an attentive and responsive participant in a focus group discussion. This act of positioning may function as an inoculation against the possibility of being positioned as an apologist for men's unwarranted venting of emotions such as anger.

Vic's final turn, at lines 375-377, sees the invocation of the 'social structures' discourse to account for the construction of the expression of anger as not antithetical to masculinity. The expression of anger is constructed as belonging
to a category of behaviours, actions or attributes that accord with and is constitutive of the locations in social structures and power relations that men are culturally supposed to occupy; these behaviours, actions and attributes, including the expression of anger, is gendered as 'masculine'. That 'power' is a part of the constitution of masculinity is apparent in Vic's generalised three-part list — "the sort of imposition of dominance and you know confidence and you know that sort of stuff" (lines 375-376). The construction of the relational functions served by male expressions of anger accounts for the construction of such emotional expressions as not antithetical to, but rather as constitutive of, masculinity. The features listed by Vic as constitutive of masculinity reads very much like a construction of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995). Finally, by invoking the discourse of 'social expectations' — "that sort of stuff are sort of expected of men" (lines 376-377) — Vic potentially inoculate himself, and other men, from criticism. Men are constructed as behaving in ways that, regardless of their acceptability, are at least expected of them. Consequently, the positions in power relations that men may occupy through the performance of masculinity, constituted by such things as gendered ways of doing emotions, are effectively constructed as culturally bestowed upon men. Arguably, the invocation of these discursive resources represents a management of stake (Potter, 1996) and the reflexive management of subject positions (Davies & Harré, 1990) and gendered subjectivities (Hollway, 1984, 1989).

The next excerpt follows from a discussion of the extent to which the members of the group felt free to express emotion through crying within the context of the particular church of which they were all members and of the possibility that
for other men other emotions, such as anger, may be freely expressed in other contexts.

Excerpt 15

245 Chris: = so there are potentially some that are more [kind of socially
246 James: yeah
247 Chris: acceptable [between men? =
248 James: yeah
249 Mark: = or maybe different emotions are acceptable in [different kinds of
250 James: yeah
251 Mark: social contexts =
252 Chris: = yeah =
253 Matthew: = or different ways of expressing the the emotion are acceptable
254 like I mean .hh you can deal with anger in a lot of different ways it's er it fits
255 in with a sort of male macho image to get angry in the sense of of you know
256 on the borderline of violence and that's ok ((laughing)) apparently but erm to
257 do something constructive with with anger to you know use it as a motivator
258 to do something .hh I think is probably erm well it would be less less obvious
259 but erm I think it's er it's not sort of taken as a .hh a thing that you would see
260 somebody doing you know that somebody becomes .hh incensed about
261 some injustice or something and it actually moves them to do something
262 about it I think that's probably quite rare .hh you know having a rant and rave
263 about it and throwing things around is probably a lot more .hh acceptable
264 and in some ways more comfortable to see that happening than for
265 somebody to actually let something get under their skin that they would do
266 something about it and that could be .hh quite uncomfortable even if you
267 agree with the original sort of idea behind that =
268 James: = isn't that to do with more to do with the the vulnerability of the
269 emotion? (. ) like for example the ones that we were just talking about erm
270 prior to to talking about anger erm make you a more vulnerable person
In the opening turns, two accounts of the acceptability of emotional expression between men are advanced. The first, advanced by me, is that emotion categories, such as 'anger', are gendered and that the gendering of emotion accounts for the acceptability of expression. Mark subsequently invokes the concept of gendered contexts to account for acceptable masculine emotional
expression. Both these repertoires of 'gendered emotions' and 'gendered contexts' are familiar resources invoked to account for masculine emotional expressions (Walton, Coyle & Lyons, 2004). However, in his turn, Matthew develops a more complex account of the acceptability of male emotional expressions as contingent upon the particular form that expression takes.

Matthew invokes 'anger' as the emotion through which he develops his account of the acceptability of emotional expression as contingent upon the form of expression. The invocation of anger is noteworthy since it is an emotion that men are regularly constructed as relatively free to express (see the above section on the findings of self-report methods in the literature on gender and emotions and the preceding excerpt). Within Matthew's turn (lines 253-267) forms of expression of anger are contrasted in terms of their relative social acceptability. From the outset, the discourses of 'experience' and 'expression' are apparent as is the exercise of 'agency' over their management — "you can deal with anger in a lot of different ways" (line 254).

Matthew then goes on to construct two forms of expression of anger. Given that these two forms of expression are being contrasted with regard to their relative social acceptability, it is inevitable that one will be constructed as 'preferred' and the other as 'dispreferred'. The first form that Matthew constructs is the 'preferred' form. Constructed as "on the borderline of violence" (line 256), the 'preferred' form of expressing anger is constructed as according with "a sort of male macho image" (line 255). Matthew reflexively orients to his construction of this form as 'preferred' — "and that's ok
((laughing)) apparently" (line 256) – in such a way that he is simultaneously
distanced from it. His use of "apparently" accords the constructed acceptability
of this form of expression to an 'other'.

The initial construction of this form of expression of anger – "on the borderline
of violence" – is subsequently developed as "having a rant and rave about it
and throwing things around" (lines 262-263). Both these constructions stop
short of constructing 'actual' violence as a part of the 'preferred' form.
Consequently, there is no ideological obstacle, such as appearing to be an
apologist for violence, to Matthew constructing this form as "probably a lot
more hh acceptable and in some ways more comfortable to see that
happening" (lines 263-264). The subtle qualifications that occur within that
construction – "probably" and "in some ways" – are interpreted as the reflexive
management of subject positions. Matthew's subjectivity is constituted as
distinct from the constructed cultural perspective. From Matthew's subjectivity,
this 'preferred' form of expression of anger is oriented to as potentially
problematic.

In Matthew's turn the visibly and audibly obvious expression of anger, through
"having a rant and rave", through "throwing things around" and through being
on "the borderline of violence", is explicitly constructed as according with "a
sort of male macho image" (line 255). The discourse of ‘masculinity’, for that is
how I interpret the "male macho image", is invoked to account for the
construction of this form of expression of anger as socially acceptable. It is
worth noting the use of two gendered adjectives in the invocation of discourses
of masculinity and the combined implications of these adjectives in terms of the discourses of 'aetiology' that they make possible. The phrase effectively conflates 'essential maleness', which may be accounted for through discourses of 'biology' or 'evolution', with the culturally determined concept of "macho". In this invocation, the discourse of 'masculinity' must be understood as drawing upon and making available both repertoires of 'aetiology'.

The second constructed form of expression for anger is the 'dispreferred' form and is markedly different from the 'preferred' form. It is explicitly constructed as "constructive", in contrast to what could be argued to be the implicitly 'destructive' character of the 'preferred' form – "but erm to do something constructive with with anger to you know use it as a motivator to do something" (lines 256-258). This 'constructive' form of expression for anger is developed further in lines 260-262. This construction is striking because of the rhetorically powerful formulation of anger that is employed – "incensed" (line 260) – and because the form of expression is explicitly functional – "to do something about it [some injustice]" (line 261-262, [lines 260-261]). I find it interesting that this constructed form of dealing with and expressing anger should be constructed as 'dispreferred'. Indeed, in the terms that it is presented here, such a construction seems to be contrary to common sense; a constructive

44 It is not my intention to imply that this construction is exceptional because emotional expression is constructed as functional, nor do I wish to imply that there can be any form of 'emotional expression' that is not functional at some level. Within the context of this thesis, all forms of emotional expression are assumed to be functional, i.e. it is assumed that they do something.
form of expression of anger, which results in the rectification of an 'injustice', would surely be preferred over an implicitly destructive form.

Within the excerpt, there are clues to how the 'destructive' form of expressing anger can be advanced as the 'preferred' form. The two forms of expression are contrasted in terms of their social visibility. The 'dispreferred' form is constructed as "less less obvious" (line 258) and as "not sort of taken as a hh a thing that you would see somebody doing" (lines 259-260). Consequently, it is also constructed as "probably quite rare" (line 262). The contrasting of the two forms of expression on the basis of their 'visibility' and 'audibility' is interpreted as forming the basis of a construction of familiarity. The destructive form is constructed as 'preferred' — "a lot more hh acceptable and in some ways more comfortable to see that happening" (lines 263-264) — precisely because it is the form with which people are constructed as most familiar. The sheer unfamiliarity, because of its constructed rarity of occurrence or observation, of the constructive form is the basis of its 'dispreferred' status.

The relationships between discourses of 'familiarity', 'acceptability' and 'expectations' are relatively straight forward; what may be constructed as 'familiar' can subsequently be constructed as 'expected' and that which can be constructed as 'familiar' and as conforming to 'expectations' may be constructed as 'acceptable'.

There is a less 'local' interpretation of why the 'constructive' form of expression of anger is constructed as 'dispreferred', which is based on the closing constructions of Matthew's turn — "to actually let something get under their skin that they would do something about it and that could be .hh quite
uncomfortable” (lines 265-266). This construction echoes the original construction of emotion within the ‘dispreferred’ form as "a motivator" (line 257). However, it is worked up as problematic through the invoked metaphor for internalization – "get under their skin". Thus the emotion, being ‘incensed’, is constructed as internalized. This construction of ‘internalized’ emotion is located within a broader framework that is constituted by the preceding phrase "to actually let something". Within this construction the repertoires of ‘emotionality’ and ‘rationality’, ‘agency’ and ‘passivity’ are at play. The ‘internalization’ of emotion is constructed as resulting from ‘agentic passivity’ and the consequent functional form of expression may be interpreted as the ‘agentic’ privileging of ‘emotionality’ over ‘rationality’. It would be easy to advance an interpretation of this form of expression of anger as ‘dispreferred’ for men because it conflicts with the hegemonic status of ‘rationality’, as the basis for masculine actions. To act on the basis of an ‘emotion’, even when that action has positive consequences, is potentially interpretable as conflicting with the performance of hegemonic masculinity.

In the final line of his turn, Matthew orients to an ideological dilemma (Billig et al., 1988) constituted by his construction of the ‘destructive’ form of expression of anger as ‘preferred’, the concomitant construction of the ‘constructive form as ‘dispreferred’ and the consequent possibility of being positioned as an apologist for male aggression and possibly even violence. This dilemma is negotiated through the invocation of a rhetorical strategy that Edley & Wetherell identified as ‘dividing theory and practice’ (1999, p.187) (see also Wetherell, Stiven and Potter, 1987). Matthew’s construction of the
'dispreferred' form is qualified by the statement "even if you agree with the original sort of idea behind that" (lines 266-267). This statement makes the distinction between 'theory' and 'practice' and is applicable to both the 'preferred' and 'dispreferred' forms. The 'dispreferred' form can be constructed as the more agreeable in 'theory', but not in 'practice' because its 'practice' is insufficiently familiar. In contrast, it would be difficult to construct the 'preferred' form, constructed as on the "borderline of violence", as agreeable in theory. Consequently, its acceptability is dependent on the constructed familiarity of its practice. The implication of Matthew's invocation of the distinction between 'theory' and 'practice' for his subject position is that he is aligned with 'dispreferred' form in 'theory' rather than with the 'practice' of the 'preferred' form.

The second part of excerpt 15, from line 268, also provides an excellent example of the type of constructions of male emotional expression and the consequent negotiation of subject position that were apparent in several of the transcripts. From line 268, the excerpt primarily involves James and Luke and it is Luke's negotiation of his subject position that is of specific interest. James's turn, beginning at line 268, sees the invocation of the concept of vulnerability and its equation with the expression of certain discrete emotions (in a similar way as was seen in excerpt 4). On this occasion, emotions are constructed as 'states', as things within which individuals are located – "whereas in anger" (line 271). The construction of emotions as 'states' dissolves the distinction between emotional 'experience' and 'expression'; the construction of being "in anger" is interpreted as conflating 'experience' and
'expression'. The equating of vulnerability with certain emotional 'states' but not others occurs within a contrast. 'Crying', indexically referenced by the statement "the ones that we were just talking about erm prior to talking about anger" (lines 269-270), is constructed as constituting a display of vulnerability – "erm make you a more vulnerable person" (line 270). Being in a 'state' of anger, by contrast, is constructed as causing an individual to be "not vulnerable" (line 271).

The above representation of certain emotions as connoting vulnerability is not strictly accurate. A more apposite representation would be that the expressions of certain emotions are constructed as positioning individuals as vulnerable; the occupation of a subject position as vulnerable is an effect of expressing certain emotions. Emotional acts, like speech acts, can be interpreted as constituting subject positions and therefore as constituting acts of first and second order positioning (Harré & Van Langenhove, 1999). This possibility is alluded to in James's construction of the consequences of being "in anger" – "you are not open to attack because people won’t approach you" (line 271-272). Presumably, being "in anger" is somewhat similar to Matthew's constructed 'preferred' form of masculine expression of anger. Nobody would approach you if you were "having a rant and rave about it and throwing things around" (lines 262-263).

From this point, James is drawn into a negotiation of subject positions by Luke. In an apparent development of James's construction, Luke constructs the expression of anger as constitutive of subject positions of 'strength' and the
expression of emotion through crying as constitutive of subject positions of weakness (lines 274 & 276). Both these constructions gain explicit confirmation from James (lines 275 & 277). Luke’s negotiation of his subject position relative to these constructions can succinctly be represented as an act of ‘distancing’. As has been demonstrated above, acts of distancing are a common occurrence, are based on a wide range of discursive resources and are characterized by the speaker’s resistance of a particular subject position, that they are either afforded or assumed to occupy, in favour of another subject position of that is of greater interactional, social, cultural or ideological currency. 

Luke’s act of distancing is negotiated through the invocation of discourses of context, which frame the constructed forms of emotional expression as constitutive of subject positions of either ‘strength’ or ‘weakness’. By invoking the distinction between ‘culture’ – "the worldly concept" (line 278) – and the ‘individual’, Luke creates the rhetorical opportunity to position himself as diametrically opposed to the constructed cultural equations of anger and strength, crying and weakness – "I actually find that [crying] a strength I find anger a weakness" (lines 280-281). At the level of the individual, a man’s expression of emotion through crying is constructed as interpretable as demonstrable of individual strength; in contrast a man’s expression of anger is

45 These categories should not be interpreted as discrete but as interactive. The currency of a subject position at an interactional level is contingent upon its currency at an ideological level and vice versa.
demonstrable of individual weakness. Arguably, this inversion of cultural equations at the level of the individual and the potential for them to be cast as 'positive' is based on the discourses of 'individuality' and 'non-conformity'. To resist what is culturally prescribed – the masculine expression of anger – is interpretable as resulting from individual 'agency' and 'strength'. To conform to cultural proscriptions – the proscription of masculine emotional expression through crying – is, by contrast, interpretable as an individual 'weakness'.

This shift in the rhetorical focus of the discussion is explicitly oriented to by James in his turn beginning at line 284. He argues that the previous equations of anger with strength and crying with weakness are highly culturally prevalent and that renegotiations of those equations are context specific. Indexing the preceding constructions of cultural expectations of masculinity, he contrasts the freedom that the speakers may exist within the context of their church – "a lot of the things that we talk about don't apply to us in church" (lines 286-287) with the requirement to conform to cultural conventions of gender performance in all other contexts – "it's only to when we go back into that world outside that we put on our man persona" (lines 287-288). This construction is interpretable as reworking of the public/private distinction that is characteristic of accounts of masculine emotional expressivity. "Church" is ascribed the status of a 'private' context and the "world" is the public context. This is a reworking of the public/private distinction because the 'private' context is shared, there are audiences to masculine emotional expressivity but it is not proscribed.
Within that construction 'masculinity', the "man persona", is explicitly constructed as a performative act. Being a man, in terms of managing emotional expressivity, is constructed as something that is agentically accomplished in accordance with context specific requirements. Consequently, to not 'do' 'masculinity' in that way is also a performative and agentic act, one that Luke positions himself as undertaking – "I'm not sure (that) I do anymore" (line 290). Luke's subject position – as a man who does not 'do' masculinity in the constructed culturally prescribed, expected and acceptable way – is constructed as the product of a process of change. While we cannot and do not assume the 'truthfulness' of the speakers constructions, it is still a little disheartening to hear the challenging of hegemonic 'masculine ways of doing emotions' constructed as a process that "took probably many years" (line 292). Certainly, the constructed length of the process of change works up the idea that change in the relationship between gender and emotions, even at the most basic level of the individual, does not and perhaps cannot happen overnight and in so doing works up the account of the expression of 'anger' as according with the performance of masculinity as culturally determined. As for Luke, the constructed length of the process of change positions him as having had a long-term reflexive engagement with his performance of masculinity and works up his status as 'agentic'. Arguably, the constitution of a subjectivity as engaged in the determined, principled and above all agentic resistance of culturally hegemonic 'masculinity' still constitutes the performance of a 'masculinity'. As Edley & Wetherell (1999) argued, one of the best ways of doing hegemonic masculinity is to claim to resist conforming to 'hegemonic' masculinity.
"Just 'cause he'd bottled it all up": The 'hydraulic model' discourse

As stated above, this section of the analysis is concerned with invocations of the 'hydraulic model of emotions'. The metaphors, images and phrases that are drawn upon in constructions of the 'hydraulic model of emotions' are collectively categorised as belonging to the 'hydraulic model' discourse. The 'hydraulic model' discourse is arguably the most frequently invoked resource in the data set to account for male emotional expressivity, and particularly for male expression of anger, in one form or another. Within this discourse emotions are constructed as ontologically existent things. The most apposite analogy that can be made is to energy. Emotions are talked about as if they involved, indeed as if they were constituted by, quantifiable levels of energy. However, to continue the analogy, like energy – following the First Law of Thermodynamics – emotions are talked about as if they cannot be destroyed, but can only be controlled and contained or transformed. It is upon this fundamental way of constructing emotions that the entire 'hydraulic model' discourse is built. Of course, 'hydraulic' metaphors and metaphors of 'energy' have a long history of association with constructions of 'emotions' and particularly with constructions of 'anger' (Lakoff, 1987)⁴⁶. This analysis will allow engagement with the relational and ideological functions served by the

⁴⁶ Lakoff (1987) provides an alternative metaphor to 'energy' for the construction of 'anger'. 'Anger', according to Lakoff, is constructed as if it had 'mass'; 'it has a scale indicating its amount, it exists when the amount is greater than zero, and it goes out of existence when the amount falls to zero' (p.386). See also Mesquita and Frijda (1992) for the 'volcanic' metaphor for 'anger'.
invocation of the ‘hydraulic model of emotions’, in terms of the negotiation of subject positions and ideological dilemmas.

Excerpt 16 provides a good example of the rhetorical work done by the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse. As will be demonstrated over the following excerpts, the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse is often invoked to account for male expressions of emotions or emotion-related actions or responses that are potentially socially problematic or questionable. The excerpt follows from a series of autobiographical narratives all of which warranted the construction of men’s expression of emotion through crying as exceptional. Consequently, the whole excerpt and the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse in particular are interpreted as accounting for instances of male emotional expression. The ‘hydraulic model’ discourse accounts for problematic or questionable male behaviours by constructing them as in ‘fact’ exceptional instances of unmanaged emotional ‘expression’, resulting from nothing more than the power of men’s emotional ‘experiences’. The status of ‘emotions’ as ‘imperatives’ within the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse, mentioned above, cannot be overstated. More than any other feature of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse, the status of ‘emotions’ as imperatives is the basis of accounts of the masculine expression of ‘anger’.
Excerpt 16

406 Maurice: = erm (.) but it’s this thing of I think where I’m going with this
407 thread it’s that thing of building up where you actually absorb a lot of issues =
408 Philip: = yeah =
409 Maurice: = and you don’t find an outlet for them =
410 Philip: = yeah yeah yeah =
411 Maurice: = erm and that outlet (1.1) because although we’re talking about
412 emotion we’re talking >it seems that the expression that we’re< (1.0)
413 describing is one that results in tears say =
414 Philip: = hmm =
415 Maurice: = but it can be anything =
416 Philip: = anger or =
417 Maurice: = absolutely =
418 Philip: = guilt or =
419 Maurice: = and the way we (.) the way that we may or (.7) experience =
420 Philip: = hmm =
421 Maurice: = what’s happening and absorb that makes manifest in in anger =
422 Philip: = hmm yeah =
423 Maurice: = or dysfunctional rela- er behaviour with your er with your
424 girlfriend your wife =
425 Philip: = hmm hmm =
426 Maurice: = erm not holding your job down or taking drugs or whatever it
427 might be you just kind of just lose it erm =
T8: 406-427.

Elements of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse are first apparent in Maurice’s
turns at lines 406-407 and 409. Prefaced by "it’s that thing" (line 407), the
‘hydraulic model of emotions’ is constructed as a recognisable and familiar
phenomenon. Maurice then draws upon the previously identified distinction constituted by discourses of emotional 'experience' and 'expression'. Emotional 'experience' is constructed as internal, cumulative and subjectively understood – "it's that thing of building up where you actually absorb a lot of issues" (line 407).

Maurice's use of the word "issues" in the opening turn must be addressed, since this analysis is concerned with how the 'hydraulic model' discourse relates to 'emotions', not to "issues". To interpret "issues" as signifying emotional 'experiences' would be to impose my categories upon the text. In contemporary culture, people are constructed as having "issues" with 'things'. Therefore, "issues" may be interpreted as signifying both the existence and quality of a relationship between an individual and an 'other', person, object or thing. One possible resource through which the quality of that relationship may be constructed is discourses of 'emotion'. Consequently, "issues" is interpreted as locating emotional 'experiences' within social contexts and as an effect of social relationships, rather than as simply 'internal' and 'subjective' phenomena. Thus, while "issues" is not interpreted as a simple synonym for emotional 'experiences', it is argued that emotional 'experiences' may be culturally understood to be an important component of what "issues" signifies. This interpretation is supported by the Maurice's subsequent move from talking about "issues" to talking about "emotions" in lines 411-412.

The above advanced interpretation of "issues" is essential to the interpretation of "you don't find an outlet for them" (line 409) as a construction of the
inexpressive component of the ‘hydraulic model of emotions’; "them" refers to the previously constructed "issues". Consequently, it is the implicitly constituted emotional ‘experiences’ that are interpreted as internalised and as not expressed. However, inexpressivity is accounted for by the constructed interaction between emotional ‘experiences’, the individual and the social context. Through the use of the third person pronoun – "them", emotional ‘experiences’ are constructed as entities over which the generalised individual – "you" – exerts agentic control. Emotional inexpressivity is constructed as resulting from a perceived lack of "outlet[s]". The use of "outlet" can, in itself, be interpreted as an invocation of a fluid, if not hydraulic, metaphor. Further, "outlet[s]" are constructed as located in or as properties of social contexts. Implicit within this construction is the possibility that if an "outlet" could be ‘found’ then emotional ‘expression’ would occur. However, the determination of the form of ‘expression’ is largely ascribed to the "outlet". Whether or not emotional ‘expression’ occurs is implicitly constructed as contingent upon the gendered form of ‘expression’ provided by any particular "outlet". Male emotional ‘(in)expression’ is constructed as resulting from a complex, reflexive and agentic relationship between the individual and the social contexts within which he is located.

The remainder of the excerpt, from line 411, is concerned with the construction of a list possible "outlet[s]" or forms of emotional ‘expression’, which are amenable to or even typical of men. Maurice evokes "tears" (line 413) as the form of exceptional emotional ‘expression’ that had been predominant in the group's discussion. He then goes on, with co-operation from Philip, to advance
a number of possible alternative forms that male emotional 'expression' might take. These forms are all constructed as passively occurring or, at least, the constructions lack any explicit ascription of agency. The closing part of Maurice's turn – "you just kind of just lose it" (line 427) – is interpreted as a construction of a simultaneous loss of control over both the 'internalised emotional experiences' and the forms of 'expression' that they might take. Internalised emotional 'experiences' or are constructed as 'expressed' as "anger" (line 416) or "guilt" (line 418), as being made "manifest in anger" (line 421), in "dysfunctional rela- er behaviour with your er with your girlfriend your wife" (lines 423-424), or in "not holding your job down or taking drugs or whatever it might be" (lines 426-427). This list is highly reminiscent of the projected dangers of an adherence to the male sex role (Goldberg, 1976; Jourard, 1974; Sattel, 1976).

Only two of the forms of expression for internalised 'emotional experiences' – "anger" and "guilt" – are actually constructed in terms of emotion discourses. The others are constructed as specific or generalised behaviours located within personal or professional social contexts. Thus, behaviours or actions that might not typically be perceived to be emotional 'expressions' are accounted for by being constructed as just that. The 'hydraulic model of emotions' is a discursive resource for accounting for socially undesirable male behaviour. Specifically, this rhetorical work is achieved through the distinction of emotional 'experience' and emotional 'expression', the explicit construction of the exercise of agency and control over emotional 'experience', the
construction of emotions as imperatives and the consequent disavowal of responsibility for the specific form that emotional 'expression' might take.

Before we proceed to the next excerpt there are two further lines of analysis that warrant mention. The first is Maurice's use of the word "issues", as argued above "issues" is interpreted as implying a strongly social component to men's emotional 'experiences'. Men, including Maurice – note his use of first and second person pronouns – are constructed as managing their emotional 'expressions'. By doing so, they are also implicitly constructed as managing their social relationships. The control or absence of emotional 'expression' functions in the management of social relationships. To borrow from Maurice, men are constructed as not making socially apparent the "issues" that they have with 'things'. Thus, they are implicitly constructed as managing the availability of a good deal of socially pertinent information. This is interpretable as a construction of the exercise of power. The performance of masculinity, through the management of emotional 'experiences' and 'expressions', is constituted by the management of the socially availability of information about the 'self', through such strategies as the reflexive occupation and affording of 'emotion-based' subject positions.

The second point concerns the construction of inexpressivity as agentically accomplished and expressivity as passively experienced. The masculine requirement for agentic control over the '(in)expression' of emotional 'experiences' is implicit within the 'hydraulic model of emotions'. Any absence of control, that is to say, any instance of emotional 'expression', can be
constructed as exceptional and accounted for through the invocation of passivity, implicit in the 'hydraulic model' discourse. Consequently, the 'hydraulic model of emotions' provides for the disavowal of responsibility for these exceptional and problematic forms of male emotional expression and for the failure to maintain control over both the performative 'self' and the information that is socially available about that 'self'. This last point will be a major concern of this section of the analysis. For now it is sufficient to state that the discourse of 'control' and the subject positions that it makes available are central to the performance of masculinity and, therefore, that any constructed absence of control must be accounted for. It is with this accountability oriented work that the 'hydraulic model' discourse is concerned.

In excerpt 16 the 'hydraulic model' discourse was used to account for behaviours that could be interpreted as detrimental at personal, interpersonal and social levels. Importantly, the 'hydraulic model' discourse allows these behaviours or phenomena to be accounted for as the unintended or accidental consequences of the performance of masculinity, constituted through the reflexive management of emotion-based subject positions, and the imperative force of 'emotions'. Through invocations of the 'hydraulic model' discourse to account for male emotional expressivity, the following excerpts provide the basis for a developing account of the functions served by emotional inexpressivity in the performance of masculinity.
Excerpt 17 follows from my asking the participants whether they thought that an apparent emotional ‘expression’ needs necessarily to accord with an internal emotional ‘experience’. The excerpt is illustrative of two particular points. The first concerns the possible functions served by emotional inexpressivity. The second concerns the invocation of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse to account for a constructed instance of personally detrimental male behaviour.

Excerpt 17

417    Ed: = can you not do it to hide what you're actually feeling sometimes? you
418        [just ] go out wearing a face so you're feeling I don't know really sad
419    Ruddiger: yeah
420    Ed: and depressed because I don't know something's happened but you
don’t want other people to know that you'll show a happy face and you'll be
out really loud and really bouncy really enthusiastic and everyone thinks
‘yeah they've got life sorted’ and then you go home and =
424    Ruddiger: = slowly get down and down about it [until] you just break (. ) I've
425    Ed: = yeah
426    Ruddiger: seen one of my mates do it at home when his parents had just split
up and none of us knew and they'd been split up for a couple of weeks and
we went to a party and he just got drunk and just ended up (. ) just (. ) starting
a fight with a tree because he was that angry about it and he just ended up
with blood coming off his head from where he'd head butted a tree and stuff
just 'cause he'd bottled it all up and not told anyone =
432    Chris: = yeah =
T4: 417-432.
In the opening lines (lines 417–423) Ed constructs a generalised account of one possible situation in which public emotional ‘expression’ might not accord with an internal emotional ‘experience’. A "happy face" and concomitant behaviour – persuasively worked up through the use of lists (lines 421–422) (Jefferson, 1990) – are constructed as a mask – "wearing a face" (line 418) – for the underlying emotional ‘experience’ – "feeling [ ] really sad and depressed" (lines 418 and 420). Such ‘expressions’ are constructed as agentic acts performed in order to conceal the ‘real’ emotional ‘experience’. However, the reasons why this might be desirable are never expanded beyond "but you don’t want other people to know that" (lines 420–421). This comment echoes the earlier interpretation that the controlling of emotional expression functions in the management of social relationships, through the controlling of socially available information about the ‘self’.

The invocation of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse is marked by the construction of the consequences of concealing ‘emotional experiences’. Ed only gets as far as constructing the context in which these consequences are likely to occur – "and then you go home and" (line 423) – before he is interrupted by Ruddiger. "Home" in Ed’s utterance is interpreted as constructing a ‘private’ context, given that it is contrasted with ‘public’ contexts, e.g. "you just go out" and "you’ll be out" (lines 417–418 and 421–422 respectively). Again, male emotional expression is constructed as occurring in as ‘private’ a context as possible. Ruddiger takes up and develops the construction of the potential consequences, i.e. the form of emotional ‘expression’ might take, which might follow from the concealment of ‘emotional experiences’. In line 424, those
consequences are constructed as "[you] slowly get down and down about it until you just break". This utterance echoes the implicit sense of passivity evident in the preceding excerpt — "you just kind of just lose it" (Excerpt 16; line 427).

Ruddiger also takes up the context of "home" (line 426) but changes its local meaning. Rather than "home" as a private context, "home" now constructs a geographical place of origin. Ruddiger's turn takes the form of a narrative that warrants the construction of emotional inexpressivity as inherently problematic and as personally damaging. In lines 426 to 431, Ruddiger constructs the antecedents of an emotional experience, constructs an absence of the occupation of any subject position relative to those antecedents or to the emotional experience, constructs alcohol as a possible determinant of a lapse in agentic control, and consequently of male emotional expressivity, and constructs the resultant, painful, form of emotional expression. The constructed form of emotional 'expression' within this invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse is striking because of its graphic and self injurious nature — "he just ended up with blood coming off his head from where he'd head butted a tree" (lines 429-430). The 'hydraulic model of emotion' is simply and directly invoked to account for this — "just 'cause he'd bottled it all up and not told anyone" (line 431).

The entire narrative from line 426 to line 431 is peppered with the word "just", which works up the sense of individual passivity relative to the implicitly constructed imperative force of emotions; one event or action is constructed as
simply, and directly, following from another\textsuperscript{47}. Indeed, emotional 'expression', within the 'hydraulic model of emotion' is characterized by an absence of agency or as occurring entirely contrary to its exercise. Within this invocation of the 'hydraulic model of emotions', an act of suppression "just" leads to an act of self-injurious behaviour.

One of the defining features of this invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse is that it contains an explicit prescription of an alternative, ameliorative course of action – "just 'cause he'd bottled it up and not told anyone" (line 431). Talking about emotions or feelings or, in the terms of this analysis, occupying emotion-based subject positions is implicitly constructed as serving ameliorative functions. Failure to publicly occupy emotion-based subject positions relative to a particular emotive event or object, and the imperative force of emotions, are advanced as accounting for self-injurious behaviour.

It is also important to consider the constructed eventual form of emotional expression – "starting a fight with a tree" (line 429). Emotion discourses are highly indexical (Edwards, 1995, 1997). They construct an individual as experiencing a particular subjective phenomenon and locate that individual and that phenomenon within a particular context and relative to a particular object. The construction of the 'self' in terms of emotion discourses therefore makes a

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{47} I acknowledge that the "just" in line 426 – "his parents had just split up" – operates differently, constructing a sense of temporal proximity rather than passivity.
\end{flushright}
good deal of indexical information socially available. And yet, even in the
constructed eventual form of emotional ‘expression’ that information is not
made socially available. The behaviours and actions of men, accounted for
through the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse as forms of emotional ‘expression’, do
not index, nor do they position the individual relative to, the constructed
antecedent of the original emotional ‘experience’.

Consequently, the provision of that indexical information is constructed as
potentially preventing such undesirable consequences. The performance of
masculinity is constructed as constituted either by inexpressivity and a
resistance of emotion-based subject positions or by emotional expressions,
accounted for through the invocation of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse, that
are not fully indexical and which do not constitute emotion-based subject
positions relative to the original antecedent of the emotional ‘experience’.
Arguably, if the performance of masculinity is constituted by the management
of the socially available information about the ‘self’ then that aim is met by both
inexpressivity and by the forms of expression constructed in these excerpts.
The question that arises is why are men constructed as resisting occupying
emotion-based subject positions relative to events and objects that are
constructed as evoking emotional experiences? Of course this question has
already in part been answered by the preceding part of this analysis. The
occupation of subject positions constituted through particular emotion
discourses or ‘expression’ and the concomitant location of the position with
certain social structures and power relations are antithetical to the dominant
cultural conception of ‘masculinity’. These excerpts merely demonstrate the
resilience of the construction of masculinity as constituted by a resistance of emotion-based subject positions.

The next excerpt follows from a discussion of the factors that may determine whether or not people express their emotions. In this excerpt, the main speaker, David, invokes what appears to be a version of the 'hydraulic model of emotions' to problematize a constructed 'other', interpreted as 'straight men'. However, in this invocation, and in comparison with the previous excerpts, there is a marked reduction in the sense of passivity with regard to the eventual form of emotional 'expression'. Indeed, the problematic forms of emotional expression, which are normally accounted for by the passivity inherent in the 'hydraulic model' discourse, are interpretable as agentically undertaken.

**Excerpt 18**

178 David: = also of course there are environmental issues we might not .hh feel comfortable in a certain place at a certain time to express our emotions or to visually show them .hh erm and we might hold back until we're on our own or till we get home or whatever (.) erm like a lot of people don't like to show any emotion at work (.) I know that and erm but I'm lucky because I'm a care worker and we're all very emotional people ((laughing)) (.)

184 Chris: why do you think that is? (.)

185 David: .hh well it's fear isn't it? it's it's fear of being (.) ridiculed (.) I think erm (.) some some men do have: difficulty controlling their temper .hh and I think when a lot of men get emotional they as I said earlier they tend to: transpose that into anger and they may not want to show that in a place of work (.) ((coughs)) so they wait till they get home and beat their wife up or
The first of David's turns, line 178-183, is largely concerned with invocation of discourses of context to account for generalised emotional (in)expressivity. Whether emotions are expressed or not is constructed as, in part, dependent upon the constructed "environmental" (social) contexts. The relationship between context and emotional 'expression', or 'inexpression', is initially constructed in non-specific terms – "we might not .hh feel comfortable in a certain place at a certain time to express our emotions or to visually show them" (lines 178-180). It is worth noting that David invokes a distinction between 'verbal' and 'non-verbal' forms of emotional 'expression' to work up the extent of context dependent inexpressivity. Subsequently, two distinct social contexts are invoked and contrasted. As with previous excerpts, these contexts conform to the 'public'/ 'private' distinction – "we might hold back until we're on our own or till we get home or whatever" (lines 180-181) and "a lot of people don't like to show any emotion at work" (lines 181-182). Within contemporary Western culture, "work" is interpretable as an exemplar of 'public' contexts and as an exemplar of contexts that are characterized by an absence of emotional expression (Hearn, 1993).
contexts that they inhabit. The functions served by the invocation of "work" contexts for David's own subject position are evident in his use of pronouns. His initial uses of first person plural pronouns — "we" and "our" (lines 178, 180 and 181 and line 179 respectively) — are interpreted as constructing a generalised category that includes David. However, following from the invocation of the category "a lot of people", located within a construction of generalised inexpressivity within the context of work, David invokes another category, which his subsequent use of first person plural pronouns must be interpreted as indexing. David invokes the specific category of "care worker", a category to which he claims membership. By constructing the members of this category as "very emotional people" (line 183), David distances himself from the qualities that he constructed and ascribed to the category of "a lot of people". Further, David constructs himself as benefiting from this category membership — "I'm lucky" (line 182). The occupation of this subject position, as emotionally expressive in the context of work, also warrants David's right to speak about and to reflect upon the unfortunate emotional inexpressivity of others.

My question at line 184 invites David to account further for the constructed differences between categories of people and for the effects of context on emotional 'expression'. Following a brief pause and an audible intake of breath — interpreted as working up what is to follow as the product of serious consideration — David advances "fear" as the determining factor. This construction takes the form of a rhetorical question — "well it's fear isn't it?" (line 185). Though questions typically require answers rhetorical ones do not.
The interpretation of the question as a rhetorical one is strengthened by David's repetition and development of "fear" as the determinant of inexpressivity – "it's it's fear of being (. ) ridiculed" (line 185). This construction reflects a common theme amongst contemporary literature on men, masculinity and emotions and echoes the constructions of emotional expressivity as connoting vulnerability and as inviting ridicule, abuse or violence that were apparent in excerpts 1, 2, 4, 7 and 8. Men are constructed as policing both their own and other men's emotional expressivity. Within such constructions, 'fear' of the consequences of socially unacceptable or gender-inappropriate emotional 'expressions', may be invoked to account for the maintenance of the constructed status quo of severely limited male emotional expressivity.

Following from his invocation of "fear" to account for emotional inexpressivity in public contexts, David's use of the narrowed categories "some some men" (line 186) and "a lot of men" (line 187) is a point of analytic interest. These categories of men are constructed as objects within the 'hydraulic model of emotions'. Though the men assigned to these categories are constructed as limited in their ability to control emotions, particularly "their temper" (line 186), this limitation is constructed as context dependent. These men are constructed as effectively controlling emotional 'expression' in one context but, drawing upon the status of emotions as imperatives, as ultimately unable to exert that control indefinitely. David's construction of an emotional 'experience', the 'expression' of which is controlled in one 'public' context, being transformed "into anger" (line 188) and being 'expressed' as violence in the 'private' context
of the "home" could be interpreted as a straightforward invocation of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse. However, sense of passivity, regarding both the determination of the eventual form of emotional ‘expression’ and the context in which it occurs, which is typical of invocations of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse is absent on this occasion. In its place is a heightened sense of agency – "they tend to: transpose that into anger and they may not want to show that in a place of work 

((coughs)) so they wait till they get home" (lines 187-189). The above identified categories of men are constructed as agentically determining both the form of emotional expression, constructed in terms of “anger” and interpreted as ‘aggression’ and ‘violence’, and the context in which it occurs, again exclusively constructed as "home".

In rhetorical terms, the distance between the construction of an emotional ‘experience’ of "anger" and the construction of the ‘expression’ of that emotion as ‘violence’ is evidently small. It is a move that David accomplishes with worrying ease. The forms of violence that David constructs are significant. The constructed violent act of "put[t]ing a fist through a wall" (line 190), echoes the act of head-butting a tree advanced in excerpt 17. To construct a category of men as able "put a fist through a wall" works up the imperative force of emotions and the power of male emotional ‘experiences’ and ‘expressions’. David also constructs these forms of male emotional ‘expression’ as familiar and social recognisable – "that’s quite common" (line 190) – and by doing so warrants his account.
More striking than the constructed act of punching a wall is David’s construction of violence against others. The invocation of the category "wife" — "beat their wife up or something" (line 189-190) — functions to further narrow the category of men being talked about. Only one broad category of men can reasonably be constructed as beating their wives, married and therefore, presumably, heterosexual men. For a speaker such as David, who elsewhere in the discussion clearly occupies the subject positions of a ‘gay man’, this constitutes another possible distancing device. However, David’s occupation of the subject position of a ‘gay man’ is not explicit within the excerpt. Instead, his apparently innocuous use of the previously identified categories and the attendant pronouns — "they" and "their" — distances him from the objects of his construction. This distancing is finally made explicit through David’s clear construction and positioning of himself as someone whose behaviour does not follow the ‘hydraulic model’ (lines 190-192).

The constructions of aggressive or violent forms of male emotional expression, seen here and in excerpt 17, are interesting because they are directed at objects that are not constructed as related to the initial eliciting of the emotional experience. Further, it could be argued that some of these constructed violent acts are directed against the ‘self’, given that they are explicitly constructed or interpretable as resulting in injuries to the individual. To return to the concept of indexicality, I argue that within these excerpts ‘masculinity’ is constructed as accomplished through the management of the indexical content of talk. Specifically, it is accomplished through the management of the indexical functions served by emotion discourses, in terms of the constitution of subject
positions and the locations of those positions within social structures and power relations. Further, this management is contextually determined. Also, the forms of eventual male emotional expression are typically constructed as non-verbal, that is to say that men are implicitly constructed as resisting occupying emotion-based subject positions constituted through the use of emotion discourses. Consequently, the socially available, indexical information constituted by these non-verbal expressions, which must be assumed to be both communicative and relational, is severely limited. They index only the emotional 'experience', in these excerpts 'anger'. Further, these constructed acts of emotional 'expression' do not index those contexts or objects that are constructed as the determinants of the emotional 'experience'. Men are constructed as managing the indexical content of interactions to such an extent that their emotional 'experiences' may appear, if they appear at all through emotional 'expression', to begin and end with their 'selves'. From my speaking position as analyst, this is interpretable as a construction of the interactional accomplishment of emotional independence and as constitutive of the performance of 'hegemonic' masculinity (Connell, 1995).

The final excerpt provides a concise illustration of the way that the 'hydraulic model' discourse can be invoked to account for highly problematic and 'masculine' social phenomena. This excerpt follows from a discussion of the importance accorded to football in contemporary British male culture and is primarily concerned with accounting for the social phenomenon of football violence. As with previous excerpts, there is a great deal that is potentially of interest. However, I will restrict this analysis to the speakers' recursive
movement towards and away from the 'hydraulic model' discourse, as a resource for accounting for male emotional expressivity, and the implications that this has for their subject positions.

Excerpt 19

976 Mark: = yeah I need to get out more ((group laughs)) if if er if England are
977 playing in a big tournament the World Cup or something I will make I'll
978 make it a point of watching the match I'll stay in and watch the match we
979 were in Malta recently and it was on in a bar we had to go and watch the
980 match because there there's this there's a tide of emotional support for the
981 England team (.) that I think it's quite a good good let out for blokes when
982 England play and especially when they win because it's a big release of
983 these so- sort of erm suppressed emotion whether it be obvious ones or
984 painful ones or happy ones it's almost like a good excuse to let rip when
985 England win 'cause =
986 Luke: = ok so what about when they start smashing places up and all this all
987 this aggression comes out wha- what do you say about that? (2)
988 Mark: well that's generally connected with them loosing erm but also you
989 know people do it anyway and I can't I don't know why people resort to
990 violence when England win maybe they're just off home ground and they
991 think 'let's let's wreck this place we're in 'cause' (.) well maybe it's alcohol I
992 don't [(inaudible)]
993 Matthew: (inaudible) not not having a means of expressing erm the emotion
994 that they feel inside in any other way =
995 Mark: = [yeah]
996 James: = that's what I was thinking that I'm not a football supporter er er I
997 follow the football like you like you say if there's a if there's a big game
998 on I'll sit down and I'll watch it and I can I can pick up on the emotion =
999 Mark: = and you get involved yeah =
James: = but er I can also understand that erm at big games when you go to
watch a big game and there's that that (. ) surge of erm fifty thousand
emotions .hh going and the anticipation of winning and if it ends up in failure
all that emotion that you would have expressed as success .h is still there
and I can understand how that gets expressed .h through anger but it's
going back to what you said erm a while back about 'what's an acceptable
expression of anger?' whether it's ok to verbalise that but not ok to
internalise it and then use it as er er a physical expression =
Simon: = hmm (2)
T5: 976-1008

Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2004) demonstrated that 'football' was a context
relative to which the relationships between 'masculinity' and emotional
expressivity were easily discussed. In this excerpt, the context of an England
international football match is constructed as beneficial to the members of a
very particular category – "blokes" (line 981). Various speakers, across the
group discussions, invoked the category "blokes". However, the meaning of
"blokes", on each occasion of use, is determined by the local interactional and
rhetorical context in which it occurs. Within this context, "blokes" is interpreted
as signifying a category of men for whom an England football match, and
specifically an England victory, can be constructed as an appropriate context
for masculine emotional expression.

Features of the 'hydraulic model' discourse are apparent in the excerpt from
line 980. An England victory is variously constructed as "quite a good good let
out for blokes" (line 981), "a big release" (line 982) and "a good excuse to let
rip" (line 984). These metaphors for emotional 'expression' imply the 'existence' of unexpressed emotional 'experiences', within members of the category "blokes". The persuasiveness of the constructed existence of "suppressed" emotional 'experiences' is worked up through a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) – "obvious ones or painful ones or happy ones" (lines 983-984). An England victory is constructed as a context in which "blokes" can passively 'express' or 'expel' – "let rip" (line 984) – a range of internalised emotional 'experiences' that would otherwise remain unexpressed.

The importance accorded to context, in both this and the preceding excerpt, represents another dimension of the 'hydraulic model' discourse. Simply, the 'hydraulic model' discourse takes context into account. Thus, change in or movement between contexts can be constructed as partially or wholly deterministic of male emotional 'expression'. The important distinction between masculine 'public' inexpressivity and masculine 'private' expressivity has already been engaged with. Discourses of context are therefore also partially deterministic of the likelihood that the 'hydraulic model' discourse will be invoked to account for male emotional 'expression'. The 'hydraulic model' discourse may be more commonly drawn upon to account for problematic 'public' male emotional expressivity. This is should not be interpreted as the statement of a rule regarding invocations of the 'hydraulic model' discourse. The preceding excerpt provides an example of the invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse to account for 'private' male emotional expressivity, though the role of agency in the determination of both the context and form of emotional expression was worked up in that instance.
Before continuing, a few features of Mark's turn warrant further mention. The first is the conditional nature of the construction of an England international football match as beneficial, in terms of providing a context within which "blokes" might express "suppressed" emotions. The condition, repeated on lines 982 and 984, is the event of an England win. The significance of this will become apparent over the coming analysis. Secondly, the beneficial functions of the football context are tentatively constructed — "it's quite a good good let out" (line 981) and the extremely cautious "it's almost like a good excuse to let rip when England win" (lines 984-985). The implication of the tentative nature of these utterances is that the construction of a football match as a wholly appropriate context for male emotional 'expression' is potentially problematic. One possible reason for this is apparent within the next turn of the excerpt.

Luke's question at lines 986-987 does not constitute a challenge to the validity of Mark's construction. Rather it constitutes a challenge to Mark to extend his construction to account for the undesirable social phenomena — "smashing places up" (line 986) and "all this aggression comes out" (lines 986-987) — that are typically associated with football matches, and England internationals in particular. Since Luke constructs Mark — "you" (line 987) — as separate from the objects of his construction — "they" (line 986), Mark is required only to account for his construction and not to defend his own masculine subjectivity.

There are obvious undesirable consequences for an individual speaker with regard to accounting for aggression and violence. This is particularly 'true' with
regard to the 'hydraulic model' discourse, given that it may constitute the basis for the disavowal of responsibility at the level of the individual. Mark's turn, line 988-991, is interpreted as oriented to all these concerns. Firstly, he constructs aggression and violence as products of England defeats, thereby differentiating them from his earlier construction, which was specifically concerned with England victories. From the conjunction "but" (line 988) he constructs aggression and violence as things that may occur generally outside the context of football — "people do it anyway" (line 989). However, he concedes that aggression and violence can also follow from an England win. Lines 989-991 are strikingly different from those that preceded them in terms of the discourses drawn upon. Specifically, there is a total absence of the 'hydraulic model' discourse.

In attempting to account for these problematic forms of emotional 'expression', Mark inoculates himself against the problematic possibility of appearing to construct violence as understandable or warranted. He positions himself as fundamentally unable to explain football violence — "I can't I don't know why" (line 989) — but since he is rhetorically obliged to try to account for football violence he goes about it cautiously. The account contains 'softeners' (Edwards, 2000) — "maybe" (repeated on line 990 and 991) — that work up Mark's constructed uncertainty. Mark also distances himself from the objects of his construction through his use of nouns and pronouns; "they" (line 990) no longer indexes "blokes" but "people" (line 989). By invoking a gender non-specific category, the account that Mark constructs may have fewer implications for his own gendered subjectivity.
Further, the sense of passivity, characteristic of the 'hydraulic model' discourse is absent from this turn. Within the context of an England international football match, undesirable consequences, such as violence, are constructed as resulting from an actively and intentionally undertaken process rather than a passively experienced one. The use of the word "resort" constructs violence as an available option that can be taken up by individual or groups. Similarly, the construction of reported thought – "they think 'let's wreck this place we're in'" (lines 990-991) – constructs violence as the product of a collective cognitive process. Overall, there is a markedly greater sense of agency apparent in lines 988-992 than there was in lines 976-985. I contend that this limits the possibility for the disavowal of responsibility, at both an individual and group level.

By working up the importance of agency Mark limits the possibility of being positioned as an apologist for football violence. This construction contrasts sharply with that seen in excerpt 4, where collective decision making and action were roundly rejected as determinants of problematic responses to male emotional 'expression'. In excerpt 4, owing to the gendered subject position occupied by the speaker, the invocation of the discourse of 'collective intention and action' was potentially problematic. In this instance, anything but the invocation of these discourses and the emphasizing of individual and collective agency would be potentially problematic for the speaker. The invocation of particular discursive resources to account for the constructed actions of men, whether those actions are constructed as forms of male emotional expression
or as responses to it, are perhaps largely determined by the subject positions that such resources would constitute for those who invoked them. Accounting for male emotional expression is, for male speakers, as much about managing their own gendered subjectivities.

The construction of emotional expression as active and intentional is, however, softened at the end of line 991. Echoing the analysis of excerpt 17, "alcohol" is tentatively evoked as a potential determinant of male emotional expression through violence. The invocation of an external determinant softens the entire construction, in terms of the emphasis placed on agency and responsibility, and creates the rhetorical space for the construction of further external social or situational determinants of emotional expression. This rhetorical possibility is picked up by Matthew, whose construction of forms of emotional expression as determined by the relationship between the individual or the group and the social context – "not having a means of expressing erm the emotion that they feel inside in any other way" (lines 993-994) – echoes that of Maurice in excerpt 16 – "you don't find an outlet for them" (line 409). Matthew's turn also restates the distinction between 'experience' and 'expression'.

Despite the previously identified problems with invoking the 'hydraulic model' discourse to account for football violence, it is taken up and developed by James in lines 996-998 and 1000-1007. Though James is perhaps not subject to the same constraints as Mark – Luke's challenge at line 986-987 was directed to Mark alone – he does considerable work in lines 996-998 to distance himself from the object(s) of his construction. He clearly locates
himself outside the potentially problematic category of "football supporter" (line 996). However, since he also needs to warrant his right to speak on the subject he instead positions himself within the category of ‘followers of football’ — "er er I follow the football" (lines 996-997). Membership of the category of ‘followers of football’ is constructed as conditional upon context — "if there's a big game on" (lines 997-998) — and is warranted by the subsequent actions — the three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) of "I'll sit down and I'll watch it and I can I can pick up on the emotion" (line 998).

James continues, from the conjunction "but" (line 1000), to qualify his subject position as a ‘follower of football’. As such he constructs himself as appreciative of the context of a football match as suffused with emotion. It should be noted that what is constructed here is not just any old football match but the seemingly mythologized "big game(s)" (lines 997, 1000 and 1001) (see Walton, Coyle and Lyons (2004) for another example of an exceptional football match being invoked as a context for masculine emotional expression). This construction imbues the invoked ‘social’ context with its own unique significance and importance. Perhaps such an exceptional context is required to warrant the subsequent invocation of parts of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse, which are evident from line 1000. The persuasiveness of the ‘hydraulic model’ discourse as an account of male emotional ‘expression’ is worked up through a constructed list of sequential conditions, which includes the use of emphasis, a high order of quantification and an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) — "when you go to watch a big game and there's that that (...) surge of erm fifty thousand emotions .hh going and the
anticipation of winning and if it ends up in failure all that emotion that you would have expressed as success. His is still there" (lines 1000-1003). All these features work up the persuasiveness of the 'hydraulic model of emotion' as an account for the constructed expression of emotions "through anger" (line 1004). It is important to note that James's construction, in identifying "anger" as the eventual expression, avoids accounting for football violence. In fact, James goes on to identify the question of permissible forms of expression for anger as an entirely separate matter for discussion and one that has already been addressed (lines 1004-1007)48.

Summary
Across the previous six excerpts the speakers constructed 'anger' as an emotional 'expression' that accorded with predominant cultural conceptions of the performance of masculinity. Emotional 'expressions' or the construction of the 'self' in terms of emotion have the same implications in terms of positioning as other discursive resources (Parrott, 2004). However, the configuration of subject positions within social structures and power relations and the consequent affording of rights and duties constituted by a particular emotion are determined by the locally and culturally established 'meaning' of that emotion. The subject positions, the configuration of power relations and the afforded rights and duties constituted by the 'expression' of 'anger', as it is understood within the contexts of these excerpts, accord with the predominant

48 This discussion of socially acceptable forms of expression of anger is contained in excerpt 15.
cultural conception of the performance of masculinity, i.e., the interactional functions served by 'anger' are determinate of its status as a masculine emotion. These functions include positioning of the 'self' as independent, the positioning of the 'self' as unapproachable and positioning of the 'self' in such ways that others are both positioned and unable to renegotiate that act of positioning. 'Anger' is demonstrably implicated in the positioning of 'others' and is therefore interpretable as the materialization of power (Butler, 1993).

However, as an emotional expression, 'anger' presents a particular problem for the performance of 'masculinities'. On the whole, the performance of 'masculinities' and 'masculine' subjectivities are characterized by claims for the need to control 'emotions' and the illegitimizing of 'emotions' as a basis for action. 'Masculinities' are constituted by reason and not by emotion. This problem is negotiated through the invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse. Through this discourse, 'expressions' of emotions, such as 'anger', and problematic behaviours that are constructed as forms of emotional 'expression', are constructed as exceptional instances of the breakdown in the exercise of 'masculine' agentic control. They are further accounted for by the construction of 'emotions', within the 'hydraulic model' discourse, as having the force of imperatives. 'Hydraulic', 'fluid', 'energy' and 'mass' metaphors for emotions (Lakoff, 1987) should not be understood as simple representational devices but as discursive resources that explicitly function to account for emotional 'expression'.
When intersected by discourses of 'context', the hydraulic model discourse provides accounts of emotional 'expressions' as determined by antecedents that lie outside the context in which emotions are 'expressed'. What is striking about the hydraulic model discourse is that it still functions in the constitution of masculinities. Emotional 'expressions' or behaviours constructed as emotional 'expression' accounted for through the 'hydraulic model' discourse do not position speakers relative to the original 'cause' of the emotional 'experience'. The 'hydraulic model' discourse still functions in the management of subject positions, social structures and power relations. It constitutes only those that accord with dominant cultural conceptions of 'masculinity'.

The invocation of the hydraulic model discourse is however not unproblematic for masculine speakers. Given that the resultant forms of expression — individual and group violence and aggression and self-injurious or otherwise self-detrimental behaviour — are accounted for as determined by context, as passively experienced and resulting from the imperative force of emotions, and as occurring despite the exercise of agency, the hydraulic model discourse is interpretable as providing for disavowals of responsibility. Consequently, masculine speakers may invoke it to account for the actions of clearly categorized 'other masculinities' — as David did in excerpt 18 — or otherwise distance themselves from it in order to manage the ideological dilemma constituted by accounting for socially problematic masculine behaviours such as football violence — as Mark did in excerpt 19. What is absent from these excerpts is any invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse by a single speaker to account for their own exceptional instances. The closest example is
Maurice's invocation of the 'hydraulic model' discourse to account for the emotional 'expressions' of a generalized category of 'men'. Whether or not 'masculine subjectivities' are constituted through the 'hydraulic model' discourse are questions that cannot be answered by this analysis.

4.5 Discussion

The above excerpts were analysed in order to answer the following questions:

- How do men construct men's relationship with emotions?
- In constructing this relationship, what discourses do men draw upon to account for it?
- In accounting for men's constructed relationship with emotions, do men reflexively orient to the implications of the discourses upon which they draw for their own subject positions as 'men'?

The analysis was based on one simple assumption, that the speakers in the focus group discussions were already gendered. They were positioned as 'masculine' when they were approached to participate in the research, they positioned their 'selves' as 'masculine' when they accepted the invitation to participate in the research and they were involved in the performance of masculinity and the constitution of masculine subjectivities throughout the discussions. This is not an essentialist assumption that 'masculinity' would be done as a result of these individuals' status 'males'. Such an assumption presupposes the primacy of 'sex' onto which 'gender' is mapped. In contrast, the above assumptions are informed by poststructuralist gender theory in which 'sex', the materialization of 'gendered' bodies as 'male' and as 'men', is an effect of 'gender' (Butler, 1999). These speakers are 'gendered', have been
'gendered' since birth and were 'gendered' by their location within the research context. The question was, 'how would they negotiate their gendered subjectivities relative to the accounts that they would give of the relationship between 'masculinity' and 'emotions'?

Given these assumptions and research questions, the use of focus group discussions as a means of data generation is entirely appropriate. Speakers were invited to construct and account for men's relationships with emotions. These constructions and accounts were open to contestation and negotiation by the other members of the group. Simultaneously, speakers negotiated their status as 'masculine' relative to the constructions of 'masculinity' and this status too was open to contestation and challenge by the other members of the group. What the focus group discussions generated was rich data within which multiple versions of masculinity and multiple masculine subjectivities were constituted and negotiated. The challenge for me was to represent that richness.

It was stated above that the analysis would be attentive to variability both in the constructions of men's relationships with emotions, in the discourses that were invoked to account for that relationship and in the masculine subjectivities that were constituted by or relative to these constructions and accounts. On the whole the constructions of men's relationships with emotions were highly consistent and the discourses invoked to account for that relationship were readily categorized as the 'socialization' repertoire, the 'social structures' repertoire, the 'evolutionary' repertoire or the 'hydraulic model' discourse.
Briefly, the ‘evolutionary’ and ‘socialization’ repertoires were invoked to manage issues of accountability that arose from the construction of the ‘hegemonic masculine way of doing emotions’. Both repertoires constitute temporally distal determinants of the ‘hegemonic masculine way of doing emotions’ and, by doing so, provide for disavowals of responsibility for any consequences that may arise from adherence to the ‘hegemonic masculine way of doing emotions’ and inoculate against possible criticisms and calls for change. The ‘socialization’ and ‘evolutionary’ repertoires, as they were invoked by speakers, are both highly reactionary and perpetuate the social structures and power relations constituted by the ‘hegemonic masculine way of doing emotions’, i.e., patriarchy. The ‘social structures’ repertoire is arguably the more reflexive of the resources invoked to account for men’s relationship with emotions, given that that relationship is accounted for as both occasioned by and constitutive of men’s location within gendered social structures. Ultimately, though masculinity is constructed as a reflexive accomplishment within the ‘social structures’ repertoire, implying a high degree of agency in the determining of that performance, the ‘social structures’ discourse is based upon the presupposition of an established hierarchical gender order, within which masculinity is dominant. As was demonstrated in the analysis even the construction of masculinity, through the ‘social structures’ repertoire, as a reflexively accomplished ‘performance’ was predicated on the construction of women as disempowered and subordinate.
Across the 'socialization' repertoire, the 'social structures' repertoire and the 'evolutionary' repertoire, invoked to account for masculine emotional inexpressivity, considerable emphasis was placed on the controlling of emotional expression as agentically accomplished. Indeed, the emphasizing of individual agency as constitutive of masculinity is evident not only in the speakers' constructions of men's relationship with emotions but also in the subject positions and subjectivities constituted relative to those constructions. The only occasion on which agency and the exercise of control were conspicuously absent as directly constitutive of masculinity was in the 'hydraulic model' discourse. In the 'hydraulic model' discourse emotions are accorded the status of 'imperatives', they are the 'passions' by which men are overcome. Importantly, the 'hydraulic model' discourse is invoked to account for those 'emotional 'expressions' that are interpretable as consistent with hegemonic masculinity, e.g. 'anger' and the imposition of dominance. Thus the 'hydraulic model' discourse again provides for disavowals of responsibility for those masculine emotional expressions that do result on the marginalization and subordination of others. However, agency is present even in the 'hydraulic model' discourse since the imperative force of emotions is worked up through their construction as occurring despite the masculine exercise of agency.

The speakers' constructions of men's relationship with emotions were interpreted as constructions of the predominant cultural understanding of 'masculinity'. That these constructions were advanced before other 'masculine' speakers meant that they had to be recognizable as constructions of 'masculinity'. The possibility for contestation and challenge resulted in broadly
consistent constructions of the contemporary cultural constitution of 'masculinity'. I use masculinity in the singular because I would argue that what the speakers constructed when they talked about men's relationship with emotions was 'hegemonic masculinity' (Connell, 1995), or at least those features of 'hegemonic masculinity' that are concerned with emotions. The assertion that the speakers constructed and accounted for hegemonic masculinity is based on the emphasis that the speakers placed on the functions of emotions and emotional 'expressions' in particular. Masculine emotional inexpressivity, accounted for through the 'socialization' repertoire, the 'social structures' repertoire and the 'evolutionary' repertoire, was constructed relative to particular emotions or forms of 'expression'. My contention is that emotions such as 'upset' or 'love' and their 'expression' either verbally or non-verbally are proscribed, not because of any implicit gendering of those emotions and forms of expression as 'not masculine' but because of the relational functions that these emotions serve.

Certain emotions or forms of emotional expression are culturally interpretable as constituting subject positions, social structures and power relations, as a result of which and within which the individual 'expressing' the 'emotion' makes available certain subject positions, and rights and duties (Davies & Harré, 1990), that might result in their disempowerment. Affording these possibilities or failing to manage these possibilities is antithetical to 'hegemonic masculinity', which is understood as 'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position
of men and the subordination of women' (Connell, 1995, p.77). Across the excerpts, 'masculinity' is demonstrably constituted through the management of power relations through emotional '(in)expression'. Thus, it is relative to 'hegemonic masculinity' and indeed through features of 'hegemonic masculinity', primarily the emphasis on individual agency and control, that the speakers constituted their own masculine subjectivities.
Chapter 5

“You can’t humiliate me, you can’t”: Accounting for episodes of ‘humiliation’ and the implications for the constitution of a gendered subjectivity

5.1 Introduction

Where chapter 4 was concerned with men’s accounts of men’s relationship with emotions and their orientations to the implications of those accounts for their own positioning as ‘masculine’, this chapter is concerned with how men construct the ‘self’ in terms of emotions and the implications this has for the constitution of masculine subjectivities. At least, that was the initial function of this chapter. An iterative process of movement between the research interests of the thesis, the analytic method to be adopted and the limitations of available and appropriate data resulted in much more specific research questions and a much more tailored analytic technique and interpretative framework.

As stated above, the initial research question was ‘Do men necessarily orient to the performance of masculinity when constructing accounts of the “self” in emotion terms’? This question follows readily from the cultural associations between ‘gender’ and ‘emotions’ and is an extension of the research questions and analysis of chapter 4. However, the question presupposes the content of the data, i.e., the data must involve men engaged in the construction of their
selves in terms of emotion. One possible source of such data was transcripts of men's sessions in therapy.

5.2 Data

Transcripts of therapeutic and counselling sessions have a history of being used as data in discursive analyses (Edwards, 1997, 1998, 1999; Greatbatch & Dingwall, 1997). The transcripts used in this study were taken from the Psychological Therapies Research Centre (PTRC) archive at the University of Leeds. This data set was generated for an original study by Shapiro, Barkham, Rees, Hardy, Reynolds and Startup (1994), which compared the effect of treatment duration and severity of depression on the effectiveness of two forms of psychotherapy, Cognitive-Behavioral and Psychodynamic-Interpersonal. Owing to the emphasis placed on the 'feelings' of the client within the Conversational Model of the Psychodynamic-Interpersonal approach (Hobson, 1985; Goldberg, Hobson, Maguire, Margison, O'Dowd, Osborn & Moss, 1984), it was decided that this half of the data-set would be the more likely to yield interactions of the type that I was interested in. In the original study, three of the therapy sessions of each participant had been audio-recorded and transcribed. From the Psychodynamic-Interpersonal stream, the transcripts of four of the male participants were selected on the basis of an initial reading and the apparent prevalence of emotion terms. These were participant numbers 069, 101, 199 and 249. Owing to this being archived data and my not having access to the original recordings it was impossible to improve upon the limited transcription format. However, for the purposes of this analysis I am content that this level of transcription is adequate.
5.3 Method

All four transcripts were read and reread before being subjected to thematic coding, in the manner advocated within grounded theory analysis (e.g. Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Pidgeon & Henwood, 1996). QSR NVivo qualitative research software was used to assist the process of thematic coding (QSR International, 1999). The aim of the initial thematic coding was to render manageable a sizable data set; each of four participants contributed three transcripts each between 20 and 30 pages in length. The systematic thematic coding of data was used as a means of identifying and grouping those tranches of text that might yield interesting and relevant analyses, i.e., those which might support engagement with the question, 'Do men necessarily orient to the performance of masculinity when constructing accounts of the “self” in emotion terms’?

Thus, the thematic coding process was informed both by the research questions and by the content of the data. The data were coded according to the clients' use of emotion terms in relation to their 'selves'. Instances of the use of emotion terms in relation to the 'self' were distinguished according to the tense involved – past and present. From the thematic coding, tranches of text emerged in which men constructed accounts of their own past or present emotional experiences and expressions.

Whilst it would have been possible to use all the available transcripts, that is the transcripts of all four clients, as the basis for an analysis of how men might construct accounts of the self through emotion terms, I felt that such an analysis would be too close, in terms of content, to that of chapter 4. The alternative was to focus on the transcripts of just one client to produce a case-
study type analysis of one male speaker's construction of account of the self in emotion terms.

Strong themes of analytic interest were identified within the transcripts of three of the four speakers. These included talk concerned with the issue of 'emotion work' in the context of a heterosexual relationship (Duncombe & Marsden, 1993), talk about the emotions in relation to work, particularly emotional responses to the prospect of enforced early retirement owing to ill health, and talk on the topic of humiliation. The decision was taken to focus on the transcripts that included talk of humiliation. This decision was based on a number of factors:

- humiliation had not previously been engaged within the thesis at an analytic level
- humiliation may be understood as involving disempowerment\(^{49}\)
- humiliation may, therefore, have particular implications for the performance of masculinity, if masculinity is assumed to be constituted through negotiations of power relations

For these reasons the transcripts of client 069’s therapy sessions, which contained the constructions of episodes of humiliation, were selected for more

\(^{49}\) In a discussion of the distinction between 'shame' and 'humiliation', Gilbert (1997) invoked the context of torture to explore their functional differences: 'The aim of the torturer is never described as a desire to shame the victim... It is about the desire to humiliate and the exercise of power' (p.133). Similarly, Silver, Conte, Miceli and Poggi (1986) argued that 'humiliation involves not having the powers that we believe the members of a group should have and this in turn involves standards of what is appropriate' (p.277; italics in original).
detailed analysis. Based upon the above listed factors, the analysis was intended to address the following specific research questions:

- How does a male speaker construct accounts of episodes of 'humiliation'?
- Are discourses of 'humiliation' used to construct accounts of the negotiation of subject positions and the constitution of power relations?
- And, based upon the presuppositions that humiliation constitutes episodes of disempowerment and that the performance of masculinity is, in some way, constituted through the negotiation of power relations, does a male speaker, when constructing episodes in which he is the object of humiliation, simultaneously orient to their implications for the constitution of a masculine subjectivity?

Essentially, these questions are reducible to, 'Is masculinity done through or relative to a male speaker's constructions of episodes of humiliation'?

The excerpts were subjected to a form of critical discursive psychological analysis of the type outlined in chapter 3. This form of analysis advocates a recursive movement between micro- and macro-textual levels (Coyle, 2000). However, moves to the macro-textual level should be firmly grounded in the micro-textual details of the data. In the case of a gender-focussed analysis, this may mean that the move towards a macro-textual analysis is contingent upon the presence of explicitly gendered terms or on the presence of some other resources that can reasonably be argued to be gendered (see Wetherell (1998) for a discussion of this issue). In the absence of the former, analysts...
may rely on the latter. However, reliance on the latter is problematic owing to the various interpretations that are possible of any particular word or phrase, including whether and how it may be gendered.

Owing to the relative paucity of gendered terms in the excerpts selected for analysis, these methodological concerns regarding the limits of a critical discursive psychological approach will be reflexively oriented to throughout the analysis. At this point, I will invoke the concepts of adequacy and parsimony as determining the analytic approach adopted and interpretative framework brought to bear in this analysis. In answer to the question of how much an analyst should bring to a text, I would say, 'As much as is needed to make adequate sense of the complexities of human social discursive interactions and no more'.\textsuperscript{50} However, when the excerpts selected for analysis were engaged with it was evident that the interpretative framework required development in order to engage adequately with the functions served by autobiographical narratives and reported speech. The subsequent engagement with concepts of the 'dialogical self', the 'polyphonic novel', 'double indexicality' and the 'iterative I' represent attempts only to develop an interpretative framework that is sufficiently sophisticated to be able to deal with the multiple I-positions constituted through the use of reported speech and unvoiced reported thought in autobiographical narratives. It should not be

\textsuperscript{50} Of course, it may be argued that no analyst can ever be absolutely certain what and how much they bring to the interpretative endeavour.
interpreted as an alternative interpretative framework to that of positioning theory outlined in chapter 3.

This interpretative framework is informed by recent social constructionist conceptualization of the 'self' (Gergen, 1999; Harré, 1998; Harré & van Langenhove, 1999; Lewis, 2003; Shotter & Gergen, 1989). In particular, it is informed by concepts of the 'relational' or 'dialogical' 'self' (Gergen, 1999; Hermans, 1996; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans, Kempen & van Loon, 1992) and by the emphasis placed on autobiographical narratives and the idea of the polyphonic novel (Bakhtin, 1929/1973; Bruner, 1986; Michotte, 1946/1963; Sarbin, 1986).

The central contribution of the polyphonic novel to the theory of a dialogical self is the possibility of multi-voicedness (Hermans, 1996). The dialogical self is theorised as a multiplicity of "voiced positions" (Hermans, 1996, p.44).

Drawing upon the metaphors of I the author and Me the actor and their possible spatio-temporal locations, constituted through autobiographical narratives, Hermans et al. (1992) outlined their conceptualization of the dialogical self as:

...a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I positions in an imaginal landscape. ...The I has the possibility to move, as in a space, from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time. The I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions. The I has the
capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be established. (p.28).

Simply, the *I* can tell stories about the adventures of multiple *Me* s and in doing so construct and negotiate its own constitution; that is to say, the constitution of *I* the author is determined by the stories that it tells about *Me* the actor and the positions that it takes relative to those *Me* s in the process of telling. Through the concepts of the dialogical self and polyphony the importance of the telling of autobiographical narratives and of the use of reported speech in those narratives to the interactional constitution of subjectivity is realised.

Any discursive psychological analysis of autobiographical narratives and of the use of reported speech must therefore be able to make sense of the inevitable multiple significations of 'I' and relate those to particular discursive objects. There are two related features of the first person pronoun 'I' that are of particular importance: they are double indexicality and the potential for iteration (Harré, 1998). Imagine a conversation in which a speaker says "I'd like to go home": 'I' indexes both the spatial location and the moral standing of the speaker (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999); this is the principle of double indexicality. Now imagine a conversation in which a speaker says "I think I'd like to go home": this is an example of the iterative possibilities of the first person pronoun. The force of the original statement, potentially interpretable as a command, is softened by the use of the iterated 'I'. While the inner 'I' of the original statement retains double indexicality, indexing the spatial location and moral standing of the speaker, the outer 'I' only indexes the moral standing of
the speaker and thus functions to mediate the force of the original statement. The iterative possibilities of the first person pronoun are also fundamental to the discursive accomplishment of reflexivity.

As was discussed in the analysis of chapter 4, reported speech serves a variety of functions. The apparent reporting of who said what and how they said it can work up the persuasiveness of a construction of a particular interaction. It can function as a distancing device; utterances that may be problematic for a speaker can be ascribed to some other. It can also be used to afford the hearer the perspective of a "third person referent" in a context or interaction in which that hearer was not originally present (Urban, 1989, p.35). Drawing upon the concept of the dialogical self, instances of reported speech are interpretable as instantiations of I positions, either through the reporting of what one said or in relation to the reported speech of others. The locations of these I positions are however relative to the I position that is constituted by the voice of the reporter. Through the use of reported speech, these I positions and the processes through which they are negotiated are made contemporaneous to the context in which they are invoked. An effect of the third of these functions is that the use of reported speech makes the hearer a third person referent to the process of negotiation of these I positions.

Consider the following hypothetical 'autobiographical' narrative. Ostensibly speaker A is telling her friend, speaker B, about a night out with her boyfriend.

A: and I said "I think I'd like to go home" =

B: = fair enough =

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A: = but X was like "oh come on just one more drink" so then I said "no I want to go now" =
B: = so what did X say?

Through the use of autobiographical narrative and reported speech, the sequence of positioning acts is made available to speaker B by speaker A. Thus, the invocation of autobiographical narratives may be interpreted as oriented to some rhetorical, interactional or ideological concern that is contemporaneous to the context in which the narrative is being recounted; "autobiographical telling articulate[s] the speaker's moral commitment to the acts of narration and to the acts narrated" (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999, p.66). The subject positions constituted by the reported speech of A and X are available to interpretation by B as constituting the basis for A's contemporaneous subject position, potentially as the 'someone who fell out with their unreasonable partner'. Thus the 'narrative about a night out' may more properly be described as a 'resource invoked to account for the contemporary status of a relationship'.

As can be seen in the preceding sentences, the concepts of positioning and subject positions have crept in unannounced. While the introduction of the metaphor of positioning to discussions of the 'self' and subjectivity is attributable to Hollway (1984), its theoretical possibilities have been most extensively developed by Rom Harré and associates (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & van Langenhove, 1999; Harré & Moghaddam, 2003). Positioning theory (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999), the concept of subject positions
(Davies & Harré, 1990; Smith, 1988) and the development of 'conditional' subject positions constituted by reported speech (see chapter 4) are resources that are sufficiently dynamic and sensitive to the location of multiple I positions across a number of spatio-temporal locations to constitute the basis of the interpretative framework of this analysis.

Again, it worth stating that the above-outlined interpretative framework is developed only as a resource for making sense of the autobiographical narratives, instances of reported speech and unvoiced reported thought that are characteristic of the following excerpts. It is developed only as a means of unravelling the complex rhetorical work done by the invocation of such discursive resources and their implications for the constitution of the contemporary subjectivity of the speaker. This framework is not developed specifically for narratives of humiliation but is generalizable to all invocations of autobiographical narratives and concomitant instances of reported speech.

5.4 Client 069 and the episodes of his humiliation

Client 069 was male and 36 years of age at the time of therapy. He worked as a manager in local government. He listed his problems as: panic, fatigue, poor concentration and an inability to work effectively. He was taking no prescribed medication at the time of therapy and his therapist was male. Given that C (indicating the client) and T (indicating the therapist) are the terms used in the excerpts to identify the speakers, I will maintain that convention throughout the analysis.
The four excerpts analysed below are represented as concerned with the topic of humiliation. However, it is evident that they are also concerned with many other things. Consequently, this entire analysis must be prefaced with a caveat. Owing to the size of the excerpts and despite the many analytically and theoretically interesting features, this analysis will remain highly selective in its focus. Specifically it will focus on the use of autobiographical narratives and particularly the use of reported speech within those narratives in the development of accounts of episodes of humiliation. The analysis will focus on the conditional subject positions constituted by the invocations of reported speech, their organisation and their implications for C's contemporary subjectivity.

The concern with autobiographical narratives and reported speech is primarily limited to the first three excerpts. In these excerpts, C recounts autobiographical narratives of occasions on which he was 'humiliated'. Through the analysis of these excerpts, the locally constituted meaning of 'humiliation' will be made explicit. Specifically, the construction of an episode as characterized by 'humiliation' is contingent upon the presence of pre-existing power relations, an unjust or unwarranted act of positioning, an inability or failure to resist that act of positioning and a resultant 'feeling' of disempowerment. The implications of these recounted narratives of 'humiliation' for C's contemporary gendered subjectivity will be discussed.

In contrast to the first three excerpts, the final excerpt is not characterized by autobiographical narratives. However, it does support an analysis of the
negotiation of the power relations upon which episodes of humiliation are predicated and the possibility of their existence between C and T within the contemporary context of the therapy session. The implications of this process of negotiation for C's contemporary gendered subjectivity will be discussed.

Excerpt 1 is taken from early in session 4. The only preceding talk in the session was a brief negotiation of who should or would start the session and it is to this discussion that C's comments at the start of line 28 are oriented. Given that this excerpt includes the introduction of the concept of humiliation as both a topic and as a potential focus of therapeutic concern, I will not offer an introductory summary of the excerpt and its analysis. Instead I will allow the excerpt to stand as an introduction to the topic, as it did in the therapy sessions. Suffice to say, the analysis is concerned with the client's negotiation of subject positions and subjectivity relative to the concept of humiliation; particularly the analysis is attentive to any negotiation of this relationship that is interpretable as accomplished in terms of gender or in gendered terms.

Excerpt 1

28 C: Mm hm. [4] Anyway I hadn't really intended to say that (laughs). I've been in a very charged up state this week...this last week. It's been a difficult week. (Deep sigh)
29 T: Difficult in...
30 C: I just felt very tense all the time. Very jumpy. Well not all the time, most of the time.
31 T: [5] And you have some...you can see some...some basis for that
32 [inaudible].
C: I can see things which may have caused me to end up like that. Um, it
doesn't mean I should say that I should have felt like that. (T: mm) There are
a couple of things which made me very angry during the course of the week,
which didn't help.

T: Do you want to...

C: Yeah well they were just that...I mean there was last Wednesday morning,
we have a...we have a departmental management team meeting to which the
fifteen or so most senior people in the department attend. And the deputy
director was saying that...There had been a decision by a sub-committee of
councillors on an industrial relations issue, and the deputy director was
saying, "This is what it means." And I was saying, and I was a lone voice
around the table saying, "No, it doesn't mean that." And other people...there
were only a couple of other people who had probably read the decision, and
they were keeping quiet. And he was saying, "Oh you're wrong, it means
this." And I knew he was wrong, and I was saying, "Look, it doesn't mean
that," and I could see the people around the table were getting a bit irritated,
and (E: Name)'s going on a bit this morning, isn't he? Um, and then I got an
[inaudible] who came up to me and a couple of other people [inaudible] and
saying, "I've been thinking about this acting ranks...acting ranks...this acting
ranks business," he said, "My view is..." and he quoted my own words back
at me, that I'd been using. And not a word of, "No you were right." That
made me angry. And I didn't saying to him, "Oh hang on, I'm getting angry
with you." And then the following morning I was in another meeting and he
said to somebody else, "As I told the departmental management team
last...on Wednesday," and then he stopped himself. He didn't...he didn't say,
you know, "You were right, I was wrong." Just a little bit of acknowledgement
would have helped. But I didn't feel the ability to say to him, "You're really
pissing me off." (laughs) um, but it was a...I mean it was a fairly small issue
in a real sense. You know the world wasn't going to collapse around it.
C's turn, beginning at line 41, involves the construction of an autobiographical narrative concerning 'anger'-provoking incidents within the context of 'work'. 'Work' provides the broad spatiotemporal context for the narrative of both these incidents, though more specific contexts are invoked at various points. The construction of the anger-provoking interactions is primarily accomplished through the use of reported speech. The remainder of the excerpts are interpretable as contextualising the instances of reported speech. As discussed above, one function of reported speech is that it allows conditional acts of positioning to be brought into contemporary discursive contexts. The acts of positioning within the narratives are therefore made accessible and apparently transparent to the hearer, in this case the therapist, within the contemporary interactional context. Of course, no claims as to the 'truthfulness' of these invoked acts of positioning or to the moral order within which they are constructed as instantiated are made; they are simply interpreted as discursive resources invoked to warrant a particular claim or to account for the contemporary constitution of a subjectivity.

The turn at lines 41-64 involves two related narratives, with the content of the latter being consequent to the content of the former. This first narrative (lines 41-58) is ostensibly about "a departmental management team meeting" (line 42), constructed as having taken place "last Wednesday morning" (line 41). Thus it is to this spatiotemporal context that constructions in the first person pronoun, such as "And I was saying", are indexically linked. The narrative
concerns a disagreement between the speaker "I"51 and the introduced character of the "deputy director" over the correct interpretation of "a decision by a sub-committee of councillors on an industrial relations issue" (lines 44-45). The sequence of acts of positioning, between C and the 'deputy director' within the spatiotemporal context of the "departmental management team meeting", is constructed through the use of reported speech, the content of which ostensibly relates to the 'correct' interpretation of the decision at issue. The first two incidents of reported speech (lines 46 and 47) are relatively benign, in so far as they index neither the speaker nor the referent. That said, the construction of two speakers advancing conflicting interpretations has the effect of bringing their relative moral standings into question; simply, they can't both implicitly claim the right to be right.

The next two invocations of reported speech differ considerably from the first two in terms of the positions they afford their speakers and their referent. "And he [the deputy director] was saying, "Oh you're wrong, it means this..." (lines 49-50) constitutes an explicit act of first order positioning of C as 'wrong'. There is an important but subtle distinction to be made between an interpretation being constructed as 'wrong' and a speaker being positioned as 'wrong'. While the first can easily be negotiated rhetorically, the second potentially warrants an explicit act of second order positioning; C could be expected to resist his being

51 In the analysis "I" in quotation marks is used to indicate that the first person pronouns appear in the excerpt and thus are differentiation from the / positions and iterative 'I' s of the above outlined interpretative framework.
positioned as 'wrong'. Lines 50 and 51 demonstrate many of the grammatical possibilities of the first person pronoun – "And I knew he was wrong, and I was saying, "look, it doesn't mean that"". The first "I" is interpreted as indexing the "self-as-knower", while the second "I" indexes the "the self-as-known" that is publicly constituted through acts of positioning (James, 1890). However, it should be remembered that both these "I" s are constructed through the contemporary subjectivity, the implicit 'I' of the author located in the contemporary interactional context of the therapy session. As such, both "I" s located within the spatiotemporal context of 'work' should be interpreted as in part constitutive of the contemporary subjectivity and its problematic status.

The second incident of reported speech ascribed to C (lines 50-51) contains no explicit orientation to the position afforded him by the deputy director. C's construction of his maintenance of the focus of the argument, on the credibility of the interpretations rather than of the speakers advancing them, is interpretable as a construction of his own moral standing relative to that of the 'deputy director'. The iterated 'I' allows for the construction of a disparity between what is known (from the position of the "self-as-knower") and what is said or done (constituting the position of the "self-as-known"). On this occasion the disparity between what is constructed as known – "I knew he was wrong" (line 50) – and what is constructed as said – "and I was saying, "look, it doesn't mean that,"") (lines 50-51) – is interpretable in two ways. Either, it is interpreted as a construction of a reflexive subjectivity, constituted through the agentic management of what is thought or felt and what is said, or it is interpreted as a consequence of a problematic subjectivity, i.e. the constructed disparity.
between what is thought or felt and what is said is advanced, within the context of the therapy session, as problematic. These two possibilities should not be assumed to be mutually exclusive.

The first possibility, with its emphasis on the reflexive and agentic management of the expression of emotional experiences, thoughts and feelings, is interpretable as performative of a traditional masculinity, as outlined in chapter 3. However, the question that must be asked of this interpretation is: given the power relations constituted by the respective positions of 'right' and 'wrong' and given the supposed centrality of the maintenance of power to the performance of masculinity, why does C not construct himself as having engaged in second order positioning? The fact that C positions himself as not having explicitly renegotiated his being positioned as 'wrong' seems incompatible with the interpretation that the narrative is in some way constitutive of an _untroubled_ masculine subjectivity. More persuasive, I feel, is the interpretation that the constructed disparity between what is thought or felt and what is said, and the implications that has for the negotiation of subject positions and power relations, is constitutive of a troubled and decidedly _masculine_ subjectivity. Two of the central tenets of contemporary constructions of 'masculinity', not occupying subject positions that are interpretable as emotion-based or as having an emotional component and the occupation of positions of dominance within local power structures, are demonstrably in conflict. C's contemporary subjectivity, constituted through narratives characterized by a disparity between what is thought or felt and what is said and the resultant marginalization and disempowerment, is interpretable as
problematic and as a focus for therapeutic concern because of the presupposition that a male speaker should do 'masculinity' through the occupation of particular dominant positions in power relations. C's subjectivity is gendered as 'masculine' because in part he fails to meet the cultural requirements of the performance of masculinity.

At lines 55-56, the perlocutionary forces (Austin, 1961) of the deputy director's reported speech – the appropriation of ownership of the correct interpretation, the marginalization of both C's prior ownership and C's unwarranted positioning as 'wrong' – are constructed as combining to determine an affective response in C: "That made me angry" (lines 56-57). C uses reported speech to constitute what would be the next potential speech act in a morally correct sequence of positioning, from the marginalized and consequently 'angry' subject position. However, this speech act is again constructed as unvoiced; as such it is interpretable as unvoiced reported thought – "That made me angry. And I didn't say to him, "Oh hang on, I'm getting angry with you.'" (lines 56-58). Again, C is either positioned as reflexively able to manage his speech acts and consequent acts of positioning or as speaking from a problematic subjectivity that is characterized by a disparity between what is thought or felt and what is said, a consequent absence of the occupation of emotion-based subject positions and a consequent failure to resist disempowerment. Emotion-based subject positions are marginalized as illegitimate resources for the negotiation of power relations between male speakers in the context of work. C's invocation of his own unvoiced speech act in lines 62-63 is interesting because, for the first time, the disparity between reported thought and reported
speech is *explicitly* constructed as not reflexively and consequently not agentically accomplished. He positions himself as ‘unable’ to voice the reported speech/thought and consequently as ‘unable’ to create publicly a discursive context within which he might finally be reinstated in the subject position as ‘right’. This act of positioning is central to the constitution of C’s subjectivity, and consequently to the subject positions he takes up within the therapy session. C’s occupation of a subject position as ‘unable’ to make such speech acts is central to the constitution of a problematic subjectivity and further accounts for his contemporary location within a therapeutic context.

With regard to the overarching themes of this thesis, it is worth considering C’s two invocations of his own unvoiced reported speech – "Oh hang on, I’m getting angry with you." (lines 57-58) and "You’re really pissing me off" (lines 62-63). Both these statements position C as experiencing a negative affective response and position the referent, in this case the ‘deputy director’, as the determinant of that affective response. However, in both cases the reported speech is constructed as unvoiced. C positions himself, within the context of the therapy session, as not having contested the ‘deputy director’s’ acts of positioning. Whilst C’s narrative is one of injustice and righteous anger, it is above all else a narrative of failure, of C’s failure to renegotiate unjust acts of positioning. It is therefore C’s positioning of himself as failing to resist these acts of positioning, when there were affective grounds to do so, that constitutes a problematic subjectivity in the context of the therapy session; a context within which the moral order supports the occupation of affect-based subject
positions. Thus, C's positioning as one who is unable or unwilling to take up such positions has the potential to become a topic of therapeutic concern.

As can be seen from the line numbers, excerpt 2 follows directly from the turns in excerpt 1. In the excerpt, the anger-provoking incidents of part 1 developed into the topic of humiliation. The tacit acceptance of an unjust act of positioning, whether through inability or unwillingness to renegotiate it, emerges as the locally determined definition of humiliation. In order to advance an analysis of these episodes of ‘humiliation’ that is capable of addressing the research questions’ concerns with the simultaneous accomplishment of an emotional and gendered ‘self’, two interpretative possibilities are available. Either, we can assume that, as a male speaker C is at some level engaged in the constitution of a gendered subjectivity and, assuming that ‘masculinity’ is in some way constituted through negotiations of power relations, we can look to the dynamics of those negotiations as the basis for a gender-focussed analysis or, in order to advance a (not) gendered (by me) analysis, we can look for C’s use of gendered terms. Both these analytic possibilities will be explored.

Excerpt 2

65  T: But the feeling there was...was a powerful one.
66  C: Yeah. It was...it was...it was relevant to my working life in that I've had
to handle a dispute over precisely that issue during the course of the week.
68  Um, you know, which ended up taking up a couple of my...hours of my time
69  on Friday when I was tired, and would have liked to be winding down for the
week. So there was that. um, another occasion when I was really...I was
71  really hassled on Friday before that meeting, and one of the assistant
directors...I mean we were at a meeting to discuss something which was
called at very short notice, I asked how long it was going to last when I was
called down, and I was told twenty minutes. So that was fine, because I had
another meeting to go to. This other guy arrives just as I was about to leave,
he was half an hour late for whatever reason. I mean he obviously had other
things to do. And I said, "I'm sorry I've got to go now because I've got other
meetings." And he said, "Oh, I've postponed my other meetings." And I was
thinking, "You stupid ass," I wanted to say, "You absolute twat," you know,
"Don't you think I've thought about ordering my priorities." And I felt
humiliated, and I didn't say anything either then. I mean again, it wasn't a
very important issue, but it's just a question of attitude of people.

Session 4

In lines 70-77, C does considerable work to contextualize the acts of
positioning that will constitute the episode of humiliation and to establish his
own and "this other guy[s]" relative moral standing in the narrative context of
'work'. C is positioned as professional and conscientious, the "other guy" as
tardy and unapologetic. In lines 77-80, C constructs the positioning sequence
between himself and "this other guy" that constitutes the episode of
humiliation. Again, this is accomplished through the use of reported speech
and reported thought. For the sake of clarity, it is worth extracting the reported
speech acts and the instances of unvoiced reported thought. By doing so we
take up the position of the third person referent within the spatiotemporal
context of the meeting, albeit a very privileged third person given that we also
have access to C's 'thoughts'. 'Thoughts', in the telling of autobiographical
narratives, are interpreted as a discursive resource invoked to make
"retrospective knowledge claims" (Edwards, 1997, p.283; italics in original),
which are oriented to the management of contemporary interactional concerns.
In this excerpt, they are invoked to account for episodes of humiliation and disempowerment and for C’s contemporary location in the therapeutic context. From this position of C’s contemporary subjectivity the sequence of positioning acts, including unvoiced ones, appears as follows — ‘OG’ stands for ‘other guy’:

C: I’m sorry I’ve got to go now because I’ve got other meetings
OG: Oh, I’ve postponed my other meetings
C: ((Unvoiced)) You stupid ass (.) You absolute twat (.) Don’t you think I’ve thought about ordering my priorities

The interpretation of this sequence must be informed by what it is subsequently constructed as determining, specifically C’s positioning as "humiliated" (line 81). Thus, this sequence of positioning acts must be hearable as one that constitutes an act of humiliation. An interpretation of how this is accomplished depends equally upon an appreciation of the subject positions that are constituted and an appreciation of the local moral order of the spatiotemporal context within which they are located.

C’s third instance of unvoiced reported thought — "Don’t you think I’ve thought about ordering my priorities" (line 80) — is interpreted as oriented to the prescriptive quality of ‘the other guy’s’ utterance — “Oh, I’ve postponed my other meetings” (line 78). If it were voiced, it would constitute an act of second order positioning; C would effectively resist being positioned as unprofessional and disorganized. However, the first two instances of unvoiced reported thought are very different, in so far as their content is not indexically linked to
that of any prior utterance. They are singular explicit derogatory acts of positioning—"You stupid ass" "You absolute twat" (both line 79)—that function only to bring the "other guy['s]" moral and intellectual standing relative to C into question. Importantly, they do not function as second order acts of positioning, in the way that the third instance of unvoiced reported speech does. Rather, they function as explicit acts of positioning of the "other guy". If these instances of unvoiced reported thought were voiced, they would be interpretable as constituting the performance of 'anger'. They are insults hurled in anger that are occasioned by an unwarranted act of positioning. Within this framework, the unvoiced reported thoughts position C as having been angered by the actions of the "other guy".

These instances of reported speech and unvoiced reported thought must now be re-contextualized. In the context of the therapy session, the positioning sequence is constructed as occasioning the affective experience of 'humiliation' and not 'anger'—"And I felt humiliated, and I didn't say anything either then" (lines 80-81). Why is the episode constructed as one of humiliation and not anger? The answer lies in the two parts of the above utterance. Failure to engage in the discursive renegotiation of subject positions is constructed as simultaneous with the affective experience of 'humiliation'. The absence of discursive action means that C, in the narrative, remains positioned by the "other guy['s]" reported speech. His occupation of an emotion-based subject position, e.g. 'humiliated', may be more dependent upon his constructed lack of action than upon the content of any of the instances of reported speech. In this context, 'humiliation' is understood as the affective consequence of being
negatively positioned by others and of failing to effectively resist that act of positioning, even when there are moral, intellectual and affective grounds for doing so. Arguably, failure to resist unjust acts of positioning when there are reasonable grounds to do so and the resulting experience of disempowerment and 'humiliation' conflict with the constitution of a 'masculine' subjectivity, where 'masculinity' is culturally constructed as characterized by the exercise of agency and the occupation of positions of dominance.

T and C return to the topic of humiliation later in session 4 and Excerpt 3 contains a substantial portion of this second discussion. It is very similar to excerpt one, not only with regard to the topic of talk but also with regard to the way that the topic is addressed as well as the positions that are constructed, afforded and negotiated relative to it. As above, the analysis will be limited to the implications of the narratives and the reported speech that they contain for C's contemporary subjectivity within the context of the therapy session. The excerpt begins with T referring to the discussion of humiliation that took place at the start of the session; that discussion constitutes excerpts 1 and 2. His closing statement, though it functions as well as a question, constitutes an invitation to C to engage in the discursive act of 'remembering' (Edwards, 1997; Middleton & Edwards, 1990). In the excerpt, C constructs three autobiographical narratives of episodes of humiliation.

Excerpt 3
288 T: [7] Mm. [8] You were talking at the beginning of the session about this sort
289 of idea, I mean I think I actually...humiliation, you know, where someone's
actually put down or... (C: mm hm) I'm wondering whether that's something which...which has (sigh) bad memories for you.

C: I've got some. Um, I mean not very...not very early memories I don't think. [3] I mean the first real humiliation I can think of, I don't know if I mentioned it to you, was over school blazers. No? Um, when I went to my nice posh secondary school, and my parents could only afford a second-hand blazer for me. And at the end of the first term I was called to the front by a master, as was another boy who was spank...nice spanking clean uniform, very spanking clean boy, who is now a professor of philosophy in the university. And he said, "Look at you, you know, look how you treated your blazer compared with him," right in front of the class. That's the first...I mean that's the only...that's the earliest memory I've got of being humiliated. I can't remember anything... That had a very...obviously a very deep impression on me. And I didn't feel able of course to say, "But please, it's not my fault, my parents aren't, you know, very well off." (T: mm) Probably also got built into a sort of resentment I felt towards my parents for being different.

T: That's what I was... I was wondering whether there was a sense of anger there, I mean this is...

C: No not at the time. At the time it happened I just felt anger towards the school teacher.

T: For picking you out?

C: Mm hm. And I remember being humiliated by the same...not by the same man in the same class. For...we were reading history, and one of the sons of one of the kings of England was called (H: Name) and there was a bloke in my village who we called (H: Name), as I recall. So I read out (H: Name) and everybody laughed at me, and I felt humiliated then. And then we came across the name of the town (M: Name of town) on another occasion, the same...the first term of the school, (M: Name) and I said (M: Name) or whatever, and again people tittered. (sigh) um, but, you know those were the first occasions I can't remember anything before then.
T: But it feels like there's a whole clutch of first occasions there, and maybe
lots of ones afterwards. (C: um) Or certainly enough to...
C: I think there was...I think I suffered a certain...I think most of the
children there at some time suffered some injustices at the hands of the
teachers who I think were prone....I mean, I hate to say it about teachers, but
I mean they were mostly Oxford, Cambridge graduates, mostly Oxford
graduates, who probably ended up teaching in most cases because they
didn't actually have that...that extra ability. (T: mm) I'm not trying to say that
all teachers are like that, um, but I suffered my share of humiliations, I think,
yes. There was the humiliation, the time that, there was a special path that
only teachers were allowed to go up, or whatever, but beside that there was a
flower border, and the games masters tripped through the flower border on
the way back from a games thing, and I followed on the exact line to be
hailed up by the headmaster to tell me off for walking through there. "But I
was only following somebody else." But I mean that wasn't being...I mean
OK I got caught, but I didn't feel that...I didn't feel able to say, "But I was
only doing what somebody else did." I took it all on myself. But there were
other...I mean but there were other times when definitely I...I and other
children were picked on, and...and dealt with very harshly by particular
people who had their own problems, I'm sure.
T: [4] But the feeling of...the feeling of being humiliated, I mean it's a very
powerful one.
C: Mm hm. I just...can I just say I justified my existence at that school by
doing brilliantly in exams in my early years there.

Session 4

In his first turn (lines 292-305), C constructs an autobiographical narrative,
which has a structure similar to those of excerpts 1 and 2. The episode of
humiliation is constituted by a public and unjust act of positioning, which C is
positioned as unable to renegotiate discursively — "And I didn’t feel able of course to say, "But please, it’s not my fault, my parents aren’t, you know, very well off."") (lines 303-304). The construction of the act of positioning as ‘unjust’ begins with the construction of the origin of C’s blazer. The origin of C’s blazer is central to the subsequent act of positioning by “a master” (lines 296-297) being interpretable as unjust. Importantly, C provides T with information regarding the origin and presumably the status of his school blazer (lines 294-296) before constructing the reported speech and unvoiced reported thought that constitutes the acts of positioning that are interpretable as constituting as an episode of humiliation. By providing this information before advancing the narrative, C equips the hearer, in this case T, with the information required to interpret the act of positioning — ""Look at you, you know, look how you treated your blazer compared with him"" (lines 299-300) — by the “master” as ‘unjust’.

The narratives contained in C’s turn at lines 311-319 have a different structure to the previous narratives of episodes of humiliation. There is no single antagonist whose acts of positioning are constructed as resulting in C’s occupying the position as ‘humiliated’. Rather, in these narratives, C constructs himself as having been humiliated by the responses of others to his own actions. The narratives are concerned with C’s reading aloud to the class and his reading of names of people and places that occasioned laughter from his classmates. Owing to the changing or obscuring of names in the original transcript, in the ensuring of confidentiality, it is difficult to appreciate why these names should occasion the constructed response. However, the important feature of the turn is that C constructs the response as directed towards
himself – "so I read out (H: Name) and everybody laughed at me, and I felt humiliated then" (lines 314-315). C's advanced interpretation of his classmates' response is interpretable as constituting a collective act of positioning.

The final narrative of the excerpt, concerning being reprimanded for walking through a flowerbed, has the same characteristic features of an episode of humiliation as were outlined above in the analysis of excerpt 2. There is an unjust act of positioning – "hauled up by the headmaster to tell me off for walking through there" (line 333), an invocation of unvoiced reported thought and a consequent failure to resist the unjust act of positioning – "I didn't feel able to say, "But I was only doing what someone else did." I took it all on myself" (lines 335-336).

Throughout this analysis I have been mindful of the aims and interests of the thesis as a whole. Broadly speaking, it is concerned with the inter-relationship between the concepts of 'emotion' and 'gender'. These excerpts were selected because they contained instances of a male speaker negotiating subject positions, and his subjectivity, through and relative to the emotion term and concept of 'humiliation'. This analysis is therefore concerned with establishing whether C, in negotiating his subject positions and subjectivity, simultaneously negotiates gendered subject positions and a gendered subjectivity. As has been evident so far, there is a relative paucity of gender terms and categories in C's speech. Consequently, an analysis that is limited to the micro-textual
level would be forced to conclude that there is little evidence here to suggest that the performance of gender is in any way an interactional concern of C.

The only possible evidence upon which a gender-sensitive micro-textual analysis could draw is the fact that all the antagonists in C's autobiographical narratives, that is to say all the speakers whose acts of positioning were constructed as causing C to occupy the position as 'humiliated', were male. Recall the "deputy director" at work, "a master" and the "headmaster" at school. Given this information, it may be argued that the performance of masculinity, accomplished through the negotiation of power relations, is something that is 'done' between men. However, aside from their sex, the antagonists in C's narratives of humiliation are all constructed as occupying positions of power at least equal to or, in three cases, greater than that occupied by C within the spatiotemporal contexts of the narratives. Consequently, the narratives of humiliation and the constructed acts of positioning within them make more sense when understood as contingent upon the constructed hierarchical power relations of the institutions within which the narratives are located, rather than as contingent upon the gendered status of any of the actors in the narratives. At the micro-textual level, these excerpts say a great deal about 'humiliation' but do not inform an analysis of the relationship between 'humiliation' and 'masculinity'. At the micro-textual level, masculinity is not 'done'.

However, a more macro-textual interpretation is possible and yields an analysis in which the narratives and the acts of positioning that they contain
are interpretable as constitutive of a problematic masculine subjectivity - problematic because it is characterized by a failure to resist and redress unjust or unwarranted acts of positioning, even when there are moral grounds to do so and masculine because these episodes of humiliation, the illegitimating of emotion-based subject positions and the consequent failure to renegotiate unjust subject positions are advanced as problematic. Their status as problematic is contingent upon their contrasting with a hegemonic cultural conception of masculinity, which is characterized by the marginalization and resistance of emotion-based subject positions, agency, assertiveness and the occupation of positions of dominance in structures of power relations. His contemporary subjectivity is interpretable as masculine because emotions are illegitimized as acceptable bases for the negotiation of power relations but as a consequence he fails to meet the remaining characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, such as the exercise of agency and the occupation of positions of dominance. Arguably, C is engaged in the performance of 'masculinity in crisis' and accounts for his contemporary location within the context of a therapy session. C's gendered subjectivity seems to conform to accounts of the conflicts inherent in contemporary cultural requirements of men outlined by authors such as Seidler (1989, 1997).

In contrast to the preceding excerpts, this final excerpt is not characterized by autobiographical narratives of episodes of humiliation. Rather, it is concerned with the possibility that the power relations that are a necessary precondition for an episode of humiliation exist within the contemporary interactional context of the therapy session. In the excerpt, C is invited to construct and account for the power relations within the therapeutic context, with specific reference to the
concept and possibility of ‘humiliation’. The consequent requirement for C to negotiate subject positions for both him and T relative to each other within a hierarchical power structure, which is implicit in the concept of humiliation, makes this excerpt extremely interesting. At the macro-textual level, it is perhaps worth remembering that C and T are both male speakers, as such they might be interpreted as necessarily invested and engaged in the performance of masculinity.

Excerpt 4

325 T: Right. [6] You see, I'm wondering here, you know, here, when we meet in
326 these sessions (C: deep breath) [3] there...there always has been this, I
327 guess, this conflict with you about your desire to be scrupulously honest and
328 actually...what that means bearing, you know, this, we talked about very early
329 on. (C: mm hm) [3] But for you to be scrupulously honest, [4] lays you open
330 (C: deep breath) to maybe a fear of me humiliating you?
332 know rationally that you...that [6] you can't affect my life outside...I mean,
333 you can't directly affect my...my life outside of this room. (T: mm) [7] You
334 can, I mean, all you can leave me with outside this room I think is a...in a
335 direct sense, is a feeling that I don't quite perform well in these sessions.
336 There are other people who [5] can put me in very real danger in other
337 situations. All that's...you know...I'm...I mean sometimes feel you take me
338 too literally. I-I just...I use words to try and create a scene and you sometimes
339 [4] (laughs) sometimes seize on those words and I—I feel like I'm an artist
340 trying to paint a picture and (T: sure) and words are part of that. Um, I mean
341 it's stupid...I mean I've had quite a good...I really had quite a good
342 week...although it was quite a tense weekend in many ways. I mean lots of
343 things that...that...that potentially could have gone wrong. And
344 I'm...I'm...I'm...I'm not trying to get away from the original question that
you asked. There was...seeing this uncle who I'd got on very badly with in
the past when I was...the last time I saw him was about...what, I suppose
about 18-19. Er, we never got on too well.

it was a far less dangerous situation than
when I'd...all the ones I'd been dealing with all weekend reasonably
competently with, but...let's go back (laughs) because I'm sorry, I-I've lost
where...where we've started off on. [3] What was your original...?

T: [19] I was talking about [4] you being...feeling that you could
C: Could be humiliated here?
T: Be humiliated here.
C: Right. [3] And the answer is no. I don't think...I don't think I can [3] and I
think that's why [3] or largely why in the last few...largely why, although
there have been other reasons, particularly today why I'm actually physically
far less tense than I was the first couple of sessions when I came here. And I
think I...I'm much...more [5] And I think I'm much more aware [3] now that
your role [3] or as it appears to me, is much more of a facilitator than [5]
being an ex...you know, a human being with whom I have to interact either
socially or at work. [6] I mean [8] again, just sort of trying to paint a word
picture, it could be that you...that...that you were...you could be a part of my
more rational part which is split off from me and was sitting over there and
being trained in a particular field which this part of me hasn't been and was,
you know, [4] trying to help this part of me. So (laughs) [3] I mean you're not
a person with whom I have a normal social or work relationship, I mean, we
don't go drinking together, we don't play games together, [3] um, we don't
have friends in common (T: mm hm) er, we don't...we don't speak about
outside experiences in common.

T: And yet... (C: deep breath) and yet here you will say things about yourself
or about your life or about your experiences which you... which leave
you...can leave you quite vulnerable.
you asked. There was...seeing this uncle who I'd got on very badly with in
the past when I was...the last time I saw him was about...what, I suppose
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T: [19] I was talking about [4] you being...feeling that you could
C: Could be humiliated here?
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C: Right. [3] And the answer is no. I don't think...I don't think I can [3] and I
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there have been other reasons, particularly today why I'm actually physically
far less tense than I was the first couple of sessions when I came here. And I
think I...I'm much...more [5] And I think I'm much more aware [3] now that
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socially or at work. [6] I mean [8] again, just sort of trying to paint a word
picture, it could be that you...that...that you were...you could be a part of my
more rational part which is split off from me and was sitting over there and
being trained in a particular field which this part of me hasn't been and was,
you know, [4] trying to help this part of me. So (laughs) [3] I mean you're not
a person with whom I have a normal social or work relationship, I mean, we
don't go drinking together, we don't play games together, [3] um, we don't
have friends in common (T: mm hm) er, we don't...we don't speak about
outside experiences in common.

T: And yet... (C: deep breath) and yet here you will say things about yourself
or about your life or about your experiences which you... which leave
you...can leave you quite vulnerable.
In T’s opening turn (lines 325-330), C’s subjectivity is made the topic of talk. T constructs C’s subjectivity as characterised by a conflict between a "desire to be scrupulously honest" (line 327) and the management of the implications of that ‘honesty’ – "for you to be scrupulously honest, [4] lays you open [ ] to maybe a fear of me humiliating you?" (lines 329-330). C’s subjectivity is constructed as one within which T occupies a position of power, a previously constructed prerequisite for the occupation of the position of the humiliator within an act of humiliation. As such, the utterance positions C as potentially less powerful than T within the context of the therapy session. It is this act of positioning and the concomitant structure of power relations that C is effectively invited to renegotiate. C orients to this particular rhetorical concern in four ways. The first two related methods are the construction of the separate objects of "me" and "my life" and the use of a ‘real terms’ framing device. The third strategy is an explicit act of positioning of T, which results in T’s disempowerment. The fourth less rhetorically complex strategy is to wander massively off topic, to require T to do ‘remembering’ in order to return to the original topic and, through the implication that T’s utterances and topic
changes are barely memorable, to minimise the importance of T within the local moral order.

"My life" (lines 332 and 333) is interpreted as the unstated contexts — ‘work’, ‘home’, et cetera — within which and through which C’s subjectivity might be located and constituted. The invocation of "my life" echoes the transition that James (1890) observed between ‘me’ and ‘mine’, such that C is understood to be constituted by the totality of things that he could categorise as ‘mine’ or as located within "my life". That the invoked category of "my life" is external to the context of the therapy session is made explicit in lines 332, 333 and 334. By implication, the therapy session is constructed as lying "outside" C’s "life". This separation constructs any power that T might have relative to C as context specific, as local to and constituted entirely within the therapy session.

Having constructed the contextual extent of power relations, C delimits the potential magnitude of their effects. The consequences that might result from the instantiation of the power relations between C and T are constructed as limited to the affective level — "all you can leave me with outside this room [ ] in a direct sense, is a feeling that I don’t quite perform well in these sessions" (lines 334-335). That C’s power is constructed as entirely — note the extreme case formulation "all" (Pomerantz, 1986) — limited to the affective level is itself a subtle negotiation of the power relations. This rhetorical move effectively constructs affective experiences such as emotions and feelings as near enough inconsequential. However, more important is C’s location of any effects of an exercise of power by T outside the context of the therapy session.
"all you can leave me with outside this room [ ] in a direct sense, is a feeling" (lines 334-335). C effectively marginalizes the topic of the potential extent and effects of negotiations of power relations between himself and T within the therapy session.

The related strategy through which C constructs and negotiates the power relations between himself and T is the 'real terms' framing device. This device is explicit in the contrast that C offers between T and "other people" — "There are other people who [5] can put me in very real danger in other situations" (lines 336-337) — and implicit in the use of the separated concepts of "me" and "my life" and in the location of the therapy session "outside" the latter. The context of the therapy session and any actions and affects that are located within it are contrasted with the 'real' world of C's "life". In this way any power relations between C and T within the therapy session are contrasted with and constructed as inconsequential relative to those existent within 'real life'.

'Reality' — the discursive resource of super-ordinate macro-contexts — can be invoked in contrast structures (Smith, 1978) as a way of negotiating and managing the importance of any local action, event or context.

In lines 337-340, C explicitly positions T in such a way that he (T) is effectively disempowered. This is accomplished through the contrasting of C's construction of the intended functions of his speech acts— "I use words to try and create a scene" (line 338) and "I feel like I'm an artist trying to paint a picture [ ] and words are part of that" (lines 339-340) — and his construction of T's interpretation of them— "I mean sometimes feel you take me too literally"
(lines 337-338) and "you sometimes [4] (laughs) sometimes seize on those words" (lines 338-339). Briefly, these two differing constructions of the functions served by C's speech acts can be categorised as 'descriptive' and 'constitutive' respectively. By constructing a first person account of the functions of his own speech, C marginalizes any account or interpretation that T might offer; a speaker retains the right to determine and explicitly state the meaning of an utterance, a right exercised through the invocation of discourses of 'intention'. Through the above contrast, T is positioned as interpreting C's utterances in ways that were not meant or intended. C assumes the position of arbiter of the 'intended' meanings of his utterances. Consequently the validity of any interpretation that T might offer of C's utterances is undermined, as is any act of positioning of C by T, which might be based on the interpretation of C's talk. The potential importance of the topic of humiliation and its validity as a basis for the negotiation of power relations between C and T are diminished through their construction as resulting from T's over-interpretation of C.

The section of talk in lines 340-382 is edited from the excerpt precisely because C wanders massively off topic and then requires T to 'do remembering' in order to return to the original topic. As a way of negotiating power relations, I can't imagine a strategy much less sophisticated than this. Talking on topic, the maintenance of topics and the negotiation of changes of topic are sensitive areas of discursive interactions given that the introduction of a topic is in part an instantiation of a speaker's rights and duties within the local moral order of the interaction (Chafe, 2001; Sacks, 1992). The acceptance, maintenance or rejection of topics, therefore, has implications for the relative
standings of speakers within an interaction. By requiring T to 'remember' the topic, C diminishes its importance, implicitly contests T's right to determine the topic of talk and negotiates his (C's) standing relative to T within the context of the therapy session.

All four of the above outlined strategies, employed by C in the negotiation of the power relations between himself and T, function in support of the "no" component of C's original ambivalent response to the possibility that he might 'fear' humiliation by T in the context of the therapy session. Through the above detailed rhetorical strategies, C positions himself relative to T so that he is empowered and T is disempowered. By disempowering T, C is able to negate the existence of any basis, such as a hierarchical power structure, for the possibility of being humiliated within the therapeutic context.

Having emphatically rejected the possibility that he risks humiliation within the therapeutic context, C accounts for doing so and, in doing so, negotiates his own standing relative to T in the locally constituted structure of power relations. Two main strategies are drawn upon by C. In lines 388 and 390, C invokes the resource of his own subjective physiological response to being in the context of the therapy sessions – "I think that's why [ ] particularly today why I'm actually physically far less tense than I was the first couple of sessions when I came here" (lines 387-390) – as evidence of the absence of risk, and, implicitly, the absence of a power structure that might support his humiliation.
The second strategy by which C renegotiates his standing relative to T within the context of the therapy session is through the use of contrasting categories, membership categorisation devices and category-bound activities (Sacks, 1992). Through this strategy, T and the therapeutic context are located outside the constructed shared norms of interpersonal interactions — "you’re not a person with whom I have a normal social or work relationship [] we don’t go drinking together, we don’t play games together [] we don’t have friends in common [] we don’t speak about outside experiences in common." (lines 398-402). The implication of C’s constructions and acts of positioning is that the power relations between himself and T cannot be assumed to be normative. The moral order of the therapy session is constructed as differing from the moral orders of ‘real life’ interactions. The rights and duties of clients and therapists within the therapeutic context are therefore constructed as not the same as those of speakers in other contexts. However, while a particular power relation may be assumed to exist within the therapeutic context, it is important to note that on this occasion the power relation is constructed as privileging the client. With regard to the topic of talk — the possibility that C might risk being humiliated by T — by constructing the moral order of the therapy session and the positions of speakers within it as differing from more normative social contexts, including those within which narratives of humiliation have already been constructed, C contests the existence of a local moral order that would support his being humiliated.

In lines 395-398, C engages in an act of positioning of T, through which he is able to further challenge the existence of a local power relation that could
support his being humiliated. Having initially constructed T as "more of a facilitator" (line 392), C then constructs T as little more than the embodiment of the 'rational part' of his (C's) own subjectivity — "you could be a part of my more rational part which is split off from me and was sitting over there and being trained in a particular field which this part of me hasn't been and was, you know, [4] trying to help this part of me" (lines 395-398). The idea of a local structure of power relations within which individual speakers are located and upon which an act of humiliation might be based is entirely undermined by C's construction of T as not 'really' a person in his own right. The primary characteristics of an episode of humiliation are constructed as absent from the therapeutic context. Therapy and the therapeutic context are constructed as safe, unchallenging and in no sense constitute any reasonable basis for fearfulness.

Over the remaining turns of the excerpt (lines 403-412), the speakers return to the topic of the relationship between speaking 'honestly' and the 'fear of humiliation', introduced at lines 329-330. However, as a result of C's subsequent focus on the power relations between himself and T, the conceptual relationship between the provision of information and the possibility and risk of humiliation was not developed. T reinstates the earlier topic that C's honesty, within the therapy sessions, might leave him open to a fear of humiliation. However, on this occasion he does so with specific reference to what C might be honest about — "yourself or about your life or about your experiences" (lines 403-404). T is interpreted as drawing upon the discursive resources introduced by C — all those contexts constructed as constituting C's
'real life' and as external to the therapy session, perhaps including all the narratives of humiliation recounted in session 4 – and making them contemporaneous to the ongoing local interaction. The resources that C used to undermine the existence of power relations between himself and T are constructed as resources that could be invoked by T to humiliate C.

However, T does not construct the potential consequence of C's 'honesty' as 'humiliation' – "can leave you quite vulnerable" (line 405). The distinction between vulnerability and humiliation is important, particularly since it is a distinction that is exploited by C, and echoes the excerpts in chapter 4 where emotional expression or talking about emotions were constructed as determinants of vulnerability. As it is locally oriented to, the distinction between vulnerability and humiliation rests on the respective absence or presence of the action of an 'other'; i.e., a person can be vulnerable but not necessarily be humiliated. To be humiliated requires an antagonist to exploit that vulnerability. However, the rights of an 'other' to exploit vulnerability and to engage in acts of humiliation are locally determined and depend upon their position within the local structure of power relations.

Having accepted that the provision of information about his life might leave him vulnerable (line 406), C then challenges T's suggestion that this also implicitly leaves him open "To being humiliated" (line 407). This challenge is again grounded in a negotiation of his standing relative to that of T and takes the form of a show concession (Antaki and Wetherell, 1999). It should, however, be acknowledged that the show concession is not one of the three forms
identified by Antaki and Wetherell (1999), given that it lacks a concession marker and the initial proposition can only be understood indexically through reference to the preceding turns. If I borrow the notation system from Antaki and Wetherell, then the opening lines of C's turn would appear as follows (bold indicates the contrast marker, italics are used to identify the proposition and the reprise and a gloss is provided on the right hand side):

C: [3] *I'm not sure about that.* (proposition)

They leave me very vulnerable [] (concession)

But...but in so far as they leave me open (reprise)

· to humiliation, I think it's self-humiliation

Through the structure of the show-concession, C is able to reorient to the possibility of being humiliated by T and to strengthen his contention that such a possibility does not exist within the context of the therapy session. Drawing upon the preceding negotiation of his standing relative to T and the explicit claim that T did not occupy a position of sufficient standing or power to humiliate him, C takes the position as the only speaker present of sufficient standing to be able to accomplish such an act.

The final words on the possibility of his humiliation within the context of the therapy session provide the basis for some interesting questions about what C has just accomplished. Through the final three turns, the negotiation of subject positions and power relations between C and T, in relation to the possibility of C's humiliation, are reduced to simple statements of first order positioning.
From C we get "you can't humiliate me, you can't" (line 410) and in response from T we hear "But you can humiliate yourself!" (line 411). Little can be said about the content of these turns without really just paraphrasing them, but what must be argued is what they do and whether that can be interpreted as a performance of a gendered subjectivity.

The obvious question is, 'why does C do so much complex rhetorical work to manage the possibility of his being humiliated by T in the context of the therapy session'? Given that there is an absence of gender terms at the micro-textual level, the answer, I contend, lies in the imposition of an interpretative framework in which gender and specifically masculinity are accomplished through the negotiation of locations within structures of power relations. By positioning himself as the only speaker in the therapeutic context that is capable of his humiliation, C claims responsibility for all the various components that would necessarily be constitutive of that act. C claims responsibility for the provision of information that might constitute a basis for his vulnerability. C claims responsibility for the hypothetical actions of T, in making use of that information and engaging in a potentially unjust act of positioning. C claims responsibility for any inability or unwillingness on his own part to renegotiate an act of positioning that would constitute an act of humiliation. C claims responsibility for and power over any and all of the acts, even those of others, that would be necessary for him to be humiliated. If any of the discursive accomplishments in this analysis look anything like the performance of gender then this must be it. Within a contemporary understanding of masculinity, C's constructions and claims of agency — even to
the extent that it is vicarious – responsibility and power look just as we might expect ‘masculinity’ to look. That this negotiation of power relations is categorized as constitutive of a ‘masculine’ subjectivity is, however, contingent only upon a concern with positions of dominance and the management of vulnerability being identified as characteristic of ‘masculinities’ within contemporary cultural contexts and upon C’s sexed status as ‘male’. There is certainly nothing in the micro-textual details or in the rhetorical strategies apparent in this excerpt that would suggest that a similar negotiation of power relations, within a local interactional context, could not be undertaken by a ‘woman’.

5.5 Discussion

From the above analysis there are four key points that warrant explication. The first is the demonstrable importance of autobiographical narratives and embedded instances of reported speech and unvoiced reported thought as rhetorical devices that function in the constitution of a contemporary subjectivity. The second is that negotiations of power are implicated in the locally constituted meaning of ‘humiliation’. The third is that the configurations of power relations implicit within the discourse of ‘humiliation’ conflict with the performance of masculinity when an individual who might be positioned as masculine is ‘subjected’ to the discourse of humiliation. The fourth point is that the interpretation of a demonstrable concern with the configuration of power relations, negotiated through a range of rhetorical devices, as constitutive of masculinity is based either on the imposition of an interpretative framework within which orientations to such concerns are assumed to be peculiar to the
performance of masculinity or upon the sex of the speaker. In the absence of either of these two frameworks, a concern with the configuration of power relations, negotiated through categories of emotion, such as humiliation, is just that. A concern with the configuration of power relations may be implicated in the performance of gender, through the simultaneous invocation of gender terms. However, in the absence of such terms, the rights and duties afforded by particular locations in power relations may also be negotiated through a range of other discursive resources.
Chapter 6

"SO DON'T START THROWING THINGS AT ME NICOLA": Three episodes of 'anger' in heterosexual relationships

6.1 Introduction

Having examined the relationships between discourses of emotion, discourses of masculinity and the performance of masculinities/the constitution of masculine subjectivities in the preceding two chapters, this chapter is intended to answer one simple question: how might all this look in practice? This chapter starts from the explicit assumption that 'emotional expressions' are a form of interpersonal communication oriented to the accomplishment of relational goals, including but not limited to the constitution of gendered subjectivities (de Rivera, 1984; Fridlund, 1991, 1994; Parkinson, 1995; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Interactions interpretable as involving 'emotional expression' will be analysed to answer the following questions:

- What functions are served by men's responses to the emotional expressions of others?
- What functions are served by men's 'doing' of emotional expressivity?
- Are these functions synchronous with the performance of masculinities or constitutive of masculine subjectivities?
6.2 Data

The aims of this chapter, specifically the aim to analyse the interaction between the ‘doing’ of emotion and the ‘doing’ of gender in practice, meant data that were as ‘naturalistic’ as possible were required. Arguably, one of the most prevalent sources of such data in contemporary British society is ‘reality TV’. A host of shows, from home, garden and personal makeover programmes, to the likes of “I’m a celebrity, get me out of here!” and “Big Brother” are predicated on the assumption that emotional expressivity makes interesting viewing. Of these shows, a number deal explicitly with the topic of heterosexual relationships, including “Would like to meet”, “Wife swap”, “Breaking point” and “Made for each other”. The decision to draw on shows of this type, specifically the 2003 series of “Made for each other”, was based on the prevalence of constructions of gender complementarity with regard to emotions in general, and emotional (in)expressivity in particular, both in chapter 4 and in the broader literature on gender and emotions. Further, the context of heterosexual relationships was assumed to be one within which gendered – masculine and feminine – subjectivities were likely to be constituted (Butler, 1999). Five of the six broadcast episodes of the 2003 season of “Made for each other” were recorded and transcribed.52

6.3 Method

The transcripts were subjected to thematic coding, in the manner advocated within grounded theory analysis (e.g. Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Pidgeon &

52 One episode was missed owing to a faulty video cassette recorder.
Henwood, 1996). Again, QSR NVivo qualitative research software was used to assist the process of thematic coding (QSR International, 1999). Those sections of text coded as involving 'emotional expressions' were subjected to a critical discursive psychological analysis of the type outlined and evidenced in chapters 3 and 453.

The construction of these interactions as occasions on which people 'did' emotions is necessarily *post hoc*. The speakers do not discursively orient to them as such, i.e., they do not discursively orient to the paralinguistic qualities of the interaction as potentially interpretable as constitutive of emotional expression. The discursive construction of an interaction as involving or as constituting an emotional episode is not necessarily accomplished simultaneously with that interaction; in realist terms, when people are 'emotional', they and the people around them do not necessarily discursively orient to them as such. In these excerpts, whilst the speakers do not orient *discursively* to the paralinguistic qualities of speech, they do orient to them *paralinguistically*; if one speaker shouts, then the other may respond by shouting. Thus, while the discursive content of the speech in these excerpts may not include reflexive orientations to the functions served by the paralinguistic features of speech, e.g., in the constitution of the interactional

53 The coding of particular sections of text as involving 'emotional expressions' was dependent on both my own interpretation of them as such and upon their representation as such within the context of the programme (see below for the contextualising information provided by the programmes' narrator).
context and the local moral orders upon which it is based, these functions are reflexively oriented to through changes in the paralinguistic features of speech. That said, on an anecdotal level, it is not difficult to imagine interactions in which such features may be oriented to discursively and an episode may be socially constructed as an emotional one as it is happening, e.g., if someone were shouting at you, an appropriate response may be "what are you getting angry at me for?" The act of labelling an episode as characterized by the expression of a particular emotion, such as 'anger', would then itself be amenable to interpretation as serving particular functions within the contemporary socio-cultural context.

That such reflexive discursive orientations do not occur within the following excerpts should not be seen as a limitation of the data or as warranting any claim that these interactions are not interpretable as 'emotional episodes'. I contend that the data highlight the 'fact' that the reflexive orientation to an action or interaction as involving or constituting an 'emotional expression' may occur at any location within a spatiotemporal matrix and may be accomplished through modes of communication other than the discursive. The implications of such an argument for discourse analytic techniques will be discussed after the analysis. For the time being, the limited capability for discourse analytic techniques to engage with modes of communication other than the discursive is an acknowledged shortcoming. Therefore, this chapter represents a tentative step towards the development of discourse analytic techniques so that they may encompass, interpret and be informed by such things as the paralinguistic features of speech.
The limitation of the scope of this analysis to the discursive content and paralinguistic features of an interaction results from the requirement for the data to be represented textually. Consequently, though contextualizing information is included and is drawn upon in one particular instance, it will not constitute a major focus of the analysis. I accept that 'emotional expressions' are constituted, or 'done', through combinations of non-verbal cues, paralinguistic features and the discursive content of talk. However, the inadequacies of textual representations of non-verbal behaviours and the concomitant requirement for those 'non-verbal behaviours' to be 'described' (see the above discussion of discursive psychology for an account of descriptions as attributions and therefore as not straightforward unproblematic representations of 'fact') mean that non-verbal behaviours are not unproblematically amenable to a text-based form of critical discursive psychological analysis. For this reason, the analysis will, for the most part, be limited to the relationship between the discursive content and the paralinguistic features of the excerpts.

That the paralinguistic features of speech are interpretable as constituting emotional expressions, and that distinct emotions can be distinguished according to the paralinguistic features of talk, is widely accepted within the positivist literature on emotions (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Frick, 1985; Kappas, Hess & Scherer, 1991; Pittam & Scherer, 1993; Scherer, 1986). On the paralinguistic features of speech alone, 'anger' is amongst the most easily recognised 'emotions' (Banse & Scherer, 1996). According to Banse and
Scherer (1996), 'anger' is characterized paralinguistically by increases in "mean F0 and mean energy" (p. 616). Increases in 'mean F0' and 'mean energy' roughly translate to audibly perceptible increases in the pitch and volume of speech.

Whilst research on the paralinguistic features of emotions is typically located within a positivist framework, it should not be assumed that paralinguistic features are necessarily theorised either as intrinsic to or as direct consequences of the 'physiological' experience of emotions. Banse and Scherer (1996) make the point that if emotion is theorised as a process rather than as a state, then the idea of unregulated 'expressions' is opened to contestation. Within this framework, 'emotional expressions', including the paralinguistic features of speech, are theorised as regulated responses oriented to "strategic action tendencies" (p.618). Whilst, the implied agency in the regulation of the paralinguistic constituents of emotional expression is incompatible with a poststructuralist approach, the idea that the form of 'emotional expression' is oriented to some specific aim, i.e., it is 'intended' to perform some interactional function, is appealing. Such functions may include the management of accountability or even the constitution of a gendered subjectivity.

Within this analysis, the paralinguistic features of talk will be interpreted as extra-discursive resources through which speakers take up emotion-based subject positions, without recourse to emotion terms. The analysis will, however, also focus on the simultaneously accomplished discursive work so
that an understanding of the possible functions served by the relationship between linguistic and paralinguistic resources at an interactional level might be arrived at.

Before moving to the analysis of the excerpts, the decision to focus on those emotional episodes interpretable as characterized by the expression of 'anger' must be accounted for. This decision was informed by a number of factors. As reported above, 'anger' is often represented as the prototypical masculine form of emotional expression (Shields, 1987). Indeed, whilst men and women are reported as 'experiencing' anger with similarly frequency, men are reported as 'expressing' anger more frequently than women (Fabes & Martin, 1991). Also, the expression of 'anger' is regarded as constitutive of and as dependent upon individuals' locations within power relations (Averill, 1982; Crawford, et al., 1992; Shields, 2002). For Shields (2002), the question of who is entitled to express anger, considering the functions that it serves in the constitution of power relations, is answerable by recourse to gender.

Anger per se is not a masculine prerogative; rather, a sense of entitlement is a masculine prerogative, and anger is the outcome of violations (or anticipated violations) of those entitlements. Power is the capacity to get what one wants, to achieve one's own goals. The use of power is aimed at restoring, maintaining, or acquiring what one values. Where gender is concerned, what is at stake is the status quo of social arrangements that inequitably benefit one sex over the other. (p.146; emphases in original)
According to this framework, men 'do' anger when their entitlements and dominant positions within structures of power relations are implicitly or explicitly threatened and their 'doing' of anger should function in defence of or in the maintenance of those entitlements and positions. Given that these interactions contained in the excerpts below occur within the context of heterosexual relationships and involve not only 'men' but 'women' 'doing anger', there is scope for the analysis to orient to any differences between male and female speakers in the functions served by their 'doing' of anger. Indeed, whilst the analysis will, in line with the aims of the thesis, be, for the most part, concerned with the functions served by the male speakers' 'doing' of anger, it will also provide a complementary account of the functions served by female speakers' 'doing' of anger.

The theorizing of women's relationship with the expression of 'anger' can be seen as the reciprocal of men's relationship with the expression of emotions other than anger. Simply, where male emotional expressivity, particularly through 'crying', is antithetical to the performance of masculinity, female expression of 'anger' has been theorized as antithetical to the performance of femininity. At least, the requirement for women to 'do' femininity — and this assumes compulsory heterosexuality — in a way that is complementary to masculinity, including the acceptance of subordinate positions within gendered power relations, is invoked to account for women's reported lower frequency of expression of 'anger' and for women's reporting of the suppression of anger (Hochschild, 1983; Lerner, 1977; Stearns & Stearns, 1986).
As a result of their engagement with 'memories' of 'anger' episodes, Crawford et al. (1992) argued that differing social representations of 'anger' existed that were contingent upon the sex of the angry person and that women's expression of anger differed markedly from men's. Specifically, they argued that "men's anger is often accompanied by violence, whereas women's is not. The absence of violence on the part of the actor in almost all of our memories involving anger provides support for the suggestion that the equation of anger with violence is not present for women. (We use ‘violence’ to refer to physical aggression) (p.180). Women’s relative powerlessness was advanced as determining both their 'experiencing' of anger as frustration and their 'expression' of anger as marked by the absence of physical aggression (for a challenge to this view of women as non-aggressive see White and Kowalski, 1994). Invoking Averill (1992), Crawford et al. argued that “the connection between anger and aggression that characterizes much anger by men is much more likely to be found in anger directed towards inferiors – either social or physical" (1992, p.183).

Within this framework, the form of expression of anger – the way in which it is 'done' – and the functions that it serves are contingent upon the position that an actor occupies within the local structure of power relations. If we do not assume that the sexes of actors are necessarily determinate of those positions, then ‘anger’ is amenable to analysis as a resource that is available to speakers according to their position in the local moral order and structure of power relations, which may be determined by a good many things other than
their sex. Consequently, the positions occupied by individuals within local moral orders and structures of power relations, are made evident through their negotiation in episodes of 'anger'.

6.4 Analysis

Given that the analysis will draw upon more information than is available from the excerpts alone, each excerpt will be framed by contextualising information. The provision of this information mirrors the explicit provision of information that occurred throughout each programme. Within the context of the television programme, this contextualising information is interpreted as constituting a basis for the audience's interpretations of the actions and events that are subsequently depicted. Consequently, because this information has inevitably influenced my interpretations, I will provide as much information as is relevant to inform readings of both the excerpt and the analysis.

Nicola and Matt

The following information is provided by the narrator:

"This week's couple are twenty six year old Nicola and twenty two year old Matt. They have been together for six years and have a five year old son Christian. Nicola and Matt are thinking of getting married, but first they want an expert opinion on whether or not they are made for each other. Nicola spends much of her day round at her parents looking after them, doing the shopping and running Christian to and from school. Matt is currently unemployed. After two weeks of analysis, it's obvious Matt spends much of his time on the
Even in the evenings when they can be together he's on the Internet for up to four hours a night."

With regard to the transcription notation system for this excerpt, the use of upper case characters signifies not only speech of higher volume than the preceding speech but speech that is shouted.

**Excerpt 1**

((CCTV footage: to begin, the couple are stood in the lounge; the soundtrack to this footage is overdubbed with the narrator's following comments)).

347 **Narrator:** Matt's still waiting for confirmation of his new job but tensions in the relationship explode into violence over a huge telephone bill. ((The couple then move into the dining room and stand at or move around the table. The soundtrack is restored as the couple move into the dining room))

349 **Matt:** right with BT we can't get it back until we pay the full bill (.) because you couldn't be bothered to pay (.) and they ((Matt is hit in the face by an object thrown by Nicola)) =

352 **Nicola:** 'CAUSE I COULDN'T BE BOTHERED TO PAY [(inaudible)]

353 **Matt:** DON'T THROW IT AT ME (.) WHAT? (.) NO YOU WERE SUPPOSED TO PAY on the =

356 **Nicola:** I'M NOT PAYING IT =

357 **Matt:** YOU'RE NOT PAYING IT RIGHT WELL WE HAVEN'T GOT [BT THEN

359 **Nicola:** I'M WITH ONETEL TOUGH YOU DON'T GET THAT ((points at the computer)) GOOD =

361 **Matt:** OK YOU CAN'T GO ON ONETEL UNLESS YOU'VE GOT A BT LINE AND WE DON'T HAVE A BT LINE (.) SO DON'T START

363 THROWING THINGS AT ME NICOLA =
From this point on, the analysis of all three excerpts is predicated on one primary assumption, that the majority of the paralinguistic qualities of the interactions are interpretable as constituting the performance of 'anger'. That is to say, it is qualities such as these that may at some later time be referenced in accounts of these interactions as characterised by the expression of anger.

The paralinguistic qualities, interpretable as constituting the performance of 'anger', coincide with a discussion on the topic of responsibility for the payment, non-payment and generation of a phone bill. Matt’s opening turn (lines 349-350) involves an explicit act of first order positioning (Harré & van
Langenhove, 1992) that occasions the discursive negotiation of positions of responsibility. The change in the paralinguistic qualities of Nicola's speech and her non-verbal behaviour (the throwing of the object at Matt)\(^{54}\) are also interpreted as occasioned by and responses to Matt's act of positioning. Matt's turn begins benignly enough with a construction of his and Nicola's joint responsibility for the phone bill and for the consequences of non-payment—"right with BT we can't get it back until we pay the full bill" (line 349). However, following a brief pause, Matt then explicitly positions Nicola as singularly responsible for the payment of the bill—"because you couldn't be bothered to pay" (lines 349-350). This utterance is more than a simple renegotiation of the locus of responsibility; the utterance has the illocutionary force (Austin, 1962) of an accusation. Matt positions Nicola as wilfully negligent of her singularly held responsibility for the payment of the bill. In doing so, he disavows any responsibility for the payment of the bill.

Nicola responds to this act of first order positioning in three ways: non-verbally, paralinguistically and discursively. Consequently, an interpretation of the function served by the content of any one of these modes of communication should be informed by an interpretation of the other two. This particularly applies to the discursive response, which is potentially interpretable as only a

\(^{54}\) My reporting that "Matt is hit in the face by an object thrown by Nicola" could have been accomplished in myriad different ways. This point is evidenced by a comparison of my reporting of the incident and that of the programme's narrator: "tensions in the relationship explode into violence over a huge telephone bill" (lines 347-348).
restatement of Matt’s accusation/act of positioning but re-formulated in the first person – "'CAUSE I COULDN'T BE BOTHERED TO PAY" (line 352). However, combined with the non-verbal and paralinguistic features, the utterance functions as, if not a resistance of the ascribed subject position as wilfully negligent, an orientation to the act of positioning as unjust and as resulting in an affected subjectivity; i.e., one that could subsequently be constructed as characterised by 'anger' at Matt's accusation/act of positioning.

Non-verbal, paralinguistic and discursive modes of communication are now contextually available resources through which Nicola and Matt may negotiate their subject positions and subjectivities. Any or all of these resources could be taken up by either speaker within the interaction and equally the use of any or all of them could be explicitly oriented to. Both these possibilities are evident in Matt's turn at lines 353-355. He takes up the paralinguistic features of Nicola's preceding speech, discursively orients to Nicola's non-verbal behaviour and reiterates his primary act of positioning of Nicola as responsible for the non-payment of the phone bill. That Matt responds paralinguistically is interpreted as a response to being positioned, by both Nicola's non-verbal and paralinguistic cues, as the determinant of her affected subjectivity and as constitutive of his own consequently affected subjectivity. Matt effectively 'does angry' as a response to Nicola's 'anger'. Both speakers are interpretable as concerned with warranting their entitlement to 'do anger'. For Nicola, her entitlement is based on Matt's 'unjust' positioning of her, whereas Matt's entitlement is based on his unwarranted positioning as the object of 'anger' and aggression.
It is worth noting that, in this interaction, the non-verbal behaviour constructed by the narrator as an explosion of "violence" is directed by a female speaker against a male speaker. This contrasts with Crawford et al.'s (1992) contention that physical aggression was typically absent from women's expression of anger. One possible account for why Nicola does anger in a way that is potentially gender atypical is that the power relations that are assumed to be a precondition for the absence of physical aggression from women's expressions of anger are not present in this instance. Simply, Nicola 'does' aggression because she occupies the position of the dominant partner. Consequently, Matt's subsequent attempt to construct Nicola's aggression as an illegitimate form of expression of anger is interpretable as both an appeal to gender typicality and an attempt to proscribe any further such actions from the interactional context.

Following from Matt's reiteration of his primary act of positioning in lines 354-355, Matt and Nicola engage in a negotiation of subject positions relative to the topic of responsibility. This is accomplished through speech that is characterised by high mean energy (Banse & Scherer, 1996), which is interpretable as constitutive of affected subjectivities. It is through the paralinguistic qualities of speech that speakers invest their utterances with the weight of their affected subjectivities. Nicola's disavowal of responsibility for the payment of the phone bill, in line 356, occasions a restatement of her subject position by Matt, in line 357. Discursive orientations to acts of positioning seem to be a recursive and integral part of this interaction. Positions are taken up and then explicitly oriented to as the basis for further
argument. The acts of positioning are, simultaneous with the discussion of the payment/non-payment and the consequences of the non-payment, themselves the topic of discourse. Further, given the paralinguistic features of the talk, it can be argued that the acts of positioning are oriented to as the determinants of affected subjectivities. 'Doing angry' is simultaneously an orientation to an act of positioning, constitutive of an affected subjectivity and a negotiation of the right to speak from that subjectivity. The question, with regards to the thesis, is: is Matt's doing of 'angry' interpretable either as done relative to or as constitutive of the performance of masculinity?

In line 357, Matt is interpreted as simultaneously 'doing anger' (paralinguistically) and 'doing' rational (discursively) through the construction of the consequence that will follow from Nicola's refusal to pay the phone bill. This might be interpreted as constituting the performance of masculinity if it were not for Nicola's ability to match Matt for the invocation of 'rational' arguments. Invoking her ability to access "ONETEL", an alternative to the use of a BT line, Nicola makes tenable her positioning as refusing to pay the BT bill. In the same line (line 359), Nicola introduces another topic, related to the phone bill, in relation to which she further constructs an affected subjectivity. From the information provided by the narrator and from rest of the programme, we, the viewers, are aware that Matt spends a good deal of time on the Internet. His potential inability to do so – "TOUGH YOU DON'T GET THAT" – as a consequence of the loss of the BT line is oriented to by Nicola as constitutive of a positively affected subjectivity – "GOOD". Through the invocation of this topic, Nicola is able to construct an outcome of the non-
payment of the phone bill and of her disavowal of responsibility for it that has positive implications for her subjectivity.

Matt’s next turn (lines 361-363) is comprised of two seemingly unrelated parts. His ‘rational’ counter to Nicola’s ‘rational’ argument – “OK YOU CAN’T GO ON ONETEL UNLESS YOU’VE GOT A BT LINE AND WE DON’T HAVE A BT LINE” (lines 362-362) – is consequentially linked to a reorientation to Nicola’s prior non-verbal behaviour – “(. ) SO DON’T START THROWING THINGS AT ME NICOLA” (lines 362-363). Nicola’s act of ‘throwing things’ is linked to a discursive undermining of her ‘rationality’. Matt positions Nicola as ‘irrational’, in both her non-verbal and verbal actions. If we incorporate our knowledge of the context of this interaction, that these are male and female speakers, engaged in a negotiation of subject positions and subjectivities within a heterosexual relationship, then the invocation of ‘rationality’ by the male speaker as a means of undermining the positioning and subjectivity of the female speaker, effectively positioning her as ‘irrational’, is interpretable as an instantiation of ‘traditional’ gender relations. The male speaker does ‘masculinity’ through the invocation of ‘rationality’ and in doing so marginalizes the positioning and subjectivity of the female speaker. The interpretation that gender is being done here is bolstered by Matt’s referring to Nicola by name at the end of his turn. This is interpreted as an explicit instantiation of a sex/gender dynamic. Forenames index the embodied, and therefore the sexed and gendered, subjectivities of speakers. Nicola’s embodied ‘femininity’ is invoked as a discursive resource in the accomplishment of her marginalization.
Nicola’s positively affected subjectivity, regarding Matt’s loss of Internet access, proves to be highly resilient. Rather than orienting to the undermining of her positioning as unaffected by the loss of the BT line, Nicola maintains her positioning as appreciative of the negative implications that the loss of the line has for Matt. Her positively affected subjectivity continues to be a useful and valued discursive resource – "GOOD you can’t go on Internet" (line 364). Over the succeeding turns, lines 365-379, the issue of Matt’s use of the Internet is firmly established as the topic. Most importantly, the establishment of Matt’s Internet use as the topic leads to a further negotiation of the subject positions of the speakers relative to the topic of responsibility for the phone bill, this time in terms of its generation.

In line 376, following from a discussion of the amount of time Matt spends on the Internet, there is a change in the paralinguistic features of Nicola’s voice: she starts shouting again – "yeah you are YOU’VE RUN THAT BILL UP f". It is significant that the change in the paralinguistic features of Nicola’s speech coincides with her positioning of Matt as responsible for the generation of the phone bill. This resource – Matt’s positioning as responsible for the generation of the phone bill – warrants Nicola’s earlier positioning as not responsible for the payment of the bill and her constituted negatively affected subjectivity at being positioned by Matt as wilfully negligent. As such, the utterance through which she renegotiates responsibility for the bill is invested, through its paralinguistic features, with the full weight of her negatively affected subjectivity.
Throughout this excerpt, changes in the paralinguistic features of talk were demonstrably occasioned by acts of positioning, which were oriented to discursively in subsequent turns as unwarranted or unjust. Furthermore, the paralinguistic features were themselves argued to constitute negotiations of the relational subject positions of the speakers, i.e., the paralinguistic features of speech were argued to be constitutive of the performance of affected subjectivities. The instantiations of these affected subjectivities are themselves interpreted as negotiations of speakers’ rights or entitlements within the local interactional context and therefore as constitutive of the local structure of power relations. Thus, Nicola and Matt are seen to negotiate their respective positions in the local structure of power relations, and indeed to constitute the nature of that structure, through both discursive and paralinguistic modes of communication. Importantly, these modes are demonstrably linked. The discursive content of speech and the implications that it has in terms of the provision of subject positions may be oriented to either discursively or paralinguistically. In this excerpt, the only evidence to suggest that this relationship, between discursive and extra-discursive resources, may operate in the other direction is Matt’s orientation to Nicola’s non-verbal behaviour. The paralinguistic features of speech are only oriented to paralinguistically.

This excerpt also supported an analysis in which the relational subject positions between the speakers were interpretable as being accomplished through resources that are ‘traditionally’ gendered. Matt’s use of ‘rationality’ as a resource to undermine Nicola’s positioning and affected subjectivity, as well as his questioning of the legitimacy of the form of her ‘expression’ of anger,
were all interpretable as constituting the performance of 'masculinity'.

However, Nicola also did 'anger' and 'rational', plus she did 'aggressive' and her paralinguistically demonstrable affected subjectivity was longer lived than Matt's. Consequently, my feeling is that the interpretation of discursive resources as 'gendered', either on the basis of an interpretative framework, within which certain resources are assumed to be amenable only to speakers of a particular sex on account of the functions that such resources serve in the constitution or maintenance of power relations, or on the basis of the 'gender' of the speaker, is thrown into question by such an interaction. In this very specific local context, the paralinguistic and discursive resources that constitute a position of dominance are drawn upon by a woman. In contrast, the next two excerpts are clearly interpretable as conforming to all the expectations regarding the gendered performance of emotions and the interactional functions that it may serve.

Victor and Della

With further reference to the limitations of these data, it is evident that the next excerpt is from a much longer interaction to which we the viewers, analysts and readers do not have access, owing to the editing requirements and practices of the programme makers. As can be seen from the line numbers, the excerpt is comprised of the transcripts of two segments of CCTV footage, which occurred non-consecutively in the programme. Thus, the excerpt is without a clear beginning or end and is also potentially missing a middle section. That said, what remains is still capable of supporting a gender sensitive analysis.
As with all the programmes in the series, contextualizing information was provided by the narrator. With regard to Victor and Della we were told: "Tonight's couple are Victor and Della. Della is forty and Victor is forty one. They've been married for sixteen years and have two teenage children, Ben and Amy. Victor and Della feel that after sixteen years their relationship has become a bit stale and want to breathe fresh life into it. Every day, before and after work, Della spends a minimum of two hours cleaning and on a Sunday she would clean from 11 in the morning to 11 at night. That's a total of 23 hours cleaning a week."

The narrator's opening comments, in lines 272-274, frame this interaction as concerned with the cleanliness of the house and the fact that responsibility for it falls exclusively to Della. The narrator's comment is far from impartial and constructs Della's cleaning as a recursive source of tension in her relationship with Victor. Throughout the programme – as can be seen in the full transcript contained in the appendix – Della's relationship with cleaning is represented as bordering on the obsessive-compulsive. Obviously, this representation marginalizes any other possible representation of why household tidiness is a source of tension in the relationship. Specifically, the construction of "Della's constant cleaning" absolves Victor of any responsibility. Based upon the content of Della's turns, an alternative construction of why tidiness should be such a source of tension would be concerned with 'Victor's constant untidiness'. My analysis must not be uncritically guided by the framing of the interaction by the narrator. Were it to be so important, analytic possibilities
regarding the functions served by Victor's turns would be elided; at worst, Victor's utterances could be interpreted as warranted by Della's 'obsessive cleaning'.

This excerpt demonstrates the importance of knowledge of the contexts in which data were generated to the interpretative process. Most significantly, this applies to the paralinguistic features of speech that are evident in the excerpt; Victor and Della do not speak so much as shout at each other. The interpretation of their shouting as constituting the performance of affected subjectivities should be mediated by our knowledge of the interactional context, specifically that Victor and Della are not always in the same room. Anecdotally, when people 'speak' to others who are not in the same room, it is common for them to shout simply in order to be heard. However, the discursive content of Victor's turns is certainly interpretable as constitutive of an affected subjectivity.

**Excerpt 2**

((CCTV Footage: Delia is shown standing in the lounge facing the kitchen area, she can be seen to be talking. Della makes several downward motions with her right hand as she is talking. However, the soundtrack to this section is overdubbed with the narrator's following comment))

272 Narrator: However in the second week Vanessa and Malcolm's concerns about this couple intensify as anger and resentment around Della's constant cleaning explode

275 Delia: LOOK AT IT THAT ALL OVER THE FLOOR ((downward motions
of right arm now interpretable as referring to the object lying on the floor))

THAT WELDING HELMET BAGS EXTRA SHOES THERE'S A
HUNDRED PAIRS OVER THERE AND YOU'RE BEING THE SAME AS
THEM =

Victor: [expletive beeped out] OFF =

Della: = I CAN'T KEEP CLEARING UP

[(CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene, the camera shot shows the lounge, neither Della nor Victor are visible but from the soundtrack it is obvious that they are elsewhere in the house)]

Della: IF I DIDN'T BRING 'EM IN THEY'D ROT OUT THERE =

Victor: = [expletive beeped out] F(beep)K OFF (inaudible) =

Della: = I JUST CAN'T HANDLE IT ANY MORE =

Victor: = SHUT UP =

Della: = I CAN'T (1.5) I CAN'T KEEP CLEARING UP AND PUTTING

THINGS AWAY IT'S REALLY DIFFICULT

In this analysis I would like to focus on Della's construction of her affected subjectivity and Victor's consequent and recursive refusal to engage with it. Particularly, I contend that this constitutes an instantiation of gendered subject positions and subjectivities. Through her turns, at lines 275-279, 281, 347, 349 and 351-352, Della positions herself relative to the topic of Victor's untidiness and in doing so negotiates a subjectivity that is consequently affected. The first feature of Della's turns that is worth noting is the constructed extent of Victor's untidiness and the consequent task with which she is faced. Della's use of an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) – "LOOK AT IT THAT ALL OVER THE FLOOR" – a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) – "THAT WELDING
HELMET BAGS EXTRA SHOES" – and a maximizing of quantity (Potter, 1996) – "THERE’S A HUNDRED PAIRS OVER THERE" – work up the constructed extent of Victor’s untidiness and consequently the size of the cleaning task with which she is faced. This extremitization warrants Della’s subsequent affective positioning relative to the task of keeping the house tidy.

With specific regard to the task of keeping the house tidy, two further features warrant mention. The first is Della’s positioning of Victor as "BEING THE SAME AS THEM" (lines 278-279). The third person pronoun in that utterance is interpreted as signifying the couple’s two children, whom we, the viewers, know about from the rest of the programme. Through constructing Victor’s behaviour as like that of the children, Della positions Victor as an unequal partner in terms of the performance of domestic chores and potentially undermines his adult status. This is interpretable as an instantiation of a discourse of ‘traditional’ gender inequality in terms of the division of responsibility for domestic chores. Thus, Della is interpretable as being subjected to this discourse and her subjectivity is therefore that of the disadvantaged female partner. This inequality is evident in the second significant feature where Della constructs a bottom line scenario to warrant her positioning as singularly responsible for domestic chores such as tidying – IF I DIDN’T BRING ‘EM IN THEY’D ROT OUT THERE (line 347).

More important, however, than the construction of inequality between Victor and Della, in terms of the performance of domestic chores, is the constructed consequences that this inequality has for Della’s subjectivity. Della invokes her
affected subjectivity as a resource in her recursive positioning as unable to continue within such an unequal status quo in lines 281, 349 and 351-352. This affected subjectivity subsequently functions as a determinant of the ‘difficulties’ with which Della claims she is faced. ‘Clearing up and putting things away’ are only difficult because of the effect that the inequality of responsibility has on Della’s subjectivity, not because of any difficulty intrinsic to the tasks themselves. Whilst the paralinguistic features of Della’s speech – the fact that she is shouting – are interpretable as a consequence of Della and Victor not being in the same room, it is also possible that they function to invest the discursive content of her speech with the weight of her affected subjectivity. If the paralinguistic features of Della’s speech are interpreted as ‘doing anger’, then it is very like ‘anger’ of the type described by Crawford et al. (1992) as typical of those who are disempowered and consequently typical of women.

[A]nger arising out of a sense of powerlessness ... is a response to strong judgements about unfairness, injustice which remains unresolved. Under these circumstances, if anger is expressed it is likely to provoke in the more powerful...angry reactions to having their power challenged (p.183).

Arguably, this description is supported by Victor’s contributions to this interaction, which are, to say the least, limited by comparison. Victor has three turns, at lines 280, 348 and 350; each consists of a phrase the only interpretable function of which is to close down the topic or end the interaction.
altogether and all of which are characterized by paralinguistic features that are interpretable as 'doing anger'. On two occasions the phrase contains an expletive, which, owing to the time at which the programme was aired, was beeped out. On the first occasion, line 280, the sound quality does not support any estimation of what the expletive might have been. On the second occasion, line 348, the /f/ and /k/ phonemes can be clearly heard; hence the expletive beeped out is assumed to be "FUCK". Though there are alternatives to "fuck" in the construction of directive phrases, such a "piss", "sod" and "bugger", none of these would warrant being beeped out. We might therefore reasonably assume that in line 280 Victor shouted "FUCK OFF" at Della.

Whether or not "FUCK OFF" is a verb phrase is a matter of some dispute. Dong (1971) argues that there are two words of the form 'fuck' and only the one meaning 'to fornicate' functions as a verb. The other, as might be used in such phrases as 'fuck you' or 'fuck off', Dong categorises as a 'quasi-verb'. I contend that we can interpret Victor's use of 'fuck off' as attempts to close down the interaction, based both on our social and cultural understanding of the occasions on which the phrase 'fuck off' is used and on Victor's subsequent use of the verb phrase "SHUT UP". Victor is positioned as refusing to engage with the topic of his own untidiness, the topic of the unequal division of domestic chores and the issue of his wife's consequently affected subjectivity. Further, his refusal to engage with these topics and issues is invested with the weight of his own affected subjectivity. Victor effectively does anger as a way of closing down these topics and issues and maintaining his position within the local structure of power relations.
As was apparent in the preceding excerpt, Victor and Della's relationship is often strained, to say the least, and the issue of responsibility for household chores is represented as the source of this tension. Through the following excerpt, Victor and Della negotiate subject positions and affected subjectivities relative to each other. These subject positions and affected subjectivities are negotiated relative to the topic of responsibility for household chores on Della's part and through the implicitly constituted 'nagging wife' discourse on Victor's part. Again, given the traditional division of domestic responsibilities within heterosexual relationships, this interaction is interpretable as highly gendered. This excerpt also involves a greater range of paralinguistic features than any of the other three excerpts and interpretations of the possible functions served by these features will be advanced in light of the discursive content of the utterance. The paralinguistic features of discourse are assumed to be linked to the content of discourse and to mediate or at least affect its meaning and/or function.

**Excerpt 3**

((CCTV footage of Victor and Della sat at opposite ends of a three-seater sofa. Della is reading the paper and Victor is watching television))

365 Della: *why aren't you talking to me?* =
366 Victor: = *cause there's no point in talking to you*
367 Della: = *why?*
368 Victor: = *cause all you do is have a bloody go at me*
369 Della: = *I'm stressed*
370 Victor: = *no YOU STRESS ME OUT. I'M ALRIGHT UNTIL YOU COME HOME*
Della: = you just =
Victor: = YOU MOAN AT STUPID LITTLE THINGS =
Della: = you don’t put things away Vic and it feels [like
Victor: WHAT?

((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene. However, the camera angle changes to the far end of the room. Vic is seen to leave the sofa and move towards the kitchen area.))

Della: (inaudible) like I say and leave everything to me =
Victor: = everything to you =
Della: = yeah everything =
Victor: = like what? =
Della: = everything =
Victor: = LIKE WHAT? =
Della: = EVERYTHING =
Victor: = LIKE WHAT? =
Della: = JUST EVERYTHING =
Victor: = WHAT'S EVERYTHING? =
Della: = just everything =
Victor: = WHAT'S EVERYTHING? =
Della: = (fuck) just go to bed Vic =
Victor: = WELL LIKE WHAT? =
Della: = just go to bed it's normal for you innit? =
Victor: = ((seen to slam a pad of paper and a pen down on the breakfast bar))
NO I'M SICK OF SEEING YOU =
Della: = no it's normal =
Victor: = BEING A SHI- AN ARSEHOLE [all the time
Della: = NO:: YOU GO TO BED EVERY NIGHT LAST NIGHT YOU HAD AN 'EADACHE AND YOU JUST [WENT TO BED

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The structure of the excerpt and the interaction lend themselves to an analysis consisting of three parts. The first part will be concerned with lines 365-375, involving the initiation of the interaction by Della, the negotiation of the right to occupy the position of ‘victim’ and the paralinguistic features that characterise this negotiation. The second part will be concerned with the apparent tit-for-tat turn sequence of lines 387 to 401 and the escalation of the paralinguistic features involved in that sequence. The final part will be concerned with lines 402 to 421 in which Victor constructs an account of Della’s ‘nagging’ as both normative and neurotic.

The excerpt begins with Della’s question to Victor – “why aren’t you talking to me?”. Though the utterance has the grammatical form of a question, it serves numerous other rhetorical and interactional functions. Firstly, the utterance
constructs Victor and Della's contemporary relationship, within the above described contemporary context, as characterised by an absence of verbal communication. Secondly, it positions Victor as responsible for the absence of verbal communication and, since it takes the form of a question, invites him to account for this position. It should be noted that I am not claiming that there is an entire absence of communication; as Watzlawick et al. (1968) argued, "if it is accepted that all behavior in an interactional situation has message value, i.e., is communication, it follows that no matter how one may try, one cannot not communicate" (pp.48-49; italics in original). This contention is supported by Della's turn, which is interpreted as an orientation to the communicative functions of the absence of verbal communication on Victor's part; that she invites Victor to account for his lack of verbal communication presupposes that it is in some way intentional and communicative. Further, given the relational component of the question, Victor's account must also be relational; Victor is required to give a response that is, at least in part, a negotiation of his and Della's contemporary relational subject positions. In effect, the question functions as both an accusation and invitation.

In terms of this analysis, the fact that the question is delivered through speech that is lower in volume than Della's 'normal' speech must also be attended to. The lowered volume of speech is interpreted as 'softening' the delivery of the utterance. Particularly I contend that it functions to mediate against the interpretation of the question as an accusation. Further, by mediating against this possibility, the lowered volume also functions as a negotiation of relational subjectivities. That is to say, Della is not 'heard' to be speaking from a position
from which she assumes the right to make accusations. Indeed, I interpret the lowered volume as constituting the subjectivity of the accused, a possibility that is implicit in Della’s question; Victor’s communicative silence is constructed as an implicit accusation.

These various rhetorical and interactional possibilities can be seen to be played out through the subsequent turns. Most importantly, Victor takes up the position as ‘purposefully not talking to Della’ and accounts for it — "'cause there’s no point in talking to you" (line 366). The emphasis that Victor places on this utterance is interpreted as constituting the performance of an affected subjectivity; the discursive content is invested with a subjectivity that is affected by contemporary relations with Della. However, this account is oriented to by Della, in her subsequent turn, as insufficient and occasions a second "why?" question. Victor’s response to this question is interpreted as an invocation of the ‘nagging wife’ discourse — "'cause all you do is have a bloody go at me" (line 368). Victor positions himself as the ‘victim’ of Della’s nagging and draws upon this position to account for his purposeful silence; by not talking to Della, Victor provides no opportunities for her to "have a bloody go at" him.

Significantly, Della does not resist being positioned within the ‘nagging wife’ discourse. Rather, she accepts being positioned as such and accounts for it — "I’m stressed" (line 369). This act of positioning, through the invocation of the discursive resource of "stress", is the trigger for what could subsequently be interpreted and constructed as the performance of ‘anger’ by Victor. Again, Della’s speech has the paralinguistic quality of lowered volume and there is
also emphasis on the word "stressed". Analysed on its discursive content alone, this utterance is nothing more than an act of first order reflexive positioning; as such it is unclear why it should warrant such tentative delivery. However, the utterance must be interpreted in light of the interactional context. Further, the subject positions that it constitutes should be interpreted in light of the accountability work that they perform. Della's positioning as "stressed" is located in a rhetorical and interactional context within which she has to account for her constructed behaviour towards Victor.

If subject positions are implicitly relational then one interpretation of Della's occupation of the position as "stressed" is that Victor is consequently positioned as the 'stressor'. These turns are therefore interpretable as a negotiation of the right to occupy the position of 'victim'. Victor explicitly positioned himself as the subject, and 'victim', of Della's nagging. In response, in accounting for her constructed behaviour, Della's positioning as stressed and her implicit positioning of Victor as the 'stressor' constitute a renegotiation of relational subject positions in which she, rather than Victor, occupies the position of the 'victim'. Finally, as a negotiation of accountability, Della's positioning as "stressed" must also be interpreted as constitutive of an affected subjectivity; that is to say, Della accounts for her 'nagging' by constructing it as a consequence of an affected 'stressed' subjectivity. Subjective states and affected subjectivities function as discursive resources in the interactional negotiation of accountability.
As stated above, Della's positioning as "stressed" occasions the paralinguistic features that are interpretable as Victor 'doing anger'. Victor resists both Della's positioning as "stressed" and his implicit positioning as the 'stressor' — "no YOU STRESS ME OUT" (line 370). The paralinguistic features, the emphasis on "no" and the subsequent increase in the volume, are concurrent with Victor's negotiation of the right to occupy the position as the 'victim' of Della's behaviour. The right to occupy the position of 'victim' is, from the paralinguistic features of his speech, one in which Victor is heavily affectively invested. Certainly, challenges to his occupation of that position meet with utterances that are interpretable as constitutive of an affected subjectivity. We must assume that there is some currency in or function served by the occupation of the position of 'victim' and that a range of resources, not all of them discursive, may be invoked in the defence of that position. One possible interpretation of the currency of the position of 'victim' is provided by Crawford et al. (1992) (for a similar interpretation of anger, see Warner, 1986).

The out-of-control aspect of anger is engendered at least in part by a feeling of victimization and the failure of the other person in an angry interchange to acknowledge the victim's status as victim. (p.174)

Crawford et al. use 'victim' not to construct an individual as “helpless” but as one "who is or perceives themselves to be aggrieved [or] wronged in some way" (1992, p.174). In this interaction, the position of 'victim' is contested because it both warrants and accounts for the constitution of an affected 'angry' subjectivity.
In the remaining part of his turn, lines 370-371, Victor explicitly positions Della as the determinant of his affected 'stressed' subjectivity. This act of positioning is warranted by Victor's clear invocation of discursive resources that may be categorized as constituting the 'nagging wife' discourse — "YOU MOAN AT STUPID LITTLE THINGS" (line 373). The construction of Della's concerns as trivial further works up Della's positioning within the 'nagging wife' discourse and further warrants both Victor's occupation of the position as the 'victim' and his right to speak from an affected subjectivity. Victor's invocation of the 'nagging wife' discourse and his trivialization of Della's concerns and subjectivity must be interpreted as constitutive of gender power relations. Through them Victor, though he claims to speak from the position of the 'victim', is able to marginalize and subordinate Della. If we accept that the discursive constituents of patriarchal ideology are invoked and played out in the day-to-day 'realities' of the lives of men and women, particularly those in heterosexual relationships, this is perhaps an empirical example of what such interactions might look like.

It is perhaps stating the obvious to claim that relational subject positions, such as 'the nagging wife' and the 'long suffering husband', are heavily invested by the institution of patriarchy with power relations that favour the male partner. What occurs in this context is interpretable as a negotiation of the affected subjectivities of the speakers relative to each other but not a negotiation of the existent power relations between the speakers, which appear to be determined by nothing more than gender. Della does 'submissive but nagging wife' and Victor does 'dominant but long suffering husband'. That the possible
paradoxical natures of these positions are never oriented to is interpretable as evidence of the ubiquity and insidiousness of gender and gender power relations within heterosexual relations. The interpretation that these are the positions taken up by Victor and Della also potentially accounts for the way in which they paralinguistically negotiate the position of ‘victim’. Victor’s dominance entitles him to ‘do’ anger in a powerful way, whereas Della’s subordinate position precludes the possibility of doing ‘anger’ to work up her status as ‘victim’.

Though the length of the edit is uncertain, I interpret the turns beginning at line 387 as following relatively shortly after Victor’s interruption at line 375 and I interpret Della’s affected subjectivity as still the topic of discussion. Though the line numbers are suggestive of a lengthier edit, they are an artefact of the editing of the programme, in which reflective footage of the two experts watching the CCTV footage was interspersed with the CCTV footage of Victor and Della. Lines 388 to 401 consist of seven consecutive question-answer pairs (Sacks, 1992), five of which are basically the same. These five question-answer pairs follow from what is interpreted as Della’s construction of her subjectivity – that she feels that Victor leaves everything to her (line 387). Della’s use of the extreme case formulation "everything" in the construction of her subjectivity provides Victor with a resource by which he can effectively close down this topic. Victor makes "everything" the topic. Victor’s questions, beginning with "everything to you", orient to Della’s use of "everything" as a matter-of-fact claim about the day-to-day division of household chores. Since Victor’s questions are requests for objective specificity on the topic of individual
responsibilities, they can in no way be interpreted as engagements with the topic of Della’s subjectivity. Whilst Victor attempts to close down the topic of Della’s subjectivity, Della resists this move through the restatement of the extreme case formulation “everything”.

Over the five similar question-answer pairs (lines 388 to 397), there are commensurate changes in the paralinguistic qualities of Victor and Della’s speech – from normal speech to emphasized speech to shouting. This escalation is initiated by Victor (lines 390 and 392). The changes in the paralinguistic qualities of Della’s speech are occasioned by those of Victor’s speech. Morally, both Victor and Della are entitled to ‘do angry’ as a response to the other’s persistent refusal to engage with their own topic. The impasse, constituted by their refusal to engage with the other’s topic and their reciprocal and equivalent performances of affected subjectivities, is only resolved when Della gives way on both counts. Della is the first to stop shouting (line 397) and subsequently abandons the topic of her subjectivity – “(fuck) just go to bed Vic” (line 399). This is interpreted as an attempt to close down both her own and Victor’s topics and consequently to end the interaction. However, Victor maintains his topic for just one more turn (line 400) and has the ‘last word’. It could be argued that there is a moral currency attached to this. By appearing still to be willing to talk on what he oriented to as the topic, Victor may be interpreted as doing ‘reasonable’. An alternative interpretation, may see Victor as doing ‘obdurate’ and Della as doing ‘calming’ or ‘defusing’. Either way, it is Della who surrenders the topic.
The turns between line 387 and line 401 show a clear negotiation of subject positions, subjectivities and power relations. This process of negotiation is demonstrably simultaneously accomplished through both the paralinguistic and discursive features of speech. In these lines, the invocation and escalation of paralinguistic features, interpretable as constitutive of the performance of 'anger', is led by the male partner. However, given that both speakers could be argued to do 'anger' in ways that are roughly equivalent, we might question the extent to which the outcome of the interaction – Della's submission – is at all dependent upon the performance of emotions. Indeed, I would argue that the eventual outcome – the apparent dominance of the male speaker over the female speaker, of the objective over the subjective and of the rational over the affective – is a consequence of the discursive resources invoked rather than the paralinguistic features that are also evident.

The discursive resources that are shown to be hegemonic in this instance advantage the male speaker. The question that should be asked is: are such resources hegemonic because they are invoked by a male speaker? Or are there other reasons why these might be 'winning' resources? One possible argument would be that certain resources are hegemonic because they are resources that are constitutive of and function in the maintenance of patriarchal ideology. They constitute culturally 'winning arguments' precisely because they are the resources that are invoked in the maintenance of male power and privilege and are therefore culturally privileged resources. As such, these discursive resources could be argued to be gendered, as masculine. However, this argument is based upon one simple ontological presupposition, men's
dominance over women. While this presupposition may, from feminist perspective, be a "reality that should not be denied" (Edwards, et al., 1995, p.26; emphasis in original), there must surely be some question as to whether it properly can or should form the basis of an interpretative framework in a social constructionist analysis, unless, the interpretative framework is represented not as based upon the known status of ontological reality but as a theory of how gender and gender power relations might be organised.

In the final section of the excerpt, lines 401-422, what was originally interpreted as an attempt to close down the interaction — ".(fuck) just go to bed Vic" (line 399) — is developed into a topic — "just go to bed it's normal for you innit?" (line 401). Victor's subsequent orientation to this construction of his normative behaviour clearly establishes it as the topic. However, Victor challenges the construction of his going to bed as 'normative' behaviour. Instead he implicitly constructs it as an agentically undertaken consequence of an affected subjectivity; this affected subjectivity is, of course, constructed in relation to Della and her subject position within the 'nagging wife discourse' — "NO I'M SICK OF SEEING YOU" (line 403). Over the remainder of the excerpt, Victor and Della maintain their respective subject positions relative to the topic of the times at which Victor goes to bed. Della maintains her construction that this is normative behaviour for Victor and in response Victor accounts for his alleged avoidance of Della by constructing her behaviour as normative and as 'neurotic'. It is Victor's turns, at lines 411, 413, 415 and 417-419, all of which are characterized by paralinguistic features that are interpretable as 'doing angry', which are of particular interest.
In line 411, Victor constructs one part of the 'choice' with which he claims to be routinely faced – "OR WHAT STAY HERE AND GET TOLD OFF ALL THE TIME" – the implicitly constituted other option being the thing for which he is accounting, his going to bed. In working up the constructed determinant of his affected subjectivity, being "TOLD OFF ALL THE TIME", Victor invokes an extreme case formulation, which is seized upon by Della in much the same way that Victor seized upon Della's use of an extreme case formulation in the construction of her subjectivity in lines 387-400. Della responds to Victor's use of the extreme case formulation with an exception – "I didn't tell you off last night" (line 412).

Victor employs a second extreme case formulation in line 413 – "NO YOU'RE ALWAYS HAVING A DIG" – and further constructs Della's behaviour as normative, rather than a response to any situational factors – "YOU DIGGED AS SOON AS YOU WALKED IN THE DOOR" (line 415). This construction of Della's behaviour as normative is fully developed in lines 417-419. Drawing upon the resource of reported thought, Victor constructs himself as agentically managing his subjectivity in the light of Della's behaviour. In this turn, Della's behaviour is constructed as not only normative but inevitable and as neurotic – "I THOUGHT 'RIGHT KEEP CALM I KNOW SHE'S GONNA GO CRAZY FOR SOME REASON' AND YOU FOUND ONE" (lines 417-419). That Victor's speech in this turn is interpretable as constitutive of an 'angry' subjectivity further warrants his construction of Della's behaviour as highly problematic; Victor is 'angry' despite his own best intentions and as a result of Della's
behaviour, her inability to appreciate the effect that it has and her subsequent attempts to position him as responsible for it. Again, though Victor positions himself as the 'victim' of Della's behaviour, the perlocutionary force of his utterances (Austin, 1962) and the fact that for the most part Della does not match the paralinguistic features of his speech – she does not 'do' anger in response to being positioned as 'normatively engaged in neurotic nagging' – do not suggest that he occupies a subordinate position within the power relations of this local interactional context.

Indeed, this part of the exchange, perhaps more than any other, is readily interpretable as an instantiation of 'traditional' or typically assumed gender power relations within heterosexual relationships. A man 'does anger' and in doing so positions his wife as the neurotic determinant of his 'anger'. Further, his anger is constructed as a 'passion', a force by which he is overcome despite his own best intentions and his exercise of agency, the result of which is the marginalization of his wife's discursive concerns and affected subjectivity and the maintenance of a local structure of power relations within which he is dominant. All of this is constructed as resulting not from him but from his wife's actions; her subordination is the result of her own unwarranted affected subjectivity and her attempts to position her husband as accountable.

Reciprocally, Della's 'doing of anger' is also highly consistent with what may be expected of a woman within the context of a heterosexual relationship, according to existent theories of the cultural structure of gender power relations (Crawford et al., 1992). Della's 'anger' is advanced as the result of
her frustration and marginalization and is strongly linked to her husband's refusal to engage with her own affected subjectivity, of which he is positioned as determinant.

6.5 Discussion

Firstly, I acknowledge that the transcription notation system used in the above excerpts is barely adequate to convey the complexities and subtleties of the paralinguistic features of human speech, simultaneous with conveying its discursive content. If discourse analytic techniques are to engage with the paralinguistic features of speech, as they must if we are to further examine 'emotional expression' in vivo, then a more sophisticated transcription notation system must be developed. However, I believe that the above excerpts still constitute an adequate resource for an initial engagement with the relationship between 'emotions' and 'gender' in 'real-life' interactions.

Across these three excerpts and two couples, very differing accounts of the functions served by 'doing anger' within the context of heterosexual relationships emerge. In both couples, both the male and female speakers are interpretable as 'doing anger'. In both couples, 'doing anger' is clearly seen to follow from and function in the renegotiation of ascribed subject positions. Within a local interactional context, 'doing anger' is demonstrably a means of negotiating the rights and entitlements of speakers to take up and ascribe particular subject positions. 'Doing anger' is demonstrably constitutive of individual subjectivities, local moral orders and local structures of power relations. How then does this analysis of episodes of anger in heterosexual
relationships answer the above research questions regarding the relationship between 'doing anger' and 'doing masculinity'?

Both Matt and Victor 'do angry' in response to challenges to and in defence of their entitlement to position others. Simultaneous with 'doing anger', both Matt and Victor 'do rational' as a way of undermining the subject positions of those speakers who challenge their rights and entitlements. Arguably, that both 'do anger' is interpretable as evidence that they do indeed occupy positions of dominance within the local interactional context (Crawford et al., 1992). That both 'do anger' and that their 'doing anger' serves the above-identified functions relative to speakers who occupy positions either as 'wife' or 'partner' within the context of heterosexual relationships, is interpretable as constituting the performance of masculinities (Connell, 1995). Both Matt and Victor may be interpreted as 'doing hegemonic masculinity', except for the fact that in Matt's case it doesn't ensure his position of dominance within the local interactional context. It is the contrast between the two couples and their interactions that constitutes the basis for the most productive arguments.

In excerpt 1, Nicola 'does anger' and 'does physical aggression' in way that may be interpretable as based on particular rights and entitlements that follow from and are constitutive of her dominant position within the local interactional context. Given the form of expression of anger, the presumption of rights and entitlements and the inferred organisation of the local structure of power relations, should we then assume that Nicola is 'doing masculinity'? I contend that this question lies at the heart of critical discursive psychological analyses.
Based upon the presence of discursive resources and configurations of power relations that are assumed to be gendered, as masculine, at the cultural level, do we impose that framework to make sense of the micro-textual level?

Undeniably, Nicola and Matt are engaged in the negotiation of power relations, rights and entitlements, but should this demonstrable process necessarily be interpreted as constitutive of the performance of gender? I would say not. There are occasions on which Matt 'does masculinity', for example when he invokes Nicola's embodied status as sexed and gendered in the proscription of her physical aggression towards him – "SO DON'T START THROWING THINGS AT ME NICOLA" (lines 362-363). For the remainder of the excerpt, I would say that he and Nicola draw equally on a range of discursive and extra-discursive resources in the negotiation of power relations, which ultimately benefits Nicola. Neither the resources nor the positions taken up by speakers are necessarily gendered, nor should they be interpreted as necessarily gendered, at the micro-textual level.

Similarly, while excerpts 2 and 3 appear to confirm all predications about the ways by which anger may be 'done' by male and female speakers within the context of heterosexual relationships, this should not be interpreted as evidence that Victor and Della 'do' masculinity and 'femininity' respectively. Nor should the resultant configuration of power relations and its resemblance to 'the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women' (Connell, 1995, p.77) be imposed as an interpretative framework to
argue that through ‘doing anger’ in the way that he does, Victor does hegemonic masculinity.

As extra-discursive resources, constituted through paralinguistic and non-verbal behaviours, ‘emotions’ are available to speakers, according to their rights and entitlements within interactional contexts for the negotiation of locations within local structures of power relations. Whilst I acknowledge that those ‘rights’ and entitlements’ may be constituted through categories of gender they may also be based on concepts such as ‘age’ or ‘employment status’. Matt’s relatively disempowered position within the context of his relationship may be accounted for by either of these resources. Consequently, to impose ‘gender’ as an interpretative framework to make sense of an interaction on the basis that features of that interaction conform to cultural or ideological understandings of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ may be to gloss over the complexities, subtleties and most importantly flexibility of the micro-textual resources invoked by speakers in the negotiation of their rights and duties. ‘Emotions’ are not always ‘gendered’ and ‘gender’ is not always done through ‘emotions’. Or at least, there is not always the micro-textual evidence to suggest such a link. As discourse analysts, we must be as attentive to what is absent as we are to what is present.
Chapter 7

Discussion: Several versions of the ‘truth’ about men and emotions

7.1 Introduction

As a whole this thesis represents an engagement with the culturally prevalent construction of men’s relationship with emotions as limited, impoverished and detrimental to both men and those around them. This construction, it was argued, represents one feature of a broader project of second-wave feminism. Within this project masculinities, understood as the culturally prescribed ways of ‘doing being men’, are taken as the focus of analysis on the assumption that they function in the maintenance of male power and privilege and female disempowerment and marginalisation, i.e., masculinities are assumed to function in the maintenance of patriarchy.

However, whilst they are assumed to function in the subordination of women, masculinities have also been theorised as operating to the detriment of men. Particularly, it has been argued that the marginalization of ‘emotions’ and the concomitant privileging of ‘reason’ as bases for knowledge and action – embodied in the traditional, objective scientific method – results in both the subordination of women, owing to their supposed greater propensity for and affinity with emotions, and the impoverishment of men. Through their assumed requirement to conform to prescribed masculinities in order to maintain their
material privileges and to avoid socio-cultural sanctions for transgressing normative conceptions of gender, men are commonly represented as suppressing emotions and as divorcing themselves from their own subjective emotional lives, to such an extent that either their emotions are manifest in behaviours that are damaging both to themselves and to those around them or they entirely lose the ability to represent their 'selves' in emotion terms. Men's emotional lives are commonly represented as characterized only by the expression of positive self-oriented emotions, such as 'pride', and negative other-oriented emotions, such as 'anger'.

The three empirical chapters of this thesis (Chapters 4, 5 & 6) represented engagements with the topic or problem of men's relationship with emotions. The empirical chapters were informed by poststructuralist theories of gender (Chapter 2). Briefly, language, conceptualized as 'discourse', was assumed to constitute, rather than simply describe, the relationship between gender and emotions. Further, the materialization of gendered subjects and subjectivities was assumed to be an effect of 'discourse'. Simply, when speakers constructed and accounted for men's relationship with emotions and the functions that emotions served in the performance of masculinity, they were assumed to be subjected to 'discourse'. Their status as gendered 'masculine' subjects was accomplished through or relative to the discourses that they invoked. Once subjected to discourse, i.e., constituted as masculine, speakers were assumed to speak from that position and subsequent constructions were interpretable as products of a masculine subjectivity. Speakers were theorized as simultaneously the products and the producers of discourse. As such,
gender, conceived as the oppositional categories of masculinity and femininity, is theorized as endlessly reproduced and reiterated. It should be noted that the conception of 'masculinity' and 'femininity' as oppositional does not preclude variability within those categories; 'masculinities' constituted through a range of discursive resources are oppositional to 'femininities'. Constructions and accomplishments of 'masculinity' are therefore assumed to be inherently relational and to locate gendered subjects and subjectivities within social structures.

Of primary concern amongst these social structures are systems of power relations. Gendered subjects were assumed to occupy particular locations within systems of power relations that afford those subjects particular rights and duties. Importantly, one assumption that does not inform the analysis is that the location of gendered subjects within those systems of power relations is already known, i.e. patriarchy is not assumed. Thus, configurations of power relations and the discursive resources through which they are constituted are not assumed to be consequences and constitutive of patriarchy. Rather, power relations are assumed to be highly dynamic and negotiated on a turn-by-turn basis within interactional contexts.

Drawing on poststructuralist discourse analytic techniques – outlined in chapter 3 – these analyses engaged with men's talk about men and emotions, a single man's talk about experiences of humiliation and the negotiation of his possible humiliation within a specific interactional context and interactions between men and women in heterosexual relationships that were characterized by
expressions of anger. These analyses were oriented to a set of linked research questions. Chapter 4 was concerned with answering the following questions:

- How do men construct men’s relationship with emotions?
- In constructing this relationship, what discourses do men draw upon to account for it?
- In accounting for men’s constructed relationship with emotions, do men reflexively orient to the implications of the discourses upon which they draw for their own subject positions as ‘men’?

The answers to these questions that emerged from the analysis of chapter 4, specifically the idea of emotional ‘expressions’ as constitutive of social structures and power relations, informed the research questions of chapters 5 and 6. Within a single interactional context, the analysis of chapter 5 was concerned with the way by which a male speaker negotiated his contemporary subjectivity relative to an emotion concept that had demonstrable implications for the constitution of power relations. The questions that were asked of this particular data set were:

- How does a male speaker construct accounts of episodes of ‘humiliation’?
- Are discourses of ‘humiliation’ used to construct accounts of the negotiation of subject positions and the constitution of power relations?
- And, based upon the presuppositions that humiliation constitutes episodes of disempowerment and that the performance of masculinity is, in some way, constituted through the negotiation of power relations, does a male speaker, when constructing episodes in which he is the
object of humiliation, simultaneously orient to their implications for the constitution of a masculine subjectivity?

The final empirical chapter (chapter 6) represented a departure from the previous two in terms of the data that were subjected to analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 had drawn on ruminative data, within which men talked generally about men's relationship with emotions or specifically about their own relationship with a particular emotion concept. In contrast, chapter 6 drew on talk-in-action; transcripts of 'naturalistic' interactions between men and women in heterosexual relationships. The choice of this data set was informed by a need to move away from ruminative discussions of men's relationship with emotions to data that would allow engagement with that relationship in practice. To this end the data in chapter 6 were analysed in order to determine:

- What functions were served by men's responses to the emotional expressions of others?
- What functions were served by men's 'doing' of emotional expressivity?
- Were these functions synchronous with the performance of masculinities or constitutive of masculine subjectivities?

The contributions of the findings of each of these chapters to our understanding of men's relationship with emotions, our understanding of the concepts of 'masculinities' and 'emotions' and to the use of discourse analytic methods will be discussed in turn.
7.2 “It’s not a man thing is it?”: The constitution of masculine subjectivities relative to ‘hegemonic’ masculinity

The analysis of chapter 4 was concerned with ruminative data within which men constructed accounts of men’s relationship with emotions. The speakers whose voices are heard in chapter 4 were argued to be involved in the constitution and negotiation of masculine subjectivities relative to the predominant construction of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995). This argument was based on the assumption that the speakers were already gendered as ‘masculine’ (Butler, 1993, 1999) and upon their acts of positioning (Davies & Harré, 1990; Harré & van Langenhove, 1999) relative to their constructions of men’s relationships with emotions. The contention that the speakers constructed ‘hegemonic masculinity’ was based on the interpretation of the constructed relationships between men and emotions being based on the relational functions served by emotion discourses and ‘expressions’ (Armon-Jones, 1986; Averill, 1985; De Rivera, 1984; Harré, 1986; Harré & Gillet, 1994; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Parkinson, 1995; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Within the accounts of men’s relationship with emotions, certain emotion ‘discourses’ and emotional ‘expressions’ were constructed as incompatible with masculinity on the grounds that they resulted in disadvantageous subject positions and locations within power relations. In contrast, those emotion discourses and ‘expressions’ constructed as according with masculinity were those that resulted in advantageous subject positions and dominant locations within structures of power relations. Thus the relationship between men and emotions ‘described’ by the speakers was
interpretable as one that would function in the maintenance of male power and privilege, i.e. in the maintenance of patriarchy.

The speakers in the excerpts drew upon a set of familiar repertoires to account for the constructed relationship between 'masculinity' and 'emotions'. These repertoires included the 'socialization' repertoire, the 'social structures' repertoire, the 'evolutionary' repertoire and the 'hydraulic model' discourse. Thus, the repertoires of 'aetiology' that are reified through positivist research methods – for the 'evolutionary' repertoire see Buss (1995), Buunk, Angleitner, Oubaid and Buss (1996), Buss, Larsen, Westen and Semmelroth (1992), and Buss and Shackleford (1997); for the 'social structures' repertoire see Eagly (1987), Fischer (1993), Grossman and Wood (1993), LaFrance and Banaji (1992); and for the 'socialization' discourse see Brody (1985), Brody and Hall (1993), Davis (1999), Haviland and Malatesta (1981), Saami (1993), and Shields (1991, 1995, 2002) – are interpretable as speakers’ resources invoked in discursive and interactional contexts to manage particular interactional or ideological concerns.

Within these repertoires and the constructions for which they account, the various 'rhetorical contrasts' identified by Edwards (1997), such as the potential for emotions to be variously constructed as 'controllable action or passive reaction', 'internal states versus external behaviour: private ("feelings") versus public ("expressions", "displays")' (p.194) are all clearly present. Further, these rhetorical contrasts are integral to the accountability-oriented work that is accomplished by the various 'aetiological' repertoires.
The presence of these repertoires and the discursive resources that are constitutive of them may be interpreted as evidence of the dissemination and cultural prevalence of psychological concepts and discourses. However, their presence should not be interpreted as in any way supporting the theories of gender differences in emotions in which these repertoires are reified as aetiological accounts. My contention is that the best approach to an understanding of the ways that these repertoires may determine gender differences in emotions is a poststructuralist and social constructionist one, in which these repertoires and discursive resources demonstrably function in the construction of concepts of gendered emotions and in the constitution of gendered subjects and subjectivities.

Arguably, one of the most important and least remarkable findings of the analysis in chapter 4 is that masculinity/masculinities is/are consistently constructed and accomplished relative to femininity/femininities. Consequently, I would contend that there is some empirical support for the contention that gender, the constitution of masculinities and femininities, is a consequence of the location of speakers within the 'heterosexual matrix' (Butler, 1999). Further support is lent to this contention when the prevalence and power of gender categories within constructions of masculinities is considered. The argument that compulsory heterosexuality and the consequent determination and materialization of sexed and gendered bodies delimits 'gendered possibilities' is evidenced by the construction of variability within 'gay masculinity' in gendered terms.
In terms of the development of critical discursive psychology as an analytic method, I am aware that the analysis of chapter 4 was dominated by micro-textual considerations and a focus on the accountability-oriented work done within the immediate interactional context. That said, with only a parsimonious interpretative framework, speakers were interpreted as constructing accounts of a stable concept of 'hegemonic' masculinity relative to which they negotiated their own gendered status and subjectivities. Further, the constitution of these gendered subjectivities was demonstrably oriented to interactional and ideological concerns such as warranting one's right to speak and the management of accountability for both one's own actions as a 'man' and the actions of other 'men'. In specific terms, the analysis contributes the concept of 'conditional' subject positions, constituted through instances of reported speech, as a speaker's resource through which they are able to negotiate positions and subjectivities relative to subject positions that lie outside the immediate interactional context. The analysis also contributes the idea of 'figurative' invocations of voice, in which the paralinguistic qualities of speech can be used to index concepts that are not discursively constituted, I am thinking of Maurice's lowered tone which was interpreted as constructing the resistance of an emotion-based subject position as constitutive of a particularly masculine masculinity (chapter 4: excerpt 5).

Overall, the most important finding of the analysis in chapter 4 is that it is not discrete emotions or emotional 'expressions' per se that are gendered, i.e., 'crying' is not exclusively femininized. Rather, it is the functions served, the subject positions, subjectivities, social relationships and power relations that
are constituted by emotional ‘expressions’ that are the basis of their gendered status. Thus, crying in public is proscribed for men but crying in private is not. It is not the ‘expression’ per se but what that ‘expression’ may do or make possible, in terms of constituting the basis for the actions of ‘others’, that is determinate of whether it accords with or is antithetical to the performance of masculinity as relationally accomplished. That said, the case can still be made that, across the excerpts, ‘emotions’ are illegitimized as discursive resources for the negotiation of masculine subject positions and the constitution of masculine subjectivities.

7.3 “You can’t humiliate me, you can’t”: The interactional accomplishment of a troubled masculine subjectivity

The argument that it is the function of an emotion that determines whether that emotion is consistent with or antithetical to the performance of masculinity or the constitution of a masculine subjectivity was explored in considerable detail in chapter 5. This chapter had always been intended to address the question of how a single male speaker would construct their ‘self’ in emotion terms and whether they would simultaneously orient to the performance of masculinity and the constitution of a masculine subjectivity. The decision to engage with ‘humiliation’ was based upon my increasing awareness that it was the function of emotions, specifically, the subject positions and configurations of power relations they constituted that determined their gendered status. Thus the presence of talk on ‘humiliation’ in the therapy session transcripts afforded the opportunity to engage with an ‘emotion’ that had not been engaged with previously and which might be culturally understood to have negative
implications for the location of the 'humiliated' individual within systems of power relations (Gilbert, 1997; Silver, et al., 1986).

That the 'episodes of humiliation' that C 'described' experiencing were constructed through autobiographical narratives and the use of reported speech and unvoiced reported thought required the development of an interpretative framework that could make sense of multiple I positions (Harré & van Langenhove, 1999). This interpretative framework drew upon the concepts of the dialogical or relational self (Gergen, 1999; Hermans, 1996; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans, Kempen & van Loon, 1992) and multi-voicedness and polyphony within autobiographical narrative structures (Bakhtin, 1929/1973; Bruner, 1986; Hermans, 1996; Michotte, 1946/1963; Sarbin, 1986).

Within this framework the dialogical self is conceptualized as:

...a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous I positions in an imaginal landscape. ...The I has the possibility to move, as in a space, from one position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time. The I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions. The I has the capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice so that dialogical relations between positions can be established.

(Hermans et al., 1992, p.28)

These theoretical concepts provided the basis for a critical discursive psychological analysis in which the contemporary subjectivity of a speaker was interpreted as constituted through his location in and movement between
multiple I positions, constituted by his telling of autobiographical narratives and his use of reported speech. As such, the analysis represents the development of these theories into a useful framework for the performance of critical discursive psychological work.

Within the analysis of chapter 5, the subjectivity of C – the client in the therapy sessions – was argued to be, in part, constituted through and relative to the conditional subject positions apparent within the narratives of humiliation; 'in part' because the analysis only focussed on one feature of the transcripts. Attention to other features would have resulted in an analysis in which C's subjectivity was constituted differently. This should not form the basis of any criticism of this approach but is an acknowledgement of the highly dynamic processes constituted through language use in day-to-day life, including the constitution of subjectivities. It is important that discourse analytic work reflexively acknowledges that the data subjected to analysis and presented to an audience are likely to be only a fraction of the data that were originally generated. The requirement to present analyses that are sufficiently coherent and consistent means that the 'things that are seen to be done' in those analyses may, unintentionally, be misrepresented as more common discursive phenomena than they 'really' are or may elide the other work that is done within any given interactional context. Certainly, in the transcripts of C069's therapy sessions, a good deal of interactional, subjectivity-constituting work was done but which is not represented here. This is undeniably a consequence of the research questions asked of the data and of the aims of the thesis as a whole, specifically the stated aim of engaging with the relationships between
men, masculinity and emotions and a consequent need to produce a gender-
focussed analysis.

The interpretation of C's subjectivity as gendered and as 'masculine' was
based on the interpretation of the narratives of humiliation. Through these
narratives, particularly through the use of reported speech and unvoiced
reported thought, a locally-determined meaning of 'humiliation' was
constituted. Within the context of the therapy sessions, episodes of
'humiliation' were characterized by unjust acts of positioning by an 'other' and
by a subsequent failure to renegotiate that act of positioning. In positioning
terms, episodes of humiliation are characterized by acts of first order
positioning and by an absence of second order positioning, despite the first
order positioning being constructed as unjust or unwarranted and there being a
moral basis for the act of second order positioning (van Langenhove & Harré,
1999). Acts of 'humiliation' are not constitutive of moral social structures and
morally correct configurations of power relations. For the speaker, in this case
C, autobiographical episodes of humiliation are interpretable as narratives of
episodes of disempowerment.

The interpretation of these narratives as constitutive of a 'masculine'
subjectivity was based upon three assumptions. The first was that C was
already gendered as 'masculine' (Butler, 1993, 1999). The second was that
speakers in therapy sessions must in some way account for their being there;
one way by which this might be done is through the construction of a troubled
or problematic subjectivity. The third was that the narratives were implicitly
comparative, i.e., the events constructed in C's narratives were implicitly contrasted with a normative concept of masculine behaviour. Simply, the interpretation advanced was that C's subjectivity, constituted through the autobiographical narratives of humiliation, was implicitly contrasted with 'hegemonic' masculinity (Connell, 1995), which is constituted through the simultaneous management of emotional expressions and the determining of configurations of power relations that are individually advantageous.

C's subjectivity is therefore interpretable as 'masculine' and 'problematic' on two counts. Although C constructs himself as emotionally inexpressive within the narratives – done through the use of unvoiced reported thought – in accordance with the illegitimacy of emotions as discursive resources for the constitution of masculine subject positions, particularly within the workplace (Hearn, 1993), his inexpressivity is complicit in his disempowerment. 'Doing emotional', specifically 'doing anger', are ways by which C might morally have renegotiated his unjust positioning and resisted disempowerment. The illegitimizing of emotions as the basis for acts of positioning, in accordance with 'hegemonic' masculinity, and the resulting disempowerment, which is entirely contradictory to 'hegemonic' masculinity, are interpreted as constitutive of a subjectivity that is simultaneous 'masculine' and 'problematic'.

More than the analysis of chapter 4, the analysis of chapter 5 demonstrates the importance of an interpretative framework and an engagement with macro-textual issues, specifically the imposition of some of the analysts' concerns and awareness as to the contexts within which particular utterances may be interpreted. That said, I would still advocate parsimony. The interpretative
framework in the analysis of chapter 5 drew on poststructuralist theories of gender (Butler, 1999) and the ideas that the 'self' could be made the topic of talk and that subjectivity could be constituted through a negotiation of related I positions (Hermans et al., 1992). The analysis was also informed by the concept of 'hegemonic' masculinity – as the practices by which patriarchy is reproduced (Connell, 1995) – as accomplished through the illegitimizing of emotions as the basis for actions and the consequent constitution of systems of power relations that ensure masculine privilege (derived from chapter 4). Without these frameworks, operating at a purely micro-textual level, the paucity of gender terms in these excerpts would have resulted in an analysis that had little to contribute to a thesis concerned with the relationship between masculinity and emotions. Again, I would reiterate the importance of parsimony. The account of the constitution of C’s subjectivity offered by the analysis is largely in C’s own terms and it is, I believe, an adequate and persuasive account. I see no reason for the importation of interpretative frameworks, such as psychoanalysis, to make sense of subjectivity. People ‘see’ the world in their own terms and that is made apparent when they speak.

7.4 “SO DON’T START THROWING THINGS AT ME NICOLA”:

‘Hegemonic’ masculinity in context

The analysis of chapter 6 represented a fairly radical departure from the preceding two chapters both in terms of the data taken for analysis and in terms of the interpretative framework involved. Where ‘masculinities’ had previously been, broadly speaking, the topic of talk and had been talked about relative to ‘femininities’, the data in chapter 6 provided an opportunity to
examine the accomplishment of gendered subjects and subjectivities in vivo, between male and female speakers in the context of heterosexual relationships. Also, 'emotions', which had previously been engaged with only at a 'representational' level, were made available to analysis as instantiated and negotiated configurations of subject positions, social structures and power relations. These data, it was hoped, would allow a critical discursive psychological engagement with 'emotions' as systems of 'interpersonal communication' and as 'relational' (De Rivera, 1984; Fridlund, 1991, 1994; Parkinson, 1995; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Further, they would allow the analysis of 'emotions' at the 'local' level and as oriented to particular 'local' interactional concerns.

The choice of episodes of 'anger' as the focus of the analysis was informed by two primary considerations. The first was that 'anger' is often categorized as a 'masculine' emotion (Fabes & Martin, 1991; Shields, 1987; see also chapter 4) and is theorized as constituting particular, sometimes gendered, social structures and power relations (Averill, 1982; Crawford, et al., 1992; Shields, 2002). For these reasons, episodes of 'anger' seemed an appropriate site of enquiry.

The second consideration was an effect of the choice of critical discursive psychology as the analytic method and the consequent requirement for interactions to be represented textually. Owing to the stated intention of the analysis to engage with 'emotions' in a 'performative' as well as 'discursive' sense, there was a resultant requirement for the extra-discursive features of
the interaction to be amenable to analysis, i.e., to be represented as text. Of all the interactions coded as 'emotional episodes', those categorized as 'episodes of anger' had by far the most obvious paralinguistic features. Simply, the most obvious examples were selected for what was an exploratory attempt at developing a critical discursive psychological approach that was simultaneously attentive to the paralinguistic features and the discursive content of talk.

The potential for poststructuralist discursive analyses to move beyond talk to other 'communicative systems' is a challenge that must be met. One way by which this may be accomplished with regard to 'emotions' is through a more sophisticated transcription notation system that is informed by positivist approaches to the paralinguistic features of emotion (Banse & Scherer, 1996; Frick, 1985; Kappas, Hess & Scherer, 1991; Pittam & Scherer, 1993; Scherer, 1986). Such a transcription notation system would allow the analysis of the relationship between the paralinguistic and discursive content of an interaction in a more detailed and sophisticated way than was possible in chapter 6.

Within the excerpts analyzed in chapter 6, the paralinguistic features of talk, and occasionally non-verbal behaviours, that are interpretable as constituting the performance of 'anger' are demonstrably occasioned by discursive acts of positioning. The paralinguistic features of talk are consequently interpreted as oriented to those acts of positioning. 'Doing anger' is interpreted as a both a means of negotiating the rights of speakers to position others and as constitutive of individuals' 'affected' subjectivities. These 'affected
subjectivities', once paralinguistically constituted in talk, are available as topics to be oriented to either discursively or paralinguistically or through some other means of communication. In response to someone 'doing anger' through shouting, an individual may either respond by shouting — reciprocally 'doing anger' — respond in speech that is quieter than surrounding speech — 'doing conciliatory' — or respond by saying 'What are you getting angry at me for?' — constructing shouting as constitutive of the performance of anger. All are ways by which the negotiation of subject positions and right and duties may be negotiated through interactions categorized as episodes of 'anger'.

Within chapter 6, 'anger' was identified as a resource that was equally available and equally invoked by both male and female speakers. Consequently, the functions served by 'doing anger', in terms of constituting and ascribing subject positions and their locations within social structures and power relations were also available to both male and female speakers. The relational functions served by 'doing anger', in terms of the constituting of a position of dominance within the interactional context and the consequent marginalization of the 'other', were seen in one couple to benefit the female speaker — Nicola in excerpt 1 — and to benefit the male speaker in the other — Victor in excerpts 2 and 3.

This finding would present an interesting conundrum for an analyst operating from the top-down who might presuppose either that particular acts, such as 'doing aggressive', or the occupation of particular positions in systems of power relations, for example positions of dominance, are already gendered.
Within such a framework, Nicola’s acts and her occupation of a position of dominance within that interactional context might be interpreted as constituting the performance of ‘masculinity’. This interpretation is based on the assumption that the direction of the flow of power is already known, i.e., that patriarchy is the social order and that dividends are paid to those individuals who ‘do masculinity’. Such an interpretation and conceptualization of power has succumbed to the misleading ‘metaphysics of external relations’ (Butler, 1993).

Power, Butler argues, should be understood at the level of ‘materiality’ which ‘designates a certain effect of power or, rather, is power in its formative and constituting effects’ (ibid., p.34; emphasis in original). Within such a framework, power is evident in the ‘materializing’ of gendered bodies and of relationships between those bodies as a consequence of discursive interaction and negotiation. As a means by which relationships are discursively and interactionally negotiated between gendered speakers, ‘emotions’ are resources that are at least equally available to speakers of both genders and are flexible enough to constitute myriad configurations of power relations within discrete, local interactional contexts. Just as the subject positions, rights and obligations that are the basis for emotional ‘expressions’ may only have a ‘remote connection with culturally imposed rules and roles’ (Parkinson, 1995, p.162), so might the configurations of subject positions that result from emotional ‘expressions’.
7.5 Conclusions

This thesis started from concerns regarding the representation of the ‘inexpressive male’, the idea that men’s relationship with emotions was troubled and individually and socially problematic and the idea that this troubled and problematic relationship was normative. Across the thesis, men’s relationship within emotions has been explored at discursive and ideological levels, through the constitution of a masculine subjectivity and as it is enacted and embodied in the interactions between gendered speakers. One consistent finding across the thesis is the extent to which the use of emotion discourses is either constructed as antithetical to the performance of masculinities or is absent from interactions in which emotions are being ‘done’; men reportedly don’t account for their selves in emotion terms and people don’t necessarily reflexively index interactions as ‘emotional’ at the time of their occurrence. Whilst there is plenty of data within this thesis on the ways that men account for their ‘selves’ and constitute masculine subjectivities through and relative to emotion discourses, those data were generated with fairly discrete, even contrived, interactional contexts. Consequently, the findings on how men may negotiate masculine subjectivities in focus group discussions on the topic of men and emotion or in therapy sessions through and relative to ‘emotion discourses’ should not be interpreted as generalizable to the ways by which men ‘do emotions’ and ‘do masculinities’ in the ‘real world’. On this issue this thesis supports two courses of further research.

The first is the development of critical discursive psychological analyses and transcription notation systems such that they are able to engage with
interactions that are interpretable as characterized by emotional episodes but from which the explicit use of emotion discourses is absent. Such an approach will allow greater understanding of the social functions served when men 'do emotions' and the implications of those functions for the constitution of masculine subjectivities. Importantly, the approach and the data that it might engage with will not be constrained by the required presence of 'emotion discourses', which should be accepted as potentially a dispreferred discursive resource for masculine speakers.

The second course draws upon the finding that it is the social functions served, the subject positions constituted and their location within social structures and power relations that are determinate of whether a particular emotion discourse or form of emotional 'expression' accords with or is antithetical to the constitution of masculine subjectivities. Simply, by adopting an analytic approach that is sensitive to the social constitutive functions served by discourses, it may be possible to identify the discursive resources preferred by masculine speakers in the accomplishment and negotiation of subject positions and social relationships, which are similar in structure to those that may be constituted through emotion discourses or through particular forms of 'emotional expression'. Essentially, I am suggesting looking for resources such as 'That'll do, pig'.

Both the proposed courses of further research require the generation and collection of more 'real-life' data, but it is only through an engagement with the constitutive effects of language in vivo that we will reach satisfactory social
psychological answers to questions regarding men's relationship with emotions. Objects, such as men and emotions, are assigned meaning through discourse, but it is the social functions of those meanings that matter.


experience of discrete emotions. Nashville: Vanderbilt University, Department of Psychology.


James, W. (1884) What is an emotion? Mind, 9, 188-205.


Appendix 1 - Transcription notation system

The form of notation used is based on a system developed by Jefferson (1985), a complete description of which can be found in Atkinson and Heritage (1984). Some basic features are outlined below:

- Square brackets mark overlap between utterances – [
- An equals sign at the end of one speaker's contribution and at the start of another's indicates no discernible pause – =
- A full stop within round brackets indicates a brief pause in the talk, both within one speaker's utterance and between turns – ( ); numbers within round brackets denote the duration of longer pauses in seconds – (4.8)
- One or more colons indicate the extension of the preceding vowel sound – e::verybody
- Underlining indicates those words said with particular emphasis, while words in upper case characters were said louder than the surrounding talk – a mean HARD rotten bastard
- Text within round brackets indicates that the speech was either inaudible or that there is doubt concerning its accuracy – (blibbing)
- Empty square brackets indicate that some of the transcript has been omitted, whilst material in square brackets is clarificatory information about the talk –
- [] well (blibbing) [crying]
- Material in italics is additional contextual information about the talk or interaction – group laughs
Appendix 2 - Participant Information Sheet

The Social Construction of Men and Emotions

My name is Chris Walton and I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of Psychology at the University of Surrey. This study, and my research as a whole, is supervised by Dr. Adrian Coyle and Dr. Evanthia Lyons also of the Department of Psychology at the University of Surrey.

What's this research about?

The aim of the research is to study how men talk about emotions; what they describe as emotions and in what situations men say they experience emotions. The study is also interested in differences between men in how they talk about emotions. The reason for this interest is that, in recent years, a lot has been written (in books, magazines and newspapers) about men and emotions. However, what is often missing from this writing is men talking about what emotions mean to them. This study will try to address this by getting lots of different men to talk about how they see emotions.
What will you have to do if you take part?

Those men who volunteer for the study will be asked to take part in a group discussion with other men on the subject of men and emotions, followed by a group task and then finally another short group discussion about the task. All parts of the study will be led by the researcher, Chris Walton. It is estimated that, as a whole, the discussions and task will take about two hours, including breaks for refreshments.

Will it hurt?

Neither the group discussions nor the group task are thought likely to cause distress. Although the research focuses on emotions and men’s talk about emotions, this does not mean that participants will be expected to reveal personal information about their own experiences of emotion. Participants will only be asked to talk about emotions on a level with which they are comfortable. If any participant feels uncomfortable at any stage during the discussions or group task, he is free to leave without having to give his reasons.

What will happen to the information that I provide?

The discussions and group task will be recorded on both audio and video tape, so that we have an accurate record of what was said. The audio recordings will be transcribed by the researcher; the video recordings will be used to provide additional information if necessary. In the transcripts, no real names will be used to identify the speakers; any other information which could reveal the identity of the men taking part in the research will be changed or left out. The transcripts will be analyzed and the research findings will be
presented in my Ph.D. thesis and in other research reports. These will include quotations from the transcripts. However, no one will be able to identify who produced these quotations, except the men who took part in the group from which the quotations were taken.

**Why should I take part and what good will this research do?**

On a personal level, talking about emotions and hearing other men talk about them might turn out to be an interesting and even beneficial experience. Taking part in the research may help you to understand more about your own emotions and about how other men see emotions.

I also hope that the research will do something to help change the way that men's emotional lives are talked about and written about by people such as psychologists and sociologists, therapists and counsellors, doctors and journalists. This might even lead to developments in the way that men with emotional problems are dealt with by professional services.

**What if I have any further questions about the study?**

If you have any questions or problems arising from participation in the study you are welcome to contact the researcher, or his supervisors, at the address below.

**Contact Details:**

Chris Walton  
Department of Psychology  
University of Surrey  
Guildford  GU2 7XH

Tel. No. 01483 686894  or at: C.Walton@surrey.ac.uk
Appendix 3 - Consent Form for Participants

The Social Construction of Men and Emotions

Please read the following statements and, if you are in agreement, sign where indicated.

I acknowledge that the purpose of this research and the nature of my participation in this research have been explained to me to a level which I find satisfactory.

I voluntarily agree to participate in the study and to comply with the requirements of the study.

I also give my consent to both audio and video recordings being made of my participation in this study and to all or parts of said recordings being transcribed for the purposes of the research.

I am aware of my rights as a participant in this study, that I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time without having to give a reason, that I can request that any information that I have provided be omitted from the research and that any information I provide will be treated in a confidential manner.

Signed ___________________________ Date ____________________

Name (Block Capitals) ____________________________________________
On behalf of all those involved with this research project, I undertake that professional confidentiality will be assured with regard to any audio or video recordings of the above participant. That any audio or video recordings, or any transcribed material from those recordings, will be used for the purposes of research only.

Signed ___________________________ Date ___________________________
Name (Block Capitals) ____________________________________________

Witnessed by ___________________________ Date ___________________________
Name (Block Capitals) ____________________________________________

Participant Number [ ]
Appendix 4 - Participant Demographic Information

Sheet

The Social Construction of Men and Emotions

The information provided on this sheet will be held in the strictest confidence.

Participant Number

Age in years

Please tick the appropriate box for the sections below.

Sexuality

Gay
Heterosexual
Bisexual
Other

Ethnicity

White
British
Irish
Any other White background
(please write in)

Mixed
White and Black Caribbean
White and Black African
White and Asian
Any other Mixed background
(please write in)

Asian or Asian British
Indian
Pakistani

Black or Black British
Caribbean
African
Bangladeshi ☐  Any other Black background ☐
Any other Asian background ☐  (please write in)_________________
(please write in)_________________

**Chinese or other ethnic group**
Chinese ☐
Any other ☐
(please write in)_________________

**Highest attained educational level**
None ☐
GCSE ☐
BTEC/GNVQ ☐
A Levels/Highers/IB ☐
HNVQ ☐
Bachelors degree ☐
Masters degree ☐
Doctorate ☐
Post-Doctorate ☐
Appendix 5 – Interview Schedule

Focus group discussions

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MEN AND EMOTIONS

Study 1

The interview schedule is intended to facilitate the achievement of the below listed aims.

1. To promote the use of 'emotion' words and discourses.
2. To promote the negotiation of rights to use emotion words and discourses.
3. To facilitate the negotiation of 'emotions' and 'subject positions' on both a social and individual level.

The questions and prompts listed below represent only a brief outline of the potential lines of enquiry which may be pursued through the course of the group discussion. As such questions and prompts used in the discussion will not be limited to those listed here. Rather as the discussions proceed and other lines of enquiry arise further questions will be added and employed. The questions listed below are constructed to fulfil at least one of the aims and in most cases more than one.

QUESTIONS AND PROMPTS

Questions marked with an asterisk are starting questions; all others are possible follow up questions.

General and Personal

* What words or images spring to mind when someone talks about 'emotions'?

Psychological studies of emotions typically list 5 or 6 basic emotions, happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust and surprise. Do you think that's an accurate list?
Are there any experiences which you would describe as emotions that are missing from that list?

Or are there things which you would remove from that list?

What do you think the word 'emotions' refers to?

* In your opinions what is it that makes a particular experience an emotion as opposed to anything else?

**Personal**

* Would you say emotions always have to be felt or are there occasions on which they are simply enacted?

Would anybody here describe themselves as an 'emotional person'?

Would anybody here describe themselves as an 'unemotional person'?

In both instances, to what extent and in what ways?

**General**

* In society at large how do you think emotions are viewed, good things/bad things, valued or not, as signs of weakness or strength? (Prompts, depending on context, person etc.)

Personally do you view emotions in the same way?

How much value, if any, do you personally place on emotions for yourself and for others?

How much value, if any do you think emotions are accorded socially, on a general level?

**Constructions of masculinity and emotions**

* How would you describe a ‘typical’ man with regard to his emotional life?

Do you think there are differences between men with regard to their emotional lives?

If it has been reported that there are differences between men, do you think that differences in emotional behaviour between men of different ages are the products of generation gaps or changes over the life span?

**Social Expectations/Constraints**
* Do you think there are social expectations about emotional behaviour, particularly displays of emotion?

Do you think these expectations are different for different people?

* Do you think there are any restrictions or controls placed on your emotional experiences expression?

And across different contexts, scenarios and causes? For example, are there any situations in which a man should control his emotions? Are there any causes for which an emotional reaction is expected? In what contexts or for what reasons would you expect a man to show his feeling?
Appendix 6 - Demographic information for participants in focus group discussions

Group 1/Transcript 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Appendix 7 - Transcript 9

14.2.02

8 Participants
Chris: so the first question erm which I would like to offer () is you were all invited to participate in (. ) a group discussion on the subject of men and emotions it's particularly the idea of emotions that we're interested in (. ) so if I were to ask what words or images sprung to mind when you thought about emotions what would they be? (3.2)

James: I think it's feelings reactions to other people or situations (. ) that affect how one er reacts (2.2)

Chris: ok (2.3)

Robert: I should think fear =

Chris: = fear =

Robert: = yeah hmm =

Chris: = so that that would be a very quite a specific emotion =

Robert: = yeah yeah hmm =

Arthur: = I would think also apprehension =

Robert: = apprehension yes yes hmm =

Arthur: = or worry =

Robert: = hmm =

Arthur: = though they're the same think I suppose =

Robert: = yes though I think it's not quite the same as real fear =

Bob: = 'what have I let myself in for what type of emotion am I going to have to try and explain somewhere down the line' =

Robert: = yeah yeah hmm =

James: = you're speaking in terms of this situation ((Chris laughs)) rather than in a more general sense =

Bob: = oh yes =

Chris: = well hopefully this isn't a situation which will evoke too much fear ((group laughs)) erm (.) so we have fear as an example of one emotion there and we had the idea that emotions were feelings =

Richard: = I I would think of erm er (1.4) non-rational er reactions or reactions which you cannot (1) easily control by reason erm by er operation of your own .hh reason faculties =

John: = agreed in both cases (.) absolutely =
James: = I think love is another emotion which can be very strong indeed =

Chris: = particularly important today =

John: = sadness joy isn’t there there’s lots of them =

Bob: = I mean wasn’t it a coincidence that this happened to be on February fourteenth ((group laughs)) =

Chris: = yeah it was (. ) erm so we had lots of examples of particular emotions there er one of the interesting features I’m sorry er one of the things I ought to do is shut this door properly which I forgot to do and the other thing which I also forgot to do is ask you all to introduce yourselves erm which was awfully er (. ) remiss of me so could we just do that and then we’ll go from there =

James: = James =

Robert: = Robert ((coughs)) excuse me Robert =

David: = David =

Richard: = Richard =

John: = John =

George: = George =

Arthur: = Arthur =

Bob: = Bob =

Chris: = Chris Walton (. ) ok one of the things that you mentioned was the idea of emotions being different erm non-rational I think was the word that you used erm could you explain what you mean by that? =

Richard: = erm well I went on to say erm I did use the word non-rational perhaps mistakenly hh bu- er I went on by way of correction I would say to er suggest that (1.4) it’s a reaction that you’re not completely in control of =

Chris: = ok =

Richard: = that was what er would be a better way of putting it (3)

Bob: I was thinking not erm (. ) completely anyway I wouldn’t say (. ) not I wouldn’t say you’re not necessarily in control but you’re not (. ) always in control of the situation not all the way down the line sometimes I think you maybe in control of one’s emotions (. ) other times (. ) things happen unexpectedly and how does one react a different type of emotion I think on that one (. ) some you can predict almost or you can carry on with but others =

Richard: = well by my way of thinking [I wo]uld disagree with you on that point yeah
Richard: because I think as far as emotions are concerned . hh they are part of
ones er err hhh. (2.5) I can't think of the word now but I keep coming back to
this idea of you're not being in complete control of yourself if you go into a film
for instance and it is er particularly moving you might be moved to tears now
you don't want to be moved to tears at least I certainly don't I know some
people go to the cinema for that sort of catharsis I don't erm I rather resent
that and erm I find that an example of my emotions taking over which is not
what I like =
Bob: = what I was saying was if I then went to that film a second time I would
be anticipating that emotion and I know how I'd be reacting (and I'd act)
slightly differently =
Richard: = well yes =
James: = of course there are situations where it is necessary and essential
indeed that you do actually control your emotions erm road-rage ((sounds of
acknowledgement from group)) if somebody does something particularly
annoying erm you have to er force yourself sometimes not to:: react er and
the temptation to react is an emotional response and you have to apply your
reason to not do it =
David: = I mean to some extent you're (. ) erm as youngsters told more or less
to suppress your emotions I mean for instance 'boy's don't cry' was a
common one =
James: = that's a thought that occurred to me when this was (. ) proposed was
that er we or certainly I feel I come from an age where er the stiff upper lip
was the thing and er you were not encouraged to be demonstrative in your
emotions at all in fact it was . hh in some ways considered to be unmanly =
John: = yes that was the who::le point of much of the traditional sort of prep
and public school education and erm I think as a result one does tend to grow
up at least . hh externally =
Arthur: = yep I was brought up in that =
Bob: = we cover our emotions =
John: = exactly exactly =
Arthur: = I think it's made me more introverted than I might otherwise have been I mean to suppress emotions an- and er cope particularly at boarding school with situations on my own as it were (. )

Bob: are you suggesting that people are more extrovert these days? =

Arthur: = I don’t know =

Bob: = I just you know I was thinking then about our dear friend Flintock for taking his shirt off ((group laughs)) which we would never have done in our time would we you can imagine what people would think =

John: = yes all that stuff about the captain’s hand on his shoulder (inaudible)

Chris: you talked about the perhaps the need to control the expression of emotions in particular situations and we had anger cited as one example do you think there would be any other situations in which you would be expected to control the expression of your emotions (4.5)

Robert: if you’re in charge of people I’m thinking in terms of erm I’m not a military person but I’m thinking in terms of a military (. ) commander who’s in charge of men in battle .hh he must not show fear he must keep a stiff upper lip mustn't he? =

George: = if you know you’re sending people to get killed =

Robert: = yes yes and [he mustn’t (express) his fear]

George: it must be a strange emotion to have actually =

Robert: = sorry? =

George: = it must be a terrible thing to have =

Robert: = yes absolutely =

George: = to know that [you’re] sending people in to battle [and ch]ances are that

Robert: oh yes yes yes

George: ten percent of those are [not] going to come back =

Robert: yes = yes that’s true =

George: = are you prepared to take that decision? =

Robert: = yes exactly (2.5)

John: yes I think Montgomery erm says something about it er in his in his writings and he erm and he himself did was very concerned not to predict anything but erm a sort of cocky optimism but I think he he he says that that
sort of (. ) thing was amongst the most sort of terrible thing he had to do to
conquer that (3.7)
Bob: back again unfortunately on to public school deliberately tried to teach
you to cover up those sort of emotions =
John: = hmm (1.5)
Robert: to prepare you for battle ((group laughs)) =
Bob: = or life generally =
Robert: = well yes (4)
Chris: where what (. ) the need to control the emotions or the requirement the
emotions in that way what functions does it serve (. ) what does it (.7) why
would you need to? (2.2)
James: well fear is an emotion which communicates itself between people =
Chris: = hmm =
James: = if you're erm leading er again I'm thinking military situations you're
leading a group of (. ) men or perhaps ladies even these days in into er a
dangerous situation if you want them to come with you (. ) erm you really do
need to encourage them to believe that they ought to do it (. ) and that
therefore er (. ) to communicate your fear to them er in the beginning there's a
good chance that they'll say 'it's not for me' =
Chris: = hmm =
John: = it's almost a sort of opposition isn't it duty versus emotion or or if you
like efficiency versus emotion =
Chris: = a requirement to do the job =
John: = indeed =
Chris: = but I mean that's partic- with particular regard to fear I mean we've
talked about that you can control anger and also (. ) Eric mentioned also boys
don't cry what what value or function would there be =
George: = I think it possibly to embarrass others if you're too overtly emotional
it can make a situation uncomfortable for other people so I think that's one of
the factors =
Richard: = also erm building on that point erm a demagogue can get er
emotions roused in other people in effect that is his object is it not? =
John: = yep =
Richard: = and er er this ca- could be done in a beneficial way or an
unpleasant way depending upon what his motives were (2.1) so I think that's
a point worth considering =

Chris: = that? =

Bob: = to an extent that applies to Afghanistan doesn’t it with all the problems
they've had out there with September and everything else how one was able
to must have been able to control those people’s minds =

Richard: = yes =

Bob: = to such an extent that they would go out and they would you know
commit suicide and they would fly those planes into it knowing that they were
going to be (.) you know going to be killed as a result what sort of power has
that sort of person got you know to change those peoples emotions (.) but
their normal emotion would be fear to do it in the first place so you'd have to
override that sort of fear haven’t you to drive people to it (.) I think they're
more guilty myself sometimes the people who ((group laughs at inaudible
comment)) work on people to convince them that they're doing the right thing
you know =

John: = so perhaps the traditional tr- er training to suppress one's emotions is
a is a er failure in training one to resist that kind of manipulation =

Bob: = maybe (2.5)

David: yes I think controlling your emotions is is purely for yo- for your own
safety in those cases isn’t it whether er it's a er a pan of fat that's on fire you
can’t sort of say ‘what the hell’ (if you like) you’ve got to act calmly and do
something about it same as a ship under attack or something like that it’s no
use throwing your hands in the air you’ve got to respo- respond very calmly to
the to the danger that's around you =

James: = yes there’s also the aspects connected with what you might call the
laddish culture (.) how men in company are expected to behave (.) you know
sort of being all soppy cissy .hh erm is likely to attract a lot of scorn from your
peers so that if you did feel particularly sad about something that they were all
pouring scorn on you .hh would er suppress your true feelings so that you
didn't stand out from the crowd =

Chris: = that er that was going to be linked into a question that I was going to
ask =
James: oh sorry ((group laughs)) =
Chris: no it's ok 'cause it does lead into it erm it the idea that there is a
requirement to control the expression of emotions begs the question where
does that requirement come from? =
James: hmm =
Chris: and you've cited perhaps male company as being one source =
James: yes there is that =
Chris: so would there be any others (. ) and what would the others be? =
Bob: I think it's in one's upbringing it seems to develop in school and
perhaps in one's family (. ) looking at how other people behave (. ) following
their example there are sort of social pressures I think like =
George: I think there may be a feeling that emotions are fairly private and
that er they should be sort of kept that way except for er special occasions I
suppose erm people are fairly happy at a wedding and and when you go to a
funeral you know people feel that they can if you like give vent to their
emotions and it's quite natural so I think it's fairly =
Bob: I think it's a very good thing that one can give vent to your emotions at
times =
George: yeah sure =
Bob: and to suppress them (. ) there are times when it can be completely
wrong to suppress your emotions =
George: yes =
Bob: but that's something you only learn from experience (. )
Arthur: I think that if you do have a loss of any kind then then you have to go
through a sort of mourning stage and er =
Bob: erm there are emotions when I hit that golf ball sometimes ((group
laughs)) =
Arthur: usually suppressed =
James: now we're back to anger aren't we ((group laughs)) or joy =
Arthur: depends again on the company you're keeping doesn't it who you're
playing with at the time whether it's a mixed match or whether it an all men
we're back to the all men again (2.7)
Richard: there could be occasions where not to display er emotions could be
considered offensive [are]n't there that's probably what you were saying =

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George: yes

Arthur: =

Chris: = or inappropriate =

Richard: = sorry =

Chris: = or inappropriate =

Richard: = or inappropriate yes (.)

Chris: because there is a certain (. ) er value in not being perceived as (.)

unemotional =

Richard: = I suppose so yes (. ) well unfeeling you see (2.6)

Chris: do you think there's a difference between those ((laughs from group))

between unemotional and unfeeling =

Bob: = I was going to say that =

Richard: = in in it's a question of appearance isn't it [you ]see =

Bob: [yeah]

Chris: yeah = or experience and

expression (. ) would that be a way of =

Richard: = hmm =

Chris: = that it (. ) unfeeling implies that you don't actually experience the

emotion whereas unemotional perhaps relates to not actually expressing it =

Richard: = well the observer [can't] necessarily tell =

Chris: yeah = exactly =

Richard: = what you're (. ) (actually) experiencing =

James: = that's right isn't it because if you are unemotional you're liable to be

accused of being unfeeling =

George: = definitely yes (3.9)

Chris: ok (1.5) and unfeeling is not desirable either =

James: = well it depends on the situation doesn't it I mean sometimes erm

accusing somebody of being unfeeling is is meant to be a criticism isn't it or I

should think most often it is because whoever is issuing that remark thinks

that you should be showing more emotion than you are =

John: = as with the Diana (. ) business two years ago ((group laughs)) =

James: = oh well ((group laughs)) mass hysteria =
John: = outpouring of grief (. ) well the Queen was accused widely of being
unfeeling because she apparently showed little emotion erm (1.5)
Chris: = she didn't tap in to the mood of the nation and she was insensitive to
the mood of the nation (1.6) it's an interesting scenario that one because I'm
something of a cynic anyway and and did sort of regard it as perhaps mass
hysteria and that the Queens reaction almost seemed reasonable that it the
public perception and the public reaction was extreme in a way that had had
not been seen previously =
James: = true =
Bob: = it built up on itself it got more and more and it was egged on by the
press as well =
Arthur: = well that's right =
James: = well yes and the BBC (. ) yes it was really I think the most
extraordinary phenomenon erm and er it seems to have gone on from there
because now commonly if when at the sites of street accidents you find
people leaving bunches flowers don't you and I was never conscious of that
occurring before erm you know the Dutch flower industry has a sort of field
day ((group laughs)) =
John: = ohh there were an awful lot after the Clapham rail disaster which took
place right opposite the school I was .hh teaching at and that little spot was
absolutely heaped heaped up with [with flow]ers and so on =
David: = we've had flowers up by where we live (. ) going back twenty years there used to be a
spot where there were road accidents regularly people getting at least one
person a year being killed =
James: = I guess I'm unobservant ((group laughs)) (inaudible) =
David: = yes exactly =
Bob: = it does seem (so much) in the last few years =
James: = yes =
Chris: = it was interesting watching the news last week with the death of
Princess Margaret and that there was people who were trying to draw
comparisons between the public mood in in reaction to her death as opposed
to Diana's =
Arthur: = I think if Margaret had died in her thirties instead of in her seventies
the reaction would have been very different (.)
Richard: there does seem to be a erm connection between racial origin and er
er emotion or at least er demonstration of emotion =
Chris: = hmm =
Richard: = er I don't know if it's a matter er worth considering =
John: = yes Latins are hot and all the rest of us are cold ((group laughs))
(Comments from other group members inaudible for 10.1 sec. owing to
laughter))
Richard: well it's a matter that I'm I'm interested in because erm I used to do
quite an amo- an amount of travelling and er I eventually finished up er with
the view that erm human beings are very much the same the world over er
and if there are differences they're culturally induced differences rather than
er possibly er racially or genetically induced but that's purely a personal view
=
Bob: = I think that's very true though yes I think that's what you were saying
there there is everybody's basically the same I think it's just the way we have
over the centuries been developing you know that sort of education training
whatever it might be that general general upbringing where the other people
haven't but I think basically people are the same (. ) when it comes down to it
we've got the emotions but we've been trained so trained in the past
indoctrinated I was going to say as well =
Arthur: = the Latin races =
Bob: = not not to show them whereas they are up and dancing straight away =
James: = I don't know how you can tell really (. ) whether it's socially induced
or genetically because er I mean for instance you see a sort of middle Eastern
funeral there's all this wailing [sobbing] rending of garments et cetera er you
say 'well
Bob: = oh yes
James: that's the way they are' now is that because it is er the done thing in
that country to show emotion or is it because it's inbred into that race (. ) how
do you know? =
Bob: = well I don't really know I'm making a few surmises I think maybe down
the line =
John: I thought it was a sort of cultural ritualization thing =

Bob: = yes yes =

James: = do you think if you went and lived in Italy for ten years you'd become a sort of very excitable ((group laughs)) =

Bob: = you'd do as other people did =

Arthur: = it'd take longer than that =

Bob: = otherwise they'd think you hadn't got any feelings =

Chris: = it does beg the question if it is social at what point do you become socialised into behaving in that way and is it from that point on is it fixed can it change if you went and lived in another country would you change your patterns of behaviour =

James: = yes I think that's right you have to be brought up that way (. ) can you change in later life I don't know =

Bob: = I don't think you would change that much actually I think your children's children might change more than you yourself it would take more than your lifetime to er settle into that sort of environment (. )

Chris: = do you think this could be answered in a personal way or a general one but I would say . hh do you think (. ) perhaps from your own perspectives men do change over their life span? =

Richard: = as opposed to females? =

Chris: = er well I suppose people whether or not there is any difference do you think people change with regard to emotions or or men or women? (2.6)

Arthur: I think you can be changed by a (. ) difference in situation I think when you get married I think that can change you (. ) quite considerably ((chuckles from group)) for better or worse so I think you do react to situations in the environment but er right to the core I suppose you're not fundamentally changed =

Bob: = fundamentally I don't think it changes at all (. ) I feel I'm exactly the same as I was (. ) er sixty years ago er in the way of the emotions I have it's just that certain ones have now been I've learned to maybe suppress them or bring them out at certain times . hh but I think what I was born with virtually has been I'm still the same =

John: = . hh I'm not so sure (2.2) I think (. ) for many years as a young man I used to suffer from periodic . hh erm extreme depressions erm (. ) whi::ch
hh. don't seem to have recurred within you know the erm second half of my
life (5.7) possibly simi- similarly the peaks of elation ((group laughs)) have
disappeared as well =

Bob: = (or the pleasure) =

David: = ((coughs)) I mean a young erm a young boy of five or something it's
obvious when he is very excited you can recognise it instantly but erm I still
think you can get quite just as excited throughout life but you just don't don't
show it sort of conceal it again it's probably that we've learnt it's not the thing
to .hh run around maniacally ((laughing)) =

Bob: = the emotions are still there I think it's just that we don't show them so
much =

James: = well that's right I think one of the things you actually learn as you
grow up is to control your emotions =

David: = [yes]

Bob: oh yes =

Richard: = very much so that's the point I was going to make an emotion is
the result of an external stimulus of some sort is it not? and as we've got older
erm the amount to which we react to these stimuli erm diminishes I would
say and (.) so it is (.) so it is a er an age related matter =

George: = but is that natural or one of sort of deliberate control =

James: = yeah that was my point too does does the er =

George: = yeah does maturity =

James: = does the erm reducing reaction to emotion arise from the erm erm
you know a less susceptibility erm the need to have a stronger dose to
produce the same emotion or is it due to the fact that you've learned to resist
it to control it more as you the older you get =

Arthur: = I think it's a bit of both I think you get set in your ways [I think you get
more confidence [through experience [you're not so worried about what other
people think [I think you're more more your own man =

James: = hmm =

George: = a growing sense of self-confidence you don't quite worry quite so
much what you say ((group laughs)) =

Bob: = you feel you can say what you like sometimes =
Chris: it's interesting that you should say that because it seems you talked about the fact that generally you learn through your life to control emotions more and yet you've just talked about self-confidence that you can have to to express emotions in ways that you're comfortable with and and these two sound perhaps a little contradictory can it work such that you would throughout the course of your life span gain sufficient confidence to express emotions more openly =

James: no I think it's it's not that at all I think that erm you become more confident in your opinions and you're more willing to them hh due to a number of factors I mean the fact that you don't have to keep in the boss's good books ((group laughs)) may have something to do with it er there's also the fact that you grow to have greater confidence in your own judgements that you know what you can get away with and what you can't which is erm based on experience of similar situations in the past I would think so there are a number of different factors aren't there and I don't think that you can actually put this sort of growing confidence or growing willingness to have your say down to any single factor =

Chris: = ok (3.7)

Bob: apart from age

James: = well yes (. ) well that's right yes you get these old people who erm talk very loudly about somebody within their hearing and you wonder whether ((group laughs)) they just don't care you know =

Bob: = (inaudible) =

Chris: erm we talked earlier about expectations of people to express or control their emo- the expression of their emotions in particular ways erm stiff upper lip and the kind of traditional way of behaving being one of them erm do you think that those hold true (. ) today do you think that is still the way that people are recommended to do emotions to behave emotionally? (2.1)

Arthur: well I think much less than when I was growing up I think there's erm (. ) just looking around I think people do express their emotions more than would have been the case fifty years ago I think there's been a lot or perhaps education as well to say that it's bad to suppress emotion it's good to er let things come out so I think we do live in a rather different situation now than say fifty years ago =
John: yes it's been suggested several times hasn't it that education particularly primary education has been feminized and I think that that what you've just been describing is perhaps part of that whether it whether it's an accurate term er other than in the sense that the vast majority of primary school teachers are in fact women er I I don't know (4.7)

James: yes well that and single parent families I suppose a lack of a male role model amongst other things but I'm inclined to think that er the encouragement to show more emotion (rather than) actively discouraged to show emotion is er I think we can blame psychologists to some extent ((chuckles from group)) erm this whole idea that letting it all hang out is is good for you seems to be an idea that is generated by psychologists ((group laughs)) =

Chris: I'll no I'll not try to defend that ((group laughs)) =

James: = no comment =

Chris: no though in private I might venture that I agree with you ((group laughs)) it is it is an interesting idea it's primarily one of the reasons that I was interested in performing this research is that there seems to be an expectation (. ) or there are expected ways for people to behave and that those do seem to be changing =

James: (inaudible) =

George: the young today don't sort of grow up in the same atmosphere well atmosphere's probably the wrong word but the same expectation if you like that that strongly held views of of what is right and what is wrong there seems to be much more er willingness to sacrifice other people to the self er (. ) today than there was in the past =

Bob: is that right or wrong? =

George: I [don't know]

Bob: funny question but ((coughs)) who are we to say? =

George: absolutely but erm (.)

Bob: I mean what would our parents have said would they have said the same conversations do you think? =

George: I've no idea =

Bob: ((laughing)) no I don't know either =
John: = I know my grandparents would have found it quite impossible to
discuss anything on this sort of level [at all] I'm not so sure about my parents
[b]ut certainly
Bob: oh yes no no
John: my grandparents ((inaudible for period of 9.1 sec. owing to laughter and
number of voices))
Bob: I think they would have strongly have disapproved of quite a lot of things
= George: = would they yes I think they would have felt that the rules have
relaxed and that since then =
Bob: = certainly the idea of living with people now rather instead of getting
married I'm sure I think they would have strongly disapproved (. ) mind you we
may have done as well ((group laughs)) = Roger: = much good it did us =
Bob: = it didn't do any good = Richard: = ((coughs)) the thing about emotions it's just occurred to me is that
erm emotions are completely unconnected with morals I would say whereas
er or on the other hand most er (1.5) forms of human activity or (2.1) er
matters concerning human activity are very much connected with morals =
George: = but the control of emotions is very much connected with morals
(2.6)
Richard: I'm not quite sure whether that's what I mean er no it isn't what I
mean no it isn't what I meant no but I'm I'm not talking about control [morals
]er emotions at
George: no sure
Richard: = all I'm talking about (. ) emotions which appear in one's self and
which I said right at the start I don't like (. ) too much erm (3.0) it seems to me
that this makes er emotions rather different from other human er er
experiences because they're completely con- unconnected with erm as I say
morals =
Arthur: = morals erm imply a judgement we make erm emotions are a reaction
which you can't control much more difficult (. ) but to er act on moral behaviour
er a moral that's a judgement you make yourself =
Richard: = yeah but morals are to some extent imposed upon one (.)
Arthur: yeah but you either accept them or you don’t =

George: = either willingly or unwillingly ((group laughs)) =

John: = yes I suppose Neal has a lot of to say about that from his educational experiment at summer hill ((voices in background and sound of door opening as Q leaves room)) =

Richard: = I don’t know this =

John: = it it’s worth getting hold of a copy if you can find it still in print .hh it’s just called Summer Hill and er I think I think it would interest you .(.)

Chris: sorry erm it’s an interesting idea because if emotions are divorced from morality (1.2) well then (2.4) they are as you say a different class of behaviour aren’t they it’s to react in a way which (1.4) is not necessarily moral er and for that it means I suppose that they can do very different things if somebody’s behaving emotionally erm it has particular effects and you can’t make the assumption that they’re actually behaving in a moral way then =

Richard: = sorry I missed that bit =

Chris: = it’s an sorry I’m trying I’m just trying to work it out for myself .(.) what the effect would be erm if if emotions are divorced from morality =

Richard: = hmm =

Chris: = erm because it means that their that their impact socially er is not one in which morals are important and therefore they’re likely to do very different things erm it’s it’s ano- it’s a different way of actually thinking about why people behave in particular ways they’re not behaving morally they’re behaving emotionally and that will (. ) will do different things =

Richard: = well there have been cultures =

Chris: = yeah =

Richard: = er where erm (. ) c-c-certain behaviour is excused because it was er assumed that they individual was er under an emotional =

Chris: = hmm =

Richard: = er er stress at the time I’m not talking about sort of things that happen in England but erm I believe I’m right in saying that erm murder [in some cultures]

Chris: hmmm

Richard: is perfectly excused on the grounds of er the emotional stress that the individual was er experiencing at the time =
Chris: = a crime of passion being the classic French example isn't? =

Arthur: = it can arise in English law too =

Richard: = well yes yes speaking as a lawyer I'm afraid it can (group laughs)

yes =

John: = or the Sicilian feud I suppose (sound of door opening and Q

returning) =

Chris: = an- and what it does is it excuses behaviour that if something is an

emotion results from an emotion then it means that that behaviour is well yeah

excused so emotions as expressions do particular things for people to

behave in an emotional way is to perhaps to excuse erm the way that you

behaved =

Robert: = is excused the same as understanding? =

Arthur: = (laughing) that's a good question =

Robert: = you can understand the why of something but you can't excuse

someone =

Chris: = that's true =

Robert: = from doing it I don't know =

Arthur: = I mean I think road rage was mentioned before that's that's an

emotional reaction but then the moral situation comes in =

Chris: = hmm =

Arthur: = which means you should try and control it (.) and that's the second

stage isn't it =

George: = there are times when you can understand why (group laughs) =

David: = teenagers who can (coughs) sort of set fire to the toilets in the

school get very excited about that but erm .hh they're they're not quite so

pleased er a few wee- well the next day or so when they get expelled from

school and .hh the emotions must be the opposite way and (7.2)

Chris: we've talked erm in very general ways erm about emotions an- and

people and obviously the subject of of my research is concerned specifically

with men and emotions and it may be the case that we've been talking about

men to to the greatest extent with regard to emotions but I would () my

question is is then () do you think there are differences between people and

obviously the simplest class of difference is gender er with regard to emotions

and the erm rules that govern erm emotional expression particularly? (2.7)
Bob: we always say that women are more emotional than men (. ) whether they are or not or is it they just appear to show it more then the men do (inaudible) in education I'm not quite certain we always do (. ) you were talking interestingly about the er the primary schools and the effects of having all female (. ) people in there teachers in there .hh I was just wondering actually you know has anybody ever thought what effect that's going to have or been able to measure what effect that's had (. ) or could have shall we say over fifty years or whatever the period might be that we could do a judgement on it whether it would effect (. ) I don't know =

Arthur: = I think it must have some effect mustn't it I think there is a desire to have more male teachers in primary school [level to] balance it out so I don't know

Bob: oh yes

Arthur: whether studies have been done it's obviously a fruitful area to study =

John: = well educational psychologists look at this I believe this is a problem that concerns them it's the lack of male role models for little boys erm but because this is not my topic but erm you hear about it so erm obviously er it is suspected that it has some effect =

Bob: = I think it certainly has an effect on the (. ) on the sports side or the games side =

John: = hmm =

Bob: = if you haven't got that's where they need the man to talk them out there and you know have a game of football or whatever it might be or rugby or whatever they are doing which you wouldn't get from the female now are they loosing something by not having that =

John: = hmm =

Bob: = I don't know =

James: = well you know does it not also extend to the emotional field as well as the football field =

Bob: = hmm =

James: = erm that er little boys don't see how men react emotionally to circumstances an- =

Arthur:= I think it's even more the case now with single parent families so that home =
James: = [hmm
Bob: hmm =
Arthur: := that the little boy just has a mother in many cases and at school it
almost primary school teachers are most of them are women where does he
get the male input? =
James: := that’s it I mean I think that’s the problem they look at isn’t it or to see
if there is a problem I suppose is a fairer way of putting it =
John: := of course er it’s a whooping great generalisation isn’t it ((group
laughs)) to pose half the human race against the other half [though like most
questions]
Richard: it’s like most questions
John: there’s something in it sorry are women more emotional than men to
answer to your question erm (1.5)
James: how do you tell? I mean yes certainly some women (. ) would appear
to be more emotional than some men .hh you know and some of them aren’t
erm but it is a socially .hh accepted norm that women will show emotions and
are expected to behave in a certain way and so they do↑ and the same thing
with men they’re expected not to show .hh a lot of emotion and therefore they
strive not to =
Arthur: := hmm yes (1.9)
George: that’s true (. ) but how much is due to the expectation? =
James: := yeah well that’s er [that what ]we’re expecting to be able to sort out
((group
((laughing))
Brian
((laughing))
James: laughs)) =
Chris: := that’s what these sessions are for =
David: := you might be better off standing in the Friary site ((local shopping
centre)) and watching ((laughs)) a thousand and I think this is partly the
trouble isn’t it that I mean er we haven’t been married a thousand times which
is about what you need for a statistical sample isn’t it? =
James:=: so there’s also the question of er er I wonder how many of us take
Beta-blockers like I do and fo- for er blood pressure and how much that
suppresses the emotions (. ) it certainly seems to =
John: = well that's why Joe Werbernuiik (Bill Werbeniuk) took it the snooker player wasn't it? =

James: = oh right (group laughs) well that's 'cause he used to get the shakes =

John: = ye(h h)s yes (3) no it wasn't he took pints and pints of lager =

James: = same same thing (group laughs) well that's a question that you haven't posed is the effect of er al- alcohol on emotions .hh () if if for instance you're you're in the company of several people and one of them is far more drunk than the rest .hh erm his behaviour and I suppose it's his emotional behaviour is very tiresome to the other people =

George: = oh er I agree there's nothing worse is there than you being the sober one =

James: = hmm =

Bob: = and listening to other people talking (laughs) =

Chris: = is that the idea of the emotional drunk then? =

James: = YEss yes =

John: = tired and emotional (laughs) =

James: = yes so that er () I supp- yes you know it's not just the how powerful the emotional stimulus is that .hh how much emotion you () show it's er due to a number of factors such as the amount of () alcohol in your blood stream =

Richard: = yes just as you can have erm changes in erm emotional response because of drugs you can have emotional response () change because of injury er brain injury and er (4.7) deliberate erm surgical =

John: = lobotomy yeah =

Richard: = yes thank you er s-s-surgical er (1.4) erm work (5.9)

Arthur: but er I mean coming back to to women being more emotional I mean they certainly seem to think () er in different ways than men they've they er certainly seem to be able to: () do multi-tasks if you like all at the same time to a much greater extent than possibly men can =

James: = yes I see what you're saying =

Arthur: = erm (2.1) whether or not they're well I suppose they're caring side is is is more developed =
James: = yes I mean obviously it leads one to suppose that erm because they're unlike us in in their psychology in their way of thinking about somethings that er they're liable to be different from us emotionally as well =

Arthur: = but they could be I mean er we touched on the expectations but er they probably do react erm (3.4) with more anxiety I think (2.0) ((coughs)) particularly about their sort of offspring and what's happening .hh hh. =

James: = oh the maternal instinct =

Bob: = the mother feeling =

Arthur: = yeah you know it's (a gale) and one of them's due to be flying in an aeroplane or or some such (. ) flights and fancies will come out =

Bob: = that's not restricted of course to the human beings is it? =

Arthur: = no =

Bob: = you can get emotions in animals =

Arthur: = sure =

Bob: = for the same things especially on the on the female side (. )

Chris: = it is a a (. ) common idea throughout emotion research erm that (. ) women are er (. ) more comfortable perhaps with intimate [erm ]emotional expressions

Bob: [such] as between [and ]the caring side [an- ]the opposite view to that is

Bob: yeah yeah yeah

Chris: obviously then that men aren't [erm ]as as able or as willing to erm show

Bob: right

Chris: intimate or affectionate or erm caring emotions wo-would is that an idea that that rings true for you? (. ) that men shouldn't =

Arthur: = by and large I think there are exceptions to that but I think well I wouldn't want to generalise but I would agree =

Bob: = there are some females who are more masculine than other females and there are men who are more female I mean you can't always use hard and fast rules =

David: = I mean if you're talking about (. ) relations of the mother and father with their (. ) their child I think that's sort of (3.1) I was going to say improving but I mean ((laughs)) er I mean first of all both both parents have to go out to
work these these days and erm very often the fa- you know in a large number of cases the father is present at the birth but .hh he has a very strong link a much stronger link I think with the child than perhaps people did men did in the past .() er and I think as a result he has the same sort of emotions as a as a woman does with with regard to the child =

Bob: = I think the child needs that's why I think the child needs both =
David: = hmm yes =

Bob: = mother and a father that's why I'm dead against these () two men who try and adopt children (laughed group Eric and Roger audible)) =

John: = (h h)ye(h h h)s =
David: = yes it's er =

Arthur: = or two women =

Bob: = there's nothing worse that's more likely to [upset my emotions I've learnt get you into the Guinness book

Bob: to control ]them maybe (1.4.) maybe =

John: = leading on from that is it true as as I've been told and read that .hh in terms of say forming confidential friendships companionship rather than er love .hh that women find it much easier to relate to homosexual .hh men than to fully heterosexual on- er men because er homosexual will have if you like a greater natural emotional af- er affinity now I read that I've no idea whether it's true or not but it seems to .hh sort of follow on a bit from what we've just been talking about (3.0)

Arthur: yes I've gained that impression like you =

James: = yes you hear it said don't you I mean er (1.5) I wonder what it's due to though is it due to this sort of emotional affinity or is it erm due to the fact er that a lot of people hold certainly that er there's no such er thing as a as a friendship between a man and a woman that er the old er hoary devil of sex comes into it every time erm .hh and that erm when however you're dealing with a homosexual man and a woman they can be genuine friends =

John: = because sex is out of [the way]
James: sex is out of the way (.) in exactly the same way as you can have a male friend or your lady can have er female friend and er they can be it can be just a pure friendship =

Richard: = I don't know to what extent the premise is erm erm(.) er valid in this particular case because when you talk about homosexuals you're really thinking about the overtly homosexuals and they of course tend to be(.) uninhibited and emotional and erm relate very easily with their fellow human beings which is why they make such excellent er stewards and er in all the caring s-spheres of activity so I think er a generalisation has been made here ((group laughs)) which is not (h)strictly valid =

John: = you maybe right I I er I simply posed the question =

Chris: = it [is a]

Richard: well just to complete that point what I'm saying is somebody maybe er er homosexual doesn't display this homosexuality and therefore his behaviour is not taken into account when we're talking about homosexuals as a group =

John: = sure that's right yes =

Chris: = it is just the common perception of .hh homosexual men as more emotional and as you say more overt overtly emotional erm which I think tends to(.) links into what Roger was saying about them why they are perceived as forming better relationships with women erm because there is that link of of er kind of an emotional awareness and a freedom to express emotion =

Richard: = well no that's not what I'm saying [wh]at I'm saying is I'm classifying

Chris: no

Richard: homosexuals into two groups [there]'s the overtly ones and there's the the

Chris: right

Richard: the er the others [and] we tend to think of the h-homosexual as the first

Chris: hmm

Richard: group [that's what I'm saying =

Chris: exactly
James: = yeah well the other group the clandestine homosexuals if you like or
or those that haven't er (.) recognised their own homosexuality whoever they
are erm you don't know really because you don't know whether they're
homosexual or not er you don't know that they're not behaving like overt
homosexuals er you say o-overt homosexuals behave in this sort of pattern
and then there's everybody else er and they behave to a certain extent
differently but how do you know? how do you know that er some of these
people that er are not supposed to be homosexual but are are not er also
behaving the same as your overtly homosexuals? =

Richard: = well no that's not [what I'm ]saying is you =

John: ((laughing))

= sorry did you

Richard: = (inaudible) suggested with erm the rest of humanity to put it rather
crudely and unkindly whereas if we are talking about homosexuals then
you've got to be careful we're not thinking about those erm >I don't know
whether this is offensive< but overtly erm er h-h-homosexual people those are
the people we tend to er think about and talk about everybody else as far as
we're concerned might just be er er a standard erm (2.2) unpleasant word h-
human being =

James: = hmm =

Chris: = er it is as you're saying it's the idea that gay men are exemplified by
(.) erm that that overtly emotional overtly homosexual stereotype and the
danger is that that (. ) they will all (. ) gay men will be viewed as being that way
er or behaving in that way when that is obviously most likely not the case =

George: = is it going from that is it not possible to er suggest that if you like
the role in life determines erm (. ) the emo- the emotional response rather than
the gender I mean those ((coughs)) very successful women are very hard I
mean you wouldn't call Mrs Thatcher a er highly emotional female ((group
laughs)) =

Chris: = no =

Arthur: = she may well be =

George: = well she covered it up very well and similarly all the other women
who are sort of pouring into er the city or the professions tend to focus very
much on er their role in life which in this instance if you like much more of a
sort of hunting er work ethic if you like rather than (. ) a caring (. ) whatever so l
mean you could suggest that ((coughs)) that the role if you like determines
erm whether people feel that they need to suppress emotions so that they can
actually concentrate on a particular [fu]nction =
Chris: it's = it's the idea =
George: = and get on with it so to speak =
Chris: = of of erm (. ) se- gender as opposed to sex differences when gender is
talked about in social sciences [it's ]most commonly dichotomised as
masculine
George: right
Chris: and feminine [we ]don't directly map onto male and female [ther]e are
George: yeah sure
Chris: masculine and feminine ways of behaving =
George: = yeah =
Arthur: = hmm =
George: = that's right =
Chris: = and you think one possible way of differentiating is is that there are
masculine and feminine ways of [expressin]g and behaving emotionally =
George: yeah sure = yeah
(3.3)
Chris: erm =
George: = so I don't know whether you can regard erm (. ) emotions as a
luxury that you can indulge in when ((group laughs)) (h)the moment is right
erm but if there are other things to worry about then you tend to er (2.5) put
them out of the way (2.9)
Chris: it's the =
Arthur: = there comes a point I'm sure when you can't [I mean the ]emotions
will
George: I'm sure yes
Arthur: become too strong [par]ticularly if you're suppressing them all the time

yes yes =
Arthur: = hmm =
Bob: = my friend the (horse) comes back in again too doesn't it ((group laughs)) (3.7)
Chris: erm (2.7) I'm trying I'm thinking what we what I'm likely to do at the
minute is is wrap this up in about ten minutes erm and then we'll actually
leave it there erm only because I think its seems to be a pertinent day to
address the issue erm love is an emotion was mentioned earlier er it just
seems like an ideal opportunity to to to address the issue of the emotion of
love erm(.) does does it fit? how does love fit with either male or female or
masculine or feminine .hhh ways of behaving emotionally? (2.0) are men or
masculine people able to express love freely or? =
Arthur: = well if you mean falling in love that applies doesn't it to both sexes
[an and]
Bob: yes yes
Arthur: I suppose they react rather similarly at the height of er of that
relationship =
Robert: = on first thing I'd say 'yes both can fall in love very similarly' (.)
whether this is true statement I'm not too certain or not on second thoughts
((laughs)) but my first reaction is 'yes both parties do' whether they fall in love
in the same way I'm not too certain but to a mutual end anyway ((laughs))
(4.1)
James: hh yes but what about the question of talking about love? =
Bob: = ah =
Chris: = yeah =
James: = I don't think the sexes behave the same then (4.4) men tend to be
repressed about these things (3.5)
Arthur: I think a man has more difficulty saying 'I love you' than than a woman
does basically (2.0)
James: that may be so you can say it quietly so nobody else can hear ((group
laughs)) =
Chris: = perhaps when she's asleep ((group laughs)) =
David: = saying that I suspect that is something that has changed very much
over the years and that the younger generation look at very differently (3.0)
Chris: would any of you be willing to venture an opinion as to why that might be the case (. ) why it's changed or or (4.2)

Bob: is it just the general openness that is around these days? =

James: = I think it's the American influence [I I you know we get ]so much sort of

Bob: = well they influence it

James: media from America don't we =

Bob: = oh yes yes =

James: = Hollywood and all these things have erm an effect on behaviour patterns =

Bob: = I don't know what effect soap operas had on behaviour patterns too (3.7)

James: yes quite (. ) well I think you need to suspend your disbelie- your sense of disbelief (((group laughs))) they do seem to er go for the full gamut of emotions in their everyday meetings don't they? .hh that particular sort of format is very special isn't it because they fall in love marry and get divorced all in about a month =

Bob: = yes (2.3)

David: I mean you may have a point blaming the Americans (((group laughs))) I mean the (. ) I was thinking I mean the big change er when they came over here in the war wasn't there with the with the effect on on the girls all of the British .hhh troops sort of thought the Americans were taking their girls from them =

George: = I think the same things happened wherever the British troops were so↑ =

David: = well yes exactly (((group laughs))) =

James: = it's certainly true though isn't it you know the American GI's were seen as being very glamorous =

David: = they were weren't they they brought plenty of stuff over for the girls =

James: = plenty of money and they had their foreign accent which was er seen as being somewhat glamorous and exotic anyway and it may well have started then but er I think it's gone on and Hollywood has er and Tin Pan Alley and all this er music industry have all had an effect haven't they? (1.3)
Arthur: well I think television has too you talked about soap operas but I do think they have had a big effect (. ) people spend so much time watching them they .hh and er I think (. ) that tends to set a pace for some people =

Bob: = hmm (1.7)

James: yes you do start to get the impression that's the normal way to behave ((group laughs)) "yes" (3.4)

Richard: er I was going to say that it's interesting that er this matter of love has only been introduced right at the end of the session and(h) not by one of us ((group laughs)) and I don't know if this is a reflection of the .hh lack of randomness of selection of this group or the date is the fourteenth ((group laughs)) er (2.3) anyway er joking apart we didn't mention it =

Chris: = hmm =

Richard: = and we're all (. ) getting on a bit is that is there some connection here? =

Chris: = er I don't I don't know I mentioned I think in part because of the date and when I do these things albeit I have a very general schedule er I have in mind sometimes (. ) issues or areas that it would be perhaps interesting to touch upon ↑areas that perhaps haven't been explored in previous groups that you would be interested to hear er an opinion on er and albeit fairly clumsily perhaps it seemed that today might be a reasonable date on which you know the idea of love might be on peoples minds obviously I didn't select this date for that reason er (. ) er and it is::: the idea the com- the idea of men not communicating intimate sentiments hh er like that such as was suggested that it might be (. ) saying 'I love you' might only be whispered er or or not said very often you know perhaps said only on Valentines Day er (. ) just it was an interest like that I was just interested to see (1.4) to hear what you would have had to say on that =

Arthur: = it would been interesting if you'd got a group of eight men aged thirty something rather than our age whether it would have come up more =

David: = isn't that why there's so many cards in the shops I mean they all try to make as much money as possible but I mean .hh it must partly come from the fact that it's it's something that people don't say so much but they (. ) they're happy to pass it on in the form of a card =
Arthur: = I think it's interesting erm because we talked about men's unwillingness to show emotion generally but I think I think you can talk about different emotions er in in different ways because there are some emotions we’re not particularly worried about expressing and anger would be one of them we talked about anger in a car rage situation .hh er and of course there's safety factors that governs your reaction then but .hh (. ) men confessing that they got angry about something to other men or to anyone indeed er is something that they're not particularly reluctant to do but talking about love (. ) now that's that really is very difficult for men I think (2.5) so you know you can fit I think you can fit the other emotions in there somewhere maybe they don’t all come in the same order for everybody but erm I think they do come in gra-gradations of difficulty =

Bob: = hmm yes (3.1)

Chris: = why might anger be I mean anger is one of the themes that has run through all these groups that men can express anger and [can talk about] it =

John: = it's acceptable

Richard: =

it's acceptable for females to be angry er if they will (. ) er er they would not just confess to it they will make a point of saying 'I was absolutely furious' (3.7)

John: hh I would suggest that one specifically:: male .hh emotion which I don't think occurs to the same extent in females >or at least in a very different way< .hh is the sort of pride which we tend to call patriotism for instances erm now in er I would suggest that in females it is concentrated very strongly in .hh o-on the family erm .hh whereas among men it tends to be a wider (. ) er as I say I think the best word is pro-probably patriotism erm and that again is something that we in fact haven't mentioned at all but I would have thought men would probably find .hh relatively eas-easy to discuss in some circumstances =

Chris: = i-it-it's (. ) strange in a to a certain extent that you’ve mentioned that because it’s a word which I've no memory of ever having occurred in any other group is the idea of pride .hh and yet it sounds like (. ) a very masculine and (normal) emotion to to feel you know it is the one thing you would expect men most to experience and to report experiencing =
Richard: I would like to know erm is is there a survival benefit er (. .) er derived from any emotion (. .) I say survival benefit to to the species the human species
[its]
Chris: er
Richard: something we're born with quite clearly [and ] have been and do animals have
Chris: hmm
Richard: er emotions er well some would say 'yes' and some other people would say 'what do you mean by emotions?' of course but erm erhh. it would be interesting to know if it does have er er a benefit in er (3.2) genetically strengthening the species =
Chris: = well the er I mean Darwin wrote 'The Emotions in Man and Animals'
ern obviously you know at the time that he was formulating the ideas of of evolution and in various a number of of other groups the idea of evolution and emotions as an adaptive trait has come up erm most likely as a response to my question if they offer a erm a construction of men as behaving in a particular way perhaps as needing to control their emotions and in response to my question of 'well why would that be?' erm they have produced evolutionary explanations er to say well er I don't like to introduce it myself but .hh the phrase that I've heard so many times previously is 'well it's that hunter-gatherer thing' =
James:= hmm =
Chris: = 'you need to control your emotions if you're going out to hunt' er and in a group .hh which I did here erm with some ph psychology phd students the example that was given was 'well you don't want to show fear when you're confronted by a rhinoceros' =
Richard: = sure =
James: = (((laughs))) =
Chris: = so whether or not (. .) I don't think anybody can as you say in response to your question er 'are emotions an adaptive trait?' well you can answer either 'yes' or 'no' and produce arguments or you can turn round and say 'well what are emotions?' and you end up in in various different places if you try and approach that question from those directions .hh certainly it has been
advanced as an explanation for why there maybe erm sex differences
between men and women hh with regard to emotions and emotional
expression and the ability to control emotional expression (3.4)
James: .hh well yes the erm I mean you can get emotional reactions that
contribute to the survival of the species and the one I'm thinking of of course
is fright (.) it makes you run a away and that may very well be very sensible if
you're being chased by something with big teeth =
Robert: = yeah =
James: = and that I think would probably apply to women as much as it would
to men wouldn't it? =
Chris: = I would hope so ((group laughs)) =
Bob: = I don't think it makes any difference what they are by the time it comes
to that I've always said 'if I'm leading a walk and there's a bull walking across
that f- comes across the field it's every person for themselves' none of this
ladies first ((laughs)) =
Richard: = what we haven't really classified erm in emotions I mean loosely
when we're talking conversationally it's been about the higher emotions and
the baser emotions now the higher emotions are the ones I was really thinking
about when I was asking 'do they have a survival benefit?' now I would call
fear a pretty basic erm er emotions er (3.2) sex for instance that's pretty basic
so I mean it's necessary for the er survival of the species =
James: = I would say so yes =
Arthur: = SUCH as could you "give us some examples"? =
Richard: = erm (.) pity↑ (2.7) er (2.4) that's the sort of thing er difficult to er be
too specific here .hh er perhaps someone else could help me ((group laughs))
=...
Richard: ye:s
James: chance of dying out =
Richard: = er f-family love of course that is for the survival of the species (.)
obviously (. ) pity for somebody who doesn’t share your .hh genetic inheritance
would seem to have no erm benefit (1.5)
Chris: arguably er (. ) yeah =
Richard: = I mean obviously you’re going to try and protect your offspring =
Chris: = hmm =
Richard: = and that is er is is that pity er or is that an emotional response? I
would think it is =
Chris: = most likely =
Richard: = but are you going to try and protect someone else someone from
another tribe for instance .hh I think nowadays you probably would you’d
probably if you saw a human being in trouble you'd probably go and help him
=  
Chris: = and that I mean what that introduces is that idea that perhaps pity as
a a higher emotion and perhaps higher emotions as a whole are not
necessarily adaptive traits but socially and morally prescribed =
Arthur: = yeah I think morals come into that you were talking about the
distinction between emotions and morals =
Richard: = yes I was =
Arthur: = I think when you get to pity there’s an element of morality about that
as well =
Richard: = I well I would I’d take issue with you on that [because I ]would say
that
Arthur: would you?
Richard: they are connected very much and if you were a moral person you
certainly ought to exhibit pity but I don’t think you have to be a moral person in
order to (. ) exhibit pity =
Arthur: = maybe not =
Richard: = er well that’s my view I’m not disagreeing ((laughs)) well I am I
suppose ((group laughs)) in the nicest possible way (2.0)
Chris: what I ought to do now is wind this discussion down because time is is
getting on erm (.) the (1.9) wha-what I normally do is say does anybody have
any questions or comments about what we've talked about today? =
Arthur: = just to hope that it will be useful for you in your research here =
John: = yes =
Chris: = it's massively useful =
John: = good =
Robert: = as long as it's some use =
Bob: = it's been an interesting time you know at times you know it's nice you
know to find out what's happening or expressing you own thoughts and to be
given the opportunity to do so =
John: = yes it's nice to have the opportunity not only to think but to bounce
your thoughts of others =
Arthur: = yes very much (1.3)
Richard: what ever we haven't really discussed the er matter of emotions in er
the other sex to very much er effect and er =
Bob: = we're frightened ((group laughs)) =
James: = not qualified to speak on the subject ((group laughs)) =
Chris: = there er seemed to be erm a certain reluctance to generalise on that
subject which is interesting I suppose certainly it will be when I come to do the
analysis ((tape runs out)
Appendix 8 - Victor and Della
(CCTV Footage: The couple are stood in the kitchen, Della is cleaning Victor is stood by the fridge))

Victor: Well what can I do sit here and watch you clean (.) while you walk past me and go upstairs =

Della: *no*

Narrator: would you let cameras into your home for two weeks?

Victor: how how long are you going to be? =

Della: = about fifteen minutes =

Victor: = why doing what? =

Della: = just finishing off here =

Victor: = NO THERE'S NOTHING that needs a clean =

Della: = and then I'll come up with you

Narrator: Are you brave enough to face the facts about your relationship?

((CCTV Footage: Victor walks away into the sitting room))

Della: then we'll go to bed at the same time for a change =

Victor: = [inaudible] for a change my arse

Narrator: This couple were
Narrator: Each week on Made For Each Other CCTV cameras are put into a different couples home and their relationship is monitored twenty four hours a day for two weeks. Tonight’s couple are Victor and Della, Della is forty and Victor is forty one, they’ve been married for sixteen years and have two teenage children Ben and Amy. On hand to dissect the couples strengths and weakness are divorce lawyer Vanessa Lloyd-Platt and psychotherapist Malcolm Stern. After two weeks of observation they will face the couple with some hard hitting truths about their relationship.

Malcolm: this is a man who’s going ‘I can’t take this anymore’ =
Vanessa: = ‘well I can’t take it anymore I’m watching it and I want to kill her

Narrator: Victor and Della feel that after sixteen years their relationship has become a bit stale and want to breathe fresh life into it. But two weeks of careful monitoring raises serious question marks over this couples future and Vanessa and Malcolm decide to take a closer look at three key areas. The first is one of the main subjects that couples fall out over, household chores.
(Graphics sequences in which 'Chores' appears as the first key area))

(Reflective footage: Della and Victor are individually shown talking to camera, apparently responding to the question "Are you satisfied with the way chores are split", which appears at the bottom of the screen))

Della: no I'm not happy with the way that the chores are split no

Victor: I'm quite satisfied with the way they are split yeah I think er at the moment it's an arrangement we've got and we've lived through since we've been married so(.) that's how we've always worked it

((CCTV Footage: Della is shown tidying a messy kitchen))

Della: just leave it like a shithole Vic

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on CCTV footage of Della cleaning))

Vanessa: that was not untypical of everyday =
Malcolm: = that's right =
Vanessa: = over and over again cleaning round and round and round

((CCTV Footage: A montage of clips of Della cleaning the kitchen and lounge is shown, the days of week from Monday through to Sunday appear on the
bottom of the screen; the soundtrack to these clips is overdubbed by the track 
"round round" by the Sugababes and by the voice of the narrator))

Narrator: Everyday, before and after work, Della spends a minimum of two hours cleaning and on a Sunday she would clean from 11 in the morning to 11 at night that's a total of 23 hours cleaning a week

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on CCTV footage of Della cleaning))

Vanessa: see how she's cleaning the top of the dustbin =
Malcolm: = yeah =
Vanessa: = she must have wiped it ten times =
Malcolm: = mhmm =
Vanessa: = that's not normal Malcolm

((CCTV Footage: Della is shown cleaning around or near the television, Victor is sat on the couch apparently watching TV))

Della: spotless =
Victor: = lovely =
Della: = that used to be yellow =
Victor: = well I really wanted to watch that great =
Della: = well you can
Vanessa: she's turned off the telly while he's watching it to clean it

Vanessa: tactually Malcolm she's just being thoroughly irritating =
Malcolm: = sometimes people can't help what they're doing they just go round the same groove again and again =
Vanessa: = well she should stop it now I think she's being a complete idiot

((CCTV Footage: Della is shown vacuuming the area between the couch and the coffee table and cleaning the coffee table, the time appears recursively in the bottom left corner of the screen; 16.53, 17.02, 17.22, 17.39 and 17.48 are the times shown; again the soundtrack to these clips is overdubbed by the track "round round" by the Sugababes: at 17.48 Victor appears on the couch))
Victor: whack the telly on will you? =

Della: = yeah ((sound of vacuum cleaner is heard above anything else))

((CCTV Footage: Victor is shown sat on the couch with his hands covering this face))

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on CCTV footage described above))

Vanessa: oh look at his face =
Malcolm: = hmm =
Vanessa: = ((shaking head)) he can't stand it (1.4) I mean look at it she's going over the same bit over and over and ov- >there is not one crumb that she's couldn't have got up the first time (.)
Malcolm: ri::::ght (. ) now this is starting to get a lot clearer this is starting to be a really (.) obsessive pattern that she has around cleaning ((following speech is dubbed over CCTV footage of Della vacuuming)) this is not someone who is choosing to clean this is someone who is driven to clean

((CCTV Footage: Della is shown vacuuming in the lounge, Victor is sat on the couch apparently watching TV. Victor stands up and leaves the room))
Della: I'm turning it off I'm turning it off can't you hear?
Victor: (((from outside the room)) [you've been at it for bloody four hours]
Della: ((turns off the vacuum and drops it)) right (1.2) it's off (1.3) VIC =
Victor: = (((from outside the room)) I'VE HAD ENOUGH DELLA =
Della: it's off (1.8) you've been upstairs anyway =

Victor: = ((from outside the room)) yeah and then I've come down here and it's a madhouse again

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on CCTV footage described above))

Vanessa: it's so intrusive nobody can hear the television nobody can sit in the kitchen it's just all consuming noise =

Malcolm: = it's almost like she is avoiding looking at herself so she keeps relentlessly going going going

((CCTV Footage: Della is cleaning the kitchen cupboard doors, the two children are sat at the breakfast bar, Victor appears periodically as he moves around the room in and out of shot))

Della: see what I mean this is what I don't like about Sundays (. ) 'cause I can't get nothing done if I was only here on my own I'd have this work done in no time =

Amy: = if I could go to bed anytime I want I'd be really happy

((Edit))

Della: [inaudible] queuing up I've got everyone around me I just want to run away:: y =

Ben: = run away then =

Amy: = [inaudible] =

Della: = I just want to run away:: y =

Amy: = but why? =
Della: = 'cause I can't get nothing clean =

Amy: = when I get [wound up] I just go to bed

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and reflecting on CCTV footage described above))

Malcolm: she's telling us all we need to know there she's saying 'I want to run away I want to run away' and she's running away into the cleaning it's almost like the cleaning is a fantasy world .hh that she's entered into because she can't face her life (1.5)

Vanessa: that's very sad =

Malcolm: it's very sad and this is I believe that this boil is ready to burst here as well =

Vanessa: = Malcolm I'm very worried I have to say .hh that if I received just this bit in isolation I would say that their marriage is virtually at an end .h it's that serious I would be very interested to see the sex area and intimacy and how that's affected by the cleaning issues as well

((Graphics sequences in which 'Sex' appears as the second key area))

((Reflective footage: Della and Victor are individually shown talking to camera, apparently responding to the question "How often would you like to have sex?", which appears at the bottom of the screen))

Victor: I would probably like to have sex maybe at least four times a month (.)

which would equate to once a week would be great
Della: ((Della is on screen for 3.7 seconds before offering her response)) I don't really know (1.6) I don't really (2.1) I can't really gauge that (.) I mean maybe when I was younger it was more frequent .hh but (1.8) maybe (1.9) once a week † once a fortnight

Victor: at the moment we're lucky to get once a month

Della: I don't think sexually I give him enough (h hh hh hhh.)

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting on reflective footage described above))

Malcolm: That's very interesting that she says 'I don't think sexually I give him enough' that is a very telling statement .hh because actually it's about sharing and she is clearly on a model of saying 'I ought to be delivering the goods at a certain amount of time' =

Vanessa: = is this lay back and think of Britain still =

Malcolm: = this is lay back and think of Britain and interestingly enough the lay back and think of Britain syndrome is normally once a month and a woman normally feels she can get away with .hh once a month if she doesn't want to have sex with her partner (.).hhh it is rarely because a woman is frigid.hh it is because a woman is not being approached in an intimate way [by her man]

Vanessa: she's not being unleashed is she she's not being encouraged and nurtured .hh well if she'd stop cleaning for five minutes maybe he'd have a chance to nurture her
Narrator: In the two weeks we filmed Victor and Della held hands once
snuggled on the sofa twice kissed each other on the cheek four times never
kissed on the lips and didn’t have sex once

Vanessa: I have to say throughout a lot of the time that we watch this couple
she was the one that was actually wanting some kind of affection and he was
quite cold

Malcolm: he’s physically lacking in spontaneity and when this comes between
a couple a man has actually lost his confidence in approaching a woman
physically and it feels to me as though he’s able to respond to her (. ) almost a
delayed (. ) delayed action a few seconds afterwards he doesn’t immediately
respond to her touch

((CCTV Footage: Della pulls a blanket over her legs and tries to curl up
resting against Vic))
Malcolm: here you are here's an opportunity Vic put your arm around her stroke her instead of cover up your face (1.8)

Vanessa: he doesn't want it look this is a very negative reaction OH now now there's a [delayed reaction

Malcolm: delayed reaction (.) and very minimal (.) but if he wants to have a sexual relationship with her which he clearly does .h he is going to have to fix the intimate relationship with her and he HE has the responsibility (Vanessa: hmm) here because she's open to being kissed and cuddled .hh at least the first step in a sexual relationship is available for him but he has to take that he can't expect to go from nought to ten and jump into a sexual relationship without having a good physical relationship with her

((CCTV Footage: Victor is shown interacting with the children Ben and Amy))

Narrator: While Victor shows little affection to Della the experts soon see it's a different story with their children Ben and Amy

Vanessa: Oh he has a lovely relationship with the daughter (.) HE NEEDS TO DO THAT with his wife COME ON =

Malcolm: = and with the son (.) he's great with his kids affectionately (2.8) again I see this very often in families when (. ) when there's a lack of affection between the mother and father they =

Vanessa: = lots on the kids they give it to =

Malcolm: = they put loads on kids which also means you're never really facing the issue that you've got an affection need that's not being met
((CCTV Footage: Della is shown standing in the lounge facing the kitchen area, she is talking (but the soundtrack is back grounded to the voice of the narrator) Della makes several downward motions with her right hand as she is talking))

Narrator: However, in the second week Vanessa and Malcolm's concerns about this couple intensify as anger and resentment around Della's constant cleaning explode

((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene but full audio soundtrack is restored Victor is evidently not in the same room))

Della: look at it that all over the floor ((downward motions of right arm now interpretable as referring to the object laying on the floor)) that welding helmet bags extra shoes there’s a hundred pairs over there and you’re being the same as them =

Victor: [beeped out expletive] OFF =

Della: = I can’t keep clearing up

((Graphics sequence and break for adverts))

Narrator: Victor and Della are putting their relationship under the microscope divorce lawyer Vanessa Lloyd Platt and psychotherapist Malcolm Stern are analysing two weeks of CCTV footage taken in the couple's home. So far our
298 experts have examined Della's obsession with cleaning the house and Victor's lack of affection, but before calling the couple in they want to take a closer look at this couple's communication.

302 ((Graphics sequences in which 'Communication' appears as the third key area))

304 ((Reflective footage: Della and Victor are individually shown talking to camera, apparently responding to the question "What causes most arguments between you?", which appears at the bottom of the screen))

308 Della: I'd say the most common cause of arguments is (. . .) really who's going to do what chores and (. . .) you know me complaining about (. . .) not getting enough help and that sort of thing

311 Victor: A messy house that would be the first cause of an argument

314 ((CCTV footage: Della can be seen in the lounge near the kitchen area))

314 Della: I think you've sabotaged these drawers =

315 Victor: = Why have I sabotaged them? =

316 Della: = Well they're not very tidy =

317 Victor: = Well for god's sake they weren't very tidy when I went in 'em

318 ((possible edit)) It's been one thing after another =

319 Della: = Yeah but Vic don't think you can get stuff out and just leave it 'cause that is [something that you]

322 Victor: I haven't I haven't ((possible edit))
Della: you're lazy though Vic you bring 'em in right when they're absolutely caked with mud =
Victor: = they weren't [I'd taken it all off
Della: and I don't want 'em in

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting on CCTV footage))

Vanessa: if you are constantly criticising your partner whether it's when you are arguing with them or otherwise .hh you are so demoralising them .hh that there is no room for anything else in the relationship
Narrator: And before long this constant criticism erupts into a major row

((CCTV footage: Della is shown standing in the lounge facing the kitchen area, she is talking (but the soundtrack is backgrounded to the voice of the narrator) Della makes several downward motions with her right hand as she is talking, when the full audio soundtrack is restored Victor is evidently not in the same room))

Della: look at it that all over the floor ((downward motions of right arm now interpretable as referring to the object laying on the floor)) that welding helmet bagS extra shoes there's a hundred pairs over there and you're being the same as them =
Malcolm: what happens in a big argument is attack attack attack attack and build up hh and someone has to sometimes go 'I'm going to lower the tone' and neither of these two has learned how to lower the tone (1.0) if you throw heavy artillery at somebody all they can do is either hit back with heavy artillery or crumple

Della: If I didn't bring 'em in they'd rOT OUT THERE =

Victor: = ((expletive beeped out)) F(beep)K OFF [inaudible]=

Della: = I JUST CAN'T HANDLE IT ANYMORE =

Victor: = SHUT UP =

Della: = I CAN'T (1.5) I CAN'T KEEP CLEARING UP AND PUTTING THINGS AWAY IT'S REALLY DIFFICULT

Della: and Malcolm shown watching and commenting on CCTV footage of above described interaction and then footage of Victor and Della sat at opposite ends of a three-seater sofa Della is reading the paper Victor is watching television}}

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting on CCTV footage))

494
Vanessa: out it comes I've had enough I can't stand it (2.3) she doesn't want to be there she wants to get on a plane and escape from the whole thing but actually from herself

((CCTV footage: of above described scene))

Della: "why aren't you talking to me?" =
Victor: 'cause there's no point in talking to you =
Della: = why? =
Victor: = 'cause all you do is have a bloody go at me =
Della: = "I'm stressed" =
Victor: = no you stress me out (.) I'm alright (.) until you come home =
Della: = you just =
Victor: = you moan at stupid little things =
Della: = you don't put things away Vic and it feels [like
Victor: WHAT?

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting on CCTV footage))

Malcolm: she's now feeling quite reticent about having a go at him he's angry and she knows she's overstepped the mark
((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene, however camera angle changes to the far end of the room Vic is seen to leave the sofa and move towards the kitchen area))

Della: [inaudible] like I say and leave everything to me =

Victor: = everything to you =

Della: = yeah everything=

Victor: = like what? =

Della: = everything =

Victor: = LIKE WHAT? =

Della: = EVERYTHING =

Victor: = LIKE WHAT? =

Della: = just everything =

Victor: = what's everything? =

Della: = just everything =

Victor: = what's everything? =

Della: = [fuck] just go to bed Vic =

Victor: = well like what? =

Della: = just go to bed it's normal for you innit? =

Victor: = ((seen to slam a pad of paper and a pen down on the breakfast bar))

NO

[I'm sick of seeing you =

Della: = no it's normal =

Victor: = BEING A SHI- AN ARSEHOLE [all the time
Della: no: you go to bed every night last night you had an 'eadache and you just [went to bed

Victor: oh sorry sorry [inaudible]

Della: [inaudible] well (. ) no I never =

Victor: = or what stay here and get told off all the time =

Della: = I didn’t tell you off last night =

Victor: = no you’re always having a dig =

Della: = it’s what you do Vic =

Victor: = you digged as soon as you walked in the door =

Della: = I mean it’s like it’s not even nine o’clock now =

Victor: = AS SOON AS YOU WALKED IN THE DOOR I THOUGHT ‘RIGHT KEEP CALM I KNOW SHE’S GONNA GO CRAZY FOR SOME REASON’

AND [YOU FOUND ONE

Della: it’s not even nine o’clock Vic ((Vic leaves the room)) (. ) go to bed Vic

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting on CCTV footage))

Malcolm: It is quite common to see men and sometimes women leave the room it it’s saying ‘I can’t actually match you in this argument therefore I have to get away’ =

((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene, Della is now seen leaving the lounge and following Vic out of the room))
Vanessa: = but for some women that is not something they can tolerate they say whenever we’re having an argument he just won’t listen and he’ll walk away and it will actually send them into orbit

((CCTV footage: continuation of above described scene the screen shows an empty lounge but the soundtrack suggest that Victor and Della are elsewhere in the house as they can be heard shouting at each other. Owing to the fact that they are shouting and the possible positioning of microphones in the house much of what is heard is incomprehensible))

((Reflective footage: Vanessa and Malcolm shown watching and commenting on CCTV footage))

Malcolm: = I would describe that as an unhealthy argument =

Vanessa: = that is an understatement of the year an unhealthy arg- they hate each other at this moment Malcolm =

Malcolm: = that’s not necessarily bad in relationships to express that from time to time what is bad is to throw it from different rooms around the place .hh what is bad is to not be able to actually listen to each other and they very rarely .hh stop and take stock of what’s happening it just keeps building and

Vanessa: = Malcolm when people reach this point in a relationship this kind of arguing this kind of exhaustion they are virtually at the end of a relationship it’s as simple as that

Malcolm: = I still believe that there are techniques and there are skills they can learn to lower the tempo (2.3) .hh negative habit patterns (. ) come very
very insidiously into a relationship and gradually eat away at the foundation of the relationship and that's what's been happening here the cleaning has eaten away at the relationship .hh the lack of physical intimacy has eaten away at the relationship .hh and the resentment and anger that they have with each other that is never really cleared has also eaten away at the relationship and that needs to be reversed it's a big job

Narrator: Having studied over two hundred hours of footage our experts are ready to meet Victor and Della and tell the couple if they think they are made for each other but will it be the verdict Victor and Della want to hear

((Assessment meeting with Vanessa, Malcolm, Victor and Della))

Vanessa: well you look very nervous you guys don't be one of the things we noticed was you don't seem to have a lot of fun =

Victor: = no no =

Vanessa: = the two of you the fun and laughter seems to have gone out of your relationship .hh when was the last time you laughed together =

Victor: = not a lot =

Della: = no I've [been very down

Victor: the end of the week you know you're sort of bloating out and your your brain's =

Della: = and actually I just feel I I I don't have a life really =

Malcolm: = ri::ght =

Della: = in general I don't I'm very fed up about it [just generally but even now
Vanessa: we could see that we could see
Della: I'm fed up about it =
Vanessa: that = we would just like to show you some clips

((Victor and Della are shown CCTV footage that shows Della initiating or trying to initiate affection between the two of them))

Vanessa: = WE FELT that Della was desperate for a bit more affection .hh and that you weren't giving it to her and she was feeling a little bit rejected = Malcolm: = and every time you don't respond she becomes a little less confident about reaching out to you and feels a little bit less loved .hh and this then starts a vicious cycle where you feel unconfident about reaching out to her because .hh she's closed down towards you you've closed down towards her .hh and you carry on not being intimate =
Della: = sometimes in the morning I mean I'm not adding fuel to the fire but sometimes in the morning he'll he'll say 'goodbye' he'll (. ) give me a kiss goodbye and it it's just (h)awful it's just like that ((mimes a peck on the cheek)) you know and there's no and I =
Malcolm: = show him what you want just tell him (. ) give him a kiss you think he'd you'd like show him what you want =
Della: = well I'd like a nice kiss like ((leans towards Vic puts her hand on the back of his neck and kisses him on the lips)) you know a nice just [a nice proper kiss but
Malcolm: a real contact a real
Della: you know it's like it's a duty but you may [as well not some
Malcolm: contact
Victor: it's not from the heart
Della: mornings [you may as well not bother
Malcolm: we've got it hear did you hear that one ((staccato)) it's not from the heart =
Vanessa: = it's mechanical =
Della: = yeah =
Malcolm: = I would have been absolutely staggered to find that you had a rich sex life to be perfectly honest (Victor: hmm) because there is so little of the glue that makes a really rich sex life here =
Vanessa: = you want more sex don't you? =
Victor: = oh yeah definitely =
Malcolm: = my guess is what happens in your sex life and excuse me if this is a little indelicate is that every so often you lay back and think of England because you think that the relationship needs some punctuation with sex but really what you're looking for is much more affection from the relationship aren't you? (1.7)
Della: yeah I suppose I do say that sometimes don't I
Vanessa: let's have a look at the next clip shall we =
Della: = oh god =
((Victor and Della are shown the CCTV footage of them arguing and shouting))
Della: I'm not laughing 'cause I think it's funny it's just awful (7.7). hhh ((to Vic)) your language (1.3) oh no I can't hear anymore (ha ha ha) =
Malcolm: = well I'm not surprised =
Vanessa: = we couldn't either 'yes I am' 'no you're not' 'yes' I mean it's like a pantomime and you weren't getting anywhere =
Della: = no =
Vanessa: = absolutely nowhere =
Malcolm: = let me tell you that also involved in your arguments is all the resentment that comes from the other areas of your relationship =
Vanessa: = so you end up actually hating each other and that's not what we want we want [you to rebuild
Della: that's how I felt about him at the moment I hate him (1.4) I love him but I hate him =
Vanessa: = I know =
Malcolm: = you carry with you all the pain of not having been cared for or not feeling cared for to you it's feeling like you're living in a house where a hoover's running around you all the time hh and you've got to change this pattern that's become completely ingrained
((possible edit))
Malcolm: I think you're going to see some interesting things in our next sequence here
((Victor and Della are shown the CCTV footage of Della cleaning and vacuuming around the sofa and coffee table))

Vanessa: what do you feel having seen that clip? =
Della: ((with hands over her mouth)) it's awful isn't it (h h) =
Vanessa: = why? =
Della: = 'cause it's just constant (.)
Vanessa: = yep (. ) it is obsessive (. ) I'm sorry I know this is very difficult for you but it is over the top and it is driving your ((staccato)) entire family barmy (. ) when you hoovered you hoovered the same area four five times .hh and this wasn't just one isolated incident it was ((staccato)) every single day .hh there were patterns where you were cleaning the table where you went round and round the same area maybe five or six time .hh round the dustbin lid again and again and again it's not healthy for you and there is a problem there =
Della: = I don't get the hoover out every night though I'm not sticking up for myself I know I'm fussy I admit and I'm not arguing the point >but I don't do that everyday(h h) =
Malcolm: "twenty three hours a week" was the amount of time you cleaned .hhh if you had a cleaner in to do your house they would spend three hours (. ) you might have them in twice a week and they might spend six hours altogether=
Della: = I do look at it like that sometimes =
Malcolm: = I don't want to make this where we shame you into doing anything what I want to suggest [is a
Della: I'd rather I'd rather because I'm unhappy so if I can look for something that's going to make me happier =

Malcolm: = yes =

Vanessa: = it will make you happier Della once we break the mould once we break this pattern =

Malcolm: = what I want to say is that when someone cleans a lot there's often a part of their lives they want to run away from and I feel like there's a part of you that's very unhappy and I think you've declared that already and tries to lose yourself in making your environment as clean and as clear as you can possibly make it now =

Vanessa: = now =

Della: = I feel awful =

Vanessa: = why do you feel awful? =

Victor: = you're not awful you're not awful =

Malcolm: = there is an area in your relationship which doesn't work and we have to find a way of putting that right (1.0) what we were looking at was actually choosing an hour where you would normally be cleaning and you would choose not to clean in that hour (.) you would do that for a whole week and you can support her Vic not by saying 'stop this cleaning' and getting really angry with her but by recognising .hh that this is a major problem and a really difficult area for Della and that you're in this together =

Victor: = mhmm =

Malcolm: = that will make the difference (.8) which do you think is more important having a clean house or actually feeling that you love each other and connect with each other? =
Della: well yeah that is more important isn't it =
Victor: = yeah =
Vanessa: = yeah =
Della: but you sort of don't realise it you have to sort of have a wake up call
sometimes you have to sort of tell yourself don't you =
Malcolm: = bingo here's your wake up call and you know whatever it was that
inspired you to (. ) come on this programme is whatever it was that was saying
'we need some help' and together you can find ways of starting to get the
relationship back on the track that you want it to be (. )
Della: I'll put an ad out for a cleaner =
Vanessa: = she's going to get a cleaner in =
Della: = I am =
Victor: = you're not going to sack her are you?
Della: = well no (. ) but they can do the dusting I can't stand dusting =
Victor: = if she did get a cleaner then I would take her out somewhere and say
'right look what you're doing now you know we're actually having a good time'
Malcolm: = 'we're having a meal out while our house is being looked after' =
Victor: = yeah 'cause that's physical 'cause something that you can see
physically is OK =
Malcolm: = would you like that? =
Della: = mm =
Malcolm: = would you like him to take you out and woo you and =
Victor: = [woo woo ((others laugh)) =
Della: yeah
Vanessa: = lots of wooing OK?

((After the assessment meeting Victor and Della are stood together talking to camera))

Della: it's been very good for me =

Victor: = you see it from a totally different perspective =

Della: = yeah definitely =

Victor: = when you're looking down in =

Della: = yeah and I you know we have got to change things definitely

((‘Three months later...Victor takes Della out regularly and the family are going out more at weekends. However, ‘Della is still trying to find a cleaner’ appears on screen))