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Bealer and the autonomy of philosophy

Sarch, A (2008) Bealer and the autonomy of philosophy Synthese, 172 (3). pp. 451-474.

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Abstract

George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that his defense fails. First, I argue that Bealer's theory of determinate concept possession, even if true, would not establish the "autonomy" of philosophy. That is, even if he is correct about what determinate concept possession consists in, it would not follow that it is possible to answer the central questions of philosophy by critical reflection on our intuitions. Furthermore, I argue that Bealer's account of determinate concept possession in fact faces serious problems. Accordingly, I conclude that Bealer does not succeed in vindicating the appeal to intuition in philosophy. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Law
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Sarch, Aa.sarch@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Date : 26 September 2008
Identification Number : https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9402-y
Copyright Disclaimer : © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008
Uncontrolled Keywords : Autonomy, Bealer, Concept possession, Concepts, Disagreement, Intuition, Philosophical methodology, Property identity, Reliability of intuition, Semantically stable
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 15:37
Last Modified : 18 May 2017 13:13
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/820925

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