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Internalism about a person's good: Don't believe it

Sarch, A (2010) Internalism about a person's good: Don't believe it Philosophical Studies, 154 (2). pp. 161-184.

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Abstract

Internalism about a person's good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person's well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person's good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one's good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don't end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls 'two-tier internalism' would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one's good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one's good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person's good do not look promising. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Law
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Sarch, Aa.sarch@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Date : 6 March 2010
Identification Number : 10.1007/s11098-010-9533-0
Copyright Disclaimer : © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Uncontrolled Keywords : Desire Satisfactionism, Good, Hedonism, Internalism, Intrinsic value, Motivation, Subjectivity, Welfare, Well-Being
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 15:37
Last Modified : 20 Oct 2017 17:06
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/820924

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