University of Surrey

Test tubes in the lab Research in the ATI Dance Research

Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly

MANTOVANI, A and MION, G (2006) Advertising and endogenous exit in a differentiated duopoly .

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

In this paper we consider a two-stage duopoly game where fîrrns first decide whether to invest in advertising and then compete in prices. Advertising has two effects : a market enlargement for both firms and a predatory gain for the investing firm only. Both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria may arise. The two most interesting cases are a coordination game where both firms investing and non-investing are equilibria. and a chicken game where only one firm invests while the other is possibly driven (endogenously) out of the market. Our results suggest that product differentiation has an ambiguous impact on investinent in advertising and that strong product substitutability may induce a coordination problem.

Item Type: Other
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
MANTOVANI, AUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
MION, Gg.mion@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Date : 1 March 2006
Uncontrolled Keywords : D64, E24, J22, Advertising, product differenciation, endogenous exit, asymmetric equilibria, coordination games
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 15:33
Last Modified : 16 May 2017 15:33
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/820459

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year


Information about this web site

© The University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom.
+44 (0)1483 300800