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Optimal Voting Rules

Gershkov, A, Moldovanu, B and Shi, X (2013) Optimal Voting Rules .

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Abstract

We study dominant strategy incentive compatible (DIC) and deterministic mechanisms in a social choice setting with several alternatives. The agents are privately informed about their preferences, and have single-crossing utility functions. Monetary transfers are not feasible. We use an equivalence between deterministic, DIC mechanisms and generalized median voter schemes to construct the constrained-efficient, optimal mechanism for an utilitarian planner. Optimal schemes for other welfare criteria such as, say, a Rawlsian maximin can be analogously obtained.

Item Type: Other
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Gershkov, Aa.gershkov@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Moldovanu, BUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Shi, XUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : 7 August 2013
Uncontrolled Keywords : D82, D72, D71, Mechanism Design, Voting, Dominant Strategy, Utilitarian
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 15:33
Last Modified : 17 May 2017 14:36
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/820456

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