Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation

Jansen, JA (2010) Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation The Journal of Industrial Economics, 58 (2). pp. 349-372.

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Abstract

The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms' profits and the probability of innovation.

Item Type:	Article
Authors :	Name Email ORCID Jansen, JA j.jansen@surrey.ac.uk
Date :	1 June 2010
DOI :	10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00417.x
Depositing User :	Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited :	16 May 2017 15:17
Last Modified :	16 May 2017 15:17
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/818598

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