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Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting

Roy, J, Brusco, S and Dziubinski, M (2012) Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (2). pp. 447-469.

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Abstract

We consider the Hotelling–Downs model with n⩾3 office-seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of votersʼ ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize

Item Type: Article
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Roy, Jj.roy@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Brusco, SUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Dziubinski, MUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : 2012
Identification Number : https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.004
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 15:16
Last Modified : 16 May 2017 15:16
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/818422

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