Are democratic governments more efficient?
Adam, A, Delis, MD and Kammas, P (2011) Are democratic governments more efficient? European Journal of Political Economy, 27 (1). pp. 75-86.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between public sector efficiency (PSE) and the level of democracy, both theoretically and empirically. At the theoretical level a simple model of elections with two time periods is presented, which takes into account whether the political regime is democratic or not. Specifically, we assume that elected officials in democracies are "more" accountable to voters than the respective ones in autocracies. This mechanism induces the democratic politicians to produce the public good in a more efficient way, in order to remain in power. In the empirical section we examine the effect of democracy on PSE for a panel dataset of 50 developing and developed countries over the period 1980-2000. Our results suggest that the relationship between PSE and democracy is positive and statistically significant, thus confirming our theoretical priors.
Item Type: | Article |
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Divisions : | Surrey research (other units) |
Authors : | Adam, A, Delis, MD and Kammas, P |
Date : | March 2011 |
DOI : | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.04.004 |
Uncontrolled Keywords : | Democracy, Public sector efficiency |
Depositing User : | Symplectic Elements |
Date Deposited : | 16 May 2017 15:15 |
Last Modified : | 24 Jan 2020 14:13 |
URI: | http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/818377 |
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