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Equilibrium and Optimal R&D Roles in a Mixed Market

Zikos, V Equilibrium and Optimal R&D Roles in a Mixed Market .

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Abstract

This is the first paper to investigate the timing of the R&D decisions in a mixed market. Considering a model in which a public firm competes against a private one, we examine the desirable (welfare-maximizing) and the equilibrium R&D role of the public firm. Our results suggest that from a social point of view, the public firm should carry out its investment as a Stackelberg follower. Using the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky [Games and Economic Behavior 2 (1990) 29], we show that the public firm may play this desirable role.

Item Type: Other
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Zikos, Vv.zikos@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Uncontrolled Keywords : L13, L31, L32, Endogenous timing, R&D, Stackelberg, mixed market.
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 15:14
Last Modified : 16 May 2017 15:14
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/818233

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