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The Temporal Dimension of Wage Contracts in Oligopoly with Spillovers

Zikos, V The Temporal Dimension of Wage Contracts in Oligopoly with Spillovers .

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Abstract

This paper examines how the duration of wage contracts influences innovation incentives, wages and employment. We find that wages are non-monotone in the duration of wage contracts. Furthermore, a positive and one-to-one relation between innovation and union utility exists and both attain their highest value under a long-term contract. Profits may vary depending on the extent of R&D spillovers and the associated raising rivals' cost incentive, although they are highest when union/firms engage in a long-term contractual relation. Testable predictions to discriminate between short-term and long-term contracts are also discussed.

Item Type: Other
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Zikos, Vv.zikos@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Uncontrolled Keywords : J41, J51, L13, O31, Wage contracts, R&D, Spillovers, Raising rivals' cost.
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 15:14
Last Modified : 16 May 2017 15:14
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/818232

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