A note on: jury size and the free rider problem

Spencer, C, Levine, P and Bag, P (2006) A note on: jury size and the free rider problem Economics Bulletin, 4 (3). pp. 1-12.

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Abstract

This note reassesses the basic result in Mukhopadhaya (2003) that, when jurors may acquire costly signals about a defendant's guilt, with a larger jury size the probability of reaching a correct verdict may in fact fall, contrary to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. We show that if the jurors coordinate on any one of a number of (equally plausible) asymmetric equilibria other than the symmetric equilibrium considered by Mukhopadhaya, the probability of accuracy reaches a maximum for a particular jury size and remains unchanged with larger juries, thus mitigating Mukhopadhaya''s result somewhat. However, the case for limiting the jury size – a recommendation by Mukhopadhaya – gains additional grounds if one shifts the focus from maximizing the probability of reaching a correct verdict to the maximization of the overall social surplus, measured by the expected benefits of jury decisions less the expected costs of acquiring signals.

Item Type:	Article
Authors :	Name Email ORCID Spencer, C UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED Levine, P p.levine@surrey.ac.uk UNSPECIFIED Bag, P UNSPECIFIED UNSPECIFIED
Date :	2006
Uncontrolled Keywords :	D7, K4
Depositing User :	Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited :	16 May 2017 15:14
Last Modified :	17 May 2017 14:33
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/818187

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