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Efficient tournaments within teams

Gershkov, A, Li, J and Schweinzer, P (2009) Efficient tournaments within teams RAND Journal of Economics, 40 (1). pp. 103-119.

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We analyze incentive problems in team and partnership structures where the only available information to condition a contract on is a partial and noisy ranking which specifies who comes first in efforts among the competing partners. This enables us to ensure both first-best efficient effort levels for all partners and the redistribution of output only among partners. Our efficiency result is obtained for a wide range of cost and production functions. Copyright © 2009, RAND.

Item Type: Article
Divisions : Surrey research (other units)
Authors :
Li, J
Schweinzer, P
Date : 26 October 2009
DOI : 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00057.x
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 15:13
Last Modified : 24 Jan 2020 14:09

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