University of Surrey

Test tubes in the lab Research in the ATI Dance Research

Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach

Gershkov, A and Moldovanu, B (2012) Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach International Journal of Industrial Organization, 30 (3). pp. 283-286.

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

This paper illustrates the benefits of applying mechanism design techniques to questions in revenue management, in particular to dynamic allocation and pricing problems. It is demonstrated that the solution to a sequential stochastic assignment problem under complete information can also be implemented under incomplete information by a variation of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. More generally, we argue that the mechanism design focus on implementable allocations rather than on prices yields many valuable insights about dynamic RM models. Finally, we also briefly survey some of the recent literature on dynamic mechanism design. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Item Type: Article
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Gershkov, Aa.gershkov@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Moldovanu, BUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : 1 May 2012
Identification Number : https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.12.008
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 15:13
Last Modified : 17 May 2017 14:33
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/818128

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year


Information about this web site

© The University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom.
+44 (0)1483 300800