Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes

Páscoa, MR and Seghir, A (2009) Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes Games and Economic Behavior, 65 (1). pp. 270-286.

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Abstract

In the presence of utility penalties, collateral requirements do not always eliminate the occurrence of Ponzi schemes. Harsh utility penalties may induce effective payments over collateral recollection values. In this event, loans can be larger than collateral costs and Ponzi schemes become possible. © 2007.

Item Type:	Article
Divisions :	Surrey research (other units)
Authors :	Páscoa, MR and Seghir, A
Date :	1 January 2009
DOI :	10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.002
Depositing User :	Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited :	16 May 2017 15:12
Last Modified :	24 Jan 2020 14:04
URI:	http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/817920

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