Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes
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Páscoa, MR and Seghir, A (2009) Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes Games and Economic Behavior, 65 (1). pp. 270-286.
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In the presence of utility penalties, collateral requirements do not always eliminate the occurrence of Ponzi schemes. Harsh utility penalties may induce effective payments over collateral recollection values. In this event, loans can be larger than collateral costs and Ponzi schemes become possible. © 2007.
Item Type: | Article |
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Divisions : | Surrey research (other units) |
Authors : | Páscoa, MR and Seghir, A |
Date : | 1 January 2009 |
DOI : | 10.1016/j.geb.2007.10.002 |
Depositing User : | Symplectic Elements |
Date Deposited : | 16 May 2017 15:12 |
Last Modified : | 24 Jan 2020 14:04 |
URI: | http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/817920 |
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