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Stackelberg mixed oligopoly with asymmetric subsidies

Zikos, V (2007) Stackelberg mixed oligopoly with asymmetric subsidies Economics Bulletin, 12 (13).

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Abstract

In a mixed oligopoly, when the public leader becomes a private leader and the government provides output subsidies, then privatization causes the optimal subsidy, profits and welfare to fall [Economics Letters 83 (2004) 411]. We show instead that if the leader and the followers receive asymmetric, rather than symmetric subsidies, the first-best optimum can be restored. In this case, privatization bears no consequences on the followers' subsidy, output and welfare.

Item Type: Article
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Zikos, Vv.zikos@surrey.ac.ukUNSPECIFIED
Date : 21 June 2007
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 16 May 2017 14:45
Last Modified : 16 May 2017 14:45
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/814537

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