Representations of the Social in UK Higher Education Policy & Personalist Alternatives

by

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Thesis abstract

This thesis aims to contribute to a personalist approach to policy. First, it covers representations of the social and by implication the person in third way approaches from New Labour to Conservative policy. To empirically demonstrate what views of the person exist, a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is conducted in the area of higher education governance. The argument put forward is that a view of the social and person exists in higher education governance and this affects policy proposals and initiatives. Thus, it is viewed necessary to present an explicit view of the person that then informs alternative policy directions. For this purpose, the work of Margaret Archer is utilised but with some revisions proposed. The argued realist model of personhood presented is then adopted as the basis of a relational policy direction defined by a homo relatus conception of personhood.
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This thesis covers the different ways the social and by implication the person is represented in UK government policy, with specific focus on higher education governance. First views of the social and personhood will be covered, followed by a critique and the proposal of possible alternative policy directions. Accordingly, there are three broad aims to the thesis:

(1) To provide an overview of governance attempts to articulate a third way vision between Left and Right and the manner this impacts a view of the social and person;

(2) To conduct a textual analysis of higher education governance policies and practices; the aim in this analysis is to investigate ways third way policy affects an attempt to regulate the social and the place of the citizen in the context of public service provision;

(3) To propose an alternative relational policy direction based on a *homo relatus* view of the person. The third aim is based on a theoretical discussion on the nature of personhood and the implications of these theoretical themes on alternative policies and practices.

The organization of the thesis’s content is informed by the above stated objectives. The first section, tackling the first aim, consists of two chapters – the first chapter covers New Labour’s attempt at third way thinking in its attempt to reconcile antagonistic policy positions of the Left and Right. The relevance of documenting New Labour’s third way approach is in its precedence as a third way approach that proposed ideas on an enabling state (an enabling state that regulates the social and the conditions of provision to meet pre-given policy outcomes). Chapter three then overviews the Conservative ‘Big Society’ agenda in which third way themes were explicitly adopted. Similar to New Labour, Conservative policy adopted ideas on an investment in the social as a path between both the Left and Right. However, with similarities acknowledged, differences between New Labour and Conservative third way thinking will be stated.

The themes discussed in the first section continue in the second section and inform the textual analysis. The second section consists of two chapters –
chapters four and five. In chapter four both the research questions and the methodology adopted in textual analysis will be stated. In chapter four three main questions will be set for analysis – (1) How does a policy vision affect social relations in higher education provision and thus represent the citizen as public service recipient? (2) How does an existing policy vision extend beyond higher education to other policy domains and how does this impact higher education practices; (3) Rhetorically what identities and views of the person are incentivised and articulated in higher education provision? Chapter five is the empirical chapter in which the set research questions are investigated in a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of “Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System”.

Chapters six and seven, the final section, consist of the theoretical work and alternative policy directions. Chapter six presents a realist view of the person and aims to give a justification of Archer’s approach to personhood, while proposing some revisions through social domain theory and a developmental re-thinking of reflexivity. Chapter seven then adopts the theoretical questions discussed in chapter six and presents a case for a realist turn in higher education practice. The realist turn adopts a homo relatus view of personhood and aims to extend the ideas discussed in the previous chapter to critique both a homo economicus and homo sociologicus view of the person prevalent in hegemonic policy agendas. Finally, contextual applications will be proposed based on this alternative view of the person in a developmental approach to the curriculum and assessment practice.
New Labour, the Third Way & Making the Social Work

The first section covers the policy side of the thesis. It specifically covers the question on how the social is conceived as a corrective mechanism, in the logic of policy triangulation\(^1\), to remedy past failures. The objective of this chapter is to identify how New Labour's third way vision emanates from certain representations of the social that pre-supposes new ideological directions and policy initiatives. The relevance of New Labour's model of the third way is in its antecedence as a hegemonic policy trend that is then adopted in the 'Big Society' agenda. Thus, the overview presented also provides continuity and context in a trajectory from New Labour to further attempts at triangulation in the 'Big Society' agenda.

The predominance of the social, as a corrective measure, means that in establishing a governance agenda through social spaces, there is, by implication, an attempt to define roles and their occupants in terms of a centralised vision of the person in relation to others. Consequently, attempts at triangulation are presupposed by a framing of the social that supposedly necessitate these policy triangulations – these are normative representations that point to an ideological

\(^1\) For New Labour policy triangulation represented a renewal in social democracy. In a changing world that demands adaptation both the past social democratic statist approaches of old Labour and the excesses of Thatcherite neo-liberal individualism, represent inadequate paths to meet the needs of a competitive global economy and a social justice agenda. Instead, New Labour, in its policy triangulation, as will be covered in this chapter, sought ways to reconcile what were perceived as contradictory goals – social justice and economic efficiency (Alderwick 2012). Chapter three extends the theme of policy triangulation to Conservative policy and covers similarities and differences between New Labour's third way and the 'Big Society' agenda. While there are similarities between New Labour's third way and the Big Society agenda, the ‘Big Society’ model takes a different direction in its focus on reconciling antagonistic themes through initiatives that first emphasise a normative societal breakdown and the need to remedy this breakdown through collective civic measures (the social). Further, an emphasis on the civic represents a space between statist welfare dependency and problems with excessive individualism.
positioning justifying certain positions (McAnualla 2010). Furthermore, it is the logic of third way politics, continued in later Conservative policy, that a dominant theme emerges of remaking the social as a corrective measure to the excesses of markets and its individualism. Both cases represent the social as something to be engineered to bring about more relevant policy initiatives and a space that can transcend the faults of previous political philosophies.

2.1 Re-defining the state and adapting to change

While re-defining the state’s role in forms of welfare co-production is something that the ‘Big Society’ approach emphasises and further develops, it was New Labour that first advocated a fundamental re-thinking of what the state does, against what was viewed as the faults of a centralised welfare state. The state, through its different agents and ethos of provision, led to a dependency culture that valued rights over responsibilities. Re-thinking the state similarly entailed a different view of the citizen and subsequently how both the state and the community were articulated. Here three main presuppositions were present, per Morrison, that necessitated a change in direction:

These are the presupposition, firstly, of a neo-liberal narrative of a changing world that demands adaptation; secondly, of a consensual society that can agree shared values and work in partnership; and, finally, of the failure of both Old Left and the New Right, characterised respectively as the first and second ways, hence the required Third Way. (Morrison 2004: 176)

According to Tony Blair, the necessity of a consensual society is in its role defining a new relationship between citizen and community for the ‘modern world’ (cited in Morrison 2004: 171). The ‘modern world’, a salient New Labour policy theme, was synonymised with represented social processes – the reification of these processes then implicated a given required adaptation. Broader macro-economic changes are rhetorically equated with the language of ‘modernising’ and a ‘modern world’ that imposes an irreversible and necessary context to adapt to and the necessity of competing and maintaining markets.

New Labour’s 2003 ‘The Future of Higher Education’ White Paper document, for example, viewed higher education as a global business responsive to skills required for a knowledge based economy and a competitive market:

Our competitors see – as we should – that the developing knowledge economy means the need for more, better trained people in the workforce. And higher education is becoming a global business. Our
competitors are looking to sell higher education overseas, into the markets we have traditionally seen as ours. (DfES 2003: 13)

The changing world requires an enabling state that acknowledges global market forces but sets-out to facilitate and address, in the words of Tony Blair, for “supply side weakness” (cited in Bevir 2005: 108). Addressing these weaknesses was understood in terms of a broader policy synergism that brings together public/private partnerships, social networks and communities to produce the right supply-side conditions. Making this synergism work, enabled and co-ordinated by the state (a long-term strategy), was set-out in an inclusive discourse of social solidarity. Here Social solidarity is understood as an investment in human capital that, simultaneously, provides pathways for opportunities and succeeding in global markets. It is the skills and ability of the workforce, in the words of Gordon Brown, which “define the ability of a national economy to compete” (Cited in Bevir 2005: 113). The language of opportunity and skills were coupled with that of responsibility, in individuals succeeding and claiming a stake in society—skills and training were viewed as an entry into what was termed as a normal life by providing the tools of self-reliance and hence breaking cycles of welfare dependence.

There is a strong functionalist bias in the above noted approach, as it assumes a systemic integration is possible if the right conditions are generated (consensual society). As system integration needs to be developed then instilled in the citizen is an inculcation of responsibility and the affirmation of the structures of group life (a focus on pre–given system needs de–focuses from the more problematic issues of a lived social integration). The citizen not only obtains the right skills for a more competitive economy but also identifies with a positive solidarity to a shared cultural system and its concomitant role expectations. Tony Blair, for example, emphasised the socialising role of the family and the community, in developing this individuated sense of stake in society:

The breakdown of family and community bonds is intimately linked to the breakdown of law and order. Both family and community rely on notions of mutual respect and duty. It is in the family that we first learn to negotiate the boundaries of acceptable conduct and to recognise that we owe responsibilities to others as well as ourselves. We then build out from that family base to the community and beyond that to society as a whole [...] we do not show our children respect or act responsibly to them if we fail to provide them with the opportunities they need, with a stake in the society in which they live. Equally, we demand that respect and responsibility from them in return. (cited in Fairclough 2000: 42-43)
A re-definition of the citizen, with an emphasis on collective duties, affects the development of policy initiatives tackling social exclusion. For example, instead of poverty being framed as a question of social integration, regarding sectional antagonisms, it is instead represented as a condition of the individual being cut-off from networks and life chances, starting from a breakdown in family and community bonds. Thus, Peter Mandelson describes the problem of social exclusion as “more than poverty and unemployment. It is about being cut off from what the rest of us regard as normal life” (cited in Fairclough 2000: 52).

A condition of being cut-off emerges when excluded from broader networks. Tackling this, New Labour sought to enable citizens but also networks to work better to bring communities out of the margins and into ‘normal life’. In this way, social problems are interlinked and welfare dependency is not merely an individual problem but a networked problem. Providing opportunity for the citizen is not only the job of the state but part of a broader national project of renewal. Workfare policies are central in generating the right (motivated) citizen subject. Here the idea is that work not only breaks cycles of dependency, with a change in attitudes, but also connects citizens with the right social networks2. This way the system works better, as not only is it more aligned to a better economic performance, in investing in previously untapped human capital, but also achieves the purpose of social justice in citizens gaining a stake and place in society.

Considering this focus, it is consistent that New Labour focused their welfare policies on ideas of social inclusion and understood social exclusion in terms of multiple deprivation and its manifestation. Thus, in being focused on better

2 An emphasis on being cut-off from social networks may be identified in New Labour’s approach to social exclusion. First acknowledged, in continuity with the theme of policy triangulation, are supply side factors such as lack of opportunities, discriminatory practice and the importance of re-distributive measures. However, at the same time, there is an attempt to re-reconcile this social integrationist discourse on exclusion with a moral under-class one. Thus, we also have an emphasis on tackling social exclusion through changes in a life-outlook, with the importance of engaging those on the margins through raising economic activity and participation in labour markets. The onus, therefore, is on those marginalised to adopt behavioural changes, when provided with the right opportunities. The inculcation of an aspirational and self-improvement ethos, for those excluded, improves employability chances (Levitas 2005: 206 – 209). The final section demonstrates, in the case of Education Action Zones (EAZ), the tensions that exist in this attempt to reconcile both an integrationist and moral-underclass approach to social exclusion.
system integration and how system goals are achieved and maintained, then processes of social exclusion are replaced with initiatives on what are described as conditions of exclusion. We are informed social exclusion is a condition of multiple deprivation, that includes social problems such as unemployment, high crime, substandard education performance, limited aspiration and so on.

Means are sought to change citizen outlooks but this is tied with breaking cycles of deprivation and behavioural habits. This way, per Fairclough (2000), there is an attempt to bring together an integrationist discourse with a previously noted New Right language on social exclusion that is predicated on cultural attitudes:

The three discourses are a redistributionist discourse, which focuses on poverty and attempts to reduce poverty by redistributing wealth; a social integrationist discourse, which sees exclusion as primarily due to unemployment and inclusion as getting people into paid work; and a moral underclass discourse, which attributes exclusion to deficiencies in the culture of the excluded and inclusion as entailing cultural change ... The New Labour discourse of social exclusion is a combination of the social integrationist discourse (the focus on shifting people from welfare to work) and moral underclass discourse. (Fairclough 2000: 57)

A synergy view of policy also implicates a modern notion of citizenship that comes with a strong normative undertone aiming to change attitudes (the moral underclass discourse) and cultivate an identification with shared values. Here the citizen subject actively participates and is part of strong communities and institutions.

Following from this discourse on strong communities and a consensual society in New Labour's third way, social antagonisms may be avoided, due to there being no necessary trade-off between the economy working better and a fairness agenda. The latter fairness agenda is one in which citizens are provided with the right skills and thus a pathway for them to claim their stake. As markets, cannot be left to function on their own, mutuality is at the centre of involving citizens with the right tools and a way back into the right forms of social capital. Just as individuals are with a mutual responsibility, the same applies to businesses and other service providers. Tony Blair, for example, stated in a speech to the Confederation of British Industry:

The choice is: to let change overwhelm us, to resist it or equip ourselves to survive and prosper in it. The first leads to a fragmented society. The second is pointless and futile, trying to keep the clock from turning. The
only way is surely to analyse the challenge of change and to meet it. When I talk of a third way – between the old-style intervention of the old left and the laissez-faire of the new right – I do not mean a soggy compromise in the middle. I mean avowing there is a role for government, for teamwork and partnership. But it must be a role for today’s world. Not about picking winners, state subsidies, heavy regulation; but about education, infrastructure, promoting investment, helping small business and entrepreneurs and fairness. To make Britain more competitive, better at generating wealth, but do it on a basis that serves the needs of the whole nation – one nation. This is a policy that is unashamedly long-termist. Competing on quality can’t be done by Government alone. The whole nation must put its shoulder to the wheel. (Cited in Fairclough 2000: 26)

The “whole nation” language of mutual responsibility and community is both an integrationist and normative discourse. There is a narrative of the social in this that consequently diagnoses and sets out initiatives to resolve what are posited as policy failures from both the Left and Right. What we have is a commitment to neoliberal politics but one that also claims a commitment to social justice and so acknowledges the need for markets to work for everyone (the “whole nation”). Ultimately, for the economy to work better and for everyone, New Labour acknowledges the role of governance in the mediation of a shared social and discursive context. Investing in the social is an attempt to make it work better but without the heavy regulation of the past. Consequently, what policy agenda is pursued is thus articulated from an understanding of the social.

2.2 Objective institutional arrangements meeting policy outcomes

As stated, a functionalist reading of the social was an analytical prism for policy initiatives and defined the intended relation between social and system integration. This functionalist reading implicated a strong normative reading of system integration imperatives and a circular view on the nature of necessary policy interventions. A circularity may be identified with pre-given system perquisites that provide guidance on how social integration is then engineered. Further, against welfare service fragmentation – a policy feature of previous Conservative governments – an investment in the social is one of legitimation that better articulates the relation of co-dependence and symbiosis between system imperatives and social integration initiatives (a project of ’national renewal’). The nature of this social investment, in its circularity, brings together both behavioural outcomes – in regard to the citizen and their actions – and a top-down regulation of objective arrangements that makes the social work to meet
stated pre-requisites (Bevir 2005). Thus, top-down objective institutional arrangements are regulated to generate the right behavioural changes and outcomes. Here two approaches to social inclusion, noted above, are brought together – first, is an integrationist view in arrangements assisting those on the margins to access the right know–how to then claim their stake (a social integrationist discourse). Second, simultaneously, these arrangements seek to bring about behavioural changes and outcomes that resolve problems in the culture of those excluded (a moral underclass discourse).

Objectified institutional arrangements (Bevir 2005: 31), therefore, play an important mediatory role in the management of contingencies of a global social order. The stated circularity is observed in the making of the social to meet pre-given policy outcomes. Hence, this leads to the important role of institutional arrangements as transmission belts between social pressures and envisaged policy outcomes. This implies that “the social pressures, the institutions, and the policy outcomes are given as natural facts, so that the only story to tell is that which relates to these facts” (Bevir 2005: 52). Thus, the notion of a ‘knowledge economy’ relates to the contingencies of a global social order and supply side investments in human capital, with the simultaneous objective of achieving behavioural changes, require an environment of flexible institutional arrangements that mediate between social pressures and policy outcomes. The flexibility and creativity in these networks are regulated in the manner they relate to pre-given outcomes. Provision of public services, therefore, may include state, private, third sector or a synergy of the three. In mediating social pressures, the importance of the idea of social capital, based on networks established on trust, is an important feature of joint up governance that builds necessary social networks and partnerships.

In sustaining policy outcomes, the management of flexible networks becomes an important feature in the management of social pressures. Here disciplinary techniques (stated as reforms) utilise accountability measures that include target based provision to ensure required outcomes. In the case of those tasked with provision, a discourse of contractual obligation was utilised (Fairclough 2000). For example, in exchange for pay increase, teachers and nurses, in the words of Tony Blair, were expected in return to “be prepared to embrace fundamental reform in the way they work” (Cited in Fairclough 2000: 39). The intended reforms aimed to generate behavioural outcomes in not only recipients but also those active in provision. A theme adopted in the ‘Big Society’ agenda, as will be covered in the next chapter, is a cyclical and self-sustaining provision that utilised behavioural changes to generate the right conditions for a culture of civic entrepreneurism that creatively adapts to reforms to better mediate social pressures (Bevir 2005).
An enabling state that invests in objective arrangements for pre-given policy outcomes, aims to utilise these outcomes to remedy system function failures. The idea of provision of opportunity, for example, focuses on whether a structure adequately performs its task and provides effective means to access legitimate cultural goods. Consequently, in effective access to sanctioned goods, possible strains in system integration are tackled. Further, functional prerequisites, considering system needs, applies to business and industry in the nature of their institutional policies and if they are conducive to the noted legitimated pathways for everyone to claim a stake in society (as was seen in the above cited speech by Tony Blair to the Confederation of British Industry). Role expectations that simultaneously sustain functional perquisites in the form of policy outcomes, are defined in a society based on a mutual rights and responsibilities. Tony Blair stated his vision as “something for something” i.e. claiming a stake through participating in a consensual society:

A society based on a notion of mutual rights and responsibilities, on what is actually a modern notion of social justice - ‘something for something’. We accept our duty as a society to give each person a stake in its future. And in return each person accepts responsibility to respond, to work to improve themselves (Cited in Morrison 2004: 114)

Here there is an affinity with Merton’s functionalism in an analysis that starts from a set of culturally prescribed set of aspirations. Thus, any dissociation in accessing goods is largely understood in relation to an objective institutional arrangement that enables the citizen to access these goods. Strong social integration is possible in institutional settings that are compatible with what Merton stated as winning under the rules of the game (Merton 1968). The rules of the game should not be skewed to allow forms of winning, that does not, at the same time, consider broader social integration. It is in this spirit that New Labour presented a third way that claimed to remedy policy mistakes of both Left and Right. Accordingly, in the words of Tony Blair, what were seen as antagonistic in the past may be reconciled:

My vision for the 21st century is of a popular politics reconciling themes which in the past have wrongly been regarded as antagonistic - patriotism and internationalism; rights and responsibilities; the promotion of enterprise and the attack on poverty and discrimination (Cited in Fairclough 2000: 41).
However, in contrast to Merton\(^3\), the functionalism of New Labour makes no clear distinction between functional prerequisites and specific institutional arrangements. Hence, while accepting the idea of possible structural strains in meeting system needs, there is, at the same time, a normative understanding of what sanctioned goods are necessary for system adaptation and integration. Dysfunctions that may exist – for example in the form of social exclusion – may be identified in the absence of adequate pathways to sanctioned goods; in a circular sense, these same goods are legitimated as important for positive integration. This approach to system integration can be observed in a stated 'shared values' that underpin a 'One Nation' vision and what is concomitant to positive integration. Consequently, the issue of integration is narrowly defined in whatever institutional form generates adequate practices that sustain pre-given outcomes and advance positive social solidarity.

In New Labour’s discourse on social exclusion there is a view that issues of inclusion/exclusion are understood in what Parsons terms as a system of culturally structured and shared symbols – a synchronic bias in analysis that figures in functionalist approaches. However, when dysfunctions do exist, they manifest themselves as networked problems. Thus, this draws New Labour closer to mid-range functionalist theories, as policy is viewed more effective when pursued in partnerships between different agencies closer to the point of delivery. As in Merton's mid-range functionalism, there exists structured pathways that lead to dysfunctions such as networked problems of deprivation. Here the social – in the form of objective institutional arrangements – require an adaptation and management so that the contingencies of integration are under less strain.

### 2.3 Global policy field & education systems as training systems

As stated, a discourse of change in a 'modern world' is an understanding that contingencies are now the given state of affairs. Thus, there is always a need to rework the social in ways that bring together pre-given system imperatives and a consensual society, should systemic goals falter in the context of a changing world. The central question in this section is on the nature of functional pre-

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\(^3\) Merton does distinguish (Merton 1968: 88–99) between functional prerequisites and specific social forms set in meeting these prerequisites. Thus, there is no view that specific social forms have any necessary functional purpose, only that a structural strain is possible in systems with disparity between the achievement of legitimated cultural goals and structural means of reaching these goals. In making this distinction between functional prerequisites and specific social forms the aim was to overcome problems with teleological explanation in unitary functionalist analysis. (Merton's focus was in better methods to apply a functional analysis).
requisites that require interventions to meet pre-given policy outcomes – if the social is to be re-worked, it requires broader objectives to promote and maintain. Here we return to the presence of a discourse of inevitable and irreversible ‘global’ forces that impacts the nature of education (Ozga & Lingard 2007). At the level of transnational networks of governance there are powerful actors promoting certain aims that articulate configurations of networks and their relations at other levels of provision (Moutsios 2009: 474). Transnational networks of governance – a global education policy field ((Ozga & Lingard 2007) – present a logic of competitive advantage in which there is a framing of national education systems as training systems that invest in human capital and overcome skills deficits.

The global policy discourse of a ‘knowledge economy’, for example, sets out how individuals may relate and identify within a ‘learning society’, including what is necessary to acclimatise provision to the demands of such an economy. If an enabling state is to succeed in mediating networks to meet the demands of socio-economic forces, then it should invest in the acquisition of relevant work-force skills and ensure the productivity of these skills. National education systems, in this context, in the words of Ozga & Lingard (2007), seek “to ensure competitive advantage through the commercial exploitation and application of knowledge. Knowledge production is brought into close relationship with economic policy; what matters is what works for the economy” (Ozga & Lingard 2007: 77-78).

Policies of organisations such as the World Bank, OECD, UNESCO and WTO are part of a process that extends beyond education and mediates the nature education relates to other policy fields. Thus, the education field is structured in ways that may not necessarily relate to immediate educational practices and be defined by an overriding logic of what may be described as an emergent global policy. Here the education policy field has moved, in the words of Lingard et al., “towards the more heteronomous end of field relations (Maton 2005), being subsumed in many instances as part of the field of economic policy, which seeks to mediate national the global economic field” (Lingard et al. 2005: 3). This move towards the heteronomous end of field relations transforms our understanding of education practice to something that is significantly defined from without.

What follows is a policy strategy that seeks to make commensurable the efficacy of education systems as training systems for the goal of a competitive national economy. For example, the discourse of ‘policy as numbers’ is articulated at a globalised level by transnational actors, in which performance is compared and measured in its success as a human capital investment. Thus, competent education systems are measured, in their efficacy, through indicators set to demonstrate the overall productive impact of an innovative education system.
Here we have a link between skills training and work-force flexibility in the context of knowledge economies:

Productivity is also boosted by higher skill levels in the labour force and by qualitative improvements that enable workers to use new technology. Increased workforce flexibility, resulting from the acquisition of general skills that facilitate adaptation, is increasingly seen as a crucial factor in economic development in the context of knowledge economies. Sustainable transformation and growth throughout the economy are not possible without the contributions of an innovative tertiary education system, which helps build the absorptive capacity needed if private sector investment and donor resources are to have a lasting productive impact. (World Bank 2002: 76 – 77)

Policy as numbers is an attempt to measure the contribution of innovative education systems to what is described as sustainable transformation and growth. Intended policy outcomes are regulated relying on technologies of governance that centrally set a means of measuring through international education indicators (part of an emergent global education policy field):

This is policy as numbers through international education indicators, such as the OECD’s programme for international Student Assessment (PISA) and the Trends in International Mathematics and Science (TIMSS), which taken together with similar national level developments constitute a central aspect of the new technologies of governance and which globally contribute to the emergent global education policy field (Ozga & Lingard 2007: 68)

Furthermore, beyond the measurement of policy outcomes in codified and quantifiable means, there is the previously noted institutional arrangements that are sought for this end. Here there is an encompassing regime of governance – first, the path encompasses policies that seek to develop consistent paths of deregulation and the introduction of the private sector in the delivery of public services; second, in the methods of delivery, as part of partnerships that mediate public service provision, there is an attempt to cultivate compatible organisational identities (Ball 2009). These identities encompass a broader notion of identities-in-relation and includes both those providing service and their recipients (Ball 2009: 96). An encompassing and multi-faceted regime is explicitly observed, for example, in policies advocated by transnational organizations such as the OECD and World Bank, which set-out to contextualise social policy, in general, in terms of a market society oriented towards economic growth:

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The enhancement of human capital through education system, according to the OECD’s recent initiatives, should be accompanied by the reinforcement of ‘social capital’ and ‘social cohesion’. What is conceived with this set of terms is an aggregate of individuals networked with shared norms and values that facilitate co-operation in a well-functioning market society oriented towards growth (OECD, cited in Moutsios 2009: 478)

This encompassing approach, in the words of Stephen Ball (2007), is a meta-policy status that “subsumes almost every aspect of public services under its rubric” (2007: 93). Thus, idealised social relations are represented in policy questions and the manner educational problems are posed. Local fields of public service practice overlap and relate to geographic and spatial policy fields, in which there is an important policy space above the nation as a global policy field or what is a ‘travelling policy’ (Lingard et al. 2005).

At the local level – national, regional or local – there is the mediation of this ‘travelling policy’ in an ‘embedded policy’ (Ozga & Lingard 2007). Due to the heteronomous effect of a global policy field and the regulation of education provision in the context of externalist agendas, global policy spaces become an important aspect of cross-field analysis in the manner social fields, at different levels of scale, are related. At the same time, policy is not reduced to this global policy space and is itself mediated at the national and more local level – an ‘embedded policy’ (Ozga & Lingard 2007). Consequently, we have a non-linear view of policy text production and its related practices in an irreducible dialectical relation between different actors and levels in the process of text production. Here we return to New Labour’s attempt at policy triangulation as an important mediation at the national, regional and local level.

It is possible to find multiple and often contradictory themes in New Labour’s policy. Thus, while policy initiatives draw upon a global policy field, it is important to acknowledge the reliance on different traditions, including the Labour party’s social democratic tradition. Newman states this as when “old and emergent regimes interact, with different elements of the new and old being packaged and repackaged, producing tensions and dis-junctures as different sets of norms and assumptions are overlaid on each other” (Newman 2001: 26). In a non-linear understanding of policy text production there are different assumptions and expectations that may coexist in a governance approach (Newman 2001: 30). Accordingly, it is possible to identify different and sometimes contradictory themes of governance within New Labour’s policy initiatives. These themes may
co-exist in tension, whether they are ideas such as self-governance and open systems models, encouraging open flows and devolution of power to citizens and communities, or a centralised governance that sets policy directives from above in an output based model of managerialism.

2.4 Social capital & the social investment state

As stated, New Labour’s third way emphasised the importance of objective institutional arrangements to generate policy objectives and outcomes. In this approach there is an emphasis on synergistic arrangements in a reflexive re-working of the social to balance the needs of a global economic field with a fairness agenda. The notion of a social investment state is firmly placed within this approach and informs the manner policy problems are then constructed. Regulating the social, as stated, brought with it the adoption of centralised controls and the utilisation of performative technologies to achieve policy outcomes. The management of social pressures – with its tensions – contextualises a proposed devolution of public services to communities and the civic.

The management of flexible networks aimed to kick-start a self-sustaining provision in which actors – whether recipients or providers – self-identified with pre-given social reforms. Regulated subjectivities are then in the position to reflexively monitor their behaviour in accordance to system needs and its complementary outcomes. Thus, human capital investment provides the recipient with the necessary tools to meet employer needs and the necessary subjectivity to self-reflexively re-invest in their skills when needed (Edwards 2002: 357). Here the devolution of service also means a devolution of responsibility to self-manage and enhance employment relevant skills. The introduction of disciplinary strategies – for example, governance through numbers – is an attempt to ensure a relevant institutional context exists to ensure an ethos in provision to meet the required outcomes that extends to cultivating normalised identities-in-relation. A virtuous cycle is identified, by the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE), in a social investment state that ties public provision of work-based opportunity with many social benefits, while simultaneously meeting the needs of business and improved economic productivity:

All adults need the opportunity to continue to learn throughout their working life, to bring their qualifications up to date and, where necessary, to train for a different job. Now and in the future employability is and will be the best guarantee of employment. Learning also brings broader benefits. It encourages and supports active citizenship, helps
communities help themselves, and opens up new opportunities such as the chance to explore art, music and literature. It helps strengthen families and encourages independence. That means that everyone must have access to high quality, relevant learning at a time and pace, and in places that suit them. Not only do individuals, families and communities benefit, learning throughout life also delivers tangible results for business—improved productivity and competitiveness. (DfEE 1999: 56)

An investment in employability meets a social justice goal and manages the contingencies of a competitive global economy in meeting a potential skills-gap. With supply-side interventions focused on the provision of opportunity – e.g. life-long learning – the goal is to generate alternative “organisational ecologies and identities” (Ball 2009: 86) and a cultural re-focusing of schooling (Thrupp & Willmott 2003:31).

In an investment in alternative organisational ecologies and identities, New Labour's third way drew upon two key themes – communitarianism and social capital theory. Both these dimensions are aspects of a social investment guided by the state and part of a devolvement of power and responsibility, to ‘empower’ individuals and communities. Enriching social capital is central to third way thinking as an antidote, in the words of Gewirtz et al. (2005), to rampant neoliberalsim and the dependency culture of welfarist collectivism:

Within third way discourses, social capital is presented as an antidote to both socially destructive nature of rampant neoliberalism and the ‘dependency culture’ produced by excessive collectivism (Gewirtz et al. 2005: 653)

Investment in the social (a corrective measure), highlighted in social capital theory and communitarian themes, tackles a possible moral anomie and social fragmentation that may arise due to unfettered markets (Driver & Martell 1997). Reliance on mid-level social networks, inclusive of communities, aims to transform the behaviour of corporate actors and social practices to correspond to re-worked institutional arrangements (Franklin 2007). Here, in a synergistic view of social capital, an affinity may be identified with Putnam’s view of social capital as a self-sustaining virtuous cycle – networks of families and communities lubricated by sources of social capital (features of social organisation). Sources of social capital include “networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, cited in Portes 1998: 18). Societies rich in the right sources of social capital (networks, norms and trust) are better equipped to cultivate desired forms of behaviour that, cyclically, enrich the stock
of social capital.

Societies rich in the right sources of social capital, therefore, are better equipped to overcome possible structural strains and generate policy outcomes that advance economic performance and system wide integration. As noted previously, reliance on the right sources of social capital was part of New Labour's view of the social world as a consensual and ordered space, in which policy adopts a pre-given normative understanding on what makes for an ordered and consensual space. In features of social capital, such as trust, there is an attempt to bring in those on the margins into ‘normal life’ in an identification with shared norms and values. Thus, an investment in the sources of social capital, in an integrationist approach, leads to a knock-on effect in bridging social capital. Bridging social capital refers to the existence of effective means to access strategic opportunities in given objective arrangements lubricated with the right forms of bonding social capital. Hence, sources of social capital, represented in a normative sense, were viewed as unproblematic in regard to what makes for positive system integration and as a resource for the dual-purposes of an ordered social space and as an economic resource (Franklin 2007).

Making the social work, for New Labour, was an attempt to create cohesive and reciprocal societies. Trust is important – part of stated virtuous cycles – and is there to generate a self-sustaining social order and provide a legitimation and predictability to the governance of complex social processes. Thus, it is a link between the personality, social and cultural sub-systems, in mid-level networks, and broader system needs. New Labour’s communitarianism is part of a broader objective to enrich social capital and its sources, with specific reference to a normative organisation of social spaces. Here we return to the idea of deficits in sociality and a networked poverty that results in a dependency culture with its wrong behavioural attitudes and types of social capital. To encourage social inclusion, the aim is to generate the active and responsible citizen in the context of shared forms of bonding social capital.

Thus, structural strains occur when individuals are not able to access certain opportunities. This lack of access to a ‘normal life’ is a networked problem and it is for communities – an important source of social capital – to provide possible

\[\text{This returns to the affinity, argued previously, between Parson’s functionalism and New Labour’s third way. Here the point is in incentivising motivational elements (personality system) to meet defined roles. This way system needs are met, in the normative regulation of social spaces, to generate the right conditions for given relations in the social system through individuals being motivated and committed to social roles (including how to navigate the requirements of these roles) and through this maintaining a given systemic order.} \]

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pathways to enable the right behavioural changes in re-calibrated networks that enable strategic forms of bridging social capital. Community, this way, according to New Labour, represented a contingent achievement of people acting ethically in fulfilling their duties to others (Bevir 2005: 77). What we have is a communitarian thinking, according to Driver & Martell (1997), that places the individual, as moral and responsible citizen, within virtuous cycle that generate social cohesion and contributing to the creation of a more viable market economy:

In Labour's communitarian thinking three themes – economic efficiency, social cohesion and morality – are interwoven. Economic success – particularly more jobs – will bring greater social cohesion, which is further strengthened by a more dutiful and responsible citizenry, and more social cohesion will in turn help create a more viable market economy (Driver & Martell 1997: 34)

New Labour's commitment to communitarian themes is a key component of a networked society, a bedrock of ties and relationships of trust, values, beliefs and norms which are all core components of social capital. Communities, potentially through the right forms of bonding and bridging social capital, contribute to the making of an ethical and ordered citizen. It is the citizen that then fulfils their responsibilities, makes the most of what opportunities are provided for by the state and wider social structures. In claiming their stake, the citizen thus internalises values that inhere within their community and wider society. As noted, in a knock-on effect, there is a renewal of civic life in the fulfilment of responsibilities to others (reciprocated social relations).

In regard to concrete examples, the deployment of social capital strategies in policy was a feature of Education Action Zones (EAZ). In this initiative, a vision existed to implement a joint-up policy in connecting schools to their local communities and resources. Here the objective was to include communities in the improvement of education performance. Consequently, in a virtuous cycle, communities will be connected to types of social capital that then establish communities as a bedrock for the regeneration of social capital sources. Linked communities entail, simultaneously, the pursuit of shared objectives. Thus, Tony Blair stated that “such interconnected communities have lower crime, better education results, better care of the vulnerable” (cited in Gewirtz et al. 2005: 654).

Education Action Zones (EAZ) consisted of “about 20 schools, usually two secondary schools with their feeder primary schools, working with a variety of public, private, community and voluntary sector interests” (Dickinson & Power 2001: 138). Along with EAZs, Education Action Forums (EAF) were set-up to link
communities to rich networks and their resources, empowering both communities and individuals towards better education attainment. EAZs were given the initial responsibility of developing local action plans and the day to day running of local institutions. At the same time, further development, implementation and monitoring of the plan and the setting of targets were given to EAFs (Halpin 2000). The initiative was set in the language of partnerships that sought to generate an active citizenship and include parents, the private sector and local community groups in the education process. For example, interventions to enhance social capital included “family learning classes, home-school liaison workers and training for parents to work in schools as classroom assistants” (Gewirtz et al. 2005: 652).

The initiative demonstrated a tension, per Gewirtz et al., between central government and local policy documents, with the existence of both a deficit moralist tone for causes of failure but also a supportive and empowering role in the access of needed resources for self-betterment:

The discourses in the policy documentation produced at central and local levels therefore present a mixed and contradictory picture, with community, home-school and intra-family dimensions of social capital, discourses of support and blame, constructions of parents as deficit and dysfunctional and a language of voice and empowerment combined often in the same documents. (Gewirtz et al. 2005: 658)

The existence of contradictory themes – with a focus on behavioural changes – corresponds to a broader tension existing in New Labour’s approach to social exclusion between a moral underclass and integrationist discourse. To remedy behavioural problems there is a pre-supposing integrationist discourse that, as stated earlier, sought to re-calibrate institutional arrangement to meet behavioural outcomes. Consequently, pre-given outcomes, including a representation of possible problems in their attainment, abstract from lived social capital to an ideological and circular understanding of its working as a policy idea. For example, those targeted by EAZs valued education attainment and while relatively rich in bonding social capital, lacked access to a bridging social capital to the ‘right’ networks. Gewirtz et al. state this as a lack of “appropriate cultural capital, in particular knowing how to effectively mount a case and exert pressure on the schools and/or local community ... the forms of cultural capital needed to work the system” (Gewirtz et al. 2005: 665). Thus, there is a cut-off, in how action plans were relevant to the experiences of parents and students.

The problem is in New Labour’s adoption of social capital as a collectivist remedy
to represented behavioural problems. Rhetorically there was an emphasis on a
devolution of power to the local level but central policy adopted a pre-given
agenda on the nature of reforms and what arrangements are necessary to achieve
behavioural changes. Instead of social capital theory being an explanatory tool on
the nature of lived social capital – both bonding and bridging – it became a policy
tool in an integrationist measure in a moralising discourse on behavioural
problems and how to legitimate system needs considering sought behavioural
changes. Thus, bridging social capital, to remedy behavioural problems, became
the site of initiatives to transform the properties and features of bonding social
capital (shared norms, values and trust). It is, in the words Franklin (2007), an
attempt to govern through communities in a normative organisation that
manufactures “conformity out of feelings of obligation and shared standards”
(Bevir 2005: 91). As the lived nature of social capital was de-emphasised then
differentiated forms of social capital and with it persistent inequalities were
neglected.

In an abstraction from lived social capital, New Labour connected education to
expected standards and its manifested outcomes, rather than socio-economic
backgrounds as an explanation of educational under-achievement (Power 2001:
15). Further, devolving responsibility, in the form of active and enterprising
subjects, established a view of individuals and communities in punitive terms. It is
more authoritarian in that it utilises the state to mediate and achieve certain
outcomes (Calder 2004). Thus, it can be said New Labour’s adoption of
communitarian themes were significantly prescriptive, moralising and ascribed
importance to the individual over the corporate in its construction of individuals
and communities in deficit terms (Driver & Martell 1997). This theme of a
triangulation between a moral underclass and integrationist discourse extends to
Conservative policy, as will be demonstrated, though with differences in emphasis
and a greater focus on behavioural deficits.

**Concluding Remarks**

For New Labour the social became a consensual space to be normatively
organised for the dual purposes of economic performance and social cohesion (a
policy model that focuses on system-wide integration). Based on this, New
Labour’s third way set itself the target to mediate social forces, so that the right
supply side conditions exist for a competitive economic productivity but also for
the provision of opportunities for individuals to claim their stake. Social exclusion
was viewed as a deficit problem – individuals and community’s cut-off from
‘normal life’, with the state responsible to generate better integration of those
viewed as excluded. It was for this purpose that mid-level networks were guided
for the dual purposes of social integration and an economy that operates inclusively. Further, in a circular manner, New Labour’s policy model, due to its functionalist bias, first sets out with a normative representation of the social in consensual terms that leads to interventions, often contradictory, to bring about certain outcomes. Certain cultural goods, institutional arrangements and concomitant subjectivities all simultaneously exist for given functional prerequisites.

While there exists a transnational global policy field, it is mediated at the national and local level. In its mediation, New Labour drew on the importance of consensual spaces that are identified in communitarian terms (the community often identified with the nation). The re-making of social capital, in a synergy view between bonding and bridging social capital, played a role in transforming concrete practice through an engineering of institutional arrangements and organisational ecologies. Further, this attempt to transform practices aimed to sustain behavioural changes in the inculcation of certain subjectivities and the identification of these subjectivities with feelings of obligation and shared standards e.g. a self-dependent and responsible citizenry. Here the citizen makes the most of the opportunities provided and is then in a position – in a virtuous cycle – to contribute to richer and effective forms of social capital.

The existence of an audit culture – policy as numbers – was part of a governance attempt to regulate the re-making of the social and maintain an ethos and cultural re-focusing of educational culture. Supply side interventions, in making the social work, utilised an audit culture and accountability measures to ensure reforms were being met and policy outcomes achieved. Further, this audit culture represented a strong centralised agenda in the regulation of the social through a prescriptive understanding of what makes for best practice (termed as ‘reforms’). A tension may be identified due to this strong centralised agenda between the language of devolution of power and the regulation of devolved networks to meet pre-given policy objectives. Returning to the theme of policy triangulation, it is possible to trace this tension in the problematic attempt to bring together an integrationist and moral underclass discourse on the problems of social exclusion.

What is absent, in New Labour’s definition of system needs, is a differentiated understanding of social capital. To be more specific, how a differentiated view of social capital and the problem of social integration may then affect policy initiatives. For example, in the case of Education Action Zones (EAZs), responsibility is devolved but the actual running of zones and the model utilised focused on a deficit approach. When a language of empowerment was utilised, it was unrelated to a lived differentiation in the access of social capital networks;
thus, in viewing institutional arrangements in neutral terms, these same arrangements were viewed, unproblematically, to generate expected outcomes. Again, the qualitative aspects of bridging and bonding social capital are somehow unproblematic, as are the sources that facilitate types of social capital. Bypassing this qualitative dimension, despite the rhetoric, there was no serious concern with lived practice in policy initiatives.
The 'Big Society' Agenda & Rethinking Sociality

This chapter is in continuity with the first aim of the thesis, focusing on the policy triangulation of the ‘Big Society’ agenda. Like New Labour’s third way, the ‘Big Society’ agenda argues for a rolling forward of the social, as an important measure to transcend past policy failures. In the Conservative approach, the focus is on a localism, to enable a more responsive state that empowers individuals and works to generate the conditions of self-dependency. Also, similar to New Labour’s third way, there is a view of the citizen in the context of a representation of their sociality; it is from these normative representations that policy initiatives are developed that seek to establish a distinct diagnosis of what went wrong and what may be done to remedy these mistakes (similar to New Labour’s own attempt at triangulation).

The objective, in this chapter, is to focus on the ‘Big Society’ as a governance agenda i.e. how it seeks to shape relations of power and with it the shaping of social relations, with their practices, between the state and citizen as welfare recipient. Further, the textual analysis that follows in the next section, considering intertextuality, brings in the ‘Big Society’ agenda as an important policy context that affects and informs the texturing of higher education governance. Consequently, the trajectory of triangulating policy models, from New Labour to the ‘Big Society’ agenda, shapes the outlines of higher education governance.

3.1 Big Society, broken Britain & breaking cycles of dependency

David Cameron’s broken Britain thesis draws on the idea of normative social practices mediating inter-generational structures. The focus is not in making the economy work better for those socially excluded, as is the case with New Labour, but a view of a moral crisis and fragmented normative landscape. Due to this fragmented landscape certain dispositions are cultivated, giving to antithetical life choices. In polemical tone, Cameron emphasises the welfare state as a harbinger of a dependency culture,
eroding responsibility and encouraging dispositions that entrap individuals in cycles of poverty. Thus, dependence on the local, in the form of community, and more importantly the family, has been eroded by what is viewed as the nationalisation of social problems by an overbearing big government; any notion of responsibility and reciprocity is eroded by a welfare system institutionalised to not reward responsibility or voice to citizens in their use of public services.

While this is a return to a New Right discourse on poverty, contemporary Conservatives are willing to state "the non-financial aspects of poverty" but utilise it for very specific ideological ends. Consequently, unemployment becomes “structural” but the shift in discourse renders this structural problem in terms of a “perpetual jobseeker”, “benefits trap”, “way of life” and in altering the conditions that rewards the work-shy to one that “the payment of unemployment benefit by the state is an entitlement which is earned, not owed” (Conservative Party 2009: 12). Countering this structural problem, with its “culture of worklessness and structural unemployment”, is a posited policy holism that tackles the inter-connected key paths to poverty i.e. "family breakdown, serious personal debt, drug and alcohol addiction, failed education, worklessness and dependency" (Social Justice Policy Group 2007: 5). However, this is not just a policy of blame with an imperative of individual self-improvement (though this exists), instead it is a position that while acknowledging the necessity of Thatcherite ‘modernisation’, concedes to problems generated from these reforms from hyper-individualism and an over-reliance on the centralised power of the state to push ahead with economic reforms (McAnulla 2010: 290).

Likewise, in the spirit of policy triangulation, the state – specifically the welfare state – erodes responsibility and entraps individuals into cycles of disadvantage and poverty. Thus, as with New Labour’s third way, David Cameron offers the idea of the ‘Big Society’ in the manner it transcends what are represented as Left/Right dichotomies:

The Left in politics talk too much about the state. And the Right sometimes talks too much about the individual. But what really matters is what is in between – society (Cameron 2009a).

The Conservative Party think-tank ‘The Centre for Social Justice’ emphasises this political triangulation in their publication 'From Breakdown Britain to Breakthrough
The traditional ‘laissez-faire’ approach understands poverty simply as a product of wrong personal choices about family, drugs, crime and schooling. That view says that poverty is always the fault of the person who makes the wrong choices. On the other side of the political divide, the elimination of poverty is seen principally as the job of government – thus if a person is in poverty it must be the government’s fault and it must be the government that develops a top down solution to the problem. (Social Justice Policy Group 2007: 7)

In place of the maligned welfare state are proposals for public service provision in terms of a welfare beyond the state. ‘Big Society’ in the form of the locale and community, between both state and individual, is viewed as the site of welfare provision and simultaneously given the role of creating “avenues through which responsibility and opportunity can develop” (Cameron 2009b). Eroding inter-generational structural disadvantage (subjectively inculcated) is thus identified with both an empowerment and a “radical decentralisation” (Cameron 2009c) of power. Rolling back the state will serve to roll forward society and so break cycles of dependency and selfish individualism (Cameron 2009b).

In the process of rolling forward society, the government is viewed as a guide, partner and instrument in engineering changes to remedy behavioural pathologies and remake society; in the words of David Cameron - “But I see a powerful role for government in helping to engineer that shift. Let me put it more plainly: we must use the state to remake society.” (Cameron 2009b). The ‘Big Society’ agenda seeks to strengthen and encourage social entrepreneurship within local institutions, embedded in local communities, generating solidarity and making welfare provision more personal—strong local institutions enable people to come together and work on a responsive provision (Cameron 2009b). Right choices are made by individuals by cultivating this more personal service, through the devolution of provision. In the devolution of provision there is an intended knock-on effect in shared responsibility in the social welfare of others, so that it is a shared burden and not solely the job of the government.

Nudging citizens towards positive choices, whether through devolving powers to communities or introducing tax credits and benefits for families, empowers both
communities and families with purpose. New conditions are envisaged to break a cycle of poverty, especially early on in a child's development (Social Justice Policy Group 2007: 8–9), encouraging behavioural changes and aspiration with new found opportunity. Thus, we have the importance of breaking initial subjective experiences of a social positionality (intergenerational worklessness), with its subsequent "state of mind". In achieving this objective, what is required is the breaking of a "cycle of disadvantage in the early years of a child's life" by rolling "forward the frontiers of society by extending the parameters of social responsibility" (Social Justice Policy Group 2007: 7).

A consistent theme emerges in ‘From Breakdown Britain to Breakthrough Britain’ – individuals make wrong choices but it is inadequate to reduce policy initiatives to the individual. Thus, wrong choices should be viewed as systemically mediated and this directs policy initiatives to a conducive objectivity in creating the right structures and environment:

On the contrary, what we should be doing as politicians is, wherever possible, creating the right structures and environment for individuals and communities to help themselves. (Cameron & Herbert 2008: 123)

‘From Breakdown Britain to Breakthrough Britain’ further describes New Labour's state interventions as piecemeal, in contrast to a Conservative holistic and structural approach. Nevertheless, there exists significant convergence between contemporary Conservative and New Labour policy. Both identify a fairness agenda in terms of access to pre-supposed goods i.e. a fairness agenda that defines deficits in the 'right' sociality and a focus on social inclusion and belonging to shared values (however, as will be clarified, there are differences in focus on the nature and reasons for this deficit). The mutualism of ‘Big Society’ offers avenues of opportunity – corrective behavioural measures – through a network of empowered local institutions meeting the needs of citizens. Membership of these organisations fosters responsibility and a more accountable and responsive welfare provision.

As covered in the previous chapter, despite differences, there remains similarities with New Labour's view of a joint up governance that enables citizens and the importance of shared responsibility to projects of reform. As a stakeholder in these services, the citizen takes some responsibility in its delivery, offering a balance to the rights of citizen as a consumer of these services. Citizens acknowledge their shared
responsibility, are incentivised by government to own local services and take up opportunities when offered and to also hold services accountable. The key difference between New Labour and Conservative policy is in the former focusing on empowering the citizen through state provision of opportunity. Here New Labour’s emphases is not only devolving service – to be more responsive – but also ensuring better quality in provision to tackle problems of social exclusion. It is this focus on quality in provision that highlights a key difference between New Labour and Conservative policy – the problem of social exclusion, according to New Labour, was highlighted as a networked poverty and something tackled with the re-working of these networks (social capital) to connect citizens to resources of self-improvement. While social exclusion was partly explained as a dependency subjectivity (in similar terms to Conservative policy), there was no similar diagnosis of a systemic normative breakdown. Instead of engineering new social structures that treat a moral malaise, the focus was on workfare pathways and provision of opportunity – responsibility was hence tied to a quality of provision (better standards) but with no intrinsic normative assumptions on disadvantaged individuals to make correct choices (New Labour’s mantra was “standards and not structures” (BBC News 2007)).

Conservative policy, on the other hand, focuses on an erosion of responsibility, inculcated by a paternalistic state, and encourages citizens to adopt a “collective culture of responsibility” and an “ethos of self-betterment” (Cameron 2011). Consequently, a collective mutualism is assumed in not only facilitating a more responsive devolved public service (better provision) but in a holistic delivery of these same services, including early life interventions and paternalistic nudges (guiding choice strategies), thus sustaining and complementing the enabling role of the state. It is this assumption of a holistic approach to welfare provision that leads the Conservative approach to accuse New Labour’s policies of being both piecemeal and insufficient in tackling the problems of social exclusion.

3.2 Welfare co-production & re-defining state provision

If poverty is viewed as structured and the locale (a site beyond the state) as providing avenues for developing an ethos of responsibility and self-improvement, then this raises questions on the role of community development and the means for achieving this development. The ‘Big Society’ agenda, as set-out by the Community
Development Foundation\(^1\), defines the role of community development as “empowering communities, opening up public services and promoting social action” and all three mentioned components “will require greater cooperation and unity among local people, and between local people and the authorities that serve them” (Community Development Foundation 2010: 2).

All three components are intertwined—empowering communities opens up public services and promotes social action (active citizenship). The third role of the ‘Big Society’ agenda (community/social action) provides “social value and complements or fills gaps in public services” (Community Development Foundation 2010b: 3). Thus, these three components fulfil two overarching and related objectives – “localism and redefining the role of the state.” (Community Development Foundation 2010b: 3). The redefined role of the state is understood as both an enabler for welfare co-production, in partnership with local people, and in being responsive to citizens, altering its provision to meet the needs of local people.

Two overarching themes may be identified with the above policy of welfare co-production:

1. A process view of service provision indicates a change in the nature of public service delivery – here a responsive and open state is engaged in both the environment of service delivery and the transformation it generates through its delivery. Consequently, there is a shift from the delivery of service as targets or outputs defined as “top-down regulations and targets” to “bottom-up accountability – individual choice, competition, direct elections and transparency” (Cameron & Clegg 2010);

2. Changing citizen behaviour and outlook by giving communities full responsibility over their lives. A responsive state encourages community action and devolves power to the locale and as a knock-on on effect, implicates a change in both the citizen's habitus and the efficacy of the state in meeting the needs of citizens.

The first objective – a process view of public service provision – is envisaged to

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\(^1\) The Community Development Foundation was chosen, by the Coalition Government, to deliver a £80m programme to help strengthen communities between 2010 - 2015. (Cabinet Office 2011).
respond to the lived expectations of consumers, in both delivery and outcome. This is a view of service provision in which “there is no separation between production and consumption of a service; they happen simultaneously” (Klein 2010: 3). Thus, objective outputs and subjective outcomes are inseparable, as citizens are envisaged to be transformed as they take responsibility for service provision in their own communities. In other words, as previously noted, a subjective transformation (a dispositionality) necessitates creating “the right structures and environment for individuals and communities to help themselves” (Cameron & Herbert 2008: 123). Whitaker describes this ‘co-production’ view as follows:

In "delivering" services the agent helps the person being served to make the desired sorts of changes. Whether it is learning new ideas or new skills, acquiring healthier habits, or changing one’s outlook on family or society, only the individual served can accomplish the change. He or she is a vital "co-producer" of any personal transformation that occur. The agent can supply encouragements, suggest options, illustrate techniques, and provide guidance and advice, but the agency alone cannot bring about the change. Rather than an agent presenting a "finished product" to the citizen, agent and citizen together produce the desired transformation. (Whitaker 1980: 240)

Specifically, the first objective of service provision as process requires “the right structures and environment for individuals and communities to help themselves”. For this objective, policy instruments are set-out, including the training of community organisers, to assist in the operation and organisation of self-help groups. Both the institutional framework and situational factors (choice context) are viewed as important interventions in generating the right conditions through which “government can harness the power and potential of self-help to meet the converging ambitions of localism and the Big Society” (Archer & Vanderhoven 2010: 5).

Institutionally policy initiatives are utilised to facilitate for devolved powers to the micro level. In terms of actual policy initiatives, the Conservative Party seeks to redefine public service as responsive through the following measures:

1. Reduced bureaucratic and red-tape burden on local community organisations and businesses;
2. Neighbourhood grants and start-up funds for community groups to generate
social capital in the poorest areas;

3. Supporting self-help groups e.g. co-ops, mutuals, charities and social enterprises (Conservative Party 2010a & 2010b), as front-line providers of a double devolution of public services, as set-out in the proposed Localism Bill (Community Development Foundation 2011);

4. Setting up a national citizen service as “a two-month summer programme for 16-year olds”, with the aim of facilitating community engagement and sowing the seeds of ‘Big Society, for it to thrive - “This is about sowing the seeds of the Big Society – and seeing them thrive in the years to come.” (Conservative Party 2010b: 2);

5. Designating a ‘Big Society Day’ that aims “to celebrate the work of neighbourhood groups and encourage more people to take part in social action projects” (Conservative Party 2010a: 2);

6. Training community organisers – with national centres established for this purpose – with the necessary skills and know-how to assist self-help groups in providing localised public services. Community organisers, while not paid, will “help communities to establish and operate neighbourhood groups, and help neighbourhood groups to tackle difficult social challenges” (Conservative Party 2010a: 6). Also, intermediary bodies are viewed as a bridge between self-help groups and the successful provision of services that requires expertise, skills and successful mediation between the state and the locale. For this purpose, the Conservative Party envisions an intermediary role from civil servants and trained community organisers, fulfilling the key functions of intermediary groups (Archer & Vanderhoven 2010). Regarding civil servants, the Conservative Party seeks to “transform the civil service into a national ‘civic service’”. The change into a ‘civic service’ is an ethos change that is sought “by making regular community service, particularly in the most deprived areas, a key element in staff appraisals” (Conservative Party 2010a: 7).

The proposal of a more responsive state (as demonstrated in a number of policy initiatives) is made part of the same process that seeks the subjective transformation of the citizen. Thus, the responsive state works to generate an altered terrain that is conducive to a different and responsible outlook.

Further, welfare co-production is argued to entail more than individualised workfare welfare policy (the idea of individual rights preceded by a responsibility to seek out and take up opportunities). While an individualised dimension exists within
Conservative policy, there is, however, a greater emphasis on a collective welfare co-production that is preceded, as noted, by a conducive structure and environment. As a processual approach does not aim to merely produce set service outputs, the collective assets of the locale are sought to generate outcomes that feed into a virtuous cycle of welfare co-production.

To maintain a culture of self-reliance, breaking intergenerational cultures of dependence, subjective transformation is intertwined with environmental changes. The broader strategy of ‘Big Society’ seeks subjective outcomes but this cannot occur without a prior commitment to sustainable community groups. Similarly, Whitaker (1980) identifies three types of citizen co-production; these types identify an inseparability between the citizen and a responsive institutional environment:

(1) Citizens requesting assistance from public agents; (2) citizens providing assistance to public agents; and (3) citizens and agents interacting to adjust each other’s service expectations and actions (Whitaker 1980: 242)

All three facets exist in Conservative policy (cf. Cabinet Office: Behavioural Insights Team 2010 & 2011), ranging from open communication on local needs between service providers and citizens, cooperation in the delivery of services (e.g. recycling waste) and finally in self-help groups as service providers, with the government as an enabler in this process.

3.3 Nudging community action & changing the decision context

Libertarian paternalism is envisaged to complement the ‘Big Society’ agenda and gives continuity to its policy vision. If re-structuring the choice context (the objective conditions viewed to cultivate particular subjectivities) and generating different social practices are sought, then nudge theory offers a means for this goal. Considering a focus on developing a choice architecture for both self-help groups and individuals, a more apt description of nudges, in Conservative policy, would be a combination of Libertarian Paternalism (Thaler and Sunstein 2003) and Libertarian Welfarism (Korobkin 2009). Here the consequences of individual choices are more than a case of a maximisation of individual utility and is inclusive of collective welfare. As sustainable communities lie at the heart of the ‘Big Society’ vision, then its policies seek to go beyond individual behavioural change. Consequently, self-help is primarily viewed as
collective and changes in individual behaviour would be organically inseparable from this collective dimension.

Nudge theory itself (Libertarian Paternalism) adopts a negative view of human decision making. Often individuals, it is argued, make decisions that are detrimental to both themselves and the greater public good. This negative view is contrasted with a *homo economicus* view of human nature that posits “unbounded rationality, unbounded willpower, and unbounded selfishness” (Mullainathan & Thaler 2000). Instead, Thaler and Sunstein adopt the term *homo economicus* to denote that “people have self-control problem” (Thaler & Sunstein 2003: 176). Self-control problems (bounded willpower and rationality) can be identified with a judgemental bias, status-quo bias, context-dependent preferences (the situational factors of decision making (Korobkin 2009)) and social influences e.g. herding (Thaler & Sunstein 2009; Thaler & Sunstein 2003).

To alter the decision making process, Thaler & Sunstein recommend an array of possible avenues or a toolbox that can nudge the citizen in directions to counter a bounded rationality and willpower. However, for it to qualify as a Libertarian Paternalism, coercion should be carefully circumvented and people’s welfare promoted to render it unobjectionable:

> But since no one is forced to do anything, we think this steering should be considered unobjectionable to libertarians. (Thaler & Sunstein 2003: 177)

For example, overcoming a status quo bias or an inertia can be through introducing an automatic enrolment for pension schemes that does not coerce the citizen, as it offers a possible opt-out. Other than setting defaults, something viewed as unavoidable, other nudges exist due to an expectation of errors in decision making. For example, to remedy possible errors, providing feedback advice is envisaged to nudge users to alter their behaviour. Examples in providing advice includes mapping choices to welfare provision and explaining public service choices and what they entail; structuring complex choices due to possible confusion, with service providers providing structured information that enables the user to learn about possible choices to then

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2 The status-quo bias being “for reasons of laziness, fear, and distraction, many people will take whatever option requires least effort, or path of least resistance” (Thaler, Sunstein & Balz 2010: 4)
reach an informed choice; and providing incentives for certain choices by making salient the outcomes of these choices (Thaler, Sunstein & Balz 2010).

In terms of Conservative policy, nudge theory is viewed as a useful means in cultivating a citizen behavioural adjustment. Importantly, it is part of a broader ‘Big Society’ vision; thus it can be described, in the context of this vision, as a Libertarian welfarism that follows from a stated bounded selfishness. Interventions or nudges, in this case, are viewed in terms of a greater well-being and so move beyond personal benefit. Nudges do exist in policies that target individual choices e.g. organ donation, smoking, diet and weight problems and the dissemination of information, so citizens can make more informed choices. Nevertheless, the ‘Big Society’ agenda primarily envisages nudges in what is termed as “the power of the crowd”; this power is both collective and collaborative where consumers work “together for a better deal”, that includes “introducing a range of new initiatives that will support the development of collective purchasing and collaborative consumption” (Cabinet Office: Behavioural Insight Team 2011: 6-7). Here there is a joint government initiative based on a view of government-business-community partnerships based around the allocation of budgets to the locale, as point of delivery.

Hence, the ‘Big Society’ agenda extends Thaler and Sunstein’s recommendations for a nudge choice architecture to collective enterprises and collaborative efforts. For example, community organisers work with intermediaries (civil service as a ‘civic service’) to nudge self-help groups to take responsibility in public service provision. Nudges, in this sense, could be through the dissemination of information, via intermediaries, and the structuring of choice mechanisms. Also, incentivising nudges are sought in generating an intrinsic motivation when devolving power and with it a sense of self-determination and belonging for local services (Klein 2010) – an envisaged ‘Big Society Day’ is one nudge in that direction. Other incentives include monetary funding, through the funding of local self-help groups via a proposed Big Society Bank (Archer & Vanderhoven 2010).

Further, as the transformation of citizen behaviour is tied to a broader holism in public service, Conservative policy sets-out a policy outline to achieve a more holistic model in “facilitating the design and delivery of other services with diverse sector partners” (Cabinet Office: Behavioural Insight Team 2011: 4). This partnership, in the delivery of services, is envisaged within a three level ecosystem conception of ‘Big Society’. Each level has its designated roles; from the government (both central and
local), to government partnerships with both private and social sectors and finally to
the locale as point of delivery in both citizens and self-help groups (Cabinet Office:
Behavioural Insight Team 2011). The overall policy objective thus trickles down and
nudges occur at all levels of this ‘Big Society’ vision. While David Cameron views the
state as reconfiguring the social, with paternalistic nudges as a means, the
Conservative Party states this as a collective and collaborative effort and not a matter
for the state alone.

Nevertheless, Conservative policy contextualises nudges within a strong normative
reading of the social; that is a normative reading of inequality and disadvantage, as a
state of mind, leads to a problematic adoption of a libertarian paternalistic nudge. Any
framing of the social will affect the formulation of policy and thereafter the
subsequent formulation of nudges steering individuals in certain directions. Further, a
stronger collectivism or a Libertarian welfarism that informs Conservative policy,
comes with a normative justification of certain nudges that ideologically reify
subjective experience. It is this reification that can generate an authoritarian design of
a choice architecture, incentivising not voice but centralised and ideological agendas.

Concluding Remarks

As covered, an ideological representation of the social, including the place of citizens
in this representation, shapes policy nudges at every level of a conceptualised social
eco-system. In the case of Conservative policy, due to a certain reading, the locale is
in a relation of a-symmetry with the state; the state, as largest source of funding, is
influential in re-configuring both the contextual resources and institutional
framework of service co-production. The mere positing of a dependency culture in
contrast to an envisaged responsibility culture, emerging in co-production, is a
diagnosis from a framed reading of a supposed societal and moral breakdown; the
problem here is defined in terms of an intergenerational worklessness (an inherited
state of mind) that is pervasive in disadvantaged communities (Mooney and Hancock
2010). For example, ‘From Breakdown Britain to Breakthrough Britain’ states there is
“a mentality of entrapment, where aspiration and hope are for other people, who live
in another place” (Social Justice Policy Group 2007: 5).

Here an inconsistency may be identified – in official terms, Conservative policy seeks
to assist self-help groups in taking-up responsibility to meet local needs but the
terrain of preferences or the “choice of choice mechanism” (Colander & Qi Lin Chong
2010: 3) for nudges are defined centrally. The collective form of policy initiatives in a stated Libertarian welfarism – defining the terrain of preferences - sets itself against what was viewed as the piecemeal approach of previous Labour policies in tackling social exclusion. Instead, the focus is more than just a provision of opportunities in the form of skills and training provision and posited a larger societal breakdown. However, this does not entail the absence of a provision of opportunities such as vocational training, as a pathway out of poverty, but places the focus on initiatives that tackle social and cultural aspects of disadvantage, including early years support and strengthening both families and communities. Nudges are means to alter the structure of social fields, generating an exposure to differing conditions and thus a qualitative change in the subjective capital appropriated (a new state of mind). As with New Labour, Conservative policy positions its ‘Big Society’ agenda as post-ideological and a new third way. In this case, attempts at policy triangulation leads to a positioning that represents itself as neither the hyper-individualism of the New Right (unbounded rationality) or the statism of Labour. Nevertheless, despite claims made, there is a strong ideological framing of the social itself and this implicates the formulation and design of a choice architecture for citizens.
Chapter four covers the set research questions, a complementary methodology and finally strategies adopted in textual analysis. Accordingly, chapter four consists of three sections:

1. First, the chapter consists of the research questions being asked and how these relate to the broader objectives of the thesis.
2. Second is a justification of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a complementary methodology, considering the stated research questions. Further, the relevance of social domain theory will be noted, including ways this theory complements CDA.
3. The final section covers strategies adopted in answering the research questions.

4.1 What questions are being asked?

Before turning to CDA and its use, an account will be provided on the questions set for textual analysis. The questions are informed by the broad aims of the thesis – as stated in the introduction – in which the goal is to demonstrate ways hegemonic policy models adopt a view of personhood and the effect of this view on the nature of public service provision. The set questions aim to investigate the manner the citizen is represented, including their broader social settings (institutionalised through government policy) that inform these representations. The analysis in the next chapter is focused on the durable aspects of orders of discourse and not their enactment as concrete practice. As will be discussed, in

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1 Fairclough (1992) defines text in an inclusive sense as the semiotic dimension of social events. Thus, texts are “the semiotic dimension of (networks of) social practices that constitute social fields, institutions, organizations etc. is orders of discourse (Fairclough 1992); the semiotic dimension of events is texts” (Fairclough 2012: 11). Texts, this way, are not only written artefacts but also include other dimensions of semiosis such as conversations, interviews and the mixing of language with visual images.
regard to social domain analysis (see 4.2), the focus is on the systemic end of
social ontology (institutional settings and contextual resources) and its intended
effect on social relations and their practices. Based on this focus on higher
education policy, as a system element, three broad questions, for analysis, are
identified:

First, identifying a policy vision – as covered in previous chapters – that
contextualises higher education policy. As a policy vision is a macro mediation
(institutionalised features of society) then explored is its causal impact as a
system element (rules and systems of formation) within broader discursive
processes. In the case of this analysis it is the study of orders of discourse
relating to representations of the person and a conception of the person in
relation to his sociality. Thus, what is explored is the mediation of “relations of
ruling”\textsuperscript{2} in which a government policy blueprint sets out to affect the structural
relation between government and citizen, in the context of public service
provider/recipient. Here the objective is to explore how a governance policy
document – informed by an asymmetry in power relations – seeks to govern a
clustering of contingent social relations. To regulate these relations, it first
represents social relations in idealised forms – ways of acting and the
inculcation of certain identities congruent with these ways of acting.

Second, in what way does a policy vision relate discursive orders\textsuperscript{3} across policy
fields (education and beyond) so there is a consistent strategy applied to
different policy domains? As a result, the issue is the salience of a broad policy
agenda (as covered in chapters two and three) and its manifestation inter-

\textsuperscript{2} The notion of ‘relations of ruling’ is taken from Layder’s identification of these
relations to system elements of social ontology. As shall be covered later, system
elements reference “the reproduced, institutionalized feature of society such as
economic markets and bureaucratic organizations that mediate relations of power and
“relations of ruling” (Layder 1997: 56 – 57)

\textsuperscript{3} Social orders of discourse are defined by Fairclough as the discourse/semiotic
aspect of a social order. It consists of three elements – genres, discourses and styles.
Genres are ways of acting and interacting in social events. Styles are modes of being –
they relate to an identification/inculcation of modes of activity. Discourses are modes
of representation of others and their ways acting and interacting. Further, discourses
include “representations of how things are and have been, as well as imaginaries –
representations of how things might or could or should be” (Fairclough 2003: 207). The
relation between these three elements is a dialectic process. Finally, the networking of
orders of discourse, at the level of social events, translates into concrete ways of acting,
identifying and representing.

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textually\textsuperscript{4}. In taking this inter-textual angle we consider the referencing of external texts in its articulation of discourse orders in a represented diagnosis of past policy failures and alternative types of practices that are then envisaged. Here the focus is on the state as owner of significant ‘meta-capital’ and how it is then used to organize social order. Attempts at policy triangulation are thus part of an attempt to organize and regulate social relations from representations of the social and the place of the citizen in relation to a social order.

Third, considering a focus on personhood, the question is in what ways these classificatory schemes are utilised to encourage a certain identity for the citizen (personhood) within the social order. Investigated here will be the manner the person is viewed to interact in a network of discursive events. This follows from the place of the citizen in a network of higher education relations and the normative representations of these relations.

4.2 Why Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)?

As this chapter is pragmatically oriented then the goal is to demonstrate the relevance of CDA considering the noted research questions (chapter six, on the other hand, seeks to provide a theoretical justification for many of the themes stated in this chapter). CDA moves beyond the text and its internal constitution, as a discursive artefact, to an explanatory account of its properties as a generative mechanism. Thus, it is not just an account of a text’s effect, in its practical usage, and how a text says what it does in an interactional analysis. The internal constitution of a text is considered but it is only a dimension, among others, in textual analysis. Hence, CDA includes the linguistic dimensions of the text but also goes beyond this dimension and seeks to contextualise linguistic elements, in the words of Fairclough, in reference to social orders of discourse:

So, text analysis is an essential part of discourse analysis, but discourse analysis is not merely the linguistic analysis of texts. I see discourse analysis as ‘oscillating’ between a focus on specific texts and a focus on what I call the ‘order of discourse’, the relatively durable social

\textsuperscript{4} Intertextuality is the manner a text selectively draws from other texts to articulate certain articulations of orders of discourse. What texts are referenced points to the voices in a document and thus points to difference and dialogicity i.e. are the texts referenced acknowledging heterogeneous voices or is consensus being articulated through select voices.
structuring of language which is itself one element of the relatively
durable structuring and networking of social practices. Critical
discourse analysis is concerned with continuity and change at this more
abstract, more structural, level, as well as with what happens in
particular texts. The link between these two concerns is made through
the way in which texts are analysed in critical discourse analysis.
(Fairclough 2003: 3)

A consideration of the linguistic dimensions of a text, in the context of the
structuring and networking of social practice, informs CDA’s three-dimensional
framework. The three-dimensional framework is consistent with a de-
compacted and stratified view of social ontology. In a three-dimensional
framework there is an interdependence between communicative interaction
(textually oriented), interdiscursive analysis (pertaining to the selective uptake of
contextual resources) and finally the importance of the systemic settings of
interaction:

(a) Analysis of communicative interaction, incorporating (i) interactional
analysis, and (ii) linguistic and semiotic analysis (both (i) and (ii) being
textually oriented analyses), (b) interdiscursive analysis which identifies
the discursive resources (genres, discourses) that are drawn upon in the

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5 Social practice is defined as mediating articulations of abstract structures,
configuring multiple mechanisms into “relative permanences” or “habitual ways of
acting”. They are closer to social events and are drawn upon in concrete events – “... they
constitute a point of connection between abstract structures and their
mechanisms, and concrete events – between ‘society’ and people living their lives”
(Chouliaraki & Fairclough 2001: 21). As they are emergent from a two-way dialectic of
abstract structures and concrete events, they are organizations of the “diverse
elements of social life and therefore diverse mechanisms”. In this sense a text, as a
dimension of semiosis, is part of broader social practice but in a dialectic relation to its
diverse elements. Texts are thus overdetermined by this dialectic and in an
interdependent relation to other elements of social life (Fairclough et al. 2002).

6 Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional framework for CDA sets a three-way
analytical distinction between texts, discourse practice and social practice. First, it is a
view of the text as an element of discursive events (the formal linguistic dimensions of a
text). Second, it is the relation of the text to relatively enduring aspects of discourse
practice i.e. the dialectic between texts as elements of discursive events and the uptake
of certain articulations of texts into relatively permanent orders of discourse. Third,
discourse practice is the semiotic dimension of social practice. The dialectic between
social practice and discourse practice provides an explanatory link to the social settings
of discursive events.

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interaction and maps them onto social orders of discourse, (c) sociologically informed analysis of the social structures and socio-cultural practices which the interaction is a facet of (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 2001: 138)

Due to its multi-dimensional framework, CDA complements the textual analysis conducted in the next chapter, as it encompasses the social structuring of language in the context of a networking of social practices. The focus on the relatively durable social structuring of language, in textual analysis, is in an attempt to identify an interplay between the linguistic elements of a policy document and its role as a contextual resource and facet of discursive practice (see below for social domain theory). Hence, analysis turns to the “institutional and organisational circumstances of the discursive event and how that shapes the nature of the discursive practice” (Fairclough 1992: 4).

As stated, in shaping the settings of interaction, government policy aims to regulate social practice as part of a mediation of relations of power. At the macro level, when we turn to the analysed text – as a generative mechanism – we start from the third dimension of CDA. It is through the third dimension of CDA that the other two dimensions are represented, from a distance, through a proposed normalised view of social relations and practices. In seeking to bring about a certain state of affairs, there is a governance attempt to regulate and define the dynamics of situated activity and the discursive resources adopted by actors in the process of interaction. The social action and interaction of citizens, in social events, maps onto proposed social orders of discourse – discourses, genres and styles. In turn, these orders of discourse translate into the manner actors name reality, ways they act and roles they identify with at the point of interaction. Policy interventions (policy documents and mission statements are key in the process of intervention) aim to sustain enduring configurations in the point of interplay between different domains of a social ontology. In these governance interventions we identify representations of personhood in ways of naming, acting and identifying in reference to defined social roles. The properties of social roles are predefined from an understanding of what constitutes flourishing and accordingly what needs to be done to incentivise a conception of the person based on this understanding.

Finally, CDA can be utilized to demonstrate the existence of pre-given
conceptions of the person that informs a governance regulation of ways of acting, identifying and representing. Thus, as a methodology in textual analysis, CDA is utilised to make the ‘invisible’ visible in demonstrating to the reader the existence of an understanding of personhood that defines the normative texture of relations and the roles ascribed to the occupants of these relations. This ‘meta-critique’ is often neglected, in which policy critique is framed within accepted hegemonic models of the person and its related pre-sanctioned goods. For example, as covered in chapter two, proposals are deemed practical when they relate to implementations that may enhance social mobility or access to strategic forms of social capital (the distribution and access of pre-sanctioned goods).

4.2.1 The relevance of social domain theory

First, a brief account will be provided of social domain theory (also theoretically relevant to chapter six). Second, following this account, noted will be the ways the theory complements CDA and further its relevance to the textual analysis featured in chapter five. It will be argued that social domain theory complements CDA, in mapping its three-dimensional framework to different properties of a differentiated social ontology. Informing the mapping of these dimensions is a de-compacted and stratified view of social ontology; this de-compacted view of social ontology corresponds to the emergence of discursive practice in a duality between the durable and pre-existing dimensions of social
practice and its mediation in situated activity. Thus, there is a multidimensionality of four inter-connected domains that contextualise abstract structures, concrete events and their lubrication in social relations and their practices:

Domain theory suggests that instead of a simple dualism (of agency and structure) we should think of the social universe as multidimensional – as four interconnected domains (Layder 2006: 273)

The four inter-connected domains pertain to lifeworld and system elements of the social. First, in lifeworld elements there are the personal and intersubjective dimensions, represented by the domains of psychobiography and situated activity. Second are system elements identified in the domains of social settings and contextual resources. The domain of psychobiography is the basis of what makes us singularities. It consists of a unique subjective trajectory of lived experiences; the basis of this unique trajectory is an interaction between irreducible personal emergent properties and external circumstances. What results from this interaction is an individuated subjective configuration of experiences – emergent from our relations with our environment – and grounded in the vantage point of the self and individual characteristics. Thus, we confront the social with unique backgrounds that are irreducible to the objective dimensions of social forces (chapter six theoretically develops the centrality of the domain of psychobiography in the development of a personal identity).

The domain of situated activity consists of the intersubjective dimensions of social life. The previously noted domain of psychobiography – with its subjective powers – comes into contact with others in encounters that form the basis of situated activity. The trajectory of an encounter is defined in terms of the nature and time period of the exchange. It is here, at the point of contact, that the properties and influences of subjective/objective dimensions of social life interplay. In interpersonal exchanges we may identify the emergence of meaning and the trajectory of morphogenesis (see chapter six). As the domain of situated activity is the point of mutual reinforcement – in an interaction of subjective/objective mechanisms – then meaning is emergent from activity and activity “must be understood as an amalgam of subjective, external and situated influences” (Layder 2006: 278).

It is in the domain of social settings – a system element – that we identify the structural influence of the above noted interplay. This domain consists of “local
aggregations of reproduced social relations, positions and practices” (Layder 2006: 280). Present activity falls under the influence of a past aggregation of reproduced social relations but subjective powers – free-form elements – mediate these reproduced relations (the dual nature of social relations). As the settings of situated activity are trans-situational then they apply and are autonomous to lifeworld elements of social life.

Finally, the second system domain is the domain of contextual resources. The domain of contextual resources is with two dimensions – first, is the distributional aspect of material resources based on structural differentiation e.g. class, gender and status. Further, there is the historical accumulation of cultural resources of a propositional register such as shared norms, fashion and popular culture (also covered in chapter six). What we have is a cultural system that is autonomous of individuals and groups but whose resources are drawn upon in the context of situated activity. Both social system and contextual resources, together, provide the objective context to the subjective and intersubjective dimensions (lifeworld elements) of a shared social universe.

Based on an interplay between the subjective and objective dimensions, in the context of situated activity, contextual resources complete the circuit of power relations as it gives definition to social systems, in the manner it connects system elements to intersubjective exchanges. In providing this connection we refer to resources, whether distributional or as a cultural repository, in the form of social relations, roles and related social practices:

The notion of contextual resources completes the circuit of power relations involved here by drawing into the discussion the wider structures of power that give definition to specific social systems. It completes the circuit in the sense that the notion of power is connected via social system features such as resources and settings through to situated practices and the transformative capacities of individuals. In this sense the individual-collective dimensions and properties of power are expressed through, and carried in, the dual nature of social relations and practices. (Layder 1997: 83)

The dual nature of social relations and practices here refers to the tension between enablement and constraint. The reproduced forms of social relations, positions and practices are represented in contextual resources that bring wider structures of power to bear on the subject and his intersubjective interaction. At
the same time, the powers of enablement provide the possibility for subjects to engage and confront social forces. Socially defined characteristics, represented in contextual resources, are sanctioned aspects of reproduced social relations and practices:

The duality of social relations refers to the tension between their ‘free-form’ and ‘reproduced’ aspects or between their ‘personally’ and ‘socially’ defined characteristics ... The influence of either reproduced or free-form elements may be minimized in different settings and circumstances but can never be driven out entirely. There are always residual elements of both in all situated activity and individual behaviour. (Layder 2006: 282)

The intertwining of both these elements establish the intersubjective as mediatory link between ‘reproduced’ and ‘free-form’ elements. As reproduced relations are enacted via situated activity then implicated is a tri-partite split in social ontology (subjective, intersubjective and objective – see figure two). First, the institutional settings of interaction (socially defined characteristics) – defined by distributive patterns and a pre-existing cultural repository – impinge on interaction. Second, the exercising of objective generative mechanisms is explained in a selective uptake of these mechanisms in accordance to the dynamics of exchange and individual predispositions. Thus, in this multi-dimensional model – subjective, intersubjective and objective – we have the tripartite modalities of social ontology.

![Figure two: Tripartite modalities of social ontology (Source: Layder 1997: 89)](image)

In regard to the relevance of social domain theory, it was adopted as a theoretical framework, in textual analysis, to map the set research questions to different dimensions of the social. Thus, the three questions pertain to different dimensions and modalities of the social – first, the third research question pertains to the representation of an idealised citizen role i.e. styles (the domain of psychobiography). The representation of an idealised identity-in-relation is explained in the context of a regulation of social practices and here analysis takes the perspective of system elements. Thus, a governance perspective acts
on relations and seeks to set the template and direction of situated activity, in shaping the contextual resources and settings of interaction. Here a tripartite split in social ontology captures the different dimensions of CDA (textual, interactional and structural). Enduring social orders of discourse (contextual resources) complete the circuit of power relations and figure in interactions in the way roles are defined.

4.3 Adopted strategy for textual analysis

The final section covers both the strategy adopted and methods used in textual analysis, to answer the set questions. This section, therefore, is split in two parts: first, a short justification will be provided on the choice of higher education governance as a case example for analysis; second, a general outline will be provided on how the text was approached and features analysed. In regard to the first part, higher education governance was selected due to education being viewed, in the logic of policy triangulation, as an important corrective measure to existing social problems. In third way thinking, higher education is an important site of intervention as it is viewed as an important facet of a fairness agenda, in the provision of opportunity. At the same, it is the site of intervention, in a human capital investment, to meet the wider needs of the economy, considering the contingencies of globalised social order.

The document selected for analysis was ‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ (June 2011); the document detailed, at the time, coalition higher education policy. Further, it relates specifically to the research questions in that it sets guidelines on how government policy defines its relation to the citizen, as part of enduring networks of social practices and social roles. Its textual features provide an entry into structural analysis and the envisaged relations proposed between different social domains.

In regard to the strategy and methods adopted, the document was approached considering the three dimensions of discourse – (1) structural analysis; (2) interactional analysis; (3) linguistic and semiotic analysis. In the case of structural analysis – the foundational point of analysis – the objective was to analyse the textual features of the document to identify representations of the

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7 At the time of writing the sole document relating to higher education governance.
institutionalised features of society and how they are envisaged to regulate networks of social practice and their relations. It is an attempt to understand ways orders of discourse are networked and related to each other and any presupposing representations of the social that may explain this. These are, in the words of Fairclough, adopted strategies (enunciative modalities\(^8\)) that define relationships between subject positions within the discursive space (Fairclough 1992).

Interactional analysis consisted of a text’s referencing of other texts (intertextuality) or “how texts draw upon, incorporate, re-contextualise and dialogue with other texts” (Fairclough 2003: 16). Here texts draw on each other with purpose and meaning; the purpose or meaning of this process is identified in a configuration and reconfiguration of orders of discourse into different articulations of meaning. To discern these articulations is significant in explaining how texts can be laced with presuppositions/assumptions. In interactional analysis there is an attempt to show in what ways certain texts are selected and how their discourses are utilised from given assumptions and presuppositions. In the case of this study – focused on system element representations – it approached interactional analysis in the manner a macro mediation impacts the interaction between texts and their discourses. Finally, linguistic analysis was utilised to discern ways the text selectively draws upon language to construe forms of consensus in given discoursal articulations.

The dimensions of CDA were viewed, analytically, in a relational sense. Thus, intertextuality shows how texts selectively draw upon orders of discourse that mediate between social practice and texts, with the process then realised through linguistic systems and the linguistic features of texts. Accordingly, linguistic analysis “shows how texts selectively draw upon linguistic systems (again, in an extended sense)” and it is intertextual analysis that “shows how texts selectively draw upon orders of discourse – the particular configurations of conventionalized practices” (Fairclough 1995: 188).

\(^8\) Enunciative modalities are defined by Fairclough as “types of discursive activity such as describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations, teaching, and so forth, each of which has its own associated subject positions. So, for example, teaching as a discursive activity positions those who take part as ‘teacher’ or ‘learner’. As in the case of ‘objects’, the rules of formation of enunciative modalities are constituted for a particular discursive formation by a complex group of relations” (Fairclough 1992: 43 – 44)
As the starting point of analysis started from the intended macro effects of the document then the adopted strategies, similarly, viewed structural analysis as the point from which it then approached both the interactional and textual. This is the case as the objective was to analyse the properties of a system mechanism (higher education governance) in the manner it represents social events, the interaction of different actors in these events and finally the textual features (semantic and grammatic) of the document in rhetorically setting out a position. Considering the direction of textual analysis, the following strategies were adopted:

(1) **Intertextuality**: The role of intertextuality was to discover the existence of external policy objectives – figuring in orders of discourse – that then shape higher education governance. Here any cited documents or ideas from external documents were relied upon to demonstrate the existence of a broader policy model informing higher education governance (for example, the salience of policy triangulation between a fairness agenda and the need for economic performance). External references cited in the document included areas such as social mobility and schools. The goal in covering these referenced texts was to show how these policy areas, in the manner texts intersect, established a cohesive policy model that works across different social spheres and policy areas. The nature of relations between texts also informed questions of difference and dialogicity in the document (considering the types of texts referenced). In the case of the document both were minimal – the interplay of texts re-affirmed pre-supposing assumptions e.g. reasons for failing schools and the type of interventions to turn these schools into ‘engines of social mobility’.

(2) **Interdiscursivity**

Interdiscursivity is the articulation of a mixture of genres and discourses in a text. In analysing the semantic and grammatical features of a text in different representations and ways of acting – based on normalised identities-in-relation – the goal was to analyse (in relation to intertextuality) the different combinations of orders of discourse figuring in represented social

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9 Fairclough terms interdiscursivity as a continuous shifting of relations between genres, between discourses and between styles and the ongoing relation between them in texts. Any accomplished relative permanence in their relations, as an order of discourse, is thus one drawing on this interdiscursivity of a text that is part of its intertextuality i.e. – “a question of what genre, discourses and styles it draws upon, and how it works them into particular articulation” (Fairclough 2012: 12)
events and the manner they articulate a broader representation of the citizen as person (an idealised personal identity).

(3) **Foregrounded assumptions**: The text’s semantic relations were investigated for assumptions that act as representations of what is the case and what should be done based on these assumptions. Further, complementing the existence of foregrounded assumptions, was the use of nominalisations that rendered complex social processes into pre-supposed entities. Thus, nominalisations, in their use, erase difference in abstracting from complex processes to then state an idealised state of affairs. Assumptions can be existential, propositional or value assumptions and set out a manner of representation i.e. in how social relations should be enacted and structure social events. Existential assumptions, in the case of the document analysed, holds sway and denotes an assumption “about what exists” (Fairclough 2003: 55). Propositional assumptions take a normative turn, blending factual statements that imply or dictate ways to adapt or intervene to what are realised conditions. In value assumptions, the normative turn is explicit and assumptions of desirability are made. Each of these assumptions can be triggered by linguistic features of the text, such that existential assumptions can be made with markers of definite reference (e.g. the, this, that, these, those). Propositional assumptions often rely on factive verbs denoting something that ought to be done, from an assumption of what is the case. It is in value assumptions that explicit markers of desirability are used, including verbs that point to positive doings (Fairclough 2003: 56). Different types of assumptions are overlaid, so that their texturing is relational e.g. propositional assumptions emerge from and can be pre-supposed by statements of what exists in the form of existential assumptions.

(4) **Modality**\(^{10}\) **features**: Modality features demonstrate a level of commitment to certain policy directions. Further, these commitments were identified in relation to foregrounded assumptions – modality features establish commitment to given assumptions that represent what needs to be done in social relations via different actors. Based on commitments to given propositions it is possible to identify passivated and activated actors in relations of power and whose voices,

\(^{10}\) Modality is defined by Fairclough as “the question of what people commit themselves to when they make Statements, ask Questions, make Demands or Offers. The point is that there are different ways of doing each of these which make different commitments.” (Fairclough 2003: 165)
consequently, are normalised. Thus, modality features were identified as an aspect of structural analysis in which the objective is to analyse textual features for representations of articulations of orders of discourse, considering institutionalised features of governance and its effect on the networking of social practices and their relations (relations of ruling). These are, in the words of Fairclough, strategies (enunciative modalities\footnote{Enunciative modalities are defined by Fairclough as “types of discursive activity such as describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations, teaching, and so forth, each of which has its own associated subject positions. So, for example, teaching as a discursive activity positions those who take part as ‘teacher’ or ‘learner’. As in the case of ‘objects’, the rules of formation of enunciative modalities are constituted for a particular discursive formation by a complex group of relations” (Fairclough 1992: 43 – 44)\textsuperscript{11}}) adopted that define relationships between subject positions within the discursive space (Fairclough 1992). Fairclough defines both modality and evaluation, both interrelated, as “seen in terms of what authors commit themselves to, with respect to what is true and what is necessary (modality), and with respect to what is desirable and undesirable, good or bad (evaluation). My assumption is that what people commit themselves to in texts is an important part of how they identify themselves, the texturing of identities” (Fairclough 2003: 165).

Here, as noted, the question is in how a governance document sought to identify and texture identities. In the process of textual analysis, covered in the next chapter, this was done through highlighting passages that demonstrate commitments to what is true or necessary and the impact of these statements on the articulation of orders of discourse (discourses, genres and styles). Textual features that highlighted evaluative commitments included deontic modalities and epistemic modalities. Deontic modalities are commitments on what should be done (a statement of obligation) and epistemic modalities are commitments to propositions or assertions (statement of truth) of what is or will be the case (e.g. existing obstacles to social mobility). Markers of modalisation and evaluation were utilised to identify modalisation elements in the text. Markers of modalisation can be triggered in the use of modal verbs (‘must’, ‘should’, ‘will’, ‘can’, ‘could’) but also modal adverbs (‘assuredly’, ‘certainly’, ‘always’), modal adjectives (‘likely’, ‘possible’, ‘probable’) and even indicators of mental process (‘I think’, ‘I believe’). Further, modalisation can also be triggered in the form of clauses to denote different scales of commitment (‘likely’, ‘possible’ and ‘probable’).
The ‘filtering’ of Genre chains: Genres are ways of acting and interacting (actional meanings) in social relations and practice. In the case of the document analysed, as a governance genre, the aim to is to act on and regulate social relations i.e. “action at a distance” (Fairclough 2003: 31). Thus, the document analysed, in the next chapter, represents ways students are expected to identify (student subjectivities) and this extends to the manner genres are cited and filtered in the document. Here, in an “action at a distance”, governance policies seek to stimulate social relations in given directions in the manner government communicates to relevant social actors:

And it is noteworthy that contemporary genres for ‘action at a distance’, genres of governance, through which organizations communicate with individuals, are pervasively characterised by stimulated social relations which, we might argue, tend to mystify social hierarchy and social distance. (Fairclough 2003: 76)

Genres stated in the document relate to orders of discourse and specifically how genres, as part of these orders, are filtered through a given regulative logic that privilege certain discourses over others (Fairclough 1995). Examples of genres, cited in the document, included surveys and student evaluations – these examples affirmed an exchange view of social relations. Further, what these examples demonstrated was the existence of a discourse of an idealised student, in the context of higher education relations that incentivise this given view of the student. Thus, in an attempt to institutionalise and regulate ways of acting there is both a discourse on an idealised student and broader institutional settings that provides context to defined social roles. This way of viewing genres, as an aspect of orders of discourse, and its application in social relations is taken from Fairclough’s definition of genres as the “discoursal aspect of ways of acting and interacting in the course of social events: we might say the (inter)acting is never just discourse, but it is often mainly discourse. So, when we analyse a text or interaction in terms of genre, we are asking how it figures within and contributes to social action and interaction in social events” (Fairclough 2003: 66). If the forms of action and interaction in social events are defined by its social practices and the ways they are networked together, then the application of genres, in the form of documents, pertains to how they figure as elements of actional meanings and specifically in their relations to other
aspects of orders of discourse (styles and discourses). The predominant genre of this document is one, as noted, that can be described as a governance genre and whose effects is sought through an action-at-a-distance in the form of regulating actions and interactions in social events. Thus, the document acts at a distance in seeking to define the types of identifications (styles) and how events and identifications of actors are represented in their actions and interactions (discourses).

(6) **Social events:** Social events are situations of interaction. In the case of this analysis, considering the genre of the document, it is the selective representation of events, from a governance perspective, and the manner discursive orders and their actors are expressed in these events (in terms of social domain theory, concrete events would be the place in which contextual resources enact power relations). Questions asked, regarding the representation of events, included ways actors were referenced and whether certain actors were activated or passivated. The normalisation of certain voices established a reference point that then established normalised patterns of social practice. For example, ‘collaboration’ between different actors was a salient feature in the document and the issue was to identify which actors were activated and how this impacted power relations.

(7) **Further notes:** The relational nature of textual analysis – pre-supposed by a relational understanding between social domains – entails there is no discrete dimension in analysis. Thus, for example, considering ways of acting implicates identities and manners of representation. Similarly, foregrounded assumptions – forms of representation – affect the manner these identities act out their roles in relation to other actors. Finally, the main themes of the document were identified inductively and acted as a procedural mechanism to organise its content for textual analysis. It was the set research questions that framed the methods used and types of questions asked when analysing the document's content.

**Concluding Remarks**

Three set questions framed the textual analysis of ‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ (June 2011). The first question asked related to the manner an existing policy model defines the role of the citizen as recipient
public provision and the role of the citizen within broader relations of public provision. The second question related to the manner this policy vision extends to higher education and other policy areas. Third, is the question of identities incentivised, with a focus on student identities, and a view of the person that informs these identities and their concomitant social roles.

Methodologically Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was adopted due to its relevance and complementarity to the noted set questions. Here CDA goes beyond the linguistic dimensions of the text to include the relatively durable social structuring of language in relation to the relatively durable structuring and networking of social practices (Fairclough 2003: 3). Specifically relevant, in the case of this study, is the perspective of a governance agenda – as a system element – in regard to the regulation and shaping of orders of discourse and the manner actors adopt social roles in the context of networks of higher education practices. Further, social domain theory was utilised as a view of the social that informed the application of CDA; the relevance of social domain theory is in the way it maps the different dimensions of CDA to the different domains of a multidimensional social universe. For example, the manner lifeworld domains are mediated in relation to an institutionalised making of contextual resources that are highlighted and enacted in situated activity.

The strategy adopted in textual analysis included – (a) the identification of cited texts (intertextuality); (b) grammatical and semantic features that identify articulations of orders of discourse; (c) identifying commitments to certain policy directions (modality features); (d) genre chains that discursively filter and highlight certain idealised social roles; (e) the manner social events and actors are represented. Together these methods were part of broader strategy to answer the set research questions and so focused on a system regulation and normative representation that seeks to structure the networking of social practices in higher education.
This chapter aims to apply Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) - considering the research questions set-out in the previous chapter - to higher education governance. CDA will be specifically conducted on ‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ (June 2011); at the same time, wider policy issues – covered in section one – will be considered. ‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ details coalition higher education policy and being a governance document directly relates to the three research questions set out in the previous chapter – (1) What elements exist in the text that identify a policy vision and how does this vision represent the citizen in relation to a governance of provision. Further, how does this representation affect the regulation of relations between social actors in higher education; (2) How does a policy vision extend beyond higher education to other policy domains? Does a diagnosis of past policy failures – with its normative view of the social – impact higher education? (3) Rhetorically what identities are incentivised considering the noted policy vision and in what ways are the actors represented in the domain of higher education policy. The three noted research questions will provide a general research framework when approaching the text.

Specifically, in regard to the third research question, the central question of personhood will be investigated. Chapters two and three highlighted attempts at policy triangulation, in which two views of the person were synthesised – the strategic subjectivity of *homo economicus* and the regulated subjectivity of *homo sociologicus*. In the former, as demonstrated in a responsibilisation discourse, the objective is to generate behavioural changes as a knock-on effect that follows from a provision of opportunities and know-how to access strategic goods. Here there is a virtuous cycle of self-dependence and self-betterment to make the right choices that leads to required behavioural changes. At the same time, it is assumed that an investment in consensual social spaces is necessary to generate strategic subjectivities. In this investment there is a *homo*

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1 At the time of writing the sole document relating to higher education governance.
sociologicus dimension of policy triangulation in making markets work for individuals. Provision is regulated, including the definition of roles in this provision, and this regulation – top down – aims to create pre-given policy outcomes. In the socially regulated subject (homo sociologicus) there is an attempt to engineer the citizen to value certain preferences that are the basis of strategic concerns and deliberations. Thus, in a responsibilisation of citizen’s rights, there is a contractual exchange in which the individual seeks their own good but with the terms of exchange defined (Mooney 2014). Accordingly, in the analysis below, the third research question will consider the manner these two views of the person are triangulated and how this relates to a broader policy vision.

5.1 Application of CDA

Four themes may be identified in ‘Students at the Heart of the System’ and each theme demonstrates a dimension of higher education governance. Together these identified themes demonstrate a consistent vision in higher education provision. As noted in the previous chapter these themes were identified inductively and act as a hermeneutic method to organise the document’s content. Further, in the document, external policy fields are identified (the second research question) and cited. These fields, together, demonstrate a consistent agenda that proposes a vision across different policy areas. For example, topics such as consumer choice, industry collaboration and social mobility establish ways higher education interrelates with external policy fields in presenting a broader policy approach in government provision. The interrelation of these fields – as shall be demonstrated – establishes social problems and initiatives that are then taken to resolve these problems.

Theme one: Statement of challenge & objective of reforms

The document starts with a statement of challenge and broader objectives of reforms:

Our challenge has been to reduce public spending on higher education without reducing the capacity of the system and, at the same time, to provide more assistance for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. We believe our new funding model meets this challenge. It allows for increased investment in higher education, is more affordable for everyone and provides significant additional support for students from
The statement of challenge puts forward a problem but, at the same time, there is a presupposed commitment to an austerity economics. This is a commitment that does not compromise support for students from disadvantaged backgrounds. Here a prognosis of welfarist waste ("burdens of bureaucracy") is contrasted with a regulated market model that tackles problems of waste:

At the same time, our reforms to higher education funding will promote the development of a more diverse, dynamic and responsive higher education sector where funding follows the student and the forces of competition replace the burdens of bureaucracy in driving up the quality of the academic experience. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 24)

Dialogue in the text is minimal – it is a statement of intent in a document whose genre can be described as governance. As a policy document, its underlying assumptions are part of a chain of documents that includes interviews, policy blueprints (for example the Big Society agenda), speeches and other areas of policy making. In placing the document within this broader chain, it is then possible to trace how – in dialogue with other texts – policy is carried through. While a practical genre is concerned with how things are done, a governance genre, on the other hand, is concerned with the way things are done (Fairclough 2003). It is a genre whose properties seek to appropriate elements of social practice so that social relations are re-contextualised and regulated – to regulate social relations, orders of discourse are mixed in ways that privilege certain discourses over others. The document puts forward its plan to govern relations between the academy, industry and economy and generate forms of discourse that then filter the organisation of social relations and their different fields of practice. Thus, a statement of challenge and setting of objectives should be viewed considering this governance objective.

Policy triangulation is noticeable in the excerpt – it identifies statist or welfarist waste (the idea of rolling back the state) with a commitment to opportunity and the need to provide some form of welfare freed from the burdens of bureaucracy. As shall be covered, the Big Society agenda and ideas of a broken Britain and inter-generational dependency are present in the document but there is also focus on guiding individuals with the right know-how to tap into strategic social networks. In this focus (a fairness agenda) government takes a
guiding role and includes collaborations and partnerships, to provide the right structures and environment for individuals and communities to help themselves (Cameron & Herbert 2008: 123). This approach is consistent with a welfare (process) co-production model put forward in the ‘Big Society’ agenda of rolling forward the social as a site of welfare provision that is also responsive to local needs (see chapter three).

In the excerpt “assistance” is provided and the focus is on an institutional structure that is a “more diverse, dynamic and responsive higher education sector where funding follows the student and the forces of competition replace the burdens of bureaucracy in driving up the quality of the academic experience”. As the stated focus on the student consumer elicits a view of the student as a responsible consumer – an antidote to a dependency culture – then advocated is a conducive environment to deliver a service that meets the needs of the consumer. Government regulates a collaborative environment for a responsive system that champions the role of student as consumer (here a homo sociologicus conception may be identified in an environment that complements strategic subjectivities i.e. the student consumer):

We will oversee a new regulatory framework with the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) taking on a major new role as a consumer champion (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 2).

It is not just delivery of services (outcomes) that are rendered in objective terms but also the process, including the contents of courses chosen by students and how they are designed and delivered (see theme three).

Assumptions in the excerpt are textured to foreground legitimation. In the excerpt above, a statement of an existing challenge is assumed (an existential assumption) and “our new funding model meets this challenge”. The use of “This” being a marker of definite reference that pre-supposes the existence of a challenge to reduce public spending. An existential assumption is itself presupposed by a propositional assumption that sets out “to reduce public spending on higher education without reducing the capacity of the system and, at the same time, to provide more assistance for students from disadvantaged backgrounds”. The factive verb utilised (“to reduce”) assumes that public spending requires reduction. Considering a propositional assumption, a value assumption is made that declares it compatible to reduce public spending but still achieve the dual goals of a fairer system and a responsive education system.
“Promote” is used in a normative sense, triggering a value assumption that a
diverse and responsive market is something sought.

Thus, the statement of challenge and objectives of reform may be identified as a
governance paradigm. Value commitments state assumptions that, from the
start of the document, seek to establish a hegemony of meaning. This ideological
work – in a statement challenge – then extends to the organisation of meaning
and mixing different discourses and their related social practices. Assumptions
on processes of neoliberal governance are, at the same time, always negotiated.
In attempts at triangulation there is a commitment to widen participation and
provide support for disadvantaged students. Value assumptions are thus
embedded to propositional ones, to elaborate how a fairness agenda may be
possible.

Theme two: Higher education as a market model - diversification and
competition

Considering the statement of challenge and objectives of higher education
reforms, it is poignant to investigate in what ways this statement and its
assumptions are then applied to governance policies. In what ways does a
mixing of genre chains impact orders of discourse and networks of social
practice. To elaborate an alternative model of neo-liberal economics –
responsive to the needs of citizens – social relations are the point of
intervention. Here analysis is on how a governance agenda represents events
from a distance – in its articulation of normalised view of relations – and what
should be the correct way of acting and interacting in these events.
Representing events and favouring of certain genres in these events means the
favouring of certain orders of discourse over others. Consequently, analysis
emphasises discourses of governance and its representation of social events,
from the perspective of pre-given discourses to genres and styles.

There are different genres cited in the document, significant ones being surveys
and student evaluations. As stated in the previous chapter, a governance genre
denotes an ‘action at a distance’ - it represents ways students are expected to
act in social events and the genres cited in the document point in this direction.
Here ‘action at a distance’ regulates social relations and adopts a discourse that
conceives discursive processes and ways of doing to be responsive to students.
However, through a representation of social events and citation of certain
normalised ways of acting there are presuppositions in assumptions regarding
student subjectivities (see theme three). A governance genre stimulates social
relations in normalising certain discourses over others and due to this stimulation of social relations mystifies social hierarchy (Fairclough 2003: 76).

To stimulate social relations, they are mediated through a filtering process that re-contextualises an articulation of discourses, as set out in the statement of challenge regarding reforms and their objectives. For instance, an event highlighted, and repeated, is the publication of data that is made available for students to better inform their choices:

This already happens to some extent with organisations such as OpinionPanel, an independent market research company, which represents publicly available data in ways which potential students might find useful. Their recent publication, The Student Fact File 2011, includes information ranging from the socio-economic background of applicants to higher education institutions to how often students go ‘clubbing’. Other examples include Push and the Student Room, which provide forums for informal sharing of students' views about higher education. The consumer organisation ‘Which?’ is now interested in providing information for prospective students and their parents, and is exploring how it might work to deliver this with other organisations, including bestcourse4me, who specialise in showing the career paths offered by different higher education courses. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 30)

Here accountability is seen in different genres including interactive websites (application portal), online summary reports and student surveys. These cited genres are filtered in a represented need to develop certain means to record and document data that offers a “seamless customer experience” and so may be responsive to choices.

Difference and dialogue refer to the manner different orders of discourse are referenced and textured (different forms of representation, action and identification). Regarding difference and dialogue in this text, there is both a focus on solidarity and a normalization of this solidarity and consensus. This can be seen in an assumption of consensus as an analytical vantage point and a value commitment that pre-supposes interventions to make consensus workable and sustainable (discussed later in themes three and four). Embedded assumptions can be identified in a commitment that a market model allows for greater diversity of provision and the administering of greater choice, improving delivery and enhancing the experience and needs of students. Thus, when voices

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are referenced, for example, when asking “the SLC and UCAS to develop a single application portal” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 32) it is then normalized so that a single application portal allows for an integrated application process. Further, a single application portal allows for “a seamless customer experience where data common to both applications is entered only once”. Here we have not only a procedural means of efficiency - how things are done - but also a value assumption re-contextualising what is apparently a procedural means. The value assumption is in how things should relate in generating a seamless customer experience, with assumptions made on subjective identifications envisaged for students (the strategic dispositionality of *homo economicus*).

Several assumptions are made, whether it is propositional or value assumptions. For example, “the Key Information Set will enable higher education institutions to illustrate the quality of the experience that they offer” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 29). Here a propositional assumption is made in the use of the factive verb “enable” - the propositional assumption makes a connection between regulation techniques (KIS) and sustaining an improved quality of provision. Also, the relation between quality provision and teaching is stated in the use of anonymised information for prospective and existing students:

> A further way in which higher education institutions can demonstrate their recognition of the importance of teaching is to publish anonymised information for prospective and existing students about the teaching qualifications, fellowships and expertise of their teaching staff at all levels (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 29)

The use of “can demonstrate” shows a value assumption that an anonymised publication of qualifications demonstrates a recognition of the importance of teaching and an assumption that a focus on teaching quality is at the centre of sustaining quality provision. These different assumptions show a predominance of strategic action and affects the relationship between genres in the context of broader purposes of reform. It is a value assumption and an ethos focused on getting results, and developing regulating techniques to demonstrate these results. Further, the relation between student, teacher and other actors in higher education is affected by this ethos.

Semantic and grammatical relations are shaped by the document’s governance genre. Containing policy blueprints the document intends to guide and
transform social practices, social relations and the styles of their occupants (Fairclough states such documents to have ‘hortatory intent’ i.e. getting people to act in certain ways (genre) based on what is represented (discourses)). Thus, the document aims to legitimate and this aim is realised in the linguistic features of the document. Expectantly the semantic relations demonstrate, in relations between sentences and clauses, a focus on relations of purpose presupposed by a logic of legitimation. Legitimation of reforms (ways of representation) is seen in positing teaching quality as central in relation to the student consumer’s provision and in teacher-teacher relations. For that purpose, additive, elaborative and purposive clauses are used; additive clauses point to addition of different elements together (e.g. in the use of “and”), purposive clauses establish legitimation and elaborative clauses establish a relation through which a second clause then clarifies and provides information on a previous one. For example, “the publication and effective use of student surveys and other evaluations to be at the heart of a continuous process of improving teaching quality” denotes purpose, in that documentation and publication of performance, with its effective use, is to be (purposive) at heart of a process improving teaching quality. When additive and elaborative clauses are used, they are often foregrounded with strong purpose and legitimation.

Returning to the ‘Big Society’ agenda there is a model of governance that represents its vision of the state as a responsive one (championing the consumer citizen) and one that devolves power to institutions and students. Service delivery and outcomes are envisaged to be in a relation of co-production, so that delivery is measurable as outcomes but these outcomes are envisaged to be responsive to the consumer (again, both strategic action and a strategic disposition are a form of identification for students to adopt). Hence, the consumer is championed to participate in shaping outcomes by being a part in its production. Further, they are championed to thereafter choose between services based on outputs and results (effective use of student surveys).

The legitimation of this form of service is further shown in additive relations then elaborated and foregrounded with purpose. For example, an additive relation is present when “such data collected and used in an open and transparent way can both support informed student choice and stimulate competition between peers”. In the passage, there are additive relations that are ordered and placed in conjunction by a clause of purpose (“can”) and an epistemic modalisation, with prescriptive intent, so that the first chain of additive clauses is given purpose with the latter. The open and transparent collection of data then serves the purpose of both championing the student
consumer and ensuring a responsive environment for consumers to help themselves (the goal is to guide and transform social practices, social relations and the styles of their occupants). Legitimation is by rationalisation, which is by “reference to the utility of institutionalized action” (Fairclough 2003: 99). Institutionalised rationality takes an instrumental logic of action, in which effective results legitimise procedures and actions. In appearance, we have procedural means for better standards but underpinning the adoption of these means is an attempt to sustain certain frameworks that regulate both teaching practice and student subjectivities (shaping of roles through bureaucratic regulation – *homo sociologicus* - highlights the importance of an institutional framework that incentivizes strategic subjectivities in higher education provision).

De-centralising service provision and empowering at the point of delivery (developing partnerships) are transformative means to a process view of provision. In this provision those delivering the product and the consumer are part of the same process. We find citizen co-production, along with nudges, in the encouragement of a careers service that promotes strategic styles and self-reliance (the active and strategic self):

The Government will establish a new careers service in England, built on the principles of independence and professionalism, by April 2012. It will provide comprehensive information about careers, skills and the labour market, and advice and guidance on all options, including vocational study in colleges, training through Apprenticeships, and higher education. There will be a single access point to national online and telephone services for young people and adults, and face-to-face careers guidance for adults. The face-to-face service will be delivered, as with the existing adult Next Step careers service, through a network of public, private and voluntary sector organisations contracted by the Skills Funding Agency. These organisations will continue to subcontract to be able to offer a service which is both trusted at local level and responsive to local needs. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 57)

Grammatical relations establish relations between clauses within sentences and two main types are highlighted—first, paratactic relations establish symmetry to clauses, setting additive relations between clauses or an elaboration that clarifies or specifies a series of clauses used. In the excerpt above the use of “and” in “skills and the labour market, and advice and guidance on all options” is
then elaborated with “including” in “including vocational study in colleges, training through Apprenticeships, and higher education”. Second, hypotactic relations between clauses are asymmetrical i.e. one clause is subordinated to another and so establishes purpose. Paratactic relations can also climax into a hypotactic relation, with a series of additive clauses culminating into and foregrounded by purposive clauses.

The excerpt establishes a prescriptive intent—the continuous use of ‘will’, in this case a deontic modalisation, demonstrates strong commitment on material processes that the government plans to make happen in a set of additive and elaborative clauses that are then given purpose (hypotactic). The ‘Next Step’ careers services will be delivered via “a network of public, private and voluntary sector organisations”. Here “and” establishes a paratactic relation between different organisations. Purpose is provided (‘to be’) and elaboration is then used (“both”) to clarify the nature of this service. The locale is a preferred point of delivery of service and it is partnerships that are responsive to needs - again informed by an engaged citizen consumer. An activated actor is identified (‘Skills Funding Agency’) and is the subject of the process verb “contracted”. The use of “contracted” in regard to the ‘Skills Funding Agency’ evokes a view of higher education as a corrective measure to counter any skills gaps and thus meet employer needs (see theme three).

Institutions are also given powers to compete for students outside a core allocation in “from year to year, every institution will have to compete for the student numbers outside its core allocation and the core will reduce every year” (2011: 50). Disciplinary techniques that regulate a competitive institutional logic are part of the same model promoting the engaged consumer students (an attempt to triangulate between a regulated provision of opportunity (homo sociologicus) and the consumer student that invests in employer needed skills (homo economicus)). The engaged student provides feedback on the provision received and institutions are envisaged to regulate their provision to be responsive to students. In being responsive to the consumer, institutions secure feedback that attract future students in the provision market. The state, from above, devolves power in this provision but sets-out the infrastructure of provision to be responsive to the consumer and business needs. Importantly, this infrastructure aims to define systemic relations between students/institutions and institutions/wider economy. These relations culminate in students obtaining the right skills and dispositions to meet the wider needs of the economy (see theme three): 

<65>
We have no target for the “right” size of the higher education system but believe it should evolve in response to demand from students and employers, reflecting particularly the wider needs of the economy. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 49)

An elaborative clause (“but”) establishes the relation between the size of higher education expansion in it being responsive to the demands of students, employers and primarily the wider needs of the economy. Grammatically the relation is realised between clauses as a hypotactic one, in that the former is made subordinate to the latter.

Theme Three: Responsive to employers and students - collaboration between higher education and industry to provide the required skills and knowledge

As stated, the document is identified with a significant prescriptive intent - it is “aimed at getting people to act in certain ways on the basis of representations of what is” (Fairclough 2003: 96). While the document acknowledges a responsive higher education, there are, at the same time, specific views of the student, teaching provision and a broader institutional logic. Here governance seeks to regulate the field of higher education practice and their relations. In an envisaged process of collaboration how are the needs of different actors realised in discourse and what does this communicate in regard to the legitimation of policy priorities? Returning to the governance question, the question posed is in how relevant social actors are related in a posited collaborative provision:

Around the world, the very best universities are building deeper links with business both to maximise innovation and promote growth, and to ensure students come out of universities equipped to excel in the workforce. Much has been done to promote better links, including through enhanced knowledge exchange, technology and research commercialisation, and curricula developments. However, in the context of our reforms to HE funding and student choice, we want our universities to look again at how they work with business, across their teaching and research activities, to promote better teaching, employer sponsorship, innovation and enterprise. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 39)

In the excerpt above hyponyms and co-hyponyms are used. The utilisation of hyponyms (words given meaning within broader semantic fields) ascribe certain meanings to processes. Synonyms identify words to meaning and it is antonymy
that identifies represented themes to their opposites (e.g. what is social cohesion and what is corrosive to this cohesion). Together with nominalisations\(^2\) it is then possible to provide certain meaning to processes that build toward semantic fields, their meanings and their polarizations and opposites.

Deep links to business by universities, in the excerpt above, are hyponyms to “promote growth”, “innovation” and for students to excel in the workforce. Co-hyponyms to promoting better links include “enhanced knowledge exchange”, “technology and research commercialisation” and “curricula developments”. From the start, the relation of universities to business is set out as a superordinate one and so the nature of the links between them is presupposed with what is better for both the institutions and the students. It is for universities to look at ways to work with business across teaching and business to “promote better teaching, employer sponsorship, innovation and enterprise”.

This superordinate relation can be further discerned in an a-symmetrical relation between institutions and employers, with collaboration between both resulting in the right skills employers want from graduates:

Graduates are more likely to be equipped with the skills that employers want if there is genuine collaboration between institutions and employers in the design and delivery of courses. Although around 80 per cent of universities say they are engaged in collaborative arrangements with employers, this can still be improved. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 39)

Further the industry sector sets standards for course content and accreditation:

There are many models, local and national. Individual employers or groups of employers can collaborate with their local higher education institution and representatives of an industry sector can set standards for course content or format to meet professional or recognised accredited standards. Sector Skills Councils can support employers and higher education institutions to develop such approaches and provide consistency where that is helpful. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 40)

\(^2\) Fairclough defines nominalisations as “the conversion of a verb into a noun-like word, and semantically of a process into an entity” (Fairclough 2003: 143).
Grammatical metaphors are also an important feature, through which discourses are realised. These are noun like verbs that represent processes as entities (nominalisations) and abstract from the circumstances and contingencies of social events and their activities. When abstracting from social events and then representing these events in normalized forms of action and interaction it is then possible to identify the subject and object of represented processes. Hence, in idealised events an agenda of governance erases or even suppresses difference (Fairclough 2003: 144). Processes figuring in concrete events are made into highly abstract things that then prescribe through process-nouns e.g. “innovation”, “growth” and “enterprise”. Consequently, the processes of education, their relations, participants and events can be excluded by process-nouns that are given meaning in an ideological rendering of social practice. The texturing of entities, through nominalisations, then act on social events in shaping their systemic setting. There are implications to this abstraction when considering relations between policy fields and approaches to social inclusion, social mobility and widening participation (see theme four).

In terms of social events (level of event representation), the document puts forward complex processes but with a restricted focus on specific social agents in these processes. Therefore, we have representations of social events – in higher education governance – at the level of institutionalised social practices and structures. Here the types of practices envisaged – at governance level – becomes a refraction in which the activity and identifications of social actors are understood. At this higher level of abstraction and its representation of social events, processes are then made dependent on a normalised reference of social practices and its articulation of orders of discourse. As an example, specific enterprise societies are asked to give advice to ministers on how to provide students with the right skills and knowledge and for societies to embed themselves in universities for this purpose:

To support this, the QAA has convened a group to develop guidance for UK universities on enterprise and entrepreneurship. The chair of the group will be Professor Andy Penaluna, the world's first Professor of Creative Entrepreneurship. This guidance will set out the skills and knowledge, attitude and approach that students should acquire through enterprise education. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 45)

What is presented to the reader are not the views of situated actors but proposed events that pertain to a consultation and the collation of information.
The objective behind these proposed consultations is to identify what attitudes, approaches, skills and knowledge that students should acquire as agents of economic progress – here concrete actors are represented at an abstract level. What we have is a re-contextualisation of social events as part of broader social fields and networks of social practices (Fairclough 2003: 139). This re-contextualisation means representations of events are filtered through a particular perspective on the workings of social practice. As noted before, process-nouns (nominal nouns) figure and represent complex processes in highly abstract ways; they signify normalized verbs or doings.

Consequently, nominalisations evoked as process-nouns – e.g. “participation” and “collaboration” - demonstrate an absenting of social events. Here obscured are contingencies in the represented processes such as problems in the collaboration process itself. By abstracting this way, the ideological working of social identities and their roles, as social practice, is given in the form of an explanatory logic reifying situated activity. It can be said events are represented as part of social processes but the representation of these processes, due to an ideological abstraction, suppress and foreground certain actors and empower others.

Hence, in processes of collaboration, for example, certain actors are activated, while others are passivated. With an ideological abstraction of specificity consensus is then advocated between concrete actors. Accordingly, specific actors identified, through the document, include student bodies (the NUS) and educational institutions (Loughborough University, University West of England, De Montfort, Sheffield Hallam, Teeside, Abertay Dundee, Glamorgan, Hull and West of Scotland). Similarly, governance bodies (QAA, HEFCE, HESA, HEBRG, ISB, OIA and SFA) and industry actors (Hewlett Packard, Unilever, Lloyds Banking Group and GlaxoSmithKline) are identified by name.

Rhetorically students are activated in collaboration processes but in the identification of styles, student voice is foregrounded, as noted, to presupposing representations. They are, therefore, named but passivated, even when personalised in noting their needs as consumers. Instead, employers, as actors, are not only named and personalised but also whose needs are made necessary and normative to what sorts of commitments that texture subjective styles:

Graduates are more likely to be equipped with the skills that employers want if there is genuine collaboration between institutions and <69>
employers in the design and delivery of courses. Although around 80 percent of universities say they are engaged in collaborative arrangements with employers, this can still be improved. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 39)

Commitments are realised in an epistemic modality in the use of a modal adjective (“likely”), indicating a median commitment. In the case of this commitment, the type of skills viewed as significant are made secondary to the type of collaboration between institutions and employers. Process noun used (“collaboration”) abstract the types of skills negotiated or their values. Instead, actors are named and the nature of relations between specific actors are asserted. In representing circumstances of collaboration, including identities-in-relation and the organisation of these identities, employers are represented in a relation of asymmetry. An evaluative statement activates employers in the use of the verb “improved” as a statement of desirability, in maintaining the level and right skills required by graduates.

There are many models, local and national. Individual employers or groups of employers can collaborate with their local higher education institution and representatives of an industry sector can set standards for course content or format to meet professional or recognised accredited standards. Sector Skills Councils can support employers and higher education institutions to develop such approaches and provide consistency where that is helpful. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 40)

Again standards, course content and the circumstances of their negotiation are abstracted and instead the process is merely stated and a commitment is made that favours and legitimises industry representatives. Explicit modal verbs are used (“can”) and predominating are epistemic modalities or assertions of local and national collaboration leading to “course content or format to meet professional or recognised accredited standards”. Evaluative statements are marked in the desirability that there is consistency and for the Sector Skills Councils to provide this consistency; when concrete examples of collaboration are cited these are often selected examples to substantiate the noted representation from abstraction. As an example, bespoke courses are envisaged in terms of partnerships between employers, students and institutions:

The new funding arrangements for higher education offer the chance of a new partnership between employer, student and institution.
Employers may help to meet a student’s tuition costs in return for a commitment from the student to work whilst studying, and a commitment from the institution to align course content to their specific needs. Below are some early examples of employers who have decided to go down this route and are working with higher education institutions in an imaginative and innovative way. Smaller firms within a sector or subsector may wish to work together to achieve leverage and economies of scale. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 41)

Examples cited include employer sponsorship and scholarships by Unilever, GlaxoSmithKline, The UK Electronics Skills Foundations and Lloyds Banking Group. In the case of Unilever and GlaxoSmithKline the “course is designed to ensure graduates are equipped with the tools and techniques to rapidly make a positive impact in chemistry-based industries” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 41). To be responsive to student needs is to view them, beforehand, as potential investments in human capital; as they are viewed in this way then the objective is to ensure students gain the right knowledge and skills (the use of “will” is an explicit deontic modality i.e. a statement of obligation):

We also set out how we will create the conditions to encourage greater collaboration between higher education institutions and employers to ensure that students gain the knowledge and skills they need to embark on rewarding careers. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 33)

**Theme Four: Relative social mobility, widening access/participation, fairness and the inculcation of aspiration**

If a broader objective exists to make higher education more responsive to the wider needs of the economy then how does this fit with the objective to “provide more assistance for students from disadvantaged backgrounds” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 33)? In the process of representing social inclusion, what voices are brought in and how are different voices textured (intertextuality)? Further, considering the broader challenges set-out at the start, with its own assumptions, in what way does the translation of key goals such as widening participation and social cohesion work considering these assumptions?
Answering these questions, two key issues are first considered - intertextuality and difference. Regarding difference, foregrounded assumptions exist and point to an attempt to reconcile any differences arising from acknowledged problems at the level of social integration. Though with the possibility of difference acknowledged, what is proposed is first prescriptive, demonstrated largely in deontic modalities. It is through strong commitments and sometimes nominalisations that difference is made resolvable and language is rendered undialogized. Social actors are cited (OFFA [Office for Fair Access], HEFCE [Higher Education Funding Council for England], Aimhigher, Careers Profession Task Force, the Russel Group and National Scholarship Programme) but they are part of pre-given commitments and are cited to affirm a foregrounded legitimation (value assumption). Consequently, it is the relation of cited actors to pre-given commitments and value assumptions which then identifies their role as passivated or activated actors. For example, OFFA and HEFCE work in partnership on access agreements and assessments to advance the government’s goal of widening participation.

Consistent with a broader nominalisation of events, student voice is absent and instead there is a re-affirmation of a self-reflexive student identification that works out their route through guidance and information provided:

Potential students need high quality advice and guidance to make informed decisions about whether higher education is the right option for them and, if so, which route to take and what subjects to study to prepare them for their desired course. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 56)

The modal verb (“need”) demonstrates a commitment to offering this advice through a government established careers service (‘Next Step’) and a “network of public, private and voluntary sector organisations contracted by the Skills Funding Agency” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 57). There is a value assumption relating to “high quality advice” – the self-reflexive student is strategically aware but in relation to pre-sanctioned goods. An “informed” choice implies the desirability of seeking government provided advice. The activated actor in this partnership (careers advice) is identified with the ‘Skills Funding Agency’ – an agency of the ‘Department for Business, Innovation and Skills’. Again, we have here a triangulation between the homo sociologicus of an enabling state and a homo economicus of a strategic student subjectivity that is provided with the right know-how to then dedicate to certain preferences.
Concerning intertextuality, there is an indirect reporting\(^3\) of what the ‘Russell Group’ considers worthy of retention in schools. The ‘Russell Group’ is cited as an activated actor and in an authoritative sense:

We are reforming performance tables so that schools are no longer rewarded for encouraging young people to pursue courses and qualifications that are not recognised by universities and employers. Instead, we believe all pupils should have a broad education with a sound grasp of the basics. The subjects covered by the English Baccalaureate match closely those which the Russell Group of universities indicated recently would be sensible choices for young people wishing to keep their higher education options as open as possible. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 57)

Again, the modal verb (“would”) shows commitment to the English Baccalaureate as a sensible choice due to an evaluation being ascribed to the ‘Russell Group’ of universities. A subjective commitment (“we believe”) frames, beforehand, the recognised courses and qualifications by both universities and employers. The follow-on, with specific mention of the ‘Russell Group’, along with a vaguer reference to “employers”, becomes an arbiter on what should be considered as a sensible choice. There is also an implied view, in a negative clause (“schools are no longer rewarded”), that attributes to schools the rewarding of students with irrelevant qualifications.

Schools, as an interlocutor in this process, are cited but there is an abstraction of their role. Consequently, their voice is largely absented and the circumstances of the event (e.g. feedback from schools regarding the circumstances and contingencies of preparing their pupils) are depicted from given representations of social practice. Instead, the styles or roles adopted in these presupposed assumptions relate to both an understanding of welfare, as noted, but also as a type of identification that coheres with the purposes of economic efficiency:

For the first time, we will introduce a measure of how well pupils do when they leave school, including information on how many progress to higher education. This ‘destinations measure’ will act as a strong incentive for schools to make sure that they are preparing young people for success in higher education or employment and are helping them to

\(^3\) Indirect reporting is defined as a summary of what was said or written; this in contrast, to direct reporting, where direct quotations are used (Fairclough 2003: 49)
make choices that are right for them. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 57)

Thus, the document utilises nominalisations ("aspirations" and "progression") but the subject of these processes (young people) are passivated:

Making sure that young people have access to high quality, aspirational information, advice and guidance is an important part of what schools can do to raise aspirations and support progression. Schools will, subject to the passage of the current Education Bill, be under a new legal duty to secure independent, impartial careers guidance for their pupils in Years 9-11. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 58)

The aspiring student is to be guided with the right information and this is the work of different agencies working in partnership and collaboration. In the above extract, value assumptions are triggered in the use of "raise" and it is aspirational information that will raise aspiration and support progression. A commitment to this value assumption is triggered in the use of the modal verb "we will" (deontic and subjective modalisation), indicating the duty of schools to offer "aspirational information" as part of careers guidance.

In terms of intertextuality, there is reference to external voices that provide some clarification on the types of styles and their relevant discourses of aspiration and progression that are legitimised. Maintained, in the referencing of external voices, is an explanatory logic that establishes an argument from assumption (dialogicity is minimal). The genre of documents cited are similarly governance ones and affirm this logic. Accordingly, cited are documents on young people's applications to research-led universities in 'Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers' (social mobility) and ‘The Importance of Teaching (schools). A think-tank report by the Sutton Trust in coordination with the 'Department for Business, Innovation & Skills' on young people's applications to research-led universities. Finally, a report on fair access to the professions in 'Fair Access to Professional Careers: A progress report by the Independent Reviewer on Social Mobility and Child Poverty'. These documents are either governance documents or reports on findings relating to accessing professions and 'Russell Group' universities. Whatever document is cited they represent continuity, rather than difference, and aim to maintain the privileging of a government purpose for the regulation of social relations.

Particularly relevant is ‘Opening Doors, Breaking Barriers’ that states the government agenda to improve social mobility in terms of a commitment to
social justice and, at the same time, in an investment in human capital. A triangulation between economic performance with the ethical imperative to improve social mobility is clearly stated:

There is a strong ethical imperative to improve social mobility. But there is an economic dimension too. In our increasingly globalised economy, new opportunities for wealth and income are emerging. A fair society ensures that those opportunities are open to everyone. (HM Government 2011: 11)

The challenge is further defined in terms of an austerity policy:

We cannot get away from the intense fiscal pressures we face as a country. Failing to reduce the deficit would saddle future generations with enduring public debt and slower growth, threatening social mobility. That creates challenges. We must do more with less. Above all, we must do more to promote a fairer society. (HM Government 2011: 12)

Also, there is a commitment to welfare-to-work and self-dependency policies as an approach to social mobility that enables behavioural changes and the breaking of patterns of welfare dependency:

Our work to increase social mobility complements the Government’s ambitious agenda for social justice. We have a group of people in our society who have become detached, unable to play a productive role in the workplace, in their families or in their communities. They are often trapped by addiction, debt, educational failure, family breakdown or welfare dependency. Our social mobility strategy is about enabling people to move up the ladder of life. Our strategy for social justice is about helping these people get their foot onto the first rung. The two are inseparable components in our fight against poverty and disadvantage. (HM Government 2011: 11)

Similarly, in ‘The importance of Teaching’ the problem of low aspiration is directly related to a “culture of failure” (Department for Education 2010: 51). However, previously failing schools have now become “engines of social mobility” (Department for Education 2010: 51). The ‘Sutton Trust’ report also focuses on the manner choices and decisions are made and the type of information available to students from different institutions. This also includes the type of information and guidance that can be used to better inform
decision-making and raise aspirations for students from disadvantaged schools. The final report of the panel on fair access to the professions states social mobility as fairer access to the professions and more fairly spread opportunities. It affirms a work-to-welfare ethos in defining social mobility as better jobs and fairer chances, with consequences for social cohesion, economic flourishing and advancement through social responsibility and individual endeavour. Subsequently, other texts (intertextuality) and genre chains, in the document, demonstrate a strong re-contextualisation from a broader government policy model. This model consistently applies to higher education, schools, a specific understanding of social mobility and more broadly the formulation of the role of state and society.

Returning to the theme of social mobility, the document sets itself the objective to propose a view of social mobility that considers both economic performance and social cohesion. Fairer chances lead to better social cohesion but also better economic performance. The document identifies social mobility as “a measure of how possible it is for people to improve their position in society” (HM Government 2011: 15). A distinction between relative and absolute social mobility is made, with both acknowledged. However, focus is placed on relative social mobility which “refers to the comparative chances of people with different backgrounds ending up in certain social or income groups” (HM Government 2011: 15). Absolute social mobility, on the other hand, refers to the “extent to which all people are able to do better than their parents” (HM Government 2011: 15). The workfare welfare model, noted above, complements the government's approach to social justice. In this approach, it is an understanding that for people to improve their position they require the right guidance and skills for the right job. This can be seen in a commitment (“should” as deontic modal verb) to relative social mobility in which, regardless of background, an individual's acquiring of the right skills should mean they then have a fair chance:

Our focus is on relative social mobility. For any given level of skill and ambition, regardless of an individual's background, everyone should have a fair chance of getting the job they want or reaching a higher income bracket. (HM Government 2011: 15)

In focusing on relative social mobility there is a reliance, for example, on careers advice. This advice provides a means to nudge citizens with valuable information to make the right decisions but always relative to the labour market. There is a commitment to provide advice (deontic modal verb “will”) and an elaboration
(“including”) on the type of education information provided as vocational study and training through to apprenticeships, other than higher education:

It will provide comprehensive information about careers, skills and the labour market, and advice and guidance on all options, including vocational study in colleges, training through Apprenticeships, and higher education. (HM Government 2011: 57)

As stated before, semantic fields associate meaning to nominalisations. For example, nominalisations such as ‘collaboration’ and ‘partnership’ are given meaning considering the words they are in mutual relation to. Thus, focus on relative social mobility is fairness but also an engine of self-dependence and informed choice. Engines of social mobility include providers of services – in partnerships and collaboration – and recipients are envisaged as participants. Hyponyms are evoked to give meaning to nominalisations and policy positioning an ideological potency. These partnerships offer pathways coordinating wider economic needs with a responsiveness to local needs. Together economic need may be met and collaborations become drivers of social cohesion, by enhancing social mobility.

The previously noted ‘Opening Doors: Breaking Barriers’, for example, is identified as an authorial text on the nature of barriers facing young people from the most disadvantaged backgrounds. Similarly, it is a governance document covering obstacles to aspiration. While ‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ sets out workable policies to overcome obstacles, these obstacles are identified in ‘Opening Doors: Breaking Barriers’. First, it is the latter document that covers obstacles to social mobility in assumptions regarding behavioural paths to poverty and an erosion of responsibility (consistent with the ‘Big Society’ agenda). Second, are interventions, complemented by life cycle interventions, that incentivise the right choices and changes. It is a focus on inculcating the right “skills and aspirations that strongly influence their success in further or higher education, and ultimately in the labour market” (HM Government 2011: 6). Further, it is the education system that “should challenge low aspirations and expectations, dispelling the myth that those from poorer backgrounds cannot aim for top universities and professional careers” (HM Government 2011: 6). Regarding assumptions made on behavioural changes, nominalisations such as “expectations” and “aspirations” contextualise semantic fields and act as hypernyms for “informed choices” about jobs and careers. Similarly, from this context, normative commitments are made on supporting a “culture where the key aspects of good parenting are widely understood and
where all parents can benefit from advice and support” (HM Government 2011: 6) - “can” being a modal verb showing commitment to a value statement (“advice” and “support” implying the positive value of this change in culture).

Job markets are to be fair all the way to the top and the synonym of this fairness is set as “success should be based on what you do, not who you know” (HM Government 2011: 7) – an evidence of positive social mobility. At the same time, the antonymy of fair job markets – incongruent with positive social mobility – is one that “a large number of the professions remain dominated by a small section of society” (HM Government 2011: 7). While advocating a fairer job market and positive social mobility – including an acknowledgement of forms of social capital that are not conducive with a fairer job market – there is a return to an assumption that current welfare arrangement fail to sufficiently incentivise work:

Getting on in work should be about merit not background. Too many struggles to get on in the labour market, held back by low qualifications or a welfare system that does not sufficiently incentivise work. Too many do not get the vital second chances they deserve. (HM Government 2011: 7)

The above excerpts bring together an existential assumption and a modality commitment. There is a statement of ‘what is’ (existential assumption) in the struggles to get on in the labour market (“that” as marker of definite reference). There is also a deontic modality in what should be the case in interactions and social relations i.e. progress through merit and not background (triggered in ‘should’ as modal verb).

Forms of collaboration and partnership, responsive to the self-dependent, informed and aspiring learner (behavioural changes), acquiring and re-acquiring new skills, becomes an engine that then drives both positive social mobility and economic performance. As a policy model informs a policy triangulation then this model adopts a normative vision that abstracts from the concrete but simultaneously intends to regulate social events through a normative representation. From a pre-given perspective, the nature of obstacles then informs workable policies to overcome both a represented problem and a diagnosis of its outcomes.

Compared to New Labour (see chapter two) there are similarities with initiatives focusing on changes that may instigate different patterns of behavioural
outcomes. However, the approach identified above – in the stated obstacles to positive social mobility – is consistent with the ‘Big Society’ agenda; here the idea is to cultivate the right subjectivities (the moral underclass discourse of social integration). Thus, the main issue is not only in generating the right conditions for aspiration and advancement – something more salient with New Labour – but also to cultivate the right subjectivity that values sanctioned goods. The citizen needs to be nudged and informed to make the right choices or to value how to make the right choices. Nevertheless, obstacles are acknowledged at the level of integration (integrationist discourse of social cohesion) with interventions proposed in widening participation, fairer access and opening access to professions all key to this. What is consistent through the document is that collaboration and partnerships are engines of social mobility, including the inculcation of the right subjectivities in maintaining a certain vision of welfare co-production.

Thus, the role of schools and improving career guidance become, as stated, part of a trajectory of life cycle interventions that affect social mobility, in providing the right information for students to then make choices and value a certain dispositionality. An existential assumption on the nature of obstacles – what is the case – is a form of perspective taking that then filters the process of intervention and consequently the texturing of student identifications, actions and social relations. Both the importance of partnerships with external service providers and the activation of certain actors within these partnerships are stated. For example, to return to an earlier extract on careers service, the representation of career guidance (as a social event), utilises verbs that ascribe processes to government and identified external providers (activated actors):

The Government will establish a new careers service in England, built on the principles of independence and professionalism, by April 2012. It will provide comprehensive information about careers, skills and the labour market, and advice and guidance on all options, including vocational study in colleges, training through apprenticeships, and higher education. There will be a single access point to national online and telephone services for young people and adults, and face-to-face careers guidance for adults. The face-to-face service will be delivered, as with the existing adult Next Step careers service, through a network of public, private and voluntary sector organisations contracted by the Skills Funding Agency. These organisations will continue to subcontract to be able to offer a service which is both trusted at local level and
responsive to local needs. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 57)

Activated actors include the government (‘Skills Funding Agency’) that establishes career services and provides information by outsourcing through a “network of public, private and voluntary sector organisations contracted by the Skills Funding Agency”. Potential students are passivated actors and are object of guidance and information. As noted above, guidance includes “comprehensive information about careers, skills and the labour market, and advice and guidance on different options, including vocational study in colleges, training through Apprenticeships, and higher education”. The contracting of services, via networks, is given to the ‘Skills Funding Agency’ and thus maintaining, at the level of social practice, a re-contextualisation of practices to the needs of the labour market.

Underlying this is an assumption that legitimises career guidance as an important guide to an idealised student role (“need” as an epistemic modalisation). A commitment to provide guidance is then given purpose (semantic relation between sentence and clause) in “to make informed decisions”:

Potential students need high quality advice and guidance to make informed decisions about whether higher education is the right option for them and, if so, which route to take and what subjects to study to prepare them for their desired course. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 56)

Student identification is elaborated from an epistemic modalisation so that the excerpt above establishes an assumption that not only should student’s identifications be set with self-dependence, aspiration and expectation but also that the “high quality advice” given to students will make them better informed in acting out set roles. To put it another way, that they are guided to value the right “high quality advice” to then “make informed decisions”.

Schools are similarly part of the broader process of collaboration and life cycles intervention, as engines of social mobility. They are further sites where students, early on, are offered aspirational information, advice and guidance.

Improving children’s attainment at every stage as they progress through school is the most important thing we can do to increase their chances
of accessing higher education, particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds. We will do this through a relentless focus on improving teacher quality and establishing a strong, autonomous school system that is accountable to parents, pupils and communities. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 57)

In the excerpt above, nominalisations in “attainment” and “progress” and their hyponyms are in the “improving of teacher quality” and in an autonomous school system that is also made accountable. There is also the theme of responsiveness to the locale as the point of delivery—an integrationist discourse that articulates the role of schools, as engines of social mobility, to be accomplished in collaboration and partnership with parents, pupils and communities.

The policy of changing perceptions and behaviour extends to a bridging social capital through the right know-how and in valuing resources then accessed from this know-how. Thus, certain forms of identification are part of and maintain sources of social capital that then regulate the right types of social capital (bridging and bonding). Problems are identified with disadvantaged students being less likely to apply to selective universities, even with the right level of qualification. The problem is diagnosed with a lack of sound information that results in a lack of aspiration. To counter this problem a case study example is provided as an intervention that can raise aspirations:

Realising Opportunities is a unique collaboration of 12 leading universities, working together to promote fair access for, and social mobility of, students from under-represented groups. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 59)

The circumstances of student support – for students from underrepresented groups – is stated in abstract terms and without clear guidelines. Again, what this demonstrates, in the semantic relations of the text, is a passivated role for students:

Students are supported through a coherent programme of activities designed to raise their aspirations to go to research-intensive universities. Successful completion of the programme leads to recognition at the point of application to one of the 12 universities, where students can receive an alternative offer through UCAS … The scheme is in its early stages, but a robust evaluation framework has been put in place that will help the 12 partners understand the impact of
Realising Opportunities on student perceptions and behaviour.  
(Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 59 – 60)

Rhetorically verbs used (“supported” and “designed”) show the processes identified as activating the subject position of the student. However, the designated programme of activities is designed to raise “their aspirations”. Thus, despite this rhetorical acknowledgement of the student subject position, the impact of the scheme is measured in how it changes student perceptions and behaviours and so acts on students to change them.

Further, when students value the right forms of social capital, institutions and institutional arrangements can hinder access to higher education and professions. There are different provisions proposed to overcome this, such as more generous financial support for part-time and low income students, further flexible routes “for progression from further to higher education, including work-based options” (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 62) and access agreements to attract students from disadvantaged groups via ‘The National Scholarship Programme’. Yet problems in social capital networks excluding outsiders (negative forms of bonding social capital) are acknowledged:

Professional bodies offer progression routes into a range of careers such as accountancy, engineering and law which often combine work and study. Those from less privileged backgrounds face a number of barriers to accessing the professions including: lack of knowledge about professional careers; lack of family connections with the professions and aspiration to enter them; and the high entry requirements, length and cost of professional courses. Other barriers stem from the structure and practices of the professions themselves. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 63)

This acknowledgement shifts back to an integrationist discourse—problems may still exist even when the right dispositions are cultivated. These problems are in certain arrangements being prohibitive of “outsiders” accessing sanctioned goods. The semantic relations of the above excerpt utilise an elaboration (“which”) in stating that the professional bodies of careers such as accountancy, engineering and law offer progression routes into careers and combine work and study. This elaboration then culminates into a series of additive relations – as professions offer this route then any barriers in entering these professions are noted, including the structure and practice of professions. The objective then becomes to make networks work better by being more inclusive for the purposes of system adaptation and integration. As any life cycle intervention
enhancing social mobility, a commitment (subjective modality) is made to what is deemed necessary to widen access to professional careers and for bodies representing professions to alter their practices and relations:

We are working with the Gateways to the Professions Collaborative Forum, chaired by the Minister for Universities and Science, to encourage the professions to widen access to professional careers, including through the development of non-university routes. (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills 2011: 63)

**Concluding Remarks**

The analysed document covered four main areas – it sets out a statement of challenge, with objectives of reforms (informing assumptions in the document); a view of higher education as a market offering services; a higher education model that is responsive to both students and employers; and finally, social mobility as a driver for an agenda of social justice. The statement of challenge – directly related to the first research question – brings together an austerity policy but with commitment to a fairer system. Further, the statement pertains to the first research question in establishing a broader policy vision, with policy triangulation explicit and with 'Big Society' themes referenced. The policy ideas identified in theme one then informs what follows in the document. First, there is a commitment to reduce public spending in higher education, with waste following from an excessive bureaucratism, but without affecting strategic investment in higher education and disadvantaged students. From these assumptions reforms are then conceived—a more diverse and competitive provision of higher education that is also responsive to the needs of students and employers. It is these assumptions, in the form of a necessary austerity policy and reforms leading to more efficient public service, that then filter and shape, from re-contextualising principles, the relations between different fields and practices. This then becomes the basis for a vision of public service provision—a market ethos intertwining and complemented with a rolling forward of 'society', by providing an environment enabling sectional interests to cooperate and be part of what is a co-production model of public service provision. The existence of the ‘Big Society’ agenda is resorted to in the texturing of the document, as an element of intertextuality.

The identified governance approach demonstrates a prescriptive texturing in relations between universities, businesses and student needs (third research question). The student consumer is provided with information on institutions
and their performance (the quality of experience offered), to then inform decisions made. Improving teaching is part of a strategy that affirms students at the heart of reforms by specifically relating teaching to an education system that offers a stated high standard learning experience. If a market model and its infrastructure is sought for higher education (the system dimension of social domains), then there is similarly a regulation of student styles and an institutional habitus through different techniques (a triangulation between a *homo sociologicus* and *homo economicus* view of the person). These techniques include information sets that offer a service comparison (with focus on teaching quality) but also broader institutional roles in relation to students. Consequently, we have interventions at the level of system domains (domains of social settings and contextual resources) and these interventions are part of a cycle that invests in an institutional setting that then sustains certain behaviours and actions (complementing a pre-supposing governance agenda). Adherence to a governance logic and its concomitant orders of discourse becomes part of a virtuous cycle. In a virtuous cycle, students provide feedback and use surveys to improve teaching quality. Simultaneously, an engaged student contributes to standards in a competitive market; quality assurance measures then seek to self-regulate institutions so that they offer an even better student experience to differentiate themselves from competing institutions. Governance guides but also maintains and sustains given social practices within relations in a higher education field.

Further, there is a guiding role envisaged for higher education institutions, enabling better life decisions. This guidance role extends to how social mobility and an agenda of fairness is then conceived. The establishment of a careers service – offering information about careers, skills and the labour market – seeks to regulate attitudes and motivations in ways that are intended to better life decisions through centralised nudges and guidance (part of a fairness agenda). As certain needs are to be valued by students and catered for by universities (third theme covered in the document) then there is a regulation of relations in which provision is defined by a foregrounded legitimation.

Universities are put in a relation of superordination to business – it is a relation that primarily promotes economic growth, innovation and an effective investment in students as a form of human capital. Social events are presented in abstract terms and in place of the contingency of situated activity there are representations of events in the use of process-nouns. These process-nouns are nominalisations that prescribe, in abstraction, the needs and dispositionality of students and the services offered by higher education institutions. Normative
commitments in these prescriptions assert the nature of collaboration between actors in a regulated provision. The nature of a normative regulation of provision is seen in the passivation and activation of certain actors. Student needs are rhetorically acknowledged but as an identity-in-relation they are passivated as recipients of skills employers want. Further, students are expected to value the needs of employability as they embark on rewarding careers and should continue to invest in this process. It is also for education institutions to arrange collaborative arrangement so that course deliveries are responsive to the type of skills that employers want, reflecting the needs of the wider economy.

The final theme covers an attempt to synthesise the possibility of a higher education system responsive to the wider needs of the economy and employers, with a fairer system that allows those disadvantaged to access sanctioned goods and the acquisition of skills (opportunities); the acquisition of skills through opportunities provided then allows individuals to participate and improve their life chances and break patterns of dependency. A fairer distribution of opportunities merits a system that rewards hard work and the right aptitude. For this purpose, forms of nudging and guidance become important factors and engines of social mobility—networks of public, private and voluntary sector organisations providing services as part of life cycles interventions that contribute to behavioural changes. A moral underclass discourse on social inclusion (providing the right advice to bring about shifts in assumed cultures and outlooks) is also complemented by an integrationist discourse acknowledging the negative forms of bonding social capital that are prohibitive of outsiders entering professions. In the case of negative forms of bonding social capital there is a cut-off between a sanctioned normative dispositionality and access of strategic networks. Thus, even with the right guidance, sound information and valuing the right social goods, there may be necessary interventions to allow networks to work better for outsiders to access resources.

Finally, as a governance document, representations of social practice and its structures are normative abstractions of social events. Nominalisations utilised represent complex processes into things and it is these things that are given meaning in the texturing of semantic fields. Semantic fields emerge from a certain perspective taking and these fields then underpin referents to noun-like entities that denote desirability e.g. ‘progress’ and ‘attainment’. Assumptions from a given perspective demonstrates a continuum with New Labour i.e. an emphasis on consensual discursive spaces and, with this emphasis, a regulation of social integration in a manner that is viewed to cohere with pre-supposing
assumptions on what makes system integration work. Further, in continuity with New Labour, there is a commitment to reinforce social capital and social cohesion as part of an understanding of aggregated individuals networked with shared norms and values – it is a networking of individuals with shared norms and values that facilitate co-operation (welfare co-production).

Yet with coalition policy and specifically, in this case, higher education governance, there is greater emphasis on a moral underclass approach to social inclusion with attempts to guide and nudge. While social capital theory and investment in calibrated networks and communitarian themes are present, they are there to guide individuals and break cycles of welfare dependency. Hence, we have engines of social mobility and life cycle interventions facilitating the breaking of a dependency culture, rather than an enabling state initiating integrationist reforms to further social inclusion (the predominant New Labour approach). With a focus on behavioural aspects of exclusion over integrationist policies – the former often represented as a prerequisite of the latter – initiatives proposed to overcome obstacles to social mobility focus on the cultivation of the right dispositionality for positive social mobility.

With a social justice agenda focused on behavioural changes then the student, in this approach, is conceived through the prism of self-dependence and self-initiative (homo economicus). University education becomes part of life cycle interventions that aim to generate behavioural changes and offer different opportunities to enhance relative social mobility (related to the second research question). Thus, there is an aim to diversify higher education provision to meet the needs of the student consumer. Here there is an incentive for universities to compete and offer the best student experience and pathways to employability. An emphasis on self-help and self-dependency is represented in employability and higher earnings. For the generation of behavioural outcomes, students are motivated to self-invest in gaining the right education and skills to better their chances for better employability and to meet wider economic needs.

As stated, students are encouraged, in this approach, to expect the best possible service in their attempt to self-invest in the enhancement of their personal skills. Consequently, in this context, the public good of higher education becomes an individuated service with the student consumer part of a broader social setting that contextualises service provision with expected standards. Thus, students, instead of engaging with bodies of knowledge, are offered a structured learning experience (service), with clear expectations on what is required for progression (Williams 2013). Regulating bodies target institutions
and their capacity to deliver a consumer responsive service. Institutions, in their own role, are centrally guided and encouraged to compete for students. Also, the role of the student is defined – an idealised subjectivity – in taking an instrumental approach to their education (for example, the introduction of the KIS dataset encourages comparison and greater choice for students by systematizing the student consumer experience before they embark on their higher education learning). As Williams observes, this constructs the student consumer before arriving at university:

The provision of this quantifiable information commodifies education into a tangible service, and the direct link between education and employment presented in such information further encourages prospective students adopt an instrumental approach to their education, constructing students as consumers before they arrive at university. (Williams 2013: 76)

Positive social mobility and widening participation (an agenda for fairness) is about informed life decisions and the state regulates a devolved market offering services that guide students on different possible courses, training and other life chances. Life chances translates into transferable workplace skills that underpin learning. Consequently, disciplinary knowledge becomes secondary to learning that is judged as a pathway to employability. While differences were noted, between coalition and New Labour policy, in the focus and role of the state in provision, higher education is consistently viewed in the words of Peter Mandelson, as a ‘ticket’:

A university education remains the gateway to the professions and a ticket to higher lifetime earnings on average (cited in Williams 2013: 70)

The difference, between New Labour and coalition triangulation, is not in the instrumentalism but only in the interventions. In both approaches to policy triangulation, education remains the site of both social and economic agendas and is viewed as a ticket or means to all sorts of sanctioned goods. Expectantly, de-focused is an engagement with subject knowledge, including a criticality towards what constitutes systemic equilibrium. Considering this view of education, provision is held to be a corrective measure and a means to social inclusion, fairness and economic performativity.
Towards an Alternative Ontology of Personhood

Previous policy chapters focused on representations of the social and citizen as person. Behind stated practical and problem-driven approaches to policy there are implicit representations that abstract from complex processes, to then state a policy of what works best. It is in these implicit conceptions, as argued before, that we have an understanding of the person in terms of a triangulation between a *homo sociologicus* and *homo economicus* view of the person. This chapter presents a theoretical basis for an alternative *homo relatus* view of personhood. The argument presented in this chapter informs a relational approach to policy advocated in chapter seven.

In making the case for this alternative view of personhood certain necessary questions need to be considered. These questions are implicitly or explicitly considered in all theoretical models and structure the content of this chapter. The argument starts from the necessity of a transcendental reasoning on what makes an object an intelligible point of reference and how this then leads to a transcendental realism based on a referential detachment. Once the necessity of a transcendental realism is established, it will then pre-suppose further questions covered.

The proposed realist understanding of personhood is based on Archer’s model of personhood and this chapter aims to provide a justification and defence of this approach. However, a revision will be proposed to Archer’s morphogenetic account, in a way that understands the emergence of a reflexive capacity as a mediatory mechanism in a multi-dimensional social universe. In reviewing the process of morphogenesis and re-thinking the developmental dimensions of the domain of psychobiography, there is a return to Layder’s social domain theory. The enactment of reflexivity, it will be argued, is understood in reference to the properties of social domains and the environment of their interaction. In investigating the properties of the domain of psychobiography there is a reliance on wider literature in the area of developmental psychology and specifically cited are the works of Zahavi on the development of a self-concept presupposed
by a pre-reflexive self-consciousness. Further, the idea of a cognitive continuum will be cited and draws on the work of Crespi and Badcock; the idea of a cognitive continuum provides an empirical case application – in a continuum between mechanistic and mentalistic cognition – on the importance of a developmental distinction between a self-regulated pre-reflective self-consciousness and the development of a reflexive capacity.

Importantly, the revisions proposed do not imply that Archer ignores subjective biographies and the situated dimensions of the social. Rather, the revisions are directed at the way these dimensions are articulated when considering the interplay between personal and social morphogenesis. In Archer's model the anchor in the process of social morphogenesis is ascribed to emergent subjective biographies and the enactment of reflexive capacities. This approach is understood to be necessary to maintain a clear subjective/objective distinction (Archer 2009: 9). The proposed revisions aim to maintain this clear realist distinction, while understanding the enactment of a personal reflexivity in developmental terms, in which the efficacy of a capacity to deliberate and then dedicate on a course of action to be enacted through public language (a semantic capacity).

Finally, the ideas and themes proposed in this chapter inform alternative policy ideas and educational practices presented in chapter seven. In chapter seven the role of collective reflexivity is highlighted in an organic link between a meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity and transformative corporate action. These transformative practices are directed at educational practices and their efficacy, in indexical interactions, to enhance non-self-referential personal ends. For example, the idea of a cognitive continuum, discussed in the final section, refers to the properties of the domain of psychobiography and the need to renew practices in referential detachment to this domain. Chapter seven extends this theme to higher education practice and its focus on a developmental model of the curriculum. As will be covered in the final chapter, the extrinsic nature of subject knowledge – an independent propositional realm – is planned in relation to the intrinsic properties of differentiated learners.

6.1 The necessity of a transcendental realist argument

In chapter seven there will be an argument for fallibist educational practices, directed at personal ends, that are pre-supposed by a transcendental realist underlabourer. Thus, it is first necessary to set–out a philosophical ontology (a realist underlabourer) that acknowledges the ontological properties of the object
of reference as the basis of educational practices. The transcendental argument starts from the position that all meta-theories must engage, in some way, with ontological questions. Based on this understanding, ontological questions inform the conditions of emergence of a personal identity and its relation to selfhood. Here the role of a philosophical ontology is to extrapolate from these conditions (the broader relational orders that give meaning to this emergence) to arrive at an explanatory 'must', if personhood is to be intelligible (Collier 1994). Thus, this means, as shall be explicated, a logical necessity for some form of referential detachment (ontological commitments) and the development of a conceptual underlabourer, based on these commitments. We arrive at an a priori from the noted objective conditions that render personal identity possible. To focus, first, on the objective conditions of emergence means an affirmation that it is the nature of the relatum that determines the nature of the terms of reference.

If an ontology of personhood implicates a homo relatus conception of the human person then a justification should be provided for its conceptual underlabourer and underpinning philosophical ontology (transcendental argument). Accordingly, this section takes the following structure:

1. Documenting the objections of those opposing a transcendental argument. The positions cited are predominantly what may be stated as mid-level forms of realism.
2. A response to these views, with an affirmation that a transcendental reasoning is both universal and a logical necessity.
3. As a transcendental reasoning is a logical necessity, in regard to ontological commitments, then an argument will be provided on how this argument is made and the conclusions that may be drawn.

6.1.1 Opposing a transcendental realism

Before presenting an argument for the necessity of a transcendental argument, some objections against a transcendental realism will be noted. Documenting the views of those opposed to a transcendental realism will provide both a theoretical background to the key relevant questions and demonstrate a justification for the necessity of a transcendental realist underlabourer. First stated will be realist views that adopt a judgemental rationality – acknowledging a distinction between meaning and reference – but view an attempt at transcendental reasoning to be internally incoherent due to the claims underpinning this ontology. Second, is a claim that any distinction between meaning and reference to be implausible, as it philosophises sociology and by
this mistakenly holds that human knowledge can be distinct from operationalising frames of reference. Following this, there will be a response that argues for the indispensability of some form of transcendental reasoning that pre-supposes operational practice.

In the first category – those affirming a meaning/reference distinction – Cruickshank argues that the epistemological primacy of reason, as embedded explanatory paradigms, locates all frames of reference as models constituted in the transitive domain. Thus, as frames of reference are located and constituted in the transitive domain, then what is needed is an epistemological vigilance (Cruickshank 2004; 2010). Here there are consequences for any ontological claims regarding the social; hence ontological claims should always be pre-supposed by fallible interpretations. Due to this, argues Cruickshank, there can be no master-definition of what social reality may be and this implicates conceptual consequences for transcendental realism’s two main aspects – its propaedeutic and prescriptive functions.

Cruickshank critiques the possibility of there being a possible fit between the propaedeutic and prescriptive functions, due to an over-extension of the epistemic fallacy to include transcendental claims:

The problem though is that in defining the epistemic fallacy as the transposing of questions about being into questions about knowing, Bhaskar has defined the said fallacy so broadly that any reference to what we know of reality (which may well be knowledge claims with a

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1 The propaedeutic function has two aspects – first, philosophy provides conceptual clarity in its role as an underlabourer and conceptual mid-wife. Here the ontological frame of reference assists scientists to avoid conceptual confusion about the reality of scientific practice. Consequently, in avoiding this conceptual confusion, in an adherence to a realist philosophical underlabourer, science will be in a better position to make progress in operational practices. The second aspect posits that in understanding practice, in realist terms, operational practice guards itself against epistemic closure – this is due to the point of reference being the intransitive realm, thus affirming the fallibist nature of scientific claims. The prescriptive function follows from the existence of an intransitive realm and sets out to separate scientific from non-scientific practice. However, this separation is not in a pre-given justification of certain forms of operational practice as ‘scientific’ but in first returning to the ontological underpinnings of practice. In first starting from the ontological underpinnings of practice, acknowledging the existence of an intransitive realm, there is then a possibility of a philosophical criticism of scientific practice in its given frames of reference (Cruickshank 2004: 570 – 571; Bhaskar 1997).
high degree veracity) must commit this putative fallacy. (Cruickshank 2004: 572)

The over-extension of the epistemic fallacy results in ontological conceptions to be a question of knowing and so part of the transitive. Here there is an internal incoherence and this puts into question the possibility of an ontological conceptual clarity that defines the nature of progressive operational practices. Cruickshank identifies the argument for a transcendental realism as a philosophical one, rather than an argument relating directly to operational practice or scientific knowledge in the transitive domain. Citing Bhaskar, it is a philosophical reasoning that is “developed by reflection upon what must be the case for science to be possible; and this is independent of any actual scientific knowledge” (Cruickshank 2004: 573). Due to the argument being a philosophical one then the distinction between a substantive and philosophical ontology does not hold. Fallible representations, framed as philosophical ontologies, are still located within the transitive domain of human knowledge and so are necessarily a posteriori and emergent; there is no “Archimedean point or God's eye view, from which one could know the essential features of reality beyond knowledge” (Cruickshank: 2004: 568).

The argument noted above is extended to a transcendental realist view of sociological practice. A transcendental realist understanding is qualified, in the case of sociological practice, but with the important qualification that social structures, contra natural structures, do not exist completely independent of social actors. At the same time, social structures endure in their effects – as emergent properties – and remain efficacious even when not triggered in specific interactions and situations (hence the intransitive dimension of social structures). Similarly, Cruickshank views, in this case, that we have a philosophical ontology in the form of a sociological intransitive dimension that stands outside practice and sets to define the parameters of what constitutes the substantive features of social reality. It is “to explain the condition of possibility of social science as well as natural science: the argument about existential intransitivity is taken to be the a priori condition of any scientific study” (Cruickshank 2004: 576).

Despite this critique, Cruickshank argues that it is still possible to commit to ontological claims but these are not transcendental. They are, instead, emergent from a critical dialogue with opposing theories and this is to recognise that “ontological claims and presuppositions were constructed and revised intersubjectively, given that ontology pertained to an interpretation of reality”
(Cruickshank 2004: 580). Accordingly, the distinction between philosophical and substantive ontologies does not hold and to adopt this distinction leads to an irresolvable antinomy. The irresolvable antinomy comes from an irresolvable understanding of an interpretative framework of social ontology that, at the same time, affirms a dogmatic metaphysical claim that denies the grounds of its emergence. Yet, for Cruickshank, this does not mean a rejection of critical realist ontological claims. What it does mean is that these claims need to be acknowledged as part of an ongoing critical dialogue and that the immanent critique vouched for by critical realists needs to be applied to critical realism itself. The theoretical rigour advocated by critical realism remains workable and will frame, de facto, social research but this framework, while presupposing the selection of practical methods, is nevertheless contingent on current understandings prevailing in the transitive domain:

Rather, ontological presuppositions may be recognised as being situated within the transitive domain, and that the task of social scientists is to draw upon the most useful ontological definitions that currently prevail in the transitive domain. (Cruickshank 2004: 582)

Instead, theory is intrinsic to practice (situated in the transitive domain) and mediates our interaction to both natural and discursive worlds. This approach can be described as mid–level; it repudiates both intransitive ontological presuppositions but also the feasibility of research pragmatics with little theoretical insight or rigour – the idea of theory as emergent a posteriori from data collected. However, while repudiating a monological immanent critique there remains a commitment to the idea of ‘internal coherence’ or that some models are progressively efficacious in producing useful ontological definitions. It is this commitment that situates Cruickshank’s approach as a mid–point between philosophical starting points and the primacy of research outcomes. In this approach the propaedeutic function is made possible and the theoretical, qua critical dialogue, is in the feasibility of an ‘internal coherence’ but one detached from a philosophical ontology.

The question extends to the possibility of deriving the universal features of the social that are isolated in a transcendental inquiry. Cruickshank critiques both Bhaskar and Archer for isolating these features in viewing them to be derived from the lay knowledge of agents, in a view of the social as a stratified open system. Social structures, in this ontological framing, are emergent properties in a contingent naturalism, in which structures are mediated in the present tense but whose properties are emergent over time. Over time there is a continuous
interaction of morphogenetic and morphostatic causal properties – a diachronic emergence – that is contingently mediated in the present tense (Cruickshank 2010). The irreducibility of structure entails there is no reduction in the relation between structures – in their constraints and enablements – and agents. Consequently, there is no assumption regarding the falsity or truth of agency’s conception of social structures, due to the irreducibility of these structures to agent activity. Consistent in his critique, Cruickshank states this approach as a form of begging the question, in that it does not establish itself in a dialogical critique with other approaches. Instead, it justifies a model of the social – based on a transcendental inquiry – and from a given starting point then critiques other models. Thus, it first stands back to apply a justification for its approach based on a metaphysical justification, in contrast to a fallibilism focusing on knowledge growth.

As an alternative approach, Cruickshank cites Popper’s justification of knowledge growth in the form of problems that are located in a theory “that had previously solved problems in a precursor theory and, when a solution to the newly located problem is developed, it too will be subject to criticism and, in due course, it will be replaced by an alternative theory” (Cruickshank 2010: 600). Adopting this approach, Cruickshank re-formulates the epistemic fallacy so that it is substantively constituted as a fallibilist epistemology. This way the epistemic fallacy is avoided, as claims of the social are open to revision and never settled to then define social reality as it really is:

This is a problem because if knowledge is held to be fallible then, rather than simply using this to say that one’s claims are not infallible, one needs to put this recognition to work, so to speak. Doing this, one would argue that as knowledge claims are fallible they need to be revised and replaced through criticism. This would be antithetical to the search for an answer to a transcendental question because one would not be seeking some fixed answer but rather holding that all forms of knowledge claim were open to revision and replacement. (Cruickshank 2010: 598)

Kaidesoja argues for a revision of transcendental arguments that sets to postulate the “general categorical structure of the world that is interpreted in a realistic way” (2013: 18). First, it is argued, there is a significant difference between Kant’s application of a transcendental argument and what he terms as Bhaskar’s metaphysical speculations on the general categorical structure of the world. Kant’s methods reject this type of metaphysical speculation on
transcendent things (intransitive) as “he maintains that categories of understanding are applicable only to the possible objects of experience” (Kaidesoja 2013: 84). As the categories are subject sided – the generalised epistemic subject – the focus is on subject sided cognition and its categories of understanding. Accordingly, this locates operational practices as firmly within the transitive or as subject–sided.

Due to this subject–sided focus, operational practices are restricted to objects of experience, as opposed to a stratified ontology that necessitates a commitment to irreducible and unobservable generative mechanisms. The synthetic *a priori* starting point directs to a transcendent idealism that brings together, at the same time, the structures of our understanding with the objects of our experience (Kaidesoja 2013: 85). Consequently, the appropriation of a synthetic *a priori* viewpoint carries with it the adoption of a subjective cognitive experience in relation to the object of experience. Further, analogical to a Kantian transcendental argument, the aim, for transcendental realism, is to demonstrate “how certain intelligible and rational scientific practices are possible by establishing their necessary conditions of possibility” (Kaidesoja 2013: 87). As this is the case, then an attempt to establish the grounds of possibility for scientific practice does not hold, argues Kaidesoja, as it does not distinguish between “descriptions of scientific practices from the practices themselves”. This distinction is important for Kaidesoja as “the truth–values of descriptions of scientific practices cannot be known *a priori*, because scientific practices are not operations of our understanding but activities of real people in the real world” (Kaidesoja 2013: 88 – 89). Consequently, any evaluation of operational practice can only be justified *a posteriori* and by analysing practice empirically, rather than from a transcendentential necessity generative from the necessary conditions of practice. In contrast, a transcendental realist approach views transcendentental necessities cannot be justified from empirical knowledge but from a transcendentential philosophy.

In appropriating Kant's transcendental argument to establish the conditions of operative practice it then becomes necessary, for the sake of internal coherence, that any subsequent argument developed, *a priori*, be justified epistemically (subjective cognition). Yet Bhaskar, for example, bases his argument for a transcendentenal necessity on the objective conditions of operative practices and because of this he cannot accept any epistemically located starting points (transcendentenal idealism). Again, an *a posteriori* justification is not possible utilising a Kantian transcendental. Bhaskar’s approach, it is argued, appropriates the Kantian position but turns the transcendental argument to an other–sided
model and whose transcendental, consequently, is necessarily negated by this. There is an internal incoherence between adopting a transcendental argument with a realist ontology “due to his attempt to combine two incompatible doctrines: Kantian transcendental arguments (which presuppose the framework of transcendental idealism) and the transcendental realist ontology” (Kaidesoja 2013: 91).

Despite Bhaskar viewing his transcendental argument as both fallible and open to revision, it is nevertheless posited as a transcendental necessity for what makes practice possible. Thus, the transcendental argument starts from the conditions of practice to then critique other models (an immanent critique) in how their ontological claims are incoherent in reference to given a priori justifications. In a Kantian sense a transcendental argument is no longer feasible, in this case, as it builds, fallibly, from an a posteriori conception of the object's operative conditions. The Kantian view, Kaidesoja argues, is to hold transcendental necessities from an apodeictic necessity of the universal subject. Taken this way the Kantian view does not develop a priori arguments from what is knowable a posteriori:

> It is not possible to justify a posteriori any propositions about transcendental necessities in the Kantian sense, because knowledge a posteriori is always merely hypothetical and hence fallible. (Kaidesoja 2013: 90)

Kaidesoja argues, similar to Cruickshank, to select certain contingent conclusions and to make this, simultaneously, transcendentally necessary is to beg the question on why certain conceptions – with their pre-supposing interpretations – yield an a priori definition of what is true. There is an incongruence between what is an a priori interpretation and the aforementioned contingency of pre-supposing ontological theories. Consequently, acknowledging the contingency of ontological definitions compromises the ability to adjudicate between different positions, as each starts from a reasoning that sets itself apart from the practices it seeks to systemise:

> Practices that are referred to in the premises of these supposedly ‘naturalised transcendental arguments’ can (in principle) always be interpreted from the point of view of two or more incompatible ontological theories and there is no a priori way to decide which interpretation is true. (Kaidesoja 2013: 98)

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Arguing for this incompatibility, the argument put forward by Kaidesoja bears resemblance to Cruickshank’s shift away from transcendental reasoning to a revisionist model that develops ontological models from the transitive:

I would thus say that the intelligibility and rationality of the practice X relate to our conceptions and judgements concerning this practice rather than the features of the world that make it possible in the first place. (Kaidesoja 2013: 87)

Kaidesoja is committed to drawing on the conditions of scientific practice, qua substantive ontology, to then derive ontological arguments. For him a substantive ontology is a criterion that makes possible an identification of research practices that produces better practices in terms of the intrinsic features of good basic science. In the social sciences, agreeing with critical realism, we rely on the “explanatory power of theories over their predictive successfulness, since, as critical realists rightly emphasize, the predictive power of explanatory models and theories developed in social sciences is inevitably circumscribed and seldom used as a standard of evaluation of explanatory theories” (Kaidesoja 2013: 100). At the same time, consistent with naturalism, and contra a Kantian transcendental a priori, the standards invoked for better explanatory theories cannot be pre-justified but emerge according to different disciplines and the development of new theoretical ideas and methodologies (Kaidesoja 2013: 101). Problematically, as shall be covered later, Kaidesoja acknowledges that certain views of social reality may be identified as incompatible with successful social scientific practice:

This requirement is needed, because the most epistemically successful scientific practices presuppose that different sciences study the same world and that the results produced in different disciplines should be complementary, not contradictory. I find this requirement especially important in the context of social ontology, since, for example, physically reductionist, idealist and individualist views of the nature of social reality are not compatible with the best theories about human cognition proposed in cognitive sciences, as was suggested in the introduction. This means that arguments in naturalised social ontology are not solely based on the successful social scientific practices since their conclusions should also be compatible with the ontological assumptions of the empirically confirmed theories of other sciences (Kaidesoja 2013: 101)
This approach, as stated, is not based on a transcendental reasoning (a priori) and nor is it transcendentally necessary. Inferences to what are successful social scientific practices (the development of ontological propositions) emerge from the “empirical analysis of the practice, not on a priori conceptual inquiries or immanent critiques of the other philosophies of science” (Kaidesoja 2013: 103). The empirical analysis of practice is rooted in an explanatory necessary condition, as opposed to a transcendentally necessary philosophy, and if critical realist propositions of an open and stratified social ontology holds then it is due to its explanatory power rather than any necessary a priori pos of the conditions of operative practices. Finally, for Kaidesoja there is no necessary epistemic fallacy in this approach, as any evaluation of better explanatory models refers to the ontological structure of the world and not current knowledge of the world. The problem, however, is a stronger ontological claim attributed to a critical realist understanding of the epistemic fallacy to include “all epistemic concerns in the context of ontology” and it is this claim that is “unacceptable as it tends to open the gates for uncritical metaphysical speculation” (Kaidesoja 2013: 102).

From an altogether different position and against ontological reasoning, is Kivinen & Piirainen’s (2006) pragmatist methodological relationism. This approach rejects any commitment to a “metaphysical language game of ontology and what might be called a “referentialist” conception of knowledge” (Kivinen & Piirainen 2006: 310). Here any form of ontological reasoning is denied, including any dualisms (subject/object or reference/referent). What follows is the relationality of the object – in that the object is never distinct to the knowing subject – and with this the problems of epistemic and ontological fallacies are considered as residues of a philosophising sociology:

Like Dewey ([1925] 1981, 173 – 225), we give up the whole philosophical subject–object dualism, which first presupposes the knowing subject as an entity distinct from the objects of its knowledge, and then engages in figuring out how the subject could form correct representations of the world. (Kivinen & Piirainen 2006: 309)

Methodologically fruitful debates (sociologizing philosophy) are not engaged in the development of a metaphysical under–labourer. Instead, they argue for an immanence that contextualises all inquiries as problems to be investigated from the “concrete troubles people face in the course of their everyday social lives” (Kivinen & Piirainen 2006: 319). The object of investigation is not a description of what is independent, as referent, but human action and internalised habits – an
embodied knowing–how or practical skill – formed and underpinned by a certain knowing–that (shared practices). This linguistic knowing–that does not capture the intrinsic features of an object (the referent), as the object is already named and it is the relations of their naming (knowing–that) that becomes the object of inquiry:

It is precisely because of the centrality of practice—because of the fact that everything is practical and can only be weighed in action—that all theories should be conceived of as nothing but tools for action. (Kivinen & Piirainen 2006: 319)

Following the Deweyan operationalist approach, we reach a practical and problem–driven way of understanding the social sciences, as all human knowledge is related to the inquirer's purposes and all beliefs are to be weighed in intentional action and its consequences. Further, social scientific conceptualizations used by the inquirer are tools that must be operationalizable in context of things to be done. Further, a sense for the rules of the game, in the form of problems people face in their everyday lives, is not something to be theorised (for example, Bourdieu's theorising a theory of practice). Instead, what is advocated is a theory with a small 't':

From a pragmatist standpoint, we need to embrace the strict demand of operationalizability—understanding theories in terms of acts to be done—and this means, among other things, dropping the idea that the growing complexity of a theory and the use of peculiar doctrinal lexicon can be justified by the claim that they are needed in capturing the complexity and indefiniteness of the real world (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 22–23, and n. 40 and 41). Rather, we need an unambiguously operationalizable frame of references (i.e., a simple theory with a small t) that serves us as a practicable toolset for solving specific research problems. (Kivinen & Piirainen 2006: 319 – 320)

6.1.2 Transcendental reasoning as a logical necessity

The positions of those opposed to a transcendental realist underlabourer, noted above, may be summarised as follows:

1. An assumption that any ontological conclusion is not possible, as pre–notions are already constituted in the transitive domain. Due to these pre–notions being constituted in the transitive domain there is an internal
incoherence in any appropriation of a Kantian transcendental reasoning. Within this contention, we have mid-range realist views that seek to maintain some distinction between referent/reference and with this the possibility of adjudicating between different explanatory approaches.

2. A stronger position that opposes any ontological reasoning as a metaphysical language game.

Regarding the first point of contention then the central issue is the possibility of differentiating, in the words of Cruickshank, between conceptual clarity and a reasoned \textit{a priori} underlabourer (an underlabourer that establishes the transcendental necessary conditions of practice and defines how a conceptual clarity implicates better explanatory models). The question, therefore, is to demonstrate the possibility of a transcendental argument, as philosophical ontology, that can also act as an underlabourer, while allowing for both an epistemic relativism and judgemental rationality in its reasoning. Here the key issue is an acknowledgement of a judgemental rationality and the possibility of more adequate explanatory models in regard to an ontological commitment. In a distinction between meaning and reference we have a possible synthetic account between the epistemic and ontic. When both are acknowledged, we require some form of framework to hold both meaning (the intensional) and external reference (the extensional) as irreducible but also relational dimensions. Accordingly, we need an account on how a referent is referenced as an object of investigation and whose terms of reference are made meaningful in the process.

Cruickshank, as noted, views an internal incoherence in the notion of ontological presuppositions that are, simultaneously, situated. However, the mere stipulation of a meaning/reference distinction implicates an \textit{a priori} philosophical ontology. This follows, if we maintain a distinction between meaning and reference and the importance of some form of judgemental rationality in regard to the ontology of the \textit{relatum} – a judgemental rationality that is mutually compatible with an epistemic relativism. As a mutual compatibility is informed by the necessity a judgemental rationality, grounded in the nature of the \textit{relatum}, then we already define the permissible objects of reference \textit{a priori}. As Tyfield argues (2007) the necessity is in the nature of the \textit{relatum} – our ontology– that then determines the nature of the relation of reference:
As with all relations, the nature of the relatum of the permissible objects of reference, i.e., our ontology, necessarily determines the nature of the relation of reference. (Tyfield 2007: 151)

Further, the mere stipulation of a relatum that determines the relation of reference – the basis of a judgemental rationality – is to commit to a synthetic *a priori*, inasmuch as it is an attempt to acknowledge that theory is indeed intrinsic to operative practice in this relation. At the same time, the version of the transcendental argument, put forward by Bhaskar, is not a logical or analytical argument and its validity is drawn from “the derivation of synthetic *a priori* truths” (Tyfield 2007: 145). Thus, it becomes necessary, de-facto, to understand relations between the intentional and extensional and that any philosophical reasoning is derived from this problematic. In the relation between both, we are concerned with what makes for a progressive explanatory model, corrigibly, considering the *a priori* conditions of practice. Investigating meaning in reference to our ontology, therefore, translates into explanatory models (substantive ontology).

It is correct to view this question as derived from the transitive domain; however, even if the manner we derive a synthetic *a priori* is not fixed, there remains a transcendental argument, as the synthetic *a priori* prescribes a certain view on the conditions of practice considering the meaning and reference problematic. We can thus ask what makes a certain actualisation possible, empirically; an explanatory model will necessarily focus on this problem, informing the question on how an actualisation relates to meaning derived from practical methods utilised (the noted dialogue between a philosophical and substantive ontology). This question, as Archer (1998) argues, is a logical necessity when we consider what makes for an empirical advance in any concrete explanatory proposition (Archer 1998: 199). Tyfield (2007) similarly states this as a reasoned necessity (the basis for a synthetic *a priori*), derived from premises grounded in the question of what makes a phenomenon an intelligible object of investigation. It already assumes, as do Cruickshank and Kaidsejoa, that we can refer and so the necessary question directs to the conditions of intelligibility by which we articulate the relation between conceptual resources (explanatory model) and the object of reference (an indirect reference that does not pre-suppose pragmatic schema (Tyfield 2007: 155)).

At the same time, the existence of this reasoned necessity, considering the problem of meaning/reference, is that there needs to be a “detachment of
conclusions” (Bhaskar 2007: 194) when providing any ontological claim, even if claims are situated. To view this detachment as an impossibility, due to a philosophical ontology being located in the transitive realm, will, at the same time, render any form of judgemental rationality as part of self–referential networks and so negate the possibility of progress qua substantive ontology. Philosophical ontology, as detached knowledge, guides practice (epistemological premises derived from conditions of practice) on how we understand the internal coherence of explanatory models and it is through this that operative practices are then judged considering ontological questions pertaining to reference.

As noted this is not a metaphysical justification, as Cruickshank argues, but it is through a procedure of detachment that premises are derived on what makes an object an intelligible point of reference (to examine an object’s ontological conditions of possibility). Hence, a synthetic a priori is in both a subjective investigation, though posited as necessarily detached, and the manner referential statements can be construed in regard to its ontological conditions of possibility. Here we direct, according to Bhaskar (2007), to a mutual compatibility between subjective investigation and the procedure of detachment through which we refer to our external world:

This is of course perfectly consistent with the easiest argument to grasp for ontology: when we refer to an object what we do in that moment in which we refer to it is detach it from the subjectivity that investigates, posits, observes. This is what I call ‘referential detachment’ and it is what we do when we talk about the world, detaching things (including totalities) from their evidential and supporting context. So we have the motifs here of: the suspension of the natural attitude; the attitude which epistemalogizes or normalizes ontology; and the procedure of detachment. (Bhaskar 2007: 194)

Accordingly, an appropriation of a Kantian transcendental argument remains possible, as an epistemic starting point is a reasoned necessity inherent in any attempt to reach ontological conclusions; this is due to the problem investigated (meaning/reference) being intrinsic to the very act of epistemic reasoning (referential detachment). Furthermore, this is a synthetic a priori as it starts from an attempt to bring together a subjective understanding with the object of experience (ontology). Thus, the philosophical ontology is posited as sui generis due to the premises being deduced from the conditions of practice. What we have is not a justification of a metaphysical speculation; it is a deduced position
that then forms the basis of a judgemental rationality on what may be progressive research practice.

To bypass this reasoning and still rely on some view on what makes for better approximations of social reality, via a posteriori successful practice, is merely to transfer philosophical inquiries to the domain of situated practice. Yet in making this transfer, without a pre-supposing philosophical ontology (a reasoned framework), there would be no clear way to judge the basis of what makes for more adequate explanations. To merely stipulate successful and complementary outcomes (substantive ontology), as the basis for better theories, is to fall into the same problem of begging the question i.e. when we talk about the world, what is the nature of the object that leads to an adequate explanation? Again, if it is incremental progress in explanatory models that identify adequate explanatory models then this is to deduce, corrigibly, from the conditions of practice, even if this may be located as analytically mid-level. For example, if individualist or collectivist views of social reality are identified as erroneous, then best practice is what leads to this conclusion i.e. it is a referential detachment to the object that leads to certain conclusions. Thus, de-facto, to identify certain ontological conceptions as erroneous is to adopt a similar position to that of a transcendental realism – it is incorrect, due to the noted synthetic a priori, to assume that this reasoned necessity equates ontological commitments relating to the nature of reality with all epistemic concerns regarding ontology. Consequently, referring to an object requires some form of view on what makes the object an intelligible point of reference to then derive mutually compatible epistemic premises, qua incremental progress, in a process that intrinsically includes a referential detachment.

Kivinen & Piirainen, on the other hand, are explicit in what can be stated as a meta-theoretical a priori stance, though from a stance of negation. Here the problem of meaning and reference is replaced with human knowledge and that the continuity of a knowing—that is in an indistinguishable relation of immanence to a knowing-how. This way it is a meta-theory, even if a closed one, that denies its own starting point, as it views the mere conception of transcendental reasoning and a mid-point realism as still committed to ontology; the latter being still committed to a philosophising ontology as an aspect of operational practice. The goal, instead, is problem-solving rather than progress in models of indirect reference (ontological questions). This is consistent with a pragmatism that holds all doings to be aspects of problem solving and that attempts to guide these doings is in a language game acknowledged from within a network of named practices.
It is difficult to see how merely conceiving theory as tools for action (getting things done) that it would then be possible to adjudicate on how it may achieve objectives relating to explanation. This is the case, as explanatory objectives would be defined by an epistemic and genetic fallacy in regard to an epistemic embeddedness of already existing shared practices. What we have is a rejection of both epistemic and ontological investigations (the meaning/reference problematic) and thus the researcher would commit an epistemic fallacy, not in conflating a knowing-how with a knowing-that, but in denying the need – at any level of research – of a knowing-that distinguished from a knowing-how.

Sociologizing philosophy, consequently, leads to a closure, though intending the opposite, in setting–up a meta–theory that not only guides but draws the parameters of what is plausible for operative practices to consider. Thus, the same operative practices would be embedded in identified concrete problems but require the development of practices to solve further research problems. However, there is no way to ascertain, outside concrete concerns, why problems may be better solved through given practices (theories are referential to acts to be done and thus self–referential). Absent in this account is an objective basis for a dialogue on improved operative practices. In self–referential operative practices, we only have self–referential networks of meanings and consequently research doings cannot be anchored in anything distinguished from de–centered practices weighed in action.

6.1.3 The basis of a Transcendental realist argument

In the next chapter, there will be an acknowledgement of the latent dimension of policy practice in the form of personalist ends. This part of the chapter establishes the basis of a transcendental realist argument that pre–supposes and informs a relational turn in policy towards these personalist ends. Two points will be covered in establishing the basis of a transcendental realist argument:

1. If a transcendental argument is a reasoned necessity, whether implicit or explicit, then the question arises on the manner it guides a realist position.
2. What would the implications of this form of argumentation be for the question of personhood as relatum.
Regarding the first point, in defining a transcendental realist position we have referential detachment. As noted before, in the words of Bhaskar (2000), this is the procedure of detachment of the act of reference from that to which it refers:

The procedure which I have called ‘referential detachment’, that is, the detachment of the act of reference from that to which it refers, establishes at once the existential separation, distinctiveness or ‘intransitivity’ of both referential act and referent and the possibility of another reference to either, a condition of any intelligible discourse at all. (Bhaskar 2000: 24)

Thus, at the centre of this referential detachment is an existential separation between the act of reference and the referent, with an ‘intransitivity’ characterised in a non-identity between them. Furthermore, closure through pre–given epistemic models – the epistemic fallacy – would be avoided by affirming the relatum as the subject matter of a transcendental argument. Due to this, against empiricist observational models, we turn to generative mechanisms as the latent model of the object – a structure that yields certain powers. While powers may be exercised in certain conditions, the latent dimension of the object – the intransitive realm – is defined by generative mechanisms that exist regardless of their contingent activation. Here we move beyond given events and point to generative mechanisms as the latent dimension of an investigated object. Referential detachment entails we may refer to this realm of exercised powers, in terms of tendential outcomes, but these mechanisms would not be reducibly explained in terms of a perceived sequence of events. Accordingly, a given concept of the object is not the same as its latent dimension (the intransitive):

Generative mechanisms, instead, are different from (exercised) powers. “Generative mechanism” is a technical term that marks “something that is real” independently of the sequence of perceived events and which usually lasts longer than the events it generates. It is the sub–stantia, the latent model of the object. The generative mechanism is that aspect of the structure of an object by virtue of which it possesses some powers, its “way of operating”. This trait lasts and is exercised whilst ever the same characteristics and conditions remain. (Prandini 2011: 41)

The relative autonomy of tendential powers means their exercise is explained in the context of an interdependent and layered emergence, rather than a given sequence of perceived events. Consequently, within an open interaction of
mechanisms – defining this emergence – the properties and powers of the human being, as Archer argues (2003), are emergent from our relations with our environment, rather than assumed or pre-defined in a given reasoned referential act.

Second, in regard to the implications of this referential detachment, a transcendental realist synthetic a priori does not aim to resolve the question of emergence of a personal identity in a pre-given metaphysical collective logic. At the same time, against the empiricism of individuated learning, as the means of inculcation of shared practices, it remains committed to an irreducible propositional realm. As Collier argues (1994), the focus is on generative mechanisms that co-jointly generate events, in a stratified and relational view of natural and non-natural worlds. Here this non-reductive approach implicates an inter-disciplinarity, as different orders of our environment contribute to social agency (natural, practical and discursive).

6.2 Affirming both differentiated singularities and irreducible sharedness

This section applies a realist underlabourer in acknowledging the existence of an independent propositional realm, while also accounting for the transmission of this shared realm. Further, the aim is to provide a justification of Archer’s realist approach to personhood through discussing and setting-out important precursors that inform this approach. Archer approaches the transmission problematic, as will be discussed, through highlighting the importance of our embodied practical interactions in our natural world; these interactions, the basis of ontogenetic developments, distance us from our biological origins and prepare us for our social becoming (Archer 2009: 90). The discussion of the transmission problematic includes a discussion on the working of mirror neurons that substantiates Archer’s view empirically. Chapter seven takes the ideas discussed in this section further in the need to develop a relational policy model that considers both the ontological difference of persons and the social link that connects persons to their shared settings (between differentiated singularities and an irreducible sharedness).

The argument is based on world-directed actions that facilitate our social becoming via a shared action ontology; it is this action ontology that enacts our embodied relations from which in potentia capacities then develop. This position is a defence of Archer’s emphasis of embodied practical relations – the bodily know-how – that then accounts for the transmission of propositional knowledge (a ‘knowing-that’) and our referential detachment to our embodied relations.
This justification of a realist approach to personhood, therefore, covers the questions of how a propositional realm is transmitted and the existence of an autonomous sharedness that is emergent from an interpersonal bodily perspective. Therefore, the section takes the following structure:

(1) The transmission problematic – The first preliminary point is the problem of sameness i.e. the means through which unitary identities, in their mediation of natural, practical and discursive orders, come to collective objects from which an objective sharedness is possible. Once this initial point is discussed, the following argument will direct to questions on the nature of the mediation of this sameness and consequently its emergence over time. The argument put forward is one opposed to an attempt to bypass the efficacy of an active pre-reflective phenomenal self-model in the emergence of social actors.

(2) Affirming irreducible sharedness – This is an argument against an individuated pragmatic sameness. Instead, it will be argued, while it is important to account for the emergence of personal identities in their singular individuation, it is likewise important to consider generative mechanisms pertaining to an irreducible discursive order.

6.2.1 The transmission problematic

The transmission problematic relates to the problem of sameness i.e. the means through which unitary identities, in their mediation of natural, practical and discursive orders, relate to collective objects from which an objective sharedness is then possible. Once this initial point is discussed, the following argument will direct to the possibility of sharedness as an irreducible world of ideas. Regarding the transmission problematic, it is, in Bourdieu’s terms, a genealogical enquiry into an “internalised objective structure” and how the transmission of this objective structure as an immanent law, a lived externality, is then “inscribed in bodies by identical histories, which is the condition not only for the coordination of practices but also for practices of co-ordination” (Bourdieu 1990: 59). Stephen Turner states this problematic in the following way:

The problematic feature of all “collective object” conceptions was that they required some sort of means of getting from the collective object into the individual that preserved the sameness or unitary identity of the collective object – of what, as Bourdieu says, is taken for granted (Turner 2007: 353)
The problem is thus concerned with an account on how sameness of external performance can be, simultaneously, a sameness of internalised structure generating behaviour. In what follows there is a contrasting of positions between Turner and Lizardo, in regard to this problematic, in which both contest the plausibility of convergence of actions based on correspondence to given tacit conceptual presuppositions. The objective, after this review, is to then arrive at a solution to the noted problematic in a way demonstrating the importance of a transcendental realist position. The importance of this position, as starting point, is in its non-reductionist referential ontology. As will be shown, Turner rightly critiques what is termed as the mystery of collective objects (tacit conceptual presuppositions). However, contra Turner, the argument put forward is informed by a transcendental realist understanding in which layers of emergent strata possess their own properties and powers. In this approach, conceptions such as convergence of collective pre-suppositions rely on a mistaken viewpoint of an ontological complicity, which results in a bypassing of subjective authority that mediates a regulating propositional knowledge. At the same time, against Turner, to direct towards generative mechanisms means there is an acknowledgement of an irreducible propositional order. To empirically substantiate this realist position there will be a referencing of the work of Metzinger and Gallese on mirror neurons (both Turner and Lizardo, in different ways, cite this work to substantiate their opposing views).

First, in regard to Turner’s view, sameness is explained in the social process of an individual–individual relation. However, this convergence is not some form of social metaphysics – a quasi-teleology – bypassing the process of individuation and without providing an account on how this is possible. The movement is then one in which practices are both collective and the source of individual dispositions:

Bourdieu’s main argument has two parts: that practices are a collective, dispositional, and strategic source of individual habitus, which are in turn the source of individual dispositions and strategies. The causal relation is bi-directional: up from the individual through affinities of habituses to the practice, and down from the practice to the individual. (Turner 2007: 354)

Here declarative sameness, such as social practice, is an embodied inculcation through the social process of interaction itself, rather than external facts imposed on individual minds. The convergence of sameness pertains to the inherent problem of social coordination – something different to a transcendent objective structure regulating the coordination of social practice (a taken for
granted). Instead of an unaccounted for sameness, the basis of social practice, we turn to the manner mirror neurons work on visual material producing a capacity to do something similar to what is seen:

The mystery element is gone: if the neurons work on visual material, and produce a capacity to do something similar to what is seen, we need another mechanism to explain other supposed cases of transmission, or we need to question whether there is anything transmitted. (Turner 2007: 366)

Mirror neurons represent a mechanism facilitating inter-individual convergence in the social process of interaction. For Turner mirror neurons would be a procedural mechanism enabling convergence, citing work done on monkey's premotor cortex of neurons, with evidence suggesting that humans also possess (2007: 366). These neurons facilitate learning through a sub-personal attunement between individuals and via known epistemic channels. Against a ‘downloading’ of an assumed shared objective logic there is – phylogenetically\(^2\) – a substrate shared by individuals, facilitating an instrumental or pragmatic sameness. Consequently, there is nothing outside the minds of individuals but a to-and-fro individuation of learning in social interaction. The working of neurons point to a learning from overt behaviour – an external perspective – which is then translated into bodily perspective and sustained through an embodied off-line simulation and emulation (a repository enabling action sharing through a trajectory of learnt behaviour).

Thus, the learning process is based on an external perspective (action observation) that is mirrored and through this perspective there is an accumulation of learnt performance – the basis of a pragmatic sameness – that allows for a predictive capacity to perceive similar actions in others and the ability to recognise self in others. Facilitating the predictive capacity –

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\(^2\) The ontogenetic development of the human is first facilitated and sustained in our embodied natural relations (phylogenetic developments). Here the development of human learning is transmitted through a shared bodily perspective that provides the basis and furthers ontogenetic developments. Thus, Archer states our embodied knowledge (know-how) is realised in our natural relations and is based on developments that are traced to the manner we interact and transmit learning through the doings of this bodily perspective – “Embodied knowledge is a know-how about nature which has literally become ‘second nature’. It is a ‘knowing how’ when doing, rather than a ‘knowing that’ in thought. Because it has to be realised by each individual in their natural relations, it is unsurprising that our ontogenetic development recapitulates phylogenetic developments”. (Archer 2003: 162)
referenced to an off-line learnt repertoire – neurons are activated when identifying the actions of others, even when no action is performed by the subject. The action is mirrored, as if the subject performed the act, and is transmitted back; with this there is an ability to ‘mind read’ another person from the same learnt repertoire that is developed when the act is learnt. Turner states the process of action simulation as an “off-line process involving the same neurons as those involved in perceiving an action of another person as 'minded' or intentional which thus becomes the means by which we ‘mind read’” (Turner 2007: 360). Instead of the transmission of content there is a mirroring that becomes the basis of emulation:

Moreover, I will suggest, the right understanding fits with my points about emulation: the same content is not directly transmitted, as he imagines, but mirrored, that is to say simulated from within the mind of the person doing the mirroring. (Turner 2007: 359)

These are retrodictions constructed through simulations applied to external performance (overt behaviour) and it is a learnt trajectory that then enables the making sense of a trajectory of observed behaviour:

We construct these retrodictions with our own capacity to simulate, which we apply to what we observe, namely overt behaviour, which our simulations enable us to make sense of, or code. (Turner 2007: 361)

Mirroring, contra content being directly transmitted, becomes an archimedean point directed to the world though bodily interactions, based on a shared mental substrate at the phylogenetic level. It grounds the possibility of sameness empirically and resolves the transmission problematic in this phylogenetic solution.

An agent–based perspective is affirmed, starting from the mind of the person doing the mirroring and emphasises “the individual, who uses himself as a model and means of understanding other” (Turner 2007: 367). We always return to individuated learning perspectives, based on differentiated backgrounds, to arrive at a functional intersubjective understanding:

‘Sameness’ in this case is sameness only at the level of functional intersubjective understanding – not a neural fact, much less one produced by common body experiences. Even less individualized training, such as military drill, is neurally overlaid on differentiated
backgrounds, such as the way recruits walked before they were disciplined by the drill sergeant. (Turner 2007: 366)

With differentiated backgrounds we have an important distinction between individual variations of social interaction and pre-supposing collective objects – in the former we respond to others in social interaction, while the latter refers to an unaccounted special realm regulating the direction of response:

The implications of this argument for social theory were identical to those of Ellwood’s social psychology a century ago. As Ellwood put it, “as individual psychology teaches, no two physical coordinations [a Dewey-Mead term from the 1890s] can ever be exactly alike” (1899, 663). The message here is very clear. What we require through interaction with others is subject to the individual variation in response that occurs in interaction. This is a social conception without being a collective one. The “social”, for Ellwood, refers to the social process of interaction itself (1901, 741), not to a special realm of substance, such as the “water” to which Bourdieu refers (Turner 2007: 354)

While there is the possibility of implicit tacit knowledge, without explicit instruction, learning history matters at the cognitive level, based on a developmental capacity to simulate overt behaviour (Turner 2007: 353). Further, even in the case of tacit knowledge and learning we still have transmission through the epistemic channels, rather than an assumed social realm as the basis of tacit pre-suppositions.

This agent-based approach allows for both pragmatic sameness and skilled interactors whose responses can never be shaped by a given objective sense. Thus, we have neither an impinging group will or an anything goes anarchy:

Because we can simulate other people more readily than we can simulate the physical world, we can thus construct, test, and assimilate complex feedback simulative “hypotheses” about this world expeditiously. The interaction between these capacities and this environment is not one that produces clones, or puppets of the group will, nor does it produce anarchy. It produces skilled interactors with enormous capacities to anticipate, predict, and model the people with whom they interact, to adjust to them, and to learn from their adjustments. (Turner 2007: 369)
In an opposing perspective, Lizardo (2007) argues empirical evidence substantiates Bourdieu's theory of objective transmission of shared practices. Mirror neurons facilitate cognition via the transmission of shared collective logics through shared body experience. Neural structures support, simultaneously, both action representation and action comprehension. More than mere embodied mirroring and then an imitation of overt behaviour there is, parallel to mirroring, a capacity to pick-up a tacit knowing—that, which Lizardo argues is the dominant mode of embodied learning. The motor neuron system in the F5 region is identified as a substrate relating to practical capacities productive of action and the coding and comprehension of practical action in relation to others:

In this sense the motor neuron system in the F5 region can be seen as one possible substrate of not only of the practical capacities productive of action (which are mainly subserved by traditional motor neurons in the pre-frontal region) but those which are in charge of the practical, representation, coding and comprehension of the practical action of self and others, and which may be involved in the implicit matching of the practical skills of others to that of other actors and vice versa; precisely the neurocognitive capacity that according to Turner (1994) belonged in the realm of high-speculation and/or logical impossibility and incoherence. (Lizardo 2007: 12)

Importantly, there is a neural basis for a practical generalisation that is interpreted by Lizardo as making possible the noted representation, coding and comprehension of practical action. It is due to this practical generalisation that we have shared practices from practical capacities, including meaningful actions directed towards collectively situated objects. Mirror neurons enable a generalisation in which objects are understood in terms of their potential motor affordances and from these affordances a proto-conceptual generalisation that forms “fairly abstract representations of practical action upon objects in the world performed by other actors” (Lizardo 2007: 330). From a proto-conceptual generalisation there is an encoding of practical information about objects in what they are for the observer. Thus, an initial practical embodied sense, the basis of an implicit transmission, then becomes the basis of meaningful actions and their pre-supposing representation in an implicit logic.

Transmission of the conceptual correlates, simultaneously, with embodied action simulation. Instead of an individuated learning from overt behaviour, resulting in an offline simulation from learnt repertoires, imitation is in a
relational immanence to collective objects. In this immanence collective transmission is in convergence to other relations and their relations to objects as meaningful (conceptual) representations. With mirror neurons, as a computational starting point, we have a capacity to transmit meaningful intentionality to shared objects and generate learning from given logics i.e. implicit certitudes, as meaningful representations, transmitted in correlation between action observation, simulation and execution. For Lizardo, the process of transmission rather than conscious and deliberate, is instead automatic, unconscious, and pre-reflexive. Thus, by virtue of being part of a given social world, humans will be exposed to countless acts of practical teaching and will be the subject of practical learning during the course of their everyday existence (Lizardo 2007: 17). Consequently, following Bourdieu, nascent forms of reflexivity are inseparable (an ontological complicity) from self-other interactions that transfer pre-conscious forms of regulated understanding in everyday spaces.

The issue of transmission, through individuated learnt instruction, no longer figures, as we do not set out to learn from overt behaviour. Instead, we have in the body, neuro-physiologically shared, a sub-personal attunement that coordinates motor schemes “across agents, without ever resorting to conscious deliberation about goals and purposes” (Lizardo 2007: 19). Hence, motor equivalence is an embodied attunement through an inter-corpority that immanently encodes bodily behaviour in action. Due to this implicit transmission, through a shared bodily analogue, we do not require the type of overt mirroring – through epistemic routes of access – which Turner argues for. The body is an analogical operator, a medium of transmission, and it is through it that social meanings and values are acted on in a variety of social settings. The body imbues meaning and allows the transmission of collective presuppositions in which learning processes are highly constrained to those practice produced by others:

Learning processes, especially those having to do with practical activity in the world, are highly constrained to match those practices already produced by role models, and correlatively to draw implicit correspondences to the tacit conceptual presuppositions encoded by those actions. (Lizardo 2007: 26)

With role models and tacit conceptual presuppositions inhering in their actions, embodied simulation is understood in reference to a structured social practical logic, as part of patterned sequences of action in a concrete context. Lizardo argues there is a subset of mirror neurons that play just this role in anticipating
the order of actions, in a concrete context, to achieve shared goal–ends. In this
sense, the “embodied simulation mechanism thus appears not only to be able to
reproduce the observed isolated actions of others, but also anticipate which
actions should “logically” follow the observed one given the context of
observation” (Lizardo 2007: 25).

Considering these two opposed views and informed by a transcendental realist
underlabourer (a stratified and non–reductionist ontology), an argument will be
presented to empirically resolve the transmission problematic. The argument
acknowledges Turner’s rejection of ‘transmission’ through pre–supposing
collective objects. The problem with pre–supposing conceptual presuppositions
is its appropriation of irreducible mechanisms pertaining to an individuated and
differentiated inculcation, through given discursive filters. At the same time, the
argument put forward acknowledges an irreducible sharedness, something
rejected in Turner’s skilled interactions of individuals. However, while
irreducible, it must refer, ontogenetically and logically, to a pragmatic sameness
in the manner practical activity is appropriated by a first person perspective.

In regard to a rejection of an appropriated irreducible mechanism (pertaining to
individuated inculcation), via tacit conceptual presuppositions, the argument is
substantiated by the workings of mirror neurons (cited by both Turner and
Lizardo). Lizardo fails to differentiate between a functional proto-conceptual
mechanism and the development of a more complex semantic mechanism
(Gallese 2003: 1238; Metzinger & Gallese 2003). Between these two there is an
inter–dependence between a know–that, in the functional proto-conceptual, and
a know–how of a semantic representation. Lizardo’s understanding, as we shall
see, takes this differentiation as given to the latter semantic representation, so
that the proto–conceptual is there to draw implicit correspondences to tacit
conceptual presuppositions. Consequently, the agent–based model of action
turns to an objective mode of regulation.

In contrast, the agent based model, set out by Gallese & Metzinger, first turns to
a capacity to extend the self, in a shared action ontology and via motor action.
This extensibility relies on a basic functional mechanism depending on
“unconscious and automatic simulation processes” (Metzinger & Gallese 2003:
556). What we have is a rudimentary first person perspective, in the noted
simulation process, in an observation of an object–related action. In observation
of action there is a coupling between observation of an object–related action
and action execution. It is a functional mechanism that is posited to be the basis
of an implicit form of action understanding:
The observation of an object-related action leads to the activation of the same neural network active during its actual execution. Action observation causes in the observer the automatic simulated re-enactment of the same action. We proposed that this mechanism could be at the basis of an implicit form of action understanding. (Gallese 2005: 32)

Further, in a proto-conceptual functional mechanism, in its embodied, unconscious and automatic simulation of object-related action, there is also the capacity to understand the ‘why’ of an action in the context of its performance. This way acts are perceived and the intention behind it detected in observing the sequence of its performance in regard to its distal goal:

Thus, pre-motor areas – areas active during the execution and the observation of an action – previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding ‘why’ of action, that is, the intention promoting it. Detecting the intention of Action A is equivalent to predict its distal goal, that is, the goal of the subsequent Action B. (Gallese 2009: 493)

In the noted extensibility, through a mind/body interplay, we establish the “core element of an automatic, unconscious, and pre–reflexive functional control mechanism whose function is the modeling of objects, events, and other agents to be controlled” (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 555). In modeling objects, events, and other agents to be controlled there is a functional basis of social referencing. The role of a functional mechanism, in this agent based model, can be described as a sub-personal mechanism that is a mediatory capacity and bridge between a first person and third person perspective. The first person perspective is the basis of an elementary self-model, while the third person perspective being a high-level capacity to cognitively model social relations (social referencing) in a practical engagement in shared target spaces.

The functional control mechanism relates to the way we relate to objects, other conspecifics and how we share subjective states, from a given elementary self-model. The elementary self-model is then understood in the manner an agent–object relationship can be phenomenally represented (Gallese & Metzinger 2003: 561), as first person perspective. Accordingly, there is first a Phenomenal Self Model (PSM) that is defined as the “integrated conscious model an organism may have of itself as a whole”. Due to this PSM being in the world then it is an
intentional relationality – established through a functional control mechanism – from which an initial self-model phenomenally represents itself in relationality to its externality. Thus, the PSM's extensibility is understood from a Phenomenal Model of the Intentionality Relation (PMIR), in an embodied observation and execution of action, in which the PMIR facilitates the modeling of objects, events, and other agents to be controlled. This facilitation is possible when the PSM is “fully immersed in its external environment through a dense network of causal, perceptual, cognitive, attentional, and agentive relations” (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 562).

In this immersion we start from the vantage point of a self-regulated practical engagement in the world to establish a first person character of action. In the activation of the PSM, in its immersion, through a PMIR, we then establish a non-conceptual and non-reflexive first person extensibility. Thus, a phenomenal representation of an integrated conscious model is not reliant on the possession of concepts, or necessarily involves a reflexive self-consciousness, and this suffices to establish the first-person character of actions:

   It is important to understand that all of this does not necessarily involve reflexive self-consciousness, the possession of concepts, or the mastering of a language: In animals such as monkeys an attentional and a volitional perspective could suffice to establish the first-person character of actions (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 561).

The activation of the relationality of a PSM – the phenomenal self-model being the point of enactment of a shared functional ontology – establishes a capacity to entertain the mental account of other agents (the basis of an intersubjectivity). The capacity of interpersonal convergence becomes meaningful in a shared action ontology i.e. a shared functional ontology. A shared action ontology, therefore, guides organisms through to intersubjectivity. It is an action ontology that brings together different organisms through a shared functional overlap and what follows in mapping the behaviour and goal states of other agents:

   The same subpersonal ontology then guides organisms when they are epistemic agents in a social world: Interpersonal relations become meaningful in virtue of a shared action ontology. An action ontology can only be shared and successfully used by two systems, if there is a sufficient degree of functional overlap between them, if they decompose target space in similar ways. We will posit that the cognitive
development of social competence capitalizes upon such a shared ontology to trigger the timely onset of behaviors such as gaze following, shared attention, and mind reading, which will eventually give rise to a full-blown capacity to entertain mental accounts of the behavior and goal states of other agents. We will also propose that what makes humans special is the fact that their functional ontology is much richer in socially individuated goal representations and that their model of reality is not only rich and flexible, but that they can actively expand their own functional ontology by mentally ascribing distal goals to conspecifics. (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 550)

While the PSM knows itself under-representation, as active self-model, it does this by applying the intentional stance to itself in a phenomenally intentional manner (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 56). What this shows is that we cannot bypass the importance of an irreducible first person vantage point and its basis in an elementary self-model. As noted before, it is the non–cognitive PMIR that builds the bridge to a social dimension in establishing the basis for intersubjectivity in a rudimentary subjective perspective:

An elementary self-model in terms of body image and visceral feelings plus the existence of a low-level attentional mechanism is quite enough to establish the basic representation of a dynamic subject-object relation. The non-cognitive PMIR is thus what builds the bridge into the social dimension. Once a rudimentary subjective perspective has been established with the help of the motor system, intersubjectivity can follow. (Metzinger & Gallese 2003: 567)

In a bridge to a social dimension, initiated by an extended first person perspective, an intentional relationality integrates proto-conceptual and conceptual worlds, generating a conscious volition with subjective authority. Goal representations – through embodied self-simulations – are integrated into the phenomenal model of intentionality relation in a process of decision and selection:

A parallel analysis is possible for the phenomenological properties of volitional subjectivity and agency. Conscious volition is generated by integrating abstract goal representations – constituted by self-simulations – into the current model of the phenomenal intentionality relation as object components, in a process of decision or selection. (Gallese and Metzinger 2003: 375)
When the agent realises its behavioural relations, through a shared action ontology, then subject-subject relations become globally available to cognition. Considering emergence, when relations become available in this way, then concept formation develops to cognitively model social relations from a third person perspective:

If the fact that you are constantly not only standing in perceptual and behavioural relations to your environment, but that you are frequently realizing subject-subject-relationships becomes globally available, it also becomes available for cognition. This, in turn, will allow those systems capable of concept formation to cognitively model social relations from a third person perspective. (Metzinger 2003: 568)

What follows, in response to Lizardo, is a rejection of complicity between first and third person perspective. In complicity, we have a proto-conceptual – an elementary self-model – reducible to given tacit conceptual presuppositions encoded by action. For example, seeking to buttress Bourdieu's model of regulating social necessities, Lizardo understands the proto-conceptual as already given in complicity to “the bodily with the mental, the psychological and the social, formal and efficient causality” (Lizardo 2007: 714). In contrast, Metzinger and Gallese’s agent based model, based on an embodied simulation of a non-cognitive PMIR (the basis of a first-person character of action), understands the functional as a mirroring mechanism dependent on the personal and situational history of the mirroring subject. Instead of complicity, an agent-based model returns to the mirroring subject, in the form of a differentiated nature of the subject that is distinguishable from the social. What is highlighted is the importance of personal history and the situated nature of the mirroring subject:

The more we study mirroring mechanisms, the more we learn about their plasticity and dependence upon the personal history and situated nature of the “mirroring subject” (Gallese 2009: 494)

If there is malfunctioning in a functional sub-personal mechanism – a rudimentary subjective perspective (Metzinger and Gallese 2003: 567) – then this affects the emergence of the semantic and with it the noted personal and situational histories of the mirroring subject. What results, to differing degrees, is a compromise in the ability to entertain the mental account and social experiences of others in bridging the propositional. Due to this we need to
consider the interaction between irreducible mechanisms – here the contextual aspects of social stimuli are filtered through the subjective perspective in regard to previous information. The functional dimension in the form of embodied simulation – grounding previous experiences – scaffolds the propositional and bears on the cognitive elaboration of contextual aspects. In this way, through ontological differentiation, we substantiate the irreducibility of the proto-conceptual as more than a complicity to given regulating tacit conceptual presuppositions (what Bourdieu terms as a quasi-teleology):

Our most sophisticated mentalizing abilities likely require the activation of large regions of our brain, certainly larger than a putative domain-specific Theory of Mind Module. For example, the same actions performed by others in different contexts can lead the observer to radically different interpretations. Thus, social stimuli can also be understood on the basis of the explicit cognitive elaboration of their contextual aspects and of previous information. These two mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. Embodied simulation is experience-based, while the second mechanism is a cognitive description of an external state of affairs. I posit that embodied simulation scaffolds the propositional, more cognitively sophisticated mentalizing mechanism. When the former mechanism is not present or malfunctioning, as in autism, the latter can provide only a pale, detached account of the social experiences of others (Gallese 2004). (Gallese 2009: 495)

A transcendental realist underlabourer, and its latent dimension in generative mechanisms, implicates an intransitive dimension in which there is no closure to a given pre-supposing objective logic. Similarly, against epistemic closure, as will be covered in the case of an irreducible sharedness, there is a rejection of the idea of a reduction to piecemeal interactions of individuated learners. Once viewed this way, we can acknowledge the personal and situational histories of agents and the irreducibility of the specific identity of the agentive/subjective parameter (Gallese and Metzinger 2003: 494). Furthermore, the non-propositional dimension, as sub-personal mechanism, bears on the personal and situational histories of the mirroring subject. Turner is right to put forward a transmission problematic – a necessary question that needs to be considered – but arrives at a solution through an empiricist underlabourer in which a pragmatic sameness negates the possibility of irreducible collective objects. The next part of this section, acknowledging the importance of a pragmatic sameness, as an important irreducible property, given in a subjective authority
and interiority, still views sharedness to be irreducible to the practical engagement of a mirroring subject.

**6.2.2 Affirming irreducible sharedness**

The second part of the argument, resolving the transmission problematic, argues for a compatibility between an individuated reflexivity that mediates collective meaning (the mirroring subject that confronts the discursive order) and the relative autonomy of a discursive order. In affirming the relative autonomy of a realm of meanings we then move from the immediate observable – in this case accounting for meaning in its transmission through known epistemic channels – to irreducible generative mechanisms in the form of collective objects as emergent properties. The argument put forward, in this section, agrees and defends Archer’s (2003) view of a social ontology of the propositional – an approach that views a propositional realm existing independently of the activities it regulates and governs. Informed by social morphogenesis, it explains the emergence of a shared register in an interplay between the properties and powers of the human being and an environment that forms the relations of emergence in which these same properties and powers are exercised. What follows is an acknowledgement of the properties of relations underpinning the emergence of a personal identity and objective forms of sharedness – the latter with *sui generis* properties and powers. Thus, as Archer (2003) argues, we have a stratified view of humanity and the emergence of humanity from different irreducible stratum:

The properties and powers of the human being are neither seen as pre-given, nor as socially appropriated, but rather these are emergent from our relations with our environment. As such, they have relative autonomy from biology and society alike, and causal powers to modify both of them. In fact, the stratified view of humanity advocated here sees human beings as constituted by a variety of strata. Each stratum is emergent from, but irreducible to, lower levels because all strata possess their own *sui generis* properties and powers. Thus, schematically, mind is emergent from neurological matter, consciousness from mind, selfhood from consciousness, personal identity from selfhood, and social agency from personal identity. (Archer 2003: 87)

The noted interplay, explaining emergence, means a pragmatic sameness, in social relations, cannot be reduced to individuated activity. In the case of a
reduction to individuated activity, shared understanding would be derived from the properties and powers of skilled actors and individual/individual relations. The question is then to account for the means of transmission of socio-cultural relations as irreducible properties and powers, while affirming the existence of a pre-supposing autonomous discursive emergent stratum.

To resolve this problematic, Archer starts from an emergent stratified view of both different orders (natural, practical and discursive) and humanity. This view emphasises the transability of ontologically distinct orders in the form of a relational interdependence between autonomous stratum. An ontology first approach, based on a referential detachment, understands the emergent properties of the discursive order to be referential to the natural and practical realms. As Archer argues, the relation between a ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’, between the practical and propositional, is one that implicates, at first, the ontogenetic development of human capacities, in our embodied relations to our natural environment. Discursive knowledge (a ‘knowing that’) is grounded in a ‘knowing how’ of doing:

Embodied knowledge is a know-how about nature which has literally become ‘second nature’. It is a ‘knowing how’ when doing, rather than a ‘knowing that’ in thought. Because it has to be realised by each individual in their natural relations, it is unsurprising that our ontogenetic development recapitulates phylogenetic developments. (Archer 2003: 162)

Returning to the mirroring subject, we are able to identify, in a shared action ontology (the basis of doings), the developmental precursor for a semantic capacity (a point empirically substantiated in the previous discussion on mirror neurons and their role in collective transmission). It is first through an extended first person perspective, initiated by a proto-conceptual mechanism, that the emergence of a more sophisticated semantic mechanism is made possible. Thus, our shared action ontology, actualised in our embodied relations, establishes a vantage point and inter-dependence to a propositional ‘knowing how’. Being prepared for social becoming never disengages from the intransitive laws of nature and the linguistic medium is not merely a self-referential representation of ideas. The manner we utilise, sequentially, human powers and properties in reference to the ontological properties of distinct orders helps us arrive at a semantic ‘knowing that’ (meanings). This first person perspective, or a sense of self, is then conceived in doings – the previously noted extended motor action of a sub-personal functional mechanism – which then secures meanings. With the
transability of different orders the propositional is no longer internal to and regulating a logic of action. The emergence of a social identity is first predicated on a reflexive personal identity and the powers of a personal identity confront rather than acquiescence to a stated regulating sharedness (Archer 2003).

As the noted ‘knowing how’ establishes referential detachment and grounds the development of our semantic capacities then we never disengage with our pre-existing natural relations in our practical doings. Further, the initial intelligibility of the propositional is first acquired in these relations to our natural environment. Thus, human properties and powers, being ontologically and logically prior to social becoming, entails that language is causally efficacious in practical action. Embodied knowledge, based on sensory-motor interactions in nature, references our physical operations. The ontogenetic development of human properties and powers pertains to these noted phylogenetic developments that are characterized in direct contact with nature.

Bodily extensibility is the ground of a semantic mechanism and the intelligibility of ideas in a propositional realm. Consequently, the properties and powers of ideas in an autonomous propositional realm – based on doctrines, theories and beliefs – necessarily reference an external world. Ideas are then emergent and develop from a capacity to utilise language; thus, the development of ideas should be explained in an interplay between different orders. Moreover, returning to the transmission problematic, if logical relations pertain to ideas and the relation between ideas, as Elder-Vass argues (Archer & Elder-Vass 2012), then it bypasses the important role embodied knowledge plays in the development of practical knowledge and thereafter the emergence of the propositional. In the notion of ideas and their self-referencing relations there is a closure to the propositional with no adequate account on its transmission; as a result, what we have is self-representing ideas. As noted earlier, first person authority, in the form of an initial sub-personal mechanism, bears on the personal and situational histories of the mirroring subject and the functional mechanism, as stated, is intrinsically referential and in direct contact with nature (referential detachment and existential intransitivity). In understanding ideas in terms of their referentiality we then affirm a transability between different orders. Ergo, what applies to the natural and practical orders applies to the discursive, due to a relational interdependence between these distinct ontological orders. The objective properties of a propositional realm, therefore, pertains to it being grounded in extra-discursive orders – the basis of semantic intelligibility – and whose non-self-referentiality extends to a propositional register that is open to transformation.
The shape this propositional register takes is contextualised in an interplay between the properties of a propositional order and socio-cultural interaction. The process of this interplay figures in morphogenetic cycles that account for the historical origins of a social order. In these cycles ‘groups’, in Socio–Cultural interaction, confront a propositional realm (Cultural System - C.S.); it is the subjective/objective interplay between ‘groups’ and ‘ideas’ (a set of doctrines, theories and beliefs) that accounts for both a diachronic and synchronic analysis. In the former case it is a study of interaction leading to a given social order and in the latter on what sustains cultural morphostasis:

The interplay between ‘ideas’ (C.S.) and ‘groups’ (S–C) is dynamic and accounts for cultural elaboration – requires both diachronic analysis (of how certain ideas came to be in social currency at any time, of which groups sponsored them and why they did and may still do so, and against what past or ongoing opposition) as well as synchronic analysis of what maintains cultural morphostasis for as long as it lasts. (Archer & Elder-Vass 2012: 95)

Moreover, an interplay between ‘ideas’ and ‘groups' is informed by the properties of a propositional realm, that may remain dormant, and the enactment of its powers through a situated interplay between these properties and the actions of groups. Hence, when we distinguish between properties and powers – identified in an analytical dualism of ‘ideas’ and ‘groups’ – we avoid reification at the level of meaning (C.S.). Here, in S–C interaction and morphogenetic cycles, there is a response to objections that an irreducible propositional register implicates the existence of a realm independent of human behaviour altogether (Layder 1990: 61). Furthermore, the explanatory deficits of empiricism can be avoided when we consider the properties of an independent register that is more than S–C level interaction and the synchronic impact of given norms. Thus, analytical dualism resolves the transmission problematic when considering both the stratified depth of a subjective moment and in accounting for the origination of a situational logic at the level of meaning as an emergent property.

What follows from an interplay between ‘ideas’ and ‘groups’ are irreducible objective meanings that are existentially distinct from the properties of people and their interactions. Social groups and their interactions, seeking to bring about a state of consensus, utilise their powers in an attempt to reproduce or transform the properties of a given sharedness (sharednes, as part of
morphogenetic cycles, always being varied). Two dimensions may be identified in this interplay - first, the properties of the world of ideas, in their relational transability to different orders, and through historic cycles of interaction, are formulations with their own logical consistency that define their objective properties. Second, causal consensus pertains to an attempt by groups to draw on this shared repository, in their own way, to establish shared ideas. Thus, in this distinction, as Archer argues, we have an independent realm that operates as both analytically and empirically distinct. In making this distinction between the properties of a propositional realm (theories, doctrines and beliefs with their own logical consistency) and exercised powers, we are then better positioned to trace the development of both the properties of groups and an independent world of ideas. Here certain ideas and their properties may be enacted in certain interactive episodes, while in other episodes a propositional realm’s properties may remain causally dormant:

Logical consistency is a property of the world of ideas, which requires no knowing subject, whilst causal consensus is a property of people and their interaction. The proposition defended here is that the two are both analytically and empirically distinct and, therefore, can vary independently of one another. (Donati & Archer 2015: 160)

Further, as will be discussed in the coming sections, this noted distinction pertains to the properties of different domains of a de-compacted social ontology. In a de-compacted social ontology interactions vary in accordance to the properties of systemic social domains and likewise the properties of people and their interactions. As a result, there is no analytical closure in the notion of a community of shared meaning, as these meanings are attempts by different corporate actors to establish hegemony at the systemic level of social domains. If the outcome of morphogenesis – based on an analytical dualism – entails cultural elaboration then attention turns to, in the coming sections, the nature an external objective world is mediated from an irreducible subjective interiority and authority. Specifically, it is an attempt to link a subjective and objective interplay at the point of interaction/mutual reinforcement and what this entails when explaining personal emergent properties (PEP) in the process of social morphogenesis. What follows, in the coming section, is an overview on the manner Archer links this subjective/objective interplay, in the context of the morphogenetic model, and to propose revisions to this model based on social domain theory.
6.3 The internal conversation & relational orders

Importantly, as will be covered in the next chapter, an emphasis on the properties of the domain of psychobiography – in a stratified sense – pertains to the question of difference and the importance of educational practices being attentive to this difference as the axiomatic dimension of policy. Here difference is not merely in means adopted, e.g. diversity and social inclusion measures, but in a re-orientation of policy so that it is shaped by goods sought in reference to the human person. In this re-orientation, the domain of psychobiography is a dimension of social ontology that pertains to the properties of a subjective authority in its unique world-directed experiential trajectory; this word-directed trajectory is understood in relation to concerns pertaining to natural, practical and discursive orders. Social reflexivity, therefore, is envisaged to cultivate a personal reflexivity in a relational context whose normativity is oriented to the ontological properties of relational orders from which personal identities are emergent. Furthermore, a revision of social morphogenesis, advocated below, re-thinks the properties of reflexive arrangements in their integrative efficacy in generating and sustaining relational effects that brings together personal and social reflexivity in ways that sustain relational goods.

In the previous section an argument to resolve the transmission problematic was presented, affirming an external and objective system of meaning. Analytical dualism, central to the argument, seeks to investigate the interplay of subjective and objective moments – the basis of morphogenesis; from this interplay, there is a co-constituting emergence of personal and structural/cultural properties. In this section, there is an investigation into the link between the subjective and objective interplay, in a manner that maintains the properties and powers of ‘internal deliberations’ pertaining to people and its efficacy as a personal emergent property (PEP).

In the efficacy of a personal emergent property (PEP) the issue arises on how these properties relate what Archer terms as ‘context’ (socio-cultural structure (Archer 2003: 348)) with ‘concern’ (the contribution of active agents (Archer 2003: 348)). Considering the interplay between both, what is being investigated is the subjective moment; this moment is understood by Archer – through the internal conversation – to be with deliberative efficacy and capacity to link context and concern. Three key facets are given to internal deliberations for it to be accorded with efficacy as a personal emergent property (PEP):
Because the properties and powers of ‘internal deliberations’ pertain to people, they cannot be expropriated from them and rendered as something impersonal. This would be to destroy their status as a personal emergent property (PEP). Thus the ‘interiority’ of the internal conversation cannot be exteriorised as ‘behaviour’, which could be impersonally understood by all. Similarly, the ‘subjectivity’ of inner dialogue cannot be transmuted into ‘objectivity’, as if first-person thoughts could be replaced by third-person ideas. Finally, the personal causal efficacy of our deliberation cannot be taken over the forces of ‘socialisation’: this would be to replace the power of the person for the power of society (Archer 2003: 94)

Following from the properties and powers of ‘internal deliberation’ – as a relational property between mind and world – is the emergence of inner deliberations as relational properties in reference, at first, to the natural and practical realms. The focus here is on inner conversations and its properties that manifest themselves between mind and world. What makes the inner conversation a personal emergent property is its relational properties:

The internal conversation is a personal emergent property (a PEP) rather than a psychological ‘faculty’ of people, meaning some intrinsic human disposition. This is because inner conversations are relational properties, and the relations in question are those which obtain between mind and world. (Archer 2003: 94)

As inner conversations are relational properties – inherent in a subjective/objective interplay – three residual problems figure in relations between mind and world:

- The **generic problem** of “how can the self be both subject and object at the same time?” (Archer 2003: 94).
- The **analytical problem** of who is speaking to whom i.e. the question of temporal emergence and the importance of considering dialogue between past, present and future selves qua the inner dialogue.
- The **explanatory problem** pertains to how the societal gets into the internal conversation. The question is an implication of what is necessary for there to be efficacious powers for PEP and how the societal, as an order, is then mediated by these powers; from this the stratified conception of the self is held to provide a more adequate explanatory account of the role of the societal in the process of its mediation.
Accordingly, these two points – the properties of internal deliberations and the implicated three residual problems of the internal conversation – will be the basis of what follows in this chapter; based on this theoretical context, an argument will be presented on a relational understanding of personhood. The aim is to develop Archer's argument regarding the efficacy of 'inner deliberations' and what it means to be capable of hermeneutics (maintaining the efficacy of inner deliberations as a personal emergent property). As we distance ourselves from our biological origins towards our social becoming, Archer argues, there is a middle ground of human properties and powers. In this middle ground is an irreducible “self-consciousness, reflexivity and a goodly knowledge of the world, which is indispensable to thriving in it” (Archer 2000: 189). The importance of this reflexive middle ground is to maintain a clear subjective-objective distinction, that allows for the capability of hermeneutics from a first person perspective (an irreducible subjective authority and interiority). If we compromise this distinction, we then merely affirm nothing more than the human as a bundle of molecules plus society's conversation:

Indeed, it has been argued here that a human being who is capable of hermeneutics has first to learn a good deal about himself or herself, about the world, and about the relations between them, all of which is accomplished through praxis. In short, the human being is both logically and ontologically prior to the social being, whose subsequent properties and powers need to build upon human ones. There is therefore no direct interface between molecules and meanings, for between them stretches this hugely important middle ground of practical life in which our emerging properties and powers distance us from our biological origins and prepare us for our social becoming. (Archer 2009: 90)

While the basis of Archer's realist argument will be acknowledged, there will be an attempt to supplement this approach. Supplementing the approach comes from a proposed revision if the proto-conceptual, preparing us for a social becoming, is necessarily reflexive for the properties and powers of the human being to be accorded with efficacy. The revision follows from a de-compacted understanding of social ontology that anchors the process of social morphogenesis in a domain of situated activity, rather than persons (Archer views the process of social morphogenesis to be anchored in persons and that this guards against a sociological imperialism). Finally, Crespi and Badcock's (2008) cognitive continuum will be proposed to empirically substantiate the significance of considering the developmental dimension of how we become
reflexive, in our distancing from our biological origins, towards adopting roles as social actors. To be reflexive, it will be argued, is better framed in explicit developmental terms. Further, this re-thinking of reflexivity in developmental terms does not compromise the important question on the manner the indexical ‘I’ is individually sensed to then become a socially indexed device (Archer 2003: 91).

6.3.1 Properties of internal deliberation

First, there will be a review of Archer’s understanding of this middle ground and the reasons why it is held to be necessarily reflexive, while returning to the three key facets of internal deliberation that define an irreducible subjective ontology. Following this overview, a revision will be proposed to the properties of internal deliberation. The revision supplements Archer’s argument on the irreducibility of reflexivity as a first person phenomenon but the approach taken understands the first person enactment of reflexivity considering its developmental trajectory. Further, when considering a developmental trajectory, we can then re-think the three residual problems of the internal conversation and the implications this may have when explaining the process of morphogenesis.

In affirming the irreducibility of a subjective moment, we start from the subjective interiority of a fundamental sense of self. The fundamental sense of self establishes a first-person perspective; the first person perspective of reflexive deliberations, of an irreducible subjective ontology, cannot be eliminated as phenomenological. As the outcome of deliberation is dedication to certain actions – considering a constellation of concerns relating to the natural, practical and discursive orders – then it is the vantage point of subjective interiority that dedicates through prioritising what it understands to be its ultimate concerns. Thus, persons are first self-conscious and reflexive to then be capable of hermeneutics. Based on this stratified view, persons are emergent from selves and the social self is a subset of a broader personal identity. The developmental trajectory of a personal identity considers the important question on the manner the indexical ‘I’ is individually sensed to then become a socially indexed device (Archer 2003: 91).

It is this indexical ‘I’, a fundamental sense of self, that then conceives itself independent of a name or any other third person referential device. With a

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3 Archer holds that while objectively a subjective ontology exists, subjectivity is its mode of existence. Thus, for there to be subjectivity there must be a reflective personhood as agentic capacity and that this is identical with self-consciousness.
subjective interiority, in the self-attribution of mental states, we can then affirm a subjective authority over the process of reflexive deliberation:

I can conceive of myself quite independently of a name, a description or any other third person referential device; reflexivity is quintessentially a first person phenomenon. (Archer 2003: 40)

Reflexivity is the first point of call and is cognitive rather than merely perceptual (Archer 2003). Second major causal powers, manifested in subjective behaviour, are presupposed by a first person integration of a constellation of concerns. When the person prioritises some concerns over others, a modus vivendi, they arrive at a behavioural outcome in a dedication to a certain path. Archer develops the DDD scheme⁴ to conceptualise this process from discernment, deliberation and then dedication to a certain modus vivendi.

A view of the internal conversation, as link between a subjective/objective interplay, is thus understood to be a conceptual necessity if internal deliberations are efficacious in grounding a first person authority emergent from an irreducible interiority. In an irreducible interiority, it is an indexical ‘I’ that transcends its context to deliberate on its concerns to then adopt a set of preferences to be pursued. Unless there is a self–knowledge of beliefs, desires, intentions and memories, then there would be no way to explain how an agent dedicates itself to certain role requirements and the manner through which this decision was reached:

Unless people accepted that obligations were incumbent upon them themselves, unless they accepted role requirements as their own, or unless they owned their preferences and consistently pursued a preferences schedule, then nothing would get done in society. (Archer 2003: 30)

⁴ The DDD scheme relates to the internal conversation and the manner it shapes life projects. The DDD dialogical scheme entails ‘discernment’, ‘deliberation’ and ‘dedication’. In this process “we are trying to prioritise our ‘ultimate concerns’ and in designing a congruent modus vivendi” (Archer 2003: 102). Discernment is an initial subject–self review of possible initiatives in the three different orders that the subject–self is drawn to. Deliberation is an initial sifting through process that leads to the stage where certain scenarios are deliberated on, considering concerns that inhere in different domains. Here, in this deliberative process, considering a constellation–of–concerns, a particular path is considered worthwhile in the identification of ‘ultimate concerns’. Reaching the stage of dedication means the subject–self then taken certain paths. This process, open to revision, defines personal powers and properties in relation to its environment.
Subjective deliberation on preferences is grounded in the interiority of a fundamental sense of self and this establishes an authority in dedication. Before going public – ensuring an irreducibility to a discursive world – internal deliberations must be private and its first port of call is the noted first person point of a transcendent indexical ‘I’. The only candidate that makes possible the efficacy of the ‘I’, as subjective authority, is reflexivity itself. Reflexive deliberation, as a mental activity, in private, leads to behavioural outcomes on what to do. The irreducibility of this first person perspective is thus the “transcendently necessary condition” (Archer 2003: 31) through which it is possible for the individual – a ‘sense of self’ – to then self-referentially deliberate and dedicate, regarding its externality:

The only candidate, which necessarily fits the bill, is reflexivity itself, as a second–order activity in which the subject deliberates upon how some item, such as a belief, desire, idea or state of affairs pertains or relates to itself. By definition, reflexivity’s first port of call has to be the first–person and the deliberation, however short, must be private before it can have the possibility of going public … Hence ‘reflexive deliberation’ is the mental activity which, in private, leads to self–knowledge: about what to do, what to think and what to say. (Archer 2003: 26)

The properties of internal deliberation establish the centrality of reflexivity in our social becoming. As we shall see later, this also anchors the process of morphogenesis in persons (the link between a subjective/objective interplay is in an internal deliberation of an emergent personal identity in relation to its external context). In an emphasis on the trajectory of a personal identity, with an emphasis on embodied practical relations, the objective is to guard against sociological imperialism:

This strictly concerns the sources of the sense of self and what factors and processes should be accorded priority, both at the start of life and throughout it. I will be arguing for the primacy of our embodiment, in practical relation with the natural world, and thus producing a naturalistic account. Harré advances the primacy of our speech–acts in a learning relation to the discursive world, and thus produces a social account. The former emphasises private practice; the latter public involvement. (Archer 2003: 106)
Between meanings and molecules primacy is ascribed to our practical relations and it is our reflexive capacity, in these practical relations, that prepares us for our social becoming. Hence, in according a primacy to our embodiment, in practical relation with the natural world, there is a pre-supposing view that holds this position necessary to avoid the appropriation of the subjective interiority, authority and efficacy to public involvement.

6.3.2 Revising the properties of internal deliberation

The revision proposed, as will be clarified, understands the domain of situated activity to be the anchor in the process of social morphogenesis (the point of mutual re-enforcement in the interaction of generative mechanisms). While Archer acknowledges the developmental dimensions of a personal identity, as noted, and the situational dynamics of interaction in the form of S–C interaction, the revision proposed aims to re-think reflexivity itself in developmental terms and as a mediatory force – identified in the domain of psychobiography – rather than analytical link in a subjective/objective interplay. The revisions presented acknowledge the necessity of a subjective interiority – establishing a subjective/objective distinction – but grounds this subjective ontology in a unique experiential developmental trajectory.

Thus, if the efficacy of internal deliberations is not viewed to link the subjective/objective interplay then the question is what may then be viewed as an anchor of the process of social morphogenesis. Problematically, Archer views persons as this anchor, in their individuated biographies and as specifically articulated in an irreducible reflexive capacity irreducible to public language. The developmental focus, this way, turns to how reflexivity enables our social becoming, as a subset of a personal identity. Reflexivity as the first port of call is what distances ourselves from our circumstances and establishes these circumstances as the object of deliberation (to be capable of trumping dispositions (Archer 2009: 9)). Viewing the first port of call this way entails the primacy of our self-regulated practical interactions in our natural world as it prepares us for our social becoming.

To focus on reflexivity, as first point of call, compromises the developmental dimension on how we come to enact a reflexive capacity itself. The importance of an account of an individually sensed indexical ‘I’ is something that can be affirmed, while arguing that this reflexive capacity is developmentally a third person plural and part of a broader developmental experiential trajectory. This is substantiated in the case of the mirroring subject’s initial experiential presence

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made available through the phenomenological salience of a mind/body ‘I’ and the means through which it establishes a vantage point to the world. In an initial self-regulated interaction – given through the first person presence of experience (Zahavi 2013) – there is the possibility to develop a semantic capacity.

What follows is a re-consideration of what interiority means and its implications for subjective authority. Interiority, as noted, is understood by Archer in regard to internal deliberations. It is the fundamental aspect of selfhood that constitutes this deliberative process in self-referential terms; further, through this sense of self we are able to conceive selfhood as independent of any third person referential device (reflexivity as a first person phenomenon). In the proposed revision, the idea of an irreducible subjective authority, similarly applies to a self-referential first person phenomenon. However, subjective interiority is not what gives reflexivity its first person character. Instead, our sense of self, in practical engagement in the natural world, is a precursor and sustains a sense of self in its social becoming.

Thus, developmentally, a sense of self is not the same as a reflexive capacity – it is an emergent property that contributes to a social becoming and to the capability of hermeneutics. Here it is possible to acknowledge the efficacy of a self-regulated practical engagement – against an understanding of the self as a gift to society – without ascribing a necessary primacy to embodiment in our practical relations with the natural world. While our human capacities are ontologically and logically prior to our social being, it does not follow we are reflective regarding our environment through mere contact with the natural world. A first person perspective – the basis of a subjectivity of experience – is, in the words of Zahavi (2013), a for-me-ness or mineness. A mineness means it is the ‘I’ of subjectivity that is the subject of experience as a perspectival ownership:

This for-me-ness or mineness, which seems inescapably required by the experiential presence of intentional objects and which is the feature that really makes it appropriate to speak of the subjectivity of experience, is not a quality like green sweet or hard. It doesn’t refer to the diachronic or synchronic sum of such content, or to some other relation that might obtain between the contents in question. Rather, it refers to the first-personal presence of experience. It refers to what has recently been called perspectival ownership (Albahari 2006). It refers to the fact that the experience I am living through are given differently (but not necessarily better) to me than to anybody else. (Zahavi 2013: 326)
What we have, in this case, is a primitive self-regulated understanding of the self – a pre-reflective self-consciousness – grounding the private interiority of a sense of self. The primitive dimension of a mineness does not disappear with the emergence of a semantic capacity. Rather, as an emergent property, it is efficacious in the manner a reflective capacity is made self-referential and enacted (this point will be substantiated in the case of a cognitive continuum). The emergence of a personal identity takes its first person character in a configuration between an initial mineness and the appropriation of the experiential presence of intentional objects, as part of a trajectory of internal deliberations. Thus, the first person dimension is affirmed in the manner it is first grounded in a mineness and, thereafter, in the emergence a differentiated reflective capacity. Consequently, we turn to the peculiarity of individuated psychobiographies in a trajectory of lived experiences.

In a unique psychobiographical trajectory, the subject-self integrates their lived experiences between perception and apperception (pre-reflective mineness and reflective consciousness). In this process we have the first person character and irreducibility of internal deliberations to public discourse. Between self and world experience – with both intertwined – lived experience is in the world and whose intentional objects present themselves, in the multitude of changing experiences, as part of a subjective point of view:

The minimal self was tentatively defined as the ubiquitous dimension of first-personal givenness in the multitude of changing experiences. On this reading, there is no pure experience-independent self. The minimal self is the very subjectivity of experience and not something that exists independently of the experiential flow. Moreover, the experiences in question are world-directed experiences. They present the world in a certain way, but at the same time they also involve self-presence and hence a subjective point of view. In short, they are of something other than the subject and they are like something for the subject. Thus, the phenomenology of conscious experience is one that emphasizes the unity of world-awareness and self-experience. (Zahavi 2009: 556)

When a psychobiographical trajectory is affirmed, in its first person giveness, then analytical primacy is ascribed to the contingency of interaction between a minimal self, in an embodied mind/body interplay, and the first person perspective of living through a multitude of changing self-experiences in relation to the natural, practical and discursive orders (experience as world-
directed). What prepares us for social becoming is not a reflexive world-awareness but a pre-reflective functional mechanism that presents world-directed self-experience for the subject to then integrate and make its own as a subjective point of view (perspectival ownership). The manner we become reflexive – develop a semantic capacity – is dependent on the ubiquitous nature of givenness of an indexical ‘I’. A subjective perceptual grip is part of an experiential flow and when this grip appropriates its objects as part of the noted process of integration, between self and word, differentiated mechanisms mediate the process. As mechanisms go beyond the discursive – with the private before and continually sustaining the public – we are with a process that is with first person interiority and thus authority. Therefore, subjective ontology should be viewed in the process of integration, between perception and apperception, in the emergence of a personal identity and its irreducibility to social identity.

As stated, the background for an emergent subjective ontology is the domain of psychobiography. This domain, in a de-compacted social ontology, mediates the properties of a social ontology in the context of situated activity; it is here, in situated activity, that we have the generation of self-experiences in relation to concerns emergent from external orders. The open interaction of mechanisms in a process of mutual re-enforcement, in social morphogenesis, imputes the domain of situated activity with its own properties (Layder 2006: 268). Therefore, the manner we develop a reflexive capacity and thereafter a personal identity is contingently manifested in the lived context of interaction between the properties of the domain of psychobiography and other social domains.

When we posit the anchor of social morphogenesis in a contingent interaction between mechanisms, then primacy is not ascribed to either public/collective discourse or an embodied practical engagement with the natural world. Instead, it is in a trajectory of an emergent personal identity, in its lived experiences and in the peculiarity of the domain of psychobiography in relation to the properties of other social domains. Thus, in the emergence of a personal identity – between molecules and meanings – there will be differentiation in which there may be a bias towards a self-regulated this-sided interaction with an external public realm, or, in other cases, across a cognitive continuum, there may be a bias towards public involvement in making self-referential deliberation. This individuated peculiarity is grounded in a differentiation in regard to singularities and the personality pre-dispositions that figure as part of a domain

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5 Singularities originate in the properties of the domain of psychobiography and the unique lived experiences that figure in this domain. These lived experiences are
of psychobiography. However, again, this is one mediatory force and the vantage point of emergence – of both social and personal emergent properties – points back to the properties of situated activity in which reflexive capacities are manifested.

Informed by this revision of the properties of internal deliberation, a review of Archer’s approach to the three residual problems of the internal conversation follows. First, before setting out further revisions, there will be an explication of the theoretical context – including key concepts. Further on, in this chapter, empirical case points will be stated, in the case of a cognitive continuum, to substantiate the importance of supplementing Archer’s analytical dualism with a differentiated understanding of cognition and the role it plays in how we become reflexive.

6.3.3 The three residual problems of the internal conversation

The three residual problems of the internal conversation relate to the relational properties of a subjective/objective interplay. First, the three residual problems of the internal conversation, identified by Archer, will be covered. Second, following this, noted will be revisions that supplement Archer’s approach, informed by the previously stated revised properties of internal deliberation. In regard to the three residual problems they are the generic problem, the analytical problem and the explanatory problem. The generic problem pertains to the subjective/objective question on how the self can be subject and object at the same time. The analytical problem considers the temporal interplay in a dialogue between past, present and future selves. Finally, the explanatory problem is concerned with how the societal enters the internal conversation, as external circumstance, and how the self is efficacious in its mediation.

The first residual problem – the generic problem – pertains to the question of subjective interiority as a property of internal deliberation; a property that ‘bends back’ and is aware of itself as an ‘I’ that alternates between subject and object. What follows is an awareness that my experiences are objects of reflection emergent from an initial being-in-the-world, with its practical ‘know-how’. Sedimented experiences, as a practical embodied engagement, are both an initial outward extensibility and a self-conscious manipulation between self and otherness of an externality. Thus, to self-consciously manipulate the

based on an interlocking relation between psychosocial development and an intersubjective environment in which this development is enacted (Layder 2006).
relationship between self and otherness is to reinforce the distinction between the two:

I can self-consciously manipulate the dialectic relationship between self and otherness and, in this very process, I reinforce the distinction between the two (Archer 2000: 130)

To affirm a subjective moment, in this dialectic relationship, a universal sense of self precedes the emergence of a social self and it is this sense of self that dedicates itself to its role as a social actor (the efficacy of a distinct subjective moment). The constellation of concerns that relate to the discursive, natural and practical orders, generate concerns, open to reflexive deliberation, that are both propositional and non-propositional – “these are concerns about our physical well-being in the natural order, about our performative achievement in the practical order and about our self-worth in the social order” (Archer 2003: 120).

In our natural relations we establish the first point of a self/otherness distinction that grounds the ‘know-how’ of a practical order with both constraints and enablements. The practical order then provides a bridge that secures meaning from an embodied practical engagement in the natural order. This way, argues Archer, the irreducibility of a subjective response to the discursive comes from a deliberation on the properties of three ontologically distinct orders. As stated before, before taking on the social order, the human being is both logically and ontologically prior to the social being; social properties and powers need to build on these pre-supposing human ones (Archer 2000: 190). Between molecules and meaning is a pivotal role ascribed to the practical order as a middle ground that “distance us from our biological origins and prepare us for our social becoming” (Archer 2000: 190). Here, in between, emerges important human properties and powers, including a reflexive capacity and knowledge of the world:

There is much more to the human being than a biological bundle of molecules plus society's conversational meanings. In fact, between the two, and reducible to neither, emerge our most crucial human properties and powers – self-consciousness, reflexivity and a goodly knowledge of the world, which is indispensable to thriving in it. (Archer 2000: 189)

The practical order's pivotal role does not merely disappear with the emergence of the propositional but continuously sustains –via human
properties and powers – society’s conversational meanings. A prior sense of self, constituted in embodied practical engagement, thus continues to be the basis of emergence of a self-concept and its sustainment. This is substantiated by the presence of both a procedural and eidetic memory that continues beyond the development of a self-concept and whose recall is non-discursive. The non-linguistic recall relates directly to a sense of self that is engaged in its environment – it is through this engagement that there is a self/otherness distinction and a referential detachment inseparable from an understanding of space, time and causality, derived from sense data. In both eidetic and procedural memory, as continuity of consciousness, a sedimentation of accomplished practical acts form the basis of a habitual body and a self-identity. The habitual body operates as both a past tense practical accomplishment and enables us to contemplate a future. Declarative memory and self-knowledge is a later development and an emergent property of this prior constitution. Importantly, any declarative memory-activity never replaces the central role of this non-linguistic component:

Here, memory, far from being some intellectualised representation, is the bodily sedimentation of accomplished acts: it is the ‘habitual body’ which gives our past tense and enables us to contemplate a future, even though our embodied expectations have continuously to be reconciled with the dynamic nature of our existence in the world. (Archer 2000: 132)

As noted in the properties of internal deliberation, the capability of hermeneutics is built on the capacities and powers of the human being. Hence, propositional knowledge does not filter and shape the direction of a semantic capability. Accordingly, the subjective/objective interplay considers the properties and powers of the object in relation to its embodied, practical and discursive knowledge. All three forms of knowledge shape the situations and circumstances that the subject then deliberates on:

All knowledge entails an interplay between properties and powers of the subject and properties and powers of the object – be this what we can learn to do in nature (embodied knowledge), the skills we can acquire in practice (practical knowledge), or the propositional elaborations we can make in the Cultural System (discursive knowledge). Any form of knowledge thus results from a confluence between our human powers (PEPs) and the powers of reality – natural, practical and social. Thus what have been discussed sequentially are the physical powers of the
natural order, the material affordances and constraints of material culture, and, lastly, the logical constraining powers of the Cultural System. However, for the three orders equally, the way in which they affect the subject is by shaping the situations in which he or she find themselves, and their supplying constraints or enablements in relation to the subjects’ projects. (Archer 2000: 177)

The second residual problem of the internal conversation refers to the efficacy of the noted subjective/objective interplay. The efficacy of this interplay is in its concrete manifestation in a subjective alignment, in the emergence of a personal identity. A subjective alignment, between personal and social identity, raises the question in what way an interplay works itself out logically and temporally. If the generic problem is concerned with the nature of relation between the subjective and objective – the basis of what Archer states as the self-conscious manipulation of the relation between self and otherness (Archer 2003: 130) – then the second residual problem is concerned with the enactment and manifestation of Personal Emergent Properties (PEP). PEP are manifested in an individuated manner and understood in how the sense of self reaches subjective alignment (personal identity) when adopting social positions. Here, in the efficacy of a subjective deliberation, the internal conversation is mapped, in which we unpack the different moments the subjective and objective interplay across the trajectory of the internal conversation. In this interplay, the ‘You’ (the positionalities and roles of social actors) is personified and acquired from a movement between Self (‘I’) to Primary Agency (the ‘Me’), to Corporate Agency (the ‘We’) and finally to the realisation of the singularity of each self in its role as social actor (‘You’).

The necessity of a continuous sense of self in a movement from ‘I’ to ‘You’ – with the practical order as bridgehead between the natural and discursive order – affirms the ‘I’ as conscious of its embodied otherness in its practical engagement. Hence, as explained before, the movement is logically initiated from this ‘I’ and pre-discursive elements sustain the process, in commanding certain concerns to be navigated. Consequently, the emergence of social actors is a subset of personal identity and the ‘Me’ does not objectively set the

6 The acquiring of a social identity (social actor) is emergent from a developmental account of how the self matures in its negotiation of this identity. The personal identity is defined by this process in the manner a social identity is acquired. Here primary agency (‘Me’) is the manner society impinges on the self and corporate agency (‘We’), in turn, is how the self responds to the ‘Me’ and seeks to collectively transform society. This whole process then reproduces or transforms the potential roles taken by social actors (Archer 2003: 271).
parameters of deliberation. The natal context ('Me') of the ‘I’ pre-dispositions
certain concerns that relate to resources, life chances, influence and so on;
however, the ‘Me’, in opposition to Mead’s view of the ‘Me’, cannot set the
parameters of transmission in an objective unidimensional shaping of mediation.

The collective ‘Me’ is part of the internal conversation and as it interplays with a
subjective moment, rather than shaping the parameters of the internal
conversation, its efficacy is then forward-looking, in the emergence of a
personal identity that is, potentially, with transformative capacity as corporate
agency ('We'). Thus, Archer conceives the internal conversation, in regard to this
interplay between context and concern, through the adaption of individuals to
their roles as social actors. Consequently, as roles are made self-referential then
this impacts the mediation of collectives. In mediating collectives, rather than
these collectives setting the parameters of internal deliberation, there is
direction to the internal conversation in relation to a subjective dedication to
collectives as ‘Agents’ (the relationship between the ‘Me’ and ‘We’). Hence, the
relation taken to either ‘Me’ and ‘We’, in the emergence of a personal identity,
corresponds to Primary and Corporate Agents. In the former direction, agency
seeks to reproduce its natal context ('Me'), and in the latter, there is an attempt
to transform this context in some way. This process, both indeterminate and co-
determinate, is termed by Archer as double morphogenesis. In the process of
double morphogenesis, Agency, whether sustaining or transforming the social
system, simultaneously sustains or transforms both Corporate and Primary
Agents:

This is ‘double morphogenesis’ during which Agency, in its attempt to
sustain or transform the social system, is inexorably drawn into
sustaining or transforming the categories of Corporate and Primary
Agents themselves. (Archer 2000: 267)

Furthermore, there is a co-determinacy in which the ‘Me’ becomes ‘We’ and
develops into a corporate actor, in an attempt to enact social transformation;
this transformative corporate activity, simultaneously, transforms the nature of
social roles and Corporate Agency itself:

The ‘Me’ is the self-as-object who, in the individual’s past, was
involuntarily placed within society’s resource distribution as a Primary
Agent. The ‘We’ represents the collective action in which the self-
engaged as part of Corporate Agency’s attempt to bring about social
transformation, which simultaneously transformed society’s extant role array as well as transforming Corporate Agency itself. (Archer 2000: 295)

It should be stated that Archer’s model does consider collectives and the internal conversation engages these collectives, whether reproducing its positionality, as Primary Agency, or, on the other hand, seeking to transform it as part of a ‘We’ (Corporate Agency). Nevertheless, the internal conversation is the vantage point and anchor in linking Primary and Corporate Agency, in a mediation between context and concern. Consequently, this results in an analytical point that takes this dialectic as understood from its relation to singularities and the trajectory of personal identities with collectives. The question of double morphogenesis, therefore, becomes a subset of subjective solidarity between personal and social identity. To substantiate this, Archer introduces the idea of triple morphogenesis i.e. while double morphogenesis refers to relations between singularities and collectives – Social Agents (‘Me’ and ‘We’) – it is personal choices that then lead to a subjective commitment to corporate roles, which affects the personification and simultaneously the transformation of these same social roles. Personal identity is then imbued with transformative capacities that affects the nature of positions then adopted – the transformation of Primary Agency. This way, the anchoring of triple morphogenesis in persons, in its relation to collectives, initiates the relation between Primary and Collective Agency. Following from this understanding, the role of the Social Actor is realised in singular terms, as a subset of personal identity, and with both Primary and Collective Agency defined as collectives in relation to these same roles. Therefore, singular persons then direct their reflexive capacities to these roles (the discursive order), in the process of double morphogenesis, which then enacts the process of triple morphogenesis.

While persons cannot be understood without reference to a pre-existent natal context (Primary Agent), social identity is analytically anchored in the deliberative process of persons. Ultimately, it is the emergent personal identity, in analytical asymmetry to social identity (a sub-set of personal identity), that deliberates on whether positions and roles are commitments to be occupied or whether it is worth partaking in some kind of transformative corporate activity. Replicating or transforming our natal context thus has consequences for the type of social actor we become but also society’s own normativity that informs these very same positions:

In living out the initial roles(s), which they have found good reason to occupy, they bring to it or them their singular manner of personifying it
or them and this, in turn, has consequences over time. What it does creatively, is to introduce a continuous stream of unscripted role performances, which also over time can cumulatively transform the role expectations. These creative acts are thus transformative of society's very normativity, which is often most clearly spelt out in the norms attaching to specific roles. (Archer 2000: 296)

In being the anchor, the transformative process of an involuntary ‘Me’ returns to the ‘I’, in how the ‘I’ deliberates on its circumstances. The collective ‘We’ is thus understood as an aspect of the ‘I’ and its dissatisfactions, as it reflects upon the involuntary ‘Me’:

The implication, at this stage, is that the ‘I’ and the dissatisfactions it experiences as it discovers and reflects upon the involuntary ‘Me’, can only transform the socio-cultural conditions (SEPs and CEPs) which gave the ‘Me’ that particular object status by elaborating the ‘We’ of collective action. (Archer 2000: 267)

The third residual problem of the internal conversation (the explanatory problem) pertains to the social, in the manner it figures in the internal conversation as an object of reflection. If the second residual problem is concerned with the manifestation of a subjective/objective interplay, then the third residual problem relates to the question on how this interplay then arrives at a solution. The solution is when the ‘I’ positions itself in relation to the ‘Me’ in the emergence of a later ‘You’ (personal identity). The ‘We’, when arriving at a subjective alignment, figures in the conversation at the stage of dissatisfaction and, therefore, a commitment of the ‘I’ to transform a social normativity that shapes the initial role occupied (‘Me’).

6.3.4 Towards a revision of the three residual problems

The re-thinking of the properties of internal deliberation also opens to revision the three residual problems of the internal conversation and the implications this may have for the process of social morphogenesis. The revision proposed is presupposed by the need to differentiate – in a stratified sense – the manner we become reflexive in the context of a domain of psychobiography and its relation to other social domains (the emergent properties of social domains is in their mutual reinforcement). A domain level analysis anchors social morphogenesis in the domain of situated activity and the properties of internal deliberation differ in accordance to the dynamics of interaction. When returning to the first residual problem (subjective/objective interplay) then the dynamics of situated
activity – at the point of mutual reinforcement – refers to the point in which a subjective moment responds to the circumstances of situated activity and the position it takes in regard to its interactive dynamics. At the same time, it will be maintained, the revision proposed does not compromise an irreducible subjective ontology.

As stated, Archer emphasises the developmental trajectory of a personal identity as the anchor of social morphogenesis. Subjective interiority is understood, by Archer, as direct access to subjective experiences, in which the subject is able to turn back and deliberate on an external objective. In a revision to the properties of internal deliberation, the argument presented was that it is an initial self-conscious givenness that sustains, self-referentially, the emergence of a thematic and reflective consciousness. The critical ‘I’ is anchored in its own unique experiential trajectory – the basis of a psychobiography – as first person perspective. An early sense of self is both logically and ontologically prior to social being and continues to sustain this sense of self. However, developmentally the capacity for mentation – the capacity to bend-back and deliberate – is a subsequent development. Hence, the possibility of an irreducible subjective ontology – against the idea of an objective regulation of self-experience – is maintained by affirming the following two points:

(1) A minimal pre-reflective self-consciousness that establishes ownership of experience. This ownership of experience is already subsumed in the world and others (the world directed nature of experiences);

(2) Any following objective moment returns to an outward extensibility of the original first person experience. Thus, there is always a return to this first person pre-reflective self-consciousness and the manner it appropriates the objective moment, with both gain and loss⁷.

Considering the generic problem, a co-constituting subjective/objective interplay is possible in the peculiar mineness of lived experience. As Gallagher and Zahavi (2012) state, the ‘I’ returns to lived experience and filters this by appropriation:

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⁷ That is what is a pre-reflective experience is then elaborated in a reflective sense and this entails some form of loss in terms of the original experience lived through. At the same time, an initial pre-reflective experience acts as a constraint on a later objective moment (reflective elaboration as thematic self-experience).
But we need an account that can explain how I can return to an experience and remember it as my experience even though it might not have been given thematically as mine when it was originally lived through. Had the experience in fact been completely anonymous, had it lacked first-personal mineness altogether when originally lived through, such a subsequent appropriation would be rather inexplicable (Gallagher & Zahavi 2012: 76)

The lived experience becomes “thematically mine” as an emergent property of an initial first person perspective. The initial first person perspective is a first person ontology that reinforces the distinction between a first person perspective to an object and one that is then made “thematically mine”:

To emphasize the importance of the first-person perspective should consequently not be seen as an endorsement of a perceptual model of self-knowledge, as if our acquaintance with our own experiences literally came about by taking up a position in relation to ourselves, or through an explicit perspective taking. Rather, the point is simply that there is a distinctive way experiential episodes are present to the subject whose episodes they are. Experiential episodes have, to use Searle's terminology, a first person ontology from the start, i.e. even before the subject acquires the conceptual and linguistic skills to classify them as his own (Gallagher & Zahavi 2012: 72)

Thematic mineness is then presupposed by perspective ownership and directs experience that is self-referential (subjective interiority). To be reflexive – that is the ability to thematically classify an experience – is to first become acquainted with our own experiences. Here the presence of a first person ontology is what makes self-comprehension and the development of conceptual and linguistic skills possible. Once again we are returning to a differentiation between an initial functional mechanism – the manipulation of intentionally loaded objects – and a semantic mechanism that is then able to classify and make these objects part of a broader subjective integration.

The temporal materialisation of mechanisms – the second residual problem – can be identified with the process of subjective integration (part of a subjective deliberation on its concerns). It is here – in the habitual body – that self-experience, in a future thrust, simultaneously includes and is affected by the integration of past-experiences. In higher capacities of mentation we look back, considering present givenness, and then bring this past to bear on the present
and so giving the present a future direction. It is the process of integration, as argued earlier in the chapter, that defines subjective authority in a ceaseless interplay between subjective and objective dimensions of deliberation. In this temporal process of subjective integration, our world-directed experiences are integrated considering both non-linguistic and linguistic elements that sustain the enactment of reflexive powers. Gallagher & Zahavi (2012) denote this a process of ‘gain and loss’, in which there is a relation between an initial non-linguistic element that then overlaps and feeds into its later higher order appropriation (Zippel 2011). A later propositional awareness means that while lived experience may be enriched in its integration, through a thematic mineness, there remains loss in its appropriation. Subjective integration takes past lived experiences (the manner they are configured) to then selectively filter a possible multiplicity of present objects. What we have is the existence of an outcome of a previous subjective/objective interplay that impinges on the present. The nature of this interaction is contingent on the nature of situated activity, including the existence of an institutional setting that may incentivise or de-incentivise certain modes of reflexivity in a relation between context and concern. Therefore, it is in this process, part of a broader de-compacted social ontology, that we can maintain both subjective and objective moments (the first residual problem), mapped as past, present and future tense (the second residual problem).

This way, considering the process of subjective integration, social identity is understood as a sub-set of personal identity in an alignment between both (third residual problem). However, the relation between both identities is contingent on the nature of a world-directed domain of psychobiography and the enactment of its properties in situated activity. Furthermore, the noted revision of the properties of internal deliberation impacts the manner we understand this subjective alignment in reference to both double and triple morphogenesis. As emphasises is placed on the domain of situated activity then the movement from ‘I’ to ‘You’ (personal reflexivity) is a mediatory factor but whose outcome does not anchor the transformative process of triple morphogenesis, as link between structure and agency. Accordingly, triple morphogenesis is not analysed from the vantage of subjective alignment when linking structure with corporate agency. Instead, any configuration of a constellation of concerns, adopted by persons, may not align to the transformative actions of corporate agents that aim to transform the social settings of situated activity.

Finally, a revision of the properties of internal deliberation leads to a re-think of the process of social morphogenesis. As stated, in anchoring the process of
social morphogenesis in a reflexive capacity, Archer sought to guard against a sociological imperialism and to maintain the possibility of a forward-looking subjective alignment (the social identity being a subset of an emergent personal identity). Thus, in continuity with Archer's premises but, at the same time, rethinking the process of social morphogenesis, the important question is in how we can bring together the analytical problem (second residual problem) with the explanatory problem (third residual problem), in ways that acknowledge a subjective response to objective circumstances (rather than the parameters of this response being pre-defined). Here the process of subjective integration – identified in the domain of psychobiography – is what gives a future momentum to the emergence of a personal identity and its impact on the broader process of social morphogenesis. When we consider the previously noted domain of psychobiography, in its temporal trajectory, we are considering an autonomous domain, with its unique trajectory, and the manner its non-propositional and propositional mechanisms mediate the domain of situated activity. As will be demonstrated in the final section, pre-dispositions in the form of a cognitive continuum differ and affect the qualitative nature of a subjective integration; however, even in the case of an a-symmetry to the propositional, in this continuum, the nature of an internal deliberation remains analytically irreducible to the linguistic. Whatever the nature of mediation, there is an acknowledgement of Archer's view that it is a necessity to disinter the genesis of practices from the logic of practices.

Consequently, the emergence of a personal identity is analytically open and there is no methodological judgement towards the linguistic, or, on the other hand, our embodiment in world-directed practical relations. When we move beyond the need to ground the genesis of a collective logic of practices in persons and their reflexive capacities it is then possible to move beyond an inflated role ascribed to a reflexive capacity. Against the analytical primacy of a world-directed reflexive capacity there is a differentiated and emergent view of consciousness and the role it plays in the development of a capacity for mentation. An irreducible subjective response, in situated activity, is activated in an interaction between the peculiarity of a domain psychobiography and the properties of other social domain. Here a unique articulation of a pre-reflective givenness and thematic giveness – in persons – is mutually reinforced in interaction with patterned distributive resources found in the domain of contextual resources. The decision-making of a subjective response, including the retention and protention of an emergent personal identity (between the pre-reflective and reflective), is influenced by mechanisms pertaining to different orders that facilitate interaction.
The movement from 'I' to 'You' – between the indexical 'I' and the emergence of a personal identity – is manifested through different dimensions of social ontology. Thus, for example, the noted process of retention and protention is affected by the distribution of contextual resources that figure in Primary Agency. What follows in mapping this movement is a primacy accorded to the situational – the point of interaction – in the enactment of personal properties in a subjective/objective interplay. As the process of social morphogenesis is anchored in situated activity then 'I', 'Me' and 'We' are ascribed to different aspects of social ontology. For example, by ascribing the analytical link to situated activity it is then possible to distinguish between collectives defining corporate actors ('We'), including the direction of their activity, in contrast to the unique psychobiographies of individuals ('I'). Therefore, corporate actors come with their own irreducible properties that define their duration, interests, decision making and actions (Layder 1990). Individual dedication may not correspond to group dedication and actions, even when individuals remain members of these corporate collectives. Biographical trajectories, shaped by the internal conversation, are, therefore, not viewed as a necessary link between primary and corporate agency. Corporate actors are actors in their own right, irreducible to persons and their internal conversations, and may take directions that define the trajectory of groups distinguished from individuals.

Hence, in revising the anchor of morphogenesis from individual dedication to roles, we have a differentiated understanding of social actors that includes the collective reflexivity of corporate activity. If we return to a tripartite view of social ontology, noted in chapter four, indexical interactions are co-constituted by their settings. Dissatisfactions occur in indexical interactions and then affect the relation between the 'I' and the emergence of 'We' that is directed towards the broader settings of social activity (the collective reflexivity of corporate actors). Here we distinguish, in this co-constitution, between small scale and focused interactions to the large scale activities of collective actors, whose decisions and actions pertain to institutional constraints and enablements of the social settings of situated activity.

In de-compacting social ontology, the different aspects of time (indexical and institutional time) define enduring from fleeting interactions. These different aspects are relational but the transformative nature of triple morphogenesis relates to the enduring aspects of social ontology. Hence, the dedication of individual actors to corporate roles relates to organisational time and its enduring structures in the form of power relations and distribution of resources.
Macro scale phenomena may be associated with corporate actors that enact the transformative thrust of triple morphogenesis. At the same time, this triple morphogenesis is presupposed by how actors relate to the ‘Me’ and their everyday lived experiences. The point, as Layder (1990) states, is that there is a distinction between individual and collective agency, with the latter irreducible to individual activity:

Although the distinction between individual and collective agency is not always capable of exact definition there is, nonetheless, a significant difference between small-scale focussed gathering (interaction in a coffee bar, private property or the like) any one individual involved is able to orient themselves towards the behaviour is thereby influenced, as well as influential. By contrast with larger–scale collective phenomena focal individuals are no longer simply influenced by the behaviour of other significant individuals, but by the collectivity as a whole. (Layder 1990: 129)

The pathways and dimensions of the internal conversation, as articulated by Archer, remain. However, the movement from ‘You’ to ‘We’ is re-defined, in regard to an emergent personal identity and its pivotal role. The dimensions of situated social activity take primacy and the internal conversation maintains its important mediatory role in dialectically tying personal and corporate forms of agency (see figure four).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Actor</th>
<th>Ontological Feature</th>
<th>Properties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons (Individual)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intentionality, purposiveness, reflexive monitoring, interpretive skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Biographical time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivities</td>
<td></td>
<td>Common interests, collective decision-making, action and 'definitions'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Inchoate or Organised)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Group or Organisational Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergent features of face-to-face interaction, for instance, 'definitions'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(One-off encounters, sequential or discontinuous episodes)</td>
<td></td>
<td>of reality, and indexicality of meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indexical time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Context</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional constraints and enablements mediated by authoritative, allocative and cultural resources (Third World phenomena)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures</td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(power relations and distributions of resources)</td>
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Figure three: A stratified ontology of the social (source – Layder 1990: 130)
6.4 Differentiating cognition in developmental selves

This section aims to empirically substantiate the relevance of a differentiated and developmental understanding of a reflexive capacity in relation to other social domains. Chapter seven will develop this theme in an understanding that personal ends, in regard to higher education policy and practice, should be informed by the properties of the domain of psychobiography. Thus, when we differentiate cognition and emphasise the singularities in developmental selves, we are then in a better position to develop practices that enhance relational goods in which the material and non-material good of the citizen depends.

Below is an attempt to empirically demonstrate the nature generative mechanisms interact and their developmental impact on the domain of psychobiography. As stated before, primacy is ascribed to an interaction between generative mechanisms – rather than public involvement or self-regulated embodied interaction in the natural world. Thus, as will be shown, a differentiated view of cognition indicates reflexivity to be a later point of emergence, rather than the first point of call. Further, grounding the development of this reflexivity in psychobiography confirms the important role,
identified by Archer, of efficacious mechanisms between meanings and molecules that prepare us for our social becoming.

The distinction between pre-reflective and reflective consciousness, developmentally, implicates the nature of mediation of a domain of psychobiography and the capacity to deliberate on external circumstances. The manner we psychologically manage our lives is with implications for the type of personal identity that develops. For an efficacious Theory of Mind (ToM) both self-affection and interpersonal attunement must function, together, for there to be subjective alignment in the emergence of 'You'. To substantiate the above point three main issues are to be considered:

(1) Establishing a distinction between the mineness of experience and reflexivity – it is their relation that sustains a functioning ToM;

(2) Mapping the relevance of this distinction in a ToM dysfunction, in the case examples of autism and schizophrenia;

(3) Tracing this distinction developmentally – here highlighted is the importance of an initial subjective interiority – the givenness of a mineness – that is then the basis of a later self-concept; dysfunctions of ToM demonstrate the emergence of the latter from the former. Hence, the mechanisms of self-regulation and higher order mentation are analytically irreducible.

The exercise of a reflexive capacity, in facilitating subjective alignment to given objective roles, is presupposed by a mechanism that delivers the 'I' for a genuine concept of the self. Zahavi (2005), as noted, states this pre-supposing mechanism as the basis of a subjective interiority in a direct and non-inferential access to mental states. Developmentally pre-reflective self-consciousness – based on a bodily self-experience – is present during the first three to four years of life. The early experiential givenness of lived experience is not something additional to a mental act that reacts, reflects or introspects on its experience, but is an intrinsic aspect of experience (Zahavi 2005). The primitive aspect of self-consciousness initiates but also sustains the self/other distinction.

Considering the development of a self-concept, we have five developmental selves (ecological, interpersonal, extended, private and conceptual self) that provide a basis for a model of an emergent and stratified self8 – the development

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8 These developmental selves are part of a continuum from which the emergence of a conceptual self is accounted. The ecological self, appearing in early infancy, is the sense of a self-regulated self as embedded and interacting in its environment. It is the
of a conceptual self is emergent from these developmental selves. The ecological self establishes the basis of a direct first person non-inferential access to self-experience from which there is a possible propositional elaboration of bodily self-experiences. This returns to a bodily analogue as a means of transmission facilitating an embodied opening to the world. In the context of the mirroring subject it is a body schema “characterised by a transmodal openness that immediately allows it to understand and imitate others” (Zahavi 2005: 208). Developmentally, before there is a theoretical mediation (ToM), infants, through a transmodal openness, develop a non-objectifying self-experience. Self-experience, from early life, is for itself and it is through access to it itself, as a bodily presence, then perceives and becomes attuned to its environment. It is before nine months that there is a primary intersubjectivity i.e. a goal directed interaction with the environment based on imitation. Imitation includes cross-modal matching between external bodily acts and a primitive self-representation of the body. From a bodily self-experience comes the first bridge between self and otherness. This initial stage continues to nine months, after which primary intersubjectivity moves to secondary intersubjectivity. The difference here is that the infant now moves beyond goal related interaction (the

interpersonal self, also appearing in early infancy, which extends the ecological self so that it responds to its conspecifics, though still unreflective, and is a direct reaction to intersubjective relationships from which the interpersonal self is then facilitated. Neisser states that both the ecological self and interpersonal self should be viewed in simultaneity as an “awareness of the interpersonal is almost invariably accompanied by a simultaneous awareness of the ecological self. A wealth of information specifies their co-existence: I can see that the person to whom you are addressing yourself (the interpersonal me) is the very person who is located here, at this point of observation in this environment (the ecological me)” (Neisser 1988: 395). The extended self is the trajectory of the self as past and what is to be expected in the future, based on memory; importantly this sense of self is based on an ownership of lived experiences and with it learnt repertoires and the recall of these repertoires. The private self is identified with an irreducible interiority of lived experiences and a sense of these experiences as demarcated from the world. On the other hand, the ecological and interpersonal selves are held to be a sense of being-in-the-world, representing a shift from extrospection to introspection. This sense of exclusivity of one’s experiences, an introspective reference, develops later (Neisser speculates this is to be around age four). An initial outward extensibility, with its perceiving and doing, thus becomes the basis of experiences that are then made objects of introspective reference. Finally, the conceptual self develops from an ability to take subjective experiences as object of reference and reflection, for it to be elaborated in a broader discursive environment. This means conceptual elaboration is emergent from these different selves and because of this “our self-concepts typically include ideas about our physical bodies, about interpersonal communication, about what kinds of things we have done in the past and are likely to do in future, and especially about the meaning of our own thoughts and feelings. The result is that each of the other four kinds of self-knowledge is also represented in the conceptual self” (Neisser 1988: 401 – 402).
beginnings of intersubjective attunement) to an interaction that involves “triangulation”. This means the “infants’ interactions with other persons start to have reference to the world around them, to the objects and events that can be shared with others” (Zahavi 2005: 211). Here feedback and validation is sought, still proto-linguistic, and this is the early stages of referencing the world that is scaffolded by later propositional self-knowledge. Hence, developmentally an emergent first person givenness continually sustains and constitutes the type of experiences that then become an object of reflection.

Further, the distinction between a primitive pre-reflective self-consciousness and reflexive self-consciousness, explains the nature of social cognition as a mentalizing spectrum (Crespi & Badcock 2008). Thus, in the case of autistic cognition there remains a first person direct access to mental states such as experiences, perceptions, desires, thoughts and emotions (Zahavi 2005). What distinguishes this condition is a diminished developmental bridging to secondary intersubjectivity and then reflexive awareness. Specifically, there are deficiencies in those aspects of cognition termed by Crespi & Badcock as mentalistic cognition, as opposed to mechanistic cognition:

Mentalistic cognition (or simply mentalism, otherwise known as theory of mind, folk psychology, or mentalizing) evolved for interaction with other people in a psychological environment, whereas mechanistic cognition (folk physics) evolved in parallel for interaction with the physical environment (Crespi & Badcock 2008: 243)

Here a point can be made regarding the notion of a ToM deficit in the case of autism and schizophrenia\textsuperscript{9} – in both cases (autistic and psychosis-related syndromes) there is a dysfunction in the nature of emergence of a functioning ToM. Exaggeration in mechanistic or mentalistic cognition represent, in their diametric opposition, problems in precursors of social cognition. In the case of hyper-reflexivity – an exaggerated reasoning of mental states with a diminished self-affection – what results is a dysfunctioning in the givenness of a bodily pre-reflective awareness that regulates self-other relations. Thus lost is a sense of ownership and simultaneously a sense of immersion in the world (it is the mind/body interplay that is a vehicle to the world). The dysfunction noted demonstrates the inseparability of a sense of self from the immersion of an

\textsuperscript{9} Accordingly, ToM is an emergent accomplishment of mechanistic and mentalizing mechanisms in co-constitution – the trajectory of this accomplishment varies considering the domain of psychobiography. This way autism and schizophrenia lead to problems in the development of social cognition though for different reasons in regard to the interplay of these noted mechanisms.
embodied practical engagement. Consequently, with a breakdown in a sense of self there is a reification of experiences as objects of reflection and so an exaggerated reflexivity. Compromising the balance between self and world is a dysfunction in what is sensed as a tacit awareness via the body schema. The body schema, as Sass and Parnas (2003) note, provides a tacit–focal structure in which any disturbance in its operation results in an imbalance in the foundations between self and world:

We have tacit awareness of the perceptual background or context of awareness as well as of the structures and processes of the embodied, knowing self. One might exemplify these two ways of knowing—focal versus tacit—by distinguishing the body image from what might be called the body schema. Whereas the first refers to an objectified or objectifiable representation (conscious or unconscious) of one's own body, the second refers to an implicit or background awareness of one's body as a sensorimotor subject that encounters and actually constitutes the world of perceptual awareness as well as one's most basic sense of self (Merleau–Ponty 1962, pp. 99–104; Gallagher and Meltzoff 1996; Dillon 1997, pp. 121–123). A tacit or subsidiary awareness of kinesthetic and proprioceptive sensations serves as the medium of prereflective selfhood, ipseity, or self–awareness, which, in turn, is the medium through which all intentional activity is realized. Any disturbance of this tacit–focal structure, or of the ipseity it implies, is likely to have subtle but broadly reverberating effects that upset the balance and shake the foundations of both self and world. (Sass and Parnas 2003: 430)

To compromise this balance consequently affects the tacit and pre–reflective givenness of bodily self-experience and with this the ability to engage with others is disturbed, as what is known of others is no longer given and permeated by this sense of self. The loss of perceptual grip and with it a phenomenological distance from objects of awareness – as part of an ongoing experiential stream – impairs social cognition from a pre–reflective self-regulation that constitutes self–experience.

In contrast, in the case of autistic cognition, ToM impairments are accounted for, early on in developmental terms, in a bridge to intersubjective self-knowledge. Difference in a bridge to inter-subjective self-knowledge, as socio-affective differences, appears from early infancy and are developmental precursors of a developed ToM. Consequently, there is a dysfunction in the bridge between the pre–reflective givenness of experience and the elaboration
of this givenness into propositional self-knowledge. The symmetry of subjective mediation is biased to mechanistic cognition (see below) and thus a bias towards direct access to mental states as this-sided cognition. In the case of higher functioning autistic cognition, deficits in an interpersonal mediated access to mental states, may be compensated and bridged by an intellectual and theory driven approach that is less interpersonal and more egocentric in its approach (Zahavi 2005). The implications of this is that to reason regarding mental states, utilising mental representations (folk psychology) is – developmentally – an interpersonal emergent property. Thus, mentalizing, in the case of autistic cognition, is biased toward a mechanistic cognition and shows a lesser dependence on others. This also coheres with Crespi & Badcock’s (2008) work on the development of a cognitive system, in autistic cognition, that is less dependent on inference from socio-affective attention and more on direct inference – what follows is an enhanced self-regulated interaction with external circumstances. In psychotic spectrum conditions, there is an over-interpretation of an other-sided intentionality due to a diminished this-sided self-regulation – what follows, in this case, is an exaggerated proneness to indirect access to mental states.

These case points demonstrate that a reflexive capacity is exercised in different ways and in accordance to mechanisms existing in a domain of psychobiography and its relation to other domains. Developmentally it is our social becoming that prepares us to exercise a reflexive capacity. However, our social becoming does not shape the direction of reflexive deliberation, as the properties of the domain of psychobiography, as covered, extend beyond a public involvement and the extra-discursive impacts the nature a reflexive capacity is enacted (as demonstrated in a cognitive continuum). Accordingly, in diametric opposing ends of a continuum, conceptual self-understanding, in regard to external circumstances, may be hindered for different reasons. It is more adequate to explain these reasons from a differentiated and developmental understanding of consciousness and the mapping of this differentiation in the interplay of generative mechanisms that are integrated – made thematically mine – via subjective authority.

Thus, at both ends of the continuum and across this continuum we establish the importance of generative mechanisms that continue to figure and mediate the self-other relation to external circumstances. Both autistic bias to mechanistic cognition and the noted hyper-reflexivity (other sided cognition) in psychotic-spectrum conditions, lead to deficits in ToM for different reasons:
Both autistic literal mindedness and mechanistic cognition, and psychotic-spectrum overinterpretation can lead, though by different mechanisms, to deficits in theory of mind tasks and understanding of pragmatic language such as metaphor and humor (C. D. Frith 2004; Frith & Allen 1988; Mitchell & Crow 2005). Taken together, this evidence suggests that reaction to gaze, as well as tendency to attribute mental states and intentions to others, exhibit contrasting patterns of hyper development and underdevelopment in psychosis and autism (Crespi & Badcock 2008: 253).

The manifestation of reflexive powers is consequently relatively open and contingent, bearing on the internal conversation and the residual problems discussed i.e. in the trajectory of subjective alignment between ‘I’ and ‘You’ and with it the continued accomplishment of a personal identity.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter sought to present an explicit theoretical argument for a *homo relatus* conception of the person. The structure of the chapter was based on a series of necessary questions that all models of personhood must engage with. Thus, the realist understanding of personhood presented, based on Archer’s work, adopted the following path:

- It is necessary, before setting out a critical realist understanding of the person, to first provide an argument for a pre-supposing transcendental argument. The necessity of this argument was set-out as a reasoned necessity that all theories must engage with in some way. The basis of a transcendental realist argument is viewed in a detachment of the act of reference from that which it refers to. Central to this referential detachment is an acknowledgement of both the possibility of reference and an existential distinction between the transitive/intransitive. The fallibism that follows from this distinction affirms the possibility of referencing personal ends and the renewal of fallibist educational practices for this purpose.

- Sharedness and differentiation pertain to different domains of a differentiated social ontology – the domains of psychobiography and contextual resources. First, it is necessary to resolve the transmission problematic, in which an account needs to be made on how ‘collective objects’ – an external perspective – are transmitted to then become a subjective perspective. The working of mirror neurons establishes an
empirical reference on what enables this transmission. Here we distinguish, developmentally, between a functional control mechanism and its role in the emergence of a semantic mechanism. This developmental distinction between a functional and semantic capacity establishes a case for an ontological distinction – rather than complicity – in which a social becoming is not pre-supposed by transmitted collectives. Second, accounting for the means of transmission and differentiated nature of subjective inculcation does not negate an objective and irreducible propositional realm. ‘Ideas’ are grounded in our practical engagement in the natural order and are more than self-referential doings. Due to the transability of knowledge between different orders, the Cultural System (CS) consists of a sedimentation of human learning; the properties of this learning may remain dormant or enacted as causal powers (the interplay between ‘ideas’ and ‘groups’). In acknowledging differentiated transmission in an individuated social becoming and an independent collective realm there is a case for educational practices that understands student development in terms of both the properties of the domain of psychobiography and an extrinsic referential standard, independent of the learner, to measure learning against. Furthermore, we have a shared context in which the material and non-material good of individuals depend and whose properties are revised in reference to these same goods.

- If we affirm irreducible subjective and objective properties, then the question extends to the manner we investigate their interplay. The properties of internal deliberation, returning to the transmission problematic, pertains to the way an indexical ‘I’ becomes a socially indexed device. An irreducible subjective interiority and authority means the subjective moment is a first person phenomenon that is never filtered through a given objective moment. Following from the properties of internal deliberation are the three residual problems of the internal conversation – the manner the self can be both subject and object in deliberation, a temporal dimension to emergence (past, present and future) and how the societal enters the internal conversation. A revision was proposed regarding the properties of internal deliberation (the subjective interiority and authority of an irreducible subjective moment), in which a developmental understanding is adopted in regard to the emergence of a reflexive capacity. Instead of a reflexive capacity being the basis of a subjective interiority and authority, preparing us for our social becoming, the focus is developmental in reference to the emergence of a reflexive capacity. In a posited developmental turn, subjective authority is
understood in terms of a developmental trajectory of a domain of psychobiography. Further, identifying the domain of psychobiography as the basis of subjective authority re-thinks the process of social morphogenesis. The properties of the domain of psychobiography are considered a point of mediation in a differentiated social ontology; thus, the process of social morphogenesis is anchored in a mutual re-enforcement between properties pertaining to relational social domains. The revisions proposed are adopted in chapter seven in the notion of a morphogenetic social order and deep citizenship that brings together personal, social and systemic reflexivity to advance the common good.

Finally, to empirically substantiate the developmental focus of a reflexive capacity, in differentiated terms, the idea of a cognitive continuum was put forward. Here the idea of a cognitive continuum means there is a further elaboration of the transmission problematic in the nature individuals enact their reflexive capacity. In regard to this continuum, we have, at one end, a bias to a this-sided cognition (self-regulated); at the other end of the continuum, there is a bias towards an other-sided cognition. The continuum, further, substantiates the developmental emergence of a reflexive capacity in which there is first an initial interaction with our physical environment; this initial practical engagement with our natural environment then establishes a bridge to more sophisticated forms of intersubjective interaction. Thus, a developmental trajectory – qua the domain of psychobiography – provides an explanatory account on the qualitative enactment of a reflexive capacity and how this impacts the emergence of a personal identity. Chapter seven takes this view as the basis of a development model of the curriculum and the different ways this curriculum may be responsive to personal ends.
Previous chapters highlighted the existence of an understanding of the social as an integrative and consensual site of intervention to further system integration goals. Consequently, for example, a stated fairness agenda focused on the manner citizens may be cut-off from consensual spaces and what may be done to further an integrationist policy of social inclusion. Further, as covered, while differences exist in explaining this cut-off, it is a self-dependent responsibilisation of the citizen – informed by an egalitarian individualism\(^1\) (Gilbert 2013: 10) - that is the basis for individuals to claim their stake. These proposed consensual spaces, with its responsibilities and duties, are concomitant with abstract representations, as they frame social processes from given policy representations. Thus, there is a closing of the integrative role of a relational reason to given closed system imperatives (the concept of relational reason will be covered later). Social reflexivity is then regulated from without — through externalist policy agendas — rather than a logic of transcendence attentive to ontological difference.

Moral governance, consequently, follows in an attempt to re-make the citizen and public service subjectivities. The noted responsibilisation turn in policy may be observed in the making of networks, including actors, into a site of reflexive self-organisation (Jessop 2002: 460) that sustains policy outcomes. In the case of the ‘Big Society’ approach, welfare co-production is an attempt to generate an integrative function in sustainable ways and governance techniques (e.g. nudging, life cycle interventions and auditing), noted before, were attempts to preserve the regeneration of consensual spaces. What follows is the organisation of actors in mutually advantageous exchanges (Münch 2012), with adequate forms of integration sought to sustain this exchange.

\(^{1}\) A commitment to an egalitarianism is in instituting the conditions through which individualistic subjectivities are facilitated and sustained. Both New Labour and the ‘Big Society’ agenda differ in what constitutes favourable conditions, including a diagnosis of problems of welfare dependency. However, there remains a consensus that what is to be done, in terms of governance, is to socialise problematic aspects of markets and through these initiatives to be responsive to the needs of citizens.
Thus, supply side interventions, in public welfare, represent a shift to ‘moral governance’ that regulates both outwards and inwards — outwards in generating the right social relations and inwards in the making of an idealised citizen to function in the context of these normalised relations. With both an outward and inward regulation there is an economisation of morality as market morality that inheres in an instrumental rationality, established in social relations and across policy fields, with responsibilisation translating into a discourse of rights defined by responsibilities (Shamir 2008). Rights are represented in terms of an exchange (something for something) and individuals integrated into consensual spaces as enterprising subjects. This approach can be seen in the re-generation of networks between universities and businesses, so that they promote growth, innovation and enable students to take-up opportunities in the workplace. The onus, in this configuration, is on universities to look for ways to work with businesses to match required skills through better pedagogic practices (promoting better teaching), innovation and enterprise. The idea of innovation ensures a form of autonomous creativity in these synergies but the nature of partnerships remain strongly articulated centrally and in ways that promote a model of education that represents students as a human capital investment and education, for students, as means to an income and work-related skills enhancement ( Dilts 2011). As presented in previous chapters, there is an underlying model of the student in higher education that finds continuity in a broader policy ethos that can be traced from New Labour policies to the ‘Big Society’ agenda. If we take Jessop’s typology of ideal-typical strategies (neocorporatism, neostatism, and neocommunitarianism), there may be differences in the configuration of ideal-type strategies complementing the neoliberalisation of higher education but it is

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Three ideal typical strategies are noted and each of these may exist within a broader neoliberal regime – neocorporatism, neostatism and neocommunitarianism. What these represent are policy models that complement a market-led restructuring of social policy and are adjustments to a globalised neoliberal travelling policy. Neocorporatism focuses on a socially embedded market economy and the use of negotiated networks and partnerships that are both state regulated and self-regulating (private, public and third-sector) to balance competition and cooperation. Neostatism represents a focus on state interventions to secure the right conditions for a broader national economic strategy – to achieve this objective the state seeks to guide market forces through coordinating economic resources, activities and the use of statist capital to achieve a competitive edge through investing in the right infrastructure to secure a competitive advantage. Finally, neocommunitarianism focuses on the ‘third sector’ and the ‘social economy’ between markets and state for the goal of both economic development (achieving economic strategies) and social cohesion. The point is that these three different ideal types may exist together and feature in different aspects of policy. Whatever configuration is sought, regarding different strategies, they are specific mediations of a global neoliberal order (Jessop 2002: 460 – 464).
a neoliberalisation that is a prism through which an egalitarian individualism is proposed.

Due to the existence of a view of the person, with defined social roles to meet this view, then the issue is to articulate an alternative direction informed by an ontology of personhood discussed in the previous chapter. Further – whether implicit or explicit – normative directions, as demonstrated in chapter five, follow from a given ontology of the person. Consequently, before moving to the implications of an ontology of personhood it is necessary to engage with some precursors i.e. if it is possible to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’ or the fact/value distinction.

7.1 Evaluative presuppositions of social policy:
Deriving ‘ought’ from ‘is’ and the fact/value distinction

Governance interventions – salient in the logic of neoliberal policy triangulation – affirm a fairer society as something sought in the regulation of market economies to work for individuals. An initiative to provide opportunity and annul negativities of collectivist welfare, for example, comes with thick notions of what makes for flourishing and by implication a conception of the social as an ordered space in a functionalist and circular reading of system imperatives (see chapter two). As noted in previous chapters there are several assumptions that exist regarding social exclusion, the promotion of social integration and behavioural forms of egalitarian individualism. Consequently, a view of the person is present and derived from a given ‘is’ is an ‘ought’ – initiatives to enable individuals to maximise on their preferences and a know-how to sustain an understanding of what constitutes individual flourishing. The objective of this introductory section is to argue that a view of the person, stated in the previous chapter, comes with evaluative policy implications. Thus, before an evaluative policy direction is presented, it is necessary to consider the fact/value distinction and if normative evaluations can be drawn from ontological questions. An argument will be put forward that, in a qualified sense, ‘ought’ can be derived from ‘is’ and an ontology of personhood implicates policy directions.

The argument put forward responds to a view that understands external and internal value judgement to be two different areas of investigation. Before presenting a view on the possibility of deriving normative directions from ontological reasoning – a transcendental logic defined by an intransitive realm – it is important to briefly state the position of those maintaining a strict fact/value distinction, pre-supposed by an empiricist underlabourer, and to then respond to their objections. First, are the views of Campbell (2014) and Black (2013) who adopt
the importance of value-free sociology. Second, is Turner’s argument against external value judgements due to the nature of these arguments leading to unidirectional explanations (Turner 2013).

Campbell and Black both argue for a strict distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in social science. In Campbell’s understanding, social science is potentially able to “answer all questions within its domain – that is, perfectly describe and explain all observable reality – but it cannot answer even a single moral question” (Campbell 2014: 446). Here a difference is made between external and internal value judgements – the former being a judgement regarding the social world that is external to the social sciences (the question of desirability of, for example, certain social reforms). The latter, on the other hand, refers to the world of social science that includes internal value judgements pertaining to what “what we should study, what methods we should use, what concepts or theories we should employ, or what ideas we should praise or criticize” (Black 2013: 767). In making this distinction there is a view of sociology that orders facts and predicts unknown facts but otherwise remains evaluatively agnostic. The point made is that the selection of subjects, methods, concepts or theories are necessary (the internal value-judgement) but actual practice itself should not hold any view regarding the desirability of the phenomenon studied:

If a sociologist chooses to study capital punishment in America, for example, the choice is not a value judgement about the desirability of capital punishment as a way to handle crime. (Black 2013: 767)

Thus, per this view, the question of ‘objectivity’ is a misnomer, as value-free social science means an absence of external value judgement and this is possible in the choice of a research strategy and the manner conclusions are presented. Accordingly, biased social science can be value-free if it restricts its tools – regardless of the factual conclusions reached – to the research question posed rather than infusing an investigation with an external judgement (what ought to be).

This way social science lays its claim to be ‘scientific’ if a distinction is maintained between internal value and external value judgement when conducting research. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the existence of external value judgement in actual social scientific practice. The distinction provides a criterion, or an ethos, through which research strategies and conclusions reached may be measured. Importantly, the debate about value-free sociology is an epistemic one i.e. if it is possible to achieve referential distance to the object of study and if the object is open to the type of investigation that excludes external value judgement:
The debate about value-free social science is not merely a matter of misunderstandings - mistaken meanings, muddled thinking, or bad logic. Nor is it merely a difference of opinion. It is part of larger conflict about whether the human is a proper subject of science. It is a cultural war - over what counts as knowledge of the human and over the standards that should apply to knowledge of the human. (Black 2013: 774)

In response, there are two main issues that may be put forward that bears on the question of a value-free sociology – first, an attempt to posit a strict distinction between internal and external value judgements is pre-supposed by an existing external epistemological model. Thus, instead of freeing social science from the problems of normative bias, it offers, theory-laden, an explanatory closure in the manner it sets out what ought to be the domain of social science. Thus, this theory-laden position dismisses a priori an evaluative external judgement that may be implicated from internal social scientific. For example, in the case of this chapter, knowledge of the human person – including the relationality of the person to his external environment – would not provide normative implications. Consequently, there is an epistemic starting point in the approach adopted by Campbell and Black – a philosophical ontology – and this bears on the argument posited on the nature of what constitutes value-free social science i.e. we have an existing external value judgement, even if this is seemingly rejected. Black (2013) adopts a form of covering law model of explanation based on an empirical falsifiability). In this starting point, the explanandum is viewed as derivative from an explanans and with this a pre-supposing definition of the object that is then espoused as 'scientific' i.e. there exists an understanding that views the explanans as a question of empirical falsifiability. Due to an existing external value judgement, there is an understanding that statements are sociologically intelligible if open to the criterion of testability, generality and simplicity (Black 2013). Distance and referentiality count as knowledge of humans, as a standard for social science. To describe and explain is to be concerned with ‘facts’ - observable reality – and this provides no preferences concerning questions of value preference. The question of observation, qua referentiality, is grounded in substantive theory testing, in a deductive sense, and this gives us an internally valid value judgement open to empirical study. The approach then rejects general theory or what was stated in chapter six as a philosophical ontology - this despite what is advocated being an epistemic model dictating the nature of investigation and hence a general theory that guides.
Second, following from the first point, due to a rejection of general theory, identified in an implicit refusal to consider an external value model that informs social science, there is a closure in the explanatory potential of social science and its broader critical role. The nature of what counts as knowledge is guided by a general theory, even if the focus is substantive, and this informs broader questions on the constitution of humans and their emergence as persons in relation to the natural, practical and discursive orders. The nature of this emergence – as argued in chapter six – means we have a broader relational human telos but also specificity in terms of differentiated singularities (Smith 2010). Further, there is an assumption that general theory closes, guides or even dictates the direction of investigation but this is a misconstrual of what may be intended by general theory. As argued previously, a transcendental reasoning is a necessity and being grounded in the intransitive dimension it is both emergent from but also irreducible to epistemic conceptions. Instead of closing research to external value judgements, asserted is the complexity and openness of the phenomenon studied. An external value judgement, while irreducible to the object of reference, is still grounded in the object – as referential detachment – and thus questions of desirability follow rather than dictate further strategies of investigation. While research on the nature of the object may implicate an external value judgement, what is posited here is a relational fallibilism in the methods chosen in which external value preference informs research preferences and questions asked. A cut-off between external and internal judgements closes possible directions when exploring the relation between personal well-being and social relations.

A relational understanding between external and internal judgement is derived from a layered and depth ontology, with two dimensions that follow – the nature of explanation and the centrality of relational emergence that underpins the nature of this explanation. Critical theory, as adopted here, sets itself the task of exploring the well-being of the person in the context of personal emergence (here the context refers to an amalgam of personal, situational and objective generative mechanisms). To acknowledge a dialogue between explanation and a realist underlabourer – the notion that generative mechanisms are pre-dispositioned to generate certain effects – means the more we know of the environment of emergence the better policy may be in remedying social problems (external value judgement). As generative mechanisms are the intransitive dimension of referential detachment then the dialogue between internal and external value judgement is a fallibilist one.⁴ There is no closure in what may be justified in

³ This approach is different to the fallibilist model advocated by Black (2013), in that it does not set explanatory possibilities through given epistemic presuppositions. Instead, it is a fallibism that takes the object as standard and with it a referentiality to the object is both open and adaptive.
relation to an *explanandum*. Further, the emergence of an object of reference is in a relational ontology and this ontologically grounds the question of what constitutes personal flourishing. Once again, to view external and internal value judgements as unrelatable is to hold, de facto, an ontological stance that epistemically defines what counts as ‘scientific’ and the direction social science should take. Consequently, what follows is a pre-supposing external value judgement on the very nature of what constitutes social science.

Acknowledging a dialogue between internal and external value judgement affirms the social preconditions of human flourishing in a pluralist sense. Grounding flourishing in the objective properties of mechanisms results in an argument against reducing value judgement to personal preference. At the same time, the complexity of interplay between generative mechanisms – pertaining to personal, situational and objective dimensions – means capacities and their manifestation are differentiated. Thus, as Gorski (2013) argues, the good itself is plural and there is an adaptive relation between external and internal value judgement (a bidirectional relation) to account for the complexity of emergence:

> While human beings do share a number of distinctive capacities, these capacities are variably distributed across human individuals. If the art of living well consists in identifying and realizing these capacities, then there will not be any one-size-fits-all model of the good life. The good itself is plural. Ethical naturalism can also evade the trap of cultural relativism by focusing on the social preconditions of human flourishing. Specifically, it will adjudge some social orders to be better than others insofar as they allow individuals enough freedom to discover enough freedom to discover their capacities and enough resources to realize them. (Gorski 2013: 550)

Turner (2013), on the other hand, argues an external value judgements lead to unidirectional explanations (Turner 2013). The problem with external value judgement – informing sociological practice – is a starting point that dictates the nature of explanation (the issue raised is consistent with the argument put forward by Turner (2007) regarding the transmission problematic – see chapter six). The problem is a conflation between ‘moral error’, as error in a point of view (for example, contravening happiness as a subjective state), with ‘moral error’ as objective concept; empirical work may be carried out on the former but not the latter. In making this conflation ‘moral facts’ – as an objective concept – are then assumed to motivate actions e.g. fulfilling an obligation. What we have are forms of unidirectional explanations that assume collective phenomena to be grounded in objective facts (moral goods). Consequently, these facts provide reason for actions without an account on how these reasons are then felt as subjective state.
The key is how we explain social action and if empirical facts that explain are simultaneously normative ones then there needs to be some explanatory connection between these facts and empirical reality. Further, this connection also applies to a view of normativity as discursive motivation – without empirical grounding – as it similarly assumes collectives that subjectively motivate but without explanation on how these same collectives are transmitted and inculcated.

In response to Turner's objection, it should be stated that ‘moral error’, in an ontologically grounded ethical naturalism, does not assume a ‘moral reality’ is transmitted due to an unaccounted existence in the nature of things. The ethical naturalism advocated – affirming a relational dialogue between internal and external value judgement – is not something explained in pre-existing notions of moral facts. Instead, it both follows and is in immanent dialogue in an explanation of generative mechanisms and the consequences of these mechanisms in their impact on personal flourishing. Accordingly, the type of social arrangements that enable this flourishing, or not, requires explanation. In an explanatory sense an external value judgement is not transcendentally affirmed and so opposes unidirectional explanations. Thus, the position that external value judgements are ontologically grounded and may be utilised as an explanatory critique of social arrangements, does not entail an explanatory account of motivations and reasons.

What we have is an argument against ‘flourishing’ as personal preference i.e. a personal preference transmitted through broader cultural and ideological expressions (again, we return to the circular problem of an assumed existence of collective phenomena, without explanation, on the nature of its transmission). If we consider the multi-dimensionality of emergence, then it does not follow that irreducible meanings of flourishing transcend subjective experience and explain action. An irreducible dimension to normative facts, qua well-being, is something empirically grounded in an ontological sense. Regardless of reasons and motivations, that err, shared meanings of flourishing – grounded in an interplay of mechanisms – may be contingently manifested but in other settings subdued all together. Thus, a ‘moral reality’ does not transcend and explain, one way, but is grounded in a relational sense and whose subsequent uptake needs to be explained. It is possible to posit a view of ‘normative facts’, ontologically grounded,

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Turner denies ‘objective’ in any sense, whether as collective objects or normative facts (‘moral reality’). However, broader cultural and ideological expressions are not the same as a ‘normativism’ that understand ‘facts’ to be internalised in unidirectional explanations. Instead, as covered in chapter six, expressions should be connected to empirical reality to avoid circular arguments.
providing there is also a complementary account in how these beliefs come to incentivise actors to take on certain social roles.

When we relate reason and value there is an explicit realist underlabourer that posits, as covered in chapter six, the propositional order to be in referential relation to the non-propositional. It is the extra-discursive that is the basis of intelligibility of the propositional (our practical relations in the natural world) grounding the relation between our emergent capacities to reason and value judgements that may follow from these emergent capacities (Sayer 2011). Practical reason is thus value-laden and social arrangements may be better attuned or close possible directions in a dialogue between value and reason. Thus, social arrangements in evaluative sense – based on a referential detachment – may be identified as more conducive to the objective outcomes of ‘well-being’ or ‘suffering’.

Furthermore, the emergence of a personal identity is first facilitated by a self-regulated openness to the world. In response to circumstance – in the emergence of a personal identity – there is a process of subjective integration of lived experience. Being in relation, with concerns emergent from context, means reasoned value judgements pertain to the “complex interplay of normativity and ontology” (Calder 2008: 432). Here the derivation of a normative discourse is evaluative, as it is prior grounded in the types of concerns that an ontology is dispositioned to generate in subjective states (Jacobs 2013).

We can thus argue that evaluative statements are contextualised in the conditions that continually sustain us as sentient beings. Instead of abstraction, evaluative reasoning then implicates a relationality between several dualisms and their seepage as emergent relational properties⁵. This seepage is manifested in everyday reasoning and informs evaluative considerations. Consequently, a strict separation of fact and value leads to an explanatory deficiency when considering the complex interplay between normativity and ontology, as everyday evaluations (deliberation on everyday concerns). The tendential properties that follow are too open for a strict fact/value split, as both are relationally intertwined, and with this normativity becomes enmeshed in the type of motivations and justifications that pertain to how persons are embodied and interact in given orders. To survive

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⁵ Sayer (2011: 29 – 32) argues that a strict separation between fact and value implicates a whole family of dualisms that are then viewed to be mutually exclusive and opposed (fact-value, is-ought, reason-emotion, science-ideology, science-ethics, positive-normative, objectivity-subjectivity and mind-body). Negating the seepage and mutual reinforcement of these dualisms has implications for how value and reason is then conceptualised.
and thrive is to be necessarily part of this process from which a personal identity is emergent. The issue to consider is the nature of flourishing and ends that are sought – between personal specificity and the plurality of its expression – and the implications this may have for policy directions and specifically higher education policy.

7.2 The interdependence between personal ends and sharedness for the common good

The previous section advocated a relational dialogue between reason and value. This section extends the argument to an alternative policy direction beyond homo sociologicus and homo economicus conceptions of the person or a synthesis between both views. Opposed to the two models of personhood and their synthesis – both approaches necessitate impersonal ends – the goal is to articulate an alternative direction that takes personal ends as the point of reference. Personal ends are compatible with a relational understanding of the citizen (homo relatus) as they are grounded – qua referential detachment – in an interplay between normativity and ontology. To focus on the interplay between both means shared arrangements are important in nurturing proactive tendential capacities of persons. At the same time, nurturing personal capacities (the basis of solidarity) implicates a context of mutual interdependence that is more conducive to the purposes of reciprocity. Instead of an integration of individuals into impersonal system ends, personal ends necessitate interventions closer to the point of interaction between generative mechanisms. Accordingly, the interplay between singularities and sharedness – between normativity and ontology – is viewed from the place of the domain of situated activity. It is in situated activity that normativity is emergent from and responsive to persons and their emergence in objective relational orders. Social relations, therefore, are open to renewal at the point of interaction (a subsidiarity in the form of reflexive arrangements) and it is in these arrangements that solidarity and subsidiarity are understood to be in mutual reinforcement.

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6 The common good is promoted by goods generated relationally, in which both solidarity and subsidiarity are in a relationship of reciprocity. Solidarity – a reciprocal sharing of responsibility – establishes the necessity of settings in which a shared relationality guides and orients the actions of social actors towards each other in reference to personal ends. Subsidiarity, on the other hand, is defined by contingent arrangements that advance the common good through which the material and non-material good of the individual depend. As solidarity and subsidiarity are mutually reinforced in advancing the common good then the reciprocity between both is defined in terms of a transcendental logic that sustains their relation (Donati 2009b).
Thus, it is the point of mutual reinforcement between interacting mechanisms that alternative policy paths and a vision for the common good is articulated. The common good informs the nature of an interplay between normativity and ontology – or between solidarity and subsidiarity. Further, the emergence of a personal identity and a social order (personal and social morphogenesis) – as discussed in chapter six – are interconnected and the relation between both returns to the common good, in the manner this common good links solidarity and subsidiarity. Proactive in potentia capacities of persons, therefore, are emergent and manifested in a relational ontology. The policy direction envisaged is one that emphasises a mutual context that links the interconnection between singularity and sharedness for personal ends. Personal ends, as will be argued in the case of student development, refers to an orientation of social relations between actors to be responsive to the point of differentiation. As personal ends and a shared context are co-constituted and interconnected the following implications follow:

**Practical interaction as the starting point of all epistemology** – The practical order is a bridgehead between the natural and discursive orders. Thus, being in the world, in our practical engagements, we are in relation to the world and others. In practical manipulation of objects, in relation to other conspecifics, as covered in chapter six, there is the development of a semantic capacity and this means it is a practical interaction with our environment that is the starting point of all epistemology (Collier 1999). Moreover, the differentiated nature of personal development – the domain of psychobiography – entails both a specificity and a shared environment. Thus, flourishing is non-self-referential in our difference and a sharedness that facilitates, simultaneously, this difference. Orders generate shared forms of concerns – physical well-being (natural order), performative achievement (practical order) that are then synthesised in an emergent social order. Similarly, as noted, the manner we navigate emergent concerns – as part of a personal modus vivendi – pertains to the specificities of a psychobiography.

**The normative basis of policy in specificity** – Specificity entails difference and the objective of being responsive to difference (solidarity) is the normative problem of policy. Consequently, in being attentive and responsive to the particular there is an analytical re-focus away from moralising policy directions that impose foregrounded assumptions to then dictate rather than be responsive to the particular. The mutual reinforcement of difference and sharedness entails, as Collier argues (1999), to view the flourishing of everyone as part of a pursuit of the common good and that this is integral to one’s own being and flourishing:
An account of the unity of a human individual as a composite unity constituted by the relatively stable causal interaction of their parts. On the basis of these points, I have arrived at the extensibility of human individuals as they become more rational/interactive to include more of the world in the open structure that makes them the individual that they are. The consequent tendency, as one becomes more rational/interactive, to care more for more of the universe, as it becomes more integral to one's own being. (Collier 1999: 42)

Being attentive to difference is to be more rational/interactive and the goal of policy is to establish adequate institutions to sustain conditions for reflexive arrangements grounded in solidarity and its renewal in relational goods.

Complementing solidarity and subsidiarity for the common good – As stated, being attentive to difference is the normative problem of policy. To maintain conditions that advance solidarity entails a continuous reflexive generation and re-generation of arrangements for the common good. As solidarity – pre-supposed by a referential detachment – is contextualised in arrangements closer to the point of subjective/objective interaction then the interplay between personal and social histories favours lived solidarity. This means relational goods are generated internal to lived practice, rather than policies and practices that universalize and abstract from interactive dynamics. Universalizing is opposed to allowing particulars – in a non-self-referential sense – to manifest themselves, including their potential gifts, in ways that potentially contribute to the common good. The fullest expression of the common good, as stated, is in our common obligations to the particular and these obligations are inherent in the non-self-referential dimensions of personal social becoming – the manner we interact with each other and the ways these interactive dynamics allow tendential capacities to flourish. If we consider triple morphogenesis then the trajectory of personal and social emergence lies in the interplay of these interactions and the manner social institutions and structures incentivise a ‘letting be’ of an emergent personal identity, so that individual flourishing is nested within a broader pursuit of the common good.

7.3 Policy directions beyond individualism and holism

As policy focuses on personal ends, in a relational sense, then the approach taken focuses neither on abstracted individual goals nor a macro regulated holism. Instead, the policy model envisaged is based on a homo relatus conception of the citizen and focuses on the social link that connects people together. The social link acknowledges the totality of social relations – rather than an aggregated
utilitarian good for the greatest number of individuals – and the interplay between
the powers and capacities of persons and their settings. Two main points are
highlighted considering this policy re-direction:

Affirming primacy to positive freedoms – To be more rational/interactive is due to
an in-gear understanding of our relational engagement in the world. The
constraints and enablements of external interactions are not an afterthought as
is the tendency with negative freedom approaches that emphasise freedom-from
in negative rights based discourses. Instead, following from a positive view of
freedoms there is a supply side view of rights. Supply side policy interventions aim
to generate conditions in which solidarity is generated and sustained; as positive
freedoms aim to enhance tendential capacities – in our embodied interactions –
than a supply side view of relational rights is implicated in an interpersonal
obligation to contribute to arrangements that enhance relational goods.

Supply side interventions in shared arrangements implicate a depth view of
citizenship in which the role of the citizen is defined in relations that connect
individuals (the 'body-actual') to their broader material settings (the 'body
cosmic'). The interconnection between the body-actual and body cosmic relates
to a societal constitutionalism in which the extensibility of the body-actual is
understood in terms of “material, cognitive and emotional interactions of
particular people with specific needs and wants, capacities and vulnerabilities in
particular material settings” (Sayer 2011: 176). Here a relational universalism – in a
shared relational extensibility of the body actual – entails a logic of action that
sustains a relational setting (a proactive, in-gear conception of the body-actual)
in ways that are conducive to a flourishing of the person. 

As an alternative to a dispersed freedom and its implicated discourse of negative
freedoms there is a transformative pursuit of the body-cosmic but in mutual
consent and responsibility to the world. Intersubjective consent – in a voluntary
sense – is sought in arrangements that incentivise a reflexive reasoning on the
nature of relational goods that advance the common good. The foundation of

7 In being in the world, in relation to external orders and others, the body actual is
in relation to the body cosmic – the body cosmic establishes the extensibility of the body
actual to its externality and is thus the ‘world as body’. In interacting with relational
environments, the body-actual, in potentia, is emergent from the body cosmic.
Consequently, there is a proactive view of causal interaction between the body-actual
and the world (Collier 2007).

8 Dispersed freedom here is taken from Collier (2007) and is contrasted to gathered
freedom – “Here I come to the ambiguity of freedom referred to in the title; many political
issues concern the area of conflict between two sets of freedoms: in political terms, we
may distinguish market freedom, which is the power money gives its possessor to
shared consensual concerns towards relational contexts, based on gathered
deliberation, refer to relations from which personal identities emerge. As personal
ends are emergent from the body-cosmic then an orientation to these relations –
the basis of material and non-material goods – entails a relational reflexivity that
is contributive to cooperative human activity⁹.

Gathered deliberation, pre-supposed by a gathered freedom, takes the form of a
civil democracy that is shaped by supply side conditions for the generation of
relational goods that shape relational rights. Here the indexical – the site of lived
solidarity – is organically tied to the actions of corporate actors. The
interconnection between lived solidarity and the actions of corporate actors
(actions directed at enduring practices and power relations) interconnects both
primary and secondary goods¹⁰ (institutional and indexical time). As will be
covered in the next section, the complementarity between the meta-reflexive
mode of personal reflexivity and a broader societarian reflexivity are important
facets that mutually reinforce and sustain reflexive arrangements. Reflexive
arrangements – based in a gathered deliberation – are then shaped by a relational
reason¹¹ that is open to renewal in referential detachment to personal ends. Thus,

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⁹ Co-operative behaviour entails gathered deliberation on the nature of our causal
interactions with our environment and how this bears on both material and non-material
goods that human flourishing depends on.

¹⁰ Primary relational goods are those goods with a deep intersubjective character,
while secondary relational goods are ones with a collective character. Thus, Donati
defines this distinction in the following manner – “An interesting question is whether
relational goods necessarily imply interpersonal relations or not. In response, I suggest
distinguishing between primary relational goods (such as friendship, family, small
informal groups, which have a deep intersubjective character) and collective or
secondary relational goods (which have an associative character and could be generated
through more impersonal relations, for instance the relational goods produced by a
voluntary association)” (Donati 2015: 199)

¹¹ Relation reason is borrowed from Donati’s re-working of Parsons’s AGIL scheme
– in this re-working the scheme is a compass for the orientation of action rather than a
fixed structure. The Adaptive dimension pertains to instrumental means; Goal oriented
rationality pertains to political power and the achievement of definite targets; the
Integrative dimension links the other three dimensions. In linking the other three
dimensions the Integrative dimension’s focus is on relations to the natural, practical and
discursive orders. The integrative process is termed, by Donati, as the rationality of
relationality itself (relational rationality). In other words, it is directed to the environment
of action in the manner relations link both the Adaptive and Goal dimensions to the
axiomatic dimension (I). The axiomatic dimension is the value end of the noted relational
rationality (I) and is represented in the human person; if an orientation to a shared
the value dimension of a relational reason is cyclically renewed in terms of an epistemic fallibilism associated with this referential detachment.

Pre-supposing a supply side understanding of relational rights by obligation – Following from a primacy ascribed to positive freedoms is a re-conception of rights in a relational sense. Relational rights are manifested in relational goods that are generated in the re-orientation of social relations towards personal ends and the common good. Furthermore, the contingent cultivation of personal capacities – in the context of these relational goods – implicates institutional settings that go beyond single principle models. Single principle models advocate – abstracting from the relational context of individuals – the total good of individual utility (homo economicus view of the citizen being an example of this approach). Thus, an approach that emphasises increasing access to pre-given sanctioned goods – for example, in interventions that aim to enhance social mobility – is foregrounded in assumptions in respect to a utilitarian conception of the good that is distributed to the greatest number of individuals.

The approach advocated, in this chapter, moves beyond individualised and holistic policy directions (homo economicus and homo sociologicus). The common good, therefore, pertains not to the sum aggregate of goods that are divided and distributed. Instead, the common good, as Donati (2009b) argues, is the gel that brings together individuals and is the social link on which the material and non-material goods of individuals depend:

The common good is the social link joining people together, on which both the material and nonmaterial goods of individuals depend. The human person cannot find fulfilment in himself, that is, apart from the fact that he exists "with" others and "for" others. This truth does not simply require that he live with others at various levels of social life, but that he seek unceasingly—in actual practice and not merely at the level of ideas—the good, that is, the meaning and truth, found in existing forms of social life. No expression of social life—from the family to intermediate social groups, associations, enterprises of an economic nature, cities, regions, states, and the community of peoples and nations—can escape the issue of its own common good, in that this is a constitutive element of its significance and the authentic reason for its very existence. (Donati 2009b: 220)
Second, going beyond single principle models – based on the distribution of impersonal social goods – is the importance of returning to relations and the manner individuals relate to each other and their environment (the basis of material and non-material relations). Relational universalism posits the universal nature of these relations and the manner their ontological properties are pre-dispositioned, in given circumstances, to generate concerns that need to be navigated. Hence, a necessary relationality – in being in the world – needs to be managed in some way and this implicates normative questions on personal flourishing and suffering. Again, a homo relatus view of the citizen requires reflexive arrangements that integrate material and non-material goods for personal ends.\footnote{I follow Archer (2013: 21) that a logic of action requires three irreducible facets – “firstly, people who are deemed capable of acting in the way specified; secondly, social structures that foster this kind of action; and, thirdly, results for the social order congruent with these types of action.”}

7.4 Deep citizenship and a meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity

A deep citizenship precedes from supply side policy interventions seeking to preserve causative arrangements that affect the generation of relational goods. Here highlighted is the citizen’s contributory role to these relational goods that link actors to each other and sustains their relations in complementary conditions of reciprocity. The role of the citizen, in this process, is shaped by a deep citizenship and a concomitant meta-reflexive reflexivity that is critically attuned to relational goods as concerns deliberated upon.\footnote{Archer identifies four modes of reflexivity – communicative, autonomous, meta-reflexive and fractured reflexivity. In the communicative mode of reflexivity “internal conversations need to be confirmed and completed by others before they lead to action” (Archer 2012: 13). In contrast, in the autonomous mode of reflexivity “internal conversations are self-contained, leading directly to action” (Archer 2012: 13). The meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity is one in which “internal conversations critically evaluate previous inner dialogues and are critical about effective action in society”. Finally, in a fractured reflexivity internal conversations “cannot lead to purposeful courses of action, but intensify personal distress and disorientation resulting in expressive action.” (Archer 2012: 13) Further, reflexivity is viewed, by Archer, as not a “homogeneous phenomenon but is exercised through distinctive modes, and that one such modality is dominant for almost every person at any given time” (Archer 2012: 12). In the case of this chapter both the autonomous and meta-reflexive modes of reflexivity are relevant. The salience of a homo economicus view of the person, in policy models, covered in previous chapters, exhibits a congruence with an autonomous mode of reflexivity in which the citizen is provided with relevant guidance and information to then strategically judge and dedicate to certain outward behavioural preferences. In contrast, the meta-reflexive is a mode of reflexivity.}
emergent from a multi-dimensional social universe, the connection between a
meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity and a deep citizenship is pre-supposed by a
depth understanding of social ontology.

It is a societal constitutionalism\textsuperscript{14} that provides the background for this deep
citizenship, in which the good of each person, and thus human dignity, is only
possible in a relational social order. As stated, the realisation of human dignity in
the common good is tied to a relational reason – in gathered deliberation – on the
relation between solidarity and subsidiarity. Here a deep citizenship extends the
role of the citizen beyond mere access and distribution of scarce individualised
utilitarian goods to that of primary goods that figure in the totality of social
relations – thus, in this context, we have a co-production of complementary
relations and practices that sustain the conditions of solidarity as secondary
relational goods. What follows from these conditions is a mutual reinforcing
relation between primary and secondary relational goods that are explained in an
interconnection between social domains (the secondary relational goods defined
in social practices and power relations are manifested in interpersonal situated
activity). In a deep citizenship, there is an interconnection and co-production
between indexical interactions and institutional arrangements that provides
context and value meaning to interactive dynamics.

It is in this broader societal context that the meta-reflexive citizen is critically
attuned to the efficacy of primary relational goods in its enhancement of personal
ends. Thus, citizen's actions extend, at a system level, to institutional
arrangements that provide context to primary relational goods. Consequently,
for example, in the context of higher education, teachers may question if current
practices meet the needs of student development and thus as corporate actors
aim to transform these practices. A depth citizenship, therefore, aims to make this
link between different strata of a differentiated social ontology so that the social
link in social relations – the common good – is cyclically sustained.

Conceptually, based on a mutual reinforcing relation between different social
domains, three forms of reflexivity are posited in the context of a morphogenetic

\textsuperscript{14} Societal constitutionalism being the recognition that one's identity is constituted
through a relation to the 'Other' (Donati 2014: 160)
social order – subjective, social and system reflexivity\(^{15}\) (see figure five). In a deep citizenship, the meta-reflexive is tied to transformative practices at the level of social reflexivity that then impacts power relations and contextual resources at the system level. Further, a system reflexivity is understood in responsive arrangements shaped by personal ends, rather than an epistemic closure that follows from impersonal policy objectives. In terms of a triple morphogenetic framework, it is the domain of situated activity – as covered in chapter six – that defines the emergent properties of interactive dynamics. Thus, indexical time is conceived to be organically tied to institutional time in this relation between different forms of reflexivity in a morphogenetic social order. Here the critical deliberation of a meta-reflexive subjective reflexivity – in the context of indexical interactions – potentially transforms into the ‘We’ of corporate activity in the context of power relations and the distribution of resources (institutional time).

Finally, a morphogenetic social order that seeks to cultivate a meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity implicates a civil democracy. A civil democracy refers to the noted totality of social relations that enables the citizen, in the form of a societal governance, to seek the common good. The common good here being a social link for individuals to develop capacities for flourishing and to contribute to relations that sustain and govern relations from which the good of the individual is maintained. A societal governance, in reflexive arrangements, relates to a morphogenetic social order in which a deep citizenship is cultivated. In this deep citizenship, emergent interactive dynamics become the site of a lived solidarity, in which transformative practices reference personal ends. Thus, as Donati (2014)

\(^{15}\) A differentiation between systemic and social reflexivity is in continuity with a social domain analysis. It understands the nature of reflexivity considering the irreducible properties of different social domains. Here space and time are important properties in the relation between different domains (indexical and institutional time). Thus, increased systemic reflexivity is understood, dialectically, in reference to increased personal and social reflexivity, as the manner personal and social reflexivity intersect bears on systemic properties and its differentiation. If we take indexical and institutional properties of social ontology, then the reflexivity of corporate actors (‘We’) is distinguished from that of the individual actors (personal reflexivity). While both personal and collective reflexivity are relational (at the personal level, the meta-reflexive being complementary to the collective reflexivity of the corporate actor), the corporate actor’s activity is directed at the common good and the generation of relational goods from which both individuals and social groups depend (social reflexivity). This way personal reflexivity, as an aspect of personal identity, through adopting the role of a corporate actor, is oriented towards the arrangements from which a system reflexivity dialectically emerges.
argues, a civil democracy sets out a distinct direction different to economic, political and social democracy:

Civil democracy (as distinct from economic, political, and social democracy) is the form of societal governance that pursues the common good not as a state of things, nor as a sum or aggregation of single goods, nor as a super-ordinated reality, but as the totality of those conditions of social life that allow groups, as well as their individual members, to achieve their own perfection more fully and quickly through the creation of relational goods. (Donati 2014: 108)

7.5 Contextual applications: Higher Education & the curriculum

In this section the aim is to propose contextual applications for an alternative relational policy direction. First, the question raised is if a relational view of the citizen is compatible with policy models that aim to triangulate between a \textit{homo economicus} and \textit{homo sociologicus} conception of the citizen. Second, in contrast to existing approaches, how does a societarian reflexivity, in the context of a morphogenetic social order, affect specific higher education policies and practices. In answering the second question, both the curriculum and assessment will be areas explored as concrete examples.

In reference to the first question, a relational understanding of personhood is incompatible with existing policy models of the person. There is a qualitative difference in the mode of reflexivity envisaged in a \textit{homo relatus} view of the person and those incentivised in hegemonic policy and practice. A relational understanding is grounded in a reflexive re-orientation to personal ends and this necessitates a meta–reflexive reflexivity responsive to difference and its emergent conditions of possibility. In contrast, as noted, both \textit{homo economicus} and \textit{homo sociologicus} – or a syncretism of both – necessitate impersonal ends. As demonstrated in previous chapters, a triangulation of these views of personhood implicate an aspirational ethos towards impersonal sanctioned goods (\textit{homo}...
economicus) and the conditions in which regulated actors access these goods (homo sociologicus). Instead of a reasoned deliberation on the nature of relational goods, the citizen is in a defined relation to goods that they may benefit from. Thus, the good in both conceptions, including a triangulation between these views, is directed towards impersonal ends that bypass central questions relating to fallibist practices shaped by a realist logic of transcendence.

In contrast, in the context of a broader common good – consistent with a homo relatus conception of citizenship – the generation of relational goods are directed towards personal ends. Thus, goods generated in solidarity to others – as will be demonstrated in the case of assessment practice – takes the common good as emergent from lived relations and their practices, in which goods are then available for all to derive advantage from (Donati 2012). Furthermore, policy missions and challenges are open to relational deliberation on relations and practices that seek to generate and regenerate relational goods. Thus, policy objectives do not aim to regulate and extrinsically represent the relational properties of personal and social morphogenesis. Instead, the more we know of our interactions in common material settings the better equipped we are to respond and facilitate better conditions for reciprocity.

The second question pertains to concrete practices, a societarian reflexivity and a gathered deliberation on responsive arrangements, in the context of a morphogenetic social order. Here the question relates to practices that are responsive to an interplay between personal and social histories. A morphogenetic social order considers relational differentiation – between Ego and Alter – as a point of adaptive integration (the integrative dimension of relational reason). A case application of a relational turn in educational practice is in a curriculum model and related assessment practices. In regard to curriculum planning, the evaluative aim focuses on the development of in potentia capacities (personal histories). Considering the goal of talent development (a developmental model of the curriculum), two goals are identified in the context of a morphogenetic social order—an end for which the process of educational renewal is revised (what education is for) and reflexive arrangements that deepen this value judgement in educational relations (what education is)

16 This approach is a re-working of Kelly's (2005) developmental model, in which growth (the development of capacities and powers over content) as end-state is reworked so that relational reason takes its full scope and the end of human dignity (what education is for) provides an orientation for what education is.
What education is – manifested in educational practices – integrates value judgements with conducive reflexive arrangements to enhance the learning process. The envisaged learning process is more than a mere credentialing to access scarce utilitarian goods e.g. entrance into a selective institution or certification to enter a profession. The hegemony of this route – observed in accountability measures in policy – is counter-productive to the development of student capacities and restricts learning outcomes to better choices in the context of ‘labour market demands’. Thus, we have an externalism as a curriculum model and one that uses state power to regulate education to meet government goals (Young 2008: 29). For example, as seen in chapter five, proposed government reforms in educational practices are shaped by objectives that figure outside the educational domain (what education is for). A fairness agenda is an example of an intervention at the level of education provision – interventions that are remedial measures to correct past policy failures (as seen in the case of life cycle interventions).

The learning process in a student developmental model, in contrast, views the learner as more than a recipient of sanctioned learning opportunities in a ‘something for something’ exchange. The ‘ought’ of education – what education is for – takes the student perspective in regard to the development of talents. Social arrangements (social reflexivity) is then revised to take the student perspective – a logic of transcendence – as the basis of what and how learning is assessed (Shepard 2013). The adaptive dimension of relational reason is in developing means to further the end of student development and learning in reference to what the student is doing.

However, while a referential detachment (the irreducible properties of the domain of psychobiography) defines the relation to the student it does not equate with an epistemic authority in regard to content or the types of skills necessary to engage with subject content. As Collier argues (1999), an important difference lies between metaphysical worth (the axiomatic dimension of relational reason) and the mistaken idea that equality in terms of this metaphysical worth entails an equal judgement on goods generated from work produced. Work produced is not of equal value and being rational means a capacity to draw conclusions considering the properties of an objective world:

The non-travelling of equality or inequality from person to work or from work to person is easy to defend because the work, once produced, is independent of its producer .... But there is something similar in the idea of some sociologists of knowledge that since all people are equally
rational beings, all opinions are equally rational. This rests on equivocation about the word ‘rational’. ‘Rational beings’ can be an all-or-nothing metaphysical characterisation of human beings, as in Kant. In that sense we are all equally rational beings. But we are not all equally good at evaluating evidence or deducing conclusions, nor do we all have equal access to evidence. Hence some people’s opinions about factual matters are worth more than others, and this in no way ‘travels’ to any judgement about the worth of the knower. (Collier 1999: 97–98)

Returning to the curriculum, it would be a mistake to view the developmental process as an end, rather than a broader goal to which this development should be reviewed. Thus, for example, the developmental model adopted by Kelly (2004) takes the processual development of the learner as an end-goal (the enhancement of capabilities, including all stages of human development). In attributing primacy to the developmental process, precedence is ascribed to developing the autonomy of the learner’s cognitive processes over content. However, subject content, as a product of rational beings, cannot be separated from an enhancement of subjective capabilities. Instead, there is a relationality between the intrinsic and extrinsic – the development of personal capabilities is manifested extrinsically. Here the learning environment (the domain of situated activity) anchors the learning process so that intrinsic development references an externality and acknowledges the multidimensional and differentiated nature of learning/learners. Propositional knowledge, as stated in chapter six, references the natural world and is bridged through the practical order. The qualitative nature of this bridging is affected by personal predispositions that mediate the nature an externality is navigated in the emergence of a personal identity (a differentiated cognitive continuum). Thus, higher education and practice should aim, as value judgement, to bring together an extrinsic reference (referential detachment) and the differentiated nature of intrinsic mediation.

Considering this developmental approach to the curriculum the ‘is’ of educational practice is re-thought to bring together differentiation (personal histories) with a shared subject criterion. As stated above, a relational educational environment aims to focus on the interplay between personal histories and shared content as the basis of reflexive arrangements that are responsive to student development. What follows are possible proposals that are better suited to achieve this developmental approach – the case example provided is assessment practice. The choice of assessment is in its evaluative role in the process of learning development. Therefore, educational practice is significantly informed by the planning of assessment and the role of assessment in the broader purposes of an educational process and an evaluation of the learning process itself. In regard to
assessment practice two main issues are raised – first, is the central question on the evaluative purpose of assessment and the manner a relational turn informs this purpose. Second, following from the evaluative purpose of assessment, the question turns to assessment practices that may complement a developmental approach to the curriculum:

(1) The ‘ought’ of assessment: The first issue is an extension of the ‘is/ought’ problematic noted earlier in the chapter. Here the question is what assessment seeks to evaluate – it points to the purpose of educational programs and what they seek to achieve. If the aim is to develop the tendential capacities of students, then this implicates assessment strategies in higher education. For example, should assessment practice be used as a selective measure to select the ‘best’ students for admittance into institutions? Post-admission is the objective to grade and credential students to meet the demands of employers and the labour market? Thus, what assessment ‘is’ cannot be abstracted from its evaluative purpose i.e. ‘ought’. As stated, higher education policy devises a view of the person and consistent objectives for education. Consequently, assessment is an important dimension in what higher education aims to achieve in regard to learning and behavioural outcomes.

In the case of a developmental model, assessment aims to develop the capacities of students, considering differentiated personal histories (including personal pre-dispositions discussed in chapter six). Assessment practice takes a relational turn in which provision – referencing the axiomatic dimension of relational reason – seeks to integrate instrumental means and the institutionalised dimensions of situated activity in ways that advance the educational mission of higher education. The mission here is informed by the common good – shared reflexive arrangements that allows all social actors to fulfil their potential capacities. Thus, the mission of higher education is to assist all students to fulfil their potential and for educators and administrators to revise their practices in accordance to this mission. Student development, in this context, defines the nature of academic ‘excellence’ and the validity of assessment strategies (Astin & Antonio 2012). Learning outcomes, therefore, do not refer to extrinsic policy agendas or institutional goals. Extrinsic objectives, abstracted from student development, entail a neglect of personal learnings ends for extrinsically defined outcomes (an existing impersonal ‘ought’ that defines the objectives of assessment).

(2) What learning outcomes should be cultivated and how? If assessment methods – the instrumental means of a relational reason – necessarily advance an evaluative purpose, whether implicitly or explicitly, then the question is what learning outcomes should be evaluated and how. Specifically, in what way does a
*homo relatus* conception of personhood implicate alternative assessment methods and practices? Further, as will be clarified, the methods adopted to evaluate the work of students is organically tied to broader issues in higher education such as research, teaching performance and funding. In terms of an evaluative purpose, learning outcomes should be viewed, as stated, in terms of personal development. This means a re-orientation of assessment practice to the specificity of the learner, in which the validity of assessment is viewed considering the efficacy of assessment for student learning.

Here we distinguish – considering learning outcomes – between conceptual outcomes and outcome measures. The former is the perspective of the student and their progress that provides a reference point for outcome measures (Astin & Antonio 2012). Thus, we may have similar assessment measures but the goals in setting these outcomes measures and their application differs when we consider conceptual outcomes. Outcome measures, on the other hand, are directed towards the best means to measure personal development – the *how* of assessment. Different students are at different stages of development and whose singularity may be better suited to certain forms of assessment. When the question of *how* we assess is posed this way, we then make salient the unique backgrounds of learners and their subjective trajectory (the properties of the domain of psychobiography). Thus, two issues follow when we consider the best means to document learning – the conceptual outcome that references student development and an outcome measure that aims to synergise differentiated developmental trajectories with shared subject content.

The argument proposed here is against norm-referenced assessment – in the case of norm referenced assessment we have de-differentiation in assessment under the pretext of equanimity. In universalised norm referenced assessment, in which grading is relativised, considering the performance of other students, the student is graded against pre-defined impersonal outcomes. What follows are forms of assessment – whether summative or formative – that neglect personalised learning trajectory, including the efficacy of assessment in reference to this personalised trajectory. Instead, criterion referenced assessment is better suited to personalist ends and advancing student learning. The advantage of criterion referenced assessment is that it sets standards for content mastery and acknowledges an epistemic authority to the subject matter without compromising the agentic authority of the learner. Both better prepared and less prepared students are assessed to the same standards but the time scale and means of assessment may differ.
In terms of assessment practice, outcome measures, in how they are designed, may be used to either enhance or neglect personalised conceptual outcomes. Consequently, examples of assessment strategies provided below should be understood in the context of alternative relational educational practices that are responsive to a student’s developmental trajectory (the axiomatic dimension of relational reason). Thus, these same assessment strategies – the Adaptive dimension of relational reason – may be utilised for different conceptual outcomes (the ought of assessment practice). Here the difference is in an objective to re-think the conceptual outcomes of assessment (the ought of assessment) so that the axiomatic dimension – recognized in the specificity of student development – shapes the application of assessment strategies. Again, we return to the nature of the social link – the common good – that defines the nature of practices and the manner they are applied in referential detachment to student development.

Re-thinking the value dimension of higher education practice in terms of the common good, as stated, means practices are not reduced either to individual preference or societal regulation (homo economicus and homo sociologicus). Instead, it resides in arrangements organised to advance a civil democracy and the conditions of solidarity. The development of the student is part of these arrangements; hence, higher education provides relational goods that are available to all. In this context, institutions adopt a logic of transcendence in which educational provision is not distributed as a scarce good designed for better prepared students. Whatever stage of development, higher education provision should aim to adapt to the student’s personal pre-dispositions and stage of development. The notion of higher education with personal ends is not only incompatible with previously covered hegemonic policy models but also traditional views of ‘excellence’ in a ‘reputation and resources’ view of provision (Astin & Antonio 2012; Astin 2016). In a ‘reputation and resources’ approach to assessment, selective institutions compete for better prepared students and funding, with excellence defined in terms of what institutions do and the resources they attract to further research. Cyclically this approach is intended to enhance institutional reputation to attract ‘better’ students and further funding.

The focus in a ‘reputation and resources’ approach is, therefore, re-oriented to the institution, rather than the good of student development. An orientation towards instrumental goals – whether in meeting a work-skills gap or a logic of institutional acquisitiveness – leads to a view of assessment as primarily intended to judge learning. This is the case as learning is set-up for given impersonal ends, before or post-entry into higher education and outcomes are intended to further institutional or governance policies and practices. What follows is an imposed
scarcity in which education is an opportunity to enhance employability in a competitive workplace or a norm-referenced credentialing in which some are set-up to 'succeed'. In contrast, education for all – a relational good – is tied to relationships in which the good of the learner is set-out in reciprocal relations. Relations – in this alternative higher education context – ties personal and social histories to advance a morphogenetic social order that is oriented to reciprocal relations in which all students are set-up to develop, in reference to their personal learning histories. Further, there is no necessary compromise in learning standards in a re-orientation to student development as this does not compromise ‘excellence’ in regard to standards but re-articulates ‘excellence’ so that it is responsive to what students do to meet subject standards. Instead of a pre-supposing definition of what is a culture of ‘success’ (as noted in chapter five), resources and funding are not artificially sanctioned and distributed but pertain to reflexive arrangements and interactive dynamics in which institutions co-operate on pedagogical practices, subject content, types of courses and assessment. Considering this alternative view of higher education policy and practice, below are examples of assessment practices and the manner these practices – a relational rationality – advance the Latent dimension of relational reason:

(a) Greater reliance on narrative evaluation: Narrative evaluation is part of an iterative mentoring process in which teachers and peers provide detailed feedback to meet the specific stage of development of a learner. Narrative evaluation – whether supplementing or replacing grading – is developed specifically to identify strengths and possible improvements for specific learners, including what students need to do to develop (Astin & Antonio 2012). Greater reliance on narrative evaluation is a complementary means in the context of a sustainable assessment that monitors the developmental trajectory of a student. Specifically, it is based on a differentiation between an assessment of learning and an assessment for learning (Boud & Solder 2016). Assessment for learning aims to generate the independence of the learner to then be capable – in the long term – to judge their own work and identify areas to develop. Reflexive learners are then in a better position to identify what may need further development and for teachers to then assist the learner with subject skills to make the required transition. Gradually, through mentoring, the goal is to equip the learner to self-assess their learning in what needs to be done to further their development.

Narrative based assessment strategies, therefore, are part of an iterative process to enhance the learning process and may be incorporated into a variety of pedagogical and assessment practices and strategies. Examples include peer assessment, learning portfolios and essay questions specifically designed to
develop meta-cognitive skills that promote learner independence. Further, in student/teacher partnerships, in curriculum design, assessment strategies are part of a feedback loop – a virtuous cycle – that informs possible changes to pedagogical practices and areas of development for learning. The goal is to integrate teaching into the assessment process so that it is responsive to the student and their learning. Thus, as Boud & Solder (2016) state, the process of assessment is part of a feedback loop and an active part of the curriculum to enable students to achieve learning outcomes in the context of student development:

For assessment tasks to be positioned as sustainable, the whole process of assessment must be conceived of as an active part of the curriculum to enable students to achieve particular outcomes, not just a means of ascertaining whether outcome have been achieved or not. This means that assessment needs to be consciously and holistically designed to scaffold processes of learning, including students’ management of their learning, and lead over the timescale of a course to activities that enable the demonstration of what has been learned. At early and mid-stages, there would be an emphasis on feedback processes and the building of capacity for students to make judgements of their own work. Later, the emphasis would shift to emphasise the assurance and portrayal of learning. A focus on sustainable assessment involves attention being paid to the integration of these elements and the building of capacity through all assessment acts for students to make increasingly better judgements. (Boud & Solder 2016: 407)

The aim in guiding the learner through a sustainable learning process is to enable an independent learner that is then capable of identifying their learning goals and to reference subject skills and content to realise these goals. Criterion referenced assessment is better suited for this purpose, as its makes salient content standards and contextualises learning outcomes in the context of the student’s development, aiming to build their capacity as reflexive learners.

(b) Documenting student trajectories: The objective in documenting a learning trajectory is to support the above noted assessment for learning. Through documenting a learning trajectory, there are possibilities to monitor student development over time. This may be contrasted with an assessment designed to judge the learner against universalized outcomes and in reference to other students at a particular period in time. For example, a longitudinal database of student development may be instituted from early schooling to university entrance, to document personalised development (Astin & Antonio 2012). As
higher education should aim to educate all students – regardless of point of development – then the importance of documenting student learning is part of a revision of institutional and pedagogical practices to be responsive to different personal histories.

Further, the validity of assessment methods, as an outcome measure, pertains to the manner it documents and sustains learning and thus adopted strategies for assessment should be capable of measuring assessment over time for the sake of student development. With norm referenced assessment – designed to measure learning at set periods – there is a tendency to measure outcomes but without recourse to personalised development and its iterative effect, as a causal input, in the learning process. Here the objective is to move from what is being assessed to how it is being assessed and the impact this may have on the individual learner. Outcome measures, this way, are viewed in an integrative relation to conceptual outcomes and as a means to document learning trajectories that leads to responsive assessment strategies.

(c) Differentiating outcomes measures and learning outcomes: If the goal is to assist student development in reference to subject content then this goal may be reached in different ways. As noted above, the outcome measures we select implicates how we then adopt assessment measures (Astin & Antonio 2012). The process of selection of suitable measures is pre-supposed by the conceptual question on why we choose to identify certain outcomes as important areas for assessment. Adopting personalist terms of assessment, in identifying these areas, means a return to the student in the context of an iterative assessment cycle; thus, this means both assessment means and outcomes may differ between students i.e. both outcome measures and learning outcomes are in relation of referential detachment to the student.

In terms of practical application, there are different paths in which students may reach intended cognitive and affective outcomes and curriculum design and pedagogical practice should reflect this. Hence, as each student aims to enhance their learning then outcomes pertain to where a student may be at a certain stage in their development. Further, this puts into question time scaled courses that are independent of learners and their stage of development. Subject standards may be reached through different assessment strategies and standards may be reached to different times scales. To answer which measures should be selected or developmental time scales adopted is to return to personal ends.

(d) The curriculum and student involvement: Student involvement is an important dimension in the design and implementation of the curriculum (Astin
Here advocated is a co-curricular partnership in which subject content is tailored for student learning. The perspective of the student informs curricular design so that the learner is set in an active position. Student involvement in curricular design should be viewed in an inclusive sense—envisaged is the development of mentoring partnerships to enable the development of a self-reflexive learner about their personal development. Again, the focus is on what the student does and their own personal stage of development. Incorporated here are curricular developments to include activities designed to generate initiative and active learning. Examples of interventions that may be included in course design—to encourage behavioural changes—extends to self-reflexive learning diaries, peer networking between learners at different stages of development and joint teacher-student activities. These different initiatives also aim to develop cognitive and affective outcomes. Cognitive outcomes refer to the development of specific subject skills. Affective outcome, on the other hand, are more encompassing and includes the development of behavioural outcomes such as, for example, the manner learning leads to the development of an ecumenical world-view, leadership, social responsibility and motivation for further learning (Astin & Antonio 2012: 61). Both cognitive and affective outcomes are inter-related—for example, the development of student involvement, in regard to subject learning, aims to further student motivation to reflexively monitor their own learning and what needs to be done to further this learning.\(^\text{17}\)

Importantly student involvement may be utilised to diagnosis multi-dimensional outcome measures, in collaboration with the learner. The goal, in a student involvement in the selection of appropriate assessment strategies, is to develop a self-reflexive capacity in which the student understands their stage of learning and what to do next in meeting learning standards, to advance their learning. As teaching, in this approach, is focused on what students do then teaching is re-defined, as stated above, in the form of a responsive mentoring that relies on an iterative narrative evaluation that is criterion referenced.

Further, as the mission of higher education is the education of all students then the development of pedagogical practices for learning, including the development of student motivation, are intended to encourage the under-prepared and passive student. Consequently, student involvement in co-curricular partnerships is an example of higher education provision that aims to be responsive to the student

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\(^\text{17}\) Furthermore, assessment practice designed to develop both cognitive and affective outcomes plays a part in the development of a meta-reflexive subjectivity. Here the inclusion of behavioural outcomes re-orient learning towards the generation of relational goods and subjectivities that sustain these goods.
Finally, a relational direction for higher education aims to place the student at the heart of the system. However, affirming a referential detachment to the person (the realisation of human dignity) re-directs the centrality of the student from a rhetorical acknowledgement, pre-supposed by impersonal ends of given policy agendas, to one that aims to articulate fallibilist practices responsive to student development. If we return to Donati’s model of relational reason, two distinct approaches may be contrasted – first, in higher education policy, as seen in chapter five, there is an appropriation of the integrative dimension of an AGIL scheme through governance goals (power and achievement of goals i.e. goal oriented rationality). Second, the relational turn takes the integrative dimension – reflexive arrangements – to be grounded in the axiomatic dimension. Reflexive arrangements (subsidiarity), therefore, informed by a transcendental realism, acknowledges the personal properties of student development as the basis of a relational rationality. Therefore, two central points may be posited in regard to a broader approach to higher education provision:

(1) The primacy of the singular: Primacy is ascribed to the singular – the basis of a homo relatus conception of the citizen. The singular – in a relational context – is the basis of higher education relations and relational concerns emergent from the context of provision is transformed in solidarity to this singular (the properties of the domain of psychobiography). It is the interactive dimensions of the domain of situated activity that anchors the process of social morphogenesis in which a mission of education for all – in referential detachment to student development – establishes the normative expectations and resources of an adaptive higher education. As noted earlier in the chapter, specificity is the normative problem of policy.

(2) A co-operative ‘system’ approach: A co-operative ‘system’ approach is opposed to both an artificially imposed scarcity in regard to educational goods and an acquisitive institutional logic. This co-operative ‘system’ approach, as Astin (2016) argues, seeks to develop an institutional infrastructure that shares promising approaches to develop student learning at different levels of preparation. The totality of higher education relations – in a mission to educate all students – are designed to enhance the common good through this exchange of relational goods. Further, in a relational reflexivity, there is an a-symmetry in the development of practices to advance the learning of under-prepared students. Here the
common good of higher education belongs to all participants and is not something sanctioned or regulated through impersonal ends.

Concluding Remarks

This chapter sought to propose an alternative policy direction and the possible applications of this direction in higher education practice. First, a justification was offered on a relational understanding between an external value judgement and internal social scientific practice. Here an argument was made on the necessity of an external value judgement – in continuity with a necessity of a transcendental reasoning – but one that is an immanent relation to internal practice. Thus, this transcendental realism implicates an ontological grounding for an external value judgement in the types of concerns different orders are dispositioned to generate. What follows is a relational dialogue between reason and value in which there is an immanent interplay between normativity and ontology and this entails educational practices that are defined in referential detachment to relations that define the material and non-material good of persons.

The common good is the glue that binds this interplay between normativity and ontology. If solidarity is understood as a re-orientation of relations and practices so they are sensitive to the ontological properties of the objective Other, then reflexive arrangements (subsidiarity) aims to sustain these relations and the glue that brings persons together. It is the common good that links solidarity with subsidiarity and provides meaning and purpose to their relation; it is in this relation that there is a deep citizenship understood in the context of a Civil Democracy. In this Civil Democracy the focus is on sustaining relational goods, in a mutually reinforcing relation between primary and secondary relational goods. Relational goods, in contrast to utilitarian goods that are sanctioned and distributed, are defined by personalist objectives. In this environment, provision aims to educate all, in reference to the development of each learner.

Examples of relational goods were provided in a student development model of the curriculum. In a developmental model of the curriculum, relational goods inhere, in the examples provided, in assessment practices (what and how learning is assessed) that reference the learner's development. Thus, validity of assessment is defined in reference to the value dimension of conceptual outcomes (the ought of educational provision). In terms of a relational reason, assessment strategies are instrumental means that are interconnected and shaped by the Latent (L) dimension of a relational reason. Consequently, the aim is to adopt appropriate outcome measures – the Adaptive (A) dimension of relational reason – in ways that reference student development in complementary reflexive arrangements.
Further, certain strategies, in their design and application, are more compatible and complement personal learning trajectories (assessment for learning). Narrative based assessment, documenting student developmental trajectories and student participation in curriculum design are all examples of strategies and paths – a relational rationality – that, in their design, focus on what students do to meet subject criteria; again, it is what students do that defines the validity of assessment strategies.
Concluding Remarks

The thesis started with an overview of attempts at articulating a policy vision that focused on the social as a corrective measure, in achieving pre-given policy objectives. Setting a precedent, New Labour, attempted to transcend what was viewed as the policies of the old Left and New Right through advocating a third way that reconciles what were viewed as antagonistic policy approaches. In this third way, New Labour viewed an investment in consensual social spaces as a way of managing contingencies to meet policy outcomes. An investment in the social meant generating the right supply side condition for a provision of opportunity – integrationist policies – that would then lead to behavioural changes e.g. responsibilities that come with rights. Together the provision of opportunity and the making of subjectivities brought with it the two goal of a fairness agenda and enhanced economic performance in adapting to a changing globalised world. Workfare policies were central to New Labour's goal of generating behavioural changes in that it assumed these changes meant individuals were connected to the right social networks and claimed their stake in an economy that worked for those marginalized. The regulation of social pressures through managerial means, to meet given objectives, was an important facet of policy reforms and part of a social investment state.

The Conservative 'Big Society' agenda continued with New Labour's third way rhetoric but placed greater emphasis on a moral underclass discourse. In this moral underclass discourse, there exists a greater emphasis on a supposed dependency culture and broader normative breakdown. However, with this focus on behavioural pathologies there is also a stated commitment to a welfare beyond the state. The state, in this approach, is seen to regulate the social – similar to New Labour – to generate possible avenues that bring about required behavioural changes. Here the social – between the state and the individual – provides the right environment for individuals and communities to help themselves. In terms of welfare provision what is advocated is an enabling state that assists and provides the required know-how and tools to sustain a process view of welfare co-production. The integrationist turn, therefore, appears in an attempt to utilise this re-thinking of welfare provisions so that it brings about holistic changes in communities and individuals. A posited holistic change is seen in advocating an ownership of provision so that there is a bottom-up accountability, individual choice and competition. Devolved power also comes with a re-structuring of choice context, so that individuals value the right choices and are self-dependent in their ownership of these devolved powers. The idea of nudges is an example of an intervention in the citizen’s decision context in which there is an effort to incentivise...
certain behavioural paths in both individual choices but also in incentivising an ownership of provision (a Libertarian Welfarism).

The noted policy overview of governance models demonstrated the existence of a view of the citizen as person. Consistent with third way thinking there is an attempted reconciliation between the strategic subjectivity of homo economicus and the socially regulated subjectivity of homo sociologicus. In homo economicus there is an attempt to generate the self-dependent citizen that when provided with the right know-how and tools for advancement – or social mobility – is then able to claim their stake and make the right choices. Thus, for example, student choice in the context of competition between institutions is highlighted in higher education provision. Homo sociologicus, on the other hand, represents the socially regulated citizen. In regulating social roles there is an attempt to engineer the infrastructure of provision so that the terms of exchange of individual choices are pre-defined. In different ways, both New Labour and the ‘Big Society’ agenda attempted to synthesise both views of the person in ways that were consistent with their broader policy vision.

A textual analysis of ‘Higher Education: Students at the Heart of the System’ demonstrated continuity with policy themes discussed in chapter three. Higher education provision was viewed as part of a fairness agenda in which it offered access to labour markets and enables social mobility. This emphasis on providing work-based skills was seen in the regulation of higher education provision in a shaping of relations between universities, businesses and student needs. The regulation of provision, including its relations and practices, put the needs of businesses and economic performance first and it was for universities to provide a service responsive to the needs of the wider economy. Further, the needs of the students, rhetorically activated, were viewed in terms of gaining the right work related skills. The acquisition of right skills was part of a fairness agenda – returning to the theme of policy triangulation – and aimed to enhance social mobility and the access of strategic resources in relevant social networks. This higher education infrastructure sets the terms of exchange (homo sociologicus) in which strategic styles of subjectivity are then enacted (homo economicus).

The final two chapters of the thesis are organically tied and attempted to articulate an alternative policy vision based on a homo relatus conception of personhood. First, chapter six sought to propose and justify a realist view of personhood. The argument presented set-out to tackle necessary questions that all theoretical accounts of personhood consider, whether implicitly or explicitly. The account of personhood starts with a justification of a transcendental reasoning and specifically the use of a transcendental realist underlabourer to articulate an ontology of personhood and the conditions of its possibility. The basis of this transcendental realism was identified in a referential detachment that affirms the latent model of an object. The latent model of an object establishes the possibility of reference but whose terms are fallibist and open to revision. Thus, the argument follows that personhood is a possible point of reference.
In accounting for the conditions of possibility of an emergent personhood personal identity the question then moves to the nature of transmission of collective discursive objects and the mechanisms that facilitate this transmission. Empirically the working of mirror neurons substantiates a realist distinction between the irreducible powers of subjectivity and those of collective objects. Both of these dimensions, in an analytical dualism, are acknowledged.

The interplay between the irreducible powers of the subjective and objective then implicates questions on the properties of an internal deliberation – in how we understand personal emergent properties – and the manner the societal enters these deliberations and the manner a personal identity responds and then adopts to a certain personal identity. In investigating these questions revisions were proposed, in which the properties of the domain of psychobiography were viewed as a mediatory factor, in differentiated multiverse social universe, rather than the link in the subjective/objective interplay. Here the goal is to distinguish between the internal deliberations of individuals, including their psychobiography, from the institutional features of the social and the collective reflexivity of corporate actors. Further, the necessity of a reflexive consciousness, preparing us for our social becoming, is questioned. Instead, the enactment of a reflexive capacity is understood in developmental terms and in reference to the properties of the domain of psychobiography. The idea of a cognitive continuum empirically substantiates this revision and views the interaction between different mechanisms – developmentally – as the basis of differentiated singularities. Importantly, the properties of the domain of psychobiography establishes the latent model of personal ends; it is the latent model of personal ends that will then be acknowledged as the basis of transformative and fallibist educational practices.

Chapter seven takes the themes discussed in the previous chapter to then present a realist turn in policy. First, it is argued that an ‘ought’ may be derived from an ‘is’ and that distinct ontological orders (natural, practical and discursive) are dispositioned to generate certain concerns that need to be subjectively navigated. Thus, an interplay between normativity and ontology implicates an inherent relationality between external and internal value judgements. It was argued that the relationality of emergence of a personal identity, in reference to distinct ontological orders, implicates personal ends that are responsive to this interplay and in reference to the domain of psychobiography (the basis of singularities). Accordingly, solidarity to difference requires complementary reflexive social arrangements that are not extrinsically regulated through pre-given impersonal governance agendas.

The link between solidarity and subsidiarity is defined by the common good. The common good, different to utilitarian goods, is the social link that connects people together. It is the totality of social relations that are structured to advance the end of human dignity and figures in fallibist arrangements that seeks to integrate difference that defines human dignity. Here relational rights mean a recognition of the rights of
ontological difference in the integration of the Adaptive dimension (A) and Goal oriented rationality of relational reason. In this integration supply side interventions are highlighted in ways that are responsive to this difference (the Latent (L) dimension of relational reason). The notion of a deep citizenship is part of supply side interventions, in which a meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity is incentivised. The meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity directs their personal deliberations to the efficacy of social arrangements in deepening the Latent (L) dimension of relational reason.

Finally, contextual examples were provided in the form of a developmental model of the curriculum and the validity of assessment practices were defined in what students do and how student learning relates to their development. The ‘ought’ of assessment practice then shapes assessment strategies and how they are applied (the ‘is’ of assessment). The personal history of the student – in a referential detachment to the properties of the domain of psychobiography – shapes how we assess learning. Further, being responsive to personal histories does not mean a neglect of learning standards. Rather, the objective is to educate all students and to develop learning standards in reference to the stage of personal student development. Thus, education provision is not viewed as an impersonal scarce good that is distributed to the largest possible number of individuals. Instead, it is a relational good that is intrinsically responsive to personal difference.
Glossary of Key Terms

**Policy Triangulation:** Policy triangulation is a policy approach that attempts to reconcile two positions that may be viewed in antagonistic terms. In attempting to reconcile different positions the positive features of each position are highlighted and brought together in ways that create a new synthesis and third way (Alderwick 2012).

**Modality & Evaluation:** Fairclough defines modality in terms of what authors of a text commit themselves to when making statements, asking questions or making demands (Fairclough 2003: 165). Markers of modality in a text point to levels commitments. Evaluation is tied to modality in that it refers to the ways authors, whether explicitly or implicitly, commit themselves to values i.e. statements of desirability and undesirability (Fairclough 2003: 171)

**Interdiscursivity:** Interdiscursivity refers to the ways a mixture of genres, discourses and styles – order of discourse – are articulated in a text. Fairclough views interdiscursive analysis to mediate between the linguistic analysis of text and the level of social events and practices that articulation of orders of discourse refer to (Fairclough 2003).

**Intertextuality:** Intertextuality points to the manner a text refers to other texts and the manner these texts are referred to e.g. are they dialogued with or rejected (Fairclough 2003).

**Genre Chains:** Genre chains refers to the ways genres are linked together and the ways this linking figure as part of the semiotic aspects of social practice. Thus, the way different genres are linked and articulated together point to ways meanings are generated in a re-contextualisation of genres from one context to another. If a genre, for example, pertaining to business practice – e.g. consumer feedback – is selectively appropriated in public service provision then this implicates questions on the meanings that are filtered in this linking of different genres (Fairclough 2003: 31-33).

**Philosophical/Substantive ontology:** Philosophical ontology, or an account of being, asks ontological questions on the nature of the world that makes scientific practice possible. It derives its premises from scientific conditions of practice to then postulate transcendental arguments that answer philosophical questions on the nature of the world that makes an object a possible point of investigation (Bhaskar 2008: 26). While a philosophical ontology acts as a philosophical underlabourer on what the world must be like for scientific practice to be intelligible, substantive ontology refers to tools developed to investigate the structures of the object studied.
Double/Triple Morphogenesis: Double morphogenesis relates to the process of interplay between the properties and powers of the subject and object. In this interplay, Personal Emergent Properties (PEP) deliberate on the powers of objective positions, with the goal of reaching a subjective alignment (the emergence of a personal identity) to then adopt a social identity. In the first instance, the ‘I’ deliberates on its natal context (‘Me’); here the response may lead to reproducing this content or seeking to change its properties in some way in the emergence of a personal identity (‘You’). An attempt to change the properties of the natal context (Primary Agent) may be identified in the dissatisfaction of an ‘I’ in regard to its natal context; what follows is an identification with the role of the Corporate Agent (‘We’). If the subject adopts corporate action then, in this instance, “agency leads to structural and cultural elaboration, but is itself elaborated in the process” (Archer 2000: 258). Triple morphogenesis refers to an extension of double morphogenesis in which persons adopt the role of Corporate Agents and with this transform the objective properties of social roles that actors occupy.

Analytical Dualism: Analytical dualism acknowledges the distinction between subjective and objective dimensions of social life and analyses their interplay as irreducible emergent properties. Here the goal is to investigate this interplay without conflating the irreducible properties of the subjective and objective. The process of morphogenesis is an explanatory model in which the noted interplay is investigated as cycles in which personal emergent properties interplay with structural and cultural emergent ones and thus lead to the elaboration of both.

Transitive/Intransitive: The transitive dimension refers to fallibist knowledge, at a given time, in regard to the nature of the world. The aim of transitive knowledge is to arrive at better approximations of the object investigated. The object investigated, being the basis of fallibist theories, exists independently of current theories. The intransitive dimension, therefore, is the nature of an object investigated that exists independently of current theories. Progressive transitive theories aim to deepen its understanding of the intransitive dimension (Collier 1994).

Meta-reflexive: Archer (2012) identifies four modes of reflexivity – communicative, autonomous, meta-reflexive and fractured reflexivity. In the communicative mode of reflexivity “internal conversations need to be confirmed and completed by others before they lead to action” (Archer 2012: 13). In contrast, in the autonomous mode of reflexivity “internal conversations are self-contained, leading directly to action” (Archer 2012: 13). The meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity is one in which “internal conversations critically evaluate previous inner dialogues and are critical about effective action in society”. Finally, in a fractured reflexivity internal conversations “cannot lead to purposeful courses of action, but intensify personal distress and disorientation resulting in expressive action.” (Archer 2012: 13). The meta-reflexive mode of reflexivity is
viewed to be harmonious with a relational view of the citizen in a critical
dispositionality towards primary relational goods and if the context of these
goods (secondary relational goods) deepen the Latent dimension of relation
reason.

**Referential Detachment:** The notion of referential detachment, adopted from
Bhaskar, is the procedure in which when we refer to our external environment;
when we refer to this externality it is necessary to referentially detach from the
object to then understand it. The detachment of the act of reference from that
which it refers to, argues Bhaskar, establishes an existential separation between
the referential act and referent, if the referent is to be intelligible and open to
discursive articulation (Bhaskar 2000).

**Domain of Psychobiography:** The domain of psychobiography is the basis of
what makes us singularities. It consists of a unique subjective trajectory of lived
experiences; the basis of this unique trajectory is an interaction between
irreducible personal emergent properties and external circumstances. What
results from this interaction is an individuated subjective configuration of
experiences – emergent from our relations with our environment – and
grounded in the vantage point of the self and the characteristics defined by this
trajectory. Thus, we confront the social with unique backgrounds that are
irreducible to the objective dimensions of the social world (Layder 2006).

**Generative Mechanism:** In critical realism generative mechanisms are identified
as the latent model of the object; according to Bhaskar it is the way of acting of a
thing (Bhaskar 2008). This way of acting is understood as the powers of an object
that are independent of perceived events that it may generate. Thus, generative
mechanisms, as causal powers, are existentially separate from events and
patterns of events (Collier 1994).

**Relational Reason:** Relation reason is based on Donati’s (2014) adaptation of
Parson’s AGIL model. Donati adapts this model as an orientation of action, rather
than a fixed theory. First, there is the Adaptive dimension that relates to
instrumental means. Second, is Goal oriented rationality that relates to political
power and the achievement of definite targets. Third, is the Integrative
dimension (I) that relates to a process in which both the Adaptive dimension and
Goal oriented rationality are linked to advance the Latent dimension (L) of
relation reason. The Latent dimension is the value end of a relational rationality
i.e. the Integrative dimension of relational reason. Specifically, the Latent
dimension references the end of human dignity (the end of human dignity is
declared in a solidarity to the ontological properties of difference).

**Norm & Criterion referenced assessment:** Criterion referenced assessment
aims to measure learning outcomes based on the place of a learner in reference
to given subject standards. Norm referenced assessment, on the other hand,
aims to measure student learning in reference to a larger cohort of students (Petty 2009).


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