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Third-party Manipulation of Conflict: An Experiment

Evdokimov, P and Garfagnini, Umberto (2017) Third-party Manipulation of Conflict: An Experiment Experimental Economics, 21 (1). pp. 27-49.

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We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with private information sends a public message to two con icting players, who then make their choices. We nd that third-party communication is not strategic. Nevertheless, a hawkish message by a third party makes hawkish behavior more likely while a dovish message makes it less likely. Moreover, how subjects respond to the message is largely una ected by the third party's incentives. We argue that our results are consistent with a focal point interpretation in the spirit of Schelling.

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Economics
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
Date : 16 March 2017
Identification Number : 10.1007/s10683-017-9523-6
Copyright Disclaimer : The final publication is available at Springer via
Uncontrolled Keywords : Third-party communication, experiment, con ict game
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 21 Mar 2017 17:17
Last Modified : 12 Feb 2018 09:16

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