University of Surrey

Test tubes in the lab Research in the ATI Dance Research

Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand

Gershkov, A, Moldovanu, B and Strack, P (2016) Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand Management Science.

[img] Text
markov53.pdf - Accepted version Manuscript
Restricted to Repository staff only

Download (587kB)
[img]
Preview
Text (licence)
SRI_deposit_agreement.pdf
Available under License : See the attached licence file.

Download (33kB) | Preview

Abstract

A designer allocates several indivisible objects to a stream of randomly arriving agents. The long-lived agents are privately informed about their value for an object, and about their arrival time to the market. The designer learns about future arrivals from past arrivals, while agents strategically choose when to make themselves available for trade. We characterize revenue maximizing direct mechanism and offer a simple indirect mechanism that captures a substantial part of the revenues of the revenue maximizing mechanism.

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Economics
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
AuthorsEmailORCID
Gershkov, AUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Moldovanu, BUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Strack, PUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : 2016
Copyright Disclaimer : Copyright © 2016, INFORMS
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 09 Nov 2016 11:48
Last Modified : 16 Nov 2016 16:19
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/812799

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year


Information about this web site

© The University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom.
+44 (0)1483 300800