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A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college

Muuls, M and Petropoulou, D (2013) A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college Canadian Journal of Economics, 46 (2). pp. 705-724.

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Abstract

This paper analyzes trade policy determination in the Electoral College in the presence of swing voters. It determines the circumstances under which incumbent politicians have an incentive to build a reputation for protectionism, thus swaying voting decisions and improving their re-election probability. Strategic trade protection is shown to be more likely when protectionist swing voters have a lead over free trade supporters in states with relatively strong electoral competition and in states representing a larger proportion of Electoral College votes. An empirical test using a measure of industrial concentration in swing and decisive U.S. states lends support to the theoretical findings.

Item Type: Article
Subjects : Economics
Divisions : Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Authors :
NameEmailORCID
Muuls, MUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Petropoulou, DUNSPECIFIEDUNSPECIFIED
Date : May 2013
Identification Number : 10.1111/caje.12029
Copyright Disclaimer : Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Related URLs :
Depositing User : Symplectic Elements
Date Deposited : 20 Sep 2016 13:23
Last Modified : 31 Oct 2017 18:44
URI: http://epubs.surrey.ac.uk/id/eprint/812244

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